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Original Article 

 

Animal Ethics: Beyond Neutrality, Universality, and Consistency 

 

Sreetama Chakraborty 

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy 

Belda College, West Midnapore, West Bengal, India 

Email: sreetamaphil@gmail.com 

 

Abstract: This paper reflects a possibility of going beyond the postmodernists’ way of ethically 

examining non-human animals based on the tripartite pillars of neutrality, universality, and 

consistency. My concentration focuses on some interrelated queries, such as – What does animal 

ethics conventionally mean? How did power, hierarchy, and domination separate humans from 

other animals? How does the fate of non-human animals (whether they ought to be morally 

considered or not) depend on humans’ moral values? How far is it justified to secure animal 

rights in the age of perilous animal use, especially for food or during animal experimentation? 

While examining these issues, I bring into light the several arguments and positions put forward 

by thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Carl Cohen, Brian Berry, and 

others. Moreover, my search is for a non-anthropocentric sustainable paradigm, to balance 

human interests and animal needs together, in order to sustain the future generations of human 

and non-human intimacy.  

 

Key Words: Animal Ethics, Sentience, Universality, Moral Values, Animal Experimentation, 

Sustainable ethics. 

 

Introduction: The aim of this paper is to, first, analyze the postmodernists’ approach to animal 

ethics that is a departure from the traditional way of doing animal ethics adopted especially by 

the analytic thinkers, and, second, to interpret it in the light of socio-cultural construction. 

Conventionally, the ethical considerability of non-human animals is judged in the context of 

standard moral ethical theories such as virtue ethics, consequentialism, and deontology. In 

addition, the tripartite pillars of neutrality, universality, and consistency were held as tools for 

ethical examination of non-human animals. I will explain how these principles work and how the 

postmodern approach departs from this trend. Neutrality signifies our suspension of biasedness 

towards anthropocentrism. The principle of universality demands that morality remains the same 

for all in all events and in all contexts, even when it extends to the case of non-humans. 

Moreover, consistency demands that both humans as well as non-humans are of equal 

importance and ought to be given due and consistent weight. These principles have been put to 

challenge by animal ethicists belonging to the postmodernist era. The postmodernists argue that 

advocating neutrality and universality is a sheer impossibility, especially because all humans are 

embedded in a web of epistemic situations and socio-linguistic backgrounds, and cannot be 



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situated apart from it. All praxis of morality and values are also byproducts of social 

construction, and are in no way given or constructed universally. Unlike the earlier trend of 

animal ethicists, I adopt the postmodernists’ way of looking from an opposite direction, 

emphasizing emotion, care, responsibility, sympathy, understanding, and so on. It would be more 

appealing if humans’ emotions and sensitivity towards animals are aroused by making them 

think as to how non-humans might also consider humans if humans were in that same plane. The 

whole endeavor of humans is to understand the non-humans in a morally sensitive way and 

develop a sense in order to accept them, considering their dignity and their right to occupy a 

place in this beautiful natural world. 

 

Revisiting the Tripartite Pillars: With the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new era 

revitalizing the very contemporary concerns over environmentalism and animal ethics has taken 

a unique shape. Across the world, we place non-human animals in a category different from 

humans, but an interesting trace could be found in Darwin’s project when he reflected on the 

presence of ‘reason’ at least to some degrees even in non-humans. However, since then the 

development of animal ethics has been divided into three major stages. The first stage is the 

1970s and 80s, when all animal questions were judged based on two major normative ethical 

principles – consequentialism and deontology. The second stage is the 1990s, when the 

postmodern approach of commenting on the traditional approach towards animal ethics began, 

and the third stage emerges with the end of the 20th century, when a new way of looking at 

animal ethics arose, especially from the perspectives of behavioral psychology and experimental 

philosophy. 

