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  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
6 

 
On the Interests of Non-human Animals in Traditional Yorùbá Culture: A 
Critique of Ọ̀ rúnmìlà  

 
Ofuasia, Emmanuel 
Doctoral Fellow, Department of Philosophy, 
Lagos State University, 
Lagos, Nigeria. 
Email: ofuasia.emma@yahoo.com 
 
Abstract: Traditional Yorùbá culture admits the hegemonic locus that humans rank above all 
else on the planet. The outlook received decisive ratification several millennia ago in one of the 
Odùs of their Ifá Corpus. Specifically, in Odù Ògúndá Otura, one of the numerous chapters of 
the Ifá Corpus, Ọ̀rúnmìlà, the founder and primordial deity of Ifá discloses his authorization, the 
use of non-human animals for sacrifice and other human ends interminably. In this study, we 
engage the Ifá chapter that upholds this outlook. We riposte that the age long supercilious 
perspective among the Yorùbá that humans rank higher and over non-human animals, as 
documented in the said Odù is no longer tenable on biological and moral-legal grounds. If the 
biological and moral-legal thrusts are not invalid, what framework is plausible when the 
interest(s) of non-human animals clash with the interest(s) of Ifá tradition and Yorùbá culture? 
On what basis will it be appropriate to jettison the interest(s) of the one for the interest(s) of the 
other? In the light of these posers, we employ Kai Horsthemke’s ethical individualism as the 
suitable groundwork that considers the interest of animals recommended for sacrifice in Ifá 
obeisance. 
 
Keywords: Ifá, Non-Human Animals, Ọ̀rúnmìlà, Biological Sciences, Moral Philosophy. 
 
Introduction: It is interesting to begin with 
the truth that moral discourse(s) centered on 
the status of non-human animals, regardless 
of situation and place will sometimes, 
divulge “…the conflict between the interests 
of animals and people’s interests in 
culture.”1 Incidentally, this inquiry attempts 
to unravel the conflict between the Yorùbá 
interest in Ifá propriety and tradition on the 
one hand and the interests of non-human 
animals in same culture on the other hand. 
The conflict or contradiction between these 
two spheres of understanding should not be 

perceived as a sign of failure. In other words 
when “in formal logic, contradiction is the 
signal of a defeat: but in the evolution of 
real knowledge it marks the first step in 
progress towards a victory.”2 When Ifá is 
consulted and animal sacrifice is 
recommended this is seen by the Yorùbá to 
be normal and in tune with the tradition and 
customs of the land. However, this interest 
in culture is now confronted by 
developments and advancements in the 
academia that non-human animals too have 
“interests that should not be cavalierly 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
7 

 
frustrated.”3 A contradiction therefore 
ensues: Oughtn’t we sacrifice the interest of 
the one for the other? On what grounds can 
the people’s interests in culture be sustained 
in the face of the conflict with the interests 
of non-human animals? Are we to let it pass 
and place the one arbitrarily over the other? 
In this regard, Alfred N. Whitehead 
instructs: “We should wait: but we should 
not wait passively, or in despair. The clash is 
a sign that there are wider truths and finer 
perspectives within which a reconciliation of 
a deeper religion and a more subtle science 
will be found.”4 This is the core of this 
inquiry. 
 
In what follows, an effort will be made to 
argue that the justification for the killing of 
non-human animals in Ifá and other variants 
of Òrìṣà propriety founders on biological 
and moral-legal bases. For the fulfillment of 
its objective, the study has five parts, 
including this introduction. In the 
succeeding part, the case for the justification 
of non-human animals for human use and 
their surbordination to human beings as 
validated by Ọ̀rúnmìlà in Odù Ògúndá 
Otura (one of the chapters of the Ifá corpus) 
is uncovered. But before this, an attempt 
will be made to provide an introductory but 
terse analysis of what Ifá connotes and does 
not. In the third section, the biological and 
moral-legal arguments that render Odù 
Ògúndá Otura antediluvian are 
comprehensively disclosed. In the fourth 
part, we propose a plausible framework to 
unknot the quagmire between the Yorùbá 
interest in Ifá tradition and status of non-
human animals that had been deemed as 

nothing but entities fit only for human ends. 
The fifth part concludes this intellectual 
drudgery. 
Ifá and Ọrúnmìlà: The Justification for 
the Killing of Non-Human Animals for 
Human Ends: It is imperious to state from 
the outset that attempts to give a univocal 
definition to Ifá have not yielded results. 
There are as much understanding of the 
concept as there are scholars and 
practitioners of Ifá. For E.M. Lijadu, Ifá is 
“the word of divination which issues from 
the mouth of Ọrúnmìlà.”5 In a related 
development, William Bascom puts that “the 
word Ifá is used to mean both the system of 
divination and the deity who controls it; and 
this deity is known also as Ọrúnmìlà.”6 
Similarly, Nicholaj De Mattos Frisvold who 
is a practicing babaláwo appends:  

“Ifá is a philosophy, a theogony, 
theology and cosmology rooted in a 
particular metaphysic that concerns itself 
with the real and ideal, the world and its 
beginning. It is rooted in the constitution of 
man the purpose of life and naure of fate. Ifá 
is a philosophy of character. The philosophy 
of Ifá lies at the root of any religious cult 
organization involving the veneration of 
Òrìṣà.7  
From the Frisvold’s position, it seems the 
portrayal of Ifá as a philosophy of character 
has been the notable attitude advocated by 
many babaláwo (i.e. male Ifá practitioner) 
and ìyanifá (i.e. female Ifá practitioner). 
Hence, it does not come as a surprise that 
even Nicholaj De Mattos Frisvold, being a 
babaláwo is not excluded from the trend. 
And this idea that Ifá passes muster as a 
philosophy of character is one of the 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
8 

 
fundamental truths embedded in some of the 
verses in Odù Ogbè-Yọ̀ nú (another Ifá 

chapter) which is rendered in the English 
thus: 

