

24     Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 
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The Impact of the 2020 Constitutional Changes on Authoritarian 

Constitutionalism in Russia: 

Judicial Pragmatism Between the Russian Constitutional Court 

(RCC) and the State 
 

Alexandra Yao1 

 
Abstract 

In 2003, the Russian government abruptly arrested Mikhail Khodorkovsky, then CEO of Yukos, 

the largest private oil company in Russia at the time. Yukos was sold for parts through court-

mandated auctions and eventually acquired by state oil company Rosneft. The Yukos Affair 

transformed Russia’s oil industry, energy sector, and state relationship with private enterprises. In 

response, Yukos shareholders appealed the injustice to international courts and have fought to 

enforce a USD 50 billion compensation ruling for nearly two decades. This article follows the 

timeline of the Yukos trials, assessing Russia’s aggressive resistance to the Yukos compensation 

ruling and focusing on the 2020 Russian constitutional amendments that legalized selective 

compliance of international rulings. The analysis concludes that the constitutional changes 

represent a critical juncture moment for the Russian Constituional Court (RCC) that transforms its 

relationship with the executive branch, offsetting the RCC’s balancing act of judicial pragmatism 

with the state by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. 

This article examines possible motivations for this change, which include the Yukos trials.  

 
1 Alexandra Yao is a PhD student at the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia 

 
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Introduction 

 
In 2003, Yukos, the largest private oil company in Russia at the time, was in the middle of merger 

talks with ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil - an unprecedented deal which would have created the 

largest oil company in the world. Later that year, Yukos’ CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested 

on charges of tax fraud. Yukos was sold for parts through court-mandated auctions and eventually 

acquired by state oil company Rosneft. The Yukos Affair transformed Russia’s oil industry, energy 

sector, and state relationship with private enterprises.  

Since Yukos was auctioned off at staggeringly low prices without due process, Yukos shareholders 

suffered a tremendous loss of capital and appealed the injustice to the international courts. For 

nearly two decades, the shareholders and the Russian government have continued to overturn and 

reinstate the compensation ruling of a USD 50 billion payout. The Yukos trials have been 

processed in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Permanent Court of Arbitration 

(PCA), Hague District Court, and Hague Court of Appeal. As of September 2021, the trials 

continue in the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. 

New developments in response to the Yukos trials, such as the 2020 Russian constitutional 

amendments that legalized selective compliance of international rulings, reflect Russia’s 

aggressive resistance to the Yukos compensation ruling. These developments threaten the 

constitutional rights and freedoms of Russian citizens and private enterprises.  

The focus of this paper is as follows: what are the implications of the recent constitutional changes 

on authoritarian constitutionalism in Russia, specifically judicial pragmatism between the Russian 

Constitutional Court (RCC) and the state?  

This article concludes that the constitutional changes represent a critical juncture moment for the 

RCC that transforms its relationship with the presidency. The RCC’s balancing act of judicial 

pragmatism with the state has been offset by formally erasing the separation of powers between 

the executive and the judiciary. This article examines possible motivations for this change, among 

which are the Yukos trials.  

1990s: Hopeful Beginnings 

Immediately after the fall of Communism, judicial scholars were hopeful for the modernization of 

the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal legislature (Mishina 2020, 63). Their goal 

was radical legislative transformation. The initial judicial reforms of the 1990s exceeded 

expectations, including political competition, free speech, freedom of the press, democratic 

elections, and other democratic institutions previously nonexistent during the Soviet Union 

(Partlett and Krasnov 2019, 644-67). The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation was 

established in accordance with European standards and was the first judicial agency in Russian 

history with the power to legally evaluate the actions of actors in the highest levels of government, 

which includes the actions of the President. The Law on the Constitutional Court espoused judicial 

immunity, irremovability, and impartiality to establish judicial autonomy (Mishina 2020, 71). In 

1991, the Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media declared freedom of the press and the 

removal of Soviet norms of censorship and ideological restrictions on independent journalism 

(2020, 71). The 1996 Russian Criminal Code emphasized protection of the individual and outlined 


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its core principles of legality, equality of individuals before the law, and criminal liability based 

only on guilt, justice, and humanism (Articles 3-8 of the 1996 Criminal Code of the Russian 

Federation [RF]). 

