Untitled document


OPTIONS FOR THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION TO PREVENT IRAN FROM
DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR WEAPON

Kevin A. Mani94

Abstract: Today, Iran’s nuclear program poses a threat to the United States’ (U.S.) security
interests in the Middle East. In 2015, under the Obama administration, the U.S. joined the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal. The
JCPOA was a multinational agreement meant to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon
in return for the removal of sanctions on Iran. However, in 2018, the Trump administration
withdrew from the agreement and re-imposed sanctions. Despite the U.S.’ decision to withdraw
from the agreement, Iran continued to abide by it until the Trump administration imposed new
sanctions against their country. The Biden administration has only two options to address this
situation: The U.S. could either rejoin the JCPOA or increase economic sanctions. While
increasing sanctions could pressure Iran to negotiate, they would risk the rise of anti-American
sentiment and enhance the power of hardliners in the government. On the other hand, if the U.S.
rejoins the JCPOA, there is the risk that Iran will continue with its missile program and its
dominance in the region.

Introduction
A Joseph R. Biden presidency renews hope of the United States (U.S.) rejoining the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal. The
JCPOA was a preliminary framework agreement reached on July 14, 2015, between Iran, the
European Union (E.U.), and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) — the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China — plus Germany,
commonly referred to as the P5+1.95 The agreement was a transaction in which Iran promised to
stop developing nuclear weapons for 15 years in return for the removal of economic sanctions.96

However, on May 8, 2018, under the Trump administration, the U.S. withdrew from the
agreement and reimposed sanctions on Iran despite strong disapproval from the other
signatories.97 Trump backed his decision to leave, claiming that it was “defective at its core.”98

Trump claimed that the limits of the agreement were “very weak,” “allow[ing] Iran to continue

98 “The P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, May 16, 2018.”

97 “The P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, May 16, 2018,” Arms Control Association, 2018,
https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2018-05-16/p41-iran-nuclear-deal-alert-may-16-2018.

96 Kali, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?”

95 Kali Robinson “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” Council on Foreign Relations, 2021,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal.

94 Undergraduate at Brandeis University, Class of 2024.

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https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2018-05-16/p41-iran-nuclear-deal-alert-may-16-2018
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal


enriching uranium and — over time — reach the brink of a nuclear breakout.”99 In November
2018, the Trump administration re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran.100 In April 2019, the
U.S. threatened to impose sanctions on any country that continued to buy oil from Iran.101 Two
months later, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei.102 The U.S.’ decision to not only withdraw from the agreement but also to increase
sanctions on Iran discouraged the country from continuing to abide by the limits set by the
agreement. On July 1, 2019, Iran violated the terms of the agreement when it surpassed the limit
on its low-enriched uranium stockpile.103 A week later, Iran breached the 3.67% limit on nuclear
enrichment.104 The potential for political and economic destabilization poses a great risk to the
U.S. and its allies in the Middle East — Israel and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the Biden
administration must decide what strategy to pursue to protect U.S. security interests in the
region. The Biden administration can pursue two strategies to address this situation: attempt to
rejoin the original agreement or increase economic sanctions. The most effective strategy that
will fulfill U.S. regional security interests is to rejoin the original agreement.

Background
Iran launched its civilian nuclear program in the 1950s under the Shah, Mohammad Reza

Pahlavi.105 In 1968, Iran signed the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT),
ratifying the treaty two years later.106 The NPT had three objectives: to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons, to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and to strive for global

106 “The Iran Primer: Iran and the NPT,” United States Institute of Peace, 2020,
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jan/22/iran-and-npt#:~:text=1968,develop%20or%20acquire%20nuclear%20w
eapons.

105 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Threats, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.: 2014.

104 Rafael Mariano Grossi, “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations
Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” International Atomic Energy Agency, 2019,
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/07/govinf2019-9.pdf.

