










































25              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2022: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

 

 

Strategic Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? 

Sean Havel1 

  
 

 

 

Abstract 

The increasing number and severity of security crises around the European periphery have 

called into question the preparedness and capability of European states. Civil wars, mass 

migration, unstable institutions, and direct kinetic conflict are features of a degrading security 

order in which European states must provide a strategic response. One such response has seen 

the European Union (EU) become increasingly involved in security issues, namely the defence 

industry. Programs such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) are now enabling 

Member States to organize civil-military responses to crises and coordinate the defence-

planning cycles of 25 European countries through the EU. This article examines why Member 

States have begun to use the EU to develop military capabilities and assets at scale. Furthermore, 

it investigates the role of differentiation in enabling these developments and how both individual 

geopolitical and economic factors contribute to this collective institutional development. 

 

 

  

  

 

1 Sean Havel received an MA from the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University 



26              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Introduction 

In 2022, the European security order faces multiple crises of collective defence far more 

dangerous and potentially escalatory than those seen during the Cold War. Around Europe lies 

a neighbourhood marked by open conventional warfare, political instability, and rising 

extremism. In response to these crises of security, efforts have been undertaken to increase the 

political coherence and military capability of European states under the European Union (EU) 

through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 2017 was a milestone year that saw 

the establishment of a legally binding Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – a 

culmination of efforts to reimagine the EU as a security actor in international affairs, enabled to 

influence the direction of the European military procurement process while being given crisis 

response mechanisms. PESCO’s goal, as defined by Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, is to “take 

concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability” of 

EU national forces (Council of the EU 2017). This article explores why, in the current context, 

Member States have opted to use the EU to enable their capabilities and manage ongoing 

security crises when such efforts have not made such headway in the past. Furthermore, it 

explores whether this transformation signifies that the EU is developing into a ‘strategic power,’ 

an actor able to rationalize its security environment and act upon it in the context of 

intergovernmental differentiation. Can this form of intergovernmentalism shape the EU into a 

strategic power or is this a contradiction in terms? 

The Implication of Differentiation in Understanding Member State Responses to EU 

Defence Policy 

Early theories on the development of the EU assumed that integration would not include aspects 

of defence, otherwise known as 'high politics' (Verdun 2018). Nevertheless, over time, a series 

of steps were taken towards a more integrated security policy, from the Petersberg Declaration 

calling for integration to develop joint European peacekeeping capabilities to the St. Malo 

Declaration's call for autonomous action backed by credible military forces. These early 

achievements culminated in 1999 with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 

renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) under the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 

While the EU has attained degrees of ‘actorness’ in some areas of international relations, most 

notably trade, the development of the EU as a security actor remains Member-State driven, 

resulting in a general lack of coordination and ability to collectively manage security crises. 

Cottey notes that it is important to understand the EU as an ‘astrategic actor,’ defining 

‘astrategic’ as the lack of “(1) clear assessment of the external environment, (2) the 

identification of priorities and pivot points where an actor may hope to have a decisive impact 

and (3) the development of the ways and means to implement the strategy” (2019, 280). 

Initiatives lack agreed on priorities to unify the security agenda; large multinational initiatives 

are based on consensus between states that have differing conceptions of their strategic priorities 

relative to one another (2019). The development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation 

(PESCO) has exemplified, in part, this reality, being comprised of 60 projects including 

Training, Facilities; Land, Formations, Systems; Maritime; Air, Systems, Cyber, C4ISR, 

Enabling, Joint, and Space. What is key is that in each project, Member State involvement 

remains differentiated, with individual countries involved in several PESCO projects. This 

differentiation thereby allows for diverse experiences and approaches to facilitate integration, 

forgoing the idea of a Europe moving at a single pace (Howorth 2019a). In the presence of 



27              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

differentiation, multiple variables will impact each Member State’s decision-making, a 

reflection of the diversity that is permissible in security affairs within the EU.  

Two features of recent security-relevant developments in the EU relate heavily to the interests 

of the Member States: an accommodation of strategic preferences through differentiation and 

its nexus with military-economic interests. Schimmelfennig writes that differentiation is a 

remedy to the political stagnation seen in EU-level policies: “It mitigates the stark choice 

between uniform and no integration. It allows governments to cooperate at a level of integration 

that is closer to their respective preferences than either uniform or no integration” (2019, 180). 

This follows a liberal-intergovernmentalist logic in which state preferences are made more 

certain when domestic actors are strong enough to shape policies. The assumption is that 

integration is not driven by concerns about sovereignty but by social welfare concerns (2019). 

Hoeffler offers a perspective that goes beyond this, explaining that the presence of 

differentiation itself does not explain why policy-making will take place; it is the construction 

of that interdependence being seen at the European level that matters (2019).  

Theories of EU integration can then be understood in terms of how they layer upon one another 

to describe emergent structures between Member States. Fundamentally, liberal 

intergovernmentalism (LI) is such a theory, layering the three principles of national preference 

formation through the competition of societal actors, the efficiency and outcomes of interstate 

bargains by way of asymmetrical interdependence (the uneven distribution of gains), and 

institutions that help to implement, elaborate, enforce, and extend contracts between states 

(Moravcsik 2018). It can be argued that LI is a collection of theories rather than one, referred 

to by Moravcsik as “theoretical elements” that aim to explain not just why integration occurred 

but how and why it continues (2018). Explanations of integration focusing on preference 

formation have certainly created a better understanding of EU defence integrations, such as the 

structure of armaments organizations in pursuing preferences (DeVore 2014), the increasing 

marketization of the European military-industrial complex (Britz 2010), and defence 

conglomerates' growing influence on political processes (Kluth 2017). LI, therefore, allows for 

a systematic appraisal of the domestic factors that contribute to the formation of Member State 

preferences regarding EU defence cooperation, including the role of economic actors that 

permeate defence areas. It must be questioned, however, whether preference formation under 

an LI framework really remains state-based, given the presence of pan-European defence actors. 

Structural realities created by the presence of both a single market and an integrated political 

space indeed influence policy formation in all European capitals; it is a question of which 

structural realities matter to those states.  

While this study relies on the assumptions of LI in analyzing national preferences and domestic 

dynamics in the formation of PESCO, concepts from other theoretical frameworks are also 

useful in understanding institutional change with regard to European strategic autonomy. 

Examining interdependence requires an appreciation of non-economic policy domains (Hoeffler 

2019), namely the security interests of states. Realism stresses the global structural realities of 

security in a world without any supranational authority to manage relations between states. 

Individual EU Member States react differently to these structural factors, which affects their 

ranking of security priorities such as the degree of concern about unilateral American actions 

(Posen 2004; Walt 2009), the unreliability of American hegemony in defending Europe’s 

security concerns (Hyde-Price 2006), the priority of efforts to constrain the German power 

(Jones 2003), or assessments of the threat from Russia. As will be discussed in the concluding 



28              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

section of this article, the neo-functionalist concept of spillover may also be helpful in 

understanding the dynamics within the EU once initiatives like PESCO take hold. Following 

Manners and Rosamond (2018), this analysis recognizes that dialogue and interdisciplinarity 

yield richer discussions on research strategies, helping to create multiple unique accounts of the 

EU (2018).  

This article begins with an overview of the developments that have occurred within the CSDP 

in recent years, outlining the security, economic, and institutional dynamics that have helped 

shape the process. It then focuses on the drivers of EU policy – the Member States themselves. 

This section will utilize the framework proposed by Svendsen, outlining that in studying 

differentiated policies such as PESCO it is helpful to use practices of actors as identifications 

of intent and policy preference (2019). Practices are defined as “socially competent 

performances” that “situate knowledge in what people do or say” (Svendsen 2019, 996). In 

doing so, this analysis will examine state actors based on three characteristics: (1) their security 

and threat conception; (2) their economic restructuring and military-industrial framework; and 

(3) their participation in PESCO2 as an indicator of how and why these states are using these 

new institutional mechanisms to respond to the previous two previous variables. Three states 

were selected based on their relative positions in European defence: France, being the strongest 

supporter of an autonomous EU capability and heavily involved in the EU’s Southern 

neighbourhood; Germany, being the cautious mediator in managing European political affairs 

and holding concerns for EU’s security; and Poland, as an adamant supporter of NATO and a 

traditional skeptic of these initiatives (Franke and Varma 2019). Semi-structured interviews 

with Member State officials were utilized to better understand the perspectives of these states. 

National documentation and current involvement in defence initiatives were also examined. 

Furthermore, this analysis used existing literature on these nations' respective arms industries 

to situate economic rationales, supplied in part by the Stockholm International Peace Research 

Institute, national think tank publications, and Transparency International documentation. 

Strategic Preferences and Domestic Interests: Forces Realizing the EU as a Security 

Actor 

Although earlier institutional mechanisms were created at the EU level to facilitate security 

cooperation between European states, notably the creation of the Military Committee of the 

European Union (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS) in 2003, many of these mechanisms 

remained unable to fully manage Europe’s increasingly insecure neighbourhood. EU external 

missions under the early CSDP (then ESDP) were limited in both scope and size, with 14 

missions launched within the first three years between 2003 and 2005 and an additional 12 

missions from 2006-2008. These missions were not based on any form of EU command 

structure but were managed through NATO or a national command, never having their own 

operational headquarters (Howorth 2019). According to Biscop, nations had in part “lost the 

habit and the expertise to analyze the world around them in geopolitical terms” (2015, 170), 

with few external conflicts directly threatening the security of the EU.  

 

2 Data on PESCO involvement is of the author’s own formulation based on data taken from the PESCO website, 

https://pesco.europa.eu/. accessed on January 5, 2021. See Appendix I. 



