64 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 Europeans but outside of the EU - the EU Soft Power of Attractiveness in Ukraine Between the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan Viktoriya Thomson1 Carleton University Abstract The role of the EU in the promotion of Europeanization and the EU political identity in potential member states of Eastern Europe prior to the 2004 enlargement was important for these states’ future acceptation in the EU community. However, most research and literature have discounted the role of the EU and its attractiveness in the countries neighbouring with the EU that did not have a prospect of joining the EU in 2004. This article studies the process of formal and informal Europeanization in Ukraine before and after the Orange revolution, which occurred five months after the bloc’s 2004 enlargement, and Euromaidan of 2013. Despite the EU’s passive leverage in Ukraine between 2004 and 2013, and the country’s weak prospects for potential membership, the EU’s soft power of attractiveness was still an effective tool that was used by Ukrainian political elite and media in promoting informal Europeanization after the 2004 enlargement. Furthermore, confidence in the EU was associated with support for such liberal values as human rights, tolerance of minorities, and political efficacy. This article posits that notwithstanding weak incentives and support offered from the EU to implement formal Europeanization in Ukraine, the EU attractiveness was successfully applied by local elite and media to promote the informal Europeanization. 1 Viktoriya Thomson, PhD, Carleton University 65 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 Introduction Studies of the impact of the European Union (EU) in post-communist states indicate that the EU pre-accession process significantly improved states’ willingness to implement political and economic reforms (Herrmann, Risse and Brewer 2004; Vachudova 2009). Moreover, the EU created two sets of requirements for potential candidates – normative (or formal) and informal (Hansen 2006, 117). The formal mandatory requirements for future membership included an established market economy, free and fair elections, and the rule of law. The informal ones were those that built on the idea of “we feeling” and conforming to European values (Hansen 2006; Castiglione 2009). Applicant states’ identification with the values in a common community, such as the EU, was perceived as necessary for sustaining political stability within the EU. “When communities have a strong feeling of shared identity, political leaders can draw on this as a resource to promote the legitimacy of institutions” (Herrmann, Risse and Brewer 2004, 4). Democracy promotion was one of the most powerful discourses that was used by the EU in the process of its assessment of prospective future members (Raik 2004). For Eastern European states that joined the EU in 2004, the path to membership was formally stringent. Nevertheless, these states’ future as part of the EU was not in doubt because of their European ideals and their acceptance of the shared system of values (Kubicek 2009). The process of European integration was perceived as their return to the place where they belonged, or a “return to Europe” (Vachudova 2005, 83). This was not the case for the former Soviet republics, with the exception of the Baltic states, which had been annexed by the USSR before the Second World War. The role of the EU in these countries was more difficult to define and measure, considering that “the painful discussion of membership” was never raised (Hansen 2006, 116). The EU European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in the states of the former USSR combined relatively high demands for reform with weak conditionally (Commission of the European Communities (Commission) 2003; Gawrich, Melnykovska and Schweickert 2009, 19), which led to limited incentives to comply with those demands. Furthermore, after the 2004 enlargement, the discussion shifted towards “enlargement fatigue” rather than future expanding of the boundaries of the European Community (Schimmelfennig 2008). The 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine, which took place less than six months after the EU enlargement, brought hopes for the country’s democratization and closer collaboration with the EU.2 However, the EU’s conditionality rules were not clearly defined due to the remote prospects of EU membership for Ukraine (Dimitrova and Dragneva 2013) and Ukraine’s inability to meet the three criteria used in the assessments, such as 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) market economy; and 3) administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement EU acquis, and ability to take on the obligations of membership (Commission, Accession Criteria). Instead of membership, the EU applied the soft power of attractiveness, built on a state’s EU membership aspirations rather than on the realistic prospect of EU accession. Although some argue that no amount of soft power can replace the lack of capability and absence of effective hard power 2 The Orange revolution was a peaceful protest against the results of the second round of the presidential election which were falsified to advance then Prime Minister Yanukovych. The result of the Orange revolution was a re-election of the second round that led to a victory of Viktor Yushchenko. For more details see Wilson (2005). 66 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 from the EU (Nilsen 2013, 725; Börzela and Schimmelfenning 2017, 279), this article contends that the EU soft power of attractiveness was effectively applied by the political elite and media in their creation of discourse about Ukraine’s Europeanization. Citizens’ attitudes towards the EU were correlated with their political orientations and values. Citizens who professed higher degrees of confidence in the EU expressed higher levels of political awareness, political competence, tolerance and political activity – orientations and values that are associated with liberal values and that are promoted by the EU as European values. These correlations were stronger for young and well-educated citizens. This article contributes to the discussion of the EU’s role in non-members states political and civil development by illustrating that the EU power of attraction remained an important political instrument in Ukraine after 2004. In the absence of formal Europeanization, the political elite and media’s promotion of this concept may have impacted citizens’ level of confidence in the EU, which increased after the Orange revolution. This