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Brandeis University Law Journal Spring 2023, Volume 10, Issue 2

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Obstacles to Accountability

Allison Weiner105

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has left much of the
international community increasingly concerned about
violations of international law and the strength of the
international legal system's ability to end impunity. With such a
young international legal system, having yet to reach its 100th

birthday, precedents are still fresh and being set with each new
case. Each investigation opened by the International Criminal
Court (ICC) encounters new uncharted territory. Using
legislation foundational to the modern international system,
this article seeks to analyze and understand the unique impact
of Russian aggression against Ukraine on the present-day
system of international law. This evaluation provides a
quasi-directive on how the international system can move
forward in the fight against international impunity.

I. Introduction

On February 24, 2022, Russian armed forces invaded
Ukraine from multiple positions along the Russian and
Belarusian borders.106 The invasion initiated over a year of
hostilities between the two nations, with no end in sight as of
this writing.107 The motivations of such an aggressive,
extensive attack have been puzzling to many in the
international community. The commitment of war crimes, as
well as violations of international law, is of increasing concern

107 Article was composed between February and March of 2023.

106 Zinets, Natalia, and Aleksandra Vasovic. “Missiles Rain Down Around
Ukraine.” Reuters, February 24, 2022.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukr
aine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/

105 Brandeis University Undergraduate, Class of 2025.

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as the war wages on. President Vladimir Putin’s continued
reign over Russia further exacerbates this concern, given the
volatility he brings to the region and its impact on the
international legal system of human rights and criminal
prosecution.

Ultimately, the recent conduct of the Russian
Federation continues to perplex the legal international
community. Though an “impulse for imperialism” emerging
from Russia is not necessarily unpredicted, scholars worldwide
have deemed the invasion of Ukraine “nonsensical,” thus,
leading many in the international community to question its
motivations.108 Questions regarding why Russian officials
responsible for potential breaches of international law continue
to hold positions of power remain unanswered. Scholars are
still attempting to understand the obstacles that have thus far
prevented foreign entities from holding the Russian
government accountable. This article seeks to respond to these
questions and provide a comprehensive understanding of the
issues surrounding Russian officials accountability under
international law.

II. Justification of the Invasion

With substantial Russian aggression against Ukraine
beginning with the annexation of Crimea, finalized in March

108 Rieber, Alfred. “Russian Imperialism: Popular, Emblematic,
Ambiguous.” The Russian Review 53, no. 3 (July 1994): 331–35, 332;
Guterres, Antonio. “Secretary-General’s Remarks to Press on the War in
Ukraine.” United Nations, March 2022.
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2022-03-22/secretary-
generals-remarks-press-the-war-ukraine?_gl=1%2A1rdjbfo%2A_ga%2AM
TYxMDgzNDk4Mi4xNjY4NjI5ODg2%2A_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z%2AMTY3
Nzc4OTI2My41LjEuMTY3Nzc4OTI5NC4wLjAuMA.

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2014, understanding the Russian regime’s motivations is
necessary to contextualize the 2022 invasion.109

Prompted by Euromaidan (also referred to as the
Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity), a collection of non-violent
demonstrations in Ukraine expressing pro-Western sentiment,
the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula was utilized as a
means to shield Russian Separatists from alleged Ukrainian
aggression. When acting Ukrainian president Viktor
Yanukovych paused the signing of the European Union (EU)
Association Agreement to closer align Ukraine with the EU,
demonstrations across the territory emerged. These
demonstrations protested the pause’s implications: hesitance to
ally with Europe coupled with the potential strengthening of
relations with the neighboring Russian Federation.110

These protests, favoring stronger ties to the EU,
initiated Russian aggression and continue to contextualize the
ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Through
Euromaidan, Vladimir Putin and his inner circle of Russian
officials were able to exploit domestic nationalism and launch
their moral justification campaign against Ukraine. With
cultural ties to World War II so deeply ingrained in Russian
society, the Kremlin effectively utilized the pro-Western
sentiment first expressed in Ukraine during the Revolution to
pit Russian citizens against their neighbors.111 Utilizing the

