Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 Bio-based and Applied Economics BAE Copyright: © 2024 Bradfield, T., Hennessy, T., D’Alberto, R., & Haltia, E. Open access, article published by Firenze University Press under CC-BY-4.0 License. Firenze University Press | www.fupress.com/bae Citation: Bradfield, T., Hennessy, T., D’Alberto, R., & Haltia, E. (2024). The use of innovative contracts to provide agri- environmental public goods: Compar- ing attitudes between Ireland and oth- er European countries. Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120. doi: 10.36253/bae-14444 Received: February 28, 2023 Accepted: October 25, 2023 Published: May 20, 2024 Data Availability Statement: All rel- evant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files. Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest. Guest Editors: Stefano Targetti, Andreas Niedermayr, Kati Häfner, Lena Schaller ORCID TB: 0000-0001-7203-1509 TH: 0000-0002-6137-1249 RD: 0000-0002-7227-7485 EH: 0000-0002-9487-4387 The use of innovative contracts to provide agri-environmental public goods: Comparing attitudes between Ireland and other European countries Tracy Bradfield1,*, Thia Hennessy1, Riccardo D’Alberto2, Emmi Haltia3 1 Cork University Business School, University College Cork, Ireland 2 Department of Economics, University of Verona, Italy 3 Natural Resources Institute Finland (LUKE), Finland *Corresponding author. E-mail: tracy.bradfield@ucc.ie Abstract. Results-based, collective action, value chain, and land tenure contracts are means to improve the management of agri-environmental public goods. The objective of this paper is to assess the understandability, applicability, and perceived economic benefit of each of these contract types by land managers and stakeholders in twelve European countries, with a special emphasis on Ireland. Using survey data, we find that most land managers agree that results-based contracts are understandable, appli- cable to their farm, and economically beneficial. A lower portion of land managers in Ireland than other European countries agree that value chain and land tenure con- tracts are understandable or applicable to their farms. The results suggest that greater efforts are required to promote collective action contracts across Europe as they are paramount to the management of public goods. To increase the adoption of innovative contracts, providing financial certainty and autonomy should be prioritized by policy- makers, particularly in Ireland. Keywords: agri-environmental climate public goods, AECPG, results-based contracts, contract design, environmental policy. JEL codes: H41, O13, Q28, Q58. 1. INTRODUCTION The provision of agri-environmental-climate public goods (AECPG) such as biodiversity, water and soil quality, and emissions reduction, was very much to the forefront of the European Union’s (EU) agenda in the prepa- ration of the latest Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (European Com- mission, 2023a). For example, an aim of both the EU’s Green Deal and the Farm to Fork initiatives is for food systems to become environmentally sus- tainable (European Commission, 2023b). Therefore, it is important that land managers are encouraged to sustainably manage AECPG. In line with this purpose, the present paper investigates innovative agri-environmental con- https://doi.org/10.36253/bae-14444 http://www.fupress.com/bae https://doi.org/10.36253/bae-14444 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7203-1509 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6137-1249 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7227-7485 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9487-4387 mailto:tracy.bradfield@ucc.ie 104 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 Tracy Bradfield et al. tract types. These are contractual arrangements that incentivise farmers to increase the provision of AECPG alongside private goods (Prager et al., 2020) and they are experimental in that they have not been a core fea- ture of traditional agri-environmental schemes (AES) (Bredemeier et al., 2022). The analysis explores the per- ceptions of agricultural and forestry land managers and other stakeholders (advisers, industry representatives, scientists, researchers, etc.) in terms of the understand- ability, applicability, and the perceived economic benefits of results-based, collective action, value chain, and land tenure contracts, both in Ireland and in eleven other European countries. Also, we examine the factors that can contribute to the adoption of these innovative agri- environmental contracts. This paper focuses on the attitudes of Irish land managers and other stakeholders towards innovative contract designs for three reasons. Firstly, agricultural land managers in Ireland play a particularly significant role in the management of AECPG because 72% of land in Ireland is used for agriculture, which is the highest portion of land among EU countries (Eurostat, 2022). As of 2013, 50% of agricultural land in Ireland was under agri-environmental commitments (Eurostat, 2023a). However, regardless of this figure, all land managers inf luence AECPG such as biodiversity, water quality and carbon sequestration to some degree. Therefore, any efforts to increase the adoption of AES by farmers can help to improve AECPG provision. Secondly, agricul- ture in Ireland faces considerable environmental chal- lenges as 37% of total greenhouse gas emissions and over 99% of ammonia emissions arise from agriculture due to the large livestock sector (DECC, 2021). Additional worries include concerns over biodiversity loss (Biodi- versity Information System, 2022) and unsatisfactory water quality (EPA, 2022), all of which can be managed through effective contract designs. Attitudes towards the four innovative contract designs discussed here have not been previously assessed in the context of Ire- land, while a general shortage of debate in relation to the subject exists in the literature (Bredemeier et al., 2022), with studies, such as D’Alberto et al. (2023), focusing on specific territories and case studies. To advance under- standing and to improve the design of innovative agri- environmental contracts, the EU has funded several pro- jects under the HORIZON 2020 Programme, such as the CONSOLE project1 (CONSOLE, 2023) within which the present work was carried out. 1 The project’s full name is Contract Solutions for Effective and Lasting Delivery of Agri-Environmental-Climate Public Goods. Horizon 2020 Grant Agreement number: 817949. More information is available at https://console-project.eu/. The remainder of this paper provides an overview of AES in Europe, agriculture in Ireland, and current envi- ronmental challenges in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data at hand. Section 4 includes an analysis of survey data to determine how understandable, applicable, and economically beneficial land managers perceive various contract types to be. Section 5 contains an assessment of land managers’ and stakeholders’ recommendations for improving the uptake of AECPG-related contracts. 