





































isparchitecture.com

CONTESTING WITTGENSTEIN”S 
REMARKS ON ARCHITECTURE

JOCHEN SCHUFF

As the general concern of  this journal issue is 
the relevance of  Wittgenstein’s thinking for the 
philosophy of  architecture, I will take the task 
quite literally. Accordingly, the aim of  my paper is 
to explore whether there is evidence for systematic 
ideas about architecture in Wittgenstein. Reading 
Culture and Value, it may well seem as if  architecture 
ranked among the subjects Wittgenstein did think 
about—at least from time to time. I will provide 
some context concerning the status of  these 
remarks—as well as that of  some others not 
included in Culture and Value—in Wittgenstein’s 
work.

All things considered, there is not much to be 
found in Wittgenstein’s writing concerning the 
arts or aesthetics in general. There are, to be sure, 
some editions of  student’s notes of  lectures on the 
subject of  aesthetics [1], and numerous opinions 
reported in correspondences and biographies, 
but only a few remarks devoted to art both in 
the single book Wittgenstein published in his 
lifetime, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and among the 
20,000 pages of  text he left in his Nachlass. Most 
of  these remarks contain reflections about music, 
especially musical meaning and understanding. In 
relation, there is even less Wittgenstein specifically 
wrote on the subject of  architecture. The fact 
may be striking, since Wittgenstein, while having 
temporarily abandoned philosophy, famously took 
part in designing and building the city mansion for 
his sister Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein in 
Kundmanngasse, Vienna, between 1926 and 1928. 
He even considered himself  an architect by trade 

All things 
considered, 

there is not 
much to 

be found in 
Wittgenstein’s 

writing 
concerning 

the arts or 
aesthetics in 

general.

“

”



AP . vol 2 . No 2 . 2017

124

SC
HU

FF

during this period.

There is much to be said, and in fact much has been said about 
Wittgenstein’s architectural practice, but I do not intend to contribute to 
that discussion [2]. Nor will I make reference to the frequent metaphors 
from the realm of  building that Wittgenstein makes use of, for instance 
in the Philosophical Investigations or in On Certainty. In my mind, the parallels 
between Wittgenstein’s activity as an architect and his being a philosopher, 
or between his architecture and his philosophy, are often overstated. 
Compared to Nana Last’s reading of  the Kundmanngasse house as a 
bridging between different spatialities in Wittgenstein’s thought or Roger 
Paden’s interpretation of  the house as a manifestation of  mysticism, 
there are more modest proposals. In a recent reevaluation of  the links 
between the house and Wittgenstein’s philosophy, for instance, David 
Macarthur nonetheless refers to Wittgenstein’s “ideas” or “reflections” 
on architecture, drawing on Culture and Value [3]. On closer inspection, 
though, most of  the ideas are actually Adolf  Loos’, serving Macarthur 
as a matrix of  interpretation for Wittgenstein’s own remarks. My aim, 
instead, is to focus exclusively on what Wittgenstein actually wrote about 
the subject of  architecture, and to determine the philosophical status of  
these remarks in their own right.

In the first section of  my paper, I will present a survey of  more or 
less everything Wittgenstein specifically (in the strict sense) wrote about 
architecture. Most of  these remarks, it will turn out, are no more than 
sketches or rough ideas. Some of  them belong to the context of  art or 
aesthetics as Wittgenstein conceived of  it. This connection will be discussed 
in the second section. In other cases, Wittgenstein uses architecture as an 
object of  analogy, or comparison. In the third section, a commentary on 
one remark comparing architectural to philosophical practice is provided. 
Section IV will conclude that the value of  Wittgenstein’s remarks 
read as contributions to a philosophy of  architecture is limited; while 
Wittgenstein’s broader reflections on aesthetics are significant in terms of  
content and method, if  often neglected, the same cannot be said of  the 
scattered paragraphs on architecture [4].