 

However, with the growing popularity of this discipline, animal ethics worked under the 

umbrella of three principles – neutrality, universality, and consistency. These principles were 

also considered determining criterions for being an animal ethicist. A human individual who 

wants to extend his or her moral consideration towards non-human animals must be neutral, 

universal, and consistent in their thinking and behavior. Let me begin by giving a brief analysis 

of how these principles work. Neutrality is the preliminary condition, which demands suspending 

or withdrawing all anthropocentric attitudes that favor human beings over and above anything 

else. Neutrality is an unbiased principle of fairness, advocating justice for all species. Under such 

a condition, all species must receive equal rights and consideration. Human wants and needs 

ought not to be seen specially or given any particular attention. However, as against this 

principle, there exists one of the strongest groups advocating anthropocentrism – speciesism, a 

view analogous to racism and sexism. Unlike animal rights supporters, the advocates of 

speciesism endorse discrimination against non-human animals. The supporters of speciesism 

treat one species, humans, as superior to all others. Many consider speciesism a moral illusion. 

However, this kind of a prejudicial differentiation that speciesism advocates directs us towards a 

rigid anthropocentric structure, which is by large dangerous for society. A speciesist might argue 

that one of the major reasons that justify human privilege is sentience. However, that might also 



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lead to another inquiry: how can we be sure that non-humans have no sentience? There are 

undoubtedly several scientific procedures by which it becomes possible to conduct tests and 

experiments in order to find out how the receptor organs of non-human animals respond, whether 

they are sentient or not. Sufficient proof exists to show that there are vertebrates whose nervous 

system shows similar receptor functions like that of mentally retarded persons or children, or 

even more. Would it then be justified to equate an infant with a non-human animal? However, 

even that would cause trouble for both sides, as on the one hand conducting experiments would 

harm animals and cause an issue for animal and environmental rights activists, and on the other 

hand harming an infant would go against ‘human rights’ policies. Therefore, critics attack the 

speciesists for being biased in the case of children and mentally retarded persons. Humans are 

incapable of choosing their life as human or to have parents or ancestors of any kind. The same 

theory applies to all other species of the world. 

 

The second principle of animal ethics is universality. The principle holds that morality remains 

the same for all people (and even for all species) at all times. This principle is tied to the 

principle of neutrality. Neutrality insists on unbiasedness whereas universality demands that this 

unbiasedness is applied universally to all species at all times. In the context of this 

universalization principle, Tom Regan, in The Case For Animal Rights, very well applied the 

principle of Kantian deontology to explain his position in favor of animal rights1. Regan took the 

basic formula of Kantian moral philosophy. Unlike the utilitarians, Regan holds that all subjects-

of-a-life have equal inherent value, regardless of their utility. Having inherent value implies that 

one has certain fundamental moral rights. In addition, individuals with inherent value must be 

treated with equal respect. This universal principle, which also serves as the basis for human 

rights, provides inherent worth to individuals, regardless of class, caste, race, sex, and gender. 

However, Regan’s uniqueness lies in considering one more element to the above list, viz. 

species. Species distinction must also not be an issue while considering the universalisability 

principle. Regan, along with Peter Singer, makes the claim that some animals do deserve the 

same value as human individuals. Regan argues that, if the universalisability principle would go 

according to what Kant says, then Kant made it very clear that rationality is the criterion for 

moral worth, and since children, mentally disabled persons lack this quality, then people of this 

marginal class are disqualified from being the holders of moral worth. Therefore, they can also 

be treated in the same way as non-human animals are (the same point was raised against the 

speciesist). Regan further proposes one more condition to be considered for being worthy of 

respect and this is the capacity to experience. Whoever possess this capacity ought to be 

considered morally. In this connection, Regan distinguishes between moral agents and moral 

patients. “A moral patient,” Regan says, “lacks the ability to formulate… [They] cannot do what 

is right, nor can they do what is wrong… only moral agents can do what is wrong.”2 So, for 

Regan, since humans give importance to those humans who are not moral agents (i.e., moral 

patients such as infants and mentally retarded persons), therefore animals also ought to get due 

consideration by parity of reasoning. However, Carl Cohen challenges Regan’s arguments 



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claiming that we cannot deprive human infants of their rights, just because they are moral 

patients (in Regan’s words). Cohen’s point becomes clearer when he says, 

 

It is not individual persons who qualify (or are disqualified) for the possession of rights 

because of the presence or absence in them of some special capacity, thus resulting in the 

award of rights to some but not to others. Rights are universally human; they arise in a 

human moral world, in a moral sphere. In the human moral world moral judgements are 

pervasive; it is the fact that all humans including infants and the senile are members of 

that moral community – not the fact that as individuals they have or do not have certain 

special capacities, or merits – that makes humans bearers of rights. Therefore, it is beside 

the point to insist that animals have remarkable capacities, that they really have a 

consciousness of self; or of the future, or make plans, and so on […]. They [supporters of 

