





































SEMIOTIC NATURALISM IN 
ARCHITECTURE THEORY

REIDAR DUE

This paper seeks to present a kind of  skeptical, 
and, in an indirect way, Wittgensteinian perspective 
upon purpose and meaning in architecture. The 
argument presented here revolves around the two 
notions that, first, there are different categories, 
which we have available for making architecture seem 
intelligible to us, and, second, that there are distinct 
historical discourses in which architecture has been 
made intelligible in specific ways. The implication 
of  this discourse argument will be a skepticism 
regarding the prospect of  an encompassing theory 
of  architecture, or a theory that would fully and 
adequately capture the purpose and significance of  
individual buildings. This skeptical argument will 
build around a distinction I will make between what 
a rational subject can perceive and what can be said 
about it—a distinction based on Gilles Deleuze’s 
distinction between the visible and the sayable.

It is argued that there are four categories of  things 
that can be said about architecture: construction, 
style, use, and ideology, and that a difficulty of  
architecture theory is the possible unification of  
these categories. The problem of  unity, it is argued, 
has been obscured by the tradition of  architecture 
interpretation originating in Hegel, and which 
implies that there is an unproblematic semiotic 
relationship between construction, style, and 
meaning such that construction serves the purpose 
of  style and style serves the purpose of  embodying 
the collective aspirations of  a community. Thinking 
through this problem in terms of  Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of  language will allow us to defamilarize 

The problem 
of unity ... has 

been obscured 
by the tradition 
of architecture 

interpretation 
originating in 

hegel

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ourselves from the notions that there could be a natural relation between 
style and meaning in architecture and that there could be an encompassing 
discourse on architecture such that all the categories of  what can be said 
about buildings would be articulated within a unifying concept. The 
following paper thus presents the reasons one might have for being skeptical 
about a theoretical discourse concerning architecture that would do justice 
to its totality of  significance. This discourse skepticism is, it must be said, 
at one remove from descriptive or prescriptive statements about particular 
buildings or building styles. Thus, unlike, Tafuri for instance, philosophy 
is not claimed (or a theoretical argument grounded in philosophy) is 
not claimed as assuming the normative power of  grading the merits of  
individual buildings according to general criteria. The relevance of  the 
skeptical program for architectural practice and architectural practitioners 
is thus indirect. That is not to say, this skepticism about meaning is without 
consequence for architectural practice. To say it more bluntly, it is believed 
that modernism and its avatars—functionalism, deconstruction, and the 
‘iconic’ style of  building—have overstated the power of  theory within 
building practice. The modernist program of  the early twentieth century 
and its continuation in architecture theory of  our time can be defined as 
the effort to provide an aesthetic rationale for an industrial process of  
production and then to amplify this aesthetic program within a fitting social 
ideology: concrete is an industrial construction tool. Concrete produces 
an anti-ornamental aesthetic. The anti-ornamental aesthetic is egalitarian. 
This would be the basic pattern of  argument. This theoretical assertiveness 
and this trajectory from construction—through style to ideology—relies 
on a conception of  the unity between style and meaning, which is herein 
called semiotic naturalism and which, it is argued, is problematic.

MEANING SKEPTICISM IN WITTGENSTEIN

Wittgenstein exhorts us to be skeptical about the notion that there is, 
or that there must be, some such entity as meaning in order for language 
to be meaningful [1]. For language to make sense, does not in turn mean 
that there is a sense which language makes and which we, the linguists 
or philosophers, could subsequently isolate and study as if  it were a self-
contained mental object. It is not clear from Wittgenstein’s texts, or from 
the scholarly interpretations of  his texts, what the implication would be of  
holding this skepticism about meaning. The pragmatic and anti-theoretical 
stance pervading the Philosophical Investigations sits uncomfortably with the 
extraordinary ingenuity of  Wittgenstein’s thought experiments and search 
for candidates that purportedly should satisfy justificatory or foundational 



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criteria, but which under his skeptical scrutiny 
always collapse [2]. This painstaking search reveals 
something other than mere opposition to particular 
theoretical positions, conceptions of  meaning, 
or conceptions of  consciousness. It reveals an 
attitude of  puzzlement or bewilderment regarding 
that which seems natural. It is true, of  course, that 
Wittgenstein’s puritanical sensibility would lead him 
to search for a higher, simpler, or more essential 
naturalness in which our thoughts about language 
would contain nothing superfluous [3]. This 
sensibility is evident in different ways in both the 
Tractatus and the Investigations, but in the latter text, 
his own method of  skeptical scrutiny runs counter 
to the ideal of  simplicity.