2. BACKGROUND 2.1 Agri-Environmental Schemes in Europe Agriculture within the EU is supported by the CAP which consists of two Pillars. Pillar 1 provides financial support to farmers to ensure they have sufficient finan- cial resources to sustain their businesses. This Pillar also provides market measures to help support challenges such as input price volatility, financial crises, and cli- mate change. Pillar 2 is co-financed by Member States and it focuses on rural development. Its aims include, among others, the modernisation of farms, employment support, and generational renewal (European Council of the EU, 2023). Voluntary environmental protection measures have also been traditionally financed by Pillar 2 (Kelemen et al., 2023). From 2023, these policy tools are managed by Member States through their national CAP strategic plans (EU CAP Network, 2023). AES are financed under Pillar 2 (Kelemen et al., 2023) and they are the primary mechanisms through which land managers are financially rewarded for farm- ing in an environment-friendly manner above that required for the Basic Payment Scheme (Teagasc, 2022). The adoption of these schemes was initially voluntary for European countries (Burton and Schwarz, 2013) and the implementation of AES became compulsory for EU Member States in 1992 under EC Regulation 2078/92 (Cullen et al., 2021). However, their adoption by farmers remains voluntary. In 2013, 26% of the utilised agricultural area of EU countries was under AES (Eurostat, 2023a). However, the environmental effects of land managers’ actions are not measurable from this figure, with several authors ques- tioning the effectiveness of AES on biodiversity and/or other aspects of the environment (see, e.g., Bartolini et al., 2021; Batáry et al., 2015). The reward for the adoption of AES has traditionally been ‘action-oriented’ payments with remuneration being based on a set of prescribed actions rather than the outcome. This focus has been, in part, due to the requirement for compensation to reim- burse land managers for the cost of adopting a particular https://console-project.eu/ 105 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 The use of innovative contracts to provide agri-environmental public goods agri-environmental practice (Burton and Schwarz, 2013). Burton and Schwarz (2013) provided examples of sce- narios where action-based contracts have failed to pro- vide environmental benefits such as the failure of action- oriented approaches to increase hornworts on the Swiss Plateau, as studied by Bisang et al. (2009), and a decline in bird and butterfly numbers in Switzerland, as noted by Roth et al. (2008). However, action-based approach- es continue to be the most common in EU AES despite their limited effectiveness (Olivieri et al., 2021). Their high acceptability by farmers is due to low risk, as their payments are not affected by external factors such as the weather. Action-based contracts are also a suitable option when it is difficult to measure the results of an action, including when monitoring and environmental knowl- edge is not sufficient (Olivieri et al., 2021). Issues with the management of any contract can arise through asymmetric information with Oliver et al. (2021) noting that it can reduce the provision of public goods through agriculture. This means that one party may have more information than the other(s) and they can use this to their advantage. This asymmetric infor- mation can result in contracts being negotiated that might not have been agreed if both parties were fully truthful. Adverse selection may arise where land manag- ers choose to include low quality land into AES because it is less productive in other uses (Quillérou and Fraser, 2010). Cullen et al. (2018) noted that extensive farms have tended to enter action-based schemes because their compliance costs are generally lower than intensive farms. In addition, Butler et al. (2013) suggested, when referring to the work of Butler et al. (2010), that a pos- sible focus of land managers on ease of management rather than ecological benefits can limit the success of action-based schemes. Moral hazard emerges when one party acts differently, such as taking on additional risks, because they do not bear the full consequences of their actions. This can lead to free riding where, for example, land managers who receive rewards for collective action decide to rely on the positive actions of others rather than their own. These phenomena need to be considered when developing new, innovative contract types. Four innovative contract types assessed by the CONSOLE project are analysed and discussed in this paper (results-based, collective action, value chain and land tenure contracts). 1. As part of a results-based contract, farmers are paid based on the results of their actions. For example, if the intention of the contract is to improve water quality, such a contract may award payments based on the results of water testing completed at agreed dates throughout the lifetime of the contract. Uthes and Matzdorf (2013) highlighted that results-based contracts allow farmers to use local knowledge and environmental learning to ameliorate their farm’s results and, hence, they are more efficient than action-based contracts. However, as previously not- ed, unpredictable external factors such as weather may affect the results land managers achieve and this can discourage them from taking up these contracts. Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to develop and monitor measurable indicators of envi- ronmental improvement (Olivieri et al., 2021). 2. Collective contracts require land managers to become members of a group which applies jointly for compensation in order to implement environ- mental or climate activities (CONSOLE, 2023). For example, if the intention is to improve biodi- versity, payments may be awarded based on the count of farm birds in an area at specific times within the contract duration. The rewards would be shared amongst the participants in acknowl- edgement that the results were a collective achieve- ment. Prager (2015) explained that some approaches emphasise collaboration, which means that farm- ers work together. Other approaches are based on co-ordination, which implies that farmers work towards the same goal, but in isolation (Prager, 2015; Reichenspurner et al., 2023). The Netherlands is the only EU country to introduce collective AES on a national level. If a land manager wishes to partici- pate in such a scheme, he/she must become a mem- ber of an agricultural collective, which is responsi- ble for the contracting and the results measuring (Barghusen et al., 2021). Olivieri et al. (2021) noted that collective contracts could particularly ben- efit AECPG such as water quality, biodiversity, and landscapes, which require coordinated buy-in from all land managers in an area. In addition, Olivieri et al. (2021) argue that these contracts involve a shar- ing of knowledge and risks, and issues of moral hazard may be low due to land managers wishing to maintain their reputation instead of free riding. However, it can be difficult to determine the opti- mum group size and costly to manage a large group (Olivieri et al., 2021) with Rodríguez-Entrena et al. (2019) noting that collective participation leads to a higher degree of uncertainty among the farmers. Similarly, Villanueva et al. (2015) suggested that farmers’ utility from engagement in collective par- ticipation is negatively influenced by the anticipated loss of freedom of their farm management. 