111 Often forgotten in the west is Russia’s role in the conclusion of WWII
and victory against the Nazi Party. However, domestically, Russia’s efforts
in the war have remained an incredibly strong point of pride. This has been
fully integrated into Russian society and strongly influences Russian views
of strength and bravery. Veterans of the war are understood as the pinnacle
of who a Russian should strive to be. The Nazi party is also considered a
piece of Western history considering the geographical positions of Russia

110 Zelinska, Olga. “Ukrainian Euromaidan Protest: Dynamics, Causes, and
Aftermath.” Sociology Compass 11, no. 9 (2017).

109 President of Russia. “Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of
Crimea to the Russian Federation Is Signed,” n.d.
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20604.

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legacy left by WWII, the Kremlin effectively propagandized
Ukraine as a Nazi puppet state under the control of the West, a
strategy still applied today in the effort to justify the
invasion.112 Citing the Western influence under which Nazism
developed and the colonial history of much of the Western
world, Vladimir Putin argues that the motions to align closer
with Europe, and thus, the West, invalidates the Russian history
and roots of many modern Ukrainians. Russian justification
and propaganda have embellished the invasion as a second
Great Patriotic War and redefined the nation of Ukraine as a
victim to Nazism.113 Taken together, the Kremlin actively
portrays the invasion of Ukraine as a liberation rather than an
intervention.

III. Relevant Legislation

Despite the ever-evolving state of International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the innumerable list of treaties
and statutes viable as a lens for investigation into Russia, the
scope of this article’s evaluation will focus on three integral
pieces of international legislation: The Charter of the United
Nations, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and The
Rome Statute. The Charter of the United Nations (UN) forms
the foundation of the international system, housing many of the
rules and customs by which the international order operates.

113 Arseniy, “Nazism.”

112 The Kremlin complex is located in Moscow, Russia and holds the
president's main office and official residence. It is the central working venue
of the presidential administration. However, it also operates as an
international symbol of Russian power and authority; Kumankov, Arseniy.
“Nazism, Genocide, and the Threat of the Global West: Russian Moral
Justification of War in Ukraine.” Etikk I Praksis--Nordic Journal of Applied
Ethics, n.d.

and the remainder of Europe. With Ukrainians advocating for much stronger
allyship with Europe, The Kremlin began propagandizing Ukraine as falling
victim to Western Nazism.

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The Geneva Conventions are a cornerstone in the institution of
jus in bello, the permitted conduct of parties engaged in
conflict.114 The Conventions establish explicit regulations on
permissible methods of warfare and the treatment of civilians,
combatants, and prisoners. The Rome Statute is the founding
document of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the
permanent international judiciary tasked with the criminal
prosecution of those found in violation of international law.
These three pieces of legislation establish a strong guide of
possible violations committed in Ukraine, as well as abridge
what would otherwise be a complex nexus of international laws
and regulations.

A. The Charter of the United Nations

Signed in June of 1945, the UN Charter is fundamental
to a contemporary understanding of international law and
politics. Establishing the basis for countless treaties, the
Charter instructs member countries on how to interact with one
another and establishes the preliminary mechanics that the
international organization uses to operate. In Article 2, the UN
Charter demands the recognition of all member states by
member states.115 Additionally, it obligates members to use
“pacific means” in dispute settlement and prohibits the use of
threat or force against the “territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”116

In addition to founding the United Nations, the charter
establishes the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), one
of its several principal organs of which Russia is a permanent

116 “Charter of the United Nations.”

115 “Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice.” United Nations, June 26, 1945.

114 “International Humanitarian Law: Answers to Your Questions.”
International Committee of the Red Cross, June 2020.

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member and possesses subjective veto power.117 Having
currently cast nearly half of all vetoes in the UNSC, Russia has
a strong precedent of unbridled veto usage, particularly in cases
of genocide or war crimes; after several decades of relative
silence, the Russian Federation reemerged as a central
proponent of veto power when met with several UNSC
resolutions regarding Syria.118 Bound by their signature to the
Charter, members consent to the quasi-judicial status of the
UNSC and agree to execute, to the best of their ability,
decisions and resolutions handed down by the Council. The
Council is tasked with the maintenance of international peace
and, due to their capability to refer international concerns to the
ICC, it is the primary vehicle through which the UN and the
Court interact.

