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Sayings Without Meaning:

A Hermeneutical Approach To Absolute Truths In Heidegger’s Be-

iträge And  Ś�aṅkara’s Brahmasūtrabhaṣ�ya

Mikael Stamm

Abstract
In this paper I will focus on Heidegger’s a theory of a primordial truth 

that claims to precede any theory of knowledge and truth, and explore the 

function and scope of a concept of machination as a pervasive distortion of our 

sense of reality. A primordial, as articulated in Heidegger’s ‘Contribution to Phi-

losophy (of the event)’, can only be as an appropriating event through a break 

with metaphysical thinking. We will explore this event, through an understanding 

of Śaṅkara’s concept of superimposition, and the subsequent advaitic school 

of Bhāmatī which addresses the problem of agency. This provides us with a tool 

to engage in reflection of methods, language, and the nature of understanding. 

Can we actually anticipate an event that might never happen? Is it possible to 

understand a speech of a text, which has no speaker and no intended listener? 

Keywords: Heidegger, Śaṅkara, Beiträge, Contribution, machination, nescience,  

                 Advaita Vedanta, maya, avidya, philosophy of language, Mantra,  

                   synchroneity.

Introduction
In this study we will take a look at forms of concept of truth, which 

exhibit peculiar characteristics due to a redefinition of such a truth to be ‘before’ 

any other views on what truth might be. We will see that insistence on an exclu-

sive, absolute and primordial truth that precedes our natural language, implies 

a fundamental problem of communication, and affects the possibility of true 



935

agency in our postmodern ‘virtual reality’. Furthermore, a truth thus disconnect-

ed from concrete applications means an exclusion of any possibility of a definite 

understanding of what it might be – and most importantly, it inevitable points 

to an emergence of a co-existing and equal original concept of what here is 

characterised as nescience. We will present two different texts from two distinct 

philosophical traditions, in order to identify characteristics of primal truths, and 

further suggest approaches with which we are able to apprehend the implication 

of such an invasive concept, reflected in the change of meanings in a range of 

dependent or supportive concepts. 

Truth and Machination
A peculiar interpretation of truth was formulated in a text, written by 

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) between 1936 and 1938, titled Contribution to 

philosophy (of the Event) (original title Beiträge der Philosophie (vom Ereignis) 

(hereafter termed Beiträge). The text was formulated nine years after publication 

of Heidegger’s first major work, Sein und Zeit, but remained unknown until it was 

posthumously published in 1986. We selected this text in order to study the way 

the text deals with the problem of a pervasive primordial truth and its relation to 

other significant concepts, which seems to alter their conventional meanings in 

the presence of this original truth. Thus, in Beiträge, along with the development 

of a unique concept of truth, a distinction is made between the three following 

concepts: beings [seiende], Being [Sein], and ‘primordial Being’ or Beyng [Seyn]; 

A ‘being’ is basically everything that can be an object of study, a ‘something’ 

which can be represented and denoted, like an object, a quality, or a relation. 

‘Being’ is inscribed in the traditional metaphysics and therefore means the most 

abstract or substantial form that constitute a ‘being’ to be cognized as a such. 

‘Beyng’ (spelled with an ‘y’) or what we occasionally refer to as ‘primordial 

Being’, is Heidegger’s concept of Being within a new context beyond tradition-

al metaphysics, connected to a transformative ‘event’ of truth [Ereignis]. This 

concept of an original truth connects to the above-mentioned differentiation of 



936

being/Being/Beyng, in order to account for a claimed pre-metaphysical domain: 

Truth can only be thought of as truth of a primordial Being. Thus, it is assumed 

that Western philosophy is necessarily permeated by metaphysics, and has to 

be revaluated if philosophy is to be a true thinking. With his ‘anti-metaphysical’ 

agenda Beiträge intends to overcome philosophy in the conventional sense, 

because, according to Heidegger, this is based on the false premise that what is 

real is derived from objects or ‘beings’ [seiendes], and consequently, so is the 

understanding of the Being [Sein] of these ‘things’.

Thus, according to Beiträge, an investigation of a fundamental truth 

can only be carried out as inherently connected to a question of Being, and 

is therefore to be articulated as a break with our current state of non-cog-

nition that we are subjected to. To approach this radical ‘other’ truth we 

need new ways of expressing what is concealed, and such a possible way 

is what Beiträge states as a ‘thoughtful meditation’ [Besinnung] on truth.

