78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 78-80 issn 2562-8429 book review1 the putin predicament: problems of legitimacy and succession in russia. ibidem-verlag: by bo petersson, stuttgart 2021, isbn-13: 978-3-8382-7050-0, €34.90, paperback reviewed by: sofya du boulay, phd the power of official discourse helps to shape and maintain the political legitimacy of incumbent regimes in modern autocracies. the putin predicament offers an excellent analysis of the evolution of putin’s narratives during the past three decades, with a special focus on the turbulent period from 2012 to the covid-19 pandemic. petersson explores the dilemma of the seeming invincibility and durability of putin’s leadership, addressing the issue of succession and the legal, economic, and moral basis for personalistic power justification. the central claim is that putin built his authority based on charismatic legitimization through the construction of political myths as a method of his ideational self-expression and domination. these myths have been well received by the public, producing a coherent and convincing narrative structure that secured the support and trust of the popular majority for an extended period. myths possess an “ideational power basis of the regime” (52) to account for its durability. as a gifted storyteller and communicator, the kremlin chief was able to articulate and exploit new political myths about modern russia’s supremacy. the book comprises eight chapters with a foreword by carleton associate professor paul goode, progressing from an overview of the socio-economic context to the legitimation crisis of 2011-2012 in the chapter “legitimizing putin.” understanding public discontent and mass demonstrations before putin’s third term is critical as it indicates deep social dissatisfaction with the ruling regime and the lack of trust in the medvedev-putin power-sharing deal. notably, the civil unrest of 2011-2012 was the largest outburst since the fall of the soviet union, and putin’s popularity ratings remained low until the annexation of crimea in 2014. the subsequent four empirical chapters explore political validation challenges in the international arena through the narrative of “legitimacy through othering” (chapter 4), domestic durability concerns in “challenges from within” (chapter 5), the response to the covid-19 pandemic and the introduction of the sputnik v vaccine (chapter 6), concluding with the postponed succession and constitutional reforms (chapter 7). the economic growth and regime efficiency that maintained putin’s status quo during his first two presidential terms became impossible due to the downfall in oil prices and the post-crimea sanctions. therefore, alternative ideological strategies of legitimation were employed. the discourse of stability, national unity, and domestic order shifted to advancing russia’s recognition abroad. the othering strategy described in chapter 4 distinguishes and crystalizes the collective self during critical political junctures. in 2000, putin implemented a harsh othering narrative on chechen separatists, accusing them of organized crime, weak statehood, and religious fundamentalism—the main issues of what the author calls “the wild 1990s” (71). the list of 1 book reviews are not peer-reviewed 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 78-80 issn 2562-8429 putin’s enemies increased over the years. legitimization through othering helped him to justify attacks on the yeltsin-era oligarchs, georgia during the military conflict in 2008, ukraine in 2014 as well as the united states (71-72). advocating for the rights of the russian-speaking population, the kremlin regime unilaterally used military force in ukraine to support the referendum on crimea’s reunification with russia. the annexation of crimea won high ratings for putin among russian nationalists and secured his status as a protector of ‘traditional values.’ the crimean victory suggested that russia could challenge american post-cold war unilateralism and guarantee a new world order together with rising regional leaders: china and turkey. on a national level, putin destroyed the opposition, leaving virtually no space for a true political rival. his most outspoken antagonist, alexei navalny, used social media platforms to discredit the regime for corruption and nepotism. notably, putin has abstained from mentioning navalny’s name during official press conferences, invalidating anyone outside the system and non-conformist opposition. though navalny’s political rating never rose beyond 4 percent, his youtube documentaries about putin and medvedev significantly challenged their political legitimacy, gradually leading to the downfall of the latter. ‘legitimation from within’ is based on the myth of the phoenix—the cyclical restoration of order in russia after periods of hardships and external conflicts. the covid-19 crisis allowed regional state authorities to exercise higher executive responsibility despite an overarching tendency of central control. the sputnik v vaccine became an export commodity and the symbol of russian soft power. during the pandemic, putin’s public image in social media changed from energetic and omnipresent to exhausted and barricaded behind the desk. the global health emergency, along with economic instabilities, made the constitutional reforms of 2020 possible. allowing the exceptional right to remain in office for two consecutive terms, putin’s presidential term could continue until 2036. the postponed succession became the central outcome of constitutional changes, along with the provisions to protect the 'traditional institution of marriage,’ the declaration of the superiority of the russian law above international regulations, and a ban that would prevent any future president from holding foreign residence. the delayed succession resolves the immediate power transfer issue in 2024 but does not provide a durable solution. putin’s predicament remains, leaving the kremlin regime to decide how to transform the incumbent’s charismatic authority into a more sustainable ground for legitimacy. the book is well structured and written in a clear manner; it would be useful reading for students in political science, diplomats and anyone who wants to understand the ideological nature of the russian regime and the evolution of its discourse during putin’s rule. 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 78-80 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of highquality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 introduction to the special issue: carbon politics in canada and europe1 arthur benz2, joan debardeleben3, stephan schott4, and miranda schreurs5 signs that the climate is undergoing rapid changes as a result of increasing greenhouse gases are all around us. average annual global temperatures records are on an upward trajectory with 2020 tying with 2016 as the hottest years on record. already global average temperatures are 1.2 degrees centigrade warmer than they were at the end of the 19th century (national oceanographic and atmospheric association 2021). extreme weather events, including scorching summer temperatures, devastating forest fires and droughts, super hurricanes, and floods are expected to become increasingly common and severe as a result of climate change (national oceanographic and atmospheric association 2021). at the heart of the problem of climate change is our addiction to, and dependence on, fossil fuels. fossil fuels, of course, helped build our modern economies, but they are now recognized as being the primary source of the greenhouse gases that are warming the planet. in november 2016, the paris agreement on climate change entered into force. the paris agreement calls on nations to develop nationally