Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 251 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 4.0 1 State University "Kyiv Aviation Institute", Ukraine E-mail: svitrad98@ukr.net ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3680-7952 DOI: https://doi.org/10.30525/2256-0742/2025-11-2-251-263 THE RCEP ECONOMIES AMID GLOBAL TURBULENCE Svitlana Radziyevska1 Abstract. In spite of the increased geopolitical tensions, recent years have witnessed a greater regional trade integration in East Asia, the heart of the Asia Pacific. The objective of the paper is to examine the dynamics of GDP, GDP per capita, population, merchandise trade of the member states of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Methodology. The data, taken from the UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics and the UNCTADstat Data Centre, as well as various publications, served as the information source for using the methods of tabular and graphical representation, comparative analysis, logical generalization, historical analysis, etc. The results demonstrate the strengthening of China’s position within the RCEP: during 2015–2023, its share of the bloc rose from 54,44% to 60,27%. The PRC’s share of the world grew from 14,92% to 16,92%. In 2023, the regional nominal GDP of the RCEP amounted to $29’481 bln, or 28,07% of the global GDP making it the second among the integration blocs of the world after the USMCA ($31’262 bln, or 29,77% of the global economy). Over 2015-2023, GDP rose with different speeds throughout the RCEP: on the one hand, GDP of Viet Nam rocketed by 118,51%; of Cambodia – by 77,30%; Singapore – by 62,77%; GDP of the PRC increased by 59,27%; while, on the other hand, GDP of Myanmar grew by 14,25%; GDP of Japan – by merely 2,67%. Brunei Darussalam is the only member of the group which experienced GDP decline (by 3,84%). During the analyzed period, GDP per capita of the RCEP grew from $9’257 to $12’712.3, i.e. nearly in line with the world average, which increased from $10’173 to $12’985. In 2023, the RCEP’s population accounted for 28,66% of the world; between 2015 and 2023, all the RCEP member states registered population growth, with the exception of Japan (-1,74%). In 2023, the group provided 29,22% of global goods exports and consumed 24,9% of global goods imports. From 2015 to 2023, the RCEP merchandise trade surplus rose from $712  bln to $920  bln. In 2023, China had the largest goods trade surplus among the RCEP nations ($823  bln), while Japan ran the largest merchandise trade deficit ($69 bln). Practical implications. East Asia has always been one of the most contested regions of the world where the interests of the global players intersect; however, the prosperity at present requires not only the reconsideration of the lessons learned in the past, but primarily implies the transformation from competition to collaboration – the imperative for peaceful coexistence in future for all. Value/originality. The RCEP, located geographically in the centre of the Indo-Pacific, has shown itself a reliable platform, created for pushing forward a stable, attractive, and predictable multilateral trading environment for all interested in liberalization. China is playing its key role in the RCEP, where ASEAN countries are also welcoming new members, representing the other regions and civilizations, to their integration bloc. Keywords: regional economic integration, East Asia, Southeast Asia, ASEAN, China, RCEP membership, major regional trading power, trade policy, nominal GDP, GDP per capita (nominal), population, merchandise exports, merchandise imports. JEL Classification: F60, A10, O10, F02, E01, O57 1. Introduction The RCEP membership exhibits considerable economic heterogeneity, in terms of overall size, level of development, economic structures, and resources. Moreover, the RCEP parties have also shown different proclivities towards the signing of economic agreements in the past. Singapore, China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Malaysia have been actively signing trade and investment agreements, whereas countries such as Myanmar, Brunei, and Cambodia have rarely stepped beyond the bounds of ASEAN (Short overview, 2021, p.  5). Despite daunting challenges posed by the pandemic, RCEP members fully concluded the market access negotiations, completed legal scrubbing for the over 14000-page text, and eventually signed the Agreement at the Summit as scheduled, Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 252 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 which is the most significant outcome of East Asian economic integration in the last two decades (Signing of RCEP, 2020). The objective of the paper is to examine the dynamics of GDP, GDP per capita, population, merchandise trade of the member states of the RCEP over 2015–2023. 2. Overview of the region, the RCEP, the nominal GDP of the members This section presents a brief overview of the region and the RCEP formation, as well as reveals the GDP dynamics of the nations over 2015-2023. It is a well-known fact that East Asia has a remarkable record of high and sustained economic growth. According to the World Bank Policy Research Report, published in 1993, from 1965 to 1990 the twenty- three economies of East Asia grew faster than all other regions of the world. However, most of this achievement is attributable to seemingly miraculous growth in just eight economies: Japan; the “Four Tigers” – Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, China; and the three newly industrializing economies of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (The East Asian Miracle, 1993). It’s necessary to mention that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration by the Founding Fathers of ASEAN: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN on 7  January 1984, followed by Viet Nam on 28  July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23  July 1997, and Cambodia on 30  April 1999, making up what is today the ten Member States of ASEAN (About ASEAN, 2025). The RCEP is an ASEAN- driven initiative. The RCEP negotiations were launched by Leaders from 10 ASEAN Member States and six ASEAN FTA partners (Australia, People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand) during the 21st ASEAN Summit, Cambodia, in November 2012; coverage areas are trade in goods, trade in services, investment, economic & technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, dispute settlement, e-commerce, small and medium enterprises, etc.  (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 2025). Hence, the RCEP entered into force on 1  January 2022, as the ASEAN Secretariat had received ratifications or acceptances from 10 RCEP member countries by 2  November 2021. The RCEP became a 15-member framework on 23  June 2023 when the 15th country, the Philippines, ratified the agreement (Political economy, 2025, p.  19). The RCEP negotiation process took so long because of the nature of multilateral negotiation where member economies differ significantly in terms of development level, economic profiles, as well as in their individual ambitions towards the trade agenda. Interestingly, the process of arriving at a common, shared trade pact in this diverse region exemplifies another important exercise – one of norms and rule-making. Arguably, RCEP asserts trade norms and rules that members adhere to, although, given their economic differences, with distinct, negotiated timelines  (Political economy, 2025, p. 96). With this in mind, let’s glimpse into the history. Since the end of the Second World War, the fundamental strategic constellation of the Indo-Pacific has been determined by relations between the “Big Four” – the US, the USSR, China, and India. At the height of the Cold War, the antagonism between the US and the USSR shaped a bipolar world order. The bloodiest proxy wars between the blocs were fought in the Indo-Pacific (e.g., Korea, Vietnam). After the end of the Cold War, the US dominated the unipolar world order. Russia, China, and India initially cooperated with the US. Unlike during the Cold War, Russia is now China’s junior partner. In contrast to the Soviet Union, China is now closely intertwined economically with the rest of the world and has a strong interest in an open trade order. Today, as then, India seeks to maximize its room for maneuver by avoiding firm alliances (Saxer, 2024). Historically, a long-standing concern for the US has been to avoid exclusion from Asian regionalism and to play a proactive role in shaping the terms of deeper economic integration. In pursuit of this goal, US trade diplomacy has adopted different approaches over time, from open regionalism with the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989 to the pursuit of bilateral trade agreements in a process of ‘competitive liberalisation’, and the high-stake negotiation of a mega-trade agreement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Political economy, 2025, p. 197). Mr.  Geoffrey Faux, a former economist for the U.S. Department of State and the Founding President of the U.S. Economic Policy Institute (the U.S. leading think tank on the political and economic issues that working Americans face), justifies that “anger over the impact of international trade on jobs, wages, and opportunities was a major cause of Donald Trump’s election” (Faux, 2016). “Since the signing of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (conceived by R.Reagan, negotiated by G.Bush, and sold to the Congress by B.Clinton) the Washington policy class has pursued ever more so-called free trade agreements (FTA). As the Institute has been reporting for decades, these deals have devastated U.S. industrial base and the economic security of millions of Americans. Under pressure from multinational corporations, Republican and Democratic leaders have systematically traded away the income and job Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 253 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 security of American workers in exchange for promoting the interests of American international investors. But the root cause of the loss of jobs and industry to globalization goes deeper than the trade pacts’ details. It is inherent in economic policies that relentlessly open up American workers and their communities to brutal global competition for which they have not been prepared. The trade policy of the last quarter century is now bankrupt, economically and politically. This is the moment for America to go back to the drawing board and rethink strategies for competing in the global economy in ways that raise living standards for all. The first step is to declare a freeze on all trade negotiations – bilateral, as well as multilateral – until we have such strategies in place.” (Faux, 2016). Thus, the U.S. pulled out of the Trans- Pacific Partnership, as well as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The NAFTA was renegotiated to obtain a “better deal” for the US. According to the U.S. National Security Strategy, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power. It is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values. Beijing frequently uses its economic power to coerce countries. It benefits from the openness of the international economy while limiting access to its domestic market, and it seeks to make the world more dependent on the PRC while reducing its own dependence on the world. The PRC is also investing in a military that is rapidly modernizing, increasingly capable in the Indo-Pacific, and growing in strength… (National Security Strategy, 2022, p. 23-24). Prof. Andriy Grytsenko, Academician of the NAS of Ukraine, emphasizes that change of world order usually starts with wars and ends with