



























Gottlieb Manuscript: Law Journal: Volume 12


Brandeis University Law Journal            2024-2025, Volume 12 

State Responsibility for State Sponsors of Terror 
Koby Gottlieb1 

This article explores the international legal obligations of 
states to cease trading with state sponsors of terrorism, 
focusing on Article 16 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Using the principles 
of customary international law, including the prohibition on the 
use of force and non-intervention, this article evaluates state 
accountability for aiding terrorism as applied to China. The 
paper asserts that international trade with state sponsors of 
terrorism, such as China’s trade with Iran, constitutes a breach 
of international law. 
 
Roadmap 
 This paper looks at the implications for Iran’s trading 
partners, particularly China, in light of Iran’s support for 
terrorism.2 It is important first to establish the theoretical 
framework underpinning this argument by analyzing the mens 
rea and actus rea elements of state responsibility. Throughout, 
the paper will apply relevant aspects of the elements of state 
responsibility to both Iran and China while also exploring 
international legal concepts on the use of force, 
non-intervention, and terrorism. In doing so, it will become 
clear that China’s trade with Iran is illegal under international 
law. 
 
Background 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is a terrorist 
organization that supports other terrorist organizations, 
including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various additional 

2 NADER USKOWI, TEMPERATURE RISING: IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND 
WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST xiv–xvi (2019). 

1 Brandeis University, Class of 2026, Brandeis University Law Journal, 
Copy Editor. 

 
 

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militias.3 The Iranian Office of the Supreme Leader controls 
and aids the IRGC, including subsidiary groups within it.4 
China was one of the largest importers of Iranian goods 
compared to other countries in 2022, substantially contributing 
to the Iranian economy.5 Since the IRGC and the Office of the 
Supreme Leader control over five hundred businesses, 
accounting for almost half of the Iranian economy, China’s 
contributions to the Iranian economy undoubtedly assist the 
IRGC.6  

Hezbollah causes significant human casualties to 
civilians and considerable destruction of property across the 
world. One notable case is the attack on a Jewish community 
center in Argentina in 1994 that killed eighty-five people, 
wounded three hundred, and leveled the recreation center.7 The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights — a regional human 
rights-centered court represented by judges from across the 
Western Hemisphere — ruled in January 2024 that Hezbollah 
committed the attack with support from Iran; Iran is also likely 
to have ordered the attack.8 Notably, the Court held that this 
attack was an act of terrorism, likely due to civilians being the 
target of this attack.9  

 

9  Memoria Activa Vs. Argentina, supra note 6 at 1; Thomas Buergenthal, 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT. LAW 231, 
233–234, 242 (1982). 

8 Decisions by the Court are binding on states that accept the American 
Convention on Human Rights as binding. See American Convention on 
Human Rights, 33, 61-62 (1969). 

7 Memoria Activa Vs. Argentina, 43 (2024). 
6 USKOWI Supra note 2 at xiv–xvi. 

5 World Integrated Trade Solution, Iran, Islamic Rep. Trade Balance, 
Exports and Imports by Country 2022, (2022). 

4 See generally AUGUSTUS R. NORTON, HEZBOLLAH: A SHORT HISTORY (New 
paperback edition ed. 2014); TREVOR JOHNSTON ET AL., Could the Houthis Be 
the Next Hizballah? Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of 
the Houthi Movement, 51–71 (2020). 

3 Id. 

 
 

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State Responsibility 
Since 1955, the International Law Commission (ILC), a 

group of thirty-four individuals elected by the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA), has developed the Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with Commentaries, determining the limits of state 
responsibility in international law.10 The Draft Articles, 
especially Article 16, serve as the backbone for this paper.11  

Article 16 concerns states aiding or assisting other 
states in committing internationally illegal acts.12 Since there is 
not a substantial contextual difference between “aiding” and 
“assisting,” these terms will be used interchangeably in line 
with the United Kingdom’s opinion.13 The Commentary sets 
forth three conditions that limit the scope of responsibility of 
states in aiding or assisting: 

First, the relevant State organ or agency providing aid 
or assistance must be aware of the circumstances 
making the conduct of the assisted State internationally 
wrongful; secondly, the aid or assistance must be given 
with a view to facilitating the commission of that act, 
and must actually do so; thirdly, the completed act must 
be such that it would have been wrongful had it been 
committed by the assisting State itself.14 

There is both a mens rea element and an actus reus 
element. The first condition and part of the second condition — 
“the aid or… of that act” —  touch on the mens rea element, 

14 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 11 at 66. 