 This is to be understood in a pre-epistemological and pre-metaphysical 

sense: On one hand a self-illuminating and self-concealing truth on which 

we wholly depend as human beings, and on the other hand, a pervasive 

opposite and a fundamental obstacle of reaching truth, preventing any 

clarity regarding ourselves and our world. But of course, there are open-

ings revealed in the Beiträge, in the form of ‘privileged phenomena’ (e.g., 

an analysis of ‘being away’, and an identification of fundamental emotive 

dispositions), and relevant to this study, indications of truth in the form 

of speech, Sayings [Sagen], which do not expressly determine or refer to 

anything: “Here the speaking is not something over and against what is 

to be said but is this latter itself as the essential occurrence of beyng.” 

 It is an important assumption of this study that Beiträge’s core statements must 

be included in this category, i.e., to be considered in this perspective of sayings.

 We tentatively call this category ‘text/speech of necessity’ due to an intrinsic 

characteristic of their articulation and operation. 

Heidegger’s concept of truth is highlighted as concerning ev-



937

erything that can be as such, including any relative truth model articu-

lated within a representational domain. Therefore, Heidegger accentu-

ates a radical difference between this domain and an original truth by 

connecting ‘truth’ to ‘Beyng’ [Wahrheit des Seyns], This essential truth 

implies a fundamental withdrawal of the primordial Being ‘in’ the domi-

nance of beings [seiendes], which in turn superimpose their characteristics 

on this Being, to the effect that ‘Beyng’ shows itself as something it is not.

. In this perspective truth is understood both as the original light that is the foun-

dation of every possible way anything can be, and a distortion of this primordial 

Being which in the current situation is manifested as what in Beiträge is asserted 

as the expansion of pervasive ‘machination’ [Machenschaft]. We are subject 

to a distortion of our sense of reality, that makes our cognitions and activities 

to be directed in conflict with our essential ‘nature’. This concept of distortion 

is crucial, since the primordial Being as the most intimately known, is also that 

which is unrealized, even to the extent that the absence is not felt or known 

at all. The only way to know this absence of truth is to engage in a project of 

recovering of what constitutes the current situation, and Beiträge’s mission is 

such an endeavour.

In Beiträge Heidegger engages in an analysis of the constitution of 

‘objects’ in terms of their makeability [Machbarkeit], that is, something that 

can be acted upon and subsumed a field of calculative planning which prop-

agates and intensifies, deepens, as an abandonment of the primordial Being 

[Seinsverlassenheit] that further leads to the forgetfulness of Being [Seins-

vergessenheit]. But, according to Beiträge, even in this state of a progressive 

distortion of truth, or precisely because of this, the seed of its opposite may 

give birth to an ‘event’ [Ereignis] of truth: “But the abandonment by beyng 

excludes and precludes the event. The resonating must sound out of this aban-

donment and must start with the unfolding of the forgottenness of beyng.” 

 The insertion of an event is crucial; this ties the original truth to the primordial 

Being by drawing on a common sense understanding of an event, e.g., timely and 



938

accidental, while suppressing others e.g., an objectively definable phenomenon. 

This ‘event’ disguises as ‘nothing’, and consequently the radical 

other truth can only be as this intervening appropriation, and  certainly this 

concept of an event moves the truth of such a Being back into the unman-

ageable unknown, connected to a multitude of modified concepts employed 

in Beiträge. This impression is supported by the claim in the text itself that 

the message does not belong to the author’s personal expression, rather it 

belongs to the hints of truth itself in its ‘own logic’ [aus ihrem Gesetz], some-

thing we think add to the category of ‘necessity’, i.e., essential speech. This 

de-humanization and de-personification of an original truth is to be sought 

after through the aforementioned openings and sayings which demand 

a conceptual framework that subverts a conventional rational approach: 

“All ‘proving’ presupposes that those who understand, as they come to 

stand before the represented content of the proposition, remain the same, 

unaltered in following the representational nexus that bears the proof.”

 This critique of the scope and validity of logic targets in particular the belief that 

logic can be utilized to clarify fundamental philosophical problems. Heidegger, 

on the contrary, sees logic as adding to the complexity of the problems of phi-

losophy, due to its establishment of an authoritative field of concepts contrib-

uting, in Heidegger’s view, to the ‘preference of things’.