The UNSC is the most powerful of the principal organs,
being the only one capable of creating legally binding orders to
member countries. The presence of permanent members and
their power to veto resolutions as they see fit further
exemplifies the power of the Council, isolating it from the
General Assembly and other organs with less cumulative
power.

118 Security Council Report. “UN Security Council Working Methods: The
Veto,” December 2022.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-method
s/the-veto.php.

117 “Charter of the United Nations,” 18; It should be noted that the
permanent members of the Security Council, and thus those given veto
power were not selected arbitrarily. The UN was designed just following
WWII and deliberately granted greater influence to the Allied powers, the
victors of the war. However, the use of this veto power when reviewing
potential resolutions to be adopted by the UNSC is capricious. Any of the
five countries can veto a resolution for any number of reasons and they are
not subjected to even a preliminary of justification for their choice.

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B. The Geneva Conventions of August 12th, 1949

The Geneva Conventions set the standard definition for
war crimes as they are understood in IHL. With protections for
wounded combatants, prisoners of war, and civilians caught in
the crossfire of international conflict, The Conventions codify
several guidelines on the treatment of human beings during war
time. The Conventions consist of seven main bodies: four
individual conventions and three additional protocols.
Considering both brevity and relevance, this analysis will
exclusively address Convention IV and Protocol I. Codifying
the protections for civilians during war, Convention IV
addresses a multitude of civilian types in conflict and the
protections guaranteed to them by the treaty. Most notably, the
protection of civilian hospitals and medical personnel, all
children under the age of 15, women–specifically against any
forms of sexual violence–, and the prohibitions of direct harm
to any “protected persons” are listed in Articles 18(a), 24, 27,
and 32 respectively.119

Protocol 1, “relating to the protection of victims of
international armed conflicts,” further extrapolates on several
ideas presented in Convention IV and supplements areas the
fourth convention may have missed, most prevalent being
Articles 48, 35, and 51.120 Expanding on ideas presented in
Convention IV, Article 35(b) prevents the deployment of
weapons known to cause “superfluous injury and unnecessary
suffering.”121 Article 35(c) prohibits the use of warfare
intended to cause widespread or severe damage to the natural
environment.122 Aiming to provide ample protections to

122 “Protocols Additional,” 30.
121 “Protocols Additional,” 30.

120 “Protocols Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.”
International Committee of the Red Cross, August 12, 1949, 1.

119 “The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.” International Committee
of the Red Cross, August 12, 1949.

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civilians, Article 48 prevents combatants from directing any
operations against individuals or objects not-yet-distinguished
as military.123 Combatants are to assume civilian status until
proven otherwise. Arguably the most significant is Article 51,
which aims to provide complete and undeniable protections to
civilians. 51(1) grants “general protection against dangers
arising from military operations,” 51(2) prevents civilian
populations or individuals from being the object of military
attacks, 51(3) guarantees all protections to all civilians unless
they join the military, and 51(4) entirely outlaws
“indiscriminate attacks.”124

C. The Rome Statute

Establishing one of the several avenues for
accountability to be evaluated, The Rome Statute is the
founding document of the ICC. Tasked with the prosecution of
individuals who have committed war crimes, crimes against
humanity, the crime of genocide, and the crime of aggression,
the ICC is the only permanent international judicial body in the
world with capacity to try world leaders for their atrocities.

Importantly, the Statute establishes the standards for
each of the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. Article 6
defines genocide as

acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to

124 “Protocols Additional,” 37.
123 “Protocols Additional,” 36.

