








































Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

7 

Original Article 

 

The Chicken Fallacy and the Ethics of Cruelty to Non-Human Animals 

 

Akande Michael Aina
1
 and Ofuasia Emmanuel

2 

1. Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria, Email: 

ainaakande@yahoo.com 

2. Department of Philosophy, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun, Nigeria, 

Email: ofuasia.emma@gmail.com 

 

Abstract: The ideological underpinning that guides our interaction with non-human animals 

needs revision. The traditional outlook, according to which humans have a higher moral 

status vis-à-vis non-human animals, is now otiose. If these claims are to be justified, what 

ideological framework would serve this end? What are the moral implications of endorsing 

the view that humans possess no higher moral status than non-human animals? This work 

takes as foundation Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, which affirms that humans 

emerged from the long chain of evolutionary history, where non-human animals have been 

the carriers of the genes that shaped humans. A revisit to the discourse on the moral 

implication of humans’ cruelty to their ancestors and neighbours becomes pertinent. This 

essay goes against the mainstream and dominant perspective that non-human animals exist to 

serve human ends and as such can be treated with disdain. The thesis of this paper goes 

beyond Peter Singer’s submission that sentience is the basis for conferring moral worth on 

non-human animals. It affirms that in addition to sentience, good neighbourliness is a factor 

in determining the moral worth of non-human animals. It submits that cruelty to reared and 

domesticated animals may produce violent and wild species of these animals’ kind in a future 

evolution, thereby endangering the lives of future human generation, through negative 

alteration of genes. In the end, this paper proposes the principle of biological altruism as a 

suitable norm for determining the moral worth of non-human animals. 

 

Keywords: Chicken fallacy, Moral worth of Non-Human Animals, Darwinism, Cruelty to 

Animals, Domestic animals. 

 

Introduction: In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell provides a very useful 

anecdote whose consequence extends to the relation between non-human animals and 

humans on the one hand and the foundation and limitations of inductive reasoning on the 

other hand. Whereas Russell intends to show the problems arising out of inferring uniformity 

of behavior in nature, his narrative also point to a very serious problem regarding the 

relationship between human and non-human animals, especially the domesticated animals 

who are our neighbours. This essay tells an anecdote which we shall refer to as the Chicken 

Fallacy
1.

The Chicken Fallacy derives from the fourth chapter of the afore-mentioned book, 

where Russell ponders: 

 

mailto:ainakande@yahoo.com
mailto:ofuasia.emma@gmail.com


Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

8 

Domestic animals expect food when they see the person who usually feeds them. We 

know that all these rather crude expectations of uniformity are liable to be misleading. 

The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its neck 

instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have 

been useful to the chicken…The mere fact that something has happened a certain 

number of times causes animals and men to expect that it will happen again. Thus our 

instincts certainly cause us to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, but we may be 

in no better a position than the chicken which unexpectedly has its neck wrung
2
. 

 

Although the Chicken Fallacy clearly outlines that man and animals can reason inductively, it 

does wish away the moral issue of whether or not animals should be thus treated (i.e. having 

the neck wrung or be killed), after exhibiting traits of loyalty and protection as it is with other 

domestic animals like cats and dogs. In other words, the discernment in the anecdote 

instigates the tendency to conclude that animals are not rational; that they are lacking in value 

outside those that promote human good. Peter Singer’s lamentation that “the view that the 

effects of our actions on nonhuman animals have no intrinsic moral significance”
3 

has 

hitherto become canonical and immaculate. In the foregoing excerpt from Russell and from 

other similar real cases, the dispute over the moral worth of animals is roused. Hence, it is 

pertinent to query: Do humans not betray the trust, albeit in whatever crude sense, reposed in 

them by domestic non-human animals? Will the fallacious reasoning of the chicken make 

other chickens within the cage or those of the future evolutions become cautious or 

preventive in their relationship with humans or not? These probes dovetail further into some 

other more pernicious moral posers: Firstly, which values and principles should guide our 

interaction with non-human animals? Secondly, how do we weigh our interests against those 

of other non-human animals as fellow occupants of this planet? More importantly, is the 

employment of non-human animals for research and food justifiable? 

 

Through the use of the method of analysis and interpretation, the above crucial questions will 

be discussed in five divisions, the first being this introduction. In the second section, the 

paper exposes the popular views on the moral status of non-human animals. When the section 

critically assesses the popular arguments over the moral status of non-human animals, the 

study agrees with Arthur L. Caplan that “purposiveness rather than sentience is a property 

that suffices for conferring moral worth upon entities”
4
 but goes further in the third part to 

justify this stance from Darwin’s Principle of Natural Selection
5
. In the fourth section, our 

theoretical framework (Evolutionism) is assessed critically. The section maintains that the 

values and principles guiding human interaction with non-human animals need revision from 

a Darwinist perspective. The paper then concludes that the interests of non-human animals as 

fellow earthly occupants need to be given befitting consideration so that our actions do not 

endanger the survival of domestic species and that of future Homo sapiens. 

