










































The Possibility of Virtue Ethics in Information Literacy


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The Possibility of Virtue Ethics in 
Information Literacy
Intellectual Virtues and the Consideration of Truth
Ezra Choe, Theology and Philosophy Librarian, Baylor University

ABSTRACT Virtue ethics has recently enjoyed a resurgence in contem-
porary scholarship, especially concerning its practical and epistemic di-
mensions. Librarians have also been part of these recent conversations, 
especially in information literacy. For example, in his recent book Virtue 
Information Literacy: Flourishing in an Age of Information Anarchy, Wayne 
Bivens-Tatum underscores the need to cultivate intellectual virtues to navi-
gate through the world of anarchy. Intellectual or epistemic virtues such 
as open-mindedness, intellectual humility, epistemic modesty, etc., are all 
necessary for information users to flourish in an age where information is 
readily available. While affirming the virtue ethics framework for informa-
tion literacy, in this paper, I will present potential problems to the virtue 
ethics framework by calling into question the object of intellectual or epis-
temic virtues, namely consideration of truth. Librarians adopting the virtue 
ethics framework should consider the metatheoretical assumptions of the 
framework itself and understand the inherent challenges it poses, one of 
which is that virtues are goal oriented.

INTRODUCTION

It seems like virtue ethics is fashionable again, especially in educational 
settings. Indeed, there has been a re-emergence of virtue ethics litera-
ture and research primarily on how educators can implement virtue 
ethics in their teaching, e.g., Oxford Character Project, Jubilee Center 
for Character and Virtue, The Human Flourishing Project, etc. What is 
fashionable, however, is usually transient. For librarians to appropriate 
virtue ethics successfully, I propose that librarians should acknowledge 
and affirm a key metatheoretical assumptions underlying the frame-
work itself. Otherwise, it risks becoming another trend. In what follows, 
I will give a brief overview of virtue ethics and focus on the intellectual 



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virtues. I then examine the merits of this approach in the context of li-
brarianship and information literacy and proceed to identify one key 
component that librarians should affirm when appropriating a virtue-
centered approach to information literacy and librarianship in general, 
that is, the fundamental epistemic good of intellectual virtues is truth. 

THE APPEAL OF VIRTUE ETHICS

Virtue ethics seem to have a universal appeal. In addition to western 
approaches, which has its root primarily in Aristotle, there are rich tra-
ditions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, etc. There are impor-
tant convergences within all these traditions, but also potential irrecon-
cilable differences. One commonality is the idea of cultivating virtues 
for a life of flourishing. Identifying these virtues and articulating what a 
life of flourishing looks like, however, differs from each tradition. Each 
traditions have meaningful contribution to a wholistic understanding 
of virtue. It would be impossible to examine each distinctives in this 
paper and therefore, I will restrict myself to the predominant school of 
virtue ethics in the Aristotelian-Thomistic (henceforth, A-T) tradition. 

So, what is virtue? In general, we can understand virtue as an 
excellent trait of character which an agent comes to possess (Hurst-
house and Pettigrove 2022)initially, be identified as the one that em-
phasizesthe virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach 
thatemphasizes duties or rules (deontology. In the A-T tradition, the 
four cardinal virtues are necessary for the moral life: wisdom, jus-
tice, courage, and temperance all of which are required for flourish-
ing. Since flourishing is a central component in the virtue ethics para-
digm, I think it is appropriate that we get a clearer sense of what this 
term means. In fact, one could argue that flourishing is the proper 
aim of education and is the key difference between other normative 
ethical approaches to education. 

In his book Flourishing as the Aim of Education, Kristjánsson de-
fines human flourishing as:

the (relatively) unencumbered, freely chosen and developmentally pro-
gressive activity of a meaningful (subjectively purposeful and objectively 
valuable) life that actualises satisfactorily an individual human being’s 
natural capacities in areas of species-specific existential tasks at which 
human beings (as rational, social, moral and emotional agents) can most 
successfully excel. (2020, 1)



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To be sure, Kristjánsson recognizes the complexity of his proposed 
definition, and he proceeds to unfold this concept throughout the rest 
of the book (2020, 2). What is helpful in Kristjánsson’s definition of 
human flourishing are the various assumptions about human nature 
that aid in our understanding of virtue. Flourishing entails individual 
agents to actualizes our natural capacities, inclinations, or powers. 
Cultivating and possessing virtue means that we are becoming more 
human; we are fulfilling those natural capacities which allows us to 
become more attuned to our human nature. 