Nothing comes from getting angry 
Patience is the father of character 

An elder who has patience has everything. 
 This is why divination was casted for orí, and for character (ìwà) 

It is only cultivating character that is hard
There is not one bad ori in Ilé-Ifẹ 

 
It is a consequence of the foregoing Odù (a 
term for Ifá chapter) and similar ones that 
may have inspired Fayemi Ademola 
Kazeem to assess the ethico-sociological 
interpretation of Ifá as a paragon for 
building positive character and human 
personality in contemporary times.8 Hence, 
the perception that Ifá is a philosophy of 
character is not misplaced.  
 
However, another crucial issue that needs to 
be addressed is the tendency to “use of Ifá 
and Ọ̀rúnmìlà”9 to mean one and the same. 
For this reason, it is important to expatiate 
and expound further to see if we can deduce 
why this is the case. According to Kola 
Abimbola:  

“Ifá, who lived for hundreds of 
years, and visited many parts of the world, 
bequeathed the Ifá divination system to 
humanity. Another name of Ifá is Ọrúnmìlà. 
The word Ifá however, is used to refer to the 
Orisa (divinity) himself, his instruments of 
divination as well his system of divination 
and literature. The name Ọ̀rúnmìlà refers 
solely to the divinity himself… Ifá priests 
and priestesses were counselors, physicians, 
historians and philosophers of ancient 
Yorùbá land.”10  

 
In this study, we shall admit and employ the 
perspective that Ifá includes a body of 
ancient, oral, Yorùbá poetic literature with 
metaphysical significance. But we are not 
the first to entertain this position. Several 
years ago, Ola Longe who endorses this 
locus chronicled that Ifá “…was originated 
and codified by Ọrúnmìlà, who lived in Ìlé-
Ìfè,̣ several centuries ago.”11  Ìlé-Ìfè,̣ in 
present day Osun State, Nigeria is the cradle 
of Yorùbá civilization.   
 
The Ifá corpus constitutes the storehouse of 
Yorùbá thought system. It is the ground of 
validation for Yorùbá cultural practices and 
social cohesion. Ifá corpus contains accounts 
of Yorùbá cosmology, of the founding of 
major Yorùbá towns and the relationship of 
deities with humans.12 Though records of 
Yorùbá lived experiences are found in Ifá, 
the corpus is not static. As a body of 
intellectual material, Ifá is simultaneously 
conservative and dynamic. Accounts 
recorded in Ifá chapters (Odù), provide us 
with explanations for certain practices in 
Yorùbá land. Ifá may be described as the 
compendium of Yorùbá life and practices. 
Ifá is composed of sixteen major chapters 
(Odù) and two hundred and forty 
derivatives, giving a total of two hundred 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
9 

 
and fifty-six chapters.13 And people consult 
these Odùs for diverse reasons. 
 
But mainly, the reason why people consult 
Ifá is based on the assumption that the 
answers to what they seek can be provided 
by the divinity. Hence, it needs no 
elaboration that: “When people consult Ifá, 
they do so because they are convinced that 
Ifá has answers and that knowing those 
answers will enable them to solve, or at least 
make sense of, the problem or the 
circumstances that have led them to the 
babaláwo’s door.”14  
 
One point to note is that for whatever the 
problem may be, solutions range within the 
recommendation to change behavior, make 
new life choices, make fruit 
offerings/rituals, and in most cases, use non-
human animals for rituals. However, the use 
of non-human animals is indispensable 
especially during initiation into Ifá and other 
cults. We arrive at the boiling point!  
 
The use of non-human animals for sacrifice 
was clearly articulated by Áwo Fáladé 
Òsúntólá in these words:  

“But there’s more to animal sacrifice 
than actively recharging an Orisa’s cosmic 
ase-battery. Animal sacrifice also nourishes 
us with the meat thereby completing the 
cycle and affirming our connection to our 
earthly and heavenly egbe (community). 
Sacrificing an animal nourishes the spirits 
(with blood) and the community (with meat) 
thereby indexing the powerful link between 
humanity and the Orisa as they are both 
nourished by a single ritual process. 

Offerings of fruit, amidu, and even drinks all 
recharge our Orisa’s ase but they perform 
this task slowly and with coolness. Blood 
sacrifice, on the other hand, recharges an 
Orisa quickly and with heat.”15  
 
The foregoing is a clear indication that 
animal sacrifice is a crucial aspect in Ifá 
tradition. Awó Fáladé Òsúntólá maintains 
that unless animal sacrifice is performed for 
initiation, such an initiation is not authentic. 
In his words:  

“It is – in part – the intensity and 
“heat” produced from animal sacrifice that 
makes animal sacrifice mandatory in all 
Orisa and Ifa initiations. Simply put, if you 
were initiated without the act of animal 
sacrifice your Orisa was not fully birthed 
and by now your Orisa has dissolved back to 
the earth from which it came. Blood is not 
just symbolic of “birthing,” the intensity of 
blood sacrifice also has a practical purpose – 
it charges – or electrifies – the struggling ase 
of a newly incarnated Orisa so that it may 
endure on earth.”16  
 