determined contributions that indicate how they plan to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions. in the aggregate, these nationally determined contributions are meant to keep global average temperatures from increasing beyond two degrees centigrade, and to strive to keep them within 1.5 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels. every five years, climate change trends are to be evaluated and nationally determined contributions reconsidered in light of the latest scientific evidence. the next major global negotiations on climate change are scheduled for november 2021 in glasgow. while the economic shut-down tied to the covid-19 pandemic led to a temporary dip in global greenhouse gas emissions (mcsweeney and tandon 2020), climate change trends are worrisome. for this reason, it is important to consider what major climate contributors are doing to address their fossil fuel emissions, and to examine their climate change policies. this special issue focuses attention on the european union (eu), several of its member states, canada, and the united kingdom. (for earlier comparative work addressing these cases see schreurs, selin, and vandeveer 2009; harrison and sundstrom 2010; 1 the introduction was updated on april 25, 2021. 2 arthur benz is professor of political science at the technical university of darmstadt. 3 joan debardeleben is chancellor’s in the institute of european, russian, and eurasian studies (eurus) at carleton university. 4 stephan schott is an associate professor in the school of public policy and administration at carleton university. 5 miranda schreurs is chair of climate and environmental policy at the bavarian school of public policy, technical university of munich. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 mehling 2011; sprinz et al. 2018). there is good reason to focus on these cases. the eu accounts for roughly 7.5 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions, of which germany (the eu’s largest economy) contributes one fourth (1.85 percent); canada accounts for about 1.5 percent of global emissions (world resources institute 2020). while the eu and canada are substantially smaller emitters than either china or the united states (us), their greenhouse gas emission levels still far exceed levels consistent with achieving a climate neutral future. there are, however, signs that a more-climate sensitive politics is emerging in canada, the eu, and individual european states. a particularly interesting dimension of the canadian-european comparison relates to their multi-level governance structures and how these influence energy and climate policy-making processes and outputs. these, on the one hand, provide avenues for policy experimentation at different levels of government but, on the other hand, can complicate policy-making due to the need for constant negotiation and compromise. political systems, politics, and policy-making scholars in comparative politics and federalism studies have pointed out that the eu and canada represent particular types of federations that share essential features (fossum 2007; hueglin 2013). their decentralized allocation of power is determined by a constitution in the case of canada, and by treaties in the case of the eu. territorial relations rest on a kind of contract, the particular social basis of their multinational societies, and on the need for a continuous search for agreements. canada and the eu were created by a ‘coming-together’ of, respectively, a group of provinces and states. today, canada is a federation of ten provinces and three territories and numerous indigenous nations, while the eu is a supranational structure comprised of 27 member states (having recently lost the united kingdom as a member). both the diversity of the founding members and the growing diversity resulting from enlargements help to explain the challenges facing these federations, which therefore rightly are characterized as multinational “holding-together” federations (stepan 1999). the cultural diversity overlaps with significant economic and social diversity. canada and the eu are also quite similar in terms of the allocation of powers in the policy fields of climate change and energy. the setting of greenhouse gas emission targets within international climate negotiations is addressed by the federal government in ottawa and eu institutions in brussels and strasbourg (with participation of member state governments in the council), while the responsibilities for energy, infrastructure, and regional economy are more decentralized. in both cases, a coherent policy designed to mitigate climate change and to transform the energy system to a more sustainable basis requires coordination and agreements between the various levels of government. however, the institutional conditions for policy coordination differ between canada and the eu. the relations between levels of government, which are particularly relevant in complex policy areas like climate change and energy policy, reveal considerable divergences. provincial governments in canada emphasize their autonomy, although they and the federal government voluntarily have negotiated important intergovernmental agreements. the eu depends on the consent of at least a majority of member state governments to pass binding regulations and, in practice, governments regularly aim for unanimous decisions. 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 in terms of the patterns of democratic government, significant divergences exist as well. in canada, which is heavily influenced by the westminster model, majoritarian democracies emerged at the federal and provincial levels, although with a party system that increases the probability of minority governments in ottawa. in the eu, power sharing between intergovernmental institutions (european council and council of the eu, which represent national governments) and supranational institutions (european parliament and european commission, which represent the common european interest) follows the model of a consensus democracy where negotiations that lead to compromise and to outcomes acceptable to all, or at least most, parties are considered crucial. in contrast to canada, the eu is characterized by a wide variety of parliamentary and semi-parliamentary governments in its member states. coordination of policy-making is essential in energy and climate policy, yet this can be difficult because of the significant differences that may exist in territorial interests due to differences in available energy sources, industrial structures, and political-cultural orientations. these differences make the comparisons explored in this special issue of such interest. the comparison of the distinct modes of multilevel policy-making in canada and the eu can help explain, on the one hand, why canada and the eu have adopted climate neutrality targets and introduced plans for reducing dependence on fossil fuels but, on the other hand, have shown different propensities for dealing with emissions stemming from carbon-intensive sectors. the comparison also allows an exploration of how different actors’ interests influence the shape of respective carbon policies as well as the challenges and opportunities involved in policy implementation. lessons can also be drawn for practical politics, demonstrating the importance of transatlantic dialogue. there are many areas where stronger cooperation and improved coordination could open new possibilities for bilateral and multilateral approaches to climate mitigation and adaptation at the federal and supranational levels as well as at the member state, provincial, and even urban levels of government. given the complexities of multi-level governance in energy and climate policy, a comparison of all aspects