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Some have said that it was fire and water which 
were initially responsible for bringing men together 
into communities, but we, considering how useful, 
even indispensable, a roof  and walls are for men, are 
convinced that it was they that drew and kept men 
together. 1

These remarks on architecture’s social function 
are taken from Giovanni Battista Alberti´s De re 
aedificatoria, in which he searches for underlying 
principles behind the architectural categories and 
concepts of  Vitruvius. This passage expresses both 
an underlying principle of  social life and awards 
architecture a unique role in relation to society: 
Because four walls and a roof  bind a group of  
people together they are a force that fashions a 
society.

Alberti, however, bases society also on a strong 
notion of  the individual human being; and thus for 
him, architecture’s second, and equally important 
focus must be the individual. This focus is, as 
he emphasizes, a necessary precondition for the 
socially important varietas (variety) of  the city. In the 
beginning of  the fourth of  his ten books, dedicated 
to the scrutiny of  “works of  a public nature”, he 
writes: 

It is obvious that buildings were made to serve man. 
[…] buildings were designed for life´s necessities, 
others offer themselves for practical requirements, 
while still others are for occasions of  pleasure, […].

Yet, when we look around at the quantity and the 
variety of  buildings, it is easy to understand that […] 
the range of  different works depends principally on 

we [...]        
must begin 

here, by 
considering 

human 
variety in 

greater 
detail

“

”

THE need for a philosophical 
anthropology of architecture

Martin Düchs & Christian Illies



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the variation within human nature. If  we wish to give an accurate account of  the 
various types of  buildings (as was our intention) and of  their constituent elements, 
our whole method of  investigation must open and begin here, by considering 
human variety in greater detail; since buildings arose on man´s account, and for 
his needs they vary; so that they may be dealt with more clearly by distinguishing 
their individual characteristics.2  

For Alberti, only if  the individuality of  human beings is taken as the starting 
point, can architecture fulfil its social role; and only then do we understand 
the task of  architecture properly.3 Good architecture and good cities care 
for both society and individual human beings; but the individual must 
come first. Alberti was inspired by the ideals of  early modernity which 
celebrated the re-birth (Re-naissance) of  individual  accomplishment. It 
was a time when man became a self-aware individual as Jacob Burckhardt 
famously stated in The Civilization of  the Renaissance in Italy in 1860—at the 
same time proposing Alberti as a true Renaissance-man (uomo universale).4

Alberti set the tone for subsequent thinkers up to the modern period. 
The 20th-century’s concern about the role of  architecture for society is 
like a distant echo of  his thoughts, but in a lopsided way. Modernity often 
focuses too much on society. Equality becomes the prime value and for 
some the collective gains absolute priority over the individual. Not much 
has changed when we reflect on the digital revolution and other major 
transformations relating to architecture in the 21st century. Debates are 
largely dominated by ideas and texts of  architectural modernity and its 
tradition that remains biased towards the collective over the individual. 
For Le Corbusier or Hannes Meyer5 and other heroes of  this tradition, the 
individual human plays a subordinate role, despite occasional contradictory 
utterances (for example in the Athens Charter).6 To be sure, this is a somewhat 
simplified picture that forces at least three reservations: First, architectural 
modernity is not a homogenous movement. One can distinguish at least 
five strands of  early architectural modernity at the beginning of  the 20th 
century: constructivism, functionalism, rationalism and biomorphic and 
sculptural architecture.7 And especially within biomorphic architecture we 
can find architects like Hugo Häring who take the biological functionings 
of  the single human being as their starting point.8 Despite this variety 
of  approaches it seems fair to talk about architectural modernity in a 
more general sense to identify its predominant form (sometimes called 
“International Style” or “Neues Bauen”), promoted by Walter Gropius, 
Hannes Meyer and Le Corbusier as dominant figures who sought to tie 
modernism to social change. Second: Since World War Two, additional 
varieties in the form of  postmodernism or deconstructivism have 



