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Aporia in Architectural Design

Aleksandar Kostic

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I will be looking at the notion 
of  aporia, as traditionally understood, and how 
it may apply in the field of  architectural design. 
First, I will explain what aporia is and then clarify 
its role in inquiry, as originally conceived in Plato 
and Aristotle, emphasizing its way of  searching 
by encountering an impasse and articulating and 
formulating an intractable puzzle.

 In book Beta of  his Metaphysics, Aristotle 
says: “Those who search without first engaging 
with aporiai are like people who don’t know where 
they need to be going; moreover, they do not even 
know whether or not they have found what they are 
searching for. For the end [of  a search] is not clear 
to such a person, but it is clear to the person who 
has first raised aporiai.”1 If  we accept Aristotle’s 
claim that aporia is indeed necessary for inquiry and 
if  design is a form of  inquiry, then it is reasonable 
to expect to find aporia in design.

In section two I consider the domain for the 
emergence of  aporia which will show us where to 
look for aporia in design. I will also indicate laws 
of  thought that traditionally apply in the setting of  
this domain. Not all laws of  thought are universally 
accepted in contemporary logic, and some relevant 
distinctions must be noted. It is important to note 
that the domain includes classical and formal logic 
extended to modal logic, but excludes paraconsistent 
logical systems. Setting aporia’s domain will allow 
me to identify both the source and necessary 
conditions for the emergence of  aporia and, in 



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turn, the necessary conditions for finding aporia in design.

Section three presents a clear case of  aporia in architectural design. 
I will show that, given the initial distinctions and certain rules that apply, 
any problem with clearly defined design intention would present a good 
enough source to demonstrate this type of  puzzle in architecture. The 
conflict inherent in cornering the classical Ionic order presents such an 
example of  aporetic reasoning in architectural design. Aporia, therefore, 
can be shown not only to be useful and routinely used, it is also of  
instrumental value in the practice of  architectural design.

Section four investigates whether aporia is also intrinsic to design 
theory. If  it is the case that aporia has intrinsic value for design, then 
it should somehow be present in the more abstract subject matter of  
design itself. Its existence might be revealed within an attempt to establish 
the foundations of  a design theory. After making a distinction between 
dilemmas and aporiai, one of  these attempts will be examined to determine 
if  the question of  the subject matter of  design and its unclear ontological 
status may indeed produce an aporetic situation.

If  this proves to be the case, it shows that design is intrinsically 
aporetic. An ancient myth of  Prometheus tells us that the “wisdom of  the 
arts,” such as house building indeed have something intrinsically aporetic. 
In Protagoras’s speech given by Plato in his dialogue Protagoras,2 human 
beings receive gifts from the Titan Prometheus (the Fore-thinker),3 namely 
fire, and, often forgotten, the arts (τέχνη). This was a compensation for 
the lack of  other human abilities, since these had already been distributed 
to other living creatures by his twin-brother, Epimetheus (the After-
thinker).4 For our purposes, it is important to underline two aspects here. 
Firstly, this story explains to us some of  the fundamental tensions of  the 
human condition; in our actions, we seem to be spread between planning 
and reflecting upon our plans; in our emotions, we are sometimes split 
between desire and fear; and in our thoughts, we are often torn between 
thinking ahead and an afterthought. But more importantly, this story is 
relevant as Prometheus himself  seems to be in perplexity, in the state of  
aporia.5 Out of  his aporia he reasons out and finds a solution: fire and arts 
are to be given to human kind. Both the “wisdom of  arts” and fire (which, 
in Plato, is an image of  knowledge or insight) were instilled in human kind. 
Thanks to this, people invented house building and many other crafts. In 
some, perhaps remote sense, both human access to knowledge and the 
human condition are related to aporetic states of  mind as their original 
source.



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1. WHAT EXACTLY IS APORIA?

Aporia is a Greek word, and it literally means 
“no passage” or “no way out” (‎a-, “a-”=no, 
without) + πόρος ‎(póros=“passage”).6 Plato, 
committed to the method of  dialectic, never 
spells out an exact definition of  aporia. He rather 
demonstrates aporiai through conversations 
between the interlocutors in his dialogues. Some of  
the dialogues begin with aporia, some are centred 
on it, while others end in it. On the other hand, 
Aristotle provides a few definitions of  aporia: one 
in Metaphysics, quoted above;7 and another one in 
his Topics, when he defines aporia as a state of  mind 
caused by “equality of  opposite reasonings.”8 Plato 
strictly distinguished knowledge from opinions in 
his Republic.9 His elaboration on the poverty of  the 
senses in the Myth of  the Cave10 comes after the 
distinction between the realm of  opinions from 
the realm of  knowledge in the famous divided line 
analogy.11 The realm of  reality which is accessible 
to the senses, the apparent world, is subjected to 
experiential opinions, while the intellectual, or, for 
Plato, the only real world, is accessible through 
knowledge (Figure 1).12 The only entities that really 
exist are universal Forms or ideas. Thanks to their 
high ontological status, these Forms represent 
the only possible object of  knowledge, as only 
what is perfectly real can be properly known. 
In the divided line analogy, a clear hierarchy of  
cognitive capacities (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς) and 
their corresponding objects is established. Images, 
shadows and reflections of  things are less real than 
things themselves; images of  Forms are more real 
than things, but less real than Forms themselves, 
and so on. In addition, each cognitive capacity has 
its own mode of  cognition and way of  searching. 
The lower end of  cognitive capacities, concerned 
with sensible particulars, is reserved for imagination 
(εἰκασία) and belief  (πίστις). These two capacities 
are based on observation and together form an 

