




































BANGLADESH JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 10(5) (2025), 12-19 

12 

        MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
          BJMSR VOL 10 NO 5 (2025) P-ISSN 2687-850X E-ISSN 2687-8518 

         Available online at https://www.cribfb.com 

     Journal homepage: https://www.cribfb.com/journal/index.php/BJMSR 

                                                                                                                                                                                                    Published by CRIBFB, USA 
                                                                                                                                     

THE STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY OF LOCAL STRONGMEN IN 

THE DEFEAT OF INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES: A 

QUALITATIVE STUDY                                                                    
 

 Lubis (a)    Budi Setiyono (b)1  Kushandajani (c)   Nur Hidayat Sardini (d)   
 

(a) Research Scholar, Department of Social Studies, Diponegoro University, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Semarang, Indonesia; E-

mail: lubis.vharoso@gmail.com 
(b) Assistant Professor, Department of Social Studies, Diponegoro University, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Semarang, Indonesia; E-

mail: budisetiyono@lecturer.undip.ac.id   
(c) Assistant Professor, Department of Social Studies, Diponegoro University, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Semarang, Indonesia; E-

mail: ningkisworo123@gmail.com 
(d) Assistant Professor, Department of Social Studies, Diponegoro University, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Semarang, Indonesia; E-

mail: nhsardini@yahoo.com 

 

 
A R T I C L E I N F O 

 
 

Article History: 
 

Received: 6th March 2025 

Reviewed & Revised: 6th March 2025 

to 12th August 2025 

Accepted: 20th August 2025 

Published: 24th August 2025 

 
Keywords: 

 

Local Strongman, Independent Candidate,  

Political Power, Local Democracy, Power 

Strategies 

 
JEL Classification Codes: 

 

      D72 
 

      Peer-Review Model:  

 

      External peer review was done through  

      double-blind method 

        

 
A B S T R A C T      

 

The phenomenon of local strongmen is an integral part of understanding the dynamics of power and 

politics in peripheral regions such as Sumbawa, West Nusa Tenggara. Although the direct regional head 

election system has opened up broader opportunities for political participation, the dominance of local 

power often constrains the emergence of democratic alternatives. Independent candidates face various 

administrative and financial obstacles, as well as political pressure from deeply rooted local power 

networks. This study aims to examine the power strategies employed by Zulkieflimansyah, a prominent 

local figure in Sumbawa, in strategically utilizing formal and informal power to defeat independent 

candidates. This study used a qualitative case study approach with data collected through in-depth 

interviews with eleven purposively selected informants, including political actors, community leaders, 

and campaign team members.  The findings show that the influence of local strongmen extends across 

various sectors, including politics, education, local government, and customary systems. This influence 

is exercised through control over strategic resources, dominance of formal authority, and the systematic 

expansion of social and economic networks that enable long-term consolidation of power and 

suppression of political alternatives. The study finds that strategic political positions and strong social 

ties are key factors in delegitimizing and defeating independent candidates. These strategies strengthen 

local strongmen’s dominance within vertical and horizontal power structures, limiting fair political 

competition. Regulatory reform, resource transparency, and civic political education are needed to 

counter this dominance. 

 
 

© 2025 by the authors. Licensee CRIBFB, USA. This open-access article is distributed under the 
terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0).  

            

       

INTRODUCTION 

Regional head elections (Pilkada) are one of the important instruments in the democratization process at the local level. 

Ideally, Pilkada provides space for the emergence of alternative candidates, including the available independent candidates 

without the support of political parties. However, the reality of local politics reveals that independent candidates often face 

complex structural challenges, which become an integral part of the dominance of complex local power networks. In the 

global context, the defeat of independent candidates is not only happening in Indonesia but also in various countries, 

including both developed and developing nations. One important finding comes from the Congress of Local and Regional 