of canadian and european climate and energy politics and policies is beyond the scope of a single special journal issue. for this reason, this issue focuses primarily on the larger member states of the eu plus the united kingdom and provinces of canada. among the eu member states, germany is the largest economy and is often considered to be a leader in some, but not all, aspects of energy and climate policymaking (fischer 2017). its influence is both direct, in terms of the policies and programs it sets nationally, as well as indirect, through its salient role in eu policymaking, where at times it pushes forward and at other times puts the brakes on more ambitious eu climate and energy targets, directives, and regulations. the uk, although no longer an eu member state, remains a major trading partner of both canada and the eu, and continues to align its climate policies with the eu. for different reasons, most southern and eastern european countries in the eu are less advanced in their energy transitions (for example, in terms of their installation of renewable energy) or the ambition-level of their climate policies, although there are exceptions. regional differences are also present in canada, where alberta, british columbia, ontario, saskatchewan, and québec can be viewed as key players influencing energy policy and thus also climate policy. in canada, there is a large divergence between very fossil fuel dependent provinces such as alberta and saskatchewan and provinces that already have a largely carbon-free electricity grid and that are spearheading a transition into a cleaner economy (e.g., québec and manitoba). 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 managing conflicts due to territorial disparities in carbon politics is a challenge in federations and the eu’s multi-level system. this is the case even though such systems technically provide institutional structures to express territorial diversity, at least more so than in the centralized structures characteristic of unitary states. the effectiveness of policies is influenced by intergovernmental coordination in canada; in the eu it is influenced by supranational joint decision making, as well as by the variable willingness (or ability) of individual member states to implement greenhouse gas emission reductions. energy policy-making has historically been dominated by executive branches and experts in public administration, with parliaments deciding on legislation and fiscal resources. this has raised the question, for all of these jurisdictions, of how executive governance and democracy can be balanced. it also raises important questions about the will of the people, as signaled by elections. democratic legitimacy in canadian federalism and in the eu’s complex multi-level system has been discussed from many perspectives and in reference to different concepts and theories of democracy (e.g., hueglin 2013; fossum 2007; fossum and laycock 2021). what is clear is that elections are an important vehicle for holding governments and their policies accountable. this can, however, make addressing longterm problems like climate change particularly challenging, as environmental issues are rarely the main issues on voters’ minds during elections. climate change demands immediate but far-reaching changes in energy provision, energy use, transport structures, and even social behavior. elections may not, however, effectively communicate an environmental mandate to politicians, at least not with the force needed to spur the far-reaching changes that green transitions require. the changing energy landscape resulting from climate change policies and the green energy transition is likely to have broad and long-lasting political consequences. the power structures that emerged during a time when carbon-based energy structures dominated are under threat. new actors and interests are emerging, but powerful, vested carbon interests are doing their best to steer developments in ways that will reduce their losses and possibly even bring them new gains. the comparison of carbon politics in canada and europe can advance our knowledge of how territorial, industrial, and value conflicts are managed in multi-level governance structures. it can also shed light on how democratic governments and society are changing as they slowly try to become low carbon, climate neutral economies. eu-canada relations and the international context although canada pulled out of the kyoto accord in late 2011, since prime minister justin trudeau came to power in 2015, canada has adopted more progressive climate change policies and joined the eu as a leader in the paris climate meeting of 2015. both canada and the eu have pushed for aggressive targets and timelines in international negotiations. the international context in which canadian and eu climate policies are developing is also changing. with the election of joseph biden, climate change is back on the us political agenda. the us is rejoining the paris agreement and the biden administration has made the clean energy revolution and climate justice central goals. canada, the us, and the eu are thus increasingly moving in line with each other’s efforts to reduce carbon emissions and to transition to clean economy models. on earth day, canadian prime minister justin trudeau pledged that canada 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 will do more to address climate change, setting a new target to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40-45 percent of 2005 levels by 2030 (volcovici and mason 2021). this came in reaction to a bilateral negotiation in the days leading up to the biden administration’s climate summit for world leaders which was held on april 22-23, 2021 (finnegan 2021). this growing convergence will reduce the likelihood of further trade barriers, although some cross-border frictions remain such as president biden’s cancellation of the keystone xl pipeline permit in early 2021 and his critique of germany’s plans to complete the nord stream 2 pipeline. at the same time, the potential for cooperation between the eu and canada in pushing an ambitious climate agenda on a bilateral basis is more promising than ever. the eu and canada are moving in tandem on the question of carbon adjustments in the comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) even though they have different approaches (hübner 2011). the eu is using a centralized emission trading system (the eu ets) and canada is relying on a variety of provincial measures with a federal system guided by the pan canadian framework on clean growth and climate change as a fallback option for provincial inaction. the potential exists to link the eu ets with québec’s and california’s cap and trade system that also used to include canada’s most populated province of ontario. the eu and canada are already collaborating on clean energy innovation and new supply chains and have considerable potential to further advance a circular clean economy. this special issue in his article, “carbon democracy in the eu and canada – ready for a ‘new green deal’?”, markus lederer takes a critical look at eu and canadian climate policy, noting some progress but arguing that neither jurisdiction is moving fast enough or making deep enough changes to contribute adequately to the global effort to keep rising greenhouse gas emissions within the 1.5 degrees centigrade ceiling. while he differentiates progress between canada and the eu, suggesting that the eu is doing somewhat better than canada, the main obstacle to change, he argues, is their historical development as carbon democracies. the democratic institutions of canada and the eu have both been powerfully shaped by fossil fuel interests. successfully transitioning towards cleaner energy structures