The above thrusts endorse the outlook that 
the use of non-human animals for food and 
sacrifice is commonplace not only in Ifá 
initiations but other cult initiations among 
the traditional Yorùbá. However, it needs to 
be asked: is there any endorsement in the Ifá 
corpus for animal sacrifice? In this regard, 
Odù Ògúndá Otura, which is replete with a 
justification for the use of animals for 
sacrifice and surbordination of animals to 
humans, by Ọ̀rúnmìlà will now be explored. 
A fair rendition in the English Language is 
simplified thus: 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
10 

 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà said: “It is a matter of running 
helter-skelter” 

Ifá says “It is a matter of being troubled” 

The children of the rat were running helter-
skelter 

They were troubled 
I asked why they were running helter-skelter and troubled 
The children of the rat said: “It was because of children” 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà asked them: “would you be my devotee?” 
“What are we asking for?”  The rat answered 
“What is baba akeyo (the great teacher) saying” 
But Ọ̀rúnmìlà declared that the children of the rat may reproduce 
They divined and provided solutions to the children of the rat 
The children of the rat started having children

Two points are imperative for the 
embellishment of the main thrust of Ògúndá 
Otura, in the fore rendered Ifá chapter. 
Firstly, by using the phrase ‘children of the 
rat’, one is tempted to counter that if the rat 
already has children why it be troubled? But 
hermeneutically speaking, the phrase is 
merely representative of the rat species.  
 
The second point relates to the antecedent 
factors that informed the interchange. 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà had come from the celestial realm, 
touring all the terrestrial species, when they 
were having challenges. In each of the 
places he toured, he discerned serious 
travails. He therefore asked what their 
problems were. The first place, which was 
the house of the rat (cited above), Ọ̀rúnmìlà 
learned that the problem was due to lack of 
children. Ọ̀rúnmìlà demanded the rat species 
be devoted to him, to which they showed 
reluctance. In order words, the rats were not 
ready to lose anything in exchange for the 
good things they wanted from Olódùmarè, 
(the Higher God/Supreme Diety) through 
Ọrúnmìlà. This is evident in their question: 
“What is baba akeyo (the great teacher) 

saying?” The rat species was pondering over 
the lack of tandem between being devoted to 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà on the one hand and the present 
agony and dilemma of childlessness, on the 
other hand. 
 
Nevertheless, Ọ̀rúnmìlà declared that they 
have children and it was so. Ọ̀rúnmìlà 
repeated the same feat in the house of the 
fish, and all other animals until he 
encountered Homo sapiens. Ọ̀rúnmìlà asked 
them the same question. Meanwhile humans 
benefitted from the advice of Èsù, another 
primordial divinity (that is, òrìṣà in 
traditional Yorùbá theology) who had 
secretly told them to affirm devotion toward 
Ọrúnmìlà. In addition, Ọ̀rúnmìlà granted 
them too, the ability to multiply.  
 
Sixteen years later, Ọ̀rúnmìlà returned to 
check if they were doing well. One after the 
other he visited he abode of each animal 
species. He entered the house of the rat. The 
multitude of children did not even know 
him. They did not remember it was he who 
made it possible for them to multiply. They 
were even spitting at him. The same 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
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happened in the house of the fish, and other 
animals. The birds even defecated on him. 
However, when Ọ̀rúnmìlà approached the 
house of humans, they recognized him from 
afar, ushered him in to be offered drinks and 
food. They provided him a place to sleep 
and he dwelt with them. 
 
Consequently, Ọ̀rúnmìlà who had hitherto 
been offended by the actions of the children 
of rat, fish, and other animals, prayed for 
humans and decreed that all those who 
revolted against humans shall henceforth be 
used as the exchange, substitute, buy back 
(i.e. ìrarí) for the problems that manifest in 
human lives. In his pronouncement 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà harps: “They will be ìrarí that is, 
‘a buy-back’ for you and your children till 
eternity.” This is the final verdict in Odù 
Ògúndá Otura which both debunks the 
vantage that non-human animals and 
humans are partners and fellow occupants of 
the planet. Secondly, it simultaneously 
serves as a thrust for their use as food and 
sacrifice, a perspective upheld by Áwo 
Fáladé Òsúntólá in a foregoing excerpt. 
Undoubtedly, Odù Ògúndá Otura contains 
the instance where humans conceded and 
accepted this hegemony. Being the devotee 
of Ọrúnmìlà, they chorused thus: 

What then would be the buy-
back of a devotee? 
The children of the rat are 
the buy-back of a devotee 
The children of the rat 
What then would be the buy-
back of the devotee? 
The children of the fish are 
the buy-back of the devotee 

The children of the fish 
What then would be the buy-
back of the devotee? 
The children of the bird are 
the buy-back of a devotee 
The children of the bird 
What then would be the buy-
back of a devotee? 
The children of animals are 
the buy-back of a devotee 
The children of animals 

 
One does not need too much intellectual 
willpower to detect that Odù Ògúndá Otura 
endorses the use of non-human animals for 
rituals and sacrifice toward the amendment 
of human absurdities. Another point that 
must be amplified is that each of the species 
of fish, rat, and bird has significance that is 
not rendered explicit in the passage but 
demands a hermeneutic interpretation. Odù 
Ògúndá Otura justifies the use of all 
animals that creep on land (symbolized by 
the rat species) for food and sacrifice. It 
endorses the use of all animals that fly 
(symbolized by bird species) for food and 
sacrifice. It also admits all animals that 
reside in water (symbolized by the fish 
species) for food and sacrifice. All these are 
calculated by the Odù to validate the locus 
that non-human animals are not perceived as 
beings with interests that must not be 
frustrated or sacrificed needlessly for human 
ends. This also contradicts the proposal that 
“the Yoruba recognize that animals have 
their own emotions, and that their pains are 
worthy of care consideration but not equal 
consideration with humans…”17 Clearly, the 
fore Odù sees animals as fit for human end 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
12 