 Therefore, Beiträge is not something to be read and intellectually 

understood, rather the reader of the text has “to be appropriated over to the 

appropriating event”. And in that appropriating event, the human being is equal 

to [gleichkommt] Da-sein in an essential transformation [Wesenswandel], 

which is somehow caused, but indeed not as a part of a straightforward agency 

or rational discourse, as we will see. The readers will instinctively collect and 

analyse the text, but is circumvented due to an unknown causality incorporat-

ed in the speech of the text. Beiträge’s speech is meant to indicate something 

entirely different that conveys the impression of immense distance of the 

radical other event of truth to the common understanding of referential truth, 



939

though a kind of progress is suggested as instrumental in a certain transitional 

state: “That conditions a stratagem which within certain limits must always 

accommodate itself at first to the ordinary meaning and must proceed in com-

pany with that meaning for a while, in order then to call up at the right moment 

an inversion of thinking, though one still under the power of the same word.”

 The concept of ‘inverse’ [umgekehrt] marks an essential feature of the trans-

formative truth: This inauthentic understanding can ‘suddenly’ be subverted in 

a reverse movement in which the familiar and known is revealed as that which 

conceals and distorts.

Now, we briefly mentioned Beiträge’s claim to be author-

less, that is, comprising hints which arises from the truth itself, and we 

are led to tentatively characterize this as ‘speech of necessity’, that is, 

an expression manifested solely by the ‘ proximity’ to the original truth.

 There is strictly speaking no author of the text to refer to, except as a 

name or a sound in the same speech; an anticipation of truth express-

es itself, and indications of individuality are to be considered as  be-

longing to the distorting totality. In principle, every word has to be re-

garded as absolute, at least in principle, if not affected by individuality.
  The phenomenal aspect of an event of truth is reflected in the concept 

‘Verrückung’ (literally: dislocation) which is a special Heideggerian use of 

a term indicating a comprehensive and abrupt movement, a displace-

ment/dislodging that includes a detachment from what was before, in 

the sense of a fundamental response to an otherness. Heidegger sug-

gests a reversal of the determining power of the logical thinking, howev-

er, something more is added when Heidegger introduces the concept of 

intimacy: “Detachment [Loslösung] from every ‘personal’ domain will 

succeed only out of the intimacy [ Innigkeit] of the earliest belonging”

 This emotive aspect points to a structural event and a progression of the recep-

tion referred to as trembling and intimacy. 



940

Before leaving the Beiträge a brief summary of interesting points: First 

we found a direct link between a pre-metaphysical truth and the question of 

a primordial Being/Beyng through a likewise changed meaning of an event (of 

truth), Secondly, there emerged a comprehensive concept of a distorted reality, 

machination, which threatens to undermine the very message of the Beiträge, 

though potentially capable to operate an essential intimacy. Thirdly, Beiträge 

emerged as text or speech of necessity, circumventing an individual receiver in 

favour of an essential Dasein. 

Brahman and the māyā/avidyā
We will try to throw some light on the Beiträge by engaging in the late 8th-cen-

tury advaitic philosopher Ādi Śaṅkarācārya’s celebrated Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, which is a 

commentary on Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahmasūtras (or Vedāntasūtras) dated somewhere be-

tween the 3rd – 2nd century BCE. Śaṅkara founded the Advaita Vedānta, a philosophy and 

a path to practice, in order to obtain a liberating knowledge of the non-dual truth - and to 

penetrate the pervasive nescience of the phenomenal world. Key-statements will here be 

collected in order to acquire a basic idea of how the concept of nescience (māyā/avidyā) 
is employed and related to a non-dual truth, brahman, a particular concept of reality taken 

from particular Upaṇ�iṣ�adic sources, which denies the apparent phenomenal world any re-

ality. It is to be noted that for the purpose of harmonization of different traditional sources 

(e.g., Ṛ�gveda, the Brāhmaṇas, or the Upaṇiṣ�adṣ) the Sanskrit word māyā is seemingly used 

synonymously with avidyā by Śaṅkara as representing a veiling and illusory power, and that 

both of these concepts are covered by the translators’ use of the English word ‘nescience’ 

or occasionally ‘ignorance’ or ‘principle of illusion.’