29              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Notwithstanding the Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and later regional institutional attempts3 to 

build a ‘ring of friends’ through diplomacy, by mid-2014, the peripheral situation became what 

former Swedish PM Bildt called “a ring of fire” (Taylor 2015). In the South, the Arab Spring 

dramatically shifted the political climate of the Greater Middle East. Notably, the collapse of 

Libya after a successful NATO air campaign saw European states limited in their ability to 

deploy ground forces due to equipment shortages (Hallams and Schreer 2012), only approving 

the symbolic EUFOR Libya operation, which was never activated (Fabbrini 2014). This further 

destabilized North Africa and the Sahel, with unguarded weapons caches in Libya giving armed 

groups the equipment necessary to expand in the region. The instability included the near 

collapse of Mali on multiple occasions due to successive coups and helped to make the Sahel a 

haven for violent extremist groups and routes for human trafficking to Europe, with 50,000 

fatalities occurring between 2014-2019 due to these conflicts (Kuperman 2013). To the East, 

European states met with an increasingly worrying hybrid threat from Russia when it invaded 

Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 after both endorsed a foreign policy directed toward 

Europe. Notably, Russia further began to conduct an increasingly hostile cyber warfare 

campaign that involved at least 27 European states as well as the US and Canada as early as 

2004 (Limnell 2018). The European Parliament has identified "evidence of organised social 

media manipulation in 70 countries, compared to 48 countries in 2018, and 28 countries in 

2017” by foreign actors such as Russia (EPRS 2020), which has targeted Western democratic 

systems in a series of information warfare campaigns. Aside from its ‘hybrid war’ on European 

nations, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reintroduced the threat of direct kinetic conflict 

to the European continent. This event has called into question notions of a strategic status quo 

with Moscow and has added to the urgency of a needed collective response, which includes the 

lend-lease of military assets. 

The security challenges faced by Europeans can be described as divided in strategic directions 

between the South and the East. Haroche has called these asymmetric crises, which unevenly 

affect European states and thereby generate less interdependence as different responses are 

required (2017, 228). Southern challenges mainly deal with hybrid threats from non-state actors, 

being enabled by conditions of instability in the parent country. Maintaining stability in these 

regions means shielding Europe from state failure, terrorism, piracy, organized crime, or 

uncontrolled migration flows (Simon and Pertusot 2017). Analysis by the European 

Parliamentary Research Service suggests that the Southern neighbourhood is “prone to an 

explosive domino effect that could still undermine the EU's security and internal political order 

with irregular migratory flows and humanitarian emergencies” (EPRS 2021). This correlates 

with concerns raised within Member States, specifically France, pointing to the multiple crises 

that result from state failure, especially in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Fears in this 

domain are only increasing due to contributing factors such as climate change, the proliferation 

of weaponry, and demographic trends in the Southern neighbourhood (Jolly and Olivier 2018). 

Crisis management tools are therefore sought after by states worried about the state of affairs in 

this region; as one EU official commented, most EU states cannot perform the military 

component of a comprehensive approach efficiently. “Contrary to NATO, the EU can actually 

do independently an integrated approach. So they have the full range of tools necessary to do a 

comprehensive approach from diplomacy, trade, humanitarian, sport, development, 

 

3 For example, the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. 



30              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

cooperation, mediation, whatever you want” (Interview A with EU Security Official, Online, 

2020). This makes increasing the intervention component of the CSDP enticing at a strategic 

level, especially given the reality that NATO’s expeditionary era came to an end. By the time 

of the Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016) summits, NATO began to effectively abandon any idea 

of establishing new expeditionary forces and focused on creating a tripwire in Eastern Europe 

and establishing the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force to present a deterrent to direct 

Russian aggression against Central and Eastern European countries, taking valuable EU forces 

away from CSDP missions elsewhere (Howorth 2018; Zima 2018). NATO functions differently 

from the EU; as it is the key defensive institution against classical threats, it is not an 

organization built to manage hybrid or systemic threats from non-state actors. It is also 

dominated by American industry, which to some Member States, especially France, represents 

a strategic issue rectified by the encouragement of a European military industrial capacity 

(Interview D with EU Security Official, Online, 2020). 

States focused on the Eastern neighbourhood equally face hybrid threats but from a centralized 

authoritarian state in the form of Russia. Since Vladimir Putin’s 2007 Munich speech, which 

openly expressed disapproval of NATO expansion,4 Russia has made increasingly hostile 

moves to ‘contain’ perceived American expansionism, culminating in its invasion of Ukraine 

in 2022. Even before Russia’s attempt to eliminate Ukrainian statehood in 2022, Central-Eastern 

EU Member States, such as the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, feared 

an increasingly hostile posture from the Kremlin. This has created the preference for NATO to 

lead the way in managing collective security, being an organization with a primary purpose of 

defending against conventional threats. For these states, the role of the EU is then to build 

capabilities. Zima has suggested a strategic coherence between the new NATO configuration 

and EU initiatives such as PESCO that are able to stimulate industrial production that would be 

seen as supporting alliance efforts (2018, 51).  

The strategic incoherence seen is best explained by an EU practitioner who believes that the EU 

is differentiated by Member States’ strategic priorities: 

Countries like Poland, the Baltic states, to a lesser extent Romania, still feel quite 

threatened by Russia, and therefore, they see their military more for territorial 

defence, and are therefore also more focused on NATO on many 

occasions…There are, however, a number of countries who also look at what 

was happening in Yugoslavia, for instance in Kosovo, but also in Africa, and 

they would like to see the EU to be capable of handling such a crisis on their 

own. If you look at the crisis in Libya, where, once again, the US said, ‘well, it's 

your problem in the end.’ Europe was not able to do anything without support of 

strategic assets from the US. More and more European countries are saying 

‘okay, at least for that type of relatively limited military engagement, we should 

be able to act independently without first having to go across the ocean to beg 

Uncle Sam if he could lend us a couple of air-to-air refuelers, perhaps an aircraft 

 

4 “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance 

itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the 

level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?” (Putin 2007). 



31              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

carrier or two, and satellite communication, and so forth.’ (Interview A with EU 

Security Official, Online, 2020). 

The EU security architecture is emerging as a product of these collective policy preferences, 

with the institutionalization reflecting the need to tackle divergent and diverse security crises 

perceived by Member States. While NATO remains the key security organization against 

traditional threats, it is limited in three major ways. First, NATO may not always be available, 

such as in the case of the EU embargo against Libya where the action was vetoed by Turkey. 

Second, NATO may not be welcome in a region such as the Maghreb. Third, NATO does not 

have the right toolkit since law enforcement, rule of law, financial and diplomatic support, 

sanctions, and development are all things that are unavailable directly through NATO 

(Interview C with EU Security Official, Online, 2020). As such, the perception by select 

Member States and practitioners is that another mechanism is required. 

Since 2015, in response to the EU’s degrading security situation, Member States have 

reinvigorated the transition that the EU began in 1999 with the founding of the CSDP. The EU 

has moved from being primarily an economic organization into a political entity that could 

actively support the foreign and security policies of its members. An important development 

was the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), outlining guiding principles for EU action and identifying 

key threats (Council of the European Union, 2016). Important to this was the acknowledgement 

that an integrated approach to conflicts and crises specifically suited the EU as its civil-military 

tools would be able to build state resilience and counter hybrid threats (Tomat 2021, 150-151). 

Furthermore, EUGS was a comprehensive exercise in EU policy coherence, the details of the 

document being developed in consultation with Member States, think tanks, and other 

organizations (EUGS 2016). The increased coherence and communication between 

stakeholders further aided in establishing the 2016 EU Level of Ambition (LOA) that set out 

three Member State goals to enable the EU in security: responding to external conflicts and 

crises through crisis management tools, building the capacities of partner countries surrounding 

the EU, and protecting the Union from external threats (Council of the EU 2016).  

With a policy foundation created, reforms then began to focus on the operationalization of EU 

missions to achieve the LOA. Between 2012 and 2016, efforts to create a formal operational 

command were embodied in the EU Operations Centre – an ad-hoc formation not formerly part 

of the EU chain of command. In 2017, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) 

was established, which is a permanent command and control structure within the EU Military 

Staff. It currently manages EU efforts in Somalia, Mali, and the Central African Republic. 

According to interviews with EU practitioners and EU documentation, the end goal is for the 

MPCC to take control of all non-executive CSDP missions and up to one EU Battlegroup-size 

executive military CSDP operation decided by the Council (EEAS, 2018). With its own 

integrated qualified military body, the EU could now independently manage operations at scale, 

forming a qualified command and control (C2) structure. This aspect is currently being 

enhanced by the EUMILCOM project to create the capacity for scaling the C2 structure for 

larger operations. In 2019, at the political level, the EU created a directorate called The 

Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP), the goal of which is to coordinate the 

political-strategic planning of military and civilian CSDP operations while managing activities 

on all parts of the conflict cycle from conflict prevention and mediation to disarmament. During 

the COVID-19 pandemic, the ISP has already engaged in creating an integrated approach to 



32              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

repatriating stranded EU citizens (Tomat 2021). ISP represents a significant step in facilitating 

foreign and security policy coherence in both diplomatic and operational fields.  