 
as Immanuel Kant18 will come to admit 
several centuries later. Now that it has been 
established how non-human animals are 
used both as food and for rituals by Ifá 
injunction, it is now pertinent to examine the 
moral-legal and biological implications of 
Odù Ògúndá Otura. 
 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà and the Status of Non-Human 
Animals: Exposing the Biological and 
Moral-Legal Limitations: Ọrúnmìlà’s 
sanction that non-human animals are ìrarí 
that is, ‘a buy-back’ for human problems for 
eternity, lacks moral cum legal justification 
on the one hand, but also vitiates the 
realities and truths about emergence and 
hierarchy of life as hold by the Biological 
Sciences on the other hand. But before 
exploring these perspectives, it is vital to 
reveal that the traditional Yorùbá had for 
several hundred years held an outlook that 
several philosophers in the academic history 
of the West will later admit. Aristotle, 
Immanuel Kant, St. Augustine for instance 
concluded as Ọ̀rúnmìlà did that the 
existence of other lives on the planet is 
sorely for the utility of humans. Whereas 
renowned and erudite persona such as Peter 
Singer19; Tom Regan20; Joel Feinberg21; 
Arthur Caplan22 and recently Rainer Ebert23 
have shown the slips why such position is no 
longer sustainable, it is important to 
therefore revise Odù Ògúndá Otura too for a 
finer perspective. The revision of 
Ọrúnmìlà’s injunction on non-human 
animals in traditional Yorùbá philosophy is 
imperative because “in this respect, the old 
phraseology is at variance with the 
psychology of modern civilizations. This 

change in psychology is largely due to 
science, and is one of the chief ways in 
which the advance of science has weakened 
the hold of the old religious forms of 
expression.”24  
 
With the foregoing preliminary statements, 
we now state in clear terms, our counter-
arguments against the justification in Odù 
Ògúndá Otura. From the Biological 
parlance, we glean that non-human animals 
can live fairly well without humans but the 
converse of this proposition cannot hold. In 
a related development, modern biology has 
also offered that non-human animals are the 
progenitors of humans through the process 
of evolution by natural selection.25 These 
revelations though implied in the Yorùbá 
creation story are usually depreciated even 
when they are crucial for revising 
Ọrúnmìlà’s sanction in Odù Ògúndá Otura. 
Let us explore the creation story to justify 
the biological locus that non-human animals 
can live even without humans, the converse 
being impossible. 
 
According to an oral tradition, Olódùmarè 
the Supreme Deity in Yorùbá belief, resided 
in heaven, and below was a watery surface. 
He then sent his right hand man, Ọbàtálá the 
god of purity or morality with a snail shell 
(or a napkin in other accounts) filled with 
loose earth, a hen (some traditions say it is a 
rooster) and a pigeon.26 While this attests to 
events before the advent of humans on the 
planet, it is clear that non-human animals do 
not depend on humans rather humans 
depend on not only them but also other 
biotic and abiotic factors. For instance, the 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
13 

 
same tradition buttresses further that 
Ọbàtálá poured out the sand while the hen 
and the pigeon spread it with their claws on 
the watery surface so that land appeared. A 
chameleon was then sent to inspect the work 
and it brought back a report to Olódùmarè 
that the earth was wide enough, Ilé-Ifẹ or the 
place of spreading.27 The place where this 
took place thus became known as Ilé-Ifẹ (or 
Ifẹ), which is for the Yorùbá, centre of 
creation from where humans, began their 
dispersal. Later, Obàtálá was sent back with 
Ọrúnmìlà, another òrìsà, to equip the earth.  
 
This creation story serves the biological 
evidence that before humans, there was non-
human animal life on the planet. The story 
reveals the role played by non-human 
animals in the creation of a world that will 
soon be occupied by humans. Are we 
morally justified to admit non-human 
animals as nothing more than entities fit for 
human ends? Are we justified to treat with 
disdain, entities that assisted in the creation 
of the world? As provoking as the posers 
are, it needs to be stated that traditional 
Yorùbá theogony has some semblances with 
the one from some religious traditions of the 
world like Judaism, Christianity and Islam.28 
By placing humans the last in the order of 
creation, as chronicled in their sacred texts 
the semblance needs no expatiation. This 
necessarily implies that all other things that 
will sustain humans (non-human animals 
inclusive) were in place. But even as these 
stories inform the belief and attitude of the 
Yorùbá, it lacks scientific basis. It is 
therefore important to engage with the 
scientific basis for our claim that: “non-

human animals can live even without 
humans, the converse being impossible.” 
 