Inspired by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in France, the 1993 Constitution of the RF also 

established a semi-presidential system (Mishina 2020, 72). The fundamental principles of the 1993 

Constitution of the RF explicitly recognized the exercise of “[state power in the RF] on the basis 

of separation of legislative, executive and judicial branches,” (Article 10 of 1993 Constitution of 

the RF) and the independence of these three branches. Articles 118-123 went on to establish the 

immunity, irremovability, and inviolability of judges (Articles 118-123 of 1993 Constitution of 

the RF). This was a remarkable achievement, especially since judicial independence was 

nonexistent under Soviet rule, as the courts operated as an arm of the repressive government 

apparatus (Mishina 2020, 75). The Constitution also established a judicial system composed of the 

RCC, the Supreme Court, federal courts of general jurisdictions, courts of arbitration, and justice-

of-the-peace courts (Article 118 of 1993 Constitution of the RF). 

Further, the 1996 Criminal Code decriminalized many anti-Soviet crimes including “anti-Soviet 

agitation, propaganda, sodomy, vagrancy, illegal currency transactions, [and] speculation” 

(Mishina 2020, 73). The Criminal Code also placed crimes against a person in superior priority to 

crimes against the state, thus privileging humanization and democratization.  

 
Authoritarian Constitutionalism 

In the past, studies of authoritarian constitutionalism focused on countries such as Singapore 

(Tushnet 2015, 391-462), Turkey (Isiksel 2013, 702-26), South Africa (Davis 2019, 57-75), 

Myanmar (Crouch 2020, 487-515), and non-Russian Former Soviet Republics (Newton 2019, 209-

39). There was little scholarship on authoritarian constitutionalism in Russia because, as Maria 

Popova (2017) argued, Russia did not adhere to Tushnet’s definition where “the autocrat sets the 

substantive law, often in negotiation with his governing coalition” (65). Alexei Trochev and Peter 

Solomon (2018) counter that Tushnet’s definition of authoritarian constitutionalism is so 

“demanding” (212) that most authoritarian states would not fit the bill. Trochev and Solomon 

(2018) argue that there is a balancing act of authoritarian constitutionalism in Russia. This paper 

builds on their balancing act argument by analyzing the recent 2020 constitutional changes to 

demonstrate how the balancing act has been disrupted. 

 
Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Russia: A Balancing Act 

Despite the achievements of the 1990s judicial reforms, the Russian judiciary was still open to 

manipulation and political pressure. This has led to a trend of authoritarian constitutionalism, 

especially between the RCC and the executive branch. During their respective terms between 

2001-2016, President Putin and President Medvedev amended the 1994 Federal Constitutional 

Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation a collective total of 15 times, making 

key changes to RCC regulations including salary changes, relocations, and age limits to test the 

loyalty and compliance of the RCC (Trochev and Solomon 2018, 204-5). 


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Trochev and Solomon have previously written about how the RCC’s defence of Russian 

sovereignty against international judicial bodies is one of the RCC’s adjustments to Vladimir 

Putin’s increasingly authoritarian regime (Trochev and Solomon 2018). They argue that the RCC 

engages in a balancing act between two governance regimes – the constitutional regime and the 

regime of political expediency, resulting in what they categorize as the Russian version of 

authoritarian constitutionalism. Popova (2017) disagrees, arguing that while Singapore has 

authoritarian constitutionalism, Russia does not, since the political regime only selectively adheres 

to constitutionalism. Among many examples, she cites the Yukos Affair and Khodorkovsky’s 

arbitrary arrest as evidence of the Kremlin’s disregard for constitutionalism and political use of 

the law (2017, 67). Her article predicted the Kremlin’s preference for “greater politicization of the 

judiciary” (2017, 74). This article builds upon her prediction by demonstrating how the political 

regime has erased the remaining independence of the judiciary and departed further from 

authoritarian constitutionalism.  

