


































Microsoft Word - G V Quinones - Singerian Vegetarianism and the Limits of Utilitarianism


Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

46 

Original article 

 

Singerian Vegetarianism and the Limits of Utilitarianism: 

A path towards a Meaning Ethics 

 

Gabriel Vidal Quiñones 

Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, Chile 

Email: gtvidal@uc.cl 

 

Abstract: The advent of the technological era put us in a radically different position against 

nature, because the whole biosphere can now be affected by our actions. Therefore, even 

though non-humans always had moral significance, only recently we start to realize their 

importance. So, we recognize them as morally significant much more than before. This brings 

a renewal to, and makes more patent than ever, the discussion over vegetarianism, since it 

challenges our view on the relation between human beings and other sentient beings. In 

Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism, Peter Singer tries to answer the question through the 

conceptual resources of utilitarianism. In contrast, we shall try to show that the issue of 

vegetarianism can start to be solved better in an ethical consideration that transcends the 

merely prescriptive.  

 

Key words: Vegetarianism, Animal Ethics, Utilitarianism, Hans Jonas, Peter Singer, Food 

Ethics. 

 

Introduction: In this paper, I will try to show that Singer’s arguments in favour of 

vegetarianism are insufficient to resolve the controversy over eating meat, as long as they are 

exclusively supported on a utilitarian basis. This is because the problem, as I shall 

demonstrate later, exceeds the limits of utilitarianism. Overcoming these limits leads us to 

further ethical considerations that show the necessity of rethinking our relationship with non-

human animals in a way that is not merely normative, i.e., considerations that solely prescribe 

rights and wrongs from a merely regulatory perspective. I will try to shed light upon what 

kind of ethical reflection is necessary to answer the question, namely, if is morally acceptable 

to eat animals, through the concept of Ethical Vision, which I shall explain later on. 

 

I shall start by recalling Singer’s main arguments. Next, I will subject them to a plausible 

objection, proceeding under the conceptual background of utilitarianism as well and showing 

how this exercise takes us to a dead point. Finally, from this impossibility of knock-out 

arguments, it will be shown what kind of reflection is necessary to shed light on the issue of 

our food ethics in relation to the Ethical Vision.  

 

Singer’s utilitarian arguments for vegetarianism: In Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism, 

Singer argues that, from a consistent utilitarian position, it follows that, given the 

contemporary state of factory farming, one should abandon meat-eating and become a 

vegetarian. So, at the beginning of his essay he says: “I’m a utilitarian. I’m also a vegetarian. 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

47 

I’m a vegetarian because I am a utilitarian”1. For Singer, taking animals into consideration is 

a simple and obvious corollary of the principle of utility, as he states: 

 

When we apply utilitarianism to the issue of how we should treat animals, one vital 

point stands out immediately. Utilitarianism, in its classical form, aims at minimizing 

pain and maximizing pleasure. Many nonhuman animals can experience pain and 

pleasure. (Perhaps some simpler forms of animal life cannot, but I shall leave this 

qualification aside.) Therefore, they are morally significant entities. They have moral 

standing. In this respect they are like humans and unlike rocks2. 

 

Nonetheless, as he starts supporting such a position, it becomes clear that the relation 

between animal suffering and vegetarianism does not seem to result in an obligatory 

prescription. Even though his arguments increase the plausibility of vegetarianism as a more 

compassionate lifestyle, he cannot prove its mandatory character, because apparently there 

are no knock-out arguments against meat-eating. Now, I shall analyse Singer’s arguments and 

give some counterarguments against them, showing how this procedure leads us to a point 

where it seems that both positions can equally be sustained under a utilitarian standpoint. 

 

One of the pivotal Singerian arguments shows that the universal adoption of vegetarianism 

and the consequent elimination of factory farming would maximize pleasure, and this is 

because, when considering advantages and disadvantages, the consequentialist calculation 

results in a positive balance in favour of vegetarianism. Nonetheless, it is possible to dissolve 

each part of the argument providing some alternatives that could equally maximize pleasure: 

 

a) The end of factory farming reduces wastes and contamination from industrial 

production: One can answer to this that vegetarian and carnivorous industries can be 

equally contaminating if production is irresponsible. A sustainable meat industry is 

perfectly possible. An adequate management of wastes and resources is something 

that both kinds of industries can perform, so, contamination is not an intrinsic 

characteristic of meat production. An exploration of a possibly sustainable meat 

production can be found in Simon Fairlie’s Meat, a Benign Extravagancy3. 