The second aspect of the EU’s transformation has been the establishment of a military-industrial 

field within the EU. Even though the EU could politically organize missions abroad, it has not 

done so and it continues to lack the capability to conduct them without risking lives. One EU 

official mentioned a distinct lack of transport, air refuelling, and intelligence capabilities: “If 

you look at the number of personnel, they [Member States] are actually able to do major military 

warfare, but not at the level that we have come to expect without any casualties…Those assets 

we are lacking”5  (Interview A with EU Security Official, Online, 2020). Some EU states remain 

reliant on the US for basic military assets, while the majority are unable to conduct anything 

outside of basic warfighting, let alone a civilian-military approach to conflict (Biscop 2018). In 

one example, an EU official commented that during a deployment in the Sahel, an EU military 

mission was unable to identify a suspected surveillance drone over its own base of operations 

for a significant period (Interview B with EU Security Official , Online, 2020). To tackle these 

issues in capability, the EU has been mandated to aid research and procurement of these 

capabilities. This fulfilled two long-term goals Member States shared: to have the ability to act 

against security challenges and to build an autonomous European defence industry (Interview 

E with EU Security Official, Online, 2020). This process began officially in 2017 with the 

launch of PESCO. Twenty-five EU Member States activated the PESCO framework, which 

was, until that point, dormant in the Lisbon Treaty6 PESCO aims to increase the ability of EU 

militaries to deal with security crises and bolster their national militaries. Compared to the 

initiatives of the past, PESCO legally binds EU Member States to take part in at least one 

capability project such that countries are free to associate themselves with any projects they 

deem fit. At the beginning of this study, PESCO had 46 active projects7 in areas like Training, 

Facilities; Land, Formations, Systems; Maritime; Air, Systems; Cyber, C4ISR; Enabling, Joint;  

Space. What is important to understand is that PESCO projects are not meant to create 

capabilities controlled by the EU, but instead they will be Member State-owned (Interview C 

with EU Security Officia,l, Online, 2020). A central initiative within PESCO is the Crisis 

Response Operation Core (CROC), a project meant to create “a coherent full spectrum force 

package” at the EU level (PESCO Secretariat 2021). Biscop notes that this “could become the 

central PESCO project and serve as a guiding framework for the other projects” (2020, 3). This 

sentiment is further echoed in other interviews conducted with EU security officials, with one 

stating that it could be the “core of the European integrated forces,” with work already started 

on an EU ‘Rapid Response Database’, a list of available assets and capabilities (Interview (e) 

with EU Security Official, Online, 2020). This means that PESCO is not just about building 

capabilities but also about coordinating Europe's diverse militaries.  

A series of other initiatives have been built in conjunction with PESCO to promote further 

autonomy for the European defence industry. This architecture begins with the Capability 

Development Plan (CDP), a document that is constructed by the European Defence Agency 

 

5 This could be in reference to assets such as long-range air and sea transport, intelligence, surveillance, target 

acquisition and reconnaissance, air-to-air refuelling and deployable networks. 
6, with the exception of Denmark and Malta. The former is not a member of the CSDP and the latter chose to opt-

out of the PESCO framework. 

7 As of March 2022, the number of projects is 60. 



33              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

(EDA) and Member States to prioritize the development of needed capabilities (European 

Defence Agency 2018). The next stage in the process is the Coordinated Annual Review on 

Defence (CARD), which provides an overview of existing capabilities in Europe and identifies 

opportunities for cooperation (2018). CARD, PESCO, and the new European Defence Fund 

(EDF) then coordinate the funding of projects to develop required capabilities. Before 2020, 

this process was managed by the European Defence Industrial Development Programme 

(EDIDP), a precursor to the EDF, and the ongoing Preparatory Action on Defence Research 

(PADR), the former providing significant funding8 towards capability development (European 

Commission 2020b). These initiatives paved the way for the modern funding apparatus under 

the EDF, which, as of 2021, had eight billion euros at its disposal to invest into capability 

development projects (European Commission 2020a). As a result, the EU is increasingly 

becoming an organization that deals directly with the military industrial development cycle, 

developing the projects that European states require.  

The most recent initiative by Member States and the EU began in 2020 with the development 

of the Strategic Compass. The impetus for this project was driven by the idea that while a global 

strategy exists, the EU does not have a way to implement the strategy (Interview (a) with 

German Defence Official, Online, 2020). The Compass represents a strategic turn and definitive 

guide for EU security and defence, a unified threat analysis that sought to operationalize the 

LOA (Fiott 2020). Earlier versions of the Compass focused on crisis management, a 

comprehensive threat analysis, and areas of action focused on diplomatic, intelligence, military, 

and economic tools, forming “the foundation of a robust European self-image [that] could 

enable the EU to not only cope with the security policy realities of the 21st century but also play 

an adequate role in shaping the world” (Europe’s Strategic Compass: A Critical Reflection 

2020).9 The 2022 edition of the Compass shifted away from this language, acknowledging that 

the EU is surrounded by instability and conflicts: “We are confronted with a dangerous mix of 

armed aggression, illegal annexation, fragile states, revisionist powers and authoritarian 

regimes” (Council of the European Union 2022, 8). To address this, the Compass outlines four 

policy ‘strands’: (1) Act, involving the creation of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5000 

troops and operationalization of an EU command and control framework to conduct CSDP 

missions; (2) Secure, committing to a consistent three-year EU Threat Analysis, a single 

intelligence capacity, joint cyber defence policy, and joint EU hybrid threat coordination; (3) 

Invest, committing to the completion of one-third of PESCO projects by 2025, the augmentation 

of the European Defence Fund to make EU defence industrial cooperation the norm, and 

increase incentives for Member State procurement in key areas identified by the European 

Defence Agency; (4) Partner, aiming to deepen cooperation with regional organizations and 

multilateral defence partnerships including NATO, while working bilaterally to provide security 

assistance to partners in the EU periphery (Council of the EU 2022). What has been described 

is a strategic turn for the EU developed in response to an increasingly unstable and dangerous 

world order.  

 

8 Investing 500 million Euros in 16 military projects targeting the development of the European defence industry 

and to research and development. 
9 Note: This source remains unpublished due to privacy concerns. It was obtained and used with permission from 

interviewees. 



34              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Notwithstanding the nature of the Compass itself, the manner of involvement of particular 

Member States in these EU-level defence initiatives has thus far not challenged the principle of 

differentiation and attempts to do so by creating high-level standardized involvement have been 

met with failure. Once states became involved in such initiatives, national economic interests 

started to aid in the rationalizing of policy preferences. PESCO is not just a coordination project; 

it is a series of initiatives that looks to develop new capabilities, enable their production, and 

prepare them for sale in a European defence market. It reflects the move of most European 

countries to ‘Europeanize’ their procurement, with domestic bias dropping from 65 percent in 

early 1991 to 43 percent in 2017 and inter-EU procurement increasing from 10 percent to 53 

percent in the same period (Kluth 2017). Rufanges et al. have written extensively on the 

presence of both national and transnational lobbyists who have been heavily involved in adding 

the Section 2 provisions in the Lisbon Treaty, which affirm that “Member states shall undertake 

progressively to improve their military” and help to facilitate the EDA’s creation in 2004 (2016, 

317). This includes the largest EU defence firms who have formed themselves into the European 

Organisation for Security (EOS)10 – a lobbying group that includes Thales, Naval Group, 

Airbus, and Leonardo, the top 25 arms companies in the world by sales (SIRPI 2019). Clearly, 

the liberal-intergovernmentalist logic of interest groups also applies to decision-making. Due to 

the high cost of research and development for military capabilities, it is often impossible for 

companies to acquire enough funding from banks or capital markets, necessitating states to pay 

up-front for the products they will purchase (DeVore 2014). Mawdsley has also brought 

attention to the reality that in most national contexts, it is the structural constraints brought upon 

by the largest military industries in Europe that have aided in the European preference formation 

(2019). Indeed, it is those large corporations that now dominate the policy-making and 

regulatory process (2019). The nexus between economy and security then meets the 

differentiated nature of the EU’s new initiatives. To fully understand why cooperation occurred 

as it has, an analysis of the security and economic considerations of key Member States is 

required, along with an understanding of their practice in existing institutional arrangements 

such as PESCO. 

Germany’s Mediation of the Union Under its Differentiated Approach to Security 

Against the initial French suggestion that the PESCO mechanism should be a 'two-speed' model 

involving only those countries most committed, German officials countered by suggesting that 

this approach would divide the EU (Maulny and Bernardini 2019). Germany thereby 

championed the idea that, in principle, every Member State must join EU operations and 

missions: “if somebody could have stepped out, because he is not part of PESCO, we would 

have created a problem at the beginning” (Interview B with German Defence Official, Online, 

2020). PESCO became inclusive and diverse yet coordinated. Member States could pursue their 

own national objectives while collectively meeting minimal EU guidelines to synchronize 

capability development and avoid duplication. As one German defence official commented: 

“we only can survive if everybody is happy” (Interview C with German Defence Official, 

Online, 2020). Furthermore, PESCO would aid in giving Germany the impetus to develop 

 

10 European Organisation for Security (EOS). “EOS Members” Accessed September 15, 2022. http://www.eos-

eu.com/members 



35              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

neglected armed forces, simultaneously strengthening its economy through the defence sector 

(Major and Molling 2019).  

Germany’s goal to further integrate European defence is driven by its deteriorating security 

environment. Its 2016 White Paper mentions an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from North Africa 

through the Horn of Africa and towards the Middle East that impairs the security of trade routes 

(BMVg 2016). For its part, Germany has slowly increased its involvement in this theater, 

deploying over a thousand personnel from the armed forces to Mali (DW 2020b) and being 

further involved in 11 other operations, notably in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan (DW 2020a). In 

addition, German leaders recognize that Russia represents a disunifying force in Europe, even 

though it sought economic arrangements in energy trade (DW 2020c). Interviewees stressed 

that the Russian threat had prompted Eastern EU members to look elsewhere for credible 

security guarantees, namely the US. One interviewee commented: “what Russia can do on very 

short notice…60,000 troops in one week. How do you want to bring the Spanish division to 

Poland? It will take months to do so, but the Americans are able to do it” (Interview A with 

German Defence Official, Online, 2020). Germany does not have the capabilities to ensure its 

forces are safe when conducting crisis management or even standard military operations, with 

its armed forces facing structural issues, including personnel shortages, neglected equipment, 

and inefficient procurement (Menon 2020). With the ambition to create an EU 'force package' 

by 2025 (Interview A with German Defence Official, Online, 2020), Germany will require new 

political impetus and support. Creating commitments at the EU level then facilitates needed 

rearmament at a national level and bridges the gap between strategic cultures by focusing on 

interoperability between similarly committed Member States. This will allow Germany to build 

on its idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ that involves the EU being able to act on its own in conflict 

zones and capable enough to replace the US in strategic areas where it is withdrawing (Interview 

C with German Defence Official, Online, 2020). 

