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Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018; 10 (1): 6-10 

 

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 Dignity, Community and Albinism in Malawi 
 

Vitumbiko Nyirenda 

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Email: vitumbikoh@gmail.com   

 

Abstract: Thaddeus Metz, “African conceptions of human dignity” (2012), presents an 

African conception of dignity that he relates to human rights. In this paper, while 

ignoring Metz’s discussion on human rights, I specifically look at how this conception 

can be applied to one of the problematic moral issues, killing of persons with albinism.  

That is, how Metz’s view would account for exclusion and wrongness of killing of 

persons with albinism. I argue that the killing of persons with albinism is acting in 

violation of their dignity. This comes from the view that persons with Albinism are 

human beings with a dignity, and therefore ought not to be killed. I offer a discussion on 

how dignity as capacity for community based on shared identity and good-will is not 

reflected in the way persons with albinism are treated in Malawi. 

Keywords: Albinism, Dignity, Shared identity, Solidarity, Thaddeus Metz, Community. 

 

Introduction: Thaddeus Metz in his paper, 

“African Conceptions of Human Dignity” 

(2012), presents an African conception of 

dignity that he relates to human rights. In 

this paper, I look at how this conception can 

be applied to one of the problematic moral 

issues, killing of persons with albinism (PA 

). That is, how Metz’s view would account 

for exclusion of persons with albinism in 

Malawi. The paper answers the following 

question, “can Metz’s conception of dignity 

based on community offer an explanation 

about the wrongness of killing of persons 

with albinism?” I offer a positive response 

to the question by showing that killing of 

PA(s) is acting in violation of their dignity. 

Dignity under Metz’s conception is 

understood as the capacity for community, 

and he defines community as based on 

shared identity and solidarity1. I will cash 

out theviolation of dignity as capacity for 

community in terms of failure to 

acknowledge a sense of shared identity with 

PA(s) as well as lack of solidarity or good-

will. The paper has three sections. In the 

first section, I will present Metz’s 

conception of dignity. In section two, I will 

show how this understanding of dignity can 

be applied to explain the killing of PA(s). In 

the last section, I will present some 

alternative worries in relation to the 

arguments provided in the paper. 

I 

Metz begins his paper by making a 

distinction between a concept of dignity and 

a conception of dignity. By concept, he 

means that which “makes a given theory one 

of dignity as opposed to something else,” 

whereas a conception of dignity “aims to 

account for an underlying structure of the 

myriad things with dignity by invoking few 

properties as possible”1. A concept of 

dignity he comes up with is the “idea of 

what it is about a human being that makes 

them objectively good for their own sake to 

an equally incomparable degree entitling 

them to respectful treatment in the form of 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018; 10 (1): 6-10 

 

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recognizing human rights” 1. There is a lot 

to be unpacked here. Firstly, the phrase 

“objectively good,” means that dignity is not 

dependent on one’s mental states or that it is 

not a social construction. Thus, a human 

being has a dignity and it is neither because 

of what one believes, thinks and desires 

about a human being, nor dependent on 

social factors. However, it is a “natural 

property of an individual that ought to be 

recognized” 1. This means that dignity is 

dependent on a natural property of some 

feature of human nature 2. Secondly, “for 

their sake” according to Metz is to have non-

instrumental value, thus, human beings are 

not good as a mere means to something else 

but as an end 1. Thirdly, “incomparable” 

means that “whenever one must choose 

between something with dignity and mere 

price, a person must choose one with 

dignity” 3 “Price” here refers to the view that 

“something else can be put in its place as an 

equivalent” and dignity has no equivalent 3. 

Therefore, dignity is something 

irreplaceable. Lastly, because people have a 

dignity, this gives them moral worth and 

value; thus, they are to be treated 

respectfully 1.  

It is this concept of dignity that Metz works 

with to present his African conception of 

dignity based on vitality and community. 

The term “vitality” refers to the idea of life 

force. It is difficult to state exactly what it is, 

but traditionally, it is understood as 

“valuable spiritual or invisible energy that 

inheres in physical or visible things” 1. This 

meaning has religious underpinnings and 

Metz ignores this religious understanding. 

Instead, he presents a naturalist idea where 

life force is understood as liveliness or 

creative power 1. He states that liveness is 

manifested in the “degree of health, strength, 

reproduction, self-motion, courage” and the 

lack of life force characterized by “presence 

of disease, weakness, barrenness, 

destruction” 1. For the sake of brevity, I will 

ignore this vitality-based view of dignity. 

