


































Compliance in International Law- The Role of Legitimacy and Effect on States’ Material Power


 1 

 

 

 

 

The Bellarmine Law Society Review 

Volume XI Issue I                  Article 2 

 

Compliance in International Law: The Role of Legitimacy and Effect on 
States’ Material Power 

Shavonne Farrell 
Boston College Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences, farrelsn@bc.edu 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 
 

 2 

COMPLIANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ROLE OF 
LEGITIMACY AND EFFECT ON STATES’ MATERIAL PWOER 

 
 

 
SHAVONNE FARRELL* 

 

Abstract: Why do some states follow international laws while others do not, and why is this 
generally accepted? To explain variation in state compliance with international law, this Article 
explores under what conditions international legal institutions are most effective. Using a series 
of case studies, this Article examines how two independent variables influence a law’s 
effectiveness: its legitimacy and effect on states’ material power. This Article concludes that 
legitimacy and a positive (or neutral) effect on a state’s material power must be present for 
international legal compliance. If one of these factors is absent, then a state’s compliance is 
unpredictable, rendering the law ineffective as related to its ultimate purpose: increasing 
predictability between distinct states. To evidence its claim that both variables must be present to 
guarantee legal compliance, this Article most critically examines China’s violation of UNCLOS 
in the South China Sea and Japan’s respect for the UN Security Council’s 1994 decision to 
impose sanctions on North Korea. 

 

Introduction 

 In the midst of a global pandemic, cooperation among states has never been of greater 

importance. As of late April 2020, the United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention 

(CDC) reported over three million novel coronavirus cases across over two hundred countries, 

although the real number of cases may be much higher.1 Effectively combating this global threat 

is imperative to decreasing the total number of deaths caused thereby and assisting the global 

economy with bearing the brunt of an impending economic downturn. To fulfill these ends, 

international institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), are helping states 

coordinate mitigation efforts, medical research, and personal protective equipment distribution, 

                                                             
* Shavonne Farrell is a third-year undergraduate student at Boston College pursuing a B.A. in 
International Studies with a concentration in Cooperation & Conflict. She is particularly interested in 
studying international law, human rights, and women’s and gender studies. The author wishes to thank 
her advisor and International Relations professor, Peter Krause, Ph.D., for guiding her through this 
research process, even amidst a global pandemic.  
1 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Coronavirus Disease 2019," Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, last modified April 27, 2020. 



 
 

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especially to those countries most seriously impacted by COVID-19.2 Despite the important 

work that the WHO and other international organizations are doing during this near-

unprecedented crisis, the legitimacy of the WHO, for example, is being threatened by the United 

States and other countries who plan on withdrawing funding to organizations which allegedly 

mishandled the COVID-19 outbreak.3 While it is unclear how this cut in funding will affect the 

WHO, there is no question that this pandemic has raised important questions about the role that 

international institutions play in world order. 

President Donald J. Trump’s repeated attacks on the WHO are not the first instance of 

powerful states questioning international organizations; in fact it is a continuation of the realist 

legal and institutional worldview that became prominent after the 1948 publication of Hans 

Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. In this book, Morgenthau argues that international 

institutions and laws are not effective because of their inability to be enforced, an issue that has 

plagued legal institutions for years, from the League of Nations to the United Nations’ 

Conference on the Law of the Sea.4 Nevertheless, the difficulty of legal enforcement on the 

international stage does not make them, as some might argue, completely useless. As in the case 

of the WHO and COVID-19, international institutions are beneficial because they help states 

coordinate policy, thus increasing transparency and trust; however, these institutions and laws 

are most effective when they are recognized and adhered to by as many states as possible.  

To increase a law’s propensity to be followed, this Article examines under what 

conditions international legal institutions are most effective, beginning with a discussion of the 

existing literature regarding the (in)effectiveness of international laws. Afterwards, this Article 

compares the Geneva Protocol banning chemical weapons, the League of Nations, the United 

Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and Japan’s 1994 decision to follow the 

UN Security Council’s imposition of sanctions on North Korea.  

Although these are all different types of international legal institutions, they are not all 

widely followed: what explains this variation? For example, why is the Geneva Protocol 

                                                             
2  "Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic," World Health Organization, 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019. 
3 Betsy Klein and Jennifer Hansler, "Trump halts World Health Organization funding over handling of coronavirus 
outbreak," CNN, April 15, 2020. 
4 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Main Problems of International Law," in Politics among Nations (n.p., 1948), 
HathiTrust. 