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prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.125

Article 7 outlines crimes against humanity as “any of
the following acts when committed as a systematic attack
directed against any civilian population: murder, forcible
transfer, imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, or other
inhumane acts of a similar character.”126 Lastly, Article 8
establishes war crimes as any grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions or “other serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in international armed conflict.”127
Despite confusion surrounding the jurisdiction of the ICC in
the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Article 12 outlines that with
Ukraine’s acceptance of ICC jurisdiction in 2015, the Court has
the ability to prosecute any Russian nationals convicted of
statute violations committed on Ukrainian territory.128
However, under Article 15(5), the Court is unable to charge
individuals for crimes of aggression when these individuals are
nationals of a non-member state.129 With respect to the crimes
of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, any
Russian national found responsible for their commitment in
Ukraine since the 2015 declaration are eligible to be charged
and tried by the ICC. Considering the role the Court plays in
IHL and criminal prosecution, jurisdiction is absolutely vital in
overcoming obstacles to Russian accountability.

129 “The Rome Statute," 10.

128 Klimkin, Pavlo. “Declaration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,”
September 8, 2015; “The Rome Statute.” International Criminal Court, July
1, 2022. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf.

127 “The Rome Statute,” 4-8.
126 “The Rome Statute,” 3-4.
125 “The Rome Statute,” 3.

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IV. International Law Violations

In accordance with each of the preceding treaties, with
evidence presented by various respected news outlets and the
International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine
(COI), and corroborated by a March 2023 ICC arrest warrant
for Russian officials, it is evident that violations of
international law are no longer speculatory. It should be noted
that many of the crimes are outlawed by more than one treaty,
subsequently leading to overlap, and specific criminal incidents
will not be examined. The confirmation of violations of
international law are vital, as accountability cannot be
considered without a crime having been committed.

A. COI on Ukraine

Established by the United Nations Human Rights
Council (UNHRC), the COI issued its first report on war
crimes in Ukraine on October 12th, 2022. Among offenses
mentioned in the report, “war crimes, violations of human
rights, and violations of [IHL],” were all found in Ukraine.130

Violations of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions
include threats to use nuclear weapons, the launching of
explosives far from the frontlines causing considerable civilian
damage, the use of explosive weapons in civilian areas,
indiscriminate attacks using explosives, frivolous attacks on
civilians, and summary executions.131 Breaching Article 8(2) of
The Rome Statute, the definition of war crimes, were the
deployment of explosive weapons across civilian areas,

131 Independent International, “Report,” 6, 7, 8, 10.

130 Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. “Report of
the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine.” The
United Nations, October 18, 2022.
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/A-77-533-AUV-EN.pdf.

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forcible transfers, unlawful confinement, and inhumane
treatment.132 Violations of Convention IV of the Geneva
Conventions include the torture, ill treatment, and deliberate
wounding of protected persons; the use of explosives in
civilian areas; the deliberate endangerment of civilians;
multiple commitments of sexual violence; and the lack of
respect for the life of children.133 Fundamentally, the grounds
upon which Russia waged war on Ukraine lead to the violation
of Article 2 of the UN Charter. The annexation of Crimea in
2014, the violent invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the
disingenuous referenda held in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia,
Luhansk, and Donetsk regions in September 2022 each violate
the Charter.134 They disregarded the obligation to pacific
settlement, the mandated recognition of sovereignty, and the
prohibition of threats or uses of force against territorial
integrity or political independence of other states.

B. War Crimes

Regarding the war crimes, the first of several potential
arrest warrants were issued by the ICC in March 2023. The
Court officially issued an arrest warrant for President Vladimir
Vladimirovich Putin and Russian Commissioner for Children’s
Rights, Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova. Putin and
Lvova-Belova have both been charged with committing war

134 Myers, Steven, and Ellen Barry. “Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and
Bitterly Denounces the West.” New York Times, March 18, 2014.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html; Ellyatt,
Holly. “Russian Forces Invade Ukraine.” CNBC, February 24, 2022.
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/24/russian-forces-invade-ukraine.html;
Ellyatt, Holly. “Fake Referendums in Occupied Ukraine Set the Stage for
Annexation — and Immense Danger for Ukraine.” CNBC, September 28,
2022.