Authorities of the Council of Europe, which revealed that strict administrative and legal requirements often limit the 

nomination, campaigning, and media access for independent candidates. These restrictions not only reduce political 

pluralism but are also susceptible to manipulation to silence opposition to the ruling power. Onerous administrative 

requirements, high political costs, and the strong grip of elites and political parties become systemic mechanisms that 

indirectly exclude genuine independent candidates from equal political competition (Dinarto & Ng, 2021). The political 

system, which is generally unfavorable to independent candidates, tends to privilege those with elite affiliations, enabling 

                                                      
1Corresponding author: ORCID ID: 0000-0001-8988-0304 
© 2025 by the authors. Hosting by CRIBFB. Peer review is the responsibility of CRIBFB, USA.  

https://doi.org/10.46281/4kz2g758 

 
To cite this article: Lubis, Setiyono, B. ., Kushandajani, & Sardini, N. H. (2025). THE STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY OF LOCAL STRONGMEN IN 

THE DEFEAT OF INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES: A QUALITATIVE STUDY. Bangladesh Journal of Multidisciplinary Scientific Research, 10(5), 

12-19. https://doi.org/10.46281/4kz2g758 

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
https://www.openaccess.nl/en
https://doi.org/10.46281/4kz2g758
https://orcid.org/0009-0009-1475-7286
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8988-0304
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3854-6765
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9599-5001


Lubis et al., Bangladesh Journal of Multidisciplinary Scientific Research 10(5) (2025), 12-19

 

13 

only well-connected people to remain viable contenders. This is reflected in the Makassar regional election case, where 

dynastic politics and legal intervention became tools of political exclusion  (Yakub et al., 2022). The withdrawal of 

numerous independent candidates, largely due to heavy administrative and financial burdens, underscores the influential 

role of entrenched local power networks in obstructing the emergence of democratic alternatives at the local level (Dinarto 

& Ng, 2021). Methodologically, this research adopts a qualitative approach with purposive selection of informants based 

on their relevance and experience. Data were collected through in-depth interviews and were analyzed thematically using 

the local strongman theory as the analytical framework.  

The political dynamics of local strongmen behind the defeat of independent candidates in regional elections occur 

in various regions of Indonesia, including the peripheral area of Sumbawa, where organized power forms political, 

economic, and social networks that make it difficult for independent candidates to compete fairly. The 2020 Sumbawa 

regional election, where independent candidates experienced defeat not solely due to weak electoral support, but more 

because of the strong power dominance strategically and structurally executed by the authorities. Various research findings 

indicate that incumbents in the Indonesian regional elections do not merely serve as current public officials, but often act as 

local strongmen who have significant control over the political power at the regional level. According to Binns (2020), this 

phenomenon is referred to as "incumbents with attitude," meaning incumbents who not only exploit their positions but also 

build and consolidate power through bureaucracy, political parties, and extensive informal social networks. In line with the 

findings of other studies, it shows that in many cases, incumbents practice clientelism by directly distributing patronage to 

citizens, making them dominant actors outside the party structure. Post-reform regional heads are the "new local rulers" who 

rely on state resources, control over institutions, and patron-client relationships to maintain power. (Berenschot, 2020) In 

this framework, the incumbent not only acts as an election candidate but also as a central actor playing a strategic and 

structured role in eliminating political rivals, particularly independent candidates (Feber & Christover, 2021) Thus, based 

on these findings, it can be concluded that in the context of local politics in Indonesia, incumbents often transform into local 

strongmen. These strong figures dominate the regional political arena through centralized power, patronage networks, and 

extensive social and cultural influence. What distinguishes this research from previous studies, marking its novelty, is the 

use of the local strongman theory to explore the role of local strongmen in defeating independent candidates. In addition, 

the focus of the research is on the peripheral regions of Indonesia. Whereas previously, research has focused chiefly on the 

central government in presidential elections. This study aims to explore how local strongmen in the peripheral areas, such 

as Sumbawa, strategically and systematically suppress independent candidates in local elections. 

This article is organized to provide a clear and logical flow for readers. The first section presents the conceptual 

and theoretical framework on local strongmen, which underpins the analysis in this study. The methodology section follows, 

detailing the research approach and data collection methods employed. The findings section explores how local strongmen 

build and utilize their power and strategies to undermine independent candidates in local elections. The final section 

concludes with a summary of key findings and offers reflections and recommendations for strengthening democratic 

practices at the local level.  