Nonetheless, I will use a traditional view of 

life force in discussing some views on 

African ontology below.  

This leads me to another conception of 

dignity provided by Metz, the community-

based view. According to Metz, a human 

being may be said to have a dignity based on 

their capacity for community 1. For Metz, 

community is understood in terms of shared 

identity and solidarity or good-will 1. Shared 

identity for Metz is for individuals to think 

of themselves as the “we”1. This 

presupposes an identity an individual has 

with her community. A better way to 

understand what this entails is to refer to 

John Mbiti who has written extensively 

about individual and community. Mbiti 

discusses a relationship an individual has 

with her community. According to Mbiti, 

the individual is defined by her community 

and cannot exist outside it. The individual 

sees herself as a product of the community. 

For Mbiti, a person says to her/himself, “I 

am because we are, and since we are, 

therefore I am” 4. Thus, by “we,” he means 

to see oneself within the context of a 

community where one is defined and is a 

product. This point is echoed in Neal and 

Paris who describe such type of identity as 

an essential share relation in which the 

community penetrates the identity of 

individuals 5. Thus, the “identity of each self 

in the community in partially or wholly 

constituted by the communal relations” 5. 

Secondly, according to Metz, by identifying 

oneself to be part of the group, that group 

should also consider that individual to be 

part of it. Thus, if one considers oneself as 

the “we”, the “we” should consider the 

individual to be part of it 6. This expresses 

the reciprocal nature of identity, where one 

does not just claim to be part of the group 

but the group also recognizes the person to 

be its member. Although Metz does not 

express the point in this way, it would mean 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018; 10 (1): 6-10 

 

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that the individual is equally important just 

as the group one belongs to. Furthermore, 

being a member of a group means sharing 

goals or ends with them. It also includes 

working together to accomplish these ends. 

This is the view of shared identity Metz 

presents. However, he argues that it is hard 

to see the moral significance of shared 

identity. Therefore, he turns to another view 

of community, solidarity or good-will 6. 

On good-will, Metz talks about mutual 

support. He lists a number of actions in 

which good-will might manifests. For Metz, 

this is when a person, 

wishes another person well 

(conation); believes that another 

person is worthy of help 

(cognition); aims to help another 

person (intention); acts so as to 

help another person (volition); 

acts for the other’s sake 

(motivation); and, finally, feels 

good upon the knowledge that 

another person has benefited and 

feels bad upon learning she has 

been harmed (affection) 6. 

In other words, part of good-will is the 

desire to see others succeed or benefit. This 

is also accompanied by the belief that other 

people are worthy of this benefit (whatever 

that is). An individual may also act in a way 

that she sacrifices herself for the benefit of 

others 6. This is explained by those who 

would put their lives on the line with the 

hope of rescuing the person in a dangerous 

situation. Central to this is the notion of 

care. That is, caring for one another whose 

duties may be grounded in common 

humanity 7. As pointed out above, part of 

shared identity is to share goals or ends, and 

under the notion of good will, Metz explains 

this idea in terms of helping others achieve 

their ends, sympathize with them and 

helping them for their sake 1. This may be 

grounded in the view that achieving or 

acting in ways that promote the ends of 

others is one way of promoting one’s ends. 

Failure to show good-will is to be hostile or 

cruel to others 1. 

According to Metz, a proper account of 

community requires both shared identity and 

good-will 6. This is because one could think 

of shared identity without good will, as well 

as goodwill without shared identity but in 

defining a community both are important. In 

relation to dignity, Metz argues that human 

beings have a dignity through their capacity 

for community. This is different from being 

in actual relationships or exercising this 

capacity 8,9. Merely having it gives one a 

dignity. Therefore, human beings have a 

dignity in virtue of their capacity to be in 

relationships where they share an identity 

with others and act in good will or 

solidarity. This is a capacity plants, 

inanimate objects, and other some non-

human animals lack 1. Metz connects his 

idea of dignity to human rights. He argues 

that to respect human rights is to respect 

dignity (capacity for community) and to 

violate human rights is to degrade this 

capacity 1. But my paper ignores a 

discussion on human rights and only 

engages with his conception of dignity 

based on community. My aim is to show 

how it can be used to explain the violation 

of dignity when PA(s) are killed. I cash out 

violation of the capacity for community by 

showing that there is lack of shared identity 

and good will. The major assumption I am 

working with is that PA(s) are human beings 

with a dignity and value. It then 

automatically follows that they ought not to 

be killed (ceteris paribus), where killing is a 

violation of their dignity. 