13State Responsibility – Comments and Observations Received from 
Governments, 53rd Session, 52 (2001). 

12 Id. 

11 UNITED NATIONS, DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR 
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, WITH COMMENTARIES 66 (2001). 

10 James Crawford, The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 874, 874 (2002); Stephen C. McCaffrey, The 
Thirty-Seventh Session of the International Law Commission, 80 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 185, 185 (1986).  

 
 

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while part of the second condition — “must actually do so” — 
and the third condition touch on the actus reus element. As 
shown below, China meets each of these conditions for state 
responsibility.  

The Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnian Genocide 
Case) further elaborates on the case law surrounding state 
responsibility. The Bosnian Genocide Case was a case in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) that determined that the 
Bosnian Serb armed forces perpetrated genocide in the town of 
Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in July 1995.15 Decisions 
by the ICJ reflect international law.16 In this case, the ICJ 
regards Article 16 as customary international law which is 
binding, according to the ICJ Statute.17 The ICJ does not 
specifically regard the attached commentaries to Article 16 as 
part of the canon of customary law, but they may still be a 
source of customary law. 

Furthermore, the ICJ’s Statute recognizes “judicial 
decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists” 
as a source of customary law.18 In 2001, the final presentation 
of the Draft Articles included commentaries by numerous 
respected international lawyers.19 These include Sir Ian 
Brownlie, James Crawford, and John Dugard — some of the 
leading international lawyers in scholarship and practice.20 

20 Philippe Sands, Sir Ian Brownlie Obituary, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 11, 2010; 
Philippe Sands, James Crawford Obituary, THE GUARDIAN, Jun. 13, 2021; 
Curriculum Vitae and Publications of John Dugard, 20 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 983 (2007). 

19 Summary Records of the First Part of the Fifty-Third Session, 1 (2001). 
18 Id. at 38(1)d. 

17 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice 420 (2007); Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, 38(b). 

16 ALAIN PELLET, DECISIONS OF THE ICJ AS SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
56–57 (2018), http://crde.unitelmasapienza.it/it/pubblicazioni/gmls-2018 
(last visited Jan 20, 2025). 

15 Vojin Dimitrijević & Marko Milanović, The Strange Story of the Bosnian 
Genocide Case, 21 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 65, 65 (2008). 

 
 

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Thus, these individuals fit the requirement of “most highly 
qualified publicists,” and as such, the Commentary to the Draft 
Articles carries an important weight in determining 
international law. Crawford suggests reading the Draft Articles 
with the Commentary and even the preparatory work of the 
ILC.21 For this article, the first important part of the Draft 
Articles is the mens rea element of Article 16. 

The Mens Rea Element 
In the Bosnian Genocide Case, the ICJ determined that 

for a state’s assistance of another state to constitute 
wrongdoing, the assisting state must do so “in full awareness 
that the aid supplied would be used to commit” a crime.22 The 
assisting state must also be aware of the “specific intent” of the 
perpetrating state.23 The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda was established by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) in 1994 to prosecute those responsible for 
genocide in Rwanda.24 International legal terms used by the 
Tribunal clarify the meaning of the same terms because, 
according to the ICJ Statute, Tribunals help interpret 
international law.25 The Tribunal ruled that “specific intent” 
requires that the perpetrator of a crime intended the result of 
the crime.26 The ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide Case determined 
that states must have “at the least” this knowledge of intent, 
suggesting that the claim of responsibility necessitates some 
knowledge.27 

27 Georg Nolte & Helmut Philipp Aust, Equivocal Helpers—Complicit 
States, Mixed Messages and International Law, 58 ICLQ 1, 14 (2009). 

26 The Prosecutor Versus Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, 59 
(1999). 

25 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 17 at 38(1)d. 