b) The elimination of industrial farms releases a huge amount of high quality vegetable 

food that could feed the hungry and marginal human populations, instead of feeding 

animals for meat production: One can say that the problem of hunger is not the 

scarceness of food, but an inefficient and negligent distribution of it. While some have 

excess food, others do not have enough. A righteous distribution of food restores a 

positive balance of pleasure, and one can provide for this end vegetable foods as well 

as food from animal sources. 

c) Even though the most important factor in this calculation is animal suffering, the 

utility of people involved must be taken into consideration too, as Singer does in his 

argument. Singer points out that working in an industrial factory farm is obnoxious 

and psychologically harming for workers: This issue is not intrinsically related to all 

factory farming, in a similar way presented in a), since one can have poor working 

conditions in a carnivorous industry as well as a vegetarian one. Cruelty-free farms 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

48 

can be created or simply an adequate administration of human resources can be 

performed.  

 

I think this exercise can be applied to most of the arguments in Utilitarianism and 

Vegetarianism, so I shall not go further with it to prove the point. Nonetheless, this does not 

reduce their legitimacy at all, because my hypothetical objections operate only through 

plausibility as well, and not as knockout arguments. Through this, one can see that, in the 

defence or abolishment of vegetarianism, we would arrive at a dead end from the point of 

view of utilitarianism, since there are a lot of alternatives that equally maximize utility. 

Singer seems, in fact, to concede this point at the end of his essay when he says: 

 

Finally, becoming a vegetarian is a way of attesting to the depth and sincerity of one’s 

belief in the wrongness of what we are doing to animals. Perhaps in a society of 

sophisticated philosophers there would be no need to attest to one’s sincerity in this 

way, because sophisticated philosophers would understand that one can sincerely 

oppose the exploitation of animals in factory farms while continuing to buy and enjoy 

the product of these very farms. But to most of the members of our society this would 

mean, as it seemed to Oliver Goldsmith’s fictitious Chinese traveler, a “strange 

contrariety of conduct”4. 

 

However, one can stretch the sort of alternatives mentioned earlier even further, as Evelyn 

Pluhar does in Meat and Morality, where she explores methods such as in vitro meat 

production5. This method can unpainfully extract some stem cells from animals, and then 

produce meat in a laboratory with completely cruelty free conditions; with such a method, 

animal life is not disturbed at all. An exploration through this kind of alternative, from the 

point of view of a utilitarian calculation, may be very fruitful, but can also be very 

unappealing to some sensitivities outside of a utilitarian outline, as she says: 

 

Granted, the initial reaction of many meat-eaters to the in-vitro meat initiative is 

repulsion. An unscientific poll conducted by this author elicited comments such as 

“That’s disgusting!” and “Who knows what they would put in that stuff?” They 

envision meat cells replicating like mold in a laboratory, injected with dubious 

additives by white-coated Frankensteins. Currently, production does involve a 

queasiness factor: cells mature in “fetal bovine serum.” Researchers are at work 

substituting a plant-based nutrient agent, however, well aware that this would be 

advantageous in marketing the product to erstwhile vegetarians as well as meat-eaters 

with humane concerns6. 

 

However, there could be more reactions that do not exclusively consist in mere disgust, 

especially if we take into consideration religious and conservative beliefs, conceptions with a 

stronger underlying anthropology or moral theories whose main criteria is not pain and 

pleasure. In this sense, such methods can raise even more complicated ethical and 

anthropological problems than factory farming, concerns the principle of utility does not take 

into account as long as their consequences maximize pleasure. Even more, if our humane 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

49 

concern for animals is solely based on suffering and rights derived from it, one could 

perfectly ask: Why not produce human meat in vitro? In this manner, there is no risk of 

somehow violating animal interests in any way, since no pain or invasion on animals is at 

play at all. This way, humans, who are the ones interested in consuming meat, put themselves 

unpainfully as resource for meat production without causing any suffering or invasion to 

other species. If meat can be produced from human stem cells, this would be a really good 

solution from a point of view concerned with animal suffering. But evidently, such a 

provocation is not ethically neutral at all, since most people would be really perturbed by 

such a possibility, even though one cannot articulate significant reasons for this disgust 

immediately that are related to our intuitions over human nature. 