In the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, the concept of brahman is discussed 

in the context of refutation of opponents’ views on this subject. Brahman 

is initially stated as pure existence [sat] and pure consciousness [cit], and 

is said to be known by everyone, though unrealized. But a problem of cog-

nition is stated due to the character of the claimed non-dualism: brahman 

is beyond any categories of causalities, qualities or actions, and thus be-

ing a non-object, it is “impossible to say that it is or is not apprehended”

 Though undecided and indetermined, a fundamental realization is possible 



941

of everything as ‘really’ brahman, and this is the true knowledge that caus-

es the releasing event of truth. Thus, Being and truth are one: The event of 

knowing brahman is being brahman; therefore, the event of truth transforms 

[pariṇāma] or rather transfigures [vivarta] everything, yet nothing is differ-

ent from what was before, since brahman is changeless and all-pervasive.

 Ś�an�kara summarizes the nature of liberation [mokṣ�a] that is brahman:

This (moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i.e., eternal without under-

going any changes [kūṭasthanitya], omnipresent as ether [akāśavat, sarvagata], 

free from all modifications [nirvikāra], absolutely self-sufficient [ṇirapekṣ�a], not 

composed of parts [akhaṇ�da, ṇiṣ�kala], of self-luminous nature [ṣvayam� prakāśa].
Here a duplication of truths must be assumed; absolute truth and relative qualifying truths 

are to be separated from each other as essentially different, though, simultaneously present 

as each other’s ‘other’ divided by an abyssal transforming event. The implication of this 

‘otherness’ is that human beings are in the state of nescience [māyā] as our inherently 

self-referencing condition (no external ‘corrections’) - but there has to be some kind of 

reflection of its opposite, since truth can be at least indicated and pursued. This implies 

of course an ontological and epistemological complexity in the concepts of māyā and 

avidyā, which has to contain not only the absence of truth but also a truth of nescience to 

be captured in and through itself. The absolute truth cannot be without the recognition of 

everything as ‘really’ a manifestation of nescience.

In  Ś�an�kara›s introduction in Brahmasūtrabhāṣya an aspect of māyā/
avidyā is characterized as a superimposition [adhyāsa] in which the qualities of 

one thing are wrongly projected on another thing, and applied to the question 

of the relation between Self [cit, ātman] and non-self [acit, anātman]. Ś�an�kara 

states this as the central problem because the purpose of the Brahmasūtra-
bhāṣya is to “free one’s Self from that wrong notion which is the cause of all 

evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self. “

 Thus, the notion of the mind [aṇtah�karaṇ�a] which is considered as an un-

conscious, that is, a ‘material’ non-Self submitted to change, is superimposed 

on a (changeless) Self [ātman], which is the internal principle of brahman 

- and the reverse: The ātman is superimposed on the mind as if it is a Self, 



942

and the collective effect is the diverse world of experience. Thus, māyā rep-

resents the cause of illusion which is neither existent nor non-existent and 

imposes its limiting adjuncts [upādhis] as delineating qualities replacing a 

more general or different thing, that is, on brahman, making the phenome-

nal world seem real. When under the spell of māyā, the Self is caught in the 

world of names and forms in circles of transmigration. But this is only by the 

workings of māyā, “not defined as being [brahman] nor different from it.”

  In this ontological limbo, ‘not belonging to brahman and not different’ and 

‘neither real nor unreal’, māyā cannot be affected by something at all; māyā can 

only be removed by the true discriminative knowledge of brahman. 

The world and the individual counterpart in the form of an illusory “I”, 

also have to represent the necessary condition of liberation. This peculiar on-

tological and epistemological ambiguity attached to the concepts of nescience 

[māyā/avidyā] causes a verbal articulation of these to engage in negative and 

circular logical figures; that there is really no acting subject, though the right 

action within nescience is urgent needed:

All acting and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimina-

tion (by the soul) of the respective nature of internal organ [aṇtah�karaṇ�a] and 

soul [jīva]; while in reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or 

enjoy; not the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is 

not capable of any modification.

The aspect regarding projection within māyā is active, i.e., adhyāsa 
takes place as an inner dual mechanism, which holds its imaginary ‘prisoners’ in 

a confusing reciprocal deadlock; the Self is superimposed on the non-Self, and 

the non-Self on the Self.

