1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 1-5 issn 2562-8429 russia-canada relations special issue: introduction megan swift1 university of victoria those looking for good news stories on canada-russia relations in recent years will have found instead headlines with keywords and phrases such as ‘disinformation’, ‘cyber threats’, ‘propaganda’, ‘kremlin lashes out’, ‘dysfunctional’, ‘election meddling’, ‘major threat’, ‘damaged relations’, ‘failure of democratization’, and ‘anti-russian sanctions’. canada-russia relations are indeed at a low ebb following the 2014 annexation of crimea and crisis in ukraine. yet as the world’s two largest states, northern nations, neighbours across the pacific, and as two powerful stakeholders in the arctic, it is worth exploring what canada and russia hold as common interests and examining possibilities for moving toward greater cooperation. as the experts gathered together for this issue show, political interactions are the loudest but by no means the only fronts for interrelations. beyond the headlines, at less visible levels, cooperation is already taking place, or is poised for development. this special issue includes analyses of five crucial spheres of involvement: foreign affairs, trade, media, global politics, and military security. the authors are scholars from russia and canada who work at universities and scholarly institutes in russia, canada, the united states and the united kingdom. their analyses delve into the complexities of canada-russia relations and the long-term causes of the deteriorated relationship. they underline a pattern of misunderstanding and mistrust that, on the canadian side, is able to draw from a well-developed pool of cold war tropes and, on the russian side, keeps perspectives on canada often undifferentiated from policy and media about the united states.2 given that we are at a critical point in canada-russia relations, it is crucial to have scholarly initiatives that can bring together expert knowledge and unbiased assessment, but until recently a research group with this specific focus has been lacking.3 this current issue is a project of the canada-russia research initiative (crri), a 2018 initiative housed at the university of victoria. the organization and its website (thecrri.ca) were launched by anna tsurkan, who gathered 1 megan swift is an associate professor of russian studies in the department of germanic and slavic studies at the university of victoria. 2 the leading organization dedicated to russia-canada affairs in russia is the russian association for canadian studies, based in moscow. 3 other scholarly initiatives in canada focus on canada-europe relations, such as the jean monnet network on eucanada relations at carleton university, or on eu-russia relations, such as the between the eu and russia (bear network) at mcgill university, and the jean monnet chair in the eu’s relations with russia and the eastern neighbourhood at carleton university. all three of these initiatives have received support from the erasmus+ programme of the european union. file:///c:/users/heather%20pyman/appdata/local/microsoft/windows/inetcache/content.outlook/4sdjzg2v/thecrri.ca) 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 1-5 issn 2562-8429 together a network of researchers working in the field of canada-russia relations. the first event of the crri, co-organized by tsurkan and megan swift in partnership with the canadian international council, was a conference on ‘arctic. media. security’ at the university of victoria in november, 2019. in november, 2020, the crri hosted a well-attended webinar on the ‘past, present and future of arctic cooperation’ that featured distinguished panelists, her excellency alison le claire, honourable lloyd axworthy, and former ambassador jeremy kinsman. a roundtable, ‘introducing the canada-russia research initiative’, will take place in august 2021 at the meeting of the international council for central and eastern european studies. this special issue is one of several projects intended to raise the profile and the quality of the dialogue around russia and canada. this issue begins with zachary paikin’s global perspective. paikin, a researcher at the center for european policy studies and senior visiting fellow at the global policy institute, looks at the changing relationship of russia and the west in terms of the balance of power. he asks to what extent the neo-liberal hegemony established in europe is coming under re-negotiation, given the fact that washington has lost legitimacy in recent years by exercising unilateral power against an accepted post-war framework of multi-lateral european relations. in this same time period, russia has undergone a eurasian turn, focusing its attention toward non-european partners, which is creating an overall sense of a shifting european power dynamic. natalia viakhireva, a program manager at moscow’s russian international affairs council, provides a forthright analysis of foreign affairs in the last half-decade, the period that culminated in the current state of obstructed russia-canada relations. she argues that the way forward will not be through engagement at the political ‘top’, but rather through avenues of para-diplomacy wherein both sides can find areas of common ground. the most promising of these avenues is cooperation on arctic affairs, where russia and canada hold two of the five permanent seats on the arctic council (along with norway, denmark and the united states). russia and canada, in fact, see eye to eye on vital issues, including determinations of national coastlines and territorial waters, an issue that will affect crucial commercial, transport, military, and environmental ventures in the years to come. the arctic is thus one avenue that presents an opportunity for these two northern leaders to work in mutual communication. anna tsurkan’s article on cross-national media reporting, on the other hand, digs into one of the most contentious levels of engagement between canada and russia. the founder and project coordinator of the canada-russia research initiative, tsurkan begins by examining how canada reported the possibility of russian election interference in and around the federal election of 2019, and how russian media responded to these allegations. she concludes that even when no evidence of election meddling was found, as was the case in 2019, the way that canadian media outlets reported about russia reinforced certain narratives that, in effect, became the story. the same can be said about russian media reporting on canada, which consistently used negative language. nancy teeple, a fulbright scholar at the university of norwich and post-doctoral fellow at the north american and arctic defence and security network, looks at the question of military security in the penultimate article of the collection. she argues that we reached a crucial turning point in 2020, given that key arms control treaties came to an end without a concrete signal of their renewal. referencing the conclusions of viakhireva’s article, teeple suggests that security in the arctic is going to be a primary concern of the future, and one in which canada and russia will inevitably be important actors. 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 1-5 issn 2562-8429 many of the issues discussed here are reflected in the 2019 report on european security published by the german educational non-profit think tank friedrich ebert stiftung. their report is based on a poll of 1,000 respondents in each of seven countries in different regions of a transforming greater europe: germany, france, russia, poland, ukraine, serbia, and latvia. when asked whom they consider the greatest current threat to national security, france and germany perceived it was the united states, not russia, that posed the largest menace (russia was indeed perceived as the greatest security threat in latvia, poland, and ukraine). the report also described a “prevailing public perception that there is a common europe and that russia is part of it” (krumm et al. 2019, 66). without minimizing the extent of the strain in russia-west relations caused by the 2014 crisis in ukraine, there is an overall sentiment that “without russia, any talk of security in europe is pointless” (2019, 6). in other words, russia can, should and must be included in important conversations going forward. based on the articles in this special issue, it is clear that deteriorated relations are likely to continue in russia-canada foreign affairs for the foreseeable future against the backdrop of a transforming europe and a shift in the global balance of power. however, new areas of importance are emerging, especially in the arctic, where canada and russia have good reasons to work together for mutual benefit. there will be much to watch, discuss, and analyze in the coming years. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 1-5 issn 2562-8429 references krumm, reinhard, alexandra dienes, simon weiss, sebastian starystach, hans-henning schroder and stefan bar. 2019. security radar 2019 wake-up call for europe. friedrich ebert stiftung. https://www.fes-vienna.org/e/new-publication-security-radar-2019-wakeup-call-for-europe. https://www.fes-vienna.org/e/new-publication-security-radar-2019-wake-up-call-for-europe https://www.fes-vienna.org/e/new-publication-security-radar-2019-wake-up-call-for-europe 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 1-5 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 introduction to the special issue: carbon politics in canada and europe1 arthur benz2, joan debardeleben3, stephan schott4, and miranda schreurs5 signs that the climate is undergoing rapid changes as a result of increasing greenhouse gases are all around us. average annual global temperatures records are on an upward trajectory with 2020 tying with 2016 as the hottest years on record. already global average temperatures are 1.2 degrees centigrade warmer than they were at the end of the 19th century (national oceanographic and atmospheric association 2021). extreme weather events, including scorching summer temperatures, devastating forest fires and droughts, super hurricanes, and floods are expected to become increasingly common and severe as a result of climate change (national oceanographic and atmospheric association 2021). at the heart of the problem of climate change is our addiction to, and dependence on, fossil fuels. fossil fuels, of course, helped build our modern economies, but they are now recognized as being the primary source of the greenhouse gases that are warming the planet. in november 2016, the paris agreement on climate change entered into force. the paris agreement calls on nations to develop nationally determined contributions that indicate how they plan to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions. in the aggregate, these nationally determined contributions are meant to keep global average temperatures from increasing beyond two degrees centigrade, and to strive to keep them within 1.5 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels. every five years, climate change trends are to be evaluated and nationally determined contributions reconsidered in light of the latest scientific evidence. the next major global negotiations on climate change are scheduled for november 2021 in glasgow. while the economic shut-down tied to the covid-19 pandemic led to a temporary dip in global greenhouse gas emissions (mcsweeney and tandon 2020), climate change trends are worrisome. for this reason, it is important to consider what major climate contributors are doing to address their fossil fuel emissions, and to examine their climate change policies. this special issue focuses attention on the european union (eu), several of its member states, canada, and the united kingdom. (for earlier comparative work addressing these cases see schreurs, selin, and vandeveer 2009; harrison and sundstrom 2010; 1 the introduction was updated on april 25, 2021. 2 arthur benz is professor of political science at the technical university of darmstadt. 3 joan debardeleben is chancellor’s in the institute of european, russian, and eurasian studies (eurus) at carleton university. 4 stephan schott is an associate professor in the school of public policy and administration at carleton university. 5 miranda schreurs is chair of climate and environmental policy at the bavarian school of public policy, technical university of munich. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 mehling 2011; sprinz et al. 2018). there is good reason to focus on these cases. the eu accounts for roughly 7.5 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions, of which germany (the eu’s largest economy) contributes one fourth (1.85 percent); canada accounts for about 1.5 percent of global emissions (world resources institute 2020). while the eu and canada are substantially smaller emitters than either china or the united states (us), their greenhouse gas emission levels still far exceed levels consistent with achieving a climate neutral future. there are, however, signs that a more-climate sensitive politics is emerging in canada, the eu, and individual european states. a particularly interesting dimension of the canadian-european comparison relates to their multi-level governance structures and how these influence energy and climate policy-making processes and outputs. these, on the one hand, provide avenues for policy experimentation at different levels of government but, on the other hand, can complicate policy-making due to the need for constant negotiation and compromise. political systems, politics, and policy-making scholars in comparative politics and federalism studies have pointed out that the eu and canada represent particular types of federations that share essential features (fossum 2007; hueglin 2013). their decentralized allocation of power is determined by a constitution in the case of canada, and by treaties in the case of the eu. territorial relations rest on a kind of contract, the particular social basis of their multinational societies, and on the need for a continuous search for agreements. canada and the eu were created by a ‘coming-together’ of, respectively, a group of provinces and states. today, canada is a federation of ten provinces and three territories and numerous indigenous nations, while the eu is a supranational structure comprised of 27 member states (having recently lost the united kingdom as a member). both the diversity of the founding members and the growing diversity resulting from enlargements help to explain the challenges facing these federations, which therefore rightly are characterized as multinational “holding-together” federations (stepan 1999). the cultural diversity overlaps with significant economic and social diversity. canada and the eu are also quite similar in terms of the allocation of powers in the policy fields of climate change and energy. the setting of greenhouse gas emission targets within international climate negotiations is addressed by the federal government in ottawa and eu institutions in brussels and strasbourg (with participation of member state governments in the council), while the responsibilities for energy, infrastructure, and regional economy are more decentralized. in both cases, a coherent policy designed to mitigate climate change and to transform the energy system to a more sustainable basis requires coordination and agreements between the various levels of government. however, the institutional conditions for policy coordination differ between canada and the eu. the relations between levels of government, which are particularly relevant in complex policy areas like climate change and energy policy, reveal considerable divergences. provincial governments in canada emphasize their autonomy, although they and the federal government voluntarily have negotiated important intergovernmental agreements. the eu depends on the consent of at least a majority of member state governments to pass binding regulations and, in practice, governments regularly aim for unanimous decisions. 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 in terms of the patterns of democratic government, significant divergences exist as well. in canada, which is heavily influenced by the westminster model, majoritarian democracies emerged at the federal and provincial levels, although with a party system that increases the probability of minority governments in ottawa. in the eu, power sharing between intergovernmental institutions (european council and council of the eu, which represent national governments) and supranational institutions (european parliament and european commission, which represent the common european interest) follows the model of a consensus democracy where negotiations that lead to compromise and to outcomes acceptable to all, or at least most, parties are considered crucial. in contrast to canada, the eu is characterized by a wide variety of parliamentary and semi-parliamentary governments in its member states. coordination of policy-making is essential in energy and climate policy, yet this can be difficult because of the significant differences that may exist in territorial interests due to differences in available energy sources, industrial structures, and political-cultural orientations. these differences make the comparisons explored in this special issue of such interest. the comparison of the distinct modes of multilevel policy-making in canada and the eu can help explain, on the one hand, why canada and the eu have adopted climate neutrality targets and introduced plans for reducing dependence on fossil fuels but, on the other hand, have shown different propensities for dealing with emissions stemming from carbon-intensive sectors. the comparison also allows an exploration of how different actors’ interests influence the shape of respective carbon policies as well as the challenges and opportunities involved in policy implementation. lessons can also be drawn for practical politics, demonstrating the importance of transatlantic dialogue. there are many areas where stronger cooperation and improved coordination could open new possibilities for bilateral and multilateral approaches to climate mitigation and adaptation at the federal and supranational levels as well as at the member state, provincial, and even urban levels of government. given the complexities of multi-level governance in energy and climate policy, a comparison of all aspects of canadian and european climate and energy politics and policies is beyond the scope of a single special journal issue. for this reason, this issue focuses primarily on the larger member states of the eu plus the united kingdom and provinces of canada. among the eu member states, germany is the largest economy and is often considered to be a leader in some, but not all, aspects of energy and climate policymaking (fischer 2017). its influence is both direct, in terms of the policies and programs it sets nationally, as well as indirect, through its salient role in eu policymaking, where at times it pushes forward and at other times puts the brakes on more ambitious eu climate and energy targets, directives, and regulations. the uk, although no longer an eu member state, remains a major trading partner of both canada and the eu, and continues to align its climate policies with the eu. for different reasons, most southern and eastern european countries in the eu are less advanced in their energy transitions (for example, in terms of their installation of renewable energy) or the ambition-level of their climate policies, although there are exceptions. regional differences are also present in canada, where alberta, british columbia, ontario, saskatchewan, and québec can be viewed as key players influencing energy policy and thus also climate policy. in canada, there is a large divergence between very fossil fuel dependent provinces such as alberta and saskatchewan and provinces that already have a largely carbon-free electricity grid and that are spearheading a transition into a cleaner economy (e.g., québec and manitoba). 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 managing conflicts due to territorial disparities in carbon politics is a challenge in federations and the eu’s multi-level system. this is the case even though such systems technically provide institutional structures to express territorial diversity, at least more so than in the centralized structures characteristic of unitary states. the effectiveness of policies is influenced by intergovernmental coordination in canada; in the eu it is influenced by supranational joint decision making, as well as by the variable willingness (or ability) of individual member states to implement greenhouse gas emission reductions. energy policy-making has historically been dominated by executive branches and experts in public administration, with parliaments deciding on legislation and fiscal resources. this has raised the question, for all of these jurisdictions, of how executive governance and democracy can be balanced. it also raises important questions about the will of the people, as signaled by elections. democratic legitimacy in canadian federalism and in the eu’s complex multi-level system has been discussed from many perspectives and in reference to different concepts and theories of democracy (e.g., hueglin 2013; fossum 2007; fossum and laycock 2021). what is clear is that elections are an important vehicle for holding governments and their policies accountable. this can, however, make addressing longterm problems like climate change particularly challenging, as environmental issues are rarely the main issues on voters’ minds during elections. climate change demands immediate but far-reaching changes in energy provision, energy use, transport structures, and even social behavior. elections may not, however, effectively communicate an environmental mandate to politicians, at least not with the force needed to spur the far-reaching changes that green transitions require. the changing energy landscape resulting from climate change policies and the green energy transition is likely to have broad and long-lasting political consequences. the power structures that emerged during a time when carbon-based energy structures dominated are under threat. new actors and interests are emerging, but powerful, vested carbon interests are doing their best to steer developments in ways that will reduce their losses and possibly even bring them new gains. the comparison of carbon politics in canada and europe can advance our knowledge of how territorial, industrial, and value conflicts are managed in multi-level governance structures. it can also shed light on how democratic governments and society are changing as they slowly try to become low carbon, climate neutral economies. eu-canada relations and the international context although canada pulled out of the kyoto accord in late 2011, since prime minister justin trudeau came to power in 2015, canada has adopted more progressive climate change policies and joined the eu as a leader in the paris climate meeting of 2015. both canada and the eu have pushed for aggressive targets and timelines in international negotiations. the international context in which canadian and eu climate policies are developing is also changing. with the election of joseph biden, climate change is back on the us political agenda. the us is rejoining the paris agreement and the biden administration has made the clean energy revolution and climate justice central goals. canada, the us, and the eu are thus increasingly moving in line with each other’s efforts to reduce carbon emissions and to transition to clean economy models. on earth day, canadian prime minister justin trudeau pledged that canada 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 will do more to address climate change, setting a new target to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40-45 percent of 2005 levels by 2030 (volcovici and mason 2021). this came in reaction to a bilateral negotiation in the days leading up to the biden administration’s climate summit for world leaders which was held on april 22-23, 2021 (finnegan 2021). this growing convergence will reduce the likelihood of further trade barriers, although some cross-border frictions remain such as president biden’s cancellation of the keystone xl pipeline permit in early 2021 and his critique of germany’s plans to complete the nord stream 2 pipeline. at the same time, the potential for cooperation between the eu and canada in pushing an ambitious climate agenda on a bilateral basis is more promising than ever. the eu and canada are moving in tandem on the question of carbon adjustments in the comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) even though they have different approaches (hübner 2011). the eu is using a centralized emission trading system (the eu ets) and canada is relying on a variety of provincial measures with a federal system guided by the pan canadian framework on clean growth and climate change as a fallback option for provincial inaction. the potential exists to link the eu ets with québec’s and california’s cap and trade system that also used to include canada’s most populated province of ontario. the eu and canada are already collaborating on clean energy innovation and new supply chains and have considerable potential to further advance a circular clean economy. this special issue in his article, “carbon democracy in the eu and canada – ready for a ‘new green deal’?”, markus lederer takes a critical look at eu and canadian climate policy, noting some progress but arguing that neither jurisdiction is moving fast enough or making deep enough changes to contribute adequately to the global effort to keep rising greenhouse gas emissions within the 1.5 degrees centigrade ceiling. while he differentiates progress between canada and the eu, suggesting that the eu is doing somewhat better than canada, the main obstacle to change, he argues, is their historical development as carbon democracies. the democratic institutions of canada and the eu have both been powerfully shaped by fossil fuel interests. successfully transitioning towards cleaner energy structures and adopting green deal politics will mean not only deep changes to energy systems, but also the adjustment of industrial structures and changes to the nature of democratic politics. the green transitions will mean that there will be winners and losers, socially, economically, and politically. while a just transition may bring some compensation to affected regions, political struggles are to be expected. climate policy-making will thus, lederer argues, need to be deeply transformative and disruptive. stephan schott and miranda schreurs, in their article, “climate politics and fossil fuel sector developments in canada and germany: dealing with fossil fuel legacies,” examine efforts to become climate neutral in germany and canada. their article discusses recent climate and energy policies and programs, and the progress being made in expanding renewable energy capacity. while both countries have been slow to tackle the elimination of fossil fuel dependency, critical junctures appear to have been reached. responding to growing domestic and international pressures, including the eu’s embrace of the european green deal, germany issued a plan to phase out coal 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 and adopted a climate protection act. opposition from impacted regions was addressed with a large compensation plan. canadian measures include the adoption of the pan canadian framework on clean growth and climate change, and on-going coal phase outs at the provincial level. in the west, the oil and gas industry is starting to recognize that changes will be needed in that sector as well. despite opposition from fossil fueldependent provinces, and provinces such as ontario with conservative governments, climate measures signal a new era of cleaner technologies, with innovations spearheaded by industry, including in fossil fuel-dependent regions. thus, schott and schreurs conclude that the goal of climate neutrality has secured a place on both countries’ political agendas. they outline particular arenas where significant opportunities exist for cooperation between canada and germany, as well as between canada and the eu, in addressing climate change. in their article, “transformative energy policy in federations: canada and germany compared,” arthur benz and jörg broschek take another look at canada and germany. by focusing on energy transition and policy dynamics under different institutional conditions in federal systems, they analyze whether governments in these countries over the last decades have succeeded in transforming the old ‘policy regime’ and consolidating a new regime in this field. benz and broschek find that policies indeed have significantly changed in both countries. in canada, policies were initially introduced by some provinces; in germany, policies were initiated by the federal government. however, the path towards an energy system based on renewable sources still lacks appropriate governance structures in both countries, although this lack is more pronounced in the canadian system of dual federalism than in germany’s cooperative federalism. douglas macdonald, asya bidordinova, and avet khachatryan focus attention on lower-tier jurisdictions (member states in the eu, and provinces and territories in canada) in their article, “rising subnational greenhouse gas emissions: a challenge to meeting federal climate policy goals.” they suggest that climate progress has been more difficult for canada than for the eu because of the particularly large and rising share of emissions in alberta. the member state that has shown the highest growth in emissions in the eu (spain) is responsible for a relatively small share of overall eu emissions. other states with large shares of emissions in the eu, such as germany, have experienced emission drops, thus aiding overall eu progress on climate. finally, harold clarke’s and jon pammett’s article, “environmental issues in british and canadian elections,” is concerned with the mandates voters give to decision makers via elections in parliamentary democracies. they compare the 2019 national elections in the united kingdom (uk) and canada, examining the extent to which environmental issues swayed voting decisions. clarke and pammett argue that in both canada and the uk, voters’ primary concerns were not related to the environment or climate change. as such, issues relating to energy transformations were only of secondary concern. voters thus did not send the kind of clear mandate to policy makers on the environment that might be needed to carry out the deep transformative changes being called for in the articles by lederer and by schott and schreurs. 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 references finnigan, conor. 2021. “us, canada to hold climate talks, paving road to biden’s earth day summit,” abc news, february 23, 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/politics/uscanada-hold-climate-talks-paving-road-bidens/story?id=76076360. fischer, severin. 2017. die energiewende und europa. springer vs: wiesbaden. friedrich, johannes, mengpin ge, and andrew pickens. 2020. “this interactive chart shows changes in the world’s top 10 emitters.” world resources institute, december 10, 2020. 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https://abcnews.go.com/politics/us-canada-hold-climate-talks-paving-road-bidens/story?id=76076360 https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/interactive-chart-top-emitters. https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/interactive-chart-top-emitters. https://www.carbonbrief.org/global-carbon-project-coronavirus-causes-record-fall-in-fossil-fuel-emissions-in-2020 https://www.carbonbrief.org/global-carbon-project-coronavirus-causes-record-fall-in-fossil-fuel-emissions-in-2020 https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/2020-tied-for-warmest-year-on-record-nasa-analysis-shows https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/2020-tied-for-warmest-year-on-record-nasa-analysis-shows https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/202013#:~:text=the%201901%e2%80%932000%20average%20combined,c%20(60.9%c2%b0f) https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/202013#:~:text=the%201901%e2%80%932000%20average%20combined,c%20(60.9%c2%b0f) 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 schreurs, miranda a., stacy vandeveer, and henrik selin, eds. 2009. transatlantic environment and energy politics: comparative and international dimensions. surrey: ashgate. sprinz, detlef f., guri bang, lars brückner, and yasuko kameyama. 2018. “major countries.” in global climate policy: actors, concepts and enduring challenges, edited by urs luterbacher and detlef f. sprinz, 171-216. cambridge: mit press. stepan, alfred. 1999. “federalism and democracy. beyond the u.s. model.” journal of democracy 10 (4): 19-34. vandeveer, stacy, and henrik selin. 2012. “federalism, multi-level governance, and climate change politics across the atlantic.” in comparative environmental politics: theory, practice, and prospects, edited by paul f. steinberg and stacy vandeveer, 341-368. cambridge: mit press. volcovici, valerie, and jeff mason. 2021. “u.s., other countries deepen climate goals at earth day summit,” reuters, april 23, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/us-pledges-halve-its-emissionsby-2030-renewed-climate-fight-2021-04-22/. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/us-pledges-halve-its-emissions-by-2030-renewed-climate-fight-2021-04-22/ https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/us-pledges-halve-its-emissions-by-2030-renewed-climate-fight-2021-04-22/ 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 economic and social balance of 15 years of eastern enlargement béla galgóczi1 european union trade institute abstract the eastern eu enlargement (2004, 2007, 2013) is still one of the success stories of the eu (and unprecedented in the world), but at the same time it is controversial and is perceived as controversial. one of the core problems has been its unbalanced character: the whole process had a clear `single market` focus and the values of a `social europe` were of secondary importance. based on a neofunctionalist approach the paper discusses the integration of the new member states from the point of view of economic and income convergence. along with a literature review, data on wages, productivity and output will be analysed to demonstrate that upward convergence of the poorer new member states towards the eu average had been stalled in wake of the 2009 crisis. the resulting cleavages put the core hypothesis of the neofunctionalist approach that eu integration has a `direction` in terms of an upwards convergence into question. 1 béla galgóczi is a senior researcher at the european union trade institute. 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 introduction the european union (eu) is a historically unique supranational entity. it has a single market (free movement of goods, capital, services and people) with eu level institutions and legislation founded on a set of common values but essentially still based on the national sovereignty of its member states. labour markets, social policies, and wage-setting are all within national competence. heterogeneity has always been a characteristic feature of the eu, but since its eastern enlargement from 2004 on, this has grown enormously. income gaps, mostly between the east and the west, are up to a ratio of one to ten. although it is true for the whole eu that the welfare state there is more pronounced than in the rest of the world, regional and country differences are huge, and different models co-exist. this paper attempts to draw a balance of fifteen years of eastern enlargement based on aggregate social and economic outcomes in the region. while economic matters have played an important role in assessing outcomes, they are only a part of the picture; this paper does not discuss political economy developments, governance structures, or varieties of capitalism issues. after laying out some theoretical considerations, section 1 discusses economic convergence and its importance in eu integration. section 2 addresses wage convergence and demonstrates how it has lost momentum in the wake of the crisis and falls short of initial expectations. section 3 examines the background and the main drivers of wage increases, including the role of minimum wage policy, foreign direct investment and labour mobility. section 4 draws a balance of the fifteen years of eastern enlargement. economic convergence and the single market driven integration theoretical considerations when considering european integration, this article builds on the neofunctionalist approach (schmitter 2005), which conceptualizes the state as an arena in which societal actors operate to realize their interests. neofunctionalism sees international cooperation as a response to scale economies in the provision of public goods. whereas functionalists argue that the only feasible way to bypass state sovereignty is by transferring specific state functions to specialized international agencies, neofunctionalists emphasize the potential for deeper and broader governance at the regional level. their key interest is the direction of regional integration, not its outcome. neofunctionalists identify a series of mutually reinforcing processes that lead to further integration. although crises may delay integration, the guiding assumption is that, over time, policy spillover and supranational activism will produce an upward trend. the term european integration itself reflects the neofunctionalist premise of having a process that has a direction. from this perspective, the causal path is characterized by path dependence. postfunctionalism roots the response to the eurocrisis in domestic politics, and in particular, in the rise of nationalist opposition to european integration that petrified governments even as the economic costs of inactivity rose (hooghe and marks 2018). the result was a spiral of crisis and inadequate response. in line with könig and ohr (2012), this article argues that economic and political integration are complementary, offering a sharp distinction between shallow and deep integration, with the latter combining economic and political integration. it also builds on theoretical work on the socio-economic heterogeneity of the eu (höpner and schäfer 2008), but it goes beyond the 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 mere recognition of this by regarding it as a core–periphery cleavage with profound implications for the political and economic relations between member states. although studies of core–periphery relations have always been a part of european integration studies (bachtler et al. 2014), the usual perspective has focused on convergence rather than divergence as a cleavage or divide. the analysis that follows will show that the earlier convergence dynamic between poorer and richer member states of the eu that was characteristic up the crisis has been stalled with consequences for the development perspectives of the periphery. asymmetrical integration it is important to bear in mind that the de facto economic integration (free trade, free capital movements) of the central-eastern europe (cee) region took place right after its opening up during the early 1990s. the accession of cee countries to the eu (eight central-eastern european countries2 in 2004, romania and bulgaria in 2007, croatia in 2013) can be seen as a political-institutional act that completed this process by drawing these countries under the eu legislative framework. freedom of services was extended to the cee region at the time of the accession, while free labour mobility has been granted in a gradual process (completed in 2011 for the 2004 accession countries, and in 2014 for 2007 entrants, with restrictions still applying for croatia until 2020). this early opening up of the markets for vulnerable transformation economies that were under the double shock of losing their former markets in the east and the widescale restructuring of their economies with applied neoliberal policy reforms has been identified as an original sin in causing unnecessary transformation pain (mencinger 2013). several analysts also argue that the very idea of the european social model has always taken a back seat in the process of european integration (streeck 2000; scharpf 2002; martin and ross 2004). accordingly, the single market project has always been at the core of integration – backed by hard law and its flagship project the emu, albeit on the basis of an incomplete architecture, as learned during the crisis; the social dimension has always been based on declarations, wish lists, and soft targets like those set out in the eu 2020 strategy. the historical founding principle of the eu concentrated on peace, but it was the prospect of upwards income convergence that embodied the european dream for millions of people. this is especially true for cee citizens whose, incomes were a fraction of those in the luckier western part of the continent. the perspective of income convergence – between poorer and richer member states and among the poorer and richer regions within states – has been an underlying feature of european integration from the outset. in this respect, a look at fifty years of eu history up the 2008-09 crisis provides confirmation of the project’s unprecedented success. as a world bank (2012:57) report states, “the european convergence in consumption levels in the last four decades is unmatched. except for east asia, the rest of the world has seen little or no convergence.” indeed, by the early 1990s, the incomes of more than one hundred million people in the poor southern regions of europe (greece, southern italy, portugal, and spain) had increased, moving closer to those of the more prosperous areas of europe. similarly, between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, the income levels of one hundred million people in central and eastern europe were dynamically converging towards levels in the richer parts of the continent. the ambition of upward convergence seemed to function for several decades. however, the year 2008, with the onset of the financial crisis, marked a halt in these processes of convergence and catching up on the part of the less prosperous countries and regions, raising questions about the sustainability of the progress achieved in earlier phases of european integration. as europe’s flagship project, the single currency, has had difficulty responding to 2 czech republic, estonia, hungary, latvia, lithuania, poland, slovakia, and slovenia 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 the external shock imposed by the financial crisis, and with adjustment therapy forcing some member states into a diverging downward spiral, this essential and fundamental mission seems to be at risk. the applied strategy of asymmetrical and downward adjustment, in which mostly peripheral, lower-income countries were affected, resulted in a persistently growing gap between surplus and deficit countries that manifests itself in a diverging europe. divergence and convergence in the wake of the crisis paradoxically, it was less the effect of the acute crisis in 2009 and 2010 that marked a turning point, and more the applied austerity policy in the eu and the macroeconomic surveillance mechanism within the european semester that put wages under pressure. according to these policy recommendations (that appear as hard constraints for national policy makers), wage increases in the past were not sustainable, and cee, similarly to the southern periphery of the eurozone, had lost its competitiveness. thus, a downward wage correction was on the agenda. in the case of countries where financial help through an imf-eu bailout had been provided (in the cee region in latvia, hungary and romania), wage cuts were often among the conditions of providing stand-by credit facility. in other countries, the pressure appeared in a more indirect way, but most of them were subject to wage corrections, as well. between 2008 and 2016, convergence in terms of gdp per capita lost momentum, convergence in nominal wages came to a standstill, overall growth rates were far behind pre-crisis rates, investments collapsed, and inward foreign direct investment (fdi) flows slowed down. data on per capita gdp are shown in table 1, following the years before and then after the 2008 crisis. individual countries show different levels of performance, as in 2018, most cees had gdp per capita between 65 percent and 75 percent of eu15 levels (at purchasing power parity, pps), up from 35-45 percent for the same countries in 1997, and also up from 50 to 65 percent in 2007. the czech republic and slovenia are above this middle range, with 83.7 percent and 81 percent in 2018, respectively, while bulgaria and romania are behind (46.6 percent and 59.7 percent in 2018, respectively). although upward convergence has lost some momentum since the crisis, the catching-up process between 2008 and 2018 is still apparent. most dynamic convergence was shown by the baltic states and slovakia, while slovenia and the czech republic were slower, and hungary and croatia were sliding back within the group. romania and bulgaria showed significant improvements but are still the two poorest member states in the eu. 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 table 1: gross domestic product at current prices per head of population (%), pps, eu15=100 1997 2008 2016 2018 czech republic 64.7 75.6 81.2 83.7 hungary 43.1 56.3 63.6 65.1 croatia 44.2 56.8 56.3 58.3 poland 39.6 50 64.1 66.9 slovakia 44.3 64.4 72.6 72.4 bulgaria 25 39.2 44.5 46.6 estonia 34.4 61.9 69.1 74.6 latvia 28.5 53.1 60.2 64.4 lithuania 31.1 56.7 70.5 74.7 romania 24.7 44.5 54.5 59.7 slovenia 67.2 80.9 77 81.0 data source: ameco (2019), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/resultserie.cfm after a setback in the wake of the crisis, economic convergence (in gdp per capita terms) continues and the overall balance of the last 20 years is positive. figure 1 illustrates economic convergence in a dynamic perspective for the period 2008-2017 for poorer member states, including all cee countries, greece, and portugal by putting per capita gdp (as share of eu28 average) in correlation with growth performance (change in real gdp between 2008-2017). indeed, there is a negative correlation between 2008 income levels of the countries and their growth performance during the period 2008-2017, illustrating that poorer countries tended to grow faster than richer ones. at the same time, croatia, portugal, slovenia, and greece had negative growth in this period and were falling behind, while bulgaria and hungary were below the convergence trendline. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/resultserie.cfm 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: convergence (catching-up process) in real gdp per capita: poorer member states compared to the eu28 average, 2008-2017 source: etui (2019) based on eurostat convergence in wages behind economic convergence theoretical considerations standard microeconomic theory applies a clear relationship between productivity, wages, and labour demand, where wages correspond to the marginal productivity of labour in the context of the profit-maximising behaviour of firms (borjas 2010). at the microeconomic level, the theory also implies that labour demand would increase if productivity per unit of labour input increased (at given wages), just as a further extension of production would increase firms' profits. this microeconomic mechanism is commonly put forward as the underlying justification for a wage–setting rule, to the effect that restraining wage increases below the rate of productivity growth will increase employment levels. profit maximisation applies to private sector enterprises only, and to apply this pattern to the macroeconomic level has several limitations and controversies, as will be shown. even if this argumentation sounds plausible in the short term, given the links between wage moderation and employment growth when productivity is growing at the microeconomic level, the mediumand long-run effectiveness of such policies is much less clear. undoubtedly, there is a strong relationship between the growth of productivity and the growth of wages in a national economy, but this is not a mechanical one, as standard economic theory suggests, and as international financial institutions and the european commission mostly apply eu15 bg cz ee gr hr lv lt hu pl pt ro si sk y = -0.5663x + 46.055 r² = 0.5102 40 65 90 115 -40 -20 0 20 40 real gdp per capita (in eu28 pps) (eu28=100) in 2008 c h a n g e i n r e a l g d p p e r c a p it a ( % ) 2 0 0 8 -2 0 1 7 poorer member states richer member states faster growth slower growth 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 in their policies. this paper argues that a more complex view is needed, addressing the following issues: what comes first, productivity or wages? changes and developments certainly matter, but the level (of productivity and wages) is also important. additionally, should wages and productivity be examined at the national or sectoral level of the economy, in regard to tradeable and non-tradeable sectors? specificities of transformation economies also need to be taken into account. an alternative approach on the link between wages and productivity is presented by the concept of ‘efficiency wages’ (shapiro and stiglitz 1984). under most efficiency wage models, the link between wages and productivity is no longer straightforward, even in the short run. efficiency wage models reject the premise that wages are aligned to the marginal productivity of workers under perfect competition. in contrast, these models argue that paying higher-than-market wages can be a rational choice for firms, e.g., in order to increase the work effort of employees. in this sense, efficiency wage models imply a kind of ’reverse causality’: rather than wages being set according to productivity, they have to be set at a particular level in order to achieve a specific level of productivity (shapiro and stiglitz 1984). in terms of catching up transformation economies, ‘efficiency wages’ can have a role in breaking out from the low wage trap. development of relative wage levels to eu15 from the 2004 ‘big bang’ eu enlargement up to the 2009 crisis, it has been taken for granted that wage convergence for poorer new member states to the high-income core of the eu is only a matter of time. even if foreign investors saw the relatively low wages (and labour costs) in cee as a comparative advantage and used this often as a threat to squeeze out wage concessions from workers in their western european home countries, wages in cee were moving upwards. wage convergence had been indeed dynamic, and by the mid-2000s, cee policy makers were starting to think about a future beyond a low wage-based economic model. then came the crisis, and the trend of upward wage convergence took a sudden end. eu crisis management policies had a major role in reinforcing the low wage-based competitiveness model in the region, causing new cleavages in europe. with a long period of stagnation after the crisis, wage convergence was stuck for several years, and while a new dynamism started in 2016, it came too late and was not enough to compensate for the losses (figure 2). hungary and croatia saw their relative wage levels sliding back from their peak in 2008, while slovenia had stagnating wage levels. a trend break in wage convergence is visible for all cee countries. still, when taking two decades of wage convergence into account (expressed in nominal eur terms for each cee country as a percent of the eu15 average), the overall catch-up of wages was substantial, as in 1998, wage levels at this measure ranged from 6.4 percent (bulgaria) to 47.5 percent (slovenia), whereas in 2019, the range was between 21.6 percent (bulgaria) and 64.1 percent (slovenia). 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: two decades of wage convergence of cee new member states, 1998-2019, at nominal eur terms in % of eu15 average data source: ameco (2019) wages lagging behind productivity wages in cee were also lagging behind productivity and in terms of relative levels; wages were consequently more behind eu15 levels than were relative productivity levels, as figure 3 shows. this was the case in 1995, as well as in 2017, for all countries of the region. while, for example, slovakia in 2017 had 49 percent of the average productivity level of eu15 countries, its relative wage level was only 38 percent. this is an indication that wage levels in cee are not only much behind western european levels, but also behind what their own economic performance should have allowed. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2 0 1 9 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 9 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 9 1 9 9 8 si ee hr sk cz lv lt pl hu ro bg 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 figure 3: wage and productivity levels in cee in percent of eu15, at nominal eur terms source: galgoczi (2017) based on ameco data in spite of a decade of dynamic catching up, wages in cee are still comparably low. even if we adopt the mainstream interpretation of wages and productivity at the national level, cee wages appear to be lower than what productivity levels accordingly would suggest. wage shares wage shares in gdp are an important measure of how wealth created by an economy (in terms of gdp) is being distributed between labour and capital. in most countries in western europe (euro area 12 [ea-12] countries), wage shares of gdp were falling during the last two decades. although the trajectories of those shares in cee countries gave a more mixed picture in spite of the longer-term downward trend, western european countries display clearly higher shares than cee countries (janssen 2015). the average wage share of cee countries in 2015 was 7 percentage points lower than that of the ea-12 countries in western europe. this is an indication that their wage levels are even lower than their economic development potential should allow. figure 4 shows the development of wage shares in a longer perspective for a number of cee countries. poland saw the largest decrease of its wage share, from 65.8 percent in 1995 to 53.9 percent by 2015, followed by hungary (from 65.9 percent to 55.7 percent). the czech republic and slovakia had no significant changes over the past 20 years but had the lowest wage shares in the region, with 52 percent and 49 percent respectively, in 2015. 6 .0 0 6 .0 0 1 8 .1 0 1 5 .7 8 5 .9 9 8 .1 1 1 1 .6 3 1 4 .9 7 9 .6 7 6 .9 7 5 .5 1 1 9 .6 7 1 6 .3 5 7 .6 8 9 .8 9 1 6 .1 0 1 9 .9 2 1 0 .1 9 1 9 .5 0 2 3 .7 5 3 0 .2 3 3 1 .5 3 3 5 .5 9 3 8 .0 9 3 8 .4 8 4 0 .5 1 4 5 .3 4 1 9 .4 5 2 8 .5 4 3 6 .8 7 3 8 .3 3 4 1 .3 1 4 0 .3 5 4 9 .0 9 4 8 .8 2 4 9 .2 3 b g r o h u p l l t l v s k c z e e 1995wage 1995prod 2017wage 2017prod 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 figure 4. development of the wage share in gdp (%) for cee countries (1995-2015) source: galgoczi (2017) based ameco data main drivers of wage developments apart from slovenia, cee countries have the lowest trade union density and collective bargaining coverage rates in the eu, and further erosion takes place from year to year (visser 2014). the weak role of collective bargaining in wage setting in cee countries can also be demonstrated by a persistent positive wage drift between collectively-agreed-upon and actual wages in these countries (delahaie et al. 2015). in the early 2000s up to the crisis, actual wage increases in cee countries have tended to be higher than agreed wage increases settled through collective bargaining (borbély and neumann 2015). this is just the opposite of what has been the main phenomenon in western europe, and in particular, in germany: there, actual wage increases were regularly lower than what had been collectively agreed (negative wage drift due to opt-outs and low coverage). in cee, however, actual wage increases were regularly overshooting collectively-agreed-upon wages in most of the period up to the crisis. this suggests that other factors beyond collective bargaining must have played a major role. dynamic growth in the period before and after enlargement and up to the crisis has certainly created a favourable environment for wage increases in the region. two main drivers were, however, particularly important in their direct or indirect effects: foreign direct investment (fdi) and cross border labour mobility to western europe. foreign direct investments fdi stock has made up a high share of the gdp of individual cees, characteristically between 60 and 80 percent. after a setback of fdi inflows to the region in the wake of the crisis, since 2015, fdi inflows picked up again and stabilised at a yearly 2.6 percent of gdp during 2016 and 2018 (adarov et al. 2019). foreign investment enterprises provide a major part of the exports in the region; they tend to have higher productivity and pay higher wages than the national or branch-level average. foreign direct investments were an important driver of upwards wage dynamism, but this did not happen automatically. the primary effect of fdi is to increase productivity that would be also reflected in higher wages than the sectoral or regional average. the pressure on wages was kept on by foreign investors, as wage increases – even if dynamic – were kept below the rate of productivity increases. 45 50 55 60 65 70 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 euro area 12 germany hungary poland czechia slovakia 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 it is a matter of bargaining regarding how much of the productivity gains can be translated into higher wages, and there are signs now that the bargaining climate is turning more favourable for labour. fdi relies strongly on skilled labour, and in recent years, the lack of its availability all over the region has become a major issue. the automobile manufacturing cluster that includes southern poland, the czech republic, slovakia, northern hungary, and western romania is facing increasing difficulty recruiting skilled workers and engineers. mounting labour shortages were reported in hungary, from a number of firms in the automobile sector, including bosch, audi, and mercedes (gergely 2016), and they started poaching workers from plants in neighbouring countries. in previous years, labour shortages were limited to engineers and skilled labour; recently, manual workers are more and more affected (előd 2016). in early 2016, the trade union organisation at the audi plant in györ, northern hungary, announced the first strike in 23 years, aimed at a significant general wage increase and improvements in working conditions (reuters 2016). cooperation between the trade unions of the german headquarters and the subsidiaries took on new momentum when ig metall opened transnational partnership offices, one near the audi plant in györ (2014) and one near the mercedes plant in kecskemet (2016), to assist hungarian organizations in the fight for higher wages and better working conditions (ig metall 2017). as far as fdi is concerned, the big wave of reorganising the division of labour in europe postenlargement has come to the end of its cycle. mass privatization programmes have been completed, and, in a number of countries, re-nationalisation strategies are even emerging (sass 2017). profit repatriation by foreign investment enterprises has become a major concern in the region. in the wake of the 2008-09 crisis, the role of fdi was subject to a critical rethinking with regard to the contribution of foreign investments to sustainable future growth, with a distinction being made between ‘good‘ and ‘bad‘ fdi. fdi focused on exploiting domestic markets (banking, retail, utilities) and possibly repatriating realised profits was seen as unwelcome (hungary and poland have introduced specific taxes for these sectors), while fdi aimed at strengthening export capacities in mainly the manufacturing sector (automotive and ict), but also business services, was seen as most welcome and enjoyed further support. one of the major concerns in the cee region is the existence of a dual economy featuring highly productive (mainly fdi-driven) export-oriented activities, alongside mostly domestically owned and domestic market-oriented sectors with low productivity. this productivity gap is a hurdle for future development and for catching up with developed economies. the productivity divide between sectors within cee economies is often greater that the productivity gap with germany in the same sector. in hungary, for example, productivity in motor vehicle manufacturing in 2015 was more than four times higher than in retail services, while german productivity in vehicle production was ‘only’ 2.4 times higher. the economic model where the ‘comparative advantage’ of the region was based on low production costs (and thus wages) is no foundation for long-term development. the case of the automotive industry also demonstrates that the mostly low value-added subcontracting role played by the region in global value chains (gvcs) has reached its limits (pavlinek et al. 2017:31). in pavlinek`s words, this model offers the perspective of “truncated development”. with lower levels of fdi, and with their limited and subordinated position in existing gvcs, cee member states need to embark on a more balanced ‘high road’ development model. 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 freedom of movement within the eu a second factor that had an impact on wage growth in cee was outward labour mobility within the eu. higher wage levels in the west were among the most important pull factors in labour mobility from the cee region. figure 5 shows the share of working age population for eu member states living in another member state. apart from the czech republic and slovenia, all cee countries are affected. for romania, the nearly 20 percent loss of its working population is a huge drain of human resources. large-scale outward migration from certain countries (particularly from poland, romania and the baltic states) has resulted in labour market bottlenecks in certain sectors; in particular, teachers, doctors, nurses, and bus drivers were often hard to recruit in these countries. figure 5: eu citizens of working age (20-64) living in another member state by country of citizenship (in % of home country population of the age group) data source: eurostat, 2018 (lfst_lmbpcita demo_pjangroup) a study (holland et al. 2011) found that, between 2004 and 2009, emigration led to an increase in wages by 0.44 percent in the czech republic, 0.68 percent in hungary, and 2.73 percent in poland. a consequence was that wages in these sectors got a further boost, by means also of government-initiated public sector wage increases. from time to time, governments made unilateral increases of public sector wages with an attempt to balance the effects of labour market tensions in the case of specific professions that arose mainly due to these two drivers. for instance, in 2002, the then-governing socialist administration in hungary announced a rise in the wages of teachers and nurses in the public sector by 50 percent. (this was an election promise with the argument to compensate public service workers for low wage growth in the past, but with a view to tackling emerging labour market tensions.) a similar increase had been made in 2012, when austerity measures of the previous years were partially rolled back, with the declared objective of slowing down the outward migration of health professionals from hungary, linked to a commitment of not moving for work abroad for five years. in poland, a law was passed in 2006 to guarantee doctors’ wage levels providing a 40% increase in pay for hospital doctors in order to tackle personnel shortages due to emigration (holt 2010). meanwhile, hospital doctors in the czech republic agreed to a wage settlement after a long and bitter battle in which nearly a quarter of the country’s 16,000 doctors threatened to quit and leave the country unless they received pay raises. the settlement was approved by the 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 government in february 2011, after which doctors who had tendered resignations, which were due to be effective from march 1, 2011, withdrew them. under the settlement, doctors saw their pay rise by around 33 percent (stafford 2011). in the baltic states, several rounds of double-digit wage increases took place, mostly for doctors, nurses, and teachers. trade unions in this period saw more opportunity for bargaining for higher wages. at the same time, wages in certain public sector professions were also raised by the state, in order to offer mobile workers who left the country to work in another member state an incentive to return. beyond anecdotal evidence, a number of studies also confirmed the positive effect of outward migration in certain professional groups. dustmann et al. (2015) identified a positive wage effect of emigration for poland, showing that, between 1997 and 2007, wage increases were highest in the skills categories of workers that were overrepresented in the emigration flows. an iza working paper (zaiceva 2014) also found that outmigration has increased the wages of stayers, especially for employment categories where labour had become relatively scarce. according to an imf working paper (atoyan et al. 2016), countries that have experienced significant outflows of skilled workers (e.g., the baltic states, romania, and bulgaria) have also seen greater upward pressures on domestic wages. the authors estimated the contribution of skilled emigration to nominal wage growth to be up to 10 percent during the period of 1995-2012. the study found that low substitutability between skilled emigrants and natives in the sending countries and higher reservation wages associated with remittances have contributed most to this outcome.3 in addition, increasing opportunities to work abroad may have strengthened workers’ bargaining power in the labour market in the short term. minimum wage increases in lack of proper collective bargaining coverage, it was often minimum wage policy that gave an impetus to wage increases throughout the entire wage scale. in 2017, the share of minimum wages in percent of the average wage ranged from 37.1 percent in the czech republic to 47.4 percent in poland, while in slovakia, romania, and hungary, it made up 39.3 percent, 44.6 percent, and 45.9 percent, respectively. in 2018, minimum wages increased by seven percent in poland, eight percent in slovakia and hungary, and 9.4 percent in the czech republic and romania. in january 2019, the monthly national gross minimum wage was 520 euros in poland, the czech republic, and slovakia, 464 euros in hungary, and 445 euros in romania. figure 6 shows hourly minimum wages expressed in euros for eu member states. cee minimum wages are still a fraction of those in the core of western europe, with minimum wages in luxembourg being almost seven times higher than in bulgaria. apart from latvia and lithuania, minimum wage increases in 2019 (on the basis of 2018) were close to 10 percent. 3 reservation wages are the lowest wage rate at which a worker would be willing to accept a particular type of job. remittances received by family members tend to push up the wage expectation of these persons and thus the lowest acceptable wage when taking up a job (remittances are thus seen as having a negative effect on the labour supply). 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 figure 6: national minimum wage per hour (january 2019, in euros) source: etui (2019) based on wsi database it can be also expected that tighter labour markets would lead to pressure for more wage increases. underemployment rates are historically low, as figure 7 shows. labour market slack in the czech republic and hungary, in 2018, with 3.4 percent and 6.5 percent respectively, was even lower than before the crisis. given the continuing scarcity of skilled labour, foreign investment enterprises embedded in clusters with wide-spun supplier networks in the region will be less resistant to paying higher wages, and their threat potential to move farther or back to their home country will be rather limited. figure 7: labour market slack in the eu member states (percentage of extended labour force aged 15–74), 2008q2, 2013q2 and 2018q2 source: etui (2019) based on eurostat, lfs drawing a balance of 15 years of eu accession according to eurobarometer surveys of the last decade (figure 8), trust in the european union has decreased in most of the cee countries since enlargement (with the exception of latvia and lithuania, where trust in the eu in 2018 was at the same level as in 2007). apart from the 11.97 10.039.91 9.8 9.66 9.19 8.85 5.45 5.1 4.4 3.61 3.39 3.39 3.21 3.11 3.05 2.99 2.92 2.69 2.68 2.54 1.72 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 lu fr nl ie be de uk es si mt pt gr lt ee cz pl sk hr hu ro lv bg 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 national minimum wage per hour (january 2019, left-hand axis) development of hourly minimum wage jan 2018-jan 2019 (in % based on national currency, right-hand axis) gr es it fi fr ie ea cy hr eu se pt be lv lu nl ee at uk dk sk bg ro si de lt pl hu mt cz 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2008q2 2013q2 2018q2 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 czech republic and slovenia, by the end of 2018, trust in the eu in the cee region was, however, still at a higher level than the eu average. figure 8: trust in the eu (% of respondents) data source: european commission (2018) economic and wage convergence is of paramount economic and political importance for all of the cee countries. disenchantment with slower-than-expected catching-up with the core eu countries can be seen all over the region and can be regarded as one of the factors behind the erosion of trust in the eu. stalled wage convergence between the east and the west also undermines social cohesion in the entire eu. with free flow of capital, services and people, this creates adverse effects both in the east and the west – such as `brain drain` from the east, undermining the human resource potential of those countries, while cee workers in the west may be seen as a threat to wage levels there. the lack of a credible convergence perspective for the poorer member states to richer ones, and of the lack of prospects for a better future for the lower income groups within both richer and poorer member states, may pose a threat to the future of the eu. summing up, while the eastern eu enlargement is still one of the success stories of the eu (and unprecedented in the world), it is still controversial. the biggest problem is the unbalanced character of european integration. although cee member states have profited and made significant progress, due to stalled convergence in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis and due to a lack of a clear development perspective, the benefits of eu membership are often questioned. 0 50 100 cz sl eu sk pl hu lv ro ee bg lt spring 2007 autumn 2013 autumn 2018 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 references adarov, a., m. ghodsi, g. hunya, and o. pindyuk. 2019. “foreign investments mostly robust despite global downturn; shift into services.” fdi in central, east and southeast europe, wiiw fdi report no. 2019-06, https://wiiw.ac.at/wiiw-fdi-reports-ps-11.html (accessed july 31, 2019). atoyan et al. 2016. “emigration and its economic impact on eastern europe.” imf staff discussion note sdn/16/07, washington d.c., international monetary fund. bachtler, j., c. mendez, and f. wishlade, eds. 2014. eu cohesion policy and european integration: the dynamics of eu budget and regional policy reform. aldershot: ashgate. borbély s. and l. neumann 2015. similarities and diversity in the development of wages 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canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 issn 2562-8429 assessing the influence of france and germany on eu foreign and security policy fabien terpan university grenoble alpes, sciences po grenoble, cesice https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2529 abstract this article assesses the influence of the franco-german partnership on the development of an eu foreign and security policy since the 1990s, in order to see whether political cohesion between the two member states is a necessary and sufficient condition for the eu to emerge as an actor in the international arena. based on a methodology using secondary literature in a systematic way, the argument unfolds in three parts: first, the article looks at the political cohesion between the two member states in terms of both the building and the content of the eu’s foreign and security policy. then, it seeks to establish a correlation between franco-german cohesion and the existence of an eu position, or lack thereof. finally, the last section explains why the franco-german cohesion is a necessary but insufficient condition for the eu to gain actorness, by looking at other variables pertaining to domestic politics, european politics, and the international environment. four models of interaction between the franco-german cohesion and these other variables are developed: effective consensus; ineffective consensus; diffuse consensus; blocking dissensus. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2529 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 1. introduction in the early 1990s, the franco-german “couple” (soutou 2012) introduced several initiatives aimed at relaunching the european integration process through the adoption of a new treaty on the european union (eu). both governments contributed to the creation of a common foreign and security policy (cfsp), which took over from the european political cooperation and raised the question of europe emerging as a power in a post-cold war context (terpan 2003, 2010, smith 2013). often presented as the ‘engine’ of european integration (schild 2010), france and germany would also become the engine of european foreign and security policy. indeed, they are often considered to be the main driving force behind the inclusion of cfsp in the maastricht treaty. furthermore, the initiatives launched by the french and german governments since 2016, designed to revive the idea of a european defence, would again testify to the leadership function performed by the two member states. however, since its creation by the maastricht treaty, cfsp has faced many difficulties and has been confronted with several crises that have hindered its development. the security-defence dimension of cfsp, in particular, was poorly implemented in the 1990s, at least before the creation of a european security and defence policy as a sub-division of cfsp (1998-99). since then, it has proved difficult for the member states to agree on crisis management operations. france and germany have sometimes been presented as being one source of these difficulties. the effectiveness of the partnership between the two countries would be rather limited (stark 2012, calla & demesmay 2013), as well as their capacity to initiate concrete eu foreign and security action. as a non-permanent member of the united nations security council (unsc), germany abstained, together with china, russia, india and brazil, when the unsc voted on a resolution authorizing military intervention in libya in 2011 (göler & jopp 2011, menon 2011). this decision made a european operation impossible, leading france and the united kingdom to intervene in the framework of nato. this shows how germany can distance itself from the idea, most often defended by france, of the eu emerging as a military power (paterson 2011). the aim of this article is not to comment on the current state of the franco-german relationship, but rather to find a way to assess the degree of cohesion between france and germany on a number of foreign and security issues, with a view to determining its influence at the eu level from 1990 onwards. are these two member states central to the strengthening of cfsp? when paris and berlin are on the same page, are they effective in influencing cfsp? this article is based on the assumption that the closer the french and german positions are, the higher the probability that the eu will defend a unified position. however, the fact that france and germany have defended a common position, and that the eu has adopted a similar position, does not necessarily prove how influential the franco-german partnership is. to ascertain their actual influence, other factors such as the european system of governance and the larger external environment will be taken into account in order and see how they interact with the franco-german partnership. in the remainder of this article, i will present my methodology, which is based on a systematic analysis of secondary literature (section two). section three will seek to give an overall view of convergence and divergence between the two member states’ foreign and security policies in order to evaluate their cohesion, or lack thereof. the fourth section will be devoted to the potential 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 influence of both countries on eu external action, whilst the fifth and last section will situate this influence in a larger system of interactions in order to understand its terms and limits. 2. methods the positions of the two actors will be systematically compared from 1990 onwards, based on an analytical framework composed of three main categories: 1) contributions to the building of european foreign policy; 2) principles and objectives of foreign policy; 3) positions towards different geographical areas. to establish the positions of france and germany, i rely on secondary literature found in 16 journals1 and 16 publishers2, selected on the basis of their reputation, and because of their likeliness to deal with the foreign policies of the two states. some 28 books, 7 book chapters and 20 journal articles have been gathered: they all include elements helping to analyse the positions of france and germany on foreign and security issues. these publications have been systematically studied in order to define the positions of the two states, and their cohesion. cohesion is a measure of the distance between the positions defended by the two partners. three kinds of situations can be distinguished depending on whether the distance is non-existent, short, or large. cohesion is lacking when the distance is large; it is weak when the distance is short; and it is strong when the distance is non-existent. when france and germany defend positions that contradict one another and lead to a disagreement on a foreign policy issue, the distance is said to be large. this was the case when france advocated an eu military operation in libya (2011), while germany voted against it. a short distance is when there is no major contradiction between the positions of the two states, but rather nuances, minor divergences, or different priorities. for example, most commentators say that the relationship with eastern countries is a priority for germany, much more than for france; yet, the policy objectives pursued by the two countries are by and large compatible with each other (smith 2013). finally, there is no distance when the positions are aligned and the two member states are on the same page, which is the case, for example, when they issued a common declaration on the building of cfsp before the maastricht treaty. the degree of cohesion is assessed based on the abovementioned literature. when there is a consensus amongst the authors (more than ¾ of them agree), the distance is characterized as either short, large, or non-existent. when there is no such consensus, the degree of cohesion is uncertain, and the distance might be indicated on the relevant table3 as being short and large at the same time, or short and non-existent. when the distance is not seen to be constant during the whole period, the existence of a fluctuation is mentioned in the right column of the tables. 1 ashgate, bruylant, cambridge university press, cornell university press, la documentation française, lynne riener, manchester university press, oxford university press, palgrave mcmillan, polity, presses de sciences po, princeton university press, routledge, springer. 2 comparative european politics, cooperation and conflict, critique internationale, european foreign affairs review, european security, international affairs, international organization, international peacekeeping, journal of common market studies, journal of european integration, journal of european public policy, journal of conflict and security law, politique étrangère, politique européenne, studia diplomatica, west european politics. 3 tables start in section 3. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 the aim is not only to establish the degree of cohesion between france and germany, but first and foremost to see whether there is a correlation between the franco-german cohesion and the development of an eu foreign and security policy. in other words, does cfsp develop when the french and german positions are aligned, and stagnate when they diverge? to answer this question, the franco-german positions are compared with eu ones, based on the same categorization as in the previous section (contributions to the building of european foreign policy; principles and objectives of foreign policy; positions towards different geographical areas). more specifically, i try to determine whether a lack of cohesion at eu level correlates with divergences between france and germany. by lack of cohesion at eu level, i mean either a lack of decision making on issues that were on the agenda, or a lack of cohesiveness in terms of implementation, with member states diverging from the line defined by the european union (european council, council of the eu, the high representative speaking on behalf of the eu) (saurugger & terpan 2015). to establish the existence of eu cohesion, or lack thereof, the same selection of secondary literature is analysed. even when a correlation exists between franco-german cohesion and eu cohesion, it remains to be seen whether the latter is a consequence of the former. have france and germany really succeeded in reaching common ground at the european level based on a logic of bottom-up and top-down europeanization (smith 2000; gross 2009; wong & hill 2011; baun & marek 2013)? providing evidence to back up this assertion is not an easy task, given the number of factors that can interfere in the process. while franco-german cohesion appears to be a necessary condition for an effective eu foreign and security policy, as seen in the previous section, it is very unlikely, in a european union of 28 member states, that this condition is sufficient, despite the economic and political weight of the two partners. to explain why a common eu position has – or has not – been possible in response to various different circumstances, and to measure the potential influence of the two member states in this context, i propose placing the franco-german tandem in a larger system of interaction, including other member states, eu institutions, and external factors. the franco-german relationship needs to be viewed as an “embedded bilateralism” (krotz & schild 2013). four factors will be taken into account, each of them being classified as either negative (when the factor clearly works against an eu position), positive (when it clearly works in favour of an eu position), quite negative, or quite positive (when the impact of the factor is noticeable, but not so clear). the relative weight of each factor is, of course, an approximation, once again based on the analysis of secondary literature. the objective is not to provide the reader with a precise ‘measurement’ for each case study, but rather to come up with a typology of different situations and different types of factor combinations. two factors are specific to france and germany. the first one concerns domestic politics; the political context (elections, salience and politicization of a problem, the role of public opinion, bilateral relations between the authorities of the two countries) may either lead to the defence of national interests (and be classified as ‘negative’) or work in favour of a franco-german position within the eu (and be classified as ‘positive’). franco-german cohesion, as defined in section 2, is the second factor, which plays a ‘negative’ or a ‘positive’ role in the eu and in cfsp. the remaining factors relate to the environment in which france and germany find themselves. firstly, european governance (eu institutions and member states; schild 2010) might be either conflictual (negative) or consensual (positive), thus hindering or supporting a cfsp position. secondly, 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 external (non-eu) factors may also work in favour of unity (positive) or lack of unity (negative) regarding eu foreign policy. when most of these four factors are classified as “negative,” it means that the situation is least favourable to eu foreign policy. on the other hand, a majority of positive factors denotes a situation in which the conditions are most favourable to eu foreign policy. in the remainder of the article, i will present the research results, following the three steps presented in this methods section: establishing the degree of cohesion between france and germany (section 3); looking for a correlation between franco-german cohesion and eu cohesion (section 4); and introducing other factors explaining eu cohesion in order to see the place that france and germany take within a larger configuration of factors (section 5). 3. reasonably strong political cohesion in all areas except the use of force at first sight, germany and france have very distinct features in terms of international actorness. they have specific interests and seem to be subject to different types of path dependence. germany is still strongly affected by the nazi period (longhurst 2010, stark 2012), which might explain self-restraint in military affairs, strong democratic control over foreign and security policies, and western ties (nato, transatlantic relations, european integration) aimed at coming to terms with the past and anchoring germany in the pro-democracy camp. in addition to this, germany began a normalisation process (gordon 1994, bulmer & paterson 2010) during the cold war and even more so in the post-cold war period, by asserting its interests in the eastern region (ostpolitik) and progressively lifting restrictions in military matters. but the question remains of whether germany will behave like a political and military power, beyond its civilian, economic, and commercial status. france, on the other hand, would still be heavily influenced by the originating ideas of the fifth republic (1958-1969) (kolodziej 1974, cerny 1980, gordon 1993, vaïsse 1998, vaïsse 2009, soutou 2012), when president de gaulle searched for greatness (‘grandeur’), rank (‘rang’), and political autonomy through the development of defence capability (nuclear deterrence), the refusal to depend on the united states, and participation in high-level negotiations, in particular the un security council. however, the french ‘exception’ may have decreased due to several developments: closer relations with nato and the united states4; stronger involvement in the european union (cole & drake 2000, drake 2005, lequesne 2008); and more modest ambitions as an individual state (balme 2009, blunden 2000, treacher 2003, charillon & wong 2011). these differences notwithstanding, the foreign and security policies of the two countries have common ground and shared interest, which justifies a close partnership. the question is whether these factors are enough to create cohesion in the pursuit of their foreign policies. the first way to evaluate franco-german cohesion is to compare how these two member states view the ‘constitutional’ building of a european security and defence policy (table 1). these views are neither incompatible, nor fully identical. 4 france joined nato’s integrated command structure in 2009. 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 table 1: french and german visions of eu foreign and security policy distance between the french and german positions evolution of the distance from 1990 onwards no distance short distance large distance the eu should become a military power x fluctuation a strong role should be given to the high representative and the eeas x stability cfsp should remain intergovernmental x stability a distance exists in relation to the european union becoming a military power. by and large, germany is close to the french position on developing a cfsp backed up with a common security and defence policy (csdp) (treacher 2003, longhurst 2010, daehnhardt 2011, stark 2012, soutou 2012, krotz & schild 2013), but remains reluctant when it comes to launching and financing military operations (menon 2011, norheim-martinsen 2012, stark 2012, terpan 2014). consequently, the question of whether the eu should become a strong international player is not perceived exactly the same way (stark 2012; calla & demesmay 2013). moreover, while the two member states agree on the idea of strengthening the security and defence dimension of cfsp, their cohesion is dependent on domestic politics, in particular in germany where there is more variation. for example, the german refusal to contribute to a european operation in libya, which happened after a period of greater acceptance of military interventions (e.g., kosovo 1999, democratic republic of congo 2005; miskimmon 2007, longhurst 2010), can be explained by the electoral context in germany; angela merkel refused to engage in a risky military intervention at a time when german citizens, dubious about military operations, were voting in local elections. on the other hand, the german government has given a stronger priority to csdp since 2013 and the third government formed by angela merkel. with regard to the ways and means of the eu international actorness (the role of the high representative and her external action service (eeas), as well as the intergovernmental nature of cfsp), the differences are minimal, or non-existent (balfour, carta & raïk 2015). france and germany support the same vision of a cfsp that should be strong and visible, although controlled by member states (treacher 2003; balme 2009; balfour, carta & raïk 2015). franco-german cohesion can also be measured in terms of foreign policy objectives and principles (table 2). not surprisingly, the use of force is the main difference between a reluctant germany and a more interventionist france (menon 2011; stark 2012). however, the distance fluctuates over time. it is quite large in 1990-91, when helmut kohl invoked constitutional limits to justify 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 german non-intervention in the gulf war. at this point the argument disappeared and bundeswehr military engagements multiplied in the 1990s in places such as kosovo and afghanistan, reducing the distance with its french partner (miskimmon 2007, longhurst 2010). later, in 2010, germany returns to a cautious position with regard to an operation in libya, before accepting a french demand to engage more heavily in the fight against terrorist groups in syria in the aftermath of the paris 2013 terrorist attacks. table 2: principles and objectives of foreign policy defended by france and germany distance between the french and german positions evolution of the distance from 1990 onwards no distance short distance large distance deference to multilateralism and international law x stability defence of democracy and human rights x stability position towards the use of force in international relations x x fluctuation the other principles are more consensual. both france and germany emphasise ideals such as multilateralism, respect of international law and un decisions, and defence of democracy and human rights. finally, table 3 focuses on the positions defended by the two member states regarding different geographical areas. points of agreement supersede divergences, and the latter are never considered more than ‘short distance.’ 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 table 3: french and german positions regarding different geographical areas distance between the french and german positions evolution of the distance from 1990 onwards no distance short distance large distance israeli / palestinian conflict x x fluctuations iranian nuclear programme x stability war in iraq x stability crises in libya and syria x relations with mediterranean countries x x stability relations with eastern europe x x stability crises in western balkans x x fluctuations relations with russia x stability peacekeeping in africa x fluctuations relations with asia x stability relations with latin america x stability relations with the us x x fluctuations most of these differences relate to the military. they concern, in particular, the german refusal to intervene militarily in libya (göler & jopp 2011), peacekeeping in the western balkans (divergences in the early 1990s – when germany unilaterally recognized slovenia and croatia – rapidly overcome in the mid-1990s; miskimmon 2007, charillon and wong 2011), and peacekeeping in africa (germany being more reluctant than france about being strongly involved). regarding africa (blunden 2000, calla & demesmay 2013), france is still very active, in particular in its former colonies, and continues to participate in crisis management through 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 military interventions. germany is politically and militarily less active in africa (dijkstra 2010). another difference relates to the nazi era, with germany supporting israel for historical reasons, while france remains closer to the palestinians and arab countries (musu 2010, müller 2013). it can be argued that germany looks east much more than france, while france is more interested in the mediterranean (cardwell 2011) and the middle east than germany. this difference, however, should not be overestimated, as both member states have a strong interest in their neighbouring countries, largely speaking (daehnhardt 2011). yet, not only is the distance between the positions of the two member states rather short, but the points of agreement are also numerous. france and germany are on the same page regarding the war in iraq, the iranian nuclear programme, relations with the mediterranean (some distance: blunden 2000, daehnhardt 2011), and russia (even regarding the war in crimea, krotz & maher 2016). no real distance can be noticed concerning the western balkans, latin america, or asia (wong 2006, daehnhardt 2011, calla & demesmay 2013, ruano 2013). over the whole period, the distance between the french and german positions remains quite stable. when the distance evolves, it is often towards convergence, like in the case of africa and the mediterranean, and facilitated by france’s willingness to europeanize its foreign policy actions (charillon & wong 2011). on transatlantic relations, there seems to be a distance between the two member states, with germany defending a more atlanticist position (stark 2012). this has changed due to france getting closer to nato (comeback to the integrated command of nato) and seeking to get german support on eu-us relations (charillon and wong 2011). once again, the only areas where we can observe fluctuations and difficulties overcoming divergences are linked with the use of force. germany is – or is not – likely to contribute to military crisis management, depending on the context, while france participates in most eu, nato, and unled operations (with the exception of the intervention in iraq in 2003). broadly speaking, french and german foreign policies are quite close to one another. there are a few topics where they do not share exactly the same position, but the distance is always a short one. the main area on which they disagree is militarization. whilst they agree about the idea of a common security and defence policy, the two partners do not have the same view on the use of force. germany is still trying to achieve a balance between a culture of self-restraint and more active participation in peacekeeping and crisis management, whereas france usually favours interventionism. 4. the franco-german partnership as a pre-requisite for an effective eu foreign policy? we have seen in the previous section that france and germany share the same general approach to eu foreign and security policy (see table 1 on “visions of eu foreign and security policy” and table 2 on “principles and objectives of foreign and security policy”), with the exception of military issues and the use of force. their foreign and security policies have been affected by a rather unsteady and ambivalent europeanization process (irondelle 2003, miskimmon 2007, charillon & wong 2011, keukeleire & delreux 2014). this can explain the ups and downs of building an eu foreign and security policy. 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 france and germany have contributed a great deal to the development of cfsp. in the early 1990s, helmut kohl and françois mitterrand strongly influenced the intergovernmental conference on political union through a series of joint initiatives (stark 2012). they overcame their differences and presented proposals that deviated from those of the united kingdom, italy, and the netherlands (laursen & vanhoonacker 1992). in the maastricht treaty, provisions around cfsp were largely due to the influence of the franco-german leaders, although concessions had to be made to more atlanticist member states (treacher 2003). furthermore, the launching of a european security and defence policy in 1998-99 (dumoulin, mathieu & sarlet 2003, koutrakos 2013) not only came from a franco-british initiative agreed in saint-malo (december 1998, schild 2010) but also benefited from strong support from france and germany during the german presidency (first semester of 1999) (stark 2012). the framing of this policy by the european council (cologne, june 1999) mainly reflected the approach defended by the two member states (norheim-martinsen 2012). most of the instruments developed to strengthen the international visibility of the european union, like the high representative, the president of the european council, and the european external action service, resulted from a situation in which france and germany were on the same page, or managed to compromise. since the european council in december 2013, although french and german views have converged again, several initiatives have been introduced in order to make progress towards a european common defence (e.g., european defence action plan, european defence fund, permanent structured cooperation). however, as seen above, there have been fluctuations in the cohesion of the franco-german partnership (miskimmon 2007). in periods of rather low cohesion, cfsp – and even more so, csdp – have stagnated. between the creation of cfsp (1992-93) and the launching of csdp (1998-99), and between the launching of csdp (1998-99) and its recent revival (2013), there was no significant contribution from the two member states. on the contrary, they failed to present the eu as a military actor in bosnia-herzegovina (mid-1990s) and the arab world crises (libya 2011). often instrumental in fostering integration on foreign and security matters, the partnership is in constant need of adjustment when it comes to military issues; this most certainly has an impact on cfsp. turning to the substance of foreign and security policy (table 3), it is obvious that areas of francogerman convergence are also areas where the eu is more likely to agree on common positions. yet, this is not a systematic phenomenon. sometimes the partners agree but fail to gather support from other member states. the war in iraq is a case in point: while some governments supported the franco-german opposition to war, others joined the british position in favour of the intervention. to a lesser degree, relations with russia are not a matter of strong disagreement between berlin and paris but may be more conflictual at the level of the eu 28, where some members have asked for hard sanctions against moscow (in particular with regard to the crimean war), while others favour collaboration (gower & timmins 2013). when france and germany are not on the same page, decision-making at the eu level is impossible, and cfsp might even be put aside as a framework for foreign policy action. disagreement may arise from a unilateral decision made by one of the two partners (recognition of slovenia and croatia by germany in 1991, the french initiative in favour of the union for the mediterranean in 2007). quite often, disagreement follows the same pattern: france promotes a european action while germany is reluctant to follow suit. germany has opposed several french initiatives in africa (e.g., rwanda), has refused to join france in external operations in libya and syria, or has only accepted french proposals after a long period of negotiation (e.g., a strategy 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 regarding the sahel region, operations in the democratic republic of congo) (norheim-martinsen 2012). in these cases, the eu still has a position (non-intervention is a position), but it might be seen as a position by default (inaction caused by lack of consensus). however, when the two partners finally succeed in finding common ground, this usually leads to an active cfsp position. we can see this by looking at the main areas where a short distance separates the two member states but does not prevent eu action: the western balkans; relations with africa/peacekeeping in africa; the israeli-palestinian conflict; and mediterranean policy in the midst of multiple crises (see table 3). in the balkans, and after a period of open divergences (unilateral recognition of slovenia and croatia by germany in 1991), german and french positions grew closer, which led to a joint conflict settlement proposal presented by the foreign affairs ministers alain juppé and klaus kinkel in 1993. as far as crisis management in africa is concerned, germany used to be reluctant about following french initiatives (for example, the intervention in rwanda during the genocide). yet, thanks to a continuous process of bilateral cooperation, germany has accepted command of eufor dr congo (2005) and agreed to adopt an eu strategy in the region of sahel (2011) (norheim-martinsen 2012). the middle east peace process is not an area where berlin and paris can easily find a common position, due to their different approaches (pro-israel for the former, pro-palestinian for the latter). however, they have succeeded in finding a compromise at critical moments, in particular in the late 1990s (the berlin declaration in 1999 regarding the possible recognition of a palestinian state) (soetendorp 2014, el-din 2016). in 2007, nicolas sarkozy proposed the creation of the union for the mediterranean (ufm), to include the countries of the region but not all eu member states. this was a strong point of contention for germany, who feared that the eu mediterranean policy would be circumvented, and that the eu eastern policy would be set aside. one year later, germany and france found a middle path (schild 2010), with the ufm becoming one pillar of the eu neighbourhood policy and the eastern partnership becoming the second pillar. military intervention appears to be the main issue limiting this franco-german inclination towards compromise. this has obliged france and the uk to intervene outside the eu framework in libya (2011) (göler & jopp 2011) and may have contributed to a decrease in the number of csdp military operations between 2008 and 2013. as far as this issue is concerned, franco-german cohesion fluctuates and the prospect of finding a bilateral compromise that could benefit the eu as a whole seems very dependent on the context, as we will see in the next section. thus, in this section we have seen that: 1) franco-german cohesion is a pre-requisite for an effective eu foreign and security policy; 2) the distance between the positions of the two actors have the effect of blocking eu foreign and security policy; and 3) europeanization processes tend to reduce this distance, by removing existing obstacles. 5. the franco-german partnership in a wider system of interactions to some extent, the influence of franco-german tandem can be inferred from the existence of a clear franco-german proposal prior to an eu decision or action, but other pieces of evidence are required to prove an actual influence. this is why the cohesion of the franco-german couple has to be placed in a wider context, where three other factors are added to the picture: domestic politics in france and germany, european governance, and external (non-eu) factors. as specified in the 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 methods section, when these four factors are negative, the cohesion of eu foreign policy is the least likely. when they are positive, the cohesion of eu foreign policy is the most likely. in between these two extremes are situations combining ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ factors. this framework of analysis has been applied to four case studies (table 4), which have been selected on the basis of the degree of unity achieved within eu foreign policy. two of these cases correspond to situations where the eu succeeded in developing its foreign and security policy: the creation of cfsp in 1990-91 and negotiation of the nuclear iranian programme in 2006-07. in the other two cases, the war in iraq (2002-03) and the intervention in libya (2011), divergences clearly prevailed. these four models of interacting factors should help us to understand variations in the influence of the franco-german partnership. table 4: factors influencing the unity of the european union in four case studies case study 1 creation of cfsp (1990-93) effective cohesion case study 2 war in iraq (2002-2003) ineffective cohesion case study 3 negotiations on the iranian nuclear programme (2006-07) diffuse cohesion case study 4 intervention in libya (2011) blocking dissensus domestic politics france and germany positive positive positive negative francogerman position positive positive positive neutral impact of european governance quite negative negative quite positive quite positive external (non-eu factors neutral negative positive quite positive case study 1. the creation of cfsp – effective cohesion the creation of cfsp (table 4) results from a combination of several ‘positive’ factors. this is mainly due to the franco-german domestic context (positive) and cohesion as a ‘couple’ (positive). in the early 1990s, berlin and paris strived to present a united front in the new political world resulting from the end of the cold war (laursen & vanhoonacker 1992; gordon 1993, 1994; treacher 2003; irondelle 2003; charillon & wong 2011; daehnhardt 2011; stark 2012; calla & demesmay 2013). france wants germany to be anchored in the european union for fear that its partner might choose a different path, be it ostpolitik or a solitary form of power (soutou 2012). germany wants german reunification to be accepted by its european partners. public opinion in both countries is consistently supportive of european integration. kohl and mitterrand 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 are said to have a close relationship. they defend a common approach to cfsp, with minor differences on military matters. at this juncture, there is no real bone of contention between the two member states, which can be explained by the fact that difficult topics like a european army are out of the discussion. european and international factors are less favourable to european unity (krotz & schild 2013). european governance can be seen as a ‘quite negative’ factor due to the strong opposition between member states who favoured the nato framework (the united kingdom, supported by the netherlands and italy) and member states who tried to advance the idea of the eu as a security actor (france and germany, supported by belgium, luxembourg, and spain) during the intergovernmental conference on political union (laursen & vanhoonacker 1992; dover 2007; dumoulin, mathieu & sarlet 2003; lequesne 2008; miskimmon 2007; stark 2012; aggestam 2015). yet, all the member states have agreed to negotiate, and there are procedures aimed at finding a common solution. at the international level, the picture is ambivalent, but quite positive, too (gordon 1993, 1994; dumoulin, mathieu & sarlet 2003; miskimmon 2007; balme 2009; koutrakos 2010). the united states is reticent and cautious regarding cfsp. but the end of the cold war provides a unique opportunity to develop a robust european foreign and security policy: with the collapse of the ussr, eu member states are less dependent on the us. finally, this combination of ‘positive’ franco-german factors, ‘quite negative’ eu factors and more ‘neutral’ external factors suggest that the franco-german partnership has exerted a decisive influence on the creation of cfsp. this first model can therefore be called “effective cohesion.” case study 2. the crisis in iraq (2002-2003) – ineffective cohesion. the crisis in iraq offers a more nuanced picture of positive and negative factors. this corresponds to a model of “ineffective cohesion,” which combines strong unity between the two partners with a lack of influence on the outcome of the negotiations. indeed, the franco-german factors are clearly positive – the two governments defend a common position, strongly supported by public opinion in their respective countries – while the other factors are negative (dover 2007; miskimmon 2007; bulmer & paterson 2010; longhurst 2010; daehnhardt 2011; charillon & wong 2011; norheim-martinsen 2012; koutrakos 2013; calla & demesmay 2013; keukeleire & delreux 2014; aggestam 2015). european governance exerts a negative influence due to the existing divergences between two groups of states (supporters and opponents of the us-led intervention) and the lack of leadership capable of resolving these divergences. external factors are also negative, with the united states pressuring several states in order to gain support for its policy. thus, franco-german cohesion is strong, but this does not translate into influence in this case. case study 3. negotiations on the iranian nuclear programme (2006-07) – diffuse cohesion our third case study offers another combination of factors, defined as “diffuse cohesion.” the cohesion between france and germany is rather strong: there is no distance between the positions of both governments, and domestic politics plays a positive role. other factors are also positive, but to a lesser degree (smith 2013; soetendorp 2014; musu 2010; keukeleire & delreux 2014; aggestam 2015). the troïka (france, germany, and the uk), together with the high representative, represent the eu’s position in the negotiation process. european demarches are welcomed by third states, including the united states, although the latter also use the threat of military action to try and get their way. to sum up, many factors work in favour of strong european actorness. yet, the franco-german ‘couple’ is certainly not as influential as it was in the first case 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 study (the creation of cfsp). cfsp was created despite quite strong opposition from a number of member states (united kingdom, italy, netherlands) who were mainly interested in preserving the transatlantic alliance. in the case of the iranian nuclear programme, the european setting / picture is much more favourable, and the uk contributes to a common position together with the french and the germans. diffuse cohesion denotes a situation where franco-german cohesiveness is hard to distinguish from the cohesiveness of the eu as a whole (and to some extent western partners). case study 4: military operation in libya – blocking dissensus our fourth and last case is the only one where franco-german cohesion is weak (göler & jopp 2011; menon 2011; calla & demesmay 2011; koutrakos 2013; aggestam 2015). domestic politics negatively affect this cohesion (paterson 2011). faced with the prospect of forthcoming legislative and local elections, angela merkel fears that german participation in a military operation in libya (2011) could undermine the chances of the christian democrats. among political parties as well as public opinion, military interventions and political power more generally (bulmer & paterson 2013) remain unpopular. external factors, on the other hand, are quite positive. indeed, the uk is in favour of a military operation and could envisage the eu as a framework for intervening in libya. in addition, there are strong humanitarian arguments in favour of the operation; a local population who would welcome it, support from the united states and favourable public opinion in western countries. this fourth model, called “blocking dissensus,” denotes a situation where the divergence between france and germany is the main factor behind a union deadlock. conclusion the purpose of this paper was to evaluate the cohesion between france and germany in foreign and security affairs, and to see how it affects the cohesion of the eu as a whole. we have seen that the french and german positions are fundamentally compatible, in spite of some discordance on geostrategic priorities and the use of force. there have been ups and downs in the partnership, but the partnership itself has never been seriously questioned. the existing discrepancies between the two member states do not mean that cohesion is systematically lacking. when disagreements are minor, it is still possible to reach a common position, thanks to the europeanization processes affecting their foreign policies (the francogerman partnership influences eu governance whilst simultaneously being influenced by the eu; wong & hill 2011, keukeleire & delreux 2014). yet, when reaching a common position proves impossible, it has a blocking effect at the eu level; in several cases, the gap between france and germany on military issues was so huge that eu action was impossible. thus, most of the time, franco-german cohesion is a prerequisite for a european position to be adopted and defended. the idea of a franco-german ‘motor’ of europe still has some relevance but might have been overestimated. their influence does not always have a decisive impact. the four models presented in the last section place the franco-german partnership in a wider perspective in order to determine their influence in relation to the influence of other factors. “effective cohesion” (the creation of cfsp) denotes a situation where franco-german cohesion has played a decisive role compared to other factors. “ineffective cohesion” (the crisis in iraq), on the other hand, means that bilateral cohesion has not been enough to reach a consensus at eu level. when france and germany agree, but their position can hardly be distinguished from that of other (member or non-member) states, 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 this can be seen as “diffuse cohesion” (negotiations on the iranian nuclear programme). finally, “blocking dissensus” pertains to a situation where a franco-german disagreement leads to european deadlock (the intervention in libya). in addition to this, it can be stressed that, apart from the franco-german ‘engine’, other actors may play the role of policy entrepreneur. the high representative has been instrumental in launching csdp operations (buchet de neuilly 2002). the eeas sets the agenda more and more frequently (vanhoonacker & pomorska 2013, balfour, carta & raïk 2015). the 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(2006) the europeanization of french foreign policy: france and the eu in east asia. basingstoke/new york palgrave macmillan. 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions 21 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 issn 2562-8429 abstract the article investigates the persistence in the political sphere of the peculiar five stars movement (5sm) in italy. it does so by analyzing how the support base was mobilized on the ground in order to provide important insights on the contemporary italian (and european) crisis of representation. the 5sm responded to the political vacuum caused by the decline of the traditional mediating role of the italian party system with a unique project. the absence of a traditional political plan in favour of a platform whose issues are supposedly decided by the 5sm’s activists, supported by a complex structure inclusive of both vertical and horizontal features, as well as an original style of communication and an ideology that officially tries to capitalize on the participative side of web 2.0, offered the activists the hope of being in control of their future. such a liquid core of the movement and the way it was perceived by the activists became key to the fortunes of the 5sm. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2530 university of victoria eugenio pazzini of the five star movement in italy lust for the vacuum: understanding the persistence https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2530 22 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 introduction the meteoric rise of the comedian beppe grillo’s five stars movement (5sm) to become the major single party in italian politics at the national elections of 2013 and 2018, starting only four years after its creation in 2009, has naturally attracted worldwide attention. the movement seemed to be peculiar in the electoral history of western democracies for a number of reasons, including the following. first, it is important to note its rather radical ideology that mixes aspects of populism and cyber-libertarianism, calling for direct democracy through the net (deseriis 2017a, 1; natale and ballatore 2014, 105). second, the movement’s ‘post-ideological’ claim is that it has transcended right and left divisions. third, the 5sm uses populist rhetoric that aggressively attacks the two ‘castes’ of politicians and ‘traditional media’ (bordignon and ceccarini 2013, 436). finally, the movement uses a very peculiar organizational structure constructed through new online communication media which, despite its lacking a traditional party platform, has vertical and horizontal elements (floridia and vignati 2013; tronconi 2018), resembling features of both political parties and social movements (diamanti 2014). emerging in a country whose recurring crises made it prone to the rise of populist parties and therefore their study (tarchi 2015; tarrow 1979), analyzing the legacy of the 5sm might contribute to the understanding of important trends. in fact, the emergence and persistence of such a political actor not only exemplifies, but goes beyond what most commentators have envisaged for the populist response to the crisis of representative democracies. the 5sm rejects in a classic populist manner the complete political establishment using aggressive tones and styles of communication. in addition, utilizing novel digital technologies, the actor questions contemporary party systems and, by claiming to override the mediation of political parties in favour of a direct form of online participation, it brings back old concerns about democracy and the critical role of political parties (ostrogorski, 1964; berger, 2017). arguably, the 5sm’s communication, organization, and absence of a fixed political plan provide a unique answer to the wider crisis of democracy, whose implications might have significant impacts on the future of italian (and western) politics. in order to understand the persistence of the 5sm, this article focuses on how support was mobilized on the ground through communication and organization employed by the political actor. the 5sm responded to the political vacuum caused by declining trust in the italian party system with a project that provided the feeling of empowerment to its activists. it is the absence of a fixed political plan in favour of an evolving platform whose issues are supposedly to be decided by the 5sm’s activists, supported by a complex structure comprised of both vertical and horizontal features, as well as an original style of communication and ideology, that officially try to capitalize on the participative side of web 2.0, that made the fortunes of the 5sm. this rather ‘liquid’ entity is key to understanding the legacy of the 5sm. initially, grillo’s blog gained an early reputation as a reliable channel of counter-information that, in turn, helped consolidate the anti-establishment traits of the comedian in a cultural environment of growing political mistrust. the web provided beppe grillo and gianroberto casaleggio (co-founder of the movement, whose ‘casaleggio associati’ managed grillo’s online communication) a way of circumventing media gatekeepers, as well as influencing the discourses, structures, and ways of mobilizing the populace. the founders constructed an entity that does not have a political plan, while it does have autonomous and decentralized elements at the local level that contrast with an authoritarian control of the head office at the national level. 23 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 in a full populist move, they called for people’s sovereignty through direct democracy online, supported by the autonomy of the local level and the fact that, theoretically, the political plan is to be decided by the 5sm’s members. thus, the shared lack of a political imaginary became their strength. the perceived availability of such empty space turned into political potential and, despite the tight control at the head office by grillo and the casaleggio associati, the 5sm kept consolidating support. this paper is structured in three parts. firstly, it will define the cyber-populist ideology of the 5sm. secondly, it will analyze how its ideology and web-based form of communication were key to expanding its support base over time. thirdly, it will dissect the complex structure of the 5sm, demonstrating how its horizontal and vertical features and the lack of a defined political plan intersected with the way it communicated with the support base. ultimately, one should be able to better comprehend the peculiarity of the 5sm’s structure and their ‘success’. cyber-populism in order to identify the ideology of the 5sm, cyber-populism (natale and ballatore 2014), one should begin by defining populism. the latter is a contested and contentious issue. nonetheless, in recent years, most scholars seem to agree that populism can be defined as a ‘thin’ ideology (mudde 2004) that ultimately divides society into two antagonistic and homogeneous groups. a ‘thin’ ideology, as opposed to ‘thick’ ones such as liberalism or socialism, is composed of a limited set of core ideas (mudde 2007, 17). these do not provide any structural frameworks for how to achieve social change, and therefore are often attached to ‘thicker’ ideologies. for the sake of this analysis, one can extrapolate three defining traits. populism firstly includes a positive image of a unitary and monolithic ‘people’, thus being people-centered. secondly, it offers a negative view of the ruling elites normally blamed for ongoing problems and is therefore anti-elitist. thirdly, there has to be a vision of the allocation of power invoking greater sovereignty for such ‘people’. this in turn means that such a unitary block can reject the constitutionalist division of powers between the many institutions, as well as the right of minorities, if they are not part of such ‘people’ (wirth et al. 2016). a political communication expressing a populist ideology would, over time, showcase statements regarding the unity of the people, defining its boundaries and stressing its virtues, as well as highlighting negative feelings toward the ruling elites and demanding greater sovereignty for the people (wirth et al. 2016). a further distinction shall be made in terms of the communication style, which refers to the way such content is presented. here, the connection between a populist style and a populist ideology is even looser. in fact, many mainstream actors use a populist style to make a message more appealing and interesting. for instance, one might use simplification, emotional and colloquial language to stress vicinity with the ‘people’, as well as use dramatization, black and white rhetoric and absolutism to stress the manichean view of society. finally, one can induce the claim to people’s sovereignty with references to the wisdom of the common man, common sense and simple decisions (wirth et al. 2016). a communication strategy that shows support for only one of these features, such as the many mainstream actors employing a people-centered approach, does not fully qualify as populist, but it nonetheless shows features of it. an actor who sends out more populist messages than another can be classified as more populist than the other, rather than just qualify as one or not. it 24 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 follows that populism becomes a matter of degree, while the concept relates more to the message than to the sender of the message (mudde 2004). having defined populism, now the paper can move on to cyber-populism. the latter merges discourses coming from the web with the ideology of populism in the belief that ‘the government of the people, by the people, for the people is achievable by means of information communications technology’ (deseriis 2017a, 441). such ideology has been given slightly different names: technopopulism (deseriis 2017a), populism 2.0 (gerbaudo 2014; 2017), web-populism (lanzone & woods 2015), or cyber-populism (natale and ballatore 2014). this paper prefers the latter definition of cyber-populism, as it draws a direct link with its cyber-libertarian and populist roots. for instance, these origins are detectable in the construction of ‘the people’. cyber-populists used the ‘new media’ as one of the lowest common denominators, as the empty signifier (laclau 2005), to build a common identity. here, the main addressee of populism, the common person, is readapted to fit the condition of modern social network societies. thus, the ability to connect becomes the lowest common denominator, and the common person is actualized to fit the online users of the net. all the unsatisfied demands therefore converge and find their element of commonality through the web, so that the latter is key in the discursive construction of such ‘people’. indeed, one can find many expressions of the type ‘we internet people’; while often, even the selfie becomes a method of political identification (gerbaudo 2014, p.69). populist claims to sovereignty can be found in a number of discourses of contemporary populist actors who often call for direct democracy online. the interactivity of web 2.0, with its likes, retweets, comments, and sharing of content and ideas have led some early activists such as casaleggio, the aforementioned co-founder of the 5sm, to think of it as informal mass democracy. following the principle of “one person, one vote,” some of these actors developed the notions of democracy 2.0. building on the idea of collective knowledge, where the sharing of ideas and amendments can lead to better results, the pirate parties employed the concept of liquid democracy and used decision-making software as liquid feedback. through these means, cyber-populists believe they can do away with the need for representation, instead enforcing direct democracy (gerbaudo 2014, 70). echoes of cyber-populism can be found in the swedish, german, and icelandic pirate parties, but also in the ‘99%’ of occupy wall street and in the spanish indignad@s, partido x, and podemos. similarly, grillo and casaleggio did invoke direct democracy through the net (deseriis 2017a, 1; natale and ballatore 2014, 112). according to its charter, “the movimento 5 stelle is not a political party, its objective being the realization of an effective exchange of opinions and democratic debate outside the associational and party bonds and without the mediation of directive of representative bodies, recognizing to the totality of internet users the role of government normally entrusted to a minority” (non-statuto m5s, art. 5). founded in 2009 to bring together the “experiences of the blog, the meetups, the rallies, and a number of other popular initiatives” (non-statuto m5s, art. 5), the five stars of the logo represent the five starting issues: safeguarding of water and the environment, and the growth of public transport, connectivity and development. moreover, by statute, the movement has no official physical location, but has instead to be found online (non-statuto m5s, art. 4). thus, the 5sm defines itself as challenging representative democracies and established party systems with online resources. the stated goal is to achieve a direct democracy where people rule without intermediaries such as politicians and political parties, an objective that is accordingly achievable through means of information and communication technology. to achieve this 25 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 objective, its people the ‘citizens’ are discursively equated with internet users, while the rule of the people normally exercised through direct democracy translates into online democracy (or edemocracy). in this regard, in early 2016, the 5sm launched their platform of e-democracy, ‘rousseau.’1 the internet here is the discursive tool through which grillo creates a people and builds the dichotomous division of society that characterizes a populist ideology. here, the evil enemies, comprised of the corrupted political, economic, and media elites, take advantage of the people whose power has been taken away. the 5sm argues that italy is an oligarchy rather than a democracy, as the main established parties reduced the duty of governing to the protection of their own interests and privileges. such parties, regardless of their political ideology, are unitary in their corruptness and represent the ‘caste’. grillo repeated constantly that the installation of such a hypocritical political class was possible only through tools that allowed for truth-covering and lying, and the removal of such evil elites could only happen through his impartial channels of communication. on the one hand, there is a deceitful, unlawful, lying unitary elite with which bankers and, sometimes, the european union, are associated, while on the other hand, there are the honest ‘citizens’ (and the 5sm) who have virtuous qualities, but have lost their sovereignty and dignity (lanzone and woods 2015, 58). alongside such a dichotomous worldview, one can also observe a number of ideas stemming from cyber-libertarian discourses. firstly, the utopian claims of grillo and casaleggio also resemble cyber-libertarian features. from the early days of the movimento until today, the two founders depicted the web as a mythical entity. they argued that it is a transparent and coherent being with a disruptive agenda and its own laws. it is able to cure the ills of italy and the rest of the world, leading towards a brighter future. the web is the ‘supermedium,’ as it will change political, social, informational, and organizational processes (natale and ballatore 2014, 113). a first consequence of the new medium would be to foster democracy by reducing corruption through transparency. an example is when grillo states that “it would be great if this money could be monitored on the web. […] one doesn’t steal through the web,” which resulted in 5sm parliamentarians having to publish their wages online (casaleggio and grillo in natale and ballatore 2014, 114). moreover, just as cyber-utopians are faithful to their self-organizing systems, so are the two founders faithful to the possibility of doing away with representative democracy. underplaying the role of new intermediaries (like themselves, the blog and/or big digital corporations), they have constantly argued that the internet does not need nor want intermediaries (natale and ballatore 2014, 115). furthermore, the new technologies of communication with their horizontal networks will ultimately eradicate the need for representation and hierarchy (floridia and vignati 2014, 70). for grillo, however, such a concept of online democracy does not simply equal a conversation between individuals sitting in front of their screens, replying or posting comments or proposals through the blog, the meetups, or their new platform of e-democracy, rousseau. in grillo’s words, online democracy will also result in offline participation, with decentralized offline local groups 1 rousseau is the platform of e-democracy developed and owned by the ‘casaleggio associati’ shortly before casaleggio’s death in april 2016. the ambitious platform divides into ten areas, some of which are still in development. briefly, the platform is intended to allow for voting in local, regional, and national legislations and for choosing candidates via majority voting. the platform also allows for proposing one’s own legislation and for voting on expulsions, even though the functionality of such new options is still a matter of debate within the 5sm. there are also a number of criticisms, as the platform is not open-source, and ‘casaleggio associati’ has exclusive access to the databases of all registered members, transactions, and votes (deseriis 2017b). 26 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 of collaboration, where citizens will have to contribute in person in order to change things. in the 5sm’s words, it is the common person that has the duty to re-appropriate their own power (natale and ballatore 2014, 116). accordingly, the oppression of the economic, political, technocratic, and media elites has taken away dignity, but the new media environment is providing an opportunity to citizens that are willing to participate. in this context, the 5sm pretends to be the political expression of such an opportunity. through the internet, the 5sm claims to regain the full control that the corrupted caste of politician has taken away. connecting with the base regardless of the perhaps naïve-sounding optimistic determinism of cyber-populism, with its equation of citizens with online users and the assumption of their will to participate in politics, the five stars movement did grow in support over the last decade. to some extent, this is due to use that it made of the changing media landscape in communicating within the italian context of low trust towards the political and media establishments. over the last decades, scholars have noted how western european countries have shown converging trends such as declining party membership and identification, declining voter turnout, and increasing volatility of the vote, suggesting that political parties were losing their representative functions (mair 2002, 89; kriesi 2014). nonetheless, some countries saw their party systems being more discredited than others. this is surely the case with italy. here, the structural changes regarding the supra-national level of governance, the impacts of globalization, and the economic crisis of 2008 added problems to an already-fragile political establishment. the political crises and the various episodes of corruption had the italian public highly skeptical of its government, with an average low level of trust throughout the 90s that reached its historical trough in the aftermath of the economic crash of 2008 (tarchi 2015; verbeek and zaslove 2016). in addition, the country also presented a low level of media pluralism, with half of the national television stations owned by berlusconi’s mediaset conglomerate (vaccari 2015, 33). such media empires did not invest in digital technologies and, likewise, the political parties ignored digital forms of communication, as they appeared politically unimportant. by 2008, however, the number of web 2.0 users increased dramatically, with important political consequences. in short, the media change amplified the divide between the political establishment and its associated forms of communication (the traditional media) and the ‘people’. the increased autonomy of the meaning-making process of online users and the relevant role of personalized algorithms in filtering information exposed users increasingly to information they were willing to receive, therefore fostering mistrust (castells 2009, 132). as the consumption of such new media assumed mass proportions, this suspicious way of thinking towards the media and political establishment also became a mass phenomenon (van zoonen 2012, 58). as a consequence, the government and the traditional mass media and journalism are often seen as a manipulative ‘power block’ (aupers 2012, 26). conversely, web 2.0 was perceived as increasingly more ‘truthful’ and ‘democratic,’ as it supposedly provided direct access to information. the old institutionalized media could not address the interests and demands of an always more segmented society with its limited number of publications, thus appearing increasingly more unresponsive compared to the new tools (quandt 2012). the small sub-networks of social media were more likely to be personalized and their 27 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 immediacy appeared more responsive. in addition, social media communication resembled to an extent the real life one-on-one communicative structure, as users mainly have friends or acquaintances online. populists, in what krämer (2017) names the ‘meta-function’ of the web, often exploit the low trust in traditional media. this was surely the case for grillo and casaleggio, who turned out to be two entrepreneurs of the situation. they were able to connect to popular anxieties and reproduce them, understanding the impacts of the changing media landscape. in fact, the comedian established himself as an anti-establishment public figure and, with the help of casaleggio, used the web to circumvent media gatekeepers and state a symbolic distinction from the traditional media and political establishment. for decades, the comedian depicted himself as a victim of media and politics that excluded him from television. in 1986, he was censored from national television after polemical jokes towards the then-in-power socialist party of bettino craxi, and managed to return on national television only in 1993 with two successful monologues critical of banks, politicians, and italian lifestyle (bordignon and ceccarini 2016, 134). grillo then dedicated himself to live events in theatres with only a few appearances on pay-tv channels such as ‘telepiù’. he mixed entertainment with issues of public interest, and his shows took on an increasingly marked aspect of counter-information (natale and ballatore 2014, 107). in january 2005, the ‘casaleggio associati’, owned by gianroberto casaleggio, launched the blog ‘beppegrillo.it’. at the same time, grillo went on a number of tours named after the url of the website. one could argue that this marks when his shows turned into political campaigns (natale and ballatore 2014, 108). the blog had a post per day showcasing a variety of multimedia content, videos, interviews, satirical mashups, and political communiques. moreover, publicized by the live shows, the webpage was soon to be the most visited in italy. grillo launched various single-issue campaigns on the platform, from a number of referenda to environmental issues, the abolition of public financing of parties and media, and attempts to make mps with criminal records ineligible to run for re-election (natale and ballatore 2014, 108). at this time, the internet in the country was used politically only by grillo and the few underground and alter-globalization movements, which gave the tool an even more marked element of counter-information. grillo’s blog always tried to exercise an element of surprise, with a post per day containing relatively in-depth analyses on issues of common interest. furthermore, such posts were careful to address a number of unsatisfied demands within italian society. these ranged from employment issues – publishing a number of testimonies of underpaid youth in illegal, precarious positions, or on zero-hour contracts – to focusing on stories regarding the mafia and environmental issues, the recycling of toxic waste, denouncements of corruption, and opposition to the ‘grandi opere’ (major infrastructure works). the blog also published stories of activist groups such as the no tav movement in northern italy (diani and fabbri 2015, 223). in this regard, many activists agree that grillo’s figure, personality, and web savviness were necessary to contrast with the communication wall of the political establishment (biorcio 2015). conversely, while grillo was building ties with the electorate, the italian political system was slowly re-descending into crisis, with berlusconi struggling with court cases and the left concentrated on opposing him. in addition, until 2013, the 5sm was the only political actor to be active on social media, which provided further practical benefits. firstly, some contend that social media can benefit political actors by broadening their repertoire of communication (della porta and mattoni 2015, 45). for instance, the degree of openness of social media can allow for higher participation and the potential for a collective process of content creation. the cost of entry is now 28 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 far lower for anyone and attentive political actors can notice how users react to certain posts as well as to the overall opinions on different topics. secondly, bartlett et al. (2013) argue that the degree of directness and openness of the communicative sphere can benefit populism in particular. social media provide a seemingly more direct connection to the people than existing media did. the new media evolve from ‘like-minded’ peer networks that can work as a direct linkage to the populace, circumnavigating the journalistic gatekeepers (engesser et al. 2017, 1113). anti-elitist and people-centered statements that claim to be willing to allocate power to the people can benefit from the immediacy of a tweet or a facebook post. taking part in likes, shares, comments, and conversation could easily seem to reduce that gap between the political actor and its followers, as communication might seem direct and unmediated. one difference is the fact that, given the short nature of online posts, comments, or tweets, ideologies will be expressed in fragments (engesser et al. 2017, 114). senders then aim at keeping the post as easy as possible to make it more comprehensible in the shorter sentences allowed by social media. ambiguous and open ideologies such as populism are well-suited to such fragmented messages, allowing users to complement such ideologies with their own elements, comments, posts, and shares. in addition, many have noticed how, over the last twenty years, a number of politicians have given increasing importance to the ‘media logic’ and the way they appear on televised politics (mazzoleni 2008; moffitt 2016, 72; kriesi 2014, 366). they use a language style imbued with simplification, emotional, colloquial language, and dramatization. while not necessarily linked to a populist ideology, this language could predispose an audience to the acceptance and preference of messages containing a degree of polarization (moffitt 2016, 73). such trends have remained unchanged with the advent of social media, where catchy slogans, humor, and outspokenness are a common language, as one is normally connected with friends online (bartlett 2014, 94). in this regard, then, one could argue that web 2.0 complements older media. despite such advantages, the 5sm was nearly unchallenged on social media until 2013. by november 2012, grillo had 700,556 followers on facebook, while the second-most-followed politician was leftist nichi vendola with 236,436; bersani, the leader of the democratic party, was third, with only 146,088 (bartlett et al. 2013, 29-34). this provided the comedian higher online visibility and resonance than any other politician. however, after the 5sm gained an unexpected 25 percent in the national elections of 2013, both the northern league and the democratic party had to renovate, and elected two new, young, media-savvy leaders: matteo salvini and matteo renzi respectively. the two politicians are not only highly visible on social media but also benefit from positive coverage on national television, therefore playing with a clear advantage in terms of visibility. renzi, employing a people-centered style of communication, even took primacy on twitter. salvini, too, is highly active on both facebook and twitter. thus, apart from an initial lack of competition, the social media landscape was soon to become as highly saturated with politics as in the rest of the western world. and yet, despite a decline following the 2013 elections, the 5sm continued to consolidate (bordignon and ceccarini 2016), reaching a 32 percent share at the 2018 national elections. while accurate communication might have been able to capture a great deal of frustration that followed the economic crisis, recent studies demonstrate that a vote of protest by itself does not suffice to 29 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 account for their ‘success’ (passarelli and tuorto 2018). therefore, the use of social media and the blog cannot fully explain the persistence of political support for 5sm, and there must be other factors at play. a peculiar structure arguably, the key is to consider how such ideology and communication intersected with the peculiar structure of the 5sm, more precisely analyzing how its support is mobilized on the ground. this is effected via a novel structure with highly decentralized aspects whose inspiration emerged once again from the internet. at the local level, the movement shows an extremely loose structure, independent from the central office. the latter would rarely interfere with the meetup groups, leaving the activists fully in charge of plans, initiatives, and local communication (tronconi 2018). such governance presents elements of participative democracy (floridia and vignati 2014) and resembles features of social movements (diamanti 2014; tronconi 2018). it is nonetheless contrasted by the tight control at the central level over the elected candidates that allows for no dissent when it comes to issues of national relevance (tronconi 2018). as far as the local level is concerned, during the v-day rallies in 2007, grillo advocated for activists’ action at the grassroots level through the online platform meetup, a simple platform that provides an online space to plan initiatives and meetings. thanks to the early communicative work of grillo and a few activists, the movimento started expanding to local areas through meetings launched on the platform. such lobbying work often managed to intercept and intersect with already-mature local protest groups, happy at acquiring a national voice. soon, some groups elected candidates within their own localities. the process expanded quite rapidly, and by 2012, the movement had won the first major city council in parma and had achieved success in sicilian regional elections. in 2015, the five stars meetups reached over 2,000 units with 135,000 members in 2016 (tronconi 2018). at the early stages, the leaders of the movement were grillo and casaleggio. under their direct leaderships, a number of unspecified staff managed the blogs, meetups, and social media accounts, developed the database of the activists and subscribers, and authorized the use of the 5sm’s logo for electoral campaigns (tronconi 2018). these ‘headquarters’ rarely interfered with local decisions, allowing local groups a great deal of autonomy (except for important and mediatized localities such as the councils of rome and parma). the activists claimed that local decisions were only taken through the assembly and that its freedom was total (biorcio 2015, 23). in fact, local assemblies could deliver on any issue relating to the locality, ranging from the choice of candidates to the manifestos and political plans, as well as issues of administrative transparency. to participate in the process was easy. the few requirements stipulated in the ‘non-statute’ were: being a resident in the area of interest, not having previously been part of any political parties, and having a clean criminal record (grillo 2009), giving birth to an entity grouping very diverse political cultures within it. arguably, such quasi-complete autonomy would prove to be one of the major agents of the political ‘success’ of the 5sm, as, in an attempt to put the preached direct democracy into practice, it did make its activists feel empowered. in this regard, the openness and directness of the blog, the meetups, and the other social platforms such as facebook and twitter were important contributors to the organization of the movement, especially at the local level. while final decisions were taken face to face in the assemblies, the meetups served as a source of information for the sharing of ideas and coordination for the activists. 30 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 the openness of the platform also contributed to maintaining these local entities leaderless. furthermore, such a mode of communication not only enabled grillo and casaleggio to monitor the reactions of their followers, but also allowed sympathizers and observers to follow the development of the meetup of a given locality, reducing the cost of entry. arguably, in this structure, one can see the extent of the application of the ideas of cyber-populism. the web provided a model of organization that was then adapted, or at least attempted to be adapted, into the reality of a social movement. in addition to the connection of loosely decentralized meetup groups that emerged outside the institutions, the 5sm applied the cyberlibertarian belief that digital information should be easily shareable, editable, and actionable, pushing citizens to take political action into their own hands. one can also find the notion embedded in the open source mode of governance that ‘a network can govern itself,’ as the structure and the local decisions are open to inputs by the base of their members and activists. activists argue that, at a theoretical level, this is an attempt to actualize the concept of collective intelligence, wherein the collaboration and competition of many individuals bring about the possibility of a new politics (biorcio 2015, 188). in short, the 5sm has elements of ‘participative’ democracy. while often overlooked, these strains do exist and are visible in the practices at the local level, which are therefore comparable to those employed by contemporary social movements such as ‘occupy,’ the ‘indignados,’ and the pirate parties in northern europe (floridia and vignati 2014, 5). however, what does not appear in the narrative of grillo, but cannot be overlooked in academic study, is the contradictory strong element of verticality. indeed, it is easy to notice how the central office repeatedly attempted to limit the actions of its candidates. while autonomy at the ground level of the meetups was quasi-complete, the central office limited its national representatives in any way it could to avoid factions and disobedience. this was especially evident after the success at the national election of 2013, when the 5sm suddenly entered national institutions with 109 deputies and 54 senators, as well as european parliamentarians and a number of regional and local councillors, including in the municipalities of rome, turin, and livorno (tronconi 2018, 173). even though grillo never ran for the presidency, and from 2017 called himself a guarantor rather than a leader, he intervened more than once in expelling members from the movement. while on some occasions this might have proven beneficial by providing unity, there is an undisputed lack of checks and balances. for instance, the expulsions of parliamentarians reached 40 in 2017, while the 2016 exclusion of pizzarotti, the mayor of parma, after a public dispute with grillo, and despite the positive reviews of pizzarotti’s work, attracted great attention. similarly, the expulsion of marika cassimatis, for undisclosed internal reasons, raised numerous concerns within the movimento. cassimatis even resorted to suing the 5sm. this brings to the fore a first critique: the lack of internal democracy. a second important criticism is the overall lack of transparency, ironically a major theme in 5sm discourse. in this regard, the management and the communication have always been in the hands of ‘casaleggio associati srl’, which is officially a profit-based e-commerce company that has at least generated revenue from advertisements on the website. while this was arguably understandable, as those revenues helped kick-start a movement that was refusing public funding, it is worrying that the relationship of the company with the 5sm has not been made fully clear to date. 31 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 likewise, ‘rousseau,’ the long-awaited platform of e-democracy, is managed and owned by the president of the ‘casaleggio associati,’ davide casaleggio, son of the founder gianroberto, who died in 2016. davide appears at e-commerce conferences and seems interested in practices of consumer surveillance and data analytics, while his position in the 5sm is not clear, leaving many suspicious (politi and roberts 2017). moreover, despite employing many discourses on the freedom of information, what strikes experts is the fact that the platform is not open-source, leaving at least doubts about the anonymity of voting on the platform (deseriis 2017b). hence, it seems accurate to speak of both a horizontal and a vertical element. one of the consequences of this tension is the fact that the movement has been hard to classify. some define the 5sm as a hybrid actor (bordignon 2014), while others argue that it does not belong to any political category; it is not a movement party, not a personal party, and not a business firm party (tronconi 2018). even entrance into italian institutions and the much-discussed institutionalization did not really remodel the 5sm into a more familiar political entity. the online registering of its members, the addition of online primaries, and voting over specific issues did not solve its organizational gaps, leaving many wondering how a political force could sustain a longterm battle without having the solid organization of parties, and their multiple levels of decisionmaking, with fixed codes of conduct and dynamics of coordination. in addition, the founders as much as the activists contributed to such confusion. while they never stated how the movement ought to be, they were always careful in differentiating themselves from the rest of the political establishment. one can observe an element of negativity recurring throughout the discourse of the 5sm. for instance, the project was born as a non-party, founded with a non-statute, with its members coming from outside the world of politics, opposing the traditional political system in favour of a new participatory conception of politics. the logo of the 5sm by itself does not define a political program of the same type as traditional parties but is an aggregation of a number of demands unaddressed by mainstream parties. furthermore, the 5sm showcases members making statements from both a right-wing position critical of immigration, refugees, and the eu, and a left-wing one in favor of civil rights and critical of neoliberal capitalism. this led some to label it as a catch-all, anti-party party (diamanti 2014). one could argue that the 5sm always left an undefined space, a liquid core characterizing its political essence. while the above arguments are well-known, the point here is that it is precisely the lack of a clear political platform, supported by its unique structure, novel ideology, and channels of communication, which account for the ongoing electoral success of the 5sm, and which have provided it with internal coherence through making claims to having implemented direct democracy. for instance, grillo argues that the 5sm willingly does not take a priori positions on issues such as immigration and membership of the european union, as they have to be decided from below. this is the major dialectical strength of the movement. the lack of official standpoints on topical issues, aided by the platforms of communication on which one can find any sort of statement, proposal, and viewpoint are, in the 5sm’s words, proof of their democratic spirit. while this argument is debatable, it has worked to date in favour of the 5sm, which has avoided having a clear political platform in the manner of traditional parties and managed to keep together an ideologically diverse electorate (bordignon and ceccarini 2016, 142). the peculiar structure of the 5sm, especially at the local level, gives coherence to such a political project that lacks an official plan. the activists, especially those elected into the institutions, have often lamented the problems emerging from a political force that lacks internal multi-level coordination (biorcio 2015). nonetheless, they claim it to be their nature: fluid and dynamic. they 32 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 claim to be oriented towards the movement because of its lack of leaders, hierarchies, and ideologies, while they undertake activism as a civic duty. moreover, the majority appreciate the ease and openness of the movement and the fact that one can get close without having to take part in it. besides, they all counterpose the alleged transparency, horizontality, and lack of ideology and structure of the movimento with the ‘hierarchical’ and ‘corrupted’ traditional party structure (biorcio 2015, 14). they acknowledge that such a nature will lead to problems that some members might not be fit for political positions, while others will act corruptly or focus opportunistically on their own careers. however, they argue that the goal of renovating politics allows for mistakes, as they are inevitable when one tries to put new methods into practice. some even defined the movement as a container, an empty space to be filled in by the activities of the members (biorcio 2015, 24). arguably, it is the perceived vacuum of this container that provides the feeling of political empowerment to the activists, the hearth of the 5sm’s success. this also parallels the ideology of cyber-populism. the latter, by being ‘thin,’ does only provide a few core ideas, in this case, the rule of the people by means of information technology. this ideology does not prescribe any social or economic reform or a clear path for how to achieve digital democracy. while it identifies a somewhat precise enemy in the political class, addressing the post-crisis frustration, it does also leave various doors open, which allows activists to fill them up with their hopes. nonetheless, this does not mean that the support is stable. the complex interconnection of structure, communication, and political praxis – that up to now remained somehow coherent – might not cope with the challenge of governing, especially if such duty is shared in a coalition. governing requires internal unity, but the 5sm’s support theoretically derives from its openness to input from the base. it is therefore important for the central office of the 5sm not to openly oppose the will of its base, attempting to maintain the perception of unchanged connectedness. while they might get away with negotiating on issues on which they did not initially adopt clear stances, such as immigration, they are less likely to gain tolerance from their voters if they fail to deliver on their classical issues, such as corruption, environmental struggles, and income levels. in depending upon their coalition partners, the leaders of the 5sm are therefore placed under the greatest pressure since their entrance into politics. the fact that during this past decade they have been able to address their challenges is no guarantee that they will do so now. conclusion in conclusion, the 5sm attempted to place the political projects in the hands of the members of the movimento, at least at a rhetorical level. this was arguably the key determinant in comprehending the long-standing support for the 5sm. hence, a few implications follow. firstly, this history demonstrates that there are considerable numbers of citizens interested in participating in the public sphere, in contrast to the many claims of political apathy. in turn, and alongside most of the literature on the topic, the findings of this case study also confirm the deep crisis of representation within the traditional italian party system. the quality of the response of the 5sm, however, does raise a number of questions. to begin with, many wonder whether this answer to the crisis of representation is a ‘good’ one or whether the emergence of such discourses can have negative consequences for the health of 33 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 contemporary democracies. surely, the 5sm did manage to re-engage citizens who were previously not participating in the political sphere. however, some warn of the undemocratic potential of the widespread acceptance of a discourse imbued with the categorical rejection of the political opposition. secondly, the discourses of the 5sm imply that the internet will offer a more effective way of mobilising citizens and their ‘collective intelligence’ compared to what can be achieved using traditional political parties. this raises the question of whether the technological utopianism intrinsic in the discourse might be beneficial. for instance, the 5sm’s concept of decentralizing political actions with the use of online platforms of e-democracy, such as ‘rousseau,’ can have benefits, cut costs, and speed up processes of democratic politics at the local level. this nurtures hope for innovative forms of a more direct democracy. however, activists cannot afford to uncritically accept claims of direct democracy online, as the internet presents instead a great number of spins and subtle forms of control. before embracing such a utopian view of the web, there should at least be widespread social awareness of the importance of data, which is far from being the case today. ultimately, it is important to monitor the influence of 5sm elsewhere in europe. in spain, ciudadanos and podemos have both made use of online resources and have, to some extent, employed similar discourses. similarly, the claims of superseding rightand left-wing ideologies are also used by right-wing populist parties, such as the front (now rassemblement) national in france. further research should move in this direction, discovering the motivation of their supporters and comparing them with the 5sm. the autonomy that interested the 5sm’s supporters might also suggest novel approaches for the eu, favouring perhaps the need for closer contacts with local realities and disempowered citizens. whether the 5sm will be able to be perceived as an incubator of hope after its first experience in a ruling government goes past the scope of this paper. it is nonetheless important to keep monitoring how this novel political experiment evolves, and to what extent the 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(2016). the appeal of populist ideas, strategies and styles: a theoretical model and research design for analyzing populist political communication. zurich: nccr working paper, 88. http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/regolamento-%20movimento-5-%20stelle.pdf http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/regolamento-%20movimento-5-%20stelle.pdf https://www.rivistailmulino.it/news/newsitem/index/item/news:news_item:4383 https://www.ft.com/content/546be098-989f-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b 37 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 the impact of the 2020 constitutional changes on authoritarian constitutionalism in russia: judicial pragmatism between the russian constitutional court (rcc) and the state alexandra yao1 abstract in 2003, the russian government abruptly arrested mikhail khodorkovsky, then ceo of yukos, the largest private oil company in russia at the time. yukos was sold for parts through courtmandated auctions and eventually acquired by state oil company rosneft. the yukos affair transformed russia’s oil industry, energy sector, and state relationship with private enterprises. in response, yukos shareholders appealed the injustice to international courts and have fought to enforce a usd 50 billion compensation ruling for nearly two decades. this article follows the timeline of the yukos trials, assessing russia’s aggressive resistance to the yukos compensation ruling and focusing on the 2020 russian constitutional amendments that legalized selective compliance of international rulings. the analysis concludes that the constitutional changes represent a critical juncture moment for the russian constituional court (rcc) that transforms its relationship with the executive branch, offsetting the rcc’s balancing act of judicial pragmatism with the state by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. this article examines possible motivations for this change, which include the yukos trials. 1 alexandra yao is a phd student at the department of political science at the university of british columbia 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 introduction in 2003, yukos, the largest private oil company in russia at the time, was in the middle of merger talks with chevrontexaco and exxonmobil an unprecedented deal which would have created the largest oil company in the world. later that year, yukos’ ceo mikhail khodorkovsky was arrested on charges of tax fraud. yukos was sold for parts through court-mandated auctions and eventually acquired by state oil company rosneft. the yukos affair transformed russia’s oil industry, energy sector, and state relationship with private enterprises. since yukos was auctioned off at staggeringly low prices without due process, yukos shareholders suffered a tremendous loss of capital and appealed the injustice to the international courts. for nearly two decades, the shareholders and the russian government have continued to overturn and reinstate the compensation ruling of a usd 50 billion payout. the yukos trials have been processed in the european court of human rights (ecthr), the permanent court of arbitration (pca), hague district court, and hague court of appeal. as of september 2021, the trials continue in the supreme court of the netherlands. new developments in response to the yukos trials, such as the 2020 russian constitutional amendments that legalized selective compliance of international rulings, reflect russia’s aggressive resistance to the yukos compensation ruling. these developments threaten the constitutional rights and freedoms of russian citizens and private enterprises. the focus of this paper is as follows: what are the implications of the recent constitutional changes on authoritarian constitutionalism in russia, specifically judicial pragmatism between the russian constitutional court (rcc) and the state? this article concludes that the constitutional changes represent a critical juncture moment for the rcc that transforms its relationship with the presidency. the rcc’s balancing act of judicial pragmatism with the state has been offset by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. this article examines possible motivations for this change, among which are the yukos trials. 1990s: hopeful beginnings immediately after the fall of communism, judicial scholars were hopeful for the modernization of the constitution of the russian federation and federal legislature (mishina 2020, 63). their goal was radical legislative transformation. the initial judicial reforms of the 1990s exceeded expectations, including political competition, free speech, freedom of the press, democratic elections, and other democratic institutions previously nonexistent during the soviet union (partlett and krasnov 2019, 644-67). the constitutional court of the russian federation was established in accordance with european standards and was the first judicial agency in russian history with the power to legally evaluate the actions of actors in the highest levels of government, which includes the actions of the president. the law on the constitutional court espoused judicial immunity, irremovability, and impartiality to establish judicial autonomy (mishina 2020, 71). in 1991, the law of the russian federation on mass media declared freedom of the press and the removal of soviet norms of censorship and ideological restrictions on independent journalism (2020, 71). the 1996 russian criminal code emphasized protection of the individual and outlined 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 its core principles of legality, equality of individuals before the law, and criminal liability based only on guilt, justice, and humanism (articles 3-8 of the 1996 criminal code of the russian federation [rf]). inspired by the constitution of the fifth republic in france, the 1993 constitution of the rf also established a semi-presidential system (mishina 2020, 72). the fundamental principles of the 1993 constitution of the rf explicitly recognized the exercise of “[state power in the rf] on the basis of separation of legislative, executive and judicial branches,” (article 10 of 1993 constitution of the rf) and the independence of these three branches. articles 118-123 went on to establish the immunity, irremovability, and inviolability of judges (articles 118-123 of 1993 constitution of the rf). this was a remarkable achievement, especially since judicial independence was nonexistent under soviet rule, as the courts operated as an arm of the repressive government apparatus (mishina 2020, 75). the constitution also established a judicial system composed of the rcc, the supreme court, federal courts of general jurisdictions, courts of arbitration, and justiceof-the-peace courts (article 118 of 1993 constitution of the rf). further, the 1996 criminal code decriminalized many anti-soviet crimes including “anti-soviet agitation, propaganda, sodomy, vagrancy, illegal currency transactions, [and] speculation” (mishina 2020, 73). the criminal code also placed crimes against a person in superior priority to crimes against the state, thus privileging humanization and democratization. authoritarian constitutionalism in the past, studies of authoritarian constitutionalism focused on countries such as singapore (tushnet 2015, 391-462), turkey (isiksel 2013, 702-26), south africa (davis 2019, 57-75), myanmar (crouch 2020, 487-515), and non-russian former soviet republics (newton 2019, 20939). there was little scholarship on authoritarian constitutionalism in russia because, as maria popova (2017) argued, russia did not adhere to tushnet’s definition where “the autocrat sets the substantive law, often in negotiation with his governing coalition” (65). alexei trochev and peter solomon (2018) counter that tushnet’s definition of authoritarian constitutionalism is so “demanding” (212) that most authoritarian states would not fit the bill. trochev and solomon (2018) argue that there is a balancing act of authoritarian constitutionalism in russia. this paper builds on their balancing act argument by analyzing the recent 2020 constitutional changes to demonstrate how the balancing act has been disrupted. authoritarian constitutionalism in russia: a balancing act despite the achievements of the 1990s judicial reforms, the russian judiciary was still open to manipulation and political pressure. this has led to a trend of authoritarian constitutionalism, especially between the rcc and the executive branch. during their respective terms between 2001-2016, president putin and president medvedev amended the 1994 federal constitutional law on the constitutional court of the russian federation a collective total of 15 times, making key changes to rcc regulations including salary changes, relocations, and age limits to test the loyalty and compliance of the rcc (trochev and solomon 2018, 204-5). 