Reflecting this mindset of EU interoperability and capability, Germany has involved itself in 38 

percent of active PESCO projects. It is supporting initiatives such as the Tiger Mark III attack 

helicopter, the new EURODRONE project, an Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS), 

and initiatives to coordinate EU countries in joint operations, including CROC, the Networks 

of Logistics Hubs in Europe (NetLogHubs), and Co-Basing. The latter looks to create shared 

basing rights between project partners, including shared overseas facilities for future naval 

deployments abroad (Jonnet 2020). According to German officials, CROC represents the central 

force package that will utilize developed capabilities in EU missions abroad (Interview A with 

German Defence Official, Online, 2020). The sum of these projects will enable EU forces to be 

deployable and efficiently coordinated, translating into coordination between NATO countries 

for territorial defence.  

Germany’s involvement in European defence is further driven by key economic actors that have 

aided in the development of these initiatives. Its defence market is both highly privatized and 

highly Europeanized, with large pan-European defence firms such as Airbus and MBDA being 

prominent players. The latter two are partially owned by the German government, with an 11 

percent stake in Airbus and MBDA being partially owned by Airbus itself (Transparency 

International 2020). This makes procurement a transnational affair. Germany’s largest defence 

company, Rheinmetall, only ranked 27th in terms of global arms sales as of 2020 (SIPRI 2020) 

and remains mostly privatized, with the majority of shareholders being large financial 



36              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

institutions.11 Additionally, the privatized nature of the industry has created opportunities for 

consolidation, with Rheinmetall looking to purchase Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, its second-

largest domestic company, limiting the procurement options for the government (TIDS 2020). 

In response to the ongoing pandemic, Germany has chosen to support its defence industry using 

relief money and buying new ships and fighter platforms from domestic companies and 

multinational companies like Airbus (Sprenger 2020). According to Transparency International, 

the current procurement process in Germany is vulnerable to corporate actors because the 

process itself is partially outsourced to the private sector (TIDS 2020). Similarly, according to 

the EU Transparency Register, German-based companies are also prominent lobbyists in the 

EU, including Airbus,12 Rheinmetall,13 ThyssenKrupp,14 and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann15 

(European Commission and European Parliament 2020). The large presence of multinational 

corporations and privatized interests means that there is an interest to become involved in EU 

defence initiatives for their economic benefit. The surge in EU-wide defence spending through 

PESCO creates opportunities for companies to generate profits. Additionally, Germany's arms 

industry is too heavily globalized to conduct capacity-building projects on Germany's own 

terms. DeVore has noted that the capacity to pursue state preferences has diminished due to the 

increasing ability of corporate actors to impose their own preferences for greater profit margins 

(2014). New armament programs benefit powerful corporate actors, which operate within 

Germany and are already linked internationally to other EU countries. 

Balancing between the expectations of its Western and Eastern allies while attempting to settle 

affairs at home will continue to be a problem for Germany into the future. Yet the benefits 

outweigh the cost of managing this cooperation. Transnational firms benefit from increased 

economic activity, while the differentiated nature of PESCO means that all EU Member States 

can meet their security needs and aid in the development of each other's capabilities. If 

successful, this would result in the augmentation of EU cooperation under a common framework 

while increasing the interoperability of European forces to better secure both the Southern and 

Eastern flanks of the EU itself. In sum, Germany is managing the process simply because the 

EU is its largest strategic enabler and will be for the foreseeable future. 

French Challenges to National Security and the Necessity of Collaborative Intervention 

Contrary to its early aversion to a PESCO based on inclusivity, future commitment, and lenient 

benchmarks (Fiott et al 2017), France has continued to champion the concept of ‘strategic 

autonomy’ in order to safeguard its interests in a differentiated EU security architecture. 

Emmanuel Macron has defined the term to mean that Europe needs to “rethink itself politically 

and act politically to define common objectives that are more than merely delegating our future 

to the market” (2020). For Macron, ‘strategic autonomy’ is not merely about developing the 

 

11 For more information on the shareholder structure see: Rheinmetall. 2020. “Rheinmetal Shareholder 

Structure.” December 31 2020. Accessed June 30 2021. 

https://ir.rheinmetall.com/websites/rheinmetall/English/1040/shareholder-structure.html 
12 Investing 1,750,000€ - 1,999,999€ in lobbying. 
13 Investing 400,000€ - 499,999€ in lobbying. 
14 Investing 700,000€ - 799,999€ in lobbying. 
15 Investing 300,000€ - 399,999€ in lobbying. 



37              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

ability to intervene abroad but also about developing a European political identity that will 

reduce the costs of its foreign entanglements (Erforth 2020). 

This policy comes at a time when France is becoming increasingly entangled in foreign conflicts 

across North Africa and combating a form of Islamic extremism that is effective at mobilizing 

terrorist attacks on French soil (Jankowski et al 2018). In response, France has deployed 5100 

troops across the Sahel, 740 in the Congo and Central Africa, and over 3000 across different 

partners in Africa (Ministère des Armées 2021). In Libya, France also aids in the maintenance 

of the EU-backed arms embargo, coming into direct conflict with Turkey in 2020 over its 

maintenance (Marcus 2020). Overextended across its many military theatres, France has tried 

to create multilateral responses to ease its burden. Yet in interviews, Haroche has documented 

that other EU countries considered France’s conflicts in Africa its own responsibility (2017). 

From France’s perspective, many Eastern EU countries were “obsessed with Russia,” unwilling 

to commit to operations elsewhere, with a French diplomat commenting that “EU missions are 

increasingly less robust, and we often reach operational capacity thanks to non-Member States’ 

support” (cited in Haroche 2017, 244-245). In an attempt to modify its role in the Sahel, France 

has ended Operation Barkhane, with its forces being lowered to 2500 in 2022 from the original 

5000, in favour of a European and regional coalition to secure the region (Roussy 2021). To 

coordinate this, France will require the commitment that it has long sought from its EU allies. 

France thereby faces the double challenge of lacking coordinated civil-military capabilities and 

an institution to create the political will to use them. 

In addition to seeing the CSDP as being geopolitically necessary, France also represents the 

third largest defence exporter in the world, with exports growing by 59 percent between 2012-

2016 and 2017-2021 (SIPRI 2022). The French armaments industry represents an important 

lobby to justify policy action being taken. Just like Germany, France undertook a massive phase 

of privatization and internationalization during the 1980s. It saw the creation of new pan-

European defence firms such as the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company 

(EADS)-Airbus, which was an aggregate of French, German, and Spanish national industries 

as well as the privatization of firms such as Dassault Electric and Thomson-CSF, now known 

as Thales Group (Calcara 2017). However, as Calcara indicates, unlike the privatized defence 

industry in Germany or Spain, the French government has maintained a great deal of influence 

on its defence industry. France controls 11 percent in Airbus (Airbus, 2021), 25 percent of 

Thales Group (Thales Group, 2021), 11 percent in Safran (Safran, 2021), and continues to own 

Naval Group and Nexter Systems (Calcara 2017). This has placed the state near public-

controlled groups, enhancing government oversight but providing “avenues for managers to 

bargain for compensation when state policy adversely impacts companies’ profits” (2017, 531). 

The EOS lobbying group, for example, includes many French defence companies such as 

Airbus, Naval Group, and Thales.16 This does not necessarily mean that the French state has 

control over its arms industry but the market structure of the industry represents mutual 

dependence: “The proximity of the state to public-controlled groups enhances government 

oversight but also it provides avenues for managers to bargain for compensation when state 

policy adversely impacts companies’ profits” (2017, 532). French firms have therefore been 

 

16 European Organisation for Security (EOS). “EOS Members” Accessed September 15, 2022. http://www.eos-

eu.com/members 



38              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

able to ‘capture’ the government’s preferences and to persuade French policy-makers to 

strongly engage in EDA’s institutionalization and in day-to-day collaborative projects. Thales, 

a national champion in France, has accounted for the majority of the transition and purchases in 

the development of EU systems (Kluth 2017, 171). In 2020, France’s arms exports increased 

by 72 percent due to it selling advanced fighter and naval equipment to the developing world 

(Makenzie 2020). A flexible international policy will thereby allow France to continue to sell 

its arms abroad competitively, something it has not shied away from in the past, as exemplified 

by the Mistral deal with Russia before the 2014 Ukraine crisis (Le Monde 2014). France has 

also not been immune from increased European integration in military equipment despite this 

stance. Its adoption of the HK416 rifle as of 2020 from a consortium involving French 

manufacturer Heckler & Koch SAS France and Heckler & Koch GmbH represents a European-

level consolidation of a key piece of equipment – the standard rifle (ASAF 2020). 

Demonstrating these European-facing interests, France has become PESCO’s most involved 

nation, participating in 70 percent of active projects. Significant for the French defence industry, 

many of these are developing a multitude of new capabilities, such as the European Patrol 

Corvette (EPC), Airborne Electronic Attack plane, and Tiger Mark III attack helicopter. France 

is furthermore involved in all ten enabling and joint cooperation programs, coordinating five of 

them, such as Co-Basing, the Energy Operational Function, and Timely Warning and 

Interception with Space-Based Theater Surveillance (TWISTER). To meet its expeditionary 

needs, it has further involved itself in CROC while also taking the lead in the EU Military 

Partnership Project meant to integrate EU military strategic cultures. France is therefore driving 

much of PESCO’s interoperability development, signalling a high interest in enabling 

multilateral responses under the EU.  

France represents a concerned party involved militarily in the EU’s Southern neighbourhood. 