3. Value chain contracts connect the delivery of AECPG with the production of private goods (CONSOLE, 106 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 Tracy Bradfield et al. 2023). The cost of these actions may be paid for by the market, mainly through a premium price. For exam- ple, if dairy farmers agree to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to a certain rate, the reduced emissions levels may be advertised on their bottles of milk and the customer pays a higher price for this guaran- tee. The contract may be between a land manager and a customer, or it may include many actors along the value chain, such as producers, processors, dis- tributors, and consumers. For example, Neumarkter Lammsbrau is a German beer producer that engages in value chain contracts with its suppliers of organic raw materials. The agreements are centred around the protection of soil, water, and biodiversity (Bredemeier et al., 2022). Ireland currently has a quality assurance scheme where sustainable products bear the label ‘Origin Green’. However, the products that meet the criteria are not charged at a premium price, so the land managers are not reimbursed for their efforts to produce the product sustainably. 4. Land tenure contracts mean that a landowner accepts a lower lease payment than for comparable land under usual land tenure agreements, to com- pensate land managers for their additional efforts to protect the environment (CONSOLE, 2023). For example, a landowner may contractually require the tenant to comply with certain management requirements like reduced use of pesticides. In addi- tion, long-term and secure contracts often lead to land investments, such as, soil conservation and tree planting which provide benefits for nature and human well-being (Bredemeier et al., 2022; Robin- son et al., 2018). It is worth noting that Olivieri et al. (2021) described the current literature on value chain and land tenure contracts as ‘poor’, fostering the need for research on these contract types. It should be highlighted that AES can consist of contracts that combine design and governance charac- teristics from more than one contract type (Bredemeier et al., 2022). For example, AES that aim to enhance bio- diversity might involve collective action and land tenure contracts. 2.2 Agriculture in Ireland and Environmental Concerns The importance of the livestock sector to agriculture in Ireland is highlighted by the fact that, in 2020, 93% of farms were specialist livestock farms (Dillon et al., 2022) compared to 22% in all EU countries (Eurostat, 2022). 17% of Irish farms were dairy farms compared to 5% of farms in the EU (Eurostat, 2022). In 2020, the livestock density in Ireland was 1.3 livestock units per hectare compared to an EU average of 0.7 (Eurostat, 2023b). These relatively high livestock numbers generate environmental challenges, as agriculture produced 37% of greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland in 2020 (DECC, 2021). More than 80% of agriculture-related greenhouse gas emissions is directly linked to livestock numbers and the management of the manures they produce, while 12% is attributed to chemical fertilisers and the remain- ing 8% arises from fuel combustion and carbon diox- ide from lime usage (DECC, 2021). In response to these environmental challenges, The Climate Action Plan 2021 commits to a 22-30% reduction in Ireland’s agricultural emissions by 2030, based on 2018 figures (DECC, 2021). Despite these concerns, livestock numbers contin- ue to rise in Ireland with a 0.5% increase in cattle and a 6.4% increase in sheep between 2021 and 2022 alone (CSO, 2023). This continued increase may suggest a hesi- tancy of land managers to reduce means of production in order to provide AECPG. This is supported by the work of Cullen et al. (2021) which found that a €1,000 increase in farm income leads to the likelihood of the farmer being an AES participant falling by 1-2%. Additional environmental concerns include water quality, with the Environmental Protection Agency noting that agriculture substantially contributes to its decline (DECC, 2021). Almost one fifth of monitored river water bodies are of ‘poor’ or ‘bad’ status and are severely polluted (EPA, 2022). In addition, 85% of habi- tats in Ireland are classified as being of ‘unfavourable status’ and 39% are categorised as ‘bad’ (EPA, 2023). As an EU member, Ireland is subject to the core targets of the Farm to Fork strategy which are a 50% reduction in chemical or hazardous pesticide use, a 50% reduction in nutrient loss, and a 20% decrease in fertiliser use by 2030 (European Commission, 2020). 2.3 Agri-Environmental Projects in Ireland Irish AES have evolved since the introduction of the Rural Environment Protection Scheme (REPS) in 1994. There were three subsequent iterations up to 2009 (McGurk et al., 2020). Farmers received the highest pay- ments for the first 20 hectares, with different rates of declining payments for additional hectares across vari- ous iterations of the scheme (Cullen et al., 2021). This led to farm size strongly influencing farmers’ decision to participate (Hynes and Garvey, 2009). The Agri-Environment Options Scheme (AEOS) replaced REPS in 2010. It differed in that the focus was on improving particular landscapes and habitat types (McGurk et al., 2020; Murphy et al., 2014) and scheme 107 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 The use of innovative contracts to provide agri-environmental public goods entry was prioritised for farms with certain features such as land designated as a Special Areas of Conser- vation2 or Special Protection Area3 (Cullen et al., 2021). However, participation was lower than REPS due to low payments (DAFM, 2017; McGurk et al., 2020). The Green Low-Carbon Scheme (GLAS) replaced AEOS in 2015 and it involved the further targeting of funds to achieve greater scheme results (Cullen et al., 2021). GLAS also had a greater focus on measures aimed at reducing car- bon emissions from agriculture. Entry into GLAS was by a three-tier system of priority which considered farms’ ‘Priority Environmental Assets’. The highest tier includ- ed farms with Natura 2000 sites, important farmland birds, rare breeds, commonages, and High-Status water- bodies4. The second tier included those with Vulnerable Water Areas and those choosing to undertake ‘Priority Actions’ which were low emission slurry spreading, min- imum tillage, catch crops, and wild bird cover. The third tier applied to the remaining farms (Cullen et al., 2021). All of these schemes have been terminated. A new agri-environmental climate measure called the Agri-Climate Rural Environment Scheme (ACRES) was introduced in Ireland in January 2023. Its objective is to address biodiversity decline mainly in designated regions, while also serving as an income support. This scheme is funded by the Irish Government and the Euro- pean Agricultural Fund for Rural Development of the EU, under Ireland’s CAP Strategic Plan 2023-27 (DAFM, 2022). There are two entry points to the ACRES, with the ACRES General approach being available nationwide and offering a range of measures for individual land manag- ers. The ACRES Co-operation approach, by contrast, is available to land managers in defined high priority geographical areas where land managers receive results- based payments, and a level of co-operation is required amongst participants (DAFM, 2022). Eco-schemes, funded under Pillar 1, are conceptu- ally similar to the AES of CAP Pillar 2 and may contain the four innovative contract designs discussed in this study. However, land managers are legally entitled to eco-scheme payments, whereas a granting procedure is used to allocate AES payments. Member States are free 2 The EU Habitats Directive lists certain habitats and species that must be protected within Special Areas of Conservation. ‘Irish habitats include raised bogs, blanket bogs, turloughs, sand dunes, machair (flat sandy plains on the north and west coasts), heaths, lakes, rivers, woodlands, estuaries and sea inlets’ (National Parks and Wildlife Service, 2023). 