I

In his early writings, Wittgenstein virtually does not mention architecture 
at all. As far as we can tell, it is only after having finished the house in 
Kundmanngasse that he starts to write down thoughts about architecture, 
but there are usually long stretches of  time in between. In 1930, he notes: 
“Today the difference between a good & a poor architect consists in the 



125

isparchitecture.com

fact that the poor architect succumbs to every 
temptation while the good one resists it” [5]. In 
this aphoristic remark, we are given no hint as to 
what kind of  temptation Wittgenstein could have 
in mind, or what the difference between a good 
and a poor architect could have been before today. 
We can only guess whether Wittgenstein is thinking 
of  someone or something particular here. Shortly 
after, there is some criticism of  contemporary 
architecture (as an expression of  a culture and 
civilization alien to the author) in the “Sketch for 
a Foreword” dating from the same year, probably 
written for the Big Typescript [6]. Both comments 
can be read as fragments of  criticism, rather than 
theory. In contrast, a recurrent aesthetic concept is 
introduced in 1933; Wittgenstein notes: “Remember 
the impression made by good architecture, that it 
expresses a thought. One would like to respond to 
it too with a gesture” [7]. Consequently, in 1938, 
in a rather sketchy remark, Wittgenstein tentatively 
thinks about, “Phenomena akin to language in 
music or architecture” [8]. Then, in 1942, the motive 
of  gesture becomes explicit again: “Architecture 
is a gesture. Not every purposive movement of  
the human body is a gesture. Just as little as every 
functional building is architecture” [9]. Here, the 
link between architecture and gestures seems even 
closer. Moreover, Wittgenstein seems to draw a 
distinction between mere building and architecture, 
the distinction being that architecture is a gesture, 
while mere building is not. In a remark existing in 
several variations, he writes in 1947: “Architecture 
glorifies something (because it endures). Hence 
there can be no architecture where there is nothing 
to glorify” [10]. One alternative version mentions 
gestures, too; it reads: “Architecture glorifies 
something because it is a gesture which endures. It 
glorifies its purpose” [11]. Taking up, perhaps, the 
thought that architecture is some kind of  petrified 
gesture designed with the purpose of  glorification, 
Wittgenstein writes in 1948: “A great architect in a 

We can only 
guess whether 

Wittgenstein 
is thinking of 

someone or 
something 

particular

“

”



AP . vol 2 . No 2 . 2017

126

SC
HU

FF

bad period (van der Nüll) has a quite different task from that of  a great 
architect in a good period. You must again not let yourself  be deceived 
by the generic term. Don’t take comparability, but rather incomparability, 
as a matter of  course” [12]. The bottom line in this case, however, is not 
so much aesthetic as linguistic, since Wittgenstein claims that one and the 
same allgemeine Begriffswort (“generic term”) can have two different meanings 
relative to context, so that the term great architect can attribute different 
qualities to a person depending on the cultural context she is working in. 
It is not easy to see, though, why Wittgenstein is talking about generic 
terms here; it seems rather trivial that being called a great architect can 
rest on different accomplishments, or tasks, for it evidently depends on 
aesthetic judgments. Without any context, the remark is rather mysterious; 
it would have been interesting to know what Wittgenstein takes the task of  
the great architect in a good or in a bad period to be, respectively. All we 
can assume is that Wittgenstein seems to have appreciated van der Nüll’s 
architecture (the most prominent example of  which is the Vienna State 
Opera) [13].

Almost all of  these remarks can be found in the collection Culture 
and Value. In German, the volume has been published under the more 
appropriate title Vermischte Bemerkungen, calling its content what it is: 
miscellaneous or mixed remarks, mixed not by Wittgenstein, but by his 
editors, Georg Henrik von Wright in this case. This is what they (or 
he) found worthy of  being published after almost everything remotely 
resembling a book, say, abandoned publication projects or typescripts and 
even more or less coherent manuscripts like those that have come to be 
known as On Certainty, had already been published. This is not to say that 
the remarks thus collected, including those on architecture, are not worthy 
of  attention, but that we should keep in mind that they do not constitute 
something like a book or coherent body of  text that Wittgenstein devoted 
to questions of  “culture” and “value,” let alone architecture.

Some of  the remarks on aesthetics and music included, in contrast, 
can be traced back to comparatively rich sequences of  reflections on art 
in Wittgenstein’s later manuscripts. There are good reasons for taking 
these series of  remarks to be serious, if  condensed, contributions to 
philosophical aesthetics. Joachim Schulte and Graham McFee argue 
convincingly to this effect [14]. Additionally, the published lectures can 
provide an impression of  Wittgenstein’s position in aesthetics. This holds 
even if  we leave aside the importance for aesthetics of  Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on aspect-perception in what has come to be known as the 
second part of  the Philosophical Investigations. Nothing of  this sort can 



127

isparchitecture.com

be said about Wittgenstein’s more or less isolated 
remarks on architecture.