 

Is not my intent with this argument to support an ethical view purely based on intuitions, but 

to show how intuitions give rise to ethical reflections that can eventually be supported by 

reason or rejected, because, as Michael Sandel points out, is difficult to find significant 

reasons for our unease7. In this sense, rejection of animal suffering shows itself, initially, as a 

pre-moral unease that is not yet clearly articulated. Later, the rationally-driven agent tries to 

articulate significant reasons for this concern, as Singer does. Therefore, in a similar way as 

Sandel in The Case against Perfection8, the starting point of our considerations for the 

limited purposes of this paper will be our intuitions, and in this sense, it has pre-moral 

components; this does not mean that further development of the concepts proposed here will 

remain at this stage. So, in the next section, I will try to provide a conceptual resource that 

can help to articulate our concern which is related to animal suffering and that utilitarianism 

seems to not take into account. 

 

The Ethical Vision: If one takes a look at Aristotle’s Ethics of Virtue, one can see two 

distinct aspects come into play. In the first place, a set of principles that prescribe good 

actions, in this case virtuous actions, are provided. Through the middle within two extremes 

and other principles, action is restricted to a certain frame of legitimacy, and in this sense, 

this part of the theory is normative or prescriptive. However, one can also see that these 

principles are related to a prefigured image of the subject’s life as a whole. The means and 

ends are chosen by the subject in order to fulfil the content of this image under the guidance 

of virtues. In this sense, the second component of Aristotle’s ethics is concerned with 

meaning, rather than setting prescriptive principles, and as Macintyre points out “generally to 

adopt a stance on the virtues will be to adopt a stance on the narrative character of human 

life”9. The image described is not a merely abstract outline, but is filled with concrete 

representative content, for example, a dream of certain career that drives a student’s life. 

 

However, one can detach this conceptual background from Aristotle’s specific interpretation 

of virtues and happiness. In this sense, ethics in general can have this prescriptive aspect and 

another concerned with meaning. The first is concerned with providing a set of a priori 

principles that determine which actions are good or evil. The second aspect analyzes a 

posteriori the representative content of our life as a totality of meaning. I shall call this 

representative content Ethical Vision, which contains different narratives that guide our 

actions in an intelligible way. This is because “behavior is only characterized adequately 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

50 

when we know what the longer and longest-term intentions invoked are and how the shorter-

term intentions are related to the longer. Once again we are involved in writing a narrative 

history.”10 This guidance is not only restricted to the personal level, but extends to the 

interpersonal as well because, as Macintyre explains, “[w]e cannot, that is to say, characterize 

behavior independently of intentions, and we cannot characterize intentions independently of 

the settings which make those intentions intelligible both to agents themselves and to 

others.”11 This adds an intersubjective function to the Ethical Vision. Generally, if we find 

someone whose behavior is not intelligible from the point of view of our shared narratives, 

we most likely will be unable to recognize this person as a morally significant agent; in this 

sense they are moral strangers. 

 

Detached from Aristotle’s particular point of view, an Ethical Vision can vary in length, since 

it can go from the wishes of self-realization of some subject to the grand narratives that 

underlies a strong political or religious belief. In this last sense, it can be similar to those 

grand narratives the postmodern condition rejects12. It is true that an Ethical Vision could 

actually consist in a teleological explanation of history but, as described earlier, since they 

vary in length, not all Ethical Visions are grand narratives. So, I shall state that a grand 

narrative is a certain type of Ethical Vision. Therefore, the concept of Ethical Vision does not 

commit us to the postmodern condition criticism, since the latter rejects an ultimate meaning 

behind history, but not every possible way of meaning behind actions. One could say then, 

more specifically, that the Ethical Vision has grades that vary from the local and particular 

point of view of a subject to a universal position, or from biography to eschatology. 

 

As explained above, Ethical Vision has a crucial importance, because it provides meaning 

and a common ground to actions that, without its guidance, appear just as unconnected events 

with no moral relevance. In other words, its absence might result in the conclusion of pure 

nihilism or a human condition of mere automatism. An otherwise unconnected series of 

events acquire moral significance when an Ethical Vision underlies them. 