The significance and purpose of  a building is 
similar to meaning in Wittgenstein’s sense in that 
within a natural, non-skeptical attitude we may 
think that there is a purpose or a significance that 
we can isolate intellectually and think about. It is 
argued that just as Wittgenstein encourages us to be 
skeptical about meaning as an isolated ideal entity, 
we should also problematize the notion of  purpose 
as a unifying meta-category within the architecture 
discourse. This problem is addressed in terms of  
distinct categories and with reference to distinct 
discourses in which architecture has been made 
intelligible, or in which one has sought to make 
architecture intelligible. The semiotic principles 
at work in these efforts at making architecture 
intelligible are questioned and problematized.

HEGEL AND THE SEMIOTICS OF ARCHITECTURE

In studying modern architecture theory, one 
cannot fail to notice that particular assumptions 
are made again and again regarding the purpose of  
architecture. These assumptions are semiotic. The 
philosophical origin of  the semiotic assumptions 
appears to be Hegel’s theory of  architecture in 
his lectures on aesthetics as embodying collective 

modernism and 
its avatars 

... have 
overstated 

the power 
of theory 

within building 
practice

“

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beliefs [4]. The legacy of  Hegel is rooted in the thought that buildings 
are meaningful because they are bearers of  shared, historically specific 
aspirations, which make up their purpose and their meaning. Within the 
Hegelian perspective, purpose and meaning appear identical, or at least 
convergent.

The Hegelian legacy is referred to as ‘semiotic naturalism’ because it 
consists in taking for granted that buildings convey meaning and that 
these meanings can be clearly and univocally determined. For instance, 
in historical research the following is a common thought formation: 
there is here a natural, that is, non-problematic relationship between a 
presupposed cultural signified and the concept of  the building as signifier. 
This way of  thinking leads us to a view in which style choices such as 
choices of  ornamentation, referring to the three orders of  antiquity, or 
choices concerning internal spatial disposition between rooms, or choices 
of  materials, or even the relation of  a building to its surroundings, can 
be reconstructed as having been made for reasons that are culturally 
transparent. The building may not be a sign in the sense of  a message or a 
tool of  communication, but it appears as a depository of  cultural meanings. 
The cultural meanings can be of  various kinds: religious, political, social, 
etc. The argument for a distrust in this semiotic principle will be given 
in the last section of  this article, where the ideological positions taken 
in Alberti’s theory of  architecture are discussed. If  the assumption of  
cultural continuity between construction, style, and ideological meaning 
is broken, so is also the idea of  a building’s cultural intelligibility and 
transparent readability. One may also say that this skeptical approach to 
ideology is directly opposed to the Marxist social and contextual reading 
proposed for instance by Tafuri.

When Hegel writes about religious medieval architecture he is inspired 
by Winckelmann’s idealization of  Greek civilization on the one hand, and 
guided, on the other, by his own notion that the European Middle Ages 
was a spiritually saturated period [5]. His idea of  churches summing up 
the spirit of  a community subsequently became influential in architecture 
theory as a basic semiotic premise. The premise was taken to mean 
that buildings are constructs made within, for, and in some cases, by a 
community. That buildings are successful to the extent that they express 
the beliefs of  that community.

One follower of  this Hegelian perspective is the twentieth century 
architecture historian Christian Norberg-Shulz. In his synthesis, Meaning 
in Western Architecture, he presents architecture as a cultural response to a 
given environment. According to this model, the succession of  civilizations 



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presents different solutions to the question of  how 
to create, and articulate a meaningful space. He 
describes how, in other words, to appropriate the 
natural environment and integrate it into forms of  
construction, that are not merely monumental and 
not entirely aloof  from their surroundings.

A less idealistic, more empirically historicist, 
but also implicitly Marxist, account of  meaning in 
architecture is Tafuri’s analysis of  post-war Italian 
architecture [6]. The analysis is committed to a 
normative idea of  social progress, which is used as 
a benchmark and tool of  distinction for evaluating 
and comparing social building projects. Some 
buildings are good because they have a style, which 
implies a commitment to modernity, while other 
buildings imply a more muted position. Tafuri also 
evaluates projects in the context of  a wider historical 
narrative. In Tafuri’s account of  Italian architects’ 
ideological responses to urbanization, he envisaged 
architectural and urban design as embodying rival 
propositions around the notion of  progress.