II 

In this section, I would like to explain 

(briefly) what albinism is and offer a 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018; 10 (1): 6-10 

 

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discussion on how people with albinism are 

treated in some African communities 

especially in Malawi. Thus, I will discuss 

why PA(s), despite being people with a 

dignity and value, present a problem to the 

community. I will discuss how PA(s) are 

negatively treated, the worst being murder. 

This will be supported by beliefs people 

hold related to albinism. I will later show 

how these beliefs indicate people’s actions 

that violate PA(s) dignity, hence, 

manifesting lack of shared identity and good 

will.  

Albinism is a “group of genetically 

determined disorders of the melanin 

pigmentary system characterized in man 

(humans) by congenital hypopigmentation 

(loss of color) of hair, skin, and eyes 

(oculocutaneous albinism) or apparently 

limited to the eyes (ocular albinism)” 10. 

Albinism can be found in other animals, but 

I will only focus on human beings. As 

described in the definition, Melanin disorder 

brings about the phenotypical distinctions in 

PA(s). These distinctions are in terms of the 

color of the skin, eyes and hair. As I will 

show, these distinctions have partly 

perpetuated the killings of PA(s). In any 

case, it is arbitrary to take these differences 

in appearance as reasons for perceiving 

PA(s) as non-human beings, and therefore, 

without a dignity and value. If phenotypical 

differences are a factor, then one would 

wonder why it is these differences in PA(s) 

that are taken seriously unlike any other 

differences in people without albinism (non-

PA) such as age, height and body shape 

(skinny or plump). In any case, it raises an 

interesting question that despite the fact that 

they are human beings with a dignity, which 

follows that they ought not to be killed, they 

still get killed. To answer this question, I 

will look at community perceptions of 

PA(s). 

One of the reasons to explain negative 

perceptions is by appealing to the notion of 

alterity or otherness. Alterity or otherness 

can be defined as “the quality of being 

different, unusual or alien from the 

conscious self or a particular cultural 

orientation” 11. In other words, as Elvis 

Imafidon also puts it, it is “being different 

from the status quo” 11. Imafidon has not 

explained how the notion of “the other” 

comes to be. In other words, how something 

comes to be perceived as the other. A point I 

think is important in understanding why 

distinctions in appearance for PA(s) are of 

special interest than that of non-PA(s). My 

proposal here is to appeal to the notion of 

normality. Normality understood in terms of 

what the society has considered as the status 

quo or what they have taken to be normal. In 

this sense, the “other” would be what is 

considered as different from what is normal. 

Furthermore, what is normal is defined by 

certain characteristics that the society has 

taken to be important 12. The central 

question to ask here then is why it is this or 

that particular characteristic that defines 

what is normal? 

Part of the response would be that it is what 

people are used to (familiarity), and find 

interesting or important in bringing about 

their desired end (whatever that might be). 

In other words, there are certain categories 

that society has accepted as important, these 

define what is normal and are usually prima 

facie based on (but not limited to) 

appearance 13. What may be worrisome is 

that much of what may be desired as normal 

(prima facie based on appearance), people 

go ahead to act on it before they question 

what lies beyond mere appearance. For 

instance, disability was for so long 

considered as a curse in some traditional 

African communities because a person with 

a disability looked different from what 

people considered as normal body, without a 

disability 11. It is until recently that in some 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018; 10 (1): 6-10 

 

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communities, people understand disability to 

be a genetic condition. But without a deeper 

understanding (facts about the condition), 

one of the ways people tried to explain the 

differences in appearance, has been to 

appeal to myths or beliefs. In any case, this 

should also explain why PA(s) are 

maltreated based on their appearance, as 

different from other human beings 

especially in predominantly black 

communities 11. This is because in such 

communities, people take a category of 

“normal” skin for a person to be “black.” 

However, since albinism, as Imafidon 

shows, is regarded as “otherness” in African 

communities, it would be helpful to look 

beyond the notion of normality, and uncover 

something deep that comes with it. To 

understand albinism in this latter context, it 

would help to refer to African ontology. 