The very idea of human flourishing should be attractive to librar-
ians and educators as it resists the idea of emphasizing outcomes 
based on skills alone. Other normative ethical approaches such as 
consequentialism and deontology are prone to this type of outcome-
based thinking. Instead of focusing primarily on helping students ob-
tain a certain grade, academic competencies, or job, a virtue-centered 
approach to education and librarianship emphasizes a different out-
come. While acknowledging the importance of skill-based outcomes, 
virtue-centered approach to librarianship and education places a 
higher emphasis on helping students develop moral and intellectual 
characters that are essential to a life of flourishing. Libraries as in-
stitutions play a formative role in helping to shape students intellec-
tually despite the deep skepticism people have for higher education 
and libraries. This, I think, gives us a renewed sense of purpose for 
our work as librarians and educators alike despite the limitation and 
challenges we face – how can librarians become exemplars to our 
students, how can we promote dialogue that increase virtue literacy, 
etc.? Philosopher Gregory Bassham puts it this way: “What qualities 
of heart, mind, and character would we ideally like our students to 
value, choose, and possess? What moral and intellectual excellences 
should we seek to cultivate in our students” (2013, 12). 

Another important aspect of the virtue-centered approach is the 
necessity of both the moral and intellectual virtues conducive for a 
life of flourishing. Like most issues in philosophy, there are substan-
tial disagreements as to how both relate to each other. In his book, 
The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemol-
ogy, Jason Baehr gives three theses to frame this discussion (2011, 
206-207). First, there is the reductive thesis according to which no 
principal distinction can be made between moral and intellectual 
virtues. Secondly, the subset thesis says that the intellectual virtues 
are subsets of moral virtues but are unified in a way that sets them 



PAPERS  67

apart from each other. Finally, the independence thesis which states 
that intellectual virtues are not a proper subset of moral virtues but 
are rather “fundamentally distinct from moral virtues” (2011, 207). 
Baehr opts for an even more nuanced approach and thinks that the 
distinction lies between the subset thesis and the independence thesis. 

One way to potentially distinguish between the two types of vir-
tues is by offering a teleological explanation. That is, the distinction 
between moral and intellectual virtues can be understood in terms 
of its purpose or aim. Whereas the moral virtues aim for moral ends, 
intellectual virtues are aimed towards epistemic ends, one of which 
is truth. The medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas also observes that 
virtue is rightly divided into moral and intellectual virtue depending 
on what part of the soul it corresponds to: 

Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. 
Now, in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz. the intel-
lect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of move-
ment in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human 
virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly 
if it perfects man’s speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed 
may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his ap-
petite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue 
is either intellectual or moral. (ST, I-II, q. 58, a. 2)

There is of course a teleological assumption here in the text as the 
two principles movement in man (reason and appetite) are ordered 
to truth and goodness. To be sure, merely pointing to the teleological 
explanation as the only criterion for distinguishing moral and intel-
lectual virtue may not be sufficient as moral ends seem to be more 
diverse and abstract compared to intellectual ends. In other words, 
more would have to be said about the underlying concept of moral-
ity and a mere appeal to human flourishing, according to Baehr, is 
“unlikely to mitigate this challenge” (2011, 214).  

So, what exactly is an intellectual virtue? Recall that virtue in gen-
eral is an excellent trait of character that an agent comes to possess. 
Intellectual virtue then, are those stable dispositions that disposes 
people to think well in the context of inquiring, learning, and rea-
soning. The contrary intellectual vices, on the other hand, are those 
dispositions that impede one from inquiring, learning, and reason-
ing (2021, 31). Despite the aforementioned difficulty of how the in-
tellectual and moral virtues relate, it is clear that the teleological ex-
planation aids in our understanding of what intellectual virtues are. 