Apart from quantity and context, another 
criterion for the importance of  a thought is the 
further use Wittgenstein is providing for it within 
his characteristic working method of  writing 
down remarks, clipping manuscripts, reassembling 
remarks, clipping again and so forth [15]. Now, 
only in a few cases did Wittgenstein copy pertinent 
remarks about architecture into typescripts. It is 
apparent that most of  these deal with the subject 
rather indirectly. The following remark from a 
1930 manuscript will reappear in the so-called 
Big Typescript: “Work on philosophy—like work in 
architecture in many respects—is really more work 
on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one 
sees things. (And what one expects of  them)” [16]. 
I will come back to these lines in the third section. 
The aforementioned remark saying architecture 
expressed a thought to which one would like to 
respond with a gesture reappears in TS 219 (which 
is part of  the process of  reworking manuscripts 
and typescripts leading from the Big Typescript to 
Philosophical Investigations) [17]. In TS 229, published 
under the title Remarks on the Philosophy of  Psychology 
I, Wittgenstein takes up the following manuscript 
note: “One employment of  the concept ‘looking in 
this direction’ is, e.g., as follows: One says, perhaps 
to an architect: ‘This distribution of  the windows 
makes the façade look in that direction.’ Similarly 
one uses the expression ‘This arm interrupts the 
movement of  the sculpture’ or ‘The movement 
should go like this’ (here one makes a gesture)” 
[18]. And, in the same typescript:

His name seems to fit his works. —How does it seem 
to fit? Well, I express myself  in some such way. —But is 
that all? —It is as if  the name together with these works, 
formed a solid whole. If  we see the name, the works come 
to mind, and if  we think of  the works, so does the name. 
We utter the name with reverence. The name turns into a 

 [the remarks] 
do not 

constitute 
something like 

a book or a 
coherent body 

of text that 
Wittgenstein 

devoted to 
questions of 

culture 
and value, 
let alone 

architecture

“

”



AP . vol 2 . No 2 . 2017

128

SC
HU

FF

gesture; into an architectonic form [19].

While both of  these remarks seem to be concerned with questions from 
the domain of  aesthetics, if  in a specifically conceptual way, architecture 
surely is not their main focus. Note that both remarks mention gestures 
(one way or the other) in the same breath as architecture.

With all of  this source material in place, first, the idea (or ideas) that 
architecture is a gesture, or demands a gesture, is related to Wittgenstein’s 
general, if  only adumbrated, corresponding ideas about art and 
especially music. Second, Wittgenstein’s comparison between the work 
of  the architect and the work of  the philosopher will be revisited when 
considering the context of  this analogy in the Big Typescript.

II

The motive of  gesture obviously is the one prominent thread in 
the remarks quoted, so there is reason to suppose Wittgenstein took it 
seriously—at least to a certain extent. In the remarks taken from the later 
typescripts, he almost seems to take the motive for granted—while being 
occupied with different subjects. The second of  the quotes from TS 229 
seems to equate gesture and architectonic form; both serve to illustrate 
the relation between name and works. This is the light we should see the 
notion of  gesture in. Wittgenstein is mentioning architecture in passages 
where he is thinking about expressiveness in various contexts, not only 
in the context of  architecture itself. If  we consider the remarks taken 
together, we can discern two reoccurring claims that Wittgenstein is putting 
forth. First, that architecture is a gesture. As a gesture, its relationship to 
building simpliciter can be compared to the contrast between corporeal 
gestures and purposive bodily movements. Yet, second, architecture also 
provokes, or demands, gestures. Good architecture seems to express a 
thought, Wittgenstein feels—he does not claim that it actually does 
express thoughts—in a way that one feels compelled to respond to it—the 
thought? the architecture?—with a gesture.

A gesture, understood minimally, is a kind of  expressive behavior. It is, 
characteristically, not only an intentional bodily movement, but a movement 
that will at least accompany and emphasize, sometimes contradict, a 
particular utterance, sometimes even replace it [20]. In the latter case, a 
gesture may appear as the appropriate mode of  communication, the right 
expression for what we want to convey. In this sense, a gesture can be an 
alternative to verbal language. It may be tempting to think that architecture, 
or art in general, is to be understood as a gesture in exactly this sense.