The great Sayings [mahāvākyas]
The problem for Ś�an�kara here is that superimposition, which is 

supposed to explain nescience, is itself conditioned by nescience, because 

of the division of Self and non-Self, is ultimately not real. In this context, 



943

it seems that adhyāsa, as both a cause and effect of nescience, in Advaita 

Vedānta necessarily express a circular structure. The reason why this con-

tradiction is not considered destructive can be found in the concept of a 

beginningless [anādi] relation, which prevents a logical infinite regress in 

the nature of the superimposition. It is to be noted that there seems to be 

found a similar structure in Heidegger’s account of Dasein as the ‘thrown 

projector’ [geworfene Werfer] and in the characteristics of machination.

 We might at this stage assume that such a circular structure is unavoidable in the 

context of a pervasive state of nescience, which non the less allows a realization 

of this in the light of truth:

Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose mind the 

sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, 

are able to intuit the sense of the sentence ‘Thou art That‘ on its first enuncia-

tion even, and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the knowledge 

of the Self having once sprung up discards all ignorance; so that in this case no 

progressive process of cognition can be acknowledged.

The sentence mentioned is a statement of identity is one of the great 

sayings, the upaṇ�iṣ�adic mahāvākyas, which can be understood in a glimpse of 

spontaneous induced intuition, but this exceptional instance is not in accor-

dance with the ‘normal’ mechanism of saṃsāra, which propagates the immense 

weight of reality on the empirical level.

 

The ‘who’ of nescience
Now a debate is raised that had to emerge from the key concepts 

employed by Ś�an�kara. For our purpose, it is interesting to track the modifications 

that took place shortly after Ś�an�kara’s work was written. We will focus on the 

Bhāmatī school represented by the third direct disciple of Ś�an�kara, Man�d�ana 

Mis�ra (8th century) who wrote the work Brahmasiddhi, followed by Vācaspati 
Mis�ra’s (9th century) Bhāmatī, which became at that time the dominant inter-

pretation of Ś�an�kara’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. In Brahmasiddhi Man�d�ana embarks 



944

on a discussion of avidyā from a slightly different point of view than previously: 

The issue of its subject or locus [āśraya] and its object or substratum [viṣ�aya].

  This type of question usually belongs to a theory of knowledge, but here it is 

applied to the ambiguous avidyā, as the question of the location of its operation, 

and the corresponding question concerning the nature of the object which is 

misapprehended. Man�d�ana Mis�ra’s position differentiate between the selves 

in responds to the new problem regarding the operation of nescience, is that it 

is the individual ‘soul’ [jīva] who is the seat of avidyā, and that it is brahman 

which is the object of this misapprehension. 

This is elaborated on a century later in Vācaspati Mis�ra’s gloss on 

Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, the Bhāmatī; regarding the individual soul, the jīva, it is 
previously told that it is only different from brahman as seen under the aspect 

of nescience, and this, of course, means that the support of the operation of 

nescience is also a product of the same:

The inner self defined by the internal organ etc., the intelligent being 

compounded of the “this” and the “not-this,” is the jīva, the agent, the enjoyer, 

the support of the two kinds of Nescience – the result and the cause - the sub-

strate of “I-ness”, the transmigrator, the vessel of the entire host of woes, the 

material cause of reciprocal superimposition; the material cause of that again is 

superimposition; hence, this being beginningless, like the seed and the sprout, 

there is not (the defect of) reciprocal dependence.

 Here, the “I” is reflected in the non-discriminative individual ‘soul’ 

[jīva] is superimposed on the Self [ātman], through non-distinction of the dif-

ference between self and non-self, resulting in a superimposition of these. The 

concept of “I” is possible because of the limited ambiguous jīva, which is con-

sidered as “the substrate of ‘I-ness’”, targeted by the “I” (which is object-like), 

nonetheless the self-manifestation of the real Śelf is present. Interpreting Ś�an�ka-

ra’s words about the real Śelf which can never be an agent or enjoyer, Vācaspati 

Mis�ra now states in Bhāmatī that avidyā is to be located in the jīva, because 

nescience can never be associated with the pure brahman, thus preserving the 



945

truth as absolute and undifferentiated. The arguments in favour of this puzzling 

role of the jīva are twofold: Firstly, a strict requirement of formal logic and 

reason is only applicable to the realm of objects, not the avidyā, which is inex-

pressible [anirvacanīya]. Secondly, jīva as both a condition of the operation of 

avidyā and an effect of the same condition is a beginningless [anādi] relation.