aporia—the 
state of being 

perplexed, 
puzzled, 
lacking 

resources, or 
being at a loss

“

”



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opinion (δόξα). The higher end (intellect) is also split into two cognitive 
capacities—between thinking (διάνοια) and reasoning (νοῦς). The 
unchangeable objects, corresponding with thinking, are representable in 
the physical world (by use of  drawings, numbers, etc.) and sometimes are 
referred to as mathematicals or as intermediaries. Discursive thought, with 
the use of  a hypothesis (assumed to be true), is its mode of  cognition. The 
commonly used example to describe this way of  searching is mathematics, 
or Plato’s favourite—geometry. Our highest cognitive capacity, which is 
reasoning (νοῦς), has Forms (ideas) as its object of  searching; it reaches 
towards the highest realm of  knowing (ἐπιστήμη), and it searches through 
dialectic.

 It is precisely dialectic that puts the “mind’s eye” in a position to 
access and “see” the puzzles within this highest realm of  reality. The 
capacity to recognise how exactly a particular puzzle becomes the source 
of  aporia belongs to a “considerable dialectical ability.”13 Aporiai are 
therefore resolved by means of  dialectical investigation.

It is traditionally accepted that aporia in Plato has a purifying effect. 
Supposedly, aporia purifies the inquirer from the pretence of  knowledge 
on the subject of  investigation. Often, Socrates’s interlocutor, faced with 
a Socratic demand for definition, presents an account about the matter of  

Figure 1: Plato’s Divided Line. See Plato, Republic, VII, 509d-511e. 



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inquiry, typically based on personal experience or 
belief. After Socrates has refuted him, or at any rate 
put his belief  to the test, the interlocutor, having 
no other alternative, doesn’t know how to proceed 
and is in a state of  aporia. The immediate effects of  
the aporetic state of  mind are speechlessness and 
inarticulateness, but, as Politis points out,14 these 
are only adding to the overwhelming feeling of  
uneasiness and distress15 or lack of  resourcefulness 
and a strong sense of  intellectual incompetence.16 
Generally, the way the interlocutor responds to this 
disclosure largely depends on his character, but 
it also points at his intellectual limitations. If  the 
interlocutor exhibits anger and remains paralysed, 
his chances to progress in dialectics are quite 
limited. If, on the other hand one accepts one’s own 
lack of  knowledge, only then it will be possible for 
one to progress further in the search. Besides this 
cathartic role, more importantly, aporia has also a 
searching (zetetic) function.17 Namely, aporia is not 
only a mental state of  puzzlement but is indeed a 
puzzle about the matter of  inquiry. The essential 
property of  such a puzzle is the co-existence 
of  two sides, seemingly opposed. The apparent 
contradiction is present in an aporia when two 
propositions both seem to be true, but are mutually 
exclusive. Apparently, when two propositions are 
contradictory, at least one of  them must be false. 
This is precisely what constitutes aporia—seeming 
logical impossibility. The decisive move then, in 
order to resolve aporia, consists in searching for 
the possibility to eliminate contradiction (e.g., by 
arguing that both sides of  aporia are true).

Let us now look at a classic example of  Socratic 
aporia and its resolution, which incidentally is about 
Socrates’ own wisdom: “What can the god possibly 
mean and why does he speak in riddles? For I am 
only too conscious that I have no pretence of  
wisdom, great or small. So what can he mean when 
he [Apollo] says that I am the most wise? For surely 



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he does not utter falsehoods; that would not be proper for him.”18 In analysis 
of  this passage Politis suggests two seemingly contradictory propositions 
(both apparently true, but mutually exclusive): “(1) ‘I know that I am not 
wise in any way’; and (2) ‘The god, who does not lie, pronounces me the 
most wise.’”19 He points out that Socrates’s “immediate response is to 
ask what this apparent contradiction can possibly mean, that is how both 
its sides can be true.”20 Politis goes even further, proposing that this way 
of  posing the problem is also a model of  at least one way of  solving an 
aporia—by drawing a distinction.21

2. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCE OF APORIA

It is now established that the essential property of  aporia is the 
apparent contradiction between two attractive propositions. I will next set 
the domain and elaborate the conditions for the emergence of  aporia, 
bearing in mind differences between standard and non-standard logical 
systems. 

