









































isparchitecture.com

on the use and abuse of historical 
monuments for life: Nietzsche and 
confederate monuments  

roger paden
The practice of  preserving various parts of  urban 
landscapes for historical purposes raises a variety of  
normative, metaphysical, and conceptual questions 
that invite philosophical analysis. The normative 
questions are particularly interesting. Why should 
we preserve historical sites? What sites are worth 
preserving? How should they be preserved and 
interpreted?1 In this essay, I apply Nietzsche’s 
theories of  history and culture as found in the 
first two Untimely Meditations to provide a fresh 
critical framework to some normative questions 
raised by a particularly difficult instance of  
historical preservation; namely, the preservation of  
Confederate monuments. This framework allows 
me to argue that some monuments should be 
removed from their prominent public sites, while 
others should be retained and reinterpreted.

Nietzsche on the Advantages and Disadvantages 
of History 

        Nietzsche’s work might seem to be a strange 
place to look for ideas concerning historical 
preservation. He wrote very little about cityscapes 
(and what little he did write is largely confined 
to an early work, the first Meditation on David 
Strauss; and he wrote nothing at all about historical 
preservation.2 His most systematic writing about 
history is found in the second Meditation, “On 
the Uses and Disadvantages of  History for Life,” 
which begins with a rather unpromising quote from 
Goethe: “I hate everything that merely instructs 
me without augmenting or directly invigorating my 



AP . vol 4 . No 1 . 2019

48

pa
de

n

activity.”3 As the study of  history is rarely thought invigorating, it might be 
supposed that Nietzsche would be an opponent not only of  the study of  
history, but of  historical preservation, as well; but this supposition would 
be mistaken as he immediately goes on to argue that, if  history does not 
invigorate, it is

a costly superfluity and luxury [which must be hated by us] because we still 
lack even the things we need and the superfluous is the enemy of  the necessary. 
[However,] we need history ... but we need it ... for the sake of  life and action, not 
so as to turn comfortably away from life and action.... We want to serve history 
only to the extent that history serves life: for it is possible to value the study of  
history to such a degree that life becomes stunted and degenerate... 4 

In fact, Nietzsche held that history is essential to a well-lived life, but that 
only some approaches to history can serve life, while others are always 
dangerous to it. Moreover, he believed that any approach can become 
dangerous if  relied upon exclusively. The point of  the second Meditation 
is to show how history – and what kinds of  history – can be useful.

     In that Meditation, Nietzsche argues that humans differ from other animals, 
not because we are essentially rational while they are not; rather, we differ 
because we have far better and more complex memory. This seemingly 
small psychological difference, however, has great consequences: humans 
are “historical animals,” while other animals, lacking a sense of  history, 
live entirely (and happily) in the present. It also follows that these other 
animals are incapable of  significant historical action and cannot grow or 
change as a species in historical time, while humans live in a world with 
both a past and a future and, consequently, can plan alternative futures. At 
the limit, humans can make a project of  themselves: unlike animals, they 
can engage in historically-significant, transformative action. 

     Nietzsche argues that, to live historically-significant lives, our lives must 
contain both “historical” moments that involve remembering history and 
“unhistorical” moments that involve forgetting or ignoring history. To 
plan, we must be aware of  our situation and this requires knowledge of  
our past, but, to act and create, we must forget – even dismiss – parts 
of  that past. Thus, the “historical and the unhistorical are necessary in 
equal measure for the health of  an individual, of  a people, and a culture.”5 

However, because he believes that the modern age suffers from “an 
excess of  history,”6 he focuses his argument on the claim that too much 
remembering is dangerous; that “there is a degree of  ... historical sense 
which is harmful and ultimately fatal.” 7

     Nietzsche distinguishes several approaches to history. Two unnamed 
approaches, which are wholly harmful to life, are described in the first 



49

isparchitecture.com

and second Meditations, and when he criticizes “the 
oversaturation of  an age with history,” I believe that 
it is these two unnamed approaches that he has in 
mind.8  The first—and  less important of  the two—
I  will call “scientific history.” On Nietzsche’s view, 
scientific historians are “idler[s] in the garden of  
knowledge,” “pedantic micrologists,” “who stand 
aside from life so as to know it unobstructedly.”9 

But, because the facts they seek are objective, 
isolated historical facts, unrelated to life and action, 
they can only be a harmful distraction. I will call the 
second, more important, approach, “teleological 
history.” As Daniel Breazeale points out in his 
Introduction to the Untimely Meditations:

Though the second Untimely Meditation is sometimes 
read as a blanket rejection of  “historicism,” this is 
far from the truth. What Nietzsche rejects ... is not 
the basic thesis that every aspect and expression of  
human life is unavoidably conditioned by history, 
but rather, the progressive or whiggish consequences 
that are typically—albeit, in Nietzsche’s view, quite 
illicitly—drawn from this thesis. It is not historicism 
per se to which he objects..., but rather the unexamined 
teleology that usually accompanies it.10  

Since Hegel and the neo-Hegelians took such a 
teleological approach to history, throughout the 
second Meditation, Nietzsche repeatedly criticizes 
their views, which present history as the inevitable 
unfolding of  a pre-established and providential 
plan. Especially dangerous versions of  this history, 
on Nietzsche’s view, portray this unfolding as 
essentially complete, as having arrived at what 
Hegel called, “the end of  history.” 