Geopolitically, it has a key interest in obtaining the support it needs to protect its forces and 

meet its political objectives. Economically, its extensive defence industry sees the development 

of EU capabilities as projects that will increase its share of the global defence market. That 

marriage between the geopolitical and economic aspects of integration has given France a 

position within the EU to coordinate its own response with partner countries in developing that 

‘exclusive club,’ which the EU was originally intended to be.  

Poland’s Threat Conception and National Utilization of EU Defence 

Above all other countries, Poland's strategic thinking hinges upon preserving NATO and US 

security guarantees. Unlike France and Germany, Poland initially remained tepid over the 

reinforcement of an EU security policy. During the negotiations for PESCO's adoption, Poland 

maintained two key positions: NATO should not be undermined by new EU security structures, 

and a 'two-speed' Europe in defence should not become a reality (Terlikowski 2018, 4). In 

interviews, Polish officials mentioned that certain Member States began to add the concept of 

‘strategic autonomy’ to foundational EU documents without defining the term. It was only in 

2020 that its content was formally discussed in the formation of the Strategic Compass 

(Interview with Polish Defence Official, Online, 2020). The unclarified term led Poland to delay 

its commitment to PESCO, with them joining it three days before the EU Council’s enactment 

(Terlikowski 2018). PESCO has given Poland two major positive results: it has allowed Poland 

to pursue its own interests and maintain a relationship with Washington. 



39              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Polish involvement in EU affairs has been a pragmatic one. The 2020 National Security Strategy 

of Poland mentions Russia’s buildup of offensive military capabilities in both conventional 

forces and in hybrid warfare, including cyber-attack and disinformation (Polish National 

Security Strategy 2020). Events in Georgia and Ukraine helped to convince Polish military 

leadership that previous non-military mechanisms to manage Russia are no longer sufficient, 

with hard power being seen as necessary to counter external threats (Moldovan 2018). NATO 

and the US have been major pillars of Poland’s sovereignty through deterrence. However, 

threats in hybrid warfare and cybersecurity have also prompted Poland to involve the EU in 

helping to establish NATO-EU task forces in those fields (Biskup 2020). Less talked about are 

Poland’s concerns with Europe’s Southern neighbourhood, which has led to the establishment 

of Frontex (Szymańska 2017). This is in concert with responses to perceived terrorist threats in 

the South, a major reason why Poland has remained one of the most involved countries in CSDP 

operations and capability-building initiatives (Terlikowski 2018). 

According to an interviewee, once Poland joined PESCO, the Polish conception became focused 

on its national objectives: “Our participation in projects was most driven by our national military 

capability development process. So, whenever we joined the projects, it was solely based on the 

added value from our national point of view” (Interview with Polish Defence Official, Online, 

2020). The defence industry in Poland is an anomaly within the EU, being its last truly 

nationalized defence industry. As of 2014, the majority of the Polish military industry had been 

consolidated into the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ), its holdings being almost entirely state-

owned and its sales reliant on the home market (Terlikowski 2017, 4), representing only the 68th 

largest defence company in the world by total sales (SIPRI 2020). This means for the 

development of its defence technological base, Poland is also reliant on technology and 

knowledge transfers from other countries, in contrast with the larger multinational firms that 

have the competitive edge (Terlikowski 2017, 4). Therefore, having an entirely state-owned and 

controlled defence industry directly links Poland’s geopolitical policy to its military industry, 

unlike Germany or France where the relationship can be seen as reciprocal. 

In this aim, Poland initially involved itself in PESCO projects that looked to benefit its 

homeland defence industry, currently involved in 22 percent of active projects. Capability 

development has focused on three key projects, namely the Integrated Unmanned Ground 

System (UGS),17 Maritime (Semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS-

MCM), the Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO),18 and the 

Integrated European Joint Training and Simulation Centre (EUROSIM).19 Unlike Germany and 

France, many of Poland's logistical involvements thus far have focused on those projects most 

operable within a NATO framework. This includes Military Mobility (MM), the Network of 

Logistics Hubs (NetLogHubs), and the European Medical Command. Poland’s limited 

participation in PESCO is due in large part to the already established political-industrial links 

between Poland and the US. Notwithstanding the difficulties that third-state participation in EU 

 

17 Providing Poland with a key technology transfer in the realm of unmanned ground vehicles for fire support, 

transport, and other force enablers. 

18 These two focused on the securitization of near-coastal maritime environments aiding in Baltic security. 

19 The latter being a capability which will give access to advanced simulation technology, aiding in the training 

of Polish soldiers. 



40              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

defence initiatives creates, Poland has sought to involve the US as much as possible: “we want 

to keep them also open for the partners from outside of the EU…our military industry is both 

connected to [the] European Framework as well as we have particular close contact with our 

American partners” (Interview with Polish Defence Official, Online, 2020). Even outside of 

PESCO, Poland has gone against ‘buying European’ to purchase F-35 fighter jets (Brozowksi 

2020). When asked about the purchase, a Polish defence official commented: “the F35 is the 

most blatant example of what the EU doesn't have to offer. It's the only fifth generation fighter 

aircraft available worldwide” (Interview with Polish Defence Official, Online, 2020). With 

Poland’s involvement in PESCO, it is foreseeable that American involvement will be present in 

at least some of its projects. Notwithstanding the global pandemic, Poland has undertaken a 

substantial rearmament program consisting mainly of American equipment with the exception 

being a new Main Battle Tank being proposed as a PESCO project (Terlikowski 2021). 

Interviews with Polish officials revealed interesting perspectives about the development of the 

Strategic Compass, which they evaluated as being very productive: “We already have it more 

or less agreed or compiled…we have it available now. It was quite surprising for me but the list 

of threats and challenges the EU can see right now, it’s highly convergent. I mean there are 27 

states, which largely agree, there is no disagreement on that…The main goal is…having the list 

of actions inclusive enough to accommodate all of the concerns of the Member States, so we're 

being realistic” (Interview with Polish Defence Official, Online, 2020). To justify its own 

security spending, Poland needed to emphasize its own security challenges in the Compass. It 

followed the National Security Strategy’s position that Poland should “seek greater involvement 

of the European Union in activities directed at improving security in the Eastern 

Neighbourhood” (Polish National Security Strategy 2020). Placing all of the Member States 

under an EU project further ensured that Poland could control its development. The 

differentiation seen in PESCO had thereby allowed Poland to selectively develop its own 

defence industry. Differentiation further allowed a level of coherence in policy, which would 

ensure Poland’s security partners would enhance their own capabilities. With the advent of the 

Ukraine war, Poland was able to further emphasize its own security challenges in the Compass. 

The EU formally acknowledged the Russian threat in the Eastern neighbourhood and PESCO 

was firmly placed to augment aging pan-European capabilities against it. 

Discussion 

The three cases described have demonstrated the results of positive differentiation and the 

bargaining present within those states. In the German case, the EU was seen as the basis for its 

continued economic and political security. The push for differentiation by Germany allowed for 

the diverse experiences of other Member States while also facilitating its own defence needs in 

the process. For France, the EU provided an institution that could mobilize the funds and the 

political will necessary to assist in its geopolitical struggles. The current government in Paris 

looks favourably on the development of new capabilities and institutional functions, especially 

those that can enable the EU to work more efficiently in crisis situations. Poland, while initially 

skeptical, has embraced EU-level cooperation as a way to increase its defence industry’s 

prowess and to counter existential threats from Russia. Its involvement in PESCO, with the 

possibility of third-state cooperation, allowed Poland to include Washington in the new defence 

process as its staunch ally. There also exists a strong lobby for the development of military 

capability, with Germany and France presenting cases of private interests shaping the defence 



41              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

narrative at both the domestic and EU levels. While security concerns are important, the type 

of cooperation that has emerged is also defined by primary interests present within particular 

Member States, which often have a key economic dimension. The PESCO framework is first 

and foremost about ensuring that the EU LOA is fulfilled, not strategic autonomy (Interview E 

with EU Security Official, Online, 2020). This ensures that Member States can meet basic 

security expectations while also allowing those states that wish to achieve the full spectrum 

force package to generate usable forces under the EU. This development, therefore, does not 

imply that the EU is developing any form of actorness but rather involves the EU taking on the 

role of a coordinator. Despite disagreement of what is needed to be done, Member States have 

begun to, at least in part, adopt the idea that the EU, as an economic entity, can help solve 

stagnant military industrial developments in the face of an international system becoming less 

certain and more volatile. 

The EU is now a part of the military development and planning process of European states and 

there exists a requirement to maintain this new framework. Initial moves towards this 

integration were fraught with issues due to a focus on national preferences over functional 

requirements. However, differentiation allowed key policy frameworks to be developed and 

spillover into new policy areas may occur to enhance this institutional capability 

(Schimmelfennig 2018). Guay had described the early efforts in the 1990s as driven by 

spillover. The first component of this was an expectation that integration in one policy area 

would lead to pressures for further integration in other related areas. A second component was 

the role of non-state actors and institutions in pushing integration beyond the lowest common 

denominator between Member States (Guay 1997). Finally, as Meyer explains, ‘sociological 

spillover’ between political-industrial actors can occur when groups that interact with one 

another develop a shared identity (2006). EU security officials interviewed for this article 

commented on the socialization of Member State military staff through programs like Military 

ERASMUS, which facilitates the “conditions for exchanges of young officers during their initial 

education and training.” One interviewee described the process:     

Let's say mid-level officers ranked Majors, Lieutenant Colonels who come back 

from an orientation course say, 'well, I wasn't aware of what the European Union 

was doing in security and defence. Wouldn't it be great if this were to be taught 

at the national staff courses?' And then, of course, I say yes, and actually, there 

are a number of Member States where we have already convinced them to 

integrate an orientation course in their national staff colleges (Interview A with 

EU Security Official, Online, 2020). 