and adopting green deal politics will mean not only deep changes to energy systems, but also the adjustment of industrial structures and changes to the nature of democratic politics. the green transitions will mean that there will be winners and losers, socially, economically, and politically. while a just transition may bring some compensation to affected regions, political struggles are to be expected. climate policy-making will thus, lederer argues, need to be deeply transformative and disruptive. stephan schott and miranda schreurs, in their article, “climate politics and fossil fuel sector developments in canada and germany: dealing with fossil fuel legacies,” examine efforts to become climate neutral in germany and canada. their article discusses recent climate and energy policies and programs, and the progress being made in expanding renewable energy capacity. while both countries have been slow to tackle the elimination of fossil fuel dependency, critical junctures appear to have been reached. responding to growing domestic and international pressures, including the eu’s embrace of the european green deal, germany issued a plan to phase out coal 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 and adopted a climate protection act. opposition from impacted regions was addressed with a large compensation plan. canadian measures include the adoption of the pan canadian framework on clean growth and climate change, and on-going coal phase outs at the provincial level. in the west, the oil and gas industry is starting to recognize that changes will be needed in that sector as well. despite opposition from fossil fueldependent provinces, and provinces such as ontario with conservative governments, climate measures signal a new era of cleaner technologies, with innovations spearheaded by industry, including in fossil fuel-dependent regions. thus, schott and schreurs conclude that the goal of climate neutrality has secured a place on both countries’ political agendas. they outline particular arenas where significant opportunities exist for cooperation between canada and germany, as well as between canada and the eu, in addressing climate change. in their article, “transformative energy policy in federations: canada and germany compared,” arthur benz and jörg broschek take another look at canada and germany. by focusing on energy transition and policy dynamics under different institutional conditions in federal systems, they analyze whether governments in these countries over the last decades have succeeded in transforming the old ‘policy regime’ and consolidating a new regime in this field. benz and broschek find that policies indeed have significantly changed in both countries. in canada, policies were initially introduced by some provinces; in germany, policies were initiated by the federal government. however, the path towards an energy system based on renewable sources still lacks appropriate governance structures in both countries, although this lack is more pronounced in the canadian system of dual federalism than in germany’s cooperative federalism. douglas macdonald, asya bidordinova, and avet khachatryan focus attention on lower-tier jurisdictions (member states in the eu, and provinces and territories in canada) in their article, “rising subnational greenhouse gas emissions: a challenge to meeting federal climate policy goals.” they suggest that climate progress has been more difficult for canada than for the eu because of the particularly large and rising share of emissions in alberta. the member state that has shown the highest growth in emissions in the eu (spain) is responsible for a relatively small share of overall eu emissions. other states with large shares of emissions in the eu, such as germany, have experienced emission drops, thus aiding overall eu progress on climate. finally, harold clarke’s and jon pammett’s article, “environmental issues in british and canadian elections,” is concerned with the mandates voters give to decision makers via elections in parliamentary democracies. they compare the 2019 national elections in the united kingdom (uk) and canada, examining the extent to which environmental issues swayed voting decisions. clarke and pammett argue that in both canada and the uk, voters’ primary concerns were not related to the environment or climate change. as such, issues relating to energy transformations were only of secondary concern. voters thus did not send the kind of clear mandate to policy makers on the environment that might be needed to carry out the deep transformative changes being called for in the articles by lederer and by schott and schreurs. 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 references finnigan, conor. 2021. “us, canada to hold climate talks, paving road to biden’s earth day summit,” abc news, february 23, 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/politics/uscanada-hold-climate-talks-paving-road-bidens/story?id=76076360. fischer, severin. 2017. die energiewende und europa. springer vs: wiesbaden. friedrich, johannes, mengpin ge, and andrew pickens. 2020. “this interactive chart shows changes in the world’s top 10 emitters.” world resources institute, december 10, 2020. https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/interactive-chart-topemitters. fossum, john eric. 2007. “on democratizing european constitution-making: possible lessons from canada's experience.” supreme court law review 37 (2): 1-39. fossum, john eric, and david laycock. 2021. “out of balance. executive dominance in federal settings.” in federal democracies at work. varieties of complex government, edited by arthur benz and jared sonnicksen, 58-77. toronto: university of toronto press. harrison, kathryn, and lisa mcintosh sundstrom, eds. 2010. global commons, domestic decisions: the comparative politics of climate change. cambridge: mit press. kurt hübner, ed. 2011. europe, canada and the comprehensive economic partnership agreement. new york: routledge. hueglin, thomas o. 2013. “treaty federalism as a model for policy making: comparing canada and the european union.” canadian public administration 56 (2): 185-202. mcsweeney, robert, and ayesha tandon. 2020. “global carbon project: coronavirus causes ‘record fall’ in fossil-fuel emissions in 2020,” carbon brief, december 11. https://www.carbonbrief.org/global-carbon-project-coronavirus-causesrecord-fall-in-fossil-fuel-emissions-in-2020. mehling, michael. 20. “facing climate change across the atlantic: how far apart are europe and north america?” in europe, canada and the comprehensive economic partnership agreement, edited by kurt hübner, 259-274. new york: routledge. national aeronautics and space administration. 2021. “2020 tied for warmest year on record, nasa analysis shows,” january 14, 2021. https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/2020-tied-for-warmest-year-on-record-nasaanalysis-shows. national oceanographic and atmospheric association. national centers for environmental information 2021. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/202013#:~:text=the%201901%e2%80 %932000%20average%20combined,c%20(60.9%c2%b0f). https://abcnews.go.com/politics/us-canada-hold-climate-talks-paving-road-bidens/story?id=76076360 https://abcnews.go.com/politics/us-canada-hold-climate-talks-paving-road-bidens/story?id=76076360 https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/interactive-chart-top-emitters. https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/interactive-chart-top-emitters. https://www.carbonbrief.org/global-carbon-project-coronavirus-causes-record-fall-in-fossil-fuel-emissions-in-2020 https://www.carbonbrief.org/global-carbon-project-coronavirus-causes-record-fall-in-fossil-fuel-emissions-in-2020 https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/2020-tied-for-warmest-year-on-record-nasa-analysis-shows https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/2020-tied-for-warmest-year-on-record-nasa-analysis-shows https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/202013#:~:text=the%201901%e2%80%932000%20average%20combined,c%20(60.9%c2%b0f) https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/202013#:~:text=the%201901%e2%80%932000%20average%20combined,c%20(60.9%c2%b0f) 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (2) 2020: 1-8 issn 2562-8429 schreurs, miranda a., stacy vandeveer, and henrik selin, eds. 2009. transatlantic environment and energy politics: comparative and international dimensions. surrey: ashgate. sprinz, detlef f., guri bang, lars brückner, and yasuko kameyama. 2018. “major countries.” in global climate policy: actors, concepts and enduring challenges, edited by urs luterbacher and detlef f. sprinz, 171-216. cambridge: mit press. stepan, alfred. 1999. “federalism and democracy. beyond the u.s. model.” journal of democracy 10 (4): 19-34. vandeveer, stacy, and henrik selin. 2012. “federalism, multi-level governance, and climate change politics across the atlantic.” in comparative environmental politics: theory, practice, and prospects, edited by paul f. steinberg and stacy vandeveer, 341-368. cambridge: mit press. volcovici, valerie, and jeff mason. 2021. “u.s., other countries deepen climate goals at earth day summit,” reuters, april 23, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/us-pledges-halve-its-emissionsby-2030-renewed-climate-fight-2021-04-22/. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/us-pledges-halve-its-emissions-by-2030-renewed-climate-fight-2021-04-22/ https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/us-pledges-halve-its-emissions-by-2030-renewed-climate-fight-2021-04-22/ canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 1 introduction: the ukraine war: a paradigm shift in eu-russian relations?1 joan debardeleben, carleton university russia’s war against ukraine, initiated in february 2022, has brought a sea change in europe’s security landscape and has also contributed to a fundamental reorientation of european union (eu) policies in several areas, most notably security and energy. russia’s efforts to expand its influence in ukraine and other neighbouring post-soviet countries have been a persistent feature of russian foreign policy under vladimir putin’s leadership. russia’s intervention in georgia in 2008 was a signal of its willingness to use military force to pursue this objective; russia’s seizing and subsequent annexation of the ukrainian region of crimea in 2014 was a precursor of russia’s 2022 actions. while the crimean annexation elicited a set of ongoing eu sanctions against russia, the 2022 war also initiated a more fundamental rethinking of the precepts underlying traditional eu approaches to foreign policy. the articles in this special issue address the dynamics that have driven russian actions in ukraine as well as the nature of eu policy changes that have resulted. as i suggested in 2018, events leading up to russia’s annexation of crimea in 2014 opened the door to a possible paradigm shift in eu-russian relations (debardeleben 2018). drawing on peter hall’s work on policy paradigms (hall 1993), i proposed the notion of “strategic paradigms” as being helpful when referring to how national leaders understand “the configuration of international power and the position of the nation within it” (debardeleben 2018, 117). with russia’s attack on ukraine in 2022, leaders of the eu and of most of its member states felt compelled to reassess their previous assumptions about the european security landscape and the place of the eu and russia in it, signalling the possibility of a paradigm change. the new situation undermined the once-touted vision of an integrated economic space ‘from lisbon to vladivostok’ that could eventually grow out of a strategic partnership with russia that had, optimistically, unfolded between the eu and russia in 1999 (solana 1999). as late as 2013, european commission president josé manuel durão barroso had articulated the vision underlying the old paradigm this way: “the long-term vision is a common economic and human space from lisbon to vladivostok with free travel of people, free exchange of goods and services, very close overall cooperation. this is our long-term vision” (barroso 2013). statements from president putin before 2014 also reflected a similar aspiration for an integrated european economic space (putin 2010). in contrast, the emerging strategic paradigm involves radically reduced economic and human interconnections between russia and the eu, dissonance on fundamental values, and a securitizing of the relationship. indicative of this change was the acknowledgement in september 2014 by federica mogherini (soon to take on the post as the eu high representative for foreign affairs 1 this article draws on research supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada. canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 2 and security policy) that the eu’s strategic partnership with russia no longer applied (euractiv 2014). since february 2022, the relationship has become securitized and militarized to a degree unimaginable just a few years ago; this might have seemed like a worst-case scenario at that time. the changes affect all countries in the region. those that are dependent on russia for security, energy, remittances, or other key resources find themselves in a nearly irreconcilable dilemma, trying to balance their security concerns against the costs of alienating either the west or russia. in this adversarial landscape, previous norms regarding diplomatic resolution of conflicts have fallen aside, while misinformation and propaganda are rife. now there is worry about even worse outcomes, including the possible use of nuclear weapons on european territory, a major catastrophe at europe’s largest nuclear power plant (located in zaporizhzhia, ukraine), or an open confrontation between the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and russia. the potential for a paradigm shift that occurred in 2014 was primarily driven by actions on the russian side, which resulted, in large part, from russia’s attempt to rectify key policy failures that threatened to undermine underlying assumptions about identity and national destiny that took on prominence in russia under vladimir putin’s leadership (debardeleben 2018). first was the russian leadership’s perception that it had not succeeded in gaining recognition as an equal partner of the eu, nato, and the united states (us). second were difficulties that russia faced in establishing itself as the regional hegemon in its own proclaimed sphere of influence, which included most of the post-soviet space (with the possible exception of the three baltic states, whose admission to the eu had largely been accepted by russia). the latter problem was exemplified by russia’s failure to successfully draw its most important regional neighbour, ukraine, into its sphere of influence, despite repeated efforts to persuade and compel. russia’s policy failures were accompanied by its leaders’ concerns about nato’s eastward expansion, their rejection of perceived eu assertions of normative superiority, and what russia’s leaders saw as an emerging unipolar geopolitical structure dominated by the us. russia’s efforts to undermine or halt these developments using traditional diplomatic approaches, usual tools of economic pressure, and various methods of covert influence had had limited success. russia saw nato as poised to attempt continued expansion further eastward. the russian leadership also observed the eu as becoming more successful in its