      Nietzsche criticizes this approach on a number 
of  grounds. Most important, he claims that “it 
implants a belief  … in the old age of  mankind, the 
belief  that one is a latecomer and epigone” who 
believes he or she is living at the end of  history.11 

Since, in this approach, this belief  is accompanied 
both by the notion that “as things are they had to 

    nietzsche 
held that 
history is 

essential to 
a well-lived 

life,  but that 
only some 

approaches 
to history can 

serve life

“

”



AP . vol 4 . No 1 . 2019

50

pa
de

n

be, as men now are they were bound to become, [and] none may resist 
this inevitability”12  and by the notion that the present age possesses “the 
rarest of  virtues, justice, to a greater degree than any other,”13 epigones 
are led to the belief  that new, historically-significant action is both 
impossible and undesirable; and this, in turn, leads to “the total surrender 
of  the personality to the world-process”14 Thus, as a teleological approach 
comes to dominate a person or a society, “the instinct for creation will be 
enfeebled and discouraged”15 and will be replaced by a “cynical ... prudent 
practical egoism, through which the forces of  life are paralyzed and at last 
destroyed.”16 Epigones seek “self-contentment,” while avoiding disturbing 
“enthusiasms”; indeed, “stupefaction is ... the goal” of  those who take this 
approach.17 This self-satisfaction, however, is purchased at a great cost: 
because epigones are incapable of  historically-significant action, they are 
condemned to an a-historical, animal-like existence. 

      In the second Meditation, Nietzsche explicitly discusses three approaches 
toward history that, unlike the first two, are useful or even “necessary for 
life.”18 The first is “antiquarian history.” The antiquarian turns to history 
to “preserve and revere.”19 The advantage of  antiquarian history is that 
it can help create a community by presenting it as the result of  a wholly-
positive history and, in doing so, it can give its members an identity. The 
antiquarian can 

look back to whence he has come, to where he came into being, with love and 
loyalty.... By tending with care that which has existed from of  old, he wants to 
preserve for those who shall come into existence after him the conditions under 
which he ... came into existence.... The history of  his city becomes for him the 
history of  himself; he reads its walls, its towered gate, its rules and regulations, 
its holidays, like an illuminated diary of  his youth and in all this he finds again 
himself.... Here we lived, he says to himself, for here we are living; here we shall 
live, for we are tough and not to be ruined overnight. Thus, with the aid of  this 
“we,” he looks beyond his own individual transitory existence and feels himself  
to be the spirit of  his house, his race, his city.20 

Nietzsche holds that this “antiquarian sense of  veneration of  the past 
is of  the greatest value when it spreads a simple feeling of  pleasure and 
contentment over the modest, rude, even wretched conditions in which 
a man or a nation lives.” It not only gives “less favored generations 
and peoples” the courage to endure, but it “restrains them from roving 
abroad in search of  something they think more worth having,” thereby 
dissipating their energies and abandoning their identity.21 It protects 
a people from being unfaithful “to its own origins and ... given over 
to a restless, cosmopolitan hunting after new and ever newer things.”22  



51

isparchitecture.com

Antiquarian history can have certain disadvantages, 
however. It does not make distinctions as all parts 
of  the antiquarian’s history are equally revered and, 
because nothing is criticized, nothing is understood. 
More important, by undermining the power of  
judgment, antiquarian history

undermines continuing and especially higher life..., [as 
it] no longer conserves but mummifies.... For it knows 
only how to preserve life, not how to engender it; it 
always undervalues that which is becoming.... Thus 
it hinders any firm resolve to attempt something new 
[and] paralyzes the man of  action...23 

     The second form, “critical history,” is adopted 
by “a being who suffers and seeks deliverance.”24 

Nietzsche argues that if, “he is to live, man must 
possess and from time to time employ the strength 
to break up and dissolve a part of  the past: he does 
this by bringing it before the tribunal, scrupulously 
examining it, and finally condemning it.”25 This 
approach remembers the past only in order to 
condemn its evils. It provides several advantages to 
its practitioners: it supplies an antidote to antiquarian 
history, but more important, it frees people from 
the past and opens up an unbounded future. But it 
also has several disadvantages. Because “every past 
is … worthy to be condemned, for that is the nature 
of  human things, [this approach to history suggests 
that] it would be better if  nothing existed.”26 But 
by rejecting too much of  the past, it leaves critical 
historians without a horizon to orient their actions: 
it rejects the existing, historically-grounded self  
and replaces it with a new one that is so weakly 
grounded that it turns to mindless cosmopolitan 
consumption.27 