article is divided into five sections. The first part discusses the concept of Europeanization, passive and active leverage, and soft power by the EU. The second part looks at the relations between the EU and Ukraine after 2004 and before 2013. The third part analyses the Ukrainian leadership and media’s promotion of the EU and Europeanization in Ukraine. Following this, the author looks at citizens’ perception of the EU and the relationship between the level of confidence in the EU and citizens’ political values and orientations. The conclusion provides the main findings of this research. Methodology The research in this article was developed and assessed through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. The texts of the official documents between the EU and Ukraine were analyzed to assess their relationship. A content analysis of the Presidential speeches in Ukraine after the Orange revolution and before Euromaidan, and of the titles of newspapers articles (450 in total) of the leading political newspaper Dzerkalo Tyshnya (Mirror Weekly)3 was performed to evaluate how the concept of European identity and Europeanization was promoted in Ukraine by its media and political elite. In order to test citizens’ support for the EU and their espousal of the EU corresponding liberal political values, this paper draws on the results of public opinion from the World Values Survey in Ukraine before and after the Orange revolution and the results of European Values Survey and International Foundation for Electoral systems. 3 This newspaper, together with newspapers Den’ and Kommentarii, is considered neutral and independent in its coverage of the political events in Ukraine (Szostek 2014). Although it is not the most circulated (57,000 as of 2006), it is considered one of the most influential newspapers by political elite (BBC 2006). 67 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 Europeanization, EU passive and active leverage, soft power Scholars who study the role of the EU define Europeanization as a process in which states adopt EU rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 7), or as the emergence and the development of a distinct structure of government to the European level (Risse 2001, 3). The adaptation and emergence may be formal with a focus on the institutionalization of the EU rules, or discursive (informal Europeanization) by incorporating “a rule as a positive reference into discourse among domestic actors” (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005, 7). The EU gained two types of leverage in the pre-accession states prior to their membership – active and passive (Vachudova 2005). Active leverage is defined as deliberate policies of the EU towards candidate states. “Active leverage is animated by the fact that the tremendous benefits of EU membership create incentives for the state to satisfy the enormous entry requirements, setting the stage for the effectiveness of conditionality within the EU’s pre-accession process” (Vachudova 2005, 4). The higher the potential for EU membership, the more likely that candidate countries will implement political and economic reforms that meet EU requirements. In contrast, passive leverage is defined as the attraction of the EU membership without deliberate conditionality exercised in the EU’s pre-accession process (Vachudova 2005, 63). The passive leverage is similar to the notion of the EU’s soft power, which is mostly based on the idea of the EU attractiveness (Tuomioja 2009; Nielsen 2013). Soft power is defined as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideal and policies” (Nye 2004, 77). Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others (Nye 2008, 95). Joseph Nye identifies three primary sources of a country’s soft power: its culture (in the places where it’s attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to these values at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority) (2008, 96). In the case of the EU, soft power was based on the idea of a collective European identity and the EU’s commitment to certain normative principles, particularly democracy and human rights (Nielsen 2013, 730). Therefore, to become European in cultural terms was to adopt European values, “to become more like the EU with the latter assessing the degree of normative convergence/divergence” (Wolczuk 2016, 65). For candidate states, to become European meant that they not only had to fulfil the official criteria for accession but that they were obligated to express their Europeanization and sense of belonging to the European community (Neumann 1998; Herrmannn, Risse and Brewer 2004). Very often, this involved applicant countries constructing and implementing discourse on how their state’s identity is relevant to the concept of ‘Europe’ in comparison to other states (Neumann 1998, 405). “In their competition for accession to Western organizations, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, furthermore, combined the assertion of their own European identity with the claim “that the next state to the East is not European” (Neumann 1998, 406). From this perceptive, the enlargement was understood as the expansion of the international community and inclusion of the countries that have similar liberal values and norms as the EU (Schimmelfenning 2001). The EU’s soft power of shared identities helped candidate countries to be persistent in their democratic commitment even after their accession (Sedelmeier 2012). 68 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 Potential membership in the EU was not discussed for ENP countries. The 2004 enlargement, although perceived as successful at that time, limited the EU’s ability or willingness to engage in further enlargement (Wolczuk 2016).4 Moreover, the countries that were going to integrate to the EU after the 2004 enlargement were “less capable of managing the ‘overload’ of EU requirements than the countries that joined the EU in 2004” (Raik 2004, 594) due to their different preconditions. For that reason, the EU built relations with these countries within the ENP’s strategy that offered the neighbourhood countries “a stake in the EU’s internal market, through gradual economic integration, but not membership, conditional on the adoption of EU rules.” (Wolczuk 2016, 61). The EU rules and criteria for the ENP countries are often portrayed as a kind of wilderness of exclusion, a scenario of a weak voice and asymmetric dependency (Wallace 2005; Smith 2005). They did not provide sufficient incentives for the countries to implement them, nor did they have a clear final goal as in the case of accession to the