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emerged. These movements can be defined as 
reactions to modernity. However, in retrospect, 
they did little to challenge its basic precepts. Third: 
Several outstanding modernist architects did place 
the single human being in the centre of  their 
(mostly practical) efforts. Alvar Aalto, for example, 
stressed the importance of  individual human beings 
(as Nicholas Ray has pointed out9). In his address 
to his old school, the Jyvaskyla Lyceum, Aalto says 
that in order to make a “cultural contribution” one 
needs an “unwillingness to ‘move with the stream,’” 
that can ultimately be transformed into a “love with 
a critical sensibility […] It is a love that lasts, as it 
rests on a critically tested foundation. It can result 
in such a love for the little man that it functions 
as a kind of  guardian when our era’s mechanized 
lifestyle threatens to strangle the individual and the 
organically harmonious life.”10 Ralph Erskine and 
Aldo van Eyck embody other prominent examples 
who consciously aimed to balance concern for both 
society and the individual as Alberti demanded. But 
these architects are to be regarded as exceptions 
from the rule. Their works are explicitly judged as 
“humane architecture” in order to distinguish it 
from the mainstream,11 which means that the latter 
is obviously seen as somehow less humane and—
again—one reason for this is that in general social 
considerations are regarded as more important than 
“considering human variety in greater detail.”

Thus, we can grant the architecture of  
modernity is more complex than our initial remarks 
might have suggested while continuing to assert a 
dominant discourse biased in favour of  the social. 
There are at least three reasons for this bias. First 
of  all architectural modernity continues to derive 
much of  its impetus as a political project that aims 
at improving the structure of  modern societies by 
architectural means.12 Industrialization had brought 
about modern mass societies, migration to the 
cities, and diverse social problems of  all sorts; and 

  The focus            
on improving 

society and the 
collective is 

a trademark 
of the 20th 

century, 
not only in 

architecture 
but cross 
post-war 

intellectual 
life.

“

”



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there was an increasing need to respond to them–socialism, incorporated 
in architectural modernity, became the most prominent attempt to do so. 
This impetus continues today in architecture’s insistence that it be part of  
the solution to global warming and to homelessness. 

Secondly, the dominant architects of  the modernist socialism 
subscribed to the idea that the individual s a product of  society and not 
vice versa. The individual’s reality is an “ensemble of  social relations,” as 
Marx famously remarks. As a consequence, architectural modernism 
understood itself  as part of  the project to create a better human being, 
via creating a better architecture for a new society without, for example, 
unjust privileges. This orientation also explains why equality became the 
dominant aesthetic guideline for this project. Equality, however, can often 
be mistaken for sameness, and an architecture exclusively guided by this 
idea tends to create over-homogenous environments. 

Finally, the focus on improving society and the collective is a trademark 
of  the 20th century, not only in architecture but also across post-war 
intellectual life. Most humanities, but philosophy in particular, have 
replaced the “paradigm of  the epistemic subject” (that dominated 18th 
and 19th century philosophy) by the new “paradigm of  inter-subjectivity,” 
as Karl-Otto Apel famously calls it.13 Language is the grand topic of  the 
early 20th century, the age of  the linguistic turn; and since language is, by 
its very nature, a social not individual reality, the turn pushes philosophical 
reflection towards society. Wittgenstein’s “form of  life”, Habermas’ 
“discursive community,” or even Heidegger’s critique of  the modern 
subject are prime examples of  the new paradigm. Inspired by Nietzsche 
and Heidegger, Foucault has even claimed that there is no such thing as 
the human being: “As the archaeology of  our thought easily shows, man 
is an invention of  recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. […] one 
can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at 
the edge of  the sea.”14

Alternative approaches that emphasize the individual human had a 
short life in the 20th century. Most notably, the so-called Philosophical 
Anthropology, a school of  thought between 1920 and 1960, did not have 
a lasting influence. Its main representatives, Max Scheler, Arnold Gehlen, 
Helmuth Plessner, Ernst Cassirer, and Hans Jonas (the two latter being 
both members of  the tradition in a wider sense), tried to conceptualize 
what it means to be an individual, yet also a group-oriented social being, in 
an age of  modern science. This movement was never given much attention 
by Anglo-Saxon philosophy and stopped rather abruptly on the continent 
when people like Jonas and Cassirer had to emigrate and then philosophers 