 
 

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followed by all member states, while UNCLOS is only adhered to by small powers?5 Comparing 

these cases elucidates how the legitimacy and effect on material power influence a state's 

propensity to comply with these specific institutions. Evidence from these cases supports this 

Article’s foundational argument that international legal institutions are most effective when they 

are regarded as legitimate by the international community, and do not damage the material power 

of the states interested in compliance. Without both of these factors present, compliance with a 

law cannot be guaranteed. 

 

The Arguments Behind Effectiveness 

An institution's effectiveness is measured by its ability to compel states of great power to 

comply with it, and numerous states at that. Measuring the effects of two independent variables 

on an institution’s compliance propensity will help delineate under what conditions international 

legal institutions are most effective: these independent variables are (1) a law’s legitimacy, and 

(2) its effect on a state’s material power. In this context, legitimacy refers to “the normative 

belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed,” which is subjective and shaped 

by a state’s inherent perception of the institution.6 Thus, the legitimacy of an institution is 

measured by the number of member states, or alternatively, the number of states which are a 

party to an international legal code. The general view which the member states have of the 

institution, and if they see it as a positive or negative entity, also impacts the institution or law’s 

legitimacy. The general presumption places institutions into two categories: legitimate or not 

legitimate.  

The second independent variable this Article will analyze is the legal institution’s effect 

on a state’s material power during a state’s period of compliance; an institution affects a state’s 

material power insofar as it positively or negatively impacts the state’s economic resources or 

national security during the same period of compliance. The two categories this Article uses to 

measure effects on material power are: (1) positive/no effect, and (2) negative effect. The 

                                                             
5  Graham Allison, "Heresy to say great powers don't bow to tribunals on Law of the Sea?," The Straits Times, July 
16, 2016. 
6 Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," International Organization 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999), 
JSTOR. 



 
 

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combination of these variables creates a matrix that lends itself to the more critical exploration of 

four case studies. 

 

Legal Institution Legitimacy No Legitimacy 

Positive/Neutral Effect on Material Power Case #1 Case #2 

Negative Effect on Material Power Case #3 Case #4 

 

 As mentioned earlier, many realists hold that international laws are not effective because 

of their inability to be enforced; in fact, on this topic, Morgenthau writes that “there can be no 

more primitive and no weaker system of law enforcement than this.”7 This theory is championed 

by international realist scholars who would otherwise disagree with the premise of this article:  

that international laws are effective under specific conditions.  

In contrast to Morgenthau, Stephen Kocs argues that international laws emerge “because 

they [correspond] to the needs and interests of the states in the system.”8 Put in other words, he 

argues that when adhering to international law is advantageous for the party states, an 

enforcement system is not necessary because states will always comply with what is in their best 

interest. Nonetheless, there are few organizations whose laws benefit all member states all of the 

time: for example, the UN cannot benefit all 193 members with every decision it makes. In these 

cases, compliance variation in the international order emerges, which is thus the subject of this 

Article’s inquiry. Unlike Morgenthau and Kocs, however, the case studies cited by this Article 

demonstrate that even if a law or policy is not advantageous to a particular state, compliance can 

still follow. 

Institutional legitimacy is an important factor in its compliance potential, and some have 

even argued that it is the most important factor: in “The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal 

Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice,” James Gibson and 

Gregory Caldeira assert that for legal institutions, no attribute is more important than legitimacy 

                                                             
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, "International Law and International Politics: An Uneasy Partnership," Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 68 (April 27, 1974) 
8 Stephen A. Kocs, "Explaining the Strategic Behavior of States: International Law as System Structure," 
International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 4 (December 1994): [Page 542] 



 
 

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because institutional legitimacy generates respect for the decisions thereby.9 In “Legitimacy and 

Authority in International Politics,” Ian Hurd also argues that there are instances in which states 

comply with international agreements that are not necessarily in their best interest, contradicting 

Kocs’s belief that laws only exist because of the benefits they afford. 

While legitimacy is of great importance, there are other factors that impact a state’s 

compliance with a law: most notably, the law’s effect on material power. Taking into account the 

realist argument that compliance is tied to state interests, this Article argues that a positive or 

neutral effect on material power is the second factor that determines compliance potential on the 

international stage. If one of these factors is absent, then a state’s compliance is unpredictable, 

rendering the law ineffective as related to its ultimate purpose: increasing predictability between 

distinct states. 