In Hegel, Norberg-Shulz, and Tafuri we arrive at 
the position that buildings are made for ideological 
purposes and that, in this, they carry meaning. For 
Hegel, buildings are meaningful when they embody 
religious beliefs. For Norberg-Shulz, buildings are 
meaningful when they articulate and appropriate a 
space. For Tafuri, buildings, or design projects, are 
like actions according to Jean-Paul Sartre: buildings 
take sides in an ideological battle between progress 
and reaction [7].

The different approaches to architecture 
from a historicist, phenomenological, and 
Marxist perspective shares the assumption that 
the relationship between architectural style 
and architectural construction—as well as the 
relationship between these two and whatever can 
be said about the meaning or significance of  a 
building—is obvious. It is obvious, according to 
Hegel, that aesthetic form expresses a moral ideal. 

within the 
hegelian 

perspective, 
purpose and 

meaning appear 
identical, 

or at least 
convergent

“

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It is obvious, for Tafuri, that design choice expresses a stance with regard 
to the opposition between modernity and reaction. It is this obviousness 
or naturalness of  meaning that is problematic and which Wittgenstein 
helps us to think of  as problematic. The assumption that buildings and 
building design must have a cultural meaning is not self-evident. At least, 
this is what this paper goes on to argue—but in doing so it will be helpful 
to return to Wittgenstein.

WITTGENSTEINIAN DIALECTIC

To approach the assumptions and the semiotic naturalism of  certain 
kinds of  architecture theory, it is useful to return to Wittgenstein to draw 
from another more specific trait of  his thinking in the Investigations. The 
trait of  interest is a methodological trait. Rather than putting forward 
views directly and systematically, his thought moves dialectically in relation 
to a number of  putative theories presented in rudimentary form—the 
most famous of  which is the so-called private language argument. The 
movement through, or via, alternative and rival theoretical scenarios has 
the obvious advantage over a straightforwardly systematic discourse in 
that it avoids, or at least postpones, the petition of  principle inherent 
in any dogmatic statement of  a systematic set of  propositions: as soon 
as there is a starting-point, something must have been assumed which 
is not quite explicit in the self-justification of  the system. At the outset, 
the position will not be argued from the plane of  a specific conception 
of  architectural meaning. In itself, the argument from potential scenarios 
has the advantage of  bringing into play, simultaneously, different 
theoretical possibilities and thus to highlighting the element of  choice in 
the formulation of  a theory. In this paper on semiotic naturalism, and 
an alternative to semiotic naturalism, a non-natural and less obvious, less 
straightforward understanding of  the meaning relation in architecture is 
unfolded, one that is manifest in a certain kind of  architecture history. 
Next, semiotic naturalism as consisting of  a set of  potential scenarios, or 
theoretical propositions, indirectly addressing a certain semiotic question 
of  intelligibility is considered.

CATEGORIES OF ARCHITECTURE DISCOURSE

We can now think of  the Hegelian tradition of  semiotic naturalism as 
consisting of  alternative theoretical propositions. These are all predicated 
on the assumption that the problem of  how to articulate intellectual and 
visible space has already been solved, or that it need not emerge. In order to 
analyze these assumptions closely, we need to consider the categories within 



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which we speak about architecture. For architecture 
is only, and can only become, intelligible in terms 
of  the things which we can say about it. Anything 
we may predicate belongs to some kind of  category. 
The question would be, therefore, what are the 
discourse categories relevant to architecture? Does 
architectural discourse, that is, the kind of  language 
which seeks to make architecture intelligible, 
possess its own distinct categories or does it employ 
categories that are common to architecture and art, 
architecture and the city, architecture and society, 
and so on? 

Before suggesting an answer to this question, one 
can take as an example of  a category problem, the 
concept of  modernity. Now, we may think of  many 
different sorts of  things as modern, for instance, 
in no apparent order: the modern state, modern 
lifestyle, modern painting, modern technology. It 
is clear that within a general historical narrative, 
all these different phenomena could somehow 
be related. It is further clear that by doing so the 
historian will have to make certain fundamental 
methodological choices regarding the relationship, 
for instance, between society and politics, between 
science and society, or between the social and the 
aesthetic. These are precisely category questions. 