In classical logic, a proposition can have only one out of  two truth-
values at any given time and in any given sense—these values are true or 
false: Either Socrates is wise, or he is not.

Aristotle’s law of  non-contradiction (LNC) maintains that it is 
impossible to hold the same thing to exist and not to exist; or for the same 
thing to have and not to have the same property; or for the same thing to 
have a property and a contrary property.22 Aristotle argues that this principle 
cannot be strictly demonstrated (for any demonstration presupposes it 
and makes use of  it), but also that it is the firmest of  all basic principles.23 
However, some non-standard logical systems partially or in whole reject 
this principle of  non-contradiction (Figure 2). For example, in the logic 
of  Łukasiewicz a proposition can have three distinct truth-values—true, 
false, and unknown (“neither true nor false”).24 In probabilistic and fuzzy 
logic a proposition can have an infinite number of  different truth-values.25

Any paraconsistent logical system (fuzzy logic, intuitionist logic, 
or dialetheism) are not of  interest here not only because the topic of  
this paper deals predominantly with the notions of  aporia in Plato and 
Aristotle, which in time greatly precedes the emergence of  these extended 
systems of  logic in the twentieth-century, but also because classical and 
standard logic as well as  modern science and contemporary thinking are 
still vastly depending on the truth-values in a traditional sense and have 



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FIGURE 2: Classification of logic, based on the inclusion of the principles of reasoning (ID, LC, LM), use 

of quantificators and formal language, and, finally, domain of truth-values (standard 2-valued 

logic systems including modal logic; paraconsistent logic systems including 3-value logic system of 

Łukasiewitz, Gödel’s finite-many value logic, and infinite-many value logic (fuzzy logic). 



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no tolerance for inconsistency within the system.26 Furthermore, any 
form of  many-valued logic systems must be excluded here, because where 
the tension between opposing truth-values is downplayed (fuzzy logic), 
or largely non-existent (dialethism), due to the presentation of  another 
one or many other options (besides true and false), the notion of  aporia, 
which rests on precisely this tension between the equality of  reasoning 
on opposing sides simply would not apply or even make much sense in 
any such inquiry.27 In fact, if  there is another way out, besides the two 
apparently mutually-exclusive propositions being true, the impasse, which 
is a key feature of  aporia, will simply not arise. The aporia also cannot 
arise when the principle of  non-contradiction is excluded from the logical 
system simply because it wouldn’t be possible to distinguish between a 
contradiction and a non-contradiction, let alone to make a distinction 
between the apparent and the real contradiction. 

To further refine the conditions under which aporiai can arise, 
a distinction must be made between (1) contradictory claims, which 
can give rise to aporia, and (2) the situations where opposing sides of  
reasoning are only contraries or sub-contraries, in which case they cannot 
give rise to aporia. Let us remind ourselves of  the difference between 
the contradictions and contraries in traditional propositional and predicate 
logic. Two propositions are contradictory when the truth of  one implies 
the falsity of  the other, or when the falsity of  one determines the truth 
of  other. According to Johnson, “contradictories have exactly opposite 
truth-values. If  A is true, then O is false, and vice versa.”28 For example, 
in propositional logic, the negation of  the proposition “Socrates is 
wise” would be “it is not the case that Socrates is wise.” This forms a 
contradictory opposition between the propositions. In standard logic, these 
two propositions are (1) mutually exclusive, which means that only one of  
them can be true, and (2) mutually exhaustive, which means that nothing 
else is possible. It becomes clear that if  and only if  it is the case that two 
propositions are at least apparently contradictory, then aporia can arise. 
If  the Law of  Excluded Middle (LEM)29 is invalidated (as in intuitionistic 
logic),30 then two propositions do not fulfil the second condition—they 
cannot be mutually exhaustive. There would be a middle ground between 
the two. Hence aporia cannot exist in such systems. For example, let us 
look at a slightly different formulation of  the two propositions: “Socrates 
is wise” and “Socrates is unwise.” It may be tempting to hold this new 
pair of  propositions as also contradictory. However, that is not the case. 
They are only contrary. Propositions are contrary when they cannot both 
be true (Socrates cannot be both wise and unwise in the same sense and 



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at the same time), but there is a possibility for both 
of  the propositions to be false (Socrates being 
neither wise nor unwise). The latter means that the 
propositions are not mutually exhaustive; namely, 
the pressure of  apparent contradiction (that is, only 
one of  the otherwise plausible propositions can 
be true) does not arise as there is a possibility of  
both propositions to be false. Hence, with merely 
contrary propositions, aporia cannot arise.