Development and research in biology from 
the time of Charles Darwin attest that non-
human animals have been living millions of 
years before the emergence of Homo sapiens 
and served as the medium of the 
preservation and transmission of favourable 
variations leading to the Homo grade.29 This 
is in line with evolution’s perspective that 
“…the organism does not live for itself. Its 
primary function is not even to reproduce 
other organism; it reproduces genes, and it 
serves as their temporary carrier.”30 Edward 
Wilson’s claim is more imposing when we 
recall, biologically speaking that the 
emergence of organisms was around 3.8 
billion years ago whereas the evolution of 
the genus Homo, was not observed not until 
about 2.5 million years ago.31 While 
presenting his fact that Homo sapiens must 
have evolved from pre-existing animals, 
Israeli erudite personae Yuval Noah Harari 
chronicles: 

“Homo sapiens, too, belong to a 
family. This banal fact used to be one of 
history’s most closely guarded secrets. 
Homo sapiens long preferred to view itself 
as set apart from animals, an orphan bereft 
of family, lacking siblings or cousins, and 
most importantly, without parents. But that’s 
just not the case. Like it or not, we are 
members of a large and particularly noisy 
family called the great apes. Our closest 
living relatives include chimpanzees, 
gorillas and orangutans. The chimpanzees 
are the closest. Just 6 million years ago, a 
single female ape had two daughters. One 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
14 

 
became the ancestor of all chimpanzees, the 
other is our own grandmother.”32 

However, for the purpose of this study, it is 
important to elucidate that all modern day 
non-human animals and humans evolved 
from common ancestors instead of the 
erroneous and accentuated tendency to 
tinker that humans evolved from apes and 
monkeys. This distinction is crucial as 
Nanda and Worms attest: 

“Saying that humans evolved from 
gorillas or chimpanzees suggest that humans 
are more evolved than these animals. 
However, no creature can be any more 
evolved than another. We can only imagine 
that we are more evolved if we believe that 
intellect or ability to alter the environment is 
the most important criterion of evolution. 
However, that is an extremely human-
centered way of looking at biology. We 
could as easily say that producing the 
greatest number of related species or the 
greatest number of individuals is the best 
measure of evolution. If we were to take 
these criteria seriously, it would be clear that 
insects are far more ‘evolved’ than 
humans.”33 

This human-centered way of looking at 
biology is redolent in Odù Ògúndá Otura. 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà’s injunction that non-human 
animals are fit only for human ends alone 
impresses that they exist simply for the sake 
of humanity. Immanuel Kant will later share 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà’s anthropocentric perspective too 
when he brings in the notion of 
consciousness to the discursive fray. For 
Kant, “so far as animals are concerned, we 

have no direct duties. Animals are not self-
conscious and they are merely as a means to 
an end. That end is man.”34 But this outlook 
that non-human animals lack consciousness 
is no longer valid. In 2012, a group of 
renowned scientists proclaimed through The 
Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness 
that: 

“[c]onvergent evidence indicates that 
non-human animals have the 
neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and 
neurophysiological substrates of conscious 
states along with the capacity to exhibit 
intentional behaviors. Consequently, the 
weight of evidence indicates that humans are 
not unique in possessing the neurological 
substrates that generate consciousness. Non-
human animals, including all mammals and 
birds, and many other creatures, including 
octopuses, also possess these neurological 
substrates.”35 

What is suggestive of the foregoing is that 
we cannot dismiss non-human animals as 
entities without consciousness fit for human 
ends. Regardless of the status quo, Rainer 
Ebert suggests that “…with a reasonable 
degree of certainty…at least mammals and 
birds have the capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness. On my view, that makes 
relevantly normal, developed members of 
these taxonomic classes intrinsically 
valuable subjects of experience whom it is 
no less seriously wrong to kill as it is to kill 
you or me, other things being equal.”36  
 
With these findings, it is appropriate to 
ascertain that there will be no buy-back in 
Ifá propriety if non-human animals cease to 


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15 

 
exist or become extinct through poaching 
and/or use for sacrifice as validated by 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà. Incidentally, it had been 
documented that “the extinction rate of 
species ranges from approximately 1,000 to 
10,000 times higher than natural extinction 
rates.”37 Elsewhere we glean: “…if this 
trend continues, as many as 2 million 
species of plants and animals will be 
exterminated worldwide by the middle of 
the next century.”38 So is it not the case that 
for the interest in Ifá culture to be sustained, 
the interest in continuous existence of 
animals can be compromised? Is it not the 
case that if the interest of the former is 
pursued it will adversely affect the latter? 
Given this reality, what is to be done? We 
consider the other arm of the limit before 
engaging with a plausible framework. 
 
In showing the limit of Odù Ògúndá Otura 
from the moral-legal angle, we commence 
with the role played by Èsù to strengthen the 
anthropocentric ties redolent in the Odù. 
One must not wish away the corpulent role 
of informant played by Èsù that humans 
concede to be devoted toward Ọ̀rúnmìlà. 
The species of the rat, fish and bird did not 
have the benefit of this information. This is 
played out in the innocence latent in the 
poser by the rat species: “What is baba 
akeyo (the great teacher) saying?” The rats 
obviously did not see the connection 
between the seemingly irrelevant request to 
become a devotee on the one hand and the 
burning challenge of childlessness on the 
other hand. The anthropocentric outlook of 
the Odù is exhibited given that only humans 
had prior knowledge to concede devotion to 

Ọ̀rúnmìlà but not any other non-human 
animal. 
 
Firstly, it is the conviction of this research 
that no moral agent should be held 
responsible eternally because of an action 
borne out of ignorance or lack of adequate 
or prior information. The species of the rat, 
fish and bird, have been unfairly treated, 
given their lack of prior information which 
informed their reluctance to be devoted to 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà. The scene where Ọ̀rúnmìlà was 
angered because the rat species failed to 
recognize him and where the bird species 
defecated on him, though aimed to justifying 
the inferiority of non-human animals to 
humans is very weak one. We hypothesize 
that had they been given a similar ‘help’ by 
Èsù, perhaps they would not have behaved 
so unruly to upset Ọ̀rúnmìlà. 
 