24 Resolution 955 Establishment of an International Tribunal and adoption 
of the Statute of the Tribunal, (1994). 

23 Id. at 421. 

22 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice 423 (2007).  

21 JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 87 (2013). 

 
 

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Nevertheless, states do not need complete certainty; 
near-certain knowledge that assistance provided to one state 
will perpetuate a crime is sufficient for the assisting state to be 
responsible under Article 16.28 Professor John Quigley, a 
scholar of international law, confirms and further explains this 
idea in the European Journal of International Law.29 He 
regards the United States’ intervention in Lebanon in 1958 as 
unlawful and Germany as complicit because Germany intended 
to assist the United States by sending American airplanes to 
Lebanon.30 While Germany was not entirely certain that the 
United States would use these airplanes unlawfully, they were 
“practically certain” that the United States would use these 
airplanes unlawfully.31  The “practically certain” designation 
insinuates that while Germany was not aware of the United 
States’ “specific intent,” they still had significant knowledge of 
the United States’ intentions. 

Since the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
addressed Iran’s ties to Hezbollah, when applying the above 
principles to China, it is reasonable to conclude that China is 
aware of this ruling and its implications for trading with a state 
sponsor of terror.32 The challenge is determining whether China 
knows that the money it uses to buy Iranian goods will go to 
support terror. Researchers, journalists, and government 
institutions have all confirmed the IRGC’s hegemony over the 
Iranian economy by controlling about half of the entire 

32 Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 
12 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 439, 439 (1990). 

31 J. Quigley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in the Law 
of State Responsibility, 57 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 
112–113 (1987). 

30 The status of the US intervention is unrelated to the purpose of this paper. 

29 John Quigley, Karim Khan’s Dubious Characterization of the Gaza 
Hostilities, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TALK! (May 28, 
2024). 

28 CRAWFORD, supra note 21 at 408. 

 
 

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economy.33 The wide range of sources confirming this fact 
reinforces the idea that China knows about the IRGC’s control 
over the Iranian economy. Accordingly, it is “practically 
certain” that China knows a significant portion of its trade with 
Iran finances terrorism around the world. 
 Another example to illustrate the standard for the 
necessary level of knowledge to hold an assisting state 
responsible is the Corfu Channel Case, where the ICJ issued a 
ruling after several British ships were damaged and several 
civilians were injured in 1946. This incident occurred after the 
British hit mines in Albanian territorial waters.34 Despite 
publicly saying it did not know about mines in its territorial 
waters, Albania “must have known” about this unlawful 
behavior.35 The Court considers knowledge as a state’s ability 
to recognize unlawful activities, making it responsible even if it 
publicly denies awareness. Since, as mentioned earlier, it is 
“practically certain” that China knows about its unlawful trade 
with Iran, China cannot avoid responsibility by denying 
awareness. 
 There are two additional considerations regarding the 
legal standards of due diligence and willful ignorance of the 
assisting state. Article 16 and the Commentaries do not refer to 
any duty of due diligence to investigate whether assistance 
might be used unlawfully. In addition, they do not mention how 
to treat an assisting state that is willfully ignorant. Instead, they 
stay neutral on both points.36 The Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in 

36 Harriet Moynihan, Aiding and Assisting: Challenges in Armed Conflict 
and Counterterrorism, 14–15. 

35 The Corfu Channel Case, International Court of Justice 19 (1949). 

34 Dafina Buçaj, The Obligation to Prevent Transboundary Cyber Harm: 
Expand the Regulatory Regime or Continue Deflecting Responsibility, 54 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 219, 252 (2023). 

33 USKOWI, supra note 2 at xvi; Julian Borger & Robert Tait, The Financial 
Power of the Revolutionary Guards, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 15, 2010; Treasury 
Targets Billion Dollar Foundations Controlled by Iran’s Supreme Leader, 
(2021). 