 

On the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals: The debate over the moral status of non-

human animals is not a recent development. It seems trivial and commonplace to believe that 

humans do not have any moral obligation towards non-human animals. For the sake of 

clarification, this paper employs the term ‘non-human animals’ to indicate animals both in the 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

9 

domestic and wild sense. It also suggests that the difference between humans and non-human 

animal is a matter of degree rather than kind. Now, the Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions 

made the verdict that in any circumstance humans have more worth than non-human animals 

(Gen. 1:28, Al-Qur’an 2:47). Aside references to passages of the revealed scriptures for 

support, some church fathers have promoted this outlook. St. Augustine claims that animals 

are lesser beings compared to humans when he denies that the law of God does not apply to 

them but “altogether for our sakes.”
6
 Further, St. Augustine believes that animals are lacking 

in the possession of a rational soul. St. Thomas Aquinas holds a similar stance that human 

treatment of animals is a matter of irrelevance since God has already given the former 

dominion over all entities
7
. Philosophers are not left out of this discourse. Aristotle, for 

instance, sees nature as a hierarchy where the most rational occupies the summit. According 

to him: 

 

Plants exist for the sake of animals, brute beasts for the sake of man – domestic 

animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate most of them) for food and 

other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. 

Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has 

made all animals for the sake of man
8
. 

 

As a consequence of the foregoing, Aristotle, “made anatomic dissections of animals for 

scientific study and teaching”
9
 which ushered in another trend of moral inquiry: whether or 

not animals ought to be used for scientific experiments. Aristotle would not have even 

considered this query seriously. Rene Descartes denies animals the gift of sentience as he 

viewed them as nothing but complex machines
10

. Descartes just like St. Augustine denies 

animals the presence of an immortal soul which involves the capacity to use language
11

. 

However, it is worth stating that another popular philosopher, Immanuel Kant, although he 

seems to see animals as food, maintains the outlook that cruelty to animals may lead to 

cruelty to fellow humans. In the end, this regurgitates the view that non-human animals are 

means to human ends. In his own words, Kant submits that “so far as animals are concerned, 

we have no direct duties. Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to 

an end. That end is man.”
12

 

 

Even when it seems commonplace to regard animals as human ends, there are a few who still 

treat animals with respect and dignity. St. Francis of Assisi seems to be outstanding in this 

mould. Thomas of Celano reports that: 

 

One time as [Francis] was passing through the Spoleto valley, he came upon a place 

near Bevagna, in which a great multitude of birds of various kinds had 

assembled. When the holy one of God saw them, because of the outstanding love of 

the Creator with which he loved all creatures, he ran swiftly to the place. He greeted 

them in his usual way, as if they shared in reason. As the birds did not take flight, he 

went to them, going to and fro among them, touching their heads and bodies with his 

tunic
13

. 

 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

10 

The report in the foregoing reveals that the existence of neighbourliness and positive relations 

between humans and non-human animals should lead to mutual respect among them. It also 

portrays the tendency of reasoning in the Chicken Fallacy routine as an excuse for animal 

brutality or cruelty. 

 

The view we have briskly considered, ranks humans over other animals and perceives, in 

most instances, the relation between them, biologically speaking, as parasitic. Even when 

humans seek to treat non-human animals kindly, this kindness is calculated to further the 

interest of humans. The moral thrust of the foregoing view is thus: aside the necessity to 

service the interest of humans, do non-human animals have intrinsic moral significance? At 

the basic level, non-human animals cannot be ‘reasoned with’ or instructed in the same way 

we could, as humans. Non-human animals cannot be held responsible for their actions or sue 

for redress in law court as humans might. Some may want to argue that non-human animals 

cannot even claim rights and this makes the question of moral worth and significance an 

instance of flogging a dead horse. This line of reasoning, albeit very common, has some 

problems. Joel Feinberg counters this idea by arguing that, if it is true that nonhuman animals 

do not have right because they cannot reason or seek redress, 

 

then neither human idiots nor wee babies would have any legal rights at all. Yet it is 

manifest that both of these classes of intellectual incompetents have legal rights 

recognized and easily enforced by the courts. Children and idiots start legal 

proceedings, not on their own direct initiate, but rather through the action of proxies 

or attorneys who are employed to speak in their names. If there is no conceptual 

absurdity in this situation, why should there be in the case where a proxy makes a 

claim on behalf of an animal? People commonly enough make wills, leaving money 

to trustees for the care of animals. Is it not natural to speak of the animal’s right to 

inheritance in cases of this kind?
14

 

 

Feinberg’s argument has its problem because one could still protest that the formal relation 

between trustees and those they represent may not hold between humans and non-human 

animals since legal proceedings hardly admit it. However, such clings on norms is escapist. It 

is clear that non-human animals are denied rights and moral status even when they fare better 

than human babies in terms of what they do. Our argument is that fetuses and comatose 

patients that are being protected are no better than non-human animals in terms of power for 

inductive collaboration with their neighbours and owners. In evolutionary biology, the 

behaviour of domestic animals in terms of their usefulness will be seen as altruistic because 

in the course of assisting humans, sometimes they risk their own lives. If this altruistic 

behavior is taken into consideration in comparison with wee babies and comatose patients, 

then animals too deserve better treatment. In other words, when the moral rights of fetuses 

and comatose patients are usually upheld even when they are not morally conscious, non-

human animals should not be denied the same consideration when their faculties are 

functioning at their optimal level. 