For the purposes of this investigation, judicial pragmatism refers to practical judicial decision 

making in recognition of limitations to legal formalism. Judicial pragmatism allows judges the 

freedom to “follow the law to the letter or openly disregard it, depending on the context” (Hendley 

2017, 4), allowing them to cater to political realities while pursuing judicial activism on lower risk 

cases. In this sense, judicial pragmatism is “activist” (Posner 1995, 4) in that it is “a rejection of 

the idea that law is something grounded in permanent principles and realized in logical 

manipulation of those principles, and a determination to use law as an instrument for social ends” 

(405). Judicial pragmatism by the RCC includes “adaption to institutional changes” (Trochev and 

Solomon 2018, 204), “adaption to personnel changes” (206), and “tolerating disobedience with 

judgments” (211) as well as adaption to the Kremlin’s needs and expanding judicial activism on 

non-politically sensitive cases.  

Trochev and Solomon (2018) demonstrate that one of the key ways the RCC has carefully 

maneuvered the tensions in the duality between constitutionalism and political expediency is by 

presenting itself as an effective defence against ECtHR international encroachment upon Russian 

national sovereignty. They illustrate how the RCC’s defence of selective compliance is necessary 

to adjust to new political realities and preserve (some) autonomy for RCC judges to continue other 

important work in expanding domestic judicial activism (Trochev and Solomon 2018). Similarly, 

Khalikova (2020) has highlighted how the RCC has balanced restricted judiciary freedom on 

politically sensitive issues, on the one hand, with the greater freedom to adjudicate social rights 

issues on the other. The duality is maintained so long as the regime of political expediency 

maintains the exercise of unrestrained power that can “bypass constitutional restraints and prevail 

over constitutional values” (Trochev and Solomon 2018, 202) and the constitutional regime 

maintains the “operation of formal constitutional rules and rules of European human rights law, 

which both constrain and guide Russia's leaders in ruling their country” (202).  

Richard Sakwa (2020) has also argued that the Russian government benefits from a “dual state 

model” where the “administrative regime” (45) gains legitimacy and authority from the 

constitutional regime principles, and yet can continue to subvert constitutional principles. 

Published in early 2020, Sakwa’s book agrees with Trochev and Solomon’s argument that the 

administrative regime is “balanced by the constitutional state” (47). This article assesses whether  

the recent constitutional changes that function as domestic defences of national sovereignty against 

international courts have now subverted the duality of the two governance regimes by firmly 

subjugating the RCC and other branches of power directly under presidential control, erasing their 


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constraint on Russian government leadership. The former balancing act between the administrative 

and constitutional regime has now been undone.  

Current Literature 

This article contributes to the scant literature surrounding authoritarian constitutionalism in Russia 

and literature on the Yukos trials as publications catch up to the recent constitutional changes, new 

Yukos trials, and their implications for the future. Before the 2014 PCA's compensation ruling, 

scholars studied how the Yukos Affair was politically motivated and not simply an issue of fraud 

and tax evasion or property redistribution as Russian authorities claim (Gustafson 2012). In recent 

years, researchers have examined the Yukos trials and their impact on Russia’s relationship with 

the ECtHR and the Council of Europe (Aksenova and Marchuk 2018). There is a general consensus 

that the Yukos trials were the most significant factor, inter alia, that affected the 2015 RCC defence 

mechanism to check ECtHR's jurisdiction (Kornya 2017) and subsequently the role of the 2020 

constitutional amendments on the trials (Krimmer 2020, 86-94). 

Scholars have also focussed on how the landmark Judgment 21-P/2015 and the rapid Russian 

constitutional changes in 2020 signify a disengagement with international courts and superiority 

of national sovereignty over international law (Kalinichenko and Kochenov 2021, 341-46). Others 

have also categorized the 2015 Russian defence mechanism as among the slew of other similar 

cases in Germany, Italy, UK, and others in the broader recent global trend of backlash against 

international courts (Voeten 2020, 407-22). 