EU. “It was the fallacious assumption that conditionality patterns which were successful for the CEE countries would also be successful for post-Soviet countries with no-membership perspective” (Moskalenko and Streltsov 2015, 112). As a result, for many Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members, the principle of exclusion from the EU enlargement process was a constant reminder that they belonged to a different category of states (Hansen 2006, 130). The EU’s soft power in these countries was based on their membership aspiration rather than a concrete promise of membership association (Sasse 2008; Pridham 2011; Langbein and Wolczuk 2012). As was stated by Lehne, “the core elements of the EU’s offer to ENP partner countries have been summed up as the ‘three Ms’: money, mobility, and markets” (2014, 12), which were not strong enough to result in long-term transformation. Furthermore, the EU’s ability to promote democracy in these countries was constrained by the stability-democratization dilemma that made the “EU often reluctant to push incumbent regimes towards democratization” (Börzel and Lebanidze 2017, 25) which could trigger instability within the region. Research also demonstrates that during neighborhood Europeanization domestic actors could use weak EU conditionality for their own political agenda to regain or consolidate their power (Borzel and Risse 2012; Boerzel and Pamuk 2012; Gawrich 2009). “Domestic actors have other choices in responding to Europeanization than endorsing or resisting EU induced reforms; they can instrumentalize EU policies and institutions to advance their own interests, decoupling them from their normative contents” (Börzel and Pamuk 2012, 80). Was this the case in Ukraine? As this article demonstrates, despite limited formal Europeanization after 2004 enlargement and weak EU conditionality, the country’s leadership and media actively promoted the concept of European identity and informal Europeanization. And although more research is needed to test causal relations between informal Europeanization and political values, this article shows that citizens’ support for the EU, which increased after 2004, was correlated with liberal democratic values. 4 Except West Balkans. 69 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 EU and Ukraine Relations: Formal Europeanization Although the question of Ukraine’s future membership in the EU was not then discussed, in 1994 Ukraine signed the Partnership and Co-Cooperation Agreement (PCA).5 In 2003, the EU introduced the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which was then launched in 2004 (Commission 2003). The main goal of the ENP was “to provide a framework for the development of a new relationship which would not, in the medium-term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union’s institutions” (Commission 2003, 5). Since the EU was preoccupied with the future accession of ten new members,6 Ukraine was not a priority for that organization in the years leading up to the Orange revolution. Nonetheless, the concept of European identity was reflected in the 2004 presidential election campaign of Viktor Yushchenko, the opposition candidate who competed against Prime Minister Yanukovych (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2005). Soon after his victory, newly elected President Yushchenko declared the Europeanization of Ukraine as one of his main priorities. In his inauguration speech in January, 2005, he declared: Our way to the future is the way followed by United Europe. We are the people of the same civilization sharing the same values. History, economic prospects and the interests of people give a clear answer – where we should look for our fate. Our place is in the European Union. My goal is – Ukraine in United Europe (Ukrayinska Pravda 2005). This optimism was not reciprocated by the EU. “The Orange Revolution presented the EU with a dilemma: despite the pan-European expression of support for democratization in Ukraine, there were divergences between member states on how to deal with Ukraine” (Wolczuk 2016, 61). Nevertheless, the ENP Action Plan was signed in February, 2005, one month after Yushchenko’s inauguration speech. The ENP Action Plan contained two parts and included a list of priorities for Ukraine, such as free and fair elections, judicial reform and adoption of a nuclear waste strategy (Wolczuk 2009). Europe was absorbing its new states and recovering from the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 (Hobolt and Brouard 2010). Ukraine’s desire to have a closer relationship with the EU beyond the ENP action plan, worried the EU (Averre 2005, 187). The EU switched towards a value-based foreign policy strategy, implemented through activities such as cultural and academic exchanges (Jarvie 2017). In 2005, Ukraine did not meet the three Copenhagen criteria for accession, namely: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) market economy; and 3) administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement EU acquis, and ability to take on the obligations of membership (Commission, European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement). The Ukrainian market economy was only partially developed, the rule of law was incomplete, and more importantly, the level of corruption was still high (Transparency International 2005). Nevertheless, the European Parliament passed a 5 “Partnership and co-operation agreement between the European Communities and their member states, and Ukraine,” European Union, Communities, Council and Commission. 6 On May 01, 2004, eight countries of the Eastern Europe joined the European Union. For details about the EU Accession in Eastern Europe, see Raik (2004). 