 

From the former description one can easily infer that an Ethical Vision underlies Singer’s 

argumentation as well. To determine its content completely, one should ask the author for it, 

but I shall tentatively describe it. I think the Ethical Vision behind Singer’s argumentation 

consists, at least, in a certain spiritual status or humane consideration for animals, and a 

relationship with humans that follows from this status. From this point of view, it seems that 

Animal Liberation is a much clearer testament of Singer’s Ethical Vision. What Renzo 

Llorente says could support this, as he explains: 

 

What does prove surprising, however, is the frequency with which even professional 

philosophers have misconstrued or misstated some of Animal liberation’s central 

theses. The most common error among professional philosophers no doubt consists in 

the belief that the moral argument advanced by Animal Liberation is based on 

utilitarianism, or – what in effect amounts to the same thing – the tendency to analyze 

the book as though its normative basis were utilitarian, when in reality the views 

defended in Animal Liberation are derived, at bottom, from the principle of non-



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

51 

maleficence, i.e. “not causing harm”, and the principle of “equal consideration of 

interests”13. 

 

This further emphasizes that utilitarianism is not the only resource for justifying 

vegetarianism in Singer’s philosophical framework, but neither just a set of principles for a 

mere logical exercise. I think Singer actually envisions a certain world that he considers 

morally ideal. I shall argue, then, that in Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism the intuitions of 

his Ethical Vision tend to slip in too, even though he clearly states his intention to base 

vegetarianism exclusively in the principle of utility and equal consideration of interests. In 

the passage of Citizen of the World, quoted at the beginning of Utilitarianism and 

Vegetarianism, where humans being are described as tender and compassionate beings, his 

vision seems to be suggested14. Also, when he criticizes the consideration of animals as mere 

means to an end and gets accused of being a Kantian, but he quickly moves back to avoid 

betraying the exclusivity of the principle of utility: 

 

This is a “slippery slope” argument: no matter how humane our original intentions, as 

long as we continue to eat animals there is a danger of our sliding back into the 

methods of treating animals in use today. [...] I may have been insufficiently critical 

of my own use of the argument, but I have not become a Kantian15. 

 

The limits of utilitarianism: The reason why it seems possible to give good arguments in 

favour and against vegetarianism lies in the fact that we have reached what seems to be the 

limits of utilitarianism. It is not my intent to discredit this ethical theory at all, but to re-

orientate its application context. Utilitarianism is supposed to be a regulatory framework for 

our actions, it tells us when an action is right or wrong, but is not able to provide an Ethical 

Vision. For this reason, it is possible to propose very different states of affairs which could 

result in the same calculation of total pleasure, and this is why all the alternatives proposed in 

the former sections apparently stood with equal ground against Singer’s arguments. The best 

alternative according to its consequences, at this point, gets out of our grasp, and so it is very 

difficult to solve the issue from a utilitarian point of view. 

 

The principle of utility is applied to an already given situation or to the methods one chooses 

to carry out a certain goal. It orients us to take the best choice with regard to a certain ethical 

dilemma, but the same thing that assures the freedom of the subject in utilitarianism is what 

prevents it from solving the issue of vegetarianism: the fact that it abstains from determining 

the content of the Ethical Vision. One can carry out whatever vital plan one chooses, as long 

as it goes along with principle of utility, and one can be a vegetarian or a meat-eater as long 

as one proceeds in a way that actually preserves a positive balance in the total amount of 

pleasure. 

 

So, with regard to the Singerian question, namely, whether utilitarianism commits its 

adherents to the obligatory practice of vegetarianism, I think the answer is negative. Anyway, 

this does not mean we should give up completely any attempt to solve the issue and abandon 

the decision of being a vegetarian to mere personal preference. For similar reasons as those 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

52 

that I have pointed out, Jordan Curnutt proposes an argument for vegetarianism which 

dispenses of pain or utility as a main criteria16. 