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 trochev and solomon have previously written about how the rcc’s defence of russian sovereignty against international judicial bodies is one of the rcc’s adjustments to vladimir putin’s increasingly authoritarian regime (trochev and solomon 2018). they argue that the rcc engages in a balancing act between two governance regimes – the constitutional regime and the regime of political expediency, resulting in what they categorize as the russian version of authoritarian constitutionalism. popova (2017) disagrees, arguing that while singapore has authoritarian constitutionalism, russia does not, since the political regime only selectively adheres to constitutionalism. among many examples, she cites the yukos affair and khodorkovsky’s arbitrary arrest as evidence of the kremlin’s disregard for constitutionalism and political use of the law (2017, 67). her article predicted the kremlin’s preference for “greater politicization of the judiciary” (2017, 74). this article builds upon her prediction by demonstrating how the political regime has erased the remaining independence of the judiciary and departed further from authoritarian constitutionalism. for the purposes of this investigation, judicial pragmatism refers to practical judicial decision making in recognition of limitations to legal formalism. judicial pragmatism allows judges the freedom to “follow the law to the letter or openly disregard it, depending on the context” (hendley 2017, 4), allowing them to cater to political realities while pursuing judicial activism on lower risk cases. in this sense, judicial pragmatism is “activist” (posner 1995, 4) in that it is “a rejection of the idea that law is something grounded in permanent principles and realized in logical manipulation of those principles, and a determination to use law as an instrument for social ends” (405). judicial pragmatism by the rcc includes “adaption to institutional changes” (trochev and solomon 2018, 204), “adaption to personnel changes” (206), and “tolerating disobedience with judgments” (211) as well as adaption to the kremlin’s needs and expanding judicial activism on non-politically sensitive cases. trochev and solomon (2018) demonstrate that one of the key ways the rcc has carefully maneuvered the tensions in the duality between constitutionalism and political expediency is by presenting itself as an effective defence against ecthr international encroachment upon russian national sovereignty. they illustrate how the rcc’s defence of selective compliance is necessary to adjust to new political realities and preserve (some) autonomy for rcc judges to continue other important work in expanding domestic judicial activism (trochev and solomon 2018). similarly, khalikova (2020) has highlighted how the rcc has balanced restricted judiciary freedom on politically sensitive issues, on the one hand, with the greater freedom to adjudicate social rights issues on the other. the duality is maintained so long as the regime of political expediency maintains the exercise of unrestrained power that can “bypass constitutional restraints and prevail over constitutional values” (trochev and solomon 2018, 202) and the constitutional regime maintains the “operation of formal constitutional rules and rules of european human rights law, which both constrain and guide russia's leaders in ruling their country” (202). richard sakwa (2020) has also argued that the russian government benefits from a “dual state model” where the “administrative regime” (45) gains legitimacy and authority from the constitutional regime principles, and yet can continue to subvert constitutional principles. published in early 2020, sakwa’s book agrees with trochev and solomon’s argument that the administrative regime is “balanced by the constitutional state” (47). this article assesses whether the recent constitutional changes that function as domestic defences of national sovereignty against international courts have now subverted the duality of the two governance regimes by firmly subjugating the rcc and other branches of power directly under presidential control, erasing their 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 constraint on russian government leadership. the former balancing act between the administrative and constitutional regime has now been undone. current literature this article contributes to the scant literature surrounding authoritarian constitutionalism in russia and literature on the yukos trials as publications catch up to the recent constitutional changes, new yukos trials, and their implications for the future. before the 2014 pca's compensation ruling, scholars studied how the yukos affair was politically motivated and not simply an issue of fraud and tax evasion or property redistribution as russian authorities claim (gustafson 2012). in recent years, researchers have examined the yukos trials and their impact on russia’s relationship with the ecthr and the council of europe (aksenova and marchuk 2018). there is a general consensus that the yukos trials were the most significant factor, inter alia, that affected the 2015 rcc defence mechanism to check ecthr's jurisdiction (kornya 2017) and subsequently the role of the 2020 constitutional amendments on the trials (krimmer 2020, 86-94). scholars have also focussed on how the landmark judgment 21-p/2015 and the rapid russian constitutional changes in 2020 signify a disengagement with international courts and superiority of national sovereignty over international law (kalinichenko and kochenov 2021, 341-46). others have also categorized the 2015 russian defence mechanism as among the slew of other similar cases in germany, italy, uk, and others in the broader recent global trend of backlash against international courts (voeten 2020, 407-22). the central contribution of this article is that it examines the current state of authoritarian constitutionalism in russia in the context of the yukos trials, which accelerated a series of constitutional changes as a form of domestic defence of national sovereignty. the research methodology of this investigation mainly involves scrutiny of legal documents (case judgments, statutes, constitutional amendments), news articles, and relevant literature (scholarship on the yukos trials, constitutional changes in russia, authoritarian constitutionalism, and backlash politics). research for this article included relevant rcc judgments, federal laws, and the case files of the yukos trials from the ecthr, pca, hague district court, hague court of appeal, and the supreme court of the netherlands. the legal documents were presented in english, russian, or french and were accessible online. the yukos trials: the elephant in the room timeline of the yukos trials after the collapse of the soviet union in 1991, the russian government underwent a process of rapid privatization. part of this process involved the government selling valuable state-owned companies at low prices to private owners in loans-for-shares auctions (sim 2008, 6). mikhail khodorkovsky, the then owner of menatep bank, acquired yukos between 1995 and 1996. in order to foster economic growth in poorer regions, the russian government issued a low-tax-region program in the 1990s, allowing local authorities to either partially or fully exempt their corporations from corporate-profit tax. yukos then relocated its trading companies to these internal offshore tax havens, selling oil to its own trading companies at low prices and then reselling the oil abroad at market prices, all while profiting from the low tax rates on the sales. during the yukos trials, the russian federation asserted that yukos “increased step by step from sham shell to sham 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 shell, generating artificially inflated profits through non-arm's length transactions” (yukos universal limited (isle of man) v. the russian federation 2014). the russian federation accused yukos of “fraudulently evad[ing] billions of dollars of russian corporate profit tax from 1999 to 2004 [by] abusing the [low-tax-region] program” (yukos universal limited (isle of man) 2014 at 109). while profiting from tax optimization methods, yukos became one of the largest oil companies in the world by 2002 (krimmer 2020, 87). by 2003, khodorkovsky had become popularly known as the richest man in russia and entered merger talks with sibneft, exxonmobil and chevrontexaco. in october 2003, khodorkovsky was arrested on charges of forgery, fraud, and tax evasion. on december 19, 2004, yukos’ major production company ‘yuganskneftegaz’ was acquired by a shell company baikalfinansgroup. four days later, baikalfinansgroup sold those shares to state-owned oil company rosneft (chernykh 2011, 1240). so far, two international courts have released rulings on the trials between yukos shareholders and the russian government. on july 18, 2014, the pca ruled that russia must pay usd 50 billion in damages to the yukos shareholders in full by january 14, 2015 or interest would begin to accrue (yukos universal limited (isle of man) 2014). two weeks later, the ecthr issued a just satisfaction judgment of eur 1.9 billion to be paid by russia (oao neftyanaya kompaniya yukos v russia 2014). subsequently, at the state duma’s (lower house of parliament) request, the rcc began to revisit and review the constitutionality of the federal laws pertaining to russian compliance with the european convention of human rights. on july 15, 2015, the rcc issued their judgment no. 21p/2015 that ranked ecthr authority (and therefore international law) subsidiary to rcc jurisdiction, thus making selective compliance of international rulings legal (postanovlenie konstitutsionnogo suda rossiĭskoĭ federatsii ot 14 iiulia 2015). referring to the anchugov and gladkov v. russia case from july 14, 2013, the rcc judgment argued that implementation of the ecthr’s judgment would violate the constitution of the rf. to substantiate their defence, the rcc also cited similar case law by the german constitutional court, italian constitutional court, austrian constitutional court, and the uk supreme court. on december 14, 2015, president putin signed a federal law empowering the rcc to evaluate international court decisions and their compliance with the rf constitution to verify their enforceability (federal'nyĭ zakon 2015). the rcc has applied the defence mechanism to two ecthr rulings: anchugov and gladkov v russia and the yukos compensation ruling. on april 19, 2016, the rcc issued judgment no. 12p/2016, which reviewed and denied the possibility of implementing the ecthr’s anchugov and gladkov v russia ruling (constitutional court of the russian federation 2016). the following day, on april 20, 2016, the hague district court overturned the pca’s usd 50 billion ruling on the grounds that the case was outside of the pca’s jurisdiction (the russian federation v. veteran petroleum limited, yukos universal limited, hulley enterprises limited 2016). next, on january 19, 2017, the rcc successfully stopped the implementation of the yukos compensation ruling, to which rcc judge aranovsky and judge yaroslavtsev dissented (postanovlenie konstitutsionnogo suda rossiĭskoĭ federatsii ot 19 ianvaria 2017). on february 18, 2020, the hague court of appeal reinstated the compensation ruling (veteran petroleum limited, yukos universal limited, hulley enterprises limited v. the russian federation 2020). the next month, putin introduced a slew of constitutional amendments including the precedence of russian constitutional law over international law, making selective compliance of international rulings constitutional. by june 2020, the supreme court of the netherlands accepted the russian government's appeal to challenge the hague court of appeal's 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 ruling. by december 2020, russia passed a law banning constitutional court judges from publishing dissenting opinions (gustafson 2012, 272-318). at the time of writing, the supreme court of the netherlands' final judgment is still pending. between january 15, 2015, and january 14, 2021, approximately usd 7 billion of interest has accrued, bringing the total of the awards to usd 57 billion. significance of the yukos trials scholars agree that khodorkovsky’s aggressive economic policies designed to increase foreign investment, increasingly defiant criticism of state policies, funding for opposition parties, proamerican stance along with rumours of political ambition, all contributed to the singling out of his company yukos (gustafson 2012, 272-318). since yukos was no different from other oil companies in its perfectly legal tax optimization methods, the yukos affair made an example of khodorkovsky and reasserted the primacy of state authority over big business as well as the power of state coercion, especially given his wealth and visibility (tompson 2005, 159-81). more importantly, putin’s power and legitimacy are directly tied to russia’s economic performance on the global stage, particularly within the energy sector (sim 2008, 69). after rosneft acquired yukos, russia’s economy benefited significantly, which translated into political longevity for putin. the yukos government takeover marked the beginning of a series of selective state acquisitions of private companies across a variety of industries, in a process of creeping nationalization. the oecd economic survey of the russian federation reported 29 major state acquisitions between 2004-2006 alone (not including state acquisitions of foreign assets) across the banking, electric power, nuclear construction, machine-building, media, aviation, auto, oil and gas, and titanium sectors (oecd 2006, 38). the role of state-owned enterprises (soes) in the russian economy is unusually significant as soes dominate the country’s top ten firms, especially the banking, energy, and transport sectors (oecd 2014, 28-29). more recently, in 2016, the private oil company bashneft was sold to state-owned rosneft without a public tender (us department of state 2021). with the capital flight from russia and sharp decline in foreign direct investments, it is expected that exiting private shareholders will continue to sell their assets to state-owned enterprises. the yukos compensation ruling is significant to russian state interests not only because it threatens a usd 57 billion financial cost but because it would alter the business-state institutional relationship (reasserted by the yukos affair and solidified by creeping nationalization of key industries) as well as set legal precedence of state responsibility for corrupt asset renationalization. constitutional changes: offsetting the balancing act judgment 21-p/2015 after the 2014 pca compensation ruling, a group of state duma members requested that the rcc revisit the constitutionality of federal laws regarding russian compliance with the ecthr, ostensibly to review a separate ecthr ruling: anchugov and gladkov v russia. on july 4, 2013, the ecthr had ruled that russia had violated article 3 of protocol no. 1 of the convention by not allowing convicted prisoners the right to vote in parliamentary elections (anchugov and gladkov v. russia 2013). however, this was in direct conflict with article 32(3) of the russian constitution that states prisoners do not have the right to vote or be elected. russian resistance against the 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 anchugov and gladkov v russia ruling was reinforced by hirst v uk (2005), a similar case concerning prisoner voting rights that also received pushback from domestic courts in the uk against the ecthr case law. this straightforward conflict between an ecthr ruling and the rf constitution was the perfect opportunity to develop the first domestic defence mechanism: rcc issued judgment no. 21-p/2015, ranking ecthr rulings subsidiary to rcc jurisdiction, and setting a precedent for future international court rulings (postanovlenie 2015). judgment no. 21p/2015 was further solidified later that year by putin, who signed a federal law authorizing rcc evaluation of enforceability of international court decisions (federal constitutional law no.7/2015) (federal'nyĭ zakon 2015). similar to the uk, russia took the opportunity of clear-cut, straightforward judicial conflict and applied it to a political agenda of limiting ecthr jurisprudence. after applying the defence mechanism to the anchugov and gladkov v russia ruling in 2016 (judgment 12-p/2016) (constitutional court of the russian federation 2016), the rcc unsurprisingly then applied it to the yukos award in 2017 (judgment 1-p/2017) (postanovlenie 2017). constitutional amendments 2020 when the hague court of appeal reinstated the yukos award in early 2020, putin fast tracked sweeping changes to the russian constitution (isachenkov 2020). the changes included the expansion of presidential control, which had been in motion prior to the reinstallation of the yukos award but were accelerated by the court of appeal’s decision, given the urgency and political sensitivity of national sovereignty against unsavoury international jurisdiction. prior to 2020, few amendments have been made to the 1993 constitution. aside from minor changes, the most substantial of any amendments made was the extension of the presidential term from four to six years and the state duma deputy terms from four to five years in 2008, and the expansion of presidential power on the procuracy in 2014 (teague, 2020, 303). of the 2020 constitutional amendments, articles 79 and 125 are directly relevant to the yukos trials. article 79 now stipulates that “decisions of international organizations adopted on the basis of provisions of international treaties of the [rf] which in their interpretation contradict the constitution shall not be subject to implementation in the [rf] (article 79 of the constitution of the rf 2020).” while the previous russian law and court decisions were addressed to the ecthr specifically, article 79 now expands the supremacy of national sovereignty to include any and all international courts and organizations to which russia is connected. the new wording of article 79 thus expands to include the energy charter treaty (ect) (crucial to the yukos trials that are based on russia’s alleged breach of obligations of the ect that russia signed but never ratified) and the 1958 new york convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (which the yukos shareholders cite in their subsequent attempted enforcement proceedings of the award since russia signed and ratified the new york convention in 1960). clearly, this effort was designed to address future yukos decisions such as those from the hague and the simultaneous enforcement proceedings. an added 5.1(b) to article 125 formally empowers the rcc to determine the possibility of enforcing international rulings if they “contradict the fundamentals of the public legal order of the [rf].” this constitutionalized the rcc’s authority to decide on the enforceability of “decisions of interstate bodies adopted on the basis of provisions of international treaties of the rf […,] a foreign or international (or interstate) court, [or] a foreign or international private arbitration court (arbitration)” (article 125(5-1.b) of the constitution of the rf 2020). specific mention of 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 interstate, foreign, and international courts, and foreign or international private arbitration courts demonstrates how this addendum was again designed to address any and all future yukos decisions. the amended article 83(f-3) of the constitution grants the president power to submit requests to terminate powers of a whole host of judges including the chairman, deputy chairman and judges of the constitutional court, the chairman, deputy chairpersons and judges of the supreme court, and judges of courts of cassation and appellate courts (article 83(f-3) of the constitution of the rf 2020). this termination request can be in case of any “act besmirching the honor and dignity of the judge” (article 83(f-3) of the constitution of the rf 2020), giving the president the right to fire judges at will based on ambiguous criteria, revoking the irremovability of judges, and neutralizing the authority of constitutional court judges to constrain state leadership. several key amendments also significantly expanded the powers of the president to a staggering degree. amended article 83(a) grants the president power to “remove the chairman of the government of the russian federation [aka the prime minister] from office” (article 83(a) of the constitution of the rf 2020) at his own discretion, without needing confirmation from the state duma or consultation with the federal council. previously, if the president wished to remove the chairman (prime minister), as a condition, he had to dismiss the entire government as well (teague 2020, 326). the european commission for democracy through law (known as the "venice commission"), an advisory body for the council of europe, has warned that under the new constitutional amendments, “the lack of regulation of the removal process in the constitution, appears to increase the possibility of influence of the executive over the constitutional court (european commission for democracy through law 2020, 17).” in reference to trochev and solomon’s authoritarian constitutionalist balancing act, the constitutional changes have allowed “the regime of political expediency” (2018, 202) to expand its power over “the constitutional regime,” (202) severely offsetting the duality of the two regimes by threatening judicial independence and constitutionalism. amended article 107(3) grants the rcc power to exercise a “preventive constitutional review by request of the president” (mishina 2020). the president has formally and constitutionally enlisted the rcc to help him block federal laws he dislikes while removing parliament’s ability to overcome a presidential “super veto” (teague 2020, 324). grigoriev has noted that while the amendment appears redundant since the president controls the duma, it is an effective failsafe in case the opposition should gain a larger representation in parliament (grigoriev 2021, 47). previously, the rcc maintained a balancing act by presenting itself as an effective defence against international encroachment as a quid pro quo for judicial autonomy on other issues. now, the rcc is increasingly being directly employed by the government as an apparatus of power and losing judicial autonomy altogether. the most notorious of the amendments, article 81(3-1) limits presidential terms to two per individual but also resets putin’s clock by nullifying his past presidential terms. this means he could run again for president in 2024 and 2030, potentially extending his term in office until 2036, at which point he will be 84 years old (grigoriev 2021, 28). the constitutional amendments in 2020 have firmly subjugated the rcc under government control, dissolving the prior balancing act and duality between the constitutional regime and the 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 regime of political expediency in russia. the amendments signal a “re-sovietization” of the russian legislature and negates the initial efforts in 1993 to commit to norms of international law, principles of democratization, and constitutional rights and freedoms. the amendments signal a clear disregard of international treaties and laws by subordinating them to the interests of national sovereignty. the president has not only significantly expanded his own powers and influence on all executive branches but has also made it far more difficult to strip him of his immunity once his presidency ends. amended article 93 now requires that in order for a president to be “deprived of immunity,” he must be charged with “high treason or of commission of another serious crime” (article 93(1) of the constitution of the rf 2020). this decision must be passed by a two-thirds majority in the upper house and at least one third vote of the state duma (article 93(2) of the constitution of the rf 2020). the charge must be confirmed by the supreme court as well as concluded by the constitutional court. for context, there have been a sum total of three attempts of impeachment (“two in 1993 under the 1978 constitution of the rsfsr and one in 1999” (mishina, 2020, 99) and in all attempts they never managed to collect enough votes. with the new amendments, the feat would require such an orchestration of government members upon which the president has direct termination control over, it has been rendered impossible, unless the judges, chairpersons, and deputy chairpersons are willing to “[pay] with their posts” (mishina 2020, 92). dissenting opinions by november 2020, the state duma passed amendments to the federal constitutional law “on the constitutional court of the russian federation” to prohibit the publication of dissenting opinions of rcc rulings (state duma committee on state building and legislation 2020). though rcc rulings are passed by a majority vote, individual judges could previously publish dissenting opinions expressing their disagreement in written form. they carry no legal force and are usually added to the case file and published along with the rcc’s final decision. the law does not ban dissenting opinions outright, but they are no longer publicized and will be accessible only in archives and out of the public eye. this carries severe legal consequences as it undermines the independence of the judiciary and undercuts the principles of open justice and pluralism. silencing dissenting opinions also means rcc judgments will appear unanimous should the rcc need to refuse future yukos decisions. amicus curiae on january 28, 2021, the rcc removed paragraph 34.1 on legal organizations and legal academics and scholars providing opinions on cases from their rules of procedure, thus ending the practice of amicus curiae (friends of the court) (rosbiznesconsulting 2021). while legal scholars and independent experts will no longer be able to present opinions to trials of public interest, the rcc is not rejecting opinions from government agencies. this development stands in stark contrast to the past, when in spite of protest from putin’s lawyers, rcc judges would request amicus curiae submissions on politically sensitive cases from ngos that the government had attempted to silence politically (trochev and solomon 2018, 201). former constitutional court judge tamara morshchakova noted how the regulations on amicus curiae reflected the readiness of the rcc to take into account views on issues of public importance and recognize citizen participation in state affairs. she noted that the court is now holding closed sessions and denying trial participants access to relevant evidence and case materials without justification. access to forensic information is also becoming increasingly restricted (shturma 2021). the removal of amicus curiae only strengthens this process of restricting citizen participation and access to legal proceedings of public 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 interest. legal scholars agree that this development is unnecessary, seriously harms the credibility of the rcc, and cements the perception of the rcc as a vehicle of the government (rights in russia 2021; nagornaia 2021). conclusion in conclusion, the constitutional changes have transformed the rcc’s relationship with the russian presidency. designed to strengthen domestic defences of national sovereignty against international encroachment, the constitutional changes have offset the rcc’s balancing act of judicial pragmatism with the state by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. among the possible reasons behind these changes are the yukos trials. although trochev and solomon convincingly argued that the rcc has thus far maintained authoritarian constitutionalism in russia by navigating a balancing act and catering to government needs in order to exercise limited judicial autonomy, that balancing act has now been offset by the recent constitutional changes. the new amendments and constitutional changes have removed the necessary checks and balances which allow for judicial autonomy of the rcc by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. in particular, the changes directly countermand the efficacy of the rcc in its balancing act by reducing their efficiency, removing their ability to publish dissent, and empowering the rcc to function as a vehicle of the government. without an independent judiciary and clear separation of powers between branches of state governance, the balancing act has been nullified. this bodes severe consequences for the rule of law in russia and threatens the constitutional rights and freedoms of russian citizens and private enterprises. the extent to which russia has successfully dodged the yukos ruling and neutralized rcc judicial autonomy has severe implications for the effectiveness of human rights advocacy and state accountability in international tribunals. this study on the constitutional changes and eradication of authoritarian constitutionalism in russia raises further questions on what mechanisms are available for rights advocates to seek justice in the face of this challenge. what does this mean for victims who initiate or have initiated legal proceedings against powerful states in international courts and the subsequent enforcement of politically unsavoury rulings? what can stakeholders of international justice do to adjust to these challenges? the growing leniency from the institutional bodies themselves in reaction to the backlash and tightening of state sovereignty raises further questions on the integrity of international legal institutions and their efficacy in rights protection in the future. it is also likely that resistance against international judicial mechanisms and the eradication of rcc judicial autonomy are linked to ngo repression in russia. further study of the functioning of the rcc in russia and reactions to the yukos trials (especially how they will progress beyond the supreme court of the netherlands) could contribute to the dialogue between academics and rights activists on how resistance and backlash affect legal mobilization for rights advocates in civil society and the legitimacy of international human rights systems. 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 references aksenova, marina, and iryna marchuk. 2018. “reinventing or rediscovering international law? the russian constitutional court’s uneasy dialogue with the european court of human rights.” international journal of constitutional law 16 (4): 1322–46. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moy088. anchugov and gladkov v. russia. 2013. no. 11157/04 and 15162/05, echr. bowring, bill. 2020. “russia and the european convention (or court) of human rights: the end?” revue québécoise de droit international (december): 201–18. https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rqdi/2020-rqdi06138/1078537ar.pdf . carothers, thomas. 2002. “the end of the transition paradigm.” journal of democracy 13 (1): 5–21. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0003. chernykh, lucy. 2011. “profit or politics? understanding renationalizations in russia.” journal of corporate finance 17 (5): 1237–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.009. crouch, melissa. 2020. “pre-emptive constitution-making: authoritarian constitutionalism and the military in myanmar.” law & society review 54 (2): 487–515. https://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12471. davis, dennis m. 2019. “authoritarian constitutionalism: the south african experience.” in authoritarian constitutionalism, edited by helena alviar garcía and günter frankenberg, 57–75. cheltenham: edward elgar publishing. https://www-elgaronlinecom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/view/edcoll/9781788117845/9781788117845.00008.xm l. diamond, larry. 2002. “elections without democracy: thinking about hybrid regimes.” journal of democracy 13 (2): 21–35. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0025. european commission for democracy through law (venice commission). 2020. “opinion on the draft amendments to the constitution (as signed by the president of the russian federation on 14 march 2020) related to the execution in the russian federation of decisions by the european court of human rights." https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdlad(2020)009-e. ———. 2021. russian federation constitution. https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-the-russianfederation-en/1680a1a237. ———. 2016. “russian federation judgment no. 12-п/2016 of 19 april 2016 of the constitutional court.” https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdlref(2016)033-e. "federal'nyĭ zakon o poluchenii ks prava priznavat' resheniia mezhdunarodnykh sudov neispolnimymi. federal'nyĭ zakon o vnesenii izmeniniĭ v fz 'o konstitutsionnom sude rossiĭskoĭ federatsii'" [federal law on the constitutional court obtaining the right to recognize decisions of international courts as unenforceable. the federal act on amending the federal act 'on the constitutional court of the russian federation']. 2015. rossiĭskaia gazeta. https://rg.ru/2015/12/15/ks-site-dok.html. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moy088 https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rqdi/2020-rqdi06138/1078537ar.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.009 https://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12471 https://www-elgaronline-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/view/edcoll/9781788117845/9781788117845.00008.xml https://www-elgaronline-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/view/edcoll/9781788117845/9781788117845.00008.xml https://www-elgaronline-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/view/edcoll/9781788117845/9781788117845.00008.xml https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0025 https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2020)009-e https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2020)009-e https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-the-russian-federation-en/1680a1a237 https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-the-russian-federation-en/1680a1a237 https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ref(2016)033-e https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ref(2016)033-e https://rg.ru/2015/12/15/ks-site-dok.html 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 grigoriev, ivan s. 2021. “what changes for the constitutional court with the new russian constitution?” russian politics 6 (1): 27–49. https://doi.org/10.30965/2451892100601003. gustafson, thane. 2012. wheel of fortune. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. https://www-degruytercom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/document/doi/10.4159/harvard.9780674068018/html. hendley, kathryn. 2017. everyday law in russia. ithaca: cornell university press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docid=4813218. hirst v. the united kingdom. 2005. (no. 2), no. 74025/01, echr 681. isachenkov, vladimir. 2020. “putin fast-tracks effort to extend his rule in russia.” associated press news, january 16, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-newsrussia-constitutions-business-8a93f5457f64b46fc3a4d142c6478198. isiksel, turkuler. 2013. “between text and context: turkey’s tradition of authoritarian constitutionalism.” international journal of constitutional law 11 (3): 702–26. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mot024. kalinichenko, paul, and dimitry vladimirovich kochenov. 2021. “amendments to the 1993 constitution of the russian federation concerning international law (2020).” international legal materials 60 (2): 341–46. https://doi.org/10.1017/ilm.2021.10. khalikova, yulia. 2020. “russia’s censored judges.” riddle russia, december 4, 2020. https://www.ridl.io/en/russia-s-censored-judges/. kornya, anastasia. 2017. "otkaz ot vypolneniia reshenii espch ne stanet reguliarnoĭ praktikoĭ" [refusal to comply with ecthr decisions will not become a regular practice]. vedomosti, january 20, 2017. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/01/20/673787-otkazreshenii-espch. krimmer, maren. 2020. “the yukos arbitration saga and russia’s constitutional amendments.” juridica international 29: 86–94. https://juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2020_29_86.pdf. levitsky, steven, and lucan a. way. 2010. competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the cold war (problems of international politics). cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511781353. ———. 2002. “elections without democracy: the rise of competitive authoritarianism.” journal of democracy 13 (2): 51–65. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0026. mälksoo, lauri. 2021. “international law and the 2020 amendments to the russian constitution.” american journal of international law 115 (1): 78–93. https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.87. ———. 2016. “russia’s constitutional court defies the european court of human rights: constitutional court of the russian federation judgment of 14 july 2015, no 21п/2015.” european constitutional law review 12 (2): 377–95. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1574019616000237. marchuk, iryna. 2020. “powerful states and international law: changing narratives and power https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00601003 https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00601003 https://www-degruyter-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/document/doi/10.4159/harvard.9780674068018/html https://www-degruyter-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/document/doi/10.4159/harvard.9780674068018/html http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docid=4813218 https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-russia-constitutions-business-8a93f5457f64b46fc3a4d142c6478198 https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-russia-constitutions-business-8a93f5457f64b46fc3a4d142c6478198 https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mot024 https://doi.org/10.1017/ilm.2021.10 https://www.ridl.io/en/russia-s-censored-judges/ https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/01/20/673787-otkaz-reshenii-espch https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/01/20/673787-otkaz-reshenii-espch https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511781353 https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0026 https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.87 https://doi.org/10.1017/s1574019616000237 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 struggles in international courts.” uc davis journal of international law and policy 26 (1): 65–97. mishina, ekaterina. 2020. “how putin’s constitutional amendments affect the judiciary.” institute of modern russia, august 4, 2020. https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/3147-howputin%e2%80%99s-constitutional-amendments-affect-the-judiciary. ———. 2020. the long shadows of the soviet past: a picture of judicial reforms in the transition era. moscow: liberal mission foundation. https://liberal.ru/wpcontent/uploads/legacy/files/articles/7689/the_long_shadows_of_the_soviet_past_final. pdf. nagornaia, marina. 2021. "konstitutsionnyĭ sud otkazalsia ot instituta amicus curiae" [the constitutional court abandons the institute amicus curiae]. advokatskaia gazeta, february 3, 2021. https://www.advgazeta.ru/novosti/konstitutsionnyy-sud-otkazalsya-ot-institutaamicus-curiae/. newton, scott. 2019. “plus ça change…the riddle of all central asian constitutions.” in authoritarian constitutionalism, edited by helena alviar garcía and günter frankenberg, 209–39. cheltenham: edward elgar publishing. oao neftyanaya kompaniya yukos v russia. 2014. no. 14902/04, echr. organisation for economic co-operation and development. 2006. oecd economic surveys: russian federation 2006. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/eco_surveysrus-2006-en. ———. 2014. oecd economic surveys: russian federation 2013. https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-rus-2013-en. palombino, fulvio maria. 2019. “introduction.” in duelling for supremacy: international law vs. national fundamental principles, edited by fulvio maria palombino, 1–5. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108601245.001. partlett, william, and mikhail krasnov. 2019. “russia’s non-transformative constitutional founding.” european constitutional law review 15 (4): 644–67. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1574019619000403. pichl, maximilian. 2019. “constitution of false prophecies: the illiberal transformation of hungary.” in authoritarian constitutionalism, edited by helena alviar garcía and günter frankenberg, 240–64. cheltenham, uk: edward elgar publishing. popova, maria. 2017. “putin-style ‘rule of law’ & the prospects for change.” daedalus 146 (2): 64–75. https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00435. posner, richard a. 1995. overcoming law. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. "postanovlenie konstitutsionnogo suda rossiĭskoĭ federatsii ot 14 iiulia 2015 no. 21-p g. sanktpeterburg 'po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti polozheniĭ stat'i 1 federal'nogo zakona 'o ratifikatsii konventsii o zashchite prav cheloveka i osnovnykh svobod i protokolov k neĭ', punktov 1 i 2 stat'i 32 federal'nogo zakona 'o mezhdunarodnykh dogovorakh rossiĭskoĭ federatsii', chasteĭ pervoĭ i chetvertoĭ stat'i 11, punkta 4 chasti chetvertoĭ stat'i 392 grazhdanskogo protsessual'nogo kodeksa rossiĭskoĭ federatsii, chasteĭ 1 i 4 stat'i 13, punkta 4 chasti 3 stat'i 311 arbitrazhnogo protsessual'nogo kodeksa rossiĭskoĭ federatsii, chasteĭ 1 i 4 stat'i 15, punkta 4 chasti 1 stat'i 350 kodeksa administrativnogo https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/3147-how-putin%e2%80%99s-constitutional-amendments-affect-the-judiciary https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/3147-how-putin%e2%80%99s-constitutional-amendments-affect-the-judiciary https://liberal.ru/wp-content/uploads/legacy/files/articles/7689/the_long_shadows_of_the_soviet_past_final.pdf https://liberal.ru/wp-content/uploads/legacy/files/articles/7689/the_long_shadows_of_the_soviet_past_final.pdf https://liberal.ru/wp-content/uploads/legacy/files/articles/7689/the_long_shadows_of_the_soviet_past_final.pdf https://www.advgazeta.ru/novosti/konstitutsionnyy-sud-otkazalsya-ot-instituta-amicus-curiae/ https://www.advgazeta.ru/novosti/konstitutsionnyy-sud-otkazalsya-ot-instituta-amicus-curiae/ https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/eco_surveys-rus-2006-en https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/eco_surveys-rus-2006-en https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-rus-2013-en https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108601245.001 https://doi.org/10.1017/s1574019619000403 https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00435 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 sudoproizvodstva rossiĭskoĭ federatsii i punkta 2 chasti chetvertoĭ stat'i 413 ugolovnoprotsessual'nogo kodeksa rossiĭskoĭ federatsii v sviazi s zaprosom gruppy deputatov gosudarstvennoĭ dumy'" [the decision of the constitutional court of the russian federation of july 14, 2015, № 21-п in saint petersburg "re the judgment on the constitutionality of section 1 of the federal act 'on the ratification of the convention on the protection of human rights and basic freedoms and protocols,' paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 32 of the federal act 'on international agreements of the russian federation,' part 1 and 4 of section 11, paragraph 4 of part 4 of section 392 of the code of civil procedure of the russian federation, part 1 and 4 of section 13, paragraph 4 of part 3 of section 311 of the code of arbitration procedure of the russian federation, part 1 and 3 of section 15, paragraph 4 of part 1 of section 350 of the code of the administrative legal proceeding of the russian federation and paragraph 2 of part 4 of section 413 of the code of criminal procedure of the russian federation initiated by a group of members of the state duma]. rossiĭskaya gazeta. https://rg.ru/documents/2015/07/27/ks-dok.html. "postanovlenie konstitutsionnogo suda rossiĭskoĭ federatsii ot 19.01.2017 № 1-п po delu o razreshenii voprosa o vozmozhnosti ispolneniia v sootvetstvii s konstitutsieĭ rossiĭskoĭ federatsii postanovleniia evropeĭskogo suda po pravam cheloveka ot 31 iiulia 2014 goda po delu 'oao 'neftianaia kompaniia 'iukos' protiv rossii' v sviazi s zaprosom ministerstva iustitsii rossiĭskoĭ federatsii" [the decision of the constitutional court of the russian federation of 19.01.2017 no. 1-п regarding the resolution of the question of the possibility to execute in accordance with the constitution of the russian federation the judgment of the european court of human rights of july 31, 2014 in the case of 'oao 'oil company 'yukos' v. russia concerning the request of the ministry of justice of the russian federation]. 2017. ofitsial'nyĭ internet-portal pravovoĭ informatsii. http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/view/0001201701200011. rosbiznesconsulting. 2021. "ks reshil otkazat'sia ot instituta 'druzej suda'" [the constitutional court decided to abandon the institute 'friends of the court']. february 4, 2021. https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/601b7c7d9a7947e57550f040. rights in russia. 2021. “constitutional court decides to do away with the practice of ‘amicus curiae.’” february 23, 2021. http://www.rightsinrussia.org/amicus-curiae/. sakwa, richard. 2020. the putin paradox. london, uk: bloomsbury publishing. schedler, andreas. 2006. electoral authoritarianism. boulder: lynne rienner publishers. schmitter, philippe c. 1994. “dangers and dilemmas of democracy.” journal of democracy 5 (2): 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1994.0036. sherwin, emily. 2020. “russian parliament fast-tracks putin’s constitutional changes.” deutsche welle, january 23, 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/russian-parliament-fast-tracksputins-constitutional-changes/a-52106277. shturma, iana. 2021. "konstitutsionnyĭ sud vybral odinochestvo" [the constitutional court chose solitude]. gazeta.ru, february 4, 2021. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2021/02/04/13466756.shtml. sim, li-chen. 2008. the rise and fall of privatization in the russian oil industry. london, uk: palgrave macmillan. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docid=455418. smirnova, maria. 2019. “russia.” in duelling for supremacy, edited by fulvio maria https://rg.ru/documents/2015/07/27/ks-dok.html http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/view/0001201701200011 https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/601b7c7d9a7947e57550f040 http://www.rightsinrussia.org/amicus-curiae/ https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1994.0036 https://www.dw.com/en/russian-parliament-fast-tracks-putins-constitutional-changes/a-52106277 https://www.dw.com/en/russian-parliament-fast-tracks-putins-constitutional-changes/a-52106277 https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2021/02/04/13466756.shtml http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docid=455418 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 palombino, 1st edition, 297–319. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108601245.016. ———. 2015. “russian constitutional court affirms russian constitution’s supremacy over ecthr decisions.” ejil: talk!, july 15, 2015. https://www.ejiltalk.org/russianconstitutional-court-affirms-russian-constitutions-supremacy-over-ecthr-decisions/. state duma committee on state building and legislation. 2020. “o vnesenii izmeneniĭ v federal'nyĭ konstitutsionnyĭ zakon 'o konstitutsionnom sude rossiĭskoĭ federatsii' [v chasti privedeniia v sootvetstvie s polozheniiami konstitutsii rossiĭskoĭ federatsii)" [on amendments to the federal constitutional law 'on the constitutional court of the russian federation' (in terms of bringing it in line with the provisions of the constitution of the russian federation)]. https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/1024643-7. teague, elizabeth. 2020. “russia’s constitutional reforms of 2020.” russian politics 5 (3): 301– 28. https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00503003. the russian federation v. veteran petroleum limited, yukos universal limited, hulley enterprises limited. 2016. no. c/09/477160 / ha za 15-1, c/09/477162 / ha za 15-2, c/09/481619 / ha za 15-112. the hague district court. tompson, william. 2005. “putting yukos in perspective.” post-soviet affairs 21 (2): 159–81. https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.21.2.159. trochev, alexei, and peter h. solomon. 2018. “authoritarian constitutionalism in putin’s russia: a pragmatic constitutional court in a dual state.” communist and post-communist studies 51 (3): 201–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.06.002. tushnet, mark. 2015. “authoritarian constitutionalism.” cornell law review 100 (2): 391–462. united states department of state – bureau of economic and business affairs. 2021. “2021 investment climate statements: russia." https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-investmentclimate-statements/russia/. veteran petroleum limited, yukos universal limited, hulley enterprises limited v. the russian federation. 2020. no. 200.197.079/01. the hague court of appeal. voeten, erik. 2020. “populism and backlashes against international courts.” perspectives on politics 18 (2): 407–22. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592719000975. yukos universal limited (isle of man) v. the russian federation. 2014. no. aa 227. permanent court of arbitration. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108601245.016 https://www.ejiltalk.org/russian-constitutional-court-affirms-russian-constitutions-supremacy-over-ecthr-decisions/ https://www.ejiltalk.org/russian-constitutional-court-affirms-russian-constitutions-supremacy-over-ecthr-decisions/ https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/1024643-7 https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00503003 https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.21.2.159 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.06.002 https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-investment-climate-statements/russia/ https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-investment-climate-statements/russia/ https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592719000975 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 the economic successes and sources of discontent in east central europe1 rachel a. epstein2 university of denver abstract by some measures, the european union’s eastern enlargement, and the attendant securitization of east central europe through membership in the north atlantic treaty organization, have brought significant economic and welfare benefits to the former soviet satellites or republics that have joined these organizations. all of their economies are considerably larger than in 1989. foreign investment has helped fuel significant growth in the region, and financial linkages between east and west had a stabilizing influence during and after the us financial crisis of 2008-09. but economic success in absolute terms has not prevented a sense of disappointment from settling over the region, nor has it forestalled an illiberal backlash in a number of countries, which has had economic, political, and in some cases ethno-populist dimensions. this article examines some of the main economic trajectories around growth, consumption, investment, and finance. it explains why, despite numerous positive measures, both economic and political liberalism are under intensifying scrutiny. growing inequality within countries, as well as continuing inequality – including power disparities between east and west europe – have fueled discontent with the terms on which many east central european states have integrated into the eu. 1 the author would like to thank anushka bose and chuck aoki for their research assistance on this project. 2 rachel a. epstein is a professor at the josef korbel school of international studies at the university of denver. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 introduction east central europe (ece) has historically been the seat of major empires. it has also been the source of cultural, spiritual, and political innovation. but ece has also been the site of foreign domination and occupation, shifting borders, forced population movements, diaspora settlement and oppression, in addition to the most brutal and comprehensive forms of ethnic cleansing. in the 20th century alone, events in munich, yalta, and katyń were illustrative of the ways in which the then still relatively new nation-states of the region fell victim to foreign political manipulation, ally abandonment, and mass atrocities. of course, every country in the world faces limits on its sovereignty. but emerging from world war ii, such limits in ece were extreme; in every country except yugoslavia, soviet takeovers and western acquiescence made a mockery of alleged statehood conferred in the aftermath of world war i (mazower 1998; rothschild and wingfield 2000). the open-door policies of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and the european union (eu) in the 1990s represented a radical break with the bleak history depicted above. nato enlargement, beginning in 1999, and eu enlargement, beginning in 2004, gave the relatively small east central european states an unprecedented opportunity to shape their own political trajectories and international allegiances, and a significant voice within two of the world’s most powerful international institutions. membership in nato and the eu enhanced these countries’ political power through, depending on the organization, voting rights, resources, institutional representation, and security guarantees. debates about the true motivations and interests at play driving enlargement notwithstanding (schimmelfennig 2001; reiter 2001; moravcsik and vachudova 2003; epstein 2008), there is little doubt that the post-1989, post-enlargement phase of europe’s evolution is more democratic, peaceful, representative, and economically open for ece than any previous transnational political or institutional arrangement. the focus of this article then is to explain why, despite demonstrably enhanced political efficacy as well as wealth in ece, there is nevertheless widespread skepticism of the same political and economic liberalism that underpinned ece’s recent dramatic reversal of fortunes. more specifically, the analysis in this article highlights the degree to which income levels between east and west europe have converged, foreign investment has fueled growth, and financial integration has curbed volatility. in each of these areas, despite a seeming increase in equality, and closer connections between east and west europe, there are still lingering disparities, both within and between countries. these disparities provide justification for economically nationalist and euroskeptic narratives. while economic inequality and dependence are not the only issues that have contributed to the rise of some increasingly authoritarian forms of governance in ece, economic dissatisfaction has been an aggravating factor. very often, scholarly work examining developments in ece focuses on socio-political factors affecting the region (e.g. trencsényi 2014; vachudova forthcoming in 2020). factors include ethno-nationalist mobilization, rhetoric and policies against migrants and asylum-seekers, curbs on checks and balances among democratic institutions, and ongoing corruption under the guise of purported corruption elimination efforts. the argument here, by contrast, is that underlying economic conditions in ece provide a foundation for illiberal and populist politicians, particularly as those conditions reinforce power disparities between east and west europe, as well as power and wealth differentials within countries. if at least some populations “evaluate the economy through the prism of identity, relying less on traditional measures like economic growth, social spending, or unemployment and more on perceptions of fairness and concerns about keeping 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 outsiders away” (vachudova 2019, 698), politicians can plausibly use some of the underlying economic conditions outlined in this article as evidence of east central european victimhood. to be clear, majorities in the eu’s new member states (nms) strongly favor eu membership, even as pluralities, if not majorities, have also elevated political parties that are highly critical of eu policies. at the same time, the analysis here argues that ece’s continuing economic subordination, stemming from a long legacy of relative under-development compared to the west, has contributed to this paradox. income convergence measures of income convergence that correct for purchasing power parity show that both the transition that began in 1989, and the eu’s enlargement in 2004, correlate with strong output convergence between eastern and western europe. however, measures of absolute output in ece lagged significantly behind the ‘old eu-15’. these different measures have affected lived experiences of east central european populations; accordingly, they impact who can take full advantage of the eu’s single market (or opportunities in the global economy). a country’s share of absolute output is a more accurate measure of power within the eu or larger economy than gdp adjusted for purchasing power. it is by this former measure that ece countries lag significantly behind many of their western counterparts. according to measures that adjust for purchasing power parity across countries, eu enlargement has generated strong income convergence between ece and the eu 28, as demonstrated in table 1. several developments are of note here. first, since 2004, every country except slovenia has gained ground vis-à-vis the eu as a whole. the us financial crisis and the eurozone crisis that followed were particularly devastating for slovenia, which explains its relative stasis compared to many other nms. second, poland, romania, slovakia, and the baltic states stand out for having moved particularly rapidly in the direction of convergence. third, ece countries are no longer the poorest as a group in the eu. the us, european and global financial crises moved greece and portugal closer to the bottom of the eu 28. in 2019, the czech republic surpassed spain according to the gdp per capita adjusted for purchasing power. one should note that these are the convergence statistics that the european commission and its attendant statistics bureaus prefer to publicize. they not only show economic progress, but do so in a way that takes into the account the cost of living across countries. in that sense, correcting for purchasing power parity is a good measure of relative welfare. even if the polish złoty or the hungarian forint are volatile or weak compared to other major currencies, including the euro, the table below nevertheless measures how far the currency goes within any given polity or economy, irrespective of that volatility or weakness. from a welfare perspective, the eu can convincingly argue that the eu is in fact a “convergence machine” (world bank 2012). 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 table 1: east central european gdp per capita in purchasing power standards (eu 28 = 100) 2004 2007 2011 2013 2017 bulgaria 35 41 45 46 49 croatia 57 61 60 59 62 czech republic 79 84 83 83 89 estonia 55 68 69 75 79 hungary 62 61 65 67 68 latvia 47 60 56 62 67 lithuania 50 61 65 73 78 poland 49 53 64 67 70 romania 34 42 51 54 63 slovak republic 56 67 73 76 76 slovenia 86 87 83 81 85 data source: eurostat, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ gdp_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_price_level_indices. note that bulgaria and romania joined the eu in 2007 and croatia joined in 2013. all of the other countries depicted here joined in the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004. income convergence can also be measured in absolute terms, as demonstrated in table 2. aside from the fact that table 2 does not adjust for purchasing power parity, it also compares the nms to the eu’s older 15 member states, rather than to the eu 28. both of these differences in measurement provide a more sobering assessment of ece’s convergence with the west. while table 1 is a good measure of relative welfare in various eu countries, table 2 is a better measure of absolute economic output and therefore of relative power in the eu. absolute output reveals who can readily travel or seek education abroad; it also identifies which countries are more likely to suffer from brain drain, and, on the other side, which countries are likely to be able to afford other countries’ assets and to hire their workers. whereas poland went from 49 percent of the eu 28 to 70 percent by 2017 when corrected for purchasing power, in absolute terms the country moved from just over 18 percent of the old eu 15 average to approximately 30 percent. these statistics reveal that easterners and westerners can avail themselves of the eu’s common market to significantly varying degrees – whether one is considering business, travel, or educational opportunities. not surprisingly, brain drain has often been a phenomenon of young, skilled people moving from east to west, while foreign investment has flowed from west to east. while both trends potentially lead to economic and power equalization over time (ebrd 2009), there is no guarantee that they will – particularly if relative deprivation in the east hampers innovation and human capital formation that would otherwise help build the local economy (bohle and greskovits 2019). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/gdp_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_price_level_indices https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/gdp_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_price_level_indices 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 table 2: east central european gdp per capita as a percentage of the old eu-15 average (not adjusted for purchasing power parity) 2004 2007 2011 2013 2017 bulgaria 8.94 11.76 14.99 15. 65 17.88 croatia 24.92 28.14 29.47 28.15 29.08 czech republic 30.71 37.37 43.08 41.45 44.26 estonia 23.55 34.46 35.37 39.73 42.28 hungary 27.76 28.96 29.4 28.25 30.91 latvia 16.88 29.12 27.93 31.16 33.89 lithuania 17.85 25.55 29.12 32.54 36.25 poland 18.22 23.87 28.18 28.5 30.13 romania 9.58 16.81 17.6 19.81 23.51 slovak republic 28.6 33.34 36.94 37.67 38.26 slovenia 46.64 50.15 50.54 48.63 51.28 data source: world bank, available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd?end= 2017&locations=gr-pt-de-at-fr-be-fi-lu-se-gb-nl-es-dk-ie-it-lt-pl-ro-sk-si-bg-hr-cz-ee-hulv&start=2017&view=bar even as absolute income in ece has trailed its west european counterparts, consumption in ece relative to gdp has rivaled that of the old eu-15 (deuber 2011). as with measures of income, there are competing interpretations of what increasing consumption means, with both supporters and detractors of increasing consumption in ece. on the one hand, expanding consumption certainly signals elevated welfare (farkas 2013). on the other, consumption in the current period does not contribute to growth in later periods unless it generates additional income or reduces current expenses. if current account deficits are financing consumption, as was the case in the runup to the eurozone crisis, there is potential for volatility and lost opportunity for productive investment (world bank 2012; jacoby 2014). andrew janos had long argued that later industrialization and development in ece compared to the west resulted in increased demand for consumption at the expense of financing underlying productive capacity (janos 2000; epstein 2014a). slow income convergence in absolute terms, in conjunction with relatively high consumption in ece, has been one source of dissatisfaction with east central european growth models; this pattern does not necessarily presage full convergence (galgóczi and drahokoupil 2017). frustration in ece with income inequality, uneven access to educational and business opportunities in the eu, and perceived economic subordination are directly observable in the policies and rhetoric of many east central european countries. in poland, hungary, romania, slovenia, the czech republic, and slovakia, policy-makers have variously tried to domesticate foreign-owned services and industry and have imposed taxes targeted at foreign-controlled sectors. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd?end=2017&locations=gr-pt-de-at-fr-be-fi-lu-se-gb-nl-es-dk-ie-it-lt-pl-ro-sk-si-bg-hr-cz-ee-hu-lv&start=2017&view=bar https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd?end=2017&locations=gr-pt-de-at-fr-be-fi-lu-se-gb-nl-es-dk-ie-it-lt-pl-ro-sk-si-bg-hr-cz-ee-hu-lv&start=2017&view=bar https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd?end=2017&locations=gr-pt-de-at-fr-be-fi-lu-se-gb-nl-es-dk-ie-it-lt-pl-ro-sk-si-bg-hr-cz-ee-hu-lv&start=2017&view=bar 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 at the same time, they have cultivated political loyalty among formerly independent institutions such as central banks. they have developed industrial policy apparatuses capable of supporting indigenous innovation in the service of domestic investment and ownership, with the goal of moving domestic production up the value chain. to be sure, rhetoric has at times been more fulsome than policy has been effective. nevertheless, the re-orientation away from economic liberalism and unbridled openness that has occurred since the 2008-09 us and then the european financial crises has been notable (see, for example, johnson and barnes 2015; appel and orenstein 2018; greskovits 2019; naczyk 2019; piroska and mérő 2020). foreign direct investment developments with respect to foreign direct investment (fdi) into ece have similarly yielded decidedly mixed results, with some unanticipated political consequences. fdi has led to increases in some wages, technical upgrading in select firms, and overall increased economic output in ece. but because of the absolute output differentials depicted in the previous section, inward investment into ece has been far larger than outward investment. economic and power asymmetries are the result. in particular, the west has been able to avail itself of lower production costs in the east (but not vice versa). as such, profit-making, managerial control, innovation, and therefore power have accrued to western countries more readily than to eastern ones. fdi has been large-scale, welfare enhancing, and transformative in terms of technical upgrading. bohle and greskovits argue that fdi created a ‘manufacturing miracle’ in much of ece (2012), while medve-bálint has pointed out that in the aughts and after, ece was receiving more fdi than brazil, china, india, russia, or mexico (2014). bruszt and langbein (forthcoming) argue that eu membership in connection with the drive for fdi built unprecedented state capacity in ece. in all, one can argue that fdi has contributed to more wealth, improved welfare, and increased international linkages for ece – exactly what had been hoped for by proponents of eastern enlargement. but fdi has also generated inequality within countries, cultivated east central european dependence on western investors, and failed to create significant innovation capacity in the nms. while even the most illiberal leaders in ece have been loath to challenge manufacturing fdi (though there have been more explicit challenges with respect to fdi in finance), economic nationalism and development initiatives in ece respond in direct ways to the dissatisfaction spawned by fdi’s power asymmetries. power asymmetries are manifest in the ‘dependent capitalism’ in ece that emerged in the wake of state-socialism’s collapse. the origins of this asymmetry rest in part in the huge wealth disparities between east and west europe by 1989, but also in the industrialization and broadbased education of the communist regimes (nölke and vliegenthart 2009; bohle and greskovits 2012). low-wage but highly educated (in global comparative terms) workers attracted fdi to ece across all economic sectors (medve-bálint 2014). key features of the dependent capitalist model included an emphasis on cost competition, not just through low wages, but also through favorable tax treatment for multinational corporations (mncs) (appel 2011; galgóczi and drahokoupil 2017; appel and orenstein 2018). research and development, including design and engineering processes, were concentrated in west european countries from which the fdi flowed. fdi financing was also controlled by foreign owners – either through firm financing or through the majority foreign-owned banking sectors in most of ece (epstein 2008; nölke and vliegenthart 2009). 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 west european fdi, while bringing jobs, capital, and some skills and technology upgrades, also posed risks for ece. for one, the vertical character of investment, with most high value added and financing functions concentrated in west european headquarters, meant that eastern populations were working in manufacturing facilities focused on ‘downstream’ assembly and processing, while technological skill transfers were limited (nölke and vliegenthart 2009). second, while the direct effects of fdi were strong for firms in ece on the receiving end, the indirect effects for domestic sectors were much weaker (hanousek et al 2011, 20-1). domestically owned firms in ece were on balance not able to achieve commensurate competitiveness with their foreign-owned counterparts (farkas 2013, 16-17). the cost competition model predicated on low taxes and low wages also limited the extent to which ece could spend more on skills, training, and research and development (r&d). that same cost competition model also meant that ece’s comparative advantage was at constant risk of erosion, since higher rates of economic growth in the periphery were pushing wages up over time (imf 2013). while “nationally owned businesses would be concerned about these long-term developments” of low levels of spending on training and research, as well as declining comparative advantage, “western headquarters do not care much about these tendencies, given their potential to relocate production in the long term” (nölke and vliegenthart 2009, 687). german automotive fdi into the visegrád 4 (v4)3 confirms arguments above about the partially disempowering effects of the kinds of fdi that have penetrated ece on a large scale. by 2012, germany had 20 percent of the global market in passenger cars. at the same time, approximately 5.5 million cars were produced in germany (a figure that had remained essentially constant for over a decade), while german firms manufactured over seven million cars elsewhere. foreign production of german cars registered a three-fold increase between 1992 and 2011. approximately three million units a year were produced in ece in 2012 (imf 2013, 13, box 1). for car production in ece, german firms dominated (pavlínek 2015, 212). german automotive fdi was organized according to “vertical specialization” or “fragmentation of production” in which lead firms outsourced aspects of production, processing, and assembly to gain efficiencies (imf 2013; gerőcs and pinkasz 2019). in practice in ece, vertical specialization referred to activities “under which germany exports intermediates that are further processed in downstream facilities in the eu, including the ce4 [referring to the visegrád 4] and then reexported directly or indirectly outside the eu to the rest of the world” (imf 2013, 12, first background note). thus, highly specialized activities, including design, engineering, and nonstandardized production took place in germany, while ece provided assembly platforms for semistandardized industrial components. in addition, as german car producers innovated in electric engines in the expectation that combustion would eventually be eclipsed, more of the standardized production of newer versions of older models with combustion engines was re-located to ece. higher standardization of production in lower-end models meant decreasing investment per unit produced and increasing pressure on returns in ece (gerőcs and pinkasz 2017). workers in investing versus receiving countries have experienced fdi’s power asymmetries directly. whereas in a coordinated market economy like germany’s, wage and benefits bargaining for workers takes place on a sectoral level in connection with a highly centralized national system of industrial relations (hall and soskice 2001), the cost competition model in the v4 depends on firm-level negotiations. this has created competitive and insecure labor markets in ece, which have moderated wage inflation. over the same period in which germany’s foreign auto 3 the visegrád 4 refers to poland, hungary, slovakia and the czech republic. 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 manufacturing has increased, the proportion of unskilled workers in germany has declined and unemployment has remained low. given their broad participation in industrial relations, german labor unions have often willingly agreed to the re-location of lower-end production and assembly to ece. german jobs lost in highly standardized manufacturing have been replaced with more positions in specialized production, engineering, and design at higher training and compensation levels. germany’s global export power, reflected in successive years of current account and trade surpluses, depends on its own wage restraint (jacoby 2017), but german wages and purchasing power remain much higher than equivalent measures in ece. in its own assessment, the imf highlighted the extent to which fdi, technology transfer to ece, and knowledge-intensive manufacturing there had increased east central european technological sophistication and contributed to income convergence between east and west europe. however, it was probably premature to conclude, as the imf’s german interlocutors did, that “[p]roduction within a vertically specialized chain is not a ‘zero sum game’” (imf 2013, 14). in a wide-ranging dialogue between imf researchers and policy-makers and industrialists from the v4 and germany in june 2013, three points about regional value chains highlighted power disparities. first was the “lively debate” among participants about whether “export growth in knowledge-intensive sectors – especially automobile production – really represented technology transfer and human capital development, or simply entailed low-skilled assembly jobs within a high-tech industry” (imf 2013, 14). since the imf researchers themselves pointed to the precarious position of ece in those value chains under conditions of income convergence, and the need for east central european firms to develop their own supply chains to sell intermediate goods downstream “following the chinese example”, even defenders of the fdi model saw a need for more innovative capacity in ece (imf 2013, 15). a second indication that relative gains mattered, and that germany had the upper hand, was the german attitude toward labor mobilization in ece. as already noted, germany and its lowercost production chain partners had starkly different industrial relations. german labor unions exercised joint authority (with management) over major business decisions, whereas east central european workers only bargained with their foreign owners at the firm level. the v4 were warned, therefore, that the “potential gains in employment as a result of production spillovers [from german investment] should be kept in mind when considering labor market reforms or during negotiations between industry and labor unions” (imf 2013, 14). third and finally, it was not just labor quiescence that german investors found desirable. even as the imf was recommending more investment in human capital, skills, and innovation in ece, german participants were emphasizing that nothing along those lines was needed at that juncture because “there was no imminent threat to the position” of the v4 in the value chain, “despite narrowing cost differentials” (imf 2013, 14-15). this was akin to the world bank arguing a year earlier that because the european union was a “convergence machine,” the nms did not need a developmental strategy, or to be “ferocious” like their asian counterparts. they needed only to be “disciplined” to attract foreign investment so that economic development and technology transfer could be secured in ece through “osmosis” (world bank 2012, 25). analyses from the imf and the world bank embraced a division of labor between east and west europe through fdi that had provoked considerable skepticism in ece by 2010, if not before. foreign direct investment also often produces the unintended consequence of increased inequality within countries, which has been the case in ece (medve-bálint 2014). not surprisingly, measures of income inequality have increased in ece since the transition began. the gini coefficient, in 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 which zero represents an equal distribution of wealth across a population and one represents wealth concentration in one person, is by no means at the high end for much of ece, with countries such the czech republic, slovakia, and slovenia achieving equal or greater equality than denmark or sweden. these countries were all below the oecd average of .315 in 2015, and significantly below the us (.415 in 2015).4 while east central european countries such as poland, bulgaria, romania, and the baltic states were above the oecd average in 2015, what might be more important than the static comparisons are the trends over time, and the ways in which the sense of rising inequality fuels policies that promise to change the status quo. for much of the transition, for example, from 1995 to 2016, income inequality within the new eu-13 (all of the postcommunist entrants plus malta and cyprus) was on the rise. it was only in 2016 that inequality within these countries begins to abate, driven mostly by inequality declines in poland and romania.5 foreign direct investment has had complex effects in ece that have produced wealth, opportunity, and upgrading alongside subordination and marginalization of groups that have not been direct beneficiaries of foreign capital. the sense of lost opportunity was therefore palpable in some countries – with prime minister viktor orbán railing against “debt slavery” in hungary and former prime minister jan krzysztof bielecki in poland pointing out that “capital has a nationality” (see respectively johnson and barnes 2015; naczyk 2019, 17). in response to perceived dependence, these politicians and others have devised economic programs to limit that dependence, engage in more welfare redistribution to combat some of the inequality-inducing effects of fdi, and increase domestic savings, investment, and innovation. financial integration and foreign bank ownership according to one interpretation, eu enlargement, and ece’s radical economic openness, has generated major gains for both east and west in financial integration and foreign bank ownership. fdi in east central european finance brought resources and expertise. moreover, as documented in a recent study (epstein 2017), ece’s bank funding stability was far stronger than in western europe, precisely because of high levels of foreign bank ownership in the east as opposed to in the west. nevertheless, foreign bank presence has been a politically contentious issue in some nms because of the ways in which domestic bank ownership is perceived to provide greater economic opportunity and autonomy – a privilege that many west european countries maintained for themselves even as western institutions counseled east european countries to privatize their banks with foreign capital (epstein 2008; 2014b). most countries around the world have long discouraged high levels of foreign bank ownership in their domestic markets, preferring to maintain politically susceptible financial institutions in the service of protecting the domestic deposit base, securing credit to the local government and economy, and insulating themselves against foreign political manipulation (pauly 1988; epstein 2017). ece proved a major exception to this trend beginning in the 1990s when international institutional pressure, banking crises, and a dearth of managerial expertise and capital pushed all 4 gini coefficient statistics are from the world bank, available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/si.pov.gini accessed 10 january 2020. 5 zsolt darvas, “this is the state of inequality in europe,” bruegel and the world economic forum, 4 may 2018. available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/european-income-inequality-begins-to-fall-once-again, accessed 10 january 2020. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/si.pov.gini https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/european-income-inequality-begins-to-fall-once-again 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 the post-communist aspirants to the eu except slovenia to privatize the bulk of their banking assets with foreign capital (epstein 2008). ece became the most highly penetrated banking market in the world, with foreign ownership levels in most cases well over half and in some instances approaching 100 percent (see table 3). the biggest investors were from austria, italy, belgium, and france, but banks from portugal, the netherlands, ireland, germany, sweden, norway, denmark, and greece also had a significant presence in the region. table 3: east central europe, new member states of the eu country percentage of foreignowned banks, assets: 2008 and 2013 bulgaria 84 70 croatia (joined the eu in 2013) 91 90 czech republic* 84 85 estonia 98 97 hungary 84 84 latvia 66 65 lithuania 92 93 poland 77 68 romania 88 89 slovakia 99 85 slovenia 31 34 data source: ebrd 2009 and ebrd banking survey for 2013. *source for czech republic is claessens and van horen 2015 because the country exited ebrd programs before this data was collected. while there is debate about the developmental consequences of high levels of foreign bank ownership for ece (ebrd 2009; bonin et al 2014), scholars agree that foreign bank ownership was a stabilizing force for the region during and following the us financial crisis. parent banks in western europe maintained their exposures to ece through the crisis, re-capitalizing their subsidiaries on an ongoing basis. there were no major failures or closures of foreign-owned banks during the crisis, though a number of locally owned or managed banks in ece faced insolvency, requiring emergency nationalization, government bailouts, or closure.6 high levels of foreign bank ownership in ece markets stabilized capital flows and limited fiscal fragility for ece governments (bonin and louie 2016). 6 examples of ece domestic banks that required substantial government assistance or closure included parex bank in latvia, a number of the state-owned banks in slovenia and by 2014, fibank in bulgaria. 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: total banking assets in the nms, 2006-2009 data source: schoenmaker and peek 2014, 6 stabilization due to foreign bank ownership in ece through and after the us financial crisis is surprising in that it contravened analyst expectations and historical experience. reflecting back on the asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, economist robert wade remarked in 2007 that, “no country should let its banking system be taken over by foreign banks.” his reasoning was that “at times of crisis banks rely heavily on their home state and are likely to sacrifice operations in developing countries in order to protect their home base” (wade 2007, 84). wade was not alone in his skepticism of foreign bank behavior in crises. by 2008-9, countless news articles, blog posts, and reports on ece focused on the seemingly dangerous combination of foreign bank ownership, home regulatory pressure, foreign exchange exposure, supervisory prerogatives and escalating uncertainty. paul krugman, a princeton university economist and new york times columnist, published a blog post in october, 2008, equating southeast asia in 1997 to east central europe in 2008.7 neither wade nor his counterparts were exactly wrong. west european banks came under precisely the pressure from home governments that wade specified. the surprise was in the degree to which europe’s transnationalized banks fought back against a national approach to bank rescue and enlisted the support of international institutions to try to preserve their market position and long investment time horizons in ece. the comparison of funding volatility between east and west europe adds still more weight to the argument that europe as a whole should seriously consider banking market openness as part of the solution to financial and currency instability. in this respect, eastern europe is a model for western europe. volatility in cross-border funding among west european eurozone states was far more severe than in ece precisely because foreign bank ownership levels in the west were low. while western europe presented a veneer of financial integration before the crisis due to high levels of cross-border debt, a clear lesson of the crisis is that these flows are prone to retreat behind national 7 see krugman’s blog post from october 31, 2008: https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/eastern-europe2008-southeast-asia-1997/ accessed 20 july 2019. 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2006 2007 2008 2009 total bank assets (2006-2009) bulgaria czech rep. estonia hungary latvia lithuania poland romania slovakia slovenia https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/eastern-europe-2008-southeast-asia-1997/ https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/eastern-europe-2008-southeast-asia-1997/ 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 borders when risk reigns (deuber and epstein 2019). that is exactly what happened. for the eurozone, a west european home bias in lending upended the european central bank’s monetary transmission, compounded downturns, accelerated contagion, and exacerbated bank-state doom loops in which government borrowing costs and bank balance sheets both deteriorated at once (epstein 2017). in ece, by contrast, western banks’ business models made it difficult and costly to indulge a home bias in lending. western bank owners allowed eastern loan-to-deposit ratios in many countries to climb to well over 100 percent. letting subsidiaries fail, while legal, would have damaged relations with host authorities and resulted in existentially threatening losses for those western banks that had spent more than a decade building up mass-market share in the postcommunist world. retreating to small and overbanked markets at home was never an option. this explanation for western banks’ continuing exposures is at odds with the more widely accepted vienna initiative explanation – a voluntary bank rollover agreement orchestrated by a range of international organizations (epstein 2014b; 2017). despite widespread skepticism of ece’s approach to opening its banking markets to foreign entrants in the 1990s and 2000s, both from within the region and outside of it, some distinct advantages have flowed to ece as a consequence. foreign bank acquisition through subsidiaries proved stabilizing through the crisis and contributed to higher credit ratings in the region, and thereby lower borrowing costs (grittersová 2017). foreign owners brought managerial expertise and capital. transnationalized bank ownership also created an interdependence between east and west that made it difficult for western firms to relegate the fortunes of eastern markets to west european economic nationalism. to be sure, foreign banks also brought economic volatility through the funding of credit booms (deuber and epstein 2019) – a source of vulnerability that much of ece has reduced through lower current account deficits. on balance, however, foreignowned banks supported growth and structural cohesion between east and west. why, then, have high levels of foreign bank ownership come under increasing scrutiny since the crisis, with poland and hungary in particular re-asserting much higher levels of domestic control through ownership? as in the other two empirical cases discussed here, income convergence and fdi, the apparent economic successes mask deeper power disparities. if states have traditionally tried to maintain politically susceptible banking sectors in the interest of credit provision, macroeconomic management, crisis response, and power projection, west european states have behaved much more conventionally than their east european counterparts. whereas table 3 shows very high levels of foreign bank ownership in the nms, table 4 shows the extent to which west european eurozone states have restricted foreign entry into their banking markets. 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 table 4: foreign bank ownership in the 15 older eu members country percentage of foreignowned banks, assets: 2008 and 2013 austria 28 26 belgium 14 47 denmark (not in the eurozone) 18 18 finland 84 84 france 6 5 germany 12 13 greece 14 0 ireland 36 36 italy 6 6 luxembourg 95 92 netherlands 2 4 portugal 24 23 spain 2 2 sweden (not in the eurozone) 0 0 united kingdom (not in the eurozone) 18 11 data source: claessens and van horen 2015 the four largest eurozone economies are highlighted because germany, france, italy, and spain have been purposeful about excluding foreign entrants (bini-smaghi 2013; donnelly 2014; goyer and valdivielso del real 2014), as have many other eurozone countries, with the partial exceptions of belgium, finland, and luxembourg (the last of which is a financial center). thus, even if western banks have brought new technology, funding, and improved credit ratings to ece, there is nevertheless the sense in some east central european countries that western investment has been exploitative and/or has resulted in lost economic opportunity. the earlier reference to former polish prime minister jan krzysztof bielecki’s observation that capital always has a nationality is a case in point. naczyk argues that domestic managers at foreign-owned multinational corporations, and particularly at banks, were greatly frustrated by the fact that outof-country headquarters always had final decision-making authority. during the crisis of 2008-9, even if foreign parent bank recapitalization of local subsidiaries continued, local managerial authority was nevertheless curtailed and managerial development was stymied (naczyk 2019). these findings are consistent with earlier research showing both a concern among foreign investors that they limit research and development (r&d) capacity in host countries by keeping innovation capacity at home (nölke and vliegenthart 2009) and the continuing national embeddedness of capital, particularly among many (but not all) banks (epstein 2017, chapter 4). foreign bank ownership, then, has had nationalist policy effects. viktor orbán’s mortgage restructuring schemes that thrust high costs on foreign-owned lenders and poland’s economic development plan under the law and justice party both point to the extent to which politicians can leverage high levels of foreign ownership in banking (and other industries) to mobilize political support for more economically nationalist policies (bohle 2014; piroska and mérő 2020).8 poland, 8 for a summary of morawiecki plan (“responsible development plan”) of pis (law and justice) in poland, see: http://cecgr.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/cec_in_depth_the_morawiecki_plan.pdf. http://cecgr.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/cec_in_depth_the_morawiecki_plan.pdf 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 hungary, slovakia, and romania all implemented bank taxes. in romania’s case, the bank tax (eventually scaled back from the original proposal) was in part to deal with “banking greed.”9 this was another recent example of banking’s high political salience – and with good reason. despite relatively propitious outcomes for ece in the most recent period, foreign bank ownership or lending under conditions different from those specified here have often wreaked havoc on host markets. moreover, none of the nms that are not in the eurozone have opted to join european banking union – another sign of the continuing preference in ece for a national approach to bank oversight in the aftermaths of the us and eurozone economic crises. from a liberal economic perspective, the nms have on balance both followed liberal prescriptions and reaped the benefits from doing so. yet robust electoral support for those same liberal principles has not always followed. we would do well to remember robert gilpin’s admonishment that the problem with liberals is that they take it for granted that all reasonable people agree on the unalloyed benefits of enhanced riches, to the exclusion of concerns about power and control (gilpin 1975). the populations of east central europe are no less reasonable than anyone else. their economic subordination, its wealth-inducing effects notwithstanding, has led to varying degrees of euro-skepticism, illiberalism, and nationalism, in keeping with a number of other advanced industrialized countries. conclusion together, eu and nato membership created a new geopolitical and economic context in which the countries of east central europe have enhanced autonomy, voice in international organizations, access to large and wealthy markets, and significant subsidies in some cases (see also vachudova 2005). to be sure, eu membership encouraged economic openness, but economic reformers in ece at times liberalized even more than was required by international organizations (appel and orenstein 2018). liberalization in the form of privatization, freer trade, and foreign direct investment have generated income gains, higher consumption, increased credit provision, enhanced productivity, and technological upgrades. and yet the political response has been far from euphoric. while majorities prefer to remain in the eu in all of the nms, euro-skepticism and illiberalism also have enormous appeal. the analysis presented here suggests that ongoing power differentials between new and old eu members, particularly as they manifest in absolute income and the one-way character of foreign direct investment, account for some of the disillusionment. unequal economic positions provide a basis on which populist politicians can plausibly argue that east central european populations are victims who are not reaping the full and just rewards of eu membership. there are at least two critiques of the claims made here. the first is that dependent capitalism is not an accurate way to characterize the relationship between (mostly) western investors and eastern host markets (bruszt and langbein 2020). this approach suggests that there may be illiberalism, corruption, and other dysfunction in ece, but it is not because of economic developments or the eu’s liberalizing agenda. on the contrary, while the eu had championed liberalization in certain areas, it also has a politically and developmentally based program of 9 see boris groendahl, “romania’s ‘greed tax’ reminds banks of eastern europe’s risks,” bloomberg, 19 december 2019. available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-19/romania-s-greed-tax-remindsbanks-of-eastern-europe-s-risks accessed 21 july 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-19/romania-s-greed-tax-reminds-banks-of-eastern-europe-s-risks https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-19/romania-s-greed-tax-reminds-banks-of-eastern-europe-s-risks 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 redistribution through its structural funds program. even more important, the eu has both actively and passively contributed to state capacity building in ece. thus the ‘dependent capitalism’ literature tends to understate east central european agency. according to bruszt and langbein, illiberalism cannot stem from relative deprivation and disempowerment because those are not, in fact, features of the current context in ece. a second plausible objection that complements the first is that east central european skepticism of democracy, economic liberalism, and the eu is firmly rooted in domestic politics and history (trencsényi 2014). the communist-era prohibition against thoroughgoing investigations into past atrocities, including local populations’ culpability, allowed politicians to take liberties in constructing historical narratives. in particular, where political party turnover in the transition facilitated the regeneration of formerly communist parties into competitive socialists (including in poland and hungary), nationalists claimed a viral incursion had poisoned the transition from the beginning – and that the virus itself was inextricably linked to liberalism. in addition to trencsényi’s argument about local political discourses concerning communism, transition, and culpability, one could also argue that democracy is still comparatively new in ece and that relatively untested democratic institutions are therefore more susceptible to political and partisan pressure. however, neither of these alternative explanations for illiberalism in ece necessarily invalidates the argument presented here about the salience of perceived economic subordination and relative deprivation. the eu can build state capacity and at the same time lack control over purchasing power differentials that result in high volumes of net inward investment, brain drain from ece, and high current account deficits in the run-up to the us and european financial crises. moreover, the economic context could spawn more than one kind of narrative about the possibilities and perils of economic liberalism. not just in ece but in many countries across the globe, critics of economic integration and interdependence have made, and won, the argument against liberalism in its many forms, at least in the most recent period. the global nature of illiberalism’s rise suggests that developments in ece may not be entirely historically specific. rather, east central europe provides the lens through which we might view and come to understand larger global trends, as has so often been the case of this part of the world. 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 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(forthcoming in 2020). “ethnopopulism and democratic backsliding: two playbooks, one strategy, many sources of opposition and support.” east european politics. wade, r. 2007. “the aftermath of the asian financial crisis: from ‘liberalize the market’ to ‘standardize the market’ and create a ‘level playing field’.” in ten years after: revisiting the asian financial crisis, edited by b. muchhala, 73-94. washington, d.c.: woodrow wilson international center for scholars. world bank. 2012. golden growth: restoring the lustre of the european economic model. washington, d.c.: world bank. 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 curating russia: the shchukin collection, the nation, and border crossing across regimes leah rasmussen1 university of maryland, college park abstract russia’s place in the world endured dramatic shocks over transitions between tsarist, soviet, and post-soviet regimes. questions of identity and nation consumed cultural and political elites alike. art plays a critical role within the state not only for its financial value, but also as a source of power. this article investigates how the russian federation employs this artistic cultural heritage through its use and displays of the collection of late tsarist moscow merchant sergei shchukin. these holdings enable the russian state and cultural leaders to participate in an increasingly globalized art world. leading western museums compete to exhibit henri matisse’s pivotal painting, dance, commissioned by shchukin and remaining in russia throughout the tsarist and soviet periods, ending up in the hermitage museum. throughout russian and soviet history, western european art has served as a cultural legitimizing force that ties both the country and its history to the artistic traditions of the west, which retains a dominant position in the global art world. 1 leah rasmussen is a phd student at the department of history at the university of maryland – college park 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 introduction speaking to author pavel buryshkin from exile in paris in the 1930s, sergei shchukin relayed “i have not been collecting only for myself and all for myself but also for my country and my nation. whatever happens in our country, my collection should stay there…” (cited in boguslavskij 1995, 328). nation has been invoked across russian regimes as a critical concept in russia’s self-identity and its global interactions with the west. in recent years, the cultural diplomatic efforts of the russian federation have increased, reflecting its desire to showcase its national patrimony and inclusion as a european state. this article traces henri matisse’s dance, commissioned by moscow merchant and art collector sergei shchukin in 1909. it highlights important themes in russian art, culture, and transnational relations to understand how the art of one nation can become central to the national patrimony of another. the arrival of matisse’s canvas in moscow, with its bright, illuminated nude figures, served to liberate russian avant-garde artists from the bounds of european convention and tradition, linking their peripheral city to the french artistic core. following the 1917 russian revolution, the canvas that marked a turning point in the history of modern art was retained and nationalized by the soviet state and would, over the course of the twentieth century, be subject to the restrictive legislations of a regime that sought strict control over cultural goods. dance’s movement through the soviet era nonetheless endowed it with accumulated meaning both in its place and power within a soviet russian cultural patrimony. dance’s re-emergence in the west following the end of the union of soviet socialist republics (ussr) became a significant global cultural event. century-long contestations over its presence and place within the russian national patrimony deepened in the post-soviet era as challenges were launched against the 1917 nationalization decrees that had inducted dance into both the national heritage and the state’s currency reserves. art plays a critical role in discourses of national culture. multiple nations and regimes have staked claims to dance as part of their national patrimony including those of tsarist russia, the ussr, the russian federation, france, and europe more broadly. matisse is considered to play a defining role in the course of the history of modern art. dance gained prominence over time as it was subject to the will of the state and was celebrated by educated societies in russia and abroad and coveted by those who sought to retrieve and view it. as a result of art’s ability to cross borders and take residency within national institutions, multiple claims could co-exist as to the place of dance within national patrimonies. from 1991, close to a century after sergei shchukin commissioned dance and hung it in the staircase of his moscow home, the russian federation has taken extraordinary measures to protect its prized possession. whereas russia recognizes and defends the place of dance within its borders and patrimony, seeking to challenge the power mechanisms of core-peripheral culture relations, western exhibitions claim it singularly as a product of france, of the west, ignoring its duality and celebrating its return. the relationship between national and transnational emerges as a complicated yet critical pathway to understanding the importance of dance and the complexity of russian national culture and its place within global pantheons of art. this article uses dance to support and extend to the present homi bhabha’s view that “in the fin de siècle, we find ourselves in the moment of transit, where space and time cross to produce complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion” (1994, 2). the production and relations of power complicate this transit, with a clear european center that leaves russia on its artistic margins and a peripheralized national patrimony. edith clowes argues that russian ideas of self and other in the post-soviet era remain a work in progress. russians at once consider russia as a global cultural center but recognize that it is not 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 seen that way in the west (clowes 2011). russian and soviet views, the western gaze, and ideas of national patrimony have evolved across time and regimes. chike c. aniakor writes that “[a]rt objects are historical documents. they reflect the social and historical conditions of their creation…” (1995, 436). this article argues that the moment of creation is complicated and cannot be seen as stagnant. aniakor challenges us to consider the intertwined historical, societal, and political context of works of art. this article follows hannah barbosa cesnik in “[r]ecognizing cultural patrimony as active rather than passive opens the possibility of ownership to something beyond constructed national borders but less than a global-free for all” (2021). finally, i recognize important recent work that places collectors at the center of moving art across borders (quodbach 2020). this article argues that sergei shchukin—even as a collector on the periphery— played a singularly important role in building the patrimonies of western europe and russia as well as propelling russian art in new directions. these directions continue to gain international recognition nearly a century after joseph stalin stopped the innovations of the avant-garde in their tracks. this article culminates in the 2008 from russia: french and russian master paintings exhibit at the royal academy of arts in london, moving through time and space to see how dance and related works were understood and identified with over a century. an interview conducted with co-curator of from russia, ann dumas, offers insight into the legal and cultural environment of the exhibit. this article also uses hermitage director mikhail piotrovsky’s memoir and a work coauthored by shchukin’s grandson, andré-marc delocque. i seek to determine the value that modern french art has come to develop within the russian patrimony—how the national and transnational blend and how pre-revolutionary modern art survived multiple controversies to emerge as a strong symbol of russian heritage. collecting the nation sergei shchukin’s purchase of a landscape by claude monet from french art dealer paul durandruel in 1898 marked a “decisive breakthrough in the russian art world’s relationship to modern western art” (dorontchenkov 2009, 1). before this point, russian artists and collectors had seen russian art as separate from europe; now, with shchukin’s purchase and the “drive towards the west” of sergei diaghilev and the artists from the world of art collective (1898-9), russian art redefined itself within a wider european art pantheon. shchukin and his contemporary, ivan morozov, both textile merchants from moscow and outsiders to the russian art world, turned to the west, to the art of france for their market. they rapidly earned international acclaim for their eye and approach in amassing two of the “best and largest collections of contemporary french art in all of europe” (dorontchenkov 2009, 77). each encountered broad resistance as they collected contemporary and provocative works of art. shchukin continued his focus on french art, setting as his goal to assemble one of the most significant, transnational collections anywhere in europe. in doing so he would place russia squarely at the forefront of collecting practices and a modern artistic world. shchukin’s early collecting was defined by the canvases of paul gauguin, claude monet, and vincent van gogh. he collected impressionists until 1904 before turning to post-impressionism. in 1903, shchukin brought to russia the work of paul cézanne, an artist who would become revered by the russian avant-garde and whose influence on the russian art scene endured through the soviet era (reid 2001, 153-184). shchukin’s tastes were fluid, responding quickly to european tides and advancements in contemporary art, which he began purchasing in 1906 with his first 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 work by henri matisse. shchukin’s singular focus on the future led matisse’s dance to cross russia’s borders and become a central piece in its national patrimony and achieve a critical, enduring role in the global history of modern art. figure 1: henri matisse, 1909, dance ii henri matisse, 1909, dance ii. collection of the state hermitage museum, st. petersburg. wikimedia commons. accessed april 18, 2022. public resistance to shchukin’s collections mounted as artists found inspiration in the influx of french art fresh from the studio. the foreignness of his canvasses jolted visitors who toured the collections in his home, which he opened to the public on sundays beginning in 1909. one of shchukin’s guests “marked up the painting of c. monet with a pencil in protest against the impressionists” (shchukin 1913, 38). such intense reactions from visitors demonstrated that while the pieces earned the russian collectors a privileged place on the world stage, sections of the russian public did not accept the paintings. as in europe, impressionist art faced hostility to its challenges of accepted styles and perhaps, in the case of russia, patriotic feelings. shchukin’s home emerged nonetheless as an ersatz academy of modern art, attracting students and members of the educated public and inspiring russia’s own modernist turn through galleries that captured in their entirety the development of select artists. in 1909, shchukin commissioned the first of two works from henri matisse, at the time a relatively unknown artist amongst the european avant-garde. shchukin reveled in how his role as a collector enabled him to enter the paris studios and galleries to discover artists and elevate their careers (armand hammer foundation, 1986). dance, a large-scale mural, was slated for the staircase of shchukin’s home. matisse’s dance represented his mastery of colour as he balanced a near imperceptible sophistication overridden by the primitive, almost barbaric, scene captured in his pivotal work. the naked figures in dance caused a scandal when first publicly displayed at the salon d’automne in 1910 as they confronted and drastically altered not only the proportions of the human form but also represented complete physical abandonment in their hypnotic dance. the russian critic of the newspaper odessky listok (odessa news) described the scene in paris: 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 explosions of indignation, anger and raillery are incessant around these pictures. in effect, their toxic colours give the impression of a demonic cacophony, whilst the lines, which are simplified to such a point that they almost disappear, and the astonishingly ugly shapes, express the painter’s idea in a way that is both rash and insistent. the world created by matisse in his naively cannibalistic panels is, i have to say, frankly distasteful. (cited in semenova and delocque 2018, 174) shchukin himself initially recoiled at the painting’s apparent barbaric nature, nearly cancelling the commission out of fear of public opinion and the attention it would draw upon its transport to moscow. he shook off fears of offending the russian orthodox church and other conservative elements in moscow, writing to matisse: “i find your panel dance of such nobility that i am resolved to brave our bourgeois opinion and to hang on my staircase a subject with nudes” (kostenevich 1990, 39). for artists in russia, dance both symbolized and enabled their emancipation. the artists who had emerged out of moscow’s studios during these years—natalia goncharova, mikhail larionov, vasily kandinsky, and marc chagall— still worked to evoke a sense of russianness through established tradition in works they exported to the west and had yet to challenge french artists’ technical mastery. in the free forms of matisse’s dancing figures, the conventions that had governed modern art were dismantled. russian artists, no longer bound by european criteria to create within the realms or “isms” characterizing the european avant-garde, moved to infiltrate the european-dominated scene (dorontchenkov 2009). alexandre benois captured this dynamic in an article written for rech’ (speech) in 1911 where he wrote that while it is possible for artists to learn or achieve “perfection” through imitation, they “cannot learn something in order to unlearn it” (benois 2009, 104-105). in other words, the creativity and ingenuity required to achieve the success of the french could not be attained by the russians if they continued to merely mimic and avoid necessary experimentation on the canvas. however, the import of dance, its crudeness and simplicity, offered a path other than mimicry and the efforts to raise themselves and russian art to the caliber of the french. benois elaborates on the freedoms attained in matisse’s work: when you recall all the crudeness, provincialism, and absurdity there is in [russian] art you can become frightened and begin to share in the general alarm that the parisian example will muddle our very uncultured artistic youth. but now there is also hope. what if it is this crudeness and simplicity that matisse wants to acquire by force and that we already have that will save us by creating in us that desirable “childlike disposition” out of which new art is to emerge? (benois 2009, 104-105) through these primitive forms, matisse made the modern art world accessible to russian artists. it allowed them to bypass the technical mastery that earlier modern art forms had seemingly required, even with their looser strokes. in the same way that matisse wanted to be seen as “worthy of creating his own new traditions, of starting anew,” (benois 2009, 104-105) so did the russian avant-garde who took from him, from shchukin’s panels, permission to break free and carve their place on the global stage. shchukin had captured and imported works from the west before the paint was even dry with the express purpose of exposing russian artists to the bold strokes of the french avant-garde and their new definitions of art. shchukin sought to inspire and expose, and leave the artists to form their own mind, their own response, more directly and concurrently than had previously been possible 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 because of russia’s distance from the ateliers of paris. however, shchukin’s singular focus on the french scene evoked disdain, even from those who benefitted from his collections. vasily kandinsky, who in 1908 was the first artist to write about the descent into pure abstraction, grew increasingly annoyed with shchukin’s disinterest in what he considered the equally innovative and inspired works of the russian avant-garde. convinced his abstracts were “just as good” as matisse’s, kandinsky wrote to his friend gabriele munter: shchukin never buys anything from me. he is a long way from sharing our ideas. i think that only artists who have been hugely successful in paris can awaken his interest. but where is such success to be found today? he believes that the two greatest contemporary artists are matisse and picasso. apparently, he doesn’t think about me, truly. nevertheless, my composition 2 and 5 would fit in very nicely at this place: i can see them there already. (cited in semenova and delocque 2018, 221) this ambivalence proliferated among russian artists, whose works were left unpurchased by shchukin and therefore remained unrepresented on the walls of his home, which had gained recognition as a temple of modernity. questions of patriotism, nationality, and a national patrimony remained open and controversial. did shchukin’s commissions, as a russian citizen, entrench these works as russian? this question of what makes a piece of art national remains unclear in art history even today. shchukin’s collection resonated within and beyond russia’s borders for its ability to break down the barriers to the contemporary art scene that resulted from the country’s distance from europe. the art of the commission itself speaks to a creativity, a boldness, and an active participation in the creation of a work that, this article argues, makes the commissioner an actor in its production. if we take this to be the case, then shchukin’s commissions, most particularly that of dance and music, can be labelled or considered as russian artistic productions, in line with those produced by russian artists even as the artist is himself french. the placement of the works in shchukin’s house and their visibility to both artists and the public alike sparked a wave of creative innovation that remains recognized as critical to russian national culture over a century later. the first world war stopped shchukin’s activity as a collector; however, he assumed the role of mentor, commentator, and guide for russian artists and sought to act as an enlightener of moscow’s public. leaders of the artistic scene in russia considered shchukin as “one of their number” even as his colleague ivan morozov, who collected the works of russians, was not (semenova and delocque 2018, 221). in the first seventeen years of the twentieth century, shchukin’s collecting had easily outpaced collectors in europe as well as russia. he had collected works snubbed by the then major art institutions and galleries of the west. the war and the subsequent 1917 bolshevik revolution scarred shchukin, whose tastes and position in society were under threat by new state ideologies. uncertain of a bolshevik future, shchukin left the country shortly after the revolution. in his wake he was forced to abandon his business and holdings, including his art collection, which had grown to 225 works by the first world war, consisting mainly of prominent french artists. by this time, shchukin’s efforts had already succeeded in closing the gap between a european artistic core and a russian periphery. though he would never again collect art with the same frenzied passion exhibited in his moscow assemblage, shchukin, prior to his death in paris in 1936, fervently believed that the works he left behind should ultimately remain within russian borders (cited in boguslavskij 1995, 328). 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 patrimony and isolation in soviet russia the value and power that dance had gained from its place within shchukin’s home and the wider russian art community earned it a critical role within a russian national patrimony, which endured throughout the soviet period. the bolsheviks acknowledged the place of the painting and works collected by shchukin and morozov, nationalizing them and realizing their monetary value. in the post-stalin era, the state turned to art for its power to legitimize both the ussr’s superpower status and ostensibly global culture. despite the soviet state’s systematic removal of shchukin’s name and that of his legendary collection from public memory in russia and abroad, its prominence remained in the eyes of the educated elite both inside and beyond state borders, where these featured works retained their place within the western art pantheon. vladimir lenin signed a decree on october 29, 1918 to nationalize the shchukin collection, reframing it as one of state-led national and world importance. the decree read: considering the national importance of the shchukin’s art gallery, being the exceptional collection of the great european – predominantly french – masters of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century and recognizing its significance in the field of national education, the soviet of people’s commissioners decrees…the nationalization of the shchukin’s art gallery. (cited in boguslavskij 1995, 326) the decree, which also nationalized morozov’s collections, brought them and their properties under the all-russian collegium for the affairs of museums and the protection of monuments of art and antiquity (vserossiĭskaia kollegiia po delam muzeev i okhrane pamiatnikov iskusstva i stariny), a branch of the people’s commissariat for education (narodnyĭ komissariat prosveshcheniia), on december 19, 1918. nationalizing the collection confirmed the place that shchukin’s art had earned in the national— and now soviet— patrimony in its education of the public and ability to propel avant-garde artists who largely supported bolshevik rule and provided creative support. inventoried, the morozov and shchukin collections remained intact at their respective residences, the palaces being renamed the state museum of new western art no. 1 and 2 respectively (muzeĭ novoĭ zapadnoĭ zhivopisi, mnzzh 1 and 2). the museums were amalgamated into the former morozov residence and renamed the state museum of new western art (gosudarstvennyĭ muzeĭ novogo zapadnogo iskusstva, gmnzi) in 1923.2 the creation of a museum dedicated solely to the exhibition of modernist works was revolutionary. it stood as the first museum of modern art in the world, preceding by six years new york’s museum of modern art (moma).3 gmnzi reflected the bolshevik belief of the power of this art to attack western bourgeois conventions and simultaneously showcase soviet russia’s ability to capture and display works of global importance at a time when soviet innovation was the subject of western fascination. nevertheless, the museum also appeared to the public as one that highlighted western decadence, producing art of 2 there is some confusion with the dates of this preliminary stage of the amalgamation. some sources quote 1922 and some as 1923 for the year that the collections were administratively merged. at which time the museum’s abbreviation changed from mnzzh 1 and 2, to gmnzi. the amalgamation in different sources cites 1923 and 1928 as the possible dates of the physical amalgamation of the collections. this paper uses 1923 as the date. 3 the revolutionary nature of the state museum of new western art stood in its collections of european modernist works. though other establishments, including the vienna secession, had been exhibiting and introducing new movements including the modernists since the turn of the century, the establishment of a museum dedicated solely to modern art is what contributed to the distinction of the gmnzi. 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 such abstraction that it was seemingly divorced from social reality as it had been purchased by wealthy russian collectors. the communist leadership nonetheless refused calls to divide these works among state museums or to remove them from the public eye, seeing the potential of gmnzi to rival the hermitage in global importance (mileeva 2013). the soviet regime under stalin was desperate for revenue to finance economic modernization and turned to these impressive works of art as sources of income. works recognized as some of the most significant in the lives of select artists, including cézanne and van gogh, were sold off and would go on to reside in some of the world’s most prestigious institutions.4 an intense campaign to save dance from suffering the fate of many of its contemporaries succeeded through emphasizing the work’s intrinsic and symbolic value to the state (newestmuseum). despite the occasional sales of valued art, gmnzi, and the collections housed there, survived the 1930s and gained a certain notoriety as they were sent, along with most of the prominent museum collections of the state, to the urals prior to the nazi invasion during the second world war. this shift in dance from being recognized under lenin as a work of national importance within a new socialist patrimony to being seen under stalin for its monetary potential shifted its power from national education and pride to the national currency reserves. in 1946, the ussr launched campaigns against cosmopolitanism and formalism to blunt perceived dangers of western influence after the wartime alliance to defeat germany crumbled and the cold war began. gmnzi was closed, its collections divided between the pushkin museum in moscow and the state hermitage museum in leningrad (present-day saint petersburg). artworks once praised for their high quality and educational importance were now proclaimed as socially and dangerously destructive in the soviet council of ministers decree 672 on march 6, 1948: the formalist collections belonging to the museum of modern western art, bought in the countries of western europe by muscovite capitalists in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, have spread formalist views and the veneration of decadent bourgeois imperialist culture, causing severe damage to the development of russian soviet art... the council of ministers hereby decrees the full liquidation of the moscow state museum of modern western art. (cited in semenova and delocque 2018, 246) matisse’s dance, considered a subversion of bourgeois values four decades earlier, was now itself labeled as bourgeois. in challenging convention, the painting’s bright, joyous, and ambiguous figures appeared to threaten the cultural stability of stalin’s regime. labelled as alien, unknown, or even hostile, this art loomed over new soviet ideas even though their very existence had served to challenge former conventions of western art. dance and other works in shchukin’s collection left moscow for the “cultural capital” of leningrad. it was placed in storage in the state hermitage museum, out of view from the public in compliance with state orders. hidden away, this work became cemented in the soviet currency reserves. curators and liberal segments of the educated public considered this a dark turn in what they saw as a declining appreciation for culture and the simple tragedy of removing these works from the public eye (iavorskaia 2009, 307-309). 4 four of the most significant works sold during this period included cézanne’s portrait of madame cézanne in the greenhouse; van gogh’s night café from the morozov collection; degas’ the singer from the café concert; renoir’s the maid. the decree of the sale, dated may 9, 1933, was signed by the deputy chairman of the council of people’s commissars v.v. kuibuster (newest museum, n.d.). 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 the forced assimilation in the 1930s of soviet russian artists into socialist realism, a propagandistic style of art that stripped away individual advancements to the global field, had monumental repercussions for soviet culture. the assimilation effectively removed soviet russia from transnational conversations required to continue placing soviet art into the prominent place it held in the early bolshevik years and soviet art became othered in the global art world. stalin’s death and the subsequent de-stalinization echoed throughout the museums and galleries of the soviet union. the soviet government became dependent on pre-revolutionary western (predominantly french) art collected by morozov and shchukin to highlight their importance within the global realms of culture and art as befitting a postwar, post-stalinist superpower. works of modern art which had remained hidden following the decrees of the 1940s gradually emerged from museum storerooms. conventional, realist art arrived first, followed in the mid-1950s by the works of pablo picasso and henri matisse. dance once more assumed pride of place alongside its companion music in leningrad’s hermitage museum. the re-emergence of what many recognized to be a prized collection generated significant excitement, as the current director of the hermitage, mikhail piotrovsky, recalled: “as [khrushchev-era] political freedom grew, so did the radical nature of the paintings on show from sisley to picasso. for many it was a turning point in their understanding of art in general” (piotrovsky 2015, 238). just as they did prior to 1917, the cubist forms of picasso, the nude figures of gauguin, and the exaggerated forms of matisse sparked controversy amongst patrons who gathered in the exhibition halls on the hermitage’s third floor, which had become synonymous with modern art in the 1950s (piotrovsky 2015, 238). in the hermitage, the resistance to the restoration of modern art was led by artists and art historians clinging to stalinist ideology. they condemned both the prominent placement of works of matisse and others at the hermitage and the sending of select pieces abroad as part of pan-european art retrospectives. operating within the still-strict confines of the state’s cultural directives, museum staff, seeking political cover, claimed that these works displayed how western culture had degraded and fallen from the ideals of classicism praised in the soviet union. for some time, this logic, along with the powerful support the pieces received among members of the educated elite who recognized their global value, subdued opposition. in his memoir, piotrovsky (2015) highlighted an incident in 1963 when an angry commission from the academy of arts descended upon the hermitage, outraged by their presentation and hanging of the “barbaric” modern pieces (238). antonina izergina, the curator of french painting at the hermitage and the widow of late museum director iosif orbeli, stood before the commission and praised the significance of the shchukin collection in educating the masses. piotrovsky (2015) recalled the crowd being outraged by izergina’s words that culminated with her reading the decree signed in 1918 that had nationalized the shchukin collection and ended with the words “v.i. lenin” (242). the commission’s efforts to remove the paintings from public view and subsequent opposition failed, allowing these works to remain as critical touchstones for debate on not only the value and role of modernist art but also their place within a national museum. piotrovsky cites this as a point where these paintings assumed a solid place within russian national identity both in spite and because of their controversial nature (2015, 242). alongside these soviet internal debates, the artistic works that composed the shchukin and morozov collections remained vital measures of modernism in europe. after the re-emergence of these paintings to the hermitage, western institutions placed them high on their wish lists to be displayed in international exhibitions (wnet and alvin h. perlmutter inc 1973). in 1954, 54 picasso works from the shchukin and morozov collections were loaned to france for an exhibition 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 in paris entitled "picasso from the museums of leningrad and moscow and parisian collections," even as the works remained prohibited from view in the soviet union. the soviet government used dance and related works to present themselves as a european civilization. through invoking them once more into the global canon, the soviet union could advance an image that would portray it in an enlightened light. the paris exhibition faced an immediate and unexpected intervention from the heirs of sergei shchukin who resided in france and who challenged the legality of the soviet state’s ownership of works that had once belonged to their family. they claimed that the works were taken illegally under lenin’s nationalization decrees and without compensation (boguslavskij 1995, 325-341). the paris exhibition organizers took immediate action, removing works that pertained to the suit. they were rushed to the soviet embassy to protect them from any legal proceedings and the risk of confiscation. this legal threat circumscribed soviet desires to exhibit works of european importance—dance was never sent abroad despite multiple requests—and promote the state’s place as an advanced culture. several potential exchanges were negotiated throughout the 1950s and thereafter including between american and soviet institutions headed by the moma. alfred h. barr jr, the moma director who had published on matisse, undertook years of close talks to uncover the “hidden masterpieces” of the soviet state through displays in several us museums (mikkonen 2013, 57-76). soviet officials refused barr’s request when he could not provide guarantees that any works loaned would be returned to the ussr at the exhibit’s end. dance dually functioned as part of a soviet and russian patrimony in the eyes of vanguard intellectuals and cultural bureaucrats as well as an object of currency and a tool of cultural diplomacy. the soviet-era erasure of shchukin’s name from the works he commissioned and collected enabled dance and others to be seen, however, primarily as western creations, representative of those systems. it would only be after the end of the soviet union—in part due to the lawsuits that had come to highlight this very erasure—that shchukin’s name was reinstated and became embedded in a now post-soviet russian national patrimony. the effort taken by soviet officials to protect these paintings from civil actions was a direct result of their desire to secure for the state a power and legitimate position as a global cultural actor. in the post-soviet period, the motivation for this protection transformed to one sparked by the painting’s place within the national cultural identity of the russian state. matisse and the other european modernists form the foundation for contemporary art and artists who still respond to the movements set in motion a century earlier. matisse’s work inspired american artists throughout the twentieth century; his influence was notably revived and recognized in the experiments of colour and abstraction in the works of mark rothko and roy lichtenstein as explored in the after matisse exhibition that began at the queens museum of art and travelled throughout the united states from 1986-1988. dance remained a critical work in the global trajectory of modern art even as it remained behind the borders of the soviet union until its collapse. though ‘dance’ was a theme that carried into several of matisse’s canvases from 19051913, dance or dance ii, as the hermitage panel is known, stands apart from the other iterations of the painting for its boldness in both colour and scale.5 shchukin’s commission holds a trance 5 henri matisse’s panel dance (la danse) commissioned for shchukin is also known in some contexts as dance ii. dance i, a large-scale work that served as a preliminary sketch for shchukin’s panel, used paler colours for the dancing figures and has significantly less detail than the final work. dance i resides in the collection of the museum of modern art (moma) in new york city. 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 like energy enabling the audience to see and feel the painting’s movement, unique for its freedom of form and use of red instead of a light pink nude that lacks the same artistic depth. exhibiting dance as the soviet union collapsed and the russian federation emerged, dance topped the wish lists of western institutions that were hopeful it would be allowed to leave the country. institutions were eager to be the first to bring it outside of russia/soviet union since it left france in 1910. from september 24, 1992 to january 19, 1993, selected matisse works including dance travelled to the moma in new york city to take part in henri matisse: a retrospective. the most comprehensive exhibition assembled on the french master comprised 400 works, carefully curated to explore the range and depth of the artist, offering an opportunity to reassess the role his pieces play in the history of twentieth-century art. it marked the first time the works from the hermitage and pushkin museum had been exhibited in the united states – a point of pride detailed within the moma’s exhibition materials. the retrospective’s curator, john elderfield, defines matisse’s impact in the exhibition catalog writing that “[matisse] altered painting so decisively…that our experience of any painting must be affected by what he achieved” (elderfield 1992, 14). as dance gained international popularity, issues of nationalization and ownership jeopardized its place within a renewed russian national patrimony. the indoctrination of the 1918 nationalization decrees into russian law and soviet caution in transnational lending had diminished legal threats from shchukin’s heirs, but the heirs saw a weakened state under boris yeltsin and a prime opportunity to challenge nationalization. in 1993, legal action was launched in french courts against the pushkin museum, the state hermitage museum, the pompidou centre in paris, and by extension, the russian federation, concerning the loan of certain paintings to the paris gallery (boguslavskij 1995, 325). the suit claimed that lenin’s decree, which ostensibly brought the paintings into the legal possession of the soviet union and, later, the contemporary russian state, could not be considered valid in france as french law dictated the necessity of compensation for confiscated property. shchukin’s heirs demanded the return of the collection to its “rightful” owner – irina shchukina, shchukin’s youngest daughter. the russian government responded on multiple fronts to protect artistic treasures considered as valuable national property. expecting support from european governments in the post-cold war era, yeltsin’s officials wrote to the french ministry of foreign affairs referring to the principle of state immunity, which they claimed was inherent in international law. the russian embassy in france took an active role “in the legal preparations of russian museums and assisted in ensuring that the directors of the museums involved could take part in the trial” (boguslavskij 1995, 329). an effective challenge to the shchukin family’s claims in court would allow the portrayal of the new russia as a deserved home for these paintings of national and global significance. for their part, the claimants highlighted moral and ethical issues that dated from the tsarist empire and the ussr, citing the un declaration of human rights in their opening arguments. the suit emphasized the difficult fate of russian emigrants such as shchukin and the oblivion surrounding his name in russia. where the claimants appealed to emotion, the defendants clung to international law. on june 16, 1993, the verdict absolved the russian federation of the responsibility for repatriation of shchukin’s collected works to his heirs. the verdict further absolved the russian government of any monetary compensation to shchukina as generally dictated under french law for confiscation of personal property by a state, recognizing lenin’s nationalization of the 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 collection and later indoctrination into the constitution of the russian federation as legitimate. shchukina’s claims were dismissed. the victory launched new initiatives to advance transnational exhibitions between european and russian museums even as underlying legal issues remained unsettled. the shchukin and morozov collections were treated with particular care. russian museums also continued to face severe financial constraints as state funding had dropped precipitously in the 1990s and the threat of needing to sell important artworks to survive loomed (cameron and lapierre 2007, 65-77). to the curators at the royal academy of art in london (ra), bringing dance to the united kingdom and germany was the foundation of what would become "from russia: french and russian master painting from moscow and leningrad 1870-1925" (ann dumas, unpublished interview by author, may 7, 2021). a joint venture with the museum kunstpalast in dusseldorf, the exhibition – which had been in planning for over five years – would unite the modernist collections of russia’s four primary art institutions. for the first time, it would introduce this critical period in the development of the modern art in both russia and abroad through 120 paintings by russian and french artists (dumas and rosenthal 2008). ann dumas and sir norman rosenthal, curators at the royal academy, worked closely with the russian institutions who presented them with a selection of works available for their venture. they agreed that the exhibition would be staged around dance. the official catalogue called the exhibition “a testimony to the glorious history of russian collecting and russia’s influence in the development of modern art” (dumas and rosenthal 2007, 5). however, it was nearly cancelled just months before its anticipated opening. russia faced renewed threats of seizure of their assets abroad in the early years of the 2000s by other individuals and entities seeking to recover imperial and soviet-era debts. in 2005, the state hermitage museum threatened a moratorium on overseas loans following the temporary capture of 54 paintings of picasso, matisse, and cézanne at the swiss border. piotrovksy claimed that “works of art are now being used as hostages in trade disputes” (o’connell 2008, 2). the dispute was resolved quickly in russia’s favour by the swiss federal council but produced new russian demands for legal guarantees of immunity from seizure for future exhibitions. such laws were already on their way to becoming commonplace, with several states already adopting protections. however, the united kingdom state immunity act of 1978 proved insufficient for russia. russia argued that the 1978 act needed updating to explicitly include items owned by national museums, not just property owned by a foreign state (o’connell 2008, 2). this grey area would have been sufficient for russia to pull the plug on the exhibit. the threat to withhold loans from russian museums launched the royal academy and uk legislators alike to push updated laws through parliament prior to the slated arrival of the russian collections. anticipation over "from russia" had built for years, culminating in an extensive media campaign that left the promise of substantial crowds for the blockbuster exhibition. the russian state’s decision to prevent the export of the promised paintings in the fall of 2007 shifted media coverage to negotiations between states and the respective museums. the exhibition’s prestige led former british prime minister tony blair to “len[d] his support at a decisive moment in the negotiations” (dumas and rosenthal 2007, 5) as the british government passed the tribunals, 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 courts, and enforcements act of 2007 (arts council england, 2007).6 "from russia" opened at the royal academy on january 26, 2008. "from russia," curated by ann dumas and sir norman rosenthal, presented a specific narrative or perception of russia’s place within the european art world and of russian national identity within the nine galleries devoted to the exhibition. chosen from lists presented by the russian museums partaking in the transnational exchange, the ra curators opted to segregate works painted in france that comprised the shchukin and morozov collections from those created by russian artists in the same period. divisions were maintained, even as the rooms were meant to explore the “interaction between russian and french art from the last third of the nineteenth century” (dumas and rosenthal 2008). dumas later stated that she felt placing the accomplishments of the russian artists from the turn of the twentieth century next to those of the french masters would do the russians a disservice as they are incomparable in terms of technical capabilities and subject matter (ann dumas, unpublished interview by author, may 7, 2021). walking from one gallery of the "from russia" exhibit to the next, a viewer sees the undeniable influence of renowned modernist paintings but misses the transnational influences and the impact of shchukin’s french pieces that allowed russian artists to come into their own. dance sits in a gallery that overwhelms its audience with the abundant wealth of the french collections. masterpiece after masterpiece, visitors are compelled to stop in their tracks. only in subsequent galleries do curators draw attention to european artistic influences on russia. an educated viewer would see the effects of parisian studios that would have been experienced vicariously by many of the artists represented in sunday tours of shchukin’s home. moments of ingenuity and a russian style might mix with french influences in the visitor’s mind from previous galleries. europe’s recognition of dance and the curatorial decisions to separate it from russian art symbolizes both the extent and the limits of russia’s successful contributions to the global artistic pantheon. "from russia" demonstrated the lengths that the russian state would go to protect these masterpieces that played a significant role in defining russian modernism and that have, over time, regimes, and space earned pride of place within the national patrimony and the national culture of the contemporary russian state. the exhibition, however, curated through a western lens, challenges this central place for russia in modernist art and the dual nationality of its central work. in separating the french works from those of russia, the curators perpetuated a core-peripheral model of art history. the segregated approach of "from russia” enforced a perspective of french works as dominant and fully european, ignoring the role of collectors such as shchukin and giving the impression that they are isolated from russia and from the margins of the art world. it is true that the impressionists, post-impressionists, modernists, and others retain a privileged, almost unassailable place among viewing audiences as representing the power of france and western europe in the artistic world. in considering pieces only at the point of the artist’s conception, the exhibit negated at once the role of the collector and the accumulated meaning of a work, which, in the case of french art, was their direct impact on russian modernism. while the curation potentially sought to reflect the collection as it hung in russia’s ersatz academies and former museums of modern art, themselves segregated prior to and just following the bolshevik revolution, it ignored the impact and meaning that has accumulated through these canvases, which placed them securely within a russian national heritage. 6 the tribunals, courts, and enforcements act 2007 provided immunity from seizure for cultural objects being loaned from overseas to temporary public exhibitions in approved museums or galleries in the united kingdom. 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 "from russia" functioned as an act of cultural diplomacy between british and russian governments. at the same time, it enforced a historical perspective that dissimulates the transnational provenance of dance. i argue that the commissioning of dance endowed it with dual citizenship in both france and russia as it traveled from matisse’s studio in 1910 to its place in moscow and then as it evolved to gain its contemporary identity and place within the hermitage museum in st. petersburg. the exhibition demonstrates the difficulties for russia, as a peripheralized nation, to overcome barriers to have paintings in its national patrimony recognized as such in the global art world in a manner that stretches beyond the artists but also includes collectors, curators, and other critical figures central to these dialogues. outside of the realm of cultural diplomacy, the case of dance connects russia and the broader soviet sphere to calls to decolonize western-centric models of history. the region’s removal from the global art world throughout most of the twentieth century, followed by the tumultuous experience of transformations to market-type economies, rendered it vulnerable to powerful cultural actors and institutions in north america and western europe. the lack of transnational recognition of dance and other european art commissioned and purchased by shchukin and morozov began with the abrupt stalin-era turn to socialist realism and their subsequent absence from the international stage. this very absence has contributed to the significance that comes from displaying them internationally in this post-soviet age as the popularity of "from russia" demonstrates. we see this also in the louis vuitton foundation exhibitions that, in 2016-2017 and 2021-2022 respectively, displayed the shchukin and morozov collections separately. the art newspaper reported that the blockbuster show in 2016-17 attracted a record number of visitors to the exhibition which signified the “symbolic unification of the shchukin collection” (kishkovsky 2019a). the collectors’ names and accomplishments, suppressed in the soviet period, now form part of the excitement in international exhibitions. exhibits now include pieces of the russian avant-garde also loaned by russian museums that seek to show their own vision of a national cultural identity. conclusion on june 13, 2019, russian president vladimir putin granted russian citizenship to sergei shchukin’s grandson, andré-marc delocque, more than a century after his family went into exile (kishkovsky 2019b). the citizenship ceremony coincided with the opening of "shchukin: biography of a collection," an exhibition that reunited shchukin’s collection inside russia’s borders for the first time since they were divided between the pushkin and hermitage museums in 1948. delocque’s legal suits launched against the russian federation had forced the state to face the question of the legality of lenin’s decrees that were indoctrinated into the constitution in 1991. yet, in the same moment that they evoked questions of monetary repatriations and debates which commonly plague contemporary museums, the lawsuits demonstrated the valued place and protections that these paintings evoke by virtue of their history. their meaning in russia developed over the course of the modern age as a result of their direct influence on the russian avant-garde. this meaning was expanded through the soviet era for the ability of shchukin’s collection to communicate across borders, both in its art and collecting practices, within these global pantheons that have historically been dominated by the legitimizing force of western europe as the cultural core. shchukin’s collecting practices were inspired by the nationalism embedded in the collection of the renowned pavel tretyakov, who accumulated russian art beginning in 1856. shchukin’s eye 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 enabled the russian vanguard to reach new heights as it bridged artists to the burgeoning western scene at the turn of the twentieth century. the importance of these paintings by european masters captured in the collection, their survival through the soviet period, reinstatement as critical cultural and national touchstones, thereafter sealed their place as central pieces of russian art. in his commission of dance and the history that has come to define it in the post-modern era—as it moved between institutions that stood for soviet openness to the rolled-up confines of the urals during the second world war and as its “formalist” fate was contested in the years that followed— shchukin assisted in creating a piece that, in spite of its western origins in the studios of france, would come to symbolize the fragmented and divided foundations of russian national identity. considered one of the key paintings of the twentieth century, dance has been inculcated into russia’s national cultural heritage and now 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https://www.films.com/ectitledetail.aspx?titleid=151536. https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2019/06/18/putin-grants-russian-citizenship-to-collector-sergei-shchukins-grandson-ahead-of-blockbuster-pushkin-show https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2019/06/18/putin-grants-russian-citizenship-to-collector-sergei-shchukins-grandson-ahead-of-blockbuster-pushkin-show http://www.newestmuseum.ru/history/chronology/index.php?lang=en http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24583/1/wps2008-20_oconnell.pdf http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24583/1/wps2008-20_oconnell.pdf https://www.films.com/ectitledetail.aspx?titleid=151536 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 102 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 environmental issues in recent british and canadian elections harold d. clarke1, university of texas at dallas jon h. pammett2, carleton university abstract the 2019 elections in britain and canada illustrate the difficulties in communication between a concerned public and prospective office-holders on the most critical set of issues of our times. an increased level of public awareness and concern about the state of the environment has been expressed in public opinion polls, social movement activity has increased, and green parties have expanded their appeal. despite these developments in recent years, environmental issues have not been able to exert a major impact on individual voting behaviour in elections, or on overall election outcomes. issues related to the environment are usually treated, by both politicians and the public, in valence terms. valence issues are ones upon which there is broad consensus about the goals of public policy, and political debate focuses not on "what to accomplish" but rather on "how to do it" and "who is best able". regarding the environment, general formulations like global warming and climate change prompt politicians to offer concerned rhetoric and engage in virtue signaling, but specific policy proposals are often absent. this paper examines four reasons why environmental/climate change issues did not have a major impact on the 2019 canadian and british elections. first, environmental concern in society at large was imperfectly translated into election issues. second, the major political parties produced inadequate and unconvincing environmental manifestos. third, environmental issues were not central to most voting decisions. fourth, environmental issues had limited impacts on election outcomes. 1 harold d. clarke is ashbel smith professor in the school of economic, political and policy sciences at the university of texas at dallas. 2 jon h. pammett is distinguished research professor of political science at carleton university, ottawa, canada. 103 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 introduction whether defined as global warming, climate change, or simply the environment, issues related to the state of the physical world have captured the public’s attention and generated widespread concern. to date, however, the effects of these issues on voting behaviour and election outcomes have been modest. this article will focus on the 2019 national elections in the united kingdom (uk) and canada, countries with comparable parliamentary systems of government. the contexts of these elections illustrate two situations where environmental issues faced different kinds of problems. in britain, environmental concern was swamped by protracted and bitter controversy over whether the country should leave the european union (eu) and, if so, under what conditions. in canada, environmental concerns were joined by other large problems (the health system, the economy) at the top of the issue agenda. we focus on the role which democratic theory gives to elections as the main mechanism for systematic public instruction to governments about the desirable direction of public policy (clarke, jenson, leduc and pammett 2019). of course, elections are only one avenue for influence on policy, but they are the one which involves the population at large. as we shall see, the governments produced by the 2019 elections in the two countries were granted "policy mandates' on the environment that were no clearer than those accorded to their predecessors. worldwide, concern over climate change varies in its urgency. in the pew research center’s 2018 survey of global threats, climate change was at the top in half of the 26 countries surveyed, with people in other countries being more concerned about terrorist threats and cyberattacks (poushter and huang 2019, 3). however, in the ipsos monthly poll of “what worries the world”, the september 2019 results show that climate change was only number eight on the list, following unemployment, crime and violence, financial and political corruption, poverty and social inequality, healthcare, education, and taxes (ipsos 2019). after the coronavirus pandemic captured the world’s attention in early 2020, covid-19 surged to the top of such lists, further depressing identification of the danger posed by climate change. that said, recognition of more imminent threats to health or the economy does not necessarily diminish underlying environmental concerns (meyer and smith 2017). the 2019 british and canadian national elections were both held in conditions of increased public concern about the environment, and in particular "climate change". figures 1 and 2 illustrate the emergence of the environment as a salient issue. in britain, where the survey question allowed respondents to identify three important issues, data from 2010 to 2019 show that public concern started to rise in 2017, and by 2019 the environment trailed only brexit and the health service as national problems (figure 1). it is reasonable to conclude that, absent brexit, the trio of healthcare, the economy and the environment would have dominated the british issue agenda. in canada, environment/climate change emerged as the top single national issue in 2019, followed by the economy and health (figure 2). as in britain, this situation contrasts with much of the recent past, when fewer than 10% of respondents to national surveys identified the environment as the most important problem facing the country. however, an abacus data poll in late march of 2019 suggested that climate change might be more significant than usual in the forthcoming federal election. results showed that 12% said it would be “my top issue” (anderson and coletto, march 27, 2019). in retrospect this was an underestimate, since 26% of 104 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 those participating in the 2019 canadian election study (ces)3 spontaneously mentioned the environment as their top concern. identification as an important national problem notwithstanding, the environment failed to have a major impact on the most recent canadian and british elections for several reasons. one of these, which we will not discuss at length here, is undoubtedly related to the nature of the electoral system in both countries. as political scientists long have recognized, a single-member plurality electoral system makes it difficult for small parties to elect members of parliament (e.g., duverger, 1954). the british and canadian green parties, with action to alleviate climate change at the top of their agendas, are typical examples. in several elections stretching back to the 1980s in both countries, these two parties never elected more than one member of parliament. the situation remained largely unchanged in 2019 with three green mps being elected in canada and one in britain (everts and harada, 2020: carter and pearson, 2020). however, in other electoral contexts, the greens have done much better. for example, in the european parliament elections of may 2019, conducted under proportional representation in the member states, the greens elected their highest total of meps ever, with the environment the most important issue in that election (pearson and rudig, 2020). similarly, in germany, the greens captured 67 of 709 seats in the bundestag (lower house) in 2017 and were represented in 11 of 16 länder (state)-level governments. figure 1: brexit/europe, economy, environment and health care as important issues, great britain, june 2010-december 2019 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 p e rc e n ta g e economy health environment europe, brexit 28 26 44 49 78 17 12 5 source: yougov and utd-essex surveys. 3 the 2019 ces data and supporting documentation are available at www.ces-eec.ca 105 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: economy, environment and health care as important issues, canada, april 2004october 2019 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 p e rc e n ta g e health econom y environm ent 26 22 10 44 6 4 source: nanos research; www.nanos.co imperfect translation into election issues when considering the salience of environmental issues, we will first examine how often respondents to election surveys mention these issues as most important for their voting decisions. the significance of environmental issues can vary according to how they are defined, as they are susceptible to various formulations. key to the importance of this, or any other, issue type is the link to a party or party platform – are they differentially associated with various parties? knowing this, we can move later to examining the patterns of voting choice based on the issues with a view to observing whether the voting patterns are skewed to benefit any party. ces survey data show that mentions of the environment (also using general terms like global warming or climate change) as the most important election issue are generally quite sparse. until the turn of the 21st century, less than one percent of answers to open-ended election survey questions about respondents’ most important election issues referenced the environment. since then, there have been more mentions, but the norm prior to 2019 was around two or three percent. as figure 3 shows, the exception was 2008 when close to nine percent of the survey respondents did so, likely in response to the widely publicized proposal of liberal leader, stephane dion, to implement a "green shift" in taxation through a carbon tax plan and various offsets. http://www.nanos.co/ 106 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 3: most important issues in the 2004-2019 canadian federal elections 7 9 35 20 32 31 37 24 18 10 3 8 1 3 9 1 2 32 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2004 2006 2008 2011 2015 2019 p e rc e n t economy health environment source: 2004-2019 canadian election study surveys. in general, references to "the environment" as an important election issue are an example of public concern with a classic valence issue. these are major problem-type issues, which all parties agree are threats to national or personal well-being and promise to address in various ways (see, e.g. clarke, kornberg and scotto 2009). classic examples of valence issues are slowdowns to economic growth and rising unemployment and deficiencies in healthcare and other social welfare measures. with valence issues, all parties claim to be on the same side, public opinion is strongly skewed in that direction, and the parties compete to convince the electorate that they should be trusted to deal with the situation. parties which have the advantage in public trust on a particular valence issue strive to raise its salience, while their rivals try to promote other issues, ones that they think will favour them. in the canadian context, raising the salience of the environment usually has been difficult. this is partially because the green party, which has established a link to the issue in the public mind, has experienced difficulty competing due to the single-member plurality electoral system. overall, environmental issues have had relatively minor effects on voting in canadian elections or the results of these contests. the environment can be blended with other issues in elections, including several that usually operate as valence issues. four prominent ones are economic growth, employment, taxation, and energy. links with these issues might work to the advantage of the environment; for example, implementing environmental protection policies might create new jobs and stimulate the development of new sources of energy production. often, however, these other issues have dynamics of their own, which do not involve the environment. more detrimentally, in elections environmental issues are susceptible to framing on other dimensions in ways that work to their disadvantage. examples are debates regarding the cost-effectiveness of government subsidies to 107 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 environmentally-friendly industries or efforts to encourage consumers, such as the construction and installation of solar panels or the purchase of electric cars. the dispute over the benefits or drawbacks of nuclear power for the environment has a separate discourse. in the canadian context, the most important way in which discussions of environmental policy have been diverted has involved the subject of carbon taxation. there have been two prior canadian federal elections where the subject of carbon taxation has been an important issue. the first instance, little remembered today, was in 1980. the 1980 election came as a result of the defeat of the progressive conservative (pc) minority government, led by joe clark, which came to power only in may of the previous year. the clark government was defeated in parliament over its budget in which finance minister john crosbie proposed a tax of 18 cents a gallon (four cents a litre) on gasoline at the pump. it is not entirely clear why the conservatives did this, since the proposal was never mentioned in the previous campaign, although it was justified in terms of both revenue and conservation. the budget bill was voted down in parliament and the pcs were defeated in the ensuing election (leduc and pammett 2016). did the proposed tax influence the election result? in an analysis of voting patterns between 1979 and 1980, there is a slight overall pc advantage over the liberals among those citing the budget, gasoline prices and the 18 cent tax as most important issues in the election. true, this came mainly from 1979 conservative voters staying with their party in 1980, but switching patterns only slightly favoured the liberals. the main negative factor for the pcs was not the budget or the tax but, rather, a very negative public judgment on clark, which was arrived at for many reasons. what was clear was that protection of the environment got lost in the discussion of the tax and the ineptitude of the government (clarke, jenson, leduc and pammett 1984, 167171). the 2008 canadian federal election was also called "early", in this case when stephen harper’s minority government, in power since 2006, judged the circumstances were right to try for a majority. one of the reasons for this was the announced policy of the liberal party, then led by stephane dion. dion had been a surprise victor in the liberal leadership convention held two years before. although he had been environment minister in the previous liberal government of paul martin, dion had opposed the carbon tax plan advanced by another candidate, michael ignatieff, during the leadership campaign. however, dion was converted to the idea, and proposed an elaborate "green shift" taxation plan during the election campaign. through a combination of tax decreases and proposed rebates to low-income people, the proposed tax was defined as revenue neutral, so the campaign position was that it was a tax shift not a tax increase. however, the harper conservatives saw their opportunity to attack the liberal proposal as a "tax on everything", given the ubiquitous nature of carbon. they promoted their leader’s economic competence and offered a "cap and trade" alternative for environmental policy. the conservatives won re-election, but not a majority (pammett and dornan 2008). once again, we can ask, how strategically disastrous was the green shift proposal in 2008? public opinion both before and after the election showed a small majority in support of the proposal. examining voting patterns showed a small net gain for the liberals among those voters in both 2006 and 2008 who thought it was the most important election issue. in this case, however, environmentally-concerned voters were scattered across the electoral landscape, with the new democratic party (ndp) and the greens also gaining from the issue. and responding to 108 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 a question asking “which party would be best at protecting the environment?” the majority answer was the green party, indicating an overall hesitancy about the liberals. the liberals failed to forge a strong "link to party" on the issue. and once again, the discussion during the campaign largely bypassed the seriousness of the condition of the environment. the carbon tax situation became an issue in the 2019 election in a different guise. the liberals had not intended to impose a carbon tax at the federal level. rather, they conceived of it as a "backstop" to be employed only in cases where provinces did not adopt plans consistent with federal requirements. as it turned out, several provinces refused to do so, including ontario, new brunswick, and the three western provinces of saskatchewan, manitoba, and alberta. therefore, a carbon tax was applied in these provinces, offset by federal rebates. recent canadian public opinion polling has shown that carbon taxation is not necessarily the toxic policy position it is sometimes thought to be, a finding consistent with some of the election findings reported earlier. in 2012, a survey found that 51 percent favoured a carbon tax, with support highest in british columbia and quebéc (lachappelle, borick and rabe 2012). similar findings (49 percent support and 44 percent opposed) are reported from another study over the 2011-15 period (mildenberger et al. 2016). an angus reid poll in october 2018 gave the national figures of 54 percent support and 46 percent opposed, although those figures were obtained only after the rebates were announced (angus reid 2018). in november 2018, abacus data reported that 59 percent of respondents agreed that “a national carbon price is a step in the right direction”, and also that 57 percent said that “if [they] were an mp, [they] would vote for a carbon tax” (anderson and coletto 2018). in the event, the carbon tax was not a major issue in the 2019 election on its own, but emerged as a provincial rights issue in the western provinces. once again, the seriousness of the environmental/climate change situation was not centre stage in that discussion. in britain, one analysis states that “the issue salience of climate change rose sharply in the uk during 2019, with the result that the election took place in the context of record levels of concern about the environment” (carter and pearson 2020, 746). nevertheless, the basis of issue choice between the major parties in the election was dominated by brexit. looking back to the 2016 referendum campaign on continued membership in the european union, there was not much discussion about how brexit might affect environmental protection efforts. the referendum produced a leave majority and, subsequently, there has been considerable attention given to the implications of leaving the eu for continued cooperation on various issues including the environment (hepburn and teytelboym 2017; farstad, carter and burns 2018). arguments have gone both ways. the conservatives have claimed that brexit would give the uk an opportunity to fashion a climate change policy of its own, which could be a better one. in contrast, the liberal democrats have maintained that brexit needs to be reversed so that a strong eu climate change policy would still be in force. under the leadership of jeremy corbyn, labour did not advocate a strong pro or con brexit policy and was largely bypassed when environmental policy after brexit was discussed. 109 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 4. top three most important issues in the 2015, 2017 and 2019 british general elections 18 60 59 53 64 57 67 39 37 9 7 23 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2015 2017 2019 p e rc e n t europe/brexit health economy environment source: 2015, 2017, 2019 utd-essex election surveys. the british election issue agenda in 2019 was dominated by two topics: brexit and the state of the national health service (nhs). when presented with a list of issues and asked to designate three as “most important”, 59 percent of the respondents in the 2019 university of texas at dallas (utd)-university of essex national election survey chose brexit, but nearly as many, 57 percent chose the nhs.45 as figure 4 shows, the nhs also had been a very salient issue in the two preceding (2015, 2017) general elections, while relations with the european union became a highly controversial topic in 2017 in the wake of the 2016 brexit referendum and the acrimonious controversies and manifold uncertainties it precipitated. in contrast, the economy was persistently salient, although the percentage citing it declined from 67 percent in 2015 to 37 percent in 2019. historically, the environment has been a very minor issue in british general election campaigns and environmental concerns do little to explain the decisions voters make (clarke et al. 2009). parties and their leaders typically focus their campaigns on classic valence issues, emphasizing their ability to deliver economic prosperity, provide generous funding for the nhs, and protect the citizenry from threats to national and personal security. in this regard, figure 4 shows that only seven percent of the 2015 utd-essex election survey respondents selected the environment 5 information about the 2015, 2017 and 2019 utd-university of essex election study data is available from the authors upon request. the data will be archived on the harvard dataverse (dataverse.harvard.edu) in the spring of 2021. 