 
 

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interpreting the “had reason to know” standard of Article 7(3) 
of the Statute of the International Tribunal, provides further 
insight into the principles of due diligence and willful 
ignorance. 37 The Tribunal indicted Tihomir Blaškić for alleged 
violations of international law against Bosnian Muslims 
between May 1992 and January 1994. After being found guilty, 
Blaškić appealed.38 The Statute of the ICJ regards tribunals as a 
source of international law.39 The Appeals Chamber ruled “that 
the mental [mens rea] element ‘had reason to know’ as 
articulated in the Statute, does not automatically imply a duty 
to obtain information… [but] responsibility can be imposed for 
deliberately [sic] refraining from finding out but not for 
negligently failing to find out.”40 This decision indicates that 
under international law, states do not have an active duty to 
conduct due diligence on other countries, but if there is 
publicly recognized evidence and the assisting state 
intentionally ignores it, then the state should be held 
responsible. So, China does not have a duty of due diligence to 
investigate the details of how its trade with Iran aids terrorism. 
However, China cannot claim willful ignorance, especially if 
there is substantial and public evidence suggesting that Iranian 
terror benefits from Chinese trade. Since there is substantial 
public evidence showing China must be “practically certain” 
that Iranian terror benefits from Chinese trade, China cannot 
claim willful ignorance. 

The Commentary explicitly mentions the need for 
intent but does not clearly define it. Moreover, the 
Commentary’s use of the words “with a view to facilitate” 

40 Blaskic Case, supra note 37 at 406. 
39 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 17 at 38(1)d. 

38 ANTONIO CASSESE, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 610–611 (2009). 

37 Blaskic Case, The Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991 406 (2004). 

 
 

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suggests that the assisting state must have intent in aiding.41 

Terms used in the Rome Statute can help elucidate the use of 
these terms in other circumstances, such as the concept of 
intent here, since the Statute is a document of international 
law.42 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) concerns itself with crimes committed by individuals, as 
opposed to states.43 The Rome Statute defines intent as when 
“in relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the 
conduct; in relation to a consequence, that person means to 
cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the 
ordinary course of event.” 44 For China to meet the threshold of 
intent, it must purposefully trade with Iran while either 
meaning to support terrorism or knowing that trading with Iran 
will aid Iran’s terrorist activities.  

The ICC further developed the concept of intent in the 
Bemba Case. In the case, the ICC initially sentenced 
Jean-Pierre Bemba, a politician in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, in 2016 for crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
but later acquitted him in 2018.45 The ICC further explains its 
definition of intent in two ways: first and second degree. The 
first degree is when an individual acts in a manner with the 
desire to bring about the elements of the crime. The second 
degree is when an individual knows that the elements of the 
crime will almost inevitably arise by the commission or 
omission of an act, even if there is no desire for the elements of 
the crime to arise.46 China’s intent is quite easy to prove based 

46 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 358–359 
(2009). 

45 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 1, 752 (2016); The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 196–198 (2018). 

44 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 30(2) (1998). 

43 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, , in THE HANDBOOK 
OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 593, 595–596 (Kevin Jon Heller & Markus 
Dubber eds., 2020). 

42 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 17 at 38(1)d. 
41 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 11 at 66. 

 
 

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on the second degree of intent. As explained above, China is 
“practically certain” that its trade with Iran aids Iran’s terror. 
Regardless of whether China wants to support terror, it still has 
intent based on the second degree. In summary, China has the 
requisite level of knowledge, under the mens rea element of 
Article 16, that its trade with Iran supports terror. 

 
The Actus Reus Element 
 While the previous section described the mens rea 
element, this section will evaluate the actus reus element by 
determining the legality of states aiding terror and ascertaining 
its universality. First, it is important to establish a definition of 
terrorism to understand why aid to the IRGC should be ceased 
immediately. Unfortunately, there is not one clear definition of 
terrorism under international law.47 The League of Nations, the 
UNGA, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), the 
UNSC, and others have all passed their own, and sometimes 
contradictory, definitions of terrorism.48 Due to the variety of 
definitions, this paper will adopt the view of terrorism 
espoused by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Established by 
the UNSC in 2007, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon primarily 
prosecuted those responsible for the assassination of the former 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.49 This definition works 
best because of the wide-ranging methodology taken by the 
Appeals Chamber in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
whereby they consulted international treaties, UN resolutions, 
and domestic legislative and judicial practices to determine the 
customary law view of terrorism. The view of terrorism taken 
by the Special Tribunal has three key elements which must all 

49 Jan Erik Wetzel & Yvonne Mitri, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A 
Court “Off the Shelf” for a Divided Country, 7 LAW PRACT INT COURTS TRIB 
81, 81–82 (2008). 