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The virtues dispose people for purposes of inquiring, learning, and 
reasoning and hence are ordered to some epistemic good, viz. truth.  

There is no standard list of intellectual virtues but that does not 
mean that the list is arbitrary. For example, most philosophers would 
agree that intellectual humility, the virtue through which one ac-
knowledges one’s own limitation and mistakes, is important to learn-
ing and reasoning. A detailed classification of the intellectual virtues 
and its basis is beyond the scope of this paper. Factors like religion 
and culture all play a role in shaping what should count as an intel-
lectual virtue. This needs to be recognized as virtue ethics has many 
traditions. For present purposes, we can accept Wayne Bivens-Ta-
tum’s list of intellectual virtues and vices which he articulates in his 
excellent book Virtue Information Literacy. He lists the following: 
open-mindedness/close-mindedness, intellectual humility/intellec-
tual arrogance, epistemic modesty/ignarrogance, intellectual cour-
age/cowardice, intellectual caution/rashness, intellectual thorough-
ness/laziness, epistemic justice/testimonial injustice, information 
vigilance/distraction (2022, 4–5). 

Bivens-Tatum echoes a similar reason I have stated before as to 
why librarians should appropriate virtue ethics and apply them in 
information literacy, an approach he calls virtue information literacy. 
These intellectual virtues ethics are necessary for a life of flourishing 
because we are in an era of information anarchy. For Bivens-Tatum, 
we live in a time where there are no clear authorities controlling the 
follow of information, and we are free to choose what we consume; 
information seekers are confronted with a deluged of information 
such as “political propaganda, advertising, marketing, corporate 
media, alternative media, social media, scholarly publications, and 
more” (2022, 1). Because of this, individuals should cultivate a range 
of intellectual virtues to critically think about the information sourc-
es they consume. Flourishing, as mentioned, makes us more human 
since we act according to our rational nature. Information anarchy 
and overload makes us vulnerable to intellectual vices which nur-
tures the spread of misinformation and sustains echo-chambers; we 
become less human when we indulge in these vices. Intentionally 
cultivating intellectual virtues, while not sufficient, is necessary to 
flourish in an era of information anarchy. 

Additionally, there are other reasons why librarians should adopt 
this framework in the context of information literacy, or at least 
consider it. First of all, intellectual virtues are directly mentioned in 



PAPERS  69

the ACRL Framework for Information Literacy. For example, in the 
threshold concept of “Research as Inquiry”, the authors note that the 
information literate individual “demonstrates intellectual humility 
(i.e., recognize their own intellectual or experiential limitations;” 
Association of Colleges & Research Libraries 2015). Moreover, each 
of the threshold concepts imply a steady cultivation of other intellec-
tual virtues. For example, “Scholarship as Conversation” certainly re-
quires open-mindedness and intellectual humility. The “Framework 
for Information Literacy” also includes indirect language that affirms 
a virtue-centered approach especially aligned with the A-T tradition, 
i.e., disposition. Intellectual virtues are dispositions that can be ac-
tualized, and while the authors of the Framework probably did not 
have the A-T tradition in mind, it does indicate that virtue develop-
ment is perhaps a central component for information literacy. David 
McMenemy and Steven Buchanan make a similar observation when 
they highlight the use of the term disposition in the Framework. They 
think that this tern aligns well with virtue epistemology approach to 
information literacy, and that “this is a potential indication that the 
approach taken in the development of the Framework is cognizant 
of character issues” (McMenemy and Buchanan 2019, 78). 