Regan] mistakenly suppose that rights are tied to some identifiable individual abilities or 

sensibilities, and they fail to see that rights arise only in a community of moral beings, 

and that therefore there are spheres in which rights do apply and spheres in which they do 

not.3 

 

Cohen definitely admits humans must restrain from showing ‘brutal’ pain to animals because 

humans are moral beings and must not act inhumanely, yet that does not imply that any and 

every human activity must not touch animals in any way.  

 

The third principle, known as the most technical principle of animal ethics, is consistency. 

Consistency holds that under similar conditions, like interests of all species must be given equal 

consideration. One of the best references of consistency is portrayed by nature that exists for all 

entities of the universe in a uniform way, and most importantly, nature treats all entities 

consistently. Nature has systematically arranged the whole of living systems under a web of 

cyclical relationships, where each species struggles to survive by feeding on the other species 

and so on. By this process, two things are maintained – first, the relation among different species 

remains natural, and that species which find it difficult to survive in the whole cycle of natural 

predation will automatically disappear. This approach sounds extremely interesting, but is 

subject to severe criticisms. Given this theory, in any practical situation, there will arise no 

scientific/natural problem in this consistency theory. The natural law of cycles has been so 

systematically arranged that each species can exist by being food for the other. This is definitely 

acceptable, but when we consider the rampant multiple uses in science and technology of 

experimenting animals and the destruction of natural habitat for human purposes, then the 

number of animals living in proper conditions comes down. In one way vegetation is dying out, 

in the other species are getting extinct. Therefore, an ethics for the humans developed. Because 

natural entities, say trees, animals, and wilderness, do not actually create the problem, as they are 

adaptable to natural changes. The problem arises for men, because men with their extreme 

use/misuse of power and intellect have continuously tried to dominate nature. Therefore, men 



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have to pay the cost for it. The centre of ethics is humans, not animals. Ethical considerations 

begin from humans. Therefore, humans must extend their moral/ethical considerability towards 

non-humans. If we take the instance of eating, then we must say that humans have a choice, 

whereas animals do not. Humans can choose to eat fruits and other plants, but it would be 

extremely difficult for a carnivorous animal to think alike, as its biological system would not let 

him or her behave that way. The consistency principle actually reflects the view of the modern 

utilitarian animal activist, Peter Singer. His view, more widely known as preference 

utilitarianism, focuses on how the best interests of the greatest number of all conscious beings 

are to be measured, rather than measuring greater happiness. Singer actually focuses on 

minimizing pain, rather than maximizing pleasure. For Singer, what counts in animals is their 

pain and how much they suffer, and not whether they can reason intelligibly or not. This view 

mostly corresponds to what Bentham argued when he said, “the question [about animals] is not, 

Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”4 In Animal Liberation, Singer argues 

against prejudiced speciesism and discrimination of animals and calls for equal consideration of 

animals on the ground that they have the ability to suffer. He adds another element of 

impartiality to all species, but that must be maintained on utilitarian grounds. While applying 

impartial treatment to all beings (considering equally the interests of all species), the one whose 

utility weighs more is to be given preferential treatment. Under this preferential treatment 

equation, as Singer says, “when the interests of two ‘persons’ are in conflict, the interest of the 

being estimated to have the greater value receives priority.”5 Singer writes: 

 

To avoid speciesism we must allow that beings who are similar in all relevant respects 

have a similar right to life—and mere membership in our own biological species cannot 

be a morally relevant criterion for this right [...]. We may legitimately hold that there are 

some features of certain beings that make their lives more valuable than those of other 

beings; but there will surely be some nonhuman animals, whose lives, by any standards, 

are more valuable than the lives of some humans. A chimpanzee, dog, or pig, for 

instance, will have a higher degree of self-awareness and a greater capacity for 

meaningful relations with others than a severely retarded infant or someone in a state of 

[advanced] senility. So, if we base the right to life on these characteristics we must grant 

these animals a right to life as good as, or better than, such retarded or senile human 

beings.6 

 

Against this principle of Singer, Judge Richard A. Posner provides a famous counterexample. 