129

isparchitecture.com

Initially, Wittgenstein’s intuition seems to be 
something like that—that works of  art express 
something ineffable in spoken language, beyond its 
limits—thus the aesthetic quietism in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus and continuing in the transitional 
Lectures on Ethics [21]. In the Philosophical Investigations, 
and even more extensively in his Remarks on the 
Philosophy of  Psychology, he acknowledges different 
forms of  expressiveness in language, in expressive 
behavior, and still even more in art. He begins 
to conceive of  the relationship between art and 
language in a more nuanced way: it is the differences 
as well as the similarities we have to take into 
account. His later thought about aesthetics tackles 
the question of  the expressiveness of  art not in 
competition with language, but in comparison. The 
notion of  gesture is of  importance in this respect 
[22]. The following provides a closer look at the 
two directions of  Wittgenstein’s claims:

(1) If  architecture is a gesture, while a mere
functional building is not, we can suppose that they 
can be told apart by their expressive potential. Both 
are functional or serve a purpose. But Wittgenstein 
seems to use the concept of  architecture as a term 
of  praise. Obviously, he is drawing a line between 
mere building and building as an art, restricting the 
concept of  architecture to the second form. This, by 
the way, stands in stark contrast to Loos’ view that 
architecture is not an art [23]. In its expressiveness, 
architecture, as Wittgenstein indicates, can be 
compared to music, and both can be compared to 
language.

In a certain sense, people can and certainly do 
speak of  languages of  architecture [24]. But in what 
sense? There seems to be an obvious difference 
between their respective communicative potentials. 
A linguistic utterance can express a proposition, 
definite content, one might think, while it is far 
from clear whether music or architecture can do 
so. Yet, we should look at it exactly the other way 

Architecture 
is a gesture [...] 

architecture 
also provokes, 

or demands, 
gestures.

“

”



AP . vol 2 . No 2 . 2017

130

SC
HU

FF

around, in Wittgenstein’s view. One kind of  remark Wittgenstein keeps 
reiterating points to a change of  direction necessary to understand the 
analogy between music and language in the right way. Take this passage 
from the Brown Book:

What we call ‘understanding a sentence’ has, in many cases, a much greater 
similarity to understanding a musical theme than we might be inclined to think. 
But I don’t mean that understanding a musical theme is more like the picture 
which one tends to make oneself  of  understanding a sentence; but rather that this 
picture is wrong, and that understanding a sentence is much more like what really 
happens when we understand a tune than at first sight appears. For understanding 
a sentence, we say, points to a reality outside the sentence. Whereas one might say 
‘Understanding a sentence means getting hold of  its content; and the content of  the 
sentence is in the sentence’ [25].

The problem lies in the model of  transfer. It is this model that is 
misleading—and it is misleading in language as well as in the arts. From 
the Philosophical Investigations on, and more specifically in his Remarks on the 
Philosophy of  Psychology, Wittgenstein discards the idea that expressiveness 
can be explained by reference to an inner something, connecting thought 
and external world, and existing before and independently of  its actual 
expression. This is why Wittgenstein, as regards the arts, prefers referring 
to the non-verbal, bodily mode of  communication of  gestures. Instead of  
overestimating the role of  contents, he thus highlights the understanding 
of  expressiveness in a specific context or situation, as Stephen Mulhall 
emphasizes: “In such contexts [of  aesthetic judgment] he emphasizes 
two features of  the concept’s grammar: the inseparability of  a gesture’s 
meaning from the gesture itself, and the importance of  the context of  the 
gesture in accounting for its impact on us” [26].

(2) This is why understanding a work of  art, in Wittgenstein’s view,
starts with our own immediate reactions or responses to it [27]. The way 
we understand art as expressive is precisely by reacting to it, with one 
or the other verbal utterance, emotional response, movement, or, for 
that matter, gesture. Interestingly, the notion of  an aesthetic reaction, in 
Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Aesthetics, is introduced by an example from the 
domain of  architecture (or rather building in general). Here, Wittgenstein 
imagines an architect at work, in the process of  meticulously judging and 
altering the dimensions of  doors and windows. We can imagine that it 
is exactly the expressed “thought” or “gesture” of  a building, its artistic 
expression, that is thus altered and improved [28]. The dimensions and 
placement of  doors and windows of  a house will, again, evoke particular 
reactions. These can be put or circumscribed or refined in words if  we 



131

isparchitecture.com

are competent critics, but in many cases they will 
remain what they are: immediate, bodily responses.