     The third approach, “monumental history,” is 
adopted by those who wish to “act and strive.”28 

Focusing on great individuals and their struggles, 
this approach makes use of  the past to inspire: it 
finds greatness there and argues that we, too, can be 
great, if  only we “flee from resignation” (the belief  



AP . vol 4 . No 1 . 2019

52

pa
de

n

that historically-significant action is not possible) and use “history as a 
specific against it.”29  This approach has several advantages: it can give us 
the courage to act in historically-significant ways; it can distance us from 
our current situation; and it can bring about a new world in which lesser 
individuals can lead happy lives. But it also has certain disadvantages. 
The past is always different from the present and the historical analogy 
on which this approach depends is false. More important, monumental 
history, on its own, cannot guide us and does not lend itself  to planning. 
Thus, it can lead to great mistakes and pointless destruction.

     Nietzsche claims that each of  these three approaches has a role to 
play in a well-ordered life and society. We need antiquarian history to 
help ground us in that which is valuable in our lives; critical history to 
distance ourselves from our mistakes; and monumental history to inspire 
us to significant action. But, we need to balance each approach against the 
others. If  monumental history dominates, change can become irrational 
and may lead to disaster. If  critical history dominates, we can lose both 
identity and community. If  antiquarian history dominates, we can lose our 
ability to face the challenges of  the present effectively. 

     In order to understand Nietzsche at this point, it is essential to understand 
what he means by “life” and why he values it; and to do this it is necessary 
to read the two Meditations together as they develop parallel distinctions 
that are central to understanding that concept. In the second Meditation, 
Nietzsche contrasts cosmopolitans with people who understand and 
properly use history, while in the first, he contrasts “cultural philistines” 
with “geniuses,” who understand and properly use culture.30 In each 
pair, the second term denotes someone who lives life well, while the first 
denotes a person who does not. The descriptions overlap to a great degree. 

     Nietzsche claims that epigones inevitably become cosmopolitans who 
live for the present moment (understood to be the last historical moment) 
and seek pleasure through the satisfaction of  immediate felt needs. As 
such, they are “given over to a restless ... hunting after new and ever 
newer things ... thought more worth having.”31 Given Nietzsche’s contrast 
between historical and a-historical beings, cosmopolitans are a-historical 
beings who live less-than-human lives in which the “forces of  life are 
paralyzed and at last destroyed.”32 The cultural philistine is described in 
similar terms. These philistines “devised the concept of  the epigone-age 
[in which they think they are living] with the object of  obtaining peace and 
quiet.”33 They do this to reject the life of  the restless, searching genius; 
and then repress even the memory of  that rejection. Desiring only “self-
contentment,” they declare that “all seeking [for a truly better life] is at 



53

isparchitecture.com

an end.”34 Characterized by “a lack of  style or a 
chaotic jumble of  all styles,”35 both cosmopolitans 
and philistines reject self-transformation, and this 
rejection paralyzes and destroys their life force. 

     This notion of  self-transformation is central 
to Nietzsche’s concept of  life. He describes life as 
a “plastic power” and claims that the greatness of  
“a man, a people, or a culture” can be measured by 
the degree to which they possess it.36 This plastic 
power is inwardly-directed, as it names “the capacity 
to develop out of  oneself  in one’s own way, to 
transform and incorporate into oneself  what is past 
and foreign, to heal wounds, [and] to replace what 
has been lost...”37 This notion of  life is connected to 
Nietzsche’s notion of  culture, as he not only believes 
that a good life requires a vital connection with true 
culture, but his notion of  life is modeled on the 
idea of  culture: it is the epitome of  a good life as it 
involves a continuous transformation which aims at 
a “unity of  artistic style in all the expressions of  the 
life of  a people”; at “a stylistic unity within which 
the manifold phenomena which characterize it are 
harmonized.”38 While Nietzsche points out that this 
stylistic unity cannot be attained through systematic 
and oppressive exclusion, he nevertheless thinks 
that it can be attained only through struggle, as we 
always find ourselves in states of  partial disunity 
and disorganization. This “grand style originates 
[only] when the beautiful carries off  the victory 
over the monstrous”; only when life creates a new 
order out of  existing disorder.39 A good life is one 
that seeks to create an integrated beauty from a 
chaos of  existing forms.