In the case of the EU’s newest military initiatives, it is possible to see the emergence of a limited 

common understanding of security concerns among EU states. As shown by this analysis, 

ongoing threats have prompted action by Member States, driven by internal economic and 

market interests. Spillover requires pressure to maintain this momentum. Now that the Member 

States have been spurred by ongoing crises, internal factors and institutional realities can begin 

to intervene. 

Functional spillover could very well occur as the EU is granted increased authority over defence 

matters. While PESCO is Member State-driven, those states are increasingly seeking 

consultation with EU actors in the selection of projects. The PESCO Secretariat is a joint EDA, 

EEAS, and the EUMS body that provides an assessment of the capabilities in operational 

aspects, coordinates the assessment of project proposals, and seeks to prevent the duplication 



42              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

of existing initiatives. According to an EU security official, the secretariat now assesses all new 

PESCO projects based on a cooperative angle (what they can bring towards the development of 

EU industrial autonomy) and an operational angle (how far the project will deliver in making a 

difference towards future missions and operations) (Interview E with EU Security Official, 

Online, 2020). It was even mentioned that Member States saw a larger role for the secretariat, 

the exact role, however, being unclear (Interview E with EU Security Official, Online, 2020). 

The very inclusion of Member States in these initiatives has resulted in their defence industries 

coming to expect EU funding for the development of increasingly more expensive capability 

development projects. The EDA itself was created due to increasing costs and the need for 

greater efficiency in procurement (Barrinha 2010). The trends show that future research and 

development costs are becoming so inflated that the development of next-generation platforms 

is becoming impossible domestically, especially in the face of economic uncertainty (Kleczka 

et al. 2020). This could very well prompt both industrial actors and military officials to increase 

collective development and the funding of pan-European initiatives, notwithstanding the clear 

monetary benefits these non-state actors gain from an expansion of domestic defence industries. 

Sociological spillover may very well be the most important factor in driving the future of EU 

initiatives. As the EU becomes more involved in military affairs, so will its practitioners, 

leaders, and corporations. The EU has embarked upon a formative and functional change of 

tone as an institution, and as Member States experience additional security crises abroad and 

across Europe, greater security cooperation will be incentivized. The EU is one institution that 

has the capacity to facilitate that function. The status quo still embraces differentiation in 

specific projects, but a principled change is underway, namely a commitment to manage 

security concerns collectively and to create conditions for strategic action. Until this change 

happens, however, the idea of an EU as a strategic power will remain a contradiction in terms. 

  



43              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

REFERENCES 

Aggestam, Lisbeth, and Adrian Hyde-Price. 2020. “Learning to Lead? Germany and the 

Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign Policy.” German politics 29 (1): 8–24. 

doi:10.1080/09644008.2019.1601177. 

Allinson, Tom, and Imane Mellouk. 2020. “US Troop Drawdown from Sahel Puts Pressure on 

Europe.” Deutsche Welle, January 31, 2020. Accessed June 30 2022. 

https://p.dw.com/p/3X76e. 

ASAF (Association de Soutien à L’Armée Française). 2020. La DGA passe une nouvelle 

commande de 12 000 fusils d’assaut HK 416 F pour les armées [DGA places a new order 

for 12,000 HK 416 F assault rifles for the armed forces]. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.asafrance.fr/archives/resultats-de-recherche-archives/item/armement-la-

dga-passe-une-nouvelle-commande-de-12-000-fusils-d-assaut-hk-416-f-pour-les-

armees.html?acm=15417_236. 

Airbus. Share Price and Information. 2021. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.airbus.com/investors/share-price-and-information.html 

Averre, Derek. 2009. “Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ‘Shared 

Neighbourhood’.” Europe-Asia Studies 61 (10): 1689–1713. 

doi:10.1080/09668130903278918. 

Barrinha, André. 2010. “Moving towards a European Defence Industry? The Political Discourse 

on a Changing Reality and its Implications for the Future of the European Union.” Global 

Society 24 (4): 467–485. 

BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). 2020. “Trump Orders Withdrawal of US Troops from 

Somalia,” December 5, 2020. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55196130. 

Beake, Nick. 2021. "Belarus Plane: 'Perfect Storm' Prompts EU to Act Fast." BBC, May 25, 

2021. Accessed June 14, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57239522. 

Biava, Alessia. 2011. “The Emergence of a Strategic Culture within the Common Security and 

Defense Policy.” European Foreign Affairs Review 16 (1): 41–58. 

Biden, Joseph. 2020. “Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing US Foreign Policy After 

Trump.” Foreign Affairs 99 (2): 64–76. 

Biscop, Sven. 2015. The State of Defense in Europe: Dependence, Deterrence and Deployment. 

Global Affairs 1 (2): 169–182. doi:10.1080/23340460.2015.1034976. 

———. 2018. “European Defense: Give PESCO a Chance.” Survival 60 (3): 161–180. 

doi:10.1080/00396338.2018.1470771. 



44              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

———. 2020. “Battalions to Brigades: The Future of European Defense.” Survival 62 (5): 

105–118. doi:10.1080/00396338.2020.1819654. 

Biskup, Przemysław. 2020. “Poland’s Policy Towards the United Kingdom.” In Yearbook of 

Polish Foreign Policy 2017, edited by Sławomir Dębski and Karol Wasilewski, 85–97. 

Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs. 

https://pism.pl/publications/Yearbook_of_Polish_Foreign_Policy_2017. 

Britz, Malena. 2010. “The Role of Marketization in the Europeanization of Defense Industry 

Policy.” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 30 (3): 176–184. 

doi:10.1177/0270467610367492. 

Brzozowski, Alexandra. 2019. “Pentagon Warns EU against Blocking Us Firms from Defence 

Fund.” Euractiv, August 19, 2019. Accessed June 13, 2021. 

https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/pentagon-warns-eu-against-

blocking-us-firms-from-defence-fund-2/. 

Brozowski, Alexandra. 2020. “Amid Beefed up Security Cooperation, Poland Inks Contract for 

US-Made F-35 Fighter Jets.” Euractiv, February 3, 2020. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.euractiv.com/section/defense-and-security/news/amid-beefed-up-security-

cooperation-poland-inks-contract-for-us-made-f-35-fighter-jets/. 

BMVg (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung) 2016. White Paper on German Security Policy 

and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Berlin. Accessed June 30, 2022. 

https://www.bundeswehr.de/resource/blob/4800140/fe103a80d8576b2cd7a135a5a8a86d

de/download-white-paper-2016-data.pdf. 

Calcara, Antonio. 2019. “Making Sense of European Armaments Policies: A Liberal 

Intergovernmentalist Research Agenda.” Comparative Strategy 38 (6): 567–581. 

doi:10.1080/01495933.2019.1674084. 

Caporaso, James. 2018. “Europe’s Triple Crisis and the Uneven Role of Institutions: The Euro, 

Refugees and Brexit.” Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (6): 1345–61. 

doi:10.1111/jcms.12746. 

Council of the European Union. 2017. “Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 

2017 Establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Determining the List 

of Participating Member States.” December 11, 2017. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D2315&from=EN. 

———. 2016. “Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of 

Security and Defence.” 14149/16. November 14, 2016. 

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugs-conclusions-st14149en16.pdf 

———. 2020. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 of 5 November 2020 Establishing the 

General Conditions under Which Third States Could Exceptionally be Invited to 



45              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Participate in Individual PESCO Projects.” November 6, 2020. https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D1639&from=EN.  

———. 2022. “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. For a European Union that 

protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and 

security.” March 21, 2022. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-

2022-INIT/en/pdf. 

Cottey, Andrew. 2019. “Astrategic Europe.” Journal of Common Market Studies 58 (2): 276–

291. 

Cox, Michael. 2017. “Europe – Still between the Superpowers.” Global Policy 8 (S4): 9–17. 

doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12427. 

Dębski, Sławomir, and Karol Wasilewski. 2020. Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2017. 

Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs. 

https://pism.pl/publications/Yearbook_of_Polish_Foreign_Policy_2017. 

DeVore, Marc. 2014. "Producing European Armaments: Policymaking Preferences and 

Processes.” Cooperation and Conflict 49 (4): 438–463. doi:10.1177/0010836714525052. 

Jensen, Donald, and Peter Doran. 2018. “Chaos as a Strategy: Putin’s ‘Promethean’ Gamble.” 

Center for European Policy Analysis. 

https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/644196_46af11fbc287466f96a9ecdfbad0fa7c.pdf. 

Deutsche Welle (DW). 2020a. “Germany Extends Bundeswehr Mission in Mali.” May 29, 

2020. Accessed June 30, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-extends-bundeswehr-

mission-in-mali/a-53621405. 

———. 2020b. “Mali: German Soldiers Injured in Smoke Grenade Explosion.” April 29, 

2020. Accessed June 30, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/mali-german-soldiers-injured-

in-smoke-grenade-explosion/a-53277891. 

———. 2020c. “Nord Stream 2: Germany Unhappy with New US Sanctions.” June 14, 2020. 

Accessed June 30, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-germany-unhappy-with-

new-us-sanctions/a-53805296. 

———. 2021. “US Wants to 'Strengthen' Iran Nuclear Deal.” February 22, 2021. Accessed June 

30, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/us-wants-to-strengthen-iran-nuclear-deal/a-56655385. 

EPRS (European Parliament Research Service). 2020. Towards a More Resilient Europe Post-

coronavirus: An Initial Mapping of Structural Risks Facing the EU. 

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653208/EPRS_STU(2020)

653208_EN.pdf. 

———. 2021. Towards a More Resilient Europe Post-coronavirus: Options to Enhance the 

EU's Resilience to Structural Risks. 

https://www.dw.com/en/germany-extends-bundeswehr-mission-in-mali/a-53621405
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-extends-bundeswehr-mission-in-mali/a-53621405


46              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/659437/EPRS_STU(2021)

659437_EN.pdf. 