efforts to export its values and norms to key neighbours, as ukraine, georgia, and moldova had all signed association agreements and free trade agreements with the eu. the us was viewed as continuing its efforts to assert global dominance, hypocritically using methods that the russian leaders considered to be in violation of the very international norms and laws that the us proclaimed to support (lavrov 2022). as hall (1993) suggested in his discussion of change in policy paradigms, policy failure is often the trigger for paradigm change. policy failure can lead to policy experimentation in an effort to correct the failure, but if this is unsuccessful, a policy paradigm shift may occur. such a shift involves a redefinition of problems facing the polity, a reconsideration or reframing of goals, and significant adjustments in the methods marshalled to achieve these goals. for russia, experimentation involved more assertive measures to secure russia’s regional dominance, already evidenced in its 2008 actions in georgia and ongoing efforts to gain leverage over other neighbours affected by ‘frozen conflicts’ by establishing itself as a mediator and peacekeeper. russia’s efforts to establish regional dominance were further operationalized with the creation of the eurasian customs union in 2010 and then with the formation of the eurasian economic union (eaeu) in 2015. in 2010, the eurasian customs union tightened economic ties between its three founding canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 3 members: russia, kazakhstan, and belarus. in 2015, with the creation of the eurasian economic union, the mandate was expanded to include a broader spectrum of economic integration measures, with armenia and kyrgyzstan joining the same year. russian leaders exerted continuous but unsuccessful pressure on ukraine’s russia-leaning leader, viktor yanukovych, to join the eaeu. these efforts failed, and the eu refused to recognize the eaeu as a worthy interlocutor (russell 2017). voices in the west dismissed this project as an effort to reconstitute the soviet union (clover 2012). this all suggested that the experiment had failed to achieve russia’s desired goals of gaining an equal status with the eu and us, and of establishing regional dominance. accompanying the creation of the eaeu, russia sought to reassert its influence more forcefully in the middle east and africa and to build a closer strategic relationship with china. the eu responded to protestations and actions on the russian side with ambivalence and hesitancy. while the eu’s reaction to russia’s annexation of crimea in 2014 was, at the time, considered strong and unambiguous, it pales in comparison to the measures taken since february 2022. the response involved a set of progressively intensifying economic sanctions against russian individuals and entities. however, until february 2022, the european union did not engage in a serious reconsideration of its larger strategy toward russia. these actions reflect what hall identifies as “second order change,” i.e., more than incremental measures, but less than a paradigmatic shift: the “[alteration] of … policy without radically altering the hierarchy of goals behind the policy” (hall 1993, 281-82). the eu’s actions, in coordination with the united states, canada, and other allies, used new measures (e.g., progressive sanctions) designed to motivate russia to engage in constructive negotiations to resolve the conflict in eastern ukraine and to deter further aggression. a hope remained that cooperation could be re-established, and that russia could be steered back into compliance with some version of a liberal global consensus. to be sure, between 2014 and 2022, eu sanctions on russia were sustained and augmented; to the surprise of some analysts, they were renewed every six months based on member state unanimity (portela et al. 2021; sjursen and rosen 2021). in addition, a general freeze in relations with russia was put in place, however, with some notable exceptions. those exceptions included the continuation of cross-border cooperation programs, the involvement of russians in research cooperation, and the eligibility of russians for participation in programs like the erasmus + jean monnet grant competitions. in addition, some informal working groups continued to operate. periodic visits of eu and member state officials to russia occurred, and consultations between russian foreign minister lavrov and the eu’s high representation mogherini took place on the sidelines of international meetings. alongside criticism of russia’s annexation of crimea and russia’s support for separatist forces in eastern ukraine, the eu maintained civil diplomatic ties with the russian federation. in march 2016, eu member states lent their support to five guiding principles for the relationship with russia that were proposed by mogherini (foreign affairs council 2016). these principles included cooperation with russia in areas where it is in the eu’s interests, support for the implementation of the minsk ii agreement, stronger relations with central asian states and eastern partner countries, enhanced attention to assuring resilience in the face of new security threats and promoting people-to-people contacts. the principles, while introducing a significant revision in the eu’s approach to russia, reflected a resistance to a more fundamental paradigm shift. change in the eu’s eastern partnership policy was even more clearly driven by underlying continuity, with only incremental adjustments following a 2015 review which did not, however, challenge the canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 4 program’s basic assumptions, goals, and mechanisms (debardeleben 2021; ikani 2019). overall, one can characterize the eu’s reaction to the 2014 crimean annexation as involving “sustained crisis response” in relation to russia, combined with incremental change in its eastern partnership policy (debardeleben 2021). reflecting an element of continuity in the eu’s approach, the eu’s energy dependence on russia was maintained until the war began in 2022; in fact, but for the outbreak of the war, that dependence would likely have remained stable or even increased incrementally over the medium term until the eu could achieve its shift to a less fossil fuel-based economic structure. germany supported the development of the nord stream 2 pipeline, which was to provide additional gas imports to europe from russia. although this was a controversial measure, strongly opposed by some eu member states (russell 2021), construction proceeded and was completed, awaiting final certification by germany in 2022. at the same time, some change was indicated by the adoption of an eu energy security strategy in 2014, reflecting an increased concern with europe’s energy vulnerability. the creation of the energy union in 2015 included measures to reduce the risk of member state divergence from shared eu norms and regulations in their external energy relations. while an overall objective of reducing energy dependence on russia was widely discussed, the main measures to realize this had as much or more to do with climate change policy than with the eu’s russia policy. in the security sphere, while there was much discussion of ‘eu strategic autonomy,’ i.e., an increased degree of eu self-reliance in the security sphere, only halting steps were achieved. since foreign policy decisions have continued to lie largely within the competence of individual eu member states, the eu has struggled to become a unified and effective security actor. rather, most member states have relied on the united states and nato to ensure their security needs. while a few eu members were not nato members prior to 2022 (austria, cyprus, finland, ireland, malta, and