     Pursuing this project requires many things. 
Negatively, it requires the rejection of  the “modern” 
all-consuming search for pleasure; it requires the 
rejection of  the life of  the cultural philistine or 
cosmopolitan.40 Positively, what it requires can be 
determined by reference to the three ways in which 
history can be useful to life. As emphasized by 

THIS NOTION 
OF SELF-

TRANSFORMATION 
IS CENTRAL TO 

NIETZSCHE’S 
CONCEPT OF LIFE

“

”



AP . vol 4 . No 1 . 2019

54

pa
de

n

antiquarians, we (as individuals, peoples, or cultures) need a stable and 
valued foundation in our identity.41 As emphasized by the critical historian, 
we need to be able to consider and devalue parts of  our history and 
identity. Finally, as emphasized by the monumental historian, we need the 
courage to reject a life of  pleasure so as to pursue “life.”

Historic Preservation in the United States

      Oddly, given our self-conception as a future-oriented society with 
little time for the past, the United States, like Nietzsche’s Germany, seems 
“oversaturated” with history – and with the wrong kinds of  history. This 
can be seen in the many political battles that are fought over the proper 
interpretation of  our history, in which each side – rather than seeking to 
promote “life” in Nietzsche’s sense – attempts to “use” history to support 
its political program, while charging the other side of  “abusing” history 
when it does the same. In these battles, American preservationists have 
typically adopted two approaches toward history described by Nietzsche. 
The dominant approach has been teleological; a secondary approach, 
antiquarian.

     Serious preservation work began in the U.S. during the early nineteenth 
century with attempts to preserve Mount Vernon and Independence Hall. 
These projects were undertaken by members of  upper-class eastern society, 
and the approach they took to historical preservation—in which they 
sought to preserve those sites and structures that played important roles 
in the development of  the nation—still dominates the practice. According 
to William Murtagh, “patriotism fueled the energies of  nineteenth-century 
preservationists to the excluding of  any other interest.” Preservationists 
adopted this approach because they believed that “it is good policy in a 
republican government to inculcate sentiments of  veneration for those 
departed heroes who have rendered service to their country in times of  
danger.” To achieve this goal, they sought to protect the houses of  worthy 
political or military figures, along with important political buildings and 
battlefields, treating them as “shrines or icons.” The dominant theme 
of  these efforts has been a “secular pietism” which sought to preserve 
buildings thought “worthy of  attention for transcendent [i.e., nation 
building] rather than intrinsic reasons.”42 

     Such an approach to preservation fits particularly well with the 
historically dominant self-conception of  the United States that 
understands the country through phrases drawn from a religious context: 
our county is like a ‘city on a hill’ with a unique ‘manifest destiny.’ This 
approach is clearly teleological in nature, but as the United States achieved 



55

isparchitecture.com

hegemonic status, this approach increasingly took 
what Nietzsche thought its most pernicious form, 
which portrays us as living in “an epigone-age” 
or, as a best-selling book of  a few years back put 
it, as living at The End of  History.43 According to 
Nietzsche, both these approaches, but especially 
the latter, would have the effect of  producing a 
cynical, self-satisfied cosmopolitanism that would 
make self-transcending actions (“life”) increasingly 
difficult for both individuals and cultures.

     Beginning in the early twentieth century, a second 
form of  preservationism took an antiquarian 
approach toward history and should be understood 
as part of  a wider project to raise the status and 
power of  the post-Civil War South. Central to this 
project is “the myth of  the Lost Cause,” which 
attempts to put the South’s defeat in the Civil War 
in the best possible light. It does this by arguing 
for a set of  mythical ideas including the idea (1) 
that slavery was a benign institution; (2) that slavery 
was an institution in decline; (3) that slavery was not 
the cause of  the South’s secession; (4) that, in the 
face of  demographic and industrial differences, the 
South could not have won the Civil War; (5) that 
Lee was one of  the greatest generals in history, who 
bravely fought for a “lost cause,” while Grant was 
an incompetent brute; and (6) and that Southerners 
and Southern society were morally superior to their 
Northern counterparts.44 Partisans of  this myth 
have adopted a preservationist program similar to 
that of  the dominant culture. They have sought 
to preserve the mansions and plantations of  
important political figures, but they have placed a 
relatively greater emphasis on military sites, placing 
statues of  Confederate generals in public places, 
and displays featuring Confederate battle flags. 

     As Nietzsche notes about antiquarian approaches 
to history in general, this project can help preserve 
the antiquarian’s identity, but it does so at some 
cost. David Lowenthal has argued:

     ODDLY, GIVEN 
OUR SELF-

CONCEPTION AS A 
FUTURE-ORIENTED 

SOCIETY  WITH 
LITTLE TIME FOR 

THE PAST, THE 
UNITED STATES, 

LIKE NIETZSCHE’S 
GERMANY,  SEEMS 
‘OVERSATURATED’ 

WITH HISTORY

“

”



