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  ISSN 2562-8429 

 

 

 

 

 

Russia-Canada Relations in a Period of Crisis, 2014-2020  

 

Natalia Viakhireva1 

 Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)  

 

 

Abstract 

This article explores the state of Russian-Canadian relations from 2014 to 2020, identifying areas 

where cooperation is still possible. Russian-Canadian bilateral relations are deeply affected by the 

crisis in Russia-West relations and are at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Despite 

the sanctions and accusatory rhetoric from politicians on both sides, ‘niche cooperation’ between 

the two countries is still possible in areas of common interest. Cooperation on non-political issues 

and the use of instruments of alternative diplomacy – Track II diplomacy, para-diplomacy, 

business diplomacy, and parliamentary diplomacy – are all workable approaches, with the 

potential for positive interactions during the crisis. One very promising area of cooperation is 

interaction in the Arctic region through bilateral and multilateral frameworks.  

 

  

 

1 Natalia Viakhireva is an expert and program manager at Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). 



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Introduction 

Political relations between Russia and Canada from 2014 to 2020 show that bilateral relations have 

been affected by the crisis in Russia-West relations and limited by a war of sanctions and 

accusatory rhetoric from both sides. In Canada, mainstream political discourse does not support 

dialogue with Russia, while in Russia, Canada itself and Russian-Canadian relations are not among 

central topics of political discourse and research. This makes the search for a common dialogue 

complicated. Yet dialogue is important to avoid a new Cold War (Westdal 2016), and effective 

diplomacy means first of all “detoxifying” the crisis (Kinsman 2018) and engaging with those 

countries one may disagree with on a number of issues. This article contributes to a better 

understanding of complex bilateral relations between Russia and Canada, and assesses whether 

there are areas where niche cooperation may be feasible, even in light of the continuing tensions 

between the two countries over fundamental issues. 

This article first discusses the current Russia-West crisis, where relations began deteriorating 

before the Ukraine crisis of 2014. Disagreements ran much deeper than different approaches to 

resolving the situations in Ukraine and Syria, however, the Ukraine crisis remains a significant 

turning point in relations between Russia and Western nations (Ivanov 2019), including Canada, 

and still poses an additional obstacle to interactions on a wide range of issues. 

Secondly, the article focuses on the state of Russian-Canadian relations. Here, Canadian policy 

toward Russia is highlighted, as Russia has been mainly reactive in bilateral relations. In turn, 

Canadian policy is a result of global Russian actions, which are not aligned with the Canadian 

vision of the ’rule-based international order.’  

The article then examines the positions of Russia and Canada on international events occurring 

between 2014 and 2020, such as the Skripal case and the Kerch incident, and the resulting 

deterioration of Russian-Canadian relations. Differences in the estimation, perception, and 

interpretation of these events by the two sides are identified, and effort is made to take Russian 

and Canadian perspectives into account. This article does not seek to investigate the controversial 

cases or incidents themselves, nor to assign blame for the current impasse, but rather to consider 

how those situations have affected the further development of bilateral relations. This article also 

examines attempts at rapprochement through discussion about inviting Russia back to the G8 and 

PACE, as well as Russia’s and Canada’s position and perspective on these matters.  

This article focuses on areas where the potential for bilateral Russian-Canadian relations exists 

and provides a forward-looking vision for the relationship that might guide efforts to better serve 

both Canadian and Russian national interests. Given the current conditions, niche cooperation is 

possible in areas where both sides can find common interests. Cooperation on non-political issues, 

using instruments of alternative diplomacy, is a viable approach. A promising area of Russian-

Canadian cooperation is interaction in the Arctic region, which remains the area least affected by 

the crisis.  

 



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The Decline of Russia-West Relations as a Precondition for the Deterioration in Russian-

Canadian Relations 

The root of the problem in Russia-West relations lies in the fundamental difference in how Russia 

and the West approach key issues of world order. As Russian political scientist Kortunov (2019b) 

argues, Russia and the West have a different understanding of “what is fair and what is unfair in 

modern world politics? What is legitimate and what is not?” They also have different perceptions 

of the foundations of European and Euro-Atlantic security. NATO enlargement, which Russia has 

opposed since the early 1990s, was one of the main stumbling blocks in relations even before the 

Ukraine crisis. The Kremlin has consistently claimed that NATO’s eastward movement threatens 

Russian security and that the alliance’s central role in European security has marginalized Russia 

as a non-member (Rumer and Sokolsky 2019). On the other hand, Canada perceives NATO as a 

major contributor to international peace and security and as the cornerstone of Canadian security 

and defence policy (Government of Canada 2020c). As one of the founding states of NATO, 

Canada has been an important and committed member of the Alliance. It has constantly supported 

the major post-Cold War transformations in the organization: membership enlargement and 

functional expansion (Bratt 2007, 246). Canada also officially approved the plan for the accession 

of new members at the NATO summit in Madrid in 1997. 

In 2008, the NATO Secretary-General promised membership to Ukraine and Georgia (Brunnstrom 

and Cornwell 2008), which Russia perceived as crossing a line by bringing the alliance too close 

to Russian borders. At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Prime Minister Harper voiced his support for 

their membership (Government of Canada 2008). However, other NATO members, such as France 

and Germany, have been more cautious about supporting Ukraine’s bid to join the Alliance (CTV 

2008). Canada’s position in favour of supporting Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO opposed 

Russia’s stance, as well as its position on supporting Georgia in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 

2008 (Westdal 2012) over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  

Major disagreements between Russia and the West also have included Western support for the 

‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 (Rumer and 

Sokolsky 2019). Russian officials saw support for the colour revolutions as reflecting the intention 

of the US, Canada, and other Western allies to retain their predominant position in the international 

system, thus ensuring their “global leadership” (Lavrov 2016). The Western countries perceived 

their own actions as part of the process of democracy promotion in post-Soviet countries. Canadian 

scholars Paquin and Beauregard, in their analysis of the foreign crises that occurred between 2004 

and 2011 in the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, argue that with 

regard to these crises Canada’s foreign policy alignment primarily tends toward a transatlantic 

orientation (2013, 618). In most cases, Canada has aligned its position with that of the US or its 

main European partners (2013, 637). Paquin and Beauregard also conclude that the defense and 

promotion of democracy were important values for Ottawa between 2004 and 2011 (2013, 632-

33).  