Polycarp Ikuenobe and Placide Tempels 

have provided a picture of African ontology 

where African ontology is understood as 

holistic. Reality is taken to be a “continuum 

and a harmonious composite of various 

elements and forces” 14. However, with this 

continuum is the natural and the 

supernatural. Understood from Tempels, 

perspective, common to both the natural and 

supernatural is possession of life force 15. 

Life force is the essential to the 

understanding of being. For Tempels, being 

is considered as force and force is likewise 

considered as being. Meaning to say that, 

what people see as the interactions of 

different of beings, can be understood as the 

interaction of different forces 15. 

Furthermore, there is a hierarchy of being or 

what can be called the hierarchy of forces. 

Thus, there are degrees of life force where 

the possession of life force is different from 

one being to another, with God at the top of 

the hierarchy possessing a great amount of 

life force and decreasing as one goes down 

the hierarchy- spirit beings or deities, human 

beings, non-human animals, plants, and at 

the very bottom are inanimate objects 14,15. I 

will not go into details on these insights, but 

what is presented is enough to ground my 

discussion below. Nonetheless, what the 

hierarchy shows is that the natural and 

supernatural are part of the same reality. 

Another important point to consider is that 

“reality and the human place in it, always 

seeks to maintain equilibrium or harmony 

among the network of elements and life 

forces” 11,14. Equilibrium here can be 

associated with continued existence. 

Disequilibrium or lack of harmony can be 

associated with threats to existence such as 

“human illness, natural disasters or 

disruption 14. 

A question remains as to how this relates to 

albinism in a human community. It is 

important to note a picture of reality 

presented above as encompassing the natural 

and supernatural accounts for all that is 

believed to exist. However, according to 

Imafidon, there are other entities that are 

excluded. What is excluded is considered as 

a threat to the balance reality seeks to 

maintain for its continued survival 11. One 

way to understand Imafidon’s point is to 

state that “exclusion” here does not mean 

that it is not an entity or something that can 

be described as part of reality possessing life 

force, instead it only means that it is a threat 

to harmony. Hence people seek to eliminate 

it from their understanding of what reality is 

since it is taken to oppose the purpose of 

reality, by bringing about disharmony. 

Community members perform certain 

actions to maintain balance or harmony to 

deal with what they perceive as a threat. 

According to Imafidon, any human 

community would want to protect itself 

from extinction, and this makes it 

discriminate or isolate what threatens its 

existence 11. In most communities, 

“otherness” is considered as a threat. This is 

because it does not fit with the established 

standards or status quo underlying a 



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particular understanding of harmony 

(whatever that is). In most African 

communities, albinism as “otherness” is 

taken as that which threatens or bring about 

disharmony. In this group, one also finds 

twins or triplets, witches and wizards, 

sorcerers, and the morally bankrupt 11. As a 

threat, common actions facing the groups 

just listed include banishment or being 

exiled, discrimination by being denied 

certain services and getting killed 11. 

The range of actions I have just listed 

including being called de-humanizing 

names, more especially among PA(s) can all 

be considered as violations of their dignity. 

They are not respected as human beings 

with a dignity. Some beliefs about albinism 

illustrate this point. For instance, the first 

time I heard one of the beliefs people hold 

about PA(s) in Malawi, was that they do not 

die but vanish or disappear. This means that 

they are not buried and one cannot find a 

corpse of a PA. There are various moral 

implications of this belief which I will 

explain below. Nonetheless, I will ignore the 

various practices associated with treatment 

of corpses that portray the kind of respect 

given to a person. Instead, I will take a 

different angle looking at what this means 

with regard to human nature. A related but 

somewhat different point is the belief that a 

baby with albinism is a ghost. It is believed 

to be a ghost of dead person who has now 

returned in the form of a PA, “white baby”. 

The vernacular name for “white person” is 

“mzungu,” which means “Caucasian” in 

Chichewa language. Some parents caution 

their children not to look at babies with 

albinism because doing so would make the 

child disappear. Sometimes parents of 

children with albinism are banished from the 

community 16. In some instances, a pregnant 

woman is told to spit after looking at a PA. 