110 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 as one of their top three issues.6 nine percent did so in 2017. however, similar to their canadian counterparts, british voters responded differently in 2019, breaking the longstanding pattern of apparent disregard. nearly one-quarter of them designated the environment as an important issue. as will be discussed below, however, this heightened identification of the environment as an election issue had only minor effects on the choices canadian and british voters made in 2019. inadequate election manifestos great britain has a long history of party manifestos being published by political parties prior to every national election. these documents are expected, and indeed ostensibly sold, by all the major parties during the campaign. the 2019 election was no exception, but the three major parties differed substantially in the amount of attention they devoted to the environment. the conservatives devoted only two of 64 pages to short statements of environmental promises in their document, get brexit done (conservative party 2019). emphasizing that “conservation is, and always has been, at the heart of conservatism”, the party promised to make investments in green technology, help industry to create new green jobs, and place a moratorium on fracking for oil (2019, 55). the conservatives also promised to improve britain’s natural environment by tree planting and creating new national parks, and they made a point of saying “we will make no changes to the hunting act” (2019, 43), in reference to an issue which had divided the party due to the banning of the traditional practice of using dogs to hunt foxes and other animals. labour, in contrast, promised nothing less than “a green industrial revolution that will create one million jobs in the uk to transform our industry, energy, transport, agriculture and our buildings, while restoring nature”, as the first item in its manifesto (labour party 2019, 12). the party also proposed creating several state institutions, like a sustainable investment board, a national investment bank, a local transformation fund, a uk national energy agency and 14 regional energy agencies, and a complete new sustainable transport system (2019, 13-21). for their part, the liberal democrats’ plan, stop brexit build a better future, proposed “a ten-year emergency programme” to “insulate all britain’s homes by 2030”, as well as to generate the majority of power from renewable sources (liberal democratic party 2019, 41). a long list of government actions follows in the liberal democratic manifesto. the liberal democrats’ pledge to stop brexit meant they wanted to see eu environmental regulations retained, but the ambiguous labour stand on brexit meant it was unclear how their proposed environmental agenda would tie in with european climate change policies. in 2019, the canadian liberal party invited voters to choose forward: a real plan for the middle class, which promised to meet a number of climate change targets (liberal party of canada 2019). the liberals aimed to “achieve net-zero emissions by 2050” by “set[ting] legallybinding, five year milestones, … appoint[ing] a group of scientists, economists and experts, … introducing new carbon-reducing measures, [and] giving workers access to the training, support 6 earlier british national election surveys employing an open-ended format for voters’ issue concerns record even fewer mentions of the environment or related themes such as climate change or global warming (see, e.g. clarke et al. 2009). 111 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 and new opportunities needed to succeed in the clean economy” (2019, 29). these general statements are followed by pledges to plant two billion trees over 10 years, lower heating bills, and “help every canadian child learn how to camp” (30-35). for the conservative party of canada (cpc), andrew scheer’s plan for you to get ahead proposed to remove carbon taxes and replace them with “green technology”, create “a cleaner and greener natural environment” and take “the climate change fight global” (2029, 38). finally, canada’s ndp promised to “declare a climate emergency and put in place ambitious, science-based greenhouse gas reductions targets” which will “create over 300,000 good jobs in all communities” (2019, 43-44). some of these climate change plans were more ambitious than others; those of the conservative parties in both countries were relatively minimal. occasionally, the manifestos offered a choice; the canadian liberal party proposed to “continue to lead with a price on pollution” (2019, 29) whereas the conservatives would not use taxes to address climate change (2019, 39). none of the major party programs in either country addressed a potential environment-economy tradeoff, whereby job losses might occur in traditional energy industries. the closest any of them came to this was the reference in the manifesto of the british labour party to "transition" as part of the green industrial revolution and to a climate apprenticeship program (labour party 2019, 18) to help with training in the green economy. usually, however, the goals were lofty, the language determined, and the proposals to create government agencies, boards, commissions, and consultations, together with new green jobs, numerous. nowhere were public sacrifices demanded, vital public policy choices outlined, or diminished futures predicted. future targets were often a long way away, as with the liberal party of canada’s pledge to “achieve net-zero emissions by 2050” (2019, 29). life in an environmentally-sustainable future would go along much as usual, except things would be better. the air would be cleaner, there would be fewer temperature extremes, and there would be lots of new "green" jobs. environmental concerns were presented as valence issues in all the party programs in both countries. environmental protection was totally "upside" – there were no shortor long-term costs or tradeoffs involved. the only party to touch on a controversial policy was the reference by the conservative party of canada to their determination to do away with a carbon tax. this position was not news to canadian voters, as the conservative party had opposed a carbon tax policy for many years, and had refused to countenance the idea when stephen harper was in power. the overall environmental component of the manifestos of both the canadian and british conservative parties was generally considered to be weak, and was a recognition that voters of both parties would be making decisions based on other issues, as will be shown in the next section. all the canadian parties, however, tried to show their leaders in environmentally friendly situations, with pictures of conservative leader andrew scheer walking in the forest, and the liberals’ justin trudeau and the ndp’s jagmeet singh both paddling canoes! the environment and voting in 2019 as discussed above, valence issues typically dominate national election agendas in canada, britain, and elsewhere. following the lead of seminal research by stokes (1963; 1992), studies of voting behaviour in the two countries have documented that judgments about party performance on key valence issues such as the economy and healthcare typically have important effects on the 112 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 choices voters make (e.g. clarke et al. 2009; clarke, kornberg and scotto 2009; see also anderson 2010). the environment is a valence issue – overwhelming majorities of people prefer safe, sustainable environmental conditions and, accordingly, political debate focuses not on what the goal should be but rather "how to get there" and, especially, "who is best able to do it". implicitly recognizing that they lack the omniscience long assumed by neo-classical economic theorists, voters acting in a world of high stakes and abundant uncertainty downplay the details of policy controversies and rely heavily on two key heuristics (cues) when making up their minds.7 one heuristic is partisanship; research shows that sizable numbers of canadian and british voters have flexible party identifications which they are willing to update in light of recent party performance (clarke and mccutcheon 2009; clarke, jenson, leduc and pammett 2019). party leader images are a second influential heuristic. information about party leaders is in plentiful supply – leaders dominate the political stage during election campaigns and are the focus of intense, ongoing media attention in periods between elections. voters use this information to form impressions of leaders’ competence and responsiveness to public needs and demands. in turn, these leader images provide important cues that do much to guide voters’ ballot choices. the indirect effects of issues will be considered shortly. the valence politics theory of electoral choice informs our analysis of the impact of environmental concerns on voting in canada and britain in 2019. we specify a multivariate model using partisan identifications, party leader images, and judgments about classic valence issues (the economy, health services) as central predictor variables.8 to assess the impact of environmental concerns, we focus on judgments about whether job creation should be given priority over protecting the environment. other predictors include attitudes towards brexit (in great britain), immigration and general left-right ideological orientations. several sociodemographics (age, educational attainment, gender, income, region of residence) are also included. since the dependent variables are dichotomies (e.g., vote liberal = 1, vote another party = 0), we use binomial logit procedures to estimate model parameters (e.g., long and freese 2014). we employ data from the 2019 ces for the canadian analysis and data from the 2019 utd-essex election survey in the british analysis. 7 on the importance of heuristics in human decision-making more generally see, e.g., gigerenzer (2008). 8 details about the construction of variables used in the canadian and british voting models are available from the authors upon request. 113 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 5: most important predictors of voting in the 2019 canadian federal election jobs-env, -0.04 singh, -0.05 trudeau, -0.06 may, 0.18 green id, 0.21 left-right, -0.10 cpc id, -0.10 trudeau, -0.15 ndp id, 0.28 singh, 0.32 jobs-env, 0.04 may, -0.07 singh, -0.08 cpc id, 0.14 trudeau, -0.18 jobs-env, 0.05 scheer, -0.12 singh, -0.14 green id, -0.15 liberal id, 0.18 trudeau, 0.67 scheer, 0.53 v ote green v ote ndp v ote cpc v ote liberal liberal id, -0.05 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 change in vote probabilities note: probabilities calculated from binomial logit analyses of factors affecting voting for various parties. 114 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 5 displays key results of this modeling exercise for voting in the 2019 canadian federal election.9 this figure shows the ability of the most influential, statistically significant predictors to change the probability of voting for various parties. considering liberal party voting first, and focusing on the five strongest predictors, we see that feelings about party leader justin trudeau are very important. as voters’ feelings about him increase from highly negative to highly positive, the probability of voting liberal increases by .67 points (on a 0-1 scale). feelings about the leaders of the conservative and new democratic parties are also influential factors in liberal voting, but these effects are considerably weaker. specifically, as feelings about conservative leader andrew scheer move from negative to positive, the probability of voting liberal declines by .12 points. the comparable decrease as feelings about ndp leader jagmeet singh go from negative to positive is .14 points. as expected, the probability of voting liberal is also influenced by being a liberal or a green party identifier – liberal identifiers are .18 points more likely to vote liberal and green identifiers are .15 points less likely to do so. judgments that job creation should have priority over the environment have statistically significant, but small, effects. all else being equal, voters favouring jobs over environment have a .05 points greater probability of voting liberal. these results for liberal voting are echoed in the analyses of voting for other canadian parties. party leader images are consistently paramount. specifically, the probability of voting conservative increases by .53 points as feelings about cpc leader andrew scheer moves from negative to positive. the comparable increase for ndp voting as feelings about party leader jagmeet singh increase is .32 points and that for green voting as feelings about party leader elizabeth may increase is .18 points. similar to the liberal analysis, the list of the other top five predictors is dominated by partisanship variables. the only exception is left-right ideological orientations which, when moved across the scale from left to right, reduce the likelihood of ndp voting by .10 points. again, the direct impact of favouring jobs over the environment is very modest, increasing the probability of a conservative vote by .04 points and reducing the probability of a green vote by an equal amount. 9 estimated parameters for the canadian and british vote models are presented in appendices a and b, respectively. 115 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 6: how beliefs about whether jobs should have priority over environment affected feelings about party leaders in the 2019 canadian federal election 41.3 39.3 43.3 44.8 35.2 46.2 51.7 52.5 30 35 40 45 50 55 strongly disagree disagree neither agree strongly agree jobs should have priority over environment l e a d e r d is li k e -l ik e s c o re trudeau scheer singh may note: feelings about canadian party leaders measured on 0-100 dislike-like scale. the dominance of leader images in these analyses suggests the possibility that environmental concerns exerted significant indirect effects on voting by working to shape feelings about the leaders. to assess this possibility, we performed a second set of multivariate analyses using these feelings (measured on a 0-100 dislike-like scale) as dependent variables. in addition to the "priority of jobs over environment" variable, predictors included all those used in the voting model described above. figure 6 summarizes the model estimates of the impact of the jobs over environment variable on leader images. as shown, the largest effects are for conservative leader andrew scheer, and green leader elizabeth may. in scheer’s case, average feelings about him are 35.2 among voters who “strongly disagree” that jobs should be given priority over the environment to 44.8 among those who “strongly agree” with this proposition. the effect on feelings about elizabeth may are larger but, as expected, move in the opposite direction, decreasing from 52.5 among those favouring the environment to 39.3 among those prioritizing jobs. effects for the ndp and liberal leaders are considerably smaller. in both cases, these leaders are more warmly received by voters who favour the environment over jobs, with feelings about jagmeet singh moving from 51.7 to 46.2 and from 43.2 to 41.3 for justin trudeau. 116 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 overall, these results indicate that attitudes toward the environment mattered in the 2019 canadian federal election, but the effects are largely indirect and modest in size.10 figure 7: most important predictors of voting in the 2019 british general election scotland, -0.08 johnson, -0.08 pro-brexit, -0.09 corbyn, -0.11 lib dem id, 0.20 swinson, 0.27 age, -0.13 labour id, 0.23 corbyn, 0.34 lib dem id, -0.11 age, 0.12 conservative id, 0.12 corbyn, -0.19 johnson, 0.55 conservative id, 0.17 vote conservative vote labour vote liberal democrat scotland, -0.13 johnson, -0.19 -1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 change in vote probability note: probabilities calculated from results of binomial logit analyses of factors affecting voting for various parties. 10 this finding remains unchanged if mentions of the environment as most important issue are used in the multivariate analyses of voting and feelings about party leaders rather than priority accorded to the economy versus the environment. 117 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 results of similar multivariate models of factors affecting voting in the 2019 british general election are shown in figure 7. given the very small number of green party voters in the utdessex survey, we do not do a separate analysis of voters for that party. the major message of figure 7 in the present context is the absence of direct effects of environmental concerns on conservative, labour, and liberal democrat voting. neither designating the environment as a most important issue nor giving priority to the environment over the economy is a top-five predictor of voting for any of these parties. and, only in the labour analysis, does one of these predictors (environment as a most important issue) have a significant effect, working to decrease the probability by .04 points. similar to the canadian analyses, the major predictors of voting in the 2019 british election are leader images and partisanship. for example, very positive rather than very negative feelings about conservative leader boris johnson increase the probability of a conservative vote by .55 points. comparable changes in feelings about labour leader jeremy corbyn and liberal democrat leader jo swinson boost the likelihood of voting labour or liberal democrat by .34 and .27 points, respectively. figure 7 also shows that partisan attachments had several "top five" effects, although the strength of these effects was considerably less than the impact of leader images. figure 8: how beliefs about priority of environment versus economy affected feelings about party leaders in 2019 british general election 4.6 3.7 4.0 4.8 3.0 3.5 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 economy not sure environment priority economy or env ironme nt l e a d e r d is li k e -l ik e s c o re johnson corbyn swinson note: feelings about british party leaders measured on 0-10 dislike-like scale. 118 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 as in the canadian case, we also investigate whether environmental concerns have indirect effects by influencing how british voters react to the party leaders. for this purpose, we employ multivariate models identical to the voting analyses just described. the results show that designating the environment as an important issue and giving priority to the environment over jobs have negative effects on feelings about boris johnson. in contrast, favouring the environment rather than jobs has positive effects on feelings about jeremy corbyn and jo swinson. as figure 8 illustrates, average feelings about johnson on a 0 (dislike) to 10 (like) scale only move from 4.8 among those favouring the economy to 4.6 among those emphasizing the environment. effects on feelings about corbyn and swinson are somewhat larger. average feelings about corbyn increase from 3.0 among voters prioritizing the economy to 3.7 among those favouring the economy, with the comparable scores for swinson being 3.5 and 4.0. these modest indirect effects of environmental concerns on electoral behaviour via leader images provide additional testimony of the failure of environmental issues to "cut through" in the 2019 british general election. limited impact on election outcomes finally, we look at the limited possibilities for environmental/climate change issues to affect the overall results of the 2019 canadian and british elections. to do this, survey respondents choosing environment as their most important issue (canada) or as one of their three most important issues (britain) have been identified in tables 1 and 2, for comparison with respondents choosing other issues. to create this table, we identified the reported status and behaviour of the respondents in the previous election (2015 in canada and 2017 in britain) and cross-tabulated this with reported vote in 2019. by computing percentages over the entire complement of 2019 voters, we can measure the effect of the environment issue on the magnitude and direction of overall flows of the vote between the two most recent elections. 119 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 table 1: effects of the environment, economy and other issues in the 2019 canadian federal election a. environment liberal cpc ndp bq green switch to 0.9 0.05 1.3 1.0 1.6 remain with 5.0 0.8 1.4 0.8 0.7 re)enter 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.5 total 6.6 1.6 3.5 2.0 2.8 b. economy liberal cpc ndp bq green switch to 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.3 remain with 3.6 4.8 0.7 0.1 0.1 re)enter 0.6 0.7 0.3 -- 0.1 total 4.8 6.5 1.7 0.4 0.4 c. all other issues liberal cpc ndp bq green switch to 2.2 4.2 3.8 2.2 1.2 remain with 12.4 13.3 3.4 1.5 0.8 re)enter 2.2 2.3 1.9 0.4 0.8 total 14.6 19.8 9.1 4.1 2.8 source: 2019 ces pre-election survey 120 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 table 2. effects of brexit, nhs, economy and environment in the 2019 british general election a. brexit liberal other conservative labour democrat green party switch to 6.2 3.1 3.6 .7 3.4 remain with 27.7 10.2 4.3 .5 3.2 re)enter 2.0 1.1 .5 .7 1.3 total 35.9 14.4 8.4 1.5 7.9 b. nhs, health care liberal other conservative labour democrat green party switch to 5.7 4.5 3.0 .9 2.6 remain with 17.9 14.2 4.5 .3 3.0 re)enter 1.6 1.4 .4 .3 .9 total 25.2 20.1 7.9 1.5 6.5 c. economy liberal other conservative labour democrat green party switch to 2.9 .7 2.1 .5 1.5 remain with 10.0 7.6 2.7 .6 1.8 re)enter 1.4 1.2 .3 .1 .8 total 14.3 9.5 5.1 1.2 4.1 d. environment liberal other conservative labour democrat green party switch to 1.7 1.4 1.4 .7 1.1 remain with 5.1 5.7 2.4 .1 .9 re)enter .3 .5 .5 .2 .4 total 7.1 7.6 4.3 1.0 2.4 source: 2019 utd-essex election survey panel 1 in table 1 shows that there was a modest impact of environment on the outcome of the 2019 canadian election, in the sense that all parties except the conservatives benefitted. in particular, the largest number in this panel (five percent of 2019 voters) are 2015 liberal voters who stayed with their party because of the environment issue. the largest amount of vote switching between the two elections was comprised of people moving to the greens, but this is a relatively small number overall (1.6 percent of 2019 voters). the data in table 1 thus emphasize that the environment was only one issue among many with quite modest effects on the 2019 canadian federal election. the economy was almost as important to the liberals, and considerably more important to conservative voters. a wide variety of other issues was cited by 121 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 people choosing the various parties. the limited impact, and the nebulous way the environment issue was defined in the party manifestos, means that the resulting liberal government had little explicit instruction from the public about the policies they should undertake, except, of course, that those policies should move "forward" and create "good jobs". who would disagree? in britain, the pattern of issue choice was considerably different, but the impact of the environment (table 2, panel d) was, if anything, less important than it was in canada. (bear in mind that three issue choices were allowed in the question in britain, so all the totals are higher than those in table 1 for canada.) the overall effect of environmental issue voting did not favour any of the larger parties, and the impact was considerably lower than that for the economy (panel c), the healthcare system (panel b), and especially for brexit (panel a), an issue vital to the conservative victory in the election. given the minimal specifics expressed in the victorious conservative party manifesto, and uncertainties about brexit arrangements to be negotiated with the eu, the election did precious little to clarify the future course of british environmental policy. conclusion: not easy going green the environment is primarily presented as a valence issue in canadian and british elections. defined as a large societal problem which all parties and their leaders promise to address if elected, it has competed with several other well established valence issues; this was certainly the case in the two electoral contests considered in detail here. the other two most important valence issues, the economy and healthcare, can be presented as complementary to environmental concerns, in that a "green" economy can create jobs, and a cleaner environment can alleviate demands on the health system. often, however, there is competition among these three valence issues for salience, funding, and policy direction. money spent on the environment can mean money not spent on hospitals and the health system. strict environmental regulation and carbon taxes can be presented as costing jobs and emptying the public’s wallets. this helps to explain why in times of economic recession, or in times of health emergencies, environmental issues can get pushed to the sidelines. a further illustration is provided by the fact that the 2020 coronavirus pandemic forcefully depressed public opinion identifying the environment as the most important problem facing the country to, in the canadian case, less than half its january value in april and may (nanos 2020). our analysis of the party manifestos presented earlier shows that none of the parties contesting the 2019 canadian and british elections presented environmental protection in terms which competed with other fields; rather, voters were invited to tacitly assume that the economy would be buoyed by green jobs and a cleaner environment would produce a healthier population. when they are addressed by the parties, and all parties devote attention (sometimes considerable attention) to environmental issues in their manifestos, their words sound sincere and their proposed actions sound sensible. all the major parties are adept at creating virtue-signaling "environmental action plans" which do not demand sacrifices on the part of voters, such as the plans to plant large numbers of trees proposed by several parties in both countries in 2019. when dealing with the subject of jobs, parties try to avoid colliding with environmental concerns by proposing to create "new green jobs" rather than focusing on job losses in fossil fuel industries. carbon taxes are not stressed, but when parties are brave enough to admit to plans to impose 122 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 them, these taxes are offset with rebates or with subsidies to promote purchasing electric vehicles. electricity pricing not being a responsibility of national governments, any additional costs there may be ignored. the result, as we have shown here, is that environmental issues, despite being identified as major problems, have not been major factors influencing voting behaviour or election outcomes in canada or britain, despite the amount of virtuous rhetoric expended on them during campaigns. where environmental issues do influence votes, there is seldom a link to a party that is robust enough to strongly favour one of them, and we have seen that many voters citing the environment as their most important issue use this as a rationale for staying with the party they supported in the previous election. overall flows of votes based on environmental issues from one party to another are not large enough to determine the outcomes of elections, certainly not the two elections examined here. can we envision future british or canadian elections where environmental issues, whether defined as climate change or in some other form, have a major impact on voting and results? it is tempting to argue that this would happen only if three conditions are met. first, a large segment of the public must be convinced that that there is, in fact, an environmental crisis that requires immediate action, a crisis so severe that it supercedes other more immediate events and conditions. second, there must be a clear differentiation among the political parties as to the actions they wish to take. third, electorates must be willing to undergo the dislocations and sacrifices, financial and otherwise, that may be necessary for effective action to address the issue. we may be waiting some time yet for these circumstances to occur. 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politics, edited by dennis kavanagh. oxford: clarendon press. 126 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 appendix a binomial logit models of voting in the 2019 canadian federal election party predictor liberal cpc ndp green bq β β β β β party leaders: trudeau .048*** -.025*** -.016*** -.017*** -.011** scheer -.014*** .047*** -.011*** -.015*** -.015*** singh -.017*** -.011*** .034*** -.011*** -.013** may -.005** -.012*** -.003 .039*** .002 blanchet -.000 -.003 -.005** .000 .049*** party identification: liberal .940** -.723*** -.374** -1.120*** -.966*** cpc -.812*** 1.144*** -1.458*** -1.491*** -.061 ndp -1.126*** -1.024*** 1.536*** -.727*** -1.159** green -1.758*** -.842** -.510** 1.504*** .354 bq -2.508*** -1.843*** -1.538*** -2.220*** 1.158*** environment v jobs .097** .102* -.025 -.330*** -.006 economic evaluations .255*** -.224** -.244*** .203 -.178 health care .260* -.379* .439*** -.710** -.623 left-right ideology .011 .033 -.098*** .099** -.109* nativism index -.031** -.011 .000 .001 .097*** socio-demographics: age -.003 .049 -.071** .016 .054 education .047 .007 -.046 .015 -.158* gender -.049 -.114 -.008 .069 .322 income .016 .127*** -.055 -.035 .013 region†: atlantic .028 -.076 .123 .443* -- quebéc -.240 -.550*** -.476*** -.465* -- prairies -.687*** .660*** .201 -.559** -- british columbia -.229* .112 .208 .107 -- constant -1.759*** -1.791*** -.589 -2.292*** -2.660*** mckelvey r2 = .67 .78 .47 .46 .68 *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; one-tailed test † ontario is region reference category --bq vote in quebéc only 127 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 appendix b binomial logit models of voting in the 2019 british general election party liberal predictor conservative labour democrat β β β party leaders johnson .503*** -.272*** -.172*** corbyn -.235*** .356*** -.232*** swinson -.110* -.136** .392*** party identification conservative 1.344*** -2.692*** -.249 labour -1.184*** 2.305*** -.671 liberal democrat -1.493** -.607 2.310*** brexit party -1.053* -1.798 .668 other parties -.749* .031 .218 favour leaving eu .452*** -.070 -.846*** economy v environment .156 .065 -.048 environment as issue .031 -.527* .182 economic evaluations .224* -.146 -.069 nhs evaluations -.014 .002 -.044 left-right ideology .034 -.003 -.002 anti-immigration attitudes .243* .226* -.130 socio-demographics age .027*** -.029*** .004 education .122 .119 -.022 gender -.679*** .138 .116 income .047 -.016 .132*** country† scotland .245 -1.885*** -.200*** wales -.000 -.322 -.918* constant -2.630*** .037 -3.993*** mckelvey r2 .82 .80 .62 n = 1446 *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; one-tailed test † england is country reference category 128 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 climate change politics in canada and the eu: from carbon democracy to a green deal? markus lederer1 technical university darmstadt abstract the idea of a green deal transforming industrialized societies’ climate policies in a sustainable manner has become highly popular in various countries. this article focuses on the politics behind green deals in canada and the eu, raising four interrelated issues. first, on a descriptive level, it addresses what has so far been achieved regarding climate policy in both polities. second, at an analytical level, making use of the concept of carbon democracy, the study provides a theoretical explanation of why, until recently, progress has been slow in the eu and hardly visible in canada. third, on a prescriptive level, it argues that the notion of a green deal can be transformative and can thus provide a road to progressive climate policies. finally, in a comparative manner, the analysis reveals canada is still highly reluctant to enact any form of green deal, while the eu, with its notion of a ‘just transition’ and the set-up of a transition fund, has made important progress towards an effective and legitimate green deal that could eventually turn the eu into a green democracy. 1 markus lederer is professor of political science with a focus on international politics at t echnical university darmstadt. 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 introduction2 climate politics have changed quite dramatically over the last couple of years, but the question arises as to how truly transformative these changes have been. on the global level, the paris agreement of 2015 revitalized multilateral politics after the failure of the international negotiations in copenhagen in 2009. it has also successfully kick-started new carbon governance initiatives at other levels of government (falkner 2016). at the local level, various cities in both canada (e.g., vancouver, montreal, and toronto) and in europe (e.g., london, copenhagen, and berlin) have been hailed as new spheres of authority, and associations like the c40 cities climate leadership group (c40), the covenant of mayors, and the local governments for sustainability (iclei) have undertaken notable initiatives in the environmental area (bulkeley 2014; fuhr, hickmann, and kern 2018). these governance experiments have been supported by transnational actors from the non-profit and for-profit camps (roger, hale, and andonova 2017). domestic climate politics also have gained more attention on the political agenda in countries as diverse as india, vietnam, ethiopia, france, and the united kingdom. and even where official reversals have occurred, most prominently in the united states (us), but also in brazil and china, new dynamics within society or within opposition parties have sometimes become visible. these new progressive approaches, whether in the us, the european union (eu), or canada, have been labelled ‘green deals’ that aim to advance climate policy ambitions and implementation in holistic and just ways. green deals are thus presented as a panacea for solving or at least mitigating many of the current ecological, social, economic, and political crises human society must confront. this article focuses on the politics behind a green deal in canada and the eu, raising four interrelated issues. first, on a descriptive level, it addresses what has so far been achieved regarding climate policy. second, at an analytical level, making use of the concept of carbon democracy, it provides a theoretical explanation of why, until recently, progress has been slow in the eu and hardly visible in canada. third, on a prescriptive level, it argues that the notion of a green deal can be transformative, and can thus provide a road to progressive climate policies. finally, in a comparative manner, the analysis reveals canada is still highly reluctant to enact any form of green deal, while the eu, with its notion of a ‘just transition’ and the set-up of a transition fund, has made important progress towards an effective and legitimate green deal that could eventually turn the eu into a green democracy. but why look at canada and the eu and compare a country with a regional entity? first, regarding their relevance, both polities are large greenhouse gas (ghg) emitters. canada is the ninth largest emitter in absolute terms, and fourth largest on per capita terms, within the club of g20 countries, with almost 19 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per capita (tco2e/capita) per year. the eu 28 is the third largest emitter in absolute terms, and the 15th largest in annual per capita emissions within the g20, at about 8.07 tco2e/capita. 3 second, both polities claim to be leaders of progressive climate change politics. the eu has long and successfully portrayed itself as a global climate leader (wurzel, connelly, and liefferink 2017), while, since 2015, the trudeau government in canada has tried to convince the world of the greening of its policies. nevertheless, in december, 2020 both polities were still evaluated by the climate action tracker as “insufficient”, although some signs of deeper change are visible, particularly within the eu (climate action tracker 2020). of course, both the eu and canada are highly diverse polities, 2 i would like to thank two anonymous reviewers as well as the editors of this special issue for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 3 data refers to 2017 and includes land-use; for details, see climate transparency (2020). 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 and it is important to differentiate between front-runners and laggards within each (torney 2019; boyd and rabe 2019). finally, both polities are highly decentralized and are thus perfect showcases for understanding multi-level governance. this article is structured as follows: the first part introduces the concept of ‘carbon democracy’ which posits that the extensive use of carbon laid the foundation for establishing democratic institutions in the first place (mitchell 2011). jason maclean has already labelled canada a carbon democracy, focusing primarily on the oil and gas industries’ ability to influence current politics even with a liberal government in power since 2015 (2018, 54). the second part of the article builds on these insights but goes beyond them by describing canada’s and the eu’s emission profiles, their ambitions, and the current policy instruments deeply enmeshed in the societal and political genome of both polities. the third part elaborates on the politics of a green deal, arguing that major distributive changes and some forms of compensation will be needed as the green deal will not always create win–win solutions, particularly not in the short run. the analysis shows that the eu is slowly moving towards a green democracy, whereas progress is much slower in canada. the conclusion summarizes the argument and identifies possible future research avenues. the concept of carbon democracy decarbonization is possible, and at least in the medium to long run it reduces private and social costs when compared to a business-as-usual scenario (stern 2015; the new climate economy 2018). why then has progress so far been rather slow? to answer this question, we have to look at how politics affects efforts to pursue green transformations. the literature on climate politics has advanced various explanations including veto-players (ike 2020), the capitalist system (brand and wissen 2017), domestic politics (sprinz and weiß 2001), national-subnational interlinkages (balthasar, schreurs, and varone 2019), and, most recently, energy cultures (stephenson, sovacool, and inderberg 2021). the concept of carbon democracy nicely complements these explanations by focusing on the materiality of carbon and the repercussions its rising use has had for the development of specific political systems. theoretically, the argument advanced is in line with historical institutionalism with its strong focus on path-dependencies. it also takes up elements of more recent materialist readings that have identified the strong influence of specific uses of energy on societies and politics (morris 2015 regarding values; smil 2018 regarding civilizations). timothy mitchell’s book, carbon democracy: political power in the age of oil (2011), makes the simple but important point that, historically, carbon energy and democratic politics are closely interlinked, and that changes in how we made use of energy allowed and even determined the way mass politics evolved in western europe and north america (2011, 14). not only has the burning of abundant and low-cost carbon in the form of coal, oil, and gas fueled accelerated economic growth, but also the extraction, transportation, and refinement of fossil fuels have shaped sociotechnical systems that have become very influential politically. this started with the massive extraction and use of coal that enabled large-scale manufacturing, modern cities, and those forces that pushed for democracy (2011, 8). hence, democratic claims had a much higher chance to be realized in countries where large parts of the workforce were involved in digging up and transporting coal, as well as providing a whole new infrastructure for its use. workers thus derived power from how energy extraction, transportation, and use were organized. this could be translated into alliances, and carbon could thus “assemble political agency, by employing the 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 ability to slow, disrupt or cut off its supply” (2011, 19). in short, the use of coal allowed workers to become a highly political force and this was, mitchell argues, more important politically than class culture, ideology, or organization (2011, 27). in the following article, the concept of carbon democracy is used as a prism to interpret the evolution of climate policy-making in canada and the eu, and to understand why progress in moving away from fossil fuels has been rather limited. this approach neither neglects the role of specific actors, nor denies the influence of capitalism. rather, it goes one step further and analyzes the strong role of the carbon centered, socio-technical systems found in both polities. three aspects will merit specific attention. first, the influence that the development of large infrastructures for energy extraction, production, transportation, and consumption have had in empowering some actors, as well as practices, and not others. second, that these actors are represented in specific sectors or regions with consequences for policy-making and specific political structures. and third, that the particular context of infrastructures, actors, and sectors has given rise to a carbon centered worldview that has underpinned and strengthened carbon democracy. carbon democracy at work: comparing the status-quo of climate politics in canada and the eu this section provides a short overview of climate politics in canada and the eu, focusing particularly on their current emission profiles and policies. in the second part, these developments are examined by taking the concept of carbon democracy into account. describing the status quo: emission profiles and policies in canada canada’s climate policy-making has seen various ups and downs and has been rather inconsistent, particularly regarding its international aspirations and domestic actions (macunias and de lassus saint-geniès 2018, 2). in the 1980s and 1990s, canada was one of the most active countries pushing for international climate action, but divergence between its international stance and domestic climate legislation became visible after the turn of the century (macunias and de lassus saint-geniès 2018). starting in 2006, when stephen harper became prime minister, the country’s international position on climate action increasingly aligned with its domestic policies, such that on neither front much happened (2018, 6). canada was in no way close to fulfilling its kyoto target of reducing its ghg emissions by six percent of 1990 levels by 2012; rather its emissions in 2008 were 24.1 percent higher than the 1990 base year. it was thus no surprise that canada withdrew from the kyoto protocol in 2011. after the trudeau government won the election in 2015, canada became an active negotiator during the climate negotiations of 2015 that generated the paris agreement, mirroring the position of the us (macneil and paterson 2016). for example, environment and climate change minister catherine mckenna said after the meeting that “canada is back” (king 2015). in its nationally determined contribution (ndc), canada promised to reduce its ghg emissions by 17 percent by 2020, and 30 percent by 2030, against a 2005 base year. however, its own projections show that it will be hard to achieve these goals (government of canada 2015; 2019). currently ghg emissions are 17 percent higher than they were in 1990, more or less at the same level as they were in 2005. in short “despite a change in tone in paris, trudeau opted to keep the national ghg emission reduction targets set by the harper government, which aligned with us targets” (boyd 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 and rabe 2019, 242). the canadian government has officially distanced itself from donald trump’s anti-paris agreement rhetoric, but on a per capita basis canadian emissions are even slightly higher than those of the us (climate transparency 2020). partially thanks to fracking (which has other highly problematic environmental impacts) the build-up of renewables, and reduction in the use of coal, the us has been able reduce its emissions considerably over the last ten years. as various authors have pointed out (schreurs 2011; boyd and rabe 2019, 252f; boyd 2019), there are significant differences between the canadian provinces. alberta alone is responsible for about a third of canada’s ghg emissions, and emissions from alberta and saskatchewan are still increasing. ontario and quebéc, meanwhile, have managed to reduce their emissions quite substantially and are cooperating with progressive us states. they are also adopting best practices from the us. to fulfill its paris agreement obligations, the canadian government launched the pan-canadian framework (pcf) on clean growth and climate change in 2016 and the greenhouse gas pollution pricing act in 2018. the pcf is highly flexible in allowing the provinces leeway on how to tackle climate change as long as something is happening that puts a price on carbon. thus, british columbia (bc) and alberta introduced a co2 tax, whereas ontario and quebéc started to set up an emission trading system (ets), which ontario abandoned in 2018. in april 2019, the federal government introduced a carbon tax on fossil fuels in four provinces (ontario, manitoba, new brunswick, and saskatchewan) after the provincial governments did not establish legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. evaluating canada’s 2030 pledge, the international monetary fund (imf) claims the country’s current plan will not be sufficient. additionally, a recent world bank report on carbon pricing calculated that to achieve the paris goal, canada’s co2 tax would need to increase from 15 canadian dollars per tonne of co2 today, to between 75 and 150 canadian dollars per tonnes in 2030 (2019, 19). according to the dominating perception, canada is backtracking on its paris agreement commitments and is “falling back on the centrality of its bilateral relationships with the united states and contending that it could only consider acting if america was moving in step” (boyd and rabe 2019, 254-255). currently, deep decarbonization is not on the federal government’s agenda. the country has introduced some new policies but will most likely miss its own ndc target, which was not very ambitious to begin with (kuramochi et al. 2019, 32). describing the status quo: emission profiles and policies in the european union if one compares the eu’s domestic track record with that of canada, the eu is doing better, having built up “the world’s most advanced and comprehensive regulatory frameworks, encompassing both eu-wide policies and targets to be achieved by the member states” (delreux and ohler 2019, 2). the eu has overachieved its kyoto target of eight percent below 1990 co2 emission levels during the first commitment period 2008–2012 by delivering a reduction of 12 percent. the bloc has also fulfilled its pledge for 2020 (20 percent below 1990 levels). the main reason for the eu’s success so far, besides the financial crisis and the de-industrialization of some parts of eastern germany, has been a tremendous increase in the use of renewable energy sources: between 2005 and 2015, there was a 71 percent increase of renewable energy capacity within the eu. still, some serious problems persist. in 2017, there was a 0.6 percent increase of ghg emissions within the eu, even within those sectors covered by the eu ets. this was due to an increase in the use of lignite for power generation. in 2018, there was a reduction of emissions by 2.1 percent, but this happened almost solely due to changes in the power sector, and the transport sector 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 witnessed a slight increase. in 2020, the slowdown due to the various pandemic lock-downs has led to further and substantial decreases in ghg emissions, but it is questionable whether these will be permanent (for a more positive reading, see schreurs and schott 2020 this issue). of course, the eu is not a monolithic bloc. some countries are doing more than others; for example, sweden and denmark, according to the 2019 new climate institute’s climate change performance index, are the two global front-runners regarding their path toward the paris agreement’s targets (burck et al. 2019). countries like estonia, bulgaria, and poland, on the other hand, are doing much worse. in the eu, the european ets has so far been the main instrument in mitigating climate change; it covers about 40 percent of the eu’s emissions in six sectors and in about 11,000 installations. non-ets sectors like agriculture, transport (except air transport), or buildings are in the domain of the member states, with each one having a specific target. the eu ets has been perceived as a success, as it has not only facilitated the reduction of ghg emissions, but has been more successful in those industries that are covered by the scheme than those that are not (ellerman, marcantonini and zaklan 2015). additionally, the ets has not reduced competitiveness of impacted companies (joltreau and sommerfeld 2019). the eu ets, which was reformed in 2018 to avoid a growing surplus of emission rights (wettestad and jevnaker 2019; eu 2018), will also lead to further reductions. its phase four, beginning in 2021, includes a yearly reduction of the cap of 2.2 percent (oberthür 2019, 19). nevertheless, problems are still visible, and they have to do with the various exceptions for specific industries and the grandfathering of a still large amount of emission rights. furthermore, the hard nuts to crack – transport and buildings – have not yet been included, and only recently has much progress has been achieved in these sectors (delreux and ohler 2019, 11). interpreting and comparing the status quo: carbon democracy at work the eu and canada have taken divergent paths and it is evident that the former has produced more progressive climate policy-making. nevertheless, both polities have historically featured the major characteristics of carbon democracy. in canada and the eu (or, more historically correctly, in its member states) broader mass participation in politics was influenced by the extensive use of first coal and later oil. during the “great acceleration” (steffen et al. 2015) after the end of world war ii, canada and europe extensively relied on the socio-technological system of fossil fuels, and they partially still do. in both polities, it was not only that economic growth depended on the burning of coal and oil, but a huge fossil fuel energy infrastructure was also formed. this infrastructure supported and strengthened powerful fossil fuel-based sectors, primarily energy companies in canada and the automotive sector in europe, that came to dominate their economies and fed into the development of a worldview that entrenched the use of fossil fuels. first, regarding energy extraction, production, transportation, and consumption, canada and the eu have both strongly relied on the digging up and burning of coal, oil, and gas. in both regions, infrastructures have been set up that have locked in the use of fossil fuels for the next generation. this has been most evident in the discussions about new pipelines. for canada, the “pipelines for paris” suggestion (maclean 2018) implied that the paris agreement could only gain enough political support in canada if its ratification would not lead to a shut-down of pipelines. this might not have increased the government’s popularity, particularly in alberta, but it certainly entrenched the power of the fossil fuel industry. former alberta premiere alison redford stated, “alberta’s oil sands are the lifeblood of our economy.” indeed, if realized, the ghg emissions of the pacific northwest liquid natural gas project would make up about 10 percent of canada’s remaining carbon budget if calculated on a per-capita emissions basis (2018, 52). even more worrisome, the upstream ghg emissions caused by the trans mountain pipeline, which the government purchased in 2018 and which is estimated to work over a period of 50 years, will by itself consume 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 about 83 percent of canada’s share of its carbon budget if we take the paris agreement’s more lenient target of two degrees celsius as a benchmark (100 percent if a 1.5°c target is taken) (2018, 58). bill mckibben (2020) thus claimed that “canada, which is 0.5 percent of the planet’s population, plans to use up nearly a third of the planet’s remaining carbon budget.” furthermore, the canadian government is, all rhetorical claims withstanding, deeply embedded in the fossil fuel age, as demonstrated by the various direct and indirect subsidies of about 40 billion dollars to oil and gas in 2015 (green 2019). for the eu, nord stream 2 is to transport natural gas directly from russia to germany. this will at first reduce germany’s, and thus the eu’s, carbon emissions, as natural gas will primarily replace lignite. but in the medium to long run, it will have serious environmental impacts in russia, and will lock the eu into a new infrastructure set to deliver 55 billion cubic metres of natural gas that will produce about 106 million tonnes of co2 – the equivalent of the annual emissions of the czech republic (stoczkiewicz 2017). similar to canada, though on a smaller scale overall, the eu is thus partially locking-in its dependence on natural gas. as for coal, in the pcf canada committed itself to a national phase out by 2030, although some leeway is provided on the provincial level (boyd and rabe 2019, 248). within the eu, portugal, greece, hungary, france, germany, and now even poland announced the phaseout of coal. however, the closing of all coal fired power plants will most likely not happen before 2038 when germany and poland have finished their respective phaseouts. second, canada and the eu still have sectors that are hard to green, which has given rise to a variety of veto-players. for canada, this is evident in the case of utilities and energy companies, including the huge field of mining and extraction. these sectors represent a form of “prairie capitalism” that richards and pratts (1979) identified as a trend for canada in some western provinces more than four decades ago and that kellogg (2015) recently ‘revisited’ for the oil and bitumen industries. the argument behind prairie capitalism is analogous to carbon democracy in that it stresses the important influence of large-scale ownership of specific extractive assets. the claim of prairie capitalism is that it is not foreign capital that advances capitalist practices, for example in alberta’s bitumen industry, but rather a regional bourgeoisie, and that therefore canada should not be understood as being part of a colonial periphery but rather of the capitalist center. canada exported fossil fuels worth 134 billion canadian dollars in 2019 (government of canada 2020) and the export-oriented agricultural sector is also highly dependent on fossil fuels. these exports go primarily to the us market, leading to a high level of vulnerability to what happens there, but these industries are largely owned by canadians. a restructuring of these sectors would be very cost intensive (boyd and rabe 2019, 242) and would impact the social fabric of canadian capitalism. but it is not only the ‘bourgeoisie’ that is profiting from canada’s carbon democracy; unions are particularly strong in the fossil fuel-dependent sectors. workers in these sectors often enjoy wages far above average and are reluctant to give up their privileged position (macarthur et al. 2020, 5). in the eu, the fossil fuel sector is less entrenched than in canada, but industrial policy is strongly influenced by companies and unions which depend on fossil fuels; this starts with airbus and includes the automotive sector with its strong union culture. furthermore, the strong welfare state in both polities, and the corporatist politics in the mentioned industries, make ambitious reforms with redistributive effects hard to implement (macarthur et al. 2020). both canada and the eu strongly rely on economic growth, and any policy that does not take this into account might face massive opposition. in europe, this became evident with france’s ‘yellow vest movement’ opposing president macron’s increase of gas prices in 2019. also, in late 2019 the german right16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 wing party alternative für deutschland (afd) announced its intention to contest the financing of renewable energy and any plans to further reduce ghg emissions. climate thus became the third major topic of the party. in canada and the eu, these policies also face strong subnational/national actors that have substantially entrenched veto positions. in both polities the ‘federal’ level has only marginal competences to actually bring change to the socio-technical infrastructure in place. for example, alberta in canada and poland in the eu can be considered spoilers of progressive climate change policies. these actors cannot simply be sidelined. alberta strongly depends on revenues from the oil and gas industry which is responsible for over a third of alberta’s emissions (boyd 2019, 2). despite the fact that alberta is a leader in installing wind power installations, with an installed wind energy capacity of 1,685 mega watt (canwea 2020), it is a “reluctant actor” that moves only when external pressure, usually from the us, is present (boyd 2019, 2; macdonald and vannijnatten 2010). thus, within canada’s strong federalist tradition, “ottawa has limited capacity to control or direct canadian climate policy” (macneil and paterson 2016, 556), and it is particularly at the provincial level that more progressive action is being held back. poland, which depends on coal for its power sector, has emerged as the main spoiler of climate change policies in the eu. the eu has repeatedly compromised on its policy frameworks due to polish pressure (skjærseth 2018). the eu might have some leeway on climate policies but is historically lacking the power to regulate energy issues (szarka 2016) and has only recently started to engage in regulating traffic. the eu 2030 framework also shows that the european commission could not set binding energy efficiency or renewable energy targets on the member states, although it could strengthen procedural obligations of member states regarding their energy and climate plans (oberthür 2019, 24). finally, canada and the eu are carbon democracies not only in that both polities rely on energy in a material sense, but also in their worldviews (for a general debate on worldviews and climate change, particularly mobility, see chuang, manley, and petersen 2020; sovacool and griffiths 2020). canadians’ and europeans’ respective identities are to some extent shaped by a tradition of resource extraction and high mobility. in canada, this is part of the pioneer mentality, where nature is understood as a “hinterland” whose purpose it is to provide goods for its citizens, while european populations might perceive of nature rather as countryside that is also available for human use (dalby 2019, 103). in both polities, a culture of high mobility has evolved that relies on individualized transport. in canada and the eu, legislation has introduced higher emission standards, and both polities have started to subsidize electric mobility, fostering some discussions on smarter mobility (barr 2018), but neither has so far started to rethink transport more fundamentally. transforming carbon democracies through green deals? canada and the eu are carbon democracies, but could this be changed through domestic pressure, as foreseen in the paris agreement (falkner 2016)? after all, various actors within civil society are pushing for more progressive climate policies, resonating with a more general attitude within the population. for example, in canada, more than half of the population supports the introduction of market-based mechanisms to stop climate change and this holds true even for provinces that have historically been reluctant on mitigation actions (pew research center 2017; mildenberger and lachapelle 2019). furthermore, the youth activist fridays for future movements are active in 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 both polities even though they have resonated more within the eu. greta thunberg was invited by ursula von der leyen, president of the eu commission, when von der leyen presented the eu’s new climate law in march 2020. thunberg, nevertheless, criticized the eu’s position as a “surrender” because it failed to keep up with the 1.5 degree target of the paris agreement (bbc 2020). similar to the student protests of the 1960s which called for democratizing western societies, the current youth movement calling for more radical climate policies might have a chance to actually make an impact (marquardt 2020). fridays for future is an indicator that climate change has become politicized in the sense that conflicts in this policy field are becoming more intense and visible (schattschneider 1960; hutter and grande 2014). this implies that climate is gaining in salience with more actors being involved, more polarization in viewpoints, and more alternatives being developed (for a discussion of these elements of politicization, see grande, schwarzbözl, and fatke 2019; hoeglinger 2016). many alternatives are currently being envisioned under the term ‘green deal’, a label which refers to franklin delano roosevelt’s ‘new deal’ which unleashed various public works and investment programs in the us between 1933 and 1939 to counter the effects of the great depression, when the unemployment rate ballooned to 25 percent. this governmental involvement in the us economy was unprecedented, and it made the government the largest employer in the country. furthermore, roosevelt’s new deal also increased the power of the federal government in relation to the states (patterson 1969). the metaphor of the new deal is today advanced by very different camps. in academia, for example, there is a group of scholars who argue that a green deal must be radically transformative, and to be successful it will have to overcome capitalism (pettifor 2019; klein 2019). others have stressed that a green deal could be part of ecological modernization and a green economy (e.g. jänicke 2012; pahle, pachauri, and steinbacher 2016; unep 2011; rifkin 2019). politically, the notion of a green deal was most prominently promoted by democratic congresswoman alexandria ocasio-cortez in the us, who became a figurehead for progressive climate policies in america in 2018. she builds on debates that had been around, at least within the democratic party, since 2006 (bang and schreurs 2011) and that at the same time also had gained a lot of traction in some parts of the labour party in the uk. in the us, the green deal offers to provide a political, as well as economic or societal, answer to the climate problem. although president biden was hesitant to endorse the notion of a green deal during the campaign, his “plan for a clean energy revolution and environmental justice” contains many of the major economic, social, and ecological elements of what the proponents of the green deal have demanded, such as a massive roll-out of new energy infrastructures (biden 2020). hence, the us example shows that climate issues are no longer just another environmental problem, but rather a challenge to how the economic system is structured. furthermore, proponents have a very strong focus on social justice and are trying to reach out to blue-collar workers. how are these ideas taken up in canada and the eu, and do they have a chance to provide an alternative to carbon democracy? the green deal in canada: a variety of bottom-up movements in canada, the idea of a green deal has been embraced by various civil society organizations (e.g., greenpeace, north 99) as well as by local communities and indigenous groups who are pushing for transformative policies that would end canada’s dependence on fossil fuels (macarthur et al. 2020). in 2019, many grassroots initiatives which were opposed to the north american free trade association (nafta) have turned their attention to environmental issues and started to campaign for a ‘new green deal’ (coalition for a green new deal 2019). this campaign serves as a rallying 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 cry that unites various political agendas. for example, the movement of “the pact for a green new deal” was developed through town hall meetings which gathered a diverse set of demands ranging from indigenous rights to green infrastructures. the resulting list was labelled a “green new deal”. the movement for a green deal is particularly strong in quebéc, where a “pacte pour le transition” was introduced and signed by more than 285,000 people in april 2020 (shields 2019). at the federal level, member of parliament peter julian submitted a motion for a “green new deal for canada” in december 2019, a legislative initiative advocating for a green deal in canada which stressed the notion of a just transition (julian 2020). what is evident is that in all statements and formulations of the broader movement, the issue of social justice is a major demand and the notions of indigenous knowledge, as well as climate justice, are particularly stressed (the council of canadians 2019). evaluating the various attempts to bring about a green deal in canada, jessica green (2019) suggests that so far it “is more aspiration than legislation. but the momentum for decisive action on climate change is growing.” one can thus conclude that the idea of a green deal in canada is an attempt to move beyond carbon democracy from the bottom up, building on grassroots movements and stressing justice as well as local and indigenous forms of knowledge (see also macarthur et al. 2020). a new worldview is being promoted, but there is still not enough momentum for a new socio-technical infrastructure to evolve. neither are the existing power structures of the fossil fuel industry – particularly the energy sector – being replaced, nor are the veto positions of fossil fuel dependent provinces being challenged. at least for the foreseeable future, it thus seems unlikely that these bottom-up processes will evolve into a game changer to canada’s carbon democracy and prairie capitalism. the green deal in the eu: top-down approaches in times of covid-19 in europe, the idea of a green deal has been advanced in a top-down fashion more than it has in canada. the concept was promoted by the eu commission, which announced that europe will be the first carbon-neutral continent and which promised to “transform the eu into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use” (european commission 2019, 2). the commission’s president, von der leyen, announced a plan worth one trillion euros that over a period of 10 years will massively restructure europe’s industry toward decarbonization. the first objective was initially set to 50 percent reduction of the eu’s emissions by 2030 (taking 1990 as the base year); however, this target was increased to 55 percent in december 2020 by the european council in order to provide new momentum to the stagnant european economy. the green deal is also much more ambitious in its scope compared to former policy announcements, as it focuses not only on carbon pricing through the eu ets, potentially supported by a carbon border tax to avoid leakage, but also on sustainable investment, e.g., in the fields of buildings, mobility, industrial policy, and a just transition (european commission 2019). in particular, the notion of a just transition fund of about 100 billion euros to compensate those regions and sectors within europe that lose out from decarbonization and to counterbalance adverse distributional effects, potentially through compensation mechanisms, has been perceived as an innovative way to get countries like poland on board (claeys, tagliapietra, and zachmann 2019, 15f). the eu’s green deal has been criticized for the fact that not much of the money is actually new or additional but rather represents a reshuffling of existing funds, generating only 7.5 billion euros in new commitments (varoufakis and adler 2020). it is also highly questionable how green the 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 contributions really are, such as those regarding farm subsidies. furthermore, most of the money is supposed to come from private-sector investments, but the private sector is still under-investing in green technologies. to reach the targets of the green deal, about 25 percent of all new investments will have to go into sustainable technologies, up from only 12 percent now (geinitz 2020). finally, the eu reached an agreement on its future budget for 2020–2027, which includes a covid-19 recovery fund and which foresees 30 percent of allocated resources being used to finance various aspects of the eu’s climate objectives. however, so far in all g20 countries the money spent in the context of covid-19 has supported high-carbon economic production, although the eu is the polity investing most in low-carbon production measures (unep 2020, 38). despite numerous challenges, the overall outlook is positive. first, the green deal will lead to some climate mainstreaming as is already visible with the eu stability pact, where – before the covid19 crisis and the factual cancellation of the pact – the idea was floated that climate measures would not count as fiscal deficits. this is relevant as it allows eu member states to invest more in sustainable technologies and practices without having to fear that austerity measures from the eu commission will follow. the green deal also targets the common agricultural policy and infrastructure investments that so far have not been front-runners of decarbonization, thus developing a strong multi-sectoral component. second, the european measures might have some leverage on the member states, which is not only true for potential buy-in by poland but also due to provisions of ambitious parameters for the frontrunners. for example, the german energy transition might get a necessary boost through tougher european regulations (löschel 2020). other players who tried to stop the commission’s work on the green deal, like the czech president babis, were simply sidelined and could not stop the deal nor the recovery fund (oroschakoff and mathiesen 2020). third, the green deal is supported by the european central bank, and some policy-makers have brought up the idea of green bonds which would, for the first time, provide the eu with revenues independent from the member states (taylor 2021). likewise, the european investment bank will continue to restructure its financing to make it greener. similarly, the green deal is going beyond the piecemeal attempts that characterized earlier european approaches (harvey and rankin 2020). the green deal will be particularly important for european clean-tech companies which need to scale up within the larger european market in order to be on an equal footing with the competitors in the us and china that often underprice european companies due to having gained experiences in larger domestic markets (claeys, tagliapietra, and zachmann 2019, 14). the green deal could, therefore, evolve as a first step for the eu to move beyond the characteristics of a carbon democracy. the eu member states’ phase out of extracting and burning coal, and the concurrent investment in renewable energies, allows the build-up of a new socio-technical infrastructure that is no longer based on fossil fuels. important sectors like the european car industry and even whole countries like poland are now being pressured by the european commission and civil society to make the changes they had long avoided (oroschakoff and mathiesen 2020). a new momentum has been created that will make obstructive policy-making much harder to succeed. finally, with the attempt to integrate progressive climate policies across the whole spectrum, and addressing recalcitrant sectors like traffic, agriculture and building, the eu can no longer be criticized for shallow green-washing. 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 conclusion: from carbon to green democracy? the gist of this article can be summarized in two arguments. first, greta thunberg’s warning at the davos world economic forum in january 2019 that “the house is on fire” came right on time. indeed, the science showing the negative impacts on our planet of anthropogenic climate change is extremely disturbing (ipcc 2018). as this article has argued, contrary to official claims, neither canada nor the eu has so far been a successful firefighter. the socio-technical infrastructure behind the extraction, transportation, and consumption of fossil fuels is still to a large extent structuring their economies, societies, and politics in profound ways. carbon democracy has been deeply entrenched in both polities. too often policy and academic debates on how the climate problem can be solved are framing the issue as another environmental disturbance that needs a technical solution, but ignoring the deep-seated entrenchment of carbon democracy. second, not all hope is lost. fridays for future and other civil society movements are contributing to a strong politicization of climate change. and at least for the eu, the politicization has found a rallying cry in the idea of a european green deal. this could lead to what meadowcraft and others have labelled a “green state” (bäckstrand and kronsell 2015; duit, feindt, and meadowcroft 2016; meadowcroft 2012). however, for canada it is evident that much has to happen to overcome the deep-seated practices of prairie capitalism and carbon democracy. as canada has traditionally aligned its climate policy with that of the us, there is hope that the government may again align its policies with the new us administration that plans to engage more constructively in global climate talks and to change some elements of its fossil fuel socio-economic infrastructure. whether 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journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 central governments in multi-level governance systems facing the challenge of jurisdictions with rising emissions1 douglas macdonald2, university of toronto asya bidordinova3, university of toronto avet khachatryan4, university of toronto abstract central governments in multi-level governance (mlg) systems seeking to put in place effective climate-change policies face a challenge when emissions in some lower-tier jurisdictions are increasing, pushing total emissions higher. this paper explores the question of how central governments can address that challenge by comparing experiences in the european union (eu), with declining emissions, and canada, where emissions are rising. an important factor is the share of total emissions generated by the rising-emission jurisdictions. central governments can more easily cope with a small share (the eu experience) than a large share (the canadian experience). another factor is the political power of the central government relative to that of the risingemission jurisdictions whose policy it seeks to influence (greater in the eu than canada). given that the eu and canada are both relatively decentralized mlg systems, more research is needed in federated states such as australia, germany, or the united states. 1 data for this article was updated in march 2021 2 douglas macdonald is senior lecturer emeritus with the school of the environment, university of toronto. 3 asya bidordinova is ph.d. candidate in the geography and planning department, university of toronto 4 avet khachatryan is a ph.d. student in the geography and planning department, university of toronto. 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 introduction countries of the world have not yet been able to reduce global greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions in part because reductions made by some countries are overwhelmed by increases in others. between 2005 and 2016, the united states (us) and the european union (eu) reduced emissions by 13.2 percent and 15.6 percent respectively. that combined reduction, however, was overwhelmed by china and india, which together account for about a third of global emissions and whose emissions rose respectively by 65.2 percent and 58.1 percent, contributing to the overall rise in global emissions of 19.3 percent during that time period (environment and climate change canada 2020b). although perhaps less visible, the same phenomenon exists within multilevel governance (mlg) systems. emissions may be declining in some jurisdictions, but that progress will be threatened if there are increases in others. in australia, a number of states have seen their emissions go down between 2005 and 2018, but in the state of western australia they rose 21.1 percent (australian government 2020). twenty states in the united states have experienced emission declines between 1990 and 2017, but the state with the largest emissions, texas, has increased emissions by 16.8 percent over that time period (u.s. energy information administration 2020). this article examines the challenge facing central governments in multi-level governance (mlg) systems due to rising emissions in some of their lower-tier jurisdictions. here the term ‘central governments’ refers to the eu governing bodies and national governments in federated states. the article offers comparative analysis of two central governments, the supranational european union (eu) and the federated state of canada, which have faced this challenge during the time period 1990 to 2018. the case study analysis allows a comparison of climate-policy success with failure: eu emissions in 2018 were 25 percent lower than they had been in 1990, while in canada they were 21 percent higher. these start and end dates are used because 1990 is the base line for the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc) and for many national policy processes, while 2018 is the most recent year for which data is available. accordingly, a ‘rising-emission jurisdiction’ (rej) is one in which emissions were higher in 2018 than in 1990, regardless of how its emissions may have risen or fallen between those dates. in both the eu and canada, five jurisdictions had emissions greater in 2018 than 1990; of these jurisdictions, the rejs in each with the greatest emissions were spain and alberta, which are thus the focus of this article’s examination. additionally, although it is not technically an rej since its emissions have fallen since 1990, poland is examined here because it had emissions higher in 2018 than when it joined the eu in 2004 and because it is a fossil-fuel dependent economy, comparable to alberta. the purpose of this article is to explore answers to this research question: what determines the ability of a central government in an mlg system to cope with the challenge of the rej phenomenon? it is assumed here that central governments facing this challenge have three options. first, they can ignore the problem, counting upon greater decreases in declining-emission jurisdictions (dej) to make up for the increase in the rising-emission jurisdictions. second, they can themselves implement a mitigation policy, using their own policy instruments, within the borders of the jurisdictions with rising emissions to the extent permitted by constitutional and legal division of powers. alternatively, as a third option (or one in combination with the second option), they can use command or diplomacy, or both, to induce the rejs to change course and use their policy instruments to move to a track of declining emissions. 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 the feasibility of the first option depends upon the share of over-all emissions made up by the rejs. if that share is small, it is still possible to have an over-all decrease. if the share is large, this is less likely. the feasibility of the second and third options depends upon the institutional nature of the mlg system, combined with other factors, which determines whether the central government has the constitutional authority and political power necessary to itself regulate or to pressure the rej to change course. actions of the eu governing bodies and the government of canada are compared in terms of those three options. the eu-canada comparison poses the methodological problem of comparing an mlg system made up of sovereign countries with a system made up of subnational jurisdictions. nevertheless, the comparison is valid for several reasons. first, both canada and the eu are extremely decentralized mlg systems. canadian provinces, while not sovereign, often act as the next thing to it, particularly in the case of the two who most often take the bit in their teeth, quebec and alberta. secondly, there is now an established body of eu-canada comparison literature (for instance, schreurs (2011) and other works discussed below) which compares eu member states and canadian provinces. the following analysis contributes to this literature a new factor that can help explain the eu’s success and canada’s failure to achieve their climate targets. this factor is the relative ability of central governments to address the problem of rising emissions in some lower-tier jurisdictions. thirdly, even in comparisons of two federated states, such as the united states and canada, there would be differences, such as checks and balances versus westminsterstyle centralized government, which would make it less than a perfect comparison. like all social science comparisons done outside the laboratory, the comparison is not perfect. here, however, this comparison is valid since it compares two similar entities which have displayed differing abilities to address the rising-emission problem. this article begins with a review of the factors currently identified as explanatory for the eu’s success at reducing emissions, and canada’s failure to cut country-wide emissions, in order to determine how the rej phenomenon relates to those factors. the viability of the first option, that is to ignore rising emissions trends in the rej, is addressed by providing data on the relative shares of total emissions provided by rejs in the eu and canada. this is followed by examination of how each central government has addressed the other two options – doing what it can to address the issue on its own or entering into diplomacy with the hope of encouraging the rej to change course. the conclusion offers thoughts on implications of the case study findings for central governments in other mlg systems faced with the rej challenge. current explanations for the different emission trajectories in the eu and canada various factors are cited in the literature as influencing emission trajectories in the eu and canada. one set of factors is the physical context. a higher rate of population growth in canada than the eu has been cited as a factor explaining the difference in emissions (harrison and sundstrom 2007; macdonald 2008; macdonald et al. 2013). another factor is geographic location. the eu is located next to russia, while canada neighbors the united states. analysts have noted the different motivations of government arising from those locations: eu leaders in the past have wanted to increase use of renewable energy to decrease reliance on imported russian gas because of fears russia could turn off the tap for political reasons (hayden 2011; vogler 2011; macdonald et al. 2013; macdonald 2014; schreurs 2011), although that concern seems to have lessened with 82 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 german support for a new gas pipeline from russia. conversely, canadian policy makers have been subjected to pressure by business interests wanting to ensure that they would not lose competitive advantage by virtue of canada adopting more ambitious climate policies than did the us (macdonald et al. 2013; macdonald and vannijnatten 2010; schreurs 2011). when climate policy first came on the policy agenda in the 1990s, eu mitigation costs were reduced because circumstances other than climate policy had brought about emission reductions. this was particularly the case in the united kingdom (uk), as it moved from coal to gas, and germany, as it modernized the former east german industrial plants (harrison and sundstrom 2007; macdonald et al. 2013; schreurs 2011). rabe (2007) says that almost half of the eu reduction between 1990 and 2004 came about for this reason. nothing similar has occurred in canada, other than the 2008 economic recession which brought about a reduction in canadian emissions unrelated to policy (macdonald 2020). a second group of explanatory factors has to do with the differing motivations of eu and canadian policy makers. eu leaders have been much more interested in putting in place effective and coordinated climate policy than have their canadian counterparts. schreurs and tiberghien (2007) point out that leadership in the eu has come from many places, including individual member states, the european commission, and the european parliament. in part, these leadership roles are explained by public opinion and pressure from environmental non-governmental organizations (schreurs and tiberghien 2007) but also by a perception on the part of those such as the european commission that climate policy is a means of strengthening the underlying goal of european integration (macdonald et al. 2013; macdonald 2014). in addition, member states already acting on the issue wanted to see eu policy impose similar costs upon their competitors in the eu (hayden 2011; macdonald 2014). finally, all eu policy makers wanted to see the eu play a lead role on the issue in the global arena, perhaps because it could not compete with us leadership on military issues (hayden 2011; macdonald et al. 2013; macdonald 2014; schreurs 2011). such a lead role was only possible if effective policy was being put in place within the eu. while some have acted, no canadian provinces have sought to influence national policy equivalent to that of member states such as germany (or, as rabe (2007) notes, of us states such as california). while eu foreign policy sought a lead role on the global stage, with some exceptions, such as the early global leadership of prime minister brian mulroney, canadian federal governments have limited themselves to ensuring harmonization with us policy. federal governments from 1990 to 2005 provided only minimal leadership. the harper conservative government, 2006 to 2015, was not at all motivated to address climate issues and essentially developed no policy (macdonald 2020). only justin trudeau, in power since the fall of 2015, has displayed motivation equivalent to that of eu leaders. difference in the roles of the oil and gas industry is also a contributing factor. schreurs and tiberghien (2007, 28) point to the fact that europe-based oil companies such as bp, shell, and the austrian oil firm omv were more supportive of climate action than were transnational oil companies based in the us, such as exxon mobile. dunn (2005) also reports that bp and shell in the eu were more open to action on the issue than were their us counterparts. falkner (2008) refers to the same difference between oil firms in the eu and the us, and ylä-anttila et al. (2018) identify the role of the fossil-fuel industry as a factor explaining differences in climate policy. this industry in canada has certainly sought to block effective climate policy, mounting an intense, 83 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 although unsuccessful, lobby to stop the chretien government from ratifying kyoto in 2002 (macdonald 2007) and then successfully lobbying for the deregulatory actions of the harper government in 2012 (macdonald 2020). because canada is an oil and gas exporting entity, while the eu is not, the industry in canada holds more structural power than it does in the eu, which is a net importer (schreurs 2011; harrison and sundstrom 2010). that structural power is augmented by the fact oil and gas play a larger role in the canadian economy than in the eu. the particular case of coal, another fossil fuel, is discussed below in relation to poland. another factor is differences in electoral systems. proportional representation has allowed green parties in europe to directly participate in governing in eu member states and the european parliament, while the first-past-the-post system in canada has ensured they are shut out. fiorino (2011) has found that proportional representation correlates with more effective environmental policy; harrison and sundstrom (2007; 2010) make the same argument. some authors have claimed that canadian federalism is a system less likely to generate effective climate policy than is eu multi-level governance (schreurs and tiberghien 2007; harrison and sundstrom 2007; schreurs 2011). others have pointed to the fact that the eu policy has been developed on the basis of an explicit process of negotiating burden sharing agreements, while canadian policy has not (schreurs and tiberghien 2007; schreurs 2011; macdonald et al. 2013; macdonald 2014). schreurs and tiberghien (2007) suggest this has meant that compared to canada, the eu has been able to more readily negotiate with veto actors by providing them financial compensation. differences in physical circumstances, motivations of governments, roles of the fossil-fuel industry, and electoral systems are all valid explanations, each helping to solve the puzzle of the very different eu and canadian emission trajectories. each of them is also a contributing factor in the rej phenomenon. poland and alberta act as they do largely because physical circumstances blessed them with fossil fuel resources, leading them to act in alliance with their fossil-fuel industries, resisting pressure from their central governments. degree of motivation helps explain the political power of central governments relative to that of rej governments because the more motivated the central government is, the more it will devote time and resources to winning in the conflict with the rej government. that motivation is also influenced by the electoral system. proportional representation electoral systems are conducive to compromise and policy continuity; such systems exist in the eu parliament and most eu member states, except france and former eu member the united kingdom. in addition, the principle of power sharing is embedded in eu governance, resulting in negotiated, compromise decisions. in contrast, a first-past-the-post electoral system in canada produces swings in ideology of the governing party – the enormous difference between ‘do-nothing’ harper and ‘activist’ trudeau is not to be found in successive eu governing bodies. the rej phenomenon, accordingly, does not contradict or require changes in explanations currently existing in the literature; instead, it complements them. the rej phenomenon is a useful addition to that literature because it shows how central governments are challenged by lower-tier jurisdictions intent on economic activity which causes their emissions to rise, even while the mlg system as a whole is committed to a decrease. the following pages explore that challenge and the responses of central governments. 84 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 rising and declining jurisdictions’ relative shares the comparison made here shows that whether or not a central government can simply ignore the rej problem depends upon three things: first, relative shares of total emissions generated by rejs and dejs; second, magnitude of the rej share increase between 1990 and 2018; and third, the extent to which rej emissions increased between 1990 and 2018. in the eu, emissions in five member states (austria, cyprus, ireland, portugal, and spain) were higher in 2018 than 1990, and so these are classified as rising-emission jurisdictions (rejs). five canadian provinces also fall into the rej category (alberta, british columbia, manitoba, newfoundland and labrador, and saskatchewan). table 1 below shows that the rej share of eu total emissions in 1990 (9 percent) was much smaller than the rej share in canada that year (49 percent). secondly, the rej share in the eu only increased from 9 percent to 13 percent in 2018. in canada, the share increased from 49 percent to 62 percent. finally, eu rej emissions increased by 13 percent during that time period, while canadian rej emissions increased by 51 percent. for all three indicators, rej emissions in the eu posed a less serious challenge than they did in canada. despite rej emissions increases, total eu emissions declined because of decreases in other member states. in canada, by contrast, decreases in some provinces were overwhelmed by the rej increases. table 1. canada and eu rej and dej shares and change rate, 1990 and 2018, mt 1990 emissions, mt 2018 emissions, mt change rate (1990-2018) canada 603 729 21% rej emissions 297 448 51% dej emissions 304 280 -7% rej share of total 49% 62% european union 5652 4227 -25% rej emissions 487 550 13% dej emissions 5164 3676 -29% rej share of total 9% 13% sources: environment and climate change canada 2020a; european energy agency 2020 this is not to suggest that the eu governing bodies have ignored the rej problem. they have been very active in implementing policies such as the 2005 emissions trading system and the 2008 and 2014 energy and climate packages which were intended to reduce all emissions, including those of the rejs. however, the rejs’ small share of total 1990 emissions, the relatively minor increase in that share up to 2018, and the relatively small increase in total rej emissions have aided in that task. the reverse has been true in the canadian case. thoughts on the importance of rej share, relative to other aspects of the rej challenge are offered in the conclusion. the following discussion focuses on the relative political power of central governments and that of the rejs in canada and the eu. 85 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 political power of central governments vis-à-vis member states/provinces the second factor which influences the rej dynamic is relative political power. this power balance influences the viability of the central government options of itself regulating within rej borders or attempting to influence rej policy. while political power is a challenging, contested subject (clegg and haugaard 2009), this paper examines only explicit forms of power, what fuchs (2007, 56) refers to as “direct observable relationships of power between actors.” arts and tatenhov (2004, 343) conceptualize power as “the ability of actors to mobilize resources in order to achieve certain outcomes in social relations,” and marquardt (2017) applies this to the power relations in climate mlg systems. three factors influencing the relative ability of central governments to mobilize resources in the eu and canada are considered: financial resources; the distribution of authority between levels of government; and the motivation of governments in terms of their willingness to use power. for the first, examination is made of all the rejs in the eu and canada. for the second and third, the rej in each with the greatest emissions – spain and alberta – provide examples. poland is also discussed which, despite the best efforts of the eu governing bodies, has not reduced its emissions since it joined the eu in 2004. financial resources of rejs governmental resources include intangibles, such as perceived legitimacy, but a fundamental indicator of relative political power is the size of annual revenues. bakvis, baier, and brown (2009, 51) note that larger, richer canadian provinces are better able to resist the federal government than are smaller provinces. fioramonti (2017) notes that at the international level power is related to size of the economy. government revenues are one of the sources of political power in climate mlg systems (marquardt 2017). while power reaches far beyond the availability and accumulation of resources, financial and professional resources are capacities that enable governments to make use of constitutional, institutional, and political resources (marquardt 2017). it is true that lower-tier governments within mlg systems can at times play a veto role. by and large, however, governments with more revenue have greater policy capacity. they can do more to hire staff to understand the science, analyze policy options, and prepare technical arguments than can those with fewer financial resources. accordingly, as an indicator of this source of power we focus upon the portion of total eu and canadian gross domestic product (gdp) held by each of the rising-emission jurisdictions. the following two tables show the share of total gdp contributed by the rejs in the eu and canada in 1990 and 2018 (table 2 and table 3). 86 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 table 2. share of gdp held by eu member states with rising emissions, 1990 and 2018, % country gdp 1990 (% total) gdp 2018 (% total) austria 2% 2% cyprus 0.1% 0.1% ireland 1% 2% portugal 1% 1% spain 7% 8% total rej share 11% 13% source: world bank group 2020 table 3. share of gdp held by canadian provinces with rising emissions, 1990 and 2018, % province gdp 1990 (% total) gdp 2018 (% total) alberta 11% 16% british columbia 12% 13% manitoba 4% 3% newfoundland and labrador 1% 1% saskatchewan 3% 4% total rej share 30% 37% sources: royal bank of canada 2020; statistics canada 2009 as can be seen, in the eu, rejs accounted for 11 percent of total gdp in 1990 and that figure had increased to 13 percent in 2018. by contrast, rejs accounted for 30 percent of canadian gdp in 1990 and that share then rose to 37 percent in 2018. the share of total gdp attributed to rejs in europe was smaller and increased less than was the case in canada. since gdp and related government revenues are one source of the political power of governments, these figures suggest that the canadian rejs were more politically powerful relative to the government of canada than were the european rejs relative to the eu governing bodies. it may be that the canadian rejs were better able to counter central government regulation within their borders or central government efforts to induce them to change their policy than were their eu counterparts. table 4 shows the same difference exists between spain and alberta: spain’s share of total gdp was less in 1990 than that of alberta, and it subsequently increased less. table 4. spain and alberta shares of total gdp gdp 1990 (% total) gdp 2018 (% total) spain 7% 8% alberta 11% 16% sources: royal bank of canada 2020; statistics canada 2009; world bank group 2020 this suggests that the political power of the eu governing bodies wishing to regulate within rej borders or induce rej policy change was greater than was the case for the government of canada. this statement is made with caution because financial resources are not the only indicator of power. two other factors influencing relative political power of central governments and rejs are discussed next. 87 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 institutional context comparison is now made of two aspects of the institutional context which influence the relative political power of central governments and rejs. the first is the system-wide degree of centralization, that is, the authority given to the central government to direct the affairs of lowertier jurisdictions. is the central government clearly dominant or simply first among equals? the second is specific to energy and climate change policy and has to do with the competence of the central government in that policy field. if a central government does not have energy and climate competence, its power in the climate policy field is seriously constrained relative to that of lowertier governments (see weibust 2009, 1-3 for discussion of these two aspects of centralization within mlg systems). the question of competence, however, is more complicated than simply whether the central government has it or does not. particularly in the canadian case, the question of whether the federal government wishes to actually use that constitutional authority is also central. degree of system-wide centralization although operating over very different time periods, the institutional structures of the eu and canada in terms of centralization of authority have moved in opposite directions. two examples are discussed: first, central government power to direct activity of a lower-tier jurisdiction; and second, intergovernmental decision-making. compared to canada, the eu has more power to direct lower-tier policy activity. when the first eu treaty was signed in 1951, there was no authority existing at a level above that of the sovereignstate signatories. since then, by a process of negotiating further treaties, such as those of rome (1957), brussels (1965), maastricht (1992), and lisbon (2007), a set of eu governing bodies with powers in some ways akin to those of a national government (and in some ways not) have come into being. in a formal, legal sense, resulting from rulings of the european court of justice, eu law takes precedence over that of member states (jordan et al. 2010). when authorized by the eu treaties, eu governing bodies can pass binding laws (regulations or directives), which are either directly applicable to the citizens or compel the member states to take policy action. this power is enforceable by means of the european court of justice. the government of canada does not have comparable authority to direct a province to implement certain policy measures. while canada was designed by sir john a. macdonald as a highly centralized system, based upon extensive federal power, it has evolved into one of the most decentralized federal systems in existence. the original basis for federal power was two-fold. the first was the power to disallow provincial legislation, any law passed by a province can be ruled out of existence by ottawa. secondly, the federal government can decree that any particular matter has become a subject of federal, rather than provincial, jurisdiction. for a variety of reasons, those two powers are completely out of sync with current federal-provincial relations and have not been used for over 50 years (webber 2015). unlike the eu, the government of canada cannot require a province to implement a given policy. differences in intergovernmental decision-making systems mean that the eu has the power to make decisions which are binding for member states. the canadian federal government does not 88 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 have that power. eu multi-level governance initially used consensus-based decision-making mechanisms, but has drifted towards a qualified majority system for most, albeit not all, decisions. in contrast, governments engaged in canadian intergovernmental relations employ only consensus-based decision-making. the council of the european union (ministers in the different policy domains) has moved from reliance on consensus to use of qualified majority voting, now done by means of a ‘double majority’ (the council decision must be supported by 55 percent of member states, representing 65 percent of eu population). that said, the eu still uses consensual decision-making for its combined energy and climate decision-making. the 2008 and 2014 climate and energy packages were adopted by consensus rather than qualified majority voting (macdonald et al. 2013; skjærseth 2018). canada has not moved at all in the direction of qualified majority voting. canadian federal and provincial governments decide by majority voting. when these governments engage in intergovernmental relations to develop coordinated national programs, however, they use only consensus. intergovernmental environment and climate policy decision-making process is supported by a secretariat, the canadian council of ministers of the environment (ccme), which has no governing powers. decision-making by federal and provincial governments at ccme meetings is always consensual. furthermore, provinces have the right to opt out of any given process or decision, increasing the power of those wishing to play a veto role (macdonald 2020). weibust (2009, 187) makes this comparison: eu member states are often able to negotiate concessions within a directive, but once a directive is passed, they cannot opt out of the directive. nor can they opt out of enforcement provisions. in contrast, none of the standards agreed to by the ccme are binding upon provincial governments, even though they have all been negotiated by those governments, on a consensual basis. in the eu, the council can decide with a qualified majority of member states in most policy areas, which means that member states can be overruled and still have to comply with eu law. in some policy areas (such as tax harmonization and police cooperation) member states can veto legislative proposals. in canada, in the case of a veto-role province whose participation is essential to the success of the program, the federal government and other provinces will do what they can to keep that province as a participant. for that, any intergovernmental agreement reached is likely to be the lowest-common-denominator, due to the influence of the veto province. in summary, the eu mlg system has a greater degree of system-wide centralization than has the canadian. eu governing bodies can direct member states to take policy activity and can make decisions by qualified majority voting. the government of canada cannot direct provincial policy action and canadian intergovernmental relations uses only consensual decision-making. 89 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 energy and climate competence (jurisdiction) and use of that competence the eu began to govern in the policy field of environment, as an area of shared competence with member states, in the 1970s. competence in that area was formally recognized in the 1987 single european act and the 1992 maastricht treaty. climate has been considered part of that environment mandate, but energy has not. the eu began to govern in the policy field of climate in the 1990s and gained formal shared competence in the policy field of energy with the 2009 lisbon treaty. nevertheless, member states have insisted that they are the ones to decide the energy mix in their economies. the october 2014 energy and climate package adopted by the council included an explicit statement that member states had the right to decide their own energy mix (skjærseth 2018). with respect to canada, in the late 1960s, both ottawa and the provinces enacted environmental legislation. after provincial court challenges, the supreme court found that ottawa held jurisdiction in the policy field of environment as a matter of shared responsibility with the provinces. since the late 1980s, it was generally assumed that federal competence also included authority to regulate ghg emissions, but recently a number of provinces have challenged the constitutional legitimacy of the federal carbon tax (winfield and macdonald 2020). on march 25, 2021, the supreme court of canada found the federal government’s carbon tax law to be constitutional. central governments in canada and the eu differ in their willingness to move into their own jurisdictional space. a central government may hold competence but decide it will not use it. in cases of divided competences, the lower-tier governments are thus left as the only ones governing in that policy field. in canada, harrison (1996) found that from the early 1970s to the date of publication, ottawa tended to only implement environmental policy at times of strong public concern when associated electoral rewards were available. from 2006 to 2015, the stephen harper government for the most part did not use the powers available to it to implement climate policy. the eu governing bodies, by contrast, have always been eager to govern in the areas of energy and climate. we return to this subject below when we discuss the differing motivation of the central governments in the eu and canada. to compare the ways in which the eu and canada central governments have used their competence, examples are drawn from their attempts to influence the emissions of spain, poland, and alberta. the three emissions trajectories are shown in figure 1 below. 90 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 figure 1. spain, poland and alberta’s ghg emissions trajectories, 1990 – 2018, mt sources: european energy agency 2020; environment and climate change canada 2020a; climate change connection n.d. there are two options for use of competence, either regulating within rej borders or inducing rej policy change. the eu governing bodies have relied almost exclusively upon the second of these options, that is, on directives. their experiences in applying directives to spain and poland, however, have been very different. in 1986, spain joined the eu as a newly industrialized country with a focus on building industrial and institutional capacities. in the 1990s, spain opposed a proposed eu carbon tax (padilla and roca 2004) and demanded that, should the tax be adopted, spain be exempted. in 2004, however, the socialist government committed to implementing the eu emissions trading system (ets) directive (skjærseth and wettestad 2008), and the new minister of the environment proclaimed an urgent need for action on climate change including through the ets; framing these issues as “a mere matter of compliance with europe” allowed the minister to overcome opposition (costa 2006). in 2008 and 2014, the eu’s focus on emissions reduction and burden sharing mechanisms during the setting of climate targets for 2020 and 2030 motivated spain to strengthen its climate policy (gobierno de espana 2017). spain’s emissions have increased since 1990 but it has moved from an opposing to a supportive stance and is now making an effort to fully participate in the eu climate effort. the spanish example shows two things. first, domestic politics within the rej is an important factor determining the political power of the central government. an important factor here was climate leadership of the socialist government and prime minister zapatero (skjærseth and wettestad 2008; costa 2006). secondly, this example seems to indicate than an rej whose government is not structurally dependent upon fossil-fuel industries may be more willing to accept the need for climate action. 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 poland spain alberta 91 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 in contrast with spain, poland, heavily reliant on coal, has perhaps been the member state most critical and pro-active in weakening eu climate policies. poland led an opposition group to weaken climate policies such as the energy and climate package adopted in 2008 (szczerbiak 2012) and the 2030 climate package adopted in 2014 (bocquillon and maltby 2017). each time the eu was able to secure poland and other opposing member states’ support by making “significant concessions and financial compensation measures” (carey 2015, 11; see also bocquillon and maltby 2017). the eu took poland to the european court of justice in march 2013 over its failure to implement the renewable energy directive, requiring it to achieve 15 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2020; poland eventually implemented the directive in 2015, five years behind deadline (skjærseth 2018). in december 2019, poland could not commit to implementing the 2050 eu climate-neutrality target (erbach 2020; the european council 2019), although it had not vetoed that target. the eu has managed to avoid a veto by poland and convinced that country to expand renewable energy generation. nevertheless, the eu has not brought about a reduction of poland’s emissions from their level in 2004, when the country first joined the eu. in canada, the central government used only persuasion to influence provincial policy as it worked to develop national climate policy from 1990 to 2003. briefly after that the martin government (2003-2005) developed plans to itself regulate within provincial borders, but then lost power. as noted, essentially no action was taken by the harper government. the justin trudeau government has used its carbon tax both as a way of regulating within provincial borders and of influencing provincial policy by threatening to regulate if the province does not itself regulate (winfield and macdonald 2020). in 1990, the alberta government led by premier ralph klein saw prime minister brian mulroney’s effort to develop canadian national climate-change policy as a threat to its oil-dependent economy (macdonald 2020; for discussion of alberta as a “petro-state” see carter 2020). in 2002, in alliance with the oil industry, alberta lobbied fiercely, but unsuccessfully, against prime minister chretien’s decision to ratify the kyoto protocol (doern and conway 1994). at the same time, the alberta government adopted a much less ambitious target to reduce alberta’s emissions than the canadian kyoto target, without invoking any public protest from ottawa. during the harper era, 2006 to 2015, ottawa made no attempt to reduce alberta emissions. in 2015, alberta introduced a carbon tax and put an absolute cap of 100 megatonnes on oil sands emissions, but it has never put a cap on total provincial emissions. in that same year, alberta premier rachel notley stipulated that alberta would only participate in the national climate plan being developed by ottawa and the provinces if the trudeau government approved a new pipeline (which it did and then subsequently purchased the trans mountain expansion pipeline in order to ensure that it was built). the kenney government in 2019 cancelled the carbon tax (which was then replaced by a federal tax; the tax was not extended to industrial emissions because alberta agreed to itself regulate them, meeting the federal design requirements (winfield and macdonald 2020)). in december 2020, the trudeau government introduced new legislation and a new climate plan which may eventually affect alberta emissions. other than that, however, since 1990, the government of canada has had almost no influence upon alberta climate policy, other than some shared cost programs and alberta’s agreement to design its industrial tax to fit ottawa requirements. in fact, ottawa has aided alberta emission growth by providing new pipeline capacity. 92 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 what are the summary results of this comparison of the two institutional contexts? the eu governance system gives its governing bodies greater power to direct member state policy than is found in canada. the eu has always been willing to use that authority, while the government of canada has not. this greater political power has allowed the eu to more successfully address its rej challenge than has ottawa. degree of motivation of central governments the degree of motivation of governments can also be referred to as the ‘degree of interest’ – how much a government wants a particular policy outcome. the question of motivation is central to the political power of central governments in mlg systems because degree of interest determines the resources that a government is willing to bring to bear as it finds itself in conflict with other governments in the system. resources, of course, are one of the main factors determining political power. the focus here is upon the degree of interest of the central government, which determines its willingness to apply resources in order to influence rej governments’ policies. the assumption here is that governmental degree of interest is influenced in particular by three factors. the first is the issue of differing motivations associated with concentrated costs versus diffused benefits. mancur olson (1965) notes that those bearing concentrated costs are more motivated to influence the relevant policy decision than those receiving the associated widely distributed benefits. james q. wilson (1980) has also used distribution of cost and benefit and associated motivation as the basis for a theoretical approach to policy analysis. for this analysis, the central government can be seen as receiving the benefit, in terms of accomplishing its policy objective of over-all emission reduction, and the rej government as receiving the cost. for an rej whose economy is dependent upon fossil fuels, such as poland (skjærseth 2018) or alberta (carter 2020), the cost may be seen to be high, leading the rej to be more motivated than the central government. the second relevant factor is the ideology of the governing party respecting the policy issue. a centrist government with no strong ideological leanings will likely be less motivated than one situated on its ideological left or right. climate change is now an ideologically polarized issue (rabe 2018) and so ideology of the governing party decides both whether a government will or will not act at all and, if the latter, how strongly motivated it will be. the third factor is the one discussed in the literature review above, in which eu governing bodies have been motivated to act on the climate issue because they believe doing so will help them achieve other objectives, such as global leadership or europeanization (schreurs 2011). it seems likely that there has been no great difference between the eu and canada respecting the concentrated cost/diffused benefit issue. for both, the majority of their lower-tier jurisdictions do not have to deal with strong resistance to climate policies coming from carbon-intensive fossil fuel extraction industries. there have also been in each some, such as poland and alberta, who have been motivated to resist central government pressure. in sum, it is impossible to point to a major difference between the eu and canada in terms of the concentrated costs and diffused benefits. with respect to ideology of the governing party, however, there is a major difference between the eu and canada. as discussed previously, most eu member states and the eu parliament use proportional representation electoral systems, which are conducive to consensus-building and political stability. the eu does not have a ‘governing party’ that changes with elections. this lends 93 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 itself to a policy consistency which is aided by the european commission’s agenda setting role. in canada, on the other hand, the first-past-the-post system can be associated with abrupt changes in orientation and policy, since an election can bring a change in the governing party. for the climate issue, this has meant that canada experienced nine years of the stephen harper government, between 2006 and 2015, during which time almost no action was taken by ottawa on climate change (macdonald 2020). the harper government had almost no motivation to address the rej challenge posed by the western oil and gas provinces of alberta and saskatchewan, due to both conservative ideology and the fact of its electoral base being situated in the west. the result is that, unlike the eu, canada, for almost a third of the time it has been making climate policy, has been governed by a central government with a very low degree of interest in the issue. there is also a major difference with respect to the third factor influencing degree of interest. as set out in the second section above, the eu governing bodies have been motivated to act on the climate issue by their concern for a number of other policies, including energy security, a desire to show global leadership, and the belief that climate action would aid european integration. the motivation of the government of canada has been almost the polar opposite. canada has never suffered from energy insecurity. while prime minister mulroney, who worked with un agencies to convene the 1988 toronto conference which put the climate issue on the international agenda, did display global leadership, successor governments prior to justin trudeau’s election in 2015 showed no desire for global climate leadership. instead, they kept their eye firmly on the objective of ensuring, for competitiveness reasons, that canadian and american climate policies were aligned. thirdly, far from aiding national unity, climate policy, given the degree to which alberta and saskatchewan feel threatened by national policy making, has a high potential to aggravate regional tensions. not surprisingly, ottawa has always compromised and weakened its climate policy for exactly that reason (macdonald 2020). with respect to central government degree of interest and associated political power relative to that of rejs, two conclusions are important. first, eu governing bodies have consistently displayed a high degree of interest in implementing effective climate policy, unlike canada with its nine-year hiatus. secondly, eu governing bodies have been more interested in putting in place effective climate policy than have liberal canadian governments. both have had the effect of giving eu governing bodies more political power relative to that of their rejs than that held by the government of canada. conclusion as stated at the outset, the purpose of this analysis has been to explore what determines the ability of a central government in an mlg system to cope with the challenge of the rising emissions jurisdictions (rej) phenomenon? this analysis suggests that a central government has three options: to ignore the problem, confident that decreases elsewhere will allow a total decrease (at least at the early stages before deeper emissions cuts are required); itself regulate within the borders of the rej; or induce the rej to change its policy. at least for the two cases examined, canada and the eu, an important element determining viability of the first option is the relative size of rej emissions. as indicated, the rej share of total eu emissions was smaller than that of canada’s in 1990; the share then increased less than it did in canada by 2018; and total rej emissions increased less than in canada. the eu rej portion of 13 percent in 2018, with only a 94 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 modest increase since 1990, did not have decisive influence – eu total emissions were still able to decline. even if poland is added to the current eu rejs, that share only goes to 23 percent. the canadian 62 percent share in 2018, after a significant rise since 1990, did have such influence. this raises the question of when do the rej share, and changes in that share, begin to decisively influence total emissions? presumably somewhere between the eu and canada cases is located the ‘critical threshold’ – the magnitude of rej share, likely specific to each mlg system, which means an mlg system can no longer ignore the rej factor and still experience an over-all reduction. while space does not allow exploration in this article, the concept of a critical threshold is potentially useful as an analytic concept and a methodological tool. further research may shed light on this topic. the eu and canada cases show that as a central government moves to itself regulate or induce the rej to change, relative political power is also important. the eu rejs had less relative financial resources than their canadian counterparts – the total share of eu gdp held by the five rejs was less in 1990 and increased by less than was the case in canada. to the extent financial resources are the source of the political power of a government within an mlg system, the eu rejs held less political power than did their canadian counterparts. beyond that, the institutional context tended to give eu rejs less power relative to their central government than was the case in canada. the eu governing bodies have authority to issue directives requiring policy action by member states and can take non-compliant member states to the european court of justice. the government of canada has no such authority. once subject to a directive, eu member states cannot opt out of the program. canadian provinces do have an opt-out right, often while still obtaining associated federal monies and without paying an electoral price since standing up to ottawa is almost always good politics. the eu governing bodies also hold more political power relative to their rejs than does ottawa because they are more motivated. eu policy makers have been motivated to put in place effective climate policy as part of their interest in world leadership on the issue, their desire to reduce energy imports, and because it was seen as contributing to their goal of europeanization. given the contribution of oil and gas exports to canadian jobs and economic growth, ottawa has always worked for national climate policy which does not kill the alberta goose laying those golden eggs and has always been shy about invoking threats to national unity. the government of alberta has always been motivated to maximize economic benefit from oil and gas exports, with an associated rise in emissions, and so almost always has been more motivated to maintain the status quo than ottawa to change it. the government of spain, by contrast, has seen the benefits of partaking in a joint eu effort to reduce emissions, including the benefits of burden sharing which seems to help build trust in the fairness of the eu’s climate regime. in sum, rej share and relative political power have been directly relevant to the ability of the central governments of the eu and canada to address the rej challenge. what can central governments in other mlg systems learn from that case comparison? some of the relevant factors, such as location of fossil fuel resources (which helps explain rising emissions in poland and alberta) or institutional context, cannot be changed. degree of government motivation and consistency of that motivation, however, are in the control of the central government. they should learn from the eu example. 95 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 although the eu has avoided poland’s veto and encouraged its transition to cleaner energy, it has failed to convince poland to renege on fossil fuel dependence, which provides yet another lesson. the eu governing bodies hold more political power relative to that rej than does the government of canada relative to alberta and have put in considerable effort, involving both carrots and the stick of court action, to convince poland to change policy, and yet the result is exactly the same as that in canada. neither central government, confronted with a lower-tier government strongly motivated by the nature of its fossil-fuel economy, has been successful in bringing about a decrease in the lower-tier jurisdiction’s emissions. eu failure to reduce polish emissions shows the importance of the first factor examined, the physical fact of rej share of total emissions, relative to political power. that factor gave the eu success in reducing its over-all emissions, despite the inability of the eu governing bodies to bring about emission reductions in its most determined opponent, poland, and in its other rej member states. secondly, it underlines the magnitude of the challenge facing central governments and hence the importance of the subject examined here, the role of rejs in mlg systems. central government success in addressing the challenge, even with the tools available to the eu governing bodies, is not assured. given the magnitude of the challenge, is it reasonable to assume that the us 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dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 europeans but outside of the eu the eu soft power of attractiveness in ukraine between the orange revolution and euromaidan viktoriya thomson1 carleton university abstract the role of the eu in the promotion of europeanization and the eu political identity in potential member states of eastern europe prior to the 2004 enlargement was important for these states’ future acceptation in the eu community. however, most research and literature have discounted the role of the eu and its attractiveness in the countries neighbouring with the eu that did not have a prospect of joining the eu in 2004. this article studies the process of formal and informal europeanization in ukraine before and after the orange revolution, which occurred five months after the bloc’s 2004 enlargement, and euromaidan of 2013. despite the eu’s passive leverage in ukraine between 2004 and 2013, and the country’s weak prospects for potential membership, the eu’s soft power of attractiveness was still an effective tool that was used by ukrainian political elite and media in promoting informal europeanization after the 2004 enlargement. furthermore, confidence in the eu was associated with support for such liberal values as human rights, tolerance of minorities, and political efficacy. this article posits that notwithstanding weak incentives and support offered from the eu to implement formal europeanization in ukraine, the eu attractiveness was successfully applied by local elite and media to promote the informal europeanization. 1 viktoriya thomson, phd, carleton university 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 introduction studies of the impact of the european union (eu) in post-communist states indicate that the eu pre-accession process significantly improved states’ willingness to implement political and economic reforms (herrmann, risse and brewer 2004; vachudova 2009). moreover, the eu created two sets of requirements for potential candidates – normative (or formal) and informal (hansen 2006, 117). the formal mandatory requirements for future membership included an established market economy, free and fair elections, and the rule of law. the informal ones were those that built on the idea of “we feeling” and conforming to european values (hansen 2006; castiglione 2009). applicant states’ identification with the values in a common community, such as the eu, was perceived as necessary for sustaining political stability within the eu. “when communities have a strong feeling of shared identity, political leaders can draw on this as a resource to promote the legitimacy of institutions” (herrmann, risse and brewer 2004, 4). democracy promotion was one of the most powerful discourses that was used by the eu in the process of its assessment of prospective future members (raik 2004). for eastern european states that joined the eu in 2004, the path to membership was formally stringent. nevertheless, these states’ future as part of the eu was not in doubt because of their european ideals and their acceptance of the shared system of values (kubicek 2009). the process of european integration was perceived as their return to the place where they belonged, or a “return to europe” (vachudova 2005, 83). this was not the case for the former soviet republics, with the exception of the baltic states, which had been annexed by the ussr before the second world war. the role of the eu in these countries was more difficult to define and measure, considering that “the painful discussion of membership” was never raised (hansen 2006, 116). the eu european neighborhood policy (enp) in the states of the former ussr combined relatively high demands for reform with weak conditionally (commission of the european communities (commission) 2003; gawrich, melnykovska and schweickert 2009, 19), which led to limited incentives to comply with those demands. furthermore, after the 2004 enlargement, the discussion shifted towards “enlargement fatigue” rather than future expanding of the boundaries of the european community (schimmelfennig 2008). the 2004 orange revolution in ukraine, which took place less than six months after the eu enlargement, brought hopes for the country’s democratization and closer collaboration with the eu.2 however, the eu’s conditionality rules were not clearly defined due to the remote prospects of eu membership for ukraine (dimitrova and dragneva 2013) and ukraine’s inability to meet the three criteria used in the assessments, such as 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) market economy; and 3) administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement eu acquis, and ability to take on the obligations of membership (commission, accession criteria). instead of membership, the eu applied the soft power of attractiveness, built on a state’s eu membership aspirations rather than on the realistic prospect of eu accession. although some argue that no amount of soft power can replace the lack of capability and absence of effective hard power 2 the orange revolution was a peaceful protest against the results of the second round of the presidential election which were falsified to advance then prime minister yanukovych. the result of the orange revolution was a re-election of the second round that led to a victory of viktor yushchenko. for more details see wilson (2005). 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 from the eu (nilsen 2013, 725; börzela and schimmelfenning 2017, 279), this article contends that the eu soft power of attractiveness was effectively applied by the political elite and media in their creation of discourse about ukraine’s europeanization. citizens’ attitudes towards the eu were correlated with their political orientations and values. citizens who professed higher degrees of confidence in the eu expressed higher levels of political awareness, political competence, tolerance and political activity – orientations and values that are associated with liberal values and that are promoted by the eu as european values. these correlations were stronger for young and well-educated citizens. this article contributes to the discussion of the eu’s role in non-members states political and civil development by illustrating that the eu power of attraction remained an important political instrument in ukraine after 2004. in the absence of formal europeanization, the political elite and media’s promotion of this concept may have impacted citizens’ level of confidence in the eu, which increased after the orange revolution. this article is divided into five sections. the first part discusses the concept of europeanization, passive and active leverage, and soft power by the eu. the second part looks at the relations between the eu and ukraine after 2004 and before 2013. the third part analyses the ukrainian leadership and media’s promotion of the eu and europeanization in ukraine. following this, the author looks at citizens’ perception of the eu and the relationship between the level of confidence in the eu and citizens’ political values and orientations. the conclusion provides the main findings of this research. methodology the research in this article was developed and assessed through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. the texts of the official documents between the eu and ukraine were analyzed to assess their relationship. a content analysis of the presidential speeches in ukraine after the orange revolution and before euromaidan, and of the titles of newspapers articles (450 in total) of the leading political newspaper dzerkalo tyshnya (mirror weekly)3 was performed to evaluate how the concept of european identity and europeanization was promoted in ukraine by its media and political elite. in order to test citizens’ support for the eu and their espousal of the eu corresponding liberal political values, this paper draws on the results of public opinion from the world values survey in ukraine before and after the orange revolution and the results of european values survey and international foundation for electoral systems. 3 this newspaper, together with newspapers den’ and kommentarii, is considered neutral and independent in its coverage of the political events in ukraine (szostek 2014). although it is not the most circulated (57,000 as of 2006), it is considered one of the most influential newspapers by political elite (bbc 2006). 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 europeanization, eu passive and active leverage, soft power scholars who study the role of the eu define europeanization as a process in which states adopt eu rules (schimmelfennig and sedelmeier 2005, 7), or as the emergence and the development of a distinct structure of government to the european level (risse 2001, 3). the adaptation and emergence may be formal with a focus on the institutionalization of the eu rules, or discursive (informal europeanization) by incorporating “a rule as a positive reference into discourse among domestic actors” (schimmelfenning and sedelmeier 2005, 7). the eu gained two types of leverage in the pre-accession states prior to their membership – active and passive (vachudova 2005). active leverage is defined as deliberate policies of the eu towards candidate states. “active leverage is animated by the fact that the tremendous benefits of eu membership create incentives for the state to satisfy the enormous entry requirements, setting the stage for the effectiveness of conditionality within the eu’s pre-accession process” (vachudova 2005, 4). the higher the potential for eu membership, the more likely that candidate countries will implement political and economic reforms that meet eu requirements. in contrast, passive leverage is defined as the attraction of the eu membership without deliberate conditionality exercised in the eu’s pre-accession process (vachudova 2005, 63). the passive leverage is similar to the notion of the eu’s soft power, which is mostly based on the idea of the eu attractiveness (tuomioja 2009; nielsen 2013). soft power is defined as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. it arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideal and policies” (nye 2004, 77). soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others (nye 2008, 95). joseph nye identifies three primary sources of a country’s soft power: its culture (in the places where it’s attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to these values at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority) (2008, 96). in the case of the eu, soft power was based on the idea of a collective european identity and the eu’s commitment to certain normative principles, particularly democracy and human rights (nielsen 2013, 730). therefore, to become european in cultural terms was to adopt european values, “to become more like the eu with the latter assessing the degree of normative convergence/divergence” (wolczuk 2016, 65). for candidate states, to become european meant that they not only had to fulfil the official criteria for accession but that they were obligated to express their europeanization and sense of belonging to the european community (neumann 1998; herrmannn, risse and brewer 2004). very often, this involved applicant countries constructing and implementing discourse on how their state’s identity is relevant to the concept of ‘europe’ in comparison to other states (neumann 1998, 405). “in their competition for accession to western organizations, the central and eastern european (cee) states, furthermore, combined the assertion of their own european identity with the claim “that the next state to the east is not european” (neumann 1998, 406). from this perceptive, the enlargement was understood as the expansion of the international community and inclusion of the countries that have similar liberal values and norms as the eu (schimmelfenning 2001). the eu’s soft power of shared identities helped candidate countries to be persistent in their democratic commitment even after their accession (sedelmeier 2012). 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 potential membership in the eu was not discussed for enp countries. the 2004 enlargement, although perceived as successful at that time, limited the eu’s ability or willingness to engage in further enlargement (wolczuk 2016).4 moreover, the countries that were going to integrate to the eu after the 2004 enlargement were “less capable of managing the ‘overload’ of eu requirements than the countries that joined the eu in 2004” (raik 2004, 594) due to their different preconditions. for that reason, the eu built relations with these countries within the enp’s strategy that offered the neighbourhood countries “a stake in the eu’s internal market, through gradual economic integration, but not membership, conditional on the adoption of eu rules.” (wolczuk 2016, 61). the eu rules and criteria for the enp countries are often portrayed as a kind of wilderness of exclusion, a scenario of a weak voice and asymmetric dependency (wallace 2005; smith 2005). they did not provide sufficient incentives for the countries to implement them, nor did they have a clear final goal as in the case of accession to the eu. “it was the fallacious assumption that conditionality patterns which were successful for the cee countries would also be successful for post-soviet countries with no-membership perspective” (moskalenko and streltsov 2015, 112). as a result, for many commonwealth of independent states (cis) members, the principle of exclusion from the eu enlargement process was a constant reminder that they belonged to a different category of states (hansen 2006, 130). the eu’s soft power in these countries was based on their membership aspiration rather than a concrete promise of membership association (sasse 2008; pridham 2011; langbein and wolczuk 2012). as was stated by lehne, “the core elements of the eu’s offer to enp partner countries have been summed up as the ‘three ms’: money, mobility, and markets” (2014, 12), which were not strong enough to result in long-term transformation. furthermore, the eu’s ability to promote democracy in these countries was constrained by the stability-democratization dilemma that made the “eu often reluctant to push incumbent regimes towards democratization” (börzel and lebanidze 2017, 25) which could trigger instability within the region. research also demonstrates that during neighborhood europeanization domestic actors could use weak eu conditionality for their own political agenda to regain or consolidate their power (borzel and risse 2012; boerzel and pamuk 2012; gawrich 2009). “domestic actors have other choices in responding to europeanization than endorsing or resisting eu induced reforms; they can instrumentalize eu policies and institutions to advance their own interests, decoupling them from their normative contents” (börzel and pamuk 2012, 80). was this the case in ukraine? as this article demonstrates, despite limited formal europeanization after 2004 enlargement and weak eu conditionality, the country’s leadership and media actively promoted the concept of european identity and informal europeanization. and although more research is needed to test causal relations between informal europeanization and political values, this article shows that citizens’ support for the eu, which increased after 2004, was correlated with liberal democratic values. 4 except west balkans. 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 eu and ukraine relations: formal europeanization although the question of ukraine’s future membership in the eu was not then discussed, in 1994 ukraine signed the partnership and co-cooperation agreement (pca).5 in 2003, the eu introduced the european neighborhood policy (enp) which was then launched in 2004 (commission 2003). the main goal of the enp was “to provide a framework for the development of a new relationship which would not, in the medium-term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the union’s institutions” (commission 2003, 5). since the eu was preoccupied with the future accession of ten new members,6 ukraine was not a priority for that organization in the years leading up to the orange revolution. nonetheless, the concept of european identity was reflected in the 2004 presidential election campaign of viktor yushchenko, the opposition candidate who competed against prime minister yanukovych (organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce) 2005). soon after his victory, newly elected president yushchenko declared the europeanization of ukraine as one of his main priorities. in his inauguration speech in january, 2005, he declared: our way to the future is the way followed by united europe. we are the people of the same civilization sharing the same values. history, economic prospects and the interests of people give a clear answer – where we should look for our fate. our place is in the european union. my goal is – ukraine in united europe (ukrayinska pravda 2005). this optimism was not reciprocated by the eu. “the orange revolution presented the eu with a dilemma: despite the pan-european expression of support for democratization in ukraine, there were divergences between member states on how to deal with ukraine” (wolczuk 2016, 61). nevertheless, the enp action plan was signed in february, 2005, one month after yushchenko’s inauguration speech. the enp action plan contained two parts and included a list of priorities for ukraine, such as free and fair elections, judicial reform and adoption of a nuclear waste strategy (wolczuk 2009). europe was absorbing its new states and recovering from the rejection of the constitutional treaty by france and the netherlands in 2005 (hobolt and brouard 2010). ukraine’s desire to have a closer relationship with the eu beyond the enp action plan, worried the eu (averre 2005, 187). the eu switched towards a value-based foreign policy strategy, implemented through activities such as cultural and academic exchanges (jarvie 2017). in 2005, ukraine did not meet the three copenhagen criteria for accession, namely: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) market economy; and 3) administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement eu acquis, and ability to take on the obligations of membership (commission, european neighborhood policy and enlargement). the ukrainian market economy was only partially developed, the rule of law was incomplete, and more importantly, the level of corruption was still high (transparency international 2005). nevertheless, the european parliament passed a 5 “partnership and co-operation agreement between the european communities and their member states, and ukraine,” european union, communities, council and commission. 6 on may 01, 2004, eight countries of the eastern europe joined the european union. for details about the eu accession in eastern europe, see raik (2004). 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 declaration calling for the european council, the european commission, and the eu member states to speed up the process of ukraine’s integration and possibly future eu membership (hansen 2006, 124). in december of 2005, the council of the european union granted ukraine market economy status (commission 2005). the relations between ukraine and the eu could have improved after the 2006 ukrainian parliamentary election when the parties of the orange team gained the majority of the seats. however, they failed to secure a parliamentary coalition and thus lost the position of prime minister to viktor yanukovych. political infighting within ukraine not only created an image problem for the country but decreased the eu’s willingness to collaborate with ukraine (pridham 2011, 25). the eu-ukraine visa liberalization dialogue commenced in october 2008, which may be attributed in part to an external event. conflict broke out between georgia and russia in august of 2008 over the territories of south ossetia and abkhazia. the hostilities compelled the eu to reconsider its future policies towards the post-communist countries. as a result, the eu offered ukraine the eastern partnership, which “was established in part as a response to the russian invasion of georgia in 2008” (macfarlane and menon 2014, 96). the eastern partnership, which was signed in may,2009, provided ukraine with the prospect of visa liberalization, signing of the association agreement, and opportunities for establishing deep and comprehensive free trade areas (dcfta) for partner countries (council of european union 2009). however, the prospect of political association for ukraine was not a sufficiently strong incentive for reforms. for conditionality rules to be effective they should be stated in the official documents and legally specified in the eu acquis and international treaties with the real prospect of integration to the eu (langbein and wolczuk 2012). this was not the case for signing the association agenda (aa). “both the european neighborhood policy and eastern partnership avoided the question of potential enlargement to the states of this region. instead, the eu offered ‘association’: closer political ties, deep and comprehensive free trade, and the possibility of visa liberalization” (macfarlane and menon 2014, 96). within ukraine, this created frustration regarding its prospects of joining the eu, thus causing negative feelings in the ukrainian society and often leading to disappointment among its pro-european part (moskalenko and streltsov 2015, 112). the european commission’s many progress reports stated that ukraine needed to undertake significant economic and democratic reforms prior to consideration of a possible future application for membership (commission 2008, 2009a). relations between the eu and ukraine deteriorated further after the 2010 presidential election that brought viktor yanukovych to power (smith 2015). the election was recognized as fair and free by osce (osce 2010). once in power, yanukovych instituted constitutional changes to strengthen his power and took steps to improve fractured relations with russia by signing the kharhiv agreement, which reduced the price of gas for ukraine for the next 10 years from russia in exchange for an extension of russia’s lease of the sevastopol naval base for the next 25 years.7 the opposition strongly criticized the agreement since it was perceived by many inside and outside ukraine as subordination to russia (unian 2010). however, yanukovych, 7 on april 21, 2010, yanukovych signed the kharkiv agreement, which reduced the price of gas for ukraine for the next ten years from russia in exchange for an extension of russia’s lease of the sevastopol naval base for the next 25 years (pan 2010). 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 acknowledging ukraine’s economic dependence on russia, was determined to strengthen ukraine’s relationship with its northern neighbor. the european commission’s (2011) final progress report posited that the ukrainian judicial system had still not been reformed after 20 years of independence (commission 2012). extensive corruption and an unfavorable environment for businesses were also cited as obstacles to ukraine’s future integration. in these circumstances, “the eu used the negotiation process on the association agreement to address the lack of democratic change” (borzel and lebanidze 2017, 19). in march 2012, the eu and ukraine initialled the text of the association agreement and its dcfta (commission 2012), which indicated ukraine’s willingness to adhere to the priorities of the agreement prior to its implementation in 2013. however, in the spring of 2013, the eu stated that “in 2012, ukraine did not address most of the key recommendations contained in last year’s european neighbourhood policy progress report” (commission 2013, 3). nevertheless, in february, 2013, president yanukovych reaffirmed ukraine’s commitment to the signing of the agreement by the time of eastern partnership summit in vilnius in november, 2013, thus promising formal europeanization of ukraine (delegation of the european union to ukraine 2013). however, it was argued that “yanukovych was spared to meet the demand of the eu to free yulia timoshenko and adopt an anti-corruption law and an election reform as the conditions for signing the association agreement” (borzel 2015, 524). instead he accepted russia’s economic support, including low gas prices and postponed the signing of the aa. euro-integration and discursive europeanization in annual presidential addresses to the parliament despite modest progress in the official relations between the eu and ukraine, the eu, eurointegration, and european identity were actively promoted by politicians for their electoral purposes. a contextual analysis of the annual speeches to parliament (verhovna rada (rada)) of president yushchenko and president yanukovych between 2005 and 2013 reveals the extent of emphasis placed upon eu integration.8 both presidents in their official annual addresses emphasized the importance of euro-integration and collaboration with the eu and attempted to capitalize on the mechanism available to them to promote closer ties with the eu (wolczuk 2016, 62). they also sought to promote the discourse of ukraine europeanization, thus signalling the country’s european identity and belonging to the eu community. the highest frequency for the root word ‘europe’ was in 2006, one year after the orange revolution. president yushchenko, in his first official address to the parliament, mentioned 54 times the words europe, european, euro-integration. 8 the author used the nvivo program to calculate the frequency of the words “europa” (europe), “eurosoyuz” (european union), “europeyskyy” (european) and “eurointegratsiya” (euro-integration) among the top 1000 frequent words in each speech. 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: eu and euro-integration in presidential addresses, 2005-2013 data source: this figure represents the frequency of the words “europe’, “european union”, “euro-integration” and “european” in each presidential address among the top 1000 frequent words (using nvivo). in 2007, the year after the orange coalition collapsed, yushchenko did not address the parliament, in contravention of his constitutional obligation.9 in 2008 and 2009, the frequency of the mention of the topic of eurointegraiton significantly decreased to 24 and 27. at the same time, president yushchenko stated in his 2008 address: “[w]e are continuing the logic of geopolitical processes of united europe. ukraine has created conditions for democracy and freedom” (rada 2008). within the same speech, yushchenko mentioned that “our middle term goal – progress in european and euro atlantic integration as an indicator and results of real changes within the country.” in 2009, his last presidential speech, yushchenko referred to ukraine as a country that historically belonged to eu community. “we have continued global historical process of uniting europe. our integration into european and euro atlantic unions is not an abstract idea. every step is a real return of ukraine to european world” (rada 2009). significantly, the references to the topic of the eu and euro-integration were not limited to president yushchenko, who was reputed to be pro-western. in his first official address after his election in 2010, president yanukovych employed the words eu, europe, european and eurointegration 38 times. moreover, yanukovych referred to euro-integration, europe and the eu, in higher numbers than his predecessor. in 2010, yanukovych made the following comments: the most important priority in our foreign policy was and is euro-integration. not only for the course of our foreign policy, but as a vector of our overall transformation. the most important question in our relationship with the eu is the signing of the association agreement between ukraine and the eu, including the creation of the deep and comprehensive free trade area and the implementation of a visa free regime (rada 2010). in 2011, yanukovych mentioned the association agreement between the eu and ukraine as a confirmed plan. “today ukraine is having active negotiations about this agreement. signing of this agreement will create preconditions for ukraine’s full integration into the european economic, social, cultural and legal community” (glavnoe 2011). in 2013, the year of the euromaidan, the frequency of the use of the words euro-integration, europe, and the eu in his annual address approached 2006 levels at 52 times. president yanukovych stated that the “signing of the association agreement between ukraine and the eu will promote economic growth and increase the welfare of ukrainian citizens” (niss 2013, 243). the discrepancy between 9 the parliament implemented a decree about yushchenko not following the constitution of ukraine (postanova verkhovnoyi rady 2007). 54 24 27 38 51 40 52 0 50 100 2006 yushchenko 2008 yushchenko 2009 yushchenko 2010 yanukovych 2011 yanukovych 2012 yanukovych 2013 yanukovych 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 yanukovych’s statements and official actions in 2013, when he postponed the signing of the association agreement, led to political protests in 2013-2014. discursive europeanization in ukrainian media beyond having two presidents who actively promoted the europeanization of ukraine, eurointegration was also widely promoted by the ukrainian media. for example, the national weekly newspaper dzerkalo tyznya (mirror weekly), extensively covered the topic of the eu and ukraine’s prospective membership in the first two years after the orange revolution. almost every issue from january to early july covered the eu, with generally positive coverage. out of 51 issues in 2005, the eu was mentioned 23 times on the front pages.10 terms including “positive signal”, ‘membership”, “hope”, “the agreement”, and “community” were mentioned in the titles of the articles. such positive coverage continued in 2006, when the words eu, eurointegration, and european were mentioned 28 times on the front pages. in 2007, the year when the orange coalition collapsed, and the public was disappointed with the performance of the orange team government, there was a decline in the coverage of the topic of the eu to 20 times. titles such as “asian eu”, “the end of euro-federalism”, and “euro-chaos” were published by the newspaper. in 2008, the frequency of mentions increased to 27 times, which was almost at the 2006 level. titles such as “our future in the eu depends on ourselves”, “ukrainians want into the eu”, “in support of the eu plans”, and “perspectives of the visa dialogue with the eu” appeared in connection to the euro-integration. the coverage declined in 2009 and 2010, when the frequency was 25 and 16, respectively. the lowest frequency was observed in 2010, the year when viktor yanukovych was elected. the words eu and euro-integration were mentioned 16 times in 49 issues. the tone of coverage also changed. words such as “warning”, “scary”, “readmission”, “concern” and “rethink” were used in the titles of the articles about eu in the newspaper. interestingly, the word russia was mentioned twice in the titles of the articles about eu in 2010. in the three years leading to the euromaidan, the frequency of use of the phrases eu and eurointegration increased to 23, 19, and 26. however, it never reached the level of 2006. the coverage was also more critical of the ukrainian government than previously. titles such as “yanukovych closed a window to europe”, “europe gave ukraine d for the fight against corruption”, and “eu asked kyiv to stop selective justice” appeared. the name of former prime minister tymoshenko, who was imprisoned in 2011, appeared four times in the titles of the articles about the eu. in 2013, the newspaper coverage of the eu was intensive, especially in the months leading to the eu summit in vilnius. titles included, “the right choice – eu”, “by foot to the eu”, “subway to europe”, “european parliament recommends signing”, and “in europe step by step-from visa-free to the association”. articles informed the public about the importance of signing the association agreement, thus increasing pressure on the government to sign it. 10 the search words were the same as for the analysis of the presidential speeches: “eurosoyuz” (european union), “europa” (europe), “europeyskyy” (european) and “eurointegratsiya” (euro-integration). 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: the coverage of the eu by mirror weekly, 2005-2013 data source: the figure was created by the author based on the analysis of the frequency of the articles on the front pages of the newspapers. the articles for 2013 did not include the month of december when euromaidan started. the ukrainian media not only raised awareness of the ‘europeanization’ in ukraine after the orange revolution, but they informed ukrainians about the choices of the ukrainian government concerning the eu. hence, favorable coverage of the eu and ukraine’s potential to join the eu may have influenced citizens’ perceptions of ‘belonging’ to the eu after the orange revolution. the negative and more pessimistic tone about ukraine’s prospects in the eu in the years leading to the euromaidan, combined with criticism of the government’s ineffectiveness, could have made citizens more willing to unite against the government in 2013. citizens’ confidence in the eu and political identities citizens’ perceptions of the eu, and their degree of identification with the eu, differed over time. the results of the world values survey (wvs) before and after the orange revolution (1996 and 2006) and the 2008 european values (ev) survey of public opinion in ukraine showed that the percentage of citizens who had “great deal or quite a lot” of confidence in the eu increased from 43.5 percent in 1996 to 48.5 percent in 2006. in 2008, confidence in the eu decreased by 10 percent to 38.5 percent, the lowest since 1996. importantly, the majority of ukrainians nationwide did not have confidence in the eu. figure 3: confidence in the european union, 1996 2008 data source: the figure was created by the author based on the results of online analysis of the wvs (1996, 2006) and evs (2008) in ukraine. the survey question asked was: “i am going to name a number of organizations. for each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” the [european union]. across the regions, western ukraine, due to its history and closer geographic proximity to the eu,11 had the highest level of confidence in the eu, with 70.1 percent expressing high confidence in the eu. the lowest confidence was in eastern and southern ukraine, regions that historically 11 the region of galicia (western ukraine) was part of austro-hungarian empire and later poland. 23 28 20 27 25 16 23 19 26 0 10 20 30 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 number of articles 43.5 48.5 38.5 56.5 51.5 61.5 0 50 100 1996 2006 2008 a great deal/quite a lot not very much/none at all 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 belonged to the territories of the russian empire prior to the 1917 revolution, and to the soviet union after 1921. these also were the regions that experienced the largest decline in the level of confidence in the eu between 1996 and 2006. young citizens expressed high levels of confidence in the eu in 1996, but not in 2006. in 2006, the highest confidence in the eu was found in the 30-49 year-olds, (the group that was 18-25 in 1996). before and after the orange revolution, ukrainians with the highest level of education (university complete) expressed the highest level of confidence in the eu in comparison to those with primary and secondary level of education. table 1: confidence in the eu (region, education and age) 19962006 1996 region western eastern central southern a great deal/quite a lot 70.1 55.2 66.9 65.5 age 18-25 26-36 36-47 48-58 59-69 a great deal/quite a lot 80.3 71.4 79.5 72.9 71.4 education primary secondary university complete a great deal/quite a lot 60.4 74.3 75.5 2006 region western eastern central southern a great deal/quite a lot 82.8 37.1 57.7 53.6 age up to 29 30-49 50 and up a great deal/quite a lot 54 61.4 54.6 education primary secondary university complete a great deal/quite a lot 12.2 52.9 68 2008 region western eastern central southern a great deal/quite a lot 70.5 26.3 44.2 23 age a great deal/quite a lot education primary secondary university complete a great deal/quite a lot 18.2 31.6 71.4 data source: created by the author based on data from wvs and evs. the question was asked as followed: “i am going to name a number of organizations. for each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? the [european union]. the table represents the category “a great deal” and ‘quite a lot” combined. public opinion regarding the potential membership in the eu after the orange revolution, revealed differences based on age, education, language at home, and region of residence. respondents with higher levels of education, and who spoke ukrainian at home supported the membership in the eu. the lowest support was observed in the eastern and southern regions and among those who spoke russian as the primary language at home. table 2: membership in the eu, 2008 education primary incomplete secondary secondary complete secondary and specialized university incomplete university complete would vote in favor 20.3 40.7 44.7 38.4 46.4 45.1 would vote against 23.2 23.1 30.9 27.3 30.4 28.3 age 18-29 30-44 45-59 60+ would vote in favor 45 41.2 41.7 35.7 would vote against 22.1 31.6 28.1 28.4 language at home ukrainian russian would vote in favor 52.5 27.2 would vote against 17.3 38.6 region western central southern eastern kyiv would vote in favor 78.8 72 44.7 38.4 77.8 would vote against 21.2 28 55.3 61.6 22.2 data source: table created by the author based on data files from ifes (2008). 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 the next step in examining political identities is to assess whether citizens’ level of confidence in the eu was associated with their political orientations and actions. table 3 illustrates that ukrainians who expressed a prominent level of confidence in the eu reported higher levels of interest in politics, higher levels of interpersonal trust, and higher levels of political participation. they also had a higher level of national pride in comparison to those who did not have confidence in the eu. higher confidence in the eu was also correlated with a higher level of intolerance for accepting bribes. these differences in political orientations of ukrainians increased in 2006. the results of the chi-square test of independence indicated that there were relationships between confidence in the eu and political values and orientations in 1996 and 2006 that were statistically significant for some categories. for example, confidence in the eu in 1996 was positively correlated with the following characteristics and actions: trust in people of another religion and race, intolerance for accepting a bribe, signing a petition and attending peaceful demonstrations. in 2006, confidence in the eu was positively correlated with membership in different forms of organizations (labour unions, art clubs, and charitable and professional organizations) as well as with interpersonal trust and participation in political activities table 3: confidence in the eu/political orientations, values and actions, 1996-2006 data source: table was created by the author based on the data filed from wvs (1996, 2006). the cases were selected in two groups:1 (great deal and/ a lot) and 2 (not very much, not at all). for a level of trust, the percentage represents those who answered, “trust completely” and “somewhat” combined. for questions on justifiability, the percentage represents those who answered category 1never. (the questions were recorded from 1 to 10, where 1 – never justified and 10-always justified). dv/iv eu (a great deal/a lot) eu (not very much/not at all) chisquare test p-value eu (a great deal/a lot) eu (not very much/not at all chisquare test pvalue 1996 1996 2006 2006 interest in politics (very interested and somewhat interested) 49.4 39.1 .000 58.5 46.2 .001 how proud of nationality? (very and quite proud) 67.7 60.3 .009 80.2 68.4 .000 membership of labor unions 36.6 37 .647 24.2 20.3 .310 membership of political party 2.4 2.4 .310 10.8 4.7 .003 membership of professional organizations 3.1 3.1 .262 8.4 6.4 .032 membership of church or religious organization 9.8 9.4 .186 20.9 14.6 .035 most people can be trusted 34.4 28.9 .026 36 23.6 .000 trust: your family n/a n/a 97.8 97.4 .742 trust: people you know personally n/a n/a 86.3 81.4 .151 trust: people you meet for the first time n/a n/a 23.9 16.1 .043 trust: people of another religion n/a n/a 51 29.5 .000 trust: people of another nationality n/a n/a 55.5 34 .000 justified: claiming government benefits for each you are not entitled (category 1never justified) 42 42.7 .738 43 35 .417 justified: avoiding a fare on public transport 27.8 27.9 .114 31.9 29.5 .209 justified: cheating on taxes 41.3 39.8 .036 38.2 33.3 .322 justified: someone accepting a bribe 72.7 67.4 .000 55.2 48.5 .032 justified: homosexuality 68.3 67 .087 51.6 51.8 .232 justified: abortion 30.4 27 .443 28.4 31.3 .020 justified: divorce 16.9 18.6 .265 18.5 19.9 .066 political action recently done: signing a petition 17.6 15.1 .000 8 8.1 .975 political action recently done: joining in boycotts 4.8 5.7 .124 3.3 3.3 .982 political action recently done: attending peaceful demonstrations 22 19.3 .005 23.3 12.6 .000 men make better political leaders than women? 