Therefore, differing perceptions and assessments of NATO enlargement and the promotion of 

democracy have contributed to the impasse in Russia-West relations in recent decades 

(MacFarlane 2016, 354). Another development that has led to the downturn in relations has been 

the change in Russia’s strategic culture. Russia wanted to re-establish its position as a key global 

actor and pre-eminent regional power in Eurasia. This change was partly a response to the West’s 

expansion into the post-Soviet space (Kanet 2019, 1, 4).  



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Russian and Western approaches to resolving the crisis in the Middle East after the ‘Arab Spring’ 

of 2011 and the conflict in Syria also differed (Tasker 2015). Moscow viewed the Arab Spring and 

the subsequent instability in Egypt, Libya, and Syria as a continuation of the colour revolutions in 

Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow also thought that attempts by the US and NATO to change regimes 

across the world were a threat to Russia (Tsygankov 2018). These developments have challenged 

Russian views of its status in the international system (MacFarlane 2016, 354). Western countries 

perceived the processes in the Middle East as promotion of democracy. Paquin argues that Canada 

aligned its strategy with that of the US throughout the Arab Spring (2012, 1019). However, there 

were some significant differences in official statements from Ottawa and Washington. The Harper 

government did not always emphasize the same themes, values, and principles as the US when 

responding to these foreign crises. For instance, Ottawa was consistently more concerned than 

Washington with the issue of stability in the Middle East (Paquin 2012, 1003).  

With this context in mind, a major deterioration in the Russian-Canadian relationship was spurred 

by the Ukraine crisis of 2014. Russia and the West, including Canada, do not agree on the causes 

of the Ukraine crisis, nor on how to resolve it. From the perspective of Canada and the West, the 

crisis is a result of “Russian ‘aggression,’ which started in 2014 with the ‘illegal invasion and 

occupation’ of Crimea, and has drawn Ukraine into a bloody conflict in the east of the country” 

(Government of Canada 2020b). This Canadian position views Russia’s actions as a violation of 

international law and of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. 

Russian officials see the causes of the Ukraine crisis as more complex and rooted in the Ukrainian 

state, thus assessing it as an internal conflict (Ivanov 2014). In a nutshell, Moscow depicts the 

Ukraine crisis as a result of corruption and weak institutions in Ukraine and biased Western policy. 

As European and Russian scholars, Fischer and Timofeev (2018) argue, Russia views the February 

2014 revolutionary changes of power in Kiev as an unconstitutional coup supported by the West. 

Moscow also suspected that the new political leaders in Ukraine were proponents of NATO 

membership and wanted closer security ties with the West, all at the expense of Russia’s security. 

Russia and the West apply different categories to characterize the change of status of Crimea. In 

Russia it is called “reunification,” while in the West the term “annexation” is used (Fischer and 

Timofeev 2018).2  

The above-mentioned conflicts, perceptions, misperceptions, and narratives have negatively 

influenced bilateral relations. Several Canadian international programs that had been successfully 

implemented in Russia have been curtailed. In particular, technical cooperation programs and the 

Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction have been 

discontinued. After the US, Canada was among the first Western countries to impose sanctions on 

Russia in 2014. According to the Government of Canada, this was done “in order to respond to the 

gravity of Russia’s violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine,” and sanctions 

extended to the financial, defence, and oil and gas sectors (Government of Canada 2020a).  

While areas of tension existed before 2014, as discussed above, former Foreign Service officer 

Breton and a Canadian scholar Dutkiewicz (2020) note that there were positive developments in 

 

2 Since Russia and the West apply different categories to characterize the change of status of Crimea (“reunification” 

vs. “annexation”), the author of this article puts both terms in quotation marks when speaking about the Russian and 

the Canadian views. 



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the pre-2014 period within areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. Thus, it would be reasonable 

to keep the relations at least at a ‘low level’ of cooperation in niche areas where both sides can 

find common interests. As long as such fundamental differences persist, the only possibility is to 

minimize confrontations (Kortunov 2019b). Ivanov (2019), former Minister of Foreign Affairs of 

Russia, argues that discussion of the Ukraine agenda and wider world issues should be a parallel 

rather than sequential process. The question of how to rebuild a cooperative Russia-West 

relationship, therefore, remains open. A minimum goal is managing the confrontation. While the 

space for manoeuvring remains limited, niche cooperation seems possible. 

 

Russian-Canadian Relations at the Political Level 2015-2020 

In light of the above-mentioned and other issues, Russian-Canadian bilateral relations are taking 

place against a difficult backdrop and are at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. The 

regime of sanctions between the two countries remains at the forefront, as well as the harsh rhetoric 

from both sides. From a Canadian perspective, Russia is not a like-minded country. From a Russian 

perspective, Canada is currently seen as one of the Western leaders of the “anti-Russian crusade” 

(Breton and Dutkiewicz 2020).   