70 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 declaration calling for the European Council, the European Commission, and the EU member states to speed up the process of Ukraine’s integration and possibly future EU membership (Hansen 2006, 124). In December of 2005, the Council of the European Union granted Ukraine Market Economy Status (Commission 2005). The relations between Ukraine and the EU could have improved after the 2006 Ukrainian parliamentary election when the parties of the Orange team gained the majority of the seats. However, they failed to secure a parliamentary coalition and thus lost the position of Prime Minister to Viktor Yanukovych. Political infighting within Ukraine not only created an image problem for the country but decreased the EU’s willingness to collaborate with Ukraine (Pridham 2011, 25). The EU-Ukraine Visa Liberalization Dialogue commenced in October 2008, which may be attributed in part to an external event. Conflict broke out between Georgia and Russia in August of 2008 over the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The hostilities compelled the EU to reconsider its future policies towards the post-communist countries. As a result, the EU offered Ukraine the Eastern Partnership, which “was established in part as a response to the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008” (MacFarlane and Menon 2014, 96). The Eastern Partnership, which was signed in May,2009, provided Ukraine with the prospect of visa liberalization, signing of the Association Agreement, and opportunities for establishing Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) for partner countries (Council of European Union 2009). However, the prospect of political association for Ukraine was not a sufficiently strong incentive for reforms. For conditionality rules to be effective they should be stated in the official documents and legally specified in the EU acquis and International Treaties with the real prospect of integration to the EU (Langbein and Wolczuk 2012). This was not the case for signing the Association Agenda (AA). “Both the European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership avoided the question of potential enlargement to the states of this region. Instead, the EU offered ‘association’: closer political ties, deep and comprehensive free trade, and the possibility of visa liberalization” (MacFarlane and Menon 2014, 96). Within Ukraine, this created frustration regarding its prospects of joining the EU, thus causing negative feelings in the Ukrainian society and often leading to disappointment among its pro-European part (Moskalenko and Streltsov 2015, 112). The European Commission’s many progress reports stated that Ukraine needed to undertake significant economic and democratic reforms prior to consideration of a possible future application for membership (Commission 2008, 2009a). Relations between the EU and Ukraine deteriorated further after the 2010 presidential election that brought Viktor Yanukovych to power (Smith 2015). The election was recognized as fair and free by OSCE (OSCE 2010). Once in power, Yanukovych instituted constitutional changes to strengthen his power and took steps to improve fractured relations with Russia by signing the Kharhiv Agreement, which reduced the price of gas for Ukraine for the next 10 years from Russia in exchange for an extension of Russia’s lease of the Sevastopol Naval base for the next 25 years.7 The opposition strongly criticized the Agreement since it was perceived by many inside and outside Ukraine as subordination to Russia (UNIAN 2010). However, Yanukovych, 7 On April 21, 2010, Yanukovych signed the Kharkiv Agreement, which reduced the price of gas for Ukraine for the next ten years from Russia in exchange for an extension of Russia’s lease of the Sevastopol Naval base for the next 25 years (Pan 2010). 71 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 acknowledging Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia, was determined to strengthen Ukraine’s relationship with its northern neighbor. The European Commission’s (2011) final progress report posited that the Ukrainian judicial system had still not been reformed after 20 years of independence (Commission 2012). Extensive corruption and an unfavorable environment for businesses were also cited as obstacles to Ukraine’s future integration. In these circumstances, “the EU used the negotiation process on the Association Agreement to address the lack of democratic change” (Borzel and Lebanidze 2017, 19). In March 2012, the EU and Ukraine initialled the text of the Association Agreement and its DCFTA (Commission 2012), which indicated Ukraine’s willingness to adhere to the priorities of the Agreement prior to its implementation in 2013. However, in the spring of 2013, the EU stated that “in 2012, Ukraine did not address most of the key recommendations contained in last year’s European Neighbourhood Policy progress report” (Commission 2013, 3). Nevertheless, in February, 2013, President Yanukovych reaffirmed Ukraine’s commitment to the signing of the Agreement by the time of Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November, 2013, thus promising formal Europeanization of Ukraine (Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine 2013). However, it was argued that “Yanukovych was spared to meet the demand of the EU to free Yulia Timoshenko and adopt an anti-corruption law and an election reform as the conditions for signing the Association Agreement” (Borzel 2015, 524). Instead he accepted Russia’s economic support, including low gas prices and postponed the signing of the AA. Euro-integration and Discursive Europeanization in Annual Presidential Addresses to the Parliament Despite modest progress in the official relations between the EU and Ukraine, the EU, Euro- integration, and European identity were actively promoted by politicians for their electoral purposes. A contextual analysis of the annual speeches to parliament (Verhovna Rada (Rada)) of President Yushchenko and President Yanukovych between 2005 and 2013 reveals the extent of emphasis placed upon EU integration.8 Both presidents in their official annual addresses emphasized the importance of Euro-integration and collaboration with the EU and attempted to capitalize on the mechanism available to them to promote closer ties with the EU (Wolczuk 2016, 62). They also sought to promote the discourse of Ukraine Europeanization, thus signalling the country’s European identity and belonging to the EU community. The highest frequency for the root word ‘Europe’ was in 2006, one year after the Orange revolution. President Yushchenko, in his first official address to the Parliament, mentioned 54 times the words Europe, European, Euro-integration. 8 The author used the NVivo program to calculate the frequency of the words “Europa” (Europe), “Eurosoyuz” (European Union), “europeyskyy” (European) and “Eurointegratsiya” (Euro-integration) among the top 1000 frequent words in each speech. 