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and sociologists of  the Frankfurt School began to 
dominate the philosophical discourse. In a famous 
paper from 1958, Habermas tellingly argued that 
Philosophical Anthropology should be entirely 
replaced by sociology because there is no relevant 
notion of  the individual outside society–and it took 
him decades to moderate his conviction.15

And this still seems where architectural theory 
stands today. We find plenty of  debate on formal 
questions, but when it 
comes to what architecture 
is about (or what building 
is for), most discussions 
focus on society. The topics 
of  the Venice Biennale for 
Architecture over the last 
20 years provide ample 
evidence: Except for the 
“Fundamentals” exhibition 
in 2014 (Rem Koolhaas) 
and partly the exhibitions 
“Out there: Architecture Beyond Building” (Aaron 
Betsky 2008) and “Next” (Deyan Sudjic 2002), all 
of  the biennales dealt with either societal or formal 
problems: “Reporting from the Front” (Alejandro 
Aravena 2016), “Common Ground” (David 
Chipperfield 2012), “People Meet in Architecture” 
(Kazujo Sejima 2010), “Cities, Architecture and 
Society” (Richard Burdett 2006), “Metamorph” 
(Kurt W. Forster 2004), and “Less Aesthetics more 
Ethics” (Massimiliano Fuksas 2000). 

And so Alberti’s second criterion for good 
architecture and good cities, a focus on the well-
being of  the individual, is still unjustly neglected. 
A research field that would continue the tradition 
of  Philosophical Anthropology and apply it to 
architecture simply does not exist.16 

Do we need any such endeavour? We believe 
that it is as much required for any profound 
philosophy of  architecture as for architectural 

figure 1: venue of the 3rd 
international ISPA-Conference 

“The human in architecture 
and philosophy”. Bamberg: 

Villa Concordia



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theory. Alberti can still remind us why architectural sociology, or a 
philosophy of  architecture that focuses on society while neglecting 
the individual will always be insufficient. On a theoretical level, the 
relationship between the individual and society seems much more 
complex than much 20th century sociology and philosophy has assumed. 
Evolutionary and developmental psychology, amongst others, have shown 
that there are innate individual human needs, desires, and tendencies that 
have some correspondence in society, but are not simply their product. 
If  architecture wants to respond adequately to this complex interactive 
relationship between society and the individual, it will have to develop 
more individualistic and flexible theories than mainstream modernism 
has been able to supply. Environmental psychology has shown that our 
relationship with buildings is both personal and individual. That is why 
a traditional sociological theory of  architecture will not do. The problem 
is sharpened by the two conflicting tendencies that characterize our 
globalized world: one tendency towards multi-culturalism and the other 
towards an atomistic, uniform consumerism. Both tendencies dissolve 
traditional, more homogenous societies. They demand new architectural 
strategies of  community-building and of  guarding people against an 
overwhelming standardisation and enforced conformism. All of  that 
speaks for an important role of  architectural philosophy: it should pave 
the theoretical way for a more balanced view by adding a practical focus 
on the individual and the possibilities of  creating space for all her needs 
and desires, thus for the good life within a community. This new research 
field might be called Philosophical Architectural Anthropology. 

There is already a research-field called “Architectural Anthropology” in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, but as yet, it is more a sociological or ethnological 
endeavour than a philosophical. What we need is an investigation that is at 
least supplemented by philosophical considerations. This is something that 
is also argued for from within the already existing field of  Architectural 
Anthropology: 

The anthropology adjectivized as architectural should be a critical, ethical 
anthropology that keeps asking fundamental, philosophical questions about 
what being human and communicating through culture mean and what is best 
for humans in terms of  what is habitable. Therefore, anthropology should 
add to interdisciplinary roots and evolutionary interests—characteristics that 
accompanied its birth a century ago—an ethical dimension that will provide 
a new set of  questions to evaluate the huge ethnographical and archaeological 
corpus of  information on the diverse human habitats created over the years.17  

A first step towards a Philosophical Architectural Anthropology was 



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made at the 3rd International Conference of  the 
International Society for the Philosophy of  Architecture 
from July 19th to 23rd 2016 at Bamberg University, 
Germany, with the topic “The Human in 
Architecture and Philosophy.” Some papers have 
already been published in 2018 in a special issue of  
ArchitecturePhilosophy (APJ, vol. 3 No.1/2017); this 
is the second selection of  papers that come out of  
the conference. 