Beiträge revisited: Self and Non-self
We notice that in Beiträge the principle of nescience, the machination, 

cannot be separated from the experiential component which means a cumu-

lative strengthening of the part of machination: Abandonment by Beyng [Seins-

verlassenheit]  Forgetfulness of Being [Seynsvergessenheit]  Machination 

[Machenschaft]  Lived experience [Erlebnis]. The seemingly infinite horizon 

of lived experiences makes possible an endless field of propagation and appli-

cations within machination/nescience. Guided by the discussion of a method of 

articulation of truth and the location/support of avidyā in Advaita Vedānta, we 

turn to a question regarding the ‘who’ of the event of truth, as well as that of the 

machination. Who is the subject of nescience/machination? A part of the answer 

is the previously observed differentiation within the concept of a self and their 

mutual relations. We have to take a closer look at Beiträge’s conceptualization 

of a human being, a self and its essential relations:

The human being has an intimation [Ahnung] of beyng, is the 

surmiser [Ahnende] of beyng, because beyng ap-propriates [Er-eignung] 

the human being and does so specifically such that the ap-propriation first 

needs something that is self-proper [Sich-eigenes], i.e., a self [Selbst]. This 

selfhood has to be withstood in that standing fast [Instandigkeit] which al-

lows the human being, by taking a stand [innestehend] in Da-sein, to become 

the being that can be encountered only in the who-question [Wer-frage].

 
     



946

The reply to the advaitic problem of the ‘who’ of nescience in the 

articulation of truth, which might be reframed to: The subject of nescience (as 

well as the event of truth) is the Self [Selbst], and this Self is not the ‘I’ [Ich] of a 

human being, since the Self needs an instrument of transformation to be able 

to go beyond the constructed ‘I’. The individual human being is not the real 

‘who’, for which the Beiträge is written (or by which it is written); it is the Self 

[Selbst] which can be only because of the essential Dasein with which the Self 

connects. It is notable that the event [Ereignis] is here meant as appropriation 

[Er-eignung] only through a reference to the Self. The human being may be pres-

ent, but its dispositions have to be dislodged [Verrückung] or turned away from 

the attachments to what the machination have to offer the dependent “I’s”. 

This ‘reversal’ of dispositions reveals the true subject of nescience as the Śelf, 

on which the propagation of nescience is based, and eventually is the place of 

its withdrawal. But this intimation to which the Self [Selbst] is receptive has a 

conceptual counterpart, which is the ‘I’ [Ich] simply because this is a product of 

machination:

The self is never the ‘I’. The with-itself [Bei-sich] of the self [Selbst] 

essentially occurs as steadfast ac-ceptance [Über-nahme] of the ap-pro-

priation [Er-eignung]. Selfhood is belongingness in the intimacy of that: 

strife as the conflict over appropriation. If instituted on their own initia-

tive, no ‘we’ [Wir] and ‘ye’ [Ihr] and no ‘I’ [Ich] and ‘thou’ [Du] and like-

wise no community can ever reach the self. Unless these are first ground-

ed on Da-sein, they merely miss the self and remain excluded from it.

 



947

The ‘I’ is to be seen as an ‘unconscious’ attachment to the machina-

tion, if not reflecting the selfhood. We can conclude that the domain of intimacy 

(though continually at work) needs to be activated to be realized in the world, 

and this is a transformation from the “I” (the constructed self) to the Self (which 

points to its essence). In Table 1 below the left-most part belongs to the ‘mate-

rial’ or constructed domain, the middle represents the ambiguous semi-subject 

that needs to be connected to the rightmost part in order to truly be, and the 

rightmost part is essentially beyond any concept of subject/object. This struc-

ture shows why there must be a rupture between the inauthentic and the other 

realms in the form of an event: “Everything is transformed [verwandelt] and that 

the bridges which just now led to beyng must be pulled down, because another 

[anderer] time-space [Zeit-Raum] is opened up by beyng itself.”1 The ‘I’ seemed 

to have lost its meaning altogether or rather has been completely reorganized. 

The form of articulation has to internally reduplicate the concept of a self to 

express what has not taken place, and which cannot be covered by words and 

meanings belonging to nescience. 