AP . vol 4 . No 1 . 2019

56

pa
de

n

In recoiling from tragic loss or fending off  a fearsome future, people the world 
over revert to ancestral legacies. As hope of  progress fades, heritage [Nietzsche’s 
“antiquarian history”] consoles us with tradition.... [However, this search 
for historical justification is] oppressive, defeatist, [and] decadent.... Breeding 
xenophobic hate, it becomes a byword for bellicose discord. Perverting the “true” 
past for greedy or chauvinist ends, heritage undermines historical truth with 
twisted myth. Exalting rooted faith over critical reason, it stymies social action 
and sanctions passive acceptance of  preordained fate.45 

And indeed, Southern antiquarian history has helped perpetuate racism, 
while stifling education and economic growth. A Nietzschean, however, 
would reject the myth of  the lost cause for a different reason, namely, 
that like all antiquarian histories, Southern antiquarian history undermines 
“higher life” and “paralyzes the man of  action.”46 As Lowenthal put 
it: “Miring us in the obsolete, the cult of  heritage immures life within 
museums and monuments.”47 The myth of  the Lost Cause, like most 
antiquarian histories, does not aid “life.”

     Moreover, contrary to what Nietzsche argues, this antiquarian history has 
not protected the South from consumerist cosmopolitanism as its partisans 
have adopted the same practical egoism that Nietzsche thought the most 
reprehensible consequence of  cosmopolitanism. The myth of  the Lost 
Cause gives some Southerners a relatively shallow identity and explains 
their supposedly-unjust relative poverty, powerlessness, and cultural 
subordination, only to allow them to more easily pursue their consumer 
interests. Indeed, the only difference between this antiquarian history and 
the more dominant teleological history is the dating of  history’s end: both 
present us as epigones, living at the twilight end of  meaningful history; 
both produce “stupefaction”; and both make historically-significant, 
transformative action difficult. 

On the Use and Abuse of Confederate Monuments 

        Following the 2016 murder of  nine black parishioners at the Emanuel 
AME Church in Charleston SC, the debate over the preservation of  
Confederate monuments intensified. Several photos of  the murderer 
with a Confederate battle flag led to protests at public sites featuring 
this flag, particularly at the State House in Columbia, and these protests 
raised questions—and inspired further protests (and counter-protests)—
concerning the many Confederate monuments located on public sites. 
Perhaps the most significant of  these protests, which occurred in 
Charlottesville, VA in 2017, was triggered by the City Council’s decision 
to remove a statue of  Confederate General Robert E. Lee and to rename 



57

isparchitecture.com

the park where it stood. This decision attracted the 
attention of  a number of  white supremacist groups 
who, seemingly with President Trump’s blessing, 
protested against the statue’s removal. One of  these 
white supremacists killed a counter-protestor.

     The issue ostensibly at stake in most of  these 
controversies is whether such statues should be 
kept in place, removed to other sites, or simply 
destroyed.48 From a Nietzschean perspective these 
controversies reflect two approaches to history: 
Southern antiquarians seek to preserve the statues 
in place, while their opponents, who have adopted a 
critical approach, call for the statues to be removed 
or destroyed. Antiquarians offer several arguments 
in favor of  their position. First, they argue that 
attempts to remove these statues amount to an 
attack on “Southern” heritage and identity. Note, 
for example, how the intentionally provocative 
phrase chanted by Neo-Nazi protestors, “Jews will 
not replace us,” reflects Nietzsche’s antiquarian 
who asserts that “here we lived, here we are living, 
and here we shall live, for we are tough and not 
to be ruined overnight.”49 In addition, Southern 
antiquarians argue that removing these statues 
amounts to an attempt to “erase history” and is, 
therefore, an attack on truth.

     Critical historians who favor removing these 
statues respond that these statues are monuments 
and, as such, do not simply record history (as the 
erasure charge implies); instead, they memorialize 
it. Monuments commemorate; they celebrate, 
honor, or valorize events, often by depicting a 
person who played a significant role in them. 
These figures are valued for the role they played in 
these historically-important dramas; their personal 
character is of  secondary importance. Statues of  
Lee, for example, are erected, not because he was 
an especially virtuous person, but rather because he 
was a noteworthy Confederate general. Moreover, 
by expressing value judgments, monuments serve 

     ’MIRING US IN 
THE OBSOLETE,  

THE CULT OF 
HERITAGE 

IMMURES LIFE 
WITHIN MUSEUMS 
AND MONUMENTS’

“

”



AP . vol 4 . No 1 . 2019

58

pa
de

n

the needs of  contemporary politics. This service can be seen in the history 
of  Confederate monuments raised during the Jim Crow period so as to 
refashion contemporary Southern society around a fixed, fundamentalist 
identity looking favorably on slavery and most at home when surrounded 
by racist institutions and practices. When this identity was again challenged 
during the Civil Rights era, these monuments were given legal protection to 
make their removal difficult, thereby adding a new layer to the institutional 
racism associated with this identity. Given that the purpose of  these 
statues is to valorize particular historical events in support of  a specific 
Southern identity associated with existing oppressive institutions, attempts 
to remove them are best understood, not as attempts to erase history, but 
as attempts to oppose these institutions.50 