We open with Gerald Adler’s “Architecture is 
Concealed Unto Itself: Helmuth Plessner and his 
Influence on Twentieth-Century Architecture.” 
Adler presents the architectural implications 
of  German philosopher Helmuth Plessner’s 
Philosophical Anthropology. Plessner (1892-1985) 
saw the human being as characterised by an “ex-
centric positionality,” because humans, unlike 
animals, are able to self-distance, to be “out of  
their centre.” Having simultaneously different 
perspectives on oneself  constitutes the conditio 
humana, according to Plessner. He specified this 
ex-centric positionality in the form of  three 
anthropological laws that are also in the centre 
of  Gerald Adler’s analysis: The law of  natural 
artificiality, the law of  mediated immediacy (or immanence 
and expressivity, the law that is most interesting for 
the philosophy of  architecture,) and the law of  
nothingness and transcendence, which “drives man to 
engage in culture, it awakens needs that can only 
be satisfied through a system of  artificial objects.”18 
Buildings are obvious examples of  such objects, 
produced within each society’s architectural culture. 
Adler’s assessment of  the importance of  Plessner’s 
thought for architecture not only introduces a 
much-neglected twentieth-century philosopher to 
an English-speaking audience, but also provides 
reflections that lie at the very heart of  what we call 
a Philosophical Architectural Anthropology. 

Following Adler, we continue our focus on the 
individual, this time, however, on the individual 

  This                    
new research 

field might 
be called 

Philosophical 
Architectural 
Anthropology

“

”



creator with Aleksandar Kostić’s “Aporia in Architectural Design.” An 
aporia, the experience of  irresolvable internal contradictions, emerges 
when a designer, presented with apparently contradictory requirements, is 
unsure how to proceed further with her design, and finds that striking out 
in a new direction is necessary to overcome her perplexity. Thus, an initial 
source of  a designer’s dismay becomes both the occasion and demand for 
creative problem-solving. But, the resolution of  this kind of  puzzlement 
in architecture can only arise if  the designer understands the conundrum 
and is fully engaged with the aporia. To explain the creative potential of  
aporiai, Kostić draws on the accounts that Plato and Aristotle give us in 
their works before moving into a detailed account of  a classic aporia in 
architecture where the Ionic order must turn a corner. He then generalizes 
from this example to suggest that “aporia has intrinsic value for design 
and therefore that it should somehow be present in the more abstract 
subject matter of  design itself.”19

Graham Owen’s paper, “The Anthropology of  a Smoke-filled Room: 
Ethnography and the Human at OMA,” moves us decisively back to a 
contemporary situation by employing the conceptual tools of  Bruno 
Latour’s Actor Network Theory and the participant-observation work 
of  Albena Yaneva to dissect the labour practices and ensuing working 
conditions of  the celebrated Dutch architectural office. The article 
contrasts the relative absence of  discussion of  issues of  labour and working 
conditions in other studies of  OMA with their prominence in recent work 
by observers of  architectural education and by activist academics such 
as Peggy Deamer, Paolo Tombesi and Mabel Wilson. A clearly ethical 
concern with the well-being of  individuals underlies this discussion, not 
of  architectural objects, but of  potentially abusive processes which give 
rise to architectural objects.

The last two papers derive from keynotes from the 3rd international 
ISPA-conference by two great figures in the philosophy of  architecture 
who, not at all coincidentally, happen to be two champions of  the human 
individual in architecture. They have consciously kept their oral style.