 

Ethics as a Normative Frame and as Meaning Ethics: I consider utilitarianism to be a 

Normative Frame, in the sense that what it does is prescribing the right action for every 

choice we make. It enables us to distinguish quickly and exactly the right from the wrong 

choice. However, is not a meaning ethics, in other words, it does not tell us what our plan for 

a good life should be, how we should interact with others fruitfully, how we should represent 

us the world as a utopian place, etc. In this sense, a Normative Frame could be defined as a 

set of principles or guidelines that indicates when an action is right or wrong, in the case of 

utilitarianism being the principle of utility. On the other hand, I shall define a Meaning Ethics 

as the reflection which enable us to critically fill with ideal representations a certain Ethical 

Vision. It is an anthropological, creative, and critical reflection over the narratives behind our 

moral representations and actions. I think the controversy over vegetarianism can be greatly 

clarified under this understanding of ethics, since it concerns a new relationship, still in 

development, between human and non-human beings. Even though we have always eaten 

animals, now they are subject to production through technology in a global-scale way. Also, 

even if animals always had moral significance, one can argue that only recently we have 

started to realize it, especially taking into consideration how new the Animal Liberation 

movement is. 

 

The overwhelming advance of technics that led to the technological era, has transformed the 

preceding character of action where, according to Hans Jonas, “action on non-human things 

did not constitute a sphere of authentic ethical significance”17. So, the field of meaning in 

which our actions had been taking place was established long ago and we take this field for 

granted, as a given fact. For example, all of us, in a certain way, presuppose that other human 

beings have certain dignity or that we, at least, owe them some respect, even if it is for 

instrumental reasons because, otherwise, we would live in a state of war. The context in 

which this takes place has an underlying common ground for our Ethical Visions to coexist, a 

common narrative of elements and values we mostly agree on. As Jonas states: 

 

The effective range of action was small, the timespan of foresight, goal setting and 

accountability was short, control of circumstances limited. Proper conduct had its 

immediate criteria and almost immediate consummation. Ethics accordingly was of 

the here and now, of occasions as they arise between men, of the recurrent, typical 

situations of private and public life. [...] All enjoinders and maxims of traditional 

ethics, materially different as they may be, show this confinement to the immediate 

setting of the action. “Love the neighbour as thyself”; “Do unto others as you would 

wish them to do unto you”; “Instruct your child in the way of truth”; “Strive for 

excellence by developing and actualizing the best potentialities of your being qua 

man”; “Subordinate your individual good to the common good”; “Never treat your 

fellow man as a means only but always also as an end in himself” - and so on18. 

 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

53 

When someone has a different narrative as ground for his Ethical Visions, we usually 

consider them moral strangers, for example, a person who has no empathy or care for other 

human beings, and has a dream to be a serial killer. The alluded narrative has been 

developing, probably, since the birth of civilization, and so it is deeply implanted in our 

behaviour; please concede this very hasty historical consideration. 

 

However, this narrative is no longer adequate for our current situation since, as Jonas points 

out, our relationship with nature has radically changed. The recent advances of technology 

are gestating a new milestone, maybe as relevant as the agriculture revolution: The 

technological revolution, whose extent is still on the horizon. But basically, it introduces a 

new narrative where morally relevant actions are no longer restricted to the interpersonal, but 

have consequences for the whole biosphere. Human action transcends its immanency and 

starts to affect non-humans. So nature is no longer an infinite, indomitable, and inexhaustible 

resource. Now, it shows a vulnerability that demands that we act as responsible agents19. 

Because of this, we should renovate the ontology behind our ethics, namely, rethink what the 

elements that constitute our current narrative are. Before, the answer was clear: the elements 

of this ontology were men, groups of men, and immediate consequences. Now, the answer is 

not so clear. We know how humans play their part in this narrative, but we have no idea how 

to think of or relate to non-humans, and this includes non-human animals. A somehow 

unreflective history led us to the previous narrative, we did not choose it because it was 

provided by our circumstances. But now, it is in our hands to critically acquire our new 

narrative, because we have an increasingly hegemonic position over our environment, so it no 

longer imposes on us a certain narrative. Finally, we need a Meaning Ethics that displays the 

new scenario for morally relevant actions. 

  

I think under this kind of ethical reflection the discussion over vegetarianism should be 

placed, because it questions a critical point concerning our new moral narrative, namely, 

which is our relationship to non-humans that are sentient. This last dimension has a huge 

existential value, since pain and pleasure are critically significant components of our lives. 

So, viewing ourselves as large-scale agents of pain through meat production is something that 

inevitably shocks our sensitivity and lead us to some sort of self-criticism. Our previous 

narrative provided an easy ground to condemn actions such as murder, cannibalism, and 

others, but is unable to afford any data to judge condemnable actions affecting non-human 

animals. 