     Southern antiquarians try to respond to this argument with a reductio 
ad absurdum: if  monuments valorize and if  slavery is evil, then we 
should remove all statues that celebrate slave owners, including those 
of  Washington and Jefferson and, if  this is true, we would soon have to 
remove all memorials. The objection to this slippery-slope argument is 
obvious: these statues valorize Washington and Jefferson, not as defenders 
of  slavery, but for other, highly significant, historically-transformative 
actions. Putting this objection aside, however, note how the antiquarian’s 
argument reflects Nietzsche’s claim that critical history is problematic 
because, since every past is worthy of  condemnation, it soon rejects all 
history. But Nietzsche, unlike the Southern antiquarian, makes this claim 
in support of  a broader point; namely, that, since the critical approach 
tends to sever all connections to history, it is dangerous to life: “men 
and ages which serve life by judging and destroying a past are always ... 
endangered men and ages.”51 

     The real problem with the two approaches to history that have shaped 
the controversy over Confederate statues is that neither approach “serves 
life.” At best the antiquarian approach might preserve, or “mummify,” a 
(particularly unacceptable and vexed) form of  life and identity, while critical 
history, because it destroys its own historical horizon, tends to produce 
a weakened personality that itself  cannot tolerate criticism. But these 
criticisms raise two questions: First, philosophically, how should history 
be approached? And second, how can these philosophical criticisms help 
solve the essentially historical/architectural controversy over Confederate 
statues? As to the first question, at the end of  his critique of  critical 
history, Nietzsche writes:

For since we are the outcome of  earlier generations, we are also the outcome of  
their aberrations ... and errors, and indeed of  their crimes; it is not possible 



59

isparchitecture.com

wholly to free ourselves from this chain. If  we condemn 
these aberrations and regard ourselves as free of  them, 
this does not alter the fact that we originated in them. 
The best we can do is to confront our inherited and 
hereditary nature with our knowledge, and through a 
new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and 
implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a new 
second nature, so that our first nature withers away.52 

     It would seem that, here, Nietzsche is arguing 
that these two approaches need to be combined, 
if  they are to support life; that it is necessary to 
both criticize one’s history and to ground oneself  
in it. We must understand not only that our identity 
grows out of  our past but also that it cannot simply 
be identified with it. In addition, we need the 
courage to take on the task of  developing a new 
identity out of  our history—of  bringing unity to 
the historical manifold—and this, Nietzsche argues, 
is only possible with the aid of  monumental history. 
In addition, we must separate the notion of  growth 
and development from the teleological notion of  
inevitable fate: we must incorporate notions of  
inescapable struggle and contingency into our 
history.

     But how can such a complex approach to history 
be represented in an urban landscape? How can 
monuments help us accomplish this task? Consider 
another example: The Appomattox Memorial in 
Alexandria VA is a bronze statue of  an unarmed 
Confederate soldier standing on a stone base with 
inscriptions on four sides. Modeled on a painting 
by John Elder of  a soldier viewing the Appomattox 
battlefield after Lee’s surrender, the statue portrays 
a soldier standing with crossed arms, equipment 
hanging from one shoulder and one hand holding 
a hat. (Figure 1) His head is bowed, his eyes 
look down. His expression is often described as 
“somber” or “contemplative.” The inscriptions state 
that the memorial was “Erected to the Memory of  
Confederate Dead of  Alexandria by their Surviving 

     CRITICAL 
HISTORY IS 

PROBLEMMATIC 
BECAUSE, SINCE 

EVERY PAST 
IS WORTHY OF 

CONDEMNATION, IT 
SOON  REJECTS ALL 

HISTORY

“

”



AP . vol 4 . No 1 . 2019

60

pa
de

n

Comrades” and, claiming that “They Died in the Consciousness of  Duty 
Faithfully Performed,” list 100 names. The memorial is set at the center of  
an intersection where, at the beginning of  the war, local troops assembled 
in advance of  an invading Union army to march south to join Lee, and 
the soldier looks south along the path they took. Originally set on a broad 
median, the site of  the memorial was greatly reduced to accommodate the 
construction of  a new parkway, eventually named after Jefferson Davis. 
On the intersection’s southwest corner stands the Lyceum, Alexandria’s 
history museum.53 The memorial was erected by the Robert E. Lee Camp 
of  the United Confederate Veterans (UCV) in 1889, early in the Jim 
Crow period. Realizing that the statue would be controversial, the UCV 
successfully petitioned the Virginia House of  Delegates to protected it 
from being removed and, indeed, although it was thought a fine work 
of  public art when in was erected, it has long been controversial. This 
controversy came to a head in late 2016, following the Charleston murders, 
when the City Council voted to remove the statue to another location and 
rename the adjacent parkway.54 