The central contribution of this article is that it examines the current state of authoritarian 

constitutionalism in Russia in the context of the Yukos trials, which accelerated a series of 

constitutional changes as a form of domestic defence of national sovereignty. The research 

methodology of this investigation mainly involves scrutiny of legal documents (case judgments, 

statutes, constitutional amendments), news articles, and relevant literature (scholarship on the 

Yukos trials, constitutional changes in Russia, authoritarian constitutionalism, and backlash 

politics). Research for this article included relevant RCC judgments, federal laws, and the case 

files of the Yukos trials from the ECtHR, PCA, Hague District Court, Hague Court of Appeal, and 

the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. The legal documents were presented in English, Russian, 

or French and were accessible online. 

 
The Yukos Trials: The Elephant in the Room 

Timeline of the Yukos trials 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian government underwent a process of 

rapid privatization. Part of this process involved the government selling valuable state-owned 

companies at low prices to private owners in loans-for-shares auctions (Sim 2008, 6). Mikhail 

Khodorkovsky, the then owner of Menatep bank, acquired Yukos between 1995 and 1996. In order 

to foster economic growth in poorer regions, the Russian government issued a low-tax-region 

program in the 1990s, allowing local authorities to either partially or fully exempt their 

corporations from corporate-profit tax. Yukos then relocated its trading companies to these internal 

offshore tax havens, selling oil to its own trading companies at low prices and then reselling the 

oil abroad at market prices, all while profiting from the low tax rates on the sales. During the Yukos 

trials, the Russian Federation asserted that Yukos “increased step by step from sham shell to sham 


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shell, generating artificially inflated profits through non-arm's length transactions” (Yukos 

Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation 2014). The Russian Federation accused 

Yukos of “fraudulently evad[ing] billions of dollars of Russian corporate profit tax from 1999 to 

2004 [by] abusing the [low-tax-region] program” (Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) 2014 at 

109). While profiting from tax optimization methods, Yukos became one of the largest oil 

companies in the world by 2002 (Krimmer 2020, 87). By 2003, Khodorkovsky had become 

popularly known as the richest man in Russia and entered merger talks with Sibneft, ExxonMobil 

and ChevronTexaco. In October 2003, Khodorkovsky was arrested on charges of forgery, fraud, 

and tax evasion. On December 19, 2004, Yukos’ major production company ‘Yuganskneftegaz’ 

was acquired by a shell company Baikalfinansgroup. Four days later, Baikalfinansgroup sold those 

shares to state-owned oil company Rosneft (Chernykh 2011, 1240). 

So far, two international courts have released rulings on the trials between Yukos shareholders and 

the Russian government. On July 18, 2014, the PCA ruled that Russia must pay USD 50 billion in 

damages to the Yukos shareholders in full by January 14, 2015 or interest would begin to accrue 

(Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) 2014). Two weeks later, the ECtHR issued a just 

satisfaction judgment of EUR 1.9 billion to be paid by Russia (OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos 

v Russia 2014). 

Subsequently, at the State Duma’s (lower house of Parliament) request, the RCC began to revisit 

and review the constitutionality of the federal laws pertaining to Russian compliance with the 

European Convention of Human Rights. On July 15, 2015, the RCC issued their Judgment No. 21-

P/2015 that ranked ECtHR authority (and therefore international law) subsidiary to RCC 

jurisdiction, thus making selective compliance of international rulings legal (Postanovlenie 

Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii ot 14 iiulia 2015). Referring to the Anchugov and 

Gladkov v. Russia case from July 14, 2013, the RCC judgment argued that implementation of the 

ECtHR’s judgment would violate the Constitution of the RF. To substantiate their defence, the 

RCC also cited similar case law by the German Constitutional Court, Italian Constitutional Court, 

Austrian Constitutional Court, and the UK Supreme Court. On December 14, 2015, President Putin 

signed a federal law empowering the RCC to evaluate international court decisions and their 

compliance with the RF Constitution to verify their enforceability (Federal'nyĭ zakon 2015).  

The RCC has applied the defence mechanism to two ECtHR rulings: Anchugov and Gladkov v 

Russia and the Yukos compensation ruling. On April 19, 2016, the RCC issued Judgment No. 12-

P/2016, which reviewed and denied the possibility of implementing the ECtHR’s Anchugov and 

Gladkov v Russia ruling (Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 2016). The following day, 

on April 20, 2016, the Hague District Court overturned the PCA’s USD 50 billion ruling on the 

grounds that the case was outside of the PCA’s jurisdiction (The Russian Federation v. Veteran 

Petroleum Limited, Yukos Universal Limited, Hulley Enterprises Limited 2016). Next, on January 

19, 2017, the RCC successfully stopped the implementation of the Yukos compensation ruling, to 

which RCC Judge Aranovsky and Judge Yaroslavtsev dissented (Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo 

Suda Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii ot 19 ianvaria 2017).  