72 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 Figure 1: EU and Euro-integration in Presidential Addresses, 2005-2013 Data Source: This figure represents the frequency of the words “Europe’, “European Union”, “Euro-integration” and “European” in each presidential address among the top 1000 frequent words (using NVivo). In 2007, the year after the Orange coalition collapsed, Yushchenko did not address the Parliament, in contravention of his constitutional obligation.9 In 2008 and 2009, the frequency of the mention of the topic of Eurointegraiton significantly decreased to 24 and 27. At the same time, President Yushchenko stated in his 2008 address: “[w]e are continuing the logic of geopolitical processes of United Europe. Ukraine has created conditions for democracy and freedom” (Rada 2008). Within the same speech, Yushchenko mentioned that “our middle term goal – progress in European and euro Atlantic integration as an indicator and results of real changes within the country.” In 2009, his last presidential speech, Yushchenko referred to Ukraine as a country that historically belonged to EU community. “We have continued global historical process of uniting Europe. Our integration into European and Euro Atlantic unions is not an abstract idea. Every step is a real return of Ukraine to European world” (Rada 2009). Significantly, the references to the topic of the EU and Euro-integration were not limited to President Yushchenko, who was reputed to be pro-Western. In his first official address after his election in 2010, President Yanukovych employed the words EU, Europe, European and Euro- integration 38 times. Moreover, Yanukovych referred to Euro-integration, Europe and the EU, in higher numbers than his predecessor. In 2010, Yanukovych made the following comments: The most important priority in our foreign policy was and is Euro-integration. Not only for the course of our foreign policy, but as a vector of our overall transformation. The most important question in our relationship with the EU is the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, including the creation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and the implementation of a visa free regime (Rada 2010). In 2011, Yanukovych mentioned the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine as a confirmed plan. “Today Ukraine is having active negotiations about this Agreement. Signing of this Agreement will create preconditions for Ukraine’s full integration into the European economic, social, cultural and legal community” (Glavnoe 2011). In 2013, the year of the Euromaidan, the frequency of the use of the words Euro-integration, Europe, and the EU in his annual address approached 2006 levels at 52 times. President Yanukovych stated that the “Signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU will promote economic growth and increase the welfare of Ukrainian citizens” (NISS 2013, 243). The discrepancy between 9 The Parliament implemented a Decree about Yushchenko not following the Constitution of Ukraine (Postanova Verkhovnoyi Rady 2007). 54 24 27 38 51 40 52 0 50 100 2006 Yushchenko 2008 Yushchenko 2009 Yushchenko 2010 Yanukovych 2011 Yanukovych 2012 Yanukovych 2013 Yanukovych 73 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 Yanukovych’s statements and official actions in 2013, when he postponed the signing of the Association Agreement, led to political protests in 2013-2014. Discursive Europeanization in Ukrainian media Beyond having two presidents who actively promoted the Europeanization of Ukraine, Euro- integration was also widely promoted by the Ukrainian media. For example, the national weekly newspaper Dzerkalo Tyznya (Mirror Weekly), extensively covered the topic of the EU and Ukraine’s prospective membership in the first two years after the Orange revolution. Almost every issue from January to early July covered the EU, with generally positive coverage. Out of 51 issues in 2005, the EU was mentioned 23 times on the front pages.10 Terms including “positive signal”, ‘membership”, “hope”, “the agreement”, and “community” were mentioned in the titles of the articles. Such positive coverage continued in 2006, when the words EU, Euro- integration, and European were mentioned 28 times on the front pages. In 2007, the year when the Orange coalition collapsed, and the public was disappointed with the performance of the Orange team government, there was a decline in the coverage of the topic of the EU to 20 times. Titles such as “Asian EU”, “the end of Euro-federalism”, and “Euro-chaos” were published by the newspaper. In 2008, the frequency of mentions increased to 27 times, which was almost at the 2006 level. Titles such as “Our future in the EU depends on ourselves”, “Ukrainians want into the EU”, “In support of the EU plans”, and “Perspectives of the visa dialogue with the EU” appeared in connection to the Euro-integration. The coverage declined in 2009 and 2010, when the frequency was 25 and 16, respectively. The lowest frequency was observed in 2010, the year when Viktor Yanukovych was elected. The words EU and Euro-integration were mentioned 16 times in 49 issues. The tone of coverage also changed. Words such as “warning”, “scary”, “readmission”, “concern” and “rethink” were used in the titles of the articles about EU in the newspaper. Interestingly, the word Russia was mentioned twice in the titles of the articles about EU in 2010. In the three years leading to the Euromaidan, the frequency of use of the phrases EU and Euro- integration increased to 23, 19, and 26. However, it never reached the level of 2006. The coverage was also more critical of the Ukrainian government than previously. Titles such as “Yanukovych closed a window to Europe”, “Europe gave Ukraine D for the fight against corruption”, and “EU asked Kyiv to stop selective justice” appeared. The name of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who was imprisoned in 2011, appeared four times in the titles of the articles about the EU. In 2013, the newspaper coverage of the EU was intensive, especially in the months leading to the EU summit in Vilnius. Titles included, “The right choice – EU”, “By foot to the EU”, “Subway to Europe”, “European parliament recommends signing”, and “In Europe step by step-from visa-free to the association”. Articles informed the public about the importance of signing the Association Agreement, thus increasing pressure on the government to sign it. 10 The search words were the same as for the analysis of the Presidential speeches: “eurosoyuz” (European Union), “Europa” (Europe), “europeyskyy” (European) and “Eurointegratsiya” (Euro-integration). 