     As with other recent controversies, this controversy took the form 
of  a debate between antiquarians and critical historians, and conventional 
alternatives would have us choose between the antiquarian preservation 
of  the statue as is, or its critical removal. A third approach that Nietzsche’s 
thinking opens us to—one that “serves life”—would be to incorporate 
the existing memorial into a larger work of  art by taking advantage of  the 
remaining, narrow landscaped median immediately south of  the memorial. 
This median should be the site of  two low panels displaying friezes visible 
to passing pedestrians and motorists. The western (southbound) side of  
these panels should contain scenes of  slaves being marched south from 
the auction houses of  Alexandria, home to one of  the largest slave-trading 
operations in the country. The eastern side of  the panels should contain 
scenes showing self-emancipated slaves traveling north on the underground 
railroad, an important route of  which ran through Alexandria. To the 
south of  these panels, in the middle of  the next intersection, a new statue 
should be erected showing members of  the 29th and 31st Brigades of  
“U.S. Colored Troops,” who helped defeat Lee’s army at Appomattox. 
An account of  Alexandria’s role in both the slave trade and the Civil War, 
and an account of  history of  the statue and these recent changes, should 
be available at the adjacent Lyceum, and at the Alexandria Black History 
Museum, a few blocks north. 

     This new work of  urban art avoids the pitfalls of  dichotomous 
thinking that contributed to the debacle in Charlottesville by weaving 



61

isparchitecture.com

together Nietzsche’s 
three approaches 
to history so as to 
make a complete 
monument that serves 
life. Critical history 
would be served by the 
low panels showing 
slaves being marched 
south. These panels 
would make the evils 
of  slavery visible, and 
their presence near the 
soldier would indicate 
the cause of  the war. 
As could be made clear 
at the nearby museums, 
their height and 
orientation, relative 
to the soldier, and 
delayed construction 
would gesture at 
their ‘invisibility’ 
perpetuated in 
repressive bad faith 
by the myth of  the 
lost cause. Antiquarian history would be served 
by retaining the contemplative look of  the soldier. 
Pondering his loss in this cause, he might now 
be understood as realizing that the ‘duty’ which 
he “faithfully performed” was embedded in a 
controversial identity, shaped and imposed by 
economic interests that may have differed from 
his own. He now faces the future with a new task: 
mummification or the development of  a new, 
more vital identity based on a more complete 
understanding of  history. Monumental history 
would be served by the statue of  the black soldiers 
at the southern end of  the ensemble, by the slaves 
emancipating themselves as they travel north on the 
railroad, and, possibly, by the Confederate soldier 

figure 1: Appomattox 
Memorial, Alexandria, VA



AP . vol 4 . No 1 . 2019

62

pa
de

n

now given an opportunity for a new identity. This new memorial would 
also reject the teleological history of  most memorials by showing that 
the conflict at the heart of  the memorial is not yet fully resolved: the 
myth is still with us; the soldier has not yet begun his new life. The task 
of  forging a new American identity rooted in the crimes and ideals, the 
struggles and the values of  the past is not yet complete, nor is its outcome 
clear. The purpose of  the new monument is to lead people to contemplate 
these ideas. Of  course, this statue possesses several unique advantages (its 
emotional qualities and location) that make it easy to re-purpose. Other 
statues would be more difficult to redesign and some are best taken down. 
In some cases, there may simply be no room to add new materials. In 
others, the statues might simply be too caught up in the Myth of  the 
Lost Cause, too antiquarian, or too racist to be successfully transformed. 
Public artists can be very creative people and may be able to salvage many 
existing statues, but in judging their proposals the important question to 
ask is: “Does this proposal transform this monument in such a way that it 
serves life?” If  not, it should be removed or destroyed.55

     Nietzsche’s theories of  history and culture can help us understand 
that cities need to incorporate history into the urban fabric and that both 
historical preservation and memorialization have central roles in the urban 
design. Memorials can fulfill this role, but only if  they aim at engendering 
the life goal of  vital, unified, and beautiful identities. As the United States 
continues to ponder the role of  Confederate monuments in its urban 
spaces, Nietzsche’s life-serving approach to history provides a useful 
alternative to the debilitating stand-off  between subservience to history 
and cosmopolitan forgetfulness. 

Endnotes 

1. William J. Murtagh, Keeping Time: The History and Theory of  Preservation in 
America (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2006), p. 5; see also Charles 
B. Hosmer, Presence of  the Past (New York: Putnam, 1965).

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, “David Strauss: The Confessor and the Writer,” 
In Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, edited by Daniel Breazeale. 
Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997): 1-55. Hereinafter, “Strauss.”

[3] Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of  History 
for Life,” In Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations: 57-124, p. 59. Hereinafter, 
“History.”