On February 18, 2020, the Hague Court of Appeal reinstated the compensation ruling (Veteran 

Petroleum Limited, Yukos Universal Limited, Hulley Enterprises Limited v. The Russian 

Federation 2020). The next month, Putin introduced a slew of constitutional amendments 

including the precedence of Russian constitutional law over international law, making selective 

compliance of international rulings constitutional. By June 2020, the Supreme Court of the 

Netherlands accepted the Russian government's appeal to challenge the Hague Court of Appeal's 


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ruling. By December 2020, Russia passed a law banning Constitutional Court judges from 

publishing dissenting opinions (Gustafson 2012, 272-318). At the time of writing, the Supreme 

Court of the Netherlands' final judgment is still pending. Between January 15, 2015, and January 

14, 2021, approximately USD 7 billion of interest has accrued, bringing the total of the awards to 

USD 57 billion. 

Significance of the Yukos Trials 

Scholars agree that Khodorkovsky’s aggressive economic policies designed to increase foreign 

investment, increasingly defiant criticism of state policies, funding for opposition parties, pro-

American stance along with rumours of political ambition, all contributed to the singling out of his 

company Yukos (Gustafson 2012, 272-318). Since Yukos was no different from other oil 

companies in its perfectly legal tax optimization methods, the Yukos Affair made an example of 

Khodorkovsky and reasserted the primacy of state authority over big business as well as the power 

of state coercion, especially given his wealth and visibility (Tompson 2005, 159-81). More 

importantly, Putin’s power and legitimacy are directly tied to Russia’s economic performance on 

the global stage, particularly within the energy sector (Sim 2008, 69). After Rosneft acquired 

Yukos, Russia’s economy benefited significantly, which translated into political longevity for 

Putin.  

The Yukos government takeover marked the beginning of a series of selective state acquisitions 

of private companies across a variety of industries, in a process of creeping nationalization. The 

OECD Economic Survey of the Russian Federation reported 29 major state acquisitions between 

2004-2006 alone (not including state acquisitions of foreign assets) across the banking, electric 

power, nuclear construction, machine-building, media, aviation, auto, oil and gas, and titanium 

sectors (OECD 2006, 38). The role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the Russian economy is 

unusually significant as SOEs dominate the country’s top ten firms, especially the banking, energy, 

and transport sectors (OECD 2014, 28-29). More recently, in 2016, the private oil company 

Bashneft was sold to state-owned Rosneft without a public tender (US Department of State 2021). 

With the capital flight from Russia and sharp decline in foreign direct investments, it is expected 

that exiting private shareholders will continue to sell their assets to state-owned enterprises. 

The Yukos compensation ruling is significant to Russian state interests not only because it 

threatens a USD 57 billion financial cost but because it would alter the business-state institutional 

relationship (reasserted by the Yukos Affair and solidified by creeping nationalization of key 

industries) as well as set legal precedence of state responsibility for corrupt asset renationalization. 

 
Constitutional Changes: Offsetting the Balancing Act 

Judgment 21-P/2015 

After the 2014 PCA compensation ruling, a group of State Duma members requested that the RCC 

revisit the constitutionality of federal laws regarding Russian compliance with the ECtHR, 

ostensibly to review a separate ECtHR ruling: Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia. On July 4, 2013, 

the ECtHR had ruled that Russia had violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention by not 

allowing convicted prisoners the right to vote in parliamentary elections (Anchugov and Gladkov 

v. Russia 2013). However, this was in direct conflict with Article 32(3) of the Russian Constitution 

that states prisoners do not have the right to vote or be elected. Russian resistance against the 


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Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia ruling was reinforced by Hirst v UK (2005), a similar case 

concerning prisoner voting rights that also received pushback from domestic courts in the UK 

against the ECtHR case law. This straightforward conflict between an ECtHR ruling and the RF 