Furthermore, the species of animals that 
encountered Ọ̀rúnmìlà’s wrath no longer 
exist. Is it not morally blameworthy to 
bestow on a later generation the sins or 
misdeeds of their ancestors? The injunction 
of Ọ̀rúnmìlà is a direct affront to the Yorùbá 
maxim: Iká t’obá ṣe l’ọ̀ ba ń ge (It is only the 
offender that is punished by the authority). 
This brings us to the discourse on the 
proportionality between crime and 
punishment. Adebayo Aina has successfully 
demonstrated that the Western traditional 
punitive theories cannot handle the 
proportionality factor. He labours to show 
that traditional Yorùbá perspective takes 
cognizance of this lacuna. In his words: 

The Yorùbá belief is that it is he who 
commits a crime that should be sanctioned. 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
16 

 
And, whoever commits a crime cannot 
escape no matter how long he hides. This 
strictly provokes the judicious imposition of 
punishment on criminal as a means of 
establishing responsibility for human 
conduct without any extraneous inclination.  
Even, after the criminal admits his 
wrongdoing and is punished for that he 
remains in the memories of the people as a 
wrongdoer.39  

In a similar fashion, David Hume had 
tinkered on the proportionality factor in 
crime and punishment when he pens: 
“punishment, according to our conceptions, 
should bear some proportion to the offence. 
Why then eternal punishment for the 
temporary offences of so frail a creature as 
man?”40 Even when David Hume was 
preoccupied with diminishing the possibility 
of life before or after physical death, his 
bearing on punishment may still be used for 
the purpose of this study. It is therefore a 
grave moral and legal oversight for 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà, not to have taken proportionality 
seriously before his injunction. His oversight 
is a direct erosion of the respectable, holistic 
and comprehensive Yorùbá culture which is 
in the words of Oladele Abiodun Balogun: 

“…a composition of knowledge, 
beliefs, art, moral, religion, customs, 
politics, technology, law and other living 
capabilities acquired by the individual as an 
indigenous member of the Yoruba race. As 
with other aspects of the culture, the legal 
arm is undoubtedly important to the 
dynamism and vitality of the Yoruba culture 
as a whole.”41 

In this section, the biological and moral-
legal limitations of Ọ̀rúnmìlà have been 
revealed. However, we are still faced with a 
crucial issue – Peoples’ interest in culture 
will make them consult Ifá. And when 
divination recommends animal sacrifice, it 
must be observed. The interest in the 
existence of non-human animals is also 
crucial as the perspective that they are of no 
more worth other than for human ends is 
now a weak thesis. It is therefore important 
to patent a framework for this clash. This is 
hub of the next section. 
 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà and the Status of Non-Human 
Animals: Why Ethical Individualism 
Matters: What is ethical individualism? 
How does it assist toward a truce when the 
interest in culture clashes with the interests 
of non-human animals? How does ethical 
individualism initiate an improved rendition 
or revision of Ọ̀rúnmìlà in Ògúndá Otura? 
These three questions will be the focus in 
the remainder of this study. 
 
The main thrust of ethical individualism is 
to evince “who counts morally, why and 
how.”42 In the words of the foremost 
proponent of this outlook, Kai Horsthemke, 
we glean that “ethical individualism is 
stimulated by the idea of a copiously 
branching network in which individuals 
interact and coexist and cooperate with other 
forms of life.”43 We discern right away that 
this theory takes cognizance of all forms of 
life. It is the case that there may be levels of 
gradation from simple to complex among 
these individual forms of life, ethical 
individualism however upholds that “these 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
17 

 
individuals resemble one another and differ 
from one another in multitudinous ways 
with the characteristics associated with one 
variety typically overlapping those 
associated with another variety.”44 The main 
thrust of ethical individualism has to do with 
the unique identity and characterization of 
each organism but not the genus or species 
that they are commonly subsumed. To make 
this point clear, a little bit of elaboration is 
pertinent. 
 
Ethical individualism does not discriminate 
organisms on the grounds of belonging to 
the class of mammals, reptiles or aves. This 
taxonomy, it needs to be mentioned, is a 
derivation of human intellectual willpower. 
Ethical individualism is focused principally 
on each unique and distinct organism. Kai 
Horsthemke makes this amplification more 
obvious:  

“Ethical individualism is a view that 
is sensitive to particular characteristics and 
to the complex pattern of similarities and 
differences that exist between individuals, a 
complex web of identity, similarity and 
diversity. What matters, on this view, is the 
individual characteristics of organisms, and 
not the classes within which these organisms 
are commonly subsumed.”45 

If ethical individualism contends that each 
organism be accorded recognition outside 
their taxonomy, then equality enters the 
discursive fray. Ethical individualism holds 
that the idea of equality does not necessarily 
imply ‘identity’ in treatment and 
consideration but that it is compatible with 
the idea of diversity in treatment and 

consideration.46 It acknowledges that the 
(conceptual) distinction between ‘moral 
agent’ and ‘moral recipient’ may be morally 
significant and may be the basis for 
sanctioning differential treatment and 
consideration. Ethical individualism denies 
that morally relevant differences between 
agents and recipients are exclusively or 
primarily relevant to the question of moral 
status. It denies also that these differences 
sanction unequal treatment and 
consideration.47 Given the fact in the 
outlook that individuals are similar in 
several ways and also different in diverse 
ways, this does not make one organism more 
or less a being with higher interest over the 
other. In the attempt to see how non-human 
animals can benefit from this intellectual 
approach, from the framework of ethical 
individualism, it is important to make a 
distinction between basic and non-basic 
rights. This distinction was developed by 
Kai Horsthemke wherein he insists: 

