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Book review
The Aesthetics of Architecture. 

Roger Scruton. 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013 (1st 
Edition 1979).

Reviewed by Hilde Heynen

Roger Scruton is a well-known and well-
respected philosopher whose work has been 
extensively studied and commented upon, especially 
in the field of  aesthetics [1]. In this field, Scruton’s 
recently reissued book on architecture is generally 
appreciated. It is even considered a “classic in 
architectural philosophy” [2]. Scruton’s standing 
within the field of  architectural history and theory, 
on the other hand, is a point of  contention. In this 
regard, the book is far less extensively studied and 
certainly not seen as indispensable. In the recent 
Sage Handbook of  Architectural Theory, the sixty page 
section on “Aesthetics/Pleasure/Excess,” for 
example, only mentions the book in passing, as an 
example of  normative discourse “pitched against the 
theoretical developments published in progressive 
architectural journals” [3]. How does one attempt 
to explain this discrepancy? How is it that a book 
that clearly impresses many philosophers fails to 
register broadly in architectural culture? There is 
of  course the possibility that aesthetics as a field 
matters to architects or artists only like ‘ornithology 
to birds’  [4]. It seems, however, that the reasons 
for the discrepancy are more complicated than that. 
Architectural culture supports, after all, a flourishing 
critical and theoretical discourse with a multitude of  
journals, books, and series all devoted to discussing 
the merits and values of  particular trends, architects, 
works, and ideas. This discourse engages quite 
intensively with a host of  philosophical references, 
and many prominent architects are actively involved 



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in the exchange. How is it then that the parameters of  the discourse 
are so clearly different in philosophical aesthetics and in architectural 
theory? Would one not expect that these fields would be involved in an 
intensive transdisciplinary dialogue? Both try, after all, to make sense 
of  what it is that drives architecture and what makes up its specific 
qualities. This review will try to delve into this problem after briefly 
discussing Scruton’s position and summarizing the book’s content and 
merits.

When The Aesthetics of  Architecture was first published in 1979 the 
book was understood as part of  a series of  publications that all focused 
on questions regarding the meaning of  architecture. Semiotics was, 
at that moment, a central concern in architectural culture, and many 
authors sought to develop an approach to architecture that could go 
beyond the functionalism and rationalism of  the modern movement. 
Such publications provided the intellectual ground for what became 
known as postmodernism, and Scruton’s book might be seen as part 
of  that endeavor. Scruton, however, was different from the other 
authors in this field (such as Norberg-Schulz, Eco, Jencks, Bonta, and 
others) in that he considerably narrowed the type of  architecture that 
he saw as ‘right.’ His book may be simplified as an argument in favor of  
some form of  classicism in architecture, and there are thus only a few 
contemporary architects whom he would sympathize with. As such, his 
position is out of  sync with the architectural culture of  the last decades. 
Classical-minded architects and theorists, just like new urbanists and 
neo-historicists, belong to a subculture which sometimes manages 
to evoke popular appeal, but which has not penetrated the academic 
sphere or the higher echelons of  the professional field.

The new introduction Scruton wrote for the 2013 edition confirms 
the impression of  desynchronization with mainstream culture. Here 
the author is more outspoken in his criticism of  modernism and in 
his alignment with particular architects and theorists than he was in 
the 1979 version of  the book. He mentions such architectural figures 
as Christopher Alexander, Nikos Salingaros, and Leon Krier as people 
who share his convictions. These are authors who indeed do not 
figure among the most prominent individuals in current architectural 
culture. Alexander and Krier briefly occupied a position of  influence 
in the 1980s and 1990s—the heydays of  postmodernism—but their 
intellectual impact has largely withered away due to the renewed 
prominence of  modernism and modernity, in all their complexities, 
as the main point of  reference. Salingaros is a mathematician and 
younger collaborator of  Alexander, who has written several works 



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on architecture and urbanism. He calls for a built 
environment catering to human emotions and 
providing agreeable and pleasant places to live, and 
thus fights ‘stararchitects’ as well as all forms of  
deconstructivism and poststructuralism. Again, 
Salingaros’s work seems to have some popular 
appeal, but it is not widely known or highly 
regarded within the architectural field as a whole, 
which rather engages with questions of  technology, 
sustainability, infrastructure, urbanism, or justice [5]. 
Many architects are weary of  easy argumentations 
like Saringaros’s because they understand how the 
call for ‘pleasant places’ can hide utter conservatism 
as well as resistance against any form of  innovation.