62.8 60.3 .013 53 50.5 .370 having a strong leader is better 54.7 56.5 .002 66.5 63.7 .245 education (complete university) 23.4 22.9 .839 35.6 25.6 .037 number of cases 955 548 361 396 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 why are these findings important? ukrainians who had confidence in the eu showed more democratic political orientations in comparison to those who did not have confidence or who had low confidence in the eu. ukrainians who expressed confidence in the eu were more politically aware, political competent, and consequently politically active. these are orientations that perceived as democratic (norris 1999; 2011). they are also orientations that are associated with values and norms that are promoted by the eu. as stated in 1993 at the copenhagen european council on the eu membership, “[m]embership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities and market economy” (european council 1993,13). moreover, according to kataryna wolczuk, “[w]hile there are significant cultural disparities within the eu, key shared european values – liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law – have been defined as what turns the participating states into a community” (2016, 64). it is evident that ukrainian citizens who had confidence in the eu expressed higher support for liberal values that are promoted by the eu. the association between the confidence in the eu and democratic political orientations of ukrainians after the orange revolution became even stronger. those who expressed higher confidence in the eu increased their trust in people, whereas those who had low or no confidence in the eu decreased their trust towards people. furthermore, the confidence in the eu in 2006 was positively correlated with the variable “i see myself as a citizen of the european union.” this indicates that those who expressed support for the eu also were more likely to perceive themselves as citizens of the european community. table 4: correlation between confidence in the eu and citizens’ perception of belonging to the eu, 2006 1 2 1. confidence in the eu … .446** 2. i see myself as a citizen of the eu .446** … note: *p<.05, **p<.01, p<.001, 2-tailed data source: table was created by the author based on the data filed from wvs 2006 ukrainians who had higher confidence in the eu not only possessed more democratic orientations and values, but they also perceived themselves as belonging to the “community of the european union” (schimmelfennig 2001). and although this group of citizens was in the minority in comparison to the whole population, they expressed values and orientations that are common to the eu normative principles. at the same time, the data showed no difference in stated tolerance of gender equality and homosexuality – attitudes that are associated with a population that is more accepting and are indicative of democratic changes (inglehart and welzel 2003). ukrainians also had high tolerance towards unlawful actions such as accepting bribes and cheating on taxes between 1996 and 2006, indicating that they have not developed strong preferences for the normative rules and principles of obedience. in the year of 2013, when asked if ukraine would be better off if it had closer economic relations with europe or russia, 39.1 percent of ukrainians chose europe and 37.3 percent chose russia. however, when testing for correlations between support for europe or russia and political orientations and values, the results show that those who chose closer collaboration with europe once again had higher level of education, were younger, were more often employed full time, and spoke ukrainian at home. they also expressed higher interest in politics and political activities. the biggest difference was observed in responses relating to the justification of actions such as limiting the rights of citizens to protest and limiting freedom of the media. the majority of those 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 who supported closer collaboration with russia (82.7 percent and 72.3 percent) agreed with limitations to these freedoms. among those who supported closer collaboration with europe, only 17.3 percent and 27.2 percent agreed with such limitations. this group of citizens also expressed higher levels of political efficacy and support for democratic freedoms – core values of the european union community. table 5: support for eu versus russia and political orientations, values and actions, 2013 dv/iv europe russia chi-square, p value interest in politics (very interested and somewhat interested) 65 56.2 .006 membership of labor unions 7.1 11.7 .000 membership of political party 1.4 4.6 .000 membership of church or religious organization 1 .3 .000 justified: limit the rights of citizens to protest (category 1justified) 17.3 82.7 .000 justified: limit freedom of the media 27.2 72.3 .000 justified: limit authority of the courts 41.7 58.3 .081 it is more important that political leaders maintain order than protect democratic rights of citizens (strongly agree and somewhat agree) 38 65.1 .000 how necessary are non-government organizations or ngos for ukraine (essential and necessary combined) 87.3 80.3 .001 people like you can have influence on decisions made by the government (strongly agree and somewhat agree) 23.5 16.7 .078 i have a role to play in solving problems in my country (strongly agree and somewhat agree) 25.3 20.2 .030 political action recently done: signing a petition 8 10.6 .104 political action recently done: attending peaceful demonstrations or protests 17.7 10.2 .002 political action recently done: using social media to express your views on political issues 8.3 3.2 .000 what is your employment (full time at one job) 38.5 37.9 .000 education (complete university) 33.8 25.2 .000 age group .000 18-29 30 16.1 30-44 30.3 26.9 45-59 21.2 23 60+ 18.5 34 number of cases 528 498 1026 data source: table was created by the author based on the data filed from ifes (2013). the cases were selected in two groups:1 (closer collaboration with europe) and 2 (closer collaboration with russia). for questions on justifiability, the percentage represents those who answered category 1 justified. these findings may help to explain the november 2013 protests following president yanukovych’s decision to postpone the signing of the association agreement with the eu. those citizens who supported closer collaboration with europe, according to the data, possessed intolerance towards injustice and corruption and supported democratic freedoms, which are the core principles of the eu. in combination with a higher level of interest in politics, and higher levels of political efficacy and participation, they could express their readiness to stand for their values and for their place in the european community.12 yet the official europeanization on the part of the eu, and the ukrainian government’s implementation of political and economic reforms that would speed up the process of country’s democratization, was missing. 12according to olga onuch (2014), who interviewed 1304 protesters between 26 november, 2013 and 10 january, 2014 in kyiv, the early protesters solely focused on supporting closer eu ties. 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 conclusion the conditionality rules that were applied by the eu before the 2004 enlargement were based on official criteria of assessment and unofficial rules of belonging to europe. although they were not easy to achieve, the incentive of membership encouraged candidate countries to follow these rules. in ukraine, after the orange revolution, the eu refrained from the use of active leverage towards ukraine, which would have required particular programs and policies for future implementation. instead, the eu employed soft power of membership aspiration, built on a commitment to shared values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, without the promise of potential membership (kubicek 2017). although ukraine’s future membership in the eu was not discussed, the discourse of ukraine’s europeanization was actively promoted and implemented within the country. as this research has demonstrated, the idealistic image of the eu and its prosperity was actively promoted by president yushchenko and later president yanukovych as well as by the ukrainian media. both presidents used the idea of ukraine’s future within the eu for political and electoral purposes. it was built on the ideas of european values and beliefs and their similarities with ukrainian values and orientations and through the enticing practical possibility of visa-free travel to countries of the schengen zone for ukrainians. a comparison of political orientations of ukrainians based on their level of confidence in the eu before and after the orange revolution showed that there was a correlation between confidence in the eu and more democratic political orientations. some ukrainians reported increased confidence in the eu as well as identification with eu liberal values such as support for democratic freedoms and rights, and intolerance of injustice. those who showed higher confidence in the eu had a higher level of interest in politics, higher membership in the socio-political groups, higher political participation, tolerance, and level of trust towards other people. the confidence in the eu was also positively correlated with citizens’ perception of their belonging to the eu. the highest level of confidence in the eu was observed among the young citizens who possessed high levels of education, resided in western or central regions, and were fully employed. this group of citizens also expressed high level of political awareness, political efficacy, and political participation in 2013, the year of euromaidan. at the same time, ukrainians expressed a mixed of materialist and post-materialist orientations, which are associated with lesser developed democracies and unstable economies (inglehart and welzel 2003). the main findings of this research indicate that the eu soft power of attractiveness was an effective tool that was used by political elites and media in ukraine to promote discursive europeanization without the implementation of formal europeanization, which was too costly to achieve without strong 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http://www.unian.ua/politics/353679-eksperti-pro-plyusi-i-minusi-harkivskih-ugod-yanukovicha-medvedeva.html http://www.unian.ua/politics/353679-eksperti-pro-plyusi-i-minusi-harkivskih-ugod-yanukovicha-medvedeva.html http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0013100-08/print http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0004100-09 http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0003100-10 86 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 the european union’s response to islamophobia: an assessment debanjali ghosh1 university of calgary abstract the european union (eu) is home to more than 25 million muslims who form an integral part of its society. however, in the aftermath of 9/11 and several other terrorist attacks in europe most of which were perpetrated by islamic fundamentalists there has been evidence of strong antimuslim sentiments among members of the larger community which is reflective of an underlying sense of islamophobia. this has manifested itself in a variety of forms ranging from hostility against islam to negative discrimination against muslims and the use of violence to target them, thereby increasing the potential for greater societal cleavages and conflict. the eu as a supranational entity strives to create an inclusive and tolerant society and as such is committed to the ideals of human rights, equality and non-discrimination. tackling the challenges posed by islamophobia and its various manifestations then becomes a priority for this organisation. against this backdrop, the objective of this research paper is to assess the eu’s response to islamophobia by examining the initiatives undertaken by it, and focusing on their adoption by the member states of france and germany. 1 debanjali ghosh is a phd candidate in the department of political science at the university of calgary, canada. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 introduction the eu recognizes the prevalence of racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance based on race, religion, ethnicity, descent, national origin, skin colour, sexual orientation and more. home to more than 25 million muslims who form an integral part of its society, this supranational entity has experienced the emergence of strong anti-muslim prejudices in the post-9/11 era which is rooted in islamophobia. this has been acknowledged in its contribution to the report of the special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (2020)2 which highlights the persistence of antimuslim hostility, discrimination and hate crimes against muslims. the eu firmly rejects all such attitudes and behaviours as incompatible with its core principles that strive to create an inclusive and tolerant society and is committed to the ideals of human rights, equality and nondiscrimination. in this context, the objective of this research article is to unpack the eu’s response to islamophobia in the first two decades of the 21st century. review of literature pre-existing literature on islamophobia refers to this phenomenon as “unfounded hostility towards islam” (runnymede trust 1997, 4), which results in sentiments not only of dread or hatred of islam as a religion but also a “fear or dislike of all or most muslims” (runnymede trust 1997, 1). as elahi and khan (2017, 7) point out, this translates into hostility against islam, negative discrimination against muslims, and the exclusion of the community and its members from mainstream society and politics. it has been argued that islamophobia is a new and more sophisticated form of biological and cultural racism (marranci 2004; rana 2007; ciftci 2012; lauwers 2019; mirza 2019) with one reinforcing the other. muslims are perceived to be a group of individuals who are visibly ‘different’ because of their innate and unchangeable biological and/or cultural characteristics which form the building blocks of their identity. biologically, this difference is highlighted through physical features like skin colour and hair or bone structure (marranci 2004, 106; mirza 2019, 310) which creates the identity of muslims as a ‘foreign’ race, different from the ‘native’ europeans. culturally, the ‘foreignness’ is marked by language, religion, ethnicity, customs and heritage (lauwers 2019, 307-11; mirza 2019, 310) with islam’s violent, intolerant, theocratic, and sexist nature being deemed incompatible with europe. the element of ‘foreignness’ in islamophobia connects it to xenophobia i.e., the dislike and fear of strangers or foreigners who are perceived to be the “carriers of a different culture”, and have the potential to jeopardize the integration of the host society by altering the existing national cultural identity through their differing practices (de master & le roy 2000, 425). this results in an ‘attitude of hostility’ against the non-natives of a given population (yakushko 2018: 13). practitioners of islam in a non-islam majority state are perceived as threatening foreigners irrespective of their race, nationality and legal status (poole and richardson 2010), implying that even muslims who have been settled in europe for generations are perceived to be outsiders. according to taras (2008), xenophobic attitudes have further been strengthened by immigration and the projection of immigrants and asylum-seekers as potential sources of threat to the security 2 the eu. 2020. eu contribution to the report of the special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief 2020. accessed october 04, 2021. https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/religion/islamophobiaantimuslim/regional%20institutions/europeanunion.pdf https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/religion/islamophobia-antimuslim/regional%20institutions/europeanunion.pdf https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/religion/islamophobia-antimuslim/regional%20institutions/europeanunion.pdf 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 and wellbeing of the eu and the european society. it has been linked to the wider debates on socioeconomic insecurity, unemployment, and criminal activities such as drug trafficking, illegal trade, home-grown terrorism and the sexual exploitation of young caucasian women (lazaridis & wadia 2015, 4; lazaridis & tsagkroni 2015, 209). these concerns form the crux of the anti-immigrant rhetoric of right-wing political parties, which have, in the past few years enjoyed electoral successes both at the supranational level of the eu and the national level of the member states, indicating proliferation of their views. while the number of far-right members of the european parliament (mep) increased by 50 percent after the european parliamentary elections 2014 (isal 2014), at the national level, right-wing parties like the national rally (france), the freedom party (austria), the sweden democrats, the northern league (italy), the people’s party (denmark), vlaams belang (belgium), and pim fortuyn list and the freedom party (the netherlands) have experienced electoral gains (leonard & kaunert 2019). the construction of immigration as a national security threat in the post-9/11 era, especially by right-wing leaders like viktor orbán, the prime minister of hungary who dubbed it as ‘trojan wooden horse of terrorism’ (wintour 2017) has reinforced the ‘migration-security’ nexus. while boswell (2007, 590) argues that the securitization of migration is largely absent in the context of europe, others like squire (2015), karamanidou (2015), and leonard and kaunert (2019) strongly believe in the prevalence of securitization of migration. according to karamanidou who traces the securitization of migration to the pre-9/11 era (2015, 40), the narrative has been institutionalized through the establishment of agencies like the frontex, as well as through domestic laws and policies, all of which only heightens the notion of migrants as security threats (karamanidou 2015, 37). further, it has concretized the identities of natives and immigrants as mutually opposing and irreconcilable, and paved the way for exclusionary politics based on ‘otherness’ (squire 2009; lazaridis & wadia 2015, 2). the use of surveillance techniques and policing focusing on immigrants and ethnic minorities makes the members of these communities more vulnerable to exploitation and has contributed towards higher levels of insecurity among them. this has especially been the case for individuals from muslim majority countries or resident muslim minority communities (lazaridis & wadia 2015: 2). the twin tower bombings coupled with subsequent terrorist attacks carried out by the islamic fundamentalists in parts of the western world has led to the conflation of islam as a religion with international terrorism and created the perception of muslims being the ‘enemy within’. a 2011 report titled intolerance, prejudice and discrimination which compared attitudes regarding islam in eight countries found that in most of the member states surveyed, islam was perceived as a religion of intolerance (zick et al. 2011, 13). a similar study also found that a staggering 83 percent of those surveyed in spain, 70 percent in germany and 50 percent in france believed muslims to be religious fanatics (ciftci 2012, 300). more recently, it has been found that within the eu member states, an average of 37 percent of the population shares an unfavourable opinion of muslims (the european commission 2019b, 13). this negative perception of islam has translated into social, economic and political practices (lauwers 2019, 310) that are tantamount not only to marginalization, exclusion or negative discrimination but also result in aggression and violence against the group. several studies published by the eu agency for fundamental rights (fra) along with those like the european union minorities and discrimination survey reports (eumidis and eu-midis ii of 2009 and 2017 respectively) have highlighted the nature and extent of islamophobia. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 nevertheless, a critical survey of the available literature reveals that although there has been an indepth analysis of islamophobia as a phenomenon, its connection to the wider debates on immigration and asylum, and its numerous manifestations, there appears to be little discussion on how the eu has responded to this challenge. the objective of this research is to make a contribution to the existing body of literature by providing an analysis of the eu’s efforts to combat this phobia. methodology the study investigates two research questions: first, what initiatives have been taken by the eu to combat islamophobia and second, are these effective ways of approaching the issue? to answer the first question, the study will look at the various initiatives undertaken by the eu to tackle islamophobia. the eu does not define the term islamophobia but instead chooses to address it collectively along with other forms of prejudices like afrophobia, colourism and others under the broader rubric of racism and xenophobia. hence, the study looks at initiatives that directly relate to anti-muslim prejudices and those that address categories like religion or belief, ethnicity and race. based on elahi and khan’s (2017) markers of islamophobia, the initiatives are broadly categorized into two, namely, those that address hostility and negative discrimination. ‘exclusion from mainstream’ has been deliberately omitted since addressing hostility and negative discrimination automatically tackles the issue of marginalization. with the eu being a supranational entity, the effectiveness of the eu’s measures depends on its adoption by the member states. hence, in answering the second question, the study investigates the implementation of the eu’s initiatives by the member states of france and germany, which have the highest and second-highest muslim population in western europe respectively. both countries have also experienced an overall increase in hate crimes between 2016 and 2020 as is reflected in figure 1 which has been compiled using data from the office for democratic institutions and human rights (odihr) of the organization for security and co-operation in europe (osce)3. 3 data used for france: osce-odihr hate crime reporting “france” 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020; data used for germany: osce-odihr hate crime reporting “germany” 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020. 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: hate crimes recorded by the police for france & germany compiled using data from the office for democratic institutions and human rights (odihr) of the organization for security and co-operation in europe (osce) . the research covers a time period between 2000 and 2020. it focuses on sources of primary data, especially those published by the eu such as the council directives, reports of the european commission and the european parliament among others. for the member states of france and germany, greater reliance has been placed on the documents issued by governmental agencies such as the premier ministre in france and the federal anti-discrimination agency (ads) of germany. country reports published by the european commission between 2016 and 2021 along with studies by the fra also provide key insights. however, with regard to data on hate crimes, osce-odihr provides invaluable data. finally, the study does refer to some secondary sources such as reports by human rights first and human rights watch as well because of the detailed data collected by them. measures to combat islamophobia in the eu the eu condemns any form of rejection, exclusion, and vilification of individuals or groups based on the perception of their being outsiders or foreigners, and inciting violence or hatred against them (council of the european union framework decision 2008, article 1). at the supranational level, the eu has made sincere efforts to promote greater discussion on xenophobia and racism to create greater awareness and sensitivity about the issues. indirectly, the eu’s measures to tackle racism and xenophobia address islamophobia as well. specific measures to deal with this form of prejudice has been rare. the following section highlights some of the important initiatives undertaken by the eu. 1835 1505 1838 2640 2672 3598 7913 8113 8585 10,240 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 hate crimes recorded by the police for france & germany (2016-2020) france germany 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 hostility a prominent manifestation of islamophobia is hostility directed against muslim individuals, their property, and institutions of the islamic faith. this is reflected through hate crimes which are criminal acts motivated by prejudices based on fundamental characteristics like religion, language or ethnicity that is shared by members of the target group (fra 2018b, 16; council of the european union 2008, article 4) and can incorporate within its ambit both physical violence and the threat thereof as well as hate speech. the eu has emphasized the prevention and countering of antimuslim hatred by making it a priority funding area under the eu’s rights, equality and citizenship programme (the european commission 2019b, 14). moreover, its first colloquium on fundamental rights on “tolerance and respect: preventing and combating antisemitic and antimuslim hatred in europe” (2015) resulted in the establishment of the eu high level group on combating racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance, which now plays a pivotal role in combating islamophobia. despite lacking a uniform definition of hate crimes, the eu has strived to provide a common response to it through the framework decision on combating racism and xenophobia (2008/913/jha) which provides for the criminalization of specific forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia. it necessitates the member states to criminalize the disquisition and dissemination of print or electronic materials that encourage hatred and incites violence against groups based on their fundamental characteristics like race or religion, skin colour, ethnicity, descent and so on, both physically as well as in online spaces (the european commission 2019b, 3). the eu’s concern with hate crimes has also paved the way for stronger cyber legislations. muslims have been identified as the most vulnerable group (the european commission 2019b, 13) with the maximum number of flagged contents online being related to anti-muslim hatred (fra 2017b, 82). the “code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online” (2016) has resulted in voluntary agreements between the european commission and organizations like facebook, twitter, microsoft, youtube, and several others, enabling these organizations to review and remove illicit content within 24 hours of notification (the european commission 2016a). this has been complemented by the commission’s “tackling illegal content online: towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms”, which along with promoting good practices to deter, detect and remove damaging content also lays down guidelines to fight against hate speech on the internet with the cooperation of the member states and other relevant stakeholders (european commission, 2017c). comprehending the nature and extent of hate crimes depends upon the availability of related data and as such the european commission works closely with the fra to collect and analyse data on discrimination, racism, intolerance and hate crimes. the eu’s efforts on data collection have also been reflected through the subgroup on methodologies of the eu high level group on combating racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance which not only brings together all the member states for recording hate crime data but also involves regional organizations like the odihr, the european commission against racism and intolerance (ecri) as well as civil society organizations. the high level group’s elaborate guideline titled “improving the recording of hate crime by law enforcement authorities key guiding principles” covers five key areas ranging from the very necessity to collect data on hate crimes to flagging such crimes as soon as 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 they are reported, and developing indicators to identify ‘motivation bias’ while investigating them (the european commission 2017b, 6-10). the eu has also identified the importance of providing support to victims of hate crimes through the victims’ rights directive, which establishes a minimum standard of rights for the victims and is responsive to their needs for protection and support. article 22 of the directive acknowledges that victims of such prejudice based crimes, especially children and the disabled, are often vulnerable to repeated attacks, intimidation and retaliation, which necessitates individual assessments based on the victim’s personal characteristics, the nature and type of the crime as well as the circumstances of it (the eu 2012, victims’ rights directive 2012/29/eu). while the victims of hate crimes often choose not to report them, national law-enforcement authorities also fail to identify them largely due to a lack of understanding or awareness on their part. the eu has undertaken sincere efforts to build trust and confidence among the victims by creating measures that can help strengthen the recording of such crimes. the eu agency for law enforcement training has introduced a variety of both offline and online training courses that strike a balance between policing and the protection of fundamental rights to create greater sensitivity among rank and file. the ten key guiding principles introduced by the european commission play an important role in identifying targets and building synergies, ensuring positive impact and sustainability of the strategy in the long run, and monitoring and appraising the outcomes (the european commission 2017a). moreover, engaging with civil society organizations also boosts the capacity building of law enforcement agencies. since these organizations actively engage with victims of hate crimes by providing support, they are not only able to offer insight into the local patterns of such crimes but also encourage the victims to report the same. the european commission itself has introduced training on anti-muslim hostility to educate its staff members regarding the stereotyping of islam and muslims to create greater awareness (the european commission 2019b, 14). some progress was also made with the creation of the post of a coordinator to deal with anti-muslim hatred in 2015 and the appointment of afzal khan as special representative for muslim communities for the socialists and democrats group in the european parliament. hostility against muslims often translates into negative discrimination against individuals and groups in spheres such as housing and the labour market which has been taken up by the following section. negative discrimination the eu has two main anti-discrimination laws which indirectly address islamophobia, namely, the racial equality directive (2000/43/ec) and the employment equality directive (2000/78/ec). the racial equality directive established a framework to ensure that individuals are treated equally irrespective of their race and ethnicity in both public and private sectors in areas related to employment, social security and protection, healthcare, education, and access to goods and services (council directive 2000/43/ec). the employment equality directive also establishes a guideline for equal treatment, but specifically in the area of employment and occupation, and prohibits discrimination by employers directly, indirectly or through harassment on the grounds of religion4 (council directive 2000/78/ec). it further encourages social dialogue to promote equal 4 when it is irrelevant to the occupation. 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 treatment at the workplace and emphasizes equal access to employment as a crucial means to social integration (council directive 2000/78/ec). the eu’s equality directives have encouraged the establishment of equality bodies like the bodies for the promotion of equal treatment by the member states (the european commission 2019b, 3). the european commission has also adopted the “recommendation on standards for equality bodies” to improve their performance in addressing discrimination on the grounds of religion, ethnicity, skin colour and more, especially in the field of employment. focus has also been directed to promoting workplace diversity and creating more inclusive atmospheres by encouraging employers to promote diversity and equal opportunities in the workplace. the eu platform too has played a pivotal role in supporting the sharing of good practices and guidelines to create more inclusive workplaces that respect socio-cultural diversity (the european commission 2019b, 6). to summarise, the eu’s response to islamophobia is a combination of general measures addressing xenophobia and racism coupled with certain islamophobia-specific measures, though the former by far outnumber the latter. while the variety and scale of measures have undoubtedly been commendable, the effectiveness of these initiatives to counter islamophobia remains to be determined. effectiveness of the eu’s measures to gauge the effectiveness of the eu’s measures, this study first focuses on their implementation by the member states of france and germany and complements the discussion through a critical assessment of the initiatives at the supranational and national levels. adoption of the eu’s initiatives by france & germany both france and germany have undertaken multiple measures to ensure the implementation of the eu’s guidelines. they have ensured the criminalization of hate crimes through their respective national laws. incitement to either discrimination or hate and harm of individuals or groups because of their ethno-religious background and race was already prohibited under the french law on the freedom of the press (1881)5. france’s criminal code further charges act motivated by ethnicity, race and religion as felonies and misdemeanours6. the country has also encouraged reforms in the criminal justice system which would enable faster prosecution of hate crime cases as was highlighted by 2015 report of the délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme (dilcra). the 2017 amendment further simplified hate crime laws and strengthened the penalty provisions related to it (osce-odihr 2017a). in a first, the vulnerability of muslims as targets of such crimes was recognized and initiatives have been undertaken to protect mosques, muslim schools and meeting places (dilcra 2015). unlike france, hate crimes were not treated as a separate category in germany prior to 2017. instead, they were perceived to be ‘politically motivated crimes’ which included those driven by race, religion and belief, ethnicity and origin. after 2017, hate crimes have come to be tracked separately. the country’s efforts to combat these is reflected in the federal government strategy to prevent extremism and promote democracy (the federal government 2016), the national action plan to fight racism (the 5 government of france. n.d. “everything you need to know about freedom of expression in france”. accessed march 03, 2022. https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/everything-you-need-to-know-about-freedom-of-expression-in-france 6 it provides an exhaustive list of such behaviours which includes acts ranging from murder and physical assault to any form of sexual aggression, the desecration of corpses and graves, and property damage (criminal code of france). https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/everything-you-need-to-know-about-freedom-of-expression-in-france 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 federal government 2017) and the country’s efforts to improve the recording and prosecution of hate crimes. for example, the federal ministry of justice in 2020 funded a project of the german institute for human rights to foster improvements in hate crime prosecution and pave the way for cooperation between the relevant stakeholders such as the police and public prosecutor’s office (osce 2020b). further, both countries have implemented the counter-islamophobia kit (cik)7 which analyses prevalent anti-muslim narratives and attempts to create a directory of the best practices in countering islamophobia across the eu that would also act as a guideline for policymakers. following the eu, france and germany have undertaken significant steps to combat hate speeches. france’s national plan against racism and anti-semitism 2018-20208 (dilcrah n.d., 5) addresses offline as well as internet-based hatred while the avia law (2020) strives to ensure the quick removal of hate-related content from online platforms. similarly, germany’s network enforcement act (netzdg) 2018 strives to combat online hate speeches and provides for the reporting of specific types of “criminal content” to the police (lomas 2020). it mandates social media operators with over 2 million users to remove “clearly illegal” content within 24 hours of receiving a complaint and “other illegal content” within 7 days, with the failure to comply resulting in hefty fines of as much as €50m (fra 2019, 96; lomas 2020). in a major development, hatemotivated insults too have come to be categorized as a criminal offence to protect vulnerable groups like muslims (ap news 2021, german government makes hate-motivated insults a crime). recognizing the importance of collecting data on hate crimes, both countries have put in place mechanisms for the collection of such data which includes the recording of anti-muslim hate crimes specifically. regular surveys have been conducted by the french authorities to gather and publish data on hate crimes (fra 2017b, 79-80). the country has also proposed an annual survey of victims to gain better knowledge of racism (dilcra 2015). interestingly, there has been an emphasis on reforming the methodology of data collection to ensure the inter-connectedness between databases (human rights first 2016, 13). in germany too, procedures for recording hate crime data by the police has become more detailed since 2017. these two member states have also transposed the victim’s rights directive into their respective national laws. both france and germany provide for the protection of victims in general and during criminal investigations under articles 18, 19 and 20 of the directive (european parliament 2017, 61). in france, victims are given a special status (european parliament 2017, 66) and supported through organizations such as the national victim support and mediation institute (inavem), which strives to promote and coordinate victim support missions, and encourages awareness of victims’ rights (european parliament 2017, 54). the german government has also sought to strengthen provisions for the protection and support of hate crime victims as a part of its project on combating racism to which it has committed €1b between 2021-2024 (european commission 2021b, 7). they have also taken note of the eu’s efforts to sensitize law enforcement agencies regarding hate crimes. in france, the prosecution system has been made more victim-centric through efforts to develop a network of magistrates and investigators specializing in hate crimes by the ministries of justice and the interior (osce-odihr 2018a). the ministry of the interior’s “national office to 7 university of leeds. n.d. counter-islamophobia kit. accessed december 4, 2020. https://cik.leeds.ac.uk/ 8délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la haine anti-lgbt (dilcrah). https://cik.leeds.ac.uk/ 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 combat hatred” aims to coordinate intelligence gathering and investigations related to anti-muslim hate crimes among others (fra 2020b, 66). similar attempts have also been undertaken in germany which has sought to sensitize its law-enforcement agencies to improve police response and equip the judicial system to better deal with such crimes. the german federal ministry of the interior (bmi) along with the criminological research institute of lower saxony (kfn) and the german police university (dhpol) have developed a study on the “best practices of co-operation between safety authorities and civil society concerning the avoidance of crime guided by prejudices” (osce-odihr 2017b) to train the police in good international practices and to improve collaboration with civil society organizations. both have also been mindful of the eu’s anti-discrimination directives. while france has transposed them through multiple legislations like the law 2001-1066, law 2004-1486 and law 2008-496 (european commission 2021a, 6), germany has incorporated the eu’s directives into labour, civil and public law through the general equal treatment act (agg) of 2006. france’s law 2001-1066 strengthened the prohibition of distinction among people based on race or religion and guarantees respect for all beliefs as highlighted in the french constitution of 1958 (european commission 2016b, 33). it amended both the penal and the labour codes by extending and elaborating the grounds prohibiting discrimination outlined by article 19 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (european commission france 2016, 34). together, the three laws have come to incorporate employment-related-discrimination as well (european commission 2021a, 6) which has been complemented by article 158 of the law on social modernisation (200273) to cover discrimination in the sphere of housing (european commission france 2016, 32) and law no. 2008-496 which focuses on the protection of race and ethnic origin in all other areas covered by the directive 2000/43/ec, such as access to supply of goods and services, healthcare and education, social protection and more (european commission 2021a, 14). the german agg (2006) provides the most extensive protection for discrimination based on race and ethnic origin (federal anti-discrimination agency n.d.) although, it also prohibits discrimination based on religion or belief and more. the act has brought about amendments in germany’s pre-existing legislations and covers a variety of areas from employment and education to the provision of goods and services, and housing (federal ministry of justice general act on equal treatment, 2006). in line with the eu’s efforts, both french and german laws provide a broader understanding of discrimination which includes direct and indirect discrimination as well as harassment and the instruction to discriminate (european commission 2021a, 6-7). similarly, the countries have also established equality bodies to tackle all discrimination related cases. france’s organic law no. 2011-333 created a constitutional equality body (european commission france 2016, 32) which consolidated the french ombudsman, the children’s defender, the national commission on security ethics and the former high authority for the fight against discrimination and for equality (european commission 2021a, 10). in germany, the agg 2006 paved the way for the establishment of the federal anti-discrimination agency that not only helps people protect their rights against negative discrimination but also provides related information and legal aid, and works closely with other government organizations such as the ministry of family affairs, senior citizens, women and youth (european commission 2021b, 13). additionally, germany has other specialized equality bodies as well, such as the federal government commissioners for migration, refugees and integration, and for matters related to ethnic german resettlers as well as national minorities (european commission 2021b, 13). 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 the above discussion reveals that both france and germany have followed the eu’s initiatives and created elaborate provisions at the national level to enforce them. the final section of this research critically assesses the developments and caveats in the eu’s response to islamophobia. an assessment a thorough examination of the eu’s initiatives and their adoption by the member state yields a mixed report card marked by both positive developments, and challenges hampering further progress. in accordance with the eu, both france and germany have made alterations to their existing legislative frameworks to criminalize incitement of hatred or discrimination against any community based on religion, ethnicity, race or nationality. the eu has been able to make a significant impact on addressing hate speech online. its initiatives have paved the way for the swift response to racist and xenophobic comments in cyberspace. according to the fourth monitoring exercise of the code, companies were estimated to assess 89 percent (the european commission 2019a, 1) of the flagged content within 24 hours and removed nearly 72 percent (2019a, 1) of what was deemed to be hate speech. the results of the sixth evaluation further reveal that 90.4 percent and 81 percent of the flagged content was reviewed within 24 hours in 2020 and 2021 respectively (european commission 2021c). the eu’s success in this sphere has also encouraged other platforms such as instagram, snapchat, dailymotion, tiktok and linkedin to participate in the code of conduct as well, which together cover over 85 percent of europe’s social media (the european commission 2019b, 6; european commission 2021c). based on data from the sixth evaluation, the performance of three such platforms have been highlighted in figure 2. the removal of hate speech increased from 28 percent to 59 percent in the second evaluation of the code of conduct (fra 2018a, 79) in some eu member states in over six months and further increased to 72 percent in 2019 (the eu 2019, 2). france and germany have also experienced positive developments in this regard, which is reflected in figure 3, compiled using data from the sixth monitoring exercise. facebook has been known to delete hundreds of hate-motivated contents ranging from insults and incitement to hatred or violence (fra 2019, 96) in both countries. furthermore, france has also attempted to make hate crime reporting easier by creating a user-friendly interface on the platform for receiving, processing, and referring notifications of unlawful content (pharos). it was estimated that the number of cases reported on pharos has increased by 73 percent between 2014 and 2016 (human rights first 2016, 13). 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: rate of removals for tiktok, twitter, and instagram compiled based on data from the sixth evaluation. figure 3: rate of removals for france and germany compiled using data from the sixth monitoring exercise however, in spite of the transposition of the eu’s directives, their effectiveness appears to be limited. in france, the very grounds of discrimination like race, ethnicity and religion or beliefs remain undefined as these concepts are not recognized as legal categories (european commission 2016b, 34-35). moreover, law 2001-1066 is directed solely towards the protection of individuals, their beliefs and allegiances and does not extend to groups. consequently, religious minorities like muslims are not recognized as a legal category because of which minority rights granted to individuals by virtue of their membership of a minority ethno-religious or cultural group remain jeopardized (european commission 2021a, 13). in germany, stronger protection against discrimination based on ethnicity indicates its precedence over other grounds. additionally, the exclusion of nationality as a basis for discrimination (federal anti-discrimination agency n.d.) because of the non-recognition of the ‘existence of different human races’ by the state also leads 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 instagram twitter tiktok rate of removals for tiktok, twitter, and instagram (%) 2020 2021 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1st monitoring (dec. 2016) 2nd monitoring (may 2017) 3rd monitoring (dec. 2017) 4th monitoring (dec. 2018) 5th monitoring (dec. 2019) 6th monitoring (october 2021) rate of removals for france and germany (%) france germany 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 to a narrower interpretation. nationality often becomes linked to ethnicity and religion, resulting in multiple discrimination regarding which neither the eu nor france and germany have elaborate mechanisms. additionally, the agg has been found to be inadequate in protecting muslims in the fields of education and labour. the 2013 report of the german federal anti-discrimination agency highlighted that approximately 700,000 muslim students experienced disadvantages due to their faith (arani 2015, 22). in the sphere of employment, data reveals that prospective candidates who identify with their faith on their cv receive fewer calls for job interviews as compared to equally qualified candidates who do not (the european commission 2019b, 13). according to the fra (2017), almost one in three muslims experienced such discrimination. twenty-two percent of the eu population feel negatively about having a muslim neighbour while roughly three in ten persons were found to be uncomfortable having a muslim colleague (fra 2020a). in fact, 21 percent of the respondents were not even open to employing muslim women because of their headscarves (fra 2020a). these findings are substantiated by other studies as well. research published in 2015 confirms that employers are much less likely to contact muslim job applicants than their jewish and catholic counterparts (abdelkader 2017, 46). while job applicants with authentic german surnames received interview requests from 18 percent (abdelkader 2017, 55) of the companies, only three percent (2017, 55) of the businesses extended similar invitations to applicants from the muslim community. it has been reported that discrimination on race and ethnicity while accessing employment is high in the case of france as well (fra 2021, 99). the special eurobarometer 393 on discrimination in the eu (2012) found that discrimination based on religion or beliefs were 66 percent in france, which was the highest figure recorded by the survey (howard 2016). both french and german muslims have found it difficult to procure longterm stable employment (2017, 55)9 and grapple with issues in the labour market such as observing friday congregational prayer or wearing the hijab. in reference to the victims’ rights directive, both countries already had comprehensive victim support services in place well before its transposition. even so, in france, the directive led to a greater focus on the individual assessment of victims and the growth of integrated referral systems while in germany, it made the criminal justice system more victim-oriented (european parliament 2017, 66-68). noticeably, germany has not adopted the directive in its entirety. it has implemented a few provisions like those related to the right to interpretation and translation, and legal aid (european parliament 2017, 52 & 57) while most of the other measures remain only partially transposed or completely absent. like france, it has not adopted the definition of ‘victim’ as per the directive (european parliament 2017, 50-51) but unlike france, which has provided for the right to information and support by victims, the right to access victim support services through referral mechanisms, guarantees on the return of victims’ property and measures to promote restorative justice (european parliament 2017), it was found to be lacking in these areas. germany argues that the right to access victim support services were already in place before the directive, but the european parliament (2017, 54) has been unable to locate specific legal statutes, ordinances or acts dealing with the same. the country was also found to lack measures related to the accompaniment by a relative, the right to be heard, rights in the event of a decision not to prosecute, and cooperation with the other member states to coordinate actions on victims’ rights (european parliament 2017 54-59 & 64). other provisions, like the victims’ rights to receive information about their case has only partially been transposed (european parliament 2017, 54). moreover, though it penalizes hate crimes more severely, there exist no special provisions for the victims and 9as compared to the german workforce, the number of marginally employed muslim workers having very low income was estimated to be around 11 percent higher in germany (arani 2015, 31). 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 generalized support was found to be less developed than specialized support (european parliament 2017, 66). on the sensitization of law enforcement, no information could be found on france but for germany, victims and their support organizations have expressed concerns regarding the role of the german police. it was reported that police interrogation was directed more towards the victims rather than the accused. allegedly, the police failed to identify hate crimes, discouraged victims from lodging formal complaints and neglected to start investigations (human rights watch 2011, 3 & 16). such experiences lead to an erosion of trust in the system and impede the ability to provide victim support. it also results in a devastating number of unreported hate crimes. according to eumidis, 82 percent (fra 2009, 13) of the hate-motivated crimes remained unreported in the year preceding the survey. in the eu-midis ii survey, nearly 64 percent (fra 2017a) of the participants did not report their most recent experience of discrimination. in both cases, a lack of trust was identified as the principal cause coupled with a pervasive belief that reporting such crimes would not lead to any changes in their circumstances and might even lead to further harassment by the authorities. redressal against negative discrimination also appears to suffer from similar challenges. the rate of reporting negative discrimination has been low. the fra (2017) found that only around 12% of muslims report incidents of discrimination across the eu. another study reveals that of the 79 percent muslim respondents who did not report their discrimination experience, 59 percent believed it would not lead to positive changes while 38 percent thought of it as a ‘normal’ incident and 33 percent were unaware of the procedures to report it (arani 2015, 19). for muslim women, reporting anti-muslim hatred and discrimination becomes more challenging because of the intersectional discrimination faced by them. indeed, equality bodies have faltered either due to the lack of staff and funding or because of the absence of a political will and concerns have been raised about their independence in several member states including germany (fra 2021, 104) where the agg has failed to establish easily accessible institutions to handle complaints (arani 2015, 34). hence, while several initiatives to address xenophobia and racism have been undertaken, there is a considerable lack of awareness and knowledge about such measures at the grassroots level. the eu-midis survey revealed that 39 percent (fra 2009, 10) respondents were unaware of the existence of anti-discrimination legislation in the employment sphere while 44 percent (2009, 1011) of the respondents were unaware of anti-discriminatory legislation in the sphere of housing. there was also little to no awareness about the availability of support systems to victims of hate crimes. only 16 percent (2009, 13) of the respondents were aware of organizations that supported hate crime victims. in eu-midis ii, 71 percent of the respondents (fra 2017a, 15) had no knowledge of victim support systems while 62 percent (2017a, 15) remained unaware of the existence of equality bodies. this highlights the gap between policy-making and policy implementation which coupled with the lack of detailed data collection on hate crimes and discrimination in various spheres makes it difficult to assess the actual impact of these measures. the european commission monitors the implementation of the eu’s directives and can initiate infringement procedures in the event of non-compliance. however, it has largely been unable to tackle the non-conformation or half-hearted conformation by the member states. although the eu has undertaken several measures and the commission has pushed for action, there appears to be a lack of political will among the eu countries to comply. this becomes explicit in the failure of the eu to establish a uniform understanding of hate crimes which would pave the way for a common criminal-law approach by which the same hate crime would be tagged as a punishable offence in 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 all the member states (council of the european union 2008). the commission’s efforts to ensure the authentic implementation of the framework decision on racism and xenophobia (2008/913/jha) has largely been unsuccessful (fra 2020b, 63). with hate crimes being essentially a matter of criminal justice that is the jurisdiction of the member states, there is also tension regarding who has the final say on hate crimes. the recording and penalization of hate crimes depend on the ability to identify them which is then adversely impacted by the lack of a uniform definition. the eu has encouraged the member states to develop their individual practices in terms of data recording based on their varying experiences and the availability of resources. there is thus no single methodology that is used to collect this type of data, making information collected by the member states incomparable. some progress has been made relating to data collection on hate crimes with 19 eu countries collecting and publishing such data, and 15 de-constructing the figures in terms of bias motivations, circumstances of the offences, vulnerable population groups, and police responses (fra 2018b, 11). even among those that collect data, the progress has not been uniform. only a few countries like france and germany have established procedures for data collection while the rest have largely been recalcitrant in this regard (fra 2018a, 77; fra 2019, 92). additionally, there exists no record of the sentencing of hate-motivated crimes even in france and germany which would demonstrate the extent to which recorded cases are prosecuted by the state. the eu’s initiatives like the code’s code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, the race and employment equality directives and the victim’s rights directive have largely been left to the member states for implementation. it has been found that none of the member states, including france and germany, have completely transposed the directives. in fact, in less than 50 percent of the member states (fra 2018a, 77; fra 2019, 92), little attempt has been made to implement strategies and dedicated action plans against racial or ethnic discrimination and related intolerance, particularly in the sphere of employment. they were also unable to reach a consensus regarding the implementation of the long-pending equal treatment directive (fra 2020b, 32; fra 2021, 69). the greatest challenge to the eu perhaps comes from institutional racism. in the post 9/11 period, muslims have come to be perceived as the ‘enemy within’ in many european countries and have been known to be disproportionately targeted by the state’s security measures. after the 2015 paris attacks, 3594 muslim houses, mosques and prayer halls were raided (enar 2016). however, such intensive operations resulted in only six criminal investigations for terrorism and only one ongoing trial (enar 2016). both the eu-midis ii and a national survey in france reveal that a higher proportion of muslims was stopped and searched as compared to other communities. this is especially the case for young men of arab and african descent, who are twenty times (fra 2018a, 79) more likely to be stopped and searched than any other male group. similar kinds of religious profiling were also found to be prevalent in germany regarding black and minority communities (open society justice initiative 2009, 82). these coupled with other measures such as prohibitions on the building of mosques, minarets and prayer rooms, restricting the entry of foreign clerics, and subjecting muslim institutions to intensive surveillance run the risk of undermining fundamental rights and paves the way for increasing hostility and discrimination against them since it gives the rest of the society the ‘permission to hate’ (poynting and mason, 2006) and creates a continuous cycle of intolerance which generates more and more violence. since such measures are justified by the states on the grounds of national security, there is little political will or scope for the eu’s intervention. 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 conclusion to conclude, the eu’s response to islamophobia has been feeble at best. it has introduced a substantial number of measures that are relevant to combating the phenomenon, however, these have largely missed their mark and failed to create a positive impact. the eu recognises islamophobia as a challenge to societal stability. nonetheless, it chooses to address them through more general measures on racism and xenophobia. this coupled with the lack of eu-wide data on anti-muslim incidents reduces its visibility. the eu’s efforts have been commendable in as much that they cover a wide range of issues from the criminalization of hate crimes and prohibition of negative discrimination to the sensitization of law enforcement agencies, the establishment of equality bodies and victims’ rights. however, in reality, these measures have had limited effectiveness. there has undoubtedly been some progress concerning stronger cyber legislations addressing hate speeches on the internet and in creating safer online spaces. it has motivated social media platforms and member states like france and germany to be more proactive in removing hate-related content. however, the lack of political will and the limited implementation of the eu’s measures have jeopardized most of the initiatives and adversely affected future progress. since all of the initiatives are centred around the understanding of hate crimes, the lack of consensus on its understanding has been a major setback. moreover, the eu has been unable to ensure the participation of all member states in collecting hate crime-related data. such data is not categorized to reflect the number of anti-muslim incidents or related cases handled by the equality bodies. as a result, any assessment of the effectiveness of the eu’s measures has to depend on general data related to racism and xenophobia. additionally, although the eu monitors these bodies regularly and has even introduced infringement procedures against some, in several of the member states they have collapsed. it is also important to note that despite the adoption of the eu’s measures, france and germany, have experienced an overall increase in hate crimes in the past few years which questions the effectiveness of these measures. in both member states, equality bodies have come to be criticized because of their ineffectiveness as well. finally, the eu has also been unable to take a strong stand against racial profiling by its member states. it also recognizes ‘gendered islamophobia’ and multiple discrimination, but has nevertheless failed to undertake specific measures to mitigate its effects. since islamophobia is driven by misperceptions regarding islam, programmes disseminating education and awareness on islam can also play a positive role in breaking down prejudices and combating intolerances. however, this has largely been absent in the eu’s efforts. as europe continues to grapple with the complexities of xenophobia and racism, particularly rising islamophobia in the 21st century, its greatest challenge will come in terms of generating a political will strong enough to resist anti-muslim prejudices not only at the societal level but also at the institutional level of policy-making in the member states. looking towards the future, as society continues to grapple with islamophobia, increasing the visibility of this phenomenon coupled with stronger measures that specifically address anti-muslim prejudices and ensuring stricter compliance by the member states will be indispensable in fostering greater cohesion. 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 references abdelkader, engy. 2017. “a comparative analysis of 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https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/07/-hungary-to-detain-all-asylum-seekers-in-container-camps 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ microsoft word pettai_final_pgjune5 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 the baltic states: keeping the faith in turbulent times1 vello pettai2 university of tartu abstract as the baltic states commemorated the centenary of their first appearance as independent states in 2018, their celebrations were mixed with feelings of ambiguity about the road travelled since then. although today we often see estonia, latvia, and lithuania as 'post-communist' countries, their experience with communism was actually much harsher than in central europe, since, for nearly fifty years, the three countries were forcibly a part of the soviet union. this has made their journey back into the european community all that more remarkable, and it has also served to keep these countries somewhat more resistant to the dangers of democratic backsliding. after all, their continued independence and well-being are intricately dependent on keeping the european liberal order intact. nevertheless, the winds of populism have also begun to buffet these three countries, meaning that they have been struggling to keep their balancing act going. this article reviews the development of the baltic states over the last 20 years, both in terms of domestic politics and eu accession and membership. it profiles the way in which the three countries have been trying to keep their faith in democracy and liberalism alive amidst ever more turbulent political and economic times. 1 research for this article has come from the european union’s horizon 2020 research and innovation programme “poprebel: populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century eastern europe: neo-traditionalism and neofeudalism” under grant agreement no. 822682. the publication reflects only the author's view and the ec is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. 2 vello pettai is professor of comparative politics at the university of tartu. 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 introduction it is difficult to begin this manuscript without a personal disclaimer. on september 14, 2003, i went to a cinema in tallinn to see the recently released and widely acclaimed movie about life in post-communist eastern germany, goodbye lenin. as i walked out of the theater reflecting on my time warp back to 1989-1990, i looked around at the sparkling glass high-rises in the downtown area and the trendy shops doing a bustling business on the retail floors. i walked calmly to a nearby taxi stand offering a row of freshly branded kia sedans. i climbed into the first car and asked the driver to take me to a school in my residential part of town. when i reached the school and entered its gymnasium, i seized the ballot being handed to me by the electoral official and proceeded to vote a resounding “yes” to european union accession. in this respect, i am complicit in the broadscale change that will be recounted in this article about political, economic, social, and foreign policy developments in the baltic states since 2004. i am not only one who helped make the decision whether to join the eu or not, but also one who laid the groundwork for that transformation by living in, and commenting on the politics of, the region, going back to before re-independence in 1991. had i known at the time that it would all go so (relatively) fast, i wouldn’t have made some of my more hesitant predictions about how quickly the baltics might emerge from their “post-soviet” shadows. had i known how quickly i would hold in my hand an electronic id card with which i could cast future electoral votes via the internet from practically any corner on earth, i would have been less distraught over how long it would take to overcome soviet bureaucracy. had i been able to imagine baltic soldiers serving in kosovo, lebanon, or mali as part of international peace-keeping missions, i might have been more visionary about how geopolitics might evolve. none of this is to say that what has evolved in the baltic states has been uniquely positive and successful. but it is to take advantage of the benefit of time – not only since 2004, but also going back another 15 years – in order to place into context some of the events and processes we might meanwhile have started to treat with a self-evident presumption. when i was first asked to contribute to this retrospective on eu accession 15 years ago, my mind went back immediately to that sunny autumn day in tallinn, and i knew that this article could not start with just a standard introduction. from here, however, it will proceed in the more conventional manner. namely, it will provide a general overview of political development in the baltic states over the last two decades. thereafter, it will recall some of the main aspects of the pre-2004 accession process. third, it will devote a lengthier section to a discussion of the balts’ experience with membership since 2004. and lastly, it will enumerate some future challenges for the baltic states, both as nations and as member-states in the european union. the title of the article is meant to capture some of today’s uncertainty that arguably is felt in particular by the baltic peoples. these countries have in many ways come the farthest of any of the “new member-states” – all the way from behind the walls of the soviet union. yet, is their faith in the european project that much stronger, or will it, too, erode amid the current period of turmoil? political development the political development of the baltic states since re-independence in 1991 has seen a fairly steady progression toward consolidated democracy. all of the three major indices of democracy that go back to the early 1990s (freedom house, polity, and varieties of democracy) show the three states having already attained a solid level of electoral democracy by 1994. the protection 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 of civil liberties, rule of law, and judicial independence has also been good, with more specific databases such as “nations in transit” or v-dem’s liberal democracy index showing consistent adherence to the norms of liberal governance. even during the last five years, the countries have remained firmly in this camp with no signs of the backsliding seen in some other regional countries. constitutionally, of course, the countries are different, with estonia and latvia sticking to parliamentary regimes and lithuania opting for a semi-presidential form of government. neither regime has proven particularly problematic, although lithuania did undergo an ordeal in 2004, when parliament decided to impeach and then remove from office president rolandas paksas for abuse of power. the three states’ party systems have also evolved in slightly different directions. figure 1 shows the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties – a measure meant to capture not only the direct number of parties, but also their proportional weight. in the early 1990s, we see that lithuania started with the most consolidated party system, anchored very much upon an anticommunist vs. ex-communist cleavage. nationalist politicians organized around the homeland union confronted former communist leaders from the lithuanian democratic labor party. but over the last 15 years, this configuration has become more fragmented, with a series of protest parties emerging and sometimes also disappearing. during this same time, estonia and latvia gradually reduced their number of parties, with estonia actually reaching a point in 2011 where just four parties were elected to parliament. but, since 2010, latvia has shown a renewed trend toward fragmentation. not only have protest parties emerged more forcefully, but also various centrist parties (such as the once-powerful unity party) have splintered. figure 1: effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties in the baltic states in figure 2, we look, therefore, at an additional metric that has been called ‘party system age’ (psa) (kreuzer and pettai 2013). psa attempts to assess how much a given party system has been perturbed over the years by organizational changes in parties, including the formation of electoral alliances, mergers, fissions, and new parties. the argument is that, not only does the relative electoral strength of parties matter, but also whether they are durable organizations that remain 2 4 6 8 10 e ff . n u m . o f p a rt ie s 92 95 99 03 07 11 15 19 election year estonia 2 4 6 8 10 e ff . n u m . o f p a rt ie s 93 95 98 02 06 10 11 14 18 election year latvia 2 4 6 8 10 e ff . n u m . o f p a rt ie s 92 96 00 04 08 12 16 election year lithuania data source: baltic electoral data; own calculations eff. nr. electoral parties eff. nr. parliamentary parties 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 committed to a brand and imply accountability. using this measure, we see that latvia and lithuania have had particular difficulty in consolidating a consistent set of political parties, while estonia has had more success in this realm. figure 2: party system age in the baltic states some of this party fragmentation has also translated into lower levels of cabinet duration. as figure 3 indicates, the first cabinets that have come together after a parliamentary election have lasted the least amount of time in latvia – on average just 372 days, or barely a year. overall, the highest average first-string cabinet duration is in estonia (739 days). however, lithuania has been steadily mounting in this category, being the only country in the baltics to have had a cabinet survive the entirety of a parliamentary term (algirdas butkevičius, 2012-2016). 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 figure 3: average cabinet duration in the baltic states, 1992-2019 a fourth interesting point of reference concerning political development in the baltic states relates to the ideological orientation of their governments. drawing on the parlgov dataset (döring and manow 2019), we can calculate the weighted left-right orientation of each baltic government and plot these values in figures 4-6. we can see that, whereas estonia and latvia have been led predominantly by right-wing governments (with values above the midpoint of 5), lithuania has followed a more alternating path, switching between rightand left-wing cabinets. moreover, the general ideological tilt of estonia and latvia is more to the right, with the few truly left-wing parties being more isolated or relatively moderate. 739 502 373 418 603 620 0 200 400 600 800 m e a n d u ra tio n , d a ys estonia latvia lithuania 1st string 2nd string 1st string 2nd string 1st string 2nd string 1st string = first cabinet formed after a parliamentary election 2nd string = all subsequent cabinets before a new election data source: döring and manow (2019), author's own calculations 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 figure 4: left-right orientation of cabinets and opposition in estonia, 1992-2019 figure 5: left-right orientation of cabinets and opposition in latvia, 1992-2018 figure 6: left-right orientation of cabinets and opposition in lithuania, 1992-2018 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 la ar i ta ra nd va hi i va hi ii va hi ii i si im an n la ar ii ka lla s pa rts an si p i an si p ii an si p iii an si p iv ro iv as i ro iv as ii ra ta s i ra ta s ii government opposition le ft -w in g ri g h tw in g l e ft -r ig h t id e o lo g ic a l s ca le legend: left-right orientation of each party in cabinet & opposition weighted by its proportional size in the cabinet/opposition. data source: döring and manow (2019), author's own calculations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 bi rk av s g ai lis sk el e i sk el e ii kr as ts i kr as ts ii kr is to pa ns i kr is to pa ns ii sk el e iii be rz in s r ep se em sis ka lv iti s i ka lv itis ii ka lv itis ii i g od m an is ii d om br ov sk is i d om br ov sk is ii do m br ov sk is ii i do m br ov sk is iv st ra uj um a i st ra uj um a ii ku ci ns ki s government opposition le ft -w in g ri g h tw in g l e ft -r ig h t id e o lo g ic a l s ca le legend: left-right orientation of each party in cabinet & opposition weighted by its proportional size in the cabinet/opposition. data source: döring and manow (2019), author's own calculations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 sl ez ev ic iu s va gn or iu s ii pa ks as i ku bi liu s i pa ks as ii br az au sk as i br az au sk as ii br az au sk as ii i ki rk ila s ku bi liu s ii ku bi liu s iii bu tk ev ic iu s sk ve rn el is government opposition le ft -w in g ri g h tw in g l e ft -r ig h t id e o lo g ic a l s ca le legend: left-right orientation of each party in cabinet & opposition weighted by its proportional size in the cabinet/opposition. data source: döring and manow (2019), author's own calculations 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 a final hallmark of political development for estonia, latvia, and lithuania has been their overall success in ensuring good governance (vilpišauskas 2014). as measured by the bertelsmann transformation index (2018), the three countries have remained near the top 15 countries in the world in terms of their governance performance (with estonia consistently placing among the top five) (figure 7). while corruption is still often cited as a problem (particularly in latvia and lithuania), the countries’ scores on this indicator have improved noticeably over the last decade. the main focus of concern for the baltic states has been ethnic politics, with estonia and latvia facing the most challenges given their sizeable russian-speaking minorities.3 after 1945, these populations had grown significantly, thanks to soviet policies encouraging slavic migration to the baltic region. by the late 1980s, russian speakers amounted to some 35-40 percent of the population in estonia and latvia.4 although in recent years these proportions have fallen (to 27 percent in estonia and 30 percent in latvia), the risk of ethnic tensions has remained an everpresent danger, not only internally, but also geopolitically, vis-à-vis russia. in particular, estonia and latvia drew sharp criticism for adopting stark legislation in 1991 that denied automatic citizenship to soviet-era settlers, as well as to their descendants (even if they were born in the republics). while legally, the two states were in their right to do so (since these non-citizen populations had come to the baltics under what most western countries had acknowledged was an illegal soviet occupation), the move generated overnight an unprecedented 3 while there is no formal definition of who constitutes a “russian speaker,” for the purposes of this analysis, all ethnic russians, ukrainians, and belarussians (as counted in different national statistical estimates) are encompassed in this category. 4 in lithuania, lithuanians constitute roughly 87 percent of the population, and in 2018, the largest minority groups were split about evenly between poles and russians (5.6 and 4.5 percent, respectively). see dambrauskas (2017). 1 5 10 15 w o rl d r a n ki n g 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 estonia latvia lithuania data source: bertelsmann transformation index (2018) figure 7: country ranking of the baltic states on the governance performance indicator of the bertelsmann transformation index, 2006-2018 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 proportion of stateless people (up to 40 percent of the population) that overlapped to a very large degree with the non-titular population. as a result, many russian speakers not only were fearful of more restrictive language and education laws that nationalist politicians were now keen to enact under independence, but in addition, they had in many cases lost their basic voting rights in these countries, threatening their ability to make their interests heard at all through the political system. while estonia did agree to give all permanent residents voting rights in local elections, this did not change the national representation of ethnic minorities. as a consequence, the first free estonian parliament elected in 1992 did not have a single russian speaker among its 101 members, despite this minority constituting 35 percent of the population. even today, minority representatives remain underrepresented in both countries’ legislatures.5 in the years that have followed, both estonia and latvia have moved to develop minority integration policies that focused on promoting naturalization among non-citizens as well as improving russian speakers’ ability to communicate in the national languages. as a result of these programs (many of which were financially supported by the european union), by 2017, the share of stateless people in estonia and latvia fell to just 5.9 percent and 11.1 percent, respectively (statistikaamet 2017a; centrālā statistikas pārvalde 2019b). a series of sociological surveys conducted during the 2000s also showed that, while minorities’ knowledge of estonian and latvian was improving only slowly, among younger generations, the progress was steadier. one study from latvia showed that, in 2014, fully 77 percent of young people aged 18-24 who were not native latvian speakers said they could either freely or fluently communicate in latvian (lauze 2016, 56). the comparable figure in estonia was lower, just 63 percent, but still an increase of 15 percentage points over 2011 (kruusvall 2015, 74). still, many flashpoints have ensued between the estonian/latvian governments and their russianspeaking minorities during the last 25 years. most notably, in 2007, an estonian government decision to relocate a world war ii memorial (known as the bronze soldier) in the capital city of tallinn sparked two days of rioting by russian youths (ehala 2009). equally, the latvian capital of riga witnessed sometimes tense demonstrations by russian minority protestors over low pension levels (1998) and educational reforms aimed at increasing the amount of latvian language instruction (2004 and 2017-18). in one notable wave of mobilization in 2012, minority activists were able to force the holding of a national referendum on whether to make russian the second official language of latvia. the constitutional amendment was defeated by a resounding margin of 75 to25 percent. however, it showed that ethnopolitical issues remained a sensitive matter. ethnicity has mirrored itself in the party system with not only prominent estonian and latvian nationalist parties in existence, but also minority-dominant parties holding key stakes in the electoral market (nakai 2014, higashijima and nakai 2016, nedelcu and debardeleben 2016). both the center party in estonia and the harmony center party in latvia claim to be broad-based political organizations, but during elections, the parties obtain between 65 and 75 percent of their vote from russian speakers. their respective support is particularly strong in the two capitals 5 it should be noted that political participation among russian speakers in estonia and latvia is in general much lower than among the titular nations. in this respect, underrepresentation is also prompted by apathy. however, because up to half of the russian-speaking population does not hold citizenship of their home country (because they either remain stateless or have opted for russian federation citizenship), they are also not a segment of the population that politicians will court during elections. the question of citizenship therefore remains a self-reinforcing problem for political interest representation. 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 (tallinn and riga), as well as in russian-speaking regions in both countries (ida-virumaa in estonia and latgale in latvia). for more than 20 years, this factor has caused both parties to be largely rejected during any national coalition formation. only in estonia was this rule broken for a couple of short-lived periods during the 2000s, and never in latvia. while a major shift did occur in estonia in 2016, when the chair of the center party, jüri ratas, became prime minister (and continued in that role after elections in 2019), this was not exactly a landmark watershed of interethnic cooperation, since both of his coalitions included staunch estonian nationalist parties, who saw it as their role to make sure the center party did not push policies that were too favorable for the russian-speaking community. hence, a fair amount of mistrust continued. the eu accession process both the successes and difficulties of the baltic states’ democratic development since 1991 fed into their process of european union accession during the late 1990s and early 2000s. during this initial period, the eu was unsurprisingly hesitant about taking in three ex-soviet republics too soon. not only was there a perception that the three states were too under-developed to cope with eu membership, but also geopolitical concerns were raised, as russia continued to accuse the baltic states (particularly estonia and latvia) of discriminating against russian minorities and neglecting russia’s broader interests (raik 2003). as russian president boris yeltsin sought precariously to modernize russia and turn it to the west, it was unclear whether actively encouraging baltic aspirations to join the eu (not to mention nato) might not overturn the apple cart. from the baltic point of view, the determination to push their case for eu membership was unrelenting. particularly successful was estonia, when in 1997, it was able to land a spot in the first group of ex-communist countries called to start negotiations with brussels. while ultimately this did not lead to these countries joining the eu any earlier, it was an important signal for the baltic states that not only could they make the case that successful political and economic reform can overcome past legacies, but also that geopolitical and ethnic minority issues would not prove a veto to their future integration with the west. as noted, the eu would still pay attention to minority integration policies, most prominently in estonia and latvia (galbreath 2003, gelazis 2004, adrey 2005, hughes 2005, pettai and kallas 2009). this would include not only supporting integration programs and language training, but also encouraging the balts’ active participation in the council of europe’s framework convention for the protection of national minorities and other monitoring forums. but this basic turning point in western assessments of how to deal with the balts’ ethnopolitical challenges was crucial for moving the process forward. in terms of the nuts and bolts of accession, a range of scholarly works and reports have already examined this process in detail (pettai and zielonka 2003, vilpišauskas and nakrošis 2003, hoganbrun 2005, maniokas 2005, feldman 2006, norkus 2007, van elsuwege 2008, jacobsson 2009, grigas et al. 2013, kerikmäe et al. 2018). suffice it to say that, because of their small size and their eagerness to join the eu, the baltic states did not pose much of a headache in terms of any of the major chapters of the acquis communautaire that needed to be negotiated. as vilpišauskas (2003) recounts, estonia, latvia, and lithuania had to do some adjustments in terms of their agricultural policies as well as free trade relations at the time with ukraine. they also negotiated a number of transition periods for raising various excise taxes to eu levels and adopting a range of eu 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 regulations regarding environment, transport, and other areas. for lithuania, two specific issues concerned the eu’s demand for a closure of the soviet-built ignalina atomic energy station and the future of transit movement to and from kaliningrad. the former related to how much the eu would support lithuania financially in this task, while the latter involved assurances that interaction with kaliningrad would remain facilitated without this adversely affecting lithuania’s future chances of joining the schengen border area. by december 2002, all three baltic states had completed their negotiations, and the stage was set for final ratification of the accession via referendums in 2003. during the period of membership negotiation, popular opinion about the european union fluctuated in the baltic states. for example, whitefield et al. (2006, 194) found that support for the eu was strongest among (a) those who believed they would stand to benefit from the new opportunities, (b) those who viewed the eu as a security guarantor for the future, and (c) those who saw the eu as part of a national-cultural return to europe (see also ehin 2001). interestingly, while some surveys showed that support for accession among russian speakers was initially high, this appears to have tapered off by 2004, as many minority residents may have begun to realize that joining the eu would mean a more definitive turning away from russia and the former soviet union. likewise, many russian speakers had become disillusioned with the prospect that the european union might somehow defend their rights more forcefully vis-à-vis the baltic governments. in the event, the fact that neither estonia nor latvia was forced to noticeably change their citizenship policies during the course of accession indicated that minority interests would have to be promoted in other ways (pettai 2004). the final referendum results were relatively unsurprising (figure 8). political elites in all three baltic states pulled all the stops in order to get people to vote yes. the pro-eu campaigns highlighted both the expected economic benefits of membership and the geopolitical significance of locking the three countries into the western community (mikkel and pridham 2004, pettai and ehin 2005). anti-eu arguments focused on retaining national sovereignty and the dangers of being absorbed by a european behemoth. in terms of the ethnic factor, russian speakers in estonia proved to be greater supporters of the eu than those in latvia. even in the overwhelmingly russian-speaking city of narva in estonia’s northeast, the ‘yes’ vote obtained a majority of 57 percent. meanwhile, in latvia, several parts of the eastern latgale region, including the city of daugavpils, voted strongly against membership (up to 67 percent). since only citizens could vote in the referendum, this meant that a sizeable share of the core minority community had reservations about shifting the baltic states toward the european union. 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 figure 8: results of the eu accession referendums in the baltic states, 2004 the experience of membership since 2004, the expectations that the baltic peoples had for eu membership have largely been fulfilled, be it in terms of political integration, economic advancement, national security, or european identities. this section will profile these various issues, while acknowledging that not everything has been smooth sailing. political integration perhaps the most direct manifestation of the balts’ success with eu accession involves being at the table and participating actively in eu institutions. all three nations have had their share of prominent eu commissioners (e.g., dalia grybauskaite, valdis dombrovskis, siim kallas). baltic members of the european parliament have stood out for their focus on eu foreign policy (e.g., in support of ukraine) and in favor of tough sanctions on russia. several baltic meps (such as vytautas landsbergis, tunne kelam, and sandra kalniete) have drawn attention to issues of historical memory in the eu, seeking recognition for the suffering of peoples under communism alongside that under nazism. likewise, the european parliament has been the venue for several russian-speaking politicians from the baltics to advocate their views. the latvian mep tatjana ždanoka was elected three times to the ep and used that rostrum often to criticize her own country about the plight of russian speakers. across the overall spectrum of member-states in the eu, it is not possible to say that the baltic states constitute a particular regional bloc, even in collaboration with the other 2004 accession countries. if anything, the baltic states have sought to maintain close coordination with finland and sweden. this, in turn, has often brought them into alignment with the netherlands and 66.8 33.2 64.0 67.0 32.5 73.0 91.0 8.9 63.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 p e rc e n ta g e estonia latvia lithuania data source: baltic electoral data; own calculations yes no turnout 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 denmark – two member-states who are generally seen as more sovereignty-minded with the eu (taylor 2018). at the same time, the baltic states took a relatively cautious stance during 201718, when the european commission launched legal action against the polish government’s alleged attempts to circumscribe the country’s courts. during one public occasion, lithuanian president dalia grybauskaite went out of her way to express solidarity with her southern neighbor (delfi.lt 2018). economic advancement it goes without saying that the economic benefits of eu accession for the baltic states have generally been positive. according to one study, estonia had the highest level of per capita support from the eu’s various structural funds of any former communist member-state. (varblane 2016, 124). this figure amounted to 2540 euros per person during the period of 2007-2013. the comparable totals for latvia and lithuania were around 2000 euros. overall during the entire period of 2007-2020, estonia, latvia, and lithuania were set to receive a total of seven, nine, and 13.6 billion euros, respectively. the share of this funding in relation to each country’s gdp has also grown from around two percent in the mid-2000s to almost five percent by the 2010s (kondortabun and staehr 2015, 2; varblane 2016, 125). with respect to spending, most of this money flowed into transportation projects, environmental sustainability, educational programs, r&d funding, and regional development. in basic terms, this meant investment in new roads, water treatment facilities, job training programs, higher education support, and rural improvements. during the 2010s, prominent attention was given to the ambitious rail baltic project, the creation of a high-speed rail link from tallinn down to the polish border (via the cities of pärnu, riga, and kaunas, with a side branch to vilnius). the objective was to facilitate commercial transport through the region and indirectly extend the link up to finland through an eventual tunnel between tallinn and helsinki. the concomitant environmental costs, however, were equally a point of contestation, since the completely walled-off rail corridor would require special bridges and other accommodations for wildlife and local traffic to cross the straightaway. additional concerns were raised about the long-term cost of maintaining the railway, since eu funds would only be given for building the project. this question of sustainability became a heightened worry as the eu’s financial period of 20142020 started coming to an end. studies of the effects of eu cohesion funding have shown that when the level of such support surpasses a threshold of around 2.3 percent of gdp, its effect is to substitute for member-states’ own spending in these areas, thereby creating a dependency that is difficult to compensate if and when eu funding declines sharply (šlander and wostner 2018, 730). in the baltic states, this effect was particularly apparent in infrastructural spending and research funding. this problem of ‘substitution’ was also driven by the eu’s own strict monitoring of programming and allocation rates among the recipient countries, meaning governments would attempt to spend money as quickly as possible and thereby be particularly tempted to substitute their own national spending with eu funds.6 6 as will be discussed below, the financial crisis of 2009-2010 further exacerbated this trend, since the eu decided to speed up its disbursement of funds in an attempt to spur economic activity in these recipient countries. this meant, however, an even stronger substitution effect taking place(see kondor-tabun and staehr 2015, 17). 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 eu membership for the baltic states therefore had a very important fiscal and financial impact. more broadly, however, it is important to acknowledge the psychological effects of membership in terms of stabilizing investor confidence, commercial relationships, and economic activity in general. although studies of the effect of eu accession on growth rates in the post-communist region have been inconclusive, it is clear that in terms of providing a more viable and promising market economic perspective for the baltic peoples, eu accession was a worthwhile choice. the baltic states have gained more opportunities and perhaps less vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the global market by being tightly integrated with their european neighbors. moreover, the same argument that was noted above regarding political integration applies here: being at the table, in terms of crafting decisions on the euro, european financial regulations, tax harmonization, or any other policy area, matters. however, as one pair of comparative researchers put it, “the economic side of…eastern enlargement is...a hybrid bag of effects for the eu’s eastern countries because membership in the eu is not a tide that lifts all boats” (jovanovic and damnjanovic 2014, 1). this was felt in particular during the global financial crisis of 2009-2010. by now, it is well known that the baltic states took one of the deepest hits in the eu during this collapse, with gdp contracting between 14 and 17 percent in 2009 and unemployment hitting nearly 20 percent. this tumble was even more stark, thanks to the above average growth rates of seven to eight percent during the early 2000s. yet, as many analysts have shown (brixiova et al. 2010, kattel and raudla 2013, staehr 2013), these issues are linked, in that the economic boom starting around 2000 was not only beginning to show signs of going bust in 2008; it was also sent into a freefall when the rest of the world began to ripple from the wider financial crash (lehmann brothers, etc.). in this respect, the baltic countries faced some particularly difficult choices that involved not only the usual options of fiscal austerity, but also how to navigate sensitive (at the time) political ambitions about joining the euro zone. as was often discussed during the crisis, the baltic states might have improved their economic situation by suspending the process of approximating their national currencies with the euro and by devaluating the exchange rate of these monies in order to regain competitiveness in export markets. however, this would have caused domestic problems for people who had to pay back loans in euros. and it would have constituted a major setback in what had heretofore been a very steady and successful eu integration process (kattel and raudla 2013). in the end, the three countries opted for what was known as internal devaluation by radically cutting their national budgets (in particular, public sector wages), tolerating large-scale deficits (up to nearly ten percent of gdp), and suffering some major bank failures (parex in latvia and ukio in lithuania).7 while estonia was able to cover some of these shortfalls thanks to some national savings that had been accumulated during the boom years, latvia and lithuania were less prepared. latvia, in particular, was forced in december 2008 to turn to international donors (including the imf and the eu) for a 7.5 billion euro stabilization package. lithuania, meanwhile, was not able to bring its budget back into balance until 2014. long-term state debt in latvia and lithuania also grew as a percentage of gdp from around 15-20 percent to 40 percent, while estonia’s remained around ten percent (kattel and raudla 2013). 7 for details, see kattel and raudla (2013), staehr (2013). 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 the fact that the baltic states were eu members during this particularly severe global crisis was probably on the whole a good thing. while the eu could not directly engineer economic recovery nor even hold off future periods of speculative economic growth through regulation, it did provide a more integrated context in which to deal with the challenges the balts would face. however, this participation also cut both ways. during 2011 and 2012, the three countries would be pulled into the difficult political decisions that the eu needed to make as result of the greek debt crisis. the three nations’ parliaments would have to ratify their states’ participation in the european stability mechanism (esm), which in many cases proved controversial; in estonia, the decision to help bail out greece would even be contested in that country’s constitutional court. these stresses of eu membership were compounded in 2015, when the baltic states would be called upon to accept a share of the millions of refugees and migrants caught up in turkish, greek, and italian transit camps. ultimately, the quotas set for estonia, latvia, and lithuania were relatively low (between 600 and 1100 people). however, the policy generated a fair amount of backlash for several reasons. one was the impression that these countries themselves were still developing and couldn’t afford the resources to be spent on sheltering and potentially integrating newcomers over the long term. another involved the irony of refugees coming into the country just as the three nations had gone through a period of large-scale out-migration of their own people. since re-independence, the population of the baltic states had gone down by as much as 25 percent (figure 9). .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1 p ro p o rt io n 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 year estonia latvia lithuania data sources: statistikaamet 2017b, centrālā statistikas pārvalde. 2019a, lietuvos statistikos departamentas 2019; own calculations figure 9: proportional declines in the resident population of the baltics states, 1995=100% 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 on the one hand, all three countries have had continuously negative population growth (deaths surpassing births) for some 25 years, sometimes amounting to 0.6 percent of the population. on top of that, however, out-migration has been an even greater problem with, for example, a net average of 26,000 people leaving lithuania and 14,000 leaving latvia each year since the mid1990s (see also berzins and zvidrins 2011, lulle 2014). particularly during the economic crisis, the totals soared to up to 77,000 per year in lithuania. in estonia, these numbers have been more modest, and in fact, by 2015, the country had turned around its migration balance, even though the natural population growth rate continued to be negative (figure 10). national security tough decisions regarding the greek debt emergency and the refugee crisis put baltic commitment to european solidarity to the test. these were among some of the first real moments where the balts were asked reciprocate for the staunch support they had been getting from europe regarding some of their own foreign and security policy concerns. on the latter score, the need was often perceived as existential: the eu and nato constituted the two most fundamental pillars of baltic foreign policy. having these two organizations safeguard baltic security was the main reason why estonia, latvia, and lithuania had joined them in the first place. and, by and large, the balts got what they wanted, especially in relation to ever more vigilant stances toward russia. in part, this trend began after the 2007 bronze soldier riots in tallinn, since it soon became clear that russia had tried to exacerbate the events by sending activists of its own to estonia. and it was alleged that russia was behind some of the cyberattacks estonia witnessed during the crisis. wariness of russia continued in 2008 after the armed conflict between russia and georgia over south ossetia. this event, in particular, prompted the balts to begin demanding from nato that the alliance put in place a clearer contingency plan for defending estonia, latvia, and lithuania, should russian expansionism turn in their direction. lastly, after the 2014 russian annexation of -10000 -5000 0 5000 10000 c h a n g e , n r o f p e rs o n s 1 9 9 5 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 5 2 0 2 0 estonia -40000 -30000 -20000 -10000 0 c h a n g e , n r o f p e rs o n s 1 9 9 5 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 5 2 0 2 0 latvia -80000 -60000 -40000 -20000 0 c h a n g e , n r o f p e rs o n s 19 95 20 00 20 05 20 10 20 15 20 20 lithuania note: migration data for estonia not available before 2004. source: see figure 9. natural population growth migration balance figure 10: natural population growth rates and migration flows in the baltic states, 1995-2018 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 crimea, the masks were taken off, and a wholesale effort was undertaken to put nato boots on the ground in the baltics. the united kingdom took responsibility for placing rotating troops in estonia, canada in latvia, and germany in lithuania. in addition, the united states played a role in the advanced deployment of materiel. the balts themselves, meanwhile, tried to adhere to the nato call for member states to spend at least two percent of their gdp on defense. estonia fulfilled this criterion, while latvia and lithuania fell somewhat short (in part because of the 2009 financial crisis). within the european union, the baltic states lobbied for tough sanctions against russia, and through mid-2019, these continued to hold, despite occasional calls for their relaxation from other eu countries. this prolonged demonstration of eu unity was a bit of a surprise even for the balts themselves. such policies were all the more challenging given that the eu’s outreach to other neighboring countries like ukraine, georgia, or moldova (via the eastern partnership) had proven less effective than originally hoped. the balts had sought to contribute their own efforts to initiatives through training agreements and policy exchanges with these other countries. this, too, was part of their effort to advance their own security through common eu policies. support for the eu the upshot from the baltic countries’ experience with membership in the eu can be seen in various questions from the eu’s regularly commissioned eurobarometer (2019) surveys. on the whole, balts have expressed average or above-average support for the eu across a number of the questions. in particular, this is apparent from around 2012 onwards, when reverberations from the economic crisis began to subside. for example, when asked whether they are satisfied with how democracy works in the eu, lithuanians respond positively on average 13.5 percent higher than the mean level in the european union (see figure 11). when asked whether they are optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the eu, lithuanians again exceed the eu mean in terms of their optimism, by an average of 15 percent between 2012 and 2019 (figure 12). estonians, too, were generally backers of the eu, although their support did slip noticeably during the refugee crisis. their image of the eu as being positive declined markedly in 2015 and has only slowly recovered since (figure 13). as can be seen in figure 12, their level of optimism about the eu also took a tumble during this period. lastly, latvians exhibited the most reticence about the eu, including immediately after accession in the 2000s (see both figures 12 and 13). at one point during november 2011, the number of latvians with a positive image of the eu was almost equal to that of those with a negative image (21 compared to 18 percent). in this instance, one could see that the bulk of erstwhile supporters of the eu had shifted mostly to a ‘neutral’ stance (60 percent); the number of negative views of the eu didn’t really increase. still, it was a low point. 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 figure 11: levels of baltic satisfaction with the way democracy works in the european union, 2004-2019, eurobarometer surveys 40 50 60 70 % o f re sp o n d e n ts i d e n tif yi n g a s fa ir ly o r v e ry s a tis fie d 1/1/2004 1/1/2006 1/1/2008 1/1/2010 1/1/2012 1/1/2014 1/1/2016 1/1/2018 eu estonia latvia lithuania 50 60 70 80 % o f re sp o n d e n ts i d e n tif yi n g a s fa ir ly o r ve ry o p ti m is tic 1/1/2007 1/1/2010 1/1/2013 1/1/2016 1/1/2019 eu estonia latvia lithuania figure 12: levels of baltic optimism about the future of the european union, 2007-2019, eurobarometer surveys 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 figure 13: baltic respondents’ image of the european union, 2007-2019, eurobarometer surveys future challenges in 2018, the baltic states celebrated the centenary of their first declarations of independence in 1918. this anniversary was – in contrast to the rest of eastern europe – not one of having actually had a hundred years of statehood. instead, the milestone came with a rather sundry mix of feelings. on the one hand, baltic independence in 2018 had now lasted longer than that between the two world wars. at the same time, the combination of these two periods of independence had yet to surpass the amount of time spent under soviet and nazi occupation from 1940 to 1991. in other words, a curious ambiguity hung in the air regarding what there was to be actually fêted. still, one of the oft-repeated mantras from that year was that the people of estonia, latvia, and lithuania had never in their history lived as well as they did now. by this was meant that not only had the socio-economic status of the three nations improved greatly over the last quarter-century, but also, geopolitically, the countries were much better positioned to deal with regional security threats, as well as to build partnerships with their neighbors. as nation-states, the three baltic peoples also now had the sovereignty and wherewithal to protect and develop their languages and cultures. all of this should have made for buoyant and assertive celebrations. and while there was no shortage of fireworks and other pomp bestowed on the 2018 festivities, there was also a feeling of discontent, particularly in estonia and latvia, as right-wing populist forces gained political momentum. in the october 2018 latvian parliamentary election, a new anti-establishment party called “who owns the state?” came second in polling (14.2 percent) and for a while appeared poised to nominate the next prime minister – until it became clear that the party leader would not be given security clearance by latvian law enforcement agencies. coupled with a strong upsurge by another, previously minor party (the new conservative party), the latvian party system became once again highly fragmented and cut along fairly divisive lines. the appointment of krišjanis 20 30 40 50 60 % o f re sp o n d e n ts s e e in g e u a s fa ir ly o r ve ry p o si tiv e 1/1/2005 1/1/2006 1/1/2007 1/1/2008 1/1/2009 1/1/2010 1/1/2011 1/1/2012 1/1/2013 1/1/2014 1/1/2015 1/1/2016 1/1/2017 1/1/2018 eu estonia latvia lithuania 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 kariņš as prime minister (from parliament’s smallest party) more than three months after the election only served to epitomize the difficult political constellation in which the country was now situated. likewise, in estonia in 2018, observers braced themselves for what was expected to be a swelling of support for the right-wing radical estonian conservative people’s party (ekre) in advance of march 2019 elections. during the electoral campaign, ekre’s leaders railed against a ‘deep state’ they claimed had taken over estonian government; they promised to give power back to the people through more referendums; and they pledged an unprecedented spending program geared towards clearing state debt. when the party scored nearly 18 percent (coming in third), the result was ominous enough for many observers. however, when prime minister jüri ratas (from the secondplace center party) decided to outmaneuver the actual winner of the election (the reform party) and form an alternative majority coalition embracing ekre and the conservative pro patria party in order to stay in office, the level of angst was raised even higher. even in lithuania, prime minister saulius skvernelis was forced in september 2018 to turn to a somewhat more long-standing, but still widely seen as populist, party, order and justice, in order to shore up his majority in parliament. while the basic political orientation of the government didn’t change, the shakiness of the cabinet (and in particular of the junior partner, the social democrats) showed that established parties were crumbling there, too. while some analysts endorsed the inclusion of populist forces in these governments as helping perhaps to blunt their future appeal, it was unclear whether the recipes these politicians offered would actually help to alleviate the problems the two countries faced. lavish promises of new spending on expanded social welfare programs ran counter to a fairly entrenched neo-liberal economic orthodoxy in the baltics. at the same time, in what seemed like a perpetual downward spiral, all three countries were caught up in a succession of retrenchment plans meant to deal with their continuous demographic declines. starting with closed-down rural schools and hospitals, moving to redrawn and consolidated administrative districts, and ending with reductions in the size of parliament itself (broadly discussed in both lithuania and estonia), the actual evolution of government in these countries seemed little like the épanouissement that the centenaries had proclaimed. while the balts still had much to be grateful for in terms of national security via nato and the european union (particularly vis-à-vis russia), these two factors were not givens over the medium term. if the countries did not maintain a solid level of governance and respectability, it was unclear whether partners like the united states (with an increasingly transactionalist view of foreign policy) might not relax some of their security commitments. equally, the european union was in a great period of flux, with brexit topping the agenda. not only was the uk’s departure from the eu a political headache, but also its consequences for future eu budgets would be of great concern for net recipients from the eu like the baltic states. financial support from brussels was set to decline steeply, which in turn would put even more pressure on national finances amid shrinking tax bases. the ambivalent position of the baltic states was thus palpable. as the three nations in europe that had gained perhaps the most, thanks to the end of the cold war – restored national independence, reintegration with the european community, and economic modernization – they had a strong incentive to keep the faith and support the liberal order that had helped them reach their centenary 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 as free peoples. however, many of the same fissures that had begun to afflict that venerable system were also now ripping through their own societies and sapping the strength to develop even further during the next hundred years. in this respect, the baltic states did not differ from some of the symptoms of ‘democratic fatigue’ (rupnik and zielonka 2013) or the ‘hollowing of democracy’ (greskovits 2015) that other postcommunist countries had experienced.8 however, the challenge was to figure out the interplay between distal and proximate factors that contributed to these trends. interestingly, the long-term legacies of soviet rule appeared to have made the baltics slightly more immune to the risk of democratic fatigue in that more people felt a vested interest in making liberal democracy and european integration work after a half-century of foreign incorporation. because the countries had travelled the farthest in terms of political, social, and economic change since 1989, their populations persisted the longest in maintaining a belief in those commitments. hence, to paraphrase a distinction brought out by grigore pop-eleches and joshua tucker (2017), the balts’ experience of living through communism seemed to outweigh their experience of living in post-communism in a positive sense. that having been said, the nature of life in postcommunism had also changed 30 years after the fall of the berlin wall. this existence was no longer simply about the immediate political choices that national leaders made after 1989. it was also about the reverberate effects of developments far outside the region, be it the 2009 global financial crisis, the migration upsurge, or democratic fatigue taking hold in ‘consolidated’ democracies such as the us, the uk, or france. the rise of right-wing populist forces in the baltics therefore seemed to be much more attributable to these broader trends rather than to tendencies within specifically post-communist democratic consolidation. to remedy these emerging ills, a much more concerted and uniform re-equilibration of liberal democracy as a whole would be required. 8 see cianetti (2018) for an especially trenchant analysis with regard to estonia and latvia. on popular support for institutions, see gudžinskas (2017). 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 references adrey, j.-b. 2005. “minority language rights before and after the 2004 eu enlargement: the copenhagen criteria in the baltic states.” journal of multilingual and multicultural development 26 (5):453-68. bertelsmann transformation index. 2018. “bti 2006-2018 scores.“ https://www.btiproject.org/en/data/. accessed february 24, 2020. berzins, a. and p. zvidrins. 2011. 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for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 offensive weapons and the future of nuclear arms control nancy teeple1 north american and arctic defence and security network abstract with a focus on the strategic competition between the united states and russia, this paper explores the prospects for the future of arms control under an intensifying nuclear security dilemma. the end of stability-enhancing agreements such as the inf treaty and the us withdrawal from the jcpoa and open skies has accelerated the arms race. the relationship between arms control and strategic stability is part of this evaluation, particularly with respect to how states view the concept framed within their national security interests. the provocative role that offensive – deterrence by denial – capabilities play in contributing to strategic instability is central to this study. this work looks particularly at new systems designed for asymmetric advantage, including those that can defeat strategic defences, such as longer-range cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles. given conditions of modernizations and upgrades to nuclear arsenals, including the entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems that can threaten a first strike, this work considers how a dialogue on limiting dangerous systems could be initiated between the us and russia, and whether new start could be revised, or a new treaty established, to limit advances in cruise missile technology, hypersonic vehicles, missile defences, and tactical nuclear weapons. 1 nancy teeple is a postdoctoral fellow at the north american and arctic defence and security network (naadsn) and an adjunct assistant professor and research associate at the department of political science and economics at the royal military college of canada. 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 introduction in 1987, president ronald reagan and general secretary mikhail gorbachev signed the intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty. this marked a significant moment of arms control, eliminating an entire class of nuclear delivery systems, and enhanced strategic stability by reducing the mutual threat posed by intermediate range weapons in the european theatre.2 in recent times, the strategic competition between the united states (us) and russia is intensified by the deployment of nuclear and conventional means to threaten one another, including new advanced delivery systems launched by sea, air, and land, to offset capability gaps. these developments led to the demise of several arms control regimes that had defined east-west cooperation in reducing strategic weapons since the cold war. the end of key biand multilateral arms control regimes, such as the inf treaty, and the us withdrawal from the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa) and open skies, places other arms control in peril, such as new start that was set to expire in february 2021. the conditions facilitating agreement on arms control cooperation have all but disappeared, save for russia’s appeal to the us to consider renewing or extending new start before its expiration plunges the two nations into greater instability and arms races. the deployment of new offensive nuclear weapons intensifies an already problematic security dilemma that characterizes the strategic competition between the us and russia. these systems deployed for strategic advantage through deterrence-by-denial have the effect of provoking a counter-response by a nuclear peer competitor to offset that advantage through asymmetric means, creating conditions of strategic instability. strategic stability can be defined as conditions characterized by a balance of mutual vulnerability and mutual threat, ensured by credible secondstrike systems, that reduce incentives to use nuclear weapons in a first strike. simply stated, mutual deterrence is reinforced by mutually assured destruction or some other form of devastating punishment. however, this understanding is nuanced, based on what nuclear states perceive as stabilizing relative to their own security. their actions to increase security through fielding offensive weapons could have the effect of creating instability that increases incentives to use nuclear or conventional disarming weapons. the concept of strategic stability is being redefined in the current strategic context as tensions increase between nuclear competitor states with the development of new destabilizing offensive weapons with a first-strike disarming capability.3 the thesis of this work rests on the assumption that the deployment offensive weapons and postures contributes to strategic instability, provokes states into arms races, and reduces incentives for cooperation on arms control. this paper argues that in a post-inf world, the deployment of next-generation offensive weapons creates unique challenges for current and future arms control. viewing us-russian strategic relations as constituting an intensifying security dilemma, based on the increasingly offensive orientation of their nuclear forces, this work employs a typology for assessing the orientation of nuclear postures and weapons systems that lends to forecasting competitive strategic behaviour. the analysis demonstrates that the situation has reached an unprecedented level of volatility in us-russia relations with the breaking down of constraints on 2 the inf treaty prohibited the soviet and us deployment of “all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5500 kilometers” (kimball and reif 2019). 3 james acton states, “from almost as soon as the term ‘strategic stability’ first entered the nuclear lexicon, there have been calls to redefine it … critics often advocated for a redefinition on the grounds that the quest for stability led to a nuclear policy that was at variance with effective deterrence” (2013, 117). 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 dangerous weapons systems, and equally provocative counter responses. these outcomes also have implications for canada as a close us continental defence partner and nato ally. the structure of this discussion begins with outlining the security dilemma framework for understanding the strategic dynamics between the us and russia, exploring the offensive orientation of nuclear systems and its impact on strategic stability. following this is an assessment of the deterioration of us-russia strategic relations and implications for canada, the offence dominance of us and russian nuclear postures with an investigation of the destabilizing weapons systems deployed by both states. the final sections consider what this means for arms control and provides recommendations for moving forward. current conditions: intense security dilemma the security dilemma is a concept that applies to conventional and non-conventional nuclear threats, with different outcomes. herz’s original concept applies to conditions under which one state exhibits an increase in military strength, intended to increase its defences and therefore security, which creates a perception of threat in another state that views it as a competitor or rival (herz 1950; 1951; 1959). whether intended to be provocative or not, the second state’s response is to build up its military capabilities to enhance its security, which the first state then perceives as aggressive (jervis 1976; 1978). in its application to conventional forces, this security dilemma creates tensions and conditions that are likely to result in conflict. however, the nature of nuclear threats creates a different kind of outcome than conventional actions. because of their destructive capacity and the taboo (and intense fear) that surrounds their use, a nuclear security dilemma does not result in conflict, but rather a destabilizing arms races fueled by mutual fear and uncertainty about intentions. this dilemma is brought about by conditions in which the actions of one state to increase its security through deploying nuclear forces creates a response by a peer competitor, perceiving the first state’s behaviour as threatening, to deploy nuclear capabilities. this response causes the first state to perceive the second state as aggressive, motivating it to increase its nuclear capabilities, and the spiral of action-response ensues. nuclear behaviour can intensify or mitigate the security dilemma based on the orientation of nuclear postures and the deployment of weapons systems towards either the offence or defence. thus, the concept of a nuclear security dilemma offers an understanding the tension between the u.s and russia, focusing on the offensive or defensive orientation of their nuclear postures and forces. the security dilemma frames the conditions that affect the future of bilateral and multilateral arms control as they pertain to the impact of nuclear weapon state members of the treaties. the security dilemma is influenced by states’ perceptions of the offensive or defensive orientation of nuclear forces, which generate a competitive or benign response. these perceptions drive the intensity of the security dilemma that creates a sense of threat, vulnerability, fear, mistrust, and uncertainty, producing a symmetric and/or asymmetric response. this nuclear security dilemma framework builds upon established security dilemma models refined for strategic relations dominated by nuclear behaviour (van evera 1998; 1999; jervis 1978; 82 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 adams 2003/04).4 its refinement provides a typology for offensive deterrence and defence deterrence (od/dd) defined by nuclear strategies and systems oriented for denial or punishment. deterrence-by-denial (offensive deterrence) refers to capabilities designed to disarm an adversary’s nuclear launch platforms, early warning systems, or command and control (c2) through a first-strike against these counterforce targets. deterrence-by-denial is distinguished from deterrence-by-punishment (defensive deterrence). due to their first-strike disarming effects, offensive weapons are destabilizing weapons. deterrence-by-punishment is characterized by survivable systems and postures designed for second-strike / retaliation (i.e. traditional mutually assured destruction (mad) strategies) that target populations and economic centres (such as cities) and infrastructure not necessarily related to military developments.5 these high-value countervalue targets constitute unacceptable damage that dis-incentivizes a state from striking in the first place. defensive weapons are therefore second-strike, intended to deter through retaliation. current systems tend to reflect flexible nuclear strategies with capabilities spanning the three legs of the nuclear triad – sea, air, land launch platforms – providing a combination of denial and punishment approaches. for nuclear powers like the us, these arsenals are strongly oriented for first-strike advantage. in recent times, nuclear deterrence systems include the entangling of conventional capabilities – such as conventional warheads on missile platforms – that play a role in offensive deterrence-by-denial strategies targeting the rival state’s nuclear assets. conventional counterforce alternatives increase the uncertainty and complexity of perceptions of threat posed by offensive systems (acton 2020). these conditions dis-incentivize competitor states from cooperating on constraining the expansion of nuclear arsenals that would otherwise involve the reduction of deployed warheads and launch platforms. the current nuclear security dilemma creates conditions that 1) obstruct forward momentum on new nuclear arms control agreements, and 2) threaten the continuation of current arms control agreements. evidence for this argument are the outcomes resulting from the us abrogation of the anti-ballistic missile (abm) treaty in 2002, mutual accusations of violating the inf treaty leading to the withdrawal from said treaty in 2019, the us withdrawal from the open skies multilateral treaty in 2020, and anticipated expiration of new start in february 2021. with a focus on offensive capabilities deployed for deterrence-by-denial, the following section presents a typology for evaluating nuclear postures and systems oriented for offensive deterrence. this typology provides a set of indicators demonstrating the threat posed to a competitor state by denial doctrine, strategies, and systems orientation. the perceived threat causes the competitor state to respond by attempting to close the gap through deploying its own denial capabilities and/or creating an asymmetric threat to target the superior state’s vulnerability in order to re-establish a sense of parity. 4 this revised framework was first proposed in the unpublished doctoral dissertation (teeple 2017). 5 ‘survivable’ indicates systems that are hardened or difficult to locate, so that they cannot be eliminated in a firststrike. hardened intercontinental ballistic missiles and hidden nuclear missile submarines (ssbns) often comprise survivable second-strike assets. 83 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 offensive deterrence orientation offensive nuclear deterrence postures are the policies, doctrines, and strategies that guide nuclear force employment for deterrence-by-denial. denial strategies to disarm the other state’s nuclear arsenals may include targeting its command, control, and communications. first-strike capabilities create advantages, but also incentivizes the opposing state to strike pre-emptively if it believes the first state to be getting ready to disarm and decapitate it. offensive strategies are rarely clear in nuclear postures, which often use ambiguous language to justify expanding nuclear arsenals and strike options. however, a spectrum of flexible responses often applies the language of warfighting, damage limitation, and escalation control to communicate intentions to act beyond retaliation in the interest of achieving advantage over the adversary. extended deterrence – a pledge to use nuclear weapons to defend an ally from nuclear attack – can be interpreted as both a defensive and offensive approach, reinforcing ambiguity and uncertainty. whether this pledge is credible is uncertain, given that it has never been tested.6 the typology for classifying nuclear postures includes the following indicators: deterrence-bydenial; counterforce, warfighting doctrine, damage limitation, escalation control, protection of the homeland, pre-emptive doctrine, indistinguishable offensive and defensive postures, ambiguous intentions, and extended deterrence. offensive nuclear deterrence systems are weapons designed with the capability to disarm the adversary’s military and leadership. these weapons are distinguished from punishment nuclear weapons in lower yield, accuracy, precision, speed, and stealth, with the purpose of evading detection and interception by missile defences. nuclear deterrence systems include multiple independently re-targetable vehicles – multiple warheads – on a missile to overwhelm missile defences and increase the likelihood of strike at multiple targets. cruise missiles that travel at lower altitudes also provide advantages of evading early warning systems. lower yield means they can be usable in the battlefield without the large-scale destructive effect against cities, but are alarming in the potential that their use could create an escalation to the use of larger, more strategic weapons. systems on high alert can be launched almost immediately and provide a pre-emptive first strike advantage against an adversary. unlimited and capable missile defences provide an advantage over states’ first and second-strike forces, which reduces the stability of mutually assured destruction. enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities designed to gather information at all levels – signals, communications, imagery, seismic, human collection and other forms of espionage – provides an advantage to a state with superior capabilities to know where and what kinds of assets the adversary deploys. the typology for offensive nuclear deterrence systems includes the following indicators: orientation for first-strike; systems on high alert; usability of weapons based on precision, accuracy, and low yield; comprehensive missile defence systems; multiple independentlyretargetable vehicles (mirvs); long-range standoff advanced cruise missiles; hypersonic vehicles with high speed and maneuverability; enhanced stealth; and enhanced isr. in the past decade, new developments in delivery platforms have been pursued by the us and russia (and china) to enhance the denial capabilities of their nuclear systems. these attempts are 6 betts (1987) describes confrontations between the us and soviet union in the european theatre during the cold war that brought both nations to the brink of conflict and nuclear threats. 84 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 intended to advantage one side over the other, and to offset advantages of the superior state by providing an asymmetric threat. these new developments increase the dominance of the offence. they include new intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbms), such as russia’s new sarmat and the us ground-based strategic deterrent to replace the minuteman iii. new delivery platforms are also able to add hypersonic capabilities – either boost-glide systems on ballistic missiles, like russia’s avangard, or us conventional global strike capabilities. hypersonic vehicles, which are also in development for cruise missiles, threaten to evade missile defences and early detection by both speed and maneuverability. as discussed, the entanglement of conventional weapons with nuclear weapons as part of the strategic arsenal creates ambiguity because the other state is uncertain whether missiles are nuclear or conventionally armed. it creates complexity in a state’s calculation in how to respond. dual-use capabilities for space and cyber increase uncertainty, as they can be deployed as highly precise anti-satellite capabilities and offensive cyber weapons to target c2 and launch platforms in all domains. the deployment of these new capabilities risks escalation by incentivizing a nation to use its nuclear weapons before losing them. strategic (in)stability and arms races the previous discussion demonstrated how offensive deterrence contributes to conditions that incentivize arms races over cooperation on arms control. such behaviour is mutually provocative and reduces the perception of any benefit in maintaining arms control. these perceptions relate to what constitutes security. from the us perspective, invulnerability achieved through superiority or, according to some critics, primacy, provides security through impenetrable defences and unmatched forces to deny other nations’ strike capabilities (lieber and press 2006a; 2006b). this is the reasoning behind upgrading missile defences, ballistic missiles and other missile systems, information advantages through enhanced isr, and new strike systems provided by long-range standoff weapons and prompt global strike (crs). from russia’s perspective, it is important to asymmetrically offset us superiority through systems that can penetrate defences and threaten the american homeland and its allies. these are pursued through the deployment of intermediate range forces in the european theatre (particularly in kaliningrad and crimea), in addition to weapons that provide enhanced stealth, precision, speed, and maneuverability (such as developments in new cruise missile technology). the pursuit of capabilities to offset us advantages also include conventional, nuclear, and the newly-emerging domains of cyber, information and space, providing opportunities to explore cross-domain coercion (adamsky 2018). mutually-provocative developments by both the us and russia negatively impact strategic stability, a concept directly tied to deterrence. given the return to great power competition in the international system, strategic stability is being redefined based on the national security interests of states, which is becoming increasingly distanced from the traditional concept based on mutual deterrence/mutual vulnerability. this strategic concept is under debate in the strategic analysis community, particularly in how russia and china are moving to reinstate strategic balance through pursuing asymmetric means to continue to be able to threaten the us, despite the superiority of america’s diverse and quantitative nuclear arsenal and evolving missile defence architecture (colby 2013). analysts define strategic stability, either narrowly or broadly, with regard to scope and content (acton 2013). former us secretary of defense edward warner provided three ways of 85 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 understanding strategic stability. most narrowly, it is the absence of incentives to use nuclear weapons first (crisis stability) and the absence of incentives to build up a nuclear force (arms race stability). in the medium-range it is the absence of armed conflict between nuclear-armed states. and, broadly, it is a regional or global security environment in which states enjoy peaceful and harmonious relations (acton 2013). the main challenge is in achieving agreement between states on what strategic stability means. the us and russia have different understandings (or preferences) of what constitutes strategic stability, which are based on how they understand deterrence (pavlov and malygina 2018). deterrence itself is an evolving concept given the increasing emphasis on deterrence-by-denial as a strategy to enhance a state’s national security against new systems against which no defence yet exists. deterioration of us-russia strategic relations and implications for canada deteriorating conditions between the us and russia involve a number of interrelated issues in military and political realms, particularly with provocative nuclear and non-nuclear behaviour contributing to increasing tensions. provocative non-nuclear behaviour involves conventional and unconventional activities intended to threaten or otherwise undermine western military and political governance (i.e. western liberal democracy). such activities include hybrid or grey warfare which spans kinetic and non-kinetic activity across multiple domains, utilizing a combination of information operations, cyber-attacks, and other covert military and non-military methods, allowing for deniability and creating ambiguity in distinguishing actions that constitute conflict versus aggressive actions below the threshold of war.7 these actions affect western forces, economic systems, political systems, and the general public – the latter through manipulation of public opinion by sowing discontent and undermining confidence in governing institutions. nato deployments close to russia’s borders in response to ambiguous russian threats against the baltic states and ukraine – including indirect support to ukrainian forces – are perceived by russia as provocative. in order to mitigate the perceived threat to russia’s sphere of influence, russia has deployed denial of access and maneuverability systems to prevent or limit western forces from operating in a given area by sea or air.8 recent exercises that simulate confrontation with a state’s adversary – such as russia’s zapad, vostok, tsentr, or nato’s trident juncture – may be viewed as provocative, and in worst cases, mis-perceived as a prelude to actual confrontation. the russia-belarus zapad-2017 exercise simulated the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict with nato.9 in the fall of 2018, nato trident juncture exercises in and around norway simulating an article v response 7 nicole jackson (2018; 2019) explores hybrid capabilities in her evaluation of nato-russia relations. 8 these attempts to deny western activity in a given region (the arctic, eastern europe, and eastern mediterranean) by sea and air is often termed anti-access and area-denial (a2/ad) – a controversial term in strategic circles because it is not explicitly stated in russian doctrine. 9 zapad is a routine exercise held by russia and belarus every four years. giles (2018) reports that “previous russian exercises on the scale of zapad left troops in position for undertaking military operations immediately afterward — against georgia in 2008 and ukraine in 2014.” however, giles cautions against western alarmist reporting about russia’s intentions, as these former developments occurred within a context preceded by a political crisis. 86 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 encountered negative reactions from russia, who perceived the exercise as targeting them.10 however, as per the organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce) vienna document on notification of military exercises to increase transparency and predictability, russia was invited to observe trident juncture (nato 2018). russia’s zapad, however, fell short of the 9000-troop minimum requiring notification to osce states. trident juncture was followed by a us-led nato exercise in poland, lithuania, latvia, and estonia (which likely also provoked russia); while russia ran its vostok exercise just weeks before trident juncture with no advanced notification to the osce under the vienna document.11 these exercises appear to simulate conflict with nato, and signal capabilities and potential intentions. non-nuclear behaviour plays a role in the escalation of tensions between nuclear powers (including nuclear-conventional entanglement). the following table presents the actions and events since the 1990s that led to the demise of formerly positive us-russia relations since the end of the cold war. table 1: irritants in us-russia security relations time period/year actors actions 1990s nato enlargement in central and eastern europe (pifer 2014) • the west had made an implied commitment to not expand nato eastward beyond the united germany (hahn 2018). • nato’s enlargement impacted russia’s sense of security and regional stability (martin 2017). 1999 nato operation allied force in yugoslavia • this operation started the decline of us-russian relations (snyder 2017) and negatively impacted nato-russia relations (averre 2009). 2002 us withdrawal from abm treaty; modernization of the nuclear triad • the 1972 abm treaty established constraints on us and russian missile defences, which dis-incentivized destabilizing arms race behaviour (nti overview 2011). • following withdrawal from the abm treaty, the us embarked on the modernization of its nuclear arsenal, combining offensive nuclear weapons with missile defences and conventional strike capabilities that increased the threat to russia (federation of american scientists 2002; woolf 2002; kristensen, norris, and oelrich 2009). 2008 russia military activity in south ossetia and abkhazia • russia aimed to create buffer zones in the form of ‘frozen conflicts’, providing leverage to prevent western interests in these regions (i.e. russia’s “near abroad”) – particularly blocking them from joining nato and the eu (matsaberidze 2015, 81). 2011 nato nato-led coalition intervention in libya 10 exercises ran from october 25 to november 7, 2018 (masters 2018). 11 vostok ran from september 11-15, 2018, and included participation of china’s people’s liberation army (masters 2018; boulègue 2018; johnson 2018). 87 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 table 1 cont’d 2014 russia russian annexation of crimea and support to separatists in the donbas region of ukraine12 2015 russia russian support to the assad regime in the syrian conflict 2016 nato decision to deploy four battlegroups to the baltics and poland • at the 2016 warsaw summit, nato established a forward presence in poland, estonia, latvia, and lithuania, and a tailored forward presence in the black sea region, to strengthen its defence and deterrence posture in eastern europe. 2016 russia revelation that russia was in violation of the inf treaty by deploying the 9m729 (ssc-8) novatar land-based cruise missile 2018 us withdrawal from jcpoa – the ‘iran nuclear deal’ – in may 2019 us withdrawal from the inf treaty in august • like the abrogation of the abm treaty, this action signaled a lack of confidence in arms control and cooperation. it removed constraints on expanding nuclear forces into more threatening deployments (kimball and reif 2019). 2019 us the trump administration’s intention to withdraw its signature of the ctbt in may on the belief that russia is cheating (persbo 2020) 2020 us withdrawal from the open skies treaty • russia had been restricting overflights within kaliningrad region, and the corridor between russia and south ossetia and abkhazia (reif 2019). the us responded by restricting overflights over hawaii and alaska. the current period has been described as an era of great power competition, in which russia and china are increasingly posing a strategic challenge to the united states in specific geopolitical regions – such as eastern europe, the arctic, and the eastern mediterranean (russia), and the asia pacific (china) – and globally. the arctic in particular has emerged as an area of strategic importance to the us, russia, and canada. this region is seeing russia deploy new nuclear weapon systems with long-range capabilities that increase its ability to threaten targets in north america. these evolving threats affect canada through its geographical proximity at the top of the continent with a long arctic coastline, in addition to its defence partnerships with the us (particularly norad).13 the enhancement of strategic stability through nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament has been a key long-term canadian foreign policy interest since the cold war. as a close defence partner with the us, a norad partner, nato ally, and five eyes member, canada has a vested interest in the outcomes of strategic behaviour that affect stability-enhancing agreements to limit offensive weapons and constrain the arms race. geographically, canada shares 12 note the language of “annexation” and “seizure” is a contested issue in russia (o’loughlin and toal 2019; ragozin 2019). 13 canada’s 2017 defence policy describes the military-strategic importance of the arctic, modernization of norad, and enhancing arctic capabilities (dnd/caf, 2017). charron and fergusson (2017; 2018) provide a detailed discussion on the evolution of north american defence. 88 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 in the security of the north american continent, which has become more vulnerable to destabilizing offensive weapons deployed by russia, china, north korea, and potentially iran. these issues and outcomes affect canada’s relationship with the us, potential fallout in canadarussia relations, and its objectives to promote peace and security regionally and globally. through the evolution of north american defence and deterrence concepts, canada may become increasingly integrated into the us strategic defence architecture in support of denial doctrine and capabilities. the new shield concept for integrating sensors, defeat mechanisms, and joint all domain command and control (jadc2) explicitly declares a deterrence-by-denial doctrine through offensive capabilities (o’shaughnessy and fesler 2020). although focused on conventional threats to the continent, many of china’s and russia’s long-range delivery platforms are dual-use, capable of carrying nuclear or conventional payloads, suggesting entanglement with the mission of stratcom. the implications for canada involve norad renewal with a potential offensive role, including options for a canadian contribution to missile defence. this outcome would be a significant departure from its traditional policy of rejecting nuclear weapons in canada, declining participation in us missile defence, and promoting nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. as the threats to north american security evolve, canada may align its foreign and defence policies closer to those of the us to enhance its own security in an increasingly uncertain and volatile strategic environment. this alignment, in conjunction with the end of stability-enhancing arms control agreements, may also see the canadian government’s retreat from its traditional active methods of promoting arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. this may also coincide with canada’s support of innovations in deterrence-by-denial concepts as part of the modernization and evolution of north american defence. as the expiration of new start looms, it remains to be seen whether canada will remain quietly on the sidelines or resume its role as an arms control activist to encourage the us to negotiate with russia to extend, revise, or renegotiate a new treaty. beyond north america, canada’s role in nato includes contributing to the enhanced forward presence leading a battlegroup in latvia. canada’s commitment in europe and support for the aegis theatre missile defence system – by land and sea – may involve a future role for canada in missile defence. the planned new canadian surface combatant (lockheed martin bae/type 26 design) equipped with the an/spy-7(v)1 advanced radar system (designed for long-range discrimination) has been suggested as providing a back door to participation in ballistic missile defence (canadian naval review 2020). this role would further integrate canada into us/natoled deterrence doctrine in a way that is yet undetermined. it may involve contributing capabilities from sensors, to data analytics, to kinetic and/or non-kinetic denial roles. us-russia and offensive deterrence in applying the typology presented previously, the nuclear deterrence postures and systems of the us and russia can be described in terms of the level of dominance of their offensive orientations. the us nuclear posture demonstrates ambiguity. it intends to deter the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (wmd) through the threat of nuclear use, but recent 89 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 posture expands this role. even prior to the 2018 nuclear posture review (npr 2018) and under the previous administration, the us stated that it would use nuclear weapons in defence of its vital national interests and those of its allies (us white house 2013). the 2018 npr states that the us nuclear triad “contributes uniquely to the deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear aggression” (2018, 16). nuclear forces also contribute to reassuring allies, as conventional forces “do not provide comparable deterrence effects” (2018, iv). notably, the npr states that nuclear weapons will achieve us objectives if deterrence fails and hedge against an uncertain future (2018, 23, 27). analysts at the federation of american scientists (fas) argue that the posture expands scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be used – such as against actors that assist terrorists in obtaining nuclear devices (fas 2019). the us arsenal comprises a number of first-strike systems, but questions remain about whether it has a ‘no first use’ posture. analysts argue that an explicit no first use policy is rare among nuclear weapon states (although china has maintained a no first use pledge since 1964). nato rejects no first use and the us “has considered but never declared a no first use policy” (panda 2018). the 2010 npr under the obama administration reduced the role of nuclear weapons, with the intention that the sole use of nuclear weapons would be to deter and retaliate against a nuclear attack. prior to becoming president, joe biden reinforced this “sole use” with the potential to shift to a “no first use” objective (kutchesfahani 2020). this approach would eliminate the ambiguity of using nuclear weapons first in response to a conventional attack. but ambiguity remained in the npr to use nuclear weapons “only in extreme circumstances” (npr 2018, 23). the trump administration’s 2018 npr reflects continuity of the 2010 posture, but has expanded “extreme circumstances” to include non-nuclear attacks against the us and allies, in addition to supplementing the arsenal with lower-yield (i.e. usable for warfighting) nuclear weapons (pifer 2020). this broadening of the role of nuclear weapons reinforces ambiguity. although it seems logical that nuclear states would be explicit with their intentions about nuclear weapon use in various scenarios, it serves us interests to be ambiguous, as per the logic of “the threat that leaves something to chance” described by thomas schelling (1960, 188, 193). this approach allows the us to “manipulate risk” and keep its adversary uncertain enough not to test america’s willingness to cross the threshold if pushed (schelling 1966, 93). russia’s nuclear weapons policy appears in its military doctrine, which explicitly states that russia would employ nuclear weapons to respond to the use of nuclear weapons and other wmd, aggression against the russian federation, and conventional forces that threaten the existence of the russian state (embassy of the russian federation 2014). russia maintained a pledge of no first use from 1982 to 1993, then abandoned this policy in military doctrine (panda 2018). there remains some debate about the role of nuclear weapons in russia’s national security strategy today, particularly when it comes to regional security. some analysts claim that this debate results from western perspectives on how russia would deploy its nuclear forces. certain western perspectives contrast with what is explicitly stated in russian strategy. one issue of debate is whether russia has an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine in which russia would prevail in a conventional conflict against a superior military force (read: nato) by detonating a tactical (low-yield) nuclear weapon in the battlefield, in order to force the us to move down the escalation ladder. however, nonwestern analysts have argued russia’s intention to lower the nuclear threshold in a conflict is “far 90 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 from convincing” (oliker 2016, 2).14 nevertheless, russia is concerned that us strategic superiority will threaten its strategic interests in its near abroad (eastern europe, middle east, and the arctic). destabilizing weapons systems in addition to nato enlargement starting in the 1990s, it can be argued that the us abrogation of the abm treaty in 2002, and the us pursuit of the new triad with a greater emphasis on offensive/denial capabilities, constitutes a significant turning point in the deterioration of usrussia relations. key capabilities that threaten strategic instability, and thus arms control, include expanded missile defences, longer-range cruise missiles, hypersonic vehicles, enhanced isr, and tactical nuclear weapons. this section will address these key capabilities and explore them in greater depth. offensive denial systems pose significant challenges to strategic stability, resulting in innovative counter-measures against the others, namely: 1) standoff capabilities posed by long range cruise missiles (like america’s new long-range standoff weapon (lrso) or russia’s attempt to create a nuclear-powered hypersonic cruise missile) that provides a first strike advantage; 2) invulnerability by negating second-strike through expanded missile defences and enhanced isr allowing for improved early warning detection and ability to intercept incoming nuclear weapons; 3) capabilities to defeat missile defences by evading detection and interception (such as the maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles); and 4) asymmetric advantage in knowledge of the other side’s capabilities on land, sea, and in the air (or airbases). enhanced isr provides information on platform location, warhead numbers, and possible vulnerabilities of weapon systems. missile defences are tasked with the detection, classification, tracking, discrimination, fire control, diversion, interception, and kill assessment of incoming missiles (csis 2020). the us operates a series of systems in multiple geographic regions: defence of the homeland, and defence of deployed us forces and allies in the european, asia-pacific, and middle east geopolitical regions. the current system is comprised of an integrated layered architecture to counter short, medium, intermediate, and long-range ballistic missiles, bombers, air-launched cruise missiles (alcms), and sea-launched cruise missiles (slcms). these are deployed in the us and abroad through the homeland (national) missile defence system which is comprised of an advanced network of sensors, space-based, and infra-red systems – land and sea-based radars to support ground-based midcourse defence, with plans to add 20 next generation ground-based interceptors in alaska for a total of 64 and to build a new missile field at fort greely, alaska (vergun 2019). new layered concepts being considered for homeland defence include the integration of the terminal high altitude air defence (thaad), patriot advanced capability-3 (pac-3), and aegis systems (midcourse). additionally, theatre missile defences include the phased adaptive approach in europe with deployed aegis systems at sea and on land (employing standard missile-3 (sm-3) interceptors in poland and romania). plans for defending deployed forces include enhancing the aegis ballistic missile defense system by procuring sm-3 block ib and iia missiles and integrating the an/spy-6 radar (air and missile defence radar). plans also include procuring 14 oliker states that “the combination of what states write, what they say, what they exercise, and what they build should provide a good sense of their actual policy” (2016, 2). 91 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 additional terminal high-altitude area defense interceptors, patriot interceptors, and the army indirect fire protection capability c2 system. similarly, in preparation for emerging threats, plans for upgrading missile defences include additional space-based sensors (vergun 2019). new concepts beyond ballistic missile defence (bmd) are being developed and promoted by strategic command, missile defence agency, northern command, and possibly part of norad renewal, to confront new capabilities such as advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic vehicles. these new concepts involve what has been described as “a holistic continuum of offensive and defensive warfighting integration” involving kinetic and non-kinetic means of eliminating threats before they launch.15 this system involves a global network of sensors, including space-based sensor architecture that can provide persistent tracking and discrimination, all-source intelligence, and integrated fires for both left and right of launch (judson 2019). there is a new emphasis on left of launch (attack operations) (2019 mdr), which can involve non-kinetic means of interrupting or sabotaging missile development programs or individual missile before launch. options for achieving these goals through cyber or electronic attacks are being considered (judson 2019). new generation cruise missiles can maintain a cruise trajectory at low altitudes, which makes them difficult to detect by radars and early warning systems, and difficult to target. new advanced cruise missiles include standoff capabilities, namely longer ranges, that allow them to be launched from out of area. this allows the platform to be protected from air defences and bypass missile defence systems, creating an advantage for the state deploying the capability. both russia and the us are pursuing advanced cruise missile technologies with standoff capabilities, such as the us agm154 standoff weapon (mizokami 2019). hypersonic weapons fly at speeds above mach 5. there is debate among strategic and technical analysts whether hypersonic vehicles are game-changers in the strategic balance. the re-entry vehicles of icbms travel at hypersonic velocities to their targets, but hypersonic vehicles offer additional advantages. there are two types of hypersonic vehicles: hypersonic glide vehicles (hgvs), and hypersonic cruise missiles. hypersonic cruise missiles provide high-speed, airbreathing engines (or scramjets), after target acquisition, and are most likely air-launched. unlike icbms, hypersonic vehicles do not follow a ballistic trajectory, but maneuver en route to the target (sayler 2019). hypersonic vehicles’ advantage is in speed and maneuverability, which reduces a target state’s reaction time as the weapons “compress time/speed/distance relationships while also flying at high altitudes” (cummings 2019). hypersonic glide vehicles have just entered operational military forces in russia, which fielded the avangard hgv on the stiletto icbm, until the new sarmat icbm is ready to be fielded. asymmetric isr can be destabilizing and can intensify the security dilemma, inciting adversaries to seek countermeasure to disable systems intended to track their nuclear forces and target c4i (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence). information-gathering capabilities, including new technologies, could enhance a state’s ability to track an opponent’s mobile nuclear forces and the corresponding countermeasures being deployed (long and green 2015). new 15 statements made by us strategic command’s deputy commander, mgen rick evans, at the space and missile defense symposium on august 6, 2019 (judson 2019). 92 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 capabilities include satellites, radars, advanced information processing systems, in which artificial intelligence may have a role (acton 2020; hersman, stadler, and arias 2019). the development and deployment of offensive systems accelerates the arms race. russia is attempting to close the gap and restore deterrence or parity through asymmetric means. this causes the us to pursue new deterrence concepts and capabilities in attempts to close the new gaps created by russian developments. the situation is further complicated by the integration of new domains into systems, including the ‘entanglement’ of nuclear and conventional systems in the nuclear architecture, which creates uncertainty in distinguishing conventional from nuclear warheads. entanglement includes the integration of c2 systems with nuclear architecture (as observed in china), in addition to unintended challenges posed by cyber and space domains and their vulnerability to countermeasures. regarding the latter, the us is vulnerable in the space and cyber domains, on which it is reliant on space surveillance, communications, and precision navigation. space assets are vulnerable to both anti-satellite weapons (asats) and potentially to cyberhacking, which the us counters with hypersonic weapons providing a rapid strike capability to disable command uplinks to asat weapons before they achieve their effect (cummings 2019). the spiraling of arms races in multiple domains, including conventional counterforce alternatives being entangled into the architecture, risk miscalculation and nuclear escalation. a recent report by russia’s national research university indicates that russian analysts view the current situation as posing a low risk of premeditated war, especially nuclear war between the nuclear powers (karaganov and suslov 2019).16 however, it does pose a higher risk of unintended military conflict that could possibly escalate to nuclear war. given the complexities of the current context, the state of strategic stability is more complex and less manageable than during the cold war. what does this mean for arms control? the future of arms control is challenged by the current conditions of an intensifying nuclear security dilemma between the us and russia. the us-russian relationship had already begun to unravel after the 1990s nato expansion, intervention in kosovo, and particularly the withdrawal from the abm treaty in 2002. relations started to improve under the obama administration due to concessions made to russia involving non-deployment of missile defence interceptors in czech republic and romania. these positive relations involving a ‘reset’ with russia led to negotiating new start in 2010. however, russia’s activities in crimea and eastern ukraine and the us/nato’s response determined the decline of us-russia relations, affecting the future of arms control. the inf treaty ended because of mutual mistrust between us and russia both thought the other was fielding a system that violated the treaty and posed a regional threat. russia deployed the 9m729 (ssc-8) intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile and the us established aegis ashore and at sea to defend its allies and deployed forces in europe. the us ended its cooperation in the open skies multilateral treaty due to concerns that russia restricted overflights of kaliningrad and parts of georgia to conceal its military activities in those regions. the us leadership’s attitude indicates a failure of confidence in the benefits of arms control as 16 this report explicitly mentions the support of the russian foreign ministry, state duma, and council on foreign and defence policy (karaganov and suslov 2019). 93 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 demonstrated by its withdrawal from the joint comprehensive plan of action iran nuclear deal (p5+1). these behaviours set a negative precedent for the future of arms control and raise concerns about the future of new start beyond february 2021. dialogue and transparency will be essential in communication between washington and moscow to address intentions and misperceptions that feed into the security dilemma. recommendations and challenges this is the key time for taking pragmatic steps in the dialogue to re-negotiate new start and perhaps consider restoring the inf treaty. bilateral talks between us and russian officials have been underway in recent years, such as helsinki sept 2017; the cancelled march 2018 meeting in vienna, which restarted in june 2020, and more recent discussions in october 2020 to extend the treaty for one year. progress remains to be seen. there are options to be considered in maintaining current, and negotiating new, arms control to restore transparency and predictability that reinforces strategic stability. in exploring these options, the question of what a post-new start world would look like should be considered. should it be allowed to expire and a new regime negotiated? should it be renewed and with what kind of changes? should there be a temporary expansion, from one to five years, to allow time to negotiate a more comprehensive treaty? should new start be expanded to include third parties (such as china)? recently, analysts have explored ideas for incorporating emerging technologies that are perceived as problematic and destabilizing. however, strategic stability between the us and russia will have to address the following: 1) hypersonic and cruise missile technology: what measures could be explored to limit types of hypersonic and advanced cruise missiles that threaten missile defences? limitations could include banning test flights of hypersonic vehicles. 2) limitations on missile defences: to restore mutual deterrence both sides would need to allow some targets to be vulnerable. this requires considering what ranges of ballistic missiles should be included in limitations. perhaps this option requires negotiating a new kind of missile defence treaty (a new abm that extends to limit threatening passive defence concepts), or could be included in an established treaty like new start. 3) limitations on enhanced isr systems: this is a challenge because transparency relies on trust and other means of verifying capabilities, and competing states fear that one another will conceal cheating on arms control. limiting asymmetric isr capabilities that create advantages for one state but disadvantages the other state makes the case for restoring the open skies treaty and other verification regimes to build trust. 4) tactical nuclear weapons: tactical or theatre nuclear weapons are not addressed in new start, which creates a gap. the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in new start contributes to nuclear warhead reductions and may alleviate western concerns about russia’s large stockpile of tactical nuclear warheads and its ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine. 5) de-alerting nuclear systems: this recommendation comes from a number of arms control analysts from organization such as arms control association and federation of american scientists. they argue that the de-alerting of systems would reduce the risk of accident, miscalculation, and inadvertent launch otherwise posed by systems on ‘hair-trigger alert’ or ‘launch on warning’. 94 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 the above options would encounter challenges in reception by american and russian leadership. considerations involve the role of politics in strategy and how to propose, negotiate, and implement any approach that might be perceived as making a concession, thus communicating weakness. the challenge is how to propose a concession without emboldening the other to aggressive action. the role of domestic variables also plays a significant role in the receptivity of including offensive nuclear deterrence systems in arms control. these variables include particular leadership styles that contribute to the failure of arms control cooperation and resurgence (such as medvedev-obama vs putin-trump), in addition to strategic advisors and commanders that oversee the nuclear arsenal and missile defences. congressmen representing stakeholders in defence industries in their states may also have an impact on which capabilities are affected by new arms control agreements. similar considerations must be part of the evaluation of russian domestic politics. these considerations provide an avenue for further exploration of the issues, particularly in terms of the failure of leadership and forward-thinking when it comes to limiting and controlling the most dangerous weapons on the planet. conclusion this paper demonstrates how the provocative role of offensive systems, particularly the newgeneration of faster and highly maneuverable vehicles oriented for deterrence-by-denial, negatively affects cooperation on arms control and creates conditions that lead to destabilizing arms races. the discussion outlines how nuclear and non-nuclear behaviour, including a chain of events and provocative behaviours, affect strategic relations between states. particularly, this article is concerned with how russia perceives us and nato activity since the 1990s as obstructing its interests in restoring/expanding its sphere of influence in eastern europe (and more recently in the arctic and middle east). the strategic behaviour of the us contributed to deterioration of relations with russia, particularly the modernization of the us nuclear arsenal for enhanced deterrence by denial systems involving the three legs, in addition to expanding missile defence and enhanced isr. russia’s response to the vulnerabilities created by us offensive systems designed for denial has been to pursue asymmetric capabilities designed to defeat missile defences, targeting military assets, command, control, and communications (c3), critical infrastructure, and isr. these behaviours intensify the nuclear security dilemma, which accelerates the arms race, resulting in the end of stability-enhancing arms control. the future of new start is in peril, although options for renewal may address multilateral partners, as well as new offensive technologies that are particularly destabilizing, such as hypersonic and cruise missiles, missile defences, and tactical nuclear weapons. these developments have implications for canada, as an arctic nation, close north american defence partner of the united states, and nato ally. will we see a change in canada’s defence and deterrence posture more in line with the us, possibly participating in missile defence? will this result in canada’s shift away from actively promoting nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament? 95 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 references acton, james. 2020. is it a nuke? pre-launch ambiguity and inadvertent escalation. carnegie endowment for international peace. 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the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 transformative energy policy in federal systems: canada and germany compared arthur benz1, technical university of darmstadt jörg broschek2, wilfrid laurier university abstract the transition of an energy system towards low-carbon resources requires a change in a policy regime sufficiently significant to redirect highly complex technical systems away from their previous path-dependent evolution. to assure the transition, the new path of policy development has to be consolidated. research suggests that the institutional conditions facilitating policy innovation and consolidation vary profoundly across federal systems. ‘dual’ federations such as canada promote policy innovation but lack incentives to stabilize coordinated policies over time. in ‘cooperative’ federations like germany, policy change is more difficult as such systems favor incremental evolution. using a most dissimilar case design comparing canadian and german energy policy developments, this article reveals policy innovation in both federations. in canada, this was facilitated by unilateral actions of federal or provincial governments in a system characterized by dual federalism. german energy policy deviated from the incrementalism of joint decision-making as the federal government negotiated crucial terms of transformative policy directly with corporate interests and circumvented the intergovernmental arena. however, this policy innovation ‘from the center’ contributed to undermining the long-term stabilizing effects of intergovernmental coordination. governments in canada and in germany changed policies but failed to establish appropriate governance structures necessary for consolidating policy change at all levels of the federation. 