133 Independent International, “Report,” 13, 14, 15, 16.
132 Independent International, “Report,” 6, 13, 13.

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crimes, specifically the abduction, deportation, and forced
transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine. With
Ukrainian officials reporting as many as 8,000 children missing
and transported to Russia, the Court asserts that both Putin and
Lvova-Belova had intimate knowledge of the alleged violation
and bear individual responsibility.135

Furthermore, the Russian Federation has been accused
of forcibly deporting children to Russia, implementing simple
and rapid avenues to “citizenship,” and placing Ukrainian
children up for Russian adoption.136 As this measure works to
strip Ukrainian children of their national and ethnic identities,
the primary concern is its role as a potential step towards the
ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Ukrainian people.

C. Concluding Notes

To conclude this segment of the evaluation, it is vital to
comprehend the meaning of these blatant violations. Between
the work of journalists and international investigations, it is
undeniable that an array of war crimes and violations of IHL
have been committed on Ukrainian territory. Even more so, the
impact of these breaches on the Ukrainian people have been
unfathomable. The blood of thousands is on the hands of the
Russian government, critical infrastructure has been decimated,

136 Deeb, Shvets, and Tilna, “How Moscow.”

135 Deeb, Sarah, Anastasiia Shvets, and Elizaveta Tilna. “How Moscow
Grabs Ukrainian Kids and Makes Them Russians.” AP News, March 17,
2023.
https://apnews.com/article/ukrainian-children-russia-7493cb22c9086c6293c
1ac7986d85ef6; International Criminal Court. “Situation in Ukraine: ICC
Judges Issue Arrest Warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and
Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova,” n.d.
https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warra
nts-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and.

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and millions have been displaced.137 Regardless of whether
Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials are held
accountable, Ukraine will spend years, if not decades,
recovering from the devastation left by Putin's Regime.

V. Obstacles to Accountability

Contextually evaluating legal accountability pertaining
to the Russia-Ukraine conflict implies three primary avenues,
and subsequently, the obstacles within each: The UNSC, the
ICC, and the role of free will within an anarchical system. The
UNSC’s ultimate purpose is the maintenance of international
peace, while the ICC’s is criminal prosecution; free will and its
relationship with anarchy is integral to the most preliminary of
understandings on international law and politics. A thorough
evaluation of each within the context of the Russia-Ukraine
conflict provides for a nuanced understanding of obstacles to
accountability.

A. The UNSC

Russia holds one of the five permanent seats on the
UNSC and, as such, possesses veto power over any potential
resolutions that come before the Council.138 Ultimately, this
grants a great deal of freedom and impunity not only to Russia,
but to essentially any of the permanent members.

Prima facie, a step similar to that taken by the UNHRC,
the suspension of the Russian Federation seems to be in order.
However, a suspension is neither judicially effective for

138 “Charter of the United Nations,” 18.

137 Cooper, Helene, Eric Schmitt, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff. “Soaring
Death Toll Gives Grim Insight Into Russian Tactics.” New York Times,
February 2, 2023.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/02/us/politics/ukraine-russia-casualties.h
tml.

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Ukraine nor exactly plausible. A suspension would result in
removal from the UNSC, while an expulsion indicates the
state’s removal from the entirety of the UN. Russia holding one
of the five permanent seats on the security council makes both
of these options virtually impossible due to any suspension or
expulsion requiring all five security council seat sign offs,
requiring Russia to approve of their own ramifications.

Due to the impossibility of Russian suspension or
expulsion, it is clear that the UN Charter failed to consider the
potentially dangerous ramifications of establishing the UNSC
in this way. Ultimately, suspension of a member state from the
Council is not mentioned anywhere in the Charter. However,
the UNSC and its permanent members are explicitly
established by Article 23(1).139 This indicates the necessity of
an amendment to alter the permanent seats of the UNSC in any
way, shape, or form; which leads to Article 108, mandating the
approval of all five permanent council members to bring a
proposed amendment into force.140 Given that this requires
Russia to sign their own death certificate, removal from the
UNSC is not a presently viable option. Regarding expulsion
from the UN altogether, it is a similarly grim situation. As
stated in Article 6, “a member of the United Nations…may be
expelled…upon the recommendation of the security
council.”141 Consistent with a potential suspension from the
UNSC, a complete expulsion would require Russian approval.