Suppose a dog threatens an infant in a busy street, and the only way to prevent the dog from 

biting would be to attack the dog, which might also cause the dog to suffer. Singer would say 

that it is not justified to cause pain and suffering, even though it is a dog. But any sensible being 

would never ever stand to watch the dog bite the innocent infant. One would counter-attack the 

animal. This illustration brings out the notion that Singer’s hierarchical cognitive capacities-

based approach is really problematic in many senses, especially in moments of severe crisis, as it 



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further leads to a problematic dilemma in the expression, “[s]ince neither a newborn human 

infant nor a fish is a person, the wrongness of killing such beings is not as great as the wrongness 

of killing a person.”7 This argument stands as a very good support in Singer’s argument favoring 

infanticide and euthanasia.  

 

The core principle in support of animal ethics is to go deep into understanding the value of all 

beings beyond humans. It is to be remembered that humans are not in any way at the centre of 

the whole living system, rather humans are only one of the species among thousands of living 

beings in the earth. However, it is only from humans that a sense of moral responsibility 

develops. This sort of responsibility enables humans to perceive the beautiful presence of not 

only humans, but of all species and their existence in the universe. 

 

A very interesting point may be noted, where animals’ lack of cognition or reasoning becomes 

one of the very important and significant reasons for humans to respect them. I recall from 

literature survey a story where a sheep owner and a hunter have very beautifully expressed what 

animal feels. They said: 

 

They [animals] have no human feelings and values, they do what is in their instincts. It is 

very stupid to hate an animal at the individual level [...]. 

 

Now I almost have to become a philosopher. They are living beings and you have to 

respect that. They are not humans. But we do not know for sure what they feel or do not 

feel. […]. We have a responsibility since we have received a brain that works differently 

than theirs.8 

 

By this claim, made by very ordinary persons, it is evident that non-human animals’ lack of 

cognitive capabilities, which we often consider as inferior, is not to be treated so. Because 

animals lack cognitive and reasoning capabilities, a human’s responsibility extends more and we 

ought to widen our toleration towards them, rather than being vulnerable towards them. 

 

Quest for Values: However, postmodern thinkers have brought a turn towards the very 

contemporary stance in the philosophy of animal rights. They claim that, given the social and 

cultural interlinkages in which an individual is embedded, it is extremely difficult to achieve the 

principles of neutrality and objectivity in reality. Neutrality, universality, and consistency are 

definitely add-ups in ethically considering the animals, but cannot be treated as hard and fast 

rules or criteria for morally considering non-human animals. But why? Many thinkers consider 

that the principles of absolute neutrality, universality, and consistency are some fixed ideals, 

which are at large impossible to attain in reality. What the conventional theorists miss while 

framing this kind of absolute principle is that the bearer of morality is humans, and humans 

being one of the intelligent species of this creation naturally possess the notions of domination, 



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supremacy, and audacity towards their own species. Human beings across the world vary in 

respect of their living, cultures, races, sexes, geography, and so on. Under such varied 

conditions, it is difficult to lay such a fixed principle that everyone ought to extend their moral 

consideration towards animals based on neutral, universal, and consistent principles. But in no 

way must humans lose hope, since as a morally sensible and responsible species, it must always 

be human’s motto to shed away speciesism, and adopt a green and non-anthropocentric attitude 

towards life. 

 

Human beings always quest for values, and this conception of value makes humanity distinct 

from other species. Values are not something located in the Platonic world. If we promote value 

from a subjective choice, then values are not absolute or fixed ideals, which lay imperatives for 

humans to follow. Humans are tied to multifarious perspectives – social, economic, cultural, 

geographical, biological, etc. and resultantly each of us has a distinct gender, ethnic and racial 

identity. That what is considered ethically good in one culture may be considered bad in the 

other. For an instance, burping after meals is a sign of politeness in some cultures, while in 

others it indicates being rude or impolite. But that in no way discards the conception of universal 

value. My point is that there are certain imperatives that tend towards universality. Suppose in a 

case where five patients, each with a different organ failing, are in dying bed. And luckily there 

is found one healthy man, whose various organs can save the life of the five dying men. Should 

we then promote the life of the five dying men at the cost of the life of one healthy man? 