sweden), most were. in a marked shift, finland and sweden applied for admission in 2022 after the russian invasion of ukraine, with finland admitted on april 4, 2022, and sweden’s membership pending as of this writing. from 2016, discussions about the importance of a greater eu ‘strategic autonomy’ were fuelled just as much by unease over the wavering in us president donald trump’s commitment to nato as by a perceived security threat from russia. the eu took some significant steps to increase its security profile, including the activation of permanent structured cooperation (pesco) in 2017 and related measures to enhance security cooperation between eu member states (havel 2022). but these still relied primarily on member state commitments and contributions. in the meanwhile, brexit weakened the eu’s overall defensive capability. so while the eu’s reaction to the events of 2014 was certainly stronger than it had been to russia’s military intervention in georgia in 2008, it still reflected an aspiration to re-normalize relations with russia within the eu’s existing policy paradigm, namely bringing russia back into the mainstream of the liberal world order, premised on economic interdependence, with energy being at the heart of these efforts. in the period from 2014 to 2021, this mixed approach, reflecting both elements of continuity and change, was mirrored by other western actors, as diplomatic efforts continued with the goal of resolving outstanding conflicts. in the late 1990s, russia had been admitted as a member of the g7 (renamed the g8), a group of leading industrialized democracies (united states, canada, canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 5 france, germany, italy, japan, and the united kingdom). this reinforced russia’s international stature and also reflected a hope and belief that russia was on the path to joining the liberal democratic economic order. in 2014, russia’s participation in the g8 was suspended in response to the crimean annexation, and the organization reverted to calling itself the g7. however, russia still sat in several other international bodies, such as the council of europe and arctic council, even taking on the chair of the latter body in 2021. other diplomatic efforts involving the west and russia included the high-level meetings in minsk that led to the 2015 minsk ii agreement, which had the goal of charting a peaceful way out of the low-grade war that was ongoing in eastern ukraine; it was never effectively implemented. meetings of the nato-russian council were resumed in july 2016 (nato 2022). these efforts were abruptly interrupted by russia’s invasion of ukraine in february 2022. the new situation that has emerged since february 2022 sets an uncertain trajectory for security in europe. nato has been strengthened as the guarantor of european security, with additional troops sent to the eastern flank to provide security guarantees. but the depth and sustainability of the us’s role in safeguarding european security still remains uncertain, especially due to rising concerns about china in us foreign policy circles. close ties between russia and china that have emerged since the war started introduce further global uncertainty. this uncertainty is reinforced by changing geopolitical dynamics on a global scale, reflected in the recent expansion of the brics group (brazil, russia, india, china, and south africa) to include six additional countries (argentina, egypt, ethiopia, iran, saudi arabia, and the united arab emirates), with others knocking on the door. russia’s war on ukraine and the western response may well serve as a trigger for an accelerated reframing of the whole global security structure. while it is clear that a sea change has occurred in russia’s relationship with the west and with its neighbours, the nature of the new paradigm governing the eu-russian relationship will take some time to assess. a clear change has occurred in the energy sphere, with russian fossil fuels being replaced by a more diverse group of suppliers. the reduction in the eu’s dependence on russian energy resources promises to weaken the role of economic interdependence as a vehicle for stabilizing the eu’s foreign policy toward authoritarian states. concerns about the eu’s economic linkages to china are also rising. at the same time, it is clear that the economic and environmental costs of the war in ukraine are immense. the eu’s support for ukraine’s eventual accession to the union suggests that many of those costs will need to be borne by european nations and their citizens. these costs, as well as the risks associated with the continuing conflict with russia, may be weakening support for ukraine in some eu member states; right-wing extremist movements, which are on the rise in several countries, may try to capitalize on these fears. democratic backsliding in countries on the eu’s eastern perimeter, namely hungary and poland, may also feed nationalist sentiments. all of these factors produce a mix of variables that could affect the fundamental nature of the emerging paradigm shift in the eu’s policy toward russia. the special issue this special issue includes articles that provide insight into russia’s actions in ukraine and into eu reactions to the russian attack on ukraine. three of the five articles contribute to a deeper understanding of the conceptual foundation for the strategic paradigm shift in russian policy, both canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 6 leading up to and during the war. the other two articles explore two key elements of eu policy, specifically security policy and energy/climate policy, that were deeply impacted by the conflict. russia’s war against ukraine many analysts believe that internal developments in russia itself will be critically important in deciding the outcome of the current war in ukraine and thus also deeply influence how the eu’s longer-term approach to russia will evolve (meister 2022). three articles in the special issue help to explain potential sources of durability as russia continues to pursue a war that thus far has imposed great costs without achieving its proclaimed objectives. in his piece, tom casier explores the conceptual frame underlying russia’s decision to attack ukraine in 2022, looking particularly at identity conceptions. after considering explanations rooted in realist theory, resource dependency theory, and critical theory, casier argues that russia’s decision to attack ukraine cannot be adequately explained solely on the basis of genuine security concerns; rather, it is rooted in “a blend of geopolitical and identity reasoning” that has prevailed in russian leadership circles (casier 2023, 17). the key notion underlying russia’s action is that “russia is entitled to being a great power and that it can only be so by being greater russia, a russia that extends beyond the borders of the russian federation and minimally encompasses the slavic core of the former soviet union” (18). in exploring reasons for the timing of the attack, casier refers to a radicalization of viewpoint that occurred between 2014 and 2022. this radicalization was integrally connected with “failures in russia’s ukraine policy,” (21) an argument consonant with the paradigm shift analysis provided above. while casier’s analysis suggests strong elements of continuity in russia’s approach to the geopolitical-identity nexus, it also provides an explanation for why this approach became radicalized in such a way as to contribute to what could be considered a paradigm shift in eu-russian relations. in their contribution, liia vihmand-veebel and vijar veebel use linguistic analysis around the western concept of deterrence to help explain communication mismatches between the west and russia in the period