The outcome is the same in predicate logic. 
Predicate logic extends propositional logic by 
including the quantifiers (Ɐ and ꓱ) which determine 
whether subject (x) of  the categorical proposition is 
respectively universal or particular and includes two 
types of  assertions—affirmative and negative. This 
results in four types of  propositions—Universal 
Affirmative (All men are wise), Universal Negative 
(No man is wise), Particular Affirmative (Some 
men are wise) and Particular Negative (Some men 
are not wise). There are also four possible types 
of  relationships between these propositions. The 
relationship between each type is shown on the 
classical square of  opposites in the diagram (Figure 
3), which originates from Aristotle, but also figures 
in modern times, especially in Boolean algebra and 
in Fregean logic.

As in propositional logic, categorical 
propositions are contrary when they cannot both be 
true (All men are wise and No man is wise), but 
there is a possibility for both of  them to be false (it 
may be the case that neither everybody is wise nor 
that nobody is wise), namely, there is a possibility 
of  the middle ground (perhaps only a few men are 
wise). This means that aporia cannot arise in the case 
of  the contraries, simply because there is a passage 
away from the mutual exclusion of  propositions. 
The situation is similar with propositions which are 
sub-contrary. This is the case when it is impossible 
for both categorical propositions to be false (Some 
men are wise and Some men are not wise); however, 



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there is a possibility for both of  them to be true. If  both propositions can 
be true, then the mutual exclusion, which was a primary condition for the 
emergence of  aporia, is removed and together with it also the pressure of  
finding a way out of  the impasse has disappeared. It can be concluded that 
in none of  these cases does aporia arise.

Therefore, aporia has bearing only in cases of  apparently contradictory 

propositions, both of  which (or sets of  which) appear attractive, but 
neither the tension nor the attraction have been properly investigated or 
understood. It has been demonstrated that aporiai apply directly within 
the domain of  at least propositional and predicate logic. It naturally 
follows that aporia will also have bearing in all forms of  standard and 
modern logic that extend the field of  classical logic, but retain the laws 
of  thinking such as the law of  non-contradiction and the law of  excluded 
middle. Such cases not only automatically apply to Boolean mathematical 
logic but also, perhaps more interestingly for designers and architects, to 
the non-classical logical system of  modal logic. The application of  modal 
logic in design and architecture is significant because it relates to what 
necessarily follows and to what might or ought to follow in deductive 
reasoning. Therefore, modal logic encompasses design propositions (with 
respects to certain rules or styles) and it is useful in design predictions.

FIGURE 3: Traditional Square of Opposition.



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Now that the domain and the source of  
aporia have been clarified along with its nature, we 
can look more closely into how aporia applies to 
architectural design.

3. APORIA IN ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 

An actual design situation may reveal a particular 
reference of  aporia in design. In architecture, the 
well-known corner conflict inherent in the employ 
of  the classical Ionic order provides a good example 
of  aporetic reasoning in architectural design.

The Ionic order’s sensual spiralling volutes that 
cushion the architrave provide an enduring source 
of  difficulty for designers needing a 
colonnade to turn a corner—for the 
traditional volutes only face forward. 
Traditionally, in Greek and Roman 
architecture, the corner capital in 
the Ionic order is different to other 
capitals as, for example, on the 
external corner of  Palladio’s Basilica 
in Vicenza and in Piranesi’s study 
(Figure 4).

The corner problem with 
the Ionic order arises due to 
the requirement for each capital 
(including the one on the corner) 
to appear the same in all elevations. 
Because of  the lateral position of  
volutes, the corner capital in the 
Ionic order cannot be the same if  
the appearance of  the capital is to be 
equal for all capitals on both front 
and side elevations. That constitutes 
a clear case of  aporia in design. In 
the case of  the corner capital conflict, 
aporia can be clearly represented with the 
following two, apparently contradictory, 
propositions:

FIGURE 4: Sketch after Opere di 
Giovanni Battista Piranesi.



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(1) All volutes are positioned in the same manner in all elevations, and

(2) Some volutes (namely corner capitals) are not positioned the same.

One is invited to compare these propositions to the previously given 
examples in propositional and predicate logic (Figure 3). It is obvious that 
this example forms an apparent contradiction in the first-order predicate 
logic and its representation as an aporia clarifies the design challenge 
that must be addressed. One may elect to confront the aporia in various 
creative ways or try to avoid the contradictory situation by eliminating the 
columns altogether from the side elevations, as in Palladio’s Villa Capra 
(La Rotunda) shown in Figure 5.