“All morally considerable 
individuals have the same basic rights, 
although their non-basic rights may differ. 
Second, basic rights are “basic” in the sense 
of being “irreducible” or “underived”. That 
is, they are not reducible to or based on 
duties, obligations, responsibilities etc., as 
they would be in duty-based theories—
insofar as these theories permit talk of 
rights. Basic rights generate duties, 
responsibilities, non-rights, and indeed other 
rights. These rights, then, will be “non-
basic”, in the sense of being “derived”, or 
dependent on basic rights. They are 
instances of “core rights”. Non-basic or 
derivative rights, it should be noted, are not 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
18 

 
generated by or derived from duties, 
obligations, responsibilities or non-rights. 
There exists an intimate relationship 
between non-basic rights and all of these but 
it is not one of direct derivation.”48 

This intimate relation must not be seen from 
the anthropocentric perspective. There is 
therefore no synchrony between the basic 
and non-basic rights of non-human animals 
when their lives are cut short for human 
ends interminably as endorsed by Ifá 
tradition. Unfortunately, for non-human 
animals, “it matters only that they are not 
made to suffer and that their lives are not cut 
short for reasons that have very little, if 
anything, to do with them, their own well-
being and interests.”49 This truth is even 
made more appalling by the inference that 
“as far as animals are concerned, we are not 
different races and different cultures. We are 
one race; one culture; one oppressor; one 
bully; one killer.”50  
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the 
distinction between the killer and the killed 
is now vague. This is the inner kernel of 
ethical individualism. So, what happens 
when the interests of Ifá ‘devotees’ clash 
with the interests of non-human animals? 
We deduce from ethical individualism that 
the sacrifice made by the devotee using 
animals is an injury against life and 
everything that it represents. This is owing 
to the understanding in ethical individualism 
that all organisms even when they exhibit 
similarities and variations are unique in their 
own distinct way. Hence, the life of a human 
on this view is equal to the life of a tilapia. 

However, for these ‘non-devotees’ of 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà – we are fellow occupants of the 
planet, “…one culture; one oppressor; one 
bully; one killer.”51 It is precisely for this 
reason that ethical individualism cautions 
and demands for a revision of the verdict or 
injunction in Odù Ògúndá Otura as it is no 
longer tenable in contemporaneous times. 
 
We have been able to establish that for non-
human animals, they are as unique as 
humans albeit with a lower gradation but 
this does not vitiate their equality and basic 
rights. We also recognize that sacrifice in Ifá 
propriety when recommended by divination 
must be observed. However, a pivot 
achievement of ethical individualism is the 
repudiation of the anthropocentric and 
hegemonic outlook in Ògúndá Otura. It 
cautions and counters the outlook that non-
human animals exist merely as ìrarí (i.e. buy 
back) for human challenges. With ethical 
individualism, we may then demand that 
“the state or animal rights groups might 
negotiate with members of a culture, say, to 
integrate stunning into their slaughter 
practice, so that, while there would still be 
animal killing, suffering would at least be 
minimized.”52  
 
Another course of action could be to bring to 
the knowledge of humans, (or shall we say 
‘devotees’?) the archaic outlook in Ògúndá 
Otura, and then start exploring other aspects 
of sacrifice that will reduce the shedding of 
blood of non-human animals. It is clear that 
an easy resolution will still be far off. One 
can only start negotiating because of the 
difficulty in transgressing established 


  Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2018;9 (2):6-21 

 
19 

 
traditions and the gradual awareness that 
non-human animals too are beings with 
“interests that should not be cavalierly 
frustrated.”53 It is the strain in arriving at an 
outright resolution that informed Thaddeus 
Metz’s conviction that his “aim is not so 
much to resolve the conflict between our 
duties to animals and our rights to culture, 
but rather to understand it, precisely as one 
that is extremely hard to resolve for 
involving comparably strong considerations 
that, despite their common moral 
foundation, pull in different directions.”54  

 
Conclusion: The entirety of this intellectual 
graft seems to have attained two agenda. 
First, it disinters that the injunction by 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà in Ògúndá Otura that non-human 
animals are for human end simplicter, is no 
longer tenable in the light of revelations 
from Biology and Moral Philosophy. 
Indeed, it needs no elaboration that “the old 
phraseology is at variance with the 
psychology of modern civilizations.”55 
Furthermore, we already showed that 
Ọ̀rúnmìlà’s injunction lacks biological, 
moral, logical and legal thrusts. Secondly, 
this study has also attempted to provide a 
context for resolution in ethical 
individualism that takes cognizance of 
peoples’ interests in culture as well as the 
interests of non-human animals. It therefore 
calls for negotiation when the interest of the 
one intersects with the interest of the other, 
pending when the consciousness and 
awareness that non-human animals are 
nothing but ìrarí (buy back) gradually 
becomes a widespread and accentuated 
perception among Ifá adherents. 

 
Author Contribution: The idea that 
evolved into this research was ‘prehended’ 
and codified by the author. 
 
Conflict of Interest: There is no conflict of 
interest. 
 
Acknowledgements: I wish to acknowledge 
the thought-provoking comments provided 
for the initial draft of this research by 
Ademola Kazeem Fayemi (Ph.D.), 
Department of Philosophy, University of 
Lagos, Nigeria. Without the colossal time 
and effort provided by ‘Booda Kaso,’ this 
essay will not have evolved into the present 
state. I am eternally grateful sir! In addition, 
the effort and constructive criticisms from 
Professor Helen Lauer, Department of 
Philosophy, University of Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania were very helpful toward the 
evolution of the initial draft of this essay to 
its present state. 
 