Constitution was the perfect opportunity to develop the first domestic defence mechanism: RCC 

issued Judgment No. 21-P/2015, ranking ECtHR rulings subsidiary to RCC jurisdiction, and 

setting a precedent for future international court rulings (Postanovlenie 2015). Judgment No. 21-

P/2015 was further solidified later that year by Putin, who signed a federal law authorizing RCC 

evaluation of enforceability of international court decisions (Federal Constitutional Law 

No.7/2015) (Federal'nyĭ zakon 2015). Similar to the UK, Russia took the opportunity of clear-cut, 

straightforward judicial conflict and applied it to a political agenda of limiting ECtHR 

jurisprudence. After applying the defence mechanism to the Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia 

ruling in 2016 (Judgment 12-P/2016) (Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 2016), the 

RCC unsurprisingly then applied it to the Yukos award in 2017 (Judgment 1-P/2017) 

(Postanovlenie 2017).  

Constitutional Amendments 2020 

When the Hague Court of Appeal reinstated the Yukos award in early 2020, Putin fast tracked 

sweeping changes to the Russian Constitution (Isachenkov 2020). The changes included the 

expansion of presidential control, which had been in motion prior to the reinstallation of the Yukos 

award but were accelerated by the Court of Appeal’s decision, given the urgency and political 

sensitivity of national sovereignty against unsavoury international jurisdiction.  

Prior to 2020, few amendments have been made to the 1993 Constitution. Aside from minor 

changes, the most substantial of any amendments made was the extension of the presidential term 

from four to six years and the State Duma deputy terms from four to five years in 2008, and the 

expansion of presidential power on the procuracy in 2014 (Teague, 2020, 303).  

Of the 2020 constitutional amendments, Articles 79 and 125 are directly relevant to the Yukos 

trials. Article 79 now stipulates that “decisions of international organizations adopted on the basis 

of provisions of international treaties of the [RF] which in their interpretation contradict the 

Constitution shall not be subject to implementation in the [RF] (Article 79 of the Constitution of 

the RF 2020).” While the previous Russian law and court decisions were addressed to the ECtHR 

specifically, Article 79 now expands the supremacy of national sovereignty to include any and all 

international courts and organizations to which Russia is connected. The new wording of Article 

79 thus expands to include the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (crucial to the Yukos trials that are 

based on Russia’s alleged breach of obligations of the ECT that Russia signed but never ratified) 

and the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 

Awards (which the Yukos shareholders cite in their subsequent attempted enforcement 

proceedings of the award since Russia signed and ratified the New York Convention in 1960). 

Clearly, this effort was designed to address future Yukos decisions such as those from the Hague 

and the simultaneous enforcement proceedings.  

An added 5.1(b) to Article 125 formally empowers the RCC to determine the possibility of 

enforcing international rulings if they “contradict the fundamentals of the public legal order of the 

[RF].” This constitutionalized the RCC’s authority to decide on the enforceability of “decisions of 

interstate bodies adopted on the basis of provisions of international treaties of the RF […,] a foreign 

or international (or interstate) court, [or] a foreign or international private arbitration court 

(arbitration)” (Article 125(5-1.b) of the Constitution of the RF 2020). Specific mention of 


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interstate, foreign, and international courts, and foreign or international private arbitration courts 

demonstrates how this addendum was again designed to address any and all future Yukos 

decisions.  

The Amended Article 83(f-3) of the Constitution grants the President power to submit requests to 

terminate powers of a whole host of judges including the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and judges 

of the Constitutional Court, the chairman, deputy chairpersons and judges of the Supreme Court, 

and judges of courts of cassation and appellate courts (Article 83(f-3) of the Constitution of the 

RF 2020). This termination request can be in case of any “act besmirching the honor and dignity 

of the judge” (Article 83(f-3) of the Constitution of the RF 2020), giving the president the right to 

fire judges at will based on ambiguous criteria, revoking the irremovability of judges, and 

neutralizing the authority of constitutional court judges to constrain state leadership.  