 

In this incipient technological era, it is decisive that we put our efforts on comprehending the 

new extent of human action, so we can provide an adequate narrative for the changes it brings 

and lead our Ethical Visions towards the common ground of a desirable future. So, if we were 

to ask, “Which values and principles should guide our interaction with other animals and the 

whole biosphere”? I would advance that I consider, at least, unappealing a future where we 

become insensitive and cruel beings, or one where we completely run out of the resources of 

our planet. The specific normative frame, namely, the specific set of guidelines for our 

actions, are to be discovered after we deeply meditate through a meaning ethics, but should 

be in line with the sentiments and self-image of humanity, and the dangers described earlier. 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

54 

 

I consider a very remarkable effort in this line the one discussed in A. G. Holdier’s The Pig’s 

Squeak. He demystifies a connection between ethics and aesthetics as a mere sentimentalism 

that roughly can be described as “[t]his sentiment that effective arguments must be 

existentially satisfactory as well as logical if they are to spark genuine change [...]”20. I would 

add that these kinds of considerations, that may include different sentiments such as 

compassion, empathy, guilt, disgust, etc., should be taken seriously in any philosophical 

account, since they provide data for how we could represent animals in our new narratives. In 

this sense, I think we must put aside the idea that invoking these reasons are mere fallacies or 

irrelevant personal preferences. 

 

A very advanced and developed form of the Meaning Ethics I propose here is the Deep 

Ecology theoretical framework, by Arne Naess, because it performs an exhaustive and radical 

revision of the relation between humans and the whole biosphere21. Deep Ecology insights 

provide a renewed ontology that takes into account living beings in a way that is adequate for 

the current situation of the planet. So, it can shed light on the consequences and dangers of 

the advent of a technological era, and our relationship with other animals. However, 

extending more about this subject would fairly exceed the pretensions of this essay. 

 

Finally, if we were to ask, “Is there a sound justification for the common view that humans 

have a higher moral status than other animals, or is this a view we should no longer accept?,” 

I think that from the point of view of a meaning ethics, one should answer a different 

question first, namely, how we should treat animals, because this can shed light on the moral 

status of non-human animals. We have to ask in what way we see ourselves coexisting with 

other animals and what moral sentiments we can have towards them, and transform our initial 

unease into a rational conviction. Through coexisting, we determine what their moral status 

is. Asserting moral superiority prima facie equals to proceed in the opposite way, namely, 

determine from a pre-existing theoretical consideration how we should coexist. Also, stating 

a moral superiority implies that we assert some sort of ontological superiority of human 

beings, a discussion that could be very difficult and may have no sense, at least from the 

point of view of meaning ethics, since this type of thinking dispenses of – but does not 

necessarily reject or abolish – a metaphysical outline.  

 

Conclusion: Under the light of all we have previously said, I shall argue that it is a mistake 

on Singer’s part to believe that explicitly aiding himself with his own Ethical Vision equals 

betraying utilitarianism. What really happens, in my opinion, is that it was initially wrong 

evaluating through a Normative Framework an issue that is supposed to be treated under the 

considerations of a Meaning Ethics. The question regarding the moral status of animals 

cannot be answered completely under the mere consideration of their sentient nature, which 

only means that they can be added as an element to take into account in the principle of utility 

and become a factor in a consequentialist calculation. This is because the principle tells us 

nothing about how they should be taken into consideration, namely, with a certain dignity, or 

rights, or in some specific interrelations with humans, with a compassionate consideration by 

humans, a loving relationship with humans, etc., because there are a bunch of possible states 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

55 

of affairs one can propose that massacre animals and still preserve a positive balance of 

pleasure. 

 

In this sense, if one was in Singer’s position, namely, trying to formulate a strong defence of 

vegetarianism, one should put most of one’s efforts in increasing the plausibility of one’s 

Ethical Vision. I think one could proceed, tentatively, in this way: revise and increase the 

plausibility of one’s Ethical Vision, propose a way in which we should interact with animals, 

and explicitly put on the table how we want to think of ourselves, namely, as cruel or 

compassionate beings; but the exact argumentation should derive from Singer’s own Ethical 

Vision whose exhaustive content is only available to himself. Following this, I think that the 

places of Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism where Singer seems to retract because he believes 

he could be exceeding a self-imposed utilitarian outline actually mark the points he should 

emphasize to proceed in the way of a meaning-producing ethic. 