 

LITERATURE REVIEW 

The defeat of independent candidates in local elections is a multidimensional phenomenon shaped by complex socio-

political and economic dynamics. Understanding this phenomenon requires examining institutional barriers, elite 

domination, and clientelism practices in peripheral regions. Independent candidates, who lack support from dominant 

political parties or elite patronage, often encounter administrative obstacles, limited access to resources, and systemic 

exclusion from political networks (Kamugisha & Swai, 2024; Gomes, 2022; Leonard Hijino, 2021). Clientelism and political 

cartelization are central themes in explaining the marginalization of independent candidates. Pierskalla and Sacks (2020) 

argue that clientelistic recruitment, especially in public service appointments, weakens meritocracy and favors those 

embedded in elite networks. Similarly, Berenschot (2020) emphasizes that local elites consolidate power through patron-

client ties, using state resources to reward loyalty and exclude challengers. This pattern has been reinforced in post-

decentralization Indonesia, where political competition is often personalized and rooted in informal structures (Fionna & 

Tomsa, 2020).  

 Dinarto and  Ng (2021) identify that institutional requirements for candidacy, such as high support thresholds and 

bureaucratic hurdles, serve as legal mechanisms to restrict non-party contenders. Furthermore, Muhtadi (2024) outlines how 

cartel politics privileges elite-backed candidates, creating structural constraints for outsiders. In this system, political parties 

often function as gatekeepers, discouraging the emergence of alternative actors. Economic patronage further limits the 

viability of independent candidates. Contractors and business elites fund elite candidates in return for preferential access to 

public contracts (Hidayat et al., 2024). This patronage economy generates an unequal playing field, especially in rural areas 

where economic dependency on elites is more pronounced (Noak, 2024). Entrepreneurs strategically align with dominant 

figures, forming mutually beneficial coalitions that reinforce electoral dominance (Forquesato, 2022). 

Socially, kinship ties and religious affiliations serve as informal but powerful tools of political mobilization. Hicken 

and Tan (2020) and Bullivant and Sadewo (2020) highlight how personal networks enable elites to shape electoral behavior 

and coerce compliance. Social resources, such as access to jobs or aid, are distributed selectively to ensure loyalty (Sabourin, 

2022). Local strongmen operate as predatory brokers, a concept rooted in Sidel’s theory of local bossism  (Brierley & 

Nathan, 2022). These actors consolidate control by capturing formal institutions while leveraging informal networks to 

extend their influence (Casas & Kselman, 2024). They stress the role of intermediaries in mobilizing support through 

clientelist incentives, while Berenschot (2020) notes that violence and intimidation are occasionally deployed to neutralize 

opposition. 



Lubis et al., Bangladesh Journal of Multidisciplinary Scientific Research 10(5) (2025), 12-19

 

14 

Research from Chile (Titelman & Sajuria, 2024) and the Philippines (Aspinall & Hicken, 2022) offers comparative 

insights, showing that party-affiliated elites replicate similar tactics across contexts, suggesting that local political structures 

are embedded in broader authoritarian legacies. Aminuddin and Ramadlan (2022) describe how Indonesian regional politics 

is characterized by elite continuity and the institutionalization of clientelistic power, even after democratic reforms. Thus, 

the literature converges on the idea that the defeat of independent candidates is not solely due to voter preferences but is 

systematically engineered through elite domination of political, economic, and social resources. Independent candidates are 

disadvantaged in all three domains identified by Weber’s theory: economic capital, social prestige, and political authority 

(Higashĳima & Washida, 2024). The purpose of this study is to analyze how Zulkieflimansyah, a dominant local political 

figure in Sumbawa, utilizes formal and informal mechanisms of power to sustain political hegemony and obstruct the 

candidacy of independent challengers. 