Obviously not, since it is always immoral to kill an innocent person for the sake of others or use 

others merely as a means.9 Life is precious to everyone, so without the consent of one, we cannot 

harm one’s life to save others. We ought to apply the same principle towards all sentient beings, 

and it is how humans’ orient themselves towards life and perspectives that doubtlessly influences 

how they value life and others, including non-human animals. 

 

However, in the postmodern era, especially with the emergence of the linguistic turn in the 

philosophical domain, humans’ views towards non-humans have also undergone changes. In 

addition, all social constructions and human relations are dominated mostly by power and 

hierarchy, which in turn largely affects humans’ relation to the non-human animals. Social 

oppression results due to the family in which one is born into, and depends on one’s caste, class, 

race, sex, species, etc. I firmly agree with the postmodern feminists that along with this male-

female hierarchical structure, there also developed another classical dualistic structure, the 

human-animal set-up that has historically tried to separate the two both emotionally and morally. 

Brian Berry, in an article entitled “Human and nonhuman animal rights and oppression: An 

Evolution Towards Equality,”10 draws a similarity between oppression of human minorities and 

non-human animals. He writes: 

 

Some humans are more oppressed than others; for example, women, racial and ethnic 

minorities, the poor, the differently-abled, children, the aged, and prisoners. I describe 



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stereotypes and unfair treatment as they are similarly applied to disadvantaged humans 

and nonhuman animals. A primary obstacle in discussing nonhuman animal oppression is 

the seeming absurdity, according to many humans, of the mere notion of nonhuman 

animals having equal worth relative to human animals […]. Prejudice against particular 

species is partly due to irrational messages passed along through socialization […]. 

[P]rejudice can be due to historical and present-day accounts of the dangers posed by 

[humans and even by the] non-human animals11. 

 

However, it is seen that many thinkers, such as Peter Singer, Carol J. Adams, and others, have 

shared similar approaches. The postmodern claim is that animal rights violations (including 

animal experimentation) have expanded primarily because of animals’ lack of participatory 

abilities in discourse and in social construction. The fate of non-human animals, whether they 

ought to be morally considered or not, is largely determined through this process of discourse. 

 

Discourse is a segment of the critical theory of society where practical questions are addressed 

based on continued rational discussions. The mode of encountering discourses in different 

societies varies according to the various social constructs of individuals’ lives and their 

reasoning capabilities. Fairclough defines discourse as “a practice not just of representing the 

world but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning.”12 It is 

through discourse that the inferiority meted out to animals can be addressed. Peter Singer sharply 

points out that the English language reflects the prejudice against non-human animals. Singer 

writes, “[t]he English language, like other languages, reflects the prejudices of its users.”13 

Singer illustrates this with the word “animal,” which in common day usage excludes human 

beings. While speaking, we regularly use the phrase “humans and animals” to indicate that 

humans are something different from non-human animals, but forget that humans are also just a 

kind of animal. This semantic distinction actually distances humans from non-humans and makes 

humans irresponsive to animal suffering. Peter Singer writes: 

 

A liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons, practices that were 

previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of an 

unjustifiable prejudice […]. [W]e must be prepared to rethink all our attitudes to other 

groups, including the most fundamental of them. We need to consider our attitudes from 

the point of view of those who suffer by them, and by the practices that follow from 

them. If we can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our 

attitudes and practices that operates so as consistently to benefit the same group – usually 

the group to which we ourselves belong – at the expense of another group. So we come to 

see that there is a case for a new liberation movement.14 

 

Conventional language has several examples to show how non-human animals as a separate class 

are completely sidelined, ignored, and treated as inferior. Whereas animals are slaughtered, 