 

I argued that Singer proceeds in Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism under the 

misunderstanding that one is committing a fallacy if one explicitly points out one’s own 

Ethical Vision; in other words, providing reasons that exceed considerations taken into 

account on the principle of utility imply a betrayal to utilitarianism. This could not be further 

from the truth, since Normative Frames and Meaning Ethics are not mutually exclusive. One 

can perfectly come up with a plausible Ethical Vision for our relationship with animals, and 

then test its legitimacy by the principle of utility. This implies that utilitarianism would reject 

every Ethical Vision that may result in a negative balance of pleasure, and this is the only 

way the principle of utility coerces the Ethical Vision, in the requirement of providing the 

best possible world one can imagine, one where pleasure is maximal. 

  

Finally, I think Singer has pointed out a very crucial issue when he puts the discussion over 

vegetarianism in the forefront, since diet constitutes a dimension of human life of tremendous 

existential significance that is usually underestimated. Eating is one of our most frequent 

activities, and is a sine qua non for life itself in a biological sense. And not only this. Our 

need for food makes us extract resources and transform the surrounding habitat in a very 

specific way, so it raises deep environmental concerns as well. It is not an accident that our 

current practices and eating habits had led to a certain industry, namely, factory farming. So, 

this dimension has a radical importance for critically understanding the advent and 

consequences of a technological era. About this, Singer himself says in Eating Ethically: 

 

When we eat, or more specifically, when we pay for what we eat, whether at a 

farmer’s market, a supermarket, or a restaurant, we are taking part in a vast global 

industry. Americans spend more than a trillion dollars on food every year. That's more 

than double what they spend on motor vehicles and also more than double what the 

government spends on defense. Food production affects every person on this planet 

and untold billions of animals as well. It is important, for the sake of the environment, 

animals, and future generations, that we see our food choices as raising serious ethical 

issues and learn the implications of what we eat22. 

 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

56 

 

Author Contribution: Author developed the conceptual idea and wrote the manuscript. 

 

Conflict of Interest: Declared none. 

 

Acknowledgements: I would like to express my gratitude to Luca Valera, who provided 

valuable insight and guidance for the writing of this paper.  

 

References: 

 

1 Singer P. Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1980; 9(4): 325. 
2 Singer P. Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1980; 9(4): 328. 
3 Fairlie, S. Meat, a Benign Extravagance. Chelsea Green Publishing Company 2010: 35-43 

(specifically Chapter 4). 
4 Singer P. Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1980; 9(4): 337. 
5 Pluhar E. Meat and Morality: Alternatives to Factory Farming. Journal of Agricultural and 

Environmental Ethics 2010; 23: 455–468. 
6 Pluhar E. Meat and Morality: Alternatives to Factory Farming. Journal of Agricultural and 

Environmental Ethics 2010; 23: 464-465.  
7 Sandel M. The Case against Perfection. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 

2007: 5-12. 
8 Sandel M. The Case against Perfection. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 

2007. 
9 Macintyre, A. After Virtue, a Study on Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press 

2007: 144. 
10 Macintyre, A. After Virtue, a Study on Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press: 

208. 
11 Macintyre, A. After Virtue, a Study on Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press: 

206. 
12 Lyotard J. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. University of Minnesota 

Press 1984. 
13 Llorente R. The Moral Framework of Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation: An Alternative to 

Utilitarianism. Ethical Perspectives 2009; 16(1): 62. 
14 Goldsmith O. Citizen of the World; Taylor & Hessey 1809: 44. 
15 Singer P. Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1980; 9(4): 332. 
16 Curnutt J. A New Argument for Vegetarianism. Journal of Social Philosophy 1997; 28(3): 

153-172.   
17 Jonas H. The imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological 

Age. University of Chicago Press 1985: 4. 
18 Jonas H. The imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological 

Age. University of Chicago Press 1985: 5. 
19 Jonas H. The imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological 

Age. University of Chicago Press 1985: 6-8. 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2016; 7(3): 46-57 

57 

 

20 Holdier A. The Pig’s Squeak: Towards a Renewed Aesthetic Argument for Veganism. 

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 2016; 29: 632. 
21 Naess A. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. Cambridge 

University Press 1990.  
22 Singer P. Eating Ethically. Free Inquiry 2005; 25(4): 19. 