All of  the examples above further present a 
relevance to the question of  architecture discourse 
in that architecture could be said to have something 
in common with all of  them. One could write 
monographs on the relationship between the 
modern state and modern architecture or on 
the relationship between modern lifestyle and 
modern architecture. The issue of  modernity and 
the category questions it immediately raises are 
thus apt at bringing out the precarious ontological 
status of  the phenomenon of  architecture as it 
exists somewhere between art and society. The 
ontological precariousness is another problem for 
the naturalist semiotician, for it gives rise to semiotic 

the assumption 
that buildings 

and building 
design must 

have cultural 
meaning is not 

self-evident

“

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problems of  classification. If  architecture is like painting, if  Le Corbusier 
is like Picasso, one set of  questions concerning meaning will arise. If  on 
the other hand architecture is technology, if  Mies van der Rohe is the 
apogee of  the historical development that produced high speed trains and 
motorways, another, entirely different set of  meaning questions will ensue. 

The precarious ontological status has to do with the relationship 
between the primary categories within which we can talk about buildings: 
construction, style, ideology, and use. It is difficult to conceive of  anything 
that can be said about buildings that does not belong within any of  these 
four categories. It is also difficult to think of  a principle according to 
which we could identify their unity. If  we think of  the development of  
architecture theory since the Renaissance we find a gradual shift in the 
relationship between these categories and their relative importance. We 
also find different efforts at identifying a unity between them. Alberti’s 
work is often considered as marking the beginning of  modern architecture 
theory and his primary focus is construction—but he also introduces the 
notion of  the importance of  architecture for human life. The notion is 
referred to as ideology so in order to distance this analysis from Tafuri’s 
more prescriptive notion of  ideology, which is based on a normative battle 
between socially modern ideas and socially reactionary ideas.

At the end of  the 16th century, Palladio writes about construction in 
terms of  a prescriptive notion of  style. In the course of  the eighteenth 
century and in response to the need for domestic houses for a bourgeoisie 
oriented toward comfort rather than ostentation, architecture theory 
becomes concerned with pragmatic questions of  what is pleasant and 
practical. Issues of  style will thus be interpreted in terms of  ideological 
questions concerning use. In twentieth century architectural modernism 
there is the effort to integrate construction, style, and an ideology of  
use. Le Corbusier is famously prescriptive in his ideas of  use, and the 
functionalist school equally presents a formidable unity of  construction 
principles, aesthetic norms, and norms of  social life: functions are finite 
and simple and correspond to a clarity of  design, and it is inconceivable 
that the purpose of  a building could be to enhance a messy overlap 
between many kinds of  activities in the manner, say, of  a medieval city.

The latest modernists, the so-called deconstructionist Bernard Tschumi 
and post-modern Koolhaas, seek to explore the relationship between 
construction, style, and ideology while arguing—against functionalism—
neither in terms of  style nor in terms of  use but in terms of  a direct 
relationship between construction and ideology. The ideological principle 
is in both cases one of  freedom of  creation. Tschumi’s notion that the 



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basic grammar of  buildings, such as walls and roof, 
is open to question or his embrace of  the principle 
of  the grid in his Parc de la Villette project implies 
that construction dictates style and use. Koolhaas’ 
surreal conception of  New York as a place 
designed by the settlers for a future invention and 
use challenges the functionalist principle that we 
already know what use is, or should be. This brief  
sketch of  the history of  architecture theory and the 
shifting relations between categories is meant to 
indicate the motivation behind semiotic naturalism.

Norberg-Shulz AND HEIDEGGER

The grand synthesis of  Norberg-Shulz is based 
on the idea that the categories of  construction 
and style are inseparable and that both find a 
common expression in the context of  a natural 
environment, which architecture has the mission 
to order, manage, structure, in short, articulate. 
The environmental aesthetic synthesis does indeed 
make the architecture of  different epochs appear 
purposeful, and in a sense meaningful, as each 
epoch with its characteristic and distinct style 
and construction method, appears to offer fresh 
solutions to the environmental, or one might say 
anthropological, problem of  man’s relation to, 
and management of, his physical surroundings. 
Norberg-Shulz’s theoretical position is referred 
to here in some detail because it constitutes a 
particularly explicit and ambitious formulation of  
semiotic naturalism. With his aesthetic and spatial 
understanding of  Heidegger’s phenomenology, 
Norberg-Shulz presents a theoretical position that 
is much more sophisticated and detailed than the 
vague philosophical reflections on building and 
living put forward by Heidegger himself  in his 
famous article “Bauen Wohnen Denken” from 
1951 [8].