Music, in the Brown Book and beyond, is the 
paradigm case for this kind of  connection [29]. We 
are often inclined to think that a musical phrase says 
something, that it is meaningful [30]. But, although 
there are certain rules governing composition, 
meaning is not determined by them. Nor is it fixed 
by the transfer of  an emotion or other content from 
the artist to the listener. Instead, musical meaning lies 
in the structures of  the phrase or piece themselves 
[31]. Drawing on a distinction Wittgenstein 
introduces in the Brown Book, it has been argued 
that he conceives of  aesthetic expression as well as 
understanding in an “intransitive” sense [32]. This 
is to say that expression in these cases, although 
meaningful, cannot be unraveled by some kind of  
translation, but only pointed to by calling attention 
to details or by interpretative comments. Grasping 
the meaning of  a work, along these lines, will often 
find its basic outward expression in appropriate 
gestures. But these are reactions informed by our 
understanding of  music (as well as other arts) in 
general; their context is the whole culture we share. 
Understanding music means both appreciating its 
structure and perceiving it according to the cultural 
context it is part of, the history and practice of  
music as well as the other arts [33].

Gestures figure on both sides of  the equation, 
so to speak. Understanding a work of  art builds 
on ways of  retracing or following its respective 
design. If  a work of  art is a gesture, its meaning is 
determined by the context of  its being made, while 
simultaneously the expression is present in the 
work. This is why the appropriate guide to artistic 
meaning is our own responses to it, in our being 
immediately involved with an object (or event).

But this, to be sure, is nothing specific to 
architecture. Or, to put it another way, when it 
comes to architecture, Wittgenstein generally seems 

Understanding 
a work of art 

builds on ways 
of retracing 
or following 

its respective 
design.

“

”



AP . vol 2 . No 2 . 2017

132

SC
HU

FF

to model its meaning and its understanding on the case of  music. The 
understanding of  architecture he is thinking about is an understanding 
of  architecture as art. The basic understanding of  artworks, to him, is an 
understanding of  meaningful configurations in their respective contexts, 
and it starts as a kind of  (somatic) resonance with the features of  their 
design and organization [34].

III

This section returns to the remark quoted in the first section, 
comparing the work of  the philosopher to the work of  the architect. In 
the Big Typescript, the remark reappears. It is given pride of  place there, 
right at the beginning of  the chapter called “Philosophy” (which is an 
obvious precursor of  the famous remarks on philosophy in Philosophical 
Investigations, § 89-133). The remark is singled out as more than a casual or 
preliminary thought, but is put to service as an opening of  reflections on 
what philosophy is, or should be. (Note that this remark was not included 
in the “Philosophy” chapter of  the Philosophical Investigations, while there 
are a number of  other remarks from the Big Typescript that were.) The title 
of  this first subsection of  the Big Typescript’s chapter on philosophy is: 
“Difficulty of  Philosophy not the Intellectual Difficulty of  the Sciences, 
but the Difficulty of  a Change of  Attitude. Resistance of  the Will Must 
Be Overcome.” Philosophy, for Wittgenstein, is serious work, but not 
solely because of  the intellectual challenges it may provide, but because 
of  obstacles concerning one’s attitude. The heading thus opens up two 
topics: a contrast between philosophy and “the sciences” and the topic of  
a necessary change of  attitude. In a Tolstoyan tone, it is this change that is 
presented as meeting resistance of  the will. Following this heading, there 
is the remark about architecture again, in its new context:

As is frequently the case with work in architecture, work on philosophy is actually 
closer to working on oneself. On one’s own understanding. On the way one sees 
things. (And on what one demands of  them.) Roughly speaking, according to the 
old conception – for instance that of  the (great) western philosophers – there have 
been two kinds of  intellectual problems: the essential, great, universal ones, and the 
non-essential, quasi-accidental problems. We, on the other hand, hold that there is no 
such thing as a great, essential problem in the intellectual sense [35].

For one thing, the second part of  the remarks distances philosophy from 
the (presumably natural) sciences, which is a common thread running all 
the way through Wittgenstein’s thinking [36]. Rather than solving, or even 
conceiving of, problems the way the sciences do, Wittgenstein’s conception 
of  philosophy aims—as he puts it here—at a change of  perspective, 



133

isparchitecture.com

at a different attitude towards the puzzles we are 
confronted with. This different attitude clearly 
involves the rejection of  essentialist intuitions. All 
philosophical problems, Wittgenstein seems to 
imply, are equally important. Now the problems 
of  aesthetics, Wittgenstein keeps on stressing (see 
Lectures on Aesthetics), are not like scientific problems 
either. They are not to be solved empirically, by 
research on causes of  reactions, for instance [37]. 
When we deal with art, in Wittgenstein’s words: 
when we are faced with aesthetic puzzles or 
conduct aesthetic investigations, we are looking for 
a different perspective, that is for alternative reasons 
a work is designed as it is we did not think of  before. 
In this respect, as recently explicated by Simo 
Säätelä, aesthetics, in Wittgenstein, can be seen as 
a kind of  paradigm of  philosophy: “[A]n aesthetic 
investigation, in Wittgenstein’s sense, bears a close 
similarity to a philosophical investigation (also in 
Wittgenstein’s sense): both aim at putting things 
‘side by side’ and change one’s way of  perceiving” [38].