Let us now turn to Scruton’s book itself  and 
its arguments. The author helpfully provides a 
summary in the third part of  the book, which 
rehearses its line of  reasoning. I will draw upon 
that summary to give an overview of  his argument. 
Scruton posits in the first chapter that architecture 
does not derive its nature from being a form of  
art but rather from an everyday occupation with 
getting things right—which is basically an aesthetic 
concern. He thus wishes to start from the aesthetics 
of  everyday life as the basis for his discussions. 
In the next chapters, he deals with theories 
that, according to him, detach aesthetics from 
architecture or that erroneously perceive some 
concept as central or essential to architecture. He 
thus dismisses functionalism, rationalism, theories 
of  space and proportion, as well as discourses 
based upon the art historical concepts of  Riegl 
(Kunstwollen) and Wölflinn (Zeitgeist). All of  these 
approaches are ‘vacuous’ because they all fail to 
adequately describe the experience of  architecture. 
In order to give a positive account of  the experience 
of  architecture, Scruton reverts to the concept of  
imagination, which he deems absolutely crucial for 
his aesthetics. Moreover, he claims that it “is because 
the experience of  architecture is imaginative that 
architecture can be judged right or wrong” [6]. For 

[Scruton’s] 
position is 

out of sync 
with the 

architectural 
culture of the 
last decades.

“

”



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aesthetic judgment is based upon imagination, informed by perception, 
and modified by reasoned reflection. It aims at an ideal of  objectivity 
and at a continuity with moral life—hence its normative quality.

With all this, the basis is put together for further dismissals of  other 
competing discourses. Freudian and Marxist analyses are seen as largely 
irrelevant to the understanding of  architecture because they either 
generalize beyond aesthetics or devote themselves to a falsification of  
architectural experience, thus missing the point. The efforts of  semiotics 
to understand architecture as a language likewise turn out to be ‘vacuous’ 
because they lack a theoretical basis or a critical application. Concepts 
such as ‘representation’ or ‘expression’ are faulted for not adequately 
connecting aesthetic judgment with the practice of  the builder. Finally, 
the concluding chapters argue the importance of  detail and the role 
of  style as an indispensable adjunct to architectural knowledge. They 
culminate in a defense of  classicism, which is seen as the only approach 
to architecture that allows it to connect with a true understanding of  the 
self  and with objectivity.

This quick summary of  course does not properly acknowledge 
the depth of  the author’s knowledge or the fine-tuned details of  his 
specific discussions. Scruton is well read in the history of  architectural 
theory, and he is an expert in the tradition of  aesthetic philosophy up 
to Kant and Hegel. He clearly makes an effort to familiarize himself  
with architectural discourses such as those of  Giedion or Tafuri. Many 
of  his architectural examples are also quite illuminative and help to 
clarify his arguments. These qualities, however, cannot detract from the 
book’s weak point: its set-up as a take-it-or-leave-it argument, almost 
like a mathematical proof  that sets out to validate the correctness of  a 
formula by deriving it from previously proven formulas or from axioms. 
If, as a reader, one disagrees with only one step in the reasoning, that is 
enough to render the whole argument—and especially its conclusions—
unconvincing (or ‘vacuous,’ to use Scruton’s own term). This, of  course, 
happened to this particular reader early on in the text. I disagreed with 
Scruton’s analysis of  functionalism and the theories of  space in chapters 
2 and 3. Whereas I was still following him in chapter 1—agreeing 
with his approach to architecture as being based on utility, location, 
public character, and continuity with decorative arts, which he later 
sums up as ‘aesthetics of  the everyday’—his analysis of  functionalism 
struck the wrong chord. Scruton understands ‘theory’ as prescriptive: 
“architectural theory consists in the attempt to formulate the maxims, 
rules and precepts which govern, or ought to govern, the practice of  
the builder” [7]. That means that he is reading texts by architects as if  



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they are fully explanatory of  the architecture they 
produce, which is rarely the case. If  Hannes Meyer 
wrote manifests of  functionalism—which he 
did—this does not in turn mean that all his design 
projects can be explained as if  he just applied his 
own rules—he did not. It also means, however, that 
a mere philosophical disputation of  the correctness 
of  the theory is not enough to deny the buildings 
associated with it any aesthetical significance. It 
is not because modernist theory does not hold 
that modernist buildings therefore lack any value. 
This however seems to be an important subtext in 
Scruton’s book.

The author also takes issue with Giedion’s and 
Zevi’s theory of  space, which considers space and 
spatial articulations as the essence of  architecture. 
“Taken literally,” he states, “the theory that the 
experience of  architecture is an experience of  space 
is obviously indefensible” [8]. The reasons for 
this indefensibility however do not convince me. 
According to Scruton, as soon as one can point to 
an architectural feature that does not relate to space 
or spatial experience, the theory is invalidated. 
He thinks he found such features by referring to 
materials or by referring to the differences between 
carved and molded forms. However, for people 
thinking as architects (I count myself  among 
them), both materials and carved versus molded 
forms are fine examples of  how some details can 
articulate space in different ways, causing different 
experiences of  space. Hence for me the theory of  
space continues to be a contender for adequately 
conceiving what the ‘essence’ of  architecture might 
be. Because I thus repeatedly found unaddressed 
objections to parts of  Scruton’s argument, the 
whole book seemed to become one large fallacy, 
constructed to prove the inescapability of  what 
Scruton calls ‘classical vernacular’ as the only valid 
form of  architecture. The more I read, the more 
the text came across as a potentially interesting but 
largely irrelevant elaboration of  an argument, many 

Its set-up 
as a take 

it or leave 
argument

“
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parts of  which I found too poorly developed to sustain scrutiny.
There are other small mistakes and larger misunderstandings in this 

book that might irritate people familiar with architectural culture. (They 
are competently summed up by Juan Pablo Bonta in his review from 
1981 [9].) Rather than further repeating the flaws, however, I would like 
to point out two major issues that are responsible for the wide gap that 
separates Scruton from much contemporary reflection in architectural 
theory. The first has to do with the import of  modernity, the second 
with his claim to objectivity.