Liberal Government of Canada, 1st Term, 2015-2019 

Following the federal election of 2015, steps taken by the Liberal Party and the Government of 

Canada, as well as by former Canadian politicians, led Russian politicians to hope for a ‘warming’ 

in bilateral relations (RIA 2016).3 Several Canadian former politicians, diplomats, and business 

representatives supported the idea of dialogue with Russia, among them Jean Chrétien, former 

Prime Minister of Canada, and Christopher Westdal and Jeremy Kinsman, both former Canadian 

ambassadors to Russia (Chase 2015; Westdal 2016; Kinsman 2018). In 2016, Russian Minister of 

Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, said of Justin Trudeau and his colleagues, “we can expect that 

there will be opportunities to set our bilateral relations straight. […] the election rhetoric and the 

rhetoric of the new government indicate that they are ready to resume a dialogue on international 

issues and restore bilateral cooperation” (Mid.ru 2016). Lavrov’s statement probably referred to a 

meeting of Chrétien and Putin in 2015, and to the views of Canadian Foreign Minister, Stéphane 

Dion, who was appointed after the 2015 federal elections. Dion called for constructive engagement 

with Russia, recalling that Canada was speaking to the Russians even during the difficult Cold 

War era. However, due to the policies of the former (Conservative) government from 2006 to 

2015, Russian-Canadian interactions had been interrupted. According to Dion, while Canada 

would always stand with Ukraine, it was time to start working with Russia “when we have common 

interests” (Zimonjic 2016). Westdal (2016), in an opinion article for the Globe and Mail, stated 

that “we seek re-engagement with Russia […] to serve major, compelling Canadian national 

security interests in Eurasia, the Middle East and far beyond. We do so to try to turn the rising tide 

of a new Cold War, […] to stop the ruinous tug of war for Ukraine, […] to cooperate in the Arctic 

[…] to do business.”  

 

3 All translations from Russian are made by the author of the article.  



35                               Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 
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However, this was a short period of good intentions and no positive shift followed. The idea of 

dialogue was a marginal position of individuals in Canada, as well as wishful thinking on the part 

of Russian officials. Much-anticipated concrete measures and practical steps leading to 

rapprochement were not taken by either side, although there remained analysts in Russia who 

expected ‘warmer’ relations (Issraelyan 2017, 358). A benchmark for them was the non-adoption 

by the Canadians of the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, also known as the 

Canadian ‘Sergei Magnitysky Law’ because of its similarity to the Magnitysky Law adopted 

earlier in the US. Dion argued that this law, which the Liberals pledged to enact, would complicate 

efforts to re-engage with Russia and harm Canadians seeking to do business in Russia (Lum 2016). 

However, after Dion’s resignation, the Liberals brought the Magnitsky Law into force in October, 

2017. 

The Canadian Magnitsky Law includes targeted measures against foreign nationals who were 

responsible for or complicit in gross violations of human rights, or were public officials or 

associates of such officials who were responsible for or complicit in acts of significant corruption 

(Government of Canada 2019b). Moreover, the law permits the freezing of assets and the 

suspension of visas when officials from Russia and other nations are found to be guilty of human 

rights violations. Canadian firms are prohibited from dealing with foreign nationals who have 

grossly violated human rights.  

The shift from bad to worse in Russian-Canadian relations coincided with Donald Trump’s 

election in the US in November, 2016. Trump’s victory contributed essentially, though not 

decisively, to the end of a warming period in Russian-Canadian relations. Trudeau was rightly 

concerned about deteriorating relations with the US and carried out a rotation of the Cabinet in 

January, 2017. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dion, was replaced by a new minister, Chrystia 

Freeland, apparently selected by Trudeau because of her strong connections in the US (Macdonald 

2019). Relations with the US, Canada’s closest ally and most important economic and security 

partner, became the top priority and required most of the resources of the Canadian administration. 

Other international and foreign policy issues were sidelined. The new Cabinet turned out to be 

unfavourable for Russian-Canadian relations. 

Freeland is often called Trudeau’s trusted ally (Scherer and Ljunggren 2020; Vigliotti 2019). Her 

views may have partly contributed to the Prime Minister’s shift away from trying to mend relations 

with Russia. Colin Robertson (2020), a former Canadian diplomat, suggests that Freeland’s 

Ukrainian origin and heritage might be a reason for her anti-Russian beliefs. Freeland is not 

popular in Russia and is perceived as being committed to anti-Russian sentiments (Sidorova 2019, 

281). She was previously included in the Russian sanctions list and has the status of persona non 

grata, which may also influence her attitude to Russia. Dion’s sensible suggestions on relations 

with Russia were not picked up by Freeland (Robertson 2020), who supported the passage of the 

Sergei Magnitsky Law. In her statement, Freeland described the law as “a clear demonstration that 

Canada takes any and all necessary measures to respond to gross violations of human rights and 

acts of significant foreign corruption” (MacDolald 2017). Canadian lawyers and scholars Cotler 

and Silver (2020) argue that the Magnitsky Law represents the very best of Canadian human rights 

foreign policy, but according to Canadian scholars Carment and Belo (2017), the law caused 

Russia’s trust in Canada to deteriorate sharply. Even though sanctions had proven to be an 

ineffective instrument in forcing Russia to abandon its doctrines, particularly regarding Syria and 

Ukraine, Canada expanded its sanctions regime (Carment and Belo 2017). This led to Russia 



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imposing countersanctions. According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian 

authorities preferred to isolate themselves from Russia instead of developing mutually beneficial 

cooperation, and thus Canada lost more than it gained from the sanction measures (TASS 2017).  

Following these developments, it became clear that a ‘reset’ in Russian-Canadian relations would 

not happen soon, and the action-reaction dealings continued on both sides. The cases indicated 

below demonstrate further divergence between Russia and Canada.  