 

However, once aporia is engaged, 

two alternatives are possible. The first alternative is when the apparent 
contradiction is not resolved and hence it becomes prominent as in the 
Temple of  Fortuna Virilis or Palladio’s Villa Foscari (Figure 6). Some cases, 
such as the exposed inside corner capital in Palladio’s Palazzo Barbaran 
Porto (Figure 7), reveal the unresolved puzzle in greater detail.

FIGURE 5: Villa Capra (La Rotunda), 
Palladio, 1567. 

FIGURE 6: Villa Foscari (La Malcontenta), 
Palladio, 1560.



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 The other alternative is when the apparent 
contradiction is resolved and contradiction 
removed by adjusting the architectural element 
or the way it is used. One of  the resolutions of  
the Ionic capital corner conflict can be found in 
the work by Palladio’s contemporary architect 
Vincenzo Scamozzi. The evidence for this can be 
found in his book The Idea of  a Universal Architecture, 
where he proposes a new capital for the Ionic order 
with diagonally positioned volutes.31 Scamozzi’s 
drawings (Figure 8) and writings on the Ionic capital 
conflict testify that, not only was he fully engaged 
with this particular aporia, he also proposed a way 
of  resolving it. It is important to note that the 
solution to this puzzle was independent of  the level 
of  craftsmanship applied. The resolution depended 
only on an architect’s ability to recognise the aporia 
and engage with it through design.

I will now show the plan and elevation of  another 
Ionic capital that is partly copied from antiquity, 
partly based on Vitruvius and for the rest is a design 
I have invented and used. To this day it remains 
different from any other [Ionic] capital ever invented 
because of  the concave profile of  the abacus and the 
corner volutes that look the same whether they are 

FIGURE 7: Palazzo 
Barbaran Da Porto,  

Palladio, 1569.



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viewed from the front or the side, which is not the case when capitals have volutes 
at the front… It is the kind I have used most frequently in my buildings.32

FIGURE 8: Sketch after Scamozzi’s drawing of Ionic capital, 
L’Idea Della Architettura Universale.



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4. APORIA IN DESIGN THEORY

For architects and planners it is quite possible 
to confuse the state of  perplexity which comes 
from aporia with the perplexity which is a result 
of  a wicked problem. Rittel and Webber, in the 
classic essay “Dilemmas in a General Theory of  
Planning,” described  planning problems as wicked 
problems, which can always be recontextualized in 
terms of  other problems and which therefore admit 
an utter lack of  stopping rules or ‘solutions’ in the 
mathematical sense.33 For efficiency, a distinction 
between the two is drawn on the relevant points 
and summarized in a table below (Figure 10). 
Besides perplexity, the other similarities between 
the two are that of  the possible paralyzing effect of  
both aporiai and wicked problems and the fact that 
an aporia may as well remain as unresolved as the 
wicked problem. It seems that the only intrinsic link 
between the two is that some wicked problems can 
indeed turn out to be aporiai, but never the other 
way round. 

‘Wicked Problem’ Aporia

impossible to solve sometimes possible to solve

cannot be formulated can be formulated

solutions cannot be true or 
false

solutions can be true or false

caused by another problem caused by apparent 
contradiction

FIGURE 9: The distinction between Rittel and Weber’s wicked problems and aporia. 
.



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In what seems to be an outline for a framework of  a coherent 
design theory, Per Galle identifies two “dilemmas of  references” as he 
calls them. Basing his case on the presupposition that design is related 
to predictions (of  a certain artefact as its product), and on the fact that 
designers sometimes in their predictions refer to things, or entities, whose 
ontological status is at best unclear, Galle proposes two questions as a 
starting point in search for the common ground of  a coherent design 
theory: (1) “If  the singular terms of  design predictions do not refer [to 
an entity], how and in what sense can the predictions be true or even 
meaningful?” and (2) “If  those terms do refer [to an entity], to what 
category of  entities are they referring?”34 Even though Galle recognises 
this situation as a “puzzlement,” and presents this problem as a challenge 
to design theorists, he appears to think that this seeming contradiction 
in questions of  fundamental importance to design is a sort of  an 
embarrassment for designers. In a way, he seems to suggest that these 
“dilemmas of  references” at hand are practically a problem of  choice, 
closely associated with ready-made philosophical world views: Nominalism 
and Realism. Moreover, theorists of  design are invited to untangle this 
conundrum by selecting a world view from which to create a coherent 
design theory. Galle claims that this sort of  a problem has a more general, 
philosophical context and that other “philosophical disciplines” might 
help in resolving it.35 But, instead of  philosophy generally, Galle proposes 
to use philosophy of  language to engage with this fundamental puzzle in 
design—that is: What exactly is the subject of  Design? I agree with Galle that, 
as sciences got Philosophy of  Science and languages got Philosophy of  
Language, perhaps Design needs to get Philosophy of  Design. However, 
I propose that a fundamental philosophical question about design can be 
addressed through philosophy directly and, likewise, that question about 
the merits of  philosophy in design should be addressed through design 
itself. 