In the article, Heidegger develops a rhetorical 
context in which the phenomenon of  architecture 

The precarious 
ontological 

status has to 
do with the 

relationship 
between 

the primary 
categories 

within which we 
can talk about 

buildings

“

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appears anonymous and traditional, as something objectively manifest—in 
the way of  having already been made—rather than as something planned 
or invented on the basis of  style and construction choices. Norberg-Shulz, 
on the other hand, keeps the door open to the perspective of  the practicing 
architect and is attuned, with his flexible concept of  articulation, to the 
element of  choice in architectural creation. At the same time, choices 
appear in retrospect to be culturally coterminous with other contemporary 
choices: this does not imply that the individual choice is determined by 
collective beliefs, perhaps, but it at least means that we cannot make sense 
of  the individual choice outside of  the context of  the culture with which 
it is contemporary. Formulated thus blandly, architecture historians might 
agree with this principle, but it implies the attribution of  a degree of  
internal coherence to architecture, which is perhaps excessive and which 
does not do justice to the multiple contingencies of  architectural creation.

The naturalist assumption Norberg-Shulz makes is that architecture is 
successful always or that architecture is identical with successful architecture. 
There is no reflection upon the relationship between vernacular or folk 
architecture and stand-alone, deliberately conceived constructions. There 
is scant reflection on the relation between public and domestic space, since 
his focus is religious and political architecture: building on a grand scale. 
In this identification between the general concept of  architecture and the 
narrower, normatively charged notion of  successful architecture, Norberg-
Shulz turns out to be close to Heidegger. For in Heidegger we see that the 
position of  normative discrimination between different buildings in terms 
of  their aesthetic merit is problematic. For such a normative aesthetic 
authority implies that the power of  viewing and thinking of  an individual 
subject is somehow higher than the weight of  tradition. Yet, Heidegger 
would exhort us to think of  architecture as a kind of  prolongation of  the 
natural environment. Buildings and bridges are there in our midst. They 
impose themselves upon us and create a coherent space and landscape, 
but they do not offer themselves to judgment. In other words, judgment is 
not the most relevant attitude that we can have towards them.

Thus, the aesthetic perspective which privileges style and, on the other 
hand, the construction perspective, which evaluates craft and technique, 
are both rendered irrelevant to a large extent within the rhetorical space 
that Heidegger creates for architecture. What Heidegger and Norberg-
Shulz share is thus a kind of  transcendental perspective where the activity 
of  making buildings, on the one hand, and the activity of  perceiving 
and judging them, on the other, are set aside. The phenomenological 
method consists in part in the transcendental. By putting aside certain 



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questions—such as empirical causality—other 
questions, concerning meaning or the essential 
properties of  phenomena can come into view. In the 
field of  architecture theory, this phenomenological 
essentialism has the authoritarian implication that 
aesthetic and ideological discussion will appear 
irrelevant. Architecture appears in its history as 
a kind of  general anthropological phenomenon. 
It manifests itself  outside of  the distinctions 
and disagreements which individuals can make, 
and which would form the topic of  theoretical 
discussions among architects.

CULTURAL INTENTIONALITY

Normative or evaluative discussions and 
reflections appear in the history of  architecture 
in two distinct forms. On the one hand is the 
discipline of  architecture history, which develops 
as a part of  art history, largely in the course of  the 
twentieth century. On the other hand is the kind of  
architecture theory that is produced by architects. 
The analysis herein will attend to the former first 
and come back to the latter at the end of  this 
article. Architecture history has been practiced in 
different rhetorical and methodological modes in 
different countries, with Italian architecture history 
often being attentive to craft, whereas the German 
tradition has been predominantly style, and the 
Anglo-American tradition of  recent years being 
positivist and contextualist. 