 

MATERIALS AND METHODS 

Design  

This study employed a qualitative research design using a case study approach to explore the defeat of independent 

candidates in the 2020 Sumbawa local election. The case study method was chosen to allow an in-depth understanding of 

the role and strategy of local strongmen in shaping political outcomes in peripheral regions (Nugroho, 2020)  

 

Theoretical Framework 

This research employed the perspective of the defeat of independent candidates (Independent Candidate) by adopting the 

theory of Local Strongman and the theory of Local Bossism (Kristono, 2024; Handoko et al., 2020). These frameworks 

emphasize power consolidation through formal and informal institutions using dimensions such as power resources, 

incentives, social sanctions, and power accomplices. Local strongmen are informal actors who control a specific territory 

through social, economic, and political networks to maintain dominance and influence the community.  

 

Data Collection and Sources 

Primary data were obtained through in-depth semi-structured interviews with 11 purposively selected informants. The 

selection criteria included individuals with direct experience or insight into the 2020 regional elections in Sumbawa. 

Informants in this study were selected purposively based on specific selection criteria, such as experience, role, and 

relevance to the research topic, to ensure the data collected were rich, contextual, and meaningful (Creswell, 2023). 

Informants included independent candidates, members of political parties, campaign teams, local journalists, civil society 

actors, and academics. Interview questions focused on the mechanisms of power used to weaken independent candidates, 

such as access to resources, coercive strategies, and social networks. All interviews followed an ethical protocol with 

informed consent and anonymity guaranteed. The interview guidelines were adapted from (Creswell, 2023), and interviews 

lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, recorded and transcribed verbatim for analysis. 

 

Sampling Method 

A purposive sampling technique was used to identify informants with critical knowledge of the election dynamics. The 

informants were selected based on their position, experience, and involvement in local political processes. The sample size 

was considered sufficient as data saturation was achieved after 11 interviews. 

 

Data Validation and Triangulation 

To ensure credibility and trustworthiness, data triangulation was applied by comparing interview data across different types 

of informants (e.g., politicians, media, civil society). Researcher reflexivity, member checking, and peer debriefing were 

also conducted to validate the findings (Creswell, 2023).  

 

Data Analysis 

Data were analyzed using NVivo 12 Pro qualitative analysis software. The process followed three stages: (1) Data 

Reduction, coding, and condensing raw data into meaningful units using inductive and deductive coding based on the 

theoretical framework. (2) Data Display – presenting themes and sub-themes using tables, narrative matrices, and visual 

diagrams (e.g., word cloud, hierarchy charts), (3) Conclusion Drawing and Verification – identifying recurring patterns, 

causal mechanisms, and propositions; verified through researcher discussions and audit trails.  

 

RESULTS 

This study found that Zulkieflimansyah, as a local strongman, exercises power through multiple, interconnected strategies 

that span formal institutions and informal networks. The defeat of independent candidates in the 2020 Sumbawa regional 

election was not merely electoral but structural, orchestrated through deliberate domination of political, social, and economic 

spheres.  

 

Participant Demographic Information 

Table 1. Participant Demographic Information (n=11) 

 
Coding Position Age (Years) Education Length of Service (Years) 

P1 Political Party 48 S2 5 

P2 Independent Candidates 58 S1 2 



Lubis et al., Bangladesh Journal of Multidisciplinary Scientific Research 10(5) (2025), 12-19

 

15 

P3 Independent Candidates 50 S1 2 

P4 Success Team 57 S1 10 

P5 Academics 45 S3 7 

P6 Journalist 42 S1 9 

P7 Academics 46 S2 5 

P8 Member of a Political Party 37 S2 10 

P9 Member of a Political Party 40 S2 10 

P10 Success Team 43 S1 5 

P11 Success Team 55 S1 5 

Source: Primary research data source 

 

Table 1 shows a total of 11 informants participated, including political party members, independent candidates, 

campaign team members, academics, and journalists. Their ages ranged from 37 to 58, with educational backgrounds from 

bachelor's to doctoral degrees and service lengths of 2–10 years. Notably, the independent candidates were among the oldest 

but had the least tenure, reflecting their marginal position in political experience. Conversely, actors from political parties 

and campaign teams had longer experience, underscoring their deeper entrenchment in the local political structure. 