1 arthur benz is a professor of political science at the technical university of darmstadt. 2 jörg broschek is an associate professor and canada research chair (tier 2) in comparative federalism and multilevel governance in the department of political science at wilfrid laurier university. 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 introduction transforming energy systems to make possible a low carbon economy is a challenge for governments. it requires redirecting the path-dependent evolution of what is a highly complex and technical system through initiating and navigating major policy change. once introduced, governments need to solidify this new path and shield it from efforts to reverse it. a transformative policy is typically accompanied by redistributive conflicts. in the case of an energy transition, these conflicts arise due to the reallocation of subsidies and privileges among economic sectors. corporations differ in their energy consumption and face different costs of reducing carbon emissions. impacts on regions differ since their economic development depends to varying degrees on non-renewable energy sources. these conflicts constitute substantial obstacles for policy innovation. they also challenge efforts to set out on a new energy path, due to power politics among parties and interest groups. in federal systems, transformative policy is further complicated because its territorial effects and redistributive conflicts have to be addressed through intergovernmental coordination. how these effects play out and how conflicts are managed varies depending on the federal structures in question. based on veto-player theory, one would expect a system characterized by ‘dual federalism’, where powers are separated between levels of government, to provide better conditions for significant policy innovation than a federal system where powers are shared; in the latter, federal and regional governments have to come to agreements (scharpf 1988; tsebelis 2002). in contrast, power-sharing federalism seems to provide better conditions for maintaining a new path of policy evolution and adjustment, whereas the separation of powers invites unilateral actions by individual governments and often leads to discontinuities in the transformation process, including significant backlash (painter 1991). canada and germany represent these two different types of federalism. the last decades of energy policy require a more nuanced evaluation of established theoretical assumptions. in both countries, energy transition has become an important aspect of climate change mitigation. in germany, the federal government embarked on a trajectory of paradigmatic policy change by avoiding the constraints of joint decision-making with the governments of the länder (states). coalition governments and corporatist arrangements emerged as the dominant arenas for negotiating the terms of the so-called energiewende (energy transition), while intergovernmental relations played a rather subsidiary role. over time, this shift to hierarchical governance produced considerable policy inconsistencies and, eventually, retardation of transformation. in canada, federal governments in the 1980s and 1990s identified energy transition as a policy issue without, however, making substantial progress. as elsewhere, climate change eventually became a more salient policy issue, but it did not, however, gain the same prominence in election campaigns as national unity, the economy, or health care. this created an incentive for the federal government to “pass the buck” to the provinces rather than embark on a potentially risky path of bold climate action (harrison 1996). when the conservative harper government almost entirely abandoned climate mitigation policy between 2006 and 2015, and sought to establish canada as a global energy superpower, provinces like british columbia and ontario became the primary venues of innovation. since 2015, the liberal trudeau government has attempted to streamline these different approaches within a pan-canadian framework, yet with modest success. while policy turns from the center undermined the stabilizing structures of institutionalized intergovernmental coordination in germany, comparable institutional conditions favoring continuity never existed in canada. in both countries, governments failed to revise modes of intergovernmental governance in order to meet the challenges of transformative policy. 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 by comparing two different federations, this article does not draw any conclusions about the relative advantages of federal or unitary systems for addressing the challenges of energy transition. although federal systems might better organize territorial diversity, different types of federal arrangements vary in their capacities and approaches to managing conflicts arising from the transformation of an energy regime. the following section outlines the concept of transformative policy and its theoretical implications. the second section compares the territorial structures of energy provision in canada and germany, showing how redistributive intraand intersectional conflicts affect territorial politics and how they interact with institutions and party politics in both federations. in light of the theoretical concept of transformative policy, the comparative analysis of energy policy in canada and germany in section three explains why significant policy change occurred, although delayed and less determined in canada than in germany, and why stabilizing this policy is still a challenge in both countries. the conclusion argues that transformative policy requires the adaptation of governance structures, which is still an issue to be addressed in both federations. the challenges of transformative policy the concept of transformation has been applied in social science to describe deep structural changes in economies, societies and political regimes. this article focuses on transformation of a “policy regime”, that is “the governing arrangements for addressing policy problems” (may and ashley 2013, 428). these arrangements include a comprehensive set of ideas and goals, regulative and (re)distributive programs, policy instruments, and institutions determined to design and implement these programs or instruments. usually, governments modify policies without revising a whole regime, and decisions affect specific parts of programs or instruments. in contrast, a transformative policy aims at a comprehensive and significant change of ideas, instruments, institutions, processes, actor constellations, and power structures in the policy field concerned. envisaging a long-term development, it starts by significant policy change followed by a continuous evolution and adaptation of the new policy. in a temporal view, transformative policy can be characterized by two different sequences: the redirection of a path-dependent development, and the continuation of the changed path of policy development. in the first sequence, a government decides on a substantial change of policy. historical institutionalism suggests that it will only succeed when there is a critical juncture that reduces the constraining effects of institutions (soifer 2012). however, critical junctures are also characterized by institutional instability, and such situations do not generally favor significant policy change. an alternative explanation points to the rise of new ideas which crystalize in a new policy paradigm (hall 1993). paradigms are more than just programmatic policy ideas; they encompass broad and general principles that transcend individual policy sectors (skogstad and schmidt 2011, 7). they usually originate outside the established policy regime, often in the transnational realm, and manifest themselves in new ideas and instruments that promote long-term transformative change. they penetrate existing paradigms with which they may collide. ideational change is filtered and mediated through institutions. governments that aspire to advance transformative policy change need to strategically use the opportunities provided by existing institutions. differentiated institutions, in particular, allow actors to benefit from various venues or redundant channels of interaction, not only to change an agenda (baumgartner and jones 1993, 25-28) but also to establish a new policy paradigm. 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 the second sequence starts when a new path of policy change has been established. once this occurs, governments must implement and stabilize the new policy regime as well as adjust policies to varying circumstances arising during the transformation process. it is likely that an evolutionary process incrementally strengthens the new policy regime and downgrades the old one. yet depending on “policy feedbacks” that can enforce or undermine a policy (jacobs and weaver 2015), a restoration of old policies and policy regimes cannot be ruled out. as patashnik (2006) has argued, it is often easier to enact a new policy than to sustain it over time. such effects are particularly relevant in federal systems (karch and rose 2019). here, a larger number of actors may have a vested interest in the established policy regime and these actors can use institutions to hamper or even reverse transformative policy. in terms of structures, a transformative policy is likely to start by “layering” (mahoney and thelen 2010, 16) a new program and institutions over the old policy regime. if implemented successfully, the ensuing process of stabilization of the new path of development incrementally expands the scope of the new regime, which finally “drifts” (2010, 17) towards a transformed policy. this longterm process of policy evolution needs to be supported by guiding ideas amplifying the new policy direction (skogstad and schmidt 2011, 12), as well as appropriate governance structures. such supporting institutional mechanisms facilitate necessary adjustments to changing conditions, therefore stabilizing the new policy against retarding or obstructing ‘counter-action’. the transformation of a policy regime can be justified by the public interest. still, it changes the distribution of resources to private actors, the fiscal capacities of governments, and the allocation of power in politics. if those who end up as ‘losers’ cannot prevent a transformation, they will try to shape the process and affect the implementation of the new policy. managing redistributive conflicts during the whole process constitutes the most challenging task for governments. this is particularly true in federal systems, where many veto points exist (immergut 1990), and where transformation affects the territorial structures of a policy regime. territorial structures of energy policy regimes in canada and germany as mentioned, policy regimes are characterized by an agenda (shared perceptions of problems, aims, and guiding ideas), political conflicts, institutions, and patterns of coordination (governance) to manage conflicts. energy policy is shaped by three determining factors: technological developments, the interests of providers and consumers of energy, and the distribution of power both between the public and private actors and within government. by focusing on federal systems, the territorial dimension – that is the geographical distribution of energy sources and consumption and the organization of federalism and democracy – is particularly relevant. canada and germany display variation in the territorial structures of their energy systems and their types of federal democracy. it is hypothesized that these differences account for the variation seen in the patterns of transformation. in canada, the extraction and export of natural resources has always fulfilled an existential function for economic development, as expressed in the notion of the ‘staples economy’. the sequential development of different staples – from fur and fish to wheat and lumber to oil and gas – has determined the emergence of settlements, infrastructural policy, and even political institutions (innis 2017). canada’s political economy has become much more diversified over the course of the twentieth century (wellstead 2007). yet the regional concentration of carbon-based energy resources (most notably oil and gas in british columbia, alberta, saskatchewan, and newfoundland and labrador) and renewables (in particular hydropower in british columbia, 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 quebéc, manitoba, and newfoundland and labrador) continues to contribute significantly to canada’s economic prosperity. this pattern of regional concentration also shapes interregional conflicts in energy policy development. during the 1990s, the province of alberta was responsible for about 60 percent of canada’s energy production, and the tar sands in the northern part of the province contain the third largest oil reservoir of the world (macdonald and vannijnatten 2003, 76). saskatchewan, the second largest oil producing province of the country, also exports uranium, coal, and gas. partly due to the carbon intensity of oil production, both provinces are also big energy consumers. together with newfoundland and labrador, these “petro-provinces” (carter 2020) have largely contributed to steadily increasing carbon emissions (carter 2020; macdonald 2020). in contrast, manitoba and quebéc, for example, generate more than 95 percent of their energy consumption through hydroelectric power (the carbon brief 2019) and quebéc exports hydroelectric power to the northeastern united states. quebéc has become an important proponent of climate mitigation policy, while alberta and saskatchewan have consistently opposed instruments that would impose stricter regulations on their energy sector. germany’s industrialization was driven by the availability of coal. after wwii, the country became dependent on the import of crude oil. hard coal mining became too expensive compared to imported coal. the expansion of nuclear power compensated for the lack of fossil energy sources, but was contested by the german public (eberlein and doern 2009, 39-46). coal extraction was, and still is, concentrated in certain regions. germany’s nuclear power was mainly produced in the western regions of germany and particularly in baden-württemberg and bavaria. the shutdown of nuclear power by 2022 and coal power by 2038, and the transition to renewables, has significantly changed the regional structure of the energy system. wind turbines are more efficient in the north and in the low mountain ranges in hesse, rhineland-palatinate, and thuringia, while solar energy is more developed in the south. in canada and in germany, energy supply is considered an essential part of public infrastructure. energy markets were liberalized and de-regulated as a result of free trade agreements in north america, and economic integration in europe. the impact of these changes differs among regions. in canada, british columbia, manitoba, newfoundland and labrador, and quebéc resisted the privatization trend and retained vertically integrated utilities, which are responsible for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. in germany, corporatist governance arrangements including associations of industry and unions were dissolved, although they still exist in the coal sector at the länder level. in both federations, state actors – the länder/provinces and the federal government – still play an important role in attracting investment and facilitating infrastructure projects, most notably pipeline and power line construction. with regard to institutions of government and patterns of governance, federal democracies in germany and canada represent different models. canadian federalism features a dual allocation of powers. legislative competencies for energy and environmental policy are distributed between both governmental tiers. the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over their land-locked natural resources, regional development, and property rights. in addition, provinces can levy taxes and royalties. the federal government has nevertheless considerable power in energy and environmental policy through its competencies for international and interprovincial trade, and interprovincial transportation. in addition, a residual clause concerning the peace, order, and good government (pogg) of the canadian constitution affords the federal government the right to bypass the institutional constraints of decentralized powers. on both levels, westminster democracy leads to a concentration of power in the executive. accordingly, elected governments 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 are not required to negotiate coalition agreements, and they have considerable discretion in drafting legislation based on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. canada’s institutional configuration encourages policy innovation, but also swift reversals. intergovernmental cooperation is highly contingent on governments’ willingness to work together, which often makes it difficult to consolidate coherent and encompassing policy solutions over time. in the area of energy and climate mitigation policy, the canadian council of ministers of the environment (ccme) offers a framework for federal, provincial, and territorial cooperation. the ccme was critical to negotiating the 1998 canada-wide accord on environmental harmonization (ccme 1998). other important agreements were reached through peak level negotiations, either horizontally through the council of the federation, which was established in 2004, or vertically through first ministers’ conferences. yet such compromises remain fragile, as agreements are not binding and individual governments can ignore them in practice, refuse to sign, or choose to opt out (macdonald 2020). finally, indigenous peoples have emerged as increasingly important stakeholders in energy policy, especially after the supreme court of canada has strengthened their rights in several landmark rulings made since the 1970s. german federalism, by contrast, is more integrated. the federal level has broad legislative competencies over energy and environmental policy, while the länder have administrative responsibilities to implement federal laws. in addition, the municipalities provide important services, although they lost some relevance due to liberalization, which strengthened big corporations. unlike in canada, this institutional framework creates an incentive for closer coordination. whenever federal legislation affects länder powers, e.g., regulates implementation by länder administration, the federal government has to negotiate with länder governments to prevent a veto by the federal council (bundesrat). both the federal and the länder governments interact through intergovernmental conferences, administrative networks, and within political parties that are part of coalition governments on both levels. unlike in canada, this institutional configuration tends not to stimulate abrupt policy changes. rather, it is more suitable for consolidating and sustaining a transformative pathway once it has been established. interestingly, however, policies in the field of energy transition reveal different dynamics. politics of energy transition in canada initiating energy policy transformation: from mulroney to martin governments during the 1980s, the emergence of the policy paradigm of sustainable development in transnational discourses increasingly challenged established approaches to economic development. climate change surfaced as an increasingly pressing issue. the need to work towards a low-carbon economy clearly resonated in canadian politics (macdonald 2020; may 2007; vannijnatten and macdonald 2003). the progressive conservative government of brian mulroney (1984-1993) envisaged a pioneering role for canada in advancing climate change mitigation policy. environment became a high portfolio cabinet post. the government advanced several policy initiatives on the international and domestic levels, such as the montreal protocol (1987), and the ‘green plan’ (1990). they also made canada’s first commitment to freeze the nation’s greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions at 1990 levels (may 2007, 387-90). 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 the two succeeding liberal governments under jean chretien (1993-2003) and paul martin (20032006) largely followed these initial steps and consolidated the path taken. both governments developed four major programs: the national action program on climate change (1995), the action plan 2000 on climate change (2000), the climate change plan for canada (2002), and the project green (2005). all four programs adopted a transformational rhetoric, emphasizing the need for encompassing and effective long-term measures to significantly reduce ghg emissions. the national action program on climate change, and the climate change plan for canada, are particularly noteworthy as they were developed as a framework agreement with the provinces, the latter for the implementation of different measures to work towards the goals set out in the kyoto protocol, which canada ratified in december, 2002. project green, which also included elements of a cap-and-trade system for large final emitters, however, was never put in place (macdonald 2020). these policy innovations indicate a gradually shifting balance between positive and negative feedback effects. for stakeholders with strong vested interests in the conventional, staples-based model of economic development, the petro-provinces as well as the federal department of natural resources (today: natural resources canada, nrcan), climate policy generated negative feedback effects. for others, most notably provinces like quebéc, environmental groups, and the federal department of the environment (today: environment and climate change canada, eccc), these measures were the first positive steps redirecting energy policy towards a low-carbon economy. canada continuously failed, however, to meet its own ghg emissions reduction targets. this was not only a consequence of policy inconsistencies, but also of a lack in federal leadership to create procedural governance reforms to consolidate initial policy changes. first, energy policy transformation was complicated by energy producing provinces, especially the petro-provinces: alberta, saskatchewan and, since about 2005, newfoundland and labrador (carter 2018; macdonald 2020). their jurisdictional authority over natural resources and regional economic development affords them with considerable power to shape both energy and environmental policy, thereby limiting the institutional scope of the federal level. given the regional concentration of fossil energy resources, these provinces have had a strong incentive to maximize energy production while opposing regulatory environmental constraints to meet canada’s international emission targets (brownsey 2006; carter 2020). second, the energy industry and its powerful representatives, most notably the canadian association of petroleum producers (capp), strongly lobbied both levels of government for a continental energy strategy based on liberalization, deregulation and close integration of the north american energy sector. in close alliance with the oil producing provinces, they anticipated considerable profits from a liberalized, integrated market that would facilitate the extraction of non-renewables, most notably oil and gas (brownsey 2006; 2007). although federal governments initiated transformative policy in the late 1980s and sought to consolidate these programs in the 1990s and early 2000s, they never prioritized climate mitigation policy over conventional economic development goals. and despite some modest efforts to sustain a conversation through the national roundtable on the environment and economy (nrtee), they never envisaged a 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 long-term strategy to orchestrate the ‘politics’ of transformative energy policy change by creating necessary governance capacities in the intergovernmental arena.3 “the empire strikes back”: the harper era the election of stephen harper’s conservative federal government in 2006 resulted in a major backlash. this dynamic resembled a pattern eric patashnik (2006, 32) labelled “the empire strikes back”: canada witnessed the reversal of a very modest reform trajectory that had not yet been sufficiently consolidated through a major reconfiguration of the established policy regime. federalism enabled the harper government to adopt an approach fully aligned with the interests of oil and gas producing provinces. from the perspective of the federal government, the contradictory policy imperative was simply resolved by abandoning any aspirational goals towards reducing canada’s ghg emissions, as exemplified in the government’s exit from the kyotoprotocol in 2011. already before he became leader of the new conservative party of canada, harper identified the international agreement as a “socialist scheme”, and mobilized his supporters to engage in “the battle of kyoto − our campaign to block the job-killing, economy-destroying kyoto accord” (cbc 2007). his aim was to establish canada as a global energy superpower (brownsey 2007). under harper, the federal government used its institutional resources to massively support resource extraction and export, especially by facilitating the expansion of pipeline projects like the trans mountain and keystone pipelines, and by dismantling environmental regulations. two amendments of the navigable waters act in 2009 and 2012, the latter as part of an omnibus bill, as well as the dismantling of the fisheries act in 2012, were particularly controversial as they significantly curtailed the impact assessment process and reduced federal oversight for major pipeline projects in order to facilitate and fast-track energy projects (brownsey 2013). resource extracting provinces, most notably alberta, saskatchewan, and newfoundland and labrador welcomed this approach, which coincided with soaring oil prices between 2005 and 2014, furthering their incentive to maximize resource extraction to realize windfall profits. indeed, a cross-provincial comparison of the four fossil fuel extracting provinces between 2009 and 2014 by carter, fraser and zalik (2017) reveals a trend towards energy policy governance convergence that mirrored the approach of the federal government. in order to accelerate energy projects, governments in all four provinces sought to streamline environmental policy in a way that made public involvement more difficult and avoided cumulative impact assessments. the vacuum in energy governance left by the harper government, however, also created an opportunity for sub-federal policy innovation that would, in the long-term, re-activate canada’s transformative trajectory. as the transnational and domestic discourse on climate change intensified, the balance between positive feedback effects that stabilized the conventional economic trajectory, on the one hand, and negative feedback effects that reflected increasing costs of this regime, on the other hand, began to change. climate change has become a more salient issue in canada as elsewhere since the mid-2000s. global warning has continued to intensify, and its consequences have become increasingly visible – and costly – even in the global north. major flooding (e.g., in alberta in 2013 and in quebéc and ontario in 2017 and 2019), and wildfires (e.g. 3 in addition, canada’s constitutional crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s, along with dramatically rising debts and deficits, further complicated energy policy transformation. these issues not only dominated canadian politics during that time, but also generated profound intergovernmental conflict, which would have been further exacerbated through a more ambitious approach in energy policy. 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 in alberta in 2016 and in british columbia in 2017 and 2018) impacted not only the affected populations, but also the insurance industry and governments. a parliamentary report registered a significant increase in expenditures for the disaster financial assistance arrangement program since 2009 (commissioner of the environment and sustainable development 2016). since 2014, these trends have coincided with sharply dropping oil prices, which have created an incentive for fossil fuel divestment. in light of the ongoing increase of canada’s ghg emissions and inconsistent federal leadership, some provinces became the main arena for continuing the transition towards a low carbon economy during the harper era (chahal et al. 2014; winfield and macdonald 2012). ontario, for example, enacted two ambitious policy innovations, the 2007 climate change action plan and the green energy act of 2009. in addition to new incentives and subsidies for energy efficiency and feed-in tariffs for renewable energy, the former entailed a commitment to phase out coal-fired electricity production by 2014. between 2007 and 2012, the province was able to achieve a significant reduction of ghg emissions, while the trend for the rest of canada was increasing (government of ontario 2014). even the petro-provinces did not deny the climate change challenge and acknowledged their responsibility to act, as reflected in their policy and administrative reforms. alberta had already introduced the climate change emissions management act (ccema) in 2002, saskatchewan created a climate change secretariat in 2007, and newfoundland and labrador established an office of climate change, energy efficiency and emissions trading in 2009. these initiatives, however, never effectively mitigated externalities emanating from nonrenewable resource extraction (carter 2018). in this context, the role of carbon pricing as a more effective policy instrument to reduce ghg emissions has gained importance in canada as elsewhere. again, the (arguably) most important policy innovation was introduced at the subfederal level. british columbia became the first province to introduce a carbon tax in 2008. this reform gained country-wide attention as it effectively contributed to reducing fossil fuel consumption by more than 17 percent per capita within the first five years after it was introduced (elgie and mcclay 2013). an alternative policy choice to a carbon tax was adopted by the governments of quebéc and ontario. within the broader framework of the western climate initiative, a non-profit organization established in 2007 by several us governors with the aim to promote a shared carbon market in north america, quebéc and california created a cap-and-trade system in 2013, which ontario briefly joined in 2018 as part of the provincial government’s new climate change action plan of 2017. provincial steps towards carbon pricing were formative in the sense that they geared the debate towards this instrument to reduce ghg emissions, rather than relying primarily on subsidies for green technologies, information, and voluntary agreements with industries to reduce their emissions. at the same time, carbon pricing remained highly controversial among provincial governments. despite these differences, the provinces began to coordinate their activities horizontally through the council of the federation. since 2007, energy policy has been one of the few persistent topics discussed among premiers during their annual meetings. agreement was reached first on several position papers, which were eventually consolidated into a more comprehensive framework agreement in 2015: the canadian energy strategy (council of the federation 2015). in this agreement, the provinces reinstated the need for ongoing horizontal coordination in order to minimize negative externalities resulting from resource extraction and transport, and to reduce energy consumption. despite the resurgence of sub-federal policy innovation, canada’s approach to tackling climate change through energy policy transformation 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 remained scattered and diffuse, lacking effective mechanisms that would foster stabilization through coordination. restoring transformative energy policy under the trudeau government the election of the justin trudeau liberal government in 2015 brought with it a promise to restore transformative policy within a pan-canadian framework on climate change mitigation. trudeau announced his government would provide national leadership, put a price on carbon, and reduce carbon pollution (liberal party of canada 2015). during the election campaign, trudeau promised meaningful collaboration with all major stakeholders, most notably provinces, territories, and indigenous peoples. however, in terms of policy design, the liberal party’s approach revealed considerable continuity with that of the chretien and martin governments. most notably, it did not entail a commitment to phase out oil and gas extraction; on the contrary, it acknowledged the need to promote fossil fuel extraction and export to secure canada’s economic prosperity, but intended to reinvest revenue from oil exports to drastically reduce ghg emissions domestically (dagg et al. 2018). within less than six months after he had gained office, trudeau hosted two first ministers’ conferences which resulted in the so-called vancouver declaration in march 2016. in this joint communiqué, which partly built on the canadian energy strategy of 2015, the federal government and its provincial and territorial counterparts agreed that a “fair transition to a sustainable, lowcarbon economy is necessary for our collective prosperity, competitiveness, health, and security”. the declaration served as a first step towards a more general framework agreement which was signed in december 2016 by all governments except for saskatchewan and manitoba: the pancanadian framework on clean growth and climate change (pcf). the pcf represents an ambitious framework for reactivating transformative policy. it is encompassing, combining regulatory measures and distributive policy incentives with substantial federal commitments. this achievement was “historic” not only in terms of the degree of policy change the pcf entailed after years of federal inactivism, but also because the trudeau government initially acknowledged that unilateral federal policy innovation is not sufficient; instead, it sought to facilitate close intergovernmental coordination to effectively generate its desired outcomes (chahal et al. 2017, 175). while this abrupt procedural and policy change demonstrated again the innovative capacity of canadian federalism, structural conflicts soon remerged and threatened to jeopardize trudeau’s new pan-canadian approach. saskatchewan’s and manitoba’s refusal to sign the agreement already indicated that the compromise was highly fragile. it did not take long until a major rift between provinces re-emerged. the bone of contention was, and still is, carbon pricing, a core element of the pcf. when the trudeau government announced the introduction of a federal carbon tax applicable only in those provinces that do not have in place a carbon pricing system by the end of 2018, it became obvious that the new collaborative spirit between the provinces and the federal government was hardly sustainable. this conflict further intensified when parliament passed the government’s greenhouse gas pollution pricing act in june 2018, which became an important issue in the canadian federal election of 2019. conservative premiers and politicians heavily opposed this policy instrument, partly for ideological reasons and partly because they considered it as an unconstitutional, unilateral federal interference in provincial jurisdiction. saskatchewan launched a constitutional reference case already before the act was passed in april 2018, and the newly elected conservative governments in ontario (2018) and alberta (2019) followed suit, supported by manitoba and new brunswick. in addition, ontario and alberta immediately 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 repealed legislation that had put in place a provincial carbon pricing system by their predecessors, thus reversing earlier policy innovations. as of this writing, the federal government appears to be winning this battle over carbon pricing with the provinces. while the trudeau liberals were reduced to minority status as a result of the 2019 federal election, the conservative party’s anti carbon tax campaign did not resonate with canadian voters (pammett and clarke 2021, in this issue). what is more, although the final decision of the supreme court of canada on the constitutionality of the federal carbon tax is still pending, two of three provincial courts of appeal followed largely the federal government’s justification of the reform. while the alberta court of appeal ruled the federal carbon tax unconstitutional, saskatchewan’s and ontario’s courts of appeal confirmed that fighting climate change is a matter of “national concern”, which allows the federal level to evoke one branch of the peace, order, and good government clause of the constitution to unilaterally introduce such an instrument. public opinion and all political parties, except for the conservatives, support a more determined approach to tackling climate change. however, the governance structure of the policy regime has not been successfully reconfigured to re-align the interests of core stakeholders and constituencies. the covid-19 pandemic appears to have reinforced this pattern. while provincial governments are preoccupied with developing emergency responses to the public health crisis, the federal government announced it would seize this unexpected opportunity to launch a ‘green’ and ‘more equitable’ recovery strategy. in its fall economic update, the liberal government announced measures like the home energy retrofit program, which includes cad 2.6 billion over seven years to improve energy efficiency of homes or support for zero emission vehicles (department of finance 2020). it also tabled a new accountability framework, which promises to exceed the original ghg emission reduction target for 2030, and commits to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 (house of commons 2020). however, the government does not intend to phase out fossil fuel development and extraction (wells 2020). hence, there is neither a significant departure from previous policy approaches to the energy-climate change mitigation trade-off on the horizon, nor did the federal government announce any plan on how it intends to revive its earlier efforts to establish a more robust governance structure necessary to consolidate transformative energy policy through intergovernmental relations. politics of energy transition in germany initiation of energy policy transformation under the ‘red-green coalition’ government like in canada, energy has been a highly contested issue in german politics. traditionally, the federal government’s energy policy was aimed at the provision of stable and low-cost energy (eberlein and doern 2009; illing 2016, 65-125). during the first two decades after world war ii, coal, crude oil, and nuclear power were the main energy sources used to fuel the economy. debates about a transformation of this energy system started in the 1970s when citizen protests against nuclear power intensified and when the organization of the oil exporting countries (opec) increased crude oil prices in 1973 and again in 1979. early on, experts began to discuss the potentials associated with a decentralized energy system based on renewable sources. the 1986 disaster in chernobyl turned public opinion against nuclear power and, with the rise of the green party during the 1980s, safety concerns with nuclear power plants found expression in federal and länder parliaments. at about the same time, the end of the cold war in the late 1980s and the 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 discovery of off-shore oil and gas resources in the north sea nourished the hope that fossil fuel supplies would be guaranteed for the foreseeable future. the liberalization of energy services in the european common market stabilized the carbon-based energy system but challenged the established policy regime which was based on a close cooperation between energy providers and governments. thus, the last two decades of the 20th century saw increasing conflict in energy policy, and this was expressed in public opinion and in debates among experts. in 1998, the federal government finally set off significant change in german energy policy, against formidable odds linked to the strong influence of major industries, ensuing path dependencies of the policy regime and associated institutional constraints of cooperative federalism. the new social democratic (spd) – green party coalition reached an agreement to phase out nuclear power and to promote renewable energy. the coalition initiated legislation to significantly renovate the previous government’s regulation on renewable energy: the 1990 electricity feed-in act. this act compelled grid operators to distribute power from renewables generated by small power companies and to pay them a guaranteed rate. although the german parliament had passed this law without significant debate (deutscher bundestag 1990, 18162-63), big power companies increasingly opposed this policy over time when they realized the impact the rising share of renewables was having on their industries. yet the legal action they pursued against the law failed. both the federal constitutional court in 1996 and the european court of justice in 2001 dismissed constitutional claims against guaranteed feed-in tariffs. within germany’s newly liberalized energy regime, the 1990 act aimed to prevent a closed shop situation in an energy market controlled by the country’s four grid-operators, but its effects were limited (stefes 2014: 60-63). the spd – green party government substantially revised and extended this policy while at the same time reinforcing its fundamental instrument, the feed-in tariff. the 2000 renewable energy sources act increased the level of remuneration for renewables fed into the grid. the added costs were financed by a surcharge on the regular market price for electricity. unlike the case of the 1990 legislation, this act required the assent of the bundesrat, the legislative body representing germany’s 16 länder. at that time, opposition parties participated in the majority in the länder governments, meaning the bundesrat could be expected to veto federal legislation. however, the länder governments did not obstruct the transformative policy. the legislation on renewable energies was combined in a policy package with a plan to phase out nuclear power. these two separate parts of the legislative program were prepared in different arenas. the legislation on nuclear power transposed an agreement which had been negotiated with the affected private power companies. chancellor gerhard schröder used this public-private agreement to discipline opponents to the legislation on renewable energy within the spd – green party coalition and within his own party, and to weaken potential opposition from within the bundesrat coming mainly from the affected länder (hirschl 2008, 155-158). in a quasi-corporatist arrangement, chancellor schröder fixed the legislative agenda and tied his cabinet’s hands to the negotiated policy. since public opinion favored a phase out of nuclear power, the länder governments refrained from vetoing the bill. consequently, they accepted the renewable energy sources act as a necessary corollary; it fostered the development and application of renewable energy technologies (solar, wind, biofuel, and geothermal power) that could replace nuclear power. certainly, public opinion supported energy transition, but significant policy change was made possible by the shift in power that occurred among the three arenas of negotiations that usually structure the federal legislative process: negotiations within the governing coalition, between federal-länder governments, and between the federal government and private stakeholders. in this 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 case, coalition bargaining and negotiations with private actors dominated joint decision-making in the federal system. the strategic interplay between these arenas also helped to sideline other potential veto players like the social democratic minister of economics, werner müller and the affected firms that had threatened to or did take legal action against the federal legislation. in the end, informal negotiations in overlapping arenas helped to trigger policy transformation. path dependent transformation and policy feedback the new policy instigated a process that transformed electricity supply. guaranteed feed-in tariffs made renewable energy technologies competitive in the electricity market. they enabled small firms, farmers, and house owners to participate in a market that in the past had been dominated by big industries (mautz 2012). incremental adjustments in feed-in tariffs prevented windfall effects that could have undermined the market mechanism. by using tariffs to cover the costs, the financial burden of transformation was allocated to consumers. this had another positive effect for the environment as it incentivized households to save electricity. moreover, by relying on the market mechanism, transformative policy stabilized the path of change. the annual share of renewables in gross electricity consumption has continuously increased, rising from 3.4 per cent in 1990 to 42.1 per cent in 2019 (bmwi 2020, 5). this is not to say that energy transition has not been without obstacles. for example, after the general federal election of 2009, a new coalition government formed by the christian democratic union (cdu) and the free democratic party (fdp) came to power. this coalition continued to promote renewable energy sources, but they revised federal nuclear energy policy. the decision to extend the period of time nuclear power facilities would be permitted to operate would delay the nuclear phase out by almost a decade. while the fdp in particular supported this partial change to federal energy policy, the nuclear energy extension plan was more contested within the cdu. the 2011 nuclear disaster in fukushima provided an opportunity for the intraparty opponents of this revised policy to once again change the country’s energy policy. what the media labeled a ‘turnaround’ in effect meant a reversion back to the policy of the previous government. hence, the coalition did not face any substantial opposition to its policy change in the federal parliament. only the governments of those länder that were directly affected by the immediate shut-down of seven nuclear power plants initially opposed the new policy. but the bundesrat had no veto power over this legislation, and the federal government addressed the concerns of the affected länder in informal and bilateral negotiations. as most of these länder were led by christian democratic governments, they avoided openly opposing the federal government. during the following years, the länder engaged in negotiations on revisions of the “law on renewable energy sources”, which adjusted the framework supporting renewables by reducing feed-in tariffs. when the federal government drafted its plan for climate protection (bmu 2016) which was designed to implement germany’s commitments resulting from the paris agreement on climate change, the länder governments and civil society had the opportunity to issue opinions and suggestions in an organized ‘dialogue’ (bohn et al. 2017). the länder governments also participated in working groups that had been set up by the federal ministry of economics to consult on energy policy in which they were on equal footing with representatives from the private sector and civil society. the ministry for the environment established similar groups for climate policy. as intergovernmental coordination of energy policy occurred in voluntary negotiations, it did not run the risk of ending up in a joint decision trap (scharpf 1988). nevertheless, these efforts to find a consensus on an energy transition path failed and no consensus on the new policy direction was achieved. 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 from joint decision-making to top-down governance the limited powers of the länder governments are surprising given germany’s ‘cooperative federalism’, that energy policy affects all levels of government, and that the federal government has labeled energy transition a ‘joint task’. in german federalism, joint decision-making in legislation and coordination in the performance of joint tasks would usually be the default mode of multilevel governance. energy policy is a matter of federal legislative power, and the assent of the bundesrat is required if länder governments are affected, for instance if they have to implement a law or bear costs. according to the prevailing interpretation of the constitution, these conditions rarely apply in the regulation of energy sources. this does not mean that länder and local governments were excluded from policy-making. they have regularly participated in planning and implementation of federal energy policy. for the most part, coordination between levels of governments remained informal. the länder governments have veto power only in a few matters of federal legislation, one example being with the law defining the need for expansion of the transmission grid. in other instances, länder governments have a voice in the bundesrat and in pre-legislative negotiations, and they occasionally achieve substantial concessions when the federal government is eager to prevent länder governments from delaying legislation. in decisions on new power lines spanning across länder borders, the affected länder governments, like local governments and private actors, can also submit their opinion to the responsible federal network agency (bundesnetzagentur). moreover, the system of intergovernmental relations allows federal and länder governments to consult regularly in conferences and in joint administrative committees. this dense network of communication has provided the federal and länder governments opportunities to mutually influence policies. the länder governments also contributed to the energy transition through complementary measures reducing the use of fossil fuel for heating and in public transport, and by their approval of renewable energy power facilities (in particular wind turbines). they have developed their own energy transition concepts, and defined goals and measures in climate protection programs. these policies have not been coordinated among the länder governments or with the federal government. länder energy and climate goals and measures have thus diverged significantly (ohlhorst 2015; chemnitz 2018). to a certain extent, this diversity has led to informal competition among länder, with each land seeking to develop its own best practices knowing that private organizations monitor the implementation of länder policies. whether these comparative evaluations have had any impact on policy-making is difficult to estimate. although this loosely coupled pattern of interaction may have contributed to policy learning, coordination processes are dominated by the federal government. the responsible ministry of economic affairs and ministry for the environment set up advisory committees and consultative bodies related to all relevant aspects of the energy transition; the bodies include representatives from business, civil society, länder, and municipalities. in addition, the government sponsors private organizations promoting energy transition (krick 2018). these processes aim at gaining acceptance and amount to “consensus management” from above, but they have so far failed to effectively manage social and territorial conflicts (quitzow et al. 2016). social conflicts are expressed by business and consumer organizations that oppose the high costs of the energy transition. territorial conflicts prompted by affected länder or local governments have caused delays in grid expansion and in the phasing out of coal-based power generation. disputes have had to be settled by compromises that externalize costs by further increasing energy prices and burdening tax payers. 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 despite undeniable success in germany’s energy transition, including in comparison to canada, in many areas progress remains sketchy. while a growing share of electricity is being produced from renewable sources, ghg emissions barely declined between 2009 and 2018 (gea 2020, 135), and according to preliminary data, the reduction goal for 2020 could only be reached under the unusual conditions of the covid-19 pandemic. the growth of renewables has been slowed down due to delays in the implementation of new transmission lines, the development of technologies to store electricity, and investments in reducing energy consumption. support for renewables via feed-in tariffs have become more and more contested, and regular adjustments to the renewable energy sources act have been focused on reducing feed-in tariffs and avoiding an over-supply of renewables instead of advancing sector-coupling. despite general public support for clean energy, redistributive effects of transformative policy have led to growing resistance to the expansion of renewable energy sources. for different reasons, growing skepticism is nourished by political parties, in particular the fdp and the right-wing populist alternative for germany (alternative für deutschland), energy consuming industries, and citizens opposing the siting of wind farms in their communities. remarkably, it was not joint decision-making, the typical mode of intergovernmental coordination requiring that federal and länder governments act in agreement which usually ended with incremental change, that slowed down the transformative process. the federal government deliberately evaded the constraining effects of the joint decision-system in federal legislating by strategically shifting the power balance toward the center, where political conflicts had to be settled. federal-länder coordination was subordinated to federal politics, despite the significant territorial effects of the energy transition. over time, federal and länder governments increasingly used informal negotiations to coordinate their policies, which has made the pattern of multilevel governance in energy policy, to some degree, more similar to that practiced in canada. länder have been able to exert some influence in ways somewhat similar to those of private actors. this change of the policy regime came at a price, as informal negotiations excluded political conflicts, which became a matter of party competition and bargaining in coalition governments. redistributive social effects of high electricity prices instigated populist reactions against renewable energy, and territorial conflicts of grid expansion, wind power, and the phasing out of coal power caused delays and high compensation payments. while the federal government did not engage in restoring and adjusting intergovernmental coordination to the challenges of energy transition, policy-making became segmented into separate sectors. to address this problem, the federal government established a ‘platform’ consisting of different working groups under the banner ‘joint task energy transition’. the coordinative effect of the platform’s regular meetings has, however, remained limited; the joint task never materialized into a coherent policy. differences in the energy policy perspectives of the ministry for economic affairs and the ministry for environment contributed to this failure at coordination. as the energy transition became increasingly highly politicized, the federal government’s topdown approach and informal coordination attempts through executive networks proved insufficient to deal with territorial conflicts. when in response to public pressure to advance the energy transition, the federal and länder governments moved on the issue of phasing out coal, they met with strong resistance from the governments of the affected länder as well as heavy industry. to break the impasse, the federal government agreed to compensate the affected regions with 40 billion euros. in the end, they managed to negotiate an agreement on shutting down the last coal-fired power plant in 2038. in july 2020, this compromise was transposed into federal law. for the same reasons, significant steps to transform the transport sector have been pushed less by the german government than by the eu. as the automobile industry is concentrated in a few 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 länder, the governments of these länder have defended the industry against regulative policies, even though overall they tend to be supportive of green energy. comparison and conclusion transformative energy policy seeks to reduce carbon emissions and to change the complex technical systems underpinning energy provision. transforming an energy path is a highly challenging task, given that energy systems are technical systems embedded in social structures and defined by power relations among actors. nonetheless, energy policy can be changed significantly, under particular conditions. achieving new energy legislation is, however, just one aspect of a complex process of change. consolidating a new energy path is a further major challenge. in canada and germany, transformative energy change was initiated through a transnational paradigmatic policy shift that has resonated in domestic political discourses on renewable energy and climate change since the late 1980s. political actors in both countries have acknowledged the need for far reaching change in order to reduce ghg emissions, but they have also encountered significant problems tied to the redistributive consequences of energy policy transformations for affected industries and regions. these conflicts have been mediated through the institutions of federalism and democracy. this study has examined how these institutional conditions have shaped the energy trajectories in both countries. in principle, canadian federalism provides more favorable conditions for initiating transformative policies than does german federalism. federal and provincial governments can unilaterally change policies. however, if coordinated action results from mutual adjustment, unilateral change can lead to a stop-and go policy. transformation becomes self-reinforcing only if one side, be it provincial governments or the federal government, takes the lead and other governments emulate policy changes. in reality, negative externalities of provincial policies have obstructed this process (harrison 2013). in germany, joint decision-making constrains policy change, yet the federal government circumvented these hurdles when it launched a transformative energy policy. it bypassed the intergovernmental arena by activating quasi-corporatist negotiations with industry, and it centralized power to manage intragovernmental conflicts. while coalition governments at the federal level prevented a stop-and-go policy, and climate policy of the eu contributed to stabilize the transition path (lederer, 2021, in this issue), party politics at the center weakened the potential of cooperative federalism to flexibly adjust policies in case of shortcomings. this study also suggests that variation in the institutional incentives of federal systems alone is not sufficient for understanding similarities and differences in long-term patterns of transformative policy. in contrast to a pure institutionalist approach, the concept of transformative policy suggests that it is necessary to take into account how initial steps taken towards a new policy regime alter the affiliations and vested interests of major stakeholders and how positive and negative feedback effects support or undermines regime change over time. transformation requires not only policy reform, but also efforts to adjust the underlying governance structure in a way that encourages important stakeholders to support transformation over time. this crucial step has not been accomplished in either canada or germany. in both countries, institutional legacies have retarded policy dynamics. when the trudeau government tried to turn to policy coordination by 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 cooperation and negotiated agreements with the provinces, confrontative behavior soon reemerged, threatening the fragile intergovernmental compromise reached on the pan-canadian framework on clean growth and climate change. in germany, the federal government used its powers in energy policy to turn joint decision-making into a more top-down governance approach. yet, it was impossible to sideline länder governments. their necessary participation in implementation and their influence on decisions about phasing out coal or fossil fuels in the transportation sector caused feedback effects that weakened the power of those seeking to transform the system into a low-carbon energy direction and slowed down progress. avoiding these feedback effects in a federal system requires adjusting the patterns of governance for transformative policy right from the start. this has not happened in either canada or germany. intergovernmental relations did evolve during the transformative process, but this was due more to the efforts of the federal government to gain power, and the reaction of provincial and länder governments to maintain influence, than to any deliberate policy to consolidate the energy transition through more effective coordination. governance structures are particularly relevant for stabilizing transformative policy and facilitating adjustments to changing conditions and challenges. neither routinized joint decisionmaking nor politicized and ad hoc intergovernmental negotiations seem appropriate to create a robust policy path. while both modes of multilevel governance can commit governments to a coordinated energy policy, a kind of steering committee with delegates from all levels of government, including municipalities and, in the canadian case, indigenous peoples, could facilitate the consolidation of transformative policy. such a body could develop and review the general strategy, while administrative committees could coordinate the implementation of individual reform measures to assure greater coherence. monitoring of implementation processes by experts from the federal and provincial/länder governments, as well as by other independent experts, constitutes a helpful means to identify problems and propose policy adjustments. establishing different layers of multilevel governance can be achieved without reforming the federal system or reallocating powers. rather, it involves altering the patterns of 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in how ottawa spends, 2003-2004: regime change and policy shift, edited by bruce doern. don mills: oxford university press. 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 elections in canada and russia in 2019: a comparative analysis of cross-national media coverage anna tsurkan1 canada-russia research initiative abstract in 2019, canada and russia both went through election campaigns; russia held regional and municipal elections in september, while canadians voted at the federal level in october. this article examines cross-national media coverage during the two election campaigns in order to provide a snapshot of the positions and perceptions each country has about the other’s electoral and political processes. the purpose is to identify and explain over-arching narratives that frame each country’s media discourse about the other, as media from the two countries were actively involved in cross-commenting about the situation on the ground as the election campaigns took place and after results were reported. however, the content of canadian and russian reporting differs greatly, in part because of the different levels at which the elections occurred, but more importantly due to differences in underlying assumptions and biases on both sides. while these differing narratives remain in place, it is unlikely that media, and by extension, public opinion about the other country will shift. 1 anna tsurkan is a founder and project coordinator of the canada-russia research initiative. 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 introduction in 2019, canadians and russians went through election campaigns in their respective countries. canada held a general election in october, which resulted in a minority government led by justin trudeau. a month earlier, russia undertook elections of heads and legislative bodies in many regions and municipalities, as well as a number of by-elections at all levels of government. voters in 70 out of 85 regions of the russian federation went to the polls, which outnumbers canadian voters in absolute figures. in comparing the two election campaigns, the level of each election is an important factor, as, in russia, there were multiple separate campaigns at the local and regional levels, each with its own issues and agendas. the canadian election, on the other hand, was conducted across the nation to determine the next federal government. examining these two 2019 elections allows us to take a snapshot of canada-russia relations at a given moment in time, providing insight into mutual perceptions of the other’s electoral processes. this article analyzes pre-election discourses, media coverage, and commentary, and examines the extent to which disinformation campaigns took place on either side. canadian and russian media outlets were actively involved in cross-commenting about the situation in each other’s country in 2019. but this coverage was rather disproportional. on the eve of the canadian federal election campaign, a number of media and research-based analyses (global news 2019; jardine 2019; al-rawi and jiwani 2019; kolga 2019a) suggested the high probability of russian interference, especially in light of the american investigation into russian meddling during the 2016 united states (us) presidential election. during the pre-election period in canada, an anti-russian discourse portraying russia as a potential threat to canadian democracy became one of the dominant themes linked to discussions of election security in the canadian context. the anti-russian media narrative in canada provoked a boost in anti-canadian rhetoric in russia. this contrasted with the traditionally low level of coverage of canada as a topic for analysis in the country. russian media did not suggest that canada was a threat to russian elections, which contrasts with the dominant narrative of a russian threat by canadian media, yet nonetheless, articles about canada in general, and the canadian reaction to the russian elections in particular, were negative in tone even while being sporadic in distribution. nevertheless, the bi-lateral relations between the two nations were further strained by a short canadian twitter campaign in the midst of pre-election opposition rallies in moscow. speaking up against mass detentions, canadian authorities called on their russian counterparts to respect freedoms of assembly which enmeshed the two foreign agencies in twitter diplomacy on the issue. taking into consideration the above-mentioned context and the research task to compare media coverage, this paper is divided into three sections. the first section discusses how a russian factor in the form of non-interference was projected by canadian media outlets as one of the main pillars of free and fair election in the country. the second part looks at russian media frames about the 2019 general election in canada. and, finally, the final section analyzes how canadian journalists covered regional and municipal elections in russia. the conclusion provides the main findings on cross-national media coverage. although the question of election interference is extensively discussed in this article, it does not represent the subject of the research. media coverage could be considered one of the aspects of election meddling, however, other aspects such as spreading misinformation through social media, 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 cyberattacks on politicians and government institutions, intrusions into election systems, and financing favorable candidates are far more serious allegations indicative of actual interference. thus, both interference and non-interference are examined in this context as topics of media coverage influencing people’s perceptions, but the validity of the various claims is not assessed in this article. the research question rather relates to how media discourses and contexts differ in the two countries. methodology and theoretical foundation the notion of ‘media cross-coverage’ is utilized in this paper in addition to a number of standard terms used in the communications field, such as ‘media coverage’ and ‘media discourse’. media cross-coverage refers to media coverage and discourse of pre-election and election campaigns in the two countries in a cross-national commenting format. as opposed to self-coverage, where self is seen as the country of origin of any given media outlet, cross-national coverage is applied to coverage of the other, in this case canadian media coverage of russia and russian media coverage of canada. furthermore, the cross-commenting does, in fact, sometimes transgress the bounds of simple media coverage and includes state officials on various levels making statements on positions and/or actions of their counterparts. in this analysis, statements connected to the substance of this research are analyzed as a part of a framing concept in media, as media content is produced in a continuous interaction between journalists and elites (de vreese 2005, 52-3). in addition, nowadays, any politician in either country can actively participate in a frame-building process by means of social media. this paper specifically focuses on twitter, which has become not only a new tool of digital diplomacy, but also one of the primary sources of troll-generated content aiming to either spread disinformation and/or to create an illusion of public discourse (chamberlain 2010, 16). in terms of methodology, this research draws from both political science and communication studies. taking media content (mainstream as well as social) as the main data for study, both qualitative and quantitative approaches were implemented in content analysis and comparative analysis relative to classical political science theory (wilkerson and casas 2017, 530). in turn, a media framing assessment was conducted based on deductive and empirical communication approaches (de vreese 2005, 53-4). the data collection and text analysis were implemented manually, with the content being drawn from media broadcasts and official statements from russian and canadian sources in russian and english.2 as the main body of this article is divided by elections in canada and russia, a systematic study of major russian3 and canadian4 media outlets was conducted on a regular basis from june, 2 canadian sources in french stayed beyond the scope of this project, which creates an additional opportunity to analyse differences in english and french media coverage of russia in canada in a separate study. 3 channel one russia, dozhd, interfax, izvestia, russian news agency, tass (telegrafnoye agentstvo sovetskogo soyuza), kommersant, moskovskij komsomolets, nezavisimaya gazeta, novaya gazeta, ria (rossiskoe informatsionnoe agentstvo) novosti, russia 1, vedomosti, vesti, vzglyad. 4 the canadian broadcasting corporation (cbc), ctv, global news, globe and mail, national post. 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 2018 to november, 2019 to gauge cross-national coverage of pre-election and election campaigns, as well as election results in both countries. for the same period of time, in the interests of tracing diversity in the existing media discourse on the issue together with an evaluation of the initial stages of media framing and the identification of media content from lesser-known sources, a news search was run through google.ca in english and yandex.ru in russian, with ‘elections in russia’ and ‘election in canada’ as key phrases. in addition, publication tracking on websites and social media accounts of global affairs canada and the russian ministry of foreign affairs, as well as other governmental institutions participating in canada-russia relations, was actively used for gathering information for content analysis and framing assessment. examination of russian media coverage of canada identified the existence of two separate categories of broadcasting. these two categories are examined separately in this paper because the target audience as well as goals of reporting were found to be different. the first category addresses russian-language media directed at a russian-speaking population both in and outside of russia, while the second looks at english-language outlets, in particular, rt (a rebranded version of russia today), which is available in canada online and through all major cable providers, and sputnik, which is available online. both media outlets are widely associated with the kremlin’s propaganda (van herpen 2015; oates 2016) and information warfare (lough et al. 2014). canadian media coverage of russia, which was only in english, contrasted with the russian approach, which published both in english and in russian. speculations about potential russian meddling in the 2019 federal election in canada were widespread in canada, and theoretical and analytical works were published about the issue (alrawi and jiwani 2019; bradshaw 2018; jardine 2019; kolga 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; sukhankin 2019). this present study builds on these sources and supports some of their conclusions. however, the author’s own experience working in the field of international election observation and election management, both in russia and in canada, enriches this article with insights on the essence of the electoral process in the two countries. canadian media coverage of the 2019 general election: the threat of russian meddling despite the absence of party leaders’ debates on foreign policy during the 2019 election campaign, russia played an important role in the campaign. candidates generally criticized russian actions on the world stage, particularly in relation to events in crimea and ukraine in 2014. however, in comparison with the 2015 election campaign, there was a shift from international to national issues and, in particular, to the issues of national cyber security. in this regard, canadian journalists, analysts, politicians, and state institutions placed the potential threat of russian meddling in the election at the centre of the discourse about freedom and fairness of elections in canada. thus, protection against foreign interference was framed as one of the main pillars preserving the canadian democratic process. pre-election period: framing the narrative a focus on election interference was initiated by the media in response to the us investigation into russian meddling during the 2016 american presidential election, and in conjunction with disruptive actions conducted by st. petersburg’s internet research agency, commonly known as 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 the ‘russian troll factory’, which produces content in the name of domestic users in foreign countries. a cache of three million deleted tweets associated with russian trolls (based on their account information) was made public by the us house intelligence committee (us house of representatives 2018). two professors from south carolina’s clemson university collected all tweets (linvill and warren 2018, 3) and shared them with fivethirtyeight website (roeder 2018). having searched this database for 60 keywords connected with canadian issues, cbc journalists revealed in august, 2018 that almost 8,000 russian tweets had targeted canada between june, 2015 and december, 2017 (rocha 2018). following this media report, a national survey commissioned by ctv showed that 69 percent of canadians found it credible that the russian government was using social media to meddle in western democracies (nanos research 2018, 23). the two major canadian media outlets, cbc and ctv, not only allowed the narrative of a potential russian interference in the 2019 election in canada to emerge, but also reinforced it by evaluating people’s perceptions on this matter. the election meddling narrative became theoretically and linguistically conceptualized, with the majority of its concepts being used further in the course of the election campaign. in addition to widely used terms like ‘disinformation’, ‘meddling’ and ‘interference’, certain keywords and ideas that continued to emerge from the initial cbc article (like, ‘target canadians’, ‘sow discord’, ‘polarizing content’, ‘threat to democracy’, etc.) indicate the existence of this narrative that could be found in subsequent media discourse. from august, 2018 to august, 2019, dozens of analyses predicting foreign interference in the 2019 federal election in canada appeared (al-rawi and jiwani 2019, jardine 2019, kolga 2019b, 2019c). several more waves of tweets showcasing the interests of russian trolls in canadian domestic policy were released. a number of research papers on how to secure the election from disinformation coming from abroad were published by researchers and by state security agencies (bradshaw 2018, communications security establishment 2019, kolga 2019a). but, more importantly, the issue was raised at the highest level. in september, 2018, canada’s prime minister justin trudeau, when asked by a journalist, denied direct russian interference in the 2015 canadian election. however, he admitted that canada was aware of and had taken actions to prevent such a possibility in 2019 (council on foreign relations 2018). in april, 2019, he went further. speaking to reporters in toronto about divisive campaigns in social media conducted by “countries like russia,” he re-affirmed that the task of the government was to ensure noninterference in canadian elections (global news 2019). the ‘russian threat’ narrative continued to amplify during the campaign, with contributions from analysts, politicians, state institutions, and media. the government of canada developed and announced a plan to protect canadian democracy in january, 2019. this plan was based on four pillars: informing voters about online threats; engaging social media platforms in tracking disinformation; activating intelligence; and coordinating government institutions’ role in security provision (government of canada 2019). the ‘get cyber safe’ campaign was conducted by a newly-created canadian centre for cyber security, and seven million dollars were allocated by the government toward digital, media, and civic literacy programming (government of canada 2019). nevertheless, alerting the public to the probability of foreign meddling fell largely to news media outlets and politicians who communicated their messages through mass media and social media. previous media research has identified the significant role played by the media in alignment with the government’s objective of informing the electorate (druckman 2005, 476-7). 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 a regular news search through google.ca during this pre-election period detected only two canadian texts counter-arguing the predominant anti-russian discourse (climenhaga 2019; nelson 2019). both of these texts were published in april, 2019 after trudeau’s above-mentioned comments about foreign disinformation campaigns on social media. mocking the election meddling narrative, both authors disputed trudeau’s politics, stating their intention not to support the prime minister and the liberal party during the 2019 general election. the existence of this counter-narrative speaks in favour of public and media pluralism, nonetheless the narrative of russian interference was clearly dominant. climenhaga’s article was posted on a personal blog and nelson’s in the calgary herald. the absence of similar messages in mainstream national media outlets in canada is an indicator that their point of view was an outlier (chomsky 2002, 29). election campaign and election day: expectations vs. reality the election campaign in canada officially started on september 11, 2019. the narrative of potential russian interference was soon eclipsed by campaign scandals and debates among election contestants. russia, or relations with russia in any form, were hardly ever mentioned by candidates or their political parties. this is explained partly by the lack of a separate debate on canadian foreign policy. the only event which had been scheduled – the 2019 munk debate on foreign policy – was cancelled due to trudeau’s absence, in spite of the fact that the other three leaders of major parties, including elizabeth may (green), andrew scheer (conservative) and jagmeet singh (new democratic party) confirmed their participation. two other leaders’ debates involving all six party leaders were organized by a leaders’ debate commission as an integral part of canada’s federal election, one in english and another one in french; these debates focused on internal canadian politics, as did the entire election campaign. the only event where a russian issue came up was the national leaders’ debate held by maclean’s and citytv. the question was raised by paul wells, a moderator and maclean’s senior writer, and addressed elizabeth may’s proposal to shift canadian focus and funding away from nato in spite of “putin’s military muscle flexing” (maclean’s 2019). among the three leaders who participated in this event, russia was mentioned only by may and andrew scheer in their responses, while jagmeet singh addressed another topic. may spoke briefly about putin’s efforts to increase russian nuclear capabilities and canadian lack of surveillance on its arctic shores to intercept russian vessels, while scheer concentrated on the russian government’s actions in ukraine and crimea and promised to support ukrainians in their “fight against the russian aggression.” the conservative leader, who was the house of commons speaker at that time, had been banned from travelling to russia under retaliatory sanctions on 13 canadian officials issued by putin back in march, 2014. when the 2019 federal election took place, the question of whether there had been interference remained open for a while. it was clear right away that the critical election incident protocol, created specifically to decide if a level of disinformation was high enough to notify citizens and compromise elections, was not activated. however, despite the fact that the threshold to threaten the integrity of the election was not met, canadian officials declared that some malicious activities were detected (thompson 2019). although the details were expected to be made public in spring 2020, the elections canada report came out earlier, in mid-february. the document repeated the pre-election security concerns and measures taken by the agency to address them, including the social media monitoring unit operating in 21 languages to detect disinformation. this particular 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 unit flagged only 28 pieces of both misinformation and instances of impersonation of elections canada between august and the election day, which “could have interfered with electors’ ability to vote” (elections canada 2020, 57-9). other than that, no cybersecurity incidents were found to have influenced the electoral process. similar estimates about the scope of foreign election interference had been presented to the public earlier by media outlets with a reference to other stakeholders monitoring potential disruptive actions online. for example, the cbc reported that facebook canada’s global director and head of public policy, kevin chan, did not see signs of election meddling on their platform (thompson 2019). the cbc also published an article titled “fears of election meddling on social media were overblown” (rocha 2019), sharing research results of the digital democracy project, the ryerson social media lab, and the university of toronto's citizen lab. thus, despite high-profile international investigations into russian meddling in foreign elections in the us and france, and the constant discourse of possible russian interference in the canadian federal election, evidence brought out in the media indicated that election-meddling never moved from a potentiality to an actuality. significantly, public discourse on interference versus non-interreference in the 2019 general election in canada was focused on either direct cyberattacks or social media trolls. (dis)information and/or messages in favour or against certain election contestants spread by foreign media broadcasters were not taken into consideration, nor were they counted for the purposes of official statistics, despite the fact that tracing this type of materials is essential for a comparative analysis of media cross-national coverage. the examination of this data is described further in the section about russian english-language media. but, at this point, it seems important to note that what we count as cases of foreign meddling in the internal politics of a sovereign state, and how we count them, finally, produces our definition of interference. in 2019, canada seemed to exclude media broadcasting from their understanding of foreign interference. lessons learned examining the goal of media warnings about potential russian election interference reveals a paradox. on the one hand, the strategy of highlighting such threats was apparently based on the assumption that the more information the media provide about the potential threat, the more protected canadian voters will be. on the other hand, there is no research on the effects of this framing, including information processing effects as well as attitudinal and behavioral effects (de vreese 2005, 52). also unclear is the type of data that could be used to evaluate such effects. unlike a variety of studies looking at how russian trolls contributed to polarization of conversations on social media, studies have not detected a direct correlation between media content and voters’ behavior (gallacher and heerdink 2019; kriel and pavliuc 2019). national surveys and anthropological research conducted in a timely manner might have helped to reveal some interesting linkages. in the meantime, several extracts from the elections canada internal social media monitoring report released by the cbc indicate a relatively high-volume of discussions among canadians questioning the legitimacy of the 2019 election (burke 2020). among the major concerns, directly or indirectly connected with the meddling narrative, were: a) an alleged potential for non-citizens to vote sparked by elections canada’s report of removing more than 100,000 non-canadians from voters’ lists and by questioning the existing id requirements for voting; b) speculations about the 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 release of compromising materials about candidates, in particular justin trudeau, which could have been an indication of foreign media interference in the election campaign; c) other instances of election-related commentary from foreigners. thus, the canadian electorate, as determined by the elections canada’s social media monitoring unit, was partially concerned about the appropriateness of foreign opinions, including media broadcasting coming from outside of the country, during the election campaign period. in turn, elections canada had to remind voters that election law permits people outside of the country to give their views on topics related to canada’s election (burke 2020). russian media coverage of the 2019 general election in canada: trudeau’s hypocrisy and the decline of liberal democracy in contrast with canadian broadcasters, which do not publish in russian language, their russian counterparts have both english-language and russian-language media outlets. their target audience as well as goals of reporting were found to be different which slightly affects the existing narratives. this section explores russian media frames about the 2019 election in canada in both types of broadcasters. canada in russian-language media and political discourse for traditional media outlets and institutions in russia, canada is not a very popular topic for analytical coverage. despite a firm anti-russian stand on most of the issues in the international arena adopted by canada since 2014, the country is mostly perceived by russian foreign agencies and portrayed in the russian media as dependent on the us. the predominant discourse in russia sees canadian eagerness in foreign policy matters strongly interconnected with us foreign policy. canada is presented as being either influenced by the us or attempting to outdo the us (ministry of foreign affairs 2019), but almost never as an independent player. however, russian elites enjoy much more power in this frame-building process in media in russia than their canadian counterparts in canada (de vreese 2005, 52), which allows us to claim that the russian authorities promote narratives about canada which are transmitted by media, shaping public opinion to a certain degree. in response to anti-russian frames put forth in canadian media, a similar boost of anti-canadian discourse was apparent in russia. on january 13, 2019, canada unexpectedly became an object of a ten-minute-long tv report prepared for dmitry kiselev’s weekly news on russia 1. kiselev, the only russian journalist sanctioned by canada for propaganda, charged the canadian government with falling under the strong influence of the ukrainian lobby within its borders (lyadov 2019). the dissemination of a russian state narrative is often depicted in the west as propaganda (jowett and o'donnell 2018, 6). in this view, russian-language media mostly represent a platform for the government to maintain a desired level of support among its citizens. media discourse is also depicted as being connected to national identity in the sense that if patriotism becomes a concept monopolized by the kremlin, those who do not support the state can be labelled unpatriotic, denying them any opportunity to criticize either the government or the dominant narrative (oates 2014, 3). 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 this new form of russianness cannot help influencing russian speakers abroad. researchers suggest the particular interest of russia is to reach out to its citizens who reside outside of the country to promote the idea of a ‘russian world’ (kozdra 2018, 63). however, in some ways this re-connection with the russian state media frames happens naturally. some segments of russianspeaking people abroad watch russian-language television and read russian-language newspapers online. ongoing negative messages about russia in countries of their residence surely affects their russian national identities. as chris nelson from the calgary herald points out, “it is a tad annoying to constantly see your native land being blamed for every problem on earth” (2019). thus, in their attempts to defend these national identities, russians abroad may become prone to accepting narratives coming from russian broadcasters. according to the 2016 census, 622,445 people in canada claimed russian ethnic origins (2016). a few television providers offer russian state-channel packages. russians living in canada can also access the same channels and a wider range of resources produced in russia online. it is not possible to estimate the exact number of russians in canada regularly following the russian media, although the majority stays consciously or unconsciously exposed to the russian content if they read anything in russian on the internet. this content contains media frames, most of which would inevitably contradict those which circulate in canada. recipients of the russian state narrative in canada are accused of spreading the kremlin’s propaganda if they wish to share any contradictory messages or speak up in favour of the russian regime (kolga 2019, 29-31). the russian congress of canada (rcc) expressed its discontent with being labeled as a ‘white propaganda’ outlet or being pro-putin (rcc 2019a). this diaspora organization tried to prove its ideological and financial independence (2019a) and defend its right to represent russian-speaking community interests, including before the government of canada (rcc 2019b). although the russian community in canada is clearly under-studied by researchers, the rcc example demonstrates the adverse effect of seeing pro-russian sources or associations as deliberately propagandist unless they take an anti-putin stand. such an interpretation would make the entire russian diaspora an outcast associated either with the kremlin’s funding, or depicted as being driven by its propaganda. in these circumstances, canadians of russian ethnic origin might feel deprived of their right to participate in any activities related somehow to the russian state or to defend any pro-russian position without being labeled propagandists. such exclusion forces them to make a choice in between russian and canadian discourses, while the media environment becomes extremely polarized. meanwhile, the more stakeholders in canada got involved in an anti-russian discourse, increasing the volume of media broadcasting about potential election interference, the more the russian press broke its previous silence in analytical coverage of canada. in april and may of 2019, three articles were published by filippov, with two appearing in the newspaper vzglyad. in addition to being a regular contributor to russian news outlets, filippov works at the centre of applied research and programs in moscow which specializes in consultation and analysis, with a separate focus in managing election campaigns in russia, abkhazia, belarus and ukraine (prisp, n.d.). in an overly-free and caddish tone, filippov accused canada of meddling in elections abroad, of committing cultural genocide towards its first nations, and of playing the russian card in order to hide its own corruption scandal with snc-lavalin (2019b; 2019c). as examples of canadian election interference, filippov mentioned canada’s role in toppling the regime in ukraine in 2014, 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 its further military and economic support of the country, and canada’s efforts to support juan guaido in venezuela (filippov 2019a). his main idea was to show russian readers that although canada blamed other international actors for their attempts to influence different countries, it has never admitted to the same in its own politics. filippov’s articles illustrate the counter-narrative with which russian media responded to an increase in the intensity and volume of canada’s anti-russian stance. the canadian rhetoric about russia could not simply be ignored in a modern highly interconnected world where information flows relatively freely. paraphrasing oates’ dilemma (2014, 9), if you can’t ignore the canadian frames, how do you try to shape them to fit the strategic narrative? the algorithm included the use of the same frames against the counterpart, by adding counterarguments and further details to support them. distinctively for this type of reporting, being portrayed through the strategic lens, it often contains a significant fraction of truth (paul and matthews 2016, 5). however, a blend of facts which an average consumer would know very little about raises credibility concerns. like in canada, not all the reporting in russia follows the dominant script. for example, in january, 2019, nezavisimaya gazeta published an article by akimushkina, a russian expert in canadian studies, who wrote that canada is not “a northern extension of the usa” (2019). she not only accurately described canada’s stance on russia, but also factually contradicted the foreign ministry’s notion about canada’s dependent foreign policy. that this sort of material was published by a state-affiliated newspaper might seem confusing in the context of state-controlled russian media. nonetheless, it happens occasionally and might reflect either a lack of interest by the authorities in print media, or their own way of challenging certain narratives to test public opinion. canadian election campaign coverage in russian media started a day earlier than the official campaign in canada. on september 10, 2019, ria novosti, an original rt founder and a part of the international information agency group rossiya segodnya, published an article about rising negativity surrounding justin trudeau on the eve of the election campaign in connection with the snc-lavalin corruption scandal (kornilov 2019). the author clearly attempted to undermine the current canadian prime minister by citing spencer fernando, a frequent contributor of antigovernment pieces to the post millennial.5 the russian media outlet claimed that cbc news was taking trudeau’s side because of the broadcaster’s funding boost generated by the prime minister. all this information was given to suggest hypocrisy among liberal canadian politicians and their form of democracy. keeping in mind that ria novosti as a part of rossiya segodnya is included on a list of russian strategic enterprises and is treated as a pro-kremlin media resource, materials produced by this news outlet must be seen in a broader framework of internal and external information campaigns (sukhankin 2019, 9). russian speakers both in russia and in canada are meant to receive a portion of the russian state narrative through such exclusively online pieces of information. thus, they 5 canadian news platform founded in 2017 in montreal and portraying itself as a “reasonable alternative” (the post millennial 2020). 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 inevitably contain pro-russian messages about how, in this case, canada is far from being truly democratic. nevertheless, the russian-language media coverage of the canadian election campaign was not very dynamic. while justin trudeau appeared in newspapers’ headlines several times during this period, the russian press mostly reacted discreetly to the campaign scandals exposed by the canadian press. in particular, an increase in media activity was noted in connection with the release of pictures of trudeau wearing blackface makeup in the past. other than that, the russian media rather neutrally reported the election results, once again coming back to a general lack of interest in covering canadian stories. russian english-language media coverage of canadian election campaign in april, 2019, the predominantly anti-russian rhetoric in canada resulted in a small-scale twitter diplomacy response on alleged charges initiated by the russian embassy. the embassy denied any allegations via its twitter account. the accusation of the impending election meddling was stated as being “fake,” adding to the disinformation campaign against russia. “given #russiagate fiasco in the us, it’s ridiculous to play the same card in canada to distract public attention from real issues,” tweeted russian diplomats (2019). the russian embassy, not unexpectedly, is viewed in canada as promoting the official russian discourse. messages coming from the embassy resemble frames used in russian media outlets, both in their tone and format of delivery. it is equally true with regard to the canadian embassy in russia which represents canadian views and follows the country’s official narrative. russian news outlets broadcast in canada in english to appeal to a broader english-speaking audience, whereas canadian media do not broadcast in russian. thus, while canadian media frames are directed primarily internally, russian english-language narratives are directed at an external audience to challenge those of western media. this state of affairs leads their western counterparts to define these types of russian information sources as propagandists (paul and matthews 2016, 2). despite the fact that even the russian ministry of foreign affairs repeatedly intervenes in the public discourse defending russian english-language media outlets, such as rt and sputnik, both of which are connected under the umbrella of rossiya segodnya, vladimir putin, when talking about the creation of rt, specified that the intention was to introduce “another strong player on the international scene [to] provide unbiased coverage of the events in russia” and to “try to break the anglo-saxon monopoly on the global information streams” (putin 2013). moreover, according to the russian president, as this media outlet receives state funding, “it cannot help but reflect the russian government’s official position on the events in our country and in the rest of the world one way or another.” although both sputnik and rt published articles during the canadian election campaign, the volume of these two outlets was quite different. sputnik issued only three major articles, two of which retranslated the actual campaign scandals and debates, including trudeau’s blackface makeup and scheer’s dual canadian and us citizenship. the third piece was more specific, showcasing election candidates from various provinces. notably, the author of this text called maxim bernier, together with his newly formed people’s party of canada “a powerful new player,” contrasting with canadian mainstream media depictions of bernier, which generally described him as populist (bolotsky 2019). after election day, sputnik shared a video of an imam 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 from british columbia appealing to his congregation to boycott the vote, accusing all the candidates of being “evil” in their approval of homosexuality and supporting “the zionists against islam and the muslims” (korso 2019). rt’s canadian election coverage was much higher in volume, and more anti-trudeau in nature. on the blackface matter alone, rt produced four articles on september 19-20, 2019, which were shared on facebook more than 600 times. through all of them, the canadian prime minister was depicted as a hypocrite, a liar, and a “self-proclaimed champion of ‘liberal values’” (cunningham 2019). the same negative depictions of trudeau in particular, and liberalism in general, were repeated by rt in its op-eds on september 27, october 7, and october 16, right up to the election day, and shared on facebook more than 1,000 times. the articles on trudeau were supplemented with a history of first nations marginalization, the snc-lavalin corruption case, and broken election promises (vivanco 2019a). additionally, rt covered more topics than did sputnik, shoring up the canadian hypocrisy narrative through stories about tensions with the philippines because of the canadian plastic trash, the disrespectful behavior of antifa protesters outside mohawk college in hamilton, trudeau’s bulletproof vest worn at one of the campaign events, air canada’s decision to apply “everyone” as a gender-neutral form of greeting, and a former playboy model with polish roots contesting the election on behalf of the people’s party of canada. and, finally, all the allegations against the current prime minister were repeated in the rt news block on october 16. compared to coverage of trudeau, other election contestants were covered minimally by the outlet. when trudeau won the election, rt portrayed his victory as a lack of competition and a broken electoral system (vivanco 2019b). knowing that rt is available in canada on a variety of basic news packages, its narratives about this country definitely reach the canadian audience, although the exact number of viewers is unknown. their articles went far beyond the original rt and sputnik mandates to improve russia’s image abroad; they easily fall under the category of promoting political polarization in the recipient country. they had the potential to influence voters’ behavior and could be construed as a disinformation campaign or election interference, but it is difficult to assess their effectiveness without further research. canadian media about regional and municipal elections in russia: concerns over political and electoral freedoms the summer of 2019 was marked by regional and municipal election campaigns in the majority of russian regions, with the elections held on september 8th across the country. in contrast to canada, a threat to the integrity of election is perceived somewhat differently in the russian context. moreover, these perceptions vary, in general, among stakeholders. election integrity is measured by the russian authorities as stability for the existing regime, as opposed to pure freedom and fairness of the election. considering widespread demands for free and fair elections in 2011, and the importance of this for an evolving civil society in russia, this concept of stability can be understood as a form of the kremlin’s interference in elections in its own country. 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 in terms of the electoral process, this interference is often expressed in registration barriers and denials of oppositional candidates, misuse of administrative resources, and inequitable media coverage, as well as election day fraud reported by numerous international and independent domestic observers.6 an ‘electoral fallacy’ has been described as an integral part of putin’s first two terms, and has been traced back to the yeltsin era and the soviet union (evans 2011, 42-3). beyond the electoral process, this fallacy is rooted in the state of the political system in russia. the opposition in the country is extensively covered as driven by external forces. they are presented as the “fifth column” funded by the us state department, while people who express their opposing views through participation in activism in person or online are exposed to political persecution (katorzhnov 2014; martinov 2011; pinchuk 2019). media coverage and twitter diplomacy election campaigns in russia officially started on may 30, 2019. by then, prominent opposition figure alexei navalny had been promoting his new voting initiative ‘smart vote’ for half a year. the idea of this project was to encourage voters to support the strongest candidates despite their party’s affiliation, to win a victory over election contestants associated with united russia (navalny 2018). navalny and his team identified candidates in various electoral districts across the country, based mainly on previous election results. this data was made publicly accessible to voters online. beyond that, navalny’s anti-corruption foundation endorsed a number of election contestants in several russian regions. none of these activities were covered by canadian media outlets until a series of demonstrations occurred after the official denial of registration for opposition candidates aiming to contest the 2019 moscow city duma election. after the first rally on july 20, 2019 gathered around 22,000 people, subsequent protests were not authorized by the city administration.7 this is when the media coverage by canadian broadcasters began. on july 27-29, canadian media outlets reposted news articles originally published by reuters and associated press about massive arrests in moscow and the suspected poisoning of alexei navalny. cbc, ctv and global news all discussed the situation in moscow in their televised news reports. their stories about the kremlin’s involvement referred to a series of similar alleged operations, including poisonings of sergey and yulia skripal, alexander litvinenko, and viktor yushchenko. the first article about the events in moscow appeared in the globe and mail on july 30, written by american author amy knight (2019).8 knight, together with another leading american researcher, william pomeranz, presented their vision on ctv news earlier. more american 6 the respective conclusions on the essence of these allegations of election violations are based on findings and reports of the following election observation missions and groups: osce/odihr, osce pa, pace, golos, league of voters, citizen observer, sonar, for clean elections and national civil monitoring. this data from 2011 to 2018 election campaigns in russia can be found on the internet and is not included into bibliography of this paper. in addition, having served as a member with a decisive vote of a precinct election commission in moscow during 2013 and 2014 regional elections, the author of this article witnessed several attempts and some particular cases of election violations. 7 an authorisation is required for any type of protests except for an individual one, according to the russian legislature. 8 the use of us experts on russia in canadian media outlets is very common and they are interviewed extensively. 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 experts shared their points of views on global news, questioning putin’s role in this whole story (pazzano 2019). global also introduced to the canadian audience that more russian regions had rallies of the same sort. the russian smart vote initiative appeared in the information environment in canada only a couple of days prior to the election day, on september 6, 2019. notably, the globe and mail interviewed exiled russian oligarch mikhail khodorkovsky, who called on voters to support only “genuine” opposition candidates in contrast to navalny’s plan (mackinnon 2019a). on july 29, 2019, by means of its twitter, global affairs canada (@canadafp) expressed grave concerns over the detention of more than a thousand participants in a pre-election opposition rally held two days previously in moscow. the canadian agency referred to the russian constitution, which includes such fundamental rights as freedom of assembly and expression. canadians called on “russian authorities to respect these rights and refrain from violence” (july 29, 2019). in response, the russian ministry of foreign affairs (@mfa_russia) recalled clashes between canadian demonstrators and local police forces in quebec city in march, 2015 (july 30, 2019). this exchange of narratives upgraded simple media coverage to the level of foreign policy practitioners in both countries. despite that the canadian broadcasters did not produce content in russian, thus limiting access for the russian audience, russian media outlets took countermeasures against the canadian coverage of russian elections. a frequent rt contributor, canadian independent journalist, eva bartlett (@evakbartlett) claimed through her facebook page that she came to moscow to observe russian protests without financial assistance from any broadcasters (august 11, 2019).9 without any prior expertise on russia, she made assumptions about the apathetic spirit of opposition protestors in moscow and specifically denied cbc’s narratives about “intense police repression.” these messages ignited more than 100 comments, including a number of aggressive exchanges between the author and her followers, and marked 270 shares of the original post on facebook. they were also widely used by russian media outlets. for example, bartlett’s views were quoted by vzglyad and eurasia daily, while federal news agency and izvestia interviewed her. although in these interviews bartlett admitted her limited knowledge about the situation in russia and an absolute lack of russian language skills which prevented her from gaining insights from protesters, she re-translated several common russian anti-opposition media frames about foreign interference and us state department funding (bartlett 2019b, 2019c). election results: canadian perceptions the successful strategy developed by key oppositional players, in combination with demonstrations and media coverage of the events within the country and abroad, led to a significant shift in the election results compared to previous elections. until the 2019 election, the ruling party, united russia, was represented in the moscow city council by 38 deputies. on september 8, 2019, united russia received only 25 of 45 seats in the city. a similar situation was seen in khabarovsk region, mari el republic, irkutsk, birobidzhan, penza, and anadyr. having featured rallies and detentions earlier, canadian broadcasters waited until the elections were over in russia before making any assessments. most of the outlets, with the exception of the 9 on her blog, ‘in gaza and beyond’ bartlett (n.d.) defines herself as “an independent writer and rights activist with extensive experience in syria and in the gaza strip.” 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 cbc and the globe and mail, limited their coverage to reports from reuters and associated press. the cbc, which has its correspondent, chris brown, stationed in moscow, made an attempt, with the assistance of a few russian scholars, to evaluate the election results on september 9th. on september 12th, the cbc broadcast a 24-minute segment from brown, which began with a comparison of canadian and russian elections. brown (2019) stated that canadian elections were “a lot more competitive, freer and unpredictable in terms of who was going to win than you would see in russia.” he expressed the view that the election outcome was much worse for the kremlin than had been expected. but more than that, brown presented insights based on background information about the situation in russia that often is not typically provided to a canadian audience. in particular, he mentioned how and why a narrative of a stable government differs in the two countries. the globe and mail sent its london-based correspondent, mark mackinnon, to moscow on the eve of their elections, and subsequently published four original articles between september 8th and 12th. mackinnon (2019b) fully described election results in various russian regions, as well as the essence of navalny’s smart vote tactic, calling it controversial. in addition, the globe and mail featured lyubov sobol, the opposition candidate promoted by navalny, whose registration to contest these elections was rejected, and followed up on police raids against addresses affiliated with navalny’s supporters across the country. russian authorities, capitalizing on the western interference narrative in russian media, made accusations against the canadian media coverage of russian elections. a foreign ministry representative, ilya timohov, outlined a strong new russian narrative at a meeting of the interim federation council commission to protect state sovereignty and prevent interference in the russian federation’s domestic affairs. despite the fact that no concrete examples of the canadian broadcasters’ misconduct were given, the canadian media was referenced in regard to their alleged information campaign against russia and its existing regime, as well as attempts to influence the russian population (timohov 2019). the russian foreign ministry seemed dissatisfied with the extensive reporting about the above-mentioned pre-election rallies and arrests. the russian frame about this type of western media election interference was spread further in the country’s media, carrying cross-national coverage to the point of absurdity. conclusion concluding this snapshot of cross-national media coverage of electoral campaigns, it is apparent that both countries report on the elections of their counterparts using certain media frames. however, the canadian media directs its state narratives exclusively at an english-speaking audience, primarily local. russian broadcasters and state institutions have both russianand english-language channels to transmit information. russian-language resources target a russianspeaking audience both in russia and abroad, while english-language sources from russia are directed at all english-speakers, including canadians. the content of canadian and russian reporting differs greatly. canadian media and officials accuse russia of election meddling, basing their charges on previous examples of similar violations proven by investigations and research (communications security establishment 2017; 2019; al-rawi and jiwani 2019). russian outlets and authorities also accuse canada by calling 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 any media coverage, especially on election day, a form of interference (timohov 2019). at the same time, russian reporting both in english and in russian contains a negative vocabulary and offensive tone which is not the norm in canadian reporting (e.g., filippov 2019b; cunningham 2019). canadian broadcasters feature the russian opposition and its activity more than the kremlin (e.g., mackinnon 2019b), but generally do not produce insulting materials. in contrast, all the negativity in russian media is abusive, using terms such as a “poster-boy politician,” a “repeat offender,” a “self-proclaimed champion of liberal values,” a “pathetic fraud” having “racist blood,” “two-faced justin trudeau,” “trudeaumania,” “hypocrisy and duplicity of the smooth-talking liberals,” etc. finally, elections canada did not try to regulate media content outside of the country and reminded voters that election law permits people outside of the country to give their views on topics related to canada’s election (burke 2020). in contrast, the russian central election commission and the ministry of foreign affairs stressed that foreign media in their respective countries should obey the russian election law when covering russian elections (timohov 2019). in canada, where citizens trust the system, the perception of threat to the process is external, and this notion is reflected in media coverage. in russia, where citizens trust neither the system nor media coverage, the perception of threat is internal. the totally unexpected successes of the russian opposition in this election period forced certain changes in russian media coverage, as state-owned mainstream media outlets had to acknowledge the decrease in popularity for united russia across the country. this article has focused on cross-national media coverage during the russian regional elections of september 2019 and canadian federal elections of october 2019 in order to provide a snapshot of the positions and perceptions each country has about the other’s electoral and political processes. what is important in the wider perspective, however, is the existence of certain over-arching narratives that frame each country’s media discourse about the other. these media frames, largely negative ones in 2019, become interpretive tools for media consumers and ultimately translate not only elections but any event or phenomenon, using a familiar set of tropes, visual images, and linguistic associations. it is these narratives – invisible, assumed and often taken for granted – that this article has set out to explore, explain, and make visible. while these discourses remain in place it is unlikely that media, and by extension, public opinion about the other country, will shift. it will be important to keep these assumptions and biases on both sides in mind as the two countries endeavor to find common ground and work 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http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkj e02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb. nanos research. 2018. “most canadians believe that the russian government is using social media to meddle in the elections of western democracies.” ctv news and nanos national survey, august, 2018. http://www.nanos.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2018-1239-ctv-julyrussian-election-interference-populated-report-w-tabs.pdf. navalny, alexei. 2018. “how we will win a victory over the united russia during elections. smart vote.” [in russian.] navalny, blog entry. november 28, 2018. https://navalny.com/p/6017/. nelson, chris. 2019. “trudeau’s more of a threat to canada than russia.” the calgary herald, april 11, 2019. https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/nelson-trudeaus-more-of-athreat-than-russia/. oates, sarah. 2014. “russian state narrative in the digital age: rewired propaganda in russian television news framing of 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(text version of an interview) “visit to russia today television channel.” kremlin. published on june 11, 2013. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319. https://twitter.com/hashtag/quebec?src=hashtag_click https://twitter.com/hashtag/police?src=hashtag_click https://twitter.com/hashtag/isthisdemocracy?src=hashtag_click https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1156201738225029121 http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb http://www.nanos.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2018-1239-ctv-july-russian-election-interference-populated-report-w-tabs.pdf http://www.nanos.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2018-1239-ctv-july-russian-election-interference-populated-report-w-tabs.pdf https://navalny.com/p/6017/ https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/nelson-trudeaus-more-of-a-threat-than-russia/ https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/nelson-trudeaus-more-of-a-threat-than-russia/ https://globalnews.ca/news/5775688/moscow-local-election-shakes-russia-heres-why/ https://globalnews.ca/news/5775688/moscow-local-election-shakes-russia-heres-why/ https://www.svoboda.org/a/29757531.html http://www.prisp.ru/experience/28-prisp-elections http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 rocha, roberto. 2018. “data sheds light on how russian twitter trolls targeted canadians.” cbc news, august 3, 2018. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/russian-twitter-trolls-canadatargeted-1.4772397. rocha, roberto. 2019. “fears of election meddling on social media were overblown, say researchers.” cbc news, november 3, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/socialmedia-bots-trolls-canadian-election-2019-1.5343210. roeder, oliver. 2018. “why we’re sharing 3 million russian troll tweets.” fivethirtyeight, july 31, 2018. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-were-sharing-3-million-russiantroll-tweets/. russia in canada (@russianembassyc). 2019. “blaming moscow for fake #meddling is pure disinformation. given #russiagate fiasco in the us, it's ridiculous to play the same card in canada to distract public attention from real issues #cndpoli.” twitter, apr. 5, 2019. https://twitter.com/russianembassyc/status/1114246378111111168. russian congress of canada (rcc) board of directors. 2019a. “rcc statement on cbc coverage of the rossiya 1 report on the ukrainian canadian diaspora.” russian congress of canada. february 10, 2019. http://russiancongresscanada.org/news-en/rcc-statement-on-cbccoverage-of-the-rossiya-1-report-on-the-ukrainian-canadian-diaspora/. _____. 2019b. “open letter to the macdonald-laurier institute in reply to the publication of marcus kolga’s report ‘stemming the virus.’” russian congress of canada. february 23, 2019. http://russiancongresscanada.org/press-releases-en/open-letter-to-the-macdonaldlaurier-institute-in-reply-to-the-publication-of-marcus-kolgas-report-stemming-the-virus/. statistics canada. 2016. “2016 census of population.” statistics canada catalogue no. 98-400x2016187. sukhankin, sergey. 2019. “the western alliance in the face of the russian (dis) information machine: where does canada stand?” the school of public policy publications, university of calgary, research paper 12:26. the post millennial. 2020. “about us.” february 18, 2020. https://www.thepostmillennial.com/page/about-us. timohov, ilya. 2019. (remarks). “meeting of a working group of an interim federation council commission to protect state sovereignty and prevent the interference in the russian federation’s domestic affairs.” [in russian]. filmed on september 12, 2019. federation council video, 1:23:13, http://council.gov.ru/events/news/107732/?hl=рабочая%20группа%20временной%20ко миссии%20совета%20федерации%20по%20защите%20государственного%20сувере нитета%20и%20предотвращению%20вмешательства%20во%20внутренние%20дела %20россии. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/russian-twitter-trolls-canada-targeted-1.4772397 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/russian-twitter-trolls-canada-targeted-1.4772397 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/social-media-bots-trolls-canadian-election-2019-1.5343210 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/social-media-bots-trolls-canadian-election-2019-1.5343210 https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-were-sharing-3-million-russian-troll-tweets/ 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elizabeth. 2019. “‘more needs to be done,’ gould says after some online election meddling detected.” cbc news, october 28, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/election-misinformation-disinformation-interference1.5336662. us house of representatives permanent select committee on intelligence. 2018. “schiff statement on release of twitter ads, accounts and data.” press releases, june 18, https://intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?documentid=396. van herpen, marcel h. 2015. putin’s propaganda machine: soft power and russian foreign policy. lanham, md: rowman and littlefield. vivanco, pablo. 2019a. “the end of trudeaumania: canadians are over pm's image obsession, lack of substance & broken promises.” rt, op-ed. october 16, 2019. https://www.rt.com/oped/471051-trudeau-elections-promises-broken/. _____. 2019b. “lack of alternatives, broken electoral system delivers ‘win’ for trudeau.” rt, oped. october 22, 2019. https://www.rt.com/op-ed/471581-trudeau-victory-canada-electionsystem/. wilkerson, john and andreu casas. 2017. “large-scale computerized text analysis in political science: opportunities and challenges.” annual review of political science 20: 529-544. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/election-misinformation-disinformation-interference-1.5336662 https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/election-misinformation-disinformation-interference-1.5336662 https://intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?documentid=396 https://www.rt.com/op-ed/471051-trudeau-elections-promises-broken/ https://www.rt.com/op-ed/471051-trudeau-elections-promises-broken/ https://www.rt.com/op-ed/471581-trudeau-victory-canada-election-system/ https://www.rt.com/op-ed/471581-trudeau-victory-canada-election-system/ 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 russia-canada relations in a period of crisis, 2014-2020 natalia viakhireva1 russian international affairs council (riac) abstract this article explores the state of russian-canadian relations from 2014 to 2020, identifying areas where cooperation is still possible. russian-canadian bilateral relations are deeply affected by the crisis in russia-west relations and are at their lowest point since the end of the cold war. despite the sanctions and accusatory rhetoric from politicians on both sides, ‘niche cooperation’ between the two countries is still possible in areas of common interest. cooperation on non-political issues and the use of instruments of alternative diplomacy – track ii diplomacy, para-diplomacy, business diplomacy, and parliamentary diplomacy – are all workable approaches, with the potential for positive interactions during the crisis. one very promising area of cooperation is interaction in the arctic region through bilateral and multilateral frameworks. 1 natalia viakhireva is an expert and program manager at russian international affairs council (riac). 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 introduction political relations between russia and canada from 2014 to 2020 show that bilateral relations have been affected by the crisis in russia-west relations and limited by a war of sanctions and accusatory rhetoric from both sides. in canada, mainstream political discourse does not support dialogue with russia, while in russia, canada itself and russian-canadian relations are not among central topics of political discourse and research. this makes the search for a common dialogue complicated. yet dialogue is important to avoid a new cold war (westdal 2016), and effective diplomacy means first of all “detoxifying” the crisis (kinsman 2018) and engaging with those countries one may disagree with on a number of issues. this article contributes to a better understanding of complex bilateral relations between russia and canada, and assesses whether there are areas where niche cooperation may be feasible, even in light of the continuing tensions between the two countries over fundamental issues. this article first discusses the current russia-west crisis, where relations began deteriorating before the ukraine crisis of 2014. disagreements ran much deeper than different approaches to resolving the situations in ukraine and syria, however, the ukraine crisis remains a significant turning point in relations between russia and western nations (ivanov 2019), including canada, and still poses an additional obstacle to interactions on a wide range of issues. secondly, the article focuses on the state of russian-canadian relations. here, canadian policy toward russia is highlighted, as russia has been mainly reactive in bilateral relations. in turn, canadian policy is a result of global russian actions, which are not aligned with the canadian vision of the ’rule-based international order.’ the article then examines the positions of russia and canada on international events occurring between 2014 and 2020, such as the skripal case and the kerch incident, and the resulting deterioration of russian-canadian relations. differences in the estimation, perception, and interpretation of these events by the two sides are identified, and effort is made to take russian and canadian perspectives into account. this article does not seek to investigate the controversial cases or incidents themselves, nor to assign blame for the current impasse, but rather to consider how those situations have affected the further development of bilateral relations. this article also examines attempts at rapprochement through discussion about inviting russia back to the g8 and pace, as well as russia’s and canada’s position and perspective on these matters. this article focuses on areas where the potential for bilateral russian-canadian relations exists and provides a forward-looking vision for the relationship that might guide efforts to better serve both canadian and russian national interests. given the current conditions, niche cooperation is possible in areas where both sides can find common interests. cooperation on non-political issues, using instruments of alternative diplomacy, is a viable approach. a promising area of russiancanadian cooperation is interaction in the arctic region, which remains the area least affected by the crisis. 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 the decline of russia-west relations as a precondition for the deterioration in russiancanadian relations the root of the problem in russia-west relations lies in the fundamental difference in how russia and the west approach key issues of world order. as russian political scientist kortunov (2019b) argues, russia and the west have a different understanding of “what is fair and what is unfair in modern world politics? what is legitimate and what is not?” they also have different perceptions of the foundations of european and euro-atlantic security. nato enlargement, which russia has opposed since the early 1990s, was one of the main stumbling blocks in relations even before the ukraine crisis. the kremlin has consistently claimed that nato’s eastward movement threatens russian security and that the alliance’s central role in european security has marginalized russia as a non-member (rumer and sokolsky 2019). on the other hand, canada perceives nato as a major contributor to international peace and security and as the cornerstone of canadian security and defence policy (government of canada 2020c). as one of the founding states of nato, canada has been an important and committed member of the alliance. it has constantly supported the major post-cold war transformations in the organization: membership enlargement and functional expansion (bratt 2007, 246). canada also officially approved the plan for the accession of new members at the nato summit in madrid in 1997. in 2008, the nato secretary-general promised membership to ukraine and georgia (brunnstrom and cornwell 2008), which russia perceived as crossing a line by bringing the alliance too close to russian borders. at the 2008 bucharest summit, prime minister harper voiced his support for their membership (government of canada 2008). however, other nato members, such as france and germany, have been more cautious about supporting ukraine’s bid to join the alliance (ctv 2008). canada’s position in favour of supporting georgia and ukraine joining nato opposed russia’s stance, as well as its position on supporting georgia in the russian-georgian conflict of 2008 (westdal 2012) over the status of south ossetia and abkhazia. major disagreements between russia and the west also have included western support for the ‘colour revolutions’ in georgia in 2003, ukraine in 2004, and kyrgyzstan in 2005 (rumer and sokolsky 2019). russian officials saw support for the colour revolutions as reflecting the intention of the us, canada, and other western allies to retain their predominant position in the international system, thus ensuring their “global leadership” (lavrov 2016). the western countries perceived their own actions as part of the process of democracy promotion in post-soviet countries. canadian scholars paquin and beauregard, in their analysis of the foreign crises that occurred between 2004 and 2011 in the caucasus, eastern europe, the middle east and north africa, argue that with regard to these crises canada’s foreign policy alignment primarily tends toward a transatlantic orientation (2013, 618). in most cases, canada has aligned its position with that of the us or its main european partners (2013, 637). paquin and beauregard also conclude that the defense and promotion of democracy were important values for ottawa between 2004 and 2011 (2013, 63233). therefore, differing perceptions and assessments of nato enlargement and the promotion of democracy have contributed to the impasse in russia-west relations in recent decades (macfarlane 2016, 354). another development that has led to the downturn in relations has been the change in russia’s strategic culture. russia wanted to re-establish its position as a key global actor and pre-eminent regional power in eurasia. this change was partly a response to the west’s expansion into the post-soviet space (kanet 2019, 1, 4). 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 russian and western approaches to resolving the crisis in the middle east after the ‘arab spring’ of 2011 and the conflict in syria also differed (tasker 2015). moscow viewed the arab spring and the subsequent instability in egypt, libya, and syria as a continuation of the colour revolutions in georgia and ukraine. moscow also thought that attempts by the us and nato to change regimes across the world were a threat to russia (tsygankov 2018). these developments have challenged russian views of its status in the international system (macfarlane 2016, 354). western countries perceived the processes in the middle east as promotion of democracy. paquin argues that canada aligned its strategy with that of the us throughout the arab spring (2012, 1019). however, there were some significant differences in official statements from ottawa and washington. the harper government did not always emphasize the same themes, values, and principles as the us when responding to these foreign crises. for instance, ottawa was consistently more concerned than washington with the issue of stability in the middle east (paquin 2012, 1003). with this context in mind, a major deterioration in the russian-canadian relationship was spurred by the ukraine crisis of 2014. russia and the west, including canada, do not agree on the causes of the ukraine crisis, nor on how to resolve it. from the perspective of canada and the west, the crisis is a result of “russian ‘aggression,’ which started in 2014 with the ‘illegal invasion and occupation’ of crimea, and has drawn ukraine into a bloody conflict in the east of the country” (government of canada 2020b). this canadian position views russia’s actions as a violation of international law and of ukraine’s territorial integrity. russian officials see the causes of the ukraine crisis as more complex and rooted in the ukrainian state, thus assessing it as an internal conflict (ivanov 2014). in a nutshell, moscow depicts the ukraine crisis as a result of corruption and weak institutions in ukraine and biased western policy. as european and russian scholars, fischer and timofeev (2018) argue, russia views the february 2014 revolutionary changes of power in kiev as an unconstitutional coup supported by the west. moscow also suspected that the new political leaders in ukraine were proponents of nato membership and wanted closer security ties with the west, all at the expense of russia’s security. russia and the west apply different categories to characterize the change of status of crimea. in russia it is called “reunification,” while in the west the term “annexation” is used (fischer and timofeev 2018).2 the above-mentioned conflicts, perceptions, misperceptions, and narratives have negatively influenced bilateral relations. several canadian international programs that had been successfully implemented in russia have been curtailed. in particular, technical cooperation programs and the global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction have been discontinued. after the us, canada was among the first western countries to impose sanctions on russia in 2014. according to the government of canada, this was done “in order to respond to the gravity of russia’s violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of ukraine,” and sanctions extended to the financial, defence, and oil and gas sectors (government of canada 2020a). while areas of tension existed before 2014, as discussed above, former foreign service officer breton and a canadian scholar dutkiewicz (2020) note that there were positive developments in 2 since russia and the west apply different categories to characterize the change of status of crimea (“reunification” vs. “annexation”), the author of this article puts both terms in quotation marks when speaking about the russian and the canadian views. 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 the pre-2014 period within areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. thus, it would be reasonable to keep the relations at least at a ‘low level’ of cooperation in niche areas where both sides can find common interests. as long as such fundamental differences persist, the only possibility is to minimize confrontations (kortunov 2019b). ivanov (2019), former minister of foreign affairs of russia, argues that discussion of the ukraine agenda and wider world issues should be a parallel rather than sequential process. the question of how to rebuild a cooperative russia-west relationship, therefore, remains open. a minimum goal is managing the confrontation. while the space for manoeuvring remains limited, niche cooperation seems possible. russian-canadian relations at the political level 2015-2020 in light of the above-mentioned and other issues, russian-canadian bilateral relations are taking place against a difficult backdrop and are at their lowest point since the end of the cold war. the regime of sanctions between the two countries remains at the forefront, as well as the harsh rhetoric from both sides. from a canadian perspective, russia is not a like-minded country. from a russian perspective, canada is currently seen as one of the western leaders of the “anti-russian crusade” (breton and dutkiewicz 2020). liberal government of canada, 1st term, 2015-2019 following the federal election of 2015, steps taken by the liberal party and the government of canada, as well as by former canadian politicians, led russian politicians to hope for a ‘warming’ in bilateral relations (ria 2016).3 several canadian former politicians, diplomats, and business representatives supported the idea of dialogue with russia, among them jean chrétien, former prime minister of canada, and christopher westdal and jeremy kinsman, both former canadian ambassadors to russia (chase 2015; westdal 2016; kinsman 2018). in 2016, russian minister of foreign affairs, sergey lavrov, said of justin trudeau and his colleagues, “we can expect that there will be opportunities to set our bilateral relations straight. […] the election rhetoric and the rhetoric of the new government indicate that they are ready to resume a dialogue on international issues and restore bilateral cooperation” (mid.ru 2016). lavrov’s statement probably referred to a meeting of chrétien and putin in 2015, and to the views of canadian foreign minister, stéphane dion, who was appointed after the 2015 federal elections. dion called for constructive engagement with russia, recalling that canada was speaking to the russians even during the difficult cold war era. however, due to the policies of the former (conservative) government from 2006 to 2015, russian-canadian interactions had been interrupted. according to dion, while canada would always stand with ukraine, it was time to start working with russia “when we have common interests” (zimonjic 2016). westdal (2016), in an opinion article for the globe and mail, stated that “we seek re-engagement with russia […] to serve major, compelling canadian national security interests in eurasia, the middle east and far beyond. we do so to try to turn the rising tide of a new cold war, […] to stop the ruinous tug of war for ukraine, […] to cooperate in the arctic […] to do business.” 3 all translations from russian are made by the author of the article. 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 however, this was a short period of good intentions and no positive shift followed. the idea of dialogue was a marginal position of individuals in canada, as well as wishful thinking on the part of russian officials. much-anticipated concrete measures and practical steps leading to rapprochement were not taken by either side, although there remained analysts in russia who expected ‘warmer’ relations (issraelyan 2017, 358). a benchmark for them was the non-adoption by the canadians of the justice for victims of corrupt foreign officials act, also known as the canadian ‘sergei magnitysky law’ because of its similarity to the magnitysky law adopted earlier in the us. dion argued that this law, which the liberals pledged to enact, would complicate efforts to re-engage with russia and harm canadians seeking to do business in russia (lum 2016). however, after dion’s resignation, the liberals brought the magnitsky law into force in october, 2017. the canadian magnitsky law includes targeted measures against foreign nationals who were responsible for or complicit in gross violations of human rights, or were public officials or associates of such officials who were responsible for or complicit in acts of significant corruption (government of canada 2019b). moreover, the law permits the freezing of assets and the suspension of visas when officials from russia and other nations are found to be guilty of human rights violations. canadian firms are prohibited from dealing with foreign nationals who have grossly violated human rights. the shift from bad to worse in russian-canadian relations coincided with donald trump’s election in the us in november, 2016. trump’s victory contributed essentially, though not decisively, to the end of a warming period in russian-canadian relations. trudeau was rightly concerned about deteriorating relations with the us and carried out a rotation of the cabinet in january, 2017. the minister of foreign affairs, dion, was replaced by a new minister, chrystia freeland, apparently selected by trudeau because of her strong connections in the us (macdonald 2019). relations with the us, canada’s closest ally and most important economic and security partner, became the top priority and required most of the resources of the canadian administration. other international and foreign policy issues were sidelined. the new cabinet turned out to be unfavourable for russian-canadian relations. freeland is often called trudeau’s trusted ally (scherer and ljunggren 2020; vigliotti 2019). her views may have partly contributed to the prime minister’s shift away from trying to mend relations with russia. colin robertson (2020), a former canadian diplomat, suggests that freeland’s ukrainian origin and heritage might be a reason for her anti-russian beliefs. freeland is not popular in russia and is perceived as being committed to anti-russian sentiments (sidorova 2019, 281). she was previously included in the russian sanctions list and has the status of persona non grata, which may also influence her attitude to russia. dion’s sensible suggestions on relations with russia were not picked up by freeland (robertson 2020), who supported the passage of the sergei magnitsky law. in her statement, freeland described the law as “a clear demonstration that canada takes any and all necessary measures to respond to gross violations of human rights and acts of significant foreign corruption” (macdolald 2017). canadian lawyers and scholars cotler and silver (2020) argue that the magnitsky law represents the very best of canadian human rights foreign policy, but according to canadian scholars carment and belo (2017), the law caused russia’s trust in canada to deteriorate sharply. even though sanctions had proven to be an ineffective instrument in forcing russia to abandon its doctrines, particularly regarding syria and ukraine, canada expanded its sanctions regime (carment and belo 2017). this led to russia 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 imposing countersanctions. according to the russian ministry of foreign affairs, canadian authorities preferred to isolate themselves from russia instead of developing mutually beneficial cooperation, and thus canada lost more than it gained from the sanction measures (tass 2017). following these developments, it became clear that a ‘reset’ in russian-canadian relations would not happen soon, and the action-reaction dealings continued on both sides. the cases indicated below demonstrate further divergence between russia and canada. the poisoning of sergei skripal in the uk adversely affected russian-canadian relations.4 russia was accused by several western countries, including the uk, the us, canada, and germany of highly likely being responsible for the incident, using chemical weapons, and breaching its chemical weapons convention obligations (government of canada 2018). the uk reacted to the incident with a series of measures, including the expulsion of russian diplomats. most eu countries, as well as the us, canada, and ukraine, also expelled russian diplomats to show solidarity with the uk. moscow denied the accusations and announced the expulsion of diplomats from its territory in retaliation. russia and its western counterparts differ in their interpretation of the skripal case, and it is hard to judge the merits of the claims on either side due to lack of evidence (kinsman 2018). but it is clear that the case provided the impetus for a new spike in the russia-west crisis. some of the direct results of this situation are impediments in embassy and consular services and visa processes from both sides, which affect people-to-people ties, tourism, cooperation, and exchanges in science, culture, and education between russia and many western countries, including canada. according to dutkiewicz (harris 2018), there was a risk of a “significant blowback in the canada-russia relationship, especially in matters touching on the arctic.” luckily, the dialogue on the arctic did not cease. the kerch strait incident in 2018 involving ukrainian naval ships also led to divergent interpretations between russia and its western partners.5 russia perceived the incident as a provocation from the ukrainian side, whereas ukraine and its western supporters saw russia’s actions as aggression against ukraine. along with the eu and the us, canada announced new sanctions on 114 individuals and 15 entities (government of canada 2019a). in response, the russian ministry of foreign affairs claimed that “the canadian authorities are playing their russophobic card” (mid.ru 2019). the lack of political dialogue and transparency from both sides heightened misunderstandings. in 2019, trump expressed his support for reinstating russia into the g7, and french president, emmanuel macron agreed that russia should be invited to the g7 summit in 2020 (atwood and klein 2019). other members, such as the uk and canada, reject this possibility (thompson 2020). 4 on march 4, 2018, sergei skripal, a former russian military officer and double agent for the uk’s intelligence services, and his daughter, yulia skripal, were poisoned in salisbury, england, with a nerve agent of novichok family. 5 on november 25, 2018, russian border guards detained two small armored artillery vessels “berdyansk” and “nikopol” in the kerch strait and the raid tugboat “yana kapu” of the ukrainian navy. on board the ships were 24 servicemen of the ukrainian navy and two officers of the security service of ukraine. it was alleged that they had illegally crossed the russian border. ukrainian sailors were arrested and detained until the exchange of detainees between moscow and kiev in september, 2019. in november, 2019, the russian federation handed over to ukraine the ships detained a year earlier. however, kiev intends to seek a guilty plea from moscow, as well as compensation from russia. 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 there is no unity within the g7 regarding conditions for russia’s return. in the west, moscow’s potential return is seen as a “reward for russia’s good behaviour,” however in moscow it is assumed that the g7 needs russia, more than russia needs the g7, in order for the group to solve serious problems in the international community (kortunov 2019d, 31-32; baunov 2019). as kortunov argues, russia would be interested in returning to the g7 only if there were significant changes in the foreign policy of at least some members (2019d, 32). however, russian scholars highlight that there might be a joint interest in returning to the “g7+1” formula (kortunov 2019a). joining the g7 for discussion on problems of common interests, such as the digital economy, international tax reform, trade protectionism, and global inequality could be productive. in the summer of 2019, russia was reinstated in the parliamentary assembly of the council of europe (pace) with french and german support (mounier 2019). kortunov (2019c) suggests those who argue about russia’s membership in pace can be divided into two groups: “pragmatists” and “skeptics.” from a pragmatic perspective, russia’s membership in pace opens a platform for dialogue, which should not be neglected when there are not enough communication lines between moscow and western capitals. however, skeptics do not believe russia’s participation will be constructive. in their opinion, the russian delegation to pace will use the assembly mainly to promote “kremlin propaganda” (kortunov 2019c). canada took the position of the skeptics on this issue, supporting ukraine’s dissatisfaction with the decision. if the goal is conflict resolution and stability in europe and the euro-atlantic space, this refusal to open the channels of communication may be counter-productive. the russian question in the 2019 federal election campaign and post-election period the “russian question” was raised in canadian political discourse shortly before the 2019 federal election in canada, as russia, as well as china and north korea, were suspected of possible election interference (reuters 2019; tass 2019). a university of calgary study identified russia’s interest in competing against canada in the arctic as a reason for such interference, although no evidence was identified (blanchfield 2019). unlike in some western countries, the russian issue was not central to canada’s federal election campaign in 2019. the party leaders touched upon the theme of russia in the framework of arctic security and development, and the crisis in ukraine. the election campaign of 2019 showed the positions of the main canadian party leaders on russia: in their comments in election debates, all of them maintained a mostly negative attitude toward the idea of dialogue with russia (dzsurdzsa 2019; glavin 2019; ndp 2018). as a result, even in a minority liberal government, a positive shift in the russia-canada agenda is very unlikely to take place. shortly after re-election, trudeau reaffirmed canada’s strategy toward russia in a speech at a ‘nato engages’ event in december, 2019, stating that nato must engage with putin from a position of strength rather than one of compromise, and he characterized russia as “a significant challenge” (brennan 2019). nonetheless, there are voices in canada calling for a renewed dialogue with russia. for example, the international relations analyst jocelyn coulon has argued that, “canada had every reason to impose sanctions on moscow for its actions in ukraine, but there was no reason to freeze all relations with russia” (2019b). he points out that it is often forgotten that canada has just two neighbours – the united states and russia – both of whom are great powers. therefore, in his view, it would be desirable for canada to have a productive relationship with moscow (2019b). 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 in its foreign policy, canada considers the views of the us and nato allies. despite the growing difficulties in canada-america relations during trump’s tenure in the white house, the us has remained canada’s closest partner (blank and gattinger 2017, 83, 95). it can be said that the state of russia-us and russia-nato relations has some effect on the development of relations between russia and canada. canadian scholars murray and rioux (2020) argue that canada should become more independent in the world and define a foreign policy that is less dependent on the us and more reflective of the emerging international order. according to canadian scholars sands and carment, there are two countries which canada must get along with – russia and china. canada’s arctic interests intersect with russia’s, and its economic interests require cooperation with china (2019, 286). several factors influence canada’s policy toward russia, primarily disagreement with russia’s actions worldwide, which in many cases are not in line with the canadian vision of the rule-based international order. it can be argued, however, that russia’s policy toward canada on a wide range of issues is primarily reactive, as there is no direct conflict between the two countries. since 2014, russia’s approach has been reduced to retaliatory measures against the sanctions imposed by canada. according to some canadian scholars, such as murray and rioux (2020) and fisher (2020), at the moment, canada has no clear vision for its foreign policy. an absence of a coherent foreign policy may partly explain the lack of a clear sense of canada’s future relations with russia. murray and rioux (2020) underline the need to review and define canada’s national interests, as well as long-term trade and economic objectives. fisher (2020) has claimed that canada is missing “a well-defined vision of what ottawa hopes to achieve and [in] what direction canada is headed.” instead, canada is intending to lead in “revitalizing the rules -based international order” (2020). murray and rioux (2020) emphasize that canada has an important role to play in global affairs, but only with a substantive review of its foreign policy. canada’s current strategy demonstrates the huge importance of the ukrainian factor on the country’s foreign policy. this can be partially explained by the presence of a large, active ukrainian diaspora in canada of 1.2 million people. the country’s leaders would not want to lose the support of this part of the population. however, coulon (2019a), for one, insists that foreign policy “is not intended to promote particularism, although it is tempting for political parties to woo the vote of ethnic communities. but the defence of the national interest demands a cold and dispassionate look at the affairs of the world.” at the same time, damage from the low level of development of russian-canadian political and economic relations is assessed as insignificant for both the russian and canadian economies (nemova and issraelyan 2019, 373). the search for ways to establish political relations is, therefore, not among foreign policy priorities on either the russian or the canadian side. however, restoration of relations is important for several reasons. as paikin (2018), international relations scholar and policy analyst, argues, stronger relations between ottawa and moscow are essential, not only if canada wishes to manage its northern border, but also if canada is genuinely interested in building a new international order in this century, rather than being a mere bystander operating on terms set by other countries. without participation and dialogue with russia, there will be no resolution of several international issues. in turn, russia has expressed interest in a dialogue with western countries, including canada, which would help to increase the level of stability and predictability in international relations. additionally, business circles in both countries have expressed an interest in cooperation. 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 alternative diplomacies and cooperation on artic development as the analysis so far demonstrates, russian-canadian relations continue to cool, and the space for cooperation is becoming narrower, as neither russia nor canada is making any active attempt to restart a political dialogue. in these conditions, niche areas for cooperation become important, such as cooperation on arctic development. similarly, it may be worth exploring increased roles for alternative diplomacy, including track ii diplomacy, science diplomacy, parliamentary diplomacy, business diplomacy, and para-diplomacy. track ii diplomacy montville defines track ii diplomacy as “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict” (1991, 162). academics and experts could take part in track ii level diplomacy, which is valuable in a time of crisis. scholars from canada and russia are concerned over the lack of knowledge the two nations have about each other. most canadians and russians lack understanding about one another, thus inhibiting better comprehension of past, present, and future drivers of competition and cooperation (lackenbauer 2019, iv). reciprocal academic contact and cooperation between russia and canada have significantly reduced since 2014, but it is important to maintain bilateral contacts to prevent an even greater failure in relations. at best, the goal of expert dialogue is to come to a consensus on the ways forward in different aspects of russia-west relations, russian-canadian relations, and to work out recommendations for decision-makers on how to improve relations. one example is the conference, ‘canada-russia dialogue and cooperation in the arctic’ hosted by carleton university in november, 2016 and co-organized by global affairs canada and the embassy of russia to canada. the conference brought together diplomats, researchers from canada and russia, policymakers, government officials, businesspeople, and indigenous leaders, and focused on the need for dialogue between canada and russia concerning the arctic (rubinstein 2016). parliamentary diplomacy the canada-russia parliamentary association was established in 1998. in 2014, ottawa suspended bilateral parliamentarian ties with russia as a result of the ukraine crisis. however, contacts between members of parliament (mps) continue, particularly on issues related to the arctic, and expanding parliamentary dialogue could serve as an effective mechanism for discussing spheres of common interest and potential cooperation. a good example of constructive inter-parliamentary cooperation is the russian-french report on the prospects of relations jointly prepared by parliamentarians from both countries (federation council 2018). parliamentarians from canada and russia could follow this example. para-diplomacy the development of relations between the canadian provinces and the russian regions could contribute to improved relations between moscow and ottawa. this level of cooperation and diplomacy is defined by some experts as para-diplomacy, meaning the activities of subnational units abroad (akimov 2018a, 25-33). these units have enough potential and capability to carry out independent policies abroad, even while remaining part of the nation. as russian scholar 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 akimov argues, parts of the russian federation and the canadian provinces have accumulated extensive experience in developing bilateral contacts (2018b, 9). despite political difficulties, regional cooperation can and should develop as there are specific common grounds for interaction. the most active in this field are the canadian provinces of quebec, british columbia, ontario, manitoba, and alberta, while on the russian side, increasing interest in forging ties with canadian counterparts has been shown by moscow, st. petersburg, the republics of tatarstan and sakha (yakutia), the territories of krasnoyarsk and krasnodar, and the regions of primorye and murmansk (the embassy of the russian federation in canada n.d.). business diplomacy the canada eurasia russia business association (cerba) is working on promoting relations between russian and canadian companies. the association unites over 200 corporations and its main goal is to improve and increase trade relations between canada and russia. according to the association, cooperation between canadian and russian business did not stop with the outbreak of the “war of sanctions” (rcabc 2020). in addition, business diplomacy activists are trying to deal with the phenomenon of self-sanctioning, when foreign companies that are not included in any sanctions list nevertheless prefer to voluntarily avoid business with russia for fear of restrictions. such self-sanctioning inhibits canadian-russian trade relations. nathan hunt, the cerba chairman of the moscow board of directors and a co-founder of the rcabc (russiacanada business council), believes that business diplomacy has the potential to establish bilateral relations, and that active dialogue between business representatives can compensate for the lack of diplomatic communication at a high level. although russia’s policy toward canada is mainly reactive, there are cases of russian proactive behaviour. russian business and industrial circles continue to support the activities of the rcabc, which was established in 2004. the canadian co-chairman gilles breton says, “both canadian and russian stakeholders are doing a great deal to keep the initiative alive and thriving. the rcabc platform responds to real business needs and serves to advance the common economic and commercial interests of our two countries” (rcabc 2020). russian co-chairman alisher usmanov claims that despite the complexity of interstate relations, the council has managed to protect dialogue and business cooperation in many areas (mining and metal manufacturing, energy, information and telecommunication technology, transport) and among the largest russian and canadian companies: kinross gold, bombardier, barrick gold, magna, erm, rosatom, severstal, alrosa, rostselmash, and evraz. besides supporting business ties, the council contributes to educational developments by organizing cultural and sporting events, and bilateral student conferences, and by supporting russian language studies in canada (rcabc 2020). the arctic dealing with common challenges presented by the arctic region was one of the most productive areas in the canada-russia relationship before the crisis of 2014, and it remains the least affected by the crisis. cooperation in the arctic and the north remains a priority in russian-canadian relations and is one of the most promising areas for cooperation. to achieve this cooperation, there are a common preconditions and niches of opportunity, but there are also potential risks. 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 common preconditions russia and canada are two major arctic nations and have similarities in their approach to various issues. both countries share the division of the arctic based on direct longitudinal lines drawn from the north pole. this sector method is more relevant than the median line method which would establish areas proportional to each country’s coastline. canada and russia both strictly respect procedure and try to resolve territorial disputes using negotiations based on international law. for example, russia, canada, and denmark have a territorial dispute over the lomonosov ridge. each of them is seeking to extend the border of its shelf through a submission to the un commission on the limits of the continental shelf. however, this dispute does not prevent the countries from cooperating on other issues in the arctic. the unilateral establishment by some states of the external borders of the continental shelf in the arctic ocean, bypassing earlier agreements, could create increasing tension between the arctic countries (zagorskii 2019, 114). thus, it is crucial to stay within the framework of international law and follow the un rules and procedures. russia and canada also hold similar positions on the northern sea route (nsr) and the northwest passage. russia considers the nsr as its historically developed national transport route and has adopted several acts regulating its navigation. canada claims the northwest passage as part of its historic internal waters, which means the waterways are under the complete control of the canadian government. in both cases, the countries meet disagreement from the us, since the us considers artic waters international. in the case of the northwest passage, the dispute has existed for almost 50 years and the us and canada have ‘agreed to disagree.’ the us-russia situation is riskier due to the overall character of their relations. the us is at a disadvantage due to difficulties in proving that both artic routes can meet the necessary legal criteria for international straits. so far, the debate on the legal status of the nsr waters has no practical implications. however, the situation might change with the arctic sea ice melting and russia planning to use the nsr on a much larger international scale (todorov 2017, 88). russia and canada are concerned about the future actions of non-arctic states on the status of the nsr and the northwest passage. east asian countries advocate greater transparency in the region. they support the idea of loosening russian and canadian control and call for the future “internationalization” of these artic routes (konyshev and sergunin 2015, 38). both countries acknowledge the leading role of the arctic council in strengthening cooperation and defining the rules of behaviour. the council was established at canada’s request in 1996, and the idea was supported by russia. both sides support the idea of priority for the eight arctic states (russia, canada, the us, denmark, norway, finland, iceland, sweden), and have voted for clearly defined procedures for observers, including non-arctic states (nuuk declaration 2011). russia and canada were the first to be critical about china, india, japan, south korea, and singapore gaining observer status in the artic. their main concern was protection of interests of the arctic states and preservation of the effectiveness of decision-making within the council. in 2013, the states listed above, as well as italy, were granted observer status with the main condition that they recognize the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the arctic council member states in the arctic. 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 thus, the arctic council remains a key platform for interaction. general political disagreements at a global level are, however, starting to impact on interaction in the arctic council. for example, in 2019, at a meeting of the heads of the ministries of foreign affairs of the countries of the arctic council, for the first time in the organization’s history, they failed to sign a final declaration because, in contrast to the position of other members, the us declined to acknowledge the paris climate agreement and the un sustainable development goals. also, us secretary of state, mike pompeo, criticized russia’s struggle for influence in the arctic and china’s new silk road project. while this particular case did not involve canada, political confrontation on issues beyond the arctic agenda and negative trends in russian-canadian relations may, in the end, have an undesirable negative effect on the arctic agenda. additionally, the arctic is becoming a more open region with a growing number of active players, state, and non-state actors. therefore, it is crucial to keep this region free from conflicts, both military and economic. russia and canada should look more actively for opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation in the region, bilaterally and multilaterally. divisive issues hard security and lack of trust and transparency are key divisive issues between canada and russia. assessments of military and non-military threats have changed little since 2014, thus there is no arms race in the arctic. however, there is a growing sense of uncertainty about the future direction of military and political developments in the region. the escalation of tension may be due to incorrect mutual interpretations of military activities, including the increased number of military exercises, which are taking place in the context of negative political rhetoric and the absence of trustworthy military communication. to avoid additional risks, it is necessary to restore dialogue and cooperation at the military level (zagorskii 2019, 11, 113). until 2014, the arctic states were cooperating along military and political lines. however, when relations between russia and the west were aggravated by the ukraine crisis, meetings were suspended. as a result, russia no longer has multilateral representation in discussions of regional security issues. according to russian officials, there is no reason for “bringing military working methods to the arctic” (mid.ru 2020). russia was in favour of resuming the previous practice of meetings of the chiefs of staff of the armed forces from the member countries of the arctic council to ensure the required level of confidence (mid.ru 2020). the sides could probably start with expert consultations. the sanctions regime is another issue dividing canada and russia. russia’s policy toward ukraine in 2014 was followed by the regime of mutual sanctions between canada and russia, which also affected the arctic in some regards. however, in terms of scope, content, and duration, the restrictions imposed by canada have been more moderate than those imposed by the us (nemova and issraelyan 2017, 367-371). in december, 2014, canada announced export restrictions on technologies used in russia for oil exploration and production. such restrictions negatively impacted the russian oil and gas industry, which is dependent on foreign equipment and technology. there have been instances when us sanctions have created difficulties in economic cooperation in the arctic. for example, a joint venture between chinese cosco (china ocean shipping company) and canadian teekay, which owns and operates an arc7 ice-class liquefied natural gas (lng) tanker for the yamal lng project, had to change its shareholder structure in order get out of the us sanctions and to continue delivering yamal lng gas to novatek (fadeeva and dzyadko 2019). 