This, to be sure, is rather what an art critic 
will do, not necessarily the work of  the artist. Yet 
Wittgenstein does not sharply distinguish between 
performance and reception, nor between artistic 
creation and criticism. What a competent art 
critic can do is to persuade us of  such a different 
perspective, to give us reasons for seeing something 
in a new way. She can help us change our attitude, 
so to speak. Being involved in the creation of  a 
work of  art includes such critical processes—in this 
sense, the artist is her own critic. The architect in 
Wittgenstein’s analogy has to train her perception, 
her way of  seeing things—especially in relation 
to detail: there is nothing inessential, accidental. 
This is the sense in which her work is a work on 
herself, on enhancing her capacities of  judging and 
responding to the features of  her work. We can see 
this as a model of  how, for Wittgenstein, work on 
philosophy also contains both aspects, procedures 
of  (self)criticism as a part of  finding the right 

Philosophy, for 
wittgenstein, is 

serious work, 
but not solely 
because of the 

intellectual 
challenges it 

may provide, 
but because of 
the obstacles 

concerning 
one’s attitude.

“

”



AP . vol 2 . No 2 . 2017

134

SC
HU

FF

expression.

Why is Wittgenstein comparing the practice of  philosophy explicitly to 
the work of  an architect, and not, say, to that of  a composer or a painter? 
Perhaps because the attention to detail here not only concerns artistic 
expressiveness as an end in itself, but can simultaneously be a matter of  
the functional value of  a building. In this sense, the comparison could 
be meant to bring out an existential dimension of  philosophizing. If  so, 
this could resonate in Wittgenstein’s approval of  the stanza from Henry 
Wadsworth Longfellow’s poem “The Builders,” which he considered using 
“as a motto” (whether for one of  his books or for himself  as philosopher 
we are not told): “In the elder days of  art, / Builders wrought with greatest 
care / Each minute and unseen part; / For the gods see everywhere” [39].

IV

Having started with a list of  Wittgenstein’s scattered manuscript 
remarks about architecture, this analysis ends with a particular analogy 
between art and philosophy. It is not a coincidence, given the argument 
of  the paper. In his typescripts and book projects, Wittgenstein mentions 
architecture directly only in the context of  other subjects he is investigating. 
In the case of  the remark quoted from the Big Typescript, for instance, he 
is concerned with the methods of  philosophy. The allusion to the work 
of  the architect put to use there has to build on an understanding of  
the subject either working on general intuitions or developed in detail 
elsewhere. So, the question remains whether the remarks on architecture 
noted in manuscripts over the years, as presented here, can be viewed as a 
serious contribution to a philosophy of  architecture. Frankly, it does not 
appear so. In itself, the fact that the remarks are too sparse to constitute 
a coherent body of  thought need not compromise their philosophical 
potential. Yet additionally, they remain far too vague to illuminate the 
practice of  architecture. There is, to be sure, the recurrent motive of  
architecture being a gesture. Although this motive only makes sense in 
the context of  Wittgenstein’s general ideas about art and aesthetics, and 
especially about music, in which the notion of  gestures is elaborated much 
further. These ideas, in turn, should be read in the light of  the discussions 
about rules and linguistic meaning in Philosophical Investigations and about 
talk of  inner states in Philosophy of  Psychology. In a sense, then, granting 
Wittgenstein’s own, rather idiosyncratic understanding of  aesthetics, 
the practice of  philosophy can be better understood by comparing it to 
the practice of  art, especially art criticism [40]. It would be exaggerating 
to claim any special role for architecture in this regard—music is, for 



135

isparchitecture.com

Wittgenstein, the much more interesting case. His 
remarks on architecture hardly scratch the surface 
of  whatever one could think of  as subject matters 
of  a philosophy of  architecture, say, problems of  
the ontology, function, experience, or appreciation 
of  architectural objects, or questions not only of  the 
aesthetic, but also of  the ethical, social, or political 
character of  architecture. This is not to say that 
aspects of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy in general and 
his perspective on aesthetics in particular cannot 
fruitfully be used for elucidating the practice and 
understanding of  architecture—but Wittgenstein 
himself, as read here, is not a philosopher of  
architecture [41].