 An understanding of this argument explains why the League of Nations was practically 

ignored and why the Geneva Protocol is still respected: both factors of effectiveness are present 

in the case of the Geneva Protocol, but were not present in the League of Nations. Though it is 

more difficult to explain why China did not comply with UNCLOS in the South China Sea while 

Japan did comply with the Security Council’s decision to impose sanctions on North Korea, a 

detailed analysis reveals that the differential presence of these two factors created markedly 

different outcomes despite the fact that the United Nations mediated both decisions.   

The League of Nations’ failed attempt to ban war supports the realist argument that 

international laws are ineffective because they cannot be enforced, but also contradicts Kocs’s 

argument that agreements are only upheld when they represent individual state self-interests. 

Indeed, the League failed because (1) member states were not self-enforcing its laws, and (2) 

because having the ability to make war is in every state’s interest. Thus, entering into an 

agreement to abolish war was not sustainable for member states. The Geneva Protocol disproves 

Morgenthau’s argument insofar as the law has been in effect since 1925 and has prevented the 

use of these chemical weapons between states despite the fact that they were used quite 

effectively in warfare. This dichotomy supports this Article’s argument that both legitimacy and 

a minimally neutral effect on material power must be present for international legal compliance. 

                                                             
9 James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, "The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: Compliance, 
Support, and the European Court of Justice," American Journal of Political Science 39, no. 2 (May 1995): [Page 
460] 



 
 

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Admittedly, however, Japan’s experience with the UN Security Council certainly complicates 

this narrative as only one factor was present, a situation that thus warrants additional exploration.  

 In all of the cases this Article’s cites, Morgenthau would assert that lack of enforcement 

potential made these institutions relatively useless, while Kocs would assert that they were all 

effective because they would have not been created if not for the benefit of their constituent 

states. In this Article’s estimation, both of these assertions are oversimplifications and thus 

encourage the case-specific balancing it explores in the UNCLOS and Security Council 

examples. 

 

Explaining Variations in International Legal Compliance 

The Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons was signed on June 17, 1925. 

This is protocol has had near-unprecedented levels of compliance from both small and great 

powers, making it an ideal case study in this Article’s two-part model. The Geneva Protocol 

exemplifies a success in international law because it: (1) aligns with state interests, per Kocs’s 

argument, and (2) has legitimacy amongst the international community. With its net-zero impact 

on all states’ material power, the Geneva Protocol is an exemplary Case #1.10 

Case #2 represents an institution that is not seen as legitimate but has a positive or neutral 

effect on a state’s material power; however, this combination does not exist because if an 

international law had a positive effect on a state’s material power, it would be seen as legitimate 

by at least one state. Furthermore, if an institution existed that was neither  legitimate nor 

impactful on a state’s material power, it would be wholly inconsequential. 

Two cases of institutions perceived as legitimate, but with a negative effect on material 

power, will be used for Case #3: both UNCLOS and the UN Security Council are entities of the 

UN, which is seen as a legitimate institution, but both institutions damaged the material power of 

China and Japan, respectively. Despite the similar categories that UNCLOS and the UN Security 

Council fall under, China does not comply with UNCLOS while Japan recognized the Security 

Council’s 1994 sanction decision, even in light of the economic blowback it created. The 

variation in these two seemingly similar cases is critical to understanding what conditions are 

most important in international legal compliance. 

                                                             
10 When this Article references case numbers, refer to the matrix found on page five.  



 
 

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Case #4 represents an institution that (1) lacks legitimacy, and (2) has a negative effect on 

material power, perhaps the best example of which is the League of Nations. As the League 

failed to achieve its goal of banning war, it supports Morgenthau’s argument that international 

institutions will be ineffective without a method of enforcement. Within the model that this 

Article proposes, the League would have never been successful because it has neither factor of 

effectiveness. 

Studying these four independent cases using the aforementioned matrix comparison will 

help determine under what conditions international legal compliance is most likely. 