103 Rafael Mariano Grossi, “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations
Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” International Atomic Energy Agency, 2019,
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/07/govinf2019-8.pdf.

102 Daphne Psaledakis and Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. imposes sweeping sanctions on Iran, targets Khamenei-linked
foundation,” Reuters, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-iran-sanctions-int/u-s-imposes-sweeping-sanctions-on-iran-targets-khamenei-lin
ked-foundation-idUSKBN27Y262.

101 Edward Wong and Clifford Krauss, “U.S. Moves to Stop All Nations From Buying Iranian Oil, but China Is
Defiant,” The New York Times, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/world/middleeast/us-iran-oil-sanctions-.html.

100 “The P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, May 16, 2018.”

99 Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” Trump White
House Archives, 2018,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-actio
n/.

44

https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jan/22/iran-and-npt#:~:text=1968,develop%20or%20acquire%20nuclear%20weapons
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jan/22/iran-and-npt#:~:text=1968,develop%20or%20acquire%20nuclear%20weapons
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/07/govinf2019-9.pdf
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/07/govinf2019-8.pdf
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-iran-sanctions-int/u-s-imposes-sweeping-sanctions-on-iran-targets-khamenei-linked-foundation-idUSKBN27Y262
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-iran-sanctions-int/u-s-imposes-sweeping-sanctions-on-iran-targets-khamenei-linked-foundation-idUSKBN27Y262
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/world/middleeast/us-iran-oil-sanctions-.html
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/


nuclear disarmament. Following the 1979 Iran Revolution, Iran’s nuclear program came to a
stillstand as many nuclear scientists had fled the country in the wake of the revolution and
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini opposed the use of nuclear technology.107 In 1984, the U.S. added
Iran to its list of state sponsors of terrorism and gradually imposed economic sanctions and arms
embargos on the country.108 Later that year, Khomeini restarted Iran’s nuclear program to defend
the Islamic Republic from external threats, such as Iraq.109 Over time, sanctions were used to
address concerns that Iran was using its civilian nuclear program as a cover for nuclear weapons
development.110

Almost two decades later, in 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI),
the political wing of the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, a militant opposition organization banned
by the Iranian government, revealed the existence of Iran’s nuclear program.111 Alireza
Jafarzadeh, a representative of the NCRI, disclosed that Iran had built two new nuclear facilities
in Natanz and Arak.112 The following year, Iran negotiated with the EU-3 — France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom — in an attempt to avoid referral to the UNSC.113 During this time, Iran
notified the IAEA that it would suspend nuclear enrichment for the duration of the talks,
commonly referred to as the Paris Agreement.114 However, diplomatic progress fell apart in 2005
after Iran rejected the EU-3’s long-term framework agreement and decided to resume enriching
uranium.115

In June 2006, the P5+1 proposed an agreement that would advance Iran’s civilian nuclear
technology if it suspended nuclear enrichment and resumed the implementation of additional
protocols requiring Iran to declare its nuclear activities and grant the IAEA access to its nuclear
facilities.116 Although Iran rejected the proposal, it admitted that it contained “elements which

116 “Iran: Nuclear,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2020, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/.

115 Kelsey Davenport, “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran,” Arms Control Association, 2021.
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran.

114 “Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004,”
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004,
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf.

113 “SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON IRAN FOR FAILURE TO HALT URANIUM
ENRICHMENT, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1737 (2006),” United Nations Security Council,
2006, https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8928.doc.htm.

112 Samore, Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, 16.
111 Samore, Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, 16.
110 “Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview.”

109 Micah Zenko, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: History and Eight Questions,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2012,
https://www.cfr.org/blog/irans-nuclear-program-history-and-eight-questions#:~:text=According%20to%20an%20IA
EA%20internal,Islamic%20Revolution%20from%20external%20threats.

108 “Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview,” U.S. Department of State, 2004,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/225050.pdf.