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 niches for cooperation until 2014, there was multifaceted cooperation between russia and canada in the arctic (konyshev and sergunin 2013, 150-156). regardless of sanctions and the lack of transparency in hard security issues, there are still areas where the two arctic states have more common interests than disagreements, where cooperation is possible, and where there have been some positive results since 2014. most of this cooperation, however, is taking place in multilateral formats, rather than on a bilateral basis. since 2014, opportunities for economic cooperation and investment have become more limited, and as of 2020, just a few projects are successfully operating. as mentioned above, the russian energy company, novatek, relies on several shipping companies and joint ventures to transport lng produced at its yamal lng facility to markets in europe and asia. the largest of these joint ventures is a partnership between teekay, whose headquarters are in vancouver, and the china lng shipping company (teekay corporation 2017). in the chukotka region, which is part of the arctic zone of russia, the largest canadian investor in the russian economy, kinross gold, has production assets. kinross has had success in russia, operating four mines in the country over the past 24 years. twenty percent of its current production comes from its russian mines, kupol and dvoinoye (canadian mining journal 2019). moreover, as reported in august, 2019, toronto-based kinross gold is expanding its portfolio in russia with the acquisition of a large, open-pit development in the region. several other canadian companies are operating in the russian arctic region. among them are silver bear resources which announced a silver project in mangazeisky in its 2017 operational update (news ykt 2019; silver bear resources plc 2018). science has been a platform for cooperation in the arctic for many years, both during and following the cold war. fortunately, the 2014 crisis had little influence in this sphere. moreover, the agreement on enhancing international arctic scientific cooperation came into force in 2018. this is one example of scientific diplomacy in a period of crisis in relations. the agreement provides a legal framework for regulating research which widens opportunities for better understanding of the region. it is important to build cooperation among the universities of the arctic countries, and to develop student and academic exchange programs to foster future developments in the region. the university of the arctic, a network of more than 150 higher education institutions, could serve as a basis for such cooperation, and indeed, russian and canadian universities already use this network (riss 2016). environmental protection and pollution control are areas of high concern for almost all governments, regardless of their political views. collaboration on these issues should remain depoliticized and could serve as a good example of multilateral cooperation. ensuring environmental safety is a priority of international cooperation in the arctic. main goals include the preservation and protection of the arctic environment and the elimination of the environmental consequences of economic activity in the face of increasing climate change. there is a trend toward the intensification of shipping in polar waters, which brings new opportunities as well as challenges. multilateral discussions on maritime safety and prevention of 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 marine pollution from ships, have taken place under the auspices of the international marine organization. as a result, the international polar code came into force in 2017. it sets binding international standards for commercial ships operating in arctic and antarctic waters, and the ratification of these measures opens a new era of protecting arctic nations and the marine environment. russia was an influential actor along with canada and other arctic coastal states in the negotiations that led to the adoption in 2018 of the agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the central arctic ocean. canada and russia are interested in a stable, secure, and sustainable arctic region and see themselves as responsible actors, dedicated to legal norms and principles. conclusion this study has demonstrated that from 2014 to 2020, there was no positive shift in russiancanadian bilateral political relations. neither side has taken measures toward rapprochement. the cases highlighted in the article – the ukraine crisis, the skripal case, and the kerch incident – are significant as indicators of the different positions of russia and western countries, including canada. however, there is no direct conflict between russia and canada. canadian foreign policy toward russia has been made in response to russian actions (russia’s policy toward ukraine) or presumed russian actions (the skripal case), while russian policy toward canada has been mainly reactive. these policies can be summarized as action-reaction, and sanctions-countersanctions, leading to a crisis in bilateral relations. there are several key factors that explain these negative dynamics. canadian relations with the us and nato partly affect its strategy toward russia. however, most importantly, the ukraine crisis remains one of the central factors currently affecting russian-canadian relations, as the two countries do not agree on the causes of the crisis, nor on how to resolve it. as long as irreconcilable differences exist and parties cannot reach a common political dialogue, managing the confrontation but not overcoming it is a reasonable aim. a policy of small steps and cooperation in areas of common interest could help to reach this goal. analysis shows that cooperation between the two countries is developing in certain niche areas, even during the crisis. there are limited results as regards track ii diplomacy, para-diplomacy, and business diplomacy, but these spheres have the potential for further development. russian-canadian cooperation continues in the arctic, though mostly in multilateral frameworks. despite some negative trends, the countries have enough common interests for cooperation in science, the environment, fisheries and navigations, and search and rescue. the arctic region was one of the most productive areas in the canada-russia relationship before the crisis of 2014 and, as this analysis demonstrates, it remains the area the least affected by the crisis. to provide a basis for future dialogue, when time comes for political, economic and other 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published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 western hegemony and russia’s eurasian turn: probing the liberal order’s place in contemporary international society zachary paikin1 centre for european policy studies abstract with the resumption of great power rivalry, the western-led liberal order appears to have failed to become synonymous with global order itself. russia’s “pivot to the east” and its deepening partnership with china have raised fundamental questions concerning the future role and preeminence of liberal states – including canada – in the emerging global order. given dueling european and eurasian elements of russian identity and foreign policy discourse, russia remains a good case study for probing the extent to which a future world order can root itself in a monist frame in today’s pluralistic world. this paper explores this question from a perspective rooted in the english school of international relations, with the aim of deriving conclusions regarding the liberal international order’s ability to maintain its hegemonic position in global international society. 1 dr. zachary paikin is a researcher at the centre for european policy studies in brussels and a nonresident research fellow with the institute for peace & diplomacy in toronto. 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 introduction the end of the cold war was initially greeted with calls for a europe “whole and free”, embodied in the paris charter that was adopted in 1990. dating back to the mid-eighteenth century, russia had been recognized as a great power in the “european family” of states (watson 1984a, 70-71). the end of hostility between the western and eastern blocs was supposed to presage russia’s “return to europe”, having been cut off from the bulk of the continent for several decades by the iron curtain. however, what these idealistic calls precisely implied for the future of europe’s political and security order remained unclear. soviet leader mikhail gorbachev initially spoke of the need for an inclusive “common european home”, although his vision was that of a “house with several rooms” (casier 2018, 21). gorbachev envisioned a convergence of equals between capitalist and communist blocs along the lines of european social democracy (tsygankov 2013, 5), with eastern european countries becoming either neutral or finlandized to ensure that moscow’s security interests would be met after the withdrawal of soviet troops and the collapse of their one-party regimes (gvosdev and marsh 2013, 209-210). however, according to sakwa, this was met with a western foreign policy aimed at pursuing “russia’s adaptation to the stringencies of an existing [american-led] order, not the creation of an expanded community” (2017, 18). the united states (us) settled into a “primacy mindset” – a foreign policy strategy rooted in “disregard for the core interests of potential adversaries” (lind and press 2020). following a series of increasingly sharp disagreements throughout the post-cold war era over the nature of state sovereignty, the legitimacy of military interventions, and the principles that should underpin the euro-atlantic and global orders, the 2013-14 ukraine crisis made it clear that “the era is over of building an all-europe house using blueprints devised immediately following the cold war” (lukyanov 2019). these developments affect not only the future of the european political and security system but also the foundations of the so-called liberal international order. the failure of the russian economic and political system to develop fully along liberal lines implies that the western-led liberal order has not succeeded in becoming identical to global order itself, nor even necessarily the “dominant element in the global system” (chalmers 2019). this raises questions concerning the future place of liberal states and the liberal order in a world where, despite its many successes and elements of appeal, liberalism has not become synonymous with universalism. with washington’s global hegemony now being challenged in the context of a renewed great power contest (allison 2020; feigenbaum 2020), such questions have become of direct relevance to canada, a country that has benefited significantly from deep economic integration and close security cooperation with the united states in the post-cold war era. this article will explore the enduring normative and identity-related elements of russia’s relationship with europe against the backdrop of moscow’s ‘pivot to the east’ and its recently launched ‘greater eurasia’ vision, with the aim of uncovering the extent to which the westernled liberal international order can retain its global appeal. using a framework drawn from the english school of international relations (es), it will first dwell on the place occupied by the liberal order within international society. it will then examine the extent of russia’s eurasian turn before deriving conceptual conclusions regarding the liberal order’s ability to maintain its hegemonic status in global affairs. in doing so, it will explore ways to find synergies between varying es approaches while also dwelling on the implications of contemporary normative contestation for canadian foreign policy. 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 hegemony, international society and the liberal order for most of modern history, international orders have been bounded by general wars and have featured a hegemonic state in addition to one or several challengers (knutsen 1999, 6-8). such wars have usually been fought over which rules and principles should underpin the order and the english school has usually been thought of as a good home to theorize on questions of legitimacy in world affairs (coker 2015, 37-88; clark 2011, v). from yugoslavia to libya to ukraine, questions of legitimacy have been at the heart of some of the central disputes between russia and the west throughout the post-cold war period, including the rights that great powers should legitimately be accorded and the instances in which state sovereignty can legitimately be set aside. the english school’s core conceptual contribution to the discipline is the notion of “international society” – that international relations have the capacity to proceed according to a social logic rather than a merely systemic one. wight defines an international society as a common set of norms that “define the boundaries of a social system” and “condition [states’] behaviour and identity” (1977, 13). modern international society possesses several “primary institutions” – not formal bodies as conceived of by liberal theory but rather core principles that are “essential for producing and maintaining order” (flockhart 2016, 12). among these, for instance, is the balance of power, contractually negotiated among states rather than operating automatically or mechanistically as neo-realists would contend (barkin 2010, 130).2 es scholars have disagreed on what constitutes social interaction in international affairs. earlier contributions to the school contended that states that became “sufficiently involved with one another” constituted an international system, whereas an international society was forged only when interactions crossed over from the merely regulatory and into the realm of shared norms and values (watson 1992, 311). more recent scholarship, however, asserts that there can be no such thing as a preor non-social system, as the mere act of mutual recognition is inherently social (reus-smit and dunne 2017, 31). perhaps most famously, earlier accounts claim that the norms and institutions of the contemporary international society of states were formed in modern europe before expanding – with mixed results – across the globe through periods of colonialism, industrialization, and decolonization (watson 1984b, 32; bozeman 1984, 405). by contrast, recent accounts emphasize international society’s “globalization” through a “polycentric pattern of expansion,” with entities such as the sinosphere, the islamicate, and latin christendom all interacting with one another over the course of history and the latter only eclipsing all others in the nineteenth century (phillips 2017, 43-60). these divergent views on whether cultural heterogeneity should be equated with the erosion of social norms inform differences among es scholars with respect to how contestation should be conceptualized. due to their conceptualization of the balance of power as representing a primary institution of international society, earlier voices within the school feared that “antisocial primacy” pursued by a “rogue hegemon” could lead to the erosion of the ties that bind international society’s actors together (clark 2011, 37-38). more recent accounts, however, have come to view contestation as not just “incorporative or corrosive, but as an engine of international social development” (reus-smit and dunne 2017, 36). 2 donnelly contends that neo-realists’ privileging of anarchy as the core notion on which the international system is based leaves them poorly positioned to contribute to discussions surrounding international order, as anarchy merely illustrates one fashion in which global affairs are not ordered (2017, 244-245). 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 recent discussions surrounding the resumption of great power rivalry have centred to a significant extent on its impact on the so-called liberal international order. however, the scope and breadth of this order has been the subject of significant contention. some effectively consign the order to the western alliance and its associated norms and institutions (sakwa 2017, 18-44). such a conceptualization views the liberal order as oscillating between periods of “enlargement” and “consolidation” or “defence” (jahn 2013, 29) and is therefore compatible with flockhart’s (2016) notion that the post-cold war world has come to be composed of several competing orders rather than a single overarching order. others, by contrast, emphasize the progression that liberal internationalism has undertaken since the industrial revolution, viewing it more as a philosophy for “how to organize international space” along broadly “open, rules-based and progressively oriented” lines (ikenberry 2018, 12). if such a conceptualization were to account for the existence of a global international society of states, then this would be a society far more open to liberal ordering practices. according to this view, what is occurring today is most likely to be characterized as a “crisis of the american governance of liberal order and not of liberal order itself” (ikenberry 2013, 92). a third perspective sees the liberal order not as necessarily representing an international convergence of ideals but rather as embodying the growing global appeal of the norms of independence and interdependence since world war ii (sørensen 2016, 200-205). although these accounts all point to different embodiments of the liberal order, it is possible to fuse them into a coherent whole. cox notes that a “system of state power” underpins the liberal order (2013, 115). in other words, although the principles that the liberal order nominally upholds enjoy a degree of support at the level of global international society, the order nonetheless relies on the transatlantic alliance and its appendages. such a conceptualization therefore contends that the liberal order may co-exist and compete with other international orders, leaving an imprint on international society without having come to encompass it entirely (paikin 2020). with sakwa contending that today’s international society is rooted in a “structure of western hegemony”, one can therefore conceive of a western-led liberal international order that occupies a hegemonic position within global international society, but due to the latter’s distribution of power and cultural-normative diversity, has not become completely synonymous with it (2017, 43). in a world composed of multiple regional or identity-based international orders, it is therefore not merely states, but orders as well, that can be hegemonic. lebow defines order as “legible, predictable behaviour in accord with recognized norms” and contends that an order must possess a degree of solidarity among its members to remain robust (2018, 305-306).3 furthering its well-known gramscian characterization as being rooted in a mixture of coercion and consent, hegemony has more recently been defined as “a status bestowed by others” – resting on “recognition by them” – that “confers special rights and responsibilities on a state (or states) with the resources to lead” (clark 2011, 35). as such, the agreed-upon legitimacy of one’s hegemonial status is key to that status being maintained. legitimacy, for its part, has been described as “an inherently social phenomenon”, with the legitimacy of an actor or action depending on “perceptions made with reference to prevailing intersubjective understandings” (reus-smit 2014, 341-8).4 3 this emphasis on predictability is also discussed by tang, who notes that “an order exists within a social system whenever there is some predictability within the system” (2016, 34). 4 lebow (2008, 67) similarly distinguishes between the greek notions of hegemonia as legitimate authority and arche as the raw exercise of power. 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 a hegemonic state or order must therefore demonstrate restraint and a desire to play by perceived rules if it is to retain its hegemonic status. however, the liberal order’s dual existence as one international order among many but possessing a degree of universal appeal at the level of international society lends itself to an inherent tension, as the states that underpin the order act to advance their own interests and not just the values and principles that the order nominally upholds.5 monteiro, employing a structural realist framework, notes that the imbalance of power distribution in unipolar systems renders the uncertainty over the hegemon’s intentions even starker, even if it aims to maintain the status quo in its relations with other major powers (2014, 159). from a normative perspective, the state of rivalry that this engenders increases the likelihood that the hegemon will make missteps, or be forced into situations where it is unable to show restraint, which in turn affects the durability of its hegemonic status, even if it fails to affect the unipolar distribution of power.6 moreover, in addition to open multilateralism and rules-based cooperation, “there is an expectation that a liberal international order will move states in a progressive direction, defined in terms of liberal democracy” (ikenberry 2018, 11). it is therefore the hegemonic character – both material and normative – and the nature of the liberal order that have helped to drive normative contestation in the post-cold war era. the challenges facing the western-led liberal order outlined above are therefore interpreted by the two most prominent es accounts of international society in differing – but ultimately similar – ways. the earlier ‘expansion’ narrative would contend that the contradictions generated by the liberal order’s hegemonic position will ultimately lead to the erosion of international society’s shared norms, potentially reverting it to a systemic rather than a social state. this is a problem exacerbated by the hegemonic position of european international society as the point of origin of global international society’s contemporary norms. in other words, it is not just the liberal order’s position that is currently in jeopardy but the very notion of western normative leadership as well, suggesting the emergence of a new global system of cultural heterogeneity and diffuse influence. while the second account – the ‘globalization’ narrative – does not view western normative hegemony as being as important a structural feature of international society, it takes such heterogeneity for granted. therefore, the structure of the emerging global order as understood by both major accounts is broadly similar, although the ‘globalization’ narrative does not fear the emergence of a non-social system from today’s nascent great power rivalry. where earlier scholars would see normative erosion, more recent ones see increasing normative complexity. in all cases, however, the outcome is change of a fundamental, historically contingent, and structurally similar nature (see table 1). the fact that the content of international society is becoming increasingly complex is not incompatible with the notion that shared norms and identities between powers may be relatively thin in a culturally diverse world. 5 sakwa captures this inherent duality in the western-led order by dubbing it a “power system combined with a liberal values order” (2017, 282). similarly, nye calls the postwar liberal order “a combination of wilsonian liberalism and balance of power realism” (2019, 71). 6 acharya succinctly describes this phenomenon in practical terms, noting that the “degree of us dominance of the world will decline, even if the us itself does not” (2018, 135). 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 table 1: english school interpretations of post-cold war contestation and change account of global international society post-cold war society and order driver of change outcome expansion diverse global international society, hegemonic liberal order tension/contradiction between order and society produces crisis of legitimacy thin/complex global order and society globalization normative contestation as inherent feature of international society how to characterize the emerging global order has been the subject of considerable debate. rather than draw a stark contrast between liberal and illiberal states, some have begun to envision a world that is merely increasingly ‘post-liberal’ (milbank and pabst 2016). others question whether there was ever a liberal order of global scope to begin with, noting that in the post-cold war era “the international order got closer to having a liberal quality but never quite passed the threshold” (barnett 2019).7 in line with flockhart’s (2016) conceptualization of a ‘multi-order world’, acharya foresees a world of “parallel and intersecting orders” featuring a “more diverse, complex, and fragmented multilateralism” in which a form of “pragmatic globalism” can take the place of an “ideologically charged liberal internationalism” (2018, 76; 158-59). coker provides a different conceptual take, claiming that the world today features a number of “civilizational states”, including china, with civilizational uniqueness inherently placing constraints on any universalist impulses in global affairs (2019, 167).8 in all cases, there exist significant structural impediments to the spread of liberal norms and values on a global scale. mounting tensions and divergent relations the end of the cold war was initially marked by russian attempts to integrate into the western-led order, with moscow even flirting with the idea of allowing a north atlantic treaty organization (nato) or organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce) military presence in those areas of the former soviet union that were experiencing ethnic-based tensions, while also supporting the western security agenda in places such as serbia and iraq (tsygankov 2013, 72-86). however, this trend of unambiguous support for the western-led liberal order encountered an early roadblock in the december 1993 parliamentary elections, which saw nationalists make gains as russia’s traditional reservoir of support for statism began to reassert itself in the wake of popular “fears of insecurity, instability, and poverty” (2013, 64). this reservoir is buttressed by the centuries-old “politics of ‘catching up’ modernization” present in russia which “traditionally imagines that the gap with more developed countries 7 sushentsov (2019) also notes that the notion of an international order as a “western centric system of liberal democracies” was never fully considered by russia to be “global, legitimate and efficient.” 8 a more limited claim allows for a form of “universal solidarity” emerging that does not require “conformity” with the “vision of the good life” emphasized by the hitherto hegemonic state or order (linklater and suganami 2006, 153). 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 will be closed through the leadership of the state” (kudrin and mau 2018, 17-25). other factors cited as underpinning popular support for statism in russia include “resigned acceptance” of the status quo and the absence of plausible alternatives (bressler 2008, 123), as well as a desire to fulfill a sense of national “mission” as a cultural mediator between east and west (richter 1996, 81), reflective of the elite perception of russia’s “special status and aura – no longer an empire in the traditional sense, but certainly more than an ‘ordinary’ nation-state” (lo 2015, 16). as these early post-cold war challenges – which preceded nato expansion and the 1999 kosovo intervention – were partly rooted in enduring elements of russian distinctiveness, this gives credence to more recent es accounts that see contestation as an unavoidable feature of global politics. events over the ensuing years exhibited clearer instances of tensions fostered in response to western hegemony and perceived overreach. in addition to the alliance’s eastward expansion, nato’s decision to intervene in yugoslavia without un support “caused the first serious postcold war rupture” in russia-west ties, with moscow’s view of the west as “dangerously unilateralist and militarily menacing” becoming entrenched despite both sides resuming cooperation over the ensuing years (hill 2019, 94-8). the kosovo crisis cast doubt on the ability of russia to integrate into a transformed west that could accommodate moscow’s independent interests. in key instances, it appeared as if nato members tended to “formulate common positions amongst themselves” and then “engage in rather desultory and non-binding conversations” with russia (smith and latawski 2003, 112). in the mid-2000s, the zero-sum nature of european union (eu)-russia relations in the context of the “colour revolutions” laid to rest any notion that a brussels-centric model could consolidate the wider european space into a single political and economic order, while the prospect of further nato expansion helped to bring about the 2008 russo-georgian war. various scholars capture this dilemma in conceptual terms, with lukin contending that the west attempted to adopt the model for german unification as the model for european unification, pushing for a single set of standards across the entire continent (2018, 5). or, as neumann put it, western countries prioritized the pursuit of “sameness” of values in place of the more traditional competition that has characterized international politics (1995, 207). both principal es narratives can account for these developments, which can be seen as a deliberate attempt at normative transformation and a form of tension that is the by-product of the liberal west adopting “some sort of tutelary relationship” with international society (sakwa 2017, 42). after the annexation of crimea in 2014, moscow engaged in attempts at territorial revisionism in ukraine, revealing a continued focus on europe despite the breakdown of the pan-european security system (kolesnikov 2015). this reflects the fact that the ukraine crisis was caused in part by clashing regulatory orders in eastern europe and the south caucasus, with the russianled eurasian economic union (eaeu) designed to provide kyiv with an alternative to the proposed eu association agreement (studin 2018a; sherwood 2018, 56). however, russia’s focus soon shifted eastward, emphasizing not only its previously declared “pivot to the east” but also a new vision of an integrated “greater eurasia” spanning the entire supercontinent (karaganov 2016). in contrast with the more monistic view of global order advanced by the liberal west, moscow asserts that europe is welcome to join the greater eurasian community if it agrees to uphold its pluralistic principles, even if this fledgling vision is still lacking in detail (lukin 2018, 187). some contend that the greater eurasia project is designed to buy russia time to respond conceptually to china’s belt and road initiative and position itself as an equal co-architect of an emerging supercontinent-wide order (paikin et al. 2019, 238; lo 2019a). others assert that russia’s eastward pivot has less to do with searching for an alternative to the west and is more 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 concerned with deepening ties with an economically dynamic asia and the need to develop siberia and the russian far east (lukin 2018, 174). this reflects the fact that most russian and chinese policy commentators stress that the deepening sino-russian entente is aimed primarily at solving common problems rather than balancing against the west (sakwa 2017, 294). such an understanding would emphasize that russia has genuinely grown to value its relationship with china and is not merely using it instrumentally to secure its “strategic rear”, even though the gradual de-securitization of their relationship grants both parties greater freedom to pursue their core interests in eastern europe and east asia respectively (kofman 2019). lukin contends that the ukraine crisis marks a “pivotal” year in which russia’s eurasian turn became “actual” and not just “verbal” (2018, 15).9 in any case, initial post-cold war aspirations to forge a “greater europe” have been superseded by a new overarching paradigm, with nato enlargement having ensured that russia and west “do not run a shared security system for europe” (buzan and wæver 2003, 429). these divisions within europe writ large highlight the thin character of the russia-west relationship that has consolidated over the past three decades, but also increased complexity evidenced by the proliferation of rival geopolitical discourses and imaginaries. buzan succinctly captures this phenomenon, resulting from postcold war liberal monism and hegemonism, noting that “the continued projection of contested western values (human rights, democracy, the market) on to the rest of the world creates considerable scope for differentiation between the west and the rest” (2012, 25). clashing visions and regulatory orders between leading actors have driven the resurrection of the russia-west rivalry, with implications for canada. while brussels has maintained that “selective engagement” with moscow is still in the eu’s interest, ottawa distinguished itself in the western community by its particularly stern response to russia’s intervention in ukraine (popeski 2015), as well as through its inconsistent positions in the context of the euromaidan revolution. while the canadian government initially indicated support for an agreement reached with protestors to institute a coalition government and hold early elections (government of canada 2014), the subsequent fall of the yanukovych government saw a call just three days later by prime minister stephen harper for ukrainians to reject “the past” (the canadian press 2014). reciprocal sanctions were imposed between ottawa and moscow and, with the brief exception of an attempt to re-engage on arctic issues under stéphane dion’s tenure as foreign minister, relations between the two countries have remained at a post-cold war low. while a rising “eurasian” discourse has marked russia’s relationship with europe in the wake of the ukraine crisis, it has also been contended that moscow has pivoted “to itself” rather than to the east, with the aim of charting a course as a “major independent player” in place of joining a larger whole such as the west (lee 2020). in essence, russia is gradually finding its bearings as an independent actor for the first time in its post-communist history. if this results in an increasingly assertive international posture, there could be uncertainty over moscow’s future behaviour in regions adjacent to canada such as the arctic, where thus far russian aims have largely been geared toward preserving regional stability (buchanan 2020). 9 morozov similarly notes that 2014 represented a “watershed in russia’s relations with the west,” although he qualifies this by noting that it did not lead to any fundamental change in putin’s international security discourse (2015, 139). 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 russia between east and west while one should not downplay the notion that clashing interests helped to bring about today’s state of rivalry between russia and the west, interests are partly the product of the context in which they are forged. for example, it could be against moscow’s interests to integrate fully into the existing european economic and regulatory order, given the current structure of the russian economy and polity (greene 2016; kluge and richter 2020). however, russia’s interest in unambiguously rejecting the geographic growth of the western-led order is not always evident. trenin (2019a) has called moscow’s fixation on nato expansion a “fundamental error of russian foreign policy” rooted in an “outdated mode of strategic thinking that assigns excessive importance to the factor of geography and strategic depth” no longer relevant in a world of strategic aviation and nuclear weapons . he also describes the kremlin’s role in helping to re-entrench the image of a hostile russia on the world stage as a “strategic defeat”. according to sushentsov and wohlforth (2020), it is nato ‘centrality’ – the notion that the major issues of euro-atlantic security are decided between americans and europeans with little meaningful input from russia – that drives contestation between russia and the west rather than the transatlantic alliance’s expansion, which suggests the importance of statusrelated concerns rather than a divergence of immutable material interests. geographic determinism aside, the notion that entrenched interests drive zero-sum rivalry between russia and the west does not sit well with the reality that russia initially attempted to join the west after the cold war. despite mounting disagreements with the west, moscow’s aims remained limited for much of the post-cold war period. after the 2003 invasion of iraq, which it opposed, high-level russian politicians largely eschewed attempts to entrench russia’s position as a pole in a multipolar world, preferring instead to focus on shaping euro-atlantic decision-making to enhance their country’s security and prospects for further economic development (smith 2012, 145). similarly, rather than actively balance against the overwhelming power of the united states throughout the 1990s, moscow’s attention was centred on more limited foreign policy aims designed “to keep the international order from impinging” at a moment of significant instability and volatility in global affairs (rozman 2014, 197). although the advent of a brussels-centric conception of europe had become unrealistic and no “mode of reconciliation” was found between it and more pluralistic visions of european order, the aim of constructing a series of “common spaces” from lisbon to vladivostok remained in place until the 2013-14 ukraine crisis (sakwa 2015a, 558-62). even as russia-west ties frayed in subsequent years, moscow has been keen to stress that the eaeu is complementary to the eu, although without compromising on its insistence on an “equal” relationship with europe (sakwa 2017, 147). russia’s “pivot to the east” remains in many ways unformed. while the deepening strategic partnership between russia and china has led both countries to “agree on most international issues”, stronger bilateral military cooperation is not akin to the establishment of a deeper alliance aimed at entrenching a comprehensive set of post-western norms and institutions (lo 2019b). kortunov (2019) cites the views of those who believe that russia will always be destined to be a second-class player in the asian theatre behind the likes of china and india, thus leaving “a russian return to the european fold as foreordained”. neumann, for his part, suggests that russia’s debate over europe has been so central to its identity formation in recent centuries that it is difficult to imagine it disappearing in its entirety (1995, 210). rozman even considers eurasianism to be “faulty as a cultural ideal” (2014, 202), which is in line with traditional binary accounts of the world’s european and asian “cultural and administrative traditions” (watson 2006, 69). morozov contends that russia developed a “subaltern” relationship with europe as early as the start of the sixteenth century, when trade moved to the 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 high seas from its more traditional landand river-based routes, rendering russia a supplier of commodities to the “global core” at the beginning of its imperial development (2015, 86-90). the central position occupied by europe and the broader west in russian identity formation is visible in that even in instances when russia tries to distinguish itself from european political trends including liberalism, it often posits itself as embodying “true” european values (neumann 1995, 194). however, russia’s concern over questions of status has also produced a tendency to distinguish itself through non-european identities or discourses. although europe has long been the main “other” against which russia has measured itself, the latter’s inclusion into european international society “divided the intellectual culture” of the country along the lines of the extent to which it is (or should be) european or western (neumann 1995, 202). lo cites a belief held by some russians that their country is “not european or asian, christian or muslim; it is all those things, a civilization unto itself” (2015, 17). nearly all of russia’s “most important economic and political centres”, including moscow, nizhny novgorod, yekaterinburg and novosibirsk, are located “deep in the mainland” of eurasia and not in or adjacent to the european peninsula (silaev and sushentsov 2018, 9). moreover, russia began its current “pivot to the east” in the early 2010s, even before the onset of the conflict over ukraine, suggesting that russia’s eurasian turn is not merely a reaction to western policies (bolt and cross 2018, 12; bordachev 2018, 83). some go so far as to assert that in the centuries that followed tsar peter the great’s initial efforts at westernization, russia had already begun to decouple, in identity-related terms, from europe. while the russian political elite in the eighteenth century insisted that their country was firmly european and culturally superior to asia, nineteenthcentury intellectuals often saw russia as embodying an east-west hybrid or a “world of its own”; by the end of the second world war, and as communism spread, moscow had become more comfortable asserting its affinities with asia (tolz 2001, 151). such views highlight the enduring elements of diversity in global international society, casting doubt on the durability of any monist and expansionist liberal hegemony. moscow’s recent pivot toward eurasia has been accompanied by a conservative turn in the country’s political discourse, with putin beginning to espouse the “conservative values of the majority” upon his return to the kremlin in 2012 (sakwa 2017, 125). however, even many russian liberals view nato as a threat to their country’s security, despite their ideological preferences and desire for a modicum of cooperative relations with the west (tsygankov 2013, 92). even in the absence of a turn away from liberalism, the russian leadership has determined that integrating with the west would prevent it from retaining its sovereignty (lukin 2018, 176-7), “freedom of action” (trenin 2019b), and “independent strategic concerns” (sakwa 2017, 244). the mere establishment of “friendly relations” with the us and europe is now viewed as necessitating moscow’s “complete political submission” (lukin 2018, 15). for a country that considers independent great power status as being “inseparable from national identity”, acquiescence to the vision of a global order rooted in american leadership is impossible (petersson 2013, 11).10 10 although the trump administration was accused of abandoning the principle of american global leadership, it nonetheless went further in some respects than the obama administration in challenging russian interests by providing lethal assistance to ukraine, increasing the american military presence in eastern europe, withdrawing from the intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) and open skies treaties, directly striking the russian-backed al-assad regime in syria, and pulling out of the iran nuclear deal (jcpoa). as such, while it is possible that a gradual decoupling has begun to occur between liberal ordering practices and washington’s pursuit of primacy, the dynamic of moscow’s inability to acquiesce to key aspects of an american-dominated order has remained unchanged. for further analysis of this dynamic, see paikin (2019). 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 russia’s launching of the eaeu and the consolidation of rival regulatory orders in the wider european space has led to calls for dialogue and bridge-building between these orders (dienes et al. 2019, 33-52). however, in large part, hope for high-level discussions has been met instead by mere “informal contacts” between the european and eurasian commissions, with the eu preferring to engage with eaeu member states on a bilateral basis (van der togt 2020). even a more ambitious harmonization of both projects would represent an “integration of integrations” rather than russia’s integration into the western order as initially envisioned by many after the cold war. studin (2018b) suggests that canada now faces a somewhat related dilemma regarding the need to construct “interstitial regimes between international blocs”, including between the eaeu and the “post-nafta architecture for north america – across the arctic space”. a regulatory logic for relations between blocs lends credence to the ‘expansion’ es narrative that sees the decline of sociability as the advent of systemic relations, while the proliferation of new institutional architecture would conform to the ‘globalization’ account’s prediction of increasingly complex content being the result of normative contestation. russia has been influenced by both the west and the east throughout its long history. even the liberal yeltsin-era foreign minister andrei kozyrev spoke as early as 1992 about the importance of not definitively choosing between east and west (bolt and cross 2018, 34-5; lukin 2018, 73), even if moscow’s overriding aim was to pursue integration with the latter.11 moreover, the debate surrounding whether western liberalism is suitable for russia is merely a product of the past two centuries and is separate from the more longstanding questions concerning how russia can catch up with western countries’ technological, military, and economic prowess (kuchins and zevelev 2012, 182). this highlights how the difficulties associated with russia integrating into any western hegemonic order are compounded by the liberal character of the contemporary west. the result – even in the case of a country such as russia with its european affinities – is a global order featuring salient elements of normative thinness and diversity. although moscow’s eastward turn may be partial and the politics of eurasianism may take multiple forms, the rise of the eurasian dimension in russian political discourse is likely to buttress the relative importance of statism and great power status in the realm of national identity, solidifying some of the dividing lines that have prevented moscow from reaching an accommodation with the contemporary liberal order (laruelle 2017, 145-56). liberal order and international society revisited enduring elements of russian distinctiveness and its concerns over international status, when combined with disagreements over the shape of post-cold war europe, have led to the erosion of the liberal order’s hegemonic position. trenin highlights washington’s reduced reach by asserting that moscow’s actions in ukraine “essentially took russia out of the post-cold war system” and that its subsequent campaign in syria “broke the de facto monopoly of the us and its allies on military interventions” (2018, 20). any hegemon’s status in international society is “permanently conditional” and “subject to ongoing contestation in terms of its degree of legitimacy” (clark 2011, 49). if the us wishes to “retain its own monopoly” and not forge a collective hegemony with other great powers, it may now be forced to “seek social sanction within a more limited constituency” (2011, 66). 11 for more on how russian bicontinentalism is intertwined with russia’s great power identity, see sakwa (2015b). 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 however, having already embarked on a large-scale project to transform international society, a ‘retreat’ to a strictly bounded community would generate the perception that washington’s pursuit of continued pre-eminence was being decoupled from its liberal ordering practices. on the other hand, doubling down on the liberal order’s pursuit of universal scope would lead to a continued a roadblock in the form of international society’s embedded normative polycentrism (phillips 2017, 43-60; watson 2006, 54). in either instance, the perceived legitimacy of the liberal order’s hegemonic position in international society would be downgraded. the first of these two options reflects the challenge to the liberal order’s global hegemonic position posed by the trump administration, in which the united states is accused of abandoning a set of ordering principles once it no longer appears to be in its interest to pursue them. but the latter option reveals how the liberal order’s hegemonic position was already beginning to erode before the election of donald trump. an es approach can therefore serve to illustrate the extent to which the trump administration has been more of a catalyst than the cause of the advent of a global order beset by great power rivalry. this contrasts with liberal scholars such as ikenberry who have asserted that the crisis of the liberal order “can only be averted by more liberal order” (2013, 101). the aforementioned structural challenges facing the liberal order can inform canadian foreign policy under the trudeau government and beyond, which in recent years has been geared toward an explicit effort to uphold the “rules-based international order” (government of canada 2017). since the liberal international order has failed to become synonymous with international society, it would be logical to draw the conclusion that the former must eventually “come to terms with other ideas about and approaches to world order” (acharya 2018, 158). per this logic, if canada has an abiding interest in maintaining stable relations with its arctic neighbour russia, then its commitment to strengthening global multilateralism must be calibrated to acknowledge the limited global appeal of western norms and hegemony. yet if canada adopts a more hands-off approach toward promoting liberal norms and values, it has the potential to affect ottawa’s relations with washington under the biden presidency, given the former us vice president’s stated commitment to restoring american global leadership (biden 2020). while the precise nature of us international engagement under the biden administration remains to be determined, the very notion of leadership has the potential to generate a self-sustaining posture of primacy. as shapiro (2020) notes, [a]lliances create their own logic that helps justify ever greater u.s. engagement on the global stage. once an alliance is created, you must defend it and therefore need to constantly expand your military infrastructure and even the alliance itself. to do otherwise is to leave allies exposed and risk losing the credibility that holds the whole system of leadership together. therefore, even in the absence of a us-led effort to spread the geographic frontiers of the liberal order, antagonistic relations with other great powers are likely to endure. when paired with the high level of canadian dependence on the united states in a post-cold war era that has featured continental free trade and a hegemonic liberal west, the task of reaching a new canadian foreign policy equilibrium is a significant challenge. early es writers such as wight contended that a states system often develops into a universal empire such as in the chinese and hellenistic-roman worlds (1977, 33-43). however, despite russia’s centuries-long participation in the european balance-of-power system, no such universal empire has been produced in post-cold war europe. some may point to the fact that russia and china have thus far not been able to advance their own “broad set of alternative ideas for the organization of world order” (ikenberry 2018, 23). however, the presence of a 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 clear alternative is not always necessary for change to occur at the international level, with lebow contending that an order may break down when “the discrepancy between behaviour and the principles of justice” on which existing hierarchies rest becomes “great and obvious” – a concise conceptual description of the difficulties resulting from the liberal order’s inherent tensions outlined above (2008, 26). in fact, in the international realm rather than the domestic one, orders are “more sensitive to unit-level change” due to the presence of fewer actors (2008, 507). russia’s ambiguous relationship with europe – to say nothing of its conflict with the westernled liberal order – can provide an indication of the norms informing global international society in today’s era of rivalry. the english school’s list of primary institutions has included the balance of power, great power management, and sovereignty, among others (buzan 2014, 10112). if one adopts a europe-centric ‘expansion’ account, then certain primary institutions such as the balance of power and great power management, which russia inherited from europe in the centuries after westphalia, have since become an obstacle to russia’s integration into the western political community. the legitimacy of those two primary institutions, while expressed in universal bodies of today’s international society such as the united nations, sits uncomfortably with the principles that are unique to the liberal order, an order averse to the notion of spheres of influence and rooted in us leadership (allison 2020). the persistence of institutions such as great power management and the balance of power is crucial to the notion, central in russia’s identity and foreign policy discourse, that moscow plays an important and legitimate role in upholding a stable global order (rumer and sokolsky 2020). the fact that contestation continues to occur over the shape, or even the very legitimacy, of these institutions in the context of a largely unipolar distribution of power demonstrates that the english school remains a useful lens through which to analyse contemporary great power relations. this utility is reinforced by moscow’s often “constitutionalist” foreign policy predisposition in recent decades, preoccupied with who gets to make international rules rather than with what the rules precisely are (allison 2013, 203). regarding the institution of sovereignty, various scholars have cast doubt on the traditional account that it had consolidated in any recognizable form by 1648 (bartelson 1995, 137; teschke 2003). contemporary es and constructivist scholars have illustrated how nonwestern powers played a significant role in developing the norm of sovereignty, extended to all on the principle of human equality, as it is understood today (philpott 2001; reus-smit 2013, 181; buzan 2014, 141). sovereignty only became fully synonymous with nonintervention in the twentieth century, and in prior centuries was deeply intertwined with the notions of the right to wage a just war or the balance of power between faiths (morozov 2015, 142-43; tilly 1992, 61). therefore, moscow’s attachment to the norm of sovereignty can be interpreted more as an expression of support for the institutions of global international society rather than the norms of a west-centric liberal order.12 again, this shows the utility of an es approach in interpreting contemporary great power relations, as it enables us to understand the (admittedly inconsistent) “conservative institutionalist” and not just instrumental nature of moscow’s defence of certain international normative tenets (sokov 2018). a comprehensive es analysis bringing together the assumptions of earlier and later accounts demonstrates the diffuse and decentralized character of the emerging international society. however, this does not necessarily imply that the momentum favouring deeper cooperation 12 sakwa’s (2017, 47) conception of russian neo-revisionism explicitly contends that russia perceives itself to be challenging the liberal order while defending the autonomy of international society, a position which aligns with the conclusions reached in this article. 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 and some normative convergence will cease in its entirety, as international society’s pluralistic fabric is historically linked with the centuries-old impulse toward some form of universal solidarity (buzan 2014, 99-100).13 nonetheless, it has now become clear that even russia, a power heavily influenced by european international society for centuries, has been unable to find a satisfactory place for itself in the western-led order commensurate with that order’s norms and expectations. it therefore stands to reason that china, which never aspired to join a ‘greater west’ as russia did after the fall of the iron curtain, will also have difficulty forging an intimate relationship with the west that is rooted in shared identities and common understandings surrounding the legitimate shape of key norms and institutions (sakwa 2017, 291). if one acknowledges a distinction between systemic and social realms, then the liberal international order may be capable of functioning as an international system focused on common rules of external behaviour, but not as a world order encompassing the diverse identities and normative preferences of global international society.14 conclusion the existence of some form of hegemony has traditionally been the norm in international society (buzan 2014, 52-53). with the resumption of great power rivalry, the liberal order as currently conceived has clearly failed to retain its hegemonic capabilities, to say nothing of its professed universal appeal. whether this contestation leads to greater instability or to the further development of international society’s agreed-upon norms and institutions, the outcome is invariably a form of change.15 it is possible that a more inclusive form of collective great power hegemony may take the liberal order’s place once the dust from the current global disorder has settled, which may not be entirely dissimilar to the ‘diffused hegemony’ of great powers that composed the concert of europe (kofman 2018; watson 1992, 239-240). however, if relations between great powers continue to exhibit a primarily rivalrous character, one may be forced to contemplate the conceptual contours of order – and even, to a certain extent, universalism – without hegemony, with implications for liberal and non-liberal states alike.16 such an order would not exhibit the contradictions of liberal hegemony nor the tensions between a monist liberal order and pluralist international society, although washington may still gear its international posture toward preserving its material primacy (beckley 2020). therefore, although canada’s relative material dependence on the united states might endure, some of the more normative constraints on canadian foreign policy in terms of recalibrating 13 sørensen encapsulates this idea by predicting a “more decentred world” even as “globalization, global institutions and common global problems” continue to tie humanity together (2016, 20). 14 zakaria (2019) captures this by noting that american engagement with communist china has been successful in moderating beijing’s external behaviour over the long term, and that it was not primarily designed to transform the country’s internal economic and political system in any fundamental fashion. 15 this is also in line with the expectations of scholars cited in this article who study hegemony’s normative dimensions. lebow claims that his “cultural theory” of international relations privileges “process over structure and change over stability” (2008, 58). watson notes that swings in his “pendulum” model, which measures the relative power and influence possessed by a hegemonic state, appear more permanent than they actually are (1997, 123). 16 lebow already contends that the international orders of the modern era “were not imposed by a dominant power but the product of negotiation and compromise among multiple parties” (2018, 145-146). however, this question is even more conceptually germane in the context of the post-cold war world, which features the first international order of genuinely global scope (khanna 2019, 2), not rigidly divided by blocs or 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and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 restrictive covid-19 policies in the eu countries and russia: an institutional approach1 artur demchuk2 lomonosov moscow state university, institute for the us and canadian studies, russian academy of sciences vladimir kapitsyn3 lomonosov moscow state university artem karateev4 institute of scientific information on social sciences, russian academy of sciences abstract based on empirical quantitative data, the article provides a comparative analysis of the course of the first covid-19 pandemic wave in the countries of the european union and russia in 2020, with a particular interest in the differences in policies implemented to counter infection as well as the specifics and stringency of government response measures. special attention is paid to the countries' institutional characteristics (including the quality of healthcare, management, public trust in the government, and value orientations), which, according to the authors’ hypothesis, determine the specifics of the measures taken and their effectiveness. using the developed index of severity of the epidemiological situation and regression analysis, institutional characteristics that most influence the effectiveness of restrictive measures and the easiest passage of the pandemic wave were identified. it is also shown that, despite significant differences between russia and the eu, restrictive policies in russia during the first wave of covid-19 were largely in line with those of eu countries and that patterns and models identified on the basis of eu data accounting for institutional characteristics can predict the severity of the epidemiological situation in russia with sufficient quality. 1 this research was performed by a team of researchers from the “preservation of the world cultural and historical heritage” – a program of the interdisciplinary scientific and educational school of moscow state university. 2 artur demchuk is the head, chair of comparative politics at the department of political science, lomonosov moscow state university, and leading research fellow, institute for the u.s. and canadian studies, russian academy of sciences. 3 vladimir kapitsyn is a professor of comparative politics at the department of political science, lomonosov moscow state university. 4 artem karateev is a researcher at the department of political science, institute of scientific information on social sciences, russian academy of sciences. 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 introduction the covid-19 pandemic that has engulfed the whole world has become a serious challenge – a stress test of the systemic functioning of the state. the pandemic has tested the state’s ability to effectively mobilize resources for an adequate response to emergencies, to make optimal decisions in the context of limited time and a high degree of uncertainty, and to ensure the proper functioning of healthcare, economic, and social protection systems. it is still impossible to give the exact date for the end of the pandemic, but the global community has already gained enough experience (both successful and unsuccessful) in combating the spread of covid-19, its treatment, and managing the negative economic and social consequences of the pandemic. looking to the future, it is now important to determine the mitigating factors and measures in order to be better prepared for potential future pandemics. it is particularly important to examine the initial phase of the pandemic – when the nature of the virus was not yet known, and there were no means of control other than restrictive measures. in this regard, comparative cross-country studies are an important tool to reach such conclusions. in this study, for the purposes of statistical analysis, the authors analyze the experience of all 27 member states of the european union, the united kingdom, and the russian federation. this choice was due to the fact that russia has experienced rather severe consequences of the pandemic compared to other countries, although it implemented strict measures to combat its effects. understanding the reasons for this discrepancy is essential to clarify the predictors of the effectiveness of covid-19 measures. to do so, it is important to analyze the experiences of other countries. the comparison with the eu countries and the uk results from: 1) the geographical proximity; 2) the similar timing of the outbreak of the pandemic (march-august 2020); 3) the fact that russia introduced measures to combat the pandemic and protect businesses and the population, which are largely based on similar measures in the eu; 4) the assumption that the covid-19 statistical data from the eu are more reliable than the data from other regions with which russia could be compared; 5) the similarities between russia and the eu including common social, economic, and political features that allow for the comparison of institutional characteristics. the authors’ hypothesis is that the stringency of covid-19 measures and the severity of the pandemic are remarkably related to institutional characteristics. to predict severity, it is important to consider not only the restrictive measures but also the institutional conditions under which these measures are used and which largely determine their effectiveness. the authors expect that the inclusion of institutional characteristics in the severity model will significantly improve its predictive power. the authors also assume that despite the significant differences between russia and the eu, patterns and models based on eu data that take institutional characteristics into account will have good predictive quality in russia as well. thus, the aim of this study is to compare the passage of the first wave of the pandemic in russia and eu countries in order to – describe the relationships between the stringency of restrictive measures (1), the severity of the pandemic (2), and institutional characteristics (3). – to develop a model describing the severity of the pandemic based on the stringency of restrictive measures and institutional characteristics; – to determine how russia fits into european trends. 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 literature review the severe consequences of the pandemic were not only due to the fact that the virus was new, and physicians lacked the resources to deal with it but also the fact that governments were not prepared for a pandemic. in this regard, global research on covid-19 responses and their effectiveness since the spring of 2020 fills an important knowledge gap and reduces future risks when similar situations arise. initially, such studies lacked verified information, contributing to their delayed appearance. a more complete picture of the political reflection of the “first wave” of the covid-19 pandemic did not emerge in russia until late 2020 (belik and kolosov 2020; abisheva et al. 2021; timofeev 2020). the titles of the published works show that relatively little attention has been paid to the problem of the interdependence between the severity of the epidemiological situation and the stringency of governmental measures.5 a team of researchers from the universities in the united kingdom (uk) and the united states (us), with the participation of scientists from the higher school of economics (hse) in russia, used data from the covid-19 public health protective policy index project to study variables that correlate with the overall stringency of public health measures in federal policies and the contribution of federal and subnational institutions to covid-19 policies (shvetsova et al. 2021). the issue of stringency of anticovid-19 measures was also discussed in political science journals in canada (paquet and schertzer 2020). in the special issue of the canadian journal of political science, articles examined the stringency of anticovid-19 measures provided by policy-making institutions, including “protective public health response,” “patterns of policy aggressiveness,” and “statutory-regulatory regimes” (rayment and vanden beukel 2020). in particular, the indicator of municipal policy “aggressiveness” in countering covid-19, the relationship between municipal policy measures and potentially relevant features of the local context in canada—type of province, population size, cases of covid-19, and local ideology—was analyzed (armstrong and lucas 2020). geographically, there is a mismatch: first-wave pandemic policies in russia and eastern europe (including only the countries that are member states of the eu) have been “overshadowed” by the study of the eu (balog-way et al. 2021), the uk, and the us (balog-way and mccomas 2020). for example, eastern european countries were rarely included in the global samples based on the study of perceptions of pandemic risks (dryhurst et al. 2020). the risks of a pandemic in the first half of 2020 and the readiness of the healthcare system in the us and the uk (where the level of risk perception of covid-19 was particularly high) were studied most intensively. the lack of attention to eastern europe is especially noticeable compared to many articles studying the onset of the pandemic in china (xuefei ren 2020); in russia, researchers also conducted a lot of analysis on china and india during the first wave of the covid19 pandemic (emelyanova, kapitsyn, and karateev 2022). a large-scale study by capano et al. (2020) did not mention russia and eastern european countries. nevertheless, the subject matter and methods of the study are noteworthy for the purposes of this article. capano et al. compare the effects of different country conditions on responses to the covid-19 pandemic. the pandemic is considered as a “natural experiment” in which governments, faced with roughly the same challenges, take a variety of protective and restrictive measures, which is interesting for comparing policy instruments and the factors that led to their choice. in their study, capano et al. have created models to help develop responses to the pandemic (2020). 5 one of the few studies was conducted at lomonosov moscow state university in 2021-2022. another notable exception is the work of political scientist norbert kersting (kersting 2021; kersting and graubner 2020). 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 in russia, the first wave of the pandemic was studied extensively (chubarova and sharova 2020). although the correlation between the severity of the situation, the stringency of measures, and the effectiveness of institutions was not specifically considered, nevertheless, it was still possible to identify the influence of spatial parameters. russian regional experts used models to describe the spatial diffusion of covid-19 in regions across russia and explained the relationship between the spread of the virus and the economic specialization of the regions, their population density, urbanization, per capita income, demographic features, and the level of excess mortality. the “network – places – scaling of infection” model is justified, which explains the mechanisms of covid-19 spread and the development of counteraction measures. a pandemic is considered a multidimensional interaction in space and time of complex biological, social, and organizational systems that includes the spread of the disease, restructuring of institutions, restrictive measures, and the dissemination of information. the russian experience was compared with regional data from poland, italy, iceland, britain, germany, sweden, and denmark. polish authors krzysztofik, kantor-pietraga, and spórna (2020) considered spatial and functional features of the fight against the virus in different regions of the country, as well as multidimensional conditions for the spread of the virus in its trans-industrial regions (2021). other authors apply a spatial approach to solving the problem of optimal distribution of human resources in the first wave of the pandemic (jarynowski, wójta-kempa, and krzowski 2021). severity of the situation in the first covid-19 pandemic wave italy was the first country in europe to suffer from covid-19. the delay in implementing strict measures, in no small part, explains the exponential growth in the number of infected in italy, where there was a serious overload of emergency rooms. in just three weeks (february 21–march 11, 2020), the virus infected 12,462 people, of which 827 died. after italy, the virus quickly spread to germany and the uk, then to scandinavia and eastern europe. in germany, the first case of infection was registered in bavaria on january 27, 2020 (schilling et al. 2021). as soon as someone tested positive for covid-19, they were instructed to enter mandatory isolation, which prevented the further spread of the virus. delayed reporting and an increase in the number of asymptomatically infected people distorted statistics on covid-19. the main indicators that most accurately expressed the severity of the situation were mortality rates, the number of hospitalizations and severe cases of the disease, and the number of occupied intensive care beds. based on the analysis of a set of these variables, in april 2020, experts from the deep knowledge group in london identified germany as the country most successfully countering the spread of covid-19 in europe. germany was second after israel in the world ranking of the security of states in the face of the pandemic. russia, the uk, italy, and spain were not included in the top 40 places on this list. on the contrary, these nations were in the top 20 countries most exposed to “coronavirus risks.”6 moscow, being a densely populated metropolis and the largest transportation, financial, and industrial hub of russia, initially became a hotbed for the spread of covid-19 and occupied a leading position in terms of the total number of cases and deaths. in russia, the first cases were identified at the end of january 2020, 6 eu reporter. “#deep knowledge group ranks #israel 1st in the #covid-19 health safety countries ranking.” 2020. eu reporter. april 3, 2020. accessed january 22, 2023. https://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/ 2020/04/03/deepknowledgegroup-ranks-israel-1st-in-the-covid-19-health-safety-countries-ranking/. https://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2020/04/03/deepknowledgegroup-ranks-israel-1st-in-the-covid-19-health-safety-countries-ranking/ https://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2020/04/03/deepknowledgegroup-ranks-israel-1st-in-the-covid-19-health-safety-countries-ranking/ 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 and the peak number of active patients during the first period of the pandemic occurred in may 2020. at the same time, it is necessary to point out the distinctions in the spread of covid-19 in different regions. this is especially true for some geographically remote regions of russia and regions with a significant shift in labour migration, for example, the regions of murmansk and magadan, the komi republic, and the yamalonenets autonomous okrug (chubarova and sharova 2020). using spatial analysis of the situation in russian regions, zemtsov and baburin explained the relatively high morbidity rate in moscow, the moscow region, st. petersburg, and the nizhny novgorod region by the high mobility of people and commerce in these regions. the spatial models used by these authors made it possible to consider the russian dynamics of morbidity and mortality in 2020 in the context of the global dynamics of morbidity and mortality. the study demonstrated the importance of restrictive measures. however, the effectiveness of the anti-covid-19 policies varied by region and depended on many local economic, geographical, social, and legal factors such as population density (especially in agglomerations), mobility of the population (tourists, entrepreneurs, migrants), law enforcement practices, the level of poverty, the socio-demographic structure of the population (including the proportion of elderly people and their short-term movements, location of bus stations, organization of testing and hospitalization, and the dissemination of information – advertising, propaganda) (zemtsov and baburin 2020). a comparison of mortality rates in russia and the eu countries demonstrates that during the first covid19 wave, indicators of total mortality in russia (13 deaths per 100 000 population) were at the level of germany (12) and denmark (11.5), were significantly lower than in belgium (86), spain (63), italy (59), sweden (58), and france (48) but higher than in austria (8), hungary, slovenia (7), and poland (6) (chubarova and sharova 2020). at the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic, the danger of the virus was underestimated. due to the underestimation of the situation, the protective and restrictive measures taken did not play a very important role, and the role of institutional characteristics (general quality of health care, sanitation level, urbanization, etc.) increased, which emphasizes the importance of studying these characteristics. stringency of restrictive measures as is often the case with an unknown phenomenon, the first cases of covid-19 in western and eastern europe did not cause an adequate political reaction, although they did not go unnoticed. countries lacked the proper experience in dealing with this virus to take sufficient precautions. all countries needed some period of time to understand the nature of the virus, the symptoms that it produced, and its level of contagiousness. without this data, any epidemiological response and preventative measures were rather “blind.” however, most eu member states and russia had some kind of a “grace period” compared to the previously affected east asian countries. european countries could use data from china, where the first confirmed covid-19 cases were recorded in december 2019. in february 2020, the world health organization (who) – china joint mission on coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19) working there on behalf of the who received valuable information from chinese doctors.7 on january 27, 2020, before the pandemic was declared, the who had already 7 who. report of the who-china joint mission on coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19). 16-24 february 2020. accessed february 28, 2022. https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-finalreport.pdf . 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 warned that even though researchers had not fully decoded the coronavirus genome, it was nevertheless necessary to adjust the global risk level to “high,” noting that some infected people become contagious before they feel unwell (berres 2020). on january 30th, 2020, the who declared a global health emergency. italy was the first country in europe to introduce restrictions on leaving home, and closing schools and offices. on february 22, 2020, the italian government issued the first decree introducing lockdowns in 11 cities in northern italy. on march 2, 2020, the third decree on restrictions was issued, which identified three zones: “red” (closed), “yellow” (medium-risk), and “green” (low-risk). on march 10, 2020, the decree on the nationwide lockdown came into force. however, there was contradictory information, and the response measures were not always justified. the italian minister of health stated that the virus can be transmitted only by direct contact with a sick person. the minister of economy and the minister of infrastructure and transport announced efforts to contain the economic damage, but with only 0.01% of the area locked down, it was not advisable to suspend flights to other regions (ruiu 2020). although the virus spread in several regions, some schools reopened, and some bars and shops organized public events, including advertising events to attract visitors. germany and most european countries initially took a cautious approach to the adoption of restrictions but moved to tougher measures shortly after; the swedish government chose a more restrained approach, relying on recommendations and voluntariness as opposed to restrictions. in may 2020, there was a noticeable easing of restrictions in germany, with almost all european countries starting to lift some restrictions in june 2020. during and after the lockdown, the number of covid-19 cases decreased; several comparative studies in european countries have shown the significant impact of strict mobility and contact restrictions on reducing covid-19 incidence (bobyleva, anshin, and ptitsyn 2020; osipov, safonov, and kuzmina 2020; blümel and busse 2020; eckner 2020). in germany, strong contact restrictions imposed on march 9, 16, and 23, 2020 led to an overall decrease in the number of infections. this, of course, does not mean that nonpharmaceutical measures solve everything. however, while there were ongoing difficulties with testing and the procurement of personal protective equipment (ppe) and medical supplies, as well as no vaccines available, non-pharmaceutical measures were crucial. the significance of restrictive measures became evident in the example of the eastern european countries during the second half of 2020. compared to the eu’s “core” countries (germany, france, belgium, netherlands), countries in eastern europe had a relatively low incidence rate during the winter and spring of 2020 but then experienced a sharp breakdown (from august through to the end of 2020). there was a sharp short-term increase in the mortality rate in the czech republic. the main reason was the abrupt transition from severe restrictions (when there were few cases of covid-19 and very low mortality) to the liberalization of control over the mobility of the population (greer et al. 2021, 413). there were numerous discussions about the adequacy of restrictive measures. scientists from the university of oxford have developed indicators that are convenient for comparing the policies of different countries – the government response index, the stringency index and other indices, which included the type and volume of school closures, travel restrictions, corporate financial assistance, and investment in vaccine development.8 8 mathieu et al. “covid-19: stringency index.” our world in data. accessed february 28, 2022. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-stringency-index. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-stringency-index 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 there were difficulties with assessing the activities of the eu governing bodies to combat the pandemic because during the first stage of the pandemic, there were disputes about the contribution of the european commission to the distribution of materials (medicines, masks, etc.), and the fight against the spread of covid-19 (especially restrictive measures) focused mainly on the level of national states. therefore, the authors did not make a comparison with the level of the eu’s general anti-covid-19 policies. as for russia, by the end of january 2020, it promptly closed its borders with china and chinese citizens were banned from entering the country. in march 2020, in a short period of time, the following measures were introduced: quarantine for people who tested positive for covid-19 and mandatory isolation for individuals who had contact with those who were exposed to the virus. in order to enforce these measures, a home quarantine monitoring system named “social monitoring” (a smart phone application that sends requests for location confirmation and monitoring using gps/glonas) was introduced. in russian regions, governors and mayors took restrictive measures at the local level. in february-march 2020, people with symptoms of upper respiratory tract infection who travelled to china (italy was later added to the list) were quarantined in hospitals, remaining there until they received two negative test results. as covid-19 spread across europe, the russian government closed all international borders on april 4, 2020, and only began allowing some international flights from the beginning of august 2020 (greer et al. 2021, 414). institutional characteristics one of the approaches to understanding why countries applied certain restrictive policies and why the measures taken gave certain results is to consider the institutional characteristics of countries. this approach assumes that governments apply measures taking into account the available “institutional capacity.” on the other hand, “institutional capacity” determines (to some extent) how effective the measures are. according to this conceptual model, it would be logical to assume that even the most successful management decisions made in conditions of unsatisfactory institutional performance are doomed to low efficiency. of particular importance here is the identification of characteristics that are most associated with the success of the measures. this approach can also help to assess the readiness of countries for possible future epidemiological challenges. the difficulty in this area of research is the selection process of institutional characteristics to consider, taking into account their great diversity and quantity. interest in studying the relationship of institutional characteristics to covid-19 policies has already been outlined in a number of publications. the authors of a study conducted at the university of michigan analyzed the issues arising from the pandemic, focusing on the countries of eastern europe that have common institutional features (hungary, czech republic, bulgaria) (greer et al. 2021, 413-4). this study demonstrated the breadth of institutional characteristics that influence the severity of the pandemic. hungary, czech republic, and bulgaria have lower indicators of public administration efficiency and regulatory quality, including a lower level of investment in this area compared to developed eu countries (for example, germany and france). according to the global health index, hungary, the czech republic, and bulgaria ranked 35th, 42nd and 61st, respectively,9 which determined their lower level of preparedness in dealing with the pandemic (greer et al. 2021). however, the high level of investment and modernization of technological equipment in the uk and sweden did not help with their preparedness for the pandemic. 9 world bank. “worldwide governance indicators.” accessed february 28, 2022. https://info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi/home/reports. 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 with comparable populations, there are institutional differences between hungary, bulgaria, and the czech republic. while hungary and bulgaria are more comparable, the czech republic’s institutions are functioning more efficiently, even though the level of democratic consolidation has declined in all three countries since 2010 (engler et al. 2021). in terms of social policy, the czech republic and hungary combine elements of the bismarckian welfare state with neoliberal policies. the responsible attitude and competence of the three governments may be called into question when they (especially the czech republic and bulgaria) quickly eased restrictive measures in april–may 2020, which contributed to a rapid increase in the incidence of covid–19 in july–august 2020; in september–october 2020, the peak incidence was reached. in less neoliberal and more authoritarian hungary, authorities kept some restrictive measures throughout the summer so that only at the end of august 2020 there was an increase in the incidence of diseases. the testing and tracking systems in all three countries were overloaded, which means that the time provided by the successful actions in march 2020 was not used productively and this likely correlated with the low efficiency of administration in these countries. a critical role was played by the preservation of basic sanitary and epidemiological services as well as the work of infectious disease specialists in primary healthcare (sheiman, shishkin, and shevksy 2018), which helped to contain the spread of covid-19. sample description since the aim of this study was to assess the extent to which the first wave of the pandemic in russia resembled that of the one in eu countries and what explains the differences between the cases, data from 27 eu countries, the uk, and russia were used for the study. data for the uk were included in the study even though the country was no longer formally a member of the eu at the time of the first wave of coronavirus (uk membership was terminated on january 31, 2020). methodology to describe the severity of the epidemiological situation in a particular country, a previously developed severity index10 was used and calculated according to the following formula: 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑋1 𝑖 (𝑙𝑠) +𝑋2 𝑖 (𝑙𝑠) +𝑋3 𝑖 (𝑙𝑠) +𝑋4 𝑖 (𝑙𝑠) 4 , where )( 1 ls i x is the linearly scaled peak number of cases detected per 100 000 population, based on the 7-day moving average, for the i-th country; )( 2 ls i x – linearly scaled number of days from the onset of the pandemic in the country to the peak for the i-th country; )( 3 ls i x – linearly scaled number of days from the peak to the time when the peak value decreases by 40% for the i-th country; )( 4 ls i x – linearly scaled peak number of deaths caused by covid-19, based on the 7-day moving average for the i-th country, calculated per 100 000 population. qualitative interpretation of all components of the index: the higher they are, the more severe the epidemiological situation was. 10 a detailed description of the process for calculating the index and the results obtained by country are provided in another article by the authors (demchuk et al. 2021). 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 the severity index allows for a comparison of the course of a pandemic wave in various countries with diverse populations and at different time intervals. moreover, its application to the situation in europe (where all countries experienced the first wave at about the same time) seems justified. the severity index is a convenient generalizing characteristic of the situation in the country. to describe the severity of protective and restrictive measures imposed by the government, the stringency index was selected,11 which was developed by researchers from oxford university as part of the “covid19 government response tracker” project.12 this index considers nine indicators or events (see appendix a for details). the stringency index has been calculated by the authors of the project since january 2020 and covers more than 180 countries, considering the stringency of the measures for all nine indicators. in this study, the authors used the averaged data from the stringency index for the period starting from the onset of the pandemic in a country to its peak (i.e., the period described by the parameter 2x of the severity index). the authors of this article refer to this averaged characteristic as si. thus, si describes the average severity of the measures that allowed to curb the upward trend in the daily number of cases in a given country. seven groups of indicators were used to describe the institutional characteristics of the countries, including demographic, economic, health, cultural, and other parameters (see appendix b for more details). data relevant to the study at the time of the onset of the first wave of the pandemic in europe were used. further data analysis was performed by pair correlation analysis of stringency, severity, and institutional characteristics to estimate the relationship between them. in some cases, the study of the correlation between individual components of the severity index on the one hand and institutional characteristics on the other was used to determine the features of the influence of institutional characteristics. to estimate the effects of institutional characteristics on the severity of the first covid-19 wave, the principal component regression (pcr) technique was used. for this purpose, the data were centred and scaled so that the obtained parameters of the multivariate linear regression equation could be compared with each other. to assess the extent to which russia fits in or diverges from the eu trends, the authors included a dummy variable in the pcr model and also compared the correlation coefficients between severity and institutional characteristics and between stringency and institutional characteristics for two samples: with and without russia. data analysis relationship between the severity of the epidemiological situation and the stringency of the measures in the first phase, the relationship between the severity of the situation (x variable) and the stringency of the measures (si variable) was analyzed. the correlation analysis showed a negative pearson linear 11 oxcgrt. “methodology for calculating indices.” accessed march 1, 2022. https://github.com/oxcgrt/covidpolicy-tracker/blob/master/documentation/index_methodology.md. 12 university of oxford. covid-19 government response tracker. accessed april 12, 2022. https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/covid-19-government-response-tracker. 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 correlation coefficient of –0.37 (95% confidence level), which can be interpreted as a moderate negative relationship (figure 1). in other words, more stringent measures correspond to a lower severity of the situation. this result is logical and consistent with the goals of the measures introduced – to protect the population from covid-19, stricter measures should be more protective. figure 1. relationship between the severity of the epidemiological situation and the stringency of the measures. source: authors’ calculations high variability of severity and stringency indicators at the same time, a wide range can be seen with respect to the regression line. this means that two countries with the same stringency of measures can have very different severity, and conversely, countries with similar severity can have very different stringency. in belgium and latvia, the stringency of the measures was approximately the same (they are roughly on the same vertical line) but the severity of the situation was significantly different. cyprus and slovenia had similar severity levels but very different stringency levels. 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 the reasons for this range may be: – the influence of additional factors (especially those related to the institutional characteristics of the countries) – inaccuracies in national statistics – in some cases, the measures were not introduced as a preventive measure but as a response to the current unfavourable epidemic situation in the country. thus, the explanatory model becomes more complex: on the one hand, as has been shown, the measures taken reduce the severity, but on the other hand, the severity of the situation encourages more stringent measures. if in the first case there is a negative correlation, in the second case there is a positive correlation. the superposition of these two trends leads to a rather large spread of points in the scatterplot. it should be noted that the correlation coefficient obtained is much closer to –1 than the coefficient obtained in the previous sample studies conducted by the authors for countries around the world. this may suggest that the eu’s restrictive policies were, on the whole, more well-thought-out and timely than the global average. the position of the eastern european countries is quite compact: with very similar stringency scores (between 70 and 80), they have a relatively low dispersion in severity. the exception is bulgaria, where high severity was observed under weaker restrictions. nevertheless, despite its particular position on the scatterplot, bulgaria fits the “stronger restrictions – lower severity” trend. overall, the eastern european countries of the eu show a very strong correlation between stringency and severity, which is -0.82. this indicates the closeness of institutional characteristics, approximately similar conditions, and a similar impact of restrictive measures on severity. russia is not in the best position in the european comparison. it is far from the trend line: relatively strict measures are associated with rather high severity. however, this is not to say that the situation in russia is very different from that of the eu countries; it is similar to that of italy, luxembourg, and ireland. best policies analyzing the position of countries in the two-dimensional space of the stringency of measures and epidemic severity (figure 1), the authors can identify the zone at the bottom left, which corresponds to the easy passage of the pandemic wave and, at the same time, relatively lax measures. the countries with the best policies—combining the possibility of the low severity of the epidemiological situation and low stringency of measures—are germany, estonia, and latvia. adjacent to these countries are austria, denmark, finland, slovenia, and greece. the covid-19 policies of these countries can be seen as an example of how to best learn from this experience. the role of institutional characteristics to examine how the severity of the epidemiological situation in a country and the stringency of the measures taken are related to its institutional characteristics (as well as to understand which characteristics are responsible for a country falling the lower left part of the scatterplot), a pair linear correlation analysis was performed. the pearson coefficients are shown in table 1. in order to assess the combined impact and individual effect sizes of the institutional characteristics, the authors conducted a multivariate regression analysis. the objective was to obtain a linear regression model 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 for pandemic severity (dependent variable x) using institutional characteristics (c1, c2, …) and the stringency of restrictive measures (si) as independent variables. in addition, a dummy variable d (d=0 for eu countries and d=1 for russia) was included in the model to estimate the difference between russia and the eu: 𝑋 = 𝑎1𝐶1 + 𝑎2𝐶2 + … + 𝑏 𝑆𝐼 + 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝑎 , where a, a1, a2, …, b, f are model parameters estimated from the data. the linear form of the model can be debated, but the authors chose it for its simplicity and its ability to provide an easy comparison of the contribution of institutional characteristics to epidemic severity reduction. in future research, it is reasonable to use other types of models, including nonlinear models. since some of the institutional characteristics (e.g. population density, safe sanitation, employment rate, government trust index, media trust index, and broadband subscriptions) have a weak correlation with the severity index (see table 1), they are excluded from the set of independent variables. survival/selfexpression values and traditional/secular values were not used as predictors in the regression model due to incomplete data. as some independent variables demonstrated a strong correlation among themselves, the principal component regression (pcr) technique was used to avoid multicollinearity and, thus, wide confidence intervals for the model parameters. the data were centred and scaled to allow comparison of the regression model parameters. the first two pcs have a cumulative proportion of explained variance equal to 73.4 % and therefore used to build a regression model: 𝑋 = 𝑑1𝑃𝐶1 + 𝑑2𝑃𝐶2 + 𝑑 the calculated parameters (d1, d2) both have p-values of less than 0.05. the resulting coefficients for institutional characteristics (a1, a2,…,an) are shown in table 1. the coefficient b for si is –0.180, the coefficient f of the dummy variable d is 0.017, and the constant d is equal to –0.009. the amount of variance explained by the model (r-squared) is 0.33. thus, the authors see that the inclusion of institutional characteristics in the severity prediction model increases the amount of variance explained from 0.13 (figure 1) to 0.33. 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 table 1. relationship between severity and institutional characteristics and between the stringency index and institutional characteristics indicator correlation coefficient between indicator and severity index (x variable) regression parameter for severity model (slope) correlation coefficient between indicator and stringency of protective and restrictive measures (si variable) 1 area 0.45 0.207 –0.45 2 population 0.40 0.228 –0.42 3 population density –0.05 – 0.13 4 urban population 0.42 0.093 –0.34 5 health expenditures 0.50 0.091 –0.41 6 life expectancy at birth 0.40 0.009 –0.17 7 safe sanitation 0.13 – –0.27 8 gdp per capita, ppp 0.40 0.001 –0.05 9 employment rate 0.00 – –0.14 10 government trust index 0.03 – –0.15 11 media trust index 0.03 – –0.12 12 survival / self-expression values 0.37 – –0.56 13 traditional / secular values –0.15 – –0.40 14 fragile states index –0.28 –0.003 0.36 15 democracy index 0.35 –0.024 –0.46 16 government effectiveness 0.21 0.038 –0.42 17 regulatory quality 0.26 0.005 –0.45 18 ict development index (idi) 0.31 0.093 –0.45 19 broadband subscriptions 0.12 – –0.31 source: authors’ calculations discussion the importance of the “scale” factor and health expenditures when analyzing the scatterplot (figure 1), it is noticeable that, in addition to russia, such large and populous eu countries as spain, sweden, france, italy, the uk, and poland are above the trend line. the position above the trend line means that with such stringent restrictions, one could expect a much better situation in severity and that the actual observed severity is higher than expected. the only large eu country that falls 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 below the trend line is germany. it is also noteworthy that only a few countries with a small territory and population are above the trend line. the relationship between severity and land area and the relationship between severity and population size is confirmed by the data in table 1. the correlation coefficient between severity and area is 0.45 (the second highest coefficient in the column), and the regression parameter is 0.207 (one of the highest). the coefficient between severity and population size is 0.40, and the regression parameter is 0.228. in other words, the larger the area and the larger the population, the more severe the pandemic wave. thus, the “scale” of the country turns out to be one of the main factors leading to severe consequences of the pandemic. smaller countries seem to be more manageable, and therefore, the restrictions introduced are more appropriate and achieve a greater impact. in particular, the inconvenience of managing large and/or populous areas led to a system in which restrictions were regulated at the regional level rather than the national level (this practice was also adopted by russia). it is important to note that there is a positive correlation between health expenditures and severity. this means that countries with higher expenditures experienced a more severe pandemic. while logically it was expected that high expenditures would mean a good healthcare system in which the pandemic wave should pass more easily, it is also worth noting that there is a positive relationship between pandemic severity and other institutional characteristics of the same group: life expectancy and sanitary conditions of the population. these results can be explained by several reasons: first, high healthcare expenditures are not the same as high healthcare efficiency (as seen, for example, in the us during the summer of 2020). second, good healthcare financing usually means relatively affordable healthcare, better diagnostics, sufficient medicine and test materials, and adequate procedures for collecting and processing health statistics. as a result, countries with higher health expenditures are likely to have higher detection rates of individuals infected with covid-19. this suggests that morbidity and mortality statistics from covid-19 are likely to be underestimated in countries with low health expenditures. third, higher life expectancy indicates not only good quality healthcare but also people’s attitudes towards their health. people who are concerned about their health often seek the help of doctors and have more frequent checkups. this also leads to more frequent detection of the virus. at the same time, it can be noted that there is a negative relationship between the stringency of the measures and indicators 5, 6, and 7 (health expenditures, life expectancy at birth, and safe sanitation). this is apparently due to the fact that governments are largely guided by the state of the healthcare system, sanitary conditions, and public health when making decisions about the introduction of certain covid-19 measures. the higher these indicators are, the more the authorities assume that the healthcare system, sanitary conditions, and public health offer reliable protection for the population from the pandemic and, as a result, introduce weaker measures. in other words, effective healthcare, good sanitary conditions, and the health of the nation should compensate for lax protection and restriction measures. for a deeper understanding of the relationship between “scale” and severity, as well as the relationship between health expenditures and severity, one can turn to an analysis of how these institutional characteristics relate to the components of the severity index. the results of this analysis, presented in table 2, lead to the following conclusions: 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 – the components 1x (peak number of detected cases) and 4x (peak number of deaths) have a stronger correlation with the health expenditures than with the “scale” indicators. it can be concluded that the proportion of registered infected and deceased people depends on the quality of healthcare. – the “scale” indicators, in turn, are more strongly related to the components 2x (days from the beginning to peak of the pandemic) and 3x (days from peak to 40% decrease) than health expenditures. 2x and 3x describe time parameters and the duration of the wave. therefore, it looks quite logical: it is the size of the population and territory that determines how long the pandemic lasts and how long the wave recedes. based on these results, the authors can show that the positive relationships between severity and indicators 1, 2, and 5 (area, population, and health expenditures) are not random and confirm the assumption that the positive relationship between health expenditures and severity is due to higher quality of diagnosis and better medical statistics. table 2. correlation coefficients between selected institutional characteristics and severity index components indicator severity index (x) peak number of detected cases ( 1x ) number of days from the beginning of the pandemic in the country to the peak ( 2x ) number of days from the peak until the peak value decreases by 40 % ( 3x ) peak number of deaths ( 4x ) 1. area 0.45 0.12 0.35 0.41 0.36 2. population 0.40 0.12 0.17 0.33 0.44 5. health expenditures 0.50 0.66 0.02 –0.14 0.52 source: authors’ calculations the situation in russia is almost completely consistent with these conclusions: health expenditures in russia are relatively low compared to eu countries. they correlate with a low 4x value (0.12), while the eu average is 0.58. high values of area and population indicators for russia are accompanied by high values of 2x (56 days) and 3x (58 days) instead of 34 and 14 days, respectively, in europe. interestingly, area, and population have a striking negative correlation with stringency. it can be seen that the larger the area and population, the weaker the restrictions. this can likely be explained by the fact that the more stringent the measures are, the more difficult it is to control their implementation in a large area and/or with a large population. small states with a small population are considered better suited to introduce stringent measures and effectively monitor their implementation. thus, the “scale” of the country proves to be a crucial factor in protecting the population and reducing the severity of the pandemic. at the same time, it is important to emphasize that the “scale” factor affects the components ( 2x and 3x ), which are almost unaffected by health expenditures. this means that an increase in health expenditures is unlikely to 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 compensate for the “scale effect.” this may explain, in particular, the difficult course of the pandemic in the us in spite of the very high health expenditures. the role of urbanization another factor that has a noticeable impact on both severity and stringency is urbanization. at the same time, a weak correlation between severity, stringency, and population density should be noted. it could be supposed that the urbanization indicator reflects close physical contact of the population rather than population density. additionally, the urban population feels the consequences of the introduction of restrictive measures and the breakdown of the usual way of life to a greater extent than the rural population,13 which, among other things, affects the psychological state of the population and is expressed through the opposition to restrictions. at the same time, the difference in the signs of the correlation coefficients between urbanization and severity and between urbanization and stringency is remarkable. a positive relationship between urbanization and severity seems logical, while a negative relationship between urbanization and stringency could indicate that governments underestimate the urbanization factor when introducing protection and restriction measures. two factors could account for this underestimation. first, during the initial wave of the pandemic, epidemiologists did not yet fully identify the modes of transmission of covid-19. second, when the measures were introduced, it was assumed that the urban population could count on better healthcare and better sanitation and was thus better protected from the pandemic. wealth vs. system effectiveness gross domestic product (gdp) based on purchasing power parity (ppp) per capita shows a surprisingly small effect on severity, according to the obtained regression model. most likely, a similar result is a consequence of the imposition of three effects: – eu countries, like russia, have a fairly good level of gdp ppp per capita (although with russia, a high level of income inequality should be mentioned). this parameter is more than two times higher than the world average in all countries in the sample. thus, gdp ppp per capita can be considered consistently high in all the countries studied, which has no critical impact on the situation of the population or the state of infrastructure or on other factors that, in turn, may influence the severity of the pandemic. – well-being can positively influence the severity (this relationship can be interpreted similarly to the interpretation of the positive relationship between severity and health expenditures). – at the same time, a high gdp ppp per capita should reduce severity because the population presumably has better healthcare and more opportunities to receive proper medical help. in general, it must be noted that at the time of the pandemic outbreak, it was not the available resources (which can be indirectly assessed by gdp ppp per capita) that were critical for reducing its consequences but the ability to use these resources effectively. it is, therefore, no coincidence that government effectiveness and the democracy index (often interpreted as an indicator of institutional quality) carry more weight in the authors’ model. the relationship between system effectiveness indicators and severity should take into account the noticeable negative relationship between system effectiveness and the stringency index. the data obtained 13 gfk. “issledovanie gfk: effekt covid-19 [gfk study: the effect of covid-19].” accessed march 21, 2022. https://www.gfk.com/ru/press/issledovanie-gfk-ehffekt-covid-19 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 can be interpreted as indicating that authorities have implemented less stringent restrictive measures with confidence in the effectiveness of the system. better policies and institutions should compensate for weaker restrictions. in general, it appears that the more effective governments are, the more they rely on their ability to control the situation. at the same time, the positive correlation between the indicators of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and severity may indicate that these capabilities are overestimated. another reason for this positive correlation is that the high level of government effectiveness and regulatory quality means both the efficiency of healthcare and the effectiveness of identifying covid-19 cases. the impact of ict the level of development and dissemination of information and communication technologies (indicators 18, 19) is likely to lead to a reduction in severity. people can be expected to leave their homes less often and have less frequent physical contact if they have electronic means of communication, opportunities to work at home, study, use services, and purchase goods online. however, it seems that this behaviour of the population is overestimated, as both indicators 18 and 19 demonstrate a positive correlation with severity. this positive correlation can also be explained by the fact that high information and communications technology (ict) penetration is a sign of a high level of prosperity and high health expenditures in a country; the mechanism of influence of these characteristics on severity has been described above. russia follows european trends the question of how russia fits into european trends should be divided into two parts: 1) did the restrictive policy in russia during the first wave of covid-19 largely correspond to eu trends? and 2) how do the results of this policy compare to the results in the european union? the answer to the first question is positive. this can be seen both from the sequence of events (eu countries started introducing restrictive measures before russia, so it was an obvious step for the russian leadership to take into account the experience of the eu) and from the particular measures taken in russia (russia largely replicated similar measures taken by eu countries, with some differences related to the stringency of the restrictions adopted but not their nomenclature). it can be noted that restrictive policies in russia during the first wave of covid-19 were largely in line with eu trends. russia took into account institutional capacity to the same extent as the policies of european countries did. this conclusion is supported by the quantitative results of this study: for almost all institutional characteristics, the inclusion or exclusion of russia in the sample does not lead to noticeable changes in correlation coefficients between these characteristics and the stringency of measures. the answer to the second question is more complex. on the one hand, as is seen in figure 1, russia is quite far from the trend line. on the other hand, this figure is only a projection of a more complex multidimensional space in which the severity of a pandemic is influenced not only by the stringency of the measures but also by other factors. in the obtained model, the authors have tried to account for this multidimensionality, considering not only stringency but also institutional characteristics. russia's alignment with european trends can be assessed by the constant f for the dummy variable d included in the model. its value close to 0 shows that russia fits well with the european trends and that the severity of the covid-19 wave in russia can be successfully predicted using the patterns observed in the eu. the model shows that at a given level of stringency and under the given institutional conditions, the registered severity of the epidemic situation in the russian federation is quite expected. the error given by the model in estimating the severity for russia is only 0.06 on a scale of 0 to 1. 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 these results may indicate that: – the impact of some institutional characteristics on severity in russia differs from the impact of these characteristics in eu countries – some of the protective and restrictive measures have somewhat different effects in russia than in eu countries – at the same time, these differences can be explained to some extent by the trends observed in the eu thus, despite the existing economic, political, social, and cultural differences, russia’s restrictive policies during the first wave of the pandemic were generally consistent with those of eu countries. however, the results for russia were more severe than could be expected based on the trends in eu countries. one of the reasons for this result seems to be that the introduction of protective and restrictive measures has simply followed the example of eu countries, not taking sufficient account of russian specificities, in particular, the “scale effect.” of course, the russian authorities had little time to adapt these measures to russian conditions when “borrowing” them. it is also worth noting that at the beginning of the pandemic, it was quite difficult to assess the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of foreign experiences since, at that time, scientists did not even have a clear understanding of the mechanism and transmission of the virus. further research further research on this topic could address the following issues: 1) search for other institutional characteristics that may affect the stringency of restrictive measures as well as the severity of the epidemic; 2) clarify the shape of the relationship between institutional characteristics, stringency, and severity – in particular, it is important to test the hypothesis of an increase or decrease in the effect of institutional characteristics, since the relationship may not be linear; 3) clarify the regional specificities of the relationships between the studied characteristics. regarding the first point, it seems particularly important to include characteristics indicating population values in the explanatory model of severity. based on the correlation analysis, it can be assumed that severity is significantly influenced by values. the prevalence of self-expression and secular-rational values correlates with weaker restrictive measures. indeed, in the spread of secular-rational values, governments can rely on the population’s conscious and voluntary refusal to travel, make physical contact, etc. conversely, a higher degree of survival values leads to poorer compliance with restrictive measures, which on the one hand, increases their stringency, and on the other hand, intensifies the severity of the pandemic. thus, russian and international studies (gubernatorov 2020) demonstrate that people who have no income and/or savings are more likely to downplay the real risk of covid-19 infection and violate the protective measures established by the authorities. 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 references abisheva, marian, taissiya marmontova, raushan dulambayeva, and bauyrzhan baglay. 2021. “covid19 country strategies counteraction: a system analysis experience.” vestnik volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. seriia 4, istoriia, 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https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.pp.cd?view=chart https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ag.lnd.totl.k2?end=2020&start=1961&view=chart https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ag.lnd.totl.k2?end=2020&start=1961&view=chart https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/home/reports https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/home/reports https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvscontents.jsp 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 appendix a. the components of stringency index 1. school closing (c1) 2. workplace closing (c2) 3. cancel public events (c3) 4. restrictions on gatherings (c4) 5. close public transport (c5) 6. stay at home requirements (c6) 7. restrictions on internal movement (c7) 8. international travel controls (c8) 9. public info campaigns (h1) appendix b. seven groups of indicators that were used to describe the institutional characteristics of the countries 1) geography and demographics: – area14 – population15 – population density16 – urban population (% of total population)17 2) state of the healthcare system, sanitary conditions and public health: – health expenditures (in us dollars per capita)18 – life expectancy at birth19 – safe sanitation (sustainable society index – indicator 3)20 3) welfare of the population: – gdp per capita, ppp (current international $)21 14world bank. “land area (sq. km).” accessed january 22, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ ag.lnd.totl.k2?end=2020&start=1961&view=chart. 15 world bank. “population, total.” accessed january 22, 2023. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl. 16world bank. “population density.” accessed january 22, 2023. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ en.pop.dnst?view=chart. 17world bank. “urban population (% of total population).” accessed december 11, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.urb.totl.in.zs?view=chart. 18who. 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https://apps.who.int/nha/database/country_profile/index/en https://population.un.org/wpp/download/files/1_indicators%20(standard)/excel_files/3_mortality/wpp2019_mort_f07_1_life_expectancy_0_both_sexes.xlsx https://population.un.org/wpp/download/files/1_indicators%20(standard)/excel_files/3_mortality/wpp2019_mort_f07_1_life_expectancy_0_both_sexes.xlsx https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.pp.cd?view=chart 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 – employment (sustainable society index – indicator 20)22 4) public confidence in institutions, the media, and the government: – government trust index (eurobarometer)23 – media trust index (eurobarometer)24 5) values and cultural characteristics of the population: – survival / self-expression values (world values survey)25 – traditional / secular values (world values survey)26 6) political system: – fragile states index (the fund for peace)27 – democracy index (democracy index, 10-14)28 – government effectiveness (world governance indicators)29 – regulatory quality (world governance indicators)30 7) level of ict development and dissemination: – ict development index (idi) (measuring the information society report)31 – broadband subscriptions 32 based on fixed-broadband subscriptions and active mobilebroadband subscriptions (international telecommunication union) indicators33 22 “sustainable society index.” https://ssi.wi.th-koeln.de/documents/version2/2019-preliminary.pdf. 23 european commission. standard eurobarometer 92. 2019. public opinion in the european union. autumn 2019. accessed january 29, 2023. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableid=72800. 24 european commission. standard eurobarometer 92. 2019. public opinion in the european union. autumn 2019. accessed january 29, 2023. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableid=72800. 25world values survey. “findings and insights.” accessed january 20, 2022. https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ wvscontents.jsp?cmsid=findings. 26 “findings and insights.” accessed january 20, 2022. 27the fund for peace. 2021. “fragile states index: annual report 2021.” https://fragilestatesindex.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/fsi2021-report.pdf. 28the economist intelligence unit. 2020. “democracy index 2019.” accessed march 30, 2022. https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=democracyindex2019. 29world bank. “worldwide governance indicators.” accessed february 28, 2022. https://info.worldbank.org /governance/wgi/home/reports. 30 “worldwide governance indicators.” 31 itu. measuring the information society report 2017 1 (31). accessed january 27, 2022. https://www.itu.int/en/itud/statistics/documents/publications/misr2017/misr2017_volume1.pdf. 32 currently, the spread of broadband access is considered to be one of the main indicators of the country's involvement in the information society. also, the presence or absence of broadband access is considered to be the main line of the digital divide (digital divide). 33 itu. “country ict data.” accessed january 27, 2022. https://www.itu.int/en/itu-d/statistics/pages/stat/ default.aspx. https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/home/reports https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/home/reports https://www.itu.int/en/itu-d/statistics/pages/stat/‌default.aspx https://www.itu.int/en/itu-d/statistics/pages/stat/‌default.aspx 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to doubleblind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 covid-19 and the russian regional response: blame diffusion and attitudes to pandemic governance matthew blackburn, university of warsaw1 derek s. hutcheson, malmö university, sweden2 bo petersson, malmö university, sweden3 elena tsumarova, north-west institute of management russian academy of national economy and public administration, russia4 abstract as was the case with other federal states, russia’s response to the covid-19 pandemic was decentralized and devolved responsibility to regional governors. contrary to the common highly centralized governance in russia, this approach is thought to have helped insulate the government from criticism. using local research and analysis based on a national representative survey carried out at the height of the pandemic during the summer of 2021, the article charts the public response to the pandemic across russia. it examines the regionalization of the response, with an in-depth focus on two of the russian cities with the highest infection rates but differing responses to the pandemic: st. petersburg and petrozavodsk. there are two main findings: at one level, the diffusion of responsibility meant little distinction was made between the different levels of government by the population; at another level, approval of the pandemic measures was tied strongly to trust levels in central and regional government. 1 matthew blackburn is a research fellow at the department of political science at the university of warsaw and an affiliated researcher at the institute of russian and eurasian studies at uppsala university. 2 derek s. hutcheson is professor of political science at malmö university, sweden. 3 bo petersson is professor of political science and co-director of the research platform russia, ukraine and the caucasus regional research (rucarr) at malmö university, sweden. 4 elena tsumarova is an assistant professor at the department of comparative political studies north-west institute of management russian academy of national economy and public administration. 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 introduction while the covid-19 pandemic presented a serious challenge to political systems across the globe, the very criteria for success in covid-19 governance are divisive. how to weigh saving lives and avoiding the overloading of hospitals against economic damage, mental health crises, and the violation of civil liberties? the question of which countries have paid too high a price or persisted with ineffective measures for too long remains vital for future pandemic management and discussions about the relative strengths and weaknesses of democratic and autocratic governance. early observations about the benefits of autocratic rule for covid-19 management have not been borne out; democracies and autocracies alike experienced outbreaks and overwhelmed healthcare systems. lockdowns and vaccination drives have involved different methods in autocratic and democratic contexts, but the results have varied in ways that suggest factors other than political regime type are important. the focus of this article is on the russian federation, whose special brand of electoral authoritarianism has previously been understood by many as being halfway between liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism. during the covid-19 pandemic, contradictory trends were observed in russian politics, with the devolution of covid-19 governance to the regions combined with hyper-centralizing constitutional reforms further empowering the president and a wave of repressive laws enforced against political opposition and civil society in 2021. this article examines the extent to which the delegation of responsibility to the regions affected levels of public trust in the state’s handling of the covid-19 pandemic and explores how variations in covid-19 policies played out in regional case studies. the main empirical question is whether the delegation of responsibility to the regions led to successful displacement or a sharing of the blame for the management of the crisis. this article examines the public reaction to covid-19 governance through surveys on nationwide and regional levels as well as an in-depth focus on russia's second-largest city, st. petersburg, and the provincial capital of petrozavodsk. this article uses these layers to analyze the public response to the antipandemic measures and the regional diversity of the approaches to it. the authors of this article find that policy responses to covid-19 were highly regionalized but that people tended not to differentiate between federal and regional authorities when it came to the responsibility for handling the crisis. the authors argue that this reflects broader attitudes to governance and the state in russia. trust in the respective levels of government was the largest predictor of approval of covid-19 governance; this suggests that the kremlin’s devolution approach to covid-19 management was relatively successful. overall, this article identifies a relationship between less invasive covid-19 governance and higher covid-19 governance approval ratings, which suggests that limits on state intervention in everyday life are still an important component of the ‘social contract’ behind the putin system. nonetheless, with developments surrounding the war in ukraine and the mobilization of military reserves in the autumn of 2022, that ‘social contract’ is surely now under more serious pressure in the postcovid period. electoral authoritarianism and covid-19 governance: framing the russian case during the first phases of the pandemic, political leaders across the globe seemed markedly indecisive and devoid of clear strategies of action (arukwe 2022). there was a general tendency for authoritarian regimes to react later and harder to the pandemic than more democratic ones (nelson 2021). electoral authoritarian regimes such as russia, iran, and kazakhstan hardly 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 distinguished themselves as successful managers of the pandemic (åslund 2020). intuitively, one could explain this by pointing out that electoral authoritarianism lacks the key advantages of both liberal democratic and closed authoritarian states. electoral authoritarianism, with its flaunting of democratic practices, lacks liberal democracies’ strengths in information capacity, which, through openness on gathering and disseminating key data, serves to combat pandemics. electoral authoritarianism also lacks the advantages of closed authoritarian states that can use full coercive capacity to enforce strict measures to curb their spread (mao 2021). electoral authoritarian regimes thus risk falling in between the two poles and excelling in neither domain. in determining russia’s position as electoral authoritarian at the time of this study (2020-21),5 there are three points to be made on governance, social trust, and legitimacy in russia. the first is that the system has been rather resilient and broadly achieved the consent of the governed (greene and robertson 2019; loftus 2022) with polling data showing increased trust in certain parts of the state in comparison with the yeltsin period (levada 2021) and broad agreement with the kremlin’s statist agenda (volkov and kolesnikov 2018). secondly, in contrast to closed authoritarian systems like china, russia has, prior to 2021-22, had a less invasive state. state responses to protests have been selective and not uniformly repressive (greene 2014). thirdly, the basic restoration of state capacity and the delivery of basic state outputs, while below the level expected in many western countries, has been considered an acceptable compromise between an invasive soviet-style state and the erratic liberal reforming state of the 1990s in much of russian society. it is clear that the basic achievements of holding russia together and having a functional state, things not considered urgent in most western societies, are marked as key achievements amongst both russian elites and the masses, with most of the credit going to the president. the popularity of these statist priorities, visible in polling data, taken together with the paradox of rather minimalistic expectations toward the state, must be kept in mind when examining responses to covid-19 governance. to summarize the social contract (at least as it existed until the start of the war in ukraine in 2022) – the president or regime ensures the state is “strong” insofar as territorial integrity, social order, macro-economic stability, national independence, and great power status are retained. meanwhile, the people put up with corruption, weak institutions, and governance-related problems with the proviso that the state does not become too invasive or predatory to them as individuals. issues such as democratization, civil rights, the rule of law, and improving institutions are tacitly understood to be off the agenda. the political context of the coronavirus pandemic and russia's model of federalism prior to the outbreak of the covid pandemic, economic stagnation, falling approval ratings (levada 2022), and question marks over president vladimir putin’s political future after his fourth presidential term (2018-24) cast clouds over the kremlin’s political agenda for 2020. in a step that sought to regain political momentum, putin announced sweeping constitutional changes in january 2020. the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic partly interfered with this agenda, forcing putin to cancel several of his 2020 planned events and conduct his affairs from his office over video link (blackburn and petersson 2021). this approach was out of step with the image putin had promoted over the last two decades as a brave and decisive man of action 5 here we must add the caveat that since the outbreak of the intensified war on ukraine at the end of february 2022, there is evidence russia is shifting to a closed authoritarian system. this is, however, subsequent to our article’s timescale (03.2020-01.2022), and we argue that russia remained an electoral authoritarian regime during the period we examined. 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 (frye 2021; petersson 2021). in the end, he spent close to a year in a specially constructed underground facility – a point capitalized on by alexey navalny, who lampooned the president as an “old man in a bunker,” fearful of contracting the disease. with putin taking a back seat, the stage was seemingly set for regional governors to show what they could do. two factors played a role in the decentralization of the responsibility for managing the pandemic: the country’s size (a single policy devised in moscow surely could not apply uniformly to regions several thousand kilometres away) and the question of where responsibility (or blame) would lie. by the presidential decree originally issued on april 2, 2020, the regional governors of the russian federation were mandated to “implement a set of restrictive and other measures aimed at ensuring the sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population within the boundaries of their territories” (presidential decree 2020). russia’s decentralized approach followed the model of many other federal countries by sharing the management of the pandemic between the centre and the constituent federal subjects and delegating significant authority downwards (chattopadhyay et al. 2022). yet, in the russian case, some key points must be made about the nature of centre-region relations and why this approach stood out. firstly, from his very first years as president, putin has deployed centralized methods of state-building to wrest power back from the regions, reducing their autonomy stage by stage (busygina 2016).6 while constitutional amendments brought about the hyper-centralization of power in 2020, the decentralization of covid-19 governance should be seen as an exceptional short-term measure rather than any permanent reform of federalism in administrative or fiscal terms (burkhardt 2020). secondly, by making regional governors accountable for the management of the crisis, the central authorities could shift blame downwards (smyth et al. 2020; blackburn and petersson 2021; terzyan 2021; shirikov et al 2023). the simple rationale was that the political centre takes the credit for impressive nation-level achievements while regional leaders, deprived of sufficient resources, are the ready-made fall guys when chaos and disorder strike at the local level (busygina 2019; smyth et al. 2020; malinova 2020; petersson 2021). this reserves the privilege of the president to step in at the very last moment and seemingly put things right. thirdly, over the last ten years, being in the position of regional governor has increasingly reflected not the approval of the local population but of the kremlin. for example, between 2017-2019, more than two-thirds of governors were removed (ivanov and petrov 2021) and often replaced by outsiders with strong kremlin connections (but no local roots) that were parachuted into regional leadership roles. regional governors of this new type simply cannot be expected to contradict the president or enter into public disputes with the federal centre. they conform to the key positions of state media on most issues and accept the primacy of key federal prerogatives, gaining, in return, a free hand in other matters. this loyalty is unsurprising; such governors owe their positions to the political centre and their fate is very much tied up with that of the president and the political system as a whole. the authors of this article agree with busygina and filippov (2021) that the regional authorities are essentially no less invested in maintaining the stability of the system than the kremlin itself. the conformity of regional governors should be noted. no governors broke ranks at any stage to complain about a lack of resources or criticize the federal authorities. they all followed the order to conduct the june/july referendum on constitutional amendments in 2020, regardless of the covid-19 situation in their region. a comparison of excess mortality and reported covid 6 direct gubernatorial elections were abolished in 2004, and when they were restored in 2012, this included a municipal and presidential filter to easily exclude unacceptable oppositional candidates (blakkisrud 2015, 115). 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 statistics indicated that many of them appear to have manipulated covid-19 death statistics to ensure conformity to the narratives in state media (busygina and filippov 2021; kofanov et al., 2022). the image presented of a unified power vertical without dissenters is combined with deliberate distortion of russia’s covid-19 response, which is bound to have an effect on public opinion. research design and hypotheses to investigate attitudes on state management of covid-19, the authors of this article examine three levels: (1) the nationwide attitudes toward how federal and (2) regional authorities handled the pandemic seen in an aggregate perspective across russia; (3) a specific qualitative focus on two case studies: st. petersburg and petrozavodsk. there has been near-universal acknowledgement for centuries that legitimate government rests on trust between the rulers and the ruled (newton et al. 2017). at the most basic level, trust is “the belief that others will, so far as they can, look after our interests, that they will not take advantage or harm us” (newton 1999, 170). central to this study are four hypotheses that connect the population’s trust in the respective levels of government with their expectations of policy delivery when it comes to covid-19 governance: • h1: it would be expected that those who trust the federal authorities more than the regional ones are more likely to approve how federal authorities handled the covid19 pandemic. • h2: conversely, those who trust the regional authorities more than the federal ones will give more credit for handling it well to the regional authorities. • h3: support for federal measures will be positively correlated with trust in the federal government. • h4: support for regional measures will be positively correlated with trust in the regional government. to assess the above hypotheses, data are used from a specially commissioned national representative survey conducted in the russian federation in june 2021 (malmö university/levada-center 2021). fieldwork was conducted in the form of face-to-face interviews conducted in russian in a representative set of 97 urban and 40 rural locations from june 17-28, 2021. the survey contained 28 questions (plus demographic information). it was commissioned by malmö university and carried out by the levada center, russia’s leading independent sociological company. the national representative sample size was n=1623, with a deepened representative sample at the city level in three major cities (st. petersburg, ekaterinburg, and petrozavodsk) of 300 or 301 respondents, respectively. in total, the weighted sample size was n=2525. the refusal rate was 42 percent, and the margin of error is not more than +/3.4 percent at the 95 percent confidence level. despite the issues of surveying public opinion in authoritarian countries (robinson and tannenberg 2019), the authors of this article have reasons to assume that the survey results in this article are not overly affected by these factors.7 7 first, the national representative survey is conducted using random probability sampling, removing any bias from self-selection. second, the questions on covid and trust in different levels of government were asked as supplementary questions in a survey that was about the relatively politically uncontentious matter of urban governance and city use during covid. third, though russia has long had electoral authoritarian tendencies and non-systemic political opposition has been marginalized, it is only since the start of the war in ukraine that there 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 in two separate questions, respondents were asked about how effective they thought the federal (the president and russian government) and regional authorities (governor and government of the federal subject) had been in the fight against the covid-19 pandemic on a four-point scale (very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, extremely ineffective). in addition, there was a battery of questions on people's trust in russian political institutions as well as their interest in politics. respondents were asked to assess “to what extent [they] trust[ed]” each of the institutions on a seven-point ascending scale. st. petersburg and petrozavodsk are appropriate as case studies for a number of reasons. at least on the basis of the official figures, the country’s second city and the republic of karelia (of which petrozavodsk is the capital) were two of the top three federal subjects in russia in the relative infection rates per one million of the population.8 the choice of these two cities as case studies is also justifiable in their geographic proximity in the northwestern federal district and the similarity of the epidemiological patterns in this geographical area (gladkikh et al. 2022).9 the pandemic: epidemiological and political impacts on the nationwide level the covid-19 pandemic has so far come in five distinct waves across russia, starting with the initial pandemic in the spring of 2020 that led to the first flurry of restrictions on mobility (particularly in moscow), which were eased in time for the popular vote on the constitutional changes in june/july 2020. several further peaks followed, as shown in figure 1. in a country as large as russia, there was inevitably some regional variation in the ebbs and flows of the pandemic and its impact on the population. the early reactions to the pandemic focused on restrictive measures to create social distancing tailored to local specificities by regional governments. while the effects of the first wave of the covid-19 pandemic in russia were not overwhelming in terms of infection and mortality rates, it brought serious economic has been a widespread crackdown on dissenting views amongst the general population. finally, the empirical facts from the survey itself (and others like it) indicate that 38 percent of respondents said that they “did not trust” the president, and 32 percent said that they “did not approve” of putin's policies as president. these are higher than the numbers who actively voted for a candidate other than putin in the 2018 presidential election – indicating that people are, at best, no more reluctant to admit to dissenting political views in a survey than at the ballot box. moreover, the long-running series of approval ratings of putin's actions conducted by the same polling agency (levada) shows fluctuations that map clearly onto real political events (for example, falling after the 2011-12 election protests and the 2018 pension reform and rising after the annexation of crimea in 2014). in other words, at least until the start of the war in ukraine in 2022, there was evidence that representative surveys reflected trends in public opinion, both upwards and downwards. 8 based on comparative figures at https://russian-trade.com/coronavirus-russia/?ysclid=lbt5u2rqmq241548499 (accessed december 18, 2022) compared with official population statistics from the russian state statistical agency (rosstat 2022). st. petersburg's official total of over 1.5 million confirmed cases from march 2020 to july 2022 was the highest relative rate of infection of any federal subject, encompassing 28.5 percent of the population. the republic of karelia, with its capital petrozavodsk, had a relative infection rate of 22.5 percent of the population, placing it third. since those figures reflect only positive test numbers (and not every ill person is tested), it is highly likely that the actual numbers are underreported, as they are in most countries. nonetheless, these verified figures represent the minimum numbers of people who actually contracted covid-19 or died from it and hence still point to the illness as a substantial public health issue. a further important caveat is that there were significant question marks over the reliability of russian infection and death statistics (dixon 2021; timonin et al. 2021). st. petersburg's and karelia's relatively high numbers may be down to better reporting or less falsification in these regions than in others. updated figures beyond july 2022 can be found at https://russiantrade.com/coronavirus-russia/respublika-kareliya/ and https://russian-trade.com/coronavirus-russia/sanktpeterburg/. 9 there is a necessary caveat—applicable in many countries—that the positive case numbers do not necessarily represent the exact pattern of infected people due to limited testing. about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 hardship. the russian government was not willing to alleviate this hardship with any serious support measures. macroeconomic stability and security were prioritized as opposed to offering large handouts or furloughs, which surely would have been popular with the public. initial polling did not show a particularly impressive gain in approval ratings for the russian government in handling the covid-19 pandemic (levada 2021), unlike many other countries, which saw substantial (if often short-lived) increases in approval ratings for the incumbent governments (yam et al. 2020). instead, approval ratings for the russian president fell from 68 percent in january 2020 to 59 percent in april 2020, recovering to 69 percent in september 2020 and fluctuating in the 65-69 percent range from november 2020 to january 2022. taking the 67 percent approval rating from january 2020 as a starting point, approval ratings for regional governors, assigned responsibility for the pandemic’s management, declined to 58 percent by july 2020 but remained around 60-62 percent for the first half of 2021 until falling back to the 57-59 range until january 2022 (levada 2021). in the pandemic’s second half, more emphasis was put on mitigating covid-19 via vaccination. despite being the first country in the world to license a vaccine—and having three domestically produced vaccines (gamcovidvak – sputnik v, covivak, epivakcorona) to choose from—there was relatively slow vaccine uptake within russia compared to many western european states (maleva et al. 2021). thus, like most other countries around the world, russia introduced anti-covid measures on epidemiological grounds that simultaneously had restrictive effects on civil liberties and damaged the economy (barceló et al. 2022). surprisingly, however, russia ended up relaxing restrictions quicker than many other states, and did not declare a state of emergency, or return to uniform nationwide lockdowns. interestingly, a year into the pandemic, a comparative poll (gallup international 2021) showed russia to be in fourth place globally in terms of citizens unwilling to sacrifice their human rights to try and prevent the spread of covid-19 (39 percent) and in second place in unwillingness to take a vaccine if it was available (46 percent). the public relations development agency (kompaniya razvitiya obshchestvennykh svyazei – kros), which prepares the “national index of anxiety” four times a year, found that by the last quarter of 2021, fear of qr-code rules actually displaced covid-19 as the main concern of russians (kros 2021). this sentiment, which rejects an invasive state and prefers the private sphere to be left intact, was seemingly ignored in measures to force vaccination via employers and bills to introduce qr-code legislation in the state duma in november 2021. the latter provoked small-scale protests involving approximately 60-200 people in towns and cities across russia (lomakina 2021). the authorities ultimately abandoned this more invasive federal legislation, showing the limits of the state’s ambition in covid-19 governance when confronted with signs of serious dissent. 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: daily covid case numbers 2020-22 source: world health organization, https://covid19.who.int/data, accessed july 16, 2022. the survey was carried out at approximately the mid-point of the overall pandemic cycle in june 2021. at the time, just over a year had passed since the initial first wave, and the second wave of winter 2020-21 had receded. a few weeks after the survey—in july 2021—there was a further outbreak of new infections. thus, the survey measured satisfaction with the authorities’ responses at a point when the initial lockdowns had receded into memory and before there was widespread controversy over vaccine mandates or qr-code/covid passport usage. the focus is, therefore, on people’s approval of the authorities’ actions during the first year of lockdowns and other sanitary measures. opinion was evenly split at the most basic level on how well the authorities had dealt with the covid-19 pandemic, as table 1 shows. only a small number thought that either the federal or regional authorities had dealt with the pandemic “very” effectively (16 and 12 percent, respectively), but the majority across russia—just over three-fifths of respondents—thought the federal authorities' response has been more effective than ineffective. only slightly fewer thought the same about their regional governments. a kendall’s tau-b correlation was run to determine the relationship between the two variables (assessments of the effectiveness of federal and regional authorities, respectively). there was a strong statistically significant positive correlation between the perceptions of both levels’ responses (τb = 0.690, p < .001). this indicates, preliminarily, that people did not make as much differentiation between the two levels of government as initially might have been expected. 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 table 1: “how do you assess the effectiveness of the federal authorities (president and the russian government) and the regional authorities (governor and government of your province / republic / krai /city of federal importance) in the fight against coronavirus?” (percent of respondents, excluding “don’t know”) federal authorities regional authorities very effective 16 13 rather effective 46 47 rather ineffective 25 27 very ineffective 13 14 total 100 100 n= 2341 2332 source: malmö university/levada center survey 2021, q.17 and q.18. margin of error +/-3.4 percent at 95% confidence interval. firstly, the authors disaggregated individual respondents’ views on covid-19 performances of the two levels of government relative to each other.10 though this did not allow the authors to measure the attitudes toward any particular regional government (which will be returned to later in the detailed focus on two regions), it gives a general nationwide picture of the perceptions about the two levels of government. overall, the difference is not substantial. in 74 percent of cases, respondents held the same perception of responses to the covid-19 pandemic of both levels of government.11 turning to the hypotheses, the authors found evidence for the first two in table 2: people who trusted one level of government more than the other were more inclined to rate the effectiveness of that level’s attempts to deal with the pandemic positively relative to the other. in the majority of cases, people saw both levels of government as being equally effective and expressed the same levels of trust in each. however, amongst the minority that trusted one level of government more than the other, a slightly larger proportion of them approved of that level’s management of the pandemic more than the other levels. 10 the respondents' scores (on a scale of 1 to 4) for the two questions (respectively) about the federal and respective regional authorities were subtracted from each other using the formula ‘covid-diff’ = q.17 [federal authorities] – q.18 [regional authorities]. the scale was descending, meaning that “1” indicated a high degree of effectiveness and “4” the lowest. negative scores indicate that the federal government was seen as more effective, positive ones indicate the opposite. the maximum score is +3 (federal authorities very ineffective and regional authorities very effective) and the minimum is -3 (federal authorities very effective and regional authorities very ineffective). for question wording, see table 1. 11 of the quarter of the sample who did not share this view, slightly more (16 percent compared with 11 percent) thought that the federal authorities had performed better than the regional ones, but the distribution was almost normally distributed around a mean just below zero (mean = -0.08 and standard deviation = 0.65). in short, perceptions of the two levels did not vary strongly. 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 table 2: assessments of covid measure effectiveness relative to trust in federal and regional governments (percent of respondents, excluding ‘don’t know’) 12 trust federal more effective both levels same regional more effective total (trust) n= trust regional more 9 75 16 100 467 same trust in each 14 78 9 100 1182 trust federal more 23 68 9 100 512 total (effectiveness) 15 75 10 100 2161 source: own calculations deriving from malmö university/levada center survey 2021, q.17 and q.18. margin of error +/-3.4 percent. correlation between the two variables: τb = 0.134, p < .001 it should be noted that the authors have hitherto examined the relative levels of trust in the two levels of government, not the absolute trust levels. now, the levels of trust in russian institutions, particularly the federal and regional governments, will be examined.13 hypotheses 3 and 4 suggested that approval of the covid-19 measures of the respective levels of government would be positively correlated with trust in those levels of government. at the federal level (hypothesis 3), 85 percent of those who trusted the president and 87 percent of those who trusted the russian government thought that the federal authorities had dealt with the crisis effectively, including more than a quarter who thought that it had been dealt with “very effectively.”14 by contrast, only a minority (31 percent and 38 percent, respectively) of those who did not trust these institutions felt positively inclined in their assessments of the covid-19 measures.15 there was a statistically significant positive correlation between the levels of trust in the russian government and satisfaction with the federal government’s response (τb = 0.444, p < .001). there was a very similar pattern when it came to attitudes toward the regional authorities’ covid-19 measures. of those that trusted their regional authorities, 84 percent thought that their measures dealing with the pandemic had been effective. by contrast, 62 percent of those that did not trust the authorities felt that the measures had been ineffective. the relationship between trust in the respective regional government and satisfaction with the regional response was slightly weaker than for the federal government but still positive and statistically significant (τb = 0.386, p < .001). thus, there is preliminary evidence to suggest that hypotheses 3 and 4 have some validity: trust in the respective authorities connects with approval for their actions. 12 trust was measured on a seven-point scale, where “1” represented the lowest level of trust. 13 on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 is the lowest level of trust), the mean scores for seven institutions ranged from 3.0 (state duma) to 4.35 (president). the federal and regional governments had mean scores of 3.70 (standard deviation of 2.11) and 3.62 (standard deviation of 1.95), respectively. the other institutions were the police, the army, and the local authorities, which had means between 3.57 and 3.70. 14 “trust” and “distrust” are respectively taken to be points 1-3 and 5-7 of the seven-point ascending trust scale (4 is considered to indicate neither trust nor distrust). overall, 38.2 percent and 34.6 percent, respectively, indicated “trust” (a score between 5 and 7) in the federal and regional governments, compared with 52.1 percent who trusted the president. “effectively” includes those who considered the authorities' response to be “very effective” or “somewhat effective” (points 1 and 2 on a four-point descending scale), while “ineffectively” combines the other two categories (“rather ineffective” and “very ineffective,” points 3-4 on the same scale). the “don’t know” responses were excluded. 15 there was a positive spearman rank correlation (when the differing directions of the scales were accounted for) of 0.528 and 0.522, respectively (significant at the p<0.01 level) between assessments of the federal authorities' handling of the covid-19 pandemic and the levels of trust in the president and federal government. the original seven-point and four-point scales were used for the correlation coefficient rather than the simplified scales mentioned above. 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 there could, of course, be many other factors that lie behind the public’s approval for authorities’ actions on covid and the authors needed to control for them. to examine this in more detail, the authors turn to two multivariate ordinary least squares (ols) regression analyses, one each in which the dependent variables are—respectively—the levels of approval of the federal and regional authorities’ actions in dealing with covid-19.16 a number of independent variables are included: • trust in the respective authorities. • efficacy: two questions that ask about the extent to which ordinary people feel they can influence the federal and regional authorities (respectively) are included in the models. • frequency of media usage: the authors hypothesize that frequent viewing/reading of state media will impact positively on approval for the authorities’ actions regarding the pandemic at the respective levels.17 • interest in politics: people’s general interest in politics may also be connected to their attitudes toward the authorities’ handling of covid-19 – given that the restrictions were not just public health measures but also political decisions. • two measures of economic welfare: size of house/apartment and self-perceived current economic situation. the smaller a person’s dwelling (number of rooms), the more likely they would arguably have felt the spatially restrictive nature of the self-isolation measures. those in a poorer economic situation may have also suffered more from the economic shocks of the pandemic and the disruptions to work. • in both models, a range of socio-demographic factors is included as controls – sex, age, and education level. the authors can hypothesize that older people—who were more objectively vulnerable to serious symptoms or mortality from covid-19—would have been more likely to approve of restrictions put in place to protect public health and that better-educated people would have had more understanding of the dynamics of the pandemic. the full list of variables is provided in appendix 1 (pg. 53) the results are shown in table 3. for ease of comparison, the models for federal and regional governments are presented in a single table. however, they refer to two slightly different models regressed to the dependent variables of approval of the authorities’ action at the respective state levels. the table lists the standardized beta coefficients from ordinary least squares (ols) multivariate regression analysis. models 1a and 1b refer to the effectiveness of the federal authorities in dealing with covid-19, and models 2a and 2b use the effectiveness of the regional authorities in the respondents’ regions as their dependent variable. 16 the federal government, rather than putin personally, was formally in charge of the pandemic response, and hence it is trust in the government rather than the president that is used as the dependent variable. 17 as is well documented, the russian media market is dominated by state-owned or state-loyal television and printed outlets (hutcheson 2018). in the survey, 72 percent of respondents said that they “regularly” or “sometimes” watched national state television, and 62 percent said the same about regional television. newspaper readership is much lower (but with slightly more people reading regional rather than national press): only 20 percent said that they regularly or sometimes read federal newspapers and 24 percent looked at regional press (malmö university/levada center survey 2021, q.27). whilst the media generally lack the critical role of western media, in circumstances such as during the pandemic, they also serve as semi-official sources of public information. 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 focusing first on people’s satisfaction with the federal authorities’ covid-19 measures, there are statistically significant relationships between the dependent variables and some of the demographic factors. as predicted, older people, people who perceived their families to be materially better off, and people who lived in larger dwellings were more likely to regard the federal government’s approach to covid-19 as effective. interestingly, individuals with lower levels of education were slightly more likely to regard the measures as effective, perhaps reflecting a less critical examination of the government’s pronouncements on the matter. collectively, however, the coefficient of determination shows that these socio-demographic factors account for only 5 percent or so of the variance. once attitudinal questions are added to the model, the model obtains more explanatory power (adj. r2 = 0.308). by far, the biggest predictor of a person’s attitude toward the effectiveness of the federal authorities in dealing with covid-19 was their inherent trust in the federal government. the respondent’s sense of efficacy played the next-biggest role. in other words, the assessments of the covid-19 measures were largely related to whether a person expected the government to make the right decisions and felt part of the governing system of the country. the extent to which a respondent followed state television or used the internet seems to have played little role in their attitudes toward the restrictions, though there is a statistically significant (but minimal) correlation between newspaper readership and attitudes to the government’s actions. this perhaps indicates that frequent newspaper readers were slightly less likely to approve of pandemic restrictions, which may arise from the fact that printed media tend to be slightly less indiscriminate than visual media. table 3: ols regression, predictors of attitudes toward effectiveness of covid-19 pandemic measures (standardized beta coefficients), all-russia sample effectiveness of federal authorities effectiveness of regional authorities 1a 1b 2a 2b adj. r2 0.054 0.308 0.039 0.218 sex 0.065** 0.010 0.097** 0.046* age 0.150** 0.059** 0.095** 0.040 education -0.073** -0.048** -0.081** -0.063** house size 0.025 0.053** -0.008 0.024 family financial situation -0.166** -0.045* -0.188** -0.084** trust russian govt 0.430** trust regional authorities 0.394** influence on federal authorities -0.144** influence on regional authorities -0.109** interest in politics 0.003 0.067** read federal newspapers 0.047* read regional newspapers -0.041** watches federal tv -0.138 watches regional tv -0.077** uses internet 0.012 0.031 source: own calculations deriving from malmö university/levada center survey 2021. n=2525. significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01 turning to the question of what predicts approval of regional authorities’ actions in managing the pandemic, a similar pattern emerges. the same (weak) relationship exists between attitudes toward pandemic restrictions, age, and financial standing. once again, levels of trust in the regional authorities and perceived influence over them are the largest predictors of whether a person thought that their regional government had handled the covid-19 pandemic 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 effectively. however, these explain less of the variance for regional than for federal authority approval.18 taken together, the evidence above indicates that hypotheses 1 to 4 also hold when controlling for other factors. nationwide, there was a significant connection between people’s evaluations of the effectiveness of pandemic restrictions and their trust in the authorities. moreover, those who had greater trust in one or the other level of government were more inclined to evaluate that level of government’s covid-19 restrictions more favourably. however, the differences in perceptions of responsibility between the two levels were not large – indicating that the ‘blame displacement’ game perhaps worked, in reality, more like ‘blame diffusion’ (or creditsharing): voters regarded both levels of government as being roughly equally responsible for dealing with the pandemic. the regionalization of covid-19 measures hitherto, the authors of the article have primarily examined the picture of the country as a whole. however, as noted earlier, the response to the spread of covid-19 was strongly regionalized, and this article now turns to the sub-national level. russia covers an eighth of the world’s land mass and ranges at one extreme from densely packed metropoles (moscow has a population density of nearly 5000 persons per square kilometre) to remote wilderness (chukotka has only 0.07 persons per square kilometre). it would thus have been surprising if the pandemic measures had been uniform across the country. how to characterize the range of regional responses? the expert foundation “petersburg politics” attempted a systematization of early regional pandemic measures, arriving at a rating of “virus sovereignty” based on the correlation between the level of covid-19 transmission and the restrictions in regions over the first month of the pandemic (petersburg politics foundation 2021) three groups of regions were identified: (1) a high level of “virus sovereignty” – regions in which people’s mobility inside and between regions was limited as the regions were practically sealed off (the republic of chechnya, chelyabinsk province, astrakhan’ province, the republic of karelia); (2) a middle level that included regions in which restrictions dealt with regulations of trade or special passes to leave one’s home (rostov province, kemerovo province, st. petersburg); (3) the lowest level of “virus sovereignty”: regions with minimal restrictions such as a self-isolation regime with recommendations not to leave the region (tambov province, republic of udmurtia, yaroslavl province). following this rating, it is evident that at least during the first wave of the pandemic, the republic of karelia had a high level of "virus sovereignty," while st. petersburg had a middle one. however, as the pandemic developed, the very strong restrictions in karelia were not repeated in future waves, while in st. petersburg, strong restrictions were maintained for a long period of time. notwithstanding the strong parallels when it came to the epidemiological side of the pandemic, the public policy response differed. during the first wave of the pandemic in st. petersburg, initial measures were similar to those taken in moscow and most regions of the country: students in schools and kindergartens were allowed to choose whether or not to physically attend (they were later transferred to an online format); mass events (initially containing over 1,000 attendees), visits to entertainment and shopping centers, bars and restaurants were 18 interestingly, there was a small but statistically significant effect from following regional television – possibly accruing from the fact that regional news tended to focus more on concrete restrictions in particular places rather than the more general macro-level covid-19 news in the national media. 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 banned.19 in petrozavodsk’s first wave, a number of restrictions were also adopted against the rapid spread of the new infection, such as suspending public transport, tourist activities, and enforcing a lockdown and tightening controls on entry to the region. by the summer of 2020, restrictions were gradually eased in both st. petersburg and petrozavodsk. from may 11 onwards, restrictions were relaxed in petrozavodsk in preparation for the nationwide vote on constitutional amendments that was held from june 25 to july 1. the only recommendations remaining were the wearing of masks indoors, sanitizing public spaces, and maintaining social distance. however, no control over the observance of these recommendations was implemented. in st. petersburg, some of the measures were cancelled by the end of june; the majority of enterprises were able to return to work as long as they complied with the restrictions, such as limits on the number of customers inside of a business and the maintenance of at least 1.5-metre distance between the customers. at the same time, the city authorities organized special events dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the end of the great patriotic war, despite the existing ban on mass events (government of st. petersburg 2020). by contrast with karelia, the most serious restrictions were imposed in st. petersburg during the second wave of the covid-19 pandemic in the fall of 2020 (postanovlenie 2020b). these restrictions mostly concerned restaurants and bars, which were prohibited from operating after 10:00 pm. at the end of november 2020, the authorities closed all cultural and entertainment institutions. also, from december 30th, 2020 to january 3, 2021 all restaurants, bars, and cultural and entertainment establishments were ordered to be shut down. such harsh measures caused discontent among entrepreneurs, who declared their intention to ignore the announced requirements to save their businesses. a "map of resistance" was organized, on which the restaurants and bars that ignored the restrictions were marked (mingazov 2021). it is noteworthy that the authorities in petrozavodsk did not return to restrictions in the second or third waves of the pandemic. despite the significant increase in the number of cases during the fall covid-19 wave of 2020 and the summer and fall waves of 2021, the only major closures thereafter related to a return to remote learning for students.20 after the introduction of the vaccine in the winter of 2021, the authorities focused on mass vaccination efforts. collective immunity passports were developed for organizations that had a minimum of 60 percent of employees who were vaccinated. such a passport allowed enterprises to keep working, regardless of the covid-19 epidemiological situation (rasporyazhenie 2021, art. 8.6). meanwhile, in st. petersburg, the local government demanded that state and municipal organizations achieve 65 percent vaccination rates among their employees, with the eventual goal of reaching 100 percent by september 1, 2021. those who refused to be vaccinated for reasons other than medical necessity were subject to various penalties, up to and including suspension without salary (postanovlenie 2021a). in the fall of 2021, during the next wave of the pandemic, st. petersburg authorities introduced mandatory qr-code verification while visiting any public places. in late october, the authorities reinstated several of the restrictions that had existed in the spring of 2020 (postanovlenie 2021b). 