 

Word- Cloud Defeat of Independent Candidates 

 

 
Figure 1. Word cloud of the independent Candidate's defeat, showing the dominance of political and social terms 

Source: Primary research data source 

 

The word cloud analysis (Figure 1) visually captures the thematic dominance of terms such as “politics,” 

“community,” “party,” “regent,” and “candidate.” These terms indicate the centrality of political discourse, with 

"Zulkieflimansyah" specifically appearing as a key node. Terms such as "friend," "family," and "relationship" suggest that 

personal ties are crucial in shaping political dynamics. Words like "bureaucracy," "project," and "contractor" point to the 

economic undercurrents of power, while “manipulative” and “influence” reflect perceptions of coercive or transactional 

politics. 

 

Synthesis of Data: Thema, Sub Thema, and Coding 

Table 2. Synthesis of data: Thema, Sub Thema, and coding 

 
Theme Sub-Theme Coding 

Sources of Power Political Networks Positions, Regional Expansion Figures, Political Figures  
Social Networks Friends, Religious Figures, Relatives, Horse Racing Hobby, Trust  
Economic Networks Entrepreneurs, Contractors, Businesses  
Funding Money 

Power Operatives Direct Actions Violent Actions, Intimidation Actions 

Incentives Economic & Social Incentives Jobs, Material Aid/Assistance 

Social Sanctions Reprimanding Actions Social Sanctions, Reprimands 

Source: Primary research data source 

 

Table 2. The study reveals that local power is constructed through four primary sources: political, social, economic 

networks, and financial resources. Political networks include formal positions and influential figures who occupy strategic 

roles within local government structures. Social networks involve personal relationships such as friends, relatives, religious 

leaders, and community-based groups like horse-racing clubs, all of which cultivate trust and loyalty toward dominant 

actors. Economic networks consist of contractors, entrepreneurs, and business entities that financially support incumbent 



Lubis et al., Bangladesh Journal of Multidisciplinary Scientific Research 10(5) (2025), 12-19

 

16 

candidates, often through covert campaign funding. These networks operate synergistically, enforced by "power 

accomplices" who employ various mechanisms, including direct actions (intimidation, coercion), incentives (job allocation, 

material assistance), and social sanctions (public reprimands, exclusion). This interconnected structure enables the 

systematic exercise of power through the mobilization of resources and social relations, effectively creating a closed and 

exclusive political arena that marginalizes independent candidates.  

 

 
Figure 2. Hierarchy chart illustrating the power structure in the defeat of independent candidates 

Source: Primary research data source 

 

As illustrated in the Hierarchy Chart (Figure 2), the power structure in Sumbawa’s local politics is vertically layered 

yet horizontally expansive, allowing influence to permeate across institutions and communities. Electoral dominance was 

primarily secured through the occupation of strategic positions within political networks, enabling the distribution of favors 

and control over administrative procedures. Social networks, particularly ties with friends and kin, were systematically 

mobilized to build legitimacy and silence opposition. Incentive-based strategies, especially job allocations, emerged as 

powerful tools to secure loyalty and reinforce allegiance. Manipulative practices such as vote buying and bureaucratic 

obstruction became routine and widely accepted. Moreover, sanctions and social reprimands were not simply deterrents but 

operated as deliberate tools of exclusion, fostering a culture of conformity, dependency, and fear that further entrenched the 

power of dominant actors. 

 

Independent Candidate Defeat Project Map 

The Conceptual Project Map (Figure 3) consolidates how political, social, and economic networks form an interlocked 

mechanism of predatory power. Contractors and entrepreneurs channel funds to campaigns in return for future access to 

government contracts, creating economic dependency. Political actors leverage their formal positions to orchestrate 

manipulative strategies—often disguised under the guise of administrative norms. Social actors, including religious leaders 

and family members, act as informal brokers of loyalty and behavior. This ecosystem is held together by a system of rewards 

and punishments that ensures the exclusion of outsiders—especially independent candidates who lack institutional and 

financial backing. 