 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

11 

The quandary of whether or not non-human animals have moral significance has inspired 

Peter Singer. Singer accuses the human society of what he calls “speciesism”
15

. Countering 

the stance that non-human animals exist to serve human interests, Singer avers that “the 

moral basis of equality among humans is not equality in fact, but the principle of equal 

consideration of interests, and it is this principle that must be extended to any non-humans 

who have interests”
16

 if we are to be consistent. Singer proceeds to defend the view that non-

human animals have interests because they are entities capable of experiencing pleasure and 

pain. He concludes that “consciousness, or the subjective capacity for subjective experience 

is both a necessary and sufficient condition for having an interest.”
17 

In a nutshell, Singer 

grants that non-human animals are moral patients in a better category than wee babies and 

comatose patient, and their interests deserve to be given due consideration when policies that 

will affect them are tinkered. 

 

Singer’s objection to the denial of moral significance to non-human animals founders on two 

grouses: the one with his principle of sentience and the other with his classical utilitarian 

approach. His position would logically imply that we do not confer moral worth on non-

human animals that lack the capacity for sentience. According to Arthur L. Caplan, Singer’s 

stance “would seem to permit experimentation on any creature which cannot, for whatever 

reason, suffer or feel pain.”
18 

Caplan’s objection, however, could also be disputed. One may 

contend that in the case of humans, a temporary cessation of sentience through illness, coma, 

neurological disorder, tranquilizers, or the administration of drugs would not diminish moral 

worth, perhaps because of their potentiality to regain consciousness. However, what it means 

is that animals such as ants that are likely non-sentient entities may not be lucky. Does this 

mean that ants could be denied moral worth because they are likely non-sentient and beings 

without interests? We think not. Ants, like other insects that are non-sentient, could be 

considered based on utility. When importance to environment is considered above sentience, 

the role of ants becomes overwhelmingly indispensable. This study suggests that the most 

plausible alternative to surpass the dilemma between consideration of sentience and 

importance to environment may be deduced from Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution 

which inadvertently promotes biological altruism. The theory endorses non-human animals as 

beings with purpose tacitly, reposed in them by the process of natural selection. If this is the 

case, the problem or implication present in the sentience factor of Singer no longer presents 

itself as an insurmountable impasse. 

 

Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory and Purposiveness in Entities: It is not an error to state 

that Darwinism has garnered a parochial and a broad reference over the years. In the former 

sense, it refers to the organic evolutionary theory propounded by Charles Darwin and others 

who have developed strands of his ideas. In the latter sense, it connotes a compendium of 

sociological, theological, and even philosophical thought that was initiated and substantiated 

by the former. This paper shall move from the former sense to the latter sense as it exposes 

the main kernel of Darwinism and its implication for the relation between humans and non-

human animals. 

 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

12 

Charles Darwin’s aim in the Origin of Species is “to accomplish three things: (a) to show that 

evolution has in fact occurred; (b) to describe the mechanism of evolution; and (c) to account 

for the major facts of morphology, embryology, biogeography, paleontology, and taxonomy 

on the evolutionary hypothesis.”
19 

Whereas Darwin informs us that we do not directly 

observe the process of evolution, he cites the shortness of human life as one out of many 

obstacles. He is, however, optimistic that certain facts and conclusions about reality force this 

thinking upon us. He invites his readers to try the hypothesis only to affirm that hitherto 

unconnected facts may in fact have a uniform elucidation. The mechanism of evolution plays 

the role of the hypothesis in question and consists of three components: natural selection, 

sexual selection, and the inheritance of characteristics attained during the lifetime of an 

organism. We shall gloss each of these very succinctly, just to highlight areas that are 

relevant to the argument of this thesis. 

 

Natural selection is that principle upon which Darwin places the greatest weight of his 

evolutionary theory. In the words of Edward Wilson, “natural selection is the process 

whereby certain genes gain representation in the following generations superior to that of 

other genes located at the same chromosome position.”
20

 The theory proposes that (1) 

populations of animals and plants display variations; (2) some of the variations provide an 

organism some sort of advantage over the rest of the population in the constant struggle for 

survival; (3) variations that are favourable are transmitted to the offspring; (4) given the fact 

that population usually produce more offspring than the environment can support, the 

proportion of favourable variations that survive and produce offspring would be larger than 

the proportion of the unfavourable variations; and, thus, (5) a population may experience 

endless evolutionary change whose consequence can be the development of new varieties. 