The speaking of Beiträge is directed towards our essential Self, Dasein, 

through a non-discursive structural disposition of intimacy, in order to activate a 

removal of mental obstacles. Just as truth and primordial Being cannot be qual-

ified, so too the true form of nescience cannot be subject to qualifications, since 

a realization of the truth of machination requires a recognition of the truth of 

Beyng. The meaning of this sentence is that machination may seem to be eternal 

and within the domain of deliberate human actions, it really is not. 



948

The mantric connection 
If we are to take the Beiträge’s claim of a ‘speech of necessity’ seri-

ously, will it not imply that the totality of words and sentences are flawless and 

therefore (at least in principle), to be recited in one prolonged exhalation of a 

sequence of modulated sound? In a text by Heidegger devoted to the question 

of language, it is said: 
 

But the mantras [Spruche] have their only master [Meister-

in] the necessity to say the self-same evermore inceptually 

each time, until at last, without even remotely trying to cal-

culate this through comparisons, one word finally hits the 

mark [glückt], a word in which the voice of Beyng becomes 

attunement.

The privileged Sayings, including the key statements in Beiträge itself, 

convey something original (inceptual) which they strictly speaking are not able 

to accomplish, but not the less have to attempt, if the claimed necessity is to 

be believed and followed.

 We have here described an attempt to articulate a frame and 

a particular method to support Beiträge’s event of truth, but we still need to 

comment on an alternative application of language which might contribute to a 

slightly different view on what language can do. We refer to a significant aspect 

of language which is frequently discussed in traditional Indian philosophy of 

language. Language here is considered to be primarily speech, and investigated 

through three means of valid cognitions [pramāṇas], perception, inference and 

testimony. We will focus on a special application of verbal testimony, which are 

generally known as mantras; we notice that this particular type of speech have 

no straightforward cognitive or communicative purpose.2 These utterances are 

not speech in the ordinary sense, since they do not intent to be received or 

understood, and due to their original (non-human) source are considered to be 



949

necessary and perfect, and therefore it is mandatory to preserve the sequence 

of the expression, and produce an exact pronunciation of what is originally trans-

mitted, which allows no improvised alterations or misconceptions, which would 

cancel the real efficacy of a mantra. Here the mantra shows what a word can 

do apart from function as a carrier of primary or secondary meanings, whether 

expressly, metaphorically, or otherwise.3 

Douglas Brooks points out in his research in the South Indian Ś�akta-

worship of Śrī Vidyā, an important distinctive feature in relation to signs, which 

can be discerned in two ways: As symbols having general meanings to be applied 

in order to refer to something according to the interpretation of an interpreter, 

or as indexical signs, which points to a particular occurrence of an elementary 

fact. In an advaitic context a mantra uttered might in itself induce identification 

of the Self and brahman. Thus, in this instance the indexical sign can only be un-

derstood as such in an initiated appropriation of this non-difference: “Being able 

to use the power of the mantra requires an appropriation of its indexical signifi-

cance. Symbolic values can enhance one’s knowledge about mantras and icons, 

but symbolic meanings are only knowledge of or knowledge about the divine 

power present in them”.4 According to Brooks a mantra is not at all a speech in 

the conventional sense; in the repetition of a mantra, we understand differently, 

not the referential ‘same’ (in Heidegger’s words: ‘the representational nexus’), 

and its ‘meaning’ lies in its efficacy as an indexical fact. The ritual setting sup-

ports this peculiar utilisation of sonic efficacy with the necessary framework to 

guide our bodies and minds towards a perfect imitation of the original sacrifice.

Conclusion
In the following we provide a summary of conclusions to be drawn 

from our study:

The problem of articulation in regard to the non-dual truth in Brah-

masūtrabhāṣya points to a similar problem of expressions of truth in the con-

struction of Sayings in the Beiträge. 



950

The characterisation in Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of nescience as a su-

perimposition [adhyāsa] of the character of a thing (‘not-self’) [acit, anātman] 
on true reality [ātman, brahman] and vice versa, seems to possess a structural 

similarity with the machination in the Beiträge, and consequently points to the 

nature of the problem of communication.

The possible occurrence of the event of truth is to be found in a ‘ma-

turing’ of the required condition of a true assimilation (not the activities of an 

“I”) of a radical ‘other’, which has to be accomplished, strictly speaking, before 

a proper reception to Beiträge’s essential Speech can be established.  This issue 

presents just one of the many circular conceptualisations involved when a per-

vasive nescience is presupposed.  