3 Sites of importance for the conservation or protection of a natural habitat or the population of a species. 4 Coastal, transitional, river and lake water bodies that have a High-Status Objective under the EU Water Framework Directive (Environmental Protection Agency, 2020). to choose eco-scheme measures, as long as they respect the legal requirements in Article 31 of the Strategic Plan Regulation5 (Runge et al., 2022). This means that their design may benefit greatly from national and local knowledge. In Ireland, land managers qualify for eco- scheme payments by undertaking specific agricultural practices on their farms and they have the flexibility to opt in/out of such schemes and/or change the agricultur- al practices annually (DAFM, 2023). 2.4 Examples of Recent Voluntary AES in Ireland Aside from AES that have been directly designed and funded by the Irish Government or the EU and eco- schemes, some locally run agri-environmental projects have provided environmental benefits in recent years and, in many cases, they have included innovative con- tract designs. The Burren Programme, funded by the Irish Government, seeks to protect biodiversity in the Burren in West Ireland, which is an UNESCO Geopark area of exposed limestone. Participating land managers may enrol in results-based contracts and five-year envi- ronmental targets are agreed between land managers and farm advisors. Payments are dependent on land manag- ers implementing plans and performing according to an evidence-based scoring system. The benefits of this project are attributed to the fact that it is locally led, that there are high levels of local engagement and that farms’ assess- ment is based on scientific evidence (CONSOLE, 2022a). The Biodiversity Regeneration in a Dairying Envi- ronment (BRIDE) Project, funded by the EU Commis- sion and the Irish Government, also uses results-based contracts and land managers agree to improve the qual- ity of the habitats on their farms. Similar to the Burren Programme, farms are assessed and those with higher scores on habitat quality gain higher payments. The pro- ject has benefitted from strong engagement from local land managers showing that the introduction of biodi- versity measures contributes to tangible environmental, economic, and social benefits (CONSOLE, 2022b). The Results-based Agri-Environment Payment Scheme (RBAPS) Pilot in Ireland, funded by the EU Commission and the Irish Government, aimed to 5 This Article establishes that all EU Member States must define and provide support for voluntary schemes for the climate, the environment and animal welfare (the ‘eco-schemes’) under the certain conditions that are set out in this Article and as further specified in the CAP. Participants are active farmers or groups of active farmers who make commitments to observe agricultural practices beneficial for the climate, the environment, animal welfare and combatting antimicrobial resistance. Further information is available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R2115 . https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R2115 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R2115 108 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 Tracy Bradfield et al. improve biodiversity on 35 farms in an area of High Nature Value farmland by using results-based payments. Small scale, low intensity beef cattle, and sheep farming were targeted (CONSOLE, 2022c). RBAPS was similar to the Burren and BRIDE Projects in that it focused on improving biodiversity in a small area, which means that collective action is also at play within each project. The Carbery Greener Dairy Farms scheme is also results-driven. However, the reward for farmers are the savings they make rather than the receipt of payments. The project was introduced by Carbery Group6 and Tea- gasc7 to measure, monitor, and optimise resources allo- cation with regard to environmental sustainability on dairy farms. The programme was based on a previous European project called the Dairyman Project, where 120 dairy land managers in 10 regions of Northwest Europe focused on farm resources efficiencies and man- agement (CONSOLE, 2022d). Carbery was the first to start such an endeavour in Ireland. Various environmen- tal efficiency measures were introduced on each farm to improve performance and achieve financial savings. The benefits from this project are improved carbon footprint of the farms, viability of farms through greater efficien- cies, higher quality products, and an evolving ecologi- cal mind-set of land managers which spills-over into the wider community (CONSOLE, 2022d). To improve envi- ronmental efficiencies, various capital expenditure was required, such as the introduction of smart meters, plate coolers in milking parlours, and water storage tanks. The funding was provided by Carbery, State grants and, in some instances, the land managers themselves (CON- SOLE, 2022d). This is an example of land managers, industry, and the State working together to achieve envi- ronmental objectives. 2.5 Factors Influencing the Perceived Benefits of Innovative Agri-Environmental Contracts in Ireland In the literature, the understanding, applicability, and perceived economic benefits of AES by land man- agers have been shown to influence their adoption. For example, Wilson and Hart (2000) found that non-famil- iarity with AES can increase the likelihood of farmers being unable to agree with their benefits. To overcome this, Morris et al. (2000) argued that while mass media and generic literature are useful for increasing the under- 6 A global leader in food ingredients, flavours, and cheese. More information on this organisation is available at https://www.carbery. com/. 7 A State body which provides research, advisory, and training to the agricultural and food sector in Ireland. More information on this organisation is available at https://www.teagasc.ie/. standing of AES, personal contact and demonstration are more important for the adoption of environmental meas- ures. Similarly, Defrancesco et al. (2008) and Dessart et al., (2019) found that the more a farmer perceives he/she can easily implement a practice associated with a given agri-environmental contract, the more likely he/she will participate in it. It is indeed crucial that land managers understand AES and the possible contracts that may exist within each scheme, so that they can perceive them as being applicable and beneficial to their land. Cullen et al. (2020) studied AES adoption in Ireland and they discussed a potential link between understand- ing and perceived economic benefits. For example, farm- ers who self-identify as ‘Productivists’8 are more likely to participate in AES if there is a potential increase in the profitability of their farm. While monetary incentives already exist in AES, Cullen et al. (2020) note that it is important that the added economic benefits of environ- mental measures are demonstrated to land managers to encourage their adoption. These measures may include optimising nutrient application, increasing pollinator numbers, and improved slurry management. Promotion of these measures may also increase the participation of ‘Forward-Looking Farmers’ who are seeking means to enhance the long-term performance of their farms. Cul- len et al. (2018) also note that the involvement of farmers in the designing of AES will help to ensure that they suit land managers’ interests and practices. Kelemen et al. (2023) studied the same four innova- tive