Additionally, there is an argument to be made about the
efficacy of an expulsion or suspension from UN activities in
bringing the Russian Federation to justice. Due to the
anarchical nature of the international order, and widely
respected foundational principles like “consent of the
governed,” a given nation can only be held responsible for
violations of a treaty they have signed. Russia cannot be held to

141 “Charter of the United Nations,” 8.
140 “Charter of the United Nations,” 69.
139 “Charter of the United Nations.”

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UN standards, penalized for violations of the organization’s
charter, or legally bound by its mandates if it is no longer a
member state. Suspension from the UNSC could very well lead
to a voluntary exit from the organization, while an
assembly-led expulsion would make accountability even more
challenging.

To fully evaluate the Security Council, it is crucial to
consider the potential outcome had Russia not vetoed the
UNSC resolution regarding their troops in Ukraine, despite the
situation's hypothetical nature. Corroborated by the realist
paradigm of international relations, a veto is merely a formal
process of informing the other permanent members that a state
does not intend to abide by a given resolution.142 In turn,
Russia’s veto of the February mandate, calling for Moscow to
remove all troops from Ukraine, simply informs council
members that it has every intention of keeping its troops in
place.

However, what if Russia did not possess veto power?
What if such a resolution was passed? Realism asserts that hard
power (i.e. military strength) is foundational to legitimacy.
States act according to their own self-interest. Hence, only
military strength or threats can change such behavior.
Considering the atrocities committed in Ukraine since then, it
is fair to say that it would have taken enemy boots on the
ground, actively pushing the Russians out of Ukrainian
territory, to change the Kremlin’s position.

The UN does not have enough coercive capacity on its
own to enforce mandates by the UNSC; it relies on the

142 One of the three paradigms of international relations, the realist paradigm
stresses the importance of anarchy and hard power in the international order.
Anarchy refers not to chaos but to the lack of a universal, international
governing body, and hard power refers to tangible resources, most often the
economy and military strength. Due to the size and strength of both the
Russian military and economy, the realist paradigm asserts that there is no
force capable of coercing The Kremlin to behave in a specific way.

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manpower of its largest member states to keep the rest in line.
The Security Council, an institution designed for the
preservation of international peace, inherently awards impunity
to the Allied Powers of WWII. The lack of checks on the
power of permanent members breeds a power dynamic in
which there is no method of enforcing punishment on the
largest, and subsequently most powerful member states. The
Security Council’s necessity to the functionality of the UN
elevates the status of the council. Furthermore, the lack of
independent UN coercive capabilities only reinforces the idea
first proposed in the Peloponnesian war, that “the strong will
do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”143

B. The ICC

The ICC is responsible for prosecuting individuals
found in violation of international law. However, bureaucracy,
enforcement mechanisms, and dwindling legitimacy hinder the
abilities of the Court to do so.

Bureaucracy generally slows various processes and
those of the ICC are no exception. Despite not necessarily
minimizing the courts physical capabilities to charge guilty
Russian officials, the bureaucratic processes by which the court
operates can take years, if not decades. The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) closed
over ten years following their issuance of the final
indictments.144 The ICTY was open for a total of twenty-four

144 Zhou, Han-Ru. “The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants by International
Forces.” Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, no. 2 (2006): 202–18;
Legacy Website of the ICTY. “ICTY Marks Official Closure with Moving
Ceremony in The Hague.” Archive. Accessed November 29, 2022.

143 Art, Robert, and Robert Jervis. “Anarchy and Its Consequences.” In
International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 13th
ed. Pearson Education, Inc., 2016.