19 among the measures of the st. petersburg authorities were the prohibition on visiting parks, squares, playgrounds, and religious institutions. failure to comply with this requirement brought a fine of 3,000 roubles (approximately 37 euros at the exchange rate in the spring of 2020) (postanovlenie 2020a). 20 for covid-19 statistics in karelia during the whole pandemic, see gogov.ru (2022). 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: number of positive cases per 100,000 people (seven-day retrospective rolling average), st. petersburg and karelia. source: authors’ own recalculations based on raw data at https://russian-trade.com/coronavirus-russia/respublikakareliya/ and https://russian-trade.com/coronavirus-russia/sankt-peterburg/ though a cross-sectional analysis of the levels of restrictions in every region is not possible, the authors can hypothesize that, in regions with less restrictive regimes, there should have been greater satisfaction with the handling of the pandemic than in regions where the restrictions were more extensive. all other things being equal, the authors expected to see more approval of the authorities’ actions in petrozavodsk than in st. petersburg. assessing the public response to regional restrictions the differential trajectories of the two case studies gave the authors a chance to re-examine the hypotheses discussed in the all-russian example with a more regional focus. in short, though the path of transmission was fairly similar in st. petersburg and petrozavodsk, the trajectories of the restrictions differed. taken together, the authors could, therefore, expect that the residents of russia’s second city may have been less satisfied with the authorities’ response to the covid-19 pandemic by the summer of 2021 than those in the karelian capital. this expectation was made on the basis that the residents of petrozavodsk had been subjected to fewer restrictions on their daily life for most of the pandemic, and that this difference would primarily manifest itself in the attitudes to the regional authorities’ responses (which differed) rather than the federal rules (which were uniform across the country). the counter-hypothesis would be that the public would be more satisfied with the more restrictive regimes on the basis that they may feel that the authorities were taking greater measures to protect them. the aforementioned national representative survey contained deepened representative samples in the two case study cities (n=300 in each location). it is thus possible to examine them against 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 the background of the all-russian picture. as table 4 shows, the people of petrozavodsk (where measures were slightly less restrictive after the initial phase) displayed higher levels of satisfaction with the authorities’ responses than the residents of st. petersburg (where there were several more lockdowns and closures). in both cases, people approved of the federal authorities more than the regional ones. overall, the number of people who thought the federal authorities’ actions had been effective was roughly the same – 57 percent in st. petersburg and 59 percent in petrozavodsk, albeit with a higher proportion of residents in petrozavodsk thinking that the government’s response had been “very” effective. there was a slightly larger difference in attitudes toward the regional governments’ responses. only 8 percent considered the st. petersburg city authorities to have handled the crisis “very effectively,” compared with 17 percent of petrozavodsk residents. at the other end of the spectrum, 49 percent of st. petersburg residents (compared with 44 percent in petrozavodsk) considered the response to have been “ineffective” to a greater or lesser extent. the mean values are not significantly different from each other. in both cases, approval ratings of the authorities’ actions were slightly lower than in the russian federation as a whole – though the margin of error is slightly larger due to the smaller sample size. notwithstanding the more vocal opposition to some of the measures in st. petersburg, the more restrictive measures appear to have made only a small difference to the approval of the authorities’ actions. table 4: “how do you assess the effectiveness of the federal authorities (president and the russian government) and the regional authorities (head of the republic and government of the republic of karelia/ mayor and city government of st. petersburg, respectively) in the fight against coronavirus?” (percent of respondents, excluding “don’t know”) petrozavodsk st. petersburg federal regional federal regional very effective 22 17 12 8 rather effective 37 39 45 43 rather ineffective 29 28 24 30 very ineffective 12 16 19 19 total 100 100 100 100 n= 259 254 273 270 source: malmö university/levada center survey 2021, q.17 and q.18 (regional extended samples only) the authors replicate the models above for the two case studies, in order to explore whether the levels of trust in the regional government and the feelings of efficacy were the main contributors toward the public’s support or otherwise for the respective regional authorities’ covid-19 actions. 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 table 5: ols regression, predictors of attitudes toward effectiveness of covid-19 measures on the part of regional authorities (standardized beta coefficients), region-specific samples petrozavodsk st. petersburg 2a 2b 2a 2b adj.r2 0.048 0.237 0.039 0.218 sex 0.040 0.003 -0.007 0.003 age 0.238** 0.194* 0.216** 0.218** education -0.106 -0.107 -0.135* -0.121 house size 0.060 0.060 -0.025 0.020 family financial situation -0.076 0.031 -0.132* -0.085 trust regional authorities 0.369** 0.422** influence on regional authorities -0.185** -0.064 political interest 0.029 0.076 reads regional newspapers -0.014 0.016 watches regional tv -0.073 -0.034 uses internet 0.008 -0.012 the results in table 5 from petrozavodsk and st. petersburg indicate a slightly different picture from the national one. though trust in the relevant authorities remains the main significant predictor of a person’s attitudes toward the pandemic, age has a much stronger effect as a significant predictive variable in st. petersburg and petrozavodsk. this perhaps indicates that in densely populated cities, rather than the smaller towns in which many russians live, older people were more conscious of the risks associated with covid-19. around 80-85 percent of the russian covid-19-related deaths in the first year of the pandemic occurred amongst those over 60 (bashkatova 2021) and there is evidence that this may have played a role. re-running the regression analysis only for cities with a population of over 100,000 inhabitants indicated that age was a significant predictor of support for the authorities (older people were more likely to approve) at the p<0.01 level, whereas it was not so for rural areas. this gives a preliminary indication, which could be the subject of future research, that older people in densely populated areas may have been more aware of (or afraid of) the risks arising from covid-19 and hence more supportive of the authorities’ attempts to combat it. there is one further difference between st. petersburg and petrozavodsk: the extent to which people’s sense of efficacy played a role in conditioning their views on covid-19. this variable is absent in the st. petersburg case, which, as seen above, had more stringent restrictions for a longer period and in which there was some resistance to the restrictions around the time of new year’s and christmas of 2020-21. again, this perhaps gives a tentative indication that the public felt less able to influence the situation in st. petersburg, where there were strict protocols put in place by the municipal authorities, than under the more lenient restrictions in petrozavodsk. however, the explanatory factors between the two cases remain fairly similar. trust in the authorities remains the overwhelming explanatory factor for supporting the pandemic measures in both cases – giving further evidence that there was a connection between generalized political trust and the perceived legitimacy of the response to the pandemic. conclusions much analysis of covid-19 pandemic governance in russia, be it in the media or academic/expert views, has focused on the most contradictory, dysfunctional, and negative 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 elements: putin’s cynical ‘blame game,’ using the façade of decentralization and preparing regional governors as ‘fall guys’; the chaotic interaction between competing institutions in pandemic governance; the manipulation of covid-19 mortality statistics and state media propaganda’s twisting of reality; the failure to provide economic support despite huge financial reserves; and the bombastic vaccine diplomacy showcased at a time when low vaccination uptake at home made russia vulnerable to new waves of the pandemic. yet, our findings suggest the outright majority inside russia do not see things in such a negative light. rather than identifying a ‘blame game’ that was detrimental to russia, it seems more natural to see ‘blame diffusion’ (or even ‘credit diffusion’) across the political system. in other words, many saw the various levels of governance as marching in unity according to one plan. the president and the governors were perceived as one team, albeit with putin as the boss. this majority view was based on the relatively high levels of trust in the russian state and the president as a leader. a minority (ranging between 15-30 percent) had lower trust in state institutions and more critical views of the president; this minority also took a more critical view of how the covid-19 pandemic was handled, both by federal and regional authorities. this suggests regional authorities were broadly considered legitimate or illegitimate in accordance with how far the president is seen as such. the findings indicate that although different regions took different approaches to deal with the public health crisis, the public did not necessarily perceive their actions as such. returning to the broader question of russia’s regime type, the findings indicate that the ‘social contract’ of post-soviet russia remained an important explanatory factor, although there is a need for more qualitative verification of these attitudes. there was a strong connection between generalized trust in the authorities and how much the public approved of the restrictions. the authors of the article can speculate that this is because the public saw the state’s role as one that ensured their safety rather than—as more oppositionist-minded people with less trust in the authorities might have regarded them—as measures that were tainted by association to authoritarian misgovernance, corruption, pompous patriotic rhetoric, or straightforward propaganda. a secondary factor was a sense of efficacy – indicating that people who felt that they had some influence over the instruments of the state were also more likely to approve of its actions at both the federal and the regional level. this again highlights the point that segments of russian society were more confident in the state’s basic abilities, accepted the state’s claims more often than not, and saw their own role as citizens in more positive terms. such attitudes were not obviously shaken by the adversities of the covid-19 pandemic and reflect the core support base of the russian political system. acknowledgements this work was completed with the assistance of a grant from the swedish international centre for local democracy (icld). the work was also financed by nawa (the polish national agency for academic exchange) as part of the ulam programme under the proposal number: ppn/ulm/2020/1/00081 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 references arukwe, nnanna onuoha. 2022. “covid-19 pandemic in africa, ‘copy-and-paste’ policies, and the biomedical hegemony of ‘cure.’” journal of black studies, 53 (4): 385-410. https://doi.org/10.1177/00219347221082327. åslund, anders. 2020. “responses to the covid-19 crisis in russia, ukraine, and belarus.” 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effectiveness of the federal authorities in the fight against coronavirus? 4-point ascending (1= very ineffective; 4 = very effective) 2 dependent variable 2 how do you assess the effectiveness of the regional authorities in the fight against coronavirus? 4-point ascending (1= very ineffective; 4 = very effective) 1 trust to what extent do you trust the russian government? 7 point ascending (1=do not trust at all; 7= full trust) 2 to what extent do you trust the regional authorities in your region? 7 point ascending (1=do not trust at all; 7= full trust) 1 efficacy to what extent do you think people like you can have a direct influence on the actions of the federal authorities? 4-point descending (1= large extent; 4=not at all) 2 to what extent do you think people like you can have a direct influence on the actions of the regional authorities? 4-point descending (1= large extent; 4 = not at all) 1 & 2 political interest how interested are you in politics? 4-point descending (1= very interested; 4 = not at all) 1 political information how often do you i) read allrussian (federal) newspapers ii) watch central television 4-point descending for each measure (1= regularly; 4= not at all). 1 political information how often do you i) read regional, local newspapers ii) watch regional, local television 4-point descending for each measure (1= regularly; 4= not at all). 1 & 2 political information how often do you use the internet 4-point descending (1= regularly; 4= not at all). 1 & 2 demographic sex binary 2-category (1= male, 2= female) 1 & 2 age 5 ordinal categories, ascending (1= 18-29; 1053 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 year brackets up to 5= 60+) 1 & 2 education 6 ordinal categories, ascending 1 & 2 how many rooms in the apartment/house where you live numerical, ascending. 1 & 2 how would you assess your family's current financial situation? 5-point descending (1= very good, 5 = very bad) 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) about:blank about:blank about:blank 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 european right-wing populist parties’ approach toward china: between anti-globalization and appeal for diversified international partnerships dong tu1 and łukasz zamęcki2 university of warsaw and sichuan university abstract despite the fact that right-wing populist parties (rpps) have gained increased prominence in the last 15 years in europe and the amount of research regarding these parties has been on the rise, rpps' attitude toward the people’s republic of china remains an understudied issue. the aim of this article is to examine questions that have not yet been thoroughly researched: how are the positions of right-wing populist parties (rpps) on china shaped and how are they evolving, what causes such differing positions, and have there been any changes in the rpp’s approach to china since the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic? this article aims to answer these questions by analyzing the policies toward china of selected political parties (primarily, hungary's fidesz, italy's lega nord, france's rassemblement national but also parties such as the polish law and justice, and germany's alternative für deutschland). this article underlines that rpps’ policies on china are formulated based on what they perceive the development of international politics can do “for the people.” their attitudes depend mainly on their stance toward free-market globalization, their need for alternatives in relations with the us and the eu, and their axiological perception of china. 1 dong tu is an associate professor at the college of foreign languages and cultures at sichuan university. 2 lucas zamecki is a political scientist and an assistant professor at the faculty of political science and international studies at the university of warsaw. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 introduction contrary to the prediction that following the initial shock concerning the covid-19 pandemic there might be an opportunity for the european union (eu) and the people’s republic of china (prc) to strengthen their cooperation, there is a new pragmatic turn in dealing with china that is beginning to emerge amongst eu member states. china has seen its reputation “collapse in some of the eu countries that were its closest allies and partners” (krastev and leonard 2020, 14). this reputational breakdown marks a new stage in eu-china relations; however, there are great variations across the eu concerning the position on china. among those, right-wing populist parties (rpps)3 have gained increased prominence in the last 15 years in europe. in a survey conducted for the european council on foreign relations, there is an improved perception of china amidst the supporters of rpps in most eu member states (dennison et al. 2020). in fact, rpps in the eu showcase a strongly diversified approach to china, ranging from the blatant antichinese agenda of france's rassemblement national’s (rn) to the contradictory stances of italy's lega nord (ln) and the more receptive attitude of hungary’s fidesz – hungarian civic alliance (fidesz). as rpps have become an important political force in the recent decades in europe and continue to shape (even if indirectly) particular public policies, the main purpose of this article is to examine the so-far understudied attitude of rpps toward china, shed light on their ever-changing and shifting position on china, explain the causes behind such differing positions and, finally, investigate whether there have been any changes in their approach to china since the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic. many european rpps have a rather positive stance toward vladimir putin’s russia (e.g. rn, fidesz, alternative für deutschland [afd]), but in the case of prc, other variables are at play such as china’s position as an economic superpower, china’s communist ideology or sino-us tensions. additionally, these parties’ positions as either a governing party or opposition also have had an effect on their stance toward china. for example, they may employ a strong anti-china strategy while being an opposition party but modify or even change their stance completely when in power. this article intends to answer these questions by analyzing policies on china (mainly from hungary's fidesz, italy's lega nord [ln], france's rassemblement national [rn] with an additional examination of parties that have been omitted in research so far, such as poland's law and justice [pis] and germany's alternative für deutschland [afd]). these geographically distributed cases representing post-communist and “old eu” states guarantee a broad overview of the studied issue.4 due to the limitations of the analysis, the article focuses only on rpps as they gain higher support than left-wing populist parties and are perceived to be a bigger 3 researchers on european populism deploy a bewildering set of labels to classify european populist parties on the right (borrowing the classical left-right spectrum), such as “radical right populists,” “populist radical right,” “far right,” “right-wing populism,” “extreme right,” and “populist right.” in response, pippa norris (2019) conceptualizes twodimensional cleavages (pluralism-populism and authoritarian-libertarian) to categorize populist and traditional mainstream parties in europe. according to this new categorization, it would be more appropriate to refer to the parties in question as authoritarian-populist or authoritarian-right parties. however, for the sake of convenience and clarity, in this article, the term right-wing populist is adopted to refer to the populist parties under investigation. for more details, please refer to norris (2019). 4 the cleavages in the post-communist societies run along slightly different lines than in the countries of western europe. an important issue of the rpps in central europe is the attitude to the political system they represented before 1989. it can be expected that the rpps from central and eastern europe (cee) put greater emphasis on the communist regime of the prc than western european parties. 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 threat to the stability of european integration and politics. nevertheless, a comparative analysis on the position toward china by left-wing populist parties could be an interesting future area of study considering their attitude toward economic globalization. arguably, the positions of rpps toward china are the result of populism as a “thin-centered” ideology (mudde 2004). their attitude, therefore, results from rpps’ perception of what is “good for the people” in their country's relations with china and, depending on their interpretation of national interest, can shape various proposals of state foreign policies; foreign policy proposals of rpps will vary, depending on the state, due to differing domestic, economic, and political situations. the article is based on secondary research as well as an analysis of statements and speeches of party leaders (china, in most cases, is absent in the political programs of rpps). the starting point for the analysis is 2001. the level of support for right-wing populism in europe increased after 1999 (tap 2019). in 2001, china became a member of the world trade organization (wto), which is one of the reasons that it has become one of the key trading partners of the eu. therefore, in its analysis of the statements of party leaders, this article has concentrated on parties’ positions in the twenty-first century. the research consists of six parts. the introduction is followed by a literature review which points out the research gap in the studies of rpps’ approaches toward china in the existing scholarship. the subsequent three parts explain the ideological content underpinning rpps' foreign policies, review these parties’ approaches to china throughout history, and analyze their approach to china since the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic. the conclusion presents a discussion on how the rpps’ positions toward china vary among parties as an effect of their attitude to the axiological issues, globalization, and the perception of foreign partners (the eu, the united states [us]). what do we know about the foreign policy positions of right-wing populist parties? the existing literature on european right-wing populism has largely ignored rpps’ approach to china. firstly, the general foreign policies of european rpps are an under-researched area in both western and chinese academic circles. secondly, the discussion on the policies of these parties toward china is still missing, although western academia has been making efforts to fill the aforementioned research gap by focusing more attention on populist politicians' foreign policy over the past dozen or so years (e.g. liang 2007, swyngedouw et al.2007, verbeek and zaslove 2015). populist parties’ international agenda toward particular countries remains largely unaddressed among western scholars’ prolific work on european populism so far. much recent research has a special focus on populism’s historical origins and political platforms, its voter patterns and electoral success, its impact on public policy, and government participation.5 this is due to populism’s nature as a direct response to the perceived domestic economic and social problems as well as its comparative marginal place in european politics. however, the evolving party politics plus the increasingly blurred boundary between domestic and international politics in europe require more academic attention on rpps’ international agenda. 5 some examples of this research include albertazzi and mcdonnell 2008, chryssogelos 2011, liang 2007, mudde 2004, mudde 2007, norris 2019, özdamar and ceydilek 2019, rivero 2019, shields 2007, verbeek and zaslove 2017, and zaslove 2008. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 the western academic circle reacted to this trend rather rapidly as more researchers have begun to address rpps’ foreign policy in the last 15 years. liang’s edited volume (2007) deals with the foreign policy of rpps in europe such as the austrian far-right, belgium's vlaams blok (now known as vlaams belang), denmark's people’s party, and france's front national (presently known as rassemblement national). angelos-stylianos chryssogelos’ research (2010; 2011) contributes to this body of knowledge by outlining rpps’ positions on transatlantic relations, eurussia relations, the middle east, and the global economic and financial systems, focusing specifically on their attitudes to aid and development assistance. verbeek and zaslove’s work (2015) analyzes the relationship between populism and foreign policy in general by looking into the case of italy's lega nord. other research on this issue includes the examination of the impact of populist parties’ political radicalization on international policy developments and relations (balfour et al. 2016). two recent contributions to this area are özdamar and ceydilek’s empirical study (2019) of the foreign policy belief systems of seven european populist far-right leaders (marine le pen, viktor orbán, geert wilders, nigel farage, jimmie åkesson, frauke petry, and norbert hofer) and escartin’s analysis (2020) of the extent to which rpps in power shape eu foreign policy, which focused on the case of italy's ln and hungary's fidesz. despite all this research, the policy of rpps toward china remains largely ignored. the situation is similar in chinese academic circles. the past 10 years saw a rapid increase in research of european populism among chinese researchers. according to the database of chinese national knowledge infrastructure (cnki), which is the largest and most-used online academic database in china, there were only six journal articles published on the subject of european populism between 1990 and 2010. between january 2011 and october 2020, there were 99 articles on the same subject. nevertheless, it is quite unfortunate that chinese scholars have largely missed rpps’ foreign policy.6 given the expansion of rpps in the european political sphere, the increasingly important role played by china in the globalization processes, and the growing significance of china as a strategic partner for the eu, it is of utmost academic urgency to research rpps’ approaches and attitudes toward china. populism and foreign policy: the increasing links between domestic and foreign policy globalization in the modern world has led to a gradual disappearance of the distinction between domestic and international politics. domestic events spill over into the international context, and at the same time, international events affect domestic and even local affairs (verbeek and zaslove 2015). in the post-cold war era, globalization has substantially increased the interdependence between national and foreign policies. this trend is particularly revealing in europe where integration has created a multi-level decision-making and governance fabric; eu member states’ interdependence is institutionalized and written into legally binding treaties. the common currency, the european single market, the schengen regime as well as the newly agreed recovery fund package in response to the covid-19 pandemic have blurred the boundaries between regional, national, and european competencies in unparalleled ways (cf. bache 2012). furthermore, the process of european integration has turned a substantial part of member states’ 6 similar to western scholars, chinese academics focus most of their attention on the historical conditions of the european rise of populism, the variations among rpps (for example, between left and right, western and eastern europe), case studies in member states, its impact on european integration, etc. 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 previously exclusive domestic politics into a pan-european one. for example, in recent years, changes in domestic politics led by polish and hungarian right-wing governments have provoked outcries from the european union (zamęcki and glied 2020). in short, eu member states’ autonomy is “arguably constrained as the boundaries defining sovereign states have become blurred” (balfour et al. 2016, 16). regulations created at the eu level shape the framework of economic activity in the member states. this is often raised by populist parties, e.g., when they accuse the eu of its regulations facilitating the penetration of national markets by foreign entities or that the eu norms limit the freedom of economic activity and hinder competition with entities from countries that do not have such strict environmental standards (like china). blurring boundaries is also happening in the field of foreign policy. competing political actors and their differing concepts of national interest are challenging the traditional way of foreign policymaking (hill 2013). in europe, globalization and europeanization have led to a “domestication” of foreign policy as external challenges become more crucial at the national level (balfour et al. 2016). at the same time, political parties have also become increasingly important actors in foreign policymaking (verbeek and zaslove 2015). in that context, the influence of rpps on the foreign policy of its countries can be observed, even if these parties are not part of government coalitions. for instance, akkerman (2018) points out the direct and indirect influence of rpps on immigration policymaking: direct influence comes through holding executive power, while indirect influence is due to the electoral pressure on incumbents from rpps. the analysis of the position of rpps toward china must therefore take into account whether the party is in power or is the opposition. the party in power has other instruments to influence public policies. in relation to the position on china, it is also important to note that when a party comes to power, it may change its stance toward such things as economic relations with china compared to the position it presented while in opposition. parties in power take much more responsibility than when they are in the role of the opposition. another important factor is also what the party competition looks like in a given party system. fagerholm emphasizes that parties tend to “respond to rival parties by shifting their position in the same direction” and that niche parties, like rpps, “do not generally respond to shifts in public opinion, but rather to opinion shifts among their own supporters” (2016, 505). in these new circumstances, european populist leaders have become known for their skills in localizing global complexity. swyngedouw et al. refer to this populist strategy as “the jumping of scales technique” (2007, 83-84). in populist language, international migration, organized crime, and cross-border terrorism are national problems. for example, in the discourse of france’s rassemblement national, european integration is responsible for france’s declining economy and the resulting immigration accounts for unemployment, crime, and the french identity crisis in general (liang 2007). consequently, once immigration is curtailed, the related domestic problems will be solved. cadier (2019) emphasizes that populists in office regard foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics even more than mainstream political parties. the ideological attachment of rpps’ foreign policy the most popular and concise definition of populism as a thin ideology is based on a central dichotomy: “the people” versus “the elite.” in the populist view, society is primarily divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the pure people against the corrupt elite; thus, politics should be an expression of the general will of the former (mudde 2007). this thin ideology does not possess a fully clarified or coherent argument about the political, economic, and social issues 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 in the real world. that is why populism can be attached both to “the left” and “the right.” it cannot exist without assigning itself to other, more fully-fledged political ideologies such as socialism, liberalism, nationalism, or radical-right ideology (verbeek and zaslove 2015). therefore, european right-wing populism7 is based on a combination of populism, radical-right thinking, and authoritarianism. a large number of radical-right and far-right parties in western europe have adopted a populist worldview and succeeded in making electoral gains in the last 15 years. apart from populism, they adopt nativism and authoritarianism as the core of their ideologies (mudde 2007). regarding economic policies, their most visible feature is the opposition to economic globalization.8 rpps’ ideology is also visible in their foreign policy programs. as populism is rooted in the idea of the authentic voice of the people, the national interest (“people’s voice”) becomes the basic starting point in their conceptualization of the international political agenda (verbeek and zaslove 2017); such an ideological orientation results in rpps’ inconsistency on most international issues. european populists have become known for their “changing views on most foreign policy issues ” (özdamar and ceydilek 2019, 138). rpps’ positions on a certain foreign policy issue, which is not as straightforward as expected, is always contingent upon whether they perceive the result as able to benefit the “people” (verbeek and zaslove 2015). such examples are easy to find. on the one hand, this inconsistency is obvious in these parties’ stance on general foreign affairs foreign issues: the french rn changed its attitudes toward russia during and after the cold war in a rather radical way (shields 2007); the austrian freedom party held contradictory positions on relations with the us and russia (meyer 2007); after the election of donald trump in 2016, the european rpp leaders downplayed their anti-americanism and adopted more friendly attitudes toward the us; the italian ln initially supported globalization when it began as a free-market, neo-liberal political movement claiming to represent northeastern italy but shifted to an anti-globalization stance in the late 1990s after its leaders portrayed globalization as a threat to the european-style welfare regime, local employment, and cultural identity (verbeek and zaslove 2015). on the other hand, these rpp attitudes toward europe further exemplify their inconsistency in foreign policy. ln’s position on european integration is based on its own evaluation of the expected effect of integration on the northern region of italy. it supports european integration when it is viewed as a strengthening factor for the region’s position in italy and europe. for example, the party used to defend the idea of a europe of the regions, which is in sharp contrast to its current opposition to the integration perceived as a threat to northern italy’s economy and cultural identity. in a similar vein, france’s rn’s euro attitude has experienced a similar turn from support to opposition. in turn, pis in poland maneuvers from a position that “polexit” is impossible to slogans that “the dictate of the eu” is a threat to polish identity – a culture based on catholicism and poland’s decision-making sovereignty (gpc 2020). 7 similar to the controversy surrounding the name of this “family of parties,” there are a number of suggestions for the label of ideology espoused by these parties, such as radical-right populism or national populism. 8 right-wing populists differ in economic policy to a large extent. for instance, some, like the freedom party in austria, opt for free markets but seek to retain extensive welfare benefits for existing citizens. others, like nigel farage, argue that lower economic growth is a price worth paying if it would reduce the influx of migrants and increase the number of jobs for britons. on the other hand, others, like marine le pen in france and similar figures in eastern europe, propose economically left-wing policies such as more state aid for troubled industries and restrictions on the free flow of capital and goods (therefore, they are termed as left-wing populists by some scholars). for more information, please see eatwell and goodwin 2018; rivero 2019; zaslove 2008. https://www.google.com.hk/search?hl=zh-cn&tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor: 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 therefore, contrary to the common understanding, rpps are not fundamentally anti-globalist or anti-eu. their positions on those issues and consequent development of international policies also depend on internal policy challenges (verbeek and zaslove 2015) and are rather contingent upon what they perceive as beneficial for the ordinary citizens of their countries. the rpps’ ideologies and their approach to china when the dynamic between rpps’ ideological attachment and foreign policy positions are applied to their policies toward china, a number of hypotheses can be made. firstly, european right-wing populists’ anti-globalization sentiment is also valid in their approach toward china. most rpps have been firm in stating that globalization, in both economic and cultural terms, has affected local europeans in a rather negative way; it is argued that neo-liberalism in the international trade regime destroys local production, lowers wages, and results in mass unemployment (kriesi and pappas 2015; mamonova and franquesa 2020). furthermore, the uncontrolled exportation of foreign culture can pose a threat to national traditions and identities; the massive flow of immigrants is argued to be another curse. all in all, the rpps’ belief is that globalization is a threat that benefits the european elites and takes a toll on the livelihood of ordinary europeans. as china’s global influence continues to grow in economic and trade terms, it is likely to fall victim to rpps’ accusations. in their discourse, the continuous relocation of the production line from europe to china and the competitive price of “made in china” products have brought about immensely negative consequences to the manufacturing industry and the employment market in their own countries. in recent years, the rapid growth of chinese investment in europe is also interpreted in rather negative terms. ironically, when donald trump was preoccupied with an anti-globalization agenda, china expressed its wish to push for greater openness of the global market. this simply goes against rpps’ anti-globalist and protectionist agenda. it is, therefore, predictable that china is to blame in rpp’s negative discourse on globalization. in the second place, european rpps pursue a foreign-policy agenda with diversified international partnerships, which may indicate possible positive views of china. these parties’ appeal to end the hegemony of the us in the international order and to build ties with russia promises a relatively friendly tone for china. cooley and nexon (2020) rightly point out that some european rpps promote an international system consisting of multiple great powers rather than one or two superpowers, envisioning a global order that privileges national sovereignty over liberal rights and values because such a multipolar international system will best serve their interests. in this sense, china can be perceived as effective leverage to oppose the usa and the “bureaucracy of brussels.” thus, in some populists’ view, china rises as a powerful challenging force to the current world order and grows to be an alternative partner (e.g., in matteo salvini’s and viktor orbán’s discourse). to conclude, it is expected that there is no unified approach to china among european rpps. rpps’ attitudes toward china depend mainly on their stance on free-market globalization, the perception of the need for alternatives to relations with the us and the eu, and their axiological assessment of the prc’s political system. a historical review of rpps’ approach to china 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 the relation between the ideological identification and the foreign policy orientations of european rpps indicates that their positions on china are also contingent upon the extent to which china’s presence enhances or hinders their perceptions of the “interests of the people.” variations are expected among these parties, and changes are possible within one party over time since rpp’s agendas in various european states are determined by national conditions. the main dimension of attitudes toward china is likely to be grounded in economic terms. the past three decades witnessed a sharp increase in trade between the eu and china. the european commission data shows that the prc is the eu’s largest source of imports and its second-largest export market as of february 2021 (eurostat 2021). this “chinese import shock” is seen as largely responsible for the increase in support for nationalist and radical-right parties (colantone and stanig 2018a). globalization, by means of the chinese import shock, also acted as a key structural determinant of the brexit vote in that “the leave share was systematically higher in regions that have been more exposed to the chinese import” (colantone and stanig 2018b, 201). initially, the european rpps did not take china seriously in foreign policy, given the latter’s comparatively minor influence. especially since for rpps, the more important issue was migration from the middle east and africa. however, along with china’s expansion in the global economy since its entry into wto in 2001, extensive investment policy by the prc’s government and its growing importance as an economic partner for the eu, these parties began to address china in their political agenda. still, important factors shaping the attitude of particular rpps toward china are domestic issues, including the structure of the national economy and inter-party relations in the party system of the state. fidesz the hungarian fidesz is one of the european rpps that hold a friendly stance toward china. hungarian prime minister viktor orbán was among the few european leaders who attended the second belt and road forum on international cooperation in 2019, and hungary was the only eu member state that did not sign the joint statement denouncing china’s belt and road initiative (bri) for hampering free trade (elmer 2018). the hungarian government claims that national interest is above anything else, and it shall not accept any kind of external ideological pressure from the eu. during the 2019 forum in beijing, orbán stated that the chinese belt and road initiative coincides entirely with hungarian national interests because the cooperation proposed under the initiative is an important guarantee for maintaining the order of free trade and the freedom of the world economy (government of hungary 2019). building close ties with china is part of hungary’s “eastern opening” strategy. in a speech delivered in 2010 after becoming prime minister, orbán stated that there should be no doubt that hungarians belong to the western world, but from then on, this fact would imply another connotation: “we are sailing under the western flag, but in the world economy an eastern wind blows. and the sailor that does not take into consideration according to which wind to rotate the sails will doom himself and his cargo” (jacoby and korkut 2016, 500). china is, in fact, among the four pillars of hungary’s “eastern opening” and is a primary target in orbán’s goal of reframing hungary’s geopolitical associations to diversify exports and attract investment in infrastructure projects (jacoby and korkut 2016). since fidesz came into power in 2010, the hungarian government has been building stronger economic and political ties with china by 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 facilitating chinese business and investment, encouraging chinese tourism in hungary, and offering china its political support on certain international issues.9 fidesz’s rapprochement with china under the leadership of orbán can be interpreted as an act of euroscepticism (hargitai 2020) and an effort to manage the pressure from the eu over his undemocratic changes. politically speaking, china, along with singapore, india, russia, and turkey, are models of successful illiberal and non-democratic countries for viktor orbán (jacoby and korkut 2016). economically speaking, closer links to china promise to offer an alternative to european resources (the hungarian order of chinese vaccines in 2021 can serve as an example here). it somewhat complements hungary’s simultaneous movements away from the eu (jacoby and korkut 2016). as orbán said in 2019, chinese companies are making a substantial contribution to the modernization of the hungarian economy, with chinese investments in hungary amounting to a record high of approximately usd 4.5 billion (government of hungary 2019). therefore, china is part of fidesz’s appeal for diversified international partnerships. it should, however, not be forgotten that fidesz did not always hold a positive opinion of china. its sinophile approach is, in fact, a shift from its earlier sinophobic one. for a long time, fidesz presented a rather skeptical stance toward china and chinese activities in hungary. for example, in their unsuccessful campaign in the 2006 election, orbán called for restrictions on chinese immigration in hungary. later, in 2008, he demanded the hungarian government caution china against its human rights record and make tibet an issue in hungary-china diplomatic relations (jacoby and korkut 2016). in addition, on more than one occasion, fidesz representatives have blamed chinese merchants for causing social and economic problems such as smuggling or illegal immigration (nyíri 2007). nevertheless, since returning to power in 2010, fidesz has considerably softened its anti-chinese populist rhetoric and downplayed or even dropped its previous harsh criticism of china. orbán’s position should therefore be seen as purely populist, resulting from the actual needs and the assessment of benefits and thus a disregard for a clear ideological position. as discussed earlier, as of the end of 2021, fidesz regards china as both an alternative partner to the west and a significant guarantee for the interest of the hungarian people. the opposition parties’ policy proposals toward china also affect fidesz. in hungary, the opposition did not play the chinese card in the previous electoral campaigns10; interestingly, the far-right jobbik has the most consistent anti-chinese stance among the main opposition parties. when in 2022, the united hungarian opposition began to criticize fidesz’s chinese policy (including support for the establishment of a branch of the fudan university in budapest), and a change in public opinion regarding china began to be noticeable (dubravčíková et al. 2020; koleszár 2021), viktor orbán softened his clearly pro-chinese stance in the campaign (standish 9 hungary was the first european country to join china’s belt and road initiative in 2015. it also opposed the eu using any strong language in its statement on the south china sea the next year. in 2021, hungary blocked the european union’s proposed statement criticizing china over hong kong. 10 the domestic political situation regarding the direct electoral competitor matters in rpp’s china policy. the challenges posed by eric zemmours for rn, the forum voor democratie for the party for freedom (pvv), the fratelli d'italia for ln are cases in point. rn, pvv and ln constantly modify their discourses on china according to the extent their rivals are questioning the china issue and competing for the dominating discursive power. the situation in hungary is somewhat different. as the governing party, fidesz is supposed to answer the challenges on governments’ policy toward china raised by opposition parties. nevertheless, the subject of china was largely missing in the previous electoral campaigns in hungary over the past decade. https://chinaobservers.eu/author/rekak/ https://www.rferl.org/author/reid-standish/tt_uqi 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 and szalai 2021). this sort of departure is in line with the findings demonstrated in studies on rpps' change in policy positions (özdamar and ceydilek 2019; verbeek and zaslove 2015). lega nord italy’s ln stands out as an interesting contrast to fidesz, not only because of its anti-china position but also due to the consistency in its policy toward china. founded in 1991, the lega nord per l'indipendenza della padania (rebranded as “lega” in 2018 without changing the official name of the party) is a right-wing populist party advocating more autonomy for the country’s wealthier northern region (padania). in its populist rhetoric, the protection of padania’s interest was the primary goal of the party. as discussed in the previous part, ln shifted from a pro-globalization and pro-eu position to its current anti-globalization and eurosceptic stance out of the concern that padania’s declining global and european competitiveness made it a victim of globalization and eu’s politics. its founder and former leader, umberto bossi, portrayed globalization as a threat to local production and local traditions (verbeek and zaslove 2015). by similar logic, china is an object of ln’s accusations. at the end of the 1990s, bossi and other leaders of ln began to worry about china’s upcoming entry into the wto. they saw chinese textile exports as a grave threat to italy’s local textile production. bossi underlined the process of moving italian manufacturing abroad. thus, ln was irritated by the eu’s push to abolish tariffs that, according to them, would expose european countries to competitors like china, and, as a result, european nations would not be able to protect their industries (woods 2009). next to immigration, protectionism became the primary concern of ln and the party called for the defence of italian businesses from china (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2005). during its time in power in the coalition government led by silvio berlusconi between 2001 and 2006, ln made frequent requests to pass protectionist measures by introducing high tariffs against products (i.e. from china) (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2008). furthermore, in 2009, roberto cenni, supported by ln, became the first conservative mayor of prato, tuscany, and after taking office, he backed stricter regulations on chinese trade and law enforcement officers’ raids on chinese garments companies (esparraga 2017). ln has often raised the issue of chinese counterfeits of italian products. since taking the party leadership from bossi in december 2013, matteo salvini persisted in ln’s sinosceptic tone. during his time in office as deputy prime minister between june 2018 and september 2019 in the coalition government of ln and the five star movement (m5s), he was quite suspicious of, if not outright opposed to italy’s rapprochement with china. when asked about his attitude toward china, he mentioned that “china is not a democracy and has a certain spirit of imperialism and control” (reuters 2019). salvini thus identifies with the atlanticist position, at the same time disagreeing with m5s’ argument stating that close ties with china safeguard italy’s national interest. moreover, salvini frequently comments that “italy is china’s colony,” arguing that italy joining the belt and road initiative is an attempt by china to colonize it in economic terms (giuffrida 2019). regarding the issue of huawei, salvini staunchly opposes chinese companies’ involvement in italy’s 5g network (o’neal 2020). in fact, he proposes to suspend italy’s relations with china altogether. nevertheless, when he was in power and was asked about his inconsistency by journalists (that he claims to be against china but takes part in some joint activities with the prc), he explained that “it is fine to encourage an economic understanding between our businesses, but this cannot be a trojan horse that indulges beijing’s geopolitical projects” (lanzavecchia 2020). 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 in 2020, in addition to blaming china for the covid-19 pandemic, salvini also supported hong kong on his social media channels. currently, ln has the sharpest position toward china among the main political parties. to sum up, italy's ln is a case of a european rpp that holds a rather negative but consistent position on china, with the cause of their concerns being focused on the regional labour market and the economy. complaints about “chinese imperialism” mainly stem from economic anxieties but an axiological element in ln’s rhetoric is also noticeable. rassemblement national france's rassemblement national (previously known as front national [fn]) is another european rpp that holds a consistent anti-china position. established as a far-right party, rn incorporated a series of populist elements in its subsequent development. since the 1980s, fn/rn has made immigration its core concern, focusing on french culture and tradition with a definition of national identity that stresses ethnicity rather than values. meanwhile, the idea of protecting french people’s interests motivates rn to be vocal on a wide range of issues such as european integration, law and order, and france’s high rate of unemployment. since the 1990s, rn has gradually shifted to a right-wing populist ideology that combines nationalism and authoritarian political values with strong populist rhetoric. when it comes to relations between france and china, the word “protectionism” dominates rn’s discourses. china is described as a “thief,” an enemy, and a threat. rn’s sinophobic position can be regarded as an extension of its euroscepticism. in condemning the eu’s commercial policy, rn’s former leader jean-marie le pen accuses the eu of promoting an extremely liberal agenda that fails to protect european industries and instead supports the benefits of the countries outside europe, particularly china (vasilopoulou 2010). according to rn, the open border policy practiced by the eu exposes french interests to excessive competition with the us and china (stockemer 2017). rn, under the new leadership of marine le pen, persists in its hardline stance toward china. in her book published in 2012, marine le pen accuses the elites (at both the french and eu levels) of negating the manufacturing industry’s relocation from europe to china over the past 30 years; in her opinion, the reality is dramatic and has, in fact, involved all economic sectors in france (le pen 2012). according to le pen, china is the culprit behind the massive unemployment and income decline in france (2012). in addition to the social dumping, le pen argues that china practices monetary dumping with erratic measures, which consequently results in imbalances in the international monetary system. she refuses to recognize beijing as a market economy, complaining that the absurd eu rules do little to protect the european market (front national 2015b) and argues that “quasi-free trade with china has been devastating to the french and european industries”; moreover, the huge discrepancies in legal, social and environmental standards between china and europe are responsible for the millions of european jobs losses subsequently replaced by chinese workers (le corre 2017). thus, in her rhetoric, china is not simply a threat but a crisis (“la crise chinoise”) (front national 2015a). in recent years, rn has emphasized the excessive dependence of the supply chain of goods on china and the need to protect the french market against goods from the prc (chenu 2019; androuet 2020). given the changing attitudes of french political parties and the french public toward china, rn’s position is not so different from the political mainstream. 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 other cases of rpps the above-mentioned cases illustrate the very typical stances of rpps toward china and the arguments for the antior pro-china position. however, other rpps are also worthy of attention. in 2016, britain's ukip, a forerunner for the leave campaign before brexit, claimed that what china had been and will be doing would impoverish the british people by their control of british companies and the consequent creation of unemployment. the british national party, a far-right nationalist grouping, also depicts china as the enemy (esparraga 2017). their position stems from reluctance toward “laissez-faire globalism.” in contrast, germany's afd stresses the positive impact of germany’s partnership with china: its representatives believe that the rise and revival of china is an imminent reality and that good relations with china are beneficial for europe. in their view, china’s belt and road initiative is a valuable addition to the global economy and brings development to the continental countries. a member of the european parliament from afd stated that “if europe wants to be an independent global player” instead of “an american vassal,” “it must nurture a good relationship,” “trustful partnership,” and even “true friendship” with china (free west media 2020). criticism of china also appears in afd’s discourse in the context of economic competition and fears of “selling off” the german economy to china (weidel 2019). this may give the impression of inconsistency in afd's appeal. however, apart from slogans about the need to protect the national economy, which is typical for rpps, afd’s members of the european parliament (meps) opposed the resolutions condemning china (becker and hail 2020). another noteworthy rpp is poland's pis, whose stance on china is an interesting example of pulls and pushbacks. different from some populist parties in europe, pis’ more multi-faceted stance stems from the fact that it is the ruling party. with its potentially important role in the belt and road initiative, poland was interested in closer cooperation with china, which was exemplified by the visit of the president of the republic of poland, andrzej duda, to china and his good relationship with president xi jinping. however, there are politicians within pis that are reluctant to china (e.g. former minister of national defence, antoni macierewicz); this fact, coupled with the lower-than-expected investment benefits from the bri, bring some doubts about closer cooperation with china, even on barely economic grounds. in addition, relations with the prc have been worsened by pis due to the us' position on huawei’s investments in 5g infrastructure in recent years. poland remains under the significant influence of the united states, which is considered the most important ally on account of the threat from russia. therefore, we can observe an internal tension in the policy toward china in pis (bachulska 2021). one faction that is keener to cooperate with china argues on the basis of economic terms. this group sees the prc entities as potential new investors in numerous (and usually large-scale) investment projects of pis' government. this is particularly true if the polish government foresees a likely reduction in the investment flows from the eu. possible investments by the prc in transport infrastructure including the new central polish airport, located 40 km from warsaw, were considered. their hope is that poland could play the role of a broker for chinese investments and therefore benefit from chinese activities in the eu. the reluctant faction emphasizes china’s incompatibility with the international security architecture based on the dominant role of the us, as the latter is seen as crucial in poland’s security. the two rpps in eastern europe, hungary's fidesz and poland's pis, are expected to be more anticommunist and hence more anti-china, given their historical experience. nevertheless, these two parties’ present approaches toward china showcase an interesting contrast. regardless of their 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 rather similar axiology-based anti-china tone in earlier days, fidesz and pis hold different perceptions of china at the moment. the former proposes to build closer ties with china and hopes to bring huge economic benefits for the hungarian people (though orbán also refers to china to support hungary’s illiberal democratic regime as an alternative to that of western europe). compared to fidesz’s rather positive stance toward china, pis seems more reserved. this contrast could be attributed to pis’ added emphasis on the axiological differences between china and the west, as well as poland’s strong inclination toward the us. in conclusion, european rpps’ policies toward china demonstrate two remarkable features. firstly, there is no unified approach to china among the right-wing populists in europe, even though they share similar ideological underpinnings. secondly, an individual party may change its position on china quite drastically. moreover, the proor anti-china stances presented by these parties indicate that, on the one hand, their sinophobia is an extension of their anti-globalization sentiment in which china is primarily portrayed as a threat to the local production and the root cause for the sluggish local economy. on the other hand, the sinophile orientation is a reflection of their appeal for diversified international partnerships in which china could act as an alternative partner to western hegemony. likewise, for some eurosceptical rpps, china is a counterbalance to brussels. additionally, one can notice that both the proand anti-china camps use the economic benefit/national interest argument to defend their approaches; such is the nature of populism. populists are eventually constrained by the electorate. all in all, “the appeal to the masses will not be made on ideological lines, but on what attracts most votes: chinese direct investment in poland or the fear of the dragon taking french jobs” (esparraga 2017, 3). the attitudes of rpps toward china also clearly show the inconsistency in the appeal of rpps, resulting from the blurred ideological foundations of populism. thus, another variable that exerts even more impact on the changes of attitude toward the prc other than nativist, anti-immigrant, axiological perspectives, or the geopolitical and economic situation of the state is rpps’ position in the government, especially if it is a ruling party. for example, fidesz changed its stance after becoming the governing party; it also partially happened with poland's pis. even matteo salvini, who presented himself as a consistent opponent of the prc, began to conduct business with china during his term in government.11 finally, the attitude of rpps toward china is heavily contingent on the rpps’ earlier attitude toward the usa. parties that are keen to cooperate strongly with the us (especially under trump’s presidency) are less favorable to china. 11 another italian populist party – leftist five star movement (m5s) – can also be used as a case of a shift in policy toward china upon becoming the governing party. starting from its establishment in 2009 to 2018, the m5s had a rather skeptical attitude toward china. the m5s founder, beppe grillo, shared skepticism of the italian government on chinese takeovers in strategic sectors and strongly protested against china’s trade practices in the past (garciaherrero and sapir 2017). however, after coming into office in june 2018, m5s led an unprecedentedly active policy toward china (poggetti 2018), i.e., the government set up a special “china task force” under the ministry of economic development and made explicit its intent to position italy as a leading european partner in cooperation with china’s belt and road initiative. in august 2018, italy signed four bilateral agreements with china (buzzetti 2018) and became the first g7 country that signed a memorandum of understanding on the belt and road initiative with china (horowitz 2019). as m5s’ members in italy’s populist government argue, collaboration with china promises to revive the sluggish italian economy, create its own opportunity, and serve the interest of the italian people. italy’s officials from the m5s also appreciate china’s efforts to provide medical supplies (coratella 2020). furthermore, as recently as august 2020, grillo criticized italy’s realignment with the us and pushed for strengthening ties with china. 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 although the positions of rpps on china vary among the parties, a recent turn toward a more hostile attitude is observable. this can be interpreted with the use of axiological arguments and by applying a geostrategic logic. from the axiological point of view, amongst the frequently raised issues are matters of communism, human rights, and authoritarianism.12 rpps’ policy toward china in times of covid-19 against the backdrop of increasing distrust toward china among european citizens and the hardening tone toward china by certain european politicians, some rpps, although not having undergone a dramatic shift, have gradually turned to a more critical stance toward china, e.g. france's rn and the netherlands' pvv. this is in line with the falling public assessment of china during the months since the pandemic outbreak (silver et al. 2020). the assessment of china during the covid-19 pandemic has worsened (krastev and leonard 2020), however, the “coronavirus diplomacy” of the prc might have created some minor exceptions to this trend. for example, china’s medical equipment sales have been initially well-received by parts of europe.13 the right-wing populist politician who praised the chinese support the most is probably the founder of the serbian progressive party and the president of serbia, aleksandr vucić. on the one side are the sinophobic parties. ln has continued its anti-china rhetoric during the covid-19 pandemic. its leader matteo salvini doubted the good intentions with which china sent the urgently needed medical advisory group and resources to italy in march 2020. on march 25, he and his ln colleague giorgia meloni posted on their personal social media accounts a piece of unconfirmed information claiming that a news program aired in 2015 about chinese lab experiments and research on other coronaviruses was “proof that the novel virus had originated in that same lab” (nardelli and d’urso 2020). a few days later, salvini took things one step further and stated that “if the chinese government knew [about the virus] and didn’t tell it publicly, it committed a crime against humanity” during a debate session in the senate (ferraresi 2020). in regard to this conspiracy theory, marine le pen did not express a clear opinion but stated that it was legitimate to wonder if the virus had escaped from a laboratory. at the same time, she was quite aware that 40% of her supporters in the first round of the presidential election in 2017 believed that the coronavirus was intentionally made, and 15% believed that it was accidentally made (lepelletier 2020). other representatives from france's rn underlined the danger of excessive dependence on a foreign country in supplies of medicine and medical protective equipment (bardella 2020). though not explicitly stated, it is obvious that china is viewed as an unreliable partner, which highlights the thesis that china is critically regarded as the trojan horse of economic globalization. 12 it is also visible among other rpps not studied here. for example, the netherlands' party for freedom (pvv) and geert wilders have questioned the fairness of competing with chinese companies. pvv underlines the systemic rivalry and the differences in values, implying that the chinese engage in industrial espionage while emphasizing the threats associated with chinese investments. wilders refers to china as the “trojan dragon” in europe (pvv 2019). recently, rpps presenting axiological challenges have exposed the issue of hong kong and huawei’s 5g infrastructure. in turn, the true finns party in finland mentions the concerns for the natural environment due to the activities of the chinese. britain's ukip presents a broader axis of geopolitical concerns, with nigel farage calling for a “more tough” stance against china – a stance that can be understood through his ties with the former president of the us, donald trump. 13 e.g., reactions of polish citizens on social media when president xi jinping promised to support poland in a phone discussion with president andrzej duda. https://plus.lefigaro.fr/page/uid/3108481 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 in contrast, on the other side are the pro-china parties. in march 2020, the hungarian prime minister orbán welcomed the flight from china that brought supplies to help hungary battle covid-19, expressed his gratitude for china’s contribution to containing the spread of covid19, and communicated his hopes for future bilateral economic cooperation. this type of discourse indicates that the appreciation of chinese aid and its efforts in combating the pandemic offer more justification for their quest for a partnership with china that would serve as an alternative to a partnership with the west. at the same time, other rpps’ critique of china proved even more valid since china’s global oligopoly of the production of medical resources weakened the capacity of european countries to effectively respond to the virus (such voices were particularly loud in the early stages of the covid-19 pandemic in europe). both of these narratives claim to protect people’s interests, i.e. the health and security of the public during the covid-19 pandemic. discussion and conclusions additional research on european rpps’ policies on china is necessary as these types of parties have seen greater electoral success and have entered mainstream politics at a time when relations between the european union and china have become increasingly multi-faceted. the analysis in this article has demonstrated the following: european rpps do not hold a unified position on china, and their positions on china are contingent upon whether they interpret relations with china as benefiting or damaging “the well-being of the people.” their either proor anti-china position is based on the argument that engagement with china either enhances or harms people’s wellbeing: china can be perceived as a threat to the national economy and (increasingly) as an axiological rival or an alternative partner to the us and the eu in international relations. another important variable turns out to be the position of a given rpp in government and its current attitude toward the us. this logic is also true of rpps’ approach toward china during the covid-19 pandemic. from the early days of the chaotic competition for medical equipment to the subsequent efforts to acquire covid-19 vaccinations in europe, both proand anti-china voices can be heard among the rpps. the parties’ pro or anti-china positions have been strengthened during the crises caused by the pandemic. what is noteworthy is that europe, in general, has toughened its attitude toward china since the beginning of the pandemic. within such an environment, the anti-chinese voices seem to be taking the lead not only among mainstream politicians but also among rpp leaders, at least for the moment. for some european right-wing populists, “the threat of china” might be exploited as a new source of political power. this research mainly deals with these parties’ preferences in their policy toward china, but it is of equal or even more significance to investigate the effect of rpps on the policies toward china at both the state and european levels. firstly, as evidence shows, the mainstream in europe has been absorbing the national-populist and right-wing agenda over the past decades, which “in whatever form, will have a powerful effect on the politics of many western countries for many years” (eatwell and goodwin 2018, 207). the issue of immigration serves as a salient case for this point. being a rather marginal subject in the closing decades of the 20th century, immigration has now successfully found its way into the political agenda of almost every eu member state, a result attributable primarily to the efforts of rpps. another example is the never-to-be-underestimated role of britain's ukip in bringing about the brexit vote. secondly, rpps in government can exert a direct impact on policy outcomes. for instance, a pro-china stance by an rpp in government has https://www.google.com.hk/search?hl=zh-cn&tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor: 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 the capacity to determine the decision-making at both the state and european levels. such examples are not difficult to find. besides, the ongoing debate over sanctions on russia provides a very recent case. apart from the above-mentioned research possibility, it must be admitted that this research’s scope omits to encompass certain points. firstly, rpps’ voices about china’s stance on issues such as taiwan, human rights, and climate change are absent. secondly, there are intricate differences between rpp parties in government and those in opposition as their different statuses exert influence on their rhetoric on china. those limitations, however, create opportunities for more nuanced and meticulous future research endeavours. 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 references androuet, mathilde. 2020. “notre souveraineté pharmaceutique est aussi un impératif” [our pharmaceutical sovereignty is also an imperative]. rassemblement national. accessed may 26, 2022. https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/notre-souverainetepharmaceutique-est-aussi-un-imperatif/. akkerman, tijitske. 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online journal modelling the new europe, 34: 57-85. https://doi.org/10.24193/ojmne.2020.34.03. zaslove, andrej. 2008. “exclusion, community, and a populist political economy: the radical right as an anti-globalization movement.” comparative european politics 6 (2): 169-189. https://www.afd.de/alice-weidel-china-duepiert-diehttps://www.afd.de/alice-weidel-china-duepiert-diehttps://doi.org/10.1080/00313220902793906 https://doi.org/10.24193/ojmne.2020.34.03 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 climate and energy politics in canada and germany: dealing with fossil fuel legacies 1 stephan schott2, carleton university miranda schreurs3, technical university of munich abstract canada and germany are both pursuing major energy transitions and far-reaching climate programs and targets, but they differ in terms of policies towards some energy sources and their preferred policy instruments. both countries have committed to large scale emission reductions despite the challenge of regional divestment from fossil fuels: hard coal in north rhine westphalia and the saarland; lignite in the rhineland, in the lusatsia (lausitz) region, and in central germany; coal in alberta, saskatchewan, and nova scotia; and oil and natural gas in western canada. this article compares the current pan-canadian framework (pcf) on clean growth and climate change with the german climate law and the european green deal. relying on these measures, canada and germany set out policies and targets to become climate neutral by 2050. the article identifies critical challenges in the transition away from fossil fuels in both countries and provides insights on the possibility and likelihood of linking policies and regulatory measures across the atlantic. 1 the authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and critiques and anita grace for her excellent editorial work. the article was updated on april 22, 2021. 2 stephan schott is an associate professor in the school of public policy and administration at carleton university. 3 prof. miranda schreurs is chair of climate and environmental policy at the bavarian school of public policy, technical university of munich. 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 introduction canada and germany are two of the largest economies among the top ten greenhouse gas (ghg) emitters globally. in 2020, canada accounted for 1.6 percent and germany for 1.8 percent of global ghg emissions. the two countries, however, have quite different historical experiences with fossil-based energy. while canada started with a relatively clean energy system based to a large extent on hydropower, it became a fossil fuel giant as a result of oil and natural gas discoveries in the west. canada, as a colonial nation, was built on the exploitation of natural resources and indigenous lands through a staples approach (watkins 1963) that has been characterized by sequential periods when specific export commodities were dominant (fish, fur, timber, grain, oil), and associated with wider economic, social, and political consequences. the latest natural resource staples to be developed are oil and gas, with canadian reserves of oil and gas, the vast majority of which are located in alberta, accounting for 10 percent of known global reserves (natural resources canada 2019). in comparison, germany fueled its industrial development with domestic coal and lignite. german coal reserves are significant. of known global reserves of coal, germany accounts for 3.5 percent, poland 2.5 percent, and the european union (eu) as a whole about seven percent (worldometers 2020). during its period of rapid economic growth from the 1960s into the 1980s, germany also invested heavily in nuclear energy (brauers, herpich, and oei 2018; von hirschhausen et al. 2018), and so did canada. while both countries’ economies have been heavily dependent on fossil fuels and had a similar number of nuclear reactors into the 1990s, in the last decades germany has embarked on an energy transition away from nuclear energy and towards renewable energy sources (onshore and offshore wind, solar photovoltaics, geothermal, and green hydrogen). germany plans to shut down the last of its nuclear reactors by 2022. more recently, it has laid out plans to phase out coal no later than 2038. these plans have been complemented by the controversial plan to bridge the transition from coal to renewables, with imports of russian natural gas. canada has also invested in expanding renewable energy and plans to phase out coal by 2030. but canada remains heavily invested in western oil and gas and maintains its nuclear power facilities in ontario and new brunswick. the impacts of canada’s and germany’s shifting energy paths are visible in their greenhouse gas emissions trajectories, which have moved in opposite directions. canada’s carbon dioxide (co2) emissions rose from 453.40 metric tonnes (hereafter m tonnes) in 1990 to 584.85 m tonnes in 2019. in contrast, german emissions declined in this same period from 1018.22 m tonnes to 702.60 m tonnes (crippa et al. 2020). indeed, although canada started out relying on cleaner energy than germany and in 1990 its per capita co2 emissions were only somewhat higher than in germany (respectively, 16.37 versus 12.87 tonnes co2/cap), in 2019 they were substantially higher: 15.69 versus 8.52 tonnes co2/cap (crippa et al. 2020). this difference suggests that canada’s status as an increasingly major oil and gas producer in the past decades has worsened its climate balance despite the phase out of coal in ontario and expansion of renewables in some provinces. in comparison, in germany there have been major industrial shifts which include the shutting down of highly polluting plants and the modernization of infrastructure (particularly in eastern parts of the country after reunification in 1990), a strong expansion of renewable energies, and a move away from highly polluting coal to growing reliance on natural gas which has a lower co2 content. germany has more consistently pursued climate policies than has canada, where changes in party control of the federal government have resulted in swings in the degree of intensity with which canada has addressed climate change. 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 this article examines factors that help explain canada’s and germany’s efforts to transition away from their historic energy paths towards cleaner, more climate-responsible energy systems, with attention to their differing experiences in dealing with powerful fossil fuel interests and carbonintensive industrial actors. as german climate and energy policy cannot be understood without reference to the eu, the article also brings in relevant dimensions of eu climate laws and programs. canada, germany, and the eu have all signed on to the paris climate agreement. canada has committed to reducing its ghg emissions by 30 percent of 2005 levels by 2030 and to working towards achieving net emissions neutrality by 2050. germany is pursuing a 55 percent reduction of 1990 emission levels by 2030, has indicated its intentions to be climate neutral by 2050, and has supported the european green deal, which calls for climate neutrality for the entire eu by 2050 as well. to follow along with european and u.s. pledges to pursue more aggressive emission reduction plans, canada announced on earth day 2021 (april 22nd) a more ambitious target of 4045 % carbon emission reductions by 2030. the article begins with a brief comparison of the energy structures in canada and germany. it then examines the german energy transition, the german climate protection act, and the european green deal, before turning to the pan-canadian framework on clean growth and climate change. next, the article examines the significant challenges that both countries face in pursuing their ambitious climate policies, particularly the need to address the resistance of powerful fossil fuels lobbies, carbon-intensive industrial/financial interests, and impacted regions. also considered is the extent to which and why these alliances may be shifting in germany and canada. the article concludes with discussion of areas where the two countries can cooperate to make progress toward their respective goals in transitioning energy sources and combatting climate change. german climate policy and the german energiewende germany plays a particularly important role within international and eu climate and energy policy-making, at times acting as a driver, and at other times acting as a brake. germany was among the first states to introduce a voluntary climate target in 1990, and in 1995 it hosted the bonn conference which lay the groundwork for the 1997 kyoto protocol negotiations. then environment minister and later german chancellor, angela merkel, helped negotiate the kyoto protocol, and later pushed to assure its international ratification. it was under the german presidency of the european council in 2007 that the groundwork was realized for an integrated european climate and energy program and at the onset of ursula von der leyen’s (a german) term as european commission president that the european green deal was launched in 2019. over the years, germany has set out numerous ambitious climate and energy plans as well as voluntary domestic ghg emission reduction targets. these include the climate protection program of 2000, the integrated energy and climate program of 2007, the climate protection concept of 2010, and the climate protection plan 2050 set in 2016. hundreds of policy measures have been introduced to shift industry, society, and energy producers in cleaner directions, to tighten building efficiency standards, to address excessive consumption and waste, to expand recycling, to further public transport opportunities, and to digitalize the economy to enhance efficiencies. 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 with these goals and actions, germany seeks to spur new industries and become a global climate leader. between 1990 and 2020, germany reduced ghg emissions by 42.3 percent and expanded renewable energy in the electricity sector from three to 45 percent (agora energiewende 2021).4 an initial drop in emissions was tied to unification as many industries in the former east germany could not compete in the new system or meet its higher pollution standards. the german federal environmental agency reports that between 1989 and 1994, co2 emissions in the former east germany dropped by about 43 percent while in the former west germany they remained largely stable. the “wall fall profit” in terms of co2 emission reductions has been estimated to be about 105 million tonnes or about 10 percent of the emission reductions from 1990 levels (eichhammer et al. 2001, 7-11). often overlooked in discussions about the wall fall profit are the tremendous financial and social costs associated with the industrial restructuring of the east; while these were perhaps easy emission reductions, they were certainly very costly. after about the mid-1990s, further emission drops are associated with climate policy measures. more recently, the covid-19 crisis has played a role in the sharp greenhouse gas emissions reductions and in the strong performance of renewable energies. agora energiewende (2021) estimates that without the economic slowdown induced by the pandemic, emissions would have only been about 38 percent below 1990 levels. prior to the pandemic, germany’s climate actions were increasingly criticized, especially by environmentalists, as being too lopsided. while much was being done to build up renewables, too little was being done to address emissions in the hardto-abate sectors due to resistance from some of the country’s most powerful industries, including the coal and automobile sectors. germany’s energy transition (energiewende) and its climate policies have been pushed forward by environmental movements and the green party, public opinion, and the search for new areas of industrial development. public pressure began with calls for a nuclear phase out, transitioned to focus on renewable energy, and more recently to demands for still more far-reaching climate action. for many years, deeper changes to the status quo were challenged by conventional fossil fuel dependent industries and regions (hey 2010; stefes 2016). the christian democratic union (cdu) and its bavarian sister party, the christian social union (csu), with its strong ties to big business interests, and the social democratic party (spd) with its support from the labour unions, initially resisted the demands for a more rapid transition in the country’s energy structure and transport system. this resistance has more recently weakened as public demand for climate action has strengthened. over time, fossil fuel industries have felt compelled to begin investing more actively in the renewable energy sector. phasing out nuclear energy and phasing in renewables the energiewende envisions a shift away from nuclear and fossil fuel dependency, enhanced resource and energy efficiency, and the expansion of renewable energy capacity. the energiewende has its roots in decades of contention over nuclear energy policies. anti-nuclear protests galvanized germany in the 1970s and 1980s. these protests led to the birth of the green party, which over the course of the next decades pressed other political parties to develop more assertive programs for sustainable development (hager 2016). today, german political parties 4 see also the frauenhofer institute’s energy charts: https://www.energy-charts.de/index.htm 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 (with the exception of the alternative for germany (alternative für deutschland)) vie with each other to convince voters that they are the true representatives of green interests. the chernobyl nuclear crisis in 1986 weakened public and political support for nuclear energy; the nuclear crisis in japan in 2011 basically ended support altogether. germany, which once had more than a quarter of its electricity supplied from nuclear energy, will soon be nuclear free. related to the phase out of nuclear energy have been the efforts to promote renewable energy. the growth of renewables began with the 1990 electricity feed-in law requiring grid operators to take renewable energy into the grid, including from small producers, and the expansion of feed-intariffs as a result of the renewable energy law of 2000 (von hirschhausen 2018; clausen 2019). this law was negotiated under a social democratic party – green party coalition (morris and jungjohann 2016). phasing out coal and transport-related emissions despite progress on renewables, germany’s ghg emissions were dropping more slowly than planned before the covid-19 pandemic struck; in fact, it appeared that the country would fail to meet its 2020 greenhouse gas reduction target. progress was stifled by the country’s continued heavy reliance on coal, both hard coal and lignite, in the heating and electricity sectors. hard coal and lignite combined accounted for over 39 percent of electricity generation in 2017. while working to develop the image of a clean manufacturing economy, germany was spewing pollution from its 42.6 gigawatts (gw) worth of coal-fired power generation capacity. transport-related emissions tied to oil and gas use were another problem area. a plan to have one million electric vehicles on the road by 2020 had to be pushed back by two years as neither the industry nor the government prioritized the transition (reuters 2018) and because the industry focused on the internal combustion engine and energy-intensive luxury vehicles (miller and campbell 2019). the slow pace of change in the automobile sector is certainly linked to the power of this industry, which employs over 800,000 people directly and many more indirectly. the pace of improvements in the energy efficiency of the housing stock has also been slow. without a climate law making the realisation of targets mandatory, progress was uneven. germany moves to phase out coal starting in the midto late 2010s, pressure grew internally and externally for germany to do more to address emissions from coal-fired power plants, its single largest source of emissions (stefes 2016; oei 2018). an external source of pressure was the launch by the united kingdom and canada of the powering past coal alliance at the 23rd conference of the parties to the un framework convention on climate change in bonn, germany in 2017 (power past coal alliance 2017). the formation of an international alliance to phase out of coal in bonn was an embarrassment for germany as it was seeking to portray itself as a climate leader but had yet to really tackle its own coal-based emissions. it certainly added to the pressure being created by large public protests. domestic protests have taken many forms, and some are still on-going. in 2018, in north rhine westphalia, protesters built camps in the hambach forest to protect this old growth forest scheduled to be cut down by the energy giant, rwe, in order to get at the lignite below. in 2019, activists broke through police lines to prevent mining equipment from being used in the garzweiler lignite mine, and the following year they broke in and occupied the mine. in parallel actions, in 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 brandenburg, protesters blocked the train tracks leading to one of the country’s dirtiest coal-fired power plants, jänschwalde. the confrontations between police and activists are reminiscent of the conflicts which had taken place decades earlier against nuclear power plants. in this increasingly tense environment, in 2018 the coalition government formed the commission for growth, structural change, and employment (more commonly known as the coal commission). germany often makes use of such commissions to develop consensus among divergent interests on deeply divisive issues. commission members discuss and debate for weeks, months, or in this case over a year until a compromise solution can be found. the commission’s final report was released in february 2019. with just one negative vote, the report called for a total phase out of coal by 2038, with a possible earlier phase out by 2035 (schulz 2020). one year later, the german parliament agreed on a “coal phase out” law. the capacity of power plants using hard coal (anthracite) (22.7 gw in 2017) and those using lignite (19.9 gw in 2017) are to be reduced to around 15 gw each by 2022, with a further reduction to 8 gw capacity for hard coal and 9 gw capacity for lignite-fired power plants by 2030. support of up to 40 billion euro for structural transitions and compensation to power plants in the impacted regions is expected (bundesrat 2020). under pressure from youth activists (especially fridays for future) and fearing loss of voter support in the face of its failure to meet set targets, the ruling cdu/csu spd coalition began work on a climate protection law. the federal climate change act, a major framework law, entered into force on december 18, 2019. in discussing the need for the law, the coalition partners noted the heavy financial burden the country would face if it failed to fulfill its ghg emission reduction targets under the eu’s effort sharing decision (fraktionen der cdu/csu und spd 2019). the act mandates a minimum 55 percent reduction in ghg emissions by 2030 (relative to 1990 levels); sets annual emission budgets for the energy, industry, transport, buildings, agriculture, and waste sectors; and legislates climate neutrality as a goal for 2050. the government is itself to become climate neutral in all of its activities and investments by 2030. the act requires annual performance evaluations and transparency in emissions data provided by an independent evaluation committee. the ministries responsible for under-performing sectors will be required within a three-month period to present an immediate action program (sofortprogramm) with measures for how to address shortcomings. parliament will determine if further regulatory measures are needed (deutscher bundestag 2019). the climate action programme 2030 specifies measures to reach targets. starting in 2020, air flight taxes were increased, a co2 price was established which raised the price of fossil fuels for transport and heating, a new tax incentive for building renovations was introduced, and the value added tax on train tickets was reduced. to address concerns about consumer backlash, electricity prices for residential consumers are to be reduced by cutting the feed-in tariff for renewables, a controversial idea intended to offset the higher prices on oil, gas, and kerosene. amid growing concern about foreign competition in electric vehicle development, the automobile sector has also been targeted. the climate action programme establishes several targets: 40 to 42 percent emissions reductions for the transport sector compared to 1990 levels, seven to 10 million electric vehicles on the road, and a target of one million charging stations for electric vehicles by 2030. as in canada, various purchase incentives for e-vehicles have been introduced. 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 there will, of course, be obstacles to acceptance of some of these measures (schreurs and ohlhorst 2015; bues 2020). the expansion of wind parks, large solar installations, biomass facilities, and electricity storage systems are facing opposition from affected communities and some nature conservation interests. there is also opposition to the phase-out in affected communities. to integrate the public into the implementation process, participatory decision-making initiatives are becoming increasingly common at both the länder (state) and federal levels. an additional problem relates to the possible lock-in effect caused by infrastructure being developed for natural gas, which is being turned to to replace coal. the controversial nord stream 2 pipeline, which is to bring natural gas directly from russia to germany via the baltic sea, is a case in point. eu climate policy and the european green deal eu climate and energy policies set general directions, targets, and expectations for member states, which then have the responsibility for implementation (lederer,2020). german climate and energy policy must be viewed in this context. the eu has managed to maintain a surprising degree of consensus on the importance of climate action despite the diversity of its member states and their rather different energy structures (schreurs and tiberghien 2007; schreurs and tiberghien 2010; jordan et al. 2012; wurzel, connelly, and liefferink 2017). it uses a variety of means ranging from advice to directives and regulations to encourage, cajole, or require member states to do more to protect the environment. this has been the case, for example, in relation to germany’s automobile sector, which historically has lobbied the federal government to oppose more stringent emission regulations. once tighter emission regulations are nevertheless decided upon at the eu level, as has occurred on numerous occasions, the german industry must comply (oki 2020). member states also take their own priorities and interests and elevate them onto the eu’s agenda in an effort to create a level playing field within the eu or to enhance progress on an issue of normative concern, like climate change. germany played a critical part in early efforts to elevate renewable energy to the eu agenda. in the meantime, the eu has issued a series of directives aimed at expanding renewable energy capacity and improving energy efficiency. as a consequence, the growth of renewable energy across the eu has been striking. in 2005, renewable energy in gross final energy consumption for the eu28 stood at nine percent; at the end of 2019 it was 18.9 percent (and 19.7 percent for the eu27) (european environment agency 2019; eurostat 2021). the eu has also managed to keep climate action a union priority despite some ups and downs in member state enthusiasm for stricter action. in 2014, in the lead up to the paris climate agreement, the clean energy for all package was adopted setting ghg emission reduction targets for 2030. these targets were amended upwards in december 2018 to 40 percent ghg emissions reduction (compared to 1990 levels), 32 percent for renewable energy and 32.5 percent for energy efficiency (compared to 2005 levels) (european commission 2019). the european commission (n.d.) reported in 2020 that, between 1990 and 2018, the eu reduced ghg emissions by 23 percent while the economy grew by 61 percent over the same time period, meaning the eu had exceeded its 2020 target to reduce emissions by 20 percent of 1990 levels ahead of schedule. a decoupling from energy use and ghg emissions is occurring (european commission 2020a). 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 with increasing concern in the eu about global warming, pollution, inefficient material use, natural resource depletion, and import dependency for energy and natural resources, in 2019, the european commission proposed a european green deal. it addresses the areas of clean energy, sustainable industry, building renovation, sustainable mobility, food production and consumption, and biodiversity protection. the european green deal aims at climate neutrality and zero pollution by 2050. the eu has set a plan to cut emissions by 55 percent of 1990 levels by 2030 (on the debate behind these targets see abnett 2020; european commission 2020d). part of the eu’s covid-19 recovery package that was spearheaded by germany and france calls for a tax on non-recycled plastics and the introduction of carbon border taxes starting in 2023 on products being produced in countries with lower carbon emission standards than the eu. thirty percent of the total €1.8 trillion package, combining the multiannual financial framework (mff) and next generation eu, is to target climate-related projects (european council 2020). the european green deal bases its climate change targets and goals on ecological modernization discourses, reflecting debates in germany about the economic opportunities for climate change action (machin 2019). a key policy instrument for achieving germany’s climate goals has been the eu emissions trading system (ets), which was launched in 2005 and covers thousands of industries. sectors covered by the ets have to cut emissions by 43 percent compared to 2005 and non-ets sectors by 30 percent (bayer and aklin 2020). early design flaws, and especially the allocation of too many pollution allowances to major industries – a problem that ensued in significant part due to the demands of german industries – limited the effectiveness of the system. subsequent corrections to the ets’ design have improved its functioning to some degree. despite the low prices on carbon resulting from initial design flaws, according to one assessment (bayer and aklin 2020), the ets saved the eu about 1.2 billion tonnes of co2 between 2008 and 2016, equating to reductions of 3.8 percent of total eu-wide emissions compared to a scenario without an ets. with the reforms, the price of carbon has risen from a low of just under three euros per tonne of carbon in april 2013 to over 43 euros per tonne in april 2021.5 under the eu post-covid-19 stimulus package, the ets is to be expanded to the aviation and maritime sectors as well as to the transportation and heating sectors. this pricing of carbon is critical for germany in its efforts to meet its domestic targets as it incentivizes the shift away from fossil fuels. the european commission (2020b) reported an 8.7 percent drop in ghg emissions in 2019 compared to 2018 levels, largely a result of a decline in emissions from stationary sources (with coal being replaced by renewables and gasfired power production), and a significant jump in the carbon price after the fourth eu ets reform. canadian energy and climate change politics canada is among the most decentralized of all federal countries. in 1982, the constitution act (section 92a) strengthened provincial powers over natural resources. each province has exclusive jurisdiction over the development, conservation, and management of its non-renewable resources, which includes energy resources, forests, and hydroelectric power facilities. the federal 5 see the ember eu ets carbon pricing tracking system: https://ember-climate.org/data/carbon-price-viewer/. 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 government has authority over transboundary emissions and interprovincial matters, and has considerable authority to regulate ghg emissions. while the federal government takes the lead in signing international agreements such as the kyoto accord and the paris accord (2015), the effective implementation of such agreements depends heavily on the cooperation of the provinces and territories. due to wavering levels of commitment at both the federal and provincial levels, canada generally has a weak record of following through on international climate change commitments. furthermore, canada is the only g7 nation without a national energy strategy (schott and campbell 2013). the lack of such a strategy makes it difficult to coordinate energy and climate policy and to set specific timelines and targets (benz and broschek, 2020). adding to the complexity is the legacy of the colonial state system. the current liberal government is committed to truth and reconciliation with 94 calls to action (truth and reconciliation committee 2015) and reversing the colonial path in line with the un declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (undrip, un 2007). there are large areas of canada that are either unceded territories or have treaties or modern land claims that provide considerable power and autonomy for indigenous peoples. recently, indigenous leaders and activists have openly demonstrated against large energy projects, such as natural gas and oil pipelines going through british columbia (bc) as well as oil exploration in the arctic (e.g., clyde river vs. petroleum geo-services). a shift to a more meaningful nation-to nation dialogue will require more indigenous representation in decision-making and an enhanced role of the federal government as a power broker and mediator between indigenous peoples and provincial and territorial governments when it comes to overlapping energy and environmental policies (gramiak and schott 2018). energy and climate change policies differ quite significantly within canada. there are important regional differences in terms of provincial efforts to reduce energy-related carbon emissions (decarbonization) and decouple economic activities and energy demand. canada has a relatively clean electricity grid, with 67 percent of electricity coming from renewable sources and 82 percent from non-ghg emitting sources. some provinces are very advanced in terms of their clean electricity grids (e.g., manitoba, québec, bc, newfoundland and labrador, and ontario). five provinces (nova scotia, new brunswick, prince edward island, ontario, and québec) and all three territories (yukon, northwest territories, and nunavut) have achieved some degree of decoupling and decarbonization. however, provinces with resource-dependent economies (saskatchewan, alberta, manitoba, newfoundland and labrador, and bc) are failing to decouple and only bc has managed to make some gains in decarbonization (hughes 2020). in aggregate, canada’s economic growth is still fuelled by increases in energy demand and weak decarbonization efforts due to a split between the post-industrial east and the industrialized fossil fuel dependent west (hughes 2020). since pierre elliot trudeau’s national energy program, there have been five attempts in canada to coordinate energy and climate change policy that have so far failed to offset increasing emissions from oil and gas development in the western provinces (macdonald 2020; winfield and macdonald 2020). a continuation of this attempt is the recent acquisition of the trans mountain pipeline expansion by the federal government to bring albertan oil to a port near vancouver. this project will enable a tripling in the pipeline’s capacity to 890,000 barrels of oil per day but increases alberta’s challenge in meeting its ghg emission reduction targets and sends a mixed message on future industry and energy transition directions. the oil and gas sector has maintained a strong influence on canadian politics for several decades and managed until 2016 to limit any serious climate regulations for the sector. a strong alliance 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 of vested interests linking oil companies, natural gas companies, utilities in the us and canada, and the canadian financial oligopoly (toronto dominion bank, bank of montreal, scotiabank, cibc, and royal bank) successfully counteracted calls for stricter environmental legislation in most provinces and by the federal government. there was also surprising public support and media coverage of climate skeptics, who were falsely perceived as providing a balanced view on climate science. the struggle to develop and implement a pan-canadian framework on clean growth and climate change the election of a liberal government under the leadership of justin trudeau in 2015 indicated a shift in the approach to energy policy, and a more climate-friendly direction compared to the previous approach of the conservative government led by stephan harper. an important step was the development of a more coordinated plan to tackle ghg emissions while enabling clean growth, which was introduced by the liberal government in 2016 in the form of the pan-canadian framework on clean growth and climate change (pcf). as noted above, implementation of effective climate and energy policy requires coordination between the federal and provincial governments. for this reason, the pcf was developed after the declaration of the premiers adopted at the québec summit on climate change in 2015 where it was agreed to take ambitious action in support of meeting or exceeding canada’s 2030 target of a 30 percent reduction below 2005 levels of ghg emissions. this involves a commitment to pursue a collaborative approach between provincial, territorial, and federal governments to reduce ghg emissions, and to enable sustainable economic growth. the pcf explicitly acknowledges the rights of indigenous peoples and their leadership in the adoption of the paris agreement (canada 2016). at that point, saskatchewan was the only province not to sign on to the pcf. the pcf tries to ensure that the provinces and territories have the flexibility to design their own policies and programs to meet emission-reductions targets, with federal support for infrastructure, specific emission-reduction opportunities, and clean technologies. the pcf focusses on carbon pricing with complementary measures by sector, adaptation and resilience, and industrial policy and economic development. to achieve these objectives, the liberal government proposed a clean growth direction with aggressive carbon price targets. a federal levy of 20 dollars per tonne of carbon came into effect april 1, 2019 and applies to provinces that did not adopt their own carbon taxes, cap-and-trade systems or other plans for carbon pricing. the levy will rise by 10 dollars per year until it reaches 50 dollars in 2022. an announcement by the liberal government in december 2020 committed to a further increase of the carbon price beyond 2022. starting in 2023, the price will go up by 15 dollars per tonne a year from the current 30 dollars until it hits 170 dollars in 2030. a major commitment in the liberal’s climate plan is the phase out of traditional coal units across canada by 2030. this will only affect nova scotia, new brunswick, alberta, and saskatchewan but is a major step towards a cleaning of the country’s electricity grids. important highlighted measures are new and enhanced transmission lines between and within provinces and territories, deployment of smart-grid technologies, and the reduction of diesel-powered generation for indigenous peoples and northern and remote communities. in the building sector, new energy efficient measures focus on the goal of adopting a ‘net-zero energy ready’ model building code by 2030 and retrofitting existing buildings through energy efficiency improvements and fuel 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 switching, including in indigenous communities and in social housing initiatives. for the transportation sector, the federal government merely commits to continue implementing increasingly stringent standards for emissions from light duty vehicles and to taking action to improve efficiency and to support fuel switching in the rail, aviation, marine, and off-road sectors. although the pcf committed to develop a canada-wide strategy for zero-emission vehicles (zev) by 2018, and to boost zero emission infrastructure, no specific strategy has been developed. the government has set rather non-ambitious targets for sales of zevs compared to other oecd countries (10 percent of new light-duty vehicle by 2025, 30 percent by 2030, and 100 percent by 2040 (transport canada 2020)), and a 5,000-dollar incentive for the purchase or lease of an eligible battery electric, hydrogen fuel cell, or longer-range plug-in hybrid vehicle, and a 2,500-dollar incentive for a shorter-range plug-in hybrid vehicle. these incentives are topped up with additional subsidies only in québec and bc. canada aims to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector, including offshore activities by 40 to 45 percent by 2025, and to phase down use of hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs) to support canada's commitment to the montreal protocol’s kigali amendment. the enhancement of carbon sinks is stressed, as are the increased use of wood products in construction, the production of renewable fuels and bioproducts, and enhanced innovation to advance ghg efficient management practices in forestry and agriculture. canada will provide infrastructure investment to deal with and prepare for climate risks like floods, wildfires, droughts, and changes in temperature, including thawing permafrost, and extreme weather events (bush and lemmen 2019). the government will support new approaches and ‘mission-oriented’ research approaches to accelerate innovation, to support clean technology, to enhance export potential, to strengthen financing, and to create jobs and a new clean energy sector. a recent announcement committed to net zero emission by 2050 (eccc 2020) with legallybinding, five-year emissions-reduction milestones, support for clean electricity generation, greener buildings and communities, and the electrification of transportation and nature-based climate solutions, such as a commitment to plant two billion trees in a decade. the pcf provides the first guiding framework of its kind which directly affects the provinces’ energy investments and electricity generation. it is overly optimistic, however. the complementary measures do not go far enough, as they mostly focus on carrots and lack timelines and concrete suggestions on how to push emission reductions further in key sectors. oil and gas, and heavy industry are responsible for 37 percent of ghg emissions. without serious advancements in those sectors, canada will not be able to achieve its targeted 511 metric tonnes of co2 equivalent cut by 2030 (see figure 1). 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: canadian ghg emissions by economic sector in 2018. source: (environment and climate change canada 2020) with percentage calculations and illustration by authors. the most recent progress report by environment and climate change canada (eccc) indicates that contributions to emission reductions by sector are not sufficient. canada is projected to overshoot its target by about 105 metric tonnes of co2. to close that gap, canada counts on credits from the western climate initiative (wci 2020) (trade of carbon credits between california and québec), contributions from the land use change and forestry sector, and uncertain advances in clean electricity, greener buildings, electrification of transportation, nature-based climate solutions (mostly planting trees), and greater than anticipated clean technology adoption (see figure 2). oil and gas 26% transportation 25% buildings 13% electricity 9% heavy industry 11% agriculture 10% waste and others 6% 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: contributions to emissions reductions in 2030. source: (government of canada 2019), figure 2: contribution to emissions reductions. the experience to date with the pcf has been mixed. the 2021 climate change performance index (ccpi) ranked the effectiveness of canadian climate change policy 58th (in comparison, germany’s ranks 19th) (burck et al. 2020) with the spread between the countries increasing relative to the previous year when canada was ranked 55th and germany 23rd (burck et al. 2019). the ccpi report gives canada: very low ratings in the categories ghg emissions, renewable energy and energy use. in all three categories, the country is not on track for a well below 2°c compatible pathway. while the country is rated high for its proactive role at international level, experts continue to observe a discrepancy between international climate leadership and national implementation (2019, 23). there are a number of reasons for canada’s mediocre to poor performance. the transportation sector is not advancing at the speed necessary to realize these reductions. there are hardly any regional electric trains or buses. a high-speed train in the most densely populated corridor from windsor, ontario to ville de québec, québec has been discussed for decades but there is no progress in site (railway technology 2020). the electric vehicle and hybrid vehicles targets are not aggressive enough, critical infrastructure is missing, and incentives vary widely across the country. large scale dairy and beef farmers that contribute significantly to ghg emissions, and that command some of the largest dairy prices in the world, are not anticipated to contribute to meeting the 2030 emission reduction goals in the proposed plan. provinces have their own building codes and are slow to adopt new national guidelines. due to the fact that provinces have more control and power over energy policy, building codes, environmental policy and transport infrastructure than in most other countries, it is difficult for canada to coordinate its policies and implement a federal strategy like the pcf. the pcf is, however, the closest canada has come to coordinated action on climate change and future energy 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 developments. the reason for failures in coordination goes back to the first serious attempt in the 1980s under pierre elliot trudeau (the father of canada’s current prime minister), which fueled western alienation and entrenched opposing regional political agendas in federal politics. western resistance, indigenous rights and a new direction for canadian industry the resistance in canada to coordinating energy policies and climate change policies goes back to the failure of the national energy programme (nep) in the 1980s, which contributed to the alienation of the west (perhaps with the exception of bc) from trusting a centralized government acting mostly in what it perceived to be the interests of eastern canada’s service and manufacturing sectors. prime minister justin trudeau is in a precarious situation as his liberal party is committed to implementing and reaching ambitious climate targets while making up with alienated western provinces. in the 2019 federal election, the liberal party did not acquire a single seat in alberta, saskatchewan, or manitoba, and trudeau returned to office with a minority government. for the first time in canadian history, climate change action and policies were a serious election issue. the clear majority of voters cared about climate change action even if it was not necessarily centre stage (clarke and pammett, 2020). andrew scheer’s conservative party did not have a serious stand on climate change policies, which some political analysts claim cost them the election in key conservative ridings in the greater toronto metropolitan area (ibbitson 2019). the last canadian election, therefore, created a new era in climate change policy that could favour climate change policy implementation in the future (the economist 2019). for the time being, however, trudeau’s liberal government needs opposition party support to put through polices, and it faces fierce criticism and resistance from western provinces and conservative provincial governments (e.g., the ford government in ontario; the kenney government in alberta). the federal government had to use the greenhouse gas pollution pricing act to impose a carbon tax on five provinces (saskatchewan, manitoba, ontario, new brunswick, and alberta) that did not have an equivalent system in place. they objected to this imposition (harrison 2020) and launched constitutional court challenges. these five provinces make up half of all provinces and 59.3 percent of the canadian population (canada, n.d.). this does not, however, coincide with public opinion on carbon pricing and climate change action. almost the same percentage of canadians (58 percent) indicated in a poll by nanos for the globe and mail that it would be unacceptable for a province to opt out of the national climate change plan (keller 2019). in addition, imposed carbon taxes are redistributed as tax credits to households in affected provinces, so that there is an incentive to switch to less carbon intensive products and behaviour without affecting household incomes. a larger hurdle will be achieving climate targets without a more direct-action plan for the future of the oil and gas sector. the federal acquisition of the trans mountain expansion pipeline in august 2018 for 4.5 billion dollars was a serious blow to the federal government’s credibility in terms of climate change action and international commitments. the federal government proclaimed that the pipeline would not undermine the government’s commitment to meet or exceed the 2030 paris targets (maclean 2018), but they did not provide estimates on how the project would affect emissions projections. energy economist marc jaccard estimated that the expansion of the pipeline would add 8.8 metric tonnes of co2 equivalent upstream annually, which over a 50-year lifespan could consume 83 percent of canada’s share of the paris agreement (maclean 2018; donner 2016). the federal government seems to some to be pursuing policies with conflicting objections: on the one hand, it supports aggressive cuts to ghg emissions in order to satisfy the paris commitments, while on the other hand it is spending precious public resources 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 that lock in the traditional fossil fuel sector. in order to meet the paris agreement’s two-degree target, mcglade and ekins (2015) estimated that it will be necessary to leave roughly 80 percent of all known fossil fuel deposits in the ground. pearce estimated that canada must resist extracting about 75 percent of its oil reserves and 25 percent of its natural gas reserves (pidcock 2015). the government is committed to limit warming to 1.5 degrees, which would imply even more reserves be left in the ground. at the same time, the oil and gas sector is having an uncertain future, since oil sands extraction cannot compete with other world supplies of lower-priced oil, and is more vulnerable to fluctuation in global oil prices and uncertainty over pipeline expansion (iea 2021). furthermore, since alberta is landlocked, it relies on refineries in the united states and receives a discounted oil price. in early 2020, the alberta government bought a share in the keystone xl pipeline’s extension at a time of major budget deficits. one of the first actions of president biden was to revoke the permit for the pipeline (the white house 2021), killing the project. oil markets have become increasingly volatile with battles over market share in a progressively contested resource sector that is still adding reserves (e.g., off the coast of guyana (baddour 2020)); the sector is also challenged by sharply declining prices of renewable energy and is threatened by rapidly increasing carbon prices. another dilemma is the bc government’s plan to expand its liquid natural gas (lng) export sector to asian markets. despite an early and aggressive carbon tax, the province will not be able to meet its own provincial climate targets (eco justice 2020). the lng expansion requires new pipelines that have divided communities between proponents and opponents. decisions were recently challenged by indigenous hereditary chiefs who questioned the legitimacy of the colonially imposed system of first nation band councils that make decisions on behalf of indigenous groups. this led to demonstrations about the coastal gas link project in bc and nationwide solidarity demonstrations that were only halted by the pandemic lockdown (rastello 2020). the oil and gas industries are recognizing that the current downturn is no exception and that they can no longer rely on conventional markets to sell their products because market prices are too low and unpredictable, and products will be increasingly subject to regulation and carbon pricing. in the oil sands sector, suncor has developed a partnership with enerkem, which turns household garbage into biofuels at a renewable production scale (corporate knights 2020). the oil sector industry and alberta innovates are focusing on innovation and value added to the oil sands resources. bitumen beyond combustion (bbc) is considering opportunities to produce carbon fiber at large scale to produce lighter, more energy efficient vehicles, including electric vehicles, which could potentially quadruple the revenue from alberta’s current bitumen output with an added economic potential of carbon fibre, activated carbon and asphalt binder in the range of 84 billion dollars annually (corporate knights 2020). industry is looking at the development of green hydrogen (from renewable energy) and blue hydrogen (from natural gas with steam methane reforming) as zero carbon fuel solutions. these new directions overlap with german and eu policy directions and interests and suggest some possible areas for future collaboration. these movements, along with a shift in public opinion that acknowledges the climate emergency, suggest that a decline in vested interests is emerging and that alliances are shifting. 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 comparing german and canadian experiences with clean energy transitions recent developments in canada, germany, and the eu suggest that policy makers increasingly recognize that they can no longer avoid addressing climate change. climate change, and the accompanying need for a low-carbon energy transition, has been given greater priority on the policy agenda. with the european green deal and the strength of the green party in german and eu politics, climate change is high on germany’s political agenda. political forces are also shifting in canada where climate change for the first time became a serious federal election issue in 2019, and a national framework is now in place with the pcf. despite political pushback by certain provinces, public opinion is on the side of more aggressive climate change policy, and even the fossil fuel industry is realizing that they need to be creative in pursuing newer and greener directions. industry is starting to understand that canada must advance passed its old staples approach based on the export of its abundant natural resources. industry and provinces such as alberta are realizing that diversification of the economy and a longer vision based on value-added and innovative cleaner technologies are more important than volatile and unpredictable fossil fuel markets and trade partners. still, as much as germany needs to find ways to transition coal regions into regions pursuing cleaner technologies, canada needs to transition its oil and gas sector into cleaner technologies and more value-added processes. certainly, neither canada, germany, nor the eu have done enough to date to mitigate against climate change, yet there are signs of a growing willingness on the part of their governments, industry, and society to support innovative plans and programs that shift energy and economic structures in new directions (balthasar, schreurs, and varone 2019). while all three have at times slid back into entrenched behaviors, more recent climate plans, programs, and targets give some hope that economically difficult choices are possible even in the face of strong industrial or local opposition to sectoral and regional transformations. the comparison shows that overcoming opposition from legacy industries has been and remains challenging. in the case of germany, this can be seen from the lack of progress in reducing emissions from the transport sector despite the efforts of the eu to introduce more stringent emission limits. the difficulty of phasing out legacy industries is also evident in the relatively late phase-out of coal. as a point of reference, the phase-out of nuclear energy began in the 1970s and was legislated first in 1990 and again in 2011; demands for a phase out of coal, on the other hand, took hold much later, only in the 2010s, with legislation only implemented in 2019. the lack of action addressing emissions from the coal and transport sectors has challenged germany’s claims to be a climate leader based on its successes with renewable energy development. although renewable energy has been rapidly expanding for many years, emissions have shown little improvement because of the country’s inability to wean itself of its dependence on coal and conventional automobiles. reaching an agreement to phase out coal was only possible with promises of large compensation programs to the affected industry and regions and increasingly strong demands from the public. certainly, it was also important that the long-term outlook for the coal industry is bleak given global shifts towards introducing prices on carbon emissions as well as the declining costs of renewables. in the case of the transport sector, it may take international competition and top-down eu directives to bring about a faster transition. in the case of canada, a significant hydropower base, the expansion of renewable energy, the north american shale gas revolution, and continued dependence on nuclear energy have made coal redundant, both economically and environmentally. the same has not been true for oil and gas. 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 these industries remain politically extremely powerful in western provinces, but face growing opposition from environmentalists, indigenous groups, the general public, and increasingly the financial sector. still, while oil and gas interests in western provinces remain substantial, developments south of the border are changing the economics of oil and gas. the cancellation of the keystone pipeline sends a powerful message and changes calculations both for alberta and the federal government. the federal government’s plan to overcome western canadian resistance to an energy transition by owning the transmountain pipeline is a political hurdle and puts in doubt the seriousness of their climate change targets and commitments. public opinion in both countries is also increasingly demanding stronger government action to combat climate change. fridays for future has been a powerful force calling for change in germany and has also established a presence in canada. transatlantic energy and climate linkages and low carbon transitions achieving climate neutrality will require action on all fronts. germany and canada have a number of opportunities to work more closely together in achieving their targets and goals while advancing innovative new economic sectors and more socially and environmentally responsible supply chains. the recently ratified free trade agreement (comprehensive economic and trade agreement) that removed most of the tariffs between canada and the eu sets the stage for further cooperation for climate and energy. in both germany and canada, industry is recognizing that change is in the air. canadian oil provinces are more desperate than before to diversify their economies and invest into innovative processes. germany, like other eu states, is similarly eager to be a leader in clean energy technologies. this provides an opportunity to innovate and invest in the clean tech sector, not only in renewable technologies but also in clean fuels, alternative aviation fuels, and new supply chains to extract and process transition minerals and metals (world bank 2017; 2020) and to advance the circular economy. a closer partnership between germany and canada is also of strategic importance. both germany and canada depend on trade and energy relations with partners that are increasingly acting in their own single national interests. for germany (and the eu), energy relations with both russia and the us are complicated. for canada energy relations with the us have changed recently since the us has become an energy superpower in its own right and is now less dependent on canada’s oil and gas sector. the us has also restricted trade and foreign imports (e.g., at the expense of the canadian automotive and aluminum sector) with their ‘buy american’ program that is continued under the biden administration. many materials and metals that are required to enable clean energy development and a green transition are sourced from countries with unstable governments and are extracted with unsustainable and unethical methods (for example cobalt extraction in congo) or are controlled by powerful countries like china. since canada has all of the metals and minerals and some infrastructure and know-how in automotive and energy sectors, and germany has expertise in advancing clean technologies and processes, there are a number of opportunities that could be further explored. four areas for potential transatlantic collaboration are highlighted here. 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 clean energy innovation mission innovation is a global initiative between 24 countries (including canada) and the european commission to accelerate clean energy innovation. the initiative has set eight specific innovation challenges (ics) (ic1: smart grids, ic2: off-grid access to electricity, ic3: carbon capture, ic4: sustainable biofuels, ic5: converting sunlight, ic6: clean energy material, ic7: affordable heating and cooling of building, and ic8: renewable and clean hydrogen). canada and the eu are participating in all of the eight challenges. canada is one of the co-leads on ic4 and ic6, while the eu is one of the co-leads on ic5, ic7, and ic8. germany is a co-lead on ic5 and ic8 as well, but is not participating in ic4. there is, therefore, already a strong partnership between the eu, germany, and canada on clean technology innovation. linking of carbon markets through the pcf, canada is committed to carbon pricing or equivalent emissions reductions with an incremental rise of the carbon price by 10 dollars per tonne of carbon equivalent until it hits 50 dollars in 2022. québec has a cap-and-trade program with california that also involved ontario for a short period of time. that system is similar to the eu ets and could potentially be linked. a larger emissions trading system would reduce the emission reduction cost for some provinces and member states through trade with jurisdictions that have lower abatement costs. a combined system would also ensure the same carbon price, eliminate carbon leakage and would advance trade links and further implementation of ceta. an expanded eu ets would allow for growing emission trading opportunities and a reduced increase in the anticipated eu ets price. development of a just and sustainable energy transition supply chain there is a unique opportunity for canadian-german cooperation on renewable energy and battery technology advancement as well as on establishing socially responsible electric vehicle manufacturing hubs. canada has a crucial supply of nickel, cobalt, and some of the largest known reserves and resources for rare earth metals (nr can 2020), as well as many other vital energy transition minerals. both germany and canada have strong auto-supply chains. canada has promising start-ups in ev buses and trucks (torrie, bak and heaps 2020) and low speed ev passenger vehicles. a natural collaboration between german auto manufacturers, canadian mining companies and auto-supply centres in ontario and québec is sensible especially as us auto manufacturers are withdrawing from canadian production centres. furthermore, corporate finance as well as consumers are demanding more sustainable, just and ethical supply chains, from mineral extraction to material recycling. partnering on advancement of the circular economy an important component of a just and sustainable clean energy supply chain is the development of a circular economy. here, germany and the eu have been leaders. canada could learn from the eu’s initiatives and experiences in developing new collaborative production processes with blue and green hydrogen, battery and ev production, biofuel development (particularly sustainable aviation fuels), and low carbon materials. insights from these innovative production processes could then be used to reform other existing sectors of the economy in order to transition to a large scale (across sectors) circular economy approach. 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 germany and canada can more easily meet their own climate change and energy security objectives if they work together on linking emissions trading and carbon pricing mechanisms, furthering clean energy innovation, advancing circular economy concepts, and developing new supply chains from mining exploration to recycling of crucial metals and minerals. pursuing such transatlantic partnerships will provide opportunities for a more just green transition that reduces inequalities through redistribution of carbon pricing proceeds, the retraining of employees in hard hit sectors, and a meaningful and respectful inclusion of indigenous peoples. the colonial expropriation of the lands of indigenous peoples has had serious environmental consequences and negative social impacts; it has also presented obstacles to the ability of indigenous people to partake in the benefits deriving from energy sector production. as major greenhouse gas emitters, europe and canada have had significant impacts on indigenous peoples and developing countries., and, therefore, share a responsibility to change this situation and find a sustainable path together with the leadership and advice of indigenous peoples and impacted communities. the opportunity of alliances between new industrial branches, environmentalists and indigenous interests to enable a just transition to a low or no carbon economy that is circular and 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centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 1 a “good” samaritan? the geopolitics of russia’s covid-19 assistance mariya omelicheva1 national war college abstract between march and december 2020, more than three dozen states received various types of covid-19 assistance from moscow. the russian government emphasized a humanitarian character of what has become the largest package of emergency aid since russia's independence. the western governments and commentators cautioned that moscow had strategic and nefarious motives in choosing the recipients of its covid-19 aid. this study theorizes humanitarian aid allocations by authoritarian states and tests theoretical expectations using novel data on russia's covid-19 aid allocations. far from being driven exclusively by humanitarian concerns, russia has used humanitarian assistance to project power on the global stage and support diverse political objectives. moscow's use of humanitarian aid for geopolitical benefits has not been a critical disruptor in the humanitarian system by itself; however, jointly with other instruments of foreign policy, russia's approaches to foreign assistance can be detrimental to the future of the international humanitarian system. 1dr. mariya y. omelicheva is a professor of strategy at the national war college in washington, dc. all opinions expressed in the article are her own and do not represent an official position of the us government or us department of defense. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 2 introduction in late march 2020, several il-76 military planes began taking off from an airbase in the moscow region, heading to the covid-19-stricken regions of italy. the launch of a humanitarian operation dubbed “from russia with love” followed a telephone conversation between russia's president vladimir putin and italian prime minister giuseppe conte. framed by the russian media as a goodwill gesture in support of the italian people, the whole operation, which included the transfer of medical equipment, supplies, doctors, nurses, and decontamination personnel, received a large dose of criticism within the western media space. la stampa, one of the oldest italian newspapers, published a report questioning russia’s motives, impugning the utility of aid, and warning of security breaches due to the involvement of the russian military. la stampa's assessments were cited widely in online and print media worldwide (bbc news 2020). moscow’s decisions to send covid-19 assistance to italy, serbia, iran, venezuela, and select countries of the maghreb region in africa, while sidelining other countries have raised questions about the kremlin's rationale for choosing where to send its aid. the western media has accused russia of using the “politics of generosity” and “mask diplomacy” to blanket its unchecked appetite for influence in “good samaritan” terms (giusti and ambrosetti 2022). however, the extent to which moscow’s geostrategic considerations have polluted the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and need in its humanitarian aid allocations has not yet received a systematic examination. this is partly due to the lack of comprehensive data on the levels of russia's development and humanitarian aid. in 2007, russia was invited to join the organization for economic co-operation and development (oecd). as part of the accession process, russia was reporting its official development assistance to oecd’s development assistance committee (dac). the accession process was postponed in the wake of russia’s annexation of crimea in 2014 and fully terminated following moscow’s invasion of ukraine in february 2022. as a consequence, there has been limited information on russia’s humanitarian and development assistance. the covid-19 pandemic, which left no country unscathed, provided an opportunity for collecting open-source data on russia’s covid-19 assistance. the russian government's information blitz to publicize its humanitarian efforts simplified the process of tracking down its transfers of personal protective equipment (ppe) and medical supplies. the goal of this article is to theorize and statistically analyze russia’s covid-19 aid allocations in 2020. there are several reasons for studying russia’s motives for humanitarian assistance. the demand for humanitarian aid will continue to rise due to intensifying climate change-induced natural disasters as well as conflict-related complex emergencies. however, the growing demand for aid is unmatched by its supply. the scarcity of funding to respond to crises has rekindled the old debate about states’ motives for humanitarian aid. the surge of the so-called “new”2 or “emerging” donors in the humanitarian milieus has also reinvigorated a conversation about the impact of domestic factors on the foreign policies of donor countries. while some humanitarian stakeholders have 2 the term “new donor” is somewhat misleading. many so-called “new” donors, including russia and china, have acted as providers of assistance for decades. some, like russia, have re-emerged in the development and humanitarian assistance scene after a period of hiatus. what unites “new” donors is that they operate largely outside the regulatory and reporting frameworks of the oecd development assistance committee (dac). 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 3 welcomed and encouraged “new” donors’ contributions to humanitarian causes, others have warned that their interests and practices are often contrary to the humanitarian principles and, therefore, threatening to the integrity of the humanitarian system itself (fuchs and klann 2013). this apprehension of the “new” donors’ foreign aid has been reinforced by the evidence of the leading authoritarian governments, like those in russia and china, hijacking the concept of “soft power,” to boost their global image, influence global public opinion, and increase their leverage over other states (walker 2016). development and humanitarian assistance, which have been viewed as important instruments of “soft power” projection, have been added to the modern authoritarian toolkit (blair, marty, and roessler 2022). for example, russia’s foreign minister sergei lavrov has repeatedly alluded to his country’s participation in international aid programs as one of russia’s “soft power” tools (kiseleva 2015). there are indeed several reasons for why “new” donors’ decisions about aid can be different from those of “traditional” donors. first, many “new” donors are not bound by the regulatory framework of the dac, which serves as the major agency to set aid agendas and shape the direction of the global aid flow. this means that “new” donors are not fully bound by the dac humanitarian principles and aid reporting requirements. this, in turn, offers these countries a greater opportunity to use aid in their interests. second, the majority of “new” donors are below the levels of economic development of dac donors, especially in per capita terms. this also provides an incentive for “new” donors to pursue their self-interest more than dac donors. third, the official aid philosophies of many “new” donors (with the exception of russia) include a principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of the recipient states (fuchs and klann 2013). this study theorizes these differences in aid motivations by tracing them to certain characteristics of democratic versus authoritarian regimes and tests theoretical expectations using novel data on russia’s covid-19 aid allocations. it begins with an overview of the literature on humanitarian aid, followed by the presentation of a theoretical framework for authoritarian aid allocations. the last section describes the research design and methodology for the study, followed by the presentation and discussion of findings. determinants of humanitarian aid international aid broadly falls into three categories: development assistance, military aid, and humanitarian assistance (also known as emergency relief aid). development assistance consists of financial flows, technical assistance, debt relief operations, and other activities aimed at promoting economic development and the welfare of developing countries. the major objective of development assistance is to meet united nations’ (un) sustainable development goal 1 – end poverty in all its forms everywhere (united nations 2018), although its various programs and activities contribute to political, environmental, and social developments of the recipient states. military aid encompasses the transfer of military articles, services, and financial flows in support of sales of military equipment and training as well as military education. these types of military assistance are designed to foster international stability, enhance the national security of donor states, assist recipient governments, deter or combat security threats, and share the burden for mutual defence. for some governments, military aid is also a means of diplomacy to cultivate 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 4 goodwill and even persuade foreign governments to take action consistent with the donors’ interests. contrary to development and security assistance that tends to be pre-planned, long-term, and targets underlying structural issues that hinder countries’ development and limit their capacity to address economic and security challenges, humanitarian assistance is designed to offer short-term rapid relief in response to an incident or event threatening human lives. its goal is to alleviate human suffering in the wake of natural disasters, technological catastrophes, and conflicts often classified as “complex emergencies,” which often combine natural disasters and conflict thus exacerbating vulnerabilities of those affected (fink and silvia redaelli 2009). the covid-19 pandemic has not only aggravated the existing humanitarian emergencies triggered by armed conflict and natural disasters, it has also disrupted livelihoods and caused economic devastation and deaths in countries previously unaffected by humanitarian disasters. according to the un under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief mark lowcock, in 2020, the covid-19 pandemic pushed the number of people needing humanitarian assistance by 40 percent compared to 2019 (un ocha 2021). another 40 percent increase in humanitarian aid was projected for 2021 due to the combination of the virus and its secondary impacts, such as falling incomes, rising food prices, and interrupted vaccination programs (world health organization 2020). international donors have been challenged to come up with additional funding for critical response efforts to the outbreak while fighting the health crises at home. some of this additional humanitarian aid has been channelled toward providing basic subsidence needs (food, shelter, etc.) in complex emergencies exacerbated by the pandemic. other types of assistance have been used to save peoples’ lives threatened by the covid-19 virus by providing support for testing and disease-surveillance capacities of countries, the supply of medical and personal protection equipment to improve these countries’ rapid response capacity, and vaccine efforts. humanitarian assistance has been regarded as a distinct form of assistance due to its ethical foundation in humanitarian law. reflected in the un resolution a/res/46/182, “humanity, neutrality and impartiality” have been the guiding principles of humanitarian assistance (united nations 1991). these principles seek to remove political conditionality from donor governments’ considerations of humanitarian assistance. the scholarship on humanitarian aid (the majority of which has been conducted on traditional donors such as the us) has found the ongoing importance of need as a driver for humanitarian aid decisions but also pointed out other motives, including countries’ self-interest for explaining their aid allocations (boussalis and caryn peiffer 2011; kevlihan, derouen, and biglasier 2014). drawing on the studies of foreign aid, it is possible to classify states’ motivations for supplying emergency aid into the needs-based, interest-based, and merit-based logics (dollar and levin 2006). the need-based logic is consistent with the humanitarian principles of emergency relief. donors’ decisions concerning assistance are determined by the needs of recipient countries, usually measured by the total number of people affected by a natural disaster or the number of casualties and displaced persons in conflict (drury, olson, and van belle 2005; fink and redaelli 2009; raschky and schwindt 2012). the greater the human suffering, the more humanitarian aid is expected to alleviate it (fuchs and klan 2013). 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 5 under the interest-based framework, humanitarian aid is deemed to be similar to other types of assistance and therefore influenced by a range of geostrategic considerations (alesina and dollar 2000; drury, olson, and van belle 2005; van der veen 2011). some studies have found that donors are driven by political and security interests and provide assistance to their allies, former colonies, and politically-aligned governments (alesina and dollar 2000; drury and olson 1998; boussalis and peiffer 2011). still, other studies have shown the impact of commercial interests and donors’ own political processes on aid allocation, such as election cycles and the budgetary situation (eisensee and strömberg 2007; dreher, nennenkamp, and thiele 2011; fleck and kilby 2006; fuchs and vadlamannati 2013; hoeffler and outram 2011). the merit-based framework is premised on the idea that donors are concerned about the effectiveness of aid and therefore favour the most deserving recipients with the worth determined by the quality of their governance, strength of institutions, and the density and effectiveness of the network of non-governmental (ngo) and international organizations that are present in the affected countries. thus, it has been found that the presence and strength of humanitarian stakeholders and their infrastructure—ngos, specialized international humanitarian agencies, donor states’ agencies, early warning systems, and rapid response units—play a decisive role in the allocation of humanitarian aid (olsen, carstensen, and hoyen 2003). in addition to the aggregate levels of humanitarian assistance, the scholarship on humanitarian aid has looked at sector-specific types of aid and different categories of donors. the idea is that some sector-specific assistance, such as health aid to contain the spread of contagious and deadly diseases, is less afflicted by donors’ geostrategic interests (neumayer 2005). the literature has also impugned the motivations of the so-called “new” donors, accused of practicing “rogue aid” driven by the interest in national wealth extraction and the generation of political leverage over the recipient states (naím 2007). the “new” donors are a rather heterogenous group of lowand middle-income countries, autocratic regimes, and donors operating outside the dac (fuchs and klann 2013; dreher and fuchs 2015; kragelund 2008). many of these donors are not “new” to the donor community; for example, china and russia, launched their aid programs at the beginning of the cold war era (asmus, fuchs, and muller 2020). many, like brazil, south africa, and india, emphasize “south-south” cooperation and appear to be reluctant to be seen as reproducing traditional donor-recipient hierarchies (rowlands 2008). in addition, the practices of these “new” donors have been under heightened attention fuelled by a suspicion that these donors abuse humanitarian and development assistance to push their national interests (fuchs and klann 2013). theorizing humanitarian aid by authoritarian states as noted in the previous section, there is no consensus in aid scholarship on the decision-making logic that determines the choices of the recipients of humanitarian aid. in theory, humanitarian aid is supposed to be driven by the principles of neutrality and impartiality, but in practice, it has been affected by the same considerations of strategic interest as development assistance and military aid. furthermore, the emergence or comeback of the so-called "new” donors has added a new layer 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 6 to the debate over the aid motivations of autocratic and less-wealthy donors. while some studies have dubbed assistance by authoritarian donors as “rogue aid” spurred exclusively by self-interest (naím 2007), others disputed this finding, noting minimal or no differences in the aid allocation of autocratic and democratic donors (dreher and fuchs 2015; dreher, nennenkamp and thiele 2011). one of the chief conclusions that stems from the broader literature on international relations and foreign policy analysis is that internal differences between democratic and autocratic states bear important implications for their foreign policy decisions. this tradition informs the studies of democratic peace that have attributed states' decisions concerning the use of force to the makeup of democratic institutions, culture, and informational processes (doyle 1983; rosato 2003). differences in states’ domestic makeup have been used to explain a range of strategic decisions (de mesquita and smith 2012). in line with this strand of scholarship, this study begins with the premise that domestic politics strongly influence foreign policy preferences, including those concerning donors’ decisions about humanitarian aid. the second assumption is that governments and individual decision-makers are rational actors seeking to maximize their utility. their paramount interest is to stay in power. all actions of political elites, whether in the domestic or foreign policy realm, are shaped by their desire to retain political power (de mesquita et al. 2003). while the humanitarian aid literature places a higher premium on the properties of disaster events and the characteristics of recipient countries, this study contends that foreign policy choices with regard to humanitarian aid are coloured by the governments’ interest in political survival. important variations in the nature of domestic constraints placed on the democratic and autocratic leadership create different incentive structures for their leadership and lead to varying policy patterns. the key characteristic of autocratic regimes3 that distinguishes them from democratic states has to do with the size of the “winning coalition” that propel autocratic leaders to power and keep them at the helm. in autocracies, the winning coalition—a group of regime insiders, also known as the “selectorate,” whose support is necessary to sustain the leader in office—is small (peceny and butler 2004; de mesquita et al. 2003). to sustain the winning coalition’s loyalty and support, autocratic leaders rely on the distribution of private goods and other favours doled out to the members of the authoritarian leaders’ inner circles. in democracies, winning coalitions are large and more diverse as far as their private interests are concerned, making it all but impossible for the democratic government to engage in the targeted distribution of goods to the individual members of the winning coalition. subsequently, democratic policies are more attuned to the needs and interests of the larger swaths of the population that they seek to satisfy through the provision of public goods, such as social welfare, security, and education. this is not to say that democratic governments do not engage in the provision of private goods to a range of special interests, yet, greater accountability of democracies compels them to use resources efficiently and favour the provision of public goods in relative terms (bader, gravingholt, and kastner 2010). transferring these differences between autocracies and democracies to the logic of foreign policymaking, there are several plausible theoretical explanations for the decisions about humanitarian 3 it is important to note that autocracies vary on a number of dimensions that bear implications for their foreign policy decisions (see for example weeks 2014). 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 7 aid by autocratic states. since the autocratic incentive structure is based on the distribution of private benefits and the reduction of private costs to the winning coalition, autocratic donors prefer dealing with likeminded autocrats in the recipient states because both governments can benefit from the lack of accountability to their respective populations. from the autocratic donor’s perspective, it is easier to manipulate the autocratic recipient’s decisions affecting the distribution of various benefits. from the autocratic recipient’s standpoint, it is easier to get private benefits from the aid, investment, or trade policies of the autocratic donor in exchange for various policy concessions (bader, gravingholt, and kastner 2010). there is strong empirical evidence that corroborates this theoretical claim. during the cold war, for example, the soviet union's relationships with developing countries were guided by their shared commitment to the communist ideology and their discontent with western capitalism and colonialism (jaster 1969). this leads to the following expectation: h1. ceteris paribus, autocratic donors are more likely to provide humanitarian assistance to other autocratic states. to recall, political survival is the dominant motive of both democratic and autocratic political leadership. however, the costs of losing political office are particularly acute in authoritarian regimes where removal from office may result in imprisonment, exile, asset forfeiture, and even death. other than natural causes (death or impairment), the loss of office by an autocratic leader and those who rely on them typically occurs due to political destabilization – whether through people’s revolt or a coup by regime insiders. autocratic regimes are, therefore, acutely sensitive to political instability and prioritize order and security over other considerations. this preference for stability and order is not limited to the domestic context of authoritarian regimes but applies to foreign contexts as well; however, autocrats are more concerned about the destabilization of fellow autocratic governments than democratic regimes. first, lacking democratic mechanisms and processes to respond to political crises, autocratic governments are more likely to resort to repressive means to quell threats to their regime. the state-led violence, in turn, can lead to escalation. second, the toppling of an autocratic government presents an opportunity for installing a democratic regime – an undesirable prospect for other autocratic leaders. therefore, authoritarian governments will be interested in the stability of autocratic governments abroad. humanitarian disasters are the types of exogenous shocks that have been associated with the political destabilization of affected countries. humanitarian disasters reduce countries’ wealth and deplete their resources, increasing the likelihood of political conflict (nel and righarts 2008; homer-dixon 2010). while humanitarian disasters affect ordinary people the most, it is the dissatisfied members of the winning coalition, or political elites excluded from the winning coalition, that mobilize people by directing their grievances against the authorities responsible for disaster relief. for autocratic regimes with greater economic and administrative resources, this moment of domestic instability in another country not only bodes potential losses, but can also bring about permanent changes in the government structure of the affected state that will curtail the channels for private benefit extraction (bader, gravingholt, and kastner 2010). furthermore, disaster-affected states are vulnerable to foreign intervention, including the larger donor states that have sought to implement their ideological (democratization) agenda with the provision of humanitarian aid (curti 2001). the prospects of a regime change in disaster-stricken countries do not sit well with the authoritarian states. subsequently, the latter will be attuned to the magnitude 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 8 of disasters and are more likely to provide aid to the most affected countries, less for humanitarian reasons and more due to concerns regarding the destabilization of the affected states. this discussion suggests the following hypothesis: h2: ceteris paribus, autocratic states are more likely to provide humanitarian aid to other autocratic governments gravely affected by humanitarian disasters. countries affected by disasters are vulnerable to political discontent to a different extent. a high level of development in the affected country reduces its susceptibility to political and economic crises precipitated by a disaster event; it also increases the country’s ability to cope with the consequences of the disaster (anbarci, escaleras, and register 2005; fink and redaelli 2009; kahn 2005). therefore, robust socioeconomic indicators of the affected state may reduce the risk associated with instability, leading to decreased humanitarian assistance. h3. ceteris paribus, stronger socioeconomic background of the affected states will reduce the probability of humanitarian assistance by autocratic donors. to reiterate, autocratic stability is a function of the stability of the winning coalition that is sustained by the continued provision of private benefits to its members. foreign relations— including trade—is an important avenue for extracting rents for private distribution among the members of the ruling elite. the reduction in import/export flows that occurs as a consequence of political or economic crises in the trading partners is an unwelcome development for autocratic elites who get a cut from the economic interchanges. this suggests the following hypothesis: h4: ceteris paribus, trading partners of autocratic states are more likely to receive humanitarian assistance. although politics, colonial history, and a host of other reasons might prevent the autocratic states from trading with their closest neighbours, the easiest market access is in countries that geography puts nearby. proximity, therefore, plays a role in the calculus of costs and the benefits of economic and humanitarian engagements by the autocratic states. logistical costs can be minimized by helping recipients within closer proximity to autocratic states' borders (fuchs and klann 2013). when it comes to the consequences of disasters, including pandemics, autocratic donors will be interested in containing the destabilizing spread of disease from nations in their neighbourhood by offering humanitarian assistance toward the treatment and control of that disease (boussalis and peiffer 2011). h5: ceteris paribus, autocratic states are more likely to provide humanitarian aid to the affected countries in their neighbourhood. lastly, aid-related decisions are not made in isolation from considerations about the broader strategic context of the autocratic states, which include national security interests, economic interests, and broader political interests, all of which have bearing on the stability of the ruling administration. therefore, humanitarian assistance can be used to signal the autocratic donor’s broader interests; for example, it can be used to reward countries willing to align their policies with the interests of the donor states. alternatively, it can be used in support of commitments made 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 9 by the autocratic donors to members of alliances. in the case of russia, multiple observers have noted that russia used its covid-19 assistance to reward countries that were moscow’s customers in the arms trade. russia’s arms sales have been its main export commodity, apart from oil and gas exports. arms transfers have been key to moscow’s image as a world power and an essential tool for projecting its global influence. h6a: autocratic donors are likely to use humanitarian aid allocations to reward countries who support the donors’ foreign policies. h6b: autocratic donors are likely to use humanitarian aid allocations to countries who are members of alliances with the donor states. h6c: the customers of russia’s arms sales are more likely to be the recipients of its covid-19 assistance. research design academic and policy communities began taking an interest in russia's role in the donor community following moscow’s highly publicized involvement in the syrian and venezuelan humanitarian crises and its covid-19 aid to italy. russia has re-emerged as a donor following the aid hiatus of the 1990s when it was a net recipient rather than a contributor of development and humanitarian assistance. yet the history of russia’s aid programs goes back to the post-world war ii period when the soviet regime invested lavishly in various infrastructure projects in south asia and the middle east (berliner 1958; rai 2018). the levels of aid, which fluctuated during the soviet period, declined precipitously in the years preceding the soviet union’s dissolution. in the 1990s, russia curtailed its aid activities; they picked up again in the 2000s following a decadelong economic growth spurred by the high petroleum prices. it was also in the 2000s that russia began establishing a regulatory and institutional framework for development and humanitarian assistance. in 2007, moscow adopted its first concept on development assistance reflecting the millennium development goals (rakhmangulov 2010). the document was updated in 2014 with a presidential decree that approved the current concept in the area of international development assistance (president of the russian federation 2014). there is no single federal agency responsible for the implementation of assistance policies. the ministry of finance, the ministry for civil defense, emergencies, and the elimination of consequences of natural disasters, defense ministry, the federal agency for commonwealth of independent states affairs, compatriots living abroad, and international humanitarian cooperation (rossotrudnichestvo) along with a number of public foundations and state-backed ngos are engaged in the development and humanitarian aid administration (velikaya 2018). when the covid-19 pandemic spread around the world, russia began sending covid-19 test kits, masks, protective gear, and medical personnel to countries that reported spikes in the spread of infections. the russian government presented its foreign aid as an act of generosity delivered at times of hardship to countries in need (zykov 2020). for example, following moscow’s delivery of covid-19 aid to italy, russian diplomatic twitter went into overdrive publicizing the shipment as russia’s “humanitarian gesture” under the hashtag #russiahelps (gigitashvili 2020). russia's own concept of international assistance exhibits a mix of goals ranging from humanitarian 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 10 objectives, such as the elimination of natural disasters' consequences, to pragmatic political aims, which include bolstering russia’s influence on global processes (president of the russian federation 2014). to collect data on russia’s covid-19 donations (most of which were in-kind), a search algorithm was created and applied to the lexusuni and additional digital sources to identify open-source data on the transfers of covid-19 aid by moscow. each donation was coded as an event with the date, donor, recipient, type and volume of donation, and other characteristics of the event recorded. for a covid-19 donation to be recorded in the dataset, it had to be confirmed in at least two different sources. to standardize donations into their dollar equivalents, a reference list of values for purchasing various types of medical equipment and supplies was defined (see appendix i table 4 for examples of conversion and total level of donations supplied by russia). the reference list contained the lowest and highest known market values for each product that were used to convert the known quantities of such items as covid-19 tests, ppe, and ventilators into their dollar equivalents. the lowest and highest totals (based on the lowest and highest market values respectively) were calculated and aggregated over the year for each recipient of covid-19 aid (see appendix i table 3). afterwards, a mean value was identified for each state year. analyses were conducted on the mean as well as the lowest and highest values of covid-19 assistance.4 aid scholarship identifies two stages of decision-making in aid allocation (boussalis and peiffer 2011; kevlihan, derouen, and biglaiser 2014). first is the "selection" stage, where a donor decides which countries will receive aid and which ones will be bypassed. the second is the "outcome" stage, and it involves decisions about the amount of aid distributed to states identified as aid recipients in the first round. consistent with the literature, this study tests the determinants of russia’s covid-19 aid in two stages. in the first (selection) stage, the dependent variable is whether the covid-afflicted country received any aid from moscow at all. countries selected for covid-19 assistance by russia were coded as “1 and “0” otherwise. in the second (outcome) stage, the dependent variable is the total volume (in usd) of covid-19 aid allocated by russia. independent variables the scholarship on humanitarian assistance typically measures the magnitude of a disaster by the number of fatalities or the number of people being affected. it is expected that more catastrophic events attract more post-disaster aid. consistent with the aid literature, the total number of deaths due to covid-19 appears to be an appropriate measure of the severity of the pandemic. however, the different approaches to counting covid-related deaths used by 4 the prices were not adjusted for inflation for the following reasons. the span of the study is short (10 months of 2020). during this time, russia experienced a 3.38% annual inflation. however, a bulk of its covid-19 donations were allocated early in 2020, and i assume that the change in prices for russian ppe and medical supplies would be insignificant to affect the results of the study. there is, however, a related challenge of using in-kind donations for inferring a country’s motivations for aid, namely, the structure of donations. arguably, airlifting military medical personnel (which is difficult to translate into a dollar value) signifies a higher priority of a recipient state for russia than a country that receives gloves and masks. i acknowledge this as one of the data limitations and invite further research into the ways in which the structure of in-kind donations reflects a donor’s motivations for aid. 