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humans are murdered. While the former is considered to be completely normal, the latter 

symbolizes brutal, violent, and uncared killing. That animals also feel pain, being fleshed bodies, 

is not taken into consideration at all. Therefore, all of our language and discourses reflects traces 

of (un)intended animal oppression. This kind of socio-cultural construction dictates what morals 

an individual ought to possess towards animals and what not. Derek Ryan points out that our 

relations to animals depend largely on how we categorize “humans” and “animals,” and how far 

we can go beyond this categorization and recognize the “unrecognizable” (the animals) without 

any intention to capture or control them either by power or domination. Feminists shun the 

approaches of neutrality, universality, and consistency, and rather embrace the elements of care, 

sympathy, kindness, etc. In favor of the neglected class of human society, i.e., women, feminists 

take such a stance. However, the same is extended even to animals. Animals belong to an 

unspeakable and inexpressible class, and it is our responsibility to hear their cries and feel their 

pain. Animals are also fleshed bodies; hence, we ought to count their sufferings. Among the 

postmodernists’ trend, Van Plumwood, Carol Adams, Vandana Shiva, and many others share this 

feminist approach. Carol Adams sharply brings together animals within the socio-cultural 

framework. In all human endeavors, animals are objectified, commodified, and treated as an 

element of human consumption. Resultantly, there have been many voices that spoke in favor of 

vegetarianism, so that animals’ presence could be felt, shared, and experienced. They have a 

common approach, to shun away instrumentality. Animals ought not to be considered mere 

means for attaining something. Rather, they must be considered for their own sake. Therefore, it 

is possible for humans to be truly responsible and value non-human animals aesthetically and 

morally. 

 

A web of epistemic relations sets up human society (because humans are aware that they have 

“reason”) and each individual is tied to each other individual culturally, geographically, and 

linguistically. Each individual or group does possess variations in their internal social structure, 

but all humans are essentially linked with one another in this web of chained relationships. In 

such a kind of structure, it is difficult to uphold and conceive moral values that are absolutely 

neutral, universal, and consistent. Humans are the possessors of moral values. Hence, all moral 

values originate from human perspectives and humans consider non-humans from a human 

perspective only. But human values must not be considered from a human viewpoint only, i.e., 

moral values of a human must not be anthropocentric in the sense that they must not privilege 

humans over non-humans. Rather, it becomes humans’ responsibility to hold moral values that 

also reflect their responsiveness towards non-humans. Moral values are not given abstractly but 

are rather constructed according to what human code of ethics guarantees and permits. Similarly, 

it is true that only humans have aesthetic value, but aesthetic value is not only meant for humans. 

Rather, the sense of beauty, truth, and goodness that humans have must extend to all species and 

ecosystems. Through an evolutionary historical process, it has been possible for humans to go 

beyond the essential features such as animality and rationality and discover the traits of aesthetic 

beauty and responsibility as unique to them. I agree with the postmodernists when they hold that 



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humans are already embedded in such a socio-linguistic framework, and that their moral 

concerns towards other species must be inculcated in a more technical way, which is familiar to 

the humans, i.e., through bonding. Animals ought to be considered as part of human society. 

Humans’ moral considerations and responsibility must extend in similar ways as they extend 

their considerations towards their fellow human beings, through care, sympathy, justice, 

kindness, and attention. 

 

Way Out: This paper doubtlessly reflects an appeal to humanity for governing all of their 

interactions with non-human animals based on love, sympathy, care, kindness, and so on, but 

parallel to this, an important question that crops up in my mind is how animal rights ought to be 

seen from the broader context of human rights. How far is it justified to secure animal rights in 

the age of perilous animal use, especially for food or during animal experimentation? This issue 

might seem to be a contemporary concern, yet can be traced back to the ideas of the Greek 

philosopher Aristotle, one of the earliest reflections of whom admires natural slavery. It becomes 

clearer from Aristotle’s writing in this passage: 

 

Similarly we must clearly think that after their birth, plants exist for the sake of animals, 

and the other animals for the benefit of men, the tame ones for service and for food, and 

the wild ones, if not all at least most, for the sake of food and other needs, so that clothes 

and tools may be made from them. If then nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, 

it must have made all of them for the sake of men.15 

 

To speak in simple words, humans’ interaction with non-human animals takes place particularly 

at meal times and in research. These are the oldest forms of animal use. In some cases, the 

practical applicability of animal use in the case of taking food is justified, especially in cases 

where survival of a human being overrides the loss of a chicken or goat. For instance, we can 

take the example of the Inuit (or those living in extreme cold climatic conditions) who had to 

take animal flesh for keeping their bodies warm. But considering this case, we cannot justify the 

rampant killing of animals for flesh. Or, in this connection, we can recall how Benjamin Franklin 

defends his eating of flesh in his Autobiography when he writes, “if you [animals] eat each other, 

I don’t see why we [humans] may not eat you [animals]?”16 Consuming animal flesh on this 

ground is justified primarily on the grounds of luxury and it reflects humans’ beastly behavior. I 

agree with Peter Singer in saying that it is absolutely unjustified to justify human consumption of 

animal flesh by considering animals’ dietary habits. It is because animals are not yet capable of 

moral reflection that humans possess. 