Failure to do so would lead to giving birth to 

a child with albinism 17. In any case, there 

are conflicting views regarding the color of 

the skin. A child with albinism is called a 

ghost because of whiteness, yet on the other 

hand (probably associated with a history of 

colonialism), “whiteness,” is associated with 

admiration, a very interesting and disturbing 

point. Most people tend to associate a white 

person with certain privileges or high status 

in a society 17. In most rural areas of 

Malawi, people see a white person as having 

a better or higher social-economic status, 

and yet the same name given to PA(s) seems 

not to have a positive impression. This is 

partly because “whiteness” in PA comes 

within the context of a predominantly black 

community and more especially being born 

from both black parents, hence creating all 

different beliefs around it, as a way to 

explain how this possible. Furthermore, 

other beliefs some people hold about PA(s) 

have much to do with suing them for 

instrumental purposes. For instance, there 

are those who believe that having sex with a 

PA would cure HIV/AIDS 17. Similarly, 

some people believe that PA(s) bones are 

believed to be important in money-making 

rituals 18. This has been the belief that has 

perpetuated much of the harm done to them 

in Malawi. As a result, some PA(s) have had 

their limbs mutilated, graves of PA(s) 

exhumed to get bones, and worst of all, they 

are killed for their bones.  

The question remains as to what to make of 

these beliefs in relation to a previous 

discussion of otherness. One part of the 

response is that these beliefs are motivated 

by differences in appearance and also reveal 

maltreatment of PA(s). However, I think 

there is something underlying the beliefs in 

relation to otherness. Otherness here seems 

to be more than being a mere phenotypical 

distinction. One way of cashing out this 

idea, as Imafidon does, is that the myths 

point to an implicitly perceived ontological 

difference 11. In other words, the beliefs 

illustrate the idea that PA(s) are taken to be 

ontologically different from other human 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018; 10 (1): 6-10 

 

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beings. For instance, calling PA(s) “ghosts” 

indicates that they are ontologically different 

from human beings. This is because if one 

locates ghosts within African ontology, 

ghosts are not in the same realm as human 

beings. Ghosts are believed to be spirits, 

hence they are found within the supernatural 

realm, just like ancestors. But unlike 

ancestors the idea of ghost in most 

communities has negative connotations. 

People venerate ancestors by offering 

sacrifices, but they tend to fear ghosts 

because they are associated with harm and 

they have various means (whatever these 

may be) of dealing with them. 

Furthermore, the belief that PA(s) vanish 

says something concerning beliefs about 

their nature, considered different from that 

of a human being, based on events a human 

being experience. The two major events are 

the time of birth and death. In the African 

context, these events are significant and are 

followed by certain rituals 4. A belief that 

PA(s) vanish eliminates the idea of natural 

death (as opposed to being killed). However, 

it is not clear at what point in their life they 

vanish, whether when a person is about to 

die or at a certain age. In any case, if a 

human being is associated with birth and 

death, then the absence of death may lead to 

belief that a PA is not human. In addition, 

the belief that PA(s) are a means to making 

money and cure to HIV/AIDS points to the 

kind of treatment they receive. This means 

that they are a means to further some end. In 

communities where poverty is a major issue 

as well as the lack of a cure for HIV/AIDS, 

it means that PA(s) live in fear. Fear that 

comes from seeing themselves as a potential 

murder or rape victim, they are likely to be 

killed for their bones or raped as a cure for 

HIV/AIDS. The latter behavior can be cited 

as a cause for the spread of HIV/AIDS 

among PA(s). Nonetheless, the belief that 

they are a mere means to some end, points 

to the attitude that PA(s) are taken to be at a 

level lower than that of a fellow human 

being (with a dignity) to which this belief is 

not ascribed. This means they are perceived 

to be at a level, like an instrument or object 

that can be merely used in a similar way (to 

make money or as a cure) to which the 

concept human being may not apply. 

A further point to consider now is how all 

this relates to Metz’s idea of community in 

terms of shared identity and good will which 

is the framework of this paper. As pointed 

out, shared identity implies a sense of “we.” 

If the “we” is a group of human beings, and 

a PA is the “other,” it follows that the 

“other” being ontologically different is not 

part of the “we.” Secondly, part of being the 

“we,” is not just saying one is a member of 

the group, but that the group should 

recognize you as its member. A PA may 

consider oneself to be a human being (with 

dignity), but fellow human beings, as 

understood from the beliefs explored above, 

seem not to recognize a PA as a human 

being. Furthermore, according to Metz, part 

of sharing an identity, is sharing ends or 

goals and working together to achieve them. 