I propose that the problem at hand here is more fruitfully treated, 
not as dilemma as suggested by Galle, but as an aporia. In order to 
demonstrate this with clarity, an important distinction must first be drawn 
between the notions of  aporia and dilemma.36 Despite the fact that both 
dilemmas and aporiai can produce a state of  indecisiveness and perplexity, 
they are also profoundly different. Dilemma is commonly used in everyday 
speech to describe a problem of  choice, where none of  the two given 
options (not necessarily propositions) are desired or preferred (but not 
necessarily with any truth value at all). It is sometimes used in rhetoric, 
as a persuasive device. However, in formal, propositional logic, dilemma 



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is a form of  valid argument always leading to the 
same conclusion (true), regardless of  the truth-
value in either of  the propositions. In a dilemma we 
are presented with a choice, none of  which may be 
appealing to us, while in aporia, as we have seen, we 
are faced with two equally plausible propositions in 
an apparent contradiction, effectively producing a 
lack of  choice. The troubling case of  design entity 
ontological status cannot be a dilemma, or a problem 
of  choice in any way, as that would mean that 
there would be no problem in reasoning correctly. 
The only problem would be to select one of  the 
options. However, both of  the “references” seem 
to be true, and it is obvious that they are mutually 
exclusive. Namely one cannot assert that both of  
them are true at the same time and in the same 
sense. That means these assertions are in apparent 
contradiction. Let us look closer and see if  these 
two sides are indeed in an apparent contradiction.

First of  all, we need to disburden ourselves 
of  the pretence of  knowledge, and at least for the 
moment assume without false pretence, that we truly 
do not know what the nature of  the subject matter 
of  Design is. Hence, I propose to re-formulate 
Galle’s questions into these two propositions:

(1) During the design process, artefacts that 
are being designed must refer to an entity that 
exists, for they are in the process of  being 
designed, we can refer to them (even in space 
and time), and they are not purely imaginary. (I 
shall argue for the plausibility of  this presently).

(2) During the design process, artefacts that are 
designed must refer to an entity that does not 
exist, for if  they did exist that would entail that 
they have already been designed.

These two propositions are apparently equally true, 
but opposed and mutually exclusive, therefore 



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seemingly contradictory. The propositions are also mutually exhaustive as 
there is no other conceivable option offered to a designer. There seems to 
be no middle ground left to settle, and an inquirer is under pressure, left 
without any easy and obvious way out. This is what constitutes an aporia 
by its definition. Now an inquirer is ready to engage with aporia and its 
zetetic (searching) function by, ideally I suggest, answering the question—
what is required for both of  these propositions to be true at the same 
time?

It might be objected that the first side of  the aporia has no real 
attraction. Why, it may be said, not simply suppose that the object of  design 
is purely imaginary, just like fictional objects? Unlike mere phantasies and 
purely imaginary objects, a key capacity of  an architectural designer is 
to create not only meaningful, but accurate and reasonable predictions 
with respect to objects designed.37 The main attraction of  this side of  
aporia is in that a designer can provide accurate predictions about those 
objects. Consequently, we should not be satisfied with a general theory of  
imaginary or fictional objects as suitable for either articulating or gauging 
the attractiveness of  this side of  the aporia. 

This example is explicated here in order to demonstrate that aporia 
is necessarily a part of  inquiry into the consistency of  a Design Theory. 
The way one reasons out of  aporiai in design is, in part, a subject of  
this whole project, and it would take us a lot more space to attempt its 
resolution here. Therefore, unless curious readers engage themselves with 
this particular aporia on the subject matter of  Design, they are asked to 
suspend their judgements and remain puzzled.

If  it is indeed the case that a world view on design theory can be 
grown out of  these “seed questions” as Galle proposes, then one must 
be first fully engaged with them by recognising the aporia.38 I agree with 
Galle that these questions are “not to be shrugged off ”, as he says.39 
Furthermore, it seems to me that they are fundamental for any design 
theory. In other words, if  one wishes to establish a consistent design 
theory, it is necessary for one to engage with this particular aporia in one 
way or the other. For how can we otherwise give an account for the subject 
matter of  design itself ? Any design theory must either reject at least one 
of  the propositions and embrace the other, or find a way to embrace 
both. An informal thinker may indeed find more compelling evidence why 
one proposition is more acceptable to him or her than the other. But, as 
we have seen, unless one rejects the principle of  non-contradiction, it is 
difficult to find a firm ground on which one can dismiss one and embrace 
the other proposition as they both seem to be plausible. One way forward 



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could be to find a way in which both propositions 
can be true, namely, explore the possibilities that are 
required in cases where both of  these propositions 
are true at the same time. That means engaging 
in aporia. The only alternative to that is to find a 
justification to abandon reasoning on the subject 
matter of  design altogether and conceive of  design 
as a craft-like activity and accept that design is 
fully exhausted through practice alone like any 
other techne. However, if  we indeed do that we will 
resemble people who are not engaged with aporia 
and as Aristotle says, don’t know where they need to be 
going in their inquiry. In that case it is difficult to see 
how design can be understood as a form of  inquiry, 
and a form of  enquiry grounded in design theory.