Several key amendments also significantly expanded the powers of the President to a staggering 

degree. Amended Article 83(a) grants the President power to “remove the Chairman of the 

Government of the Russian Federation [aka the Prime Minister] from office” (Article 83(a) of the 

Constitution of the RF 2020) at his own discretion, without needing confirmation from the State 

Duma or consultation with the Federal Council. Previously, if the President wished to remove the 

Chairman (Prime Minister), as a condition, he had to dismiss the entire government as well 

(Teague 2020, 326).  

The European Commission for Democracy through Law (known as the "Venice Commission"), 

an advisory body for the Council of Europe, has warned that under the new constitutional 

amendments, “the lack of regulation of the removal process in the Constitution, appears to increase 

the possibility of influence of the Executive over the Constitutional Court (European Commission 

for Democracy through Law 2020, 17).” In reference to Trochev and Solomon’s authoritarian 

constitutionalist balancing act, the constitutional changes have allowed “the regime of political 

expediency” (2018, 202) to expand its power over “the constitutional regime,” (202) severely 

offsetting the duality of the two regimes by threatening judicial independence and 

constitutionalism.  

Amended Article 107(3) grants the RCC power to exercise a “preventive constitutional review by 

request of the president” (Mishina 2020). The President has formally and constitutionally enlisted 

the RCC to help him block federal laws he dislikes while removing Parliament’s ability to 

overcome a presidential “super veto” (Teague 2020, 324).  Grigoriev has noted that while the 

amendment appears redundant since the President controls the Duma, it is an effective failsafe in 

case the opposition should gain a larger representation in parliament (Grigoriev 2021, 47). 

Previously, the RCC maintained a balancing act by presenting itself as an effective defence against 

international encroachment as a quid pro quo for judicial autonomy on other issues. Now, the RCC 

is increasingly being directly employed by the government as an apparatus of power and losing 

judicial autonomy altogether.  

The most notorious of the amendments, Article 81(3-1) limits presidential terms to two per 

individual but also resets Putin’s clock by nullifying his past presidential terms. This means he 

could run again for president in 2024 and 2030, potentially extending his term in office until 2036, 

at which point he will be 84 years old (Grigoriev 2021, 28). 

The constitutional amendments in 2020 have firmly subjugated the RCC under government 

control, dissolving the prior balancing act and duality between the constitutional regime and the 


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regime of political expediency in Russia. The amendments signal a “re-Sovietization” of the 

Russian legislature and negates the initial efforts in 1993 to commit to norms of international law, 

principles of democratization, and constitutional rights and freedoms. The amendments signal a 

clear disregard of international treaties and laws by subordinating them to the interests of national 

sovereignty. The President has not only significantly expanded his own powers and influence on 

all executive branches but has also made it far more difficult to strip him of his immunity once his 

presidency ends. Amended Article 93 now requires that in order for a President to be “deprived of 

immunity,” he must be charged with “high treason or of commission of another serious crime” 

(Article 93(1) of the Constitution of the RF 2020). This decision must be passed by a two-thirds 

majority in the upper house and at least one third vote of the State Duma (Article 93(2) of the 

Constitution of the RF 2020). The charge must be confirmed by the Supreme Court as well as 

concluded by the Constitutional Court. For context, there have been a sum total of three attempts 

of impeachment (“two in 1993 under the 1978 Constitution of the RSFSR and one in 1999” 

(Mishina, 2020, 99) and in all attempts they never managed to collect enough votes. With the new 

amendments, the feat would require such an orchestration of government members upon which 

the President has direct termination control over, it has been rendered impossible, unless the 

judges, chairpersons, and deputy chairpersons are willing to “[pay] with their posts” (Mishina 

2020, 92).  

Dissenting Opinions 

By November 2020, the State Duma passed amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law “On 

the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation” to prohibit the publication of dissenting 

opinions of RCC rulings (State Duma Committee on State Building and Legislation 2020). Though 

RCC rulings are passed by a majority vote, individual judges could previously publish dissenting 

opinions expressing their disagreement in written form. They carry no legal force and are usually 

added to the case file and published along with the RCC’s final decision. The law does not ban 

dissenting opinions outright, but they are no longer publicized and will be accessible only in 

archives and out of the public eye. This carries severe legal consequences as it undermines the 

independence of the judiciary and undercuts the principles of open justice and pluralism. Silencing 

dissenting opinions also means RCC judgments will appear unanimous should the RCC need to 

refuse future Yukos decisions.  