The poisoning of Sergei Skripal in the UK adversely affected Russian-Canadian relations.4 Russia 

was accused by several Western countries, including the UK, the US, Canada, and Germany of 

highly likely being responsible for the incident, using chemical weapons, and breaching its 

Chemical Weapons Convention obligations (Government of Canada 2018). The UK reacted to the 

incident with a series of measures, including the expulsion of Russian diplomats. Most EU 

countries, as well as the US, Canada, and Ukraine, also expelled Russian diplomats to show 

solidarity with the UK. Moscow denied the accusations and announced the expulsion of diplomats 

from its territory in retaliation. Russia and its Western counterparts differ in their interpretation of 

the Skripal case, and it is hard to judge the merits of the claims on either side due to lack of 

evidence (Kinsman 2018). But it is clear that the case provided the impetus for a new spike in the 

Russia-West crisis. Some of the direct results of this situation are impediments in embassy and 

consular services and visa processes from both sides, which affect people-to-people ties, tourism, 

cooperation, and exchanges in science, culture, and education between Russia and many Western 

countries, including Canada. According to Dutkiewicz (Harris 2018), there was a risk of a 

“significant blowback in the Canada-Russia relationship, especially in matters touching on the 

Arctic.” Luckily, the dialogue on the Arctic did not cease.  

The Kerch Strait incident in 2018 involving Ukrainian naval ships also led to divergent 

interpretations between Russia and its Western partners.5 Russia perceived the incident as a 

provocation from the Ukrainian side, whereas Ukraine and its Western supporters saw Russia’s 

actions as aggression against Ukraine. Along with the EU and the US, Canada announced new 

sanctions on 114 individuals and 15 entities (Government of Canada 2019a). In response, the 

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that “the Canadian authorities are playing their Russo-

phobic card” (Mid.ru 2019). The lack of political dialogue and transparency from both sides 

heightened misunderstandings.  

In 2019, Trump expressed his support for reinstating Russia into the G7, and French President, 

Emmanuel Macron agreed that Russia should be invited to the G7 summit in 2020 (Atwood and 

Klein 2019). Other members, such as the UK and Canada, reject this possibility (Thompson 2020). 

 

4 On March 4, 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and double agent for the UK’s intelligence 

services, and his daughter, Yulia Skripal, were poisoned in Salisbury, England, with a nerve agent of Novichok family. 

5 On November 25, 2018, Russian border guards detained two small armored artillery vessels “Berdyansk” and 

“Nikopol” in the Kerch Strait and the raid tugboat “Yana Kapu” of the Ukrainian Navy. On board the ships were 24 

servicemen of the Ukrainian Navy and two officers of the Security Service of Ukraine. It was alleged that they had 

illegally crossed the Russian border. Ukrainian sailors were arrested and detained until the exchange of detainees 

between Moscow and Kiev in September, 2019. In November, 2019, the Russian Federation handed over to Ukraine 

the ships detained a year earlier. However, Kiev intends to seek a guilty plea from Moscow, as well as compensation 

from Russia. 



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There is no unity within the G7 regarding conditions for Russia’s return. In the West, Moscow’s 

potential return is seen as a “reward for Russia’s good behaviour,” however in Moscow it is 

assumed that the G7 needs Russia, more than Russia needs the G7, in order for the group to solve 

serious problems in the international community (Kortunov 2019d, 31-32; Baunov 2019). As 

Kortunov argues, Russia would be interested in returning to the G7 only if there were significant 

changes in the foreign policy of at least some members (2019d, 32). However, Russian scholars 

highlight that there might be a joint interest in returning to the “G7+1” formula (Kortunov 2019a). 

Joining the G7 for discussion on problems of common interests, such as the digital economy, 

international tax reform, trade protectionism, and global inequality could be productive.  

In the summer of 2019, Russia was reinstated in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 

Europe (PACE) with French and German support (Mounier 2019). Kortunov (2019c) suggests 

those who argue about Russia’s membership in PACE can be divided into two groups: 

“pragmatists” and “skeptics.” From a pragmatic perspective, Russia’s membership in PACE opens 

a platform for dialogue, which should not be neglected when there are not enough communication 

lines between Moscow and Western capitals. However, skeptics do not believe Russia’s 

participation will be constructive. In their opinion, the Russian delegation to PACE will use the 

Assembly mainly to promote “Kremlin propaganda” (Kortunov 2019c). Canada took the position 

of the skeptics on this issue, supporting Ukraine’s dissatisfaction with the decision. If the goal is 

conflict resolution and stability in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic space, this refusal to open the 

channels of communication may be counter-productive. 

The Russian Question in the 2019 Federal Election Campaign and Post-election Period 

The “Russian question” was raised in Canadian political discourse shortly before the 2019 federal 

election in Canada, as Russia, as well as China and North Korea, were suspected of possible 

election interference (Reuters 2019; TASS 2019). A University of Calgary study identified 

Russia’s interest in competing against Canada in the Arctic as a reason for such interference, 

although no evidence was identified (Blanchfield 2019). Unlike in some Western countries, the 

Russian issue was not central to Canada’s federal election campaign in 2019. The party leaders 

touched upon the theme of Russia in the framework of Arctic security and development, and the 

crisis in Ukraine. The election campaign of 2019 showed the positions of the main Canadian party 

leaders on Russia: in their comments in election debates, all of them maintained a mostly negative 

attitude toward the idea of dialogue with Russia (Dzsurdzsa 2019; Glavin 2019; NDP 2018). As a 

result, even in a minority Liberal government, a positive shift in the Russia-Canada agenda is very 

unlikely to take place. Shortly after re-election, Trudeau reaffirmed Canada’s strategy toward 

Russia in a speech at a ‘NATO Engages’ event in December, 2019, stating that NATO must engage 

with Putin from a position of strength rather than one of compromise, and he characterized Russia 

as “a significant challenge” (Brennan 2019).  