The analysis is now primarily focused on the 
naturalist semiotic assumptions of  contextual 
architecture history. A prominent example of  the 
naturalist semiotic method is Ákos Moravánszky’s 
Competing Visions text devoted to the themes of  
eclecticism and modernism in large cities of  
Central Europe during the early twentieth century 
[9]. In this work, he reconstructs a complex cultural 
intentionality underlying the making of  individual 
buildings by the preeminent architects of  the time. 

A normative 
aesthetic 

authority implies 
that the power 

of viewing and 
thinking of an 

individual subject 
is somehow higher 

than the weight 
of tradition

“

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Moravánszky’s account keeps alive both the notion of  individual creation 
and the notion of  collective belief, a balance which was not achieved in 
the synthesis of  Norberg-Shulz. He is able to correlate specific choices of  
ornament or construction with general aesthetic and ideological currents 
prevalent at the time the building was conceived so as to demonstrate 
how general trends are taken up and inflected by the personality of  
individual architects. The architects, Moravánszky argues, impose their 
own personality and idiosyncrasies upon the ideas made available to them 
in the surrounding culture.

The subtle, multifactorial historical approach cannot properly be named 
simply contextual or positivist, since it is carried by a phenomenological 
idea, similar to that of  Norberg-Shulz. The complexity of  the notion is 
captured in the title of  the book, Competing Visions. At the horizon of  the 
study is principally the philosophical idea that architecture embodies a 
vision. The vision is both aesthetic and moral. It is embedded in style and 
construction. It involves an open question as to what constitutes modernity. 
It concerns the historical development of  large cities and brings into view 
questions of  how one should live in modern society. Moravánszky is 
some senses similar to Norberg-Shulz in thinking of  architecture as a sort 
of  synthesis, but differs from Norberg-Shulz in that the arena of  such 
a synthesis is neither the appropriation of  space nor the articulation of  
space through choices of  construction and style. The arena of  synthesis 
is instead the relationship, that the historian reconstructs, between style 
and ideology. The relationship, once it is painstakingly reconstructed, can 
be retrospectively attributed to the agents—the architects and theorists of  
architecture—so that it appears as the backbone or structure of  a complex, 
cultural intentionality. This ideologically rich intentionality appears as the 
ground of  architectural creation.

Thus, by placing the focus on ideology rather than construction, while 
retaining style as a central category, Moravánszky is both in continuity with 
Norberg-Shulz and decisively different. Both start from the assumption 
that architecture is predominantly a phenomenon of  style. Yet, Norberg-
Shulz interprets style in terms of  anthropological needs and Moravánszky 
interprets style in terms of  specific ideological commitments. We can 
elaborate on the divergences between to two thinkers in terms of  the four 
primary categories and the relation between them. In Norberg-Shulz we 
find with his concept of  articulation a claim that the satisfaction of  spatial 
anthropological needs is simultaneously a feat of  style, of  construction, 
and of  ideology. For articulation corresponds to anthropological needs 
and is expressed through style features and construction choices. With 



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this anthropological focus on the task of  creating 
spatial articulation, Norberg-Shulz interestingly 
downgrades the normative importance of  those 
features of  style that are purely ornamental. Style 
is so intimately related to construction through the 
articulation of  space that any style choice would 
become significant within the context of  molding 
that space. Moravánszky’s method, on the other 
hand, is symbolic rather than anthropological. 
For him the specific ornamental choices on the 
façade of  a building are ideological signifiers 
independently of  the building’s functionality. Thus, 
with architectural historians such as Moravánszky, 
we find the concrete elaboration of  the ontological 
assumption that buildings are primarily visible, 
which is to say, buildings are something akin to 
three dimensional paintings amenable to aesthetic 
analysis.