48 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, (1937); 
Resolution 49/60 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, (1995); 
Kofi Annan, Statement to the General Assembly, (2005); Resolution 1566, 
(2004). 

47 BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2008). 

 
 

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be fulfilled: “the perpetration of a criminal act;… the intent to 
spread fear among the population… or directly or indirectly 
coerce a national or international authority to take some action, 
or to refrain from taking it; when the act involved a 
transnational element.”50 With this definition of terrorism, it is 
important to further investigate Iran’s terrorist actions by 
looking at the international legal principles of the use of force 
and non-intervention. 

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter expresses the fundamental 
principle on the use of force in saying: “All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.”51 According to the ILC in 
1966, the Charter’s view on using force is consistent with 
customary international law.52 UNGA Resolution 2625 further 
clarifies the principle of the use of force. The ICJ recognized 
this resolution as customary law in the Case Concerning the 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua Case). This case was brought to the ICJ by 
Nicaragua after the United States allegedly used military force 
against Nicaragua. Based on the principle of the use of force, 
the Court declared that “every State has the duty to refrain 
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of 
civil strife or terrorist acts in another State.”53 The challenge 
with employing the principle of the use of force is that in the 

53 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua, ICJ 191 (1986); Resolution 2625  Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, (1970); 
Thomas J. Pax, Nicaragua v. United States in the International Court of 
Justice: Compulsory Jurisdiction or Just Compulsion?, 8 BOSTON COLLEGE 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 471, 471 (1985). 

52 UNITED NATIONS, YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1966, 
VOL. II 20 (1966). 

51 United Nations Charter, 2(4) (1945). 
50 The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., 85 (2011). 

 
 

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Nicaragua Case, the ICJ determined that acts must be 
“classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier 
incident” to be forbidden based on this approach.54 According 
to legal commentators, an armed attack can refer to the use of 
force when it causes “serious consequences… human 
casualties, or considerable destruction of property”.55 This 
limitation by the Court’s ruling means that arming and training 
terrorist forces violates the principle of the use of force, but 
simply funding these forces does not. Instead, funding may be 
a problem under the principle of non-intervention.56 Only a 
limited number of acts of aggression are considered armed 
attacks; the remainder are frontier incidents.57 The high number 
of civilian casualties and destruction of property in the attack 
on the Jewish community center show that Hezbollah’s attacks 
can be considered armed attacks.   By organizing, assisting, and 
participating in these attacks through Hezbollah and the IRGC, 
Iran violates the use of force principle.  

Based on the principle of non-intervention, UNGA 
Resolution 2625 declares that “no State shall organize, assist, 
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed 
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime 
of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.”58 
The limitation of this principle is that for an entity to violate it, 
the terrorist activities must be conducted with the intention of 
bringing about change regarding “matters in which each State 
is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide 
freely,” including “political, economic, social and cultural 

58 Resolution 2625  Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, supra note 53. 

57 JOHN H. CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 504 (2. ed ed. 2008). 

56 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua, supra note 53 at 228. 

55 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 193 (Fourth 
edition ed. 2005). 

54 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua, supra note 53 at 195. 