Darwin admits that the cause for variation and natural selection is a matter of conjecture. 

However, it is admitted that changing environmental situations enormously promote 

variability by acting on the reproductive system and, consequently, providing material for 

natural selection when and where necessary
21

. Edward Wilson advances further that the 

individual organism is only a vehicle for the preservation and transmission of favourable 

variations. He argues that “in a Darwinist sense, the organism does not live for itself. Its 

primary function is not even to reproduce other organisms; it reproduces genes, and it serves 

as their temporary carrier.”
22

 

 

Charles Darwin accounts for the rationale behind sexual selection as the catalyst in mating 

rituals, sexual behaviours, and characteristics. The intent of sexual selection is to influence 

the probability of having offspring. Writing on the sexual behaviours of ring doves, D.S. 

Lehrman reveals that the sight and sound of the male alone stimulates the pituitary gland to 

secret gonadotropins
23

. These substances induce an increase in estrogen, which triggers best-

building behavior and progesterone which initiates incubation behaviour
24

. What we call 

‘sight’ and ‘sound’ is a deeper communication and language among doves. It is, therefore, 

not an error to ascertain that non-human animals have their linguistic and communication 

techniques aboriginal and unique to them. With regards to the evolution of humans, M.W. 

Fox informs us that sexual selection was the auxiliary motor that drove human evolution all 

the way to the Homo grade
25

. Edward Wilson expands this line of thought in his words thus: 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

13 

 

Polygyny is a general trait in hunter-gatherer bands and may also have been the rule 

in the early hominid societies. If so, a premium would have been placed on sexual 

selection involving both epigamic display toward the females and intra-sexual 

competition among the males. The selection would be enhanced by the constant 

mating provocation that arises from the female’s nearly continuous sexual receptivity. 

Because of the existence of a high level of cooperation within the band, a legacy of 

the original Australopithecus adaptation, sexual selection would tend to be linked with 

hunting prowess, leadership, skill at tool making and other visible attributes that 

contribute to the success of the family and the male band
26

. 

 

If there is any truth in the above excerpt, the weight is on humans to therefore re-evaluate 

their relation with non-human animals. This becomes pertinent given their role as the vehicle 

preserving the genes that led to Homo sapiens. This is true if we remember that, in Darwinist 

parlance, the organism does not live for itself, but as a temporary carrier of genes. If this is 

the case, then it calls for caution on our part when engaging in actions that will breed 

unfavourable genes in non-human progenitors. At this point, a critic may object that, since 

evolution has no aim or purpose, there is no reason to deduce that non-human animals are 

purposive beings with aims that must not be cavalierly frustrated. The response one may 

proffer here is that even if the critic is not incorrect in saying that evolution has no intention 

or purpose, this does not downplay the possibility of giving meaning and purpose to it. After 

all, a bulk of human life involves interpreting and giving existence meaning through 

deliberations and actions. For instance, humans may marvel at the complex things of the 

phenomena and propound the existence of God (teleological and cosmological arguments for 

the existence of God are popular instances). In other words, humans do attribute aims and 

purpose to nature, including non-human creatures, if persistent regularity is observed. Darwin 

observed through fossil evidence and record of animals’ features that lower-grade entities 

have evolved into higher-grade, complex entities. If Darwin’s conjecture is taken, then it 

would not be an error to say this is precisely the aim of evolution. If this is accepted, non-

human animals have been used by evolution to bring about the emergence of humanity. This 

makes them human ancestors. It is the failure to see them as such that presents the difficulty 

in admitting that non-human animals are purposive entities with moral worth. 

 

However, even if the term ‘purposive’ seem inapplicable in the same sense it is applied to 

humans, the difference in the meaning may be a matter of degree and not kind. A dog that 

saves his master’s child from drowning in a pool may be said to be faithful just like the cock 

that crows behind his owner’s window regularly to wake him up for work. Whereas the dog 

did his act once, the cock does his always. The cock may be responding to an inner 

mechanism but the dog is not. After all, not all dogs will do that. So, their faithfulness differs 

only in degree but not in kind. 

 

Furthermore, upon a consideration of the mechanism of inheritance, a deeper appreciation of 

the position of animals suffices. Inheritance of acquired characters is the third pillar of 

Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Whereas the modern theory of the origin of genetic variation 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

14 

in populations was not available to Darwin, he suggests that some variations are due to the 

action of the environment on the germ plasm but the effects of use and disuse cannot be ruled 

out in variations. One may notice the role of Lamack’s theory of use and disuse in Darwin’s 

evolutionism, save for the environmental conditions that the latter added to his element. 