peace agreements. At the level of the formation of new international orders concerning the territorial division and regulation of relations between leading countries, one can single out: Peace of Westphalia (1648), which, after the end of the Thirty Years’ War, formed a new order in Europe and a corresponding system of international relations based on the concept of state sovereignty; The Congress of Vienna (September 1814 – June 1815), which was attended by more than two hundred diplomats representing nearly all countries of the European continent, and redrawn the political map of Europe, thus turning it into a community of legitimate monarchies which provided peace for a while; The Treaty of Versailles (1919), which formalized the results of the First World War; the agreement between the USA and Germany (1921) practically repeated the Treaty of Versailles, but did not contain articles on the League of Nations and Germany’s responsibility for starting the war, became a shaky basis for interstate relations, which is associated with significant contradictions between countries, the revolution in Russia and the general instability of the situation; The Yalta and Potsdam conferences (1945), which summed up the Second World War and formed the post-war world order, including changes in state borders, denazification, demilitarization, democratization and decartelization of Germany, decisions on the principles of formation and activities of the UN (Economic contradictions, 2024). The collapse of the USSR marked the beginning of a change in the post-war world order. This process has already gone through a number of stages, and general trends of reformatting the modern world order have been outlined. Among the most important trends are the following: the decline of the US share in the world production, and the aggravation of internal economic and social contradictions in the USA; the economic strengthening of China;  the increase of the share of the countries of the East in the global economy, etc. (Economic contradictions, 2024). Famous Ukrainian scholars Prof. Leonid Kistersky, Prof.  Vasyl Marmazov, and Prof. Igor Piliaiev stress that the East Asian Confucian tradition countries’ successful performance, especially regarding the anti-pandemic measures, have highly actualized the issue of restructuring mainstream pattern of effective democracy, rethinking the relationship between democracy, strong state, human rights, traditional/ innovative values, and sustainable development. That has become especially challenging if compared to Western, primarily Anglo-American, liberal democracies against the background of West’s evident retreat from the world conceptual and practical leadership positions in global economy, finance, and globalization processes (Kistersky, Marmazov, & Piliaiev, 2021). Prof.  Volodymyr Sidenko, Corresponding Member of the NAS of Ukraine, concludes in his publication that the strategic initiatives adopted by China in recent years are driving the spread of alternative views on world order based on the implementation of the principle of multipolarity, the establishment of an alternative model of the globalization processes, international development based on the strategic concept “A Shared Future for Mankind”. This policy is systemic in nature and strategically oriented towards a significant change in the current mechanisms of global regulation (Sidenko, 2025). In his turn, German researcher Marc  Saxer mentions that while Donald Trump has won the presidential election for the second term, it is still unclear whether primacists (defending American hegemony), prioritizers (focusing on Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 254 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 China), or isolationists (America First) will have the stronger sway in his next administration. However, there has long been a consensus across party lines that competition with China must be fierce (Saxer, 2024). In addition, Prof.  Zhang Yunling, Member of the Chinese Academy of  Social Sciences, states that the RCEP is a unique opportunity for China to deepen its reform and opening-up and enhance close relations with East Asian countries. The RCEP plays the role of sharing the spirit of openness & inclusiveness in East Asia (Yunling Zhang, 2022). According to the UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics and the UNCTADstat Data Centre (Table  1), in 2015, the highest GDP, in nominal terms, among the RCEP nations, was recorded for the PRC ($11’156,3  bln, or 54,44% of the trading bloc’s GDP). Japan ranked second ($4’079,1  bln, or 19,91%); South Korea (the ROK) – third ($1’356,7 bln, or 6,62%); Australia – fourth ($1’276,2  bln, or 6,23%); Indonesia  – fifth ($877,6 bln, or 4,28%); Thailand – sixth ($391,2 bln); the Philippines  – seventh ($298,2  bln); Malaysia  – eighth ($293,7  bln); Singapore  – ninth ($287,9  bln); Viet Nam  – tenth ($194,8  bln); New Zealand  – eleventh ($171,3 bln); Myanmar – twelfth ($63,3 bln); Cambodia – thirteenth ($18,1 bln); Brunei Darussalam – fourteenth ($15,6  bln); The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) – fifteenth ($12,5 bln). Obviously, in 2023, China topped the list ($17’769,1  bln, or 60,27% of the regional GDP). Japan ranked second ($4’188,1  bln, or 14,21%); Australia  – third ($1’787,3  bln, or 6,06%); the ROK  – fourth ($1’713,6  bln, or 5,81%); Indonesia  – fifth ($1’370,6  bln, or 4,65%); Thailand  – sixth ($517,5  bln); Singapore  – seventh ($468,6  bln); the Philippines – eighth ($436,2  bln); Viet Nam  – ninth ($425,7  bln); Malaysia  – tenth ($415,7  bln); New Zealand  – eleventh ($253,2  bln); Myanmar  – twelfth ($72,3  bln); Cambodia  – thirteenth ($32,0 bln); Lao PDR – fourteenth ($15,7 bln); Brunei Darussalam – fifteenth ($15,0 bln). The calculations demonstrate that during the period under analysis, the regional nominal GDP of the RCEP