 
Figure 3. Conceptual project map showing resource flows and predatory power structures 

Source: Primary research data source 



Lubis et al., Bangladesh Journal of Multidisciplinary Scientific Research 10(5) (2025), 12-19

 

17 

DISCUSSIONS 

This study's findings provide strong support for the primary hypothesis that local strongmen structurally orchestrated the 

defeat of independent candidates in Sumbawa's 2020 regional election through interconnected political, economic, and 

social networks. The secondary hypothesis, which posits that these networks operate through coercive, manipulative, and 

clientelistic strategies, was also supported by empirical data drawn from interviews with political actors, candidates, 

journalists, and academics. The dominance of political networks, particularly the occupation of strategic bureaucratic 

positions, emerged as the most influential factor in electoral outcomes. This finding is consistent with Berenschot (2020), 

who highlights the central role of incumbents in Indonesian local politics as "brokers of power" who distribute patronage to 

ensure loyalty. Similarly, Fossati (2025), Noak (2024), and Sari (2024) have noted how local candidates frequently exploit 

state resources to offer personalized benefits, which are often disguised as infrastructure or social welfare projects, in 

exchange for political support. This confirms the entrenchment of clientelism as a normalized feature of political 

mobilization in Indonesia’s periphery (Fajri et al., 2024). 

The influence of economic networks further amplifies the role of patronage in reinforcing power asymmetries. The 

study shows that entrepreneurs and contractors, reliant on access to public procurement channels, campaign funds to 

dominant candidates in exchange for project allocations post-election. This mirrors (Forquesato, 2022; Sabourin, 2022) 

observations in Latin America, where clientelist ties between business elites and political actors distort fair competition. In 

the context of Sumbawa, these relationships create an entrenched system of economic dependency that disadvantages 

candidates lacking such networks. Social networks, including kinship, religious ties, and communal affiliations (e.g., horse-

racing groups), serve as informal mechanisms of control. These findings resonate with (Hicken & Tan, 2020; Bullivant & 

Sadewo, 2020), who emphasize the strategic deployment of personal relationships in shaping voter behavior and loyalty. 

The data suggest that these informal affiliations are not merely symbolic but play a direct role in political exclusion, resource 

distribution, and public recognition. This reinforces previous studies (Jusup et al., 2022; Fionna & Tomsa, 2020; Bullivant 

& Sadewo, 2020) that describe local politics as operating through socially embedded systems of favoritism. 

Crucially, this research demonstrates how the combined effects of these three networks, political, economic, and 

social, form a predatory ecosystem of power maintained by "accomplices of power." These actors use coercion, incentives, 

and social sanctions to delegitimize independent candidates. Max Weber's stratification theory (Higashĳima & Washida, 

2024; Rocha, 2023; Dinarto & Ng, 2021) is especially relevant in this context. Independent candidates, unlike those affiliated 

with dominant parties, suffer from triple disadvantage: lack of economic capital, limited social prestige, and absence of 

institutional power, making them structurally incapable of competing on equal footing. Compared to previous studies, this 

research contributes a novel analytical lens by applying the Local Strongman theory in the specific context of peripheral 

Indonesia, rather than national elections or urban centers. It highlights the continuity of authoritarian legacies in local politics 

and underscores how democratic institutions can be captured by informal, personalized power. Looking forward, this study 

suggests that reforms are urgently needed in three areas: first, the regulation of campaign financing and procurement to 

prevent economic collusion; second, the strengthening of independent institutions to resist political manipulation; and third, 

the promotion of civic education to reduce community dependency on elite figures (Lipcean & Casal Bértoa, 2024). Future 

research should consider comparative studies across other peripheral regions to assess the generalizability of these dynamics 

and examine potential strategies for countering the entrenchment of local political oligarchies. 
 