Nonetheless, there are voices in Canada calling for a renewed dialogue with Russia. For example, 

the international relations analyst Jocelyn Coulon has argued that, “Canada had every reason to 

impose sanctions on Moscow for its actions in Ukraine, but there was no reason to freeze all 

relations with Russia” (2019b). He points out that it is often forgotten that Canada has just two 

neighbours – the United States and Russia – both of whom are great powers. Therefore, in his 

view, it would be desirable for Canada to have a productive relationship with Moscow (2019b).  



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In its foreign policy, Canada considers the views of the US and NATO allies. Despite the growing 

difficulties in Canada-America relations during Trump’s tenure in the White House, the US has 

remained Canada’s closest partner (Blank and Gattinger 2017, 83, 95). It can be said that the state 

of Russia-US and Russia-NATO relations has some effect on the development of relations between 

Russia and Canada. Canadian scholars Murray and Rioux (2020) argue that Canada should become 

more independent in the world and define a foreign policy that is less dependent on the US and 

more reflective of the emerging international order. According to Canadian scholars Sands and 

Carment, there are two countries which Canada must get along with – Russia and China. Canada’s 

Arctic interests intersect with Russia’s, and its economic interests require cooperation with China 

(2019, 286). 

Several factors influence Canada’s policy toward Russia, primarily disagreement with Russia’s 

actions worldwide, which in many cases are not in line with the Canadian vision of the rule-based 

international order. It can be argued, however, that Russia’s policy toward Canada on a wide range 

of issues is primarily reactive, as there is no direct conflict between the two countries. Since 2014, 

Russia’s approach has been reduced to retaliatory measures against the sanctions imposed by 

Canada. According to some Canadian scholars, such as Murray and Rioux (2020) and Fisher 

(2020), at the moment, Canada has no clear vision for its foreign policy. An absence of a coherent 

foreign policy may partly explain the lack of a clear sense of Canada’s future relations with Russia. 

Murray and Rioux (2020) underline the need to review and define Canada’s national interests, as 

well as long-term trade and economic objectives. Fisher (2020) has claimed that Canada is 

missing “a well-defined vision of what Ottawa hopes to achieve and [in] what direction 

Canada is headed.” Instead, Canada is intending to lead in “revitalizing the rules -based 

international order” (2020). Murray and Rioux (2020) emphasize that Canada has an important 

role to play in global affairs, but only with a substantive review of its foreign policy.  

Canada’s current strategy demonstrates the huge importance of the Ukrainian factor on the 

country’s foreign policy. This can be partially explained by the presence of a large, active 

Ukrainian diaspora in Canada of 1.2 million people. The country’s leaders would not want to lose 

the support of this part of the population. However, Coulon (2019a), for one, insists that foreign 

policy “is not intended to promote particularism, although it is tempting for political parties to woo 

the vote of ethnic communities. But the defence of the national interest demands a cold and 

dispassionate look at the affairs of the world.” At the same time, damage from the low level of 

development of Russian-Canadian political and economic relations is assessed as insignificant for 

both the Russian and Canadian economies (Nemova and Issraelyan 2019, 373). The search for 

ways to establish political relations is, therefore, not among foreign policy priorities on either the 

Russian or the Canadian side.  

However, restoration of relations is important for several reasons. As Paikin (2018), international 

relations scholar and policy analyst, argues, stronger relations between Ottawa and Moscow are 

essential, not only if Canada wishes to manage its northern border, but also if Canada is genuinely 

interested in building a new international order in this century, rather than being a mere bystander 

operating on terms set by other countries. Without participation and dialogue with Russia, there 

will be no resolution of several international issues. In turn, Russia has expressed interest in a 

dialogue with Western countries, including Canada, which would help to increase the level of 

stability and predictability in international relations. Additionally, business circles in both 

countries have expressed an interest in cooperation.  



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Alternative Diplomacies and Cooperation on Artic Development 

As the analysis so far demonstrates, Russian-Canadian relations continue to cool, and the space 

for cooperation is becoming narrower, as neither Russia nor Canada is making any active attempt 

to restart a political dialogue. In these conditions, niche areas for cooperation become important, 

such as cooperation on Arctic development. Similarly, it may be worth exploring increased roles 

for alternative diplomacy, including Track II diplomacy, science diplomacy, parliamentary 

diplomacy, business diplomacy, and para-diplomacy. 

Track II diplomacy  

Montville defines Track II diplomacy as “unofficial, informal interaction between members of 

adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize 

human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict” (1991, 162). 

Academics and experts could take part in Track II level diplomacy, which is valuable in a time of 

crisis. Scholars from Canada and Russia are concerned over the lack of knowledge the two nations 

have about each other. Most Canadians and Russians lack understanding about one another, thus 

inhibiting better comprehension of past, present, and future drivers of competition and cooperation 

(Lackenbauer 2019, iv). Reciprocal academic contact and cooperation between Russia and Canada 

have significantly reduced since 2014, but it is important to maintain bilateral contacts to prevent 

an even greater failure in relations. At best, the goal of expert dialogue is to come to a consensus 

on the ways forward in different aspects of Russia-West relations, Russian-Canadian relations, and 

to work out recommendations for decision-makers on how to improve relations.  

One example is the conference, ‘Canada-Russia Dialogue and Cooperation in the Arctic’ hosted 

by Carleton University in November, 2016 and co-organized by Global Affairs Canada and the 

Embassy of Russia to Canada. The conference brought together diplomats, researchers from 

Canada and Russia, policymakers, government officials, businesspeople, and Indigenous leaders, 

and focused on the need for dialogue between Canada and Russia concerning the Arctic 

(Rubinstein 2016).  