Darwin’s theory invites humans to perceive themselves as purposive creatures brought about 

through the effect of natural selection on non-human animals. In Darwin’s words: 

 

When we no longer look at an organic being as a savage looks at a ship, as something 

wholly beyond his comprehension; when we regard every production of nature as one 

which has had a long history; when we contemplate every complex structure and 

instinct as the summing up of many contrivances…when we thus view each organic 

being, how far more interesting – I speak from experience – does the study of natural 

history become!
27

 

 

As opposed to the foregoing, pre-Darwinian taxonomy proposed humankind to be at the 

summit of all there is. The view that all creatures are individually brought into existence 

through the unalterable work of God had been accepted before Darwin. This among other 

observations denied non-human animals rationality and moral status. This assessment holds 

that non-human creatures exist solely to promote the human good, and as such deserve no 

consideration. 

 

It is pertinent to hint that Darwin’s Origin of Species questioned some popular and dominant 

ways of thinking. Darwin’s thought poked at creationism and natural theology, on the ground 

that “the living world, including man, is due to a single origin of life.”
28

 The implication here 

is the futility in invoking an intelligent deity who has subsumed all other living entities to the 

whim and caprice of the Homo sapiens. By extension, anthropocentrism is probed. This is the 

belief that man is at the apex of the Great Chain of Being and legitimizes man’s perception of 

everything in the world from his ‘specialized gaze’. Darwin challenges us to view humans as 

animals, albeit complex ones that have acquired the trait of higher intelligence through 

evolution. Darwin’s idea of common descent proposes that all organisms, including humans, 

descended from common ancestors
29

. 

 

Darwin’s Origin of Species, aside the impact on the afore-stated dominant ways of thinking, 

also tasked people to review their perspectives with regard to classical mechanics, 

essentialism, cosmic theology, and determinism. 
 

Darwin’s Evolutionism as an Ethical and Normative Groundwork for a Holistic 

Animal-Human Relation: The deductions from the foray into Darwin’s evolutionary theory, 

with its implications for human relations with non-human animals and their moral worth, are 

as follows: 

 

(1) Humans are not essentially different from non-human animals. If there is any ‘real 

difference’, it is a matter of degree, not of kind; 

 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

15 

(2) Non-human animals are the vehicles employed by evolution, through natural selection, 

sexual selection, and inheritance of acquired traits for the appearance of an improved 

organism, which at the moment seems to be the Homo sapiens; 

 

(3) All organisms (including Homo sapiens) are carriers of genetic materials with altruistic 

consequence. This indicates that evolution is purposive. If not, the regular process of the 

emergence of higher-grade species from lower grades may be difficult to explain; and 

 

(4) Deducing from (1) – (3), it would be morally imprudent for humans to cavalierly frustrate 

the aims of their progenitors. This confers a degree of moral worth on non-human 

animals. Among humans there is this cherished and cordial relationship towards those 

who had done us one favour or the other and their kin albeit without any direct benefit. In 

this regard, human society is challenged to rethink: if we consider blood relation in 

certain ethical situations, why do we neglect genetic relation? 

 

The preceding section lends credence to (1). For if one agrees with the mechanism of 

evolution, (1) has no misgivings. A critic may grouse about (2) that, despite its emergence, 

Homo sapiens have not been able to evolve into a higher being with higher intelligence and 

consciousness. This study ripostes that although no one has witnessed evolution yet, facts and 

anecdotes of variation of species impose it on our intelligence. However, the shortness of 

human life, among other challenging factors, has been a major impasse in this empirical 

demand of the critics. Just because we do not directly observe natural selection is not enough 

to wish away the reality. In order to avoid the pitfall of argumentum ad ignoratiam, it would 

be prudent to admit (2) alongside the caveat that “absence of evidence is not evidence of 

absence.”
30

 The claim in (3) follows necessarily from (1) and (2). The movement from beings 

that are genetic carriers to purposive beings is entrenched in (3).In the words of Samir 

Okasha: 

 

Altruistic behaviour is common throughout the animal kingdom, particularly in 

species with complex social structures. For example, vampire bats regularly 

regurgitate blood and donate it to other members of their group who have failed to 

feed that night, ensuring they do not starve. In numerous bird species, a breeding pair 

receives help in raising its young from other ‘helper’ birds, who protect the nest from 

predators and help to feed the fledglings. Vervet monkeys give alarm calls to warn 

fellow monkeys of the presence of predators, even though in doing so they attract 

attention to themselves, increasing their personal chance of being attacked. In social 

insect colonies (ants, wasps, bees and termites), sterile workers devote their whole 

lives to caring for the queen, constructing and protecting the nest, foraging for food, 

and tending the larvae. Such behaviour is maximally altruistic: sterile workers 

obviously do not leave any offspring of their own—so have personal fitness of zero—

but their actions greatly assist the reproductive efforts of the queen
31

. 