But to treat a PA as a non-human and a 

means to make money with their bones, 

shows a lack of shared ends. Thus, there is 

failure to recognize that PA(s) are human 

beings who share the same ends with other 

humans. Instead, they are seen as a means to 

some further end, money. This means that 

they (PA and non-PA) are not working 

together to achieve the same end (say 

promoting each other’s humanity or 

dignity), since they do not share the same 

end. Therefore, there is lack of shared 

identity with the PA(s). 

A similar approach of showing lack of 

shared identity with PA(s) can be applied to 

showing lack of good will or solidarity. 

Earlier on, I argued that a community deals 

with threats to preserve its own existence 

and survival. In other words, the community 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018; 10 (1): 6-10 

 

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aims at preserving harmony for its own 

survival 11. Albinism as an “other” and 

identified as a threat, it is a threat to the 

harmony of the community. Therefore, 

certain actions may follow to preserve or 

promote this harmony. Such actions are 

considered or may be justified as morally 

right. According to Metz, “an action is right 

just insofar as it produces harmony and 

reduces discord; an act is wrong to the 

extent that it fails to develop community” 2. 

It follows then that, if PA(s) are regarded as 

a threat to the harmony of the community, 

actions toward PA(s) are likely to be 

justified as morally right. In other words, 

maltreatment of PA(s) may find justification 

within the context of a community in the 

name of promoting of harmony 11. For 

instance, a community that sees a baby with 

albinism as a ghost (where ghosts are 

considered dangerous), such a community 

will have no problem killing such a child or 

banishing the parents and their child. 

Banishment or killing of PA(s) may be 

justified as morally right by the community. 

As previously cited, good will (and dignity) 

involves wishing others well, helping them 

become successful, feeling good that they 

are benefiting, feeling bad about them being 

harmed and seeing that they are worthy of 

help 1. Actions such as treating PA(s) as a 

mere means to getting rich by selling their 

bones or using the bones in money making 

rituals, as a mere means to cure HIV/AIDS, 

taking them to be ghosts, and every other 

belief cited, not only do they show lack of 

identity, they also show a lack of good will 

(and dignity). There is failure to recognize 

PA(s) as human beings who need help such 

as protection. Instead of seeing a PA to be in 

need of help from the community, some 

members of the community kill the PA. 

Thus, PA(s) find themselves helpless 

because the people who are meant to protect 

and promote their wellbeing are the very 

same people who are a threat. This is also 

reflected in actions of dehumanizing the 

child with albinism as a ghost or chasing the 

parents away from a society. This denies the 

child an environment for growth or 

resources required for her development 

which are found in the community and at the 

same time, parents suffer a punishment for 

something they did not have a choice. The 

PA(s) in general, are seen as not worthy of 

help for their own benefit or success in life. 

Hence, they are mistreated and such actions 

are a reflection of lack of solidarity. 

Furthermore, part of lack of solidarity is 

failure to feel bad about the harm done to 

PA(s). For instance, mutilating their limbs to 

get the bones or killing them is a failure to 

feel bad about the harm done to them. Even 

when one would argue that people do feel 

bad about harm, it just means that those 

causing harm put their interests (money or 

curing HIV/AIDS) above the interest of a 

PA (more importantly, his or her life). This 

implies that PA(s) dignity is taken to be 

comparable to money, making it a mere 

price that can be replaced with anything, an 

idea I find disturbing when it comes to how 

people think or understand dignity as shown 

in section one where dignity is something 

incomparable. 

To sum up, I have shown why PA(s) are 

killed and beliefs that perpetuate this kind of 

violence. I have also shown how the beliefs 

reflect lack of shared identity and good will 

for PA(s). I have shown that lack of shared 

identity comes with seeing PA(s) as the 

“other.” As an “other,” they are taken to be a 

threat to the harmony of the community. As 

a threat, people feel obliged to take action to 

eliminate it, and such actions are justified as 

morally right. Actions are taken may include 

banishment, murder, or mutilation of their 

limbs. These actions also reflect a lack of 

solidarity. Part of explaining lack of 

solidarity is also that they are considered as 

a mere means to some further end. All these 

are an indication of failure to see PA(s) as 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018; 10 (1): 6-10 

 

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worth of help and failure to feel bad about 

the harm done to them. Therefore, lack of 

shared identity and good will as defining 

features of a community, is failure to respect 

PA(s) capacity for community, a violation of 

their dignity. 