Parliamentary diplomacy 

The Canada-Russia Parliamentary Association was established in 1998. In 2014, Ottawa 

suspended bilateral parliamentarian ties with Russia as a result of the Ukraine crisis. However, 

contacts between members of parliament (MPs) continue, particularly on issues related to the 

Arctic, and expanding parliamentary dialogue could serve as an effective mechanism for 

discussing spheres of common interest and potential cooperation. A good example of constructive 

inter-parliamentary cooperation is the Russian-French report on the prospects of relations jointly 

prepared by parliamentarians from both countries (Federation Council 2018). Parliamentarians 

from Canada and Russia could follow this example.  

Para-diplomacy  

The development of relations between the Canadian provinces and the Russian regions could 

contribute to improved relations between Moscow and Ottawa. This level of cooperation and 

diplomacy is defined by some experts as para-diplomacy, meaning the activities of subnational 

units abroad (Akimov 2018a, 25-33). These units have enough potential and capability to carry 

out independent policies abroad, even while remaining part of the nation. As Russian scholar 



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Akimov argues, parts of the Russian Federation and the Canadian provinces have accumulated 

extensive experience in developing bilateral contacts (2018b, 9). Despite political difficulties, 

regional cooperation can and should develop as there are specific common grounds for interaction.  

The most active in this field are the Canadian provinces of Quebec, British Columbia, Ontario, 

Manitoba, and Alberta, while on the Russian side, increasing interest in forging ties with Canadian 

counterparts has been shown by Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Republics of Tatarstan and Sakha 

(Yakutia), the territories of Krasnoyarsk and Krasnodar, and the regions of Primorye and 

Murmansk (The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada n.d.).  

Business diplomacy 

The Canada Eurasia Russia Business Association (CERBA) is working on promoting relations 

between Russian and Canadian companies. The Association unites over 200 corporations and its 

main goal is to improve and increase trade relations between Canada and Russia. According to the 

Association, cooperation between Canadian and Russian business did not stop with the outbreak 

of the “war of sanctions” (RCaBC 2020). In addition, business diplomacy activists are trying to 

deal with the phenomenon of self-sanctioning, when foreign companies that are not included in 

any sanctions list nevertheless prefer to voluntarily avoid business with Russia for fear of 

restrictions. Such self-sanctioning inhibits Canadian-Russian trade relations. Nathan Hunt, the 

CERBA Chairman of the Moscow Board of Directors and a co-founder of the RCaBC (Russia-

Canada Business Council), believes that business diplomacy has the potential to establish bilateral 

relations, and that active dialogue between business representatives can compensate for the lack 

of diplomatic communication at a high level. 

Although Russia’s policy toward Canada is mainly reactive, there are cases of Russian proactive 

behaviour. Russian business and industrial circles continue to support the activities of the RCaBC, 

which was established in 2004. The Canadian Co-Chairman Gilles Breton says, “both Canadian 

and Russian stakeholders are doing a great deal to keep the initiative alive and thriving. The 

RCaBC platform responds to real business needs and serves to advance the common economic 

and commercial interests of our two countries” (RCaBC 2020). Russian Co-Chairman Alisher 

Usmanov claims that despite the complexity of interstate relations, the Council has managed to 

protect dialogue and business cooperation in many areas (mining and metal manufacturing, energy, 

information and telecommunication technology, transport) and among the largest Russian and 

Canadian companies: Kinross Gold, Bombardier, Barrick Gold, Magna, ERM, Rosatom, 

Severstal, Alrosa, Rostselmash, and Evraz. Besides supporting business ties, the Council 

contributes to educational developments by organizing cultural and sporting events, and bilateral 

student conferences, and by supporting Russian language studies in Canada (RCaBC 2020).  

The Arctic 

Dealing with common challenges presented by the Arctic region was one of the most productive 

areas in the Canada-Russia relationship before the crisis of 2014, and it remains the least affected 

by the crisis. Cooperation in the Arctic and the North remains a priority in Russian-Canadian 

relations and is one of the most promising areas for cooperation. To achieve this cooperation, there 
are a common preconditions and niches of opportunity, but there are also potential risks.  



41                               Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 
  ISSN 2562-8429 

Common preconditions 

Russia and Canada are two major Arctic nations and have similarities in their approach to various 

issues. Both countries share the division of the Arctic based on direct longitudinal lines drawn 

from the North Pole. This sector method is more relevant than the median line method which 

would establish areas proportional to each country’s coastline. 

Canada and Russia both strictly respect procedure and try to resolve territorial disputes using 

negotiations based on international law. For example, Russia, Canada, and Denmark have a 

territorial dispute over the Lomonosov Ridge. Each of them is seeking to extend the border of its 

shelf through a submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 

However, this dispute does not prevent the countries from cooperating on other issues in the Arctic. 

The unilateral establishment by some states of the external borders of the continental shelf in the 

Arctic Ocean, bypassing earlier agreements, could create increasing tension between the Arctic 

countries (Zagorskii 2019, 114). Thus, it is crucial to stay within the framework of international 

law and follow the UN rules and procedures.  

Russia and Canada also hold similar positions on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest 

Passage. Russia considers the NSR as its historically developed national transport route and has 

adopted several acts regulating its navigation. Canada claims the Northwest Passage as part of its 

historic internal waters, which means the waterways are under the complete control of the 

Canadian government. In both cases, the countries meet disagreement from the US, since the US 

considers Artic waters international. In the case of the Northwest Passage, the dispute has existed 

for almost 50 years and the US and Canada have ‘agreed to disagree.’  