 

Legal Institution Legitimacy No Legitimacy 

Positive/Neutral Effect on Material Power Geneva Protocol N/A 

Negative Effect on Material Power UNCLOS 

UN Security Council 

League of Nations 

  

The Geneva Protocol banning chemical weapons is an effective law because it is 

perceived as legitimate and it does not substantially affect state power. The Geneva Protocol was 

proposed by the Allied Powers following the widespread use of chemical weapons during World 

War I. Although the United States did not sign the original protocol, it recognized in 1943 that 

“the protocol had become part of customary international law,” and the United Nations also 

came to recognize the law after its formation in 1945.11 In addition to the UN’s endorsement of 

the Geneva Protocol, the legitimacy of this legal norm can be traced to the fact that lethal 

chemical weapons have been used quite rarely since World War II.12 Indeed, in most of the 

instances where chemical weapons have been used, the battle was not between two separate 

states, but instead in the context of civil wars, and thus not under the jurisdiction of the Geneva 

Protocol.  

                                                             
11 Thomas Graham and Damien J. LaVera, "The 1925 Geneva Protocol," in Cornerstones of Security (n.p.: 
University of Washington Press, 2002), [Page 8], JSTOR. 
12 H. Martin Lancaster, Why We Need the Chemical Weapons Convention (n.p.: Stimson Center, 1995), 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11010.9 



 
 

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Perhaps the most well-known use of chemical weapons in recent years was in Syria: the 

chemical weapons attack in Ghouta, Damascus was launched by the Assad regime on rebel 

groups as part of the Syrian Civil War, but the non-discriminatory nature of the chemical 

weapons “killed hundreds of civilians, including large numbers of children.”13 This attack was 

publicly condemned by the United States, Arab League, and Russian Federation, one of Syria’s 

closest allies. While former President Barack Obama did not execute his “red line policy” threat 

and did not call for military strikes in Syria, the United States and Russia did reach an agreement 

on Syrian chemical weapons: in September of 2013, the two states “called for Syria’s arsenal of 

chemical weapons to be removed or destroyed by the middle of 2014.”14 This ability of an 

international law to compel Russia’s allyship with the United States to disarm one of its closest 

allies makes a strong case for the legitimacy and relevance of the Geneva Protocol; in fact, the 

global reaction to the August 2013 chemical weapons attack on Damascus remains a 

representation of the widespread acceptance and legitimacy of the Geneva Protocol. 

 As much as the Protocol’s legitimacy increases its compliance potential, its net neutral 

effect on material power cannot be forgotten either: considering the fact that nearly all states 

have the ability to produce chemical weapons, no advantage is lost when all states give them up. 

Additionally, there is a clause in the Geneva Protocol that states the Protocol “[will] cease to be 

binding in regard to any enemy states whose armed forces or allies do not observe provisions.”15 

In other words, if an enemy state was to use chemical weapons, your state could respond with 

chemical weapons and still remain in compliance. Ultimately, this is a mechanism of 

enforcement as no state prefers chemical weapons to be used on it, so it will not use them in the 

first place. Thus, the combination of legitimacy and net neutral effect (albeit nuanced), makes the 

Geneva Protocol the gold standard for international legal structures. 

 Unlike the Geneva Protocol, the League of Nations lacks both legitimacy and a 

positive/neutral effect on state power. The ineffectiveness of the League has no better historical 

champion than the fact that World War II began just nineteen years after the League’s formation.  

                                                             
13 "Attacks on Ghouta," Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/10/attacks-ghouta/analysis-
alleged-use-chemical-weapons-syria. 
14 Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria's Chemical Arms," The New York Times, 
September 14, 2013, [Page #], https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/syria-talks.html. 
15 Graham and LaVera, "The 1925," [Page 12]. 



 
 

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 The League of Nations was unable to achieve its goal of lasting peace because it lacked 

important legitimizing factors. First, the organization’s membership did not represent the balance 

of power in the international community. Most notably, although Woodrow Wilson and the 

United States were original proponents for the League of Nations, the Senate did not ratify the 

treaty, undermining the ability of one of the world’s greatest powers to join the League. 

Moreover, Germany and the USSR, two other great powers in the early twentieth century, were 

not members either. Consequently, the League lacked the membership of three key decision 

makers in the international community as members. Aside from the lack of ‘power-membership,’ 

unanimous consent was required for almost all League votes, prompting the fifty member states 

to agree to relatively few policies and initiatives.16 By this token, the League’s inability to make 

decisions and its small-state membership made it wholly lacking legitimacy on the international 

stage.  