Erforth, Benedikt. 2020. “Multilateralism as a Tool: Exploring French Military Cooperation in 

the Sahel.” Journal of Strategic Studies 43 (4): 560–582. 

doi:10.1080/01402390.2020.1733986. 

European Commission. 2020a. “Communication from the Commission to the European 

Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social 

Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The EU Budget Powering the Recovery 

Plan for Europe.” May 25, 2020. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A442%3AFIN.  

———. 2020b. Towards a European Defence Union European Defence Industrial 

Development Programme 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/

en/fs_20_1076. 

European Commission and European Parliament. 2020. Transparency Register: Airbus. 

Accessed June 30, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/

displaylobbyist.do?id=2732167674-76. 

———. 2020. Transparency Register: Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. Accessed June 30, 2020. 

https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=524

127838990-69. 

———. 2020. Transparency Register: Rheinmetall. Accessed June 30, 2020. 

https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=708

107818892-23. 

———. 2020. Transparency Register: ThyssenKrupp. Accessed June 30, 2020. 

https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=456

211534646-58. 

EDA (European Defence Agency). 2018. Capability Development Plan. 

https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-06-28-

factsheet_cdpb020b03fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f. 

European External Action Service (EEAS). 2018. Factsheet: The Military Planning and 

Conduct Capability (MPCC). https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/

mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf. 

———. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the 

European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/

eugs_review_web_0.pdf. 

Fabbrini, Sergio. 2014. “The European Union and the Libyan Crisis.” International Politics 

51 (2): 177–195. doi:10.1057/ip.2014.2. 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A442%3AFIN
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A442%3AFIN
https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-06-28-factsheet_cdpb020b03fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f
https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-06-28-factsheet_cdpb020b03fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf


47              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Fiott, Daniel. 2020. “Uncharted Territory? Towards A Common Threat Analysis and A 

Strategic Compass for EU Security and Defence.” European Union Institute for Security 

Studies.https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/

Brief%2016%20Strategic%20Compass_0.pdf. 

Foot, Daniel, Antonio Missiroli, and Thierry Tardy. 2017. “Permanent Structured Cooperation: 

What’s in a name?” European Union Institute for Security Studies: Chaillot Papers (142) 

https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_142_ONLINE.pdf. 

Franke, Ulrike, and Tara Varma. 2019. “Independence Play: Europe’s Pursuit of Strategic 

Autonomy.” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 18, 2019. 

https://ecfr.eu/special/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy/. 

Guay, Terrence R. 1997. “The European Union, Expansion of Policy-making, and Defense 

Industrial Policy.” Journal of European Public Policy 4 (3), 404–421. 

doi.org/10.1080/13501769780000071.  

Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Schreer. 2012. “Towards a ‘Post-American’ Alliance? NATO 

Burden-Sharing after Libya.” International affairs 88 (2): 313–327. doi:10.1111/j.1468-

2346.2012.01073.x. 

Haroche, Pierre. 2017.” Interdependence, Asymmetric Crises and European Defence 

Cooperation.” European Security 26 (2): 226–252. doi:10.1080/09662839.2017.1294579. 

———. 2018. “France, Poland and the Relaunch of EU Defence Cooperation.” In France and 

Poland: Facing the Evolution of the Security Environment, edited by Barbara Jankowski 

and Amélie Zima, 77–84.  Issue 59. Paris: Institut de Recherche Stratégique et de l’École 

Militaire (IRSEM). 

Hodge, Carl Cavanagh. 2013. “Full circle: two decades of NATO intervention.” Journal of 

Transatlantic Studies 11 (4): 350–367. doi:10.1080/14794012.2013.843883. 

Hoeffler, Cathrine. 2019. “Differentiated Integration in CSDP Through Defence Market 

Integration.” European Review of International Studies 6 (2): 43–70. 

Hoffmann, Stanley. 2000. “Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?” 

Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (2): 189–198. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00216. 

Hollis, Rosemary. 2012. “No Friend of Democratization: Europe’s Role in the Genesis of the 

‘Arab Spring.’” International affairs 88 (1): 81–94. doi:10.1111/j.1468-

2346.2012.01058.x. 

Howorth, Jolyon. 2018. “Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation: threat or opportunity 

for transatlantic defence relations?” Journal of European Integration: Transatlantic 

Relations in Times of Uncertainty: Crises and EU-US Relations 40 (5): 523–537. 

doi:10.1080/07036337.2018.1512268. 



48              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

———. 2019a. “Differentiation in security and defence policy.” Comparative European 

Politics. 17 (2), 261–277. doi:10.1057/s41295-019-00161-w. 

———. 2019b. “European defence policy and subsidiarity: The imperative of the EU level.” 

European View 18 (1): 62–70. doi:10.1177/1781685819838431. 

Hyde-Price, Adrian. 2006. “‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique.” Journal of European 

Public Policy 13 (2): 217–234. doi:10.1080/13501760500451634. 

Irish, John, and Robin Emmott. 2020. "France-Turkey tensions mount after NATO naval 

incident." Reuters, July 7, 2020. Accessed June 30. 2021. 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-france-turkey-analysis-idUSKBN2481K5. 

Jolly, Édouard, and Colonel Olivier Passot. 2018. “Instability and Uncertainty. Strategic 

Review of Security and Defence Challenges from a French Perspective” In France and 

Poland: Facing the Evolution of the Security Environment, edited by Barbara Jankowski 

and Amélie Zima, 37-38. Issue 59. Paris: Institut de Recherche Stratégique et de l’École 

Militaire (IRSEM). 

Jones, Seth. 2003. “The European Union and the Security Dilemma.” Security studies 12 (3), 

114–156. doi:10.1080/09636410390443107. 

Jonnet, Edouard. 2020. “Common Naval Bases for European Navies.” Institut de Recherche 

Stratégique de L’école Militaire. https://www.irsem.fr/data/files/irsem/documents/

document/file/3271/RP%20IRSEM%2092%20-%20Jonnet%20-

%20Common%20naval%20bases.pdf. 

Kleczka, Mitja, Caroline Buts, and Marc Jegers. 2020. “Addressing the ‘headwinds’ faced by 

the European arms industry.” Defense & Security Analysis 36 (2): 129–160. 

Klose, Stephan. 2018. “Theorizing the EU’s Actorness: Towards an Interactionist Role Theory 

Framework.” Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (5): 1144–1160. 

doi:10.1111/jcms.12725. 

Kluth, Michael. 2017. “European defence industry consolidation and domestic procurement 

bias.” Defence & Security Analysis 33 (2): 158–173. 

doi:10.1080/14751798.2017.1302576. 

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2016. “The Politicization of European Integration.” Journal of Common 

Market Studies 54: 32–47. doi:10.1111/jcms.12406. 

Kuperman, Alan. 2013. “Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene.” Quarterly Journal: 

International Security. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/

Kuperman%20policy%20brief%20published%20version%202.pdf. 

Le Monde. 2014. “Pourquoi la vente de Mistral à la Russie embarrasse la France” [Why the sale 

of the Mistral to Russia embarrasses France]. July 22, 2014. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-france-turkey-analysis-idUSKBN2481K5


49              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2014/07/22/pourquoi-la-france-est-

embarrassee-par-la-vente-de-mistral-a-la-russie_4461142_4355770.html. 

Limnell, Jarno 2018. “Russian Cyber Activities in the EU.” In Hacks, Leaks and Disruptions: 

Russian Cyber Strategies, edited by Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru, 65–74. 

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). 

http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21140.10.  

Macron, Emmanuel. 2020. “Interview Granted to Le Grand Continent Magazine by the French 

President Emmanuel Macron.” November 16, 2020. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/11/16/interview-granted-to-le-grand-

continent-magazine-by-the-french-president-emmanuel-macron. 

Major, Claudia, and Christian Molling. 2019. “PeSCo: The German Perspective.” Armament 

Industry European Research Group. https://www.iris-france.org/wp-

content/uploads/2019/02/Ares-36.pdf. 

Makenzie, Christina. 2020. “Here’s what’s behind France’s 72 percent jump in weapons 

exports.” Defence News, March 10, 2020. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.defencenews.com/global/europe/2020/03/10/heres-whats-behind-frances-

72-jump-in-weapons-exports/. 

Manners, Ian, and Ben Rosamond. 2018. “A Different Europe is Possible: The 

Professionalization of EU Studies and the Dilemmas of Integration in the 21stCentury.” 

Journal of Common Market Studies. 5628–38. doi:10.1111/jcms.12771. 

Marcus, Jonathan. 2020. “Libya crisis: France Suspends NATO Mission Role Amid Turkey 

Row.” BBC. July 2, 2020. Accessed June 30, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-

europe-53262725". 

Maulny, Jean-Pierre, and Livia Di Bernardini. 2019. “Moving PeSCo forward: what are the next 

steps?” Armament Industry European Research Group. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ARES-39.pdf. 

Mawdsley, Jocelyn. 2019. “Armaments decision-making: Are European states really different?” 

Comparative strategy 37 (4): 260–271. doi:10.1080/01495933.2018.1497319. 

Mcnamara, Kathleen. 2018. “Authority Under Construction: The European Union in 

Comparative Political Perspective.” Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (7): 1510–

1525. doi:10.1111/jcms.12784. 

Menon, Rajan. 2020. “The Sorry State of Germany’s Armed Forces.” Foreign Policy, June 18, 

2020. Accessed June 30, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/18/trump-withdraw-

troops-germany-military-spending/. 

Meyer, Christoph. 2006. “The quest for a European strategic culture: changing norms on 

security and defence in the European Union.” London: Palgrave MacMillan. 



50              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Baun, Michael, and Dan Marek. 2019. “Making Europe Defend Again: The Relaunch of 

European Defence Cooperation from a Neoclassical Realist Perspective.” Mezinárodní 

vztahy 54 (4): 27–46. 