The US-Russia situation is riskier due to the overall character of their relations. The US is at a 

disadvantage due to difficulties in proving that both Artic routes can meet the necessary legal 

criteria for international straits. So far, the debate on the legal status of the NSR waters has no 

practical implications. However, the situation might change with the Arctic sea ice melting and 

Russia planning to use the NSR on a much larger international scale (Todorov 2017, 88). Russia 

and Canada are concerned about the future actions of non-Arctic states on the status of the NSR 

and the Northwest Passage. East Asian countries advocate greater transparency in the region. They 

support the idea of loosening Russian and Canadian control and call for the future 

“internationalization” of these artic routes (Konyshev and Sergunin 2015, 38).  

Both countries acknowledge the leading role of the Arctic Council in strengthening cooperation 

and defining the rules of behaviour. The Council was established at Canada’s request in 1996, and 

the idea was supported by Russia. Both sides support the idea of priority for the eight Arctic states 

(Russia, Canada, the US, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden), and have voted for clearly 

defined procedures for observers, including non-Arctic states (Nuuk Declaration 2011). 

Russia and Canada were the first to be critical about China, India, Japan, South Korea, and 

Singapore gaining observer status in the Artic. Their main concern was protection of interests of 

the Arctic states and preservation of the effectiveness of decision-making within the Council. In 

2013, the states listed above, as well as Italy, were granted observer status with the main condition 

that they recognize the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Arctic Council member states in the 

Arctic.  



42                               Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 
  ISSN 2562-8429 

Thus, the Arctic Council remains a key platform for interaction. General political disagreements 

at a global level are, however, starting to impact on interaction in the Arctic Council. For example, 

in 2019, at a meeting of the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the countries of the Arctic 

Council, for the first time in the organization’s history, they failed to sign a final declaration 

because, in contrast to the position of other members, the US declined to acknowledge the Paris 

Climate Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Also, US Secretary of State, 

Mike Pompeo, criticized Russia’s struggle for influence in the Arctic and China’s New Silk Road 

project. While this particular case did not involve Canada, political confrontation on issues beyond 

the Arctic agenda and negative trends in Russian-Canadian relations may, in the end, have an 

undesirable negative effect on the Arctic agenda. Additionally, the Arctic is becoming a more open 

region with a growing number of active players, state, and non-state actors. Therefore, it is crucial 

to keep this region free from conflicts, both military and economic. Russia and Canada should look 

more actively for opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation in the region, bilaterally and 

multilaterally. 

Divisive Issues 

Hard security and lack of trust and transparency are key divisive issues between Canada and 

Russia. Assessments of military and non-military threats have changed little since 2014, thus there 

is no arms race in the Arctic. However, there is a growing sense of uncertainty about the future 

direction of military and political developments in the region. The escalation of tension may be 

due to incorrect mutual interpretations of military activities, including the increased number of 

military exercises, which are taking place in the context of negative political rhetoric and the 

absence of trustworthy military communication. To avoid additional risks, it is necessary to restore 

dialogue and cooperation at the military level (Zagorskii 2019, 11, 113). Until 2014, the Arctic 

states were cooperating along military and political lines. However, when relations between Russia 

and the West were aggravated by the Ukraine crisis, meetings were suspended. As a result, Russia 

no longer has multilateral representation in discussions of regional security issues. 

According to Russian officials, there is no reason for “bringing military working methods to the 

Arctic” (Mid.ru 2020). Russia was in favour of resuming the previous practice of meetings of the 

chiefs of staff of the armed forces from the member countries of the Arctic Council to ensure the 

required level of confidence (Mid.ru 2020). The sides could probably start with expert 

consultations.  

The sanctions regime is another issue dividing Canada and Russia. Russia’s policy toward Ukraine 

in 2014 was followed by the regime of mutual sanctions between Canada and Russia, which also 

affected the Arctic in some regards. However, in terms of scope, content, and duration, the 

restrictions imposed by Canada have been more moderate than those imposed by the US (Nemova 

and Issraelyan 2017, 367-371). In December, 2014, Canada announced export restrictions on 

technologies used in Russia for oil exploration and production. Such restrictions negatively 

impacted the Russian oil and gas industry, which is dependent on foreign equipment and 

technology. There have been instances when US sanctions have created difficulties in economic 

cooperation in the Arctic. For example, a joint venture between Chinese COSCO (China Ocean 

Shipping Company) and Canadian Teekay, which owns and operates an Arc7 ice-class liquefied 

natural gas (LNG) tanker for the Yamal LNG project, had to change its shareholder structure in 

order get out of the US sanctions and to continue delivering Yamal LNG gas to Novatek (Fadeeva 

and Dzyadko 2019). 



43                               Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 
  ISSN 2562-8429 

Niches for Cooperation  

Until 2014, there was multifaceted cooperation between Russia and Canada in the Arctic 

(Konyshev and Sergunin 2013, 150-156). Regardless of sanctions and the lack of transparency in 

hard security issues, there are still areas where the two Arctic states have more common interests 

than disagreements, where cooperation is possible, and where there have been some positive 

results since 2014. Most of this cooperation, however, is taking place in multilateral formats, rather 

than on a bilateral basis.  

Since 2014, opportunities for economic cooperation and investment have become more limited, 

and as of 2020, just a few projects are successfully operating. As mentioned above, the Russian 

energy company, Novatek, relies on several shipping companies and joint ventures to transport 

LNG produced at its Yamal LNG facility to markets in Europe and Asia. The largest of these joint 

ventures is a partnership between Teekay, whose headquarters are in Vancouver, and the China 

LNG Shipping Company (Teekay Corporation 2017). 