74 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 Figure 2: The Coverage of the EU by Mirror Weekly, 2005-2013 Data Source: the figure was created by the author based on the analysis of the frequency of the articles on the front pages of the newspapers. The articles for 2013 did not include the month of December when Euromaidan started. The Ukrainian media not only raised awareness of the ‘Europeanization’ in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, but they informed Ukrainians about the choices of the Ukrainian government concerning the EU. Hence, favorable coverage of the EU and Ukraine’s potential to join the EU may have influenced citizens’ perceptions of ‘belonging’ to the EU after the Orange revolution. The negative and more pessimistic tone about Ukraine’s prospects in the EU in the years leading to the Euromaidan, combined with criticism of the government’s ineffectiveness, could have made citizens more willing to unite against the government in 2013. Citizens’ confidence in the EU and political identities Citizens’ perceptions of the EU, and their degree of identification with the EU, differed over time. The results of the World Values Survey (WVS) before and after the Orange revolution (1996 and 2006) and the 2008 European Values (EV) survey of public opinion in Ukraine showed that the percentage of citizens who had “great deal or quite a lot” of confidence in the EU increased from 43.5 percent in 1996 to 48.5 percent in 2006. In 2008, confidence in the EU decreased by 10 percent to 38.5 percent, the lowest since 1996. Importantly, the majority of Ukrainians nationwide did not have confidence in the EU. Figure 3: Confidence in the European Union, 1996 - 2008 Data Source: the figure was created by the author based on the results of online analysis of the WVS (1996, 2006) and EVS (2008) in Ukraine. The survey question asked was: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” The [European Union]. Across the regions, Western Ukraine, due to its history and closer geographic proximity to the EU,11 had the highest level of confidence in the EU, with 70.1 percent expressing high confidence in the EU. The lowest confidence was in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, regions that historically 11 The region of Galicia (Western Ukraine) was part of Austro-Hungarian Empire and later Poland. 23 28 20 27 25 16 23 19 26 0 10 20 30 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Number of Articles 43.5 48.5 38.5 56.5 51.5 61.5 0 50 100 1996 2006 2008 A great deal/quite a lot Not very much/none at all 75 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 belonged to the territories of the Russian Empire prior to the 1917 revolution, and to the Soviet Union after 1921. These also were the regions that experienced the largest decline in the level of confidence in the EU between 1996 and 2006. Young citizens expressed high levels of confidence in the EU in 1996, but not in 2006. In 2006, the highest confidence in the EU was found in the 30-49 year-olds, (the group that was 18-25 in 1996). Before and after the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians with the highest level of education (university complete) expressed the highest level of confidence in the EU in comparison to those with primary and secondary level of education. Table 1: Confidence in the EU (region, education and age) 1996- 2006 1996 REGION Western Eastern Central Southern A great deal/quite a lot 70.1 55.2 66.9 65.5 AGE 18-25 26-36 36-47 48-58 59-69 A great deal/quite a lot 80.3 71.4 79.5 72.9 71.4 EDUCATION Primary Secondary University complete A great deal/quite a lot 60.4 74.3 75.5 2006 REGION Western Eastern Central Southern A great deal/quite a lot 82.8 37.1 57.7 53.6 AGE Up to 29 30-49 50 and up A great deal/quite a lot 54 61.4 54.6 EDUCATION Primary Secondary University complete A great deal/quite a lot 12.2 52.9 68 2008 REGION Western Eastern Central Southern A great deal/quite a lot 70.5 26.3 44.2 23 AGE A great deal/quite a lot EDUCATION Primary Secondary University Complete A great deal/quite a lot 18.2 31.6 71.4 Data Source: created by the author based on data from WVS and EVS. The question was asked as followed: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The [European Union]. The table represents the category “a great deal” and ‘Quite a lot” combined. Public opinion regarding the potential membership in the EU after the Orange revolution, revealed differences based on age, education, language at home, and region of residence. Respondents with higher levels of education, and who spoke Ukrainian at home supported the membership in the EU. The lowest support was observed in the Eastern and Southern regions and among those who spoke Russian as the primary language at home. Table 2: Membership in the EU, 2008 EDUCATION Primary Incomplete secondary Secondary complete Secondary and specialized University incomplete University complete Would vote in favor 20.3 40.7 44.7 38.4 46.4 45.1 Would vote against 23.2 23.1 30.9 27.3 30.4 28.3 AGE 18-29 30-44 45-59 60+ Would vote in favor 45 41.2 41.7 35.7 Would vote against 22.1 31.6 28.1 28.4 LANGUAGE AT HOME Ukrainian Russian Would vote in favor 52.5 27.2 Would vote against 17.3 38.6 REGION Western Central Southern Eastern Kyiv Would vote in favor 78.8 72 44.7 38.4 77.8 Would vote against 21.2 28 55.3 61.6 22.2 Data Source: table created by the author based on data files from IFES (2008). 76 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 The next step in examining political identities is to assess whether citizens’ level of confidence in the EU was associated with their political orientations and actions. Table 3 illustrates that Ukrainians who expressed a prominent level of confidence in the EU reported higher levels of interest in politics, higher levels of interpersonal trust, and higher levels of political participation. They also had a higher level of national pride in comparison to those who did not have confidence in the EU. Higher confidence in the EU was also correlated with a higher level of intolerance for accepting bribes. These differences in political orientations of Ukrainians increased in 2006. The results of the Chi-square test of independence indicated that there were relationships between confidence in the EU and political values and orientations in 1996 and 2006 that were statistically significant for some categories. For example, confidence in the EU in 1996 was positively correlated with the following characteristics and actions: trust in people of another religion and race, intolerance for accepting a bribe, signing a petition and attending peaceful demonstrations. In 2006, confidence in the EU was positively correlated with membership in different forms of organizations (labour unions, art clubs, and charitable and professional organizations) as well as with interpersonal trust and participation in political activities Table 3: Confidence in the EU/Political Orientations, Values and Actions, 1996-2006 Data Source: table was created by the author based on the data filed from WVS (1996, 2006). The cases were selected in two groups:1 (great deal and/ a lot) and 2 (not very much, not at all). For a level