CONCLUSIONS 

The primary purpose of this study was to investigate how local strongmen in peripheral regions, specifically 

Zulkieflimansyah in Sumbawa, strategically consolidate and exercise power to defeat independent candidates in local 

elections. Using a qualitative case study approach, this research collected data from purposively selected informants to 

uncover the complex interplay of political, economic, and social networks that shape electoral outcomes. The findings reveal 

that the defeat of independent candidates was not simply the result of weak electoral support but stemmed from a structurally 

entrenched system of domination. Local strongmen secured control over strategic political positions, enabling them to 

manipulate bureaucratic processes, distribute patronage, and influence electoral procedures. Social networks, including 

kinship ties, religious affiliations, and community-based organizations, were systematically mobilized to legitimize their 

dominance and suppress opposition. Economic networks comprising contractors, entrepreneurs, and business actors 

provided essential financial backing in exchange for post-election rewards such as procurement contracts. These interlinked 

networks operated in synergy, reinforced by coercive measures, incentive-based strategies, and social sanctions that 

marginalized independent candidates and limited fair political competition. 

This study makes a unique contribution to the literature by applying the Local Strongman theory within the 

underexplored context of Indonesia's peripheral regions, rather than focusing on national or urban-level politics. It deepens 

the understanding of how informal, personalized power can capture and manipulate formal democratic institutions. 

Moreover, it highlights the persistence of authoritarian legacies in local politics, showing how decentralization has not fully 

dismantled entrenched elite control but has instead allowed it to adapt and thrive in new forms. Theoretically, the findings 

reinforce Max Weber's stratification framework by demonstrating how independent candidates face a triple disadvantage, 

lacking economic capital, social prestige, and political authority, making equal competition virtually impossible. From a 

policy and practical perspective, the research underscores the need for targeted reforms to strengthen democratic resilience 

at the local level. These reforms should include stricter regulation of campaign financing, greater transparency in public 

procurement to disrupt clientelist economic networks, and institutional safeguards to prevent political interference in 

bureaucratic appointments. Expanding civic political education is also essential to reduce community dependency on elite 

patronage and foster grassroots democratic participation. 



Lubis et al., Bangladesh Journal of Multidisciplinary Scientific Research 10(5) (2025), 12-19

 

18 

This study has several limitations. The analysis is based on a single case study in Sumbawa, which may limit the 

generalizability of its findings to other contexts. The reliance on interview data introduces the potential for subjective bias, 

although triangulation methods were used to enhance validity. Additionally, the absence of longitudinal data restricts 

insights into how these power structures evolve. Future research should conduct comparative case studies across multiple 

peripheral regions in Indonesia and beyond to test the broader applicability of these findings. Further studies could also 

evaluate the effectiveness of anti-clientelism measures such as participatory budgeting or independent electoral monitoring 

in weakening entrenched local political networks. By broadening the scope and employing diverse methodologies, scholars 

can develop a deeper understanding of, and more effective responses to, the resilience of local strongmen in shaping 

democratic outcomes. 

 
Author Contribution: Conceptualization, L., B.S., K. and N.H.S.; Methodology, L.; Software, L.; Validation, L., B.S., K. and N.H.S.; Formal Analysis, 

L., B.S., K. and N.H.S.; Investigation, L., B.S., K. and N.H.S.; Resources, L.; Data Curation, L.; Writing- Original Draft Preparation, L., B.S., K. and 
N.H.S.; Writing- Review and Editing, L., B.S., K. and N.H.S.; Visualization, L.; Supervision, L.; Project Administration, L.; Funding Acquisition, L., B.S., 

K. and N.H.S. The authors have read and agreed with the published version of the manuscript. 

Institutional Review Board Statement: Ethical review and approval were not required for this study as it does not involve vulnerable groups or sensitive 

issues. 

Funding: This research is funded by the Indonesian Education Scholarship. The Center for Higher Education Funding and Assessment, Ministry of 

Education, Research, and Technology of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Endowment Fund for Education Agency, Ministry of Finance of the Republic 
of Indonesia, for their financial support that enabled the publication of this journal and participation in this international conference. 

Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank the Indonesian Education Scholarship, the Center for Higher Education Funding and Assessment, the 

Ministry of Higher Education, Research, and Technology of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Endowment Fund for Education Agency, Ministry of 
Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, for the funding support that made the publication of this journal and participation in this international conference 

possible. 

Informed Consent Statement: Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study. 
Data Availability Statement: The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available 

due to restrictions.  
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.      

 

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