








































A Review and Analysis of Eviatar Zerubavel’s Book:


A Review and Analysis of Eviatar Zerubavel’s  
Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology 

 
 

Gerardo Inzunza 
Department of Sociology 

California State University, Los Angeles 
 
 

Psychologists believe the human experience is the same throughout 
all cultures and societies. However, where psychology ends, 
Zerubavel's cognitive sociology steps in and further explains the 
actual disparity between all societies that psychology has failed to 
elaborate on. As there is a functionalist approach to division of 
labor, so is there a division of thought in modern society. These 
divisions are separated by perceiving (social optics), attending 
(the social gates of consciousness), classifying (the social division 
of the world), assigning meaning (social meanings), remembering 
(social memories), and reckoning time (standard time). In essence, 
according to Zurabavel, we are socialized into deterministic 
thinkers with no free will to think. We are left to only think what is 
socialized to be normal. 
 

 
Psychology poses that there is a 
universal human experience such as fear, 
happiness, or grief that is consistent 
throughout all societies.  Involved, it 
seems, are human psychological and 
physical mechanisms that indeed do 
seem quite homogenous whether 
experienced in Greece in 2000 AD or in 
Tokyo, Japan last night. What becomes 
blurred is what influences reactions of1 
fear or happiness, indicating that it is not 
a universal human affair. For example, 

                                                 
1 Gerardo Inzunza is a graduate student 
at the Department of Sociology, 
California State University.  His paper 
was initially submitted to Soc. 514 
Contemporary Theory, taught by 
Professor Terry Kandal in Fall 2007. 

happiness in Mexico may be expe-
rienced differently than in Serbia; or 
perhaps fear for a Tibetan Buddhist may 
be experienced differently from a Wall 
Street economist.  It indicates that at 
work are elements beyond the limits of 
psychology and the assumed inde-
pendent mind. The mind in effect, is a 
temporal space that appears as a human 
characteristic that functions as a lens to 
view reality. It is this supposed reality 
that reveals the variations of cognition. 
Zerubavel’s work attempts to penetrate 
this aspect in asserting that human 
thought is not a consistently individual 
subjective act, nor is it a consistently 
objective human one either. Instead, he 
argues that there is a middle ground 
which he classifies as the inter-

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REVIEW OF EVIATAR ZERBAVEL by Gerardo Inzunza 28

subjective aspect of human cognition, 
suggesting that thought is in effect 
influenced by a membership to thought 
communities. To set up his theory, he 
delineates three classifications of 
cognition: individualistic, sociological 
and universal. By doing so, Zerbavel 
rejects individualistic and universal 
forms of cognition, suggesting that they 
engage in assumptions of convention-
alism and reductionism. What he finds is 
that sociological cognition actually fuses 
the two polar assumptions of cognition 
and serves as a middle ground; thus 
calling for sociological thinking, or cog-
nitive sociology. As Zerubavel (1997) 
indicates:   
 

 Cognitive sociology reminds us that 
we think not only as individuals and 
human beings, but also as social 
beings, products of particular social 
environments that affect as well as 
constrain the way we cognitively 
interact with the world. (P. 6). 

 
 In this regard, Zerubavel rec-
ognizes a cognitive diversity indicating 
that “It is society, after all, that 
determines what we come to regard as 
‘reasonable’ or nonsensical’, and it 
usually does so by exerting tacit pressure 
which we rarely even notice unless we 
try to resist it” (Zerubavel 1997: 13). 
More to the point, he finds that a 
comparative study is in place in order to 
reveal the normative nature of thinking, 
implying that thought is molded by 
socialization. This explains cognitive 
subcultures such as Southern Califor-
nians, students, mechanics, or poets; 
cognitive deviants such as atheists in 
Christian communities, and cognitive 
norms such as the normalcy of eating 

beef over dog meat in America. 
Cognitive socialization is Zerubavel’s 
(1997) theoretical premise: 
 

As we become socialized and learn 
to see the world through mental 
lenses of particular thought 
communities, we come to assign to 
objects the same meaning that they 
have for others around us, to both 
ignore and remember the same 
things that they do, and to laugh at 
the same things that they find 
funny. Only then do we actually 
‘enter’ the social world. (P. 15) 

 
 Cognitive diversity signifies that 
individuals engage in multiple thought 
communities, and like the engineer or 
mystic, indicates that in modern society 
there is a cognitive division of thought 
as promulgated by the division of labor. 
Modernity and society impose a 
multiplicity of thought communities: the 
church, the office, the street, the club, 
the school, the market, etc. To illustrate 
the scope and agenda of cognitive 
sociology, Zerubavel discusses six 
particular cognitive elements to reveal 
the relevance of inter-subjective and 
normative thinking which are: social 
optics, social consciousness, the social 
division of the world, social meanings, 
social memory, and standard time. 
Zerubavel formats his work as an 
illustrative outline to demonstrate the 
insight and depth in his proposition for 
cognitive sociology. The following is a   
review and interpretation of these cog-
nitive elements. 
 