 

The above instances are clear cases of biological altruism among animals for the preservation 

of species. It seems puzzling how natural selection would admit the element of altruism into 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

16 

its schema. In the words of Jonah Lehrer: “Charles Darwin regarded the problem of 

altruism—the act of helping someone else, even if it comes at a steep personal cost—as a 

potentially fatal challenge to his theory of natural selection.”
32

 Even in the face of the 

seeming contradiction in the personal and selfish struggle for survival and the altruistic 

tendency latent in both animals and even humans, it is not incorrect to say that non-human 

animals have purpose and sometimes go out of the line, become generous to fulfill this drive. 

Consequently, one can readily defend (4). 

 

When Peter Singer confers moral worth on non-human animals on the basis of sentience, we 

believe he overlooks non-sentient creatures with utility value, given that they are carriers of 

genes. This study diverges by hinging on the purposiveness of the evolutionary process rather 

than sentience. It maintains that sentience could inadvertently deny non-human animals moral 

worth if it could be proven that such creatures could be used for pain-free scientific research. 

This scorching issue shall be assessed shortly. For the moment, this research agrees with 

Arthur Caplan who recommends that “purposiveness rather than sentience is a property that 

suffices for conferring moral worth”
33

 for non-human animals. 

 

As Darwin submits that human beings evolved from non-human animals, this truth places a 

certain moral responsibility on human beings towards their evolutionary ancestors. The least 

we can do is to treat these entities with more dignity and consideration than what currently 

obtains. We must improve our social relations with them since they are like neighbours to us. 

Animals are not meant to serve human ends simpliciter. There are instances where animals 

have developed the ability to drive automobiles, serve countries during wars, practice yoga, 

and even assist members of dissimilar species
34

. These attest to what may be the result of a 

good and positive human-animal relation as opposed to the received view that places the one 

over the other. To corroborate this claim, research in sociobiology has shown that animals are 

also social beings and as such are purposive in their behaviours. Social behaviours of animals 

are indicative that they also have interests and goals which should make us replicate the 

loyalty and good services they render to us as humans. The dogs that fend us from human 

criminals, the cats that keep our environment clean of rodents, and the chicken that serves as 

a clock should not be killed like ‘common criminals’. If cruelty to good fellow human 

neighbours is discouraged, the same treatment should be extended to domestic animals. This 

empathy may not be extended to wild animals since part of our concern in this paper is to rid 

the world of cruelty and violence. Most wild animals are naturally cruel and violent and 

killing them may be a way of defense but if any of them has been domesticated and 

successfully develops friendly genes then our position may admit such. Hence, this research 

lauds implemented efforts of some authorities towards training of wild animals with the 

purpose to generate neighbourly and friendly relations with them. This is crucial especially 

for those species that are on the brink of extinction. At this point, it is pertinent to emphasize 

the emotional bond that domestic non-human animals have built with humans. 

 

Killing those who have become attached to us betrays their trust even if it is tacitly reposed. 

An analogy from Chinua Achebe could prove helpful. Chinua Achebe, in his book Things 

Fall Apart, relays a relevant story to this discourse where Ikemefuna who was brought to 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

17 

Okonkwo’s house as a sacrificial lamb was kept in the house of the hero of the novel, 

Okonkwo, for a period of time
35

. Due to the long stay and familiarity with the house, the boy 

saw Okonkwo as his father. As it was time to sacrifice Ikemefuna, other men could not kill 

the boy because they have grown to love him and his youthfulness. Okonkwo whom the boy 

calls father drew out his sword and killed Ikemefuna. The explanation offered is that 

Okonkwo has the fear of failure, but the complex of portraying himself as a brave man. This 

single act turned his immediate family against him as his fellow chiefs were also 

disappointed. The chiefs retort: “but the boy calls you father!” In the same vein, our attempt 

to show superiority on earth should not lead us to treat our non-human neighbours as non-

entities. Such treatment portrays betrayal on the part of humans. The dog that wags his tail 

when we are home and the chicken who clucks when we approach deserve to be treated like 

neighbours, if not friends, since these acts are signs of love or acceptability displayed towards 

humans. 

 

This paper agrees with Caplan that “it is wrong to interfere with or deprive animals of the 

opportunity to fulfill their basic drive.”
36

 However, a deep look at our cruelty to animals will 

show that what we obstruct mainly is the purpose of the force behind evolutionary goals 

rather than the purpose of creatures. We all may not fulfill our individual purposes since 

death is inevitable but one should not be killed before the maturity of the genes to maintain 

evolutionary balance in the world. Consequently, we have a duty as humans to lessen cruelty 

to, and even death of, non-human animals where possible. In other words, cruelty to animals 

is a means of altering evolutionary process that persistently and consistently strives to 

produce improved species. This is what (4) also admits. 