 Complying with the League of Nations would have also damaged a state’s material 

power: indeed, an important step in ensuring lasting peace was the disarmament of member 

states, an initiative that would have only been binding of the small member states, making them 

vulnerable to the military prowess of the United States and Germany, for example. Similarly, 

because the League had no mechanisms to enforce disarmament, the League’s primary goal was 

not achieved, furthering its illegitimacy.  

 The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is not as straightforward as the 

Geneva Protocol or the League of Nations because it has one of the important factors of 

effectiveness, but not both. UNCLOS was signed by over 150 UN states in 1982, and went into 

effect in 1994. The conference standardized previously ambiguous laws regarding where coastal 

states have economic and military power and where they do not. UNCLOS divides a state’s 

maritime territory into three categories: territorial waters, a contiguous zone, and an exclusive 

economic zone (EEZ). The EEZ gives states exclusive rights to the natural resources like fish 

and oil in the seabed within two-hundred miles of their coast.17 This latter detail has been a 

source of conflict in recent years, particularly in Southeast Asia, where some EEZs overlap.  

                                                             
16 Peter Krause, "International Institutions Lecture" (lecture, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, March 12, 2020). 
17 Rebecca Strating, "Maritime Territorialization, UNCLOS and the Timor Sea Dispute," Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 40, no. 1 (April 2018). 



 
 

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 China has been violating the EEZ of other states in the South China Sea for over twenty 

years, and there is no indicating that this posture will change soon. The South China Sea is rich 

in mineral and oil resources, and China has recently asserted a historic claim to eighty percent of 

the territory with their “Nine Dash Line.” The basis for this claim is questionable not only 

because Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines all have claim to this region under 

UNCLOS, but also because “until the 1940s, China had never claimed sovereignty over the 

disputed islands in the region and officially staked sovereign claim to the four archipelagos only 

in 1958.”18 In 2016, the Philippines took China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the 

Hague to argue this violation of UNCLOS, and not surprisingly, the PCA sided with the 

Philippines. Nevertheless, it is also not surprising that China stated they would ignore the ruling.  

To explain the lack of compliance with UNCLOS, which is quite serious considering that 

no member of the UN Security Council has ever complied with a UNCLOS-related ruling,19 we 

need first look at legitimacy. Perhaps most importantly, the United States is not even a signatory 

of the Law of the Sea Tribunals, presenting a notable legitimacy issue for UNCLOS.  

 In this case, the legitimacy and material power considerations are inextricable. Great 

powers do not comply with (China) or even recognize (United States) UNCLOS because it 

damages their access to maritime resources. In this case, despite the fact that UNCLOS is 

championed by the United Nations, an internationally respected organization, it should be 

considered legitimate, but because great powers are not willing to abide by the law, its effect is 

undermined. This demonstrates the importance of the connection between material power and 

legitimacy: one factor alone cannot compel a state to comply. 

 Though the UN Security Council’s imposition of sanctions on North Korea in 1994 

contradicts this Article’s fundamental argument that both compliance factors must be present for 

a law to be effective, scholars of international relations have asserted that the legitimacy behind 

the UN Security Council compelled Japan to impose sanctions on North Korea even in spite of 

the fact that it negatively impacted Japanese material power.20 Economically, Japan was slated to 

suffer from sanctioning North Korea as (1) many North Koreans living in Japan would return to 

                                                             
18 Leishangthem Singh, "China's Strategy On The South China Sea Disputes," World Affairs: The Journal of 
International Issues 21, no. 1 (Spring 2017): [Page 81], JSTOR. 
19 Graham Allison, "Heresy to say great powers don't bow to tribunals on Law of the Sea?," The Straits Times, July 
16, 2016. 
20 Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority," [Page 402]. 



 
 

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their country, and (2) Japan would lose North Korea as a partner in trade. In the face of 

impending economic consequences, the decision to accept sanctions “is a strong sign that Japan 

accepted the legitimacy of a Security Council decision, even with a medium probability of an 

adverse outcome.”21 This is a victory for international legal compliance, but as much as it places 

legitimacy at the summit of compliance factors, the UNCLOS example cannot be ignored.  

 This compliance variation between the UNCLOS and Security Council cases 

demonstrates that without both legitimacy and a positive/neutral effect on material power, the 

ultimate outcome of legal compliance remains unsure. Indeed, though both of these institutions 

are entities of the highly-legitimate UN, differential outcomes prove that legitimacy is not the 

only requisite factor for compliance. Without both factors of effectiveness present, compliance 

with the law cannot be guaranteed, which explains the variation in compliance between the 

UNCLOS and Security Council cases.  