ENDNOTES

[1] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations 
on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril 
Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966). See also G. 
E. Moore, “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33,” 
Mind 64, no. 253 (1955) and Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935, ed. Alice 
Ambrose (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2001).

[2] Monographs on the architecture (and, 
sometimes, “philosophy”) of  the Stonborough-
Wittgenstein house include: Bernhard Leitner, The 
Architecture of  Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Documentation 
(London: Studio International Publications, 1973); 
Jan Turnovský, The Poetics of  a Wall Projection 
(London: Architectural Association Publications, 
2009); Paul Wijdeveld, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1994); Bernhard 
Leitner, The Wittgenstein House (Princeton: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 2000); Roger Paden, Mysticism 
and Architecture: The Meanings of  the Palais Stonborough 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007); Nana Last, 
Wittgenstein’s House: Language, Space and Architecture 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2008); 
Daniele Pisani, L’architettura è un gesto: Ludwig 
Wittgenstein architetto (Macerata: Quodlibet Studio, 

Wittgenstein 
himself, as read 

here, is not a 
philosopher of 
architecture.

“
”



AP . vol 2 . No 2 . 2017

136

SC
HU

FF

2011); August Sarnitz, Die Architektur Wittgensteins: Rekonstruktion einer 
gebauten Idee (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011).

[3] See David Macarthur, “Working on Oneself  in Philosophy and 
Architecture: A Perfectionist Reading of  the Wittgenstein House,” 
Architectural Theory Review 19, no. 2 (2014).

[4] For the contrast between Wittgenstein’s own aesthetic perspective 
and what became known as “Wittgensteinianism” in aesthetics see, for 
instance, Noël Carroll, “Art in an Expanded Field: Wittgenstein and 
Aesthetics,” The Nordic Journal of  Aesthetics 23, no. 42 (2012); Paul Guyer, 
A History of  Modern Aesthetics, Volume 3: The Twentieth Century (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 432-450.

[5] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ms 107 230, Culture and Value, ed. G. H. von 
Wright, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 5. My quotations 
from Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts are taken from The Bergen 
Electronic Edition of  Wittgenstein’s Nachlass (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998). Translations are Peter Winch’s from the 1998 revised edition 
of  Culture and Value, unless otherwise indicated.

[6] Wittgenstein, Ms 109 205, Culture and Value, 8. 

[7] Wittgenstein, Ms 156a 25r, Culture and Value, 26.

[8] Wittgenstein, Ms 121 26v, Culture and Value, 40.

[9] Wittgenstein, Ms 126 29, Culture and Value, 49.

[10] Wittgenstein, Ms 167 11r, Culture and Value, 74. 

[11] Wittgenstein, Ms 167 10v, my translation.

[12] Wittgenstein, Ms 137 76a, Culture and Value, 84.

[13] For a more extensive interpretation of  the remark, see Joseph 
Masheck, Adolf  Loos: The Art of  Architecture (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), 
213-215. 

[14] See Joachim Schulte, Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy 
of  Psychology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 37-45; Graham McFee, 
“Wittgenstein and the Arts: Understanding and Performing,” in Wittgenstein, 
Aesthetics and Philosophy, ed. Peter B. Lewis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

[15] On Wittgenstein’s working process, see Joachim Schulte, “What is a 
Work by Wittgenstein?,” in Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works, ed. 
Alois Pichler and Simo Säätelä (Heusenstamm: Ontos, 2006), 400-401. 

[16] Wittgenstein, Ms 112 24r; Culture and Value, 24.

[17] Ludwig Wittgenstein, TS 219 22. 

[18] Ludwig Wittgenstein, TS 229 192, Remarks on the Philosophy of  Psychology 



137

isparchitecture.com

I, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1980), 5. Translations are Anscombe’s.

[19] Wittgenstein, Ts 229 269; Remarks on the Philosophy of  Psychology I, 68. 

[20] For a substantial account of  gestures and their meaning, see David 
McNeill, Gesture and Thought (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2005), 
especially the second chapter. 

[21] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), sections 6.421, 6.522; TS 207.

[22] See Karlheinz Lüdeking, “Pictures and Gestures,” British Journal of  
Aesthetics 30, no. 3 (1990); Fabian Goppelsröder, “Über die Gestensprache 
zur Sprachgeste. Wittgenstein und die Konsequenzen seines alternativen 
Kommunikationsmodells,” Paragrana 19, no. 1 (2010).