Ministère des Armées. 2021. “Dispositif opérationnel français déployé à travers le monde” 

[French operational system deployed throughout the world]. June 15, 2021. Accessed 

June 30, 2021. https://www.defence.gouv.fr/operations/rubriques_complementaires/

carte-des-operations-et-missions-militaire. 

Moldovan, Anton-Gabriel. 2018. “Poland’s National Security Policy in A New Regional 

Security Environment. Case Study: National Security Strategy of Poland (2014).” Torun 

International Studies 1 (11): 89–102. 

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 

Intergovernmentalist Approach.” Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (4): 473–524. 

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x. 

———. 2018. “Preferences, Power and Institutions in 21st-century Europe.” Journal of 

Common Market Studies 56 (7): 1648-1674. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12804. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2020. “NATO 2030: United for a New Era.” 

November 25, 2020. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/

pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf. 

Ojanen, Hanna. 2006. “The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence 

Policy.” Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (1): 57–76. doi:10.1111/j.1468-

5965.2006.00614.x. 

Parker, A. 2016. “Donald Trump Says NATO is ‘Obsolete,’ UN is ‘Political Game’.” The New 

York Times, April 2, 2016. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/04/02/donald-trump-tells-crowd-hed-

be-fine-if-nato-broke-up/. 

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Secretariat. 2021. “EUFOR Crisis Response 

Operation Core (EUFOR CROC).” Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://pesco.europa.eu/project/eufor-crisis-response-operation-core/. 

Peterson, John. 2018. “Present at the Destruction? The Liberal Order in the Trump Era.” The 

International spectator 53 (1): 28–44. doi:10.1080/03932729.2018.1421295. 

Polyakova, Alina, and Benjamin Haddad. 2019. “Europe Alone What Comes After the 

Transatlantic Alliance.” Foreign affairs 98 (4): 109–120. 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2019-06-11/europe-alone.  

Posen, Barry. 2004. “ESDP and the structure of world power.” The International spectator 39 

(1), 5–17: doi:10.1080/03932720408457057. 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2019-06-11/europe-alone


51              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

President of the Republic of Poland. 2020. “National Security Strategy of The Republic of 

Poland.” Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej. Warsaw, May 12. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Republic_of

_Poland_2020.pdf. 

Putin, Vladimir. 2007. “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on 

Security Policy.” Munich, February 10. Accessed June 15, 2022. 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/copy/24034. 

Ratti, Lucca. 2006. “Post-cold War NATO and International Relations Theory: The Case for 

Neo-Classical Realism.” Journal of transatlantic studies 4 (1): 81–110. 

doi:10.1080/14794010608656841. 

Rehrl, Jochen, ed. 2021. “Handbook On CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of 

the European Union.” European Security and Defence College. ISBN: 978-3-902275-51-

6. 

Roussy, Caroline. 2021. “Fin de l’opération Barkhane : une étonnante convergence avec 

l’agenda présidentiel français?” [End of Operation Barkhane: a surprising convergence 

with the French presidential agenda?] Institut de Relations Internationales et 

Stratégiques. June 24, 2021. Accessed June 30, 2021. https://www.iris-

france.org/158618-fin-de-loperation-barkhane-une-etonnante-convergence-avec-

lagenda-presidentiel-francais/. 

Rufanges, Calvo Jordi Xifra, and Almiron Núria. 2016. “The Arms Industry Lobby in Europe.” 

American Behavioral Scientist 60 (3), 305–320: doi:10.1177/0002764215613406. 

Rynning, Sten. 2011. Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy. Journal of 

Common Market Studies 49 (1), 23–42: doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02127.x. 

Safran. 2021. “Structure du capital et des droits de vote” [Ownership structure and voting rights] 

April 30, 2021. Accessed June 30, 2021. https://www.safran-group.com/fr/finance/action-

safran/structure-du-capital-et-des-droits-de-vote.  

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2019. “The Choice for Differentiated Europe: An Intergovernmentalist 

Theoretical Framework.” Comparative European Politics 17 (2): 176–191. 

doi:10.1057/s41295-019-00166-5. 

Silove, Nina. 2016. “The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance 

in Asia.” International Security 40 (4): 45–88. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00238. 

Simon, Luis, and Vivien Pertusot. 2017. “Making sense of Europe’s Southern Neighbourhood: 

Main Geopolitical and Security Parameters.” Institut français des relations 

internationales. ARI 10/2017. Accessed June 15, 2022. https://www.ifri.org/en/

publications/publications-ifri/making-sense-europes-southern-neighbourhood-main-

geopolitical-and. 



52              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Sprenger, Sebastian. 2020. “Germany wants to Beef Up Its Defence Firms with Pandemic Relief 

Funds.” Defence News, June 10, 2020. Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.defencenews.com/global/europe/2020/06/10/germany-wants-to-beef-up-its-

defence-firms-with-pandemic-relief-funds/. 

Stanicek, Branislav. 2020. “Turkey: Remodelling the Eastern Mediterranean Conflicting 

Exploration of Natural Gas Reserves.” European Parliamentary Research Service. PE 

652.048. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652048/

EPRS_BRI(2020)652048_EN.pdf. 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2020. “The SIPRI Top 100 Arms‐

producing And Military Services Companies, 2020.” December. 

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/fs_2112_top_100_2020.pdf.  

———. 2022. “Summary: SIPRI Yearbook 2022: Armaments, Disarmaments, and 

International Security.” Stockholm. Accessed July, 2022. 

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/yb22_summary_en_v3.pdf 

Svendsen, Øyvind. 2019. “Brexit and the future of EU defence: a practice approach to 

differentiated defence integration.” Journal of European Integration 41 (8): 993–1007. 

doi:10.1080/07036337.2019.1622540. 

Szymańska, Jolanta. 2017. “Poland’s Policy in the European Union.” In Yearbook of Polish 

Foreign Policy, edited by Sławomir Dębski and Karol Wasilewski. Polish Institute of 

International Affairs, 53-68. https://pism.pl/publications/

Yearbook_of_Polish_Foreign_Policy_2017. 

Taylor, Paul. 2015. "EU 'Ring of Friends' Turns into Ring of Fire." Reuters. September 27, 

2015. Accessed June 30, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-

neighbourhood-analysi-idUSKCN0RR09020150927. 

Terlikowski, Marcin. 2017. “Defence and Industrial Policy in Poland: Drivers and Influence.” 

Armament Industry European Research Group. https://www.iris-france.org/wp-

content/uploads/2017/07/Ares_Defence_Industrial_Policy_in_Poland_July_2017.pdf. 

——— . 2018. “PeSCo THE POLISH PERSPECTIVE, Policy Paper.” Armament Industry 

European Research Group. https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/

10/Ares-32.pdf. 

——— . 2021. “Poland.” In Collective Collapse or Resilience? European Defence Priorities in 

the Pandemic Era, edited by Corentin Brustlein, 65-74. Focus Stratégique, French 

Institute of International Relations, 103. https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-

lifri/focus-strategique/collective-collapse-or-resilience-european-defense. 

Thales Group. 2021. “Share and Shareholding 2021.” Accessed June 30, 2021. 

https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/investor/retail-investors/share-and-shareholding. 



53              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

The White House. 2017. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” October 

12, 2017. White House Press Team. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-

content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 

Tomat, Stefano. 2021. “EU Foreign Policy Coherence in Times of Crises: The Integrated 

Approach.” European Foreign Affairs Review 26 (1): 149-156. 

Transparency International Defense and Security (TIDS). 2020. “Defense Industry Influence 

in Germany Analysing Defense Industry Influence on the German Policy Agenda.” 

Transparency International Defense & Security. https://ti-defense.org/publications/

defense-industry-influence-germany/. 

Verdun, Amy. 2018. “Theories of European Integration and Governance.” In European Union 

Governance and Policy Making: A Canadian Perspective, edited by Emmanuel Brunet-

Jailly, Achim Hurrelmann, and Amy Verdun, 106-124. Toronto: University of Toronto 

Press. 

Walt, Stephen 2009. “Alliances in a Unipolar World.” World politics 61 (1): 86–120. 

doi:10.1017/S0043887109000045. 

Zima, Amélie. 2018. “NATO After the Warsaw Summit: Back to Basics?” In France and 

Poland: Facing the Evolution of the Security Environment, edited by Barbara Jankowski 

and Amélie Zima, 41-50. Issue 59. Paris: Institut de Recherche Stratégique et de l’École 

Militaire (IRSEM). 

Interviews (Conducted Virtually) 

• Interview with EU Official (a), November 26, 2020. 

• Interview with EU Official (b), December 10, 2020. 

• Interview with EU Official (c), December 9, 2020. 

• Interview with EU Official (d), December 14, 2020. 

• Interview with EU Official (e), November 24, 2020. 

• Interview with EU Official (f), November 21, 2020. 

• Interview with German Official (a), November 19, 2020. 

• Interview with German Official (b), November 19, 2020. 

• Interview with German Official (c), November 19, 2020. 

• Interview with Polish Official, January 29, 2021. 

 



54              Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Published by the Centre for European Studies at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada 

Available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index 

 

The Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies (CJERS – formerly Review of 

European and Russian Affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: 

articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. Topics relate to the European Union, its 

Member States, the former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe. The journal is 

published by the Centre for European Studies, an associated unit of the Institute of European, 

Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University. 

CJERS aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high 

quality research and scholarship.  

Contact: 

Carleton University 

The Centre for European Studies 

1103 Dunton Tower 

1125 Colonel By Drive 

Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 

Canada 

E-mail: CJERS@carleton.ca 

Creative Commons License 

 

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 

This Working Paper is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial- 

No Derivs 4.0 Unported License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).  

Articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the 

source is acknowledged. No use of this publication may be made for resale or other 

commercial purposes. 

ISSN: 2562-8429 

© 2019 The Author(s) 

 

https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index
mailto:CJERS@carleton.ca
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