4. Nietzsche, “History,” 59.



63

isparchitecture.com

5. Nietzsche, “History,” 63.

6. Nietzsche, “History,” 67,

7. Nietzsche, “History,” 62.

8. Nietzsche, “History,” 83; and Nietzsche, 
“Strauss,” 30-35.

9. Nietzsche, “History,” 59, 68, and 117.

10. Daniel Breazeale, “Introduction.” In Nietzsche, 
Untimely Meditations: vii-xxxiii, p. xv. 

11. Nietzsche, History, 83.

12. Nietzsche, “History,” 107.

13. Nietzsche, “History,” 83,

14. Nietzsche, “History,” 107.

15. Nietzsche, “History,” 95.

16. Nietzsche, “History,” 83.

17. Nietzsche, “Strauss,” 10-11.

18. Nietzsche, “History,” 75.

19. Nietzsche, “History,” 67.

20. Nietzsche, “History,” 72-3.

21. Nietzsche, “History,” 73.

22. Nietzsche, “History” 74.

23. Nietzsche, “History,” 75.

24. Nietzsche, “History,” 67.

25. Nietzsche, “History,” 75-6.

26. Nietzsche, “History,” 76.

27. Nietzsche, “History,” 76.

28. Nietzsche, “History,” 67.

29. Nietzsche, “History,” 68.

30. Nietzsche, “Strauss,” 11.

31. Nietzsche, “History,” 73-74.

32. Nietzsche, “History,” 83.

33. Nietzsche, “Strauss,” 10.

34. Nietzsche, “Strauss,” 10-11.

35. Nietzsche, “Strauss,” 6,

36. Nietzsche, “History,” 62.



AP . vol 4 . No 1 . 2019

64

pa
de

n

37. Nietzsche, “History,” 62.

38. Nietzsche, “Strauss,” 7-8.

39. Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Wanderer and his Shadow,” in Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 301-395, p. 334.

40. William Arrowsmith, “Introduction,” in Friedrich Nietzsche, Unmodern 
Observations. Edited by William Arrowsmith. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990), p. xi, quoting “History,” 60.

41. Nietzsche, “History,” 63.

42. Murtagh, Keeping Time, pp. xxvii, xxviii, and 11-24; also see Hosmer, 
Presence of  the Past, pp. 298-303.

43. Francis Fukuyama, The End of  History and the Last Man, (New York: 
Free Press, 1992).

44. Edward H. Bonekemper, The Myth of  the Lost Cause: Why the South Fought 
the Civil War and Why the North Won (Washington, DC: Regnery History, 
2015); and Caroline Janney, Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits 
of  Reconciliation, (Chapel Hill, University of  North Carolina Press, 2013), 
pp. 251-254.

45.David Lowenthal, “The Heritage Crusade and its Contradictions.” In 
Max Page and Randall Mason, Giving Preservation a History, (New York: 
Routledge, 2004): 19-43, p. 19.

46. Nietzsche, “History,” 75.

47. Lowenthal, “The Heritage Crusade,” p. 19.

48. Monica Hesse, “A Quandary Set in Stone,” Washington Post, 5/9/2016, 
C1; Christopher Phelps, “Removing Racist Symbols Isn’t a Denial of  
History,” The Chronicle of  Higher Education, Jan 29, 2016, pp. 48-51; Sarah 
Fenton, “The Confederacy, Its Symbols, and the Politics of  Public 
Culture,” AHA Today, 1/9/2016.

49. Nietzsche, “History,”  73.

50. In fact, the erasure charge is more accurately applied to the attempts 
to preserve these statues, as these monuments materialize an ideology that 
attempts to erase the history of  slavery. This is consistent with another of  
Nietzsche’s criticisms of  antiquarian history; namely, that it “possesses an 
extremely restricted field of  vision” (Nietzsche, “History,” 74).

51. Nietzsche, “History,” 76.

52. Nietzsche, “History,” 76.

53. Office of  Historic Alexandria, “The Confederate Statue,” https://www.



65

isparchitecture.com

alexandriava.gov/ uploadedFiles/historic/info/brochures/
ConfederateStatueBrochure.pdf/, accessed 5/12/2015.

54.  Sullivan, Patricia, “Alexandria will seek to move 
Confederate statue and rename Jefferson Davis 
Highway,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
virginia-politics/alexandria-will-seek-to-move-confederate-
statue-and-rename-jefferson-davis-highway/2016/09/17/
fec35310-7b53-11e6-ac8e-cf8e0dd91dc7_story.html?utm_
term=.1b5f0e67d0e7rnon/ accessed 9/26/2017. 

55. The controversy surrounding the Confederacy 
Memorial Carving at Stone Mountain, Georgia that 
gained prominence during the 2018 Governor’s 
race between a white male and a black female 
candidate may be one such example admitting of  
no life-serving solution.