For those willing to engage the aporias that 
present themselves, architectural design does 
indeed become a form of  inquiry. This conception 
of  architecture that is engaged with aporia opens 
up the possibility of  removing the experiential 
limits sometimes imposed on design and to realign 
architectural design within the classical division 
of  knowledge in such a way so that all cognitive 
capacities are engaged in design—from experiential 
to higher, intellectual capacities.40 

I have not attempted to resolve this aporia—
this is for another occasion. What I have done is 
argue that, if  we want to take seriously the idea of  
design as a form of  inquiry, and a form of  inquiry 
grounded in design theory, then we must engage 
with and try to resolve this (and similar) aporiai.

I want to end by drawing attention to one 
condition for a successful resolution of  this 
aporia—which is, I believe, a core aporia in design 
theory. For, as we saw in our response to Galle, 
there is a danger here that grand philosophical 
views—be it this, that, or the other philosophical 
position—be hauled in ready-made to do the job 
of  resolving an aporia that, if  it is at all genuine and 
worth taking seriously, is specific to and rooted in 

aporia is 
indeed rooted, 

not only 
in general 

philosophical 
considerations 

about design 
theory, but 
also in the 
process of 

design itself. 

“

”



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design and design theory. This, I believe, has to be resisted. For if  this is 
what we do to engage with and try to resolve the aporia, then we are in 
effect admitting that the aporia is not specific to or rooted in design and 
design theory: since its resolution will not make use of  any tools or idea 
that are specific to design or design theory. In that case, however, one 
would be forgiven for wondering why design theory should worry about 
this aporia and not simply leave it to the philosophers.

Nonetheless, we have shown that aporia is indeed rooted, not only in 
general philosophical considerations about design theory, but also—and, 
for us designers and design theorists, primarily—in the process of  design 
itself. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the (guest-)editors, Martin Düchs and Christian 
Illies, as well as Tom Spector, the managing editor of  the Journal 
Architecture Philosophy for their help, constructive criticism, and inspiring 
challenges posed in the various drafts they reviewed. I am also very 
grateful to the anonymous referees for their influential comments and 
valuable suggestions.

Very special thanks I owe to the people at the Plato Centre at Trinity 
College Dublin, especially to professor of  philosophy Vasilis Politis for 
many stimulating discussions on the subject and philosopher Brendan 
O’Byrne for unreserved support.

ENDNOTES

[1] Aristotle, The Basic Works of  Aristotle (New York: Random House 
Incorporated, 2001), Metaphysics, III. 1, 995a34-b1.

[2] See Plato, Protagoras, 321c. Extract from Protagoras’s speech: 

Prometheus arrived to examine his [Epimetheus] distribution, and saw that whereas 
the other creatures were fully and suitably provided, man was naked, unshod, unbedded, 
unarmed; and already the destined day was come, whereon man like the rest should 
emerge from earth to light. Then Prometheus, in his perplexity [ἀπορία] as to what 
preservation he could devise for man, stole from Hephaestus and Athena wisdom in the 
arts together with fire—since by no means without fire could it be acquired or helpfully 
used by any—and he handed it there and then as a gift to man.

[3] The meaning of  the word Prometheus can be translated as 
“Forethought.”



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[4] The meaning of  the word Epimetheus can be translated as “Afterthought.”

[5] Plato actually uses the word aporia to depict Titan’s mental state. See 
Plato, Protagoras, 321c2.

[6] ἀπορία = aporia—the state of  being perplexed, puzzled, lacking resources, 
or being at a loss.

[7] Aristotle, The Basic Works, Metaphysics, III. 1, 995a34-b1.

[8] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics Topica, ed. Loeb Classical Library (London and 
New York: Harvard University Press, 1960), 145b17.

[9] If  not stated otherwise, in this paper I have generally relied on Cooper’s 
edition of  Plato’s Complete Works. See Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper, (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).

[10] Plato, Republic, 514a-519a.

[11] Ibid., 509d-511e.

[12] See Plato, Republic, VII, 509d-511e. Illustration by Aleksandar Kostić.

[13] Vasilis Politis, “Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato,” in Remembering 
Socrates: Philosophical Essays, eds. Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karasmanēs 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 101. For the place of  aporia in 
Plato’s philosophy, see especially Politis, The Structure of  Enquiry in Plato’s Early 
Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Part II.