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years and delivered a total of 161 sentences.145 There is no
reason to presume an ICC prosecution of Putin and other
responsible officials would take any less time. The pace at
which these trials move guarantees that thousands of
Ukrainians would likely die before seeing any justice or
reparations for all they have endured at the hands of Russian
officials. Additionally, Article 63(1) poses a large enforcement
barrier to the ICC because it obligates the Court to have the
suspect in custody prior to conducting the trial.146 It should be
clarified that the following analysis in no way intends to make
a statement on the rights awarded to individuals accused of a
crime or assert that due process should be removed from the
protocols by which the ICC abides. However, lacking an
independent law enforcement agency, this mandate objectively
disrupts the Court’s ability to bring those guilty of international
atrocities to justice, and brings the legitimacy of the Court into
question. As seen with the ICTY, if the ICC is forced to rely on
multinational forces, the legitimacy of the court as an
independent entity is questionable.147

With the ICTY, and the ICC trial regarding Darfur,
Sudan, the international community has illustrated hesitance to
enforce arrest warrants issued by the Court.148 In multiple cases,

148 Sharp, Walter. “International Obligations to Search For and Arrest War
Criminals: Government Failure in the Former Yugoslavia.” Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law, 1997, 411–60; Chazal, Nerida. The
International Criminal Court and Global Social Control: International
Criminal Justice in Late Modernity. Routledge, n.d. Accessed September
21, 2022; Beginning in 2003, rebels in Darfur, a western region of Sudan,
staged an insurrection against the Sudanese government. They claimed the
current regime disregarded the needs of the large non-Arab population in
Darfur. Over the course of several years the situation between the Sudanese

147 Zhou, “The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants,” 202–18.
146 “The Rome Statute,” 31.

145 Legacy Website of the ICTY. “About the ICTY.” Accessed November 29,
2022. https://www.icty.org/en/about.

https://www.icty.org/en/press/icty-marks-official-closure-with-moving-cere
mony-in-the-hague.

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including those of Yugolsavia and Darfur, arrest warrants have
gone unenforced by countries in which suspects were found.149
Currently, a precedent has been established of nations’
complicity in the behavior of war criminals and reluctance to
enforce arrest warrants.

C. Free Will and Anarchy

The International system is fundamentally anarchic.
Both state and non-state actors operate within the law as they
see fit. This seemingly lawlessness is in the absence of “will at
national and/or international levels.”150 Unfortunately, there is
no global enforcement agency to ensure the cooperation of
other nations. As such, within the context of the
Russia-Ukraine conflict, little to no coercive action has been
taken against Russia. Though sanctions have been employed,
the lack of more aggressive coercive efforts (stronger military
opposition) only reinforces the notion that the Russian
Federation, as a relatively strong world power, enjoys impunity
from the coercive capacity of other states and international
forces.

Referencing the ICC as understood in the previous
section, an arrest warrant can, and likely will, go unfulfilled for
years. With a precedent of international complicity, the
responsibility to execute such a warrant now falls on the
Russian Federation and its allies. The Kremlin has already

150 Morris, Madeline. “International Guidelines Against Impunity:
Facilitating Accountability.” Law and Contemporary Problems 59, no. 4
(1996): 29–39.

149 Sharp, “International Obligations,” 411-460; Chazal, “International Court
and Social Control”

military and the rebels escalated and was eventually referred to the ICC by
the UNSC. This led to the issuance of an arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir,
the sitting president of Sudan, for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.

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dismissed the ICC warrant for Putin and Lvova-Belova,
indicating its more than expected refusal to enforce it.151
However, the recent arrest warrant issued by the Court
certainly shrunk the world of Vladimir Putin; it prevents him
from traveling to any major countries in the West as well as
attending any summits of major world leaders. Though Putin
will likely attend the 2023 G20 summit in India (as of the
writing of this article), the presence of a Russian delegation at
important meetings going forward will likely hinge on the host
country, and its status of allyship with the Russian Federation.
The degree to which Putin can interact with the rest of the
international order will likely be inconsistent. Though such
irregular involvement in the international system will certainly
reduce Russia's role on the world stage and drain its ability to
weigh in on policy, it will take time for these hindrances to
show their full impact.

When evaluating the known reasons for why Russia has
violated international law in such egregious ways, there are
three primary factors to assess regarding why an international
actor abides by a given rule or acts in accordance with an
organization: (1) they fear the punishment of the enforcers, (2)
the actor views the rule or mandate as within their own
self-interest, or (3) the actor feels as though the rule or mandate
is legitimate and ought to be obeyed.152 Conversely, each one of
these can be inverted to signify reasons as to why a given rule
or organization is not obeyed by international actors. Either (1)
there is not a large enough coercive threat to force the actor
into submission, (2) the rule is not within the actor’s own

152 Hurd, Ian. “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.”
International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 379–408, 379.