grew by $8’988 bln, or increased by 43,86% while that of the world  – by $30’270 bln, or 40,49% (Table 1). The calculations, made in the previous publication, based on the UNCTAD Statistics, illustrate that in 2015, the highest regional GDP, in nominal terms, among the selected integration blocs (RCEP was not included in that list since the agreement had not been signed) was recorded for the NAFTA: its GDP accounted for 27,62% of the global GDP; while the EU ranked second (21,49%); and the ASEAN (3,28%) – fifth (Radziyevska, Us, 2020). In 2018, the regional GDP Table 1 The dynamics of the nominal GDP* of the RCEP nations, 2015-2023, mln, USD China Japan Australia Republic of Korea Indonesia Thailand 2015 11’156’254 4’079’074 1’276’180 1’356’669 877’642 391’230 2018 13’605’485 4’935’519 1’439’851 1’619’952 1’041’776 504’880 2019 14’279’966 5’117’994 1’379’624 1’651’223 1’119’100 543’977 2020 14’687’744 5’048’790 1’437’563 1’644’313 1’059’055 500’457 2021 17’820’459 5’005’537 1’752’688 1’818’432 1’186’505 505’568 2022 17’963’171 4’232’174 1’776’577 1’673’917 1’319’100 495’341 2023 17’769’085 4’188’121 1’787’281 1’713’568 1’370’639 517’484 Singapore Philippines Viet Nam Malaysia New Zealand Myanmar 2015 287’919 298’191 194’819 293’727 171’277 63’307 2018 347’334 330’831 244’502 354’280 204’551 70’035 2019 376’837 376’823 334’365 365’178 212’958 71’802 2020 348’392 361’751 346’616 337’339 212’401 79’970 2021 423’797 394’087 366’138 372’981 253’227 71’683 2022 466’789 404’284 408’802 406’306 245’845 65’212 2023 468’641 436’168 425’701 415’707 253’217 72’329 Cambodia Lao PDR Brunei Darussalam RCEP World 2015 18’053 12’523 15’620 20’492’485 74’753’058 2018 24’391 18’175 14’073 24’755’635 85’304’000 2019 27’098 18’741 13’469 25’889’155 87’741’201 2020 25’873 19’116 12’006 26’121’386 85’483’570 2021 26’961 19’074 14’006 30’031’143 97’329’051 2022 29’505 15’363 16’682 29’519’068 100’834’796 2023 32’008 15’703 15’020 29’480’672 105’022’738 *Gross domestic product: US$ at current prices. Last updated 29 Oct. 2024. Source: UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics 2016-2023; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. URL: https://unctadstat.unctad.org; author’s own calculations. Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 255 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 of the NAFTA – 27.59%, and that of the EU – 21.93% of the world, respectively (Radziyevska, 2020). Still, when President Trump capped his first term in the White House by replacing the much-criticized NAFTA with the USMCA in 2020, he hailed the new deal as “a truly fair and reciprocal trade deal that will keep jobs, wealth and growth right here in America.” In the first weeks in office of his second term, President Trump took a different turn, threatening or imposing tariffs at a rate of 25% on many US imports from Canada and Mexico  (Contreras et al., 2025). From 2015 to 2023, the USMCA increased its share from 27,62% to 29,77% of the world; the EU fell from 21,49% to 17,51%; the ASEAN grew from 3,28% to 3,59%. Importantly and specifically, Prof.  Mуkhailо Zveryakov, Corresponding Member of the NAS of Ukraine, presents the results of his thorough theoretical analysis of the crisis of the neoliberal model of globalization, which led to the processes of deindustrialization in many countries of the world, including Ukraine. The Ukrainian scholar substantiates that through the restoration of the development of high-tech sectors of the real economy, a global economic model is changing, which gives a chance to overcome negative consequences of the crisis (Zveryakov, 2017a). Prof.  Mуkhailо Zveryakov reveals the specificity of some models of capitalism under the conditions of the neoliberal globalization, and provides the detailed investigation into the capitalism models of the post-socialist countries, emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The scholar concludes that the high-tech manufacturing industry, driven by innovations (production of high- tech goods domestically), ensures efficient functioning of the national economies amid global turbulence (Zveryakov, 2017b). Clearly, the global capitalist system is in a deep crisis... There is no need to prove that the democracy has also been in a severe crisis for quite a while (e.g., Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975). Logically, the value systems revision requires deep reconsideration, where in the economic research discourse the concept of holistic truth which is of universumic character, complex organization and structure is to occupy its proper place (Tarasevych, 2018). World- famous Dr.  Abraham Cressy Morrison, the President of the New York Academy of Sciences, in his book, published during the Second World War, notes that “reverence, generosity, nobility of character, morality, inspiration, and what may be called the Divine attributes, do not arise from atheism or negation, a surprising form of self-conceit which puts man in the place of God. Without faith, civilization would become bankrupt, order would become disorder, restraint and control would be lost, and evil would prevail” (Morrison, 1944, p.106). Prof. Viktor Tarasevych, Corresponding Member of the NAS of Ukraine, pays special attention to the concept of truth, its content and types in the context of the evolution of classical, non-classical, and post- non-classical science. In the above-mentioned context, political economy should play its critical role in finding the solutions to a wide variety of problems since it also serves as a philosophy of economic sciences (Tarasevych, 2018). Similarly, Prof. Tymur Kalchenko devotes his research to the civilizational level of the global system in general, and in one of his papers focuses on the Western European region in particular: “the physical fall of Alexandria in 642 marks the collapse of the Hellenistic world, symbolically founded