 

The destructive consequence would be the interference in the ‘preservation processes’ of the 

genetic materials that are necessary for the sustenance of life and evolution. This implores 

that if non-human animals are fit for human ends, the best way to show that is to preserve 

them. Animals are not just dumb and non-rational entities lacking in self-awareness. To this 

effect, there are torrents of research in ethology, sociobiology, and comparative psychology 

that indicate at least that some non-human animals are capable of some forms of 

intentionality, language, and self-awareness
37

. What this means is that our attitude towards 

them goes a long way to shape their world and their progeny. Converse attitude from them is 

not impossible. In spite of these, a critic may counter (4) on two grounds: Firstly, it may be 

stated that animals did not intentionally act as carriers of the genes that led to the emergence 

of humanity. So it is pointless according reverence to entities that did us a favour when they 

are not even aware of it. Secondly, that animals that are currently existing have done close to 

nothing to our genetic make-up. Hence, there is no justification for taking their existence 

seriously as we would, for instance, idiots and wee babies. 

 

The first objection is countered by offering that, if natural selection allowed non-human 

animals to do this task intentionally, perhaps humanity would not exist as some of these 

animals would not want to be the fore-runners of higher-grade entities that would maltreat 

them, decimate their habitat, and even denigrate the environment. The second objection is 

even less trivial. Even if we admit that present animals have not contributed to our genetic 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

18 

make-up, we must not wish away how cruelty towards them may impose on their genes the 

emergence of advanced organisms that may develop adaptive wild behaviours as the 

principles of survival and selection of the fittest made us to understand. The chicken 

ignorance will then turn into the chicken rationality as non-human animals that were hitherto 

friendly, now evolve adaptive but cruel and violent behaviours. Through natural selection and 

preservation of the species, a once friendly but cruelly-treated dog could whelp puppies that 

would acquire adaptive features that turns them into wild and tenacious breeds. These are 

some of the consequences of failing to give a proper interpretation to evolution and the moral 

worth of non-human animals even if they are moral patients. 

 

Since purposiveness is a criterion for moral worth, what consideration should be put in place 

if the purposes of humans clash with those of non-human animals, for example in the context 

of scientific experiments? In other words, there is a gulf between the recognition that non-

human animals possess worth on the one hand and the question of whether or not they could 

be subjected to laboratory use on the other hand. However, if humans must fulfill the drive 

and impulses for medicine, it seems some animals must suffer in the course of the discovery 

of new drugs. Our preference for the utility of non-human animals and humans suggests that 

they ought to be preserved for maturity of genes necessary for future evolution. It seems 

helping with drugs is a way of doing this. In this vein, preference is given to those scientific 

research projects that increase the overall well-being of the human species and non-human 

animals, in the drive to retrieve some from the abyss of extinction, with the help of drugs 

borne out of research on them. What we shall have is a win-win situation. This attests to 

Darwin’s thinking that all organisms must survive in the face of scarce and limited resources. 

As a result, there is an assurance that some non-human animals would have their moral worth 

and rights transgressed in order to fulfill the goal of evolution. It is the unchecked but 

indiscriminate killing for food and pleasure that are discouraged. The use of a few animals in 

the development of drugs and medicines saves more animals from diseases and avoidable 

demise. This is where Singer’s principle of equal consideration of interest is revived, albeit in 

newer perspective
38

. 

 

Conclusion: The relations that ought to exist between humans and non-human animals as 

occupants of the same environment have received attention from different scholars. When 

some have argued that animals have certain fundamental rights and as such should not be 

killed for whatever ends by humans, others maintain that cruelty to non-human animals can 

make humans to develop malignant attitudes to one another. Hence, the haphazard and blasé 

killing of animals for food and research purposes should be discouraged. This study departs 

from the status quo to propose that cruelty to non-human animals, especially the ones who are 

domesticated, is a mark of betrayal given the attitude of loyalty to humans. Further, this could 

make domestic non-human animals that were hitherto non-wild to develop adaptive wild 

behaviours against humans in order to preserve their species. This invariably blurs the 

zoologists’ demarcation between the wild and non-wild. We should note that what we are 

writing by our malevolent behaviours in the genes of these domestic animals is the 

inscription: “Dogs, Beware of Men,” which is the reverse of what we normally place at the 

entrance of our residence: “Beware of Dogs.” 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

19 

 

 

Author Contribution: Both authors contributed equally to the paper. 

 

Conflict of Interest: Declared none. 

 

Acknowledgements: Special thanks to Rainer Ebert, Ph.D., our dear friend on Facebook, 

who informed us about this journal and encouraged us to write this piece. This 

acknowledgement is incomplete without a mention of Okoro Chiedozie, Ph.D., who helped 

with some materials on this topic. 

 

References 

 
1
Some refer to the illustration as “Russell’s Chicken”. See Deutsch, D. The Fabric of Reality, 

the Science of Parallel Universes and its Implications. New York: Viking Adult. 1997. 
2
Russell, B. Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1959 p. 63. 