contracts as those outlined in our study. They asked stakeholders in fifteen countries to compare the inno- vative contract types with existing mainstream action- based AES and they found that results-based contracts are perceived to require a ‘a broader knowledge base and a more developed infrastructure’ than mainstream AES and the other three innovative contract types. This further highlights the need for land managers to under- stand the nuances of contract types to increase their adoption. The findings of Kelemen et al. (2023) question the applicability of collective contracts as they are consid- ered to be the least suited to existing institutions, and the social and cultural context. One stated reason was the opinion that farmers only collaborate when there is a business interest and that collective contracts might require additional coordination and management. The authors also stress concerns over the perceived econom- ic benefits of results-based contracts. They found that European stakeholders perceive results-based contracts 8 Cullen et al. (2020) use the term ‘Productivists’ to describe farmers who express a desire to produce more food and maximise income, even if the environment is harmed in the process. https://www.carbery.com/ https://www.carbery.com/ https://www.teagasc.ie/ 109 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 The use of innovative contracts to provide agri-environmental public goods to be ‘more costly to implement’ than mainstream AES and the three other innovative contract types. However, they do not study this on a per country basis. In the study by Kelemen et al. (2023), the preferred policies stated by the stakeholders to improve the adop- tion of the four innovative contract types were formal education, peer-to-peer learning, and financial top-ups. Education and learning would help understanding, while the top-ups would help to reduce financial uncer- tainty. The provision of top-ups allows farmers to retain their flat payment and lose only the top-up if environ- mental targets are not met (Kelemen et al., 2023). 3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 3.1 Overview of data collection Data were collected as part of the EU Horizon 2020 funded CONSOLE Project (Contract Solutions for Effec- tive and lasting delivery of agri-environmental-climate public goods). Surveys were conducted in twelve Euro- pean countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Ger- many, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Spain, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), with 2,275 land managers and 486 stakeholders surveyed between December 2020 and July 2021 based on non-probability sampling. The Irish sample of respondents includes 210 land manag- ers and 16 stakeholders (farm advisors, researchers, and industry experts). The survey questionnaires were designed by means of a common approach by the project partners, in English, and they were then translated to national languages (D’Alberto et al., 2022). The question- naires were disseminated by project partners directly, as well as by non-profit organizations, farmers unions, and local institution boards. The non-probability sampling is due to the fact that the questionnaires, conducted dur- ing the COVID-19 pandemic restriction period, were distributed mainly via the CONSOLE Project’s web- site, through local institutions’ mailing lists, and local institutions’ official social media accounts. Therefore, respondents were self-selected. 3.2 Land manager surveys In Ireland, the land manager surveys were distrib- uted by an agency which provides administrative and technical advice to farmers and all surveys were com- pleted online. The characteristics of the Irish sample are outlined in Table 1, as well as those of all twelve Euro- pean countries studied. The data of the survey respond- ents can be compared to nationally representative data which is derived from the Farm Accountancy Data Net- work (FADN, 2021) and Eurostat data9 (Eurostat, 2016; Eurostat, 2021a, Eurostat, 2021b)10. Farm Accountancy Data Network (2021) data on farm types and data col- lected by Eurostat (2021) on formal agricultural training can be directly compared with the sample of this study. However, Eurostat (2021) collected data on farm hold- ers’ ages under categories that differ from those used in our survey. We use data collected by Eurostat (2016) on farm holders who describe their main economic activity as being derived from their farm as a proxy variable for farm income being more than 50% of total income. Table 2 includes descriptive statistics related to the surveyed land managers’ experiences and opinions of innovative agri-environmental contract designs. As noted in Table 2, 30% of surveyed land managers in Ire- land are currently using results-based contracts, 17% are using collective action, 16% are using value chain, and 3% are using land tenure contracts. Between 1 and 5 years is the most preferred contract duration. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, data on the current use of innovative agri-environmental contracts are not cur- rently collected on a level that is representative of the European Union or its Member States. Respondents were asked to select a scoring option on a 5 points Likert scale, expressing whether a charac- teristic of a potential agri-environmental contract would increase their willingness to enrol in such contracts. The options were: increases willingness considerably, some- what increases willingness, no effect, somewhat decreases willingness and decreases willingness considerably. These characteristics of potential contracts are listed in Table 3. Then, descriptions of results-based, collective action, value chain, and land tenure contracts (as described in Section 2.1) were provided to participants. They were asked whether they strongly agree, agree, are neutral, dis- agree or strongly disagree with the following statements: 1) ‘The contract type is easy to understand’; 2) ‘The con- tract type is applicable to my farm’, 3) ‘The contract type is economically beneficial for my farm’. 3.3 Stakeholder survey Each project partner selected local stakeholders to complete surveys and attend workshops at a local level. 9 Data on farm holders’ ages and formal agricultural training in the United Kingdom are not reported by Eurostat and, therefore, are not included in Table 1. 10 This datasets do not include forests. 110 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 Tracy Bradfield et al. Of the total sample, 61% of participants were scientists, 19% represented environmental NGOs or advisory ser- vices, 10% worked in administration, 7% were farmers, foresters or landowners, and 3% worked in industry. The aim of the workshops was to discuss and select the most promising examples of existing contract solutions among those retrieved by the common literature review. The reasons for the failure or success of these contracts were identified and discussed too. In October 2020, a pan-European web-seminar with 105 participants (excluding the organisers and panellists) was held online (for further details, please refer to Viaggi et al., 2020). Stakeholders from the local level workshops were called to discuss, together, the results from each country. In addition, stakeholders were asked whether they strongly agree, agree, are neutral, disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that the features of contracts outlined in Table 4 would increase the willingness of land manag- ers to enrol in an agri-environmental contract. In addition, stakeholders were asked the follow- ing question: ‘In your opinion, for which environmental objective provision would the four contract types be the most suitable? Choose only one environmental objec- tive for each contract type.’ The options were landscape and scenery: biodiversity, soil health and quality, carbon storage, and water quality and quantity. Table 1. Descriptive statistics of surveyed land managers. Variable Frequency Ireland All surveyed countries Sample (n=210) Nationally representative data Sample (n=2,7211) Representative data Farm type Dairy 0.55 0.17 0.14 0.11 Cereals 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.19 Field crops/Permanent crops - - 0.13 0.16 Mixed systems 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.10 Cattle 0.21 0.60 0.08 0.10 Sheep/Goats/Poultry - 0.17 0.03 0.08 Mixed livestock 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.01 Forestry 0.01 - 0.16 - Fruit/Vineyards/Horticulture - - 0.10 0.25 Other - - 0.02 - Agriculture/Forestry Education Completed 0.82 0.54 0.60 0.65 Age 18-30 Years 0.06 - 0.07 - 31-50 Years 0.53 - 0.42 - 51-70 Years 0.39 - 0.44 - 71 Years and older 0.02 - 0.07 - < 25 Years - 0.01 - 0.01 25-29 Years - 0.08 - 0.08 30-34 Years 0.07 0.08 35-44 Years - 0.10 - 0.11 45-54 Years - 0.27 - 0.30 55-64 Years - 0.24 - 0.29 65 Years and older - 0.23 - 0.13 Farm To Total Income Ratio Farm income > 50% Total income 0.66 0.52 0.88 0.75 1 2,721 valid land manager surveys were considered from the 2,275 units initially retrieved. 111 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 The use of innovative contracts to provide agri-environmental public goods 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 4.1 Land managers’ attitudes to innovative contract designs Figures 1 details the percentage of land manag- ers who agreed that a characteristic of a contract would increase their willingness to enrol in a hypothetical agri- environmental contract/programme. The data for Ire- land is labelled ‘IRL’ and the data for the other eleven European countries is noted as ‘Others.’ Figure 1 suggests that self-chosen measures increase the willingness of most surveyed land managers to enrol in novel AES in Ireland and other European countries. This supports the work of the EU in ensuring that each Member State develops its own national CAP Strate- gic Plan in consultation with land managers and other stakeholders. More specifically, it is important that land managers have autonomy over how they manage their land to achieve environmental benefits and the design of AES should allow for this. When the means of the responses11 are calculated for each contract character- istic, the results for Ireland and the other countries are very similar. It is important to highlight that common payments are not desired by many respondents in all countries, which plays as a major obstacle for the implementation of collective contracts. A reluctance to share a common payment may be due to increased uncertainty (Rod- ríguez-Entrena et al., 2019) or a fear that they will lose autonomy by working collectively (Villanueva et al., 2015). They may also fear that others will act as free rid- ers, benefitting from the group’s actions without contrib- uting themselves, which would contradict the perception of Olivieri et al. (2021) that the desire of group members to maintain their reputation would reduce the risk of moral hazard. Our finding supports the work of Kele- men et al. (2023) which noted that collective arrange- ments are not considered to be the suited to existing institutions, and the social and cultural contexts. As previously mentioned, descriptions of results- based, collective action, value chain, and land tenure contracts were then provided to participants who were asked to rate their level of agreement with the under- standability, applicability, and economic benefits of these contracts. Figure 2 details the percentage of surveyed land managers who agreed that a contract type is easy to understand/applicable/economically beneficial. Figure 2 shows that results-based contracts are con- sidered understandable, applicable, and economically beneficial by more land managers in Ireland than other European countries. Of the four innovative contract 11 Based on the points of the Likert scale ranging from 1 (decreases willingness considerably) to 5 (increases willingness considerably). Table 2. Descriptive statistics of surveyed land managers’ experi- ences. Variable Frequency Ireland (n=210) All Surveyed Countries (n=2,721) Experience of results-based contracts Currently using results-based contract 0.30 0.21 Never used results-based contract 0.66 0.73 Previously used results-based contract 0.04 0.06 Experience of collective action contracts Currently using collective contract 0.17 0.06 Never used collective contract 0.81 0.91 Previously used collective contract 0.02 0.03 Experience of value chain contracts Currently using value chain contract 0.16 0.16 Never used value chain contract 0.82 0.81 Previously used value chain contract 0.02 0.03 Experience of tenure based contracts Currently using tenure contract 0.03 0.07 Never used tenure contract 0.96 0.90 Previously used tenure contract 0.01 0.03 Preferred contract length1 < 1 Year 0.05 0.23 Between 1 and 5 Years 0.72 0.66 > 5 up to 10 Years 0.23 0.11 1 Respondents answered this question regardless of whether they have used entered a contract before or not. Table 3. Contract Characteristics Evaluated by Land Managers. Contract characteristic Definition Self-chosen measures In the contract, the land manager is free to decide about the management practices used to achieve the specified environmental result. Common payment A group of land managers receive a common payment and they jointly agree on the distribution of the payment. Paid by customers The contract is not paid by public money, instead the compensation that a land manager gets for environmentally friendly production is paid by buyers of products. Reduced rent Land managers pay reduced rent on land rented in if they agree to follow environmental management clauses as specified in the lease contract. 112 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 Tracy Bradfield et al. types, the understandability of results-based contracts in Ireland scores the highest, at a mean of 4.012, while the 12 Based on the points of the Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). mean score of this characteristic for all other countries is 3.8. In relation to results-based contracts, the greatest dif- ference in means between Ireland and the other Europe- an countries is related to the applicability of results-based contracts. The mean score in Ireland is 4.1 compared to Table 4. Contract characteristics evaluated by stakeholders. Contract characteristic Definition Annual compensation Land managers receive compensation payment on an annual basis. Authority control The results that land managers achieve are regularly controlled by the competent authority visiting a farm e.g. once a year. Self-chosen measures In the contract, the land manager is free to decide about the management practices used to achieve the specified environmental result. Better results, higher payment The better the environmental result, the higher the payment. Collective agreement Land managers can collectively agree on environmental targets and measures at landscape-level together with other land managers. Common payment A group of land managers receive a common payment and they jointly agree on the distribution of the payment. Free training Land