almost a thousand years earlier. Thus, a kind of Western European community was formed, with the Franco-German and Norman nuclei acting as catalysts for its development. It should be noted that the new entity already then began to deliberately discriminate against Greece and all the territories within its oikoumene. However, in its origins it still retained its Hellenistic roots, inheriting from Israel the principle of impartiality, from Greece – the concept of justice, from Rome – the rule of law, from Christianity – the foundational principles of equality and brotherhood. Consequently, the gradual decline of Western European civilisation depends, first and foremost, on the betrayal of these four basic principles. The future of human life depends on the effectiveness of their implementation. Above all, the fundamental laws of existence that have been formed over the centuries, have been tested by time, confirmed by experience and sanctified by spiritual practice. Departing from them will result not only in a personalised, albeit immediately conscious tragedy, but also in global systemic cataclysms, which we observe today, when many activities have gone out of control of moral checks and balances, creating chaos and destroying the fragile balance of power and interests” (Kalchenko, 2021). Thus, it is logical to agree with Prof. Valerii Novikov who focuses on the concept of ethical economy as a system of economic views on a fair economic order. Prof.  Valerii Novikov defines ethical economy as a universal theory of rational activity, which takes into account the interaction of ethics, economy and finance, law, sociology, history. The normative side of ethical economy includes legal obligations, which can be properly implemented in laws. In the triad of law, ethics and economics, the principle of efficiency and social justice applies to both law itself and ethics and should be used in the development of adequate legislation (Novikov, 2024). Let’s focus on the figures: in 2023, regional GDP of the USMCA amounted to $31’261’638 mln, or 29,77% of the global GDP (as of January 15, 2025, according to the UNCTAD Statistics) since in 2023, GDP of the US – Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 256 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 $27’348’814  mln; GDP of Canada – $2’121’034  mln; GDP of Mexico – $1’791’790 mln, GDP of the world – $105’022’738  mln, while regional GDP of the RCEP amounted to $29’480’672  mln, or 28,07% of the global GDP (Figure 1). More specifically, in 2015 the regional GDP of the RCEP accounted for 27.41% of the global GDP (Figure 1); in 2018 – 29.02%; in 2019 – 29.51%; in 2020 – 30.56%; in 2021– 30.86%; in 2022 – 29.27%; in 2023 – 28.07% (trend: y=0.1368x+28,696). Nevertheless, in November 2019, India (the fifth- largest economy by nominal GDP and the third-largest economy by GDP based on PPP in the world in 2023) expressed concerns about its trade deficit with China and withdrew from the RCEP negotiations just before the agreement was signed, at the end of 2019. The calculations, made in the previous research, show that the RCEP’s share of the world with India (since India initially planned to be the part of the bloc) in 2015 accounted for 30,38%; in 2018 – 32,24%, respectively (Radziyevska, 2020). On the one hand, “the 15  RCEP participating countries reaffirmed their commitment to continue working with India…, as instructed by RCEP Leaders at the Third RCEP Summit in November 2019. Recognising India as a valuable original participant, the 15 RCEP participating countries would welcome India’s return…” (Political economy, 2025, p.  25). On the other hand, in February 2025, the President of the USA, the Honorable Donald J. Trump and the Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi resolved to expand trade and investment to make their citizens more prosperous, nations stronger, economies more innovative and supply chains more resilient. The leaders resolved to deepen the U.S. – India trade relationship to promote growth that ensures fairness, national security, job creation. To this end, the leaders set a bold new goal for bilateral trade – “Mission 500” – aiming to more than double total bilateral trade to $500 bln by 2030  (United States – India, 2025). On January 10, 2025, China’s Commerce Ministry spokesperson He Yadong made the comments at a regular press conference after the third anniversary of the implementation of the RCEP, adding that “China, the largest economy in RCEP, will continue to implement the RCEP comprehensively and with high quality, and make greater contributions to promoting Asia-Pacific economic integration and achieving regional common development and prosperity. As the non-ASEAN rotating chair of RCEP in 2024, China worked to facilitate new members in joining the pact: China’s Hong Kong, Sri Lanka and Chile have submitted formal applications to join RCEP, while other economies have shown strong interest” (China hails trade, 2025). 3. Population and GDP per capita of the RCEP member economies The goal of this part is to examine the dynamics of the population and the dynamics of the GDP per capita of the trading bloc’s parties. According to the UNCTAD (Table  2), in 2023, among the RCEP countries, by population, the PRC topped the list (1’422,6  mln, or 61,34% of the bloc’s population); Indonesia ranked second (281,2  mln, or 12,13%); Japan – third (124,4  mln, or 5,36%); the Philippines  – fourth (114,9  mln, or 4,95%); Viet Nam – fifth (100,4  mln, or 4,33%); Thailand – sixth (71,7 mln, or 3,09%); Myanmar – seventh (54,1 mln, or 2,33%); the ROK – eighth (51,7  mln, or 2,23%); Malaysia – ninth (35,1  mln); Australia – tenth (26,5 mln); Cambodia – eleventh (17,4 mln); Lao PDR – Figure 1. The RCEP’s share of world GDP*, % *Gross domestic product: US$ at current prices. Last updated 29 Oct. 2024. Source: UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics 2016-2023; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. URL: https://unctadstat.unctad.org; author’s own calculations. 