107 Gary Samore, Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, London, UK: Routledge, 2005, 9-16.

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https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf
https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8928.doc.htm
https://www.cfr.org/blog/irans-nuclear-program-history-and-eight-questions#:~:text=According%20to%20an%20IAEA%20internal,Islamic%20Revolution%20from%20external%20threats
https://www.cfr.org/blog/irans-nuclear-program-history-and-eight-questions#:~:text=According%20to%20an%20IAEA%20internal,Islamic%20Revolution%20from%20external%20threats
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/225050.pdf


may be useful for a constructive approach.”117 In response, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1737,
which gradually imposed economic sanctions on Iran in an attempt to force the country to the
negotiation table.118

In June 2008, the UNSC proposed a new, more comprehensive framework agreement.119

Unlike the first proposal, the UNSC’s new proposal included a promise not to impose any
additional sanctions on Iran.120 A year later, under the Obama administration, the U.S. initiated a
“fuel swap” agreement whereby Iran would trade a majority of its 3.5% enriched uranium in
return for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.121 Although Iran agreed, the country increased its
stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium, violating the agreement.122 In response, the UNSC adopted
Resolution 1929, expanding sanctions on Iran.123

Six years later, on April 2, 2015, a general framework agreement was agreed upon, and a
date was set to finalize the deal.124 However, before the agreement could be completed, the U.S.
Congress passed the “Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015,” a bill that gave Congress
the right to review any nuclear agreement negotiated with Iran.125 Congress had 60 days to pass a
resolution in support of or in opposition to the agreement.126 If Congress could not come to a
decision, the choice would be — and ultimately was — left to the President.127 On July 14, Iran,
the EU, and the P5+1 met in Vienna, Austria, to finalize the agreement.128 However, in October,

128 Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, “Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen
With Time,” The New York Times, 2015,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html.

127 Jennifer Steinhauer, “Democrats Hand Victory to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal,” The New York Times, 2015,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html.

126 “Summary of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, as Amended by Committee.”

125 “Summary of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, as Amended by Committee,” National Iranian American
Council, 2015,
https://www.niacouncil.org/resources/summary-of-the-iran-nuclear-agreement-review-act-as-amended-by-committe
e/?locale=en.

124 “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear
Program,” Obama White House Archives, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/02/parameters-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-rega
rding-islamic-republic-ir.

123 Colum Lynch and Glenn Kessler, “U.N. Imposes another round of sanctions on Iran,” Washington Post, 2010,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060902876.html.

122 Poneman and Nowrouzzadeh, “The Deal That Got Away: The 2009 Nuclear Fuel Swap with Iran.”

121 Daniel Poneman and Sahar Nowrouzzadeh, “The Deal That Got Away: The 2009 Nuclear Fuel Swap with Iran,”
Harvard Kennedy School: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2021,
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/deal-got-away-2009-nuclear-fuel-swap-iran.

120 “Updated P5+1 Package.”
119 “Updated P5+1 Package,” U.S. Department of State, 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/106217.htm.

118 Rafael Mariano Grossi, “Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency in the light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006),” International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007,
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2007-07.pdf.

117 Davenport, “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran.”

46

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html
https://www.niacouncil.org/resources/summary-of-the-iran-nuclear-agreement-review-act-as-amended-by-committee/?locale=en
https://www.niacouncil.org/resources/summary-of-the-iran-nuclear-agreement-review-act-as-amended-by-committee/?locale=en
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/02/parameters-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-regarding-islamic-republic-ir
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/02/parameters-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-regarding-islamic-republic-ir
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060902876.html
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/deal-got-away-2009-nuclear-fuel-swap-iran
https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/106217.htm
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2007-07.pdf


the U.S. raised concerns to the UNSC for Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile tests, a possible
violation of Resolution 1929.129

In December 2016, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reissued sanctions waivers to
demonstrate the U.S.’ commitment to JCPOA.130 In January 2017, Iran tested medium-range
ballistic missiles in violation of Resolution 2231.131 Two months later, the U.S. introduced new
sanctions on Iran targeting its ballistic missile program and its support of terrorism.132