III 

There is alternative worry in relation to the 

arguments presented. It would be helpful to 

consider it in this section. It is possible for 

one to argue that people in the community 

always speak of PA(s) as human beings and 

not as non-human beings as some of my 

arguments suggested. Thus, when they call 

PA(s) names, it does not mean that they take 

them to be non-humans; rather they are just 

making fun of them, just as people call each 

other nick names.  Furthermore, this could 

be shown in the way people in the 

community interact with PA(s), that they 

interact with them in ways they do with 

anyone else, and different from the way they 

interact with non-human animals. However, 

there is a way to respond to this objection. It 

is true that PA(s) are called several names 

just like people call each other nicknames. 

However, it does not end there; people go on 

to act in accordance with the ascribed name. 

For instance, calling a PA a “ghost” does not 

stop at the level of utterance; people start 

acting in accordance with what they believe 

about the name, “ghost”, as shown in the 

paper. Thus, there is an attitude and belief 

that comes with the name ascribed to PA(s). 

Furthermore, arguing that people in a 

community interact with PA(s) in a way that 

they interact with anyone else is not the 

whole story. Thus, there are indeed those 

who see PA(s) as human beings but still use 

them as a means to making money, which 

involves killing them. However, this is 

where the problem lies. Such an action 

reflects a failure to treat a PA as a human 

being with a dignity and value. This is 

placing a price or replacing their dignity 

with something else. But the dignity of a 

human being (ceteris paribus) is 

irreplaceable. Therefore, even if one would 

interact with a PA as a human being, such 

an attitude is negated if that person is 

willing to kill them by not respecting PA(s) 

dignity and value as human beings.  

From the above discussion, there is a 

problem that is worth considering. I have 

alluded to the view that there is a sense in 

which PA(s) are perceived as human beings 

but actions of people rendered towards 

PA(s) seem to negate it, not as fully human. 

Therefore, it might be useful to think about 

how people manage to hold contradictory 

beliefs or exhibit contradictory attitudes. 

That is, as I say, many people do sometimes 

treat PAs as human beings, just everyone 

else who is not a PA, and at the same time 

also view them as not fully human. One way 

of responding to this view is to say that this 

is strictly speaking a psychological issue. 

This a quick supposition I would offer, but it 

would be more interesting to offer a helpful 

response. Therefore, one way of thinking 

about it is that it is possible for people to 

hold these inconsistent beliefs but they seem 

to be resolved in different ways. I will only 

focus on one, where a person undermines 

one of the beliefs 19. Thus, if there are two 

inconsistent beliefs, one chooses to 

undermine either of the two. Therefore,one 

way of resolving the problem of inconsistent 

beliefs about PA(s) is by undermining the 

belief that PA(s) are human beings with a 

dignity. This belief may be undermined by a 

belief in taking one’s interest as more 

important than a PA’s life. Here, the ends 

(benefits) for which people kill PA(s) are 

considered as of primary interests to their 

life. Thus, the benefit one gets from killing a 

PA is more important that the life of a PA 

itself. Hence it is easy to understand why 

even though PA(s) are human beings with a 

dignity and ought not to be killed, they are 

still killed. It is the undermining of the belief 



Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018; 10 (1): 6-10 

 

10 

 

that they are humans with a dignity, that 

makes such actions allowable.  

In conclusion, I have argued that Metz 

conception of dignity can help us explain 

why PA(s) are killed. Metz takes dignity to 

be the capacity for community. He defines 

community in terms of shared identity and 

good will. I was working under the 

assumption that PA(s) are human beings 

with dignity and therefore ought not to be 

killed. But PA(s) are killed in a community. 

To explain why they are killed, I argued that 

they are not taken to be human beings 

capable of being in a community. I argued 

that there is lack of shared identity and 

good-will when it comes to PA(s). This lack 

or failure shows failure to respect their 

capacity for community, hence a violation of 

their dignity.  I supported this point by citing 

several beliefs to do with albinism in 

Malawi. 

 

References 

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Author contribution: Author conceive the idea, 

done literature review and wrote the manuscript and 

check the manuscript meticulously.  

Conflict of interest: The author declares no conflict 

of interest. 

 