Social Optics 
 
By establishing the criteria for cognitive 
sociology, Zerubavel exposes that 

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REVIEW OF EVIATAR ZERBAVEL by Gerardo Inzunza 29

individuals do not engage the world with 
a “tabula rasa”, but rather with cognitive 
commitments, or perceptions. He sug-
gests that we view and identify the world 
or social structures not objectively, but 
in a consistent tunneling of the world 
through our socialized minds, rather than 
exposing the mind to the world. In this 
regard, the mind coerces reality.  

To illustrate, Zerubavel evokes 
Columbus’ “discovery” of America and 
his insist-ence upon his reaching of the 
Indies, in spite of the Cuban natives 
informing him of his error. Further, 
scientists who advocate objective facts 
in essence observe through the lens of 
their field; thus this observation is 
subjective. These examples, according to 
Zerubavel, express a mental gaze that 
makes reality pluralistic. An economist 
gazes and assesses the market through 
statistics, surplus, investments, stocks 
and de-mand, while an immigrant farm 
worker gazes at the economy by job 
stability, affordability of milk and gas, 
and an assessment of his sore back, or 
arthritic knee. Zerubavel asserts that 
mental gazing is inter-subjective, 
indicating that Columbus, like the 
economist or farm worker, took 
“cognitive stances as members of a 
particular social environment” 
(Zerubavel 1997:32)– the Catholic 
Spanish Crown, Wall Street or the 
United Farm Workers. These 
communities create optical norms. 
 
The Social Gates of Consciousness 
 
Zerubavel then transitions to the act of 
cognitive attention asserting that 
individuals develop mental horizons, in 
effect categorizing reality by attention 
and inattention, or by foreground and 

background. As an example that we 
propose, a Democratic Party activist may 
hold Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton as 
pivotal candidates of historical change, 
while another individual may find that 
Obama and Clinton simply represent a 
branch of the power structure that 
actually limits change. As a result, 
“change” is interpreted at various levels 
of attention or inattention, and it 
expresses the aspect of mental horizons. 
Zerubavel finds that these horizons 
“…basically protect us from cognitive 
predicament of being constantly bom-
barded by an undifferentiated stream of 
stimuli” (Zerubavel 1997:36).  

In the same manner, Zerubavel 
finds that mental horizons bring forth 
moral focusing. As he illustrates, a pro-
life individual will morally focus on 
saving the unborn life while denying the 
same right to the convicted murderer. 
Ex-pressing itself in these examples of 
thought communities are mental 
horizons that influence what will be 
perceived as foreground or background. 
Thus, “society…defines what we 
consider relevant (42)” and therefore 
opens and closes the social gates of 
consciousness. 
 
The Social Division of the World 
 
Zerubavel suggests that society also has 
influence upon how the individual 
categorizes and classifies the world. He 
also observes that each society draws 
different meanings of the same reality.  
A cow may be classified as “edible” in 
the United States, while in India it is 
classified as “sacred.” These classi-
fications apply to all facets of reality 
drawn from the community’s inter-
pretations that then mold and influence 

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REVIEW OF EVIATAR ZERBAVEL by Gerardo Inzunza 30

the individual. As a result, members of 
the thought community formulate quite 
homogenous classifications amongst 
them-selves. Further, Zerubavel dis-
covers insightful nuances in these cog-
nitive classifications or categorizations: 
rigidity, fuzziness, and flexibility.  
 Rigid classifications are found in 
the sacred and profane as observed by 
Durkheim in the manner that religion 
classifies the world through sin and evil. 
As he wrote: “The fundamental 
categories of thought…have religious 
origins” (Fields 1995:421). This may 
also be evident in bureaucratic def-
initions of official versus unofficial; 
public versus private; coworker versus; 
friend. There are clear distinctions in 
classifications. Zerubavel indicates that 
fuzzy classifications involve “mental 
promiscuity” as found in the thought 
community of artists who fuse the sacred 
and profane by wearing or creating 
fantastic attire or provocative images 
and lyrics that sustain their expected 
fuzziness, that upon exiting the artistic 
lair, become rigid classifications that 
adhere to the norms of a new thought 
community. Zerubavel also finds this 
fuzziness in intimacy, humor or comedy. 
Lastly, flexible classifications are in play 
in its fluidity of identity since playing 
involves the recalibration of roles and 
expectations as dictated by the game.  
 The key argument in this analysis 
for Zerubavel is that the classification of 
sacredness or profane varies between 
groups as well as over time. The element 
of social meanings further highlights this 
aspect.   
 