151 Reuters. “Kremlin: ICC Warrants Outrageous and Unacceptable, but Null
and Void for Us,” March 17, 2023.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-warrant-against-putin-meanin
gless-russia-does-not-belong-icc-2023-03-17/.

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self-interest, or (3) the actor does not view the given mandate
or body as legitimate and deserving of obedience. Situations
like the Russia-Ukraine conflict, or general international
disobedience, occur when neither one, two, nor three are met.
Though a given international organization or mandate does not
necessarily need all three, it is certainly clear that at least two
of the three factors are necessary to guarantee the cooperation
of actors. Though the UN has widespread legitimacy, its lack of
coercive capacity alongside its clear opposition to Russian
interests has left the international body paralyzed.

When viewing the reasons for international conflict
specifically through the lens of the situation in Ukraine, each
tenet necessary for cooperation can be evaluated individually.
It is evident that neither the UN nor the ICC independently
possess an adequately strong coercive apparatus to either halt
Russia’s behavior or force a surrender to the Court. The
violations prohibiting the very conduct performed in Ukraine
clearly competes with the self-interest of the Russian
Federation. Further, none of the international bodies capable of
holding Russia accountable are viewed as legitimate by the
Russian Federation to actively prevent atrocities from being
committed. As mentioned previously, at least two of the three
factors must be met for cooperation. However, there is an
argument to be made that the regularity and magnitude of
international disobedience comes from the lack of all three. No
single international mandate or organization possesses coercive
capacity, legitimacy, and self interest and it is possible that the
lack of such an international institution is to blame for the
frequency and scale at which international conflict occurs.

Increasing coercive efforts and capability seems to be
the most efficient solution to improve the UN’s capacity for
resolution in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, it should
be noted that coercion as a method of guaranteed cooperation is
the least sustainable. Coercion to motivate compliance requires
excessive resources dedicated to surveillance and enforcement

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and increases the likelihood of disobedience upon the halting
of enforcement measures.153 Due to the vast nature of the
Russia-Ukraine conflict and the reduction in the likelihood of
compliance without coercion in the future, increasing the
coercive capacity is not a permanent solution to the problems
offered by the situation in Ukraine.154 Fundamentally, the very
nature of the international system is one of the greatest
obstacles in ending impunity held by officials of world powers.
The anarchy inherent to the international order only decreases
the likelihood that Russia, and other nations like it, can or will
be held accountable for the atrocities they have committed.

VI. Concluding Thoughts

The preceding analysis aimed to synthesize a large
portion of the existing information on the Russia-Ukraine
conflict, specifically regarding the international law in
question, the validity of claims that said international law has
been violated since the February invasion, and the obstacles to
bringing Russian officials to justice. The ICC, with the
potential to hold Russian officials accountable for their crimes,
has opened an investigation. However, with limited resources
and the lack of cooperation from the UNSC, bound by Russia’s
veto power, the Court will continue to face challenges and it is
unclear if or when a trial will ever commence. Just over a year
into hostilities and the impact of the ongoing war has been
insurmountable. With millions from the region displaced, an
estimated 280,000 casualties, and over 30,000 civilian deaths,
Eastern Europe will be recovering from the wreckage left by

154 Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority,” 385.
153 Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority,” 384.

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this war for years.155 With each new case opened by the ICC,
new precedents are set; it is of the utmost importance that the
international order commits to an agenda rooted in justice and
ending impunity held by many world leaders. Let the foregoing
assessment serve as a directive not only on the recent conduct
of the Russian Federation, but the obstacles in place hindering
international heroes from bringing the nation to justice.

155 Cooper, Helene, Eric Schmitt, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff. “Soaring
Death Toll Gives Grim Insight Into Russian Tactics.” New York Times,
February 2, 2023.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/02/us/politics/ukraine-russia-casualties.h
tml.

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