Our discussion thus far has examined what the intellectual vir-
tues are and why it is good for librarians to appropriate or at least 
consider a virtue-centered approach. Now I want to turn to a par-
ticular claim about intellectual virtues which I find necessary and 
essential for librarians to consider. The central claim is that all the 
intellectual virtues are ordered to truth as the fundamental epistemic 
good. I have already hinted at the fact that there is a teleological as-
sumption in the virtue ethics framework. From an epistemic point of 
view, truth is non-instrumentally valuable: all other epistemic goods 
(e.g., justification) are instrumental relative to the truth (Pritchard 
2021b, 5516). The corollary of this claim is that agents of intellectual 
virtues desire truth. The philosopher Duncan Pritchard calls this 
motivation state veritic desire, whereby the “intellectually virtuous 
subject rightly value truth for its own sake because they recognize 
that truth is valuable for its own sake” (2021, 1). This is also affirmed 
in the A-T tradition as well, as Aquinas notes, “…every virtue is or-
dained to some good…they may indeed be called virtues in so far as 
they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth” 
(ST, I-II, q. 57, a. 1). Previously, I have mentioned that the answer dis-
tinction between moral and intellectual virtue lies, in part, due to 



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their natural ends: the intellectual virtue aiming towards truth and 
the moral virtues towards good. Even though the teleological answer 
is not decisive in differentiating the two types of virtues, the appeal 
to truth is necessary for any meaningful concept of intellectual vir-
tues. If this is the case, then librarians appropriating the intellectual 
virtue framework should be concerned with truth in the context of 
information literacy.

On the other hand, Wayne Bivens-Tatum does not think that truth 
places a significant role in information literacy. In fact, he repeatedly 
wants to persuade readers to abandon the idea of truth in the con-
text of information literacy: “…information literacy in general, and 
professional librarians in particular, have nothing to do with truth 
apart from socially constructed selves in scholarly conversation…if 
you think librarians and information literacy instructors have some 
concern for truth, I hope to persuade you otherwise (2022, 115). But 
severing truth from intellectual virtues undermines a key aspect of 
the whole framework itself: librarians should be concerned with 
truth especially when applying a virtue-centered framework namely 
because the framework demands it. 

To be sure, there is always a pragmatic concern when it comes to 
the practicality of insisting on a particular aspect of the intellectual 
virtues. For example, if one adopts a particular theory of truth, let’s 
say a correspondence theory of truth in the context of information 
literacy, does it really make a difference? Is veritic desire a neces-
sary part of virtue epistemology? Bivens-Tatum is inclined to say 
that even if this picture is correct, “this is nothing that librarians are 
professionally concerned about” (2022, 134). Adding to this compli-
cation is that fact that pragmatists also disagree amongst themselves 
in regards to concepts of truth. Indeed, Bivens-Tatum rightly points 
out Peircean pragmatists like Cheryl Misak insists that the aim of in-
quiry and discourse is directed towards true belief — a view that is 
virtually identical with the veritic desire thesis (2022, 137). Yet Misak, 
like most pragmatists, deny a correspondence theory of truth. Oth-
ers, notably Labaree and Scimeca, conclude similarly with Bivens-
Tatum and say that a suspension of truth is necessary but only for a 
completely opposite reason. They think that adopting a particular 
theory of truth hinders librarians from performing their duties: “…
librarians must suspend the truth value of singular items and ar-
tifacts in the historical record in order that the whole truth of any 
period of history be accurately analyzed and understood” (2008, 



PAPERS  71

66). These concerns are difficult to answer and while I do not have 
concrete answers to these problems and have not attempted to ad-
dress them in any adequate manner in this paper, I still think that it 
would be hard to ignore the concept of truth in relation to intellectual 
virtues since it is an essential concept within virtue epistemology. 
And these difficulties should be expected as virtue ethics itself is a 
normative approach which puts the onus on the agent on applying 
the virtues in various circumstances. There is no one right way to 
infuse intellectual virtues in information literacy but to leave out a 
core component from the framework would be, it seems to me, a mis-
take. As librarians start to apply intellectual virtues in librarianship 
and information literacy, a careful circumspection and prudence is 
needed when appropriating virtue information literacy so that we 
can truly help and instill virtues of the mind to our students in an 
era of information anarchy.

REFERENCES

Baehr, Jason. 2021a. Deep in Thought: A Practical Guide to Teaching 
for Intellectual Virtues. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Education 
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———. 2021b. “Two Concepts of Intellectual Humility.” In 
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Bassham, Gregory. 2013. “Virtue-Centered Approaches to 
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Labaree, Robert V., and Ross Scimeca. 2008. “The Philosophical 
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