 
 

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system, and the formulation of foreign policy” by the victim 
state.59 Terrorism, according to the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, includes cases where the terrorist organization 
intends to alter “matters in which a state is permitted to decide 
freely.” Therefore, the non-intervention principle encompasses 
most acts of support to a terror organization. The principles on 
the use of force and non-intervention are customary principles 
that have their ultimate authority in Article 2 of the UN Charter 
and are thus incumbent on all states.60  

The recent Houthi attacks on Israel also demonstrate 
Iran’s violation of international law. In December 2024, the 
Houthis fired rockets targeting Israel for several nights.61 These 
attacks may not be considered armed attacks because the 
Houthi strikes have only killed one Israeli and have only 
caused limited damage, thereby not fulfilling the criteria of 
“human casualties.”62 Therefore, these attacks do not 
necessarily violate the principle of the use of force but could 
violate the principle of non-intervention. The Houthis are firing 
these rockets to try to force Israel to end the war in Gaza, a 
highly political matter.63 Because the Houthi rebels are using 
Iranian funds and weapons to interfere with Israeli political 
matters, Iran has violated the principle of non-intervention by 
financing the rebels.64 Since these attacks are ongoing, Iran is 
currently in violation of this principle. 

64 USKOWI Supra note 2 at xiv–xvi 

63 Yemen’s Houthis ‘will not stop’ Red Sea Attacks Until Israel Ends Gaza 
War, AL JAZEERA, Dec. 19, 2023. 

62 Greg Myre & Daniel Estrin, Drone Strikes Tel Aviv, Killing One. Houthis 
Claim Responsibility, NPR, Jul. 19, 2024; Tia Goldenberg, Israel Struggles 
to Deter Escalating Attacks From Yemen’s Houthi Rebels as Other Fronts 
Calm, AP NEWS, Jan. 3, 2025. 

61 Stuart Winer & Emanuel Fabian, Houthis Fire Missile at Central Israel 
for 4th Night in Past Week; IDF Intercepts It, Dec. 25, 2024. 

60 United Nations Charter, supra note 51 at 2. 

59 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua, supra note 53 at 205. 

 
 

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Acts that violate both the principles of the use of force and 
non-intervention violate the key elements of terrorism.65 
However, that does not imply that all acts of terrorism 
necessarily fall under one of either the principles of the use of 
force or non-intervention. There could be a case where a state 
only provides funds to a terrorist organization, thereby possibly 
violating the principle of non-intervention. If the terrorist 
organization only commits attacks to spread fear and not to 
effect change concerning “matters in which each State is 
permitted,” then a state aiding terror would not necessarily be 
committing a crime. Nevertheless, this is not a concern because 
of the nature of state sponsors of terror who act with the intent 
to alter the political and security conditions of the victim state. 
Therefore, state sponsors of terror support terror organizations 
that have a goal of changing “matters in which each State is 
permitted.”66 

Conclusion 
 As demonstrated, trade with Iran violates international 
law. The only remedy is for states to cease all trade with Iran or 
violate international law. Another option would be for the 
UNSC to pass a resolution imposing economic sanctions on 
Iran, which would be incumbent on all states.67 Whether or not 
the UNSC passes a resolution, trade with Iran and other state 
sponsors of terror remains illegal, requiring all states to cease 
such activity. Although international law is not enforceable, 

67 Rebecca Barber, An Exploration of the General Assembly’s Troubled 
Relationship with Unilateral Sanctions, 70 ICLQ 343, 346–348 (2021); See 
Anne Van Aaken & Betül Simsek, Rewarding in International Law, 115 AM. 
J. INT. LAW 195 (2021). 

66 MAGDALENA KIRCHNER, WHY STATES REBEL: UNDERSTANDING STATE 
SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM 239–240 (2016). 

65 See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al. supra note 50 at 85 “The perpetration 
of a criminal act;… the intent to spread fear among the population… or 
directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take 
some action, or to refrain from taking it; when the act involved a 
transnational element” 

 
 

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states may have a desire to comply with it and, therefore, 
should cease trade with Iran on their own accord.68 States must 
not assist other states in committing internationally unlawful 
acts. There are both mens rea and actus reus elements to this 
responsibility. Since support for terrorism is illegal under 
international law, it is illegal for states to support those who aid 
terrorist organizations or commit terror attacks themselves. 
Using China and Iran as a case study, this article demonstrates 
why all states, including China, must halt trade with Iran due to 
its support for terrorism. 

68 Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really Law, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 
1293, 1293 (1984). 

 
 

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	State Responsibility for State Sponsors of Terror 
	Roadmap 
	 
	Background 
	State Responsibility 
	The Mens Rea Element 
	The Actus Reus Element 
	Conclusion 