27,41 29,02 29,51 30,56 30,86 29,27 28,07 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 2015 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 257 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 twelfth (7,7 mln); Singapore – thirteenth (5,8 mln); New Zealand – fourteenth (5,2  mln); Brunei Darussalam – fifteenth (0,5 mln). The calculations reveal that during 2015-2023 the population of the RCEP grew by 4.76%, or 105,3 mln while that of the world – by 10.1%, or 742,3  mln. Over 2015-2023, the RCEP’s share of the global population fell by 1.46% (Figure 2). Table 2 indicates that during 2015-2023, on the one hand, the population of Malaysia increased by 15,81%; that of New Zealand  – by 14,22%; the Philippines – by 14,09%; on the other hand, the population of the PRC rose by 3,38%; that of the ROK  – by 2,9%; Myanmar  – by 0,44%; nevertheless, the population of Japan declined by 1,74%. For Japan, the RCEP is one of the fruits of its strategy Table 2 The dynamics of the RCEP population*, 2015-2023, thousand China Indonesia Japan Philippines Viet Nam Thailand 2015 1’376’049 257’564 126’573 100’699 93’448 67’959 2018 1’427’648 267’671 127’202 106’651 95’546 69’428 2019 1’433’784 270’626 126’860 108’117 96’462 69’626 2020 1’439’324 273’524 126’476 109’581 97’339 69’800 2021 1’426’437 276’758 125’679 113’101 98’935 71’727 2022 1’425’887 275’501 123’952 115’559 98’187 71’697 2023 1’422’585 281’190 124’371 114’891 100’352 71’702 Myanmar Republic of Korea Malaysia Australia Cambodia Lao PDR 2015 53’897 50’293 30’331 23’969 15’578 6’802 2018 53’708 51’172 31’528 24’898 16’250 7’061 2019 54’045 51’225 31’950 25’203 16’487 7’169 2020 54’410 51’269 32’366 25’500 16’719 7’276 2021 53’387 51’848 34’282 25’956 16’974 7’453 2022 54’179 51’816 33’938 26’177 16’768 7’529 2023 54’134 51’749 35’126 26’451 17’424 7’665 Singapore New Zealand Brunei Darussalam RCEP World 2015 5’604 4’529 423 2’213’718 7’349’472 2018 5’758 4’743 429 2’289’693 7’631’091 2019 5’804 4’783 433 2’302’574 7’713’468 2020 5’850 4’822 437 2’314’693 7’794’799 2021 5’546 5’108 452 2’313’643 7’954’448 2022 5’976 5’185 449 2’312’800 7’975’105 2023 5’789 5’173 459 2’319’061 8’091’735 *Population, absolute value in thousands. Population refers to de facto population in a country, area or region as of 1 July of the indicated year. Last updated 11 Sept. 2024. Source: UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics 2016-2023; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. URL: https://unctadstat.unctad.org; author’s own calculations. Figure 2. The RCEP’s share of the global population*, % *Population refers to de facto population in a country, area or region as of 1 July of the indicated year. Last updated 11 Sept. 2024. Source: UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics 2016-2023; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. URL: https://unctadstat.unctad.org; author’s own calculations. 30,12 30 29,85 29,7 29,09 29 28,66 27,5 28 28,5 29 29,5 30 30,5 2015 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 258 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 in East Asia  /  Asia-Pacific since the mid-1990s. The importance of the RCEP for Japan had been secondary to that of the TPP. However, after the US withdrawal from the TPP, the RCEP was seen as an essential framework for establishing a rules-based regional order in the Indo-Pacific region  (Political economy, 2025, p.159). Interestingly, development of the most countries in this region has been shaped by not only economic factors (e.g., the symbiosis between strong state governance and market economy), but primarily by non-economiс ones: the long colonial dependence on the Western Europe; the civilizational diversity (Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, etc.), where axiological emphasis is put on spiritual prosperity rather than material well-being. Let’s have a closer look at the GDP per capita of the fifteen economies (Table 3). According to the UNCTAD, in 2023, the highest GDP per capita in the RCEP, in nominal terms, was recorded for Singapore, while the lowest – for Myanmar. It’s easy to notice (Table 3) that in 2023, six out of fifteen member states produced an output per person greater than $30’000: Singapore ($80’952), Australia ($67’569), New Zealand ($48’951), Japan ($33’674), the ROK ($33’113), Brunei Darussalam ($32’727). By contrast, six out of fifteen nations recorded a per capita output of less than $5’000: Indonesia ($4’874), Viet Nam ($4’242), the Philippines ($3’796), Lao PDR ($2’049), Cambodia ($1’837), and Myanmar ($1’336). Over 2015-2023, GDP per capita rose with different speeds throughout the RCEP: on the one hand, it increased in Viet Nam by 103,45%; in Cambodia  – by 58,5%; in Singapore – by 57,56%; in the PRC – by 54,08%; on the other hand, it grew in Lao PDR by 11,3%; in Japan – by 4,49%. At the same time Brunei Darussalam was the only member of the bloc which experienced a decline of GPD per capita (–11,33%). The results of the calculations demonstrate that over 2015-2023 the GDP per capita of the world rose by 27,64%, or $2’812 while that of the RCEP – by 37,33%, or $3’455.3 (Figure 3). 