Amicus Curiae 

On January 28, 2021, the RCC removed paragraph 34.1 on legal organizations and legal academics 

and scholars providing opinions on cases from their rules of procedure, thus ending the practice of 

amicus curiae (friends of the court) (ROSBIZNESCONSULTING 2021). While legal scholars and 

independent experts will no longer be able to present opinions to trials of public interest, the RCC 

is not rejecting opinions from government agencies. This development stands in stark contrast to 

the past, when in spite of protest from Putin’s lawyers, RCC judges would request amicus curiae 

submissions on politically sensitive cases from NGOs that the government had attempted to silence 

politically (Trochev and Solomon 2018, 201). Former Constitutional Court judge Tamara 

Morshchakova noted how the regulations on amicus curiae reflected the readiness of the RCC to 

take into account views on issues of public importance and recognize citizen participation in state 

affairs. She noted that the Court is now holding closed sessions and denying trial participants 

access to relevant evidence and case materials without justification. Access to forensic information 

is also becoming increasingly restricted (Shturma 2021). The removal of amicus curiae only 

strengthens this process of restricting citizen participation and access to legal proceedings of public 


34     Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 
interest. Legal scholars agree that this development is unnecessary, seriously harms the credibility 

of the RCC, and cements the perception of the RCC as a vehicle of the government (Rights in 

Russia 2021; Nagornaia 2021). 

 
Conclusion 

In conclusion, the constitutional changes have transformed the RCC’s relationship with the 

Russian presidency. Designed to strengthen domestic defences of national sovereignty against 

international encroachment, the constitutional changes have offset the RCC’s balancing act of 

judicial pragmatism with the state by formally erasing the separation of powers between the 

executive and the judiciary. Among the possible reasons behind these changes are the Yukos trials. 

Although Trochev and Solomon convincingly argued that the RCC has thus far maintained 

authoritarian constitutionalism in Russia by navigating a balancing act and catering to government 

needs in order to exercise limited judicial autonomy, that balancing act has now been offset by the 

recent constitutional changes.   

The new amendments and constitutional changes have removed the necessary checks and balances 

which allow for judicial autonomy of the RCC by formally erasing the separation of powers 

between the executive and the judiciary. In particular, the changes directly countermand the 

efficacy of the RCC in its balancing act by reducing their efficiency, removing their ability to 

publish dissent, and empowering the RCC to function as a vehicle of the government. Without an 

independent judiciary and clear separation of powers between branches of state governance, the 

balancing act has been nullified. This bodes severe consequences for the rule of law in Russia and 

threatens the constitutional rights and freedoms of Russian citizens and private enterprises.  

The extent to which Russia has successfully dodged the Yukos ruling and neutralized RCC judicial 

autonomy has severe implications for the effectiveness of human rights advocacy and state 

accountability in international tribunals. This study on the constitutional changes and eradication 

of authoritarian constitutionalism in Russia raises further questions on what mechanisms are 

available for rights advocates to seek justice in the face of this challenge. What does this mean for 

victims who initiate or have initiated legal proceedings against powerful states in international 

courts and the subsequent enforcement of politically unsavoury rulings? What can stakeholders of 

international justice do to adjust to these challenges? The growing leniency from the institutional 

bodies themselves in reaction to the backlash and tightening of state sovereignty raises further 

questions on the integrity of international legal institutions and their efficacy in rights protection 

in the future. 

It is also likely that resistance against international judicial mechanisms and the eradication of 

RCC judicial autonomy are linked to NGO repression in Russia. Further study of the functioning 

of the RCC in Russia and reactions to the Yukos trials (especially how they will progress beyond 

the Supreme Court of the Netherlands) could contribute to the dialogue between academics and 

rights activists on how resistance and backlash affect legal mobilization for rights advocates in 

civil society and the legitimacy of international human rights systems.  

 
35     Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 
ISSN 2562-8429 

 
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