From the turn of  the twentieth century onwards, architects and 
architectural theorists have been talking about modernity. Around 1900, 
Berlage, Muthesius, Loos, Van de Velde, and many others agreed that 
industrialization and urbanization gave rise to societies with a wholly 
different way of  life, which hence necessitated a wholly different kind of  
architecture. There was a widespread consensus that modernity implied 
a rupture with tradition, and that this discontinuity somehow had to 
be reflected in architecture. The intensity of  the conviction provoked 
an aesthetics that no longer took classicism to be the ultimate point of  
reference. The new aesthetic sensibility has since been elaborated in 
many different ways—avant-garde, modernism, art deco, regionalism, 
critical regionalism, high tech, postmodernism, deconstructivism, neo-
modernism, etc.—but across the board the idea that architecture needs 
to relate—somehow—to modernity has remained paramount. This 
means that ‘getting things right,’ as Scruton says, is only part of  the 
equation for contemporary architects. Since dissonance, struggle, and 
contradictions are so much a part of  that modern condition, a new 
aesthetic register seems to be more adequate, one that can show, in a 
right way, that things are not all right. Such an aesthetic register is more 
consistent with the philosophical musings of  Walter Benjamin, Theodor 
Adorno, Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, or Gilles Deleuze—
names indeed prominently present in contemporary architectural 
culture.

Secondly there is the issue of  objectivity. Whereas I agree with 
Scruton that aesthetic judgment assumes in the act of  judging a claim to 
universal validity, I would be much more reluctant than he is to translate 
the claim into something actually true and objective. As an architectural 
theorist who has taken to heart the criticisms of  rational discourse 
coming from Marxism, feminism, and postcolonial theories, I have a 
hard time accepting Scruton’s writing as possibly universally valid. It 
rather strikes me as an excellent example of  how an intellectual of  a 
specific (hegemonic) class, gender, and culture produces a discourse 



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that serves the continuation of  the dominance of  
that class, gender, and culture. I do not believe, in 
other words, that there really is a general consensus 
possible about how buildings would ‘feel right.’ I do 
not believe that the aesthetics of  the everyday can 
be anything else than confusing, contradictory, and 
hybrid (which, by the way, I see more as an asset 
than as a problem).

All in all, I think Scruton’s The Aesthetics of  
Architecture narrows architecture to something 
which most of  its practitioners today would not 
recognize as such—as if  architecture essentially 
deals with only questions of  style and detail, 
regardless of  everything else. Most architects and 
theorists would agree that architecture necessarily 
engages with the real world—that it is crucial 
therefore to consider political and social issues 
(such as, Who is the client? Who is excluded? Who 
is included?), technological and material questions, 
ecological constraints, contextual considerations, 
and so on, as part and parcel of  what architecture is 
all about. An aesthetic theory valid for today needs 
to adequately address these issues, not putting them 
aside as ‘marginal’ to the ‘essence’ of  architecture. 
I am afraid that Scruton’s book does not live up to 
these expectations, not in 1979 and not now.

ENDNOTES
[1] Andy Hamilton and Nick Zangwill (eds.), 
Scruton’s Aesthetics (New York: Pallgrave Macmillan, 
2012).
[2] Rafael De Clercq, “Scruton on Rightness of  
Proportion in Architecture,” British Journal of  
Aesthetics 49, no. 4 (2009): 405.
[3] John Macarthur and Naomi Stead, 
“Introduction: Architecture and Aesthetics,” in 
The SAGE Handbook of  Architectural Theory, eds. 
Greig Crysler, Stephen Cairns, and Hilde Heynen 
(London: Sage, 2012), 126.
[4] Barnett Newman, “Untitled” (presentation, 4th 
Annual Woodstock Art Conference, Woodstock, 

I would be 
much more 
reluctant 

than he is to 
translate 

a claim into 
something 

actually true 
and objective.

“

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NY, August 22-23, 1952).
[5] The SAGE Handbook of  Architectural Theory doesn’t even mention 
Salingaros.
[6] Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of  Architecture (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 240.
[7] Ibid., 3.
[8] Ibid., 39.
[9] Juan Pablo Bonta, review of  The Aesthetics of  Architecture, by Roger 
Scruton, Journal of  Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39, no. 3 (1981): 328-330.