Social Meanings 
 
Zerubavel considers symbols as being of 

high significance. As he indicates: 
“Using symbols presupposes a mental 
association of two elements one of 
which (the ‘signifier’) is regarded as 
representing, or ‘standing for’, the other 
(the ‘signified’). The meaning of a pre-
sent, thus, is the personal affection it is 
supposed to represent” (Zerubavel 
1997:68). What he finds is that signifiers 
typify a particular element such as 
illness or the color blue, but are provided 
two distinct associations of either natural 
or artificial association. “Illness” (the 
signified) is typified by a natural 
association of indicators such as a 
“symptom” (the signifier) that evokes 
images of bleeding, sickness, death. In 
the case of the color “blue”, it obtains 
artificial associations via symbols such 
as masculinity, a newborn boy, etc.  
Hence, the latter is driven by social 
convention signifying that social 
meanings vary from society to society or 
from thought community to thought 
community as in the case of the cross in 
Christianity having a different meaning 
in Mayan culture, or a gun for a hunter 
as opposed to a suicidal individual. 
 Meanings, according to Zeru-
bavel, are packaged within a thought 
community whereby the Star Spangled 
Banner, as he suggests, may evoke a 
different meaning for an American than 
for a Bulgarian. He indicates that 
involved are different mental asso-
ciations to the symbols; therefore 
provoking different meanings. Since 
individuals overlook the conventional 
associations they make, Zerubavel 
indicates that the symbols are therefore 
susceptible to reification; thus we 
confuse the inter-subjective with the 
objective. For example, the manner in 
which functionalists reify crime or 

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REVIEW OF EVIATAR ZERBAVEL by Gerardo Inzunza 31

deviance as concrete and as “fact” is to 
engage in artificial association. 
  
Social Memories 
 
Zerubavel (1997) proposes that the past 
and what we remember, is also affected 
by the social environment.  In this vein, 
he finds cognitive psychology’s 
deficiency in recognizing this 
phenomenon. He states:  
 

The notion that there are certain 
things that one should forget also 
underscores the normative 
dimension of memory, which is 
typically ignored by cognitive 
psychology. Like the curricular 
institutionalization of required 
history classes in school, it reminds 
us that remembering is more than 
just a spontaneous act ,as it also 
happens to be regulated by 
unmistakably social rules of 
remembrance that tell us quite 
specifically what we should 
remember and what we must 
forget. (P. 84).       

  
 The framing of the past, in effect, 
also frames the boundaries of the 
individual’s memory. Thus; for example, 
we interpret that for the history teacher 
to glorify the revolutionary genius of the 
Founding Fathers in America, while 
omitting the revolutionary genius of 
other foreign movements, is to engage in 
the social framing of memory. It implies 
that the concept of revolution and our 
memory to it as Americans, is only 
legitimate in history and not in 
contemporary life both domestically or 
abroad.  Forgetting, it seems, is a social 
process of memory regulation. 
Zerubavel illustrates that the classi-

fication of “history” and “pre history”, 
or “pre-Columbian” in essence regulates 
the memory of history students in 
silencing and forgetting pre-1492 in the 
same manner the sociology student is 
socialized into commencing studies of 
the field with Comte and not with 
Aristotle or Plato.  He finds that this “is 
neither logical nor natural. It is 
unmistakably social, normative con-
vention (86)”. He asserts that at play is a 
process of mnemonic socialization or a 
learned tradition of remembering.  
Mnemonic socialization is particularly 
biased and is a type of memory that is 
communal more so than personal such as 
the Jews memory of the holocaust or 
Dodger fan’s memory of Kirk Gibson’s 
1988 World Series home run. 
 
Standard Time 
 
Lastly, Zerubavel proposes that the 
mental “placement” of time is dependent 
on social environment.  In other words, 
individuals create inter-subjective time 
frames: start date at work, the day I ran 
the Los Angeles Marathon, the Whittier 
earthquake of 1987, etc. Involved is 
what Zerubavel finds as the formulation 
of chronological eras and socio-temporal 
landmarks which serve as “temporal 
anchors”. He indicates that these anchors 
not only organize and shape the past, 
they also shape present and future time 
whereby the essence of a common time 
arrangement between individual and the 
society is to allow for participation in the 
world. According to Zerubavel, “stan-
dard time is one of the pillars of the 
Inter–subjective social world” (1997: 
103).  
 Without this mental placement 
then, is to engage in what he defines as 

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REVIEW OF EVIATAR ZERBAVEL by Gerardo Inzunza 32

“mental exile”. He illustrates how 
castaway sailors or prisoners in solitary 
confinement gravitate towards keeping 
track of the days in spite of no contact or 
pragmatic need for time to avoid “socio-
temporal disorientation.”  He indicates 
that adhering to this universal system of 
time is not natural, but as he suggests, 
normative. The transition from solar 
time, to mathematical time via the clock 
illustrates this socio-temporal arrange-
ment. To not subscribe to such a 
universal and almost reified view of time 
is to be susceptible to becoming cogni-
tively deviant.  
 