of trust, the percentage represents those who answered, “trust completely” and “somewhat” combined. For questions on Justifiability, the percentage represents those who answered category 1- never. (the questions were recorded from 1 to 10, where 1 – never justified and 10-always justified). DV/IV EU (a great deal/a lot) EU (not very much/not at all) Chi- square test p-value EU (a great deal/a lot) EU (not very much/not at all Chi- square test p- value 1996 1996 2006 2006 Interest in politics (very interested and somewhat interested) 49.4 39.1 .000 58.5 46.2 .001 How proud of nationality? (very and quite proud) 67.7 60.3 .009 80.2 68.4 .000 Membership of labor unions 36.6 37 .647 24.2 20.3 .310 Membership of political party 2.4 2.4 .310 10.8 4.7 .003 Membership of professional organizations 3.1 3.1 .262 8.4 6.4 .032 Membership of church or religious organization 9.8 9.4 .186 20.9 14.6 .035 Most people can be trusted 34.4 28.9 .026 36 23.6 .000 Trust: your family n/a n/a 97.8 97.4 .742 Trust: people you know personally n/a n/a 86.3 81.4 .151 Trust: people you meet for the first time n/a n/a 23.9 16.1 .043 Trust: people of another religion n/a n/a 51 29.5 .000 Trust: people of another nationality n/a n/a 55.5 34 .000 Justified: claiming government benefits for each you are not entitled (category 1- never justified) 42 42.7 .738 43 35 .417 Justified: avoiding a fare on public transport 27.8 27.9 .114 31.9 29.5 .209 Justified: cheating on taxes 41.3 39.8 .036 38.2 33.3 .322 Justified: someone accepting a bribe 72.7 67.4 .000 55.2 48.5 .032 Justified: homosexuality 68.3 67 .087 51.6 51.8 .232 Justified: abortion 30.4 27 .443 28.4 31.3 .020 Justified: divorce 16.9 18.6 .265 18.5 19.9 .066 Political action recently done: signing a petition 17.6 15.1 .000 8 8.1 .975 Political action recently done: joining in boycotts 4.8 5.7 .124 3.3 3.3 .982 Political action recently done: attending peaceful demonstrations 22 19.3 .005 23.3 12.6 .000 Men make better political leaders than women? 62.8 60.3 .013 53 50.5 .370 Having a strong leader is better 54.7 56.5 .002 66.5 63.7 .245 Education (complete university) 23.4 22.9 .839 35.6 25.6 .037 Number of cases 955 548 361 396 77 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 Why are these findings important? Ukrainians who had confidence in the EU showed more democratic political orientations in comparison to those who did not have confidence or who had low confidence in the EU. Ukrainians who expressed confidence in the EU were more politically aware, political competent, and consequently politically active. These are orientations that perceived as democratic (Norris 1999; 2011). They are also orientations that are associated with values and norms that are promoted by the EU. As stated in 1993 at the Copenhagen European Council on the EU membership, “[m]embership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities and market economy” (European Council 1993,13). Moreover, according to Kataryna Wolczuk, “[w]hile there are significant cultural disparities within the EU, key shared European values – liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law – have been defined as what turns the participating states into a community” (2016, 64). It is evident that Ukrainian citizens who had confidence in the EU expressed higher support for liberal values that are promoted by the EU. The association between the confidence in the EU and democratic political orientations of Ukrainians after the Orange revolution became even stronger. Those who expressed higher confidence in the EU increased their trust in people, whereas those who had low or no confidence in the EU decreased their trust towards people. Furthermore, the confidence in the EU in 2006 was positively correlated with the variable “I see myself as a citizen of the European Union.” This indicates that those who expressed support for the EU also were more likely to perceive themselves as citizens of the European community. Table 4: Correlation between confidence in the EU and citizens’ perception of belonging to the EU, 2006 1 2 1. Confidence in the EU … .446** 2. I see myself as a citizen of the EU .446** … Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, p<.001, 2-tailed Data Source: table was created by the author based on the data filed from WVS 2006 Ukrainians who had higher confidence in the EU not only possessed more democratic orientations and values, but they also perceived themselves as belonging to the “community of the European Union” (Schimmelfennig 2001). And although this group of citizens was in the minority in comparison to the whole population, they expressed values and orientations that are common to the EU normative principles. At the same time, the data showed no difference in stated tolerance of gender equality and homosexuality – attitudes that are associated with a population that is more accepting and are indicative of democratic changes (Inglehart and Welzel 2003). Ukrainians also had high tolerance towards unlawful actions such as accepting bribes and cheating on taxes between 1996 and 2006, indicating that they have not developed strong preferences for the normative rules and principles of obedience. In the year of 2013, when asked if Ukraine would be better off if it had closer economic relations with Europe or Russia, 39.1 percent of Ukrainians chose Europe and 37.3 percent chose Russia. However, when testing for correlations between support for Europe or Russia and political orientations and values, the results show that those who chose closer collaboration with Europe once again had higher level of education, were younger, were more often employed full time, and spoke Ukrainian at home. They also expressed higher interest in politics and political activities. The biggest difference was observed in responses relating to the justification of actions such as limiting the rights of citizens to protest and limiting freedom of the media. The majority of those 78 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 who supported closer collaboration with Russia (82.7 percent and 72.3 percent) agreed with limitations to these freedoms. Among those who supported closer collaboration with Europe, only 17.3 percent and 27.2 percent agreed with such limitations. This group of citizens also expressed higher levels of political efficacy and support for democratic freedoms – core values of the European Union Community. Table 5: Support for EU versus Russia and Political Orientations, Values and Actions, 2013 DV/IV Europe Russia Chi-square, p value Interest in politics (very interested and somewhat interested) 65 56.2 .006 Membership of labor unions 