In his reflections on “Ut Architectura Philosophia? Questioning the 
Relationship of  Architecture and Philosophy”, Karsten Harries considers 
the mutual inspiration of  philosophy and architecture, their relationship 
and their mutual contributions to one another. To look at philosophy’s 
contribution to architecture more closely, Harries begins by asking what 
it means that architecture should build for humans. By reference to 
observations by Vitruvius, Hegel, and Le Corbusier, Harries argues that 
“the requirements of  human dwelling resist their reduction to the need 



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for physical shelter or functional frames for certain 
activities.  Not only the body, the spirit, too, needs 
shelter, shelter especially from the terror of  time.” 
He then considers how architecture might influence 
philosophy. Harries looks at Heidegger, his important 
source of  inspiration, and focusses on the need of  
humans to dwell and find a place—physically but 
also self-reflectively, thus philosophically. In his The 
Ethical Function of  Architecture (1997), a classic of  the 
Heidegger-based phenomenological tradition of  
the philosophy of  architecture, Harries had argued 
for the power of  buildings to interpret the most 
fundamental truths of  human existence, and to 
give humans a place and thus ethical orientation. 
Does that assertion still hold or is our modern 
society un-representable by architecture? Harries 
renews his earlier position powerfully by focussing 
on the challenges of  modernity that seem to refuse 
a dwelling-place. Consequently, our world is most 
adequately represented by the decorated shed (a 
term popularized by Robert Venturi), a functional 
building with a superficial aesthetic addition. 
This shed becomes a “potent figure for the 
spiritual situation of  this age, which tends covers 
up the spiritual poverty that is the price of  our 
objectification of  reality, with an often borrowed 
aesthetic veneer.” But we are in need of  more, 
he argues. Humans still have to find a meaningful 
place. To what extent architecture, or even reason-
based philosophy, might still be able to provide the 
much needed orientation, must remain somewhat 
open.

While Karsten Harries is a founding father 
of  contemporary phenomenological philosophy 
of  architecture, Roger Scruton’s The Aesthetics of  
Architecture (1979) plays the same role for the entire 
analytic tradition of  philosophy of  architecture. The 
title of  his keynote from the Bamberg-conference, 
“Aesthetic Education and Design,” indicates his 
central contribution to a philosophical architectural 



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anthropology: We need a fundamental architectural education, Scruton 
argues, “in which pattern, composition, and the idea of  fit are given a proper 
place, and in which function and utility are regarded as the consequences 
of  beauty and not prior requirements that must be independently 
fulfilled.” Only such an education can work as an “antidote” to the kind of  
“depersonalised madness that had possessed the schools of  architecture 
and town planning in the wake of  the Second World War.” Its desire has 
been and still is, he critiques, a “total solution” and thus a “total control 
in manifestoes and projects that involve destroying whole settlements and 
cities.” Since this madness is inhuman, to fight it via education (and in 
keynotes) becomes a moral obligation. The new education must “transmit 
a culture that embodies shared conceptions of  life and discovered 
solutions to life’s problems, including the principal problem, which is how 
to live at peace with one’s neighbours and competitors, even when you 
dislike them.” 

Given Scruton’s well-known public engagement for re-establishing 
beauty in the public space, it comes to no surprise that his keynote turned 
into philosophie engagé, a passionate Philippica for a new education and for 
beauty as a primary goal in architectural design. And since few escape 
the vigour of  his pen and voice, his keynote obviously provoked critical 
responses at the Bamberg-conference. This provides an excellent basis 
for a debate about his theses. In a future issue of  Architecture Philosophy 
we would like to present several responses to Scruton’s plea for changes 
to architectural education and his attack on the apparent failure of  most 
architectural modernism. We hope in this way to further a stated goal of  
the journal to provide a forum for ongoing discussions and continue these 
exchanges in subsequent issues. 

Next to contemplation, engaged argumentation, debates and 
disagreement are the elixir of  philosophical life. According to Thomas 
Kuhn, strong debates and heavy disagreements can also mark the crisis of  
an existing paradigm and the search for a new one. It seems fair to argue 
that architecture is currently in a crisis and struggling about what sort 
of  answer it can provide in the modern world shaken by environmental, 
societal and political crisis, in which the over-challenged, homeless 
individual still has to find his or her place to dwell.  And this place must be 
built. We hope that a flourishing Philosophical Architectural Anthropology will 
contribute to it being a good one.