The Trump administration announced the U.S.’ withdrawal from the JCPOA in May
2018.133 Trump referred to the deal as “defective at its core” and accused Iran of exporting
ballistic missiles to fuel proxy wars with Israel and Saudi Arabia.134 Many international
organizations, countries, and U.S. scholars have criticized the Trump administration’s decision to
withdraw, while many U.S. conservatives, Israel, and Saudi Arabia supported the move.135

Former President Barack H. Obama called Trump’s decision “a serious mistake.”136 He claimed
that “without the JCPOA, the United States could eventually be left with a losing choice between
a nuclear-armed Iran or another war in the Middle East.”137

Once again, in July 2019, Iran breached the agreement when it surpassed the limit on its
low-enriched uranium stockpile.138

Analysis
Iran’s nuclear program remains one of the United States’ most pressing foreign policy

issues. If Iran successfully develops a nuclear weapon, the safety of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and
other countries in the Middle East will be in jeopardy. Such a feat would further destabilize the
region and threaten U.S. regional security interests. Therefore, it is within the Biden

138 Grossi, “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council
resolution 2231 (2015).”

137 Obama, “REMARKS: Quitting the Iran Nuclear Deal: ‘A Serious Mistake.’”

136 Barack H. Obama, “REMARKS: Quitting the Iran Nuclear Deal: ‘A Serious Mistake,’” Arms Control
Association, 2018,
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-06/features/remarks-quitting-iran-nuclear-deal-%E2%80%98-serious-mistake
%E2%80%99.

135 Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned.”
134 Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned.”

133 Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned,” The New York Times, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html.

132 Donald J. Trump, “Read the Full Transcript of Trump’s Speech on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The New York Times,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/politics/trump-speech-iran-deal.html?partner=rss&emc=rss.

131 “Iran’s Compliance with UNSCR 2231: Alleged Violations Must Be Addressed,” Iran Watch, 2017,
https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-compliance-unscr-2231-alleged-violations-must-be
-addressed.

130 John Kerry, “Statement by Secretary Kerry on Renewing Waivers Related to Extension of the Iran Sanctions
Act,” U.S. Department of State, 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/265652.htm.

129 Louis Charbonneau, “U.S. confirms Iran tested nuclear-capable ballistic missile,” Reuters, 2015,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-missiles-usa/u-s-confirms-iran-tested-nuclear-capable-ballistic-missile-idUS
KCN0SA20Z20151016.

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https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-06/features/remarks-quitting-iran-nuclear-deal-%E2%80%98-serious-mistake%E2%80%99
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https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/politics/trump-speech-iran-deal.html?partner=rss&emc=rss
https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-compliance-unscr-2231-alleged-violations-must-be-addressed
https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-compliance-unscr-2231-alleged-violations-must-be-addressed
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/265652.htm
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-missiles-usa/u-s-confirms-iran-tested-nuclear-capable-ballistic-missile-idUSKCN0SA20Z20151016
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-missiles-usa/u-s-confirms-iran-tested-nuclear-capable-ballistic-missile-idUSKCN0SA20Z20151016


administration’s best interest to prevent such an outcome from occurring by taking proactive
steps to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon.

Rejoining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Prior to withdrawing from the JCPOA, the Trump administration imposed various

sanctions on Iran without compromising the United States’ commitments to the Iran nuclear
deal.139 After withdrawing from the JCPOA, the Trump administration introduced additional
sanctions that violated U.S. commitments to the deal.140 The Biden administration’s ability to
re-enter the JCPOA is contingent upon addressing four different groups of sanctions: those
imposed after May 2018 that violate the U.S.’ JCPOA commitments, sanctions imposed between
January 2016 and May 2018 that are in line with the U.S.’ commitments, and non-nuclear
sanctions imposed by the Trump administration in 2019 that prevent efficient re-entry.