managers are offered free training and advice that enables them to reach the environmental targets. Labelled product Land managers sell their products labelled as environmentally friendly (e.g. climate friendly products) when following management measures as prescribed in a processor or retailer contract. Paid by customers The contract is not paid by public money, instead the compensation that a land manager gets for environmentally friendly production is paid by buyers of products. Reduced rent Land managers pay reduced rent on land rented if they agree to follow environmental management clauses as specified in the lease contract. Sales guarantee Land managers receive a sales guarantee from a processor or retailer in return for implementing environmental measures. Self-monitoring Land managers do the monitoring of the environmental results themselves (e.g. count specific plants). Periodical payment Land managers receive half of the environmental payment at the beginning of the five-year contract period, and half at the end of it. Figure 1. The impact of contract characteristics on willingness to enrol in agri-environmental contracts. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Common Payment - Others Common Payment - IRL Paid By Customers - Others Paid By Customers - IRL Reduced Rent - Others Reduced Rent - IRL Self-Chosen Measures - Others Self-Chosen Measures - IRL Percentage of Respondents Increases willingness considerably Somewhat increases willingness No effect on willingness Somewhat decreases willingness Decreases willingness considerably 113 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 The use of innovative contracts to provide agri-environmental public goods 3.6 in other countries. This finding is plausible consider- ing that they are the most common of the four contract types in the sample for Ireland. They are also perceived by many to be economically beneficial which follows the connection between familiarity and perceived benefits previously highlighted by Wilson and Hart (2000). Giv- en their relative popularity in Ireland13, it is possible that some farmers with no first-hand experience of results- based contracts may have gained some insights from those who have personal experience of them. Compared to other European countries, agreement with the understandability and applicability of value- chain and land tenure contract types in Ireland is rela- tively low. This is an important finding because, as previ- ously noted, the more a farmer perceives that he/she can easily implement an element of a given agri-environmen- tal contract, the more likely he/she will participate in it (Defrancesco et al., 2008; Dessart et al., 2019). Therefore, our findings call for greater education of these contracts in Ireland to increase their adoption. Approximately one half of surveyed Irish land managers consider value chain contracts to be economically beneficial and, despite their rarity, this suggests there is some interest amongst land managers in Ireland to enter this type of contract. As land rental levels in Ireland are the second low- est in Europe, after Portugal, (European Commission, 2022), it may be difficult for some Irish land managers to imagine that a land tenure contract would be suitable 13 34% of Irish farmers in this sample have experience of using these contracts compared to 27% in all twelve surveyed countries. for them. Land is also typically rented on eleven-month contract agreements in Ireland and the Irish Govern- ment is already encouraging the renting out of land on long term leases through tax incentives (Bradfield et al., 2023a). Longer contract durations may encourage land- owners to include environmental management condi- tions in their contracts, as the added time may allow them to reap greater benefits from the tenants’ practices. Collective contracts are considered to be under- standable, applicable, and economically beneficial by the lowest percent of Irish and other European land manag- ers. A lack of understanding may be driving the other two factors to be low. It may also be the case that land managers enjoy the autonomy of managing their own farm and do not wish to be contractually linked to other land managers which is supported by respondents being in favour of self-chosen measures (Figure 1). Previous work by Raina et al. (2021) also supports this conclusion as they noted that some studies have found that farmers prefer individual management and discrete compensa- tion. Another example is offered by Rodríguez-Entrena et al. (2019) who stated that collective participation leads to a higher degree of uncertainty among the farmers. Farming already bears considerable risk, whether it be financial risk, unpredictable weather or susceptibility to international economic shocks. Consequently, land man- agers may be reluctant to bear more uncertainty through collaborative work (Rodríguez-Entrena et al., 2019). In summary, of the four innovative contract types presented in this paper, results-based are considered to Figure 2. The percentage of land managers who (strongly) agree that a contract type is easy to understand/applicable/economically beneficial. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% R es ul t-b as ed C ol le ct iv e V al ue c ha in La nd te nu re R es ul t-b as ed C ol le ct iv e V al ue c ha in La nd te nu re R es ul t-b as ed C ol le ct iv e V al ue c ha in La nd te nu re Understandable Applicable Economically Beneficial Pe rc en ta ge o f R es po nd en ts Ireland Other Countries 114 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 Tracy Bradfield et al. be understandable, applicable, and economically benefi- cial by approximately 70% of surveyed land managers in Ireland which is higher than in other European coun- tries. This high percentage may be driven by the exist- ing familiarity with this contract type and the fact that they allow for autonomy over both work and its potential results. Compared to data from other European countries, the understanding of value chain, collective action and land tenure-based contracts is low in Ireland, and further research may explore the reasons why this is the case. 4.2 Stakeholders’ attitudes to innovative contract designs A previously mentioned, stakeholders were asked whether they agree that a characteristic increases land managers’ willingness to enrol in an environmental con- tract/programme and their responses to this question are presented in Figure 3. ‘Annual compensation’ and ‘sales guarantee’, which both provide financial certainty, were considered by most stakeholders to be particularly important to land managers in both Ireland and across Europe. A reward system of better results generating higher payments (‘better results, higher payment’) also scored highly. This is also a contract characteristic that supports the desire for financial certainty, as well as environmental ben- efits. Free training is also considered to be important for the uptake of such contracts. When compared to other European countries, land managers in Ireland tend to be less in favour of collective action or authority control. This supports our conclusion in Section 4.1 that there is a strong desire for autonomy amongst land managers. This may be related to the memory of the fight for inde- pendence in the early 1900s to remove authoritative con- trol from English landlords (Bradfield et al., 2023b). In Ireland, a lower percentage of respondents per- ceive that the self-monitoring of environmental results encourages enrolment, when compared to other Euro- pean countries. It may be the case that authority control is thought to be undesirable by land managers in Ire- land, because it reduces autonomy over land manage- ment practices, but the monitoring of environmental outcomes by external agencies is accepted. Keleman et al. (2023) highlight that the monitoring of results poses a challenge for innovative contracts with the definition of indicators, use of information technology and farmers’ 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Common payment Periodical payment Reduced rent Paid by customers Authority control Self-monitoring Collective agreement Labelled product Self-chosen measures Free training Better results, higher payment Sales guarantee Annual compensation Percentage of Respondents Ireland Other Countries Figure 3. The percentage of stakeholders who agree that a characteristic increases land managers’ willingness to enrol in an environmental contract/programme. 