Assessment 
 
The essence of Zerubavel’s work is to 
demonstrate and assert that we are not 
romantically original and spontaneous 
thinkers, that as social beings, we are 
instead normative thinkers, or socialized 
thinkers whereby we limit the scope and 
range of our thought as illustrated and 
brought forth by Zerubavel.  In effect, 
the environment and social structure that 
is a force upon our actions is more 
specifically a force upon our cognition; 
thereby, being a phenomenon that can be 
investigated by a sociology of the mind.  
This reviewer interprets this as an 
extension of Durkheim’s analysis of 
norms, whereby Zerubavel intelligently 
takes this element of social life, 
transcending the social sphere and finds 
the relationship to the mental sphere - 
hence; a “social mindscape”.  
 In so doing, he seems to take aim 
at psychology’s juggernaut over its 
understanding and analysis of cognition 
by indicating that psychology fails to 
observe the social influence upon the 
mind. In sum, it falls short in 

understanding the full cognitive proc-
esses since the mind is not in a vacuum, 
independent of external influences, but 
rather in communion with social life.  
 As a criticism, Zerubavel’s 
analysis lacks an assessment of the 
hierarchical nature of modern societies 
and their influence upon cognition. In 
other words, he does not address the 
structures of ideology, coercion, and 
propaganda, or how artificial as-
sociations can become manipulated and 
exploited on behalf of the social 
regulators of thought. For example, 
“immigrant” can have various as-
sociations such as “problematic”, 
“newcomer” or “alien”, while 
“homosexual” may be associated with 
“sinner” rather than “same-sex orient-
tation.” Zerubavel does not address the 
dialectical nature between cultures and 
subcultures and what this writer would 
assess as the dynamics of thought 
politics.  In this sense, he approaches his 
subject in an almost functionalist 
perspective, not entirely delineating the 
power structure and its exploitative 
nature.  
 In reading his piece, this 
reviewer is reminded of George Orwell’s 
1984 and the looming Thought Police. 
As Orwell wrote: “Thoughtcrime they 
called it. Thoughtcrime as not a thing 
that could be concealed forever. You 
might dodge successfully for a while, 
even for years, but sooner or later they 
were bound to get you” (1983:16). 
Fiction came to life under McCarthyism 
as it did in Chile under the Pinochet run 
D.I.N.A. forces. Likewise we find a 
government who advocates to the 
citizenry that they are “either with us or 
against us.” This has all the character-
istics of thought politics that makes 

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33

thinking a deviant act. Orwell seemed to 
have recognized this aspect of reification 
on behalf of the power structure in the 
name of sustaining cognitive control by 
blurring contradictions in his now 
famous phrase: “War is Peace, Freedom 
is Slavery and Ignorance is Strength.”  
 What Zerubavel brings forth is a 
fantastic realm of social life from the 
micro and macro perspective, revealing 
the mind’s dependence on the 
environment and the processes of 
cognitive inheritance.  In effect, we think 
with bequeathed ideas and parameters 
that society and the environment have 
provided; hence, we are conditioned 
thinkers. The danger is in the capacity of 
powerful interests in manipulating such 
cognitive mechanisms.  Marx under-
stood this quite well in indicating that, 
“…the reform of consciousness consists 
only in enabling the world to clarify its 
consciousness, in waking it from its 
dream about itself, in explaining to it the 
meaning  of  its  own  actions”  (15).  He  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

would go on to call for this “clarity” of 
mind against ruling class ideology. We 
consider, then, that Zerubavel’s work is 
significant and relevant in bringing forth 
a particularly keen sociological imag-
ination, requiring a further step by 
assessing power interests and their 
molding of what this writer considers 
“popular” or “appropriate” conscious-
ness to then address the politics of 
thought through cognitive sociology.    
 
REFERENCES 
 
Durkheim, Emile. 1995. The Elementary 

Forms of Religious Life. Translated 
by Karen E. Field. New York: The 
Free Press. 

Orwell, George. 1983. 1984. New York: 
Penguin Group. 

Tucker, Robert. ed. 1978. The Marx-Engels 
Reader. New York: Norton.  

Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1997. Social Mindscapes 
An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology. 
Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press. 