In the Chukotka region, which is part of the Arctic zone of Russia, the largest Canadian investor 

in the Russian economy, Kinross Gold, has production assets. Kinross has had success in Russia, 

operating four mines in the country over the past 24 years. Twenty percent of its current production 

comes from its Russian mines, Kupol and Dvoinoye (Canadian Mining Journal 2019). Moreover, 

as reported in August, 2019, Toronto-based Kinross Gold is expanding its portfolio in Russia with 

the acquisition of a large, open-pit development in the region. Several other Canadian companies 

are operating in the Russian Arctic region. Among them are Silver Bear Resources which 

announced a silver project in Mangazeisky in its 2017 Operational Update (News Ykt 2019; Silver 

Bear Resources PLC 2018). 

Science has been a platform for cooperation in the Arctic for many years, both during and 

following the Cold War. Fortunately, the 2014 crisis had little influence in this sphere. Moreover, 

the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation came into force in 2018. 

This is one example of scientific diplomacy in a period of crisis in relations. The agreement 

provides a legal framework for regulating research which widens opportunities for better 

understanding of the region.  

It is important to build cooperation among the universities of the Arctic countries, and to develop 

student and academic exchange programs to foster future developments in the region. The 

University of the Arctic, a network of more than 150 higher education institutions, could serve as 

a basis for such cooperation, and indeed, Russian and Canadian universities already use this 

network (RISS 2016). 

Environmental protection and pollution control are areas of high concern for almost all 

governments, regardless of their political views. Collaboration on these issues should remain 

depoliticized and could serve as a good example of multilateral cooperation. Ensuring 

environmental safety is a priority of international cooperation in the Arctic. Main goals include 

the preservation and protection of the Arctic environment and the elimination of the environmental 

consequences of economic activity in the face of increasing climate change. 

There is a trend toward the intensification of shipping in polar waters, which brings new 

opportunities as well as challenges. Multilateral discussions on maritime safety and prevention of 



44                               Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 
  ISSN 2562-8429 

marine pollution from ships, have taken place under the auspices of the International Marine 

Organization. As a result, the International Polar Code came into force in 2017. It sets binding 

international standards for commercial ships operating in Arctic and Antarctic waters, and the 

ratification of these measures opens a new era of protecting Arctic nations and the marine 

environment.  

Russia was an influential actor along with Canada and other Arctic coastal states in the negotiations 

that led to the adoption in 2018 of the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in 

the Central Arctic Ocean. Canada and Russia are interested in a stable, secure, and sustainable 

Arctic region and see themselves as responsible actors, dedicated to legal norms and principles.  

 

Conclusion 

This study has demonstrated that from 2014 to 2020, there was no positive shift in Russian-

Canadian bilateral political relations. Neither side has taken measures toward rapprochement. The 

cases highlighted in the article – the Ukraine crisis, the Skripal case, and the Kerch incident – are 

significant as indicators of the different positions of Russia and Western countries, including 

Canada. However, there is no direct conflict between Russia and Canada. Canadian foreign policy 

toward Russia has been made in response to Russian actions (Russia’s policy toward Ukraine) or 

presumed Russian actions (the Skripal case), while Russian policy toward Canada has been mainly 

reactive. These policies can be summarized as action-reaction, and sanctions-countersanctions, 

leading to a crisis in bilateral relations.  

There are several key factors that explain these negative dynamics. Canadian relations with the US 

and NATO partly affect its strategy toward Russia. However, most importantly, the Ukraine crisis 

remains one of the central factors currently affecting Russian-Canadian relations, as the two 

countries do not agree on the causes of the crisis, nor on how to resolve it. As long as irreconcilable 

differences exist and parties cannot reach a common political dialogue, managing the confrontation 

but not overcoming it is a reasonable aim. A policy of small steps and cooperation in areas of 

common interest could help to reach this goal. Analysis shows that cooperation between the two 

countries is developing in certain niche areas, even during the crisis. There are limited results as 

regards Track II diplomacy, para-diplomacy, and business diplomacy, but these spheres have the 

potential for further development. Russian-Canadian cooperation continues in the Arctic, though 

mostly in multilateral frameworks. Despite some negative trends, the countries have enough 

common interests for cooperation in science, the environment, fisheries and navigations, and 

search and rescue. The Arctic region was one of the most productive areas in the Canada-Russia 

relationship before the crisis of 2014 and, as this analysis demonstrates, it remains the area the 

least affected by the crisis. To provide a basis for future dialogue, when time comes for political, 

economic and other collaborative opportunities, it is crucial to keep lines of communication and 

cooperation open, at least in those areas where Russian-Canadian joint interests currently exist, as 

illustrated by the arguments of experts from both sides who support the idea of political dialogue 

between Russia and Canada (Coulon 2019; Issraelyan 2017; Kinsman 2018; Paikin 2018; Westdal 

2016; Breton and Dutkiewicz 2020). 

 



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54                               Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 
  ISSN 2562-8429 

Published by the Centre for European Studies at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada 

Available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index 

The Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies (CJERS – formerly Review of European 

and Russian Affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are 

subject to double-blind peer-review. Topics relate to the European Union, its Member States, the 

former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe. The journal is published by the Centre for 

European Studies, an associated unit of the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at 

Carleton University. 

CJERS aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality 

research and scholarship.  

 

Contact: 

Carleton University 

The Centre for European Studies 

1103 Dunton Tower 

1125 Colonel By Drive 

Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 

Canada 

 

Tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; E-mail: CJERS@carleton.ca 

 

Creative Commons License 

 

 

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 

This Working Paper is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial- 

No Derivs 4.0 Unported License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).  

Articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is 

acknowledged. No use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. 

 

ISSN: 2562-8429 

© 2019 The Author(s) 

https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index
mailto:CJERS@carleton.ca
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