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1Thaddeus Metz. “Duties Toward Animals versus 

Rights to Culture: An African Approach to the 
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2Alfred N. Whitehead. Science and the Modern 
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3Arthur L. Caplan. “Beastly Conduct: Ethical Issues 
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4Op. Cit., Whitehead., p. 184 
5E.M. Lijadu. Ifá, Imole Re Ti Ise Ipinle Isin Ni Ile 

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6William R. Bascom. Ifá Divination: Communication 
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7Nicholaj M. Frisvold. Ifá: A Forest of Mystery. 
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8Kazeem D. Fayemi. “Human Personality and the 
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9Oladele O. Balogun & Kazeem D. Fayemi. “The 
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10Kola Abimbola. Yorùbá Culture: A Philosophical 
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11Ola Longe.  Ifá Divination and Computer Science: 
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12Bolaji Idowu. Olódùmarè: God in Yorùbá Belief. 
(London: Longmans 1962) 

13See Daniel O. Epega. Iwe Ifá ati Itumo Ala. (Lagos: 
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Abimbola. Ijinle Ohun Enu Ifá. (Ibadan: Oxford 
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14Olufemi Taiwo. “Ifá: An Account of a Divination 
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15Áwo Fáladé Òsúntólá. “Is Animal Sacrifice 
Important.” 2013. Available at 
http://iyaifagbemi.blogspot.com.ng/2013/03/is-
animal-sacrifice-important.html?m=1. Accessed 
on 12 January, 2018 

16Ibid 
17Ebun Oduwole & Kazeem Ademola Fayemi. 

“Animal Rights vs. Animal Care Ethics: 
Interrogating the Relationship to Non-Human 
Animals in Yoruba Culture.” In J. Chimakonam 
(Ed). African Philosophy and Environmental 
Conservation. (London: Routledge 2018), p. 77 

18Immanuel Kant. Lectures on Ethics. (New York: 
Harper & Row. 1963) 

19Peter Singer. Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for 
Our Treatment of Animals. (New York: Avon 
Books 1975); Peter Singer. “Not for Humans 
Alone: The Place of Nonhumans in 
Environmental Issues”. ETHICS: Thought and 
Practice. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.1985)  

20Tom Regan. The Case for Animal Rights. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press 2004) 

21Joel Feinberg. “The Rights of Animals and Unborn 
Generations.” ETHICS: Thought and Practice. 
(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1985) 

22Arthur L. Caplan. “Beastly Conduct: Ethical Issues 
in Animal Experimentation.” The Ethical 
Dimensions of the Biological Science. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995) 

23Rainer Ebert. The Wrongness of Killing. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis. Rice University. 2016 

24Op. Cit., Whitehead, p. 191 
25Charles L. Darwin. On the Origin of Species by 

means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation 
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26See Op. Cit., Idowu, pp. 18-21; O. Awolalu. Yoruba 
Beliefs and Sacrificial Rites. (Essex: Longman 
1979) 

27Funmi Olojede. “The Exodus and Identity 
Formation in View of the Yoruba Origin and 
Migration Narratives.” Scriptura. 2011, 108 
p.343 

28See Genesis 1: 28 and Al-Qur’an 2:47. 
29Edward O. Wilson. Sociobiology: The Abridged 

Edition. (London: Belknap Press 1998), p. 3 
30Ibid., p. 3 
31Yuval N. Harari. Sapiens: A Brief History of 

Humankind. (Canada: Random House 2014), p. 
7 

32Ibid., p. 11 
33S. Nanda & R.L. Warms. Cultural Anthropology. 

(California: Wadsworth 2010), p. 7 
34Op. Cit., Kant, p. 239 
35The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness 

(Cambridge, July 7, 2012) Available at 
http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclara
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2018.  

36Op Cit., Ebert, p. 212 
37R.S. Keller & O.E. Wilson. The Biophilia 

Hypothesis. (Washington: Island Press 1993) 
38S.L. Pimm, G.J. Russell, J.L. Gittleman, T.M. 

Brooks. “The Future of Biodiversity.” Science. 
1995 (269) pp. 347-50. 

39Aina A. Adebayo. “Crime, Punishment and the 
Proportionality Factor in Contemporary Society: 
The Yorùbá Experience.” Philosophia Africana. 
2016 18 (1) p. 16 

40David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding. Edited and with an introduction 
by Peter Millican (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 2007), p. 149 


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21 

 
41Oladele O. Balogun. “A Philosophical Defense of 
Punishment in Traditional African Legal 
Culture: The Yoruba Example.” Africology: The 
Journal of Pan African Studies. 2009 3(3) p. 44 

42Kai Horsthemke. “Animals and the Challenges of 
Ethnocentrism.” In L. Cordeiro-Rodrigues & L. 
Mitchell (eds.). Animals, Race and 
Multiculturalism. (London: Palgrave Macmillan 
2017) 

43Ibid., p. 141 
44Ibid., p. 141 
45Ibid., 141 
46Ibid., p. 142 
47Ibid., p. 143 
48Kai Horthemske. The Moral Status and Rights of 

Animals. (Pinegowrie: Porcupine Press 2010) 
49Op Cit., Horthemske 2017, p. 142 
50G. Francione. “The Abolitionist Approach to 

Animal Rights.” Available at 
https://www.facebook.com/abolitionistapproach/
posts/530170923669333 Retrieved on 2nd  
April, 2018 

51Ibid 
52F. Zuolo. “The Priority of Suffering Over Life: 

How to Accommodate Animal Welfare and 
Religious Slaughter.” The Ethics Forum. 2014 
(9), p. 180 

53Op Cit., Caplan, p. 183 
 
54Op Cit., Metz, p. 292 
 
55Op Cit., Whitehead, p. 191