The purpose of the mental component is purely instrumental and 

therefore connected to the negative process of a gradual removal of obstacles, 

culminating in a break with the fixed representational scheme of the logical 

thinking.  

Ś�an�kara›s concept of truth as self-luminous [svayaṃprāśa] is cor-

relating with Beiträge’s clearing [Lichtung], not because they are the ‘same’, but 

because the concealing ‘determining power’ is everything but this (svayaṃprāśa 
/ Lichtung). 

Regarding the role of the self in Beiträge, a tripartite of differences 

within this concept became clear: An “I” [Ich], a Self [Selbst] and Dasein. These 

differentiations had a function of linking machination and truth together: An inert 

construction of nescience [Ich, aṇtah�karaṇ�a], a complete ‘Other’ [Dasein, āta-
man], and a possible reverberation of truth [Selbst, jīva] mediating between the 

two opposites. This suggests at least in principle a identification of the receiver 

and target of true communication

This exposed the problem of agency: The essential Dasein does not 

possess individuality and therefore unable to act - while the ‘I’ appears to act 

but represents an ‘inert’ and determinated agency only reflecting the Erleb-

nis-aspect of machination. The only possibility of a true agency of authentic 



951

decisions is the Self [Selbst] precisely because it potentially can show itself as 

a reflection of the event of truth through Dasein, and thus may be said to be 

identified as an agent, capable of re-organizing the ‘I’ and thus giving voice and 

space to the ‘nothingness’ of Beyng. 

Regarding the speech of Beiträge itself we have pointed to the ar-

ticulation of a testimony of a ‘necessity’, which due to its claimed resistance 

to any assimilating dialectics or institutionalisation, causes a break with the 

comfortability and reassurance of machination. Thus, necessity pervades the 

speech, which means not only is it possible to broaden our awareness in order to 

enhance our understanding based on established meanings, but also to employ 

other dimensions of speech. We pointed to the peculiar practice of ‘mantric’ 

or indexical understanding and the resounding of authorless verbal testimonies 

from teachers to disciples. We pointed out that the Sayings in Beiträge can only 

be expressed in speech, and that part of their significance lies in their inherently 

meaninglessness, that is, not a part of ‘the representational nexus’. 

Lastly, an important point in regard to the concept of nescience is that 

the event of truth is not thought of as a ‘copy’ of the propagation of avidyā/
machination, rather truth can only be drawn from the source of the infinite 

depth of nescience; an emergence of a ‘another time-space is opened up’ by 

the primordial Being itself, transforming everything that is and can be. 

Now, we assume that if the ‘causal factors’ have been brought about 

by earnest and recurrent practice, it is obvious that a conventional progressive 

understanding cannot be applied to a relation between a receptiveness to a 

radical ‘other’ - and a transitional rupture in reality itself. An event of a primor-

dial truth, may (in principle) occur at any suitable moment, and this presents 

a curious problem in Beiträge; how may such an event take place? Are we to 

believe that a change is confined to individuals, or can it be applied to some kind 

of collective transmission? 

We prefer to designate such an occurrence as ‘synchroneity’, in order 

to indicate a simultaneity of, on one hand, the progressive construction of fa-



952

vourable conditions of understanding, both individually and collectively - and, 

on the other, the actual realisation of an event of truth. This coordination of two 

mutually incompatible domains has to exclude any conventional causality alto-

gether. This slightly differs from connotations arising from Heidegger’s positioning 

as an ‘attunement’, to point out that such an appropriation by a radical ‘other’ 

possibility, strictly speaking cannot be obtained due to the incompatibility of 

the factors involved, though we are aware that such unique correlations might 

occur.5 

We will complete this study with a citation from the Sāṃkhyakārikā 
which articulate the impossible moment of a union between the silent spectator 

[puruṣ�a] (the true Self) and the female matter (intellect, mind, world) [prakr�ti], 

which have provided him with his supporting nescience [māyā] to make possible 

his release from the self-same nescience: 
As a dancer ceases from the dance after having been seen by the 

audience; So also, prakṛti ceases after having manifested 

herself to the puruṣa |It is my thought that there is nothing 

more delicate than prakṛti who says ‘I have been seen’ and 

never again comes into the sight of puruṣa |Nothing there-

fore is bound; nothing released, not anything transmigrates.6

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