4. Merchandise trade of the RCEP states The current section of the study touches upon the merchandise exports and merchandise imports of the RCEP nations. In 2023, the top ten merchandise exporters among the RCEP economies (Table  4) were the PRC ($3’379 bln), Japan ($717  bln), the ROK ($632  bln), Singapore ($476 bln), Australia ($371 bln), Viet Nam ($354 bln), Malaysia ($313 bln), Thailand ($285 bln), Table 3 The dynamics of the GDP per capita* in the RCEP member states, USD Singapore Australia New Zealand Japan Republic of Korea Brunei Darussalam 2015 51’380 53’243 37’822 32’227 26’975 36’909 2018 60’322 57’830 43’127 39’178 31’657 32’804 2019 66’467 54’140 42’682 40’144 31’897 30’427 2020 61’990 55’841 41’895 39’420 31’708 26’834 2021 76’411 67’524 49’578 39’749 35’072 31’007 2022 73’170 68’578 46’971 33’888 32’150 36’941 2023 80’952 67’569 48’951 33’674 33’113 32’727 China Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Viet Nam Philippines 2015 8’107 9’684 5’757 3’407 2’085 2’961 2018 9’530 11’237 7’272 3’892 2’559 3’102 2019 10’031 10’920 7’606 4’107 3’441 3’401 2020 10’299 9’954 6’986 3’854 3’534 3’228 2021 12’493 10’880 7’048 4’287 3’701 3’484 2022 12’677 11’962 6’958 4’781 4’124 3’500 2023 12’491 11’835 7’217 4’874 4’242 3’796 Lao PDR Cambodia Myanmar RCEP World 2015 1’841 1’159 1’175 9’257.0 10’173 2018 2’574 1’501 1’304 10’811.8 11’181 2019 2’589 1’644 1’364 11’243.6 11’371 2020 2’602 1’547 1’508 11’285.0 10’892 2021 2’559 1’588 1’343 12’980.0 12’170 2022 2’101 1’724 1’041 12’763.3 12’564 2023 2’049 1’837 1’336 12’712.3 12’985 *Gross domestic product per capita, current prices, United States dollars. Last updated 29 Oct. 2024. Source: UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics 2016-2023; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. URL: https://unctadstat.unctad.org; author’s own calculations. Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 259 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 Indonesia ($259  bln), the Philippines ($74  bln). In 2023, the top ten merchandise importers among the bloc parties were PRC ($2’557  bln), Japan ($786 bln), the ROK ($643 bln), Singapore ($423 bln), Viet Nam ($326  bln), Thailand ($290  bln), Australia ($287 bln), Malaysia ($266 bln), Indonesia ($222 bln), the Philippines ($134 bln). In 2023, in absolute terms, among the RCEP members China enjoyed the largest merchandise trade surplus ($822’690  mln). PRC was followed by Australia ($83’872  mln); Singapore ($52’804  mln); Malaysia ($47’081  mln); Indonesia ($36’971  mln); Viet Nam ($28’006  mln); Brunei Darussalam ($3’757  mln); Lao PDR ($721  mln). By contrast, in 2023, among the RCEP nations Japan ran the largest merchandise trade deficit ($68’535  mln). Japan was followed by the Philippines ($60’279  mln); the ROK ($10’346 mln); New Zealand ($8’558  mln); Thailand ($5’192  mln); Myanmar ($1’688  mln); Cambodia ($916 mln). Over 2015-2023, some RCEP economies enjoyed a boost in goods exports (e.g., Lao PDR – by 202,28%; Viet Nam – by 118,24%; Australia – by 97,2%; Cambodia – 90,43%); while others – in goods imports (e.g., Brunei Darussalam  – by 131,7%; Viet Nam – by 96,13%; the Philippines – by 90,73%; Cambodia – 76,58%). Over 2015-2023, the value of the RCEP merchandise exports grew by 44,45%, or $2’141’276  mln while the value of the world merchandise exports increased by 43,87%, or $7’261’813  mln. Between 2015 and 2023, the value of the RCEP merchandise imports grew by 47,07%, or $1’932’662 mln, while the value of the world merchandise imports rose by 46,05%, or $7’647’347 mln. The RCEP merchandise exports and imports increased nearly in line with the world average, varying between 43-47%, with imports of goods growing slightly faster than exports of goods (Table 4). For the RCEP, the value of the goods exported exceeded the value of goods imported (Figure 4): the RCEP merchandise trade surplus rose from $711’773  mln in 2015 to $920’387 mln in 2023 (in 2018 – $445’369 mln; in 2019 – $525’592 mln; in 2020 – $740’157 mln; in 2021 – $869’525  mln; in 2022 – $853’864 mln, respectively). In 2015, the RCEP contributed $4’817’787  mln to the world total merchandise exports of $16’551’591 mln making it 29,11% of global goods exports (Figure 5). In 2023, the RCEP contributed $6’959’063 mln to the world total merchandise exports of $23’813’404 mln making it 29,22% of global goods exports (trend for 2015-2023 of the RCEP’s merchandise exports share of the world: y=0.1632x+28,964). In 2015, the RCEP contributed $4’106’014  mln to the world total merchandise imports of $16’607’237 mln making it 24,72% of global goods imports (Figure 5). In 2023, the RCEP contributed $6’038’676 mln to the world total merchandise imports of $24’254’584  mln making it 24,9% of global goods imports (trend for 2015-2023 of the RCEP’s merchandise imports share of the world: y=0.0325x+25,546). Dr.  Ruan Zongze, Executive Vice President of China Institute of International Studies, describes the signing of the agreement as “crucial and timely”: he points out that the RCEP agreement represents a victory of multilateralism over unilateralism and free trade over protectionism, and will strongly boost all parties’ confidence in economic growth (Signing of RCEP, 2020). Figure 3. The dynamics of the GDP per capita*, World and RCEP, USD *Gross domestic product per capita, current prices, United States dollars. Last updated 29 Oct. 2024. Source: UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics 2016-2023; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics (2025). URL: https://unctadstat.unctad.org; author’s own calculations. 