Martin Düchs and Christian Illies



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Endnotes

[1] Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of  Building. In 
Ten Books, translated by Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach 
and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge, Mass, London: 
MIT Press, 1988 [1452]) Prologue, 3.

[2] Ibid., book IV, Chap. 1, p.92.

[3] Hanno-Walter Kruft, A History of  Architectural 
Theory. From Vitruvius to the Present. (New York: 
Princeton Architectural Press., 1994), 49.

[4] See: Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of  the 
Renaissance in Italy (New York: Modern Library, 
2002 [1860]). 

[5] The writings of  the former Bauhaus director 
(1928-1930) Hannes Meyer are probably the most 
striking example for the ideas mentioned. In his 
essay “Die neue Welt” from 1926 he states for 
example as follows: „Die Gemeinschaft beherrscht 
das Einzelwesen. […] Das sicherste Kennzeichen 
wahrer Gemeinschaft ist die Befriedigung 
gleicher Bedürfnisse mit gleichen Mitteln. Das 
Ergebnis solcher Kollektivforderung ist das 
Standardprodukt.” Hannes Meyer, „Die Neue Welt“ 
in: Das Werk 13 (7, 1926), 205. Online: http://www.
cloud-cuckoo.net/openarchive/Autoren/Meyer/
Meyer1926.htm.

[6] See especially the §87 of  the Athens Charter of  
the CIAM. Le Corbusier, The Athens Charter (New 
York: Grossman Publishers 1973), 101. 

[7] See: Jürgen Pahl, Architekturtheorie des 20. 
Jahrhunderts (München, London, New York: Prestel, 
1999), 54.

[8] See Peter Blundell-Jones, Hugo Häring. The organic 
versus the geometric (Stuttgart: Ed. Axel Menges, 1999).

[9] Nicholas Ray, Aalto (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2005).

[10] Quoted in Göran Schildt, ed.: Alvar Aalto in his 
Own Words (New York: Rizzoli International, 1998). 



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[11] See: Mats Egelius ed., Ralph Erskine: the Humane Architect. AD - 
Architectural Design Vol 47 (11-12, AD Profile 9. London, Architectural 
Design, 1977). See also: Winfried Nerdinger, ed.: Alvar Aalto. Toward a 
Human Modernism (Munich, London, New York: Prestel, 1999)

[12] Le Corbusier concludes his seminal book Toward an Architecture from 
1923 with considerations about architecture as the key to solve societal 
problems: “C’est une question de bâtiment qui est à la clé de l’équilibre 
rompu aujourd’hui : architecture ou révolution.” Le Corbusier, Vers une 
Architecture (Collection de “L’Esprit Nouveau”. Paris: Éditions Crès, 1923)

[13] See: Otto Apel, „Die Kommunikationsgemeinschaft als transzendentale 
Voraussetzung der Sozialwissenschaften,“ in Transformation der Philosophie, 
(vol. 2, 1972), 220–263.

[14] Michel Foucault, The Order of  Things. An Archaeology of  the Human 
Sciences. (London Routledge, 2006), 442. 

[15] Jürgen Habermas, “philosophische Anthropologie“ in Alwin Diemer 
und Ivo Frenzel, ed., Fischer Lexikon Philosophie (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 
1958), 18–35.

[16] There is social or cultural anthropology of  architecture, but these 
sciences dwell upon different issues and mostly place, again, society in the 
centre.

[17] Mari-Jose Amerlinck, “The Meaning and Scope of  Architectural 
Anthropology,” in Mari-Jose Amerlinck, ed., Architectural Anthropology 
(Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 2001), 1–26.

[18] Helmuth Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch: 
Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1928), 
reprinted 1975 (Berlin: de Gruyter), Sammlung Göschen 2200.

[19] The quote is taken from Aleksandar Kostić’s paper in this volume.