By rejoining the JCPOA, the Biden administration would have to address the current
sanctions that contradict JCPOA commitments. This category of sanctions would be relatively
easy to address because the administration would only need to revert to compliance with the
deal. Notably, these are the same sanctions that the Obama administration lifted in 2016 to
ensure U.S. compliance with the agreement.141 The sanctions cover Iran’s petrochemical
development, oil sales, and acquisition of hard currency.142 The second point of consideration in
reentry would be the sanctions prior to withdrawal. As noted above, the Trump administration
had imposed various sanctions on Iran that were in line with U.S. commitments under the
JCPOA. The sanctions covered terrorist networks, Iran’s prison system, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Iran’s networks for ballistic missile procurement.143 In the
negotiations phase, Iran might advocate for a total reset to when the deal first went into effect.
However, sanctions hereby outlined under the second category were made in compliance with
JCPOA regulations, and it is unlikely that the Biden administration will lift them. Iran would
need to agree to decrease its nuclear enrichment levels to the negotiated levels and to correct
JCPOA restriction violations such as the development of new centrifuges and resuming heavy
water production.144

144 Kali, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?”
143 O’Toole, “Rejoining the Iran nuclear deal: Not so easy.”
142 O’Toole, “Rejoining the Iran nuclear deal: Not so easy.”
141 O’Toole, “Rejoining the Iran nuclear deal: Not so easy.”
140 “The P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, May 16, 2018.”

139 Brian O’Toole, “Rejoining the Iran nuclear deal: Not so easy,” Atlantic Council, 2021,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/rejoining-the-iran-nuclear-deal-not-so-easy/.

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https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/rejoining-the-iran-nuclear-deal-not-so-easy/


Increasing Economic Sanctions
The Biden administration has the option to increase sanctions on Iran. Powerful nations

and multilateral alliances use economic sanctions to force adversaries to change specific
behaviors. The U.S. government has used sanctions on Iran to degrade Iran’s military and
nuclear powers, influence its decision making, and “promote positive political change in the
nature of the Iranian regime.”145 As a coercive instrument of influence, the U.S. and its
multilateral partners have used sanctions to discourage Iranian defiance of international
community demands. Although sanctions are primarily economic, the overall price of sanctions
is the coercive element that necessitates political changes.146 For example, sanctions proved
effective in bringing Iran to the negotiation table, which resulted in the JCPOA. These sanctions
created unfavorable economic conditions for the people of Iran and may have slowed the
progress of the nuclear program due to economic hardship.

Nonetheless, economic struggles caused by sanctions do not always create positive
political changes. In addition, sanctions could accelerate Iran’s nuclear program.147 Sanctions
might also increase the population’s support for the regime’s economic defiance and
consequently undermine the efficacy of economic sanctions.148 This can include building
stronger political and economic relationships with U.S. adversaries such as China and Russia.
Overall, economic pressure does not always guarantee effective control of the incumbent regime.

In various ways, Iran is not the ideal candidate for the use of economic sanctions by the
U.S. In general, the outcomes of economic sanctions are uncertain when it comes to attempting
to influence behavior.149 Sanctions may fail to match their coercive objectives, particularly when
imposed on authoritarian adversaries.150 Although the U.S. has used coercive economic sanctions
on Iran for decades, the results have been far from ideal.151 Since the Reagan administration, the
U.S. has imposed various sanctions to restrict monetary aid, arms trade, and economic activities
between the U.S. and Iran, among other penalties.152 During the Bush administration, the U.S.
restricted Iran’s access to the international financial system with the objective of blocking or

152 Mahapatra, “US–Iran Nuclear Deal: Cohorts and Challenger.”

151 Chintamani Mahapatra, “US–Iran Nuclear Deal: Cohorts and Challenger,” Contemporary Review of the Middle
East, 2016, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2347798916632323.