In a less nuanced version of  this type of  intellectual 
history of  architecture, such as Pelkonen’s book on 
nationalism and internationalism in Alvar Aalto, 
the ideological strand in the argument becomes 
so dominant that other considerations are clearly 
subordinate [10]. In Moravánszky’s study ideological 
commitments do not command the analysis [9]. 
Moravánszky’s text deftly and incessantly moves 
between different types of  consideration. It is, 
however, in the balance and subtlety that the 
method betrays its semiotic assumptions. For the 
seamless transition between different categories 
and apparently effortless integration of  different 
sorts of  material is only possible if  it is assumed 
at the outset that style, construction, and ideology 
cohere and form a necessary unity. The assumption 
may of  course turn out to be the case, but how 
do we justify such a general, idealistic, semiotic 
conception of  architectural unity? It is this sort of  
unity that was referred to as a naturalist conception 
of  purpose earlier, that is, an idea of  what a building 
is for.

ideologically 
rich 

intentionality 
appears as 

the ground of 
architectural 

creation

“

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ARCHITECTURE IDEOLOGY 

The different kinds of  theoretical synthesis discussed involve  not 
questioning the possibility of  coherence between different categories. 
These are the categories within which, or at the aid of  which, architecture 
purportedly becomes intelligible in its purpose and significance within 
the discourse of  architecture historians. It is suggested that the synthesis 
of  different categories, which justifies claims for intelligibility within 
architecture history (and which are referred to as semiotic naturalism) rest 
upon a denial. Or as psychoanalysts might say, foreclosure, of  a possible 
scenario in which the visible and the intelligible might drift apart. Such 
a drifting apart takes place in discourse and is perceivable as a skeptical 
scenario occurring within the discourse. If  that which drifts apart are 
intelligibility and visibility, there must be also a scenario of  something, 
which is presented to visual perception but which does not immediately 
fall within the realm of  discourse. That being said, the relationship 
between the primal categories varies greatly both within the history of  the 
discipline of  architecture history and in the history of  theories produced 
by architects—which is in some cases distinct from the discipline of  
architecture history (though not always, as Tafuri and Norberg-Shulz are 
both examples of).

This is the sort of  theory now considered in order to argue that it 
highlights a specific problem of  ideology. In its implications, this problem 
of  ideology poses, I will argue, a challenge to semiotic naturalism. As 
I said, the term “ideology” is used here not in the Marxist sense, for 
instance by Tafuri in his discussion of  competing stances taken towards 
urban or social modernity. Tafuri attributes definite ideological positions 
to individual architects and deftly correlates these positions with style 
and construction choices. My view of  architecture is less concerned with 
positions and choices; it is Platonic, rather, in its focus on rival conceptions 
of  the good life or the sort of  life that architecture is for or that it should 
enhance and promote. There may well be many different conceptions of  
the good life, depending on geographical and historical circumstances. The 
concept of  ideology thus does not come with a theoretical—in Tafuri’s 
case, modernist and social historicist—script, which would provide the 
ground for identifying individual positions contrastively and contrasting 
them with others as on a structural grid. Ideology, in this context is a 
conception of  life, of  what life should consist of, and of  how architecture 
can enhance this good or appropriate life. The ideological conception of  
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from them.

ALBERTI’S IDEA OF THE GOOD LIFE

Alberti’s On the art Art of  Building in Ten Books, 
which appeared around 1450, pursues a painstaking 
and detailed reconstruction of  everything that the 
craft of  architecture entails as a material process of  
construction [11]. Yet, in doing so, in presenting 
the meticulous inventory of  principles, problems, 
and prescriptions, Alberti also introduces his own 
presuppositions concerning what matters in life. 
In short, in the margins of  the text we find his 
ideology. His ideology coheres with his construction 
principles, but significantly, is not correlated with 
style, a topic about which he has little to say—and 
what he says is theoretically bland.

Alberti’s starting points are climatic and 
geographical. He shares with Machiavelli the notion 
that place is a category defined by geographical 
security questions. In Alberti’s case, however, 
it is not only the advent of  potential enemies 
that buildings and towns must be prepared for 
but also natural disasters, and, more generally, 
contingencies. In book 3, chapter 7 book 3/7 
he thus says, programmatically, about weather 
conditions: “Moreover, it is self-evident, without 
looking for any less obvious reasons, that the 
assault of  the weather will be responsible for 
loosening and breaking the bond of  anything that 
has grown or been forced together” [12]. We could 
of  course gloss this statement pragmatically, seeing 
it in continuity with Vitruvian norms of  adapting 
to the environment, but the emphasis here is very 
different. Against the happy common sense of  
Vitruvius, we find here an anxious memento mori, 
an acute and poignant awareness of  the fragility 
of  all things made by humans. There is a kind of  
existential dimension to Alberti’s architectural 
thinking in which contingency is not far from 
his mind. The adequate response to contingency 

in the margins 
of the text we 
find [alberti’s] 

ideology

“
”