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 11 countries raise concerns about the reliability of this measure.5 therefore, this article opted for the covid-19 mortality rate to be displayed in percentage terms as a measure of the pandemic’s severity in a country. the metric is calculated as a ratio of the total deaths to the number of infected individuals. since russia allocated most of its covid-19 assistance in the early stages of the pandemic—in late spring and early summer of 2020—the half-year total deaths estimate, as of july 1, 2020, was used in the study. our world in data is the source of data that was consulted on the number of covid-19 deaths (ritchie et al. 2020). it is expected that the higher number of deaths due to covid -19 will be associated with both a decision to provide aid and the higher volume of aid disbursed to the affected country. socioeconomic background that conditions decisions about aid allocation is typically measured by a country’s gdp per capita. this study uses gross domestic product per capita in 2019, measured in millions of usd logged in the statistical analysis of russia’s covid19 assistance; this data comes from the world bank (2019). similar to other disasters, the covid-19 pandemic affected economic relations, including trade, among countries. it was hypothesized that autocratic donors were sensitive to losses due to interruptions in economic exchanges and would be motivated to assist countries with greater economic ties to the donor state. the study uses the total volume of trade with russia in 2019 measured in thousands of us dollars; this data comes from the un statistics division (2020). the proximity of recipient states to russia was measured by the distance from moscow to the country's capital in km (gleditsch and ward 2001). the expectation is that the shorter the distance of a country’s capital to moscow, the more likely it is to receive russia’s covid 19 aid. to measure the regime type, this study uses v -dem’s interval-scale index for liberal democracy for 2019 (coppedge 2020). the expectation is that states with higher values of liberal democracy are less likely to receive covid-19 aid from moscow. to create an interaction term for testing hypothesis 2 , which expects russia to provide more assistance to autocratic counterparts severely affected by the covid -19 pandemic, this study created two binary variables: one measuring whether or not the country’s covid -19 mortality rate fell below or above the median and another one measuring whether the country was a full liberal democracy (scoring 0.6 or above on a scale from 0 to 10). countries with higher (above median) mortality rates due to covid-19 and full liberal democracies were coded as “1” and “0” otherwise. an interaction terms of the two binary variables was used in the equation. the political affinity of a country with russia (i.e., the extent to which the country supports russia’s foreign policy) can be proxied by their voting alignment in the un general assembly. the study used the roll-call votes for the un general assembly resolution 74/17 on the militarization of crimea, adopted on december 9, 2019 (un general assembly 2019). 5 to illustrate this problem, the central asian republics of kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan used to exclude atypically high death numbers due to pneumonia from the covid-19 death counts at the beginning of the pandemic. both governments changed their methodology in summer 2020 that resulted in a spike of deaths reported due to covid19. 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 12 the resolution condemned russia’s temporary occupation of the crimean peninsula . all votes in favour of these resolutions were coded as "1"; all other votes were coded as “2 .”6 membership in an alliance (including nonaggression pacts or a treaty containing a stipulation of nonaggression) was measured as a binary variable with "1" de noting membership in an alliance with russia and "0" otherwise (leeds, ritter, and mclaughlin 2002). to separate membership in an alliance with russia from the proximity variable, another binary variable denoting whether a country shared a land border with russia was added for the robustness checks to select models. this study also included a binary variable denoting whether a country was a recipient of arms sales from russia since 2014 ("yes" = 1 and "no" = 0). the source of the data was the stockholm international peace research institute (sipri) arms transfers database (sipri 2020). lastly, the total population at the end of 2019 (logged) is also included among the control variables (un population division 2019). the study estimated russia’s decisions about covid-19 aid allocations using heckman’s (1979) two-step estimator, which allows for the correlation of the error terms of two decisions at hand. the sample includes all states in the year 2020 (but excludes unrecognized territories — abkhazia, transdniestria, south ossetia, palestine—to which moscow also provided assistance). russia’s aid to the kremlin-controlled territories in eastern ukraine and a highlycontested transfer of medical supplies and equipment to the us were excluded from the study. the heckman model generates a wald test statistic. when significant, it indicates that the two models are not independent and must be solved together. in this study’s case, the wald test statistic was significant in all but the base model (1) with and without the binary variable denoting shared borders with russia (see table 1) suggesting that a null hypothesis of the two models’ independence could be rejected. the base model (1) was further estimated using logit and regression analysis separately for the selection and outcome stages, with result s being largely similar to that estimated by the heckman model (see appendix i table 2). table 1 contains the results of the heckman selection estimator. model 1 is a base model that uses the mean values of russia’s covid-19 aid (in usd) and excludes the interaction term. model 2 also uses mean values of russia’s covid-19 aid and includes an interaction of the severity of the covid-19 crisis and the type of regime among its predictors. models 3 and 4 use the lowest and highest estimated values of russia’s covid-19 aid, respectively. since the distribution of the covid-19 aid in dollar values was skewed, a logarithmic transformation of the variable was used in the outcome part of the equation. table 5 containing a variance inflation factor (vif) appears in the appendix. in the selection stage, the direction of the coefficients on all independent variables is consistent with the study’s expectations but only “un resolution a74/17,” “membership in alliance,” and “liberal democracy index” reached a level of statistical significance at p < 0.01 or above. 6 as a robustness check, this study substituted roll-call votes for the un general assembly resolution 54/17 with roll-call votes for the un general assembly resolution 68/262 adopted on march 27, 2014 (un general assembly 2014) in response to the russian annexation of crimea. it was a non -binding resolution that called on states not to recognize changes in the status of the crimea region, affirmed the territorial integrity of ukraine, and invalidated the 2014 crimean referendum . the findings of the models with the alternative measure of “political affinity” were similar to th ose reported in table 1 and, therefore, are not included here. 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 13 table 1: the heckman model of the determinants of russian covid-19 aid selection stage (1) covid-19 aid mean values (2) covid-19 aid mean values (3) covid-19 aid minimal values (4) covid-19 aid maximum values covid-19 deaths rate -0.0212 (0.043) 0.014 (0.052) 0.014 (0.052) 0.0143 (0.052) covid deaths/liberal democracy interaction 0 1 1.24* (0.68) 1 0 -0.249 (0.381) 1 1 0.087 (0.859) 0 1 1.24* (0.683) 1 0 -0.249 (0.381) 1 1 0.087 (0.920) 0 1 1.24* (0.683) 1 0 -0.249 (0.381) 1 1 0.087 (0.859) distance to capital -0.000026 (0.00048) -0.00002 (0.00005) -0.00002 (0.00005) -0.0002 (0.0005) un resolution a74/17 1.076** (0.484) 1.24** (0.506) 1.105** (0.505) 1.105** (0.505) liberal democracy index -0.945 (0.736) -2.112** (1.000) -2.12* (1.09) -2.119* (1.09) membership in alliance 1.129*** (0.387) 1.197*** (0.414) 1.197*** (0.414) 1.197*** (0.414) total trade in 2019 (logged)) -0.003 (0.022) -0.009 (0.096) -0.010 (0.0234) -0.0096 (0.023) total population (logged) -0.100 (0.092) -0.067 (0.096) -0.068 (0.096) -0.067 (0.096) arms sales 0.192 (0.315 -0.039 (1.569) 0.064 0.325 0.065 (0.325) constant 0.204 (1.523) -4.008* (2.40) -0.039 (1.569) -4.122 (2.474) outcome stage (1) (2) (3) (4) covid-19 deaths rate 0.699* (0.360) 0.708** (0.277) 0.773*** (0.268) 0.643** (0.285) distance to capital -0.0001 (0,0003) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0003) liberal democracy index 4.021 (6.057) 2.347 (4.153) 2.193 (4.034) 2.692 (4.271) membership in alliance -2.016 (3.227) -1.646 (4.15) -1.581 (2.124) -1.707 (2.248) total trade in 2019 (logged) 0.284 (0.199) 0.252* (0.142) 0.318** (0.138) 0.186 (0.146) 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 14 table 1: cont’d gdp per capita in 2019 (logged) 1.828* (0.968) 1.507** (0.678) 1.62** (0.658) 1.393** (0.697) total population (logged) -0.136 (0.636) -0.206 (0.480) -0.364 (0.467) -0.048 (0.494) arms sales 0.559 (2.09) 1.21 (1.48) 1.515 (1.150) 0.574 (1.522) constant 3.255 (11.438) 5.928 (8.275) 5.369 (8.039) 6.487 (8.512) n=153 selected=34 wald chi2(8) = 14.32 prob>chi = 0.074 n=153 selected=34 wald chi2(8) = 24.6 prob>chi2 = 0.002 n=153 selected=34 wald chi2(8) = 28.96 prob>chi2 = 0.000 n=153 selected=34 wald chi2(8) = 21.46 prob>chi2 = 0.000 to interpret the coefficients, marginal effects were calculated. the probability of being selected as recipients of russia’s covid-19 aid increases by nearly 20 percentage points across all models for those countries that abstained from voting or voted against the un general assembly resolution a74/17 (compared to those who voted in support of the resolution). in the soviet tradition of “aid for votes,” russia used aid to reward countries that expressed support to its foreign policy priorities by siding with moscow on the un’s roll call votes. moscow also rewarded the members of alliances with aid. the likelihood for a country to be chosen as a recipient of russia’s covid-19 assistance increased by 18.4 percent if it was a member of an alliance with russia. importantly, the impact of alliances held even when controlled for the shared borders with russia (see models 3 and 4, appendix i table 2). many members of alliances with russia are also moscow’s neighbours; however, there are several russian neighbours—ukraine, georgia, estonia, latvia, lithuania, finland, norway, and poland, among others—that are not members of alliances with russia. the border variable turned insignificant in the robustness checks while the alliances’ measures retained their significance, suggesting that autocratic donors are more likely to use humanitarian aid allocations to countries who are members of alliances with the donor states. lastly, democracies in the sample were less likely to be selected as recipients of russia’s covid-19 assistance. the marginal effect for a full liberal democracy of being selected as a recipient of russia’s covid-19 aid is 19.6 percent less compared to nondemocracies. the interaction term did not return the results consistent with the expectation that autocratic states experiencing a severe health crisis due to the covid-19 pandemic were more likely to be selected as recipients of russia’s covid-19 assistance. interestingly, it is the democracies with lower than median mortality rates due to covid-19 were more likely to be selected to be the recipients of russian covid-19 aid. while this finding departs from the theoretical expectations, it comports with the available empirical evidence of moscow sending large amounts of medical supplies and ppe to italy, serbia, bosnia and herzegovina, and other democratic countries with the purported 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 15 goal of breaking the european solidarity and changing the “hearts and minds” of the people in these countries to view russia in a more favourable light. in the end, the regime variable returned a statistically significant coefficient in the expected direction, independent of the interaction term; everything else being equal, moscow has consistently preferred other autocracies as the recipients of its covid-19 assistance. the second “outcome” model corresponding to the second stage of the decision-making process of aid allocation returned statistically significant coefficients on two variables – the mortality rate due to covid-19 and the gdp per capita. this implies that in russia’s case, the selection or the gate-keeping stage of decision-making involved many more considerations concerning the choice of the recipients of covid-19 assistance from russia. when it comes to making decisions about the levels of assistance, countries experiencing more severe health crises, as measured by covid19 mortality rates, received higher levels of assistance from russia. while somewhat unexpected, the relationship was born out in practice in that russia's assistance appeared to be tracing the spread of the infectious disease around the globe. in march 2020, the epicentre of the covid 19 outbreak shifted to europe, with italy experiencing higher daily death tolls than chin a, and italy received some of the highest amounts of covid-19 aid (in usd) from the kremlin. in late spring/early summer of 2020, central asian republics experienced the peak of the first wave of the pandemic. the first wave of the covid-19 pandemic was milder in africa than in the rest of the world, but the second wave that came by the end of 2020 was more aggressive. russia’s assistance roughly followed the same pattern with the first aid packages going to europe, then to central asian and african states. countries with higher levels of gdp per capita also receive d higher amounts of covid-19 aid from russia. this outcome might be accounted for by the pragmatic considerations over the logistics of accepting and distributing the in-kind assistance packages (better-off countries have more robust infrastructure for accepting and distributing aid deliveries). in addition, high levels of gdp per capita are also suggestive of stronger institutional and health infrastructure, which means that even the modest in-kind contributions of ppe and equipment may have a higher rate of return, which can be claimed by russia as outcomes of its assistance. russia’s total volume of aid was not conditional on the size of the countries’ population, regime, membership in alliance with moscow, or proximity to russia. statistical findings offer several plausible explanations for russia's covid-19 assistance. first, the results attest to the importance of separating the decision-making process regarding aid into two stages: a “selection” stage of making a decision on the recipients of aid and an “outcome” stage where decisions about the amount of aid are made. different sets of determinants appear to be at play at different stages of decision-making about covid-19 assistance. in the “selection” stage when an authoritarian donor, such as russia, makes a decision about which countries deserve its assistance, several factors consistent with the theoretical expectations turned out to be significant in shaping russia’s decisions. these include political affinity (as measured by countries’ votes in the un general assembly), membership in alliances with russia, and the nature of the political regime. russia appears to reward countries supporting its foreign policies by resorting to the “checkbook" diplomacy of humanitarian assistance. similarly, members of alliances are rewarded with aid, as are the fellow co-authoritarians, while countries with higher scores on the liberal democracy index are less likely to receive russia’s aid. when it comes to the 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 16 second stage of the decision-making process regarding the amount of total assistance allocated to the countries selected as the recipients of russia’s covid-19 aid, many of the determinants of aid from the selection model appear to be less relevant. discussion and conclusions in 2003, an informal donor forum and network of 17 donors endorsed the principles of good humanitarian donorship (2003). these principles include humanity (saving lives and alleviating suffering as a goal of humanitarian assistance), impartiality, neutrality, and independence. by adhering to these principles, donors foreswear using humanitarian aid for geopolitical and other non-humanitarian means. like many other so-called “new” and “emerging” donors, russia has not acceded to these principles, and its motives for humanitarian assistance have been called into question. by focusing on russia’s decisions about covid-19 assistance allocation, this article sought to contribute to the larger literature on foreign aid that deals with donors' determinants of aid flow. more directly relevant for this study is the literature on humanitarian aid suggesting that the level of humanitarian assistance is not just an expression of humanitarian concerns, but it is also influenced by donors’ domestic strategic considerations. the study theorized aid as a function of the donor government’s interest in political survival, which is more astute in authoritarian than democratic states. the key differences between democratic and autocratic regimes relevant for understanding their aid choices have to do with the nature of constraints placed on democratic versus authoritarian leaders. by destabilizing the affected countries, humanitarian disasters threaten autocratic states’ access to and their ability to distribute private gains and/or elevate the costs of maintaining the “winning coalition.” autocratic states, therefore, are sensitive to the prospects of the disaster-induced instability and are more likely to assist countries that are vulnerable to political instability. consistent with these expectations, the study found that russia was more likely to allocate aid to countries that were non-democratic, supportive of russia’s foreign policy orientation, and belonged to alliances with moscow. russia’s international response to the covid-19 crisis is telling of its foreign policy priorities. moscow has taken advantage of the humanitarian cause to advance its military cooperation, weaken the prospects for democracy around the world, and gain geopolitical approval. moscow might have scored some points by presenting itself as a responsible global power delivering the much-needed medical supplies at a time of us retrenchment, its political gamble under the guise of humanitarian covid-19 assistance was cut short by the pandemic troubles at home and the limitations of russia’s own fiscal approach. the government of vladimir putin has been opposed to investments in public welfare in favour of a fiscal discipline to eliminate moscow’s public debt. russia’s unfinished healthcare reforms increased the public’s vulnerability to contracting covid-19, which spiked during the summer of 2020 (cook and twigg 2020). as the russian military jets delivered ppe and medical supplies around the world, russia turned out to be utterly unprepared to manage the crisis at home. the kremlin’s cavalier approach to the pandemic, which involved downplaying the threat of covid-19 infections in russia, had backfired with the population growing highly skeptical of personal health and safety measures and 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 17 becoming distrustful of vaccines (stronski 2021). russia’s strong financial reserves have been viewed as a symbol of its “sovereignty.” subsequently, russia’s domestic covid-19 relief measures were less than 3 percent of its gdp, compared to extensive pandemic relief packages in some european countries that stood in double digits (trudolyubov 2020). only a sliver of this amount was put toward foreign covid-19 assistance, which dwindled toward the end of 2020. this does not mean, however, that russia’s humanitarian contributions are irrelevant. humanitarian aid is not the only tool in the russian foreign policy toolkit. when used together with other instruments of the so-called “smart power,” combining “soft” and “hard” power techniques for generating a desired foreign policy effect, humanitarian aid can be a force multiplier helping moscow to achieve its foreign policy objectives. whether in central asia, africa, latin america, or south east asia, russia’s covid-19 aid has been used in conjunction with expanding military cooperation, including through the use of private military contractors (pmcs), deepening economic engagement (mostly through moscow’s contracts in extractive industries), and informational influence. the efforts at cultivating and sustaining bi-lateral, mainly elite-to-elite, connections have been accompanied by an anti-western narrative contrasting the principles of sovereignty and [regime] security with the value-based conditionality imposed by the west. the so-called “traditional donors” are not beyond the pale in deviating from the need-based principles of humanitarian aid allocations. still, the ideas of impartiality, neutrality, and need have long been integral to the integrity of the humanitarian system and an important draw for private and public donations. russia’s participation in humanitarian efforts for clear, pragmatic concerns and geopolitical motives reinforces the growing skepticism regarding the universality of international disaster relief aid that threatens to undermine global humanitarian efforts. the perceived politicization of aid and biases in states’ allocations of disaster relief assistance have been named among the chief reasons for the crisis in the international humanitarian system (paulmann 2016). 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 18 appendix i table 2: ols and logit models of the determinants of russian covid-19 aid (1) logistic (selection) model (2) ols (outcome) model (3) logistic (selection) model (4) ols (outcome) model covid-19 deaths rate -0.013 (0.071) -0.083 (0.126) -0.052 (0.083) 0.023 (0.131) un resolution a74/17 2.482** (1.106) 3.046** (1.333) 2.793** (1.321) 1.126* (0.661) distance to capital -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002* (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0001) liberal democracy index -2.988** (1.477) -1.853 (2.562) -1.227 (1.676) -0.199 (2.501) membership in alliance 2.045*** (0.647) 3.644*** (1.222) 1.776*** (0.581) 3.518*** (1.185) states bordering russia 2.924 (1.780) total trade in 2019 (logged) -0.0113 (0.040) 0.019 (0.062) 0.0111 (0.041) 0.019 (0.065) gdp per capita in 2019 (logged) 1.828* (0.968) -0.907** (0.355) -0.809*** (0.231) -1.004*** (0.365) total population (logged) -0.078 (0.153) -0.296 (0.281) -0.167 (0.174) -0.452 (0.310) arms sales -0.692 (0.632) 1.559 (0.974) 0.411 (0.586) 1.728 (1.252) constant 0.40 (2.57) 15.98*** (5.718) 7.357* (3.910) 15.86*** (5.582) n (pseudo) r-squared 153 0.23 153 0.24 153 0.29 153 wald chi2(8)/ f(8, 145) prob > chi2 / prob > f 16.55 0.035 4.57 0.000 21.25 0.019 4.66 0.00 robust error terms in parentheses * p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 19 table 3: russia’s covid-19 donations (2020) country minimum estimate maximum estimate afghanistan 65,629.8 757,500 algeria 771,600 14,600,000 angola 440,000 11,400,000 armenia 1,299,600 15,000,000 azerbaijan 1,457,112 16,800,000 belarus 2,234,041 22,100,000 bosnia and herzegovina 3,086,400 58,300,000 cape verde 440,000 11,400,000 central african republic 4600 4600 china 1,840,000 34,800,000 comoros 46 4600 congo 4600 4600 costa rica 26000 300,000 democratic republic of the congo 103,920 125,440 djibouti 778,378 1,020,270 ethiopia 4600 46,000 guinea 154,200 606,400 iran 649,800 7,500,000 italy 33,500,000 380,000,000 kazakhstan 1,299,600 15,000,000 kyrgyzstan 2,737,900 3,953,000 moldova 1,494,540 17,300,000 mongolia 1,299,600 15,000,000 nicaragua 11569 528,630 north korea 84,474 975,000 serbia 8,526,570 160,000,000 sierra leone 130,000 1,500,000 somalia 46 4600 south africa 1299.6 15,000 syria 172,124.5 1,595,445 tajikistan 1,299,600 15,000,000 ukraine 80,000 1,512,000 uzbekistan 1,299,600 15,000,000 venezuela 1,189,880 19,600,000 zambia 65,000 750000 zimbabwe 4600 46,000 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 20 table 4: examples of the ppe and market prices (in us$) ppe price per item (low) price per item (high) price per box amount in the box weight per item 3ply face mask 0.2 0.6 30 50 0.011 kn95 mask 1.89 2.6 18.9 50 0.005 nitrile gloves 0.2907 3.5 29.07 100 0.012 protective coveralls 20.99 45 0.124 rapid test kit 12.996 150 324.9 25 test reagent 66 370 face shield 4.9 5.1 0.078 table 5: variance inflation factor variable vif 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https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/03/09/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 27 world health organization. 2020. “un and partners release record humanitarian response plan as covid-19 wreaks havoc.” december 1, 2020. accessed november 21, 2022. https://worldhealthorganization.cmail19.com/t/viewemail/d/0ff9a0b2affb5d912540e f23f30feded/7979a0f208459ae6419c69e1cebe89f9. zykov, kirill. 2020. “russia sends coronavirus aid to 46 countries – analysis.” the moscow times, august 19, 2020. accessed november 21, 2022. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 2020/08/19/russia-sends-coronavirus-aid-to-46-countries-analysis-a71201 https://worldhealthorganization.cmail19.com/t/viewemail/d/0ff9a0b2affb5d912540ef23f30feded/7979a0f208459ae6419c69e1cebe89f9 https://worldhealthorganization.cmail19.com/t/viewemail/d/0ff9a0b2affb5d912540ef23f30feded/7979a0f208459ae6419c69e1cebe89f9 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/08/19/russia-sends-coronavirus-aid-to-46-countries-analysis-a71201 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/08/19/russia-sends-coronavirus-aid-to-46-countries-analysis-a71201 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 28 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 issn 2562-8429 becoming european? strangers finding a place in the european union maricia fischer-souan1 universidad carlos iii de madrid https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2550 abstract this article addresses the idea of belonging in europe from the perspective of postcolonial migrants settling in eu societies. it draws on over one hundred in-depth interviews with algerian, ecuadorian, and indian individuals settled mainly in and around the cities of london, madrid, and paris. rather than investigating migrants’ orientations to europe through a narrow interest in selfidentification (feeling vs. not feeling european), it delves into individual migration narratives for evidence of how europe is imagined (if it is imagined at all) during the migration process and its relation to other physical and symbolic sites. as a frame for interpreting individual migration narratives, i introduce the concept of ‘migratory rupture’, a dialectical experience of both the disorienting and creative aspects of migration. in excavating some of the reflexive processes involved in constructing symbolic geographies of attachment, i find that regardless of the scales of comparison used to articulate place affiliation across different contexts, e.g. whether small-scale (neighbourhoods or city districts) or larger-scale (supranational or de-territorialized categories), symbolic geographies allow migrants to view their transnational life experience on a single, coherent plane and express a form of global consciousness. 1 maricia fischer-souan is a phd candidate in the department of social sciences at the universidad carlos iii de madrid https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2550 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 now home to millions of people from non-european backgrounds, and with its many religious and cultural dispositions, europe is a crossing of transnational networks that incorporate almost all its citizens and residents. it is as much a space of longings rooted in myths of origin and tradition, as it is a space of cosmopolitan identities and attachments, and hybrid geographies of cultural formation. -ash amin 1. introduction there is ample public and scholarly interest in the ways native-born and ‘majority’ segments of european populations experience and position themselves in relation to interrelated globalization and europeanization process. recently, greater attention is being paid to the ways in which ‘people on the move’, including immigrant minorities, view the global processes in which they are enmeshed. migration is thus seen as the ‘human face’ of globalization and the migrant as the ‘figure of our time’ (nail 2015). contrary to what one might expect with the advent of european citizenship, european union (eu) movers are not the most emblematic of these processes. though intra-eu mobility has been on the rise since the turn of the new millennium, third-country nationals and individuals born outside of the eu make up a larger share of the european population than eu movers (eurostat 2017; recchi 2015). to be sure, much of the geographic mobility in european societies (not to mention human and cultural diversity) is associated with ‘non-european’ migrants and their descendants, a label which can obscure the many cultural and historic ties the latter have to europe since many of these migration flows are in some way related to colonial and postcolonial contexts. with respect to the different cultural and social processes that shape the experiences of noneuropean/postcolonial migrants in the european union, the specifically european dimension of experience has sparked some scholarly interest. there is growing research into how non-europeanorigin populations relate to the added european dimension of political and cultural membership. studies of european identity and support for european integration are increasingly interested in the perspective of minorities (agirdag et al. 2016; cinnirella and hamilton 2007; dowley and silver 2011; erisen 2017; roeder 2011; teney et al. 2016; vieten 2018), as well as the potential significance of ‘europe’ in processes of migrant integration (sperling 2013). survey research on these issues indicates that minorities support european integration more than non-minorities. the former are less likely to see european integration as a threat to national identity (cinirella and hamilton 2007; dowley and silver 2011; roeder 2011). minorities may also be more likely to see eu law as a potential arena for supranational human rights claims-making when faced with discrimination at the national level (dowley and silver 2011). on the other hand, the possibility that eu policy discourse may reinforce perceptions, especially among muslims, of the eu as a ‘christian club’ may lead to more ambivalent relationships with the idea of europe (ibid.). qualitative studies on non-eu migrant identification with and understandings of europe illuminate some of the ambivalence in these attitudes. experiences of discrimination or marginalization visà-vis dominant groups and the increased politicization of migration across europe may limit the sense of belonging to europe (vieten 2018). at the same time, the freedom of mobility associated with the european union can offer a potentially more ‘open’ space of belonging and foster cosmopolitan and post-national understandings of membership as well as opportunities for individual growth and freedom (sperling 2013; vieten 2018). 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 yet, relatively little is known about the ways in which understandings of and identifications with europe (understood loosely) are articulated in migrants’ narratives of mobility and settlement, that is, how europe is imagined (if it is imagined at all) during the migration process and its relation to other physical and symbolic sites that structure the migratory experience. by approaching the idea of europe from postcolonial migrants’ perspective in a roundabout away that considers europe as one of several potential spatial referent points, i try to glimpse into the dynamic process of place affiliation in european migration contexts. this study considers international migration as an intense life experience with the ability to alter one’s identity, potentially casting it against a global frame of reference (savage, bagnall, and longhurst 2005). it should be noted that the postcolonial relationships that have significantly shaped migration processes in europe (and which are investigated in this study) have global reflexivity built into them, leading to a degree of familiarity among north african, south american and south asian individuals with their european societies of destination (and vice-versa). elements of cultural and linguistic proximity are reinforced by contemporary mediascapes (appadurai 1996) and other global processes. yet, postcolonial migrants are equally cast as distant, unfamiliar, and other – as a result of international migration regimes, cultural boundaries, and racializing ideologies. through this dialectic of ‘familiarity and unfamiliarity’ and ‘nearness and farness’, non-european postcolonial migrants settling in europe can be understood in terms of simmel’s figure of the ‘stranger’ – “the one who comes today and stays tomorrow” (simmel 1950) as well as more contemporary accounts of ‘strangeness’ under conditions of globalization (amin 2012; rumford 2013). the north african, south american and south asian (mainly firstgeneration algerian, ecuadorian, and indian) participants in this study are not considered ‘strangers’ merely because they are migrants, newcomers, or minorities in european majority contexts, however. rather, their accounts of affiliation to place that frequently draw on hybrid and reflexive geographies are relevant to some of the key qualities of the simmelian notion of the stranger-as-outsider – notably, creativity, improved perspective, and the ability to be a catalyst for change (coupland 1999; rumford 2013; simmel 1950). contemporary theorizations that build on simmel’s account emphasise the blurring of lines between ‘strangers’ and ‘neighbours’ and associate the global era with a generalized condition of ‘strangeness’, as argued by rumford (2013). through this understanding, the condition of strangeness applies to migrants and non-migrants alike and involves a “sense of disorientation resulting from […] an experience of globalization in which previously reliable reference points have been eroded and we encounter strangers where previously we encountered neighbours” (rumford 2013, 7). how postcolonial migrants deal with processes of ‘disorientation’– both pertaining to the life-changing intensity of migratory experience and to becoming embedded into social worlds that are themselves “on the move” (bauman 1991, 97) is what this study is about. as a way of connecting both the classical properties of ‘strangerhood’ and the contemporary condition of strangeness in an international migration experience, i present the concept of ‘migratory rupture’. through a dialectical experience involving personal rupture engendered by migration and the need to re-establish a sense of continuity during settlement, the concept draws both on the potentially disorientating aspects of the lived experience of migration as well as the creative potential of migrants to regain control of their life-narrative. as a frame for interpreting individual migration narratives, the migratory rupture concept allows me to excavate some of the reflexive processes involved in constructing symbolic geographies of attachment. regardless of the scales used to draw spatial comparisons or bridge the distance between distinct places, e.g. 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 whether small-scale (neighbourhoods or city districts) or larger-scale (supranational or deterritorialized categories), i argue that symbolic geographies can serve at least two functions. first, they articulate a migrant’s transnational experiences on a single plane of existence and second, they express a form of global consciousness. 2. theoretical framework 2.1. spatial consciousness and identity formation in migration contexts how do individual understandings of and attachments to place change in the context of migration and settlement experiences? specifically, in international migration processes between a noneuropean country of origin and a destination society in the european union, how does the supranational european category intermingle in one’s expanding spatial consciousness and postmigration identity formation? this study considers international migrants settling in european societies as particularly interesting subjects for investigating: a) how one’s geographic imagination expands to incorporate a growing number of potential place attachments; and b) how different scales of attachment, ranging from neighbourhoods, cities, states, and supranational categories, are articulated in these changing geographic imaginations. human geographers have developed several conceptual tools for thinking about the meaning people attach both to everyday practical and more abstract spatial forms. the geographic or spatial imagination refers to the ways in which individuals understand and classify places and the connections between them (agnew and duncan 1989; gregory 1994; harvey 2005). closely linked is the concept of mental maps which can refer both to processes of storing and extracting meaning from concrete experiences in space as well as imagining unknown places (tuan 1975). these concepts view human spatial consciousness as shaped by both the material and symbolic realms of personal and collective experience and as relevant to sociological concepts, such as the social imaginary (taylor 2002). through a multidimensional understanding of place as constructed by location, social interactions and identifications, agnew and duncan (1989) argue for a more systematic focus on the simultaneous engagement between the social and geographic imaginations. linking the social and geographic imaginations is also crucial to harvey (2005), who draws attention to the specific role of space and place in shaping individuals’ understandings and experiences of their own biographies and their relationships to the world around them. he writes that the geographic imagination allows the individual to recognize the relationship which exists between him [sic.] and his neighbourhood, his territory […]. it allows him to judge the relevance of events in other places […] – to judge whether [these events] are relevant to him wherever he is now. it allows him also to fashion and use space creatively and to appreciate the meaning of the spatial forms created by others (harvey 2005, quoting harvey 1973). for harvey, investigating the relations between social processes and spatial forms is essential in order to develop a fuller understanding of complex global processes, including regional integration and migration. harvey’s emphasis on “consciousness” and “imagination” as well as his references to “geographical knowledges” and mental maps are particularly relevant to the cultural focus of this study. he understands mental maps as repertoires of spatial concepts and geographical understandings shaped by an individual’s surroundings, which vary greatly across different spatial and cultural environments. “such mental maps, once formed, tend to be stubbornly recalcitrant to 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 change and ill-adapted to the heightened fluidity demanded by contemporary processes of globalization” (harvey 2005, 236). this relatively static view of mental maps is surprising given harvey’s frequent emphasis on dynamic processes such as relational space. it is also a departure from tuan’s (1975) multidimensional definition of mental maps that includes a highly projective and aspirational element through “imaginary worlds that depict attractive goals that tempt people out of their habitual rounds” (tuan 1975, 210). harvey nevertheless challenges overly deterministic notions of the geographic imagination by highlighting the diversity of specialized geographical knowledges, even within a single locality: “the nature of experience as well as of socialization guarantees considerable variation in geographical perceptions according to class, gender, age, ethnicity, religion and lifestyle dispositions” (2005, 236). the emphasis on the complex relationship between individual-level and external factors that shape spatial consciousness is highly relevant to the research at hand, given the multiple spatial and cultural realms of socialization and individual experience that international migrants ‘cross’ along their journey. building on the sociological relevance of this geographical scholarship, recchi (2015) offers the concept of space-sets: “the complex of physical sites where individuals spend their social existence, stemming from past and present practices, unified by remembering ‘togetherness’ in a geographical location” (recchi 2015; recchi and kuhn 2013, 192). similar to harvey’s understanding of the geographic imagination, recchi and kuhn (2013) underline the variability of space-sets and liken them to ‘personal maps’, the components of which differ in terms of width, interconnectedness, and salience (ibid.). these three properties endow the space-sets concept with a more dynamic and context-specific definition than the geographic imagination. both objective and subjective processes distinguish the characteristics of space-sets, as width is concerned with the totality of places encountered at multiple scales, so that the experience of geographic mobility expands the width of one’s space-sets. recchi and kuhn’s understanding of the interconnectedness and salience of sites, on the other hand, can be likened to the symbolic aspects of the geographic imagination, based on the extent to which one perceives different places as separate or connected and the affective meaning conjured by each. they explore this in relation to the political legitimacy of the european union in the minds of eu citizens but trace the relevance of the concept to other historical moments of social transformation, such as industrialisation, “which unleashed workers from the countryside and brought them to cities, expanding their space-sets significantly” (recchi and kuhn 2013, 192). the dynamic and interrelated properties of width, interconnectedness, and salience that make up an individual’s space-sets and shape the geographic imagination are thus of specific interest to the study of migrant subjectivity and identity formation. drawing on gregory’s (1994) geographical imaginations, robins (2019) emphasises the identity processes that are at stake in the geographic imagination beyond the perceptions and behaviours that shape and are shaped by our spatial consciousness. individuals and collectives also use the geographic imagination “to imagine and negotiate their identities in relation to wider national and cultural ones” (robins 2019, 730). in his study of brazilian migrants in london, he highlights the significance of interconnected frames of reference that define a migrant’s spatial consciousness and belonging: “the way the places of origin and destination are imagined occur in reference to each other” (ibid.). 2.2. “migratory rupture” and the dialectics of belonging 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 three aspects of these different theoretical contributions are particularly significant for the study at hand. first, our geographic imaginations, mental maps, and space-sets refer both to our objective spatial knowledge and experience as well as the individual and collective meanings attached to them. second, these objective and subjective processes not only shape our orientations to spatial forms but also our identity work and other imaginaries (e.g. social, cultural, and political). third, we mobilize both objective experience and subjective meanings of space inter-temporally and at multiple scalar levels (e.g. neighbourhood, city, state) in connecting or distinguishing physical sites in our personal mental maps. moreover, though mental maps and geographic imaginations are essential to most human experience, the theories discussed thus far suggest the act of migration and the ‘migrant condition’ as particularly revealing of the complexity of these processes. the authors dealing with various aspects of spatial consciousness seem to differ when it comes to the malleability of mental maps and geographic imaginations. whereas harvey suggests that one’s mental maps, born of context-specific spatial and social experience, are not particularly well equipped to deal with changing circumstances and environments, tuan (1975) and recchi and kuhn (2013) are more inclined to view mental maps or space-sets as continuous processes. the latter approach seems the most appropriate for addressing the geographic imagination and belonging in migration contexts as it puts the migrant actor in a position to take stock of accumulated experiences and desired outcomes related to multiple spatial and social contexts. but how might some of the building blocks of mental mapping in tuan’s words, the combination of “memory-images and imaginary-images” (1975, 211), or for recchi and kuhn (2013), width, interconnectedness, and salience – be felt and experienced by migrants as changing, expanding, and potentially challenging their previous orientations to space? specifically, if our mental maps are complex by nature, as this conceptual framework suggests, how does the added complexity of socialization in multiple societies – as one becomes dis-embedded or ‘uprooted’ from one (noneuropean) society and embedded into another (european, urban one) affect our spatial consciousness? if we consider the lived experiences of international mobility as fundamental aspects of a migrant’s biography, then the dialectical relationships that inform processes of dis-embedding and embedding – involving both personal rupture and continuity – deserve special attention. whether we are more inclined to follow harvey’s understanding of recalcitrant mental maps or a more fluid approach to the geographic imagination, the spatial consciousness that informs our identity work does not simply stay put nor expand on its own. especially in a migratory experience, one is confronted with new social and geographic circumstances which will inevitably lead one to reflect on and question one’s understanding of and attachments to place. the rupture-continuity dialectic can be used as a frame for better understanding some of the particularities of migrant biographies as well as the connected concept of evolving mental maps. as a way of assembling together the different subjective and objective components that give personal meaning to the migrant biography, i offer the concept of “migratory rupture”. this concept is based on the premise that the migration experience represents a significant life-event which may cause one to re-evaluate the self-concept in ways that other ‘milestones’, more in-line with social expectations related to the life-course (e.g. education or fertility decisions), do not. thus, moving to and settling in an eu context, regardless of one’s desire to do so, can be experienced as a form of rupture, both in space and in the life-course. i use the concept of migratory rupture to highlight the feeling of fragmentation of the self in the context of migration and the 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 subsequent effort to re-establish personal continuity that is coherent and ‘makes sense’ in the individual biography. 2.3 “elective belonging” and expanding european space-sets research on how the idea of belonging in urban contexts is changing through globalization processes highlights the importance of reflexivity and symbolic geographies. the concept of “elective belonging” developed in globalization and belonging by savage, bagnall, and longhurst (2005) suggests that individual narratives of settlement may have greater significance than local historic ties in contemporary urban contexts. as a core idea in the empirical study on globalization and local belonging, elective belonging articulates senses of spatial attachment, social position, and forms of connectivity to other places. […] individuals attach their own biography to their ‘chosen’ residential location, so that they tell stories that indicate that their arrival and subsequent settlement is appropriate to their sense of themselves. people who come to live in an area with no prior ties to it, but can link their residence to their biographical life history, are able to see themselves as belonging to the area. this kind of elective belonging is critically dependent on people’s relational sense of place, their ability to relate their area of residence against other possible areas, so that the meaning of place is critically judged in terms of its relational meanings (savage, bagnall, and longhurst 2005, 29, emphasis added). the role that critical reflection plays in connecting place to biography – the conscious effort to achieve a coherent sense of self in the context of geographic mobility – is illustrative of the link between our spatial orientations and our identity work. savage and his colleagues’ emphasis on both meaningful and relational senses of place reinforces the theoretical material discussed previously. the multi-scalar interconnectedness and salience of sites (recchi and kuhn 2013) and interconnected frames of reference (robins 2019) that come to structure one’s self-understanding are intimately related to the experience of geographic mobility and to the way we imagine and relate our departure, arrival, and settlement stories. though savage, bagnall, and longhurst’s concept of elective belonging draws principally from findings on internal mobility in britain more than on international migrants, it is relevant to any analysis of the agentic capabilities of newcomers in their own social integration, embedding and emplacement in their new society (wessendorf and phillimore 2019). the latter authors have drawn attention to the role of ‘superdiverse contexts’ (such as the european capitals in this study) as highlighting the still unresolved public and scholarly debates around ‘migrant integration’ by begging the question of which spatial unit migrants are supposed to ‘integrate’ into. the study at hand suggests that postcolonial migrants settling in european cities develop symbolic geographies of their settlement contexts that are not necessarily congruent with official spatial units. as will be shown, they develop their own accounts of settlement or ‘integration’ into the spatial units that are most appropriate for their self-understandings, based on a relational and interconnected sense of space. exploring the meanings and salience of europe in connection to other spatial categories in the context of these processes of elective belonging and changing geographic imaginations allows us to consider the multi-scalar and interconnected properties of these processes to a greater extent than a focus on national or local place attachments would. to what extent do the mental maps of newcomers in european societies, reveal a ‘european imaginary’ of sorts, whether spatial, cultural, social, or political? the european union, especially through its regime of free cross-border 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 mobility, has potentially set the stage for an increased “internationalisation of europeans’ spacesets” (recchi and kuhn 2013, 202). similarly, for harvey (2005), the political transformations related to european integration have led to a progressive transformation of nationally based geographical outlooks into a more european-wide perspective. it is beyond the scope of this investigation to ask what the effects of citizenship status of non-eu migrants might have on their potential for developing european space-sets, and how these space-sets might be constituted compared to those of ‘native’ eu citizens. however, given the cross-country comparative research design, it is possible to explore the differences across groups when it comes to the cultural resonance of europe. the european union as the common denominator among all possible spatial categories of reference adds an additional layer of complexity to the question of expanding geographical imaginations in the migration context, while at the same time allowing for more robust comparisons of migration narratives. 3. research design and analytical approach the theory of elective belonging, put specifically in an international migration context, would suggest that newcomers to europe – as ‘strangers’ – understand their biography and their sense of belonging in relation to multiple spaces, both in practical and personally meaningful terms. in-line with research on migrants’ integration into social networks in the ‘new’ society, i find that the boundaries between the functions of instrumental and affective relationships (in this case, to space), are fuzzy, rather than fixed (see wessendorf and phillimore 2019). i suggest that the comparative evaluation of both the instrumental and affective meaning of different spatial categories encountered during migration and settlement (no matter how directly or indirectly) constitutes a dynamic process through the dialectics of migratory rupture discussed previously. as an interpretative approach to my interview material, i pay special attention to multiple spatial scales and environments as well as the social and cultural imaginaries connected to them, through which the sense of place attachment and belonging is articulated. these include towns, neighbourhoods and districts, landscapes, national territories and supranational categories. the focus is on the way these categories are mobilized in individual migration narratives to make sense of the individual biography in a context of migratory rupture. it should be noted that many of these spatial categories have cultural resonance in one’s spatial imagination, without necessarily constituting the most relevant sites of belonging, however. they represent the multiple places and spaces that individuals reckon with and negotiate as they engage in processes of elective belonging and become embedded in their new society. as will be seen in the findings, many questions that probe for images and understandings of spatial forms and cultural configurations associated with urban, national or supranational categories can take respondents off-guard. during the first and most lengthy part of interviews, migration narratives unfolded more on informants’ own terms and resembled biographical narratives. in the second phase of the interview, i steered narratives into more specific spatial and cultural units. moreover, many questions on distinct categories (e.g. france, madrid, europe) were formulated in intentionally vague terms. though this often disrupted the fluidity of the exchange and could even cause confusion or discomfort in some respondents (e.g. “what comes to mind if i say ‘europe’ to you?” or, “is there something about europe that distinguishes it from other parts of the world?”), it was important not to overly ‘correct’ such situations, even where they provoked 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 silences or reluctance to engage with vague concepts. such reactions in themselves can be revelatory of how spatial categories are understood and constructed. 3.1 sampling and fieldwork in cross-country context this study draws on over one hundred in-depth semi-structured interviews on different aspects of migration and settlement experiences, including identity formation and place affiliation. three main groups of research participants were selected: individuals born in algeria, ecuador, and india2 who had been living for at least five years in the regions of paris, london, and madrid (as well as a few other cities in the uk and spain). fieldwork was conducted between 2014 and 2016 and involved a range of participant recruitment methods in each context with the help of the researcher’s personal and research network, religious, cultural, and professional organizations, local journalists and ‘lucky encounters’ during civic and cultural events. some key aspects of the cultural and political backdrop at the time of the fieldwork which often shaped the narratives obtained are related to the 2008 eurozone crisis and its aftermath, the european ‘migrant crisis’, and the calls for a uk referendum on eu membership. the three principal migrant groups were selected on the basis of their historical and cultural connection with one of the three european contexts under investigation. the sampling logic in each national context was based on the relevant postcolonial migration relationship. thus, the principal sampling pairs are algerians in the french context, ecuadorians in the spanish context, and indians in the british context. however, to enhance the comparative dimension of the study, a sub-sample of each migrant group was also constructed in a second context so that roughly ten ecuadorians were interviewed in london, ten indians in paris and ten algerians in madrid as well as valencia. interviews were conducted and transcribed by the researcher in english, french, and spanish according to the national context. interview excerpts in french and spanish presented in this essay have been translated by the researcher. the names of participants have been changed in order to preserve their anonymity. 3.2 interviewing strategies: ‘spontaneous’ europe vs. probing for europe about three quarters of the interview schedule was designed to encourage biographical migration narratives (as far as 2-3-hour semi-structured interviews can allow for). where the sections on the pre-departure and settlement stages of the narrative were concerned, i avoided direct references to specific locations in my questions (e.g. using the names of cities or countries relevant to the migrant’s trajectory). i tended more to frame questions on relevant spatial categories using deixis adverbs such as ‘here’ and ‘there’ (e.g. “tell me about your life back there,” or “before you came here…”). only towards the last quarter of the interview were respondents ‘led’ into specific spatial categories relevant to the specific migration context, with questions such as, “what is the first thing that comes to mind when you think of paris/france/europe? what are the main challenges facing the uk today?” thus, as a typical interview progressed towards the end, the narrative style became less biographical in scope. my questions became narrower and focused on perceptions of national societies and politics as well as european integration. although it was not disclosed to participants, i was constantly “on the look-out” for mentions of europe, among other supranational constructions. informants only became immediately aware of 2 with the exception of a few respondents from other countries in north africa, south asia and south america, including colombia, venezuela, sri lanka, pakistan, morocco and tunisia. 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 this when i deployed the second strategy and narrowed the geographical scope of questions to fit with existing or potential institutional and territorial configurations (e.g. “can you imagine the countries of your region of origin establishing similar integration patterns as the eu? or “is it a good thing that spain/france/uk is in the eu?”). in contrast, as mentioned, the first strategy was concerned with obtaining spontaneous spatial references (potentially, more salient ones). during this phase of the interview, participants would develop different scalar or cultural meanings associated with abstract spatial adverbs (usually at local or national scales). instances in which respondents spontaneously referred to ‘europe’ (e.g. “i came to europe…”, “the european lifestyle is very different from ours…” etc.) gave me the opportunity to probe deeper on the topic of europe (e.g. “you just mentioned that you had a long interest in moving to europe. what was your image of europe at the time of your departure?”). as fieldwork progressed, it became clear that spontaneous utterances on europe, although not exactly rare (they concern just over one-third of participants), had little to do with a clearly articulated orientation to europe as a spatial category or as a source of belonging. still, the relative frequency of spontaneous references to europe is noteworthy. they were usually located in the context of comparative talk on lifestyles and values between the country of origin and country of residence, or in referring to a european space-set associated with progress, culture, and prosperity. probing directly for europe towards the close of interviews was therefore necessary in order to develop a more complete picture of the various orientations to different spatial categories and how they relate to one another. as my findings suggest, questions on european integration and images of europe could shed light on respondents’ orientations to spaces and sites of collective belonging related to both european and non-european spaces, including places related to the countries of origin and residence. the ‘direct probing’ strategy was especially relevant in the context of the comparative nature of the study. putting a common referent ‘europe’ to the test in different national contexts among different groups of migrants actually revealed little in common at all. not only does this reinforce previous research on the particular national frames of interpretation of european integration (díez medrano 2003), it also suggests that unique understandings of europe are emerging among migrant populations as a result of multiple socialization processes related to the country of origin, european societies, and personal experiences of migration. 4. findings i offer two contrasting scales through which to consider the interconnectedness of spatial reference points articulated as meaningful in individual migration narratives. first, a small-scale, which is developed through emphasis on belonging to specific local or urban settings and conceptions of community as well as distinct physical environments as opposed to more extensive ones. second, a large-scale, which shifts the focus of the study exclusively onto the algerian/north african group of research participants based on their extensive mobilization of frames related to the mediterranean sea in articulating feelings of belonging that connect contexts of origin and residence. i cannot, within the scope of this essay, explore all of the relevant spatial categories that seem to shape informants’ geographic imaginations (whether smaller or larger scale) nor examine in-depth the boundary-drawing and distinction processes that often accompany work of constructing meaningful places of belonging. 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 however, by presenting a selection of spatial motifs relevant to respondents’ discourse on belonging, i hope to achieve two things. first, to shed more light on how migrants experience their own integration, or embedding, into european societies through interpretative ‘comparative work’. comparisons between the different places that have shaped one’s biography inevitably draw sending and receiving country-contexts onto the same plane of experience and existence. thus, whether or not as migrants, we are conscious of the concrete acts or symbolic processes through which we become ‘embedded’ into the new society or psychologically attempt to resolve the experience of migratory rupture, any perception of the ‘new’ place is built in relation to perceptions of ‘other’ spaces of experience, and vice-versa. thus, and as discussed in the theoretical section, migrants construct spatial categories with cultural and personal resonance through relational processes. second, i argue that this emphasis on relational spatial constructs needs to be taken into account in investigations on non-eu migrants’ orientations to europe, no matter how diverse, vague, or ambivalent they may be. to be sure, there are few participants across the three-country study who articulate strong attachments to a supranational european category (whether spontaneously evinced or directly probed for) in the absence of other contexts (social, spatial, cultural, institutional). however, when probed for in relation to other categories (e.g. multi-scalar conceptions of sending and receiving contexts), or simply, by paying attention to how mobilizations of europe occur in participants’ narratives, the category can take on unique significance in conceptions of belonging and expanding geographic imaginations. 4.1 small-scale constructions of salience and interconnected spaces: “le bled”, “el pueblo”, “mini-india” one of the more striking aspects of the findings is the multi-scalar, comparative, and relational shape that answers to direct questions on spatial categories of belonging take. indeed, responding “yes” or “no” to a question on “feeling european” or developing more or less positive or negative orientations to europe can reveal ambivalent and even contradictory attitudes if not contextualized against specific cultural and social fields. when probing for the degree of relevance of specific spaces to daily life and belonging (whether or not i had mentioned names of cities, countries, or continents in questions) it is remarkable how talk of one’s relationship to a place conjured talk of other places and spaces. reflections of this sort drew equally on material and symbolic realms of experience. several respondents claimed a sense of belonging, familiarity or relative ease of acculturation in the host society by mobilizing comparative frames drawing their place of origin and place of residence closer together, suggestive of processes of commensuration (espeland and stevens 1998). these instances are illustrative of a degree of global reflexivity, which, in its weaker variant, is identified by savage, bagnall, and longhurst (2005) as the ability to draw comparisons between one’s city and other cities (nationally or internationally), reinforcing the notion that globalization fosters the “comparative interaction of different forms of life” (the authors citing robertson 1992, 27). the following interview excerpts focus on the relation between the european capitals under study and how they can be experienced as similar to meaningful places in the sending country (to the extent that the meaning of european places can be quite transformed in a migrant’s symbolic geography). these are not meant to be taken as the basis for a general schema of interpreting the relation between distinct spaces in migration narratives. however, the following quotes 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 demonstrate that the relational nature of place interpretation can be particularly strong in the context of postcolonial migratory processes. case study 1: spatial continuity across disparate geographies (small-scale) “when i saw paris, i saw algiers” moussa, paris what is the first thing that comes to mind when you think of paris? when i think of paris? what do i think of? i don’t know how to answer that…in terms of what? it’s up to you. the first time i came…when i arrived in paris [after having crossed from the south of france and taken a train] … when i saw paris, i saw algiers. yes? i saw algiers, directly. are you talking about buildings? architecture? it’s the same. the architecture. the same, the same. they [the french] have left their mark [in algiers]. [as algerians], we can’t get lost [in paris]. very quickly, it’s as if…we know the streets [of paris]. it was not a shock [coming here] … paris, the first time i saw it, i saw algeria. it’s algiers. the capital. the same. “the way we live in london, it’s like mini-india” abbigail, london [when you arrived,] was there anything about life here [in london] that seemed different, new, strange to you? [no.] because the way we live [in london], it’s like mini-india. i don’t know whether you noticed it […] east ham. it’s like mini-india. so, you don’t feel lost at all [as a recently arrived indian] until you go outside east ham. other than east ham, manor park…you have to go outside [of those areas] to know what london is. […] when we visited [family] in oxford, [i understood that] that was english countryside. “i think in terms of india. we can’t say that this is europe…” balavan, london when you think of your daily life, on what scale are you thinking? for example, are you thinking more in terms of london, the uk, europe…? i think [in terms of] india. (laughter). we can’t say that this is europe […] or the uk […] or, london or anything. […] if i want to feel that this is london, i have to travel from here [east ham] to… at least to tower bridge. (laughter). i think like... this is south india. and if you go to other side, in upton park, it’s north india. if you go to southall, we think like…we are in punjab! (laughter). 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 arriving in madrid was like being in quito” santiago, madrid what felt different and what felt familiar when you arrived in madrid? let’s see, what was familiar is that madrid looks a lot like the capital of ecuador. […] when i was 12 years old, i moved [from the countryside to quito]. so [arriving here in madrid] was like being in quito. even the bridges […] the streets are the same, the architecture and everything is the same as in the centre of quito. […] you said earlier [that when you travel to other parts of spain], you tend to miss madrid… [yes] and whenever i return [i notice how madrid] looks a lot like the part of quito where i used to live, so i feel very close to madrid, i identify with it and i feel very good. i walk around the streets with ease, i move around with ease, i know madrid very well. the passages in case study 1 are not merely an illustration of the comparative thought-processes through which migrants arrive at elective belonging across disparate geographic contexts. they are equally revelatory of a pattern in strategies for embedding oneself in the new society (wessendorf and phillimore 2019) and may be connected to the psychology of easing the sense of migratory rupture. indeed, mobilizing comparative frames through figures of speech that establish equivalence or similarity between disparate places seems to be a way of transforming and appropriating local spaces. this is accomplished by drawing on both tangible and symbolic experience relevant to postcolonial legacies. though many research participants would reject the notions of equivalence between places like algiers and paris, quito and madrid, or the re-drawing of the map of london based on indian geography, comparative frames, though not always as striking as those presented above, are ubiquitous in migration narratives. to the extent that the testimonials in case study 1 illustrate a degree of global reflexivity that can be likened to savage and his co-authors’ account, the ‘comparative work’ of postcolonial international migrants settling in europe seems to have a stronger impact on their identity formation than that observed by the authors of globalization and belonging who studied (mainly) british internal movers. though the latter were frequently able to extract meaning from the city of manchester against a global context of other cities, these comparisons more often reinforced their local identities and attachments to the manchester area. indeed, the authors point out that most of the respondents in their study “did not develop the kind of reflexivity which indicated that their own identity was placed in a global context” (savage, bagnall, and longhurst 2005, 191). the comparisons drawn by participants in the study at hand instead suggest that the sense of belonging integrates multiple contexts understood as central to the individual migration story. indeed, rather than fostering a stronger attachment to one place or another, the global reflexivity of the sort developed in case study 1 (and in the section below) can transform the nature of the attachment altogether along the lines of one’s symbolic geography. even participants who tend to highlight more differences than similarities across spaces of experience and belonging are engaged in processes of social commensuration, through which they are constructing unique scales of value. this is evocative of boltanski and thévenot’s notion of grandeurs (1991) – the common reference points that structure actors’ understandings of and justifications for their and others’ actions. talk on tangible experiences in different and multiscalar environments can provide insights into how one constructs personally meaningful spatial categories of attachment. the extended cases presented below highlight the discursive use of 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 comparative frames as central to accounts of belonging to particular spaces understood in connection to specific social groups. whether they span both sending and receiving country geographies or are more restricted to a single territory, what is seen as constituting the most important unit of belonging is articulated in relation to another unit – both socially and spatially constituted. 4.1.1. merging social and geographic imaginaries fadéla, a woman born in 1961 in rural western algeria who grew up in the city of oran, was one of the few algerians interviewed who struggled with the french language. coming from a traditional low-income family, she completed only three years of primary education and explains her decision to move to france around the age of thirty in terms of her inability to find work, to marry, or to become emancipated. she settled in the paris suburb of argenteuil after having married a moroccan man she had met during one of her previous family visits. fadéla, though she displays a great interest in one day acquiring french nationality for practical reasons, but also given her belief that “as algerians, we are a little bit french,” develops a decidedly local-level account of her place attachments. though our interview generated few rich accounts due to our communication difficulties, she does not limit her responses on identity questions to simplistic national territorial spheres. though she feels strongly algerian and not french, she nevertheless distinguishes between multiple scales of belonging in france that have differentiated meanings to her. crucially, through frequent references to the bled3, she mobilizes a single unifying frame that focuses on her most salient attachments in both france and algeria. what is the first thing that comes to mind when you think of france? i don’t understand [the question] … france? that’s where i got married, where i live freely. it’s calm. it’s normal…i live just like in the bled. i haven’t changed. do you feel at home here, in argenteuil, in france? yes, yes. more than in algeria? here in argenteuil, i feel like over there in the bled. paris is different. in argenteuil, the people are like [those] in the bled. it’s a lot more working-class. it’s a quartier populaire [working-class district]. in paris, i feel a little bit like it’s something else. more like france. a strikingly similar focus on working-class districts as offering the most meaningful and authentic sites for belonging across both sending and receiving societies is offered by santiago, an ecuadorian migrant in madrid who is deeply attached to his rural and indigenous roots in the region of cayambe. similar to fadéla, whose understanding of the bled and quartier populaire bridge the space between france and algeria, santiago offers the pueblo4 frame as an important 3 bled is a noun with multiple meanings used in both french slang and north african arabic. in french, it means ‘small village’ having pejorative or affective connotations (e.g. a ‘hole’ in the middle of nowhere). in north africa, it often denotes the country-side. north african migrants in france specifically use bled to refer to the country or the village of origin (cambridge online dictionary 2016; centre national de ressources textuelles et lexicales 2012). 4 there are three general meanings of the noun pueblo. it can refer to a ‘people’ or ‘nation’ in the political sense; to the ‘plebe’ or ‘common people’ in terms of social class and to a ‘small town’, ‘village’ or ‘countryside’ from a spatial and cultural perspective (collins spanish-english online dictionary 2019). 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 reference point that transcends the distance between ecuador and spain. when asked about which spatial scales between madrid, spain, and europe are the most relevant to his daily life, like many research participants, santiago chose the local (madrid) scale. he accounts for this choice drawing on both symbolic and tangible experiences. why is madrid the most important level for you? because it has been 16 years… that i have imbibed, as one says… [the surroundings of madrid] … 21 years in ecuador, in cayambe especially, you know? i’ve spent 16 years here [madrid]. i’ve spent almost equal parts of my life in the two cities, in the two pueblos. because this is also the pueblo of madrid. i really like that word, i identify more with it. when asked to explain his unusual use of the term pueblo to make sense of a capital city like madrid, he specifically emphasizes the working-class sense of the term (rather than the political or geographic sense). that is, his identification with both madrid and the ecuadorian city of cayambe springs from an attachment to places he associates with ‘common people’. in contrast, he creates a socially-differentiated map of the city of madrid when i ask him what comes to mind if i say the word ‘europe’ to him: i think of london, of switzerland, of those places. for me, that’s europe. why? i don’t know…because…you see those people standing out there? [motioning from the window of the café we are seated at toward the crowd in the puerta del sol square]. they look more like common people (más de pueblo). i’ve always thought, since they say that the [typical] european is blonder, taller… even when i find myself in the barrio of salamanca [affluent district of madrid], i tell myself, “now, this is europe.” thus, santiago develops a class-based understanding of what distinguishes the european and noneuropean sides of madrid as well as an ‘ethnic’ component of europeanness that intermingles with geographic distinctions. the unpretentious and ‘common’ spaces he associates with the workingclass barrios of madrid – decidedly ‘un-european’ ones –constitute his primary spaces for attachment in the spanish context. the previous passage, in which he explains his attachment to madrid in terms of accumulated life experience, as well as the pueblo common denominator to express his relationship to the spanish capital and cayambe, illustrate the possibility of experiencing the two spaces as continuous in spite of the distance that separates them. as a result, both fadéla and santiago effectively transform the spaces they inhabit by positioning them in relation to other (socially-differentiated) ones encountered throughout the migratory experience, both european and non-european: argenteuil as the bled vs. paris as france; the district of salamanca as ‘europe’ vs. the pueblo (spanning both madrid and cayambe). these individuals are examples of participants who, through their discourse on belonging and various aspects of the migratory story, reveal themselves as ‘small-thinkers’ when it comes to the construction of socially and spatially meaningful places. it is not that fadéla and santiago display limited consciousness of inhabiting potentially larger spaces or develop one-sided orientations to territory (e.g. sendingvs. receiving-society). indeed, they actually consider the multiple units of space relevant to the migration experience and develop unique interpretations of them through comparative frames of analysis. ‘thinking small’, for these participants, is the means through which the continuity-rupture dialectic is resolved. for fadéla and santiago, ‘small-thinking’ puts greatest value on local-level working-class spaces of experience in a way that guarantees 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 continuity of the sense of self across disparate geographies. for other participants that can be described as ‘small-thinkers’, the value of local and small-scale spaces is not necessarily understood in terms of class. one’s attachment (or lack thereof) to local spaces can also be explained in terms of topographical characteristics. nabil, for instance, an algerian participant in paris explains his lack of strong attachment to the french capital in terms of the value he places on a rural existence compared to an urban one. he coins the phrase “topographical exile” to depict his transition from his mountain-top village in kabylie, northern algeria ma montagne (“my mountain”) as he calls it, to the parisian metropolis. the two are inherently incompatible. unlike for fadéla and santiago, who can connect the bled and the pueblo to specific parts of the regions of paris and madrid, ma montagne is a contradiction in terms with the french capital. 4.2 large-scale constructions of salience and interconnected spaces: the mediterranean sea as a ‘bridge’ to europe and other spaces of belonging this section shifts focus toward the construction of meaningful and interconnected spatial categories articulated at larger scales. the accounts in this section are germane to savage and his colleagues’ (2005) observations on both the limited and more profound expressions of global reflexivity. they illustrate that large scales of comparison can be used to demonstrate an identity unfolding together with an expanding geographic imagination (akin to feeling one is a ‘citizen of the world’) while still being anchored in a physically and culturally constituted sense of place. in other words, articulating larger-scale spatial orientations that draw from experiences and perceptions of multiple contexts does not necessarily lead one into abstract notions of ‘cosmopolitanism’ or rootlessness but in fact can reinforce specific attachments. one of the most salient ‘big’ frames for understanding the sense of belonging to receiving-societyrelevant spaces (such as the country of residence or europe) is the mediterranean sea. the mediterranean as a cultural and physical space was remarkably present in the migration narratives of algerian and other north african participants. a total of twenty-seven informants spontaneously referred to the ‘mediterranean sea’ (or basin) and/or to ‘mediterranean culture’ (roughly one-quarter of respondents), most of them algerians or other north africans.5 indeed, out of the 45 interviews conducted with algerians (in france and spain), more than half (24) mobilized this category. more remarkable is the sheer emphasis that many participants put on this category to make sense of the experience of migration and settlement in europe. indeed, when compared to the roughly one-third of participants in the study who had spontaneously conjured more or less vague images of ‘europe’ in the migration story, the ‘mediterranean’ category emerges as a much more clearly articulated space of reference. apart from a minority of respondents who were self-proclaimed ‘citizens of the world’, few other large-scale spatial and cultural frames – apart from europe – could rival the significance of the mediterranean space-set. evidence of a globally reflexive cultural imagination for south american and south asian participants that could have been used as a bridge between the place of origin and destination, are la hispanidad, the commonwealth, or other referents that emphasise cultural and historical ties in postcolonial contexts. such referents were virtually non-existent in testimonials, however. instead, the spatial and cultural imaginaries of south americans and south asians that indicated a large-scale or global consciousness at work in the rupture and continuity dialectics of 5 the only other references to the ‘mediterranean’ category were by two ecuadorian participants in spain and two indian participants in france. 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 belonging tended to be assembled in a more dispersed fashion rather than through a single unifying frame. i cannot present this evidence in a detailed manner within the limits of this study but provide a brief depiction in the following paragraph. examples of large-scale articulations of belonging include, for south americans, transnational evangelical christian communities as crucial in their understanding of their own social and cultural embedding in madrid as well as developing or reinforcing their south american/latino identity as a result of migration and settlement in europe. for indians and other south asians, a large-scale articulation of belonging could emphasise their feeling at home within the indian and south asian diaspora in britain and abroad, including canada and the united states. moreover, though the commonwealth did not appear explicitly in testimonials, it seems to influence some of the boundary-work through which several indian respondents in london questioned both the moral and historic legitimacy of eu migrants that they saw as displacing the more ‘appropriate’ relationship of postcolonial migration to the uk. finally, a number of indian respondents – both in the british and french contexts – evinced a particularly interesting form of global reflexivity in endorsing the project of european integration specifically in terms of their indian spatial imaginaries. indeed, some participants explicitly framed their desire for more integration and a ‘truly’ borderless europe in terms of their commitment to indian nationalism. by comparing the territorial, cultural, and linguistic diversity of india with that of the european continent, they articulated an almost common-sense desire for european federalism based on their strong attachment to the indian state project. turning back to the significance of the mediterranean for situating north african migrant identities into a large-scale more globally reflexive context, the significance of this particular space-set may lie in its ability to conjure multidimensional imaginaries pertaining to culture, space, power, and history. figure 1. different frames of the mediterranean referent the interview data offer four broad articulations of the mediterranean as a meaningful category (see figure 1). one is constructed as an adjective for a (spatially situated) common culture – e.g. a mediterranean culture, lifestyle, climate, family structure, etc. a second meaning is constructed in reference to the mediterranean as a physical space, e.g. direct references to the sea and the geographical context that connects the different points of the basin. third, the mediterranean emerges as a historically situated concept, through references to mediterranean civilizations and different periods of conquest and colonization (and their legacies) that have shaped the region. finally, the mediterranean is frequently mobilized as an image of (unequal) spatial distributions of power. the mediterranean in this context becomes a frame to symbolize uneven power and status that distinguishes one side of the sea and the other, frequently illustrated by the figure of culture space power history mediterranean 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 harragas 6 or the migrant dead at sea. each category is expressed along different degrees of ‘harmony vs. contestation’ vis-a-vis more ‘official’ and existing organizations of culture and power through space and alternative or normative ones. figure 2. the mediterranean as ‘bridge’ to other spatial categories with respect to the cultural resonance of the mediterranean for north african participants, it seems to act as a vehicle to maintain an attachment to their native culture while simultaneously facilitating the opening up of the self towards other identity spaces, such as the country of residence and europe, among others (see figure 2). regardless of the specific parameters with which respondents associate mediterranean culture (or dissociate it from) e.g. southern europe, europe, northern europe, maghreb, marseilles, valencia, france, spain, etc., claiming a mediterranean identity is equivalent to establishing oneself as a ‘big thinker’ or as having developed an extended geographic imagination. to signal the salience of the mediterranean throughout the migration narrative is to assert that one’s geography of belonging extends beyond specific nation states or sub-national regions. in addition, it also allows north african migrants to endorse alternative visions of the spatial and cultural limits of europe and/or to claim moral legitimacy of belonging to existing organizations of culture and space related to the country of residence and europe. as the case studies below illustrate, the mediterranean as a common culture is located frequently in discourse to establish cultural similarities (or few incompatibilities) between algeria and the country of residence, in this case, france or spain, e.g. “i’m very mediterranean, so i felt right at home in spain,” or, “as an algerian, i feel completely at home whenever i visit marseilles.” another frequent use of the mediterranean as a container of common culture occurs in relation to what participants consider as distinct pockets of larger spatial categories. for instance, associating southern europe and/or north africa with a common mediterranean culture at times presented in conjunction with larger spaces that extend beyond the basin “e.g. i relate to people in spain and italy because we are all mediterranean. i am algerian, i am african!” but just as it can signal the experience of commonality, it can also be mobilized as an emblem of institutionalised inequality between inhabitants of the northern and southern frontiers, resulting in differentiated and fractured cultural and geographic imaginaries. in other cases, the mediterranean as a common culture can be used to establish continuity and compatibility across different identifications through an extension of scales, including a european level, e.g. “i prefer to consider myself as euro-mediterranean rather than franco-algerian.” 6 clandestine migrants, see abderrezak (2016). france/spain/ algeria europe/eu southern europe maghreb/north africa/africa mediterranean 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 case study 2: the mediterranean vis-à-vis europe: contesting boundaries and unequal status europe as a “great wall” touraya, madrid now for an ‘out of the blue’ question: what do you think of if i say the word ‘europe’ to you? …a great wall. […] when i came of age and began to dream about travelling, and all young people [in tunisia] were dreaming of travel, [i realized that] […] one must line-up and request a visa, […] the schengen visa for europe. it felt like you were about to enter a perfect world and that you need to be screened in order to enter this perfect world. so, if you don’t have the means, the education, if you’re not the son of…or the daughter of… [someone with means], all you see is this great wall. so i saw this from the perspective of my generation, of [tunisian] youth. if i, as a student, can go on [a single] trip, europeans [on the other hand], they have seen all of europe, they have the erasmus scholarship, they have all these possibilities. and we [north africans] have all the languages of the world, but we are faced with this big wall. a tunisian like me who has always lived in an environment that’s very close to the francophonie, if not 100% francophone, must request a visa to enter france, whereas a spaniard, who may not know any languages, is a european citizen, he can enter [france]. … so there is this big wall…so the only thing that’s left for you is to look to your right and to your left onto the arab world …and now that i’ve crossed this wall, i keep telling them [tunisian youth], “don’t be fooled. don’t dream about crossing or climbing that wall, because it’s all a big lie! life [on the other side] is not as amazing as you think!” … so, as a result of this understanding of europe [as a ‘wall’] should the eu expand to include a country like tunisia? we are in africa. i am african. i have become increasingly conscious of this and i assume my african identity and origins because my country is located in africa. clearly. but there is something very important, very influential in the history of the world – the mediterranean [sea]. and i think that a french [person] is closer to a tunisian than…a person from norway. one, there is the language, the history. we overcame a history of war and colonisation and we were able to have friendships or marriages or cultural exchanges between france and tunisia. when france recognized that one of the main dishes of the french family is couscous, this means that we have overcome the negative part of our relationship. we have this exchange. even in tunisia…we make quiche…because it’s a very good dish […] we have this exchange, which begins with culture, with tastes, with smells, with colours, with artistic expression, with the [french] language that brings us closer together. and this wall called europe has been created. this geographical division that completely refused turkey […] it isn’t advantageous to create a barrier between the countries of […] the northern mediterranean and of the southern mediterranean. we cannot build europe while forgetting the mediterranean. stigma and “the other side of the mediterranean” bariza, paris [talking about perceptions of racism as an algerian physician in the french healthcare sector] there is clear racism in the french medical establishment. […] the difference of treatment toward my [foreign] colleagues [who, unlike myself are not white or have an accent] is very clear. there is a huge difference. […] though [the racism] is never directly expressed. but i think that amongst themselves [native french physicians], they speak about us [non-european physicians] in a different way. they don’t have the same rapport with a polish [physician]. […] the polish or the hungarian [physician] with her little accent [in french] …she is a part of europe. but for someone who comes from the other side of the mediterranean, they [french] talk about ‘blacks’! the medical establishment by definition is a right-wing milieu. 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 case study 3: the mediterranean vis-à-vis europe: reconfiguring identity horizons “i feel mediterranean and i feel european…i even feel international” hakima, paris [talking about the experience of becoming naturalized as a french citizen] i am algerian and i am french. i have the two cultures in me because when one lives in a country…any country […] no matter where i go, i don’t think i would ever ask myself the question of whether i belong or whether i am algerian or something else. […] [i am drawn to the idea of] the euro-mediterranean because i think it is a new identity space. because i feel mediterranean and i feel european. […] i cannot say that i am only algerian or only french. honestly, i even feel international at times. i would have no problem living elsewhere. in fact, i travel a lot. and wherever i go, i feel at home. i don’t know why. “i am african, you see. i am mediterranean” lounès, paris you have mentioned you are intending to apply for french citizenship. what might be the advantages of becoming a french citizen? […] i want to live here [france]. i do exactly the same things as anyone one who is here. i mean, can a nationality really reflect what i am from an identity perspective? there is no nationality in the world that could summarize who i am. even algerian nationality. [even] when one speaks of the three identity dimensions in algeria: arab-ness, islamic-ness, berber-ness (l’arabité, l’islamité, la berberité) … but i feel very close to…i am african, you see. i am mediterranean. you see, italians, spaniards, i really feel very close to their way of being. […] case study 4: the mediterranean vis-à-vis europe: bridging “the maghreb is mediterranean” hosni, paris [talking about regional integration processes] where do you see algeria in the midst of these processes [of integration]? closer to europe or closer to the maghrebi countries? both, in fact. algeria…the maghreb is mediterranean. we are mediterranean. […] [regional] integration in north africa would have to be based on [shared] principles. it could be [based] on the land, on language, on history. […] the maghreb shares the same land, the same history, the same language, the same religion. we are berbers. […] a strong, united maghreb […] could become integrated into other groups [in future]. in europe, in africa…in the middle. […] if [the maghreb] had been strong, it could have been a bridge between all of that [europe and africa]. unfortunately, it [maghrebi integration] is not working and we have many problems. so…and also, the maghreb is mediterranean. when you go to marseilles, or you go to algiers, it’s the same thing. it’s the same thing. “on which side of the sea…?” malika, paris if you have children one day, where would you like to raise them? not in paris. i mean, if it’s in france, it would be [somewhere else, where life is easier, less stressful, more affordable]. […] ideally, i don’t think it will be in paris. ideally, it would be by the sea. i think that [the sea] is a reference point. a visual reference point, for me. i mean, i always grew up by the sea. i would love to live by the mediterranean. now, on which side [of the sea would i be living], that i don’t know. in which country, i don’t know. but the mediterranean basin is sufficiently large to… [choose]. to be able to see the sea, i would love that. i think it’s a lovely thing for children to grow up by the sea, it’s a nice horizon. 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 thus, the mediterranean frame allows many algerian and other north african participants to establish themselves as simultaneously ‘close’ to both ‘european’ (valencia, marseilles, southern europe…) and ‘non-european’ (e.g. maghreb, berber, africa, north africa…) space-culture configurations, as well as de-territorialized global reference points. in addition, by establishing proximity to certain notions of europeanness and distance from others, north africans are contesting dominant and mainstream understandings of europe and european integration. the fact that the mediterranean and its connection to europe resonates almost exclusively among north african participants and is conspicuously absent in the narratives of ecuadorians settling in spain, for instance, reinforces the significance of the dialectical relationship of rupture and continuity in the context of migration and settlement. objectively speaking, the mediterranean coast is closer to madrid (303 km via valencia) than to paris (660 km via marseilles). yet, the mediterranean as a meaningful way to articulate spatial reflexivity scarcely surfaced in narratives of migration and settlement among ecuadorians interviewed in madrid, in contrast to algerians in paris (and valencia). therefore, my findings provide some support to harvey’s understanding on the ‘stickiness’ of mental maps and can be connected to savage, bagnall, and longhurst’s conclusions on the nature of global reflexivity – namely, that it “does not seep into people’s lives because of the pervasive power of global idioms and cues, but rather it depends on particular, indeed local and personal circumstances” (2003, 202). perhaps the desire for continuity, after all, overpowers the experience of rupture in the migration experience, as ‘strangers’ categorize their new experiences in ways that are legible from the perspective of previous spatial orientations. algerians’ frequent interpretation of france, spain, and europe through the mediterranean lens may be more illustrative of the current stakes surrounding algerian and north african identity formation7 than of french, spanish, or european identity construction. other spatial themes that emerged frequently in ecuadorian participants’ migration narratives, though not explored in this study, may also lend support to the recalcitrance of geographic imaginaries. they invite us to reconsider the theme of ‘topographical exile’ used by an algerian kabyle respondent to describe his experience in paris. indeed, the discourse on roots (raíces) and land (tierra) that surfaced frequently in the accounts of ecuadorians is evocative of certain aspects of the geographic imagination that may not ‘travel’ as well as others, especially where the journey begins in a rural and developing space and ends in a major european capital. for ecuadorians intent on returning to their place of origin, the use of such vocabulary illustrates both the distinction between one’s ‘true home’ and the place of residence as well as the salient markers of ecuadorian geography – highland and coastal regions – that shape their sense of self. 5. conclusion: toward a migrant’s cartography of europe my use of the ‘thinking small’ vs. ‘thinking big’ trope should not be seen as an assumption on the limited cognitive resources for spatial abstraction of some research participants. i am not making an argument premised on cognitive mobilization theory (inglehart 1970) that would assume lower 7algerian research participants draw attention to the multiple and often conflicting identity narratives in contemporary algerian society that have to do with french colonial legacies (e.g. the continued relevance of the french language in national administration and education as well as the cultural divisions between more arabic/islamically-oriented and french/secularly-oriented segments of society); the status of berber languages and culture marginalized by the state, as well as a general sensation of algerian culture and civil society being stifled by heavy emigration trends and a political regime dominated by an elite and military caste. 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 educated participants are less inclined than higher-educated ones to perceive the relevance of becoming embedded into larger socio-spatial categories. indeed, the cases discussed in some depth as well as the interview fragments presented in the case studies find that small-scale motifs are not synonymous with limited spatial imaginaries. instead, participants who make use of smaller spatial frames are simply emphasising the higher degree of relevance of these spaces, both in material and symbolic terms, to their daily lives and migratory experiences, compared to other, often larger spatial categories. articulating notions of belonging, membership and identification in the context of different spatial scales, whether small or large, seems to bridge distance between distinct spaces and may ease the multiple transitions inherent in migratory rupture. for example, talk on the transformation and appropriation of official units of urban space in the country of residence (using vocabulary such as mini-india, bled, or pueblo to make sense of attachment vis-à-vis london, madrid, and paris) reflects perceptions of shifting multi-scalar boundaries. whether between diaspora and ‘mainstream’ society or between working-class and affluent urban and sub-urban spaces, the process of appropriating local spaces, even from a small-scale perspective, involves the blurring of boundaries between sending-and receiving-societies. thus, migrants are able to re-draw boundaries in the receiving society (through expanding spatial consciousness) in a way that nevertheless preserves elements of the mental maps acquired prior to migration. with respect to understandings of the physical environment, such as architecture that reminds individuals of former colonial relationships (e.g. paris=algiers, quito=madrid) or topographical characteristics which act as evidence of the disjuncture between one’s life preand post-migration (e.g. ma montagne≠paris), migrants frequently judge the relationship between distinct spaces when they provide accounts of acculturation processes. this alerts us to the significance of connecting multiple urban and physical environments as savage et al.’s work on elective belonging and global reflexivity already suggests. in globalization and belonging (2005), savage, longhurst, and bagnall remarked on how the minority of research participants they interviewed in the manchester area who were not brought up in britain or whose life experiences abroad were not limited to the beaten track of the ‘white british diaspora’ seemed to possess the most developed forms of global consciousness. though the authors effectively challenge abstract notions of cosmopolitanism that have tended to confuse global cultural processes with the de-territorialization of attachments, they nevertheless view the ‘strangers’ in their study as the most authentically cosmopolitan. these are the only individuals who “place their identities in some kind of explicit global frame” (savage, longhurst, and bagnall 2005, 197), compared to the majority of respondents for whom global reflexivity is more limited to understanding their urban environment (and their attachments to it) in a broader context of national and international cities. my findings to a certain extent challenge the assumptions these authors make about global reflexivity – both in its more limited and profound versions. i do not view small-scale reflexivity (e.g. comparing neighbourhoods or cities in different places) as reinforcing a primary local attachment, as may be the case for non-migrants. rather, i show how drawing these comparisons allows migrants to: a) create symbolic geographies that bridge the distance between ‘here’ and ‘there’, and b) convert these symbolic geographies into the basis for belonging. this inevitably leads to an extended form of global awareness, even if one does not proclaim oneself to be a citizen of the world. the ability of international migrants to set their place of settlement in europe in a broader context that is significant to their sense of self, whether this occurs at a small or at a large 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 scale, need not result in strengthening one local attachment over another. instead, this reflexivity is what allows them to ease the migratory transition and draw together multiple spheres of experience into a coherent life-narrative. with respect to reflexivity through larger-scale forms of bridging, my exploration of the mediterranean frame of reference highlights how extending one’s spatial and cultural imaginary is nevertheless rooted in a particular sense of place. moreover, my findings suggest that the migratory experience, though it constitutes a form of “extreme life experience”, in the words of savage and his colleagues, is not on its own what “recruits” individuals into developing more global awareness (2005, 202). though i have argued that the act of migration certainly contributes to expanding and unsettling previous orientations to space, my findings emphasise the important role of previous imaginaries and the embodied cultural capital that migrants ‘carry’ with them along their journey. this essay stops-short in developing an account of the degree to which non-european migrants understand themselves as ‘becoming europeans’ as they settle in the different eu cities under study. though the european category is the focal point of the investigation, it is premised on the idea of connecting images and experiences of europe to other geographies and spaces of belonging. since the interviewing and data analysis approach paid attention to both ‘organic’ (spontaneous) constructions of meaningful spaces as well as reactions to spatial categories that were ‘forced’ upon participants, the question “to be or not to be european” altogether loses relevance, compared to: to what extent is there a place for europe in your geographical imagination? as i have tried to show, asking postcolonial migrants about their relationship to europe is a loaded question. international postcolonial migrants are not ‘clean slates’ or ‘complete strangers’ to europe, contrary to what one might expect. rather, they are strangers in the simmelian sense of embodying the synthesis of proximity and distance relationships. multiple processes of socialization that occur at different space-time junctures (before and after the act of border-crossing) and the will to re-establish internal consistency in what may be a radically different environment turn migrants into cartographers of sorts. more than constructing unique cartographies of europe, however, the accounts developed in this study speak to a broader research agenda that questions implicit spatial assumptions in concepts such as ‘culture’ and ‘society’. following gupta and ferguson (1992), in an effort to de-naturalize cultural and spatial divisions across peoples, this study reinforces the need for further research into the ability of people to confound the established spatial orders, either through physical movement or through their own conceptual and political acts of re-imagination, [which means] that space 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russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 strategic power europe: a contradiction in terms? sean havel1 abstract the increasing number and severity of security crises around the european periphery have called into question the preparedness and capability of european states. civil wars, mass migration, unstable institutions, and direct kinetic conflict are features of a degrading security order in which european states must provide a strategic response. one such response has seen the european union (eu) become increasingly involved in security issues, namely the defence industry. programs such as the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) are now enabling member states to organize civil-military responses to crises and coordinate the defenceplanning cycles of 25 european countries through the eu. this article examines why member states have begun to use the eu to develop military capabilities and assets at scale. furthermore, it investigates the role of differentiation in enabling these developments and how both individual geopolitical and economic factors contribute to this collective institutional development. 1 sean havel received an ma from the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies, carleton university 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 introduction in 2022, the european security order faces multiple crises of collective defence far more dangerous and potentially escalatory than those seen during the cold war. around europe lies a neighbourhood marked by open conventional warfare, political instability, and rising extremism. in response to these crises of security, efforts have been undertaken to increase the political coherence and military capability of european states under the european union (eu) through its common security and defence policy (csdp). 2017 was a milestone year that saw the establishment of a legally binding permanent structured cooperation (pesco) – a culmination of efforts to reimagine the eu as a security actor in international affairs, enabled to influence the direction of the european military procurement process while being given crisis response mechanisms. pesco’s goal, as defined by article 42 of the lisbon treaty, is to “take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability” of eu national forces (council of the eu 2017). this article explores why, in the current context, member states have opted to use the eu to enable their capabilities and manage ongoing security crises when such efforts have not made such headway in the past. furthermore, it explores whether this transformation signifies that the eu is developing into a ‘strategic power,’ an actor able to rationalize its security environment and act upon it in the context of intergovernmental differentiation. can this form of intergovernmentalism shape the eu into a strategic power or is this a contradiction in terms? the implication of differentiation in understanding member state responses to eu defence policy early theories on the development of the eu assumed that integration would not include aspects of defence, otherwise known as 'high politics' (verdun 2018). nevertheless, over time, a series of steps were taken towards a more integrated security policy, from the petersberg declaration calling for integration to develop joint european peacekeeping capabilities to the st. malo declaration's call for autonomous action backed by credible military forces. these early achievements culminated in 1999 with the european security and defence policy (esdp), renamed the common security and defence policy (csdp) under the lisbon treaty in 2009. while the eu has attained degrees of ‘actorness’ in some areas of international relations, most notably trade, the development of the eu as a security actor remains member-state driven, resulting in a general lack of coordination and ability to collectively manage security crises. cottey notes that it is important to understand the eu as an ‘astrategic actor,’ defining ‘astrategic’ as the lack of “(1) clear assessment of the external environment, (2) the identification of priorities and pivot points where an actor may hope to have a decisive impact and (3) the development of the ways and means to implement the strategy” (2019, 280). initiatives lack agreed on priorities to unify the security agenda; large multinational initiatives are based on consensus between states that have differing conceptions of their strategic priorities relative to one another (2019). the development of the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) has exemplified, in part, this reality, being comprised of 60 projects including training, facilities; land, formations, systems; maritime; air, systems, cyber, c4isr, enabling, joint, and space. what is key is that in each project, member state involvement remains differentiated, with individual countries involved in several pesco projects. this differentiation thereby allows for diverse experiences and approaches to facilitate integration, forgoing the idea of a europe moving at a single pace (howorth 2019a). in the presence of 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 differentiation, multiple variables will impact each member state’s decision-making, a reflection of the diversity that is permissible in security affairs within the eu. two features of recent security-relevant developments in the eu relate heavily to the interests of the member states: an accommodation of strategic preferences through differentiation and its nexus with military-economic interests. schimmelfennig writes that differentiation is a remedy to the political stagnation seen in eu-level policies: “it mitigates the stark choice between uniform and no integration. it allows governments to cooperate at a level of integration that is closer to their respective preferences than either uniform or no integration” (2019, 180). this follows a liberal-intergovernmentalist logic in which state preferences are made more certain when domestic actors are strong enough to shape policies. the assumption is that integration is not driven by concerns about sovereignty but by social welfare concerns (2019). hoeffler offers a perspective that goes beyond this, explaining that the presence of differentiation itself does not explain why policy-making will take place; it is the construction of that interdependence being seen at the european level that matters (2019). theories of eu integration can then be understood in terms of how they layer upon one another to describe emergent structures between member states. fundamentally, liberal intergovernmentalism (li) is such a theory, layering the three principles of national preference formation through the competition of societal actors, the efficiency and outcomes of interstate bargains by way of asymmetrical interdependence (the uneven distribution of gains), and institutions that help to implement, elaborate, enforce, and extend contracts between states (moravcsik 2018). it can be argued that li is a collection of theories rather than one, referred to by moravcsik as “theoretical elements” that aim to explain not just why integration occurred but how and why it continues (2018). explanations of integration focusing on preference formation have certainly created a better understanding of eu defence integrations, such as the structure of armaments organizations in pursuing preferences (devore 2014), the increasing marketization of the european military-industrial complex (britz 2010), and defence conglomerates' growing influence on political processes (kluth 2017). li, therefore, allows for a systematic appraisal of the domestic factors that contribute to the formation of member state preferences regarding eu defence cooperation, including the role of economic actors that permeate defence areas. it must be questioned, however, whether preference formation under an li framework really remains state-based, given the presence of pan-european defence actors. structural realities created by the presence of both a single market and an integrated political space indeed influence policy formation in all european capitals; it is a question of which structural realities matter to those states. while this study relies on the assumptions of li in analyzing national preferences and domestic dynamics in the formation of pesco, concepts from other theoretical frameworks are also useful in understanding institutional change with regard to european strategic autonomy. examining interdependence requires an appreciation of non-economic policy domains (hoeffler 2019), namely the security interests of states. realism stresses the global structural realities of security in a world without any supranational authority to manage relations between states. individual eu member states react differently to these structural factors, which affects their ranking of security priorities such as the degree of concern about unilateral american actions (posen 2004; walt 2009), the unreliability of american hegemony in defending europe’s security concerns (hyde-price 2006), the priority of efforts to constrain the german power (jones 2003), or assessments of the threat from russia. as will be discussed in the concluding 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 section of this article, the neo-functionalist concept of spillover may also be helpful in understanding the dynamics within the eu once initiatives like pesco take hold. following manners and rosamond (2018), this analysis recognizes that dialogue and interdisciplinarity yield richer discussions on research strategies, helping to create multiple unique accounts of the eu (2018). this article begins with an overview of the developments that have occurred within the csdp in recent years, outlining the security, economic, and institutional dynamics that have helped shape the process. it then focuses on the drivers of eu policy – the member states themselves. this section will utilize the framework proposed by svendsen, outlining that in studying differentiated policies such as pesco it is helpful to use practices of actors as identifications of intent and policy preference (2019). practices are defined as “socially competent performances” that “situate knowledge in what people do or say” (svendsen 2019, 996). in doing so, this analysis will examine state actors based on three characteristics: (1) their security and threat conception; (2) their economic restructuring and military-industrial framework; and (3) their participation in pesco2 as an indicator of how and why these states are using these new institutional mechanisms to respond to the previous two previous variables. three states were selected based on their relative positions in european defence: france, being the strongest supporter of an autonomous eu capability and heavily involved in the eu’s southern neighbourhood; germany, being the cautious mediator in managing european political affairs and holding concerns for eu’s security; and poland, as an adamant supporter of nato and a traditional skeptic of these initiatives (franke and varma 2019). semi-structured interviews with member state officials were utilized to better understand the perspectives of these states. national documentation and current involvement in defence initiatives were also examined. furthermore, this analysis used existing literature on these nations' respective arms industries to situate economic rationales, supplied in part by the stockholm international peace research institute, national think tank publications, and transparency international documentation. strategic preferences and domestic interests: forces realizing the eu as a security actor although earlier institutional mechanisms were created at the eu level to facilitate security cooperation between european states, notably the creation of the military committee of the european union (eumc) and eu military staff (eums) in 2003, many of these mechanisms remained unable to fully manage europe’s increasingly insecure neighbourhood. eu external missions under the early csdp (then esdp) were limited in both scope and size, with 14 missions launched within the first three years between 2003 and 2005 and an additional 12 missions from 2006-2008. these missions were not based on any form of eu command structure but were managed through nato or a national command, never having their own operational headquarters (howorth 2019). according to biscop, nations had in part “lost the habit and the expertise to analyze the world around them in geopolitical terms” (2015, 170), with few external conflicts directly threatening the security of the eu. 2 data on pesco involvement is of the author’s own formulation based on data taken from the pesco website, https://pesco.europa.eu/. accessed on january 5, 2021. see appendix i. 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 notwithstanding the neighbourhood policy (2004) and later regional institutional attempts3 to build a ‘ring of friends’ through diplomacy, by mid-2014, the peripheral situation became what former swedish pm bildt called “a ring of fire” (taylor 2015). in the south, the arab spring dramatically shifted the political climate of the greater middle east. notably, the collapse of libya after a successful nato air campaign saw european states limited in their ability to deploy ground forces due to equipment shortages (hallams and schreer 2012), only approving the symbolic eufor libya operation, which was never activated (fabbrini 2014). this further destabilized north africa and the sahel, with unguarded weapons caches in libya giving armed groups the equipment necessary to expand in the region. the instability included the near collapse of mali on multiple occasions due to successive coups and helped to make the sahel a haven for violent extremist groups and routes for human trafficking to europe, with 50,000 fatalities occurring between 2014-2019 due to these conflicts (kuperman 2013). to the east, european states met with an increasingly worrying hybrid threat from russia when it invaded georgia in 2008 and ukraine in 2014 after both endorsed a foreign policy directed toward europe. notably, russia further began to conduct an increasingly hostile cyber warfare campaign that involved at least 27 european states as well as the us and canada as early as 2004 (limnell 2018). the european parliament has identified "evidence of organised social media manipulation in 70 countries, compared to 48 countries in 2018, and 28 countries in 2017” by foreign actors such as russia (eprs 2020), which has targeted western democratic systems in a series of information warfare campaigns. aside from its ‘hybrid war’ on european nations, russia’s invasion of ukraine in 2022 reintroduced the threat of direct kinetic conflict to the european continent. this event has called into question notions of a strategic status quo with moscow and has added to the urgency of a needed collective response, which includes the lend-lease of military assets. the security challenges faced by europeans can be described as divided in strategic directions between the south and the east. haroche has called these asymmetric crises, which unevenly affect european states and thereby generate less interdependence as different responses are required (2017, 228). southern challenges mainly deal with hybrid threats from non-state actors, being enabled by conditions of instability in the parent country. maintaining stability in these regions means shielding europe from state failure, terrorism, piracy, organized crime, or uncontrolled migration flows (simon and pertusot 2017). analysis by the european parliamentary research service suggests that the southern neighbourhood is “prone to an explosive domino effect that could still undermine the eu's security and internal political order with irregular migratory flows and humanitarian emergencies” (eprs 2021). this correlates with concerns raised within member states, specifically france, pointing to the multiple crises that result from state failure, especially in northern africa and the middle east. fears in this domain are only increasing due to contributing factors such as climate change, the proliferation of weaponry, and demographic trends in the southern neighbourhood (jolly and olivier 2018). crisis management tools are therefore sought after by states worried about the state of affairs in this region; as one eu official commented, most eu states cannot perform the military component of a comprehensive approach efficiently. “contrary to nato, the eu can actually do independently an integrated approach. so they have the full range of tools necessary to do a comprehensive approach from diplomacy, trade, humanitarian, sport, development, 3 for example, the eastern partnership and the union for the mediterranean. 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 cooperation, mediation, whatever you want” (interview a with eu security official, online, 2020). this makes increasing the intervention component of the csdp enticing at a strategic level, especially given the reality that nato’s expeditionary era came to an end. by the time of the wales (2014) and warsaw (2016) summits, nato began to effectively abandon any idea of establishing new expeditionary forces and focused on creating a tripwire in eastern europe and establishing the very high readiness joint task force to present a deterrent to direct russian aggression against central and eastern european countries, taking valuable eu forces away from csdp missions elsewhere (howorth 2018; zima 2018). nato functions differently from the eu; as it is the key defensive institution against classical threats, it is not an organization built to manage hybrid or systemic threats from non-state actors. it is also dominated by american industry, which to some member states, especially france, represents a strategic issue rectified by the encouragement of a european military industrial capacity (interview d with eu security official, online, 2020). states focused on the eastern neighbourhood equally face hybrid threats but from a centralized authoritarian state in the form of russia. since vladimir putin’s 2007 munich speech, which openly expressed disapproval of nato expansion,4 russia has made increasingly hostile moves to ‘contain’ perceived american expansionism, culminating in its invasion of ukraine in 2022. even before russia’s attempt to eliminate ukrainian statehood in 2022, central-eastern eu member states, such as the baltic states, poland, slovakia, and the czech republic, feared an increasingly hostile posture from the kremlin. this has created the preference for nato to lead the way in managing collective security, being an organization with a primary purpose of defending against conventional threats. for these states, the role of the eu is then to build capabilities. zima has suggested a strategic coherence between the new nato configuration and eu initiatives such as pesco that are able to stimulate industrial production that would be seen as supporting alliance efforts (2018, 51). the strategic incoherence seen is best explained by an eu practitioner who believes that the eu is differentiated by member states’ strategic priorities: countries like poland, the baltic states, to a lesser extent romania, still feel quite threatened by russia, and therefore, they see their military more for territorial defence, and are therefore also more focused on nato on many occasions…there are, however, a number of countries who also look at what was happening in yugoslavia, for instance in kosovo, but also in africa, and they would like to see the eu to be capable of handling such a crisis on their own. if you look at the crisis in libya, where, once again, the us said, ‘well, it's your problem in the end.’ europe was not able to do anything without support of strategic assets from the us. more and more european countries are saying ‘okay, at least for that type of relatively limited military engagement, we should be able to act independently without first having to go across the ocean to beg uncle sam if he could lend us a couple of air-to-air refuelers, perhaps an aircraft 4 “i think it is obvious that nato expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in europe. on the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. and we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?” (putin 2007). 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 carrier or two, and satellite communication, and so forth.’ (interview a with eu security official, online, 2020). the eu security architecture is emerging as a product of these collective policy preferences, with the institutionalization reflecting the need to tackle divergent and diverse security crises perceived by member states. while nato remains the key security organization against traditional threats, it is limited in three major ways. first, nato may not always be available, such as in the case of the eu embargo against libya where the action was vetoed by turkey. second, nato may not be welcome in a region such as the maghreb. third, nato does not have the right toolkit since law enforcement, rule of law, financial and diplomatic support, sanctions, and development are all things that are unavailable directly through nato (interview c with eu security official, online, 2020). as such, the perception by select member states and practitioners is that another mechanism is required. since 2015, in response to the eu’s degrading security situation, member states have reinvigorated the transition that the eu began in 1999 with the founding of the csdp. the eu has moved from being primarily an economic organization into a political entity that could actively support the foreign and security policies of its members. an important development was the eu global strategy (eugs), outlining guiding principles for eu action and identifying key threats (council of the european union, 2016). important to this was the acknowledgement that an integrated approach to conflicts and crises specifically suited the eu as its civil-military tools would be able to build state resilience and counter hybrid threats (tomat 2021, 150-151). furthermore, eugs was a comprehensive exercise in eu policy coherence, the details of the document being developed in consultation with member states, think tanks, and other organizations (eugs 2016). the increased coherence and communication between stakeholders further aided in establishing the 2016 eu level of ambition (loa) that set out three member state goals to enable the eu in security: responding to external conflicts and crises through crisis management tools, building the capacities of partner countries surrounding the eu, and protecting the union from external threats (council of the eu 2016). with a policy foundation created, reforms then began to focus on the operationalization of eu missions to achieve the loa. between 2012 and 2016, efforts to create a formal operational command were embodied in the eu operations centre – an ad-hoc formation not formerly part of the eu chain of command. in 2017, the military planning and conduct capability (mpcc) was established, which is a permanent command and control structure within the eu military staff. it currently manages eu efforts in somalia, mali, and the central african republic. according to interviews with eu practitioners and eu documentation, the end goal is for the mpcc to take control of all non-executive csdp missions and up to one eu battlegroup-size executive military csdp operation decided by the council (eeas, 2018). with its own integrated qualified military body, the eu could now independently manage operations at scale, forming a qualified command and control (c2) structure. this aspect is currently being enhanced by the eumilcom project to create the capacity for scaling the c2 structure for larger operations. in 2019, at the political level, the eu created a directorate called the integrated approach for security and peace (isp), the goal of which is to coordinate the political-strategic planning of military and civilian csdp operations while managing activities on all parts of the conflict cycle from conflict prevention and mediation to disarmament. during the covid-19 pandemic, the isp has already engaged in creating an integrated approach to 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 repatriating stranded eu citizens (tomat 2021). isp represents a significant step in facilitating foreign and security policy coherence in both diplomatic and operational fields. the second aspect of the eu’s transformation has been the establishment of a military-industrial field within the eu. even though the eu could politically organize missions abroad, it has not done so and it continues to lack the capability to conduct them without risking lives. one eu official mentioned a distinct lack of transport, air refuelling, and intelligence capabilities: “if you look at the number of personnel, they [member states] are actually able to do major military warfare, but not at the level that we have come to expect without any casualties…those assets we are lacking”5 (interview a with eu security official, online, 2020). some eu states remain reliant on the us for basic military assets, while the majority are unable to conduct anything outside of basic warfighting, let alone a civilian-military approach to conflict (biscop 2018). in one example, an eu official commented that during a deployment in the sahel, an eu military mission was unable to identify a suspected surveillance drone over its own base of operations for a significant period (interview b with eu security official , online, 2020). to tackle these issues in capability, the eu has been mandated to aid research and procurement of these capabilities. this fulfilled two long-term goals member states shared: to have the ability to act against security challenges and to build an autonomous european defence industry (interview e with eu security official, online, 2020). this process began officially in 2017 with the launch of pesco. twenty-five eu member states activated the pesco framework, which was, until that point, dormant in the lisbon treaty6 pesco aims to increase the ability of eu militaries to deal with security crises and bolster their national militaries. compared to the initiatives of the past, pesco legally binds eu member states to take part in at least one capability project such that countries are free to associate themselves with any projects they deem fit. at the beginning of this study, pesco had 46 active projects7 in areas like training, facilities; land, formations, systems; maritime; air, systems; cyber, c4isr; enabling, joint; space. what is important to understand is that pesco projects are not meant to create capabilities controlled by the eu, but instead they will be member state-owned (interview c with eu security officia,l, online, 2020). a central initiative within pesco is the crisis response operation core (croc), a project meant to create “a coherent full spectrum force package” at the eu level (pesco secretariat 2021). biscop notes that this “could become the central pesco project and serve as a guiding framework for the other projects” (2020, 3). this sentiment is further echoed in other interviews conducted with eu security officials, with one stating that it could be the “core of the european integrated forces,” with work already started on an eu ‘rapid response database’, a list of available assets and capabilities (interview (e) with eu security official, online, 2020). this means that pesco is not just about building capabilities but also about coordinating europe's diverse militaries. a series of other initiatives have been built in conjunction with pesco to promote further autonomy for the european defence industry. this architecture begins with the capability development plan (cdp), a document that is constructed by the european defence agency 5 this could be in reference to assets such as long-range air and sea transport, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, air-to-air refuelling and deployable networks. 6, with the exception of denmark and malta. the former is not a member of the csdp and the latter chose to optout of the pesco framework. 7 as of march 2022, the number of projects is 60. 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 (eda) and member states to prioritize the development of needed capabilities (european defence agency 2018). the next stage in the process is the coordinated annual review on defence (card), which provides an overview of existing capabilities in europe and identifies opportunities for cooperation (2018). card, pesco, and the new european defence fund (edf) then coordinate the funding of projects to develop required capabilities. before 2020, this process was managed by the european defence industrial development programme (edidp), a precursor to the edf, and the ongoing preparatory action on defence research (padr), the former providing significant funding8 towards capability development (european commission 2020b). these initiatives paved the way for the modern funding apparatus under the edf, which, as of 2021, had eight billion euros at its disposal to invest into capability development projects (european commission 2020a). as a result, the eu is increasingly becoming an organization that deals directly with the military industrial development cycle, developing the projects that european states require. the most recent initiative by member states and the eu began in 2020 with the development of the strategic compass. the impetus for this project was driven by the idea that while a global strategy exists, the eu does not have a way to implement the strategy (interview (a) with german defence official, online, 2020). the compass represents a strategic turn and definitive guide for eu security and defence, a unified threat analysis that sought to operationalize the loa (fiott 2020). earlier versions of the compass focused on crisis management, a comprehensive threat analysis, and areas of action focused on diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic tools, forming “the foundation of a robust european self-image [that] could enable the eu to not only cope with the security policy realities of the 21st century but also play an adequate role in shaping the world” (europe’s strategic compass: a critical reflection 2020).9 the 2022 edition of the compass shifted away from this language, acknowledging that the eu is surrounded by instability and conflicts: “we are confronted with a dangerous mix of armed aggression, illegal annexation, fragile states, revisionist powers and authoritarian regimes” (council of the european union 2022, 8). to address this, the compass outlines four policy ‘strands’: (1) act, involving the creation of an eu rapid deployment capacity of 5000 troops and operationalization of an eu command and control framework to conduct csdp missions; (2) secure, committing to a consistent three-year eu threat analysis, a single intelligence capacity, joint cyber defence policy, and joint eu hybrid threat coordination; (3) invest, committing to the completion of one-third of pesco projects by 2025, the augmentation of the european defence fund to make eu defence industrial cooperation the norm, and increase incentives for member state procurement in key areas identified by the european defence agency; (4) partner, aiming to deepen cooperation with regional organizations and multilateral defence partnerships including nato, while working bilaterally to provide security assistance to partners in the eu periphery (council of the eu 2022). what has been described is a strategic turn for the eu developed in response to an increasingly unstable and dangerous world order. 8 investing 500 million euros in 16 military projects targeting the development of the european defence industry and to research and development. 9 note: this source remains unpublished due to privacy concerns. it was obtained and used with permission from interviewees. 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 notwithstanding the nature of the compass itself, the manner of involvement of particular member states in these eu-level defence initiatives has thus far not challenged the principle of differentiation and attempts to do so by creating high-level standardized involvement have been met with failure. once states became involved in such initiatives, national economic interests started to aid in the rationalizing of policy preferences. pesco is not just a coordination project; it is a series of initiatives that looks to develop new capabilities, enable their production, and prepare them for sale in a european defence market. it reflects the move of most european countries to ‘europeanize’ their procurement, with domestic bias dropping from 65 percent in early 1991 to 43 percent in 2017 and inter-eu procurement increasing from 10 percent to 53 percent in the same period (kluth 2017). rufanges et al. have written extensively on the presence of both national and transnational lobbyists who have been heavily involved in adding the section 2 provisions in the lisbon treaty, which affirm that “member states shall undertake progressively to improve their military” and help to facilitate the eda’s creation in 2004 (2016, 317). this includes the largest eu defence firms who have formed themselves into the european organisation for security (eos)10 – a lobbying group that includes thales, naval group, airbus, and leonardo, the top 25 arms companies in the world by sales (sirpi 2019). clearly, the liberal-intergovernmentalist logic of interest groups also applies to decision-making. due to the high cost of research and development for military capabilities, it is often impossible for companies to acquire enough funding from banks or capital markets, necessitating states to pay up-front for the products they will purchase (devore 2014). mawdsley has also brought attention to the reality that in most national contexts, it is the structural constraints brought upon by the largest military industries in europe that have aided in the european preference formation (2019). indeed, it is those large corporations that now dominate the policy-making and regulatory process (2019). the nexus between economy and security then meets the differentiated nature of the eu’s new initiatives. to fully understand why cooperation occurred as it has, an analysis of the security and economic considerations of key member states is required, along with an understanding of their practice in existing institutional arrangements such as pesco. germany’s mediation of the union under its differentiated approach to security against the initial french suggestion that the pesco mechanism should be a 'two-speed' model involving only those countries most committed, german officials countered by suggesting that this approach would divide the eu (maulny and bernardini 2019). germany thereby championed the idea that, in principle, every member state must join eu operations and missions: “if somebody could have stepped out, because he is not part of pesco, we would have created a problem at the beginning” (interview b with german defence official, online, 2020). pesco became inclusive and diverse yet coordinated. member states could pursue their own national objectives while collectively meeting minimal eu guidelines to synchronize capability development and avoid duplication. as one german defence official commented: “we only can survive if everybody is happy” (interview c with german defence official, online, 2020). furthermore, pesco would aid in giving germany the impetus to develop 10 european organisation for security (eos). “eos members” accessed september 15, 2022. http://www.eoseu.com/members 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 neglected armed forces, simultaneously strengthening its economy through the defence sector (major and molling 2019). germany’s goal to further integrate european defence is driven by its deteriorating security environment. its 2016 white paper mentions an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from north africa through the horn of africa and towards the middle east that impairs the security of trade routes (bmvg 2016). for its part, germany has slowly increased its involvement in this theater, deploying over a thousand personnel from the armed forces to mali (dw 2020b) and being further involved in 11 other operations, notably in syria, iraq, and afghanistan (dw 2020a). in addition, german leaders recognize that russia represents a disunifying force in europe, even though it sought economic arrangements in energy trade (dw 2020c). interviewees stressed that the russian threat had prompted eastern eu members to look elsewhere for credible security guarantees, namely the us. one interviewee commented: “what russia can do on very short notice…60,000 troops in one week. how do you want to bring the spanish division to poland? it will take months to do so, but the americans are able to do it” (interview a with german defence official, online, 2020). germany does not have the capabilities to ensure its forces are safe when conducting crisis management or even standard military operations, with its armed forces facing structural issues, including personnel shortages, neglected equipment, and inefficient procurement (menon 2020). with the ambition to create an eu 'force package' by 2025 (interview a with german defence official, online, 2020), germany will require new political impetus and support. creating commitments at the eu level then facilitates needed rearmament at a national level and bridges the gap between strategic cultures by focusing on interoperability between similarly committed member states. this will allow germany to build on its idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ that involves the eu being able to act on its own in conflict zones and capable enough to replace the us in strategic areas where it is withdrawing (interview c with german defence official, online, 2020). reflecting this mindset of eu interoperability and capability, germany has involved itself in 38 percent of active pesco projects. it is supporting initiatives such as the tiger mark iii attack helicopter, the new eurodrone project, an integrated unmanned ground system (ugs), and initiatives to coordinate eu countries in joint operations, including croc, the networks of logistics hubs in europe (netloghubs), and co-basing. the latter looks to create shared basing rights between project partners, including shared overseas facilities for future naval deployments abroad (jonnet 2020). according to german officials, croc represents the central force package that will utilize developed capabilities in eu missions abroad (interview a with german defence official, online, 2020). the sum of these projects will enable eu forces to be deployable and efficiently coordinated, translating into coordination between nato countries for territorial defence. germany’s involvement in european defence is further driven by key economic actors that have aided in the development of these initiatives. its defence market is both highly privatized and highly europeanized, with large pan-european defence firms such as airbus and mbda being prominent players. the latter two are partially owned by the german government, with an 11 percent stake in airbus and mbda being partially owned by airbus itself (transparency international 2020). this makes procurement a transnational affair. germany’s largest defence company, rheinmetall, only ranked 27th in terms of global arms sales as of 2020 (sipri 2020) and remains mostly privatized, with the majority of shareholders being large financial 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 institutions.11 additionally, the privatized nature of the industry has created opportunities for consolidation, with rheinmetall looking to purchase krauss-maffei wegmann, its secondlargest domestic company, limiting the procurement options for the government (tids 2020). in response to the ongoing pandemic, germany has chosen to support its defence industry using relief money and buying new ships and fighter platforms from domestic companies and multinational companies like airbus (sprenger 2020). according to transparency international, the current procurement process in germany is vulnerable to corporate actors because the process itself is partially outsourced to the private sector (tids 2020). similarly, according to the eu transparency register, german-based companies are also prominent lobbyists in the eu, including airbus,12 rheinmetall,13 thyssenkrupp,14 and krauss-maffei wegmann15 (european commission and european parliament 2020). the large presence of multinational corporations and privatized interests means that there is an interest to become involved in eu defence initiatives for their economic benefit. the surge in eu-wide defence spending through pesco creates opportunities for companies to generate profits. additionally, germany's arms industry is too heavily globalized to conduct capacity-building projects on germany's own terms. devore has noted that the capacity to pursue state preferences has diminished due to the increasing ability of corporate actors to impose their own preferences for greater profit margins (2014). new armament programs benefit powerful corporate actors, which operate within germany and are already linked internationally to other eu countries. balancing between the expectations of its western and eastern allies while attempting to settle affairs at home will continue to be a problem for germany into the future. yet the benefits outweigh the cost of managing this cooperation. transnational firms benefit from increased economic activity, while the differentiated nature of pesco means that all eu member states can meet their security needs and aid in the development of each other's capabilities. if successful, this would result in the augmentation of eu cooperation under a common framework while increasing the interoperability of european forces to better secure both the southern and eastern flanks of the eu itself. in sum, germany is managing the process simply because the eu is its largest strategic enabler and will be for the foreseeable future. french challenges to national security and the necessity of collaborative intervention contrary to its early aversion to a pesco based on inclusivity, future commitment, and lenient benchmarks (fiott et al 2017), france has continued to champion the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ in order to safeguard its interests in a differentiated eu security architecture. emmanuel macron has defined the term to mean that europe needs to “rethink itself politically and act politically to define common objectives that are more than merely delegating our future to the market” (2020). for macron, ‘strategic autonomy’ is not merely about developing the 11 for more information on the shareholder structure see: rheinmetall. 2020. “rheinmetal shareholder structure.” december 31 2020. accessed june 30 2021. https://ir.rheinmetall.com/websites/rheinmetall/english/1040/shareholder-structure.html 12 investing 1,750,000€ 1,999,999€ in lobbying. 13 investing 400,000€ 499,999€ in lobbying. 14 investing 700,000€ 799,999€ in lobbying. 15 investing 300,000€ 399,999€ in lobbying. 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 ability to intervene abroad but also about developing a european political identity that will reduce the costs of its foreign entanglements (erforth 2020). this policy comes at a time when france is becoming increasingly entangled in foreign conflicts across north africa and combating a form of islamic extremism that is effective at mobilizing terrorist attacks on french soil (jankowski et al 2018). in response, france has deployed 5100 troops across the sahel, 740 in the congo and central africa, and over 3000 across different partners in africa (ministère des armées 2021). in libya, france also aids in the maintenance of the eu-backed arms embargo, coming into direct conflict with turkey in 2020 over its maintenance (marcus 2020). overextended across its many military theatres, france has tried to create multilateral responses to ease its burden. yet in interviews, haroche has documented that other eu countries considered france’s conflicts in africa its own responsibility (2017). from france’s perspective, many eastern eu countries were “obsessed with russia,” unwilling to commit to operations elsewhere, with a french diplomat commenting that “eu missions are increasingly less robust, and we often reach operational capacity thanks to non-member states’ support” (cited in haroche 2017, 244-245). in an attempt to modify its role in the sahel, france has ended operation barkhane, with its forces being lowered to 2500 in 2022 from the original 5000, in favour of a european and regional coalition to secure the region (roussy 2021). to coordinate this, france will require the commitment that it has long sought from its eu allies. france thereby faces the double challenge of lacking coordinated civil-military capabilities and an institution to create the political will to use them. in addition to seeing the csdp as being geopolitically necessary, france also represents the third largest defence exporter in the world, with exports growing by 59 percent between 20122016 and 2017-2021 (sipri 2022). the french armaments industry represents an important lobby to justify policy action being taken. just like germany, france undertook a massive phase of privatization and internationalization during the 1980s. it saw the creation of new paneuropean defence firms such as the european aeronautic defence and space company (eads)-airbus, which was an aggregate of french, german, and spanish national industries as well as the privatization of firms such as dassault electric and thomson-csf, now known as thales group (calcara 2017). however, as calcara indicates, unlike the privatized defence industry in germany or spain, the french government has maintained a great deal of influence on its defence industry. france controls 11 percent in airbus (airbus, 2021), 25 percent of thales group (thales group, 2021), 11 percent in safran (safran, 2021), and continues to own naval group and nexter systems (calcara 2017). this has placed the state near publiccontrolled groups, enhancing government oversight but providing “avenues for managers to bargain for compensation when state policy adversely impacts companies’ profits” (2017, 531). the eos lobbying group, for example, includes many french defence companies such as airbus, naval group, and thales.16 this does not necessarily mean that the french state has control over its arms industry but the market structure of the industry represents mutual dependence: “the proximity of the state to public-controlled groups enhances government oversight but also it provides avenues for managers to bargain for compensation when state policy adversely impacts companies’ profits” (2017, 532). french firms have therefore been 16 european organisation for security (eos). “eos members” accessed september 15, 2022. http://www.eoseu.com/members 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 able to ‘capture’ the government’s preferences and to persuade french policy-makers to strongly engage in eda’s institutionalization and in day-to-day collaborative projects. thales, a national champion in france, has accounted for the majority of the transition and purchases in the development of eu systems (kluth 2017, 171). in 2020, france’s arms exports increased by 72 percent due to it selling advanced fighter and naval equipment to the developing world (makenzie 2020). a flexible international policy will thereby allow france to continue to sell its arms abroad competitively, something it has not shied away from in the past, as exemplified by the mistral deal with russia before the 2014 ukraine crisis (le monde 2014). france has also not been immune from increased european integration in military equipment despite this stance. its adoption of the hk416 rifle as of 2020 from a consortium involving french manufacturer heckler & koch sas france and heckler & koch gmbh represents a europeanlevel consolidation of a key piece of equipment – the standard rifle (asaf 2020). demonstrating these european-facing interests, france has become pesco’s most involved nation, participating in 70 percent of active projects. significant for the french defence industry, many of these are developing a multitude of new capabilities, such as the european patrol corvette (epc), airborne electronic attack plane, and tiger mark iii attack helicopter. france is furthermore involved in all ten enabling and joint cooperation programs, coordinating five of them, such as co-basing, the energy operational function, and timely warning and interception with space-based theater surveillance (twister). to meet its expeditionary needs, it has further involved itself in croc while also taking the lead in the eu military partnership project meant to integrate eu military strategic cultures. france is therefore driving much of pesco’s interoperability development, signalling a high interest in enabling multilateral responses under the eu. france represents a concerned party involved militarily in the eu’s southern neighbourhood. geopolitically, it has a key interest in obtaining the support it needs to protect its forces and meet its political objectives. economically, its extensive defence industry sees the development of eu capabilities as projects that will increase its share of the global defence market. that marriage between the geopolitical and economic aspects of integration has given france a position within the eu to coordinate its own response with partner countries in developing that ‘exclusive club,’ which the eu was originally intended to be. poland’s threat conception and national utilization of eu defence above all other countries, poland's strategic thinking hinges upon preserving nato and us security guarantees. unlike france and germany, poland initially remained tepid over the reinforcement of an eu security policy. during the negotiations for pesco's adoption, poland maintained two key positions: nato should not be undermined by new eu security structures, and a 'two-speed' europe in defence should not become a reality (terlikowski 2018, 4). in interviews, polish officials mentioned that certain member states began to add the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ to foundational eu documents without defining the term. it was only in 2020 that its content was formally discussed in the formation of the strategic compass (interview with polish defence official, online, 2020). the unclarified term led poland to delay its commitment to pesco, with them joining it three days before the eu council’s enactment (terlikowski 2018). pesco has given poland two major positive results: it has allowed poland to pursue its own interests and maintain a relationship with washington. 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 polish involvement in eu affairs has been a pragmatic one. the 2020 national security strategy of poland mentions russia’s buildup of offensive military capabilities in both conventional forces and in hybrid warfare, including cyber-attack and disinformation (polish national security strategy 2020). events in georgia and ukraine helped to convince polish military leadership that previous non-military mechanisms to manage russia are no longer sufficient, with hard power being seen as necessary to counter external threats (moldovan 2018). nato and the us have been major pillars of poland’s sovereignty through deterrence. however, threats in hybrid warfare and cybersecurity have also prompted poland to involve the eu in helping to establish nato-eu task forces in those fields (biskup 2020). less talked about are poland’s concerns with europe’s southern neighbourhood, which has led to the establishment of frontex (szymańska 2017). this is in concert with responses to perceived terrorist threats in the south, a major reason why poland has remained one of the most involved countries in csdp operations and capability-building initiatives (terlikowski 2018). according to an interviewee, once poland joined pesco, the polish conception became focused on its national objectives: “our participation in projects was most driven by our national military capability development process. so, whenever we joined the projects, it was solely based on the added value from our national point of view” (interview with polish defence official, online, 2020). the defence industry in poland is an anomaly within the eu, being its last truly nationalized defence industry. as of 2014, the majority of the polish military industry had been consolidated into the polish armaments group (pgz), its holdings being almost entirely stateowned and its sales reliant on the home market (terlikowski 2017, 4), representing only the 68th largest defence company in the world by total sales (sipri 2020). this means for the development of its defence technological base, poland is also reliant on technology and knowledge transfers from other countries, in contrast with the larger multinational firms that have the competitive edge (terlikowski 2017, 4). therefore, having an entirely state-owned and controlled defence industry directly links poland’s geopolitical policy to its military industry, unlike germany or france where the relationship can be seen as reciprocal. in this aim, poland initially involved itself in pesco projects that looked to benefit its homeland defence industry, currently involved in 22 percent of active projects. capability development has focused on three key projects, namely the integrated unmanned ground system (ugs),17 maritime (semi-) autonomous systems for mine countermeasures (masmcm), the harbour & maritime surveillance and protection (harmspro),18 and the integrated european joint training and simulation centre (eurosim).19 unlike germany and france, many of poland's logistical involvements thus far have focused on those projects most operable within a nato framework. this includes military mobility (mm), the network of logistics hubs (netloghubs), and the european medical command. poland’s limited participation in pesco is due in large part to the already established political-industrial links between poland and the us. notwithstanding the difficulties that third-state participation in eu 17 providing poland with a key technology transfer in the realm of unmanned ground vehicles for fire support, transport, and other force enablers. 18 these two focused on the securitization of near-coastal maritime environments aiding in baltic security. 19 the latter being a capability which will give access to advanced simulation technology, aiding in the training of polish soldiers. 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 defence initiatives creates, poland has sought to involve the us as much as possible: “we want to keep them also open for the partners from outside of the eu…our military industry is both connected to [the] european framework as well as we have particular close contact with our american partners” (interview with polish defence official, online, 2020). even outside of pesco, poland has gone against ‘buying european’ to purchase f-35 fighter jets (brozowksi 2020). when asked about the purchase, a polish defence official commented: “the f35 is the most blatant example of what the eu doesn't have to offer. it's the only fifth generation fighter aircraft available worldwide” (interview with polish defence official, online, 2020). with poland’s involvement in pesco, it is foreseeable that american involvement will be present in at least some of its projects. notwithstanding the global pandemic, poland has undertaken a substantial rearmament program consisting mainly of american equipment with the exception being a new main battle tank being proposed as a pesco project (terlikowski 2021). interviews with polish officials revealed interesting perspectives about the development of the strategic compass, which they evaluated as being very productive: “we already have it more or less agreed or compiled…we have it available now. it was quite surprising for me but the list of threats and challenges the eu can see right now, it’s highly convergent. i mean there are 27 states, which largely agree, there is no disagreement on that…the main goal is…having the list of actions inclusive enough to accommodate all of the concerns of the member states, so we're being realistic” (interview with polish defence official, online, 2020). to justify its own security spending, poland needed to emphasize its own security challenges in the compass. it followed the national security strategy’s position that poland should “seek greater involvement of the european union in activities directed at improving security in the eastern neighbourhood” (polish national security strategy 2020). placing all of the member states under an eu project further ensured that poland could control its development. the differentiation seen in pesco had thereby allowed poland to selectively develop its own defence industry. differentiation further allowed a level of coherence in policy, which would ensure poland’s security partners would enhance their own capabilities. with the advent of the ukraine war, poland was able to further emphasize its own security challenges in the compass. the eu formally acknowledged the russian threat in the eastern neighbourhood and pesco was firmly placed to augment aging pan-european capabilities against it. discussion the three cases described have demonstrated the results of positive differentiation and the bargaining present within those states. in the german case, the eu was seen as the basis for its continued economic and political security. the push for differentiation by germany allowed for the diverse experiences of other member states while also facilitating its own defence needs in the process. for france, the eu provided an institution that could mobilize the funds and the political will necessary to assist in its geopolitical struggles. the current government in paris looks favourably on the development of new capabilities and institutional functions, especially those that can enable the eu to work more efficiently in crisis situations. poland, while initially skeptical, has embraced eu-level cooperation as a way to increase its defence industry’s prowess and to counter existential threats from russia. its involvement in pesco, with the possibility of third-state cooperation, allowed poland to include washington in the new defence process as its staunch ally. there also exists a strong lobby for the development of military capability, with germany and france presenting cases of private interests shaping the defence 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 narrative at both the domestic and eu levels. while security concerns are important, the type of cooperation that has emerged is also defined by primary interests present within particular member states, which often have a key economic dimension. the pesco framework is first and foremost about ensuring that the eu loa is fulfilled, not strategic autonomy (interview e with eu security official, online, 2020). this ensures that member states can meet basic security expectations while also allowing those states that wish to achieve the full spectrum force package to generate usable forces under the eu. this development, therefore, does not imply that the eu is developing any form of actorness but rather involves the eu taking on the role of a coordinator. despite disagreement of what is needed to be done, member states have begun to, at least in part, adopt the idea that the eu, as an economic entity, can help solve stagnant military industrial developments in the face of an international system becoming less certain and more volatile. the eu is now a part of the military development and planning process of european states and there exists a requirement to maintain this new framework. initial moves towards this integration were fraught with issues due to a focus on national preferences over functional requirements. however, differentiation allowed key policy frameworks to be developed and spillover into new policy areas may occur to enhance this institutional capability (schimmelfennig 2018). guay had described the early efforts in the 1990s as driven by spillover. the first component of this was an expectation that integration in one policy area would lead to pressures for further integration in other related areas. a second component was the role of non-state actors and institutions in pushing integration beyond the lowest common denominator between member states (guay 1997). finally, as meyer explains, ‘sociological spillover’ between political-industrial actors can occur when groups that interact with one another develop a shared identity (2006). eu security officials interviewed for this article commented on the socialization of member state military staff through programs like military erasmus, which facilitates the “conditions for exchanges of young officers during their initial education and training.” one interviewee described the process: let's say mid-level officers ranked majors, lieutenant colonels who come back from an orientation course say, 'well, i wasn't aware of what the european union was doing in security and defence. wouldn't it be great if this were to be taught at the national staff courses?' and then, of course, i say yes, and actually, there are a number of member states where we have already convinced them to integrate an orientation course in their national staff colleges (interview a with eu security official, online, 2020). in the case of the eu’s newest military initiatives, it is possible to see the emergence of a limited common understanding of security concerns among eu states. as shown by this analysis, ongoing threats have prompted action by member states, driven by internal economic and market interests. spillover requires pressure to maintain this momentum. now that the member states have been spurred by ongoing crises, internal factors and institutional realities can begin to intervene. functional spillover could very well occur as the eu is granted increased authority over defence matters. while pesco is member state-driven, those states are increasingly seeking consultation with eu actors in the selection of projects. the pesco secretariat is a joint eda, eeas, and the eums body that provides an assessment of the capabilities in operational aspects, coordinates the assessment of project proposals, and seeks to prevent the duplication 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 of existing initiatives. according to an eu security official, the secretariat now assesses all new pesco projects based on a cooperative angle (what they can bring towards the development of eu industrial autonomy) and an operational angle (how far the project will deliver in making a difference towards future missions and operations) (interview e with eu security official, online, 2020). it was even mentioned that member states saw a larger role for the secretariat, the exact role, however, being unclear (interview e with eu security official, online, 2020). the very inclusion of member states in these initiatives has resulted in their defence industries coming to expect eu funding for the development of increasingly more expensive capability development projects. the eda itself was created due to increasing costs and the need for greater efficiency in procurement (barrinha 2010). the trends show that future research and development costs are becoming so inflated that the development of next-generation platforms is becoming impossible domestically, especially in the face of economic uncertainty (kleczka et al. 2020). this could very well prompt both industrial actors and military officials to increase collective development and the funding of pan-european initiatives, notwithstanding the clear monetary benefits these non-state actors gain from an expansion of domestic defence industries. sociological spillover may very well be the most important factor in driving the future of eu initiatives. as the eu becomes more involved in military affairs, so will its practitioners, leaders, and corporations. the eu has embarked upon a formative and functional change of tone as an institution, and as member states experience additional security crises abroad and across europe, greater security cooperation will be incentivized. the eu is one institution that has the capacity to facilitate that function. the status quo still embraces differentiation in specific projects, but a principled change is underway, namely a commitment to manage security concerns collectively and to create conditions for strategic action. until this change happens, however, the idea of an eu as a strategic power will remain a contradiction in terms. 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 references aggestam, lisbeth, and adrian hyde-price. 2020. “learning to lead? germany and the leadership paradox in eu foreign policy.” german politics 29 (1): 8–24. doi:10.1080/09644008.2019.1601177. allinson, tom, 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