150 Tarock, “The Iran nuclear deal: winning a little, losing a lot.”

149 Adam Tarock, “The Iran nuclear deal: winning a little, losing a lot,” Third World Quarterly, 2016,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2016.1166049.

148 Mousavian, “Building on the Iran Nuclear Deal for International Peace and Security.”

147 Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Mohammad Mehdi Mousavian, “Building on the Iran Nuclear Deal for
International Peace and Security,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 2018,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2017.1420373.

146 Shirley A. Kan, “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,”
Congressional Research Service, 2015, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf.

145 Robert Reardon, “Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge,” RAND
Corporation, 2012. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1180.html.

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https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2016.1166049
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2017.1420373
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1180.html


discouraging banks from operating in Iran.153 This policy continued in the Obama administration
and successfully limited Iran’s access to the international financial system.154 The Trump
administration introduced sanctions on Iran’s manufacturing, textiles, mining, and construction
sectors, as well as imposing additional sanctions on specific companies, individuals, and
authorities in a failed attempt to bring Iran back to the negotiation table to negotiate a new
agreement.155

If the Biden administration chooses to tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran, the key challenge
will be to prevent a domestic backlash in Iran. Adverse coercive measures such as sanctions on
Iranian oil could have negative implications for the Iranian population at large. Although an oil
sanction could inflict economic pain on Iran, it could also rally the masses in support of the
incumbent regime and strengthen the hardline position to block negotiations with the U.S. This
risk is characteristically high, considering that hardliners support both the country’s uranium
enrichment and missile program.156 To put it succinctly, it is unlikely that sanctions can be used
as an effective way to limit the missile program of Iran, which has been used by hardliners as a
tool to secure their dominance in the region.

Conclusion
Although the Biden administration has a variety of intervention options at its disposal,

rejoining the JCPOA deal would be the most effective strategy. One option is to continue
imposing further economic sanctions on Iran. A drawback of this strategy is an increase in
anti-American sentiment and drawing attention away from the oppressive behavior of the Iranian
government. The Biden administration should secure re-entry into the JCPOA by renegotiating
current sanctions that violate the United States’ commitment to the agreement.

Rejoining the JCPOA will not be easy. However, compared to economic sanctions,
returning the JCPOA appears to be the most beneficial. Despite the U.S.’ withdrawal during the
Trump administration, Iran initially continued to abide by the deal. The current U.S.
administration can use quiet diplomacy to ensure Iran’s commitment to a new bargain agenda
that covers various issues after U.S. withdrawal. First, the Biden administration should ensure
that all issues regarding compliance to the JCPOA be resolved before beginning re-entry talks.

156 Ariane M. Tabatabai and Annie Tracy Samuel, “What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran
Nuclear Deal,” International Security, 2017, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00286; Ali
Fathollah-Nejad and Amin Naeni, “What explains the decline of Iran’s moderates? It’s not Trump,” Brookings,
2020,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/15/what-explains-the-decline-of-irans-moderates-its-not-
trump/.

155 O’Toole, “Rejoining the Iran nuclear deal: Not so easy.”
154 Robert, “Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge.”
153 Mahapatra, “US–Iran Nuclear Deal: Cohorts and Challenger.”

50

https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00286
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/15/what-explains-the-decline-of-irans-moderates-its-not-trump/
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/15/what-explains-the-decline-of-irans-moderates-its-not-trump/


The U.S. would need to remove any sanctions not aligned with the JCPOA and reassure Iran that
the U.S. will not leave the agreement. Iran would need to agree to decrease its nuclear
enrichment levels to the negotiated levels and to correct JCPOA restriction violations such as the
development of new centrifuges and resuming heavy water production.157 Second, the Biden
administration should ensure that there is an agreement from Tehran to engage in discussions
regarding its missile program. In summary, the Biden administration should return to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action.

157 Kali, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?”

51



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