 

In another way, humans justify animal killing for the purpose of experimentation. Being one of 

the intelligent species of this universe, the urge to know more has led humans to discover the 

undiscovered. Humans continue to invent thousands of products ranging from drugs to 

cosmetics, leaving a grievous impact upon non-human animals. Animals are regularly objectified 



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in labs due to heavy experimentations done upon them. On one hand, it becomes extremely 

difficult to see the sufferings inflicted upon our neighbor species, animals, while on the other 

hand, would we (as opponent of experimentation) be really prepared to let thousands (of human 

beings) die from a dreadful disease that could be cured if experimented on only a few animals? 

This is really a moral dilemma, and it calls for writing another paper. 

 

Nevertheless, today, when the whole world is engaged in upholding the notion of sustainable 

development, let us be hopeful enough and be prepared to balance human life in ways that do not 

cause inhumane harm to non-human animals. For a sustainable life, the minimal human interests 

must be balanced in accordance with the interests and welfare of the animals involved. For the 

sake of sustainable development, let us meet hands to promote a non-anthropocentric approach in 

our lives through endorsing animal welfare, a holistic approach, which integrates ethical and 

environmental considerations of animals. I wind up recalling a poem by Kenneth Cassar that 

reflects animals’ cries for a helping human hand: 

 

Out there is a cry of anguish and of pain 

Out there someone’s suffering for someone else’s blame 

Out there, there is someone who’s lost all sense of hope 

Waiting for some kind of help without which he can’t cope. 

 

Out there lies a semblance of a once healthy being 

Who’ll die a slow and painful death unless he gets some seeing 

But out there stands a person who cares for animals, true 

Yes someone who can make a change, that person could be you!17 

 

 

Author Contribution: Author developed the conceptual idea and wrote the manuscript. 

 

Conflict of Interest: Declared none. 

 

Acknowledgement: I dedicate this work and express my deepest compassion to the suffering of 

the non-human animals, who are a bigger part of our life. 

 

References: 

 

1 Tom Regan, The Case For Animal Rights, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California 

Press, 2004. 
2 Carl Cohen, ‘Do Animals Have Rights?’ in Ethics and Behavior, 7(2), 91-102, 1997, 96. 
3 Ibid. 97. 
4 Jeremy Bentham, ‘A Utilitarian View,’ in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, ed. Tom 

Regan and Peter Singer, Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1976, 129-30. 



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5 Nicholas H. Lee, ‘In Defense of Humanity: Why Animals Cannot Possess Human Rights?’ in 

Regent University Law Review, Vol. 26: 457, 2014, 465. 
6 Peter Singer, ‘All Animals Are Equal,’ in Contemporary Moral Problems, 9th edition, ed. 

James E. White, Thomson Wadswoth, 335. 
7 Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of our Traditional Ethics, 190-91, 1994, 

220.  
8 Paul Shepard puts forward this illustration during his interview with Derrick Jensen. See, 

Derrick Jensen, Listening to the Land: Conservations about Nature, Culture, and Eros, Vermont: 

Chelsea Green Publishing, 248-259. 
9 It reminds us of a famous Kantian imperative, which says not to treat anyone as an means, but 

always as an end. 
10 B. Berry, ‘Human and Nonhuman Animal rights and Oppression: An Evolution Towards 

Equality’ in Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology, 25 (2), 155-160. 
11 Ibid. 156. 
12 N. Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, 64. 
13 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. New York: New York Review, 1990, vi. 
14 Ibid. v.  
15 Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Humans Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate, 

London: Duckworth, 1993, 136. 
16 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 70. 
17 Kenneth Cassar, http://www.rabbitadvocacy.com/animal_rights_poems.htm, Accessed on 2nd  

December, 2016. 