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according to Alberti appears to be control—and control is according 
to him based on knowledge. The required knowledge is by no means 
limited narrowly to the architect’s craft but includes detailed and specific 
geographical information. It is a kind of  highly specific knowledge which 
ideally should inform choices of  material and hence construction. In 
Book 3, Chapter 12 he thus talks about controlling natural conditions 
when it comes to choosing wood: “The beams should be related if  at 
all possible: that is, they should be of  the same type of  timber, from the 
same forest, raised under the same climatic conditions, and felled on the 
same day, so that by having the same natural strength they will perform 
their function equally” [13]. There is an elegant slide in this passage from 
reflections upon conditions to a prescription concerning structure. In fact 
the arc of  Alberti’s argument is formed by this integration of  control 
and structure. For construction is for Alberti essentially a control of  
structure. The purpose of  this kind of  control is a wider sense of  control 
of  contingency. Hence, in Book 3, Chapter 14 he develops an analogy 
between biological organisms and architectural construction with the aim 
of  articulating a concept of  structure: “In short, with every type of  vault 
we should imitate Nature throughout, that is, bind together the bones and 
interweave flesh with nerves running along any possible section: in length, 
breath and depth, and also obliquely across” [14].

His reflections on use and usefulness are similarly climatological and 
informed by a sense of  insecurity and need of  protection. In book 5, 
chapter 2, for instance, he discusses the internal division of  private houses: 
“Inside, the dining rooms, storerooms, and so on should be appropriately 
located where their contents will keep well. Where the air is right and they 
will receive the correct amount of  sun and ventilation, and where they can 
serve their intended uses” [15]. We find a similar climatological idea of  
usefulness in a reflection on urban planning. In Book 5, Chapter 7 Alberti 
discusses the location of  monasteries in towns: “But I would have any 
cloister within the city, be it for women or for men, sited in the healthiest 
possible place, lest emaciation of  the body and sleeplessness prevent the 
inmates from attending fully to their minds, and lest illness make their lives 
harder than usual” [16].

The running thread of  geography and contingency forms the ideological 
basis of  Alberti’s thinking. The purpose of  architecture is safety. It aims 
to protect us against decay, illness, natural disaster, weather conditions, 
and enemies. The ideological conception that he projects and presupposes 
is that life is precarious, in need of  support and security. The good life 
is essentially one in which one survives. This may be a bleak vision of  



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the good life, but it is explicit, articulate, and clear. 
Through his reflections on structure, Alberti 
integrates his ideas of  protection and solidity 
within his precepts on construction. Alberti’s aim 
is to integrate construction and ideology. He thus 
indirectly problematizes the later programs of  
categorical synthesis in which style is central, either 
in relation to construction as in Norberg-Shulz or 
in relation to ideology as in Moravánszky.

Returning to Wittgenstein, the skeptical 
conclusion of  this comparison between different 
styles of  architectural reflection is that the 
relationship between the four suggested categories 
of  architecture—construction, style, ideology, and 
use—is more contested and more controversial than 
one might think if  one starts from the assumptions 
of  semiotic naturalism and the presupposition of  
coherence.

ENDNOTES

[1] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982).

[2] Reidar A. Due, “At the Margins of  Sense: The 
Function of  Paradox in Deleuze and Wittgenstein,” 
Paragraph 34, no. 3 (2011): 358-370.

[3] Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: Nothing is Hidden 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).

[4] G. W. F. Hegel, Ästhetik (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 
1965).

[5] Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Gedanken über die 
Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und 
Bildhauerkunst (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2007).

[6] Manfredo Tafuri, Storia dell’architettura italiana 
1944-1985 (Torino: Einaudi, 1986).

[7] Michael Scriven, Sartre and the Media (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1993).

[8] Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000).



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[9] Ákos Moravánszky, Competing Visions: Aesthetic Invention and Social 
Imagination in Central European Architecture, 1867-1918 (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1998).

[10] Eeva-Liisa Pelkonen, Alvar Aalto: Architecture, Modernity, and Geopolitics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

[11] Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of  Building in Ten Books, trans. Joseph 
Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1991).

[12] Ibid., 71.

[13] Ibid., 80.

[14] Ibid., 86.

[15] Ibid., 119.

[16] Ibid., 127.