115 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 The use of innovative contracts to provide agri-environmental public goods expertise being some examples. These may be reasons why farmers are hesitate to self-monitor their actions. All countries perceive periodical payments14 or common payments to be the least likely to increase enrolment which further supports a desire for control over incomes. As the aim of AES and agri-environmental con- tracts is to improve environmental outcomes, we wish to discover which agri-environmental goods are con- sidered to benefit most from a particular contract type. Therefore, stakeholders were asked the following ques- tion: ‘In your opinion, for which environmental objective provision would the four contract types be the most suit- able? Choose only one environmental objective for each contract type.’ Figure 4 displays the percentage of respondents who stated that a particular agri-environmental objective would benefit the most from a specific contract type. Data for Ireland is labelled ‘IRL’ and the data for the other eleven European countries is noted as ‘Others’. In Ireland, most surveyed stakeholders believe that biodiversity would benefit the most from results-based contracts. As previously shown in the description of AES case studies, results-based contracts in Ireland have so far mainly targeted improved biodiversity, which may explain why stakeholders in Ireland see a link between 14 Stated as follows: ‘Land managers receive half of the environmental payment at the beginning of the five-year contract period and half at the end of the contract’. these contracts and biodiversity gains. We find that col- lective action is perceived as the most beneficial for improving water quality amongst respondents in Ire- land. However, it is the innovative contract type that scores the lowest in terms of understandability, applica- bility, and perceived economic benefit, and further edu- cation may be needed to highlight its potential environ- mental benefits. A high portion of surveyed stakeholders in Ireland feel that value chain contracts are best suited to support carbon storage. Fewer of the surveyed stake- holders in other European countries believe that indi- vidual contract types can benefit one particular AECPG. This suggests that they perceive the contracts as having a wider range of environmental benefits which is appro- priate given that, for example, collective contracts can benefit AECPG such as water quality, biodiversity, and landscapes across large regions (Prager, 2015; Olivieri et al., 2021). A limitation of this study is a lack of representative- ness of the farming population, given the fact that the survey has been carried out on a non-probability sample. However, the large spectrum of respondents questioned, both in Ireland and at the European level, support the conclusion that our results remain informative, and the common European survey perspective adds relevance to the comparisons made. Further research could include analysis of the factors that cause land managers and stakeholders to either agree or disagree that a contract 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% Land tenure - Others Land tenure - IRL Value chain - Others Value chain - IRL Collective - Others Collective - IRL Result-based - Others Result-based - IRL Percentage of Respondents Landscape and scenery Biodiversity Soil health and quality Carbon storage Water quality and quantity Figure 4. Perceived suitability of contract type for environmental objective (Ireland). Also available in D’Alberto et al. (2022). 116 Bio-based and Applied Economics 13(1): 103-120, 2024 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-14444 Tracy Bradfield et al. type is understandable, applicable, and economically beneficial. Additionally, more complex experimental research, such as discrete choice experiments, could be utilized to determine the extent to which land managers prefer some characteristics of agri-environmental con- tracts over others. 5. CONCLUSIONS Understanding the factors influencing farmer deci- sion-making is important for policymakers in their design and promotion of agri-environmental schemes. Existing evidence suggests that action-based contracts have not maximized environmental benefits (Burton and Schwarz, 2013) and, as an alternative, four innovative contract types have been studied by the EU funded CONSOLE Project. This research highlights the perceptions of land managers and stakeholders in terms of the understandability, appli- cability, perceived economic benefits, and characteristics of such contract forms, which have not been previously studied in the context of Ireland despite the challenges the agriculture sector faces in becoming more environmen- tally sustainable. This research fills a gap in the literature as discussion of these contracts has been limited to date (Bredemeier et al., 2022) and it is important that we under- stand how attitudes differ in Ireland compared to other European countries so that further research and the CAP can be tailored to fit the local context. Our findings show that the understanding of the four innovative contract types, as well as their applica- bility and economic benefits, could be greatly improved in European countries. This calls for greater promotion and education of these contracts to encourage their adop- tion. Results-based contracts, which are the most com- mon of the four innovative contract types in Ireland, are considered understandable, applicable, and economically beneficial by the majority of Irish land managers. This suggests that practical experience or the hearing of other people’s experiences can boost understanding and this form of promotion should be encouraged. This is impor- tant for land managers in Ireland who have relatively low levels of understanding of collective action, value chain, and land tenure contracts due to the fact that they may have had little direct experience of them. With respect to the need for increasing the adop- tion rate of agri-environmental contracts, self-chosen measures and financial certainty should be the priority, as advised by land managers and stakeholders across Europe, and this is particularly the case in Ireland. Therefore, it is of importance that agri-environmental policies in Ireland provide autonomy for farmers. These findings also help to explain why collective contracts are not considered to be economically beneficial by many land managers in this study, as they potentially expose land managers to uncertainty (Rodríguez-Entrena et al., 2019). 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