[23] See Masheck, Adolf  Loos, 230; David Macarthur, “Remarks on 
‘Architecture is a Gesture’ (Wittgenstein),” Paragrana 23, no. 1 (2014).

[24] For a quick overview, see Edward Winters, “Architecture,” in The 
Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver 
Lopes (London: Routledge, 2013).

[25] Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1958), 167; compare Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. 
E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), § 527.

[26] Stephen Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
Kierkegaard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 169

[27] See Simo Säätelä, “‘Perhaps the most important thing in connection 
with aesthetics’ Wittgenstein on ‘Aesthetic Reactions,’” Revue internationale 
de philosophie, no. 219 (2002).

[28] See Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations, 13-14. 

[29] See Lüdeking, “Pictures and Gestures;” Roger Scruton, “Wittgenstein 
and the Understanding of  Music,” British Journal of  Aesthetics 44, no. 
1 (2004); Yves Bossart, Ästhetik nach Wittgenstein. Eine systematische 
Rekonstruktion (Heusenstamm: Ontos, 2013), 213-226. 

[30] See Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, 166. 

[31] See ibid.

[32] See Richard Wollheim, Art and its Objects, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), 73-76; David Bell, “The Art of  Judgment,” 
Mind 96, no. 382 (1987), 239-244; Kjell S. Johannessen, “Philosophy, Art 
and Intransitive Understanding,” in Wittgenstein and Norway, ed. Kjell S. 
Johannessen (Oslo: Solum, 1994); Bossart, Ästhetik nach Wittgenstein, 
195-204.



AP . vol 2 . No 2 . 2017

138

SC
HU

FF

[33] For an excellent reading of  the way Wittgenstein comments on two
musical examples, see Katrin Eggers, “‘Diese musikalische Phrase ist für
mich eine Gebärde. Sie schleicht sich in mein Leben ein.’ Musik als Geste
und musikalische Gesten bei Wittgenstein,” Wittgenstein-Studien 6, no. 1
(2015).

[34] For detailed analyses of  the way Wittgenstein criticizes and preserves
both formalist and expressivist intuitions, especially with respect to musical
meaning, see Béla Szabados, Wittgenstein as Philosophical Tone-Poet: Philosophy
and Music in Dialogue (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014), especially 87-97; Katrin
Eggers, Ludwig Wittgenstein als Musikphilosoph (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2011),
203-227.

[35] Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript: TS 213, ed. and trans. C. Grant
Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 300-
301. While Winch’s translation of  the remark differs substantially from
Luckhardt and Aue’s, Wittgenstein did not change the wording from the
manuscript to the typescript version. The German original reads (in both
cases): “Die Arbeit an der Philosophie ist – wie vielfach die Arbeit in der
Architektur – eigentlich mehr eine Arbeit an Einem selbst. An der eignen
Auffassung. Daran, wie man die Dinge sieht. (Und was man von ihnen
verlangt.)”

[36] See for prominent instances Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
section 4.111; Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, 18; Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, § 109.

[37] See Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations, 19-23. Repercussions of
Wittgenstein’s view are clearly visible in Alva Noë’s recent Strange Tools, not
only in the repudiation of  scientific approaches in aesthetics, be they of
an evolutionary or neuroscientific variety, but also in the proposed model
of  philosophy as providing “perspicuous representations.” See Alva Noë,
Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015),
especially 17, 49-71, 120-133.

[38] Simo Säätelä, “Aesthetics – Wittgenstein’s Paradigm of  Philosophy?,”
Aisthesis 6, no. 1 (2014), 40.

[39] Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, “The Builders,” Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow, Maine Historical Society, accessed November 18, 2015,
http://www.hwlongfellow.org/poems_poem.php?pid=118. Wittgenstein
misquotes the last line of  the stanza as “For the gods are everywhere.”
I can see no indication of  this alteration being intentional. (Of  course, I
cannot rule that out, either.) Compare Wittgenstein, Ms 120 144v; Culture
and Value, 39.



139

isparchitecture.com

[40] See Kjell S. Johannessen, “Wittgenstein and the Aesthetic Domain,” 
in Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy, ed. Peter B. Lewis (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2004). 

[41] I wish to thank Eva Backhaus, Stefan Koller, and Martin Seel, as 
well as two anonymous reviewers for Architecture Philosophy, for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of  this paper.



AP . vol 2 . No 2 . 2017