[14] Ibid., 88-110.

[15] Plato, Laches, 194a-b.

[16] Plato, Meno, 80a-c.

[17] Politis proposes that besides being a mental state, “aporia is [also] zetetic: 
[its aim is] to generate particular searches, defined and directed by the puzzle 
and problem at hand.” See Politis, “Aporia,” 108.

[18] Plato, Apology, 21b3–7.

[19] Politis, “Aporia,” 88–110.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., 98.

[22] Aristotle, The Basic Works, Metaphysics, IV, 1005b24.

[23] Ibid., 1011b13–14.

[24] Graham Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 119.



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[25] Susan Haack, Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond the Formalism (Chicago: 
University of  Chicago Press, 1996).

[26] The belief  that it is possible for a single proposition to be at the same 
time both true and false, without inferring that this leads to any and every 
proposition being true is called Dialetheism. However, this view fails to 
define a negation, as it is difficult to grasp what a concept of  disagreement 
would be in the world where a proposition can be both true and false at the 
same time. Another important and undesired consequence of  Dialetheism 
is the principle of  explosion. Namely, if  we hold both propositions p and 
¬p to be true, then it follows that for any statement q both p˅q and ¬p˅q 
to be also true, which means any and every proposition q is true.

[27] A passionate read on many-valued logic can be found in Graham 
Priest’s An Introduction on Non-Classical Logic, cited above.

[28] Robert M. Johnson, A Logic Book: Fundamentals of  Reasoning (Belmont: 
Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 63.

[29] The Law of  excluded middle (LEM) is the third law of  thinking in 
traditional logic and it simply means that besides true or false there is no 
other available option for truth-value.

[30] Intuitionistic logic invalidates the Law of  excluded middle. This 
rejection has “far-reaching consequences.” (See Joan Moschovakis, 
“Intuitionistic Logic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, ed. Edward 
N. Zalta, Spring 2015 edition, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-
intuitionistic/.) One of  those consequences being that the principle of  
elimination of  double negation also becomes invalid and, perhaps more 
importantly, intuitionistic logic becomes “axiomatically incomplete.” For 
our purposes, it is important to note that rejection of  the LEM practically 
disables the condition of  the principle of  mutual exhaustion (i.e., there is 
a middle ground available, hence aporia is not possible).

[31] Vincenzo Scamozzi, The Idea of  a Universal Architecture, Volume VI 
(Amsterdam: Architectura & Natura Press, 2008).

[32] Ibid.

[33] Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General 
Theory of  Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 155-169.

[34] Per Galle, “Candidate worldviews for design theory,” Design Studies 29, 
3 (May 2008): 279. 

[35] Ibid., 280.

[36] Some philosophers consider a notion of  dilemma that is closely related 



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to aporia. For example, Karamanolis uses the term “dilemmatic structure” 
to describe weighing various possibilities or ways out of  the aporia. (See 
George Karamanolis, “The Aporetic Character of  Plotinus’ Philosophy,” 
in The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, eds. George Karamanolis and 
Vasilis Politis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 250.) Others 
hold that the reasoning leading to an aporia need not take the form of  
dilemma. (For example, see John Palmer, “Contradiction and Aporia in Early 
Greek Philosophy,” in The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, eds. George 
Karamanolis and Vasilis Politis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), 9.) Gelber maintains that a particular type of  aporia, in cases where 
we are presented with equally impossible options (i.e., ‘negative aporias’), can 
present itself  in a form of  dilemma, but also that some aporiai do not have 
“the appearance of  dilemma at all” and so on. (See Jessica Gelber, “Uses 
of  Aporiai in Aristotle’s Generation of  Animals,” in The Aporetic Tradition in 
Ancient Philosophy, eds. George Karamanolis and Vasilis Politis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 164-165.) I am considering the notion 
of  dilemma here in the context of  Galle’s proposition (seed questions) to 
distinguish between problems of  choice and aporiai.   

[37] To describe the predictions architects make, Galle gives an example of  
an architect designing an opera who points “to one of  his drawings, saying 
‘every seat on this balcony has an unobstructed view of  the stage.’” Galle 
rightly emphasizes that “if  we could not rely on such design predictions as 
largely true, we should hardly be able to make artefacts at all.” See Galle, 
“Candidate Worldviews for Design Theory,” 278.

[38] Galle, “Candidate Worldviews for Design Theory,” 267-303.

[39] Ibid.

[40] For Plato, architecture is indeed a form inquiry leading to true knowledge. 
In the Statesman, when Plato makes a distinction concerning the highest kinds 
of  knowledge, he specifically uses the example of  an architect to depict the 
highest level of  knowing (γνωστικὴ ἐπιτακτικὴν), which is removed from 
practical experience and belongs to higher cognitive capacities. See Plato, 
Statesman, 260d.