10173 11181 11371 10892 12170 12564 12985 9257 10812 11244 11285 12980 12763 12712 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 2015 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 World RCEP Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 260 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 Table 4 The dynamics of the merchandise trade* of the RCEP member states, 2015-2023, mln, USD China Japan Republic of Korea Singapore Australia Viet Nam Exports 2015 2’274’949 624’939 526’755 350’506 188’445 162’107 2018 2’486’695 738’143 604’860 412’953 257’098 242’683 2019 2’499’457 705’564 542’233 390’763 271’005 264’273 2020 2’590’221 641’319 512’498 362’534 250’578 282’725 2021 3’363’835 756’032 644’400 457’357 344’829 335’929 2022 3’593’523 746’920 683’585 515’802 412’562 371’288 2023 3’379’255 717’261 632’226 476’252 371’278 353’782 Imports 2015 1’681’951 648’494 436’499 296’745 208’419 166’103 2018 2’135’748 748’488 535’202 370’881 235’386 235’517 2019 2’078’386 720’957 503’343 359’266 221’564 253’903 2020 2’057’217 635’460 467’633 329’830 211’109 262’620 2021 2’688’634 768’976 615’093 406’226 261’165 331’582 2022 2’716’151 897’242 731’370 475’578 309’189 359’148 2023 2’556’565 785’796 642’572 423’448 287’406 325’776 Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines New Zealand Cambodia Exports 2015 199’869 214’375 150’282 58’648 34’359 12’325 2018 247’455 252’957 180’215 67’488 39’673 13’950 2019 238’195 246’269 167’683 70’927 39’517 14’700 2020 234’127 231’468 163’306 63’767 38’919 17’215 2021 299’028 272’006 229’850 74’618 44’758 17’362 2022 352’475 287’068 291’979 78’930 45’102 22’472 2023 312’830 284’562 258’857 73’527 41’399 23’470 Imports 2015 175’961 202’654 142’695 70’153 36’563 13’810 2018 217’602 248’201 188’707 119’330 43’793 18’780 2019 204’998 236’260 171’276 112’909 42’363 20’720 2020 189’856 206’992 141’622 90’654 37’152 19’131 2021 237’980 266’882 196’041 124’386 49’855 28’369 2022 294’317 303’191 237’447 145’867 54’219 29’805 2023 265’750 289’754 221’886 133’806 49’957 24’386 Myanmar Brunei Darussalam Lao PDR RCEP World Exports 2015 11’106 6’353 2’769 4’817’787 16’551’591 2018 16’640 6’574 5’295 5’572’679 19’453’362 2019 18’110 7’039 5’764 5’481’499 18’933’037 2020 16’692 6’608 6’115 5’418’092 17’619’005 2021 15’145 11’037 7’695 6’873’881 22’328’177 2022 17’085 14’230 8’198 7’441’219 24’926’251 2023 14’753 11’241 8’370 6’959’063 23’813’404 Imports 2015 17’505 3’229 5’233 4’106’014 16’607’237 2018 19’347 4’164 6’164 5’127’310 19’793’724 2019 18’607 5’103 6’252 4’955’907 19’263’247 2020 17’947 5’342 5’370 4’677’935 17’827’911 2021 14’322 8’570 6’275 6’004’356 22’586’618 2022 17’403 9’184 7’244 6’587’355 25’670’141 2023 16’441 7’484 7’649 6’038’676 24’254’584 *Merchandise trade: the value of total merchandise exports and imports, expressed in United States dollars at current prices. Last updated 10 Oct. 2024. Source: UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics 2016-2023; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. URL: https://unctadstat.unctad.org; author’s own calculations. Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 261 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 It must be noted that since its establishment in 1977, the ASEAN-U.S. dialogue relations has evolved from exchange of views on political and security issues to a wide range of cooperation areas (Overview, 2024). It’s also essential to recall that in May 2022, the U.S. and 13 partners launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the Biden Administration’s first major trade and economic initiative in the region. Partner countries are Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. The initiative is not designed as a traditional FTA. IPEF aims to establish “high-standard commitments” in four pillars: (1)  Connected Economy (selected trade issues); (2)  Resilient Economy (supply chains); (3)  Clean Economy (clean energy, decarbonization, infrastructure); and (4)  Fair Economy (tax, anti- corruption issues). All partners opted to participate in all IPEF pillars, except for India, which opted out of the trade pillar. IPEF partners have reached agreements in all pillars except for trade. In 2023, Japan, the ROK, India were in the top 10 U.S. trading partners; U.S.-Vietnam trade has grown by more than 400% in the past decade. IPEF partners accounted for nearly one- fifth of both U.S. goods & services trade (IPEF, 2024). Similarly, as the non-ASEAN rotating chair of the RCEP in 2024, China has worked with the ASEAN chair Indonesia in actively leading the 15 parties to establish the RCEP Support Unit (RSU) as scheduled. The inauguration ceremony marks the start of full operation of the RSU, an important milestone Figure 4. The RCEP merchandise trade* dynamics, 2015-2023, billion, USD *Merchandise trade: the value of total merchandise exports and imports, expressed in United States dollars at current prices. Last updated 10 Oct. 2024. Source: UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics 2016-2023; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics; author’s own calculations. URL: https://unctadstat.unctad.org 4818 5573 5481 5418 6874 7441 6959 4106 5127 4956 4678 6004 6587 6039 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 2015 2020 2021 2022 20232018 2019 Merchandise exports Merchandise imports Figure 5. The RCEP merchandise exports and imports, 2015-2023, % of the world Source: author’s calculations based on UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics 2016-2023; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. URL: https://unctadstat.unctad.org 29,11 28,65 28,95 30,75 30,79 29,85 29,22 24,72 25,9 25,73 26,24 26,58 25,66 24,9 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 2015 2020 2021 2022 20232018 2019 Merchandise exports Merchandise imports Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 262 Vol. 11 No. 2, 2025 in the development of RCEP mechanism, which is conducive to providing adequate secretarial and technical support for the implementation of the RCEP and the operation of relevant institutions, so as to further promote the full and high-quality implementation of the RCEP. On December 9, 2024 the inauguration ceremony of the RSU was held at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia, attended by Secretary General of ASEAN, Dr.  Kao Kim Hourn, Minister of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr.  Budi Santoso, and representatives from 15 RCEP member countries (The RCEP Support Unit, 2024). 5. 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Available at: https://nasu-periodicals.org.ua/index.php/economyukr/ article/view/2017-12-1/2017-12-1 Received on: 03th of April, 2025 Accepted on: 16th of May, 2025 Published on: 10th of June, 2025