 

Conclusion 

The central problem with international legal institutions is that there are more than two-

hundred countries in the world, and no law or organization will be seen as legitimate nor benefit 

the material power of every single state. Nevertheless, there are conditions that heighten the 

compliance potential of laws, the best of which are evident in the Geneva Protocol and especially 

its relationship to the Syrian Civil War. This Article’s exploration of UNCLOS and the UN 

Security Council also demonstrate that both factors must be present to accurately predict the 

compliance with international law: in both cases, only one factor is present, and thus, two 

different outcomes arise. 

 Both arguments from Morgenthau and Kocs oversimplify the complex situations that 

arise in international politics. Indeed, Morgenthau’s argument that institutions are ineffective 

because they lack enforcement mechanisms can be applied to the failure of the League of 

Nations, but does not explain the success of the Geneva Protocol. By the same token, Kocs’s 

argument that laws must be self-enforced by member states is exemplified by the Geneva 

Protocol, but does not account for organizations like the League of Nations. These two 

                                                             
21 Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority," [Page 402]. 



 
 

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arguments align well with realism and liberalism respectively, but overall, they are not faceted 

enough to explain the effectiveness of international laws. 

This Article’s findings can be applied more broadly to international institutions and the 

unraveling relationship between the United States and World Health Organization. As the United 

States contributes far more financial resources to the WHO than China, the WHO 

disproportionately impacts the economic power of the United States as compared to China: it is 

unsurprising that the President decided to halt WHO funding. In the case of the United States and 

the WHO, the legitimacy factor is present, but the material power factor is not: while there is a 

case to be made for not decreasing funding to the WHO during a global pandemic under the 

conditions of my model, it follows that the United States would not financially support an 

organization that does not minimally have a neutral effect on its power. To regain support from 

the United States, the WHO would have to re-classify China as a developed country to increase 

its monetary contribution, or it would have to decrease the amount that the United States is 

compelled to give. In either situation, the effect on the material power of China and the United 

States would find a counterbalance and therefore increase the probability of the United States 

renewing funding to the WHO. 

  



 
 

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Allison, Graham. "Heresy to say great powers don't bow to tribunals on Law of the Sea?" The 
Straits Times, July 16, 2016. Accessed April 5, 2020. 
 

Alter, Karen J. International Courts Altering Politics. Vol. 2 of Courts, Politics, Rights. N.p.: 
Princeton University Press, 2014. JSTOR. 
 

"Attacks on Ghouta." Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/10/attacks-
ghouta/analysis-alleged-use-chemical-weapons-syria. 
 

"Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic." World Health Organization. 
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Gibson, James L., and Gregory A. Caldeira. "The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: 
Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice." American Journal of Political 
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Gordon, Michael R. "U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria's Chemical Arms." The New 
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Graham, Thomas, and Damien J. LaVera. "The 1925 Geneva Protocol." In Cornerstones of 
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Hurd, Ian. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." International Organization 53, 
no. 2 (Spring 1999): 379-408. JSTOR. 
 

Klein, Betsy, and Jennifer Hansler. "Trump halts World Health Organization funding over 
handling of coronavirus outbreak." CNN, April 15, 2020. 
 

Kocs, Stephen A. "Explaining the Strategic Behavior of States: International Law as System 
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Krause, Peter. "International Institutions Lecture." Lecture, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, 
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Lancaster, H. Martin. Why We Need the Chemical Weapons Convention. N.p.: Stimson Center, 
1995. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11010.9. 



 
 

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Morgenthau, Hans J. "International Law and International Politics: An Uneasy Partnership." 

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 68 (April 
27, 1974): 331-34. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25657843. 
 

Morgenthau, Hans J. "The Main Problems of International Law." In Politics among Nations, 
263-98. N.p., 1948. HathiTrust. 
 

Singh, Leishangthem. "China's Strategy On The South China Sea Disputes." World Affairs: The 
Journal of International Issues 21, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 80-99. JSTOR. 
 

Strating, Rebecca. "Maritime Territorialization, UNCLOS and the Timor Sea Dispute." 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 40, no. 1 (April 2018): 101-25. JSTOR. 
 
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