7.1 11.7 .000 Membership of political party 1.4 4.6 .000 Membership of church or religious organization 1 .3 .000 Justified: limit the rights of citizens to protest (category 1- justified) 17.3 82.7 .000 Justified: limit freedom of the media 27.2 72.3 .000 Justified: limit authority of the courts 41.7 58.3 .081 It is more important that political leaders maintain order than protect democratic rights of citizens (Strongly agree and somewhat agree) 38 65.1 .000 How necessary are non-government organizations or NGOS for Ukraine (Essential and Necessary combined) 87.3 80.3 .001 People like you can have influence on decisions made by the government (strongly agree and somewhat agree) 23.5 16.7 .078 I have a role to play in solving problems in my country (strongly agree and somewhat agree) 25.3 20.2 .030 Political action recently done: signing a petition 8 10.6 .104 Political action recently done: attending peaceful demonstrations or protests 17.7 10.2 .002 Political action recently done: using social media to express your views on political issues 8.3 3.2 .000 What is your employment (full time at one job) 38.5 37.9 .000 Education (complete university) 33.8 25.2 .000 Age group .000 18-29 30 16.1 30-44 30.3 26.9 45-59 21.2 23 60+ 18.5 34 Number of cases 528 498 1026 Data Source: table was created by the author based on the data filed from IFES (2013). The cases were selected in two groups:1 (closer collaboration with Europe) and 2 (closer collaboration with Russia). For questions on Justifiability, the percentage represents those who answered category 1- justified. These findings may help to explain the November 2013 protests following President Yanukovych’s decision to postpone the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU. Those citizens who supported closer collaboration with Europe, according to the data, possessed intolerance towards injustice and corruption and supported democratic freedoms, which are the core principles of the EU. In combination with a higher level of interest in politics, and higher levels of political efficacy and participation, they could express their readiness to stand for their values and for their place in the European community.12 Yet the official Europeanization on the part of the EU, and the Ukrainian government’s implementation of political and economic reforms that would speed up the process of country’s democratization, was missing. 12According to Olga Onuch (2014), who interviewed 1304 protesters between 26 November, 2013 and 10 January, 2014 in Kyiv, the early protesters solely focused on supporting closer EU ties. 79 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 ISSN 2562-8429 Conclusion The conditionality rules that were applied by the EU before the 2004 enlargement were based on official criteria of assessment and unofficial rules of belonging to Europe. Although they were not easy to achieve, the incentive of membership encouraged candidate countries to follow these rules. In Ukraine, after the Orange revolution, the EU refrained from the use of active leverage towards Ukraine, which would have required particular programs and policies for future implementation. Instead, the EU employed soft power of membership aspiration, built on a commitment to shared values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, without the promise of potential membership (Kubicek 2017). Although Ukraine’s future membership in the EU was not discussed, the discourse of Ukraine’s Europeanization was actively promoted and implemented within the country. As this research has demonstrated, the idealistic image of the EU and its prosperity was actively promoted by President Yushchenko and later President Yanukovych as well as by the Ukrainian media. Both Presidents used the idea of Ukraine’s future within the EU for political and electoral purposes. It was built on the ideas of European values and beliefs and their similarities with Ukrainian values and orientations and through the enticing practical possibility of visa-free travel to countries of the Schengen zone for Ukrainians. A comparison of political orientations of Ukrainians based on their level of confidence in the EU before and after the Orange revolution showed that there was a correlation between confidence in the EU and more democratic political orientations. Some Ukrainians reported increased confidence in the EU as well as identification with EU liberal values such as support for democratic freedoms and rights, and intolerance of injustice. Those who showed higher confidence in the EU had a higher level of interest in politics, higher membership in the socio-political groups, higher political participation, tolerance, and level of trust towards other people. The confidence in the EU was also positively correlated with citizens’ perception of their belonging to the EU. The highest level of confidence in the EU was observed among the young citizens who possessed high levels of education, resided in Western or Central regions, and were fully employed. This group of citizens also expressed high level of political awareness, political efficacy, and political participation in 2013, the year of Euromaidan. At the same time, Ukrainians expressed a mixed of materialist and post-materialist orientations, which are associated with lesser developed democracies and unstable economies (Inglehart and Welzel 2003). The main findings of this research indicate that the EU soft power of attractiveness was an effective tool that was used by political elites and media in Ukraine to promote discursive Europeanization without the implementation of formal Europeanization, which was too costly to achieve without strong incentives from the EU. 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Topics relate to the European Union, its Member States, the former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe. The journal is published by the Centre for European Studies, an associated unit of the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University. CJERS aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. Contact: Carleton University The Centre for European Studies 1103 Dunton Tower 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Canada Tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; E-mail: CJERS@carleton.ca Creative Commons License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This Working Paper is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial- No Derivs 4.0 Unported License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. No use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. 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