3
Singer, P. “Not for Humans Alone: The Place of Nonhumans in Environmental Issues” in 

ETHICS: Thought and Practice. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1985 p. 479 
4
Caplan, A.L. “Beastly Conduct: Ethical Issues in Animal Experimentation” The Ethical 

Dimensions of the Biological Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995 p. 184 
5
Darwin, C.L. On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of 

Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. New York: Modern Library Edition 1949 
6
Augustine, St. The Catholic and Manichean Ways of Life, (trans.) D.A. Gallagher and I.J. 

Gallagher. Boston: Catholic University Press 1966 p. 102 
7
Rowan, A.N. Of Mice, Models and Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal Research. Albany: 

State University of New York Press 1984 pp. 1-323 
8
Aristotle,Politics, 1256b. 

9
Bulger, R.E. “Use of Animals in Experimental Research: A Scientist’s Perspective” The 

Ethical Dimensions of the Biological Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995 

p. 187 
10

Levine, C. “Should Animal Experimentations be Stopped?”in Taking Sides: Clashing Views 

on Controversial Bio-Ethical Issues. Guilford: Dushkin Publishing Group 1984 pp. 222-3 
11

Benjamin, M.“Ethics and Animal Consciousness” in Social Ethics, Morality and Social 

Policy. New York: McGraw Hill 1987 pp. 476 
12

Kant, I. Lectures on Ethics, New York: Harper & Row 1963 p. 239 
13

Thomas of Celano, The Treatise on the Miracle of Saint Francis (1250-1252) R.J. 

Armstrong, OFM Cap, J.A.W. Hellmoann, OFM Cov, W.J. Short, (eds.) The Francis 

Theology of Thomas of Celano. Hyde Park: New City Press pp 329-30 
14

Feinberg, J. “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations” in ETHICS: Thought and 

Practice. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1985 p. 469 
15

Singer, P. Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals. New York: Avon 

Books 1975 
16

Op. Cit, Singer 1985 p. 479 
17

Ibid p. 479-80 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2017; 8(1): 7-20 

20 

18
Op. Cit, Caplan 1995 p. 183 

19
“Darwinism,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/. 

Retrieved on 11/12/2016. 
20

Wilson, O.E. Sociobiology: The Abridged Edition. London: Belknap Press 1998 p. 3 
21

Op. Cit, Darwin 1949 
22

Op. Cit, Wilson 1998 p. 3 
23

Lehrman, D.S. “The Reproductive Behaviour of Ring Doves” in Scientific American 1964 

211(5): 48-54 
24

Op. Cit, Wilson 1998 p. 107 
25

Fox, M.W. “Socio-Ecological Implications of Individual Differences in Wolf Litters: A 

Development and Evolutionary Perspective” in Behaviour1972 46(3,4) 298-313. 
26

Op. Cit, Wilson 1998 
27

Op. Cit, Darwin 1949 
28

Mayr, E. “Darwin’s Impact on Modern Thought” in Proceedings of the American 

Philosophical Society.1995 139 (4) 317-325 
29

Ibid p. 319 
30

Weiss, E.The Long Trajectory: Reincarnation and Life After Death. Unpublished Version. 

2009 p. 23 
31

Okasha, S. “Biological Altruism” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/altruism-biological/. Retrieved on 21/11/2016. 
32

Lehrer, J. “The Paradox of Altruism” 2012 https://www.wired.com/2012/02/the-paradox-

of-altruism/. Retrieved on 21/11/2016. 
33

Op. Cit, Caplan 1995 p. 184 
34

Beres, D. “Animal Stories: When Beasts Act Like Humans” http://www.rd.com/true-

stories/inspiring/animal-stories-when-beasts-act-like-humans/. Retrieved on 24/11/2016. 
35

Achebe, C. Things Fall Apart, London: William Heinemann Press 1958 
36

Op. Cit, Caplan 1995 p. 183 
37

see Bowd, A.D. “Ethical Reservations about Psychological Research with Animals” 

Psyschol. Rec. 1980 30 (Spring): 201-10; Fox, M.S. “Experimental Psychology, Animal 

Rights, Welfare and Ethics”. Psychopharm. Bull. 1981; 17(2): 80-4; Griffin, D.R. The 

Question of Animal Awareness. New York: Rockefeller University Press. 1976; Wilson, O.E. 

Sociobiology: The Abridged Edition. London: Belknap Press 1998 
38

Op. Cit, Singer 1985 p. 479 

http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/altruism-biological/
https://www.wired.com/2012/02/the-paradox-of-altruism/
https://www.wired.com/2012/02/the-paradox-of-altruism/
http://www.rd.com/true-stories/inspiring/animal-stories-when-beasts-act-like-humans/
http://www.rd.com/true-stories/inspiring/animal-stories-when-beasts-act-like-humans/