leading up to the war. specifically, they focus on the ways in which the rendering of the concept of deterrence in the russian language may have contributed to a breakdown of understanding. a key purpose of the sanctions put in place against russia by the west after 2014 was to deter further aggression. the 2022 attack demonstrated that deterrence failed. vihmand-veebel and veebel argue that, in a general sense, the russian leadership understood that deterrence was a key element of the west’s policy toward russia both during the cold war as well as more recently. however, they may have misapprehended the exact meaning of the concept, which, when rendered in russian, is blurred by translation difficulties. the absence of a single word that can adequately translate the concept into russian means that the various terms used to translate the concept are not fully adequate to capture the notion. in particular, “[a]ll russian translations include the sentiment that the one who is being deterred is the one being dominated, controlled, and patronized” (citing karaganov and suslov, 2019) (vihmand veebel and veebel, 2023, 36). this analysis of the linguistic subtleties of translations and the difficulties they create for clear communication makes an important supplement to more traditional analyses of the breakdown of relations between russia and the west after 2014. measures taken by the western alliance, both in the economic and security spheres, thus far, have failed to halt russia’s aggressive actions against ukraine. some analysts believe that sanctions can be effective in the longer term, but the mechanism of that impact is debated. would it be by canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 7 triggering discontent (either among the elite or the populace at large) that would lead to domestic political change? or could the sanctions eventually impose such high costs that prosecuting the war would become truly problematic for russia, producing a readiness for a negotiated settlement that could eventually be acceptable to ukraine? we do not yet have the answer to these questions. perhaps ironically, the weaker sanctions that the eu and other western countries put in place after 2014 may have provided the russian leadership with a window to adapt to a lesser reliance on western imports and investment. in the economic sphere, this involved a turn to import substitution and the location of alternative economic markets and suppliers. in the political sphere, the official public narrative helped to shape public expectations in such a way as to make the sanctions palatable. toms rostoks’ article provides additional insight into the manner in which russia has sustained its commitment to the war effort, despite these material problems and despite the remarkable successes that the ukrainian military has achieved in defending ukrainian territory despite unfavourable odds. he suggests that the russian leadership has adopted an approach of “outsuffering” the adversary, a strategy reverted to when military force failed to achieve its objectives in the earlier part of the war. rostoks argues that outsuffering “reflects the determination of the state to pursue foreign policy objectives even when initial estimations about the likely costs of the chosen policy exceed initial calculations by far” (rostoks, 2023, 55). in unpacking the logic of this approach, rostoks clarifies under what conditions it may be adopted, as well as conditions in which it may fail, exposing some of the vulnerabilities of russia’s current strategy in ukraine. the ukraine war and elements of a new eu approach to russia as noted above, the picture after february 2022 appears to suggest a radical change in the eu’s approach to russia but still without the definition of a longer-term strategic perspective. this is in part because the outcome of the war is not yet clear. another factor is the difficulty of achieving member state unanimity on a long-term strategy. many of the policies adopted since february 2022 are only indirectly part of the eu’s russia policy; rather, they are directed at bolstering ukraine’s defences against russian aggression. policies specifically directed at russia include dramatically stronger sanctions, coordinated with partners; severe restrictions on oil imports (eurostat 2023) and a trajectory to radically reduce europe’s imports of russian natural gas (european commission 2022); and a deep-freeze in relations with russia, also across spheres previously left intact after 2014. alongside these policies directed at russia, the eu has granted ukraine (and moldova) eu candidate status, opened the eu’s doors to a large inflow of ukrainians seeking refuge from the war, and granted large amounts of humanitarian, economic, and, significantly, military assistance to ukraine. taken together, all of these measures might suggest that a strategic paradigm shift is underway in the eu’s policies toward russia; on the other hand, overall, a clear strategic direction has not been laid out. as before, the eu remains dependent on nato and the united states for its security needs, even as some members, including germany, are taking steps to increase their military capacities. accordingly, a shift in the trajectory of us policy could deeply unsettle the efficacy of nato’s security guarantee. discussions of eu strategic autonomy have waned but might be back on the agenda in such a scenario. it is also unclear how europe foresees its longer-term relations with russia—as a perpetual adversary, a force to be contained, or a possible partner if domestic changes there allow? furthermore, member state unanimity, even in the medium term, could fade, introducing further ambiguity, as ‘ukraine fatigue’ sets in. canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 8 two of the articles in this special issue address in depth some of the deeper transformative trajectories in eu policy that have emerged as the war has unfolded. luca ratti looks specifically at developments in the sphere of security policy. he highlights three main areas of change. the first is a shift from a discourse of crisis management and cooperative security to one emphasizing deterrence and defence. second, for the moment at least, there are lessened worries about us disengagement in europe, and, thus, a decreased urgency regarding eu strategic autonomy. third is an increased awareness of the need for a greater european contribution to transatlantic security. ratti warns that “[r]ather than taking strong us support for granted...eu members should strengthen their contribution to the alliance but also endeavour to rekindle and deepen integration” (ratti, 2023, 85) ratti’s analysis might raise questions about whether russia’s war against ukraine will, in fact, trigger a paradigmatic shift in how the eu conducts its security policy, precisely because the re-engagement of the us and the strong role of nato may seem to make european strategic autonomy less urgent. a failure, however, to think longer-term could produce a new crisis point if us domestic political dynamics bring a shift in us commitment to the alliance. these could, for example, be connected to the 2024 election cycle, or to an increased priority placed on asian policy and challenges posed by china. in her article, miranda schreurs (2023) explores the impact of the ukraine war on the eu’s energy and climate change policies. measures taken by the european union to reduce its dependence on russian fossil fuel imports are among the most dramatic effects of russia’s aggression against ukraine. what began with germany’s decision to stop the certification process for the nord stream 2 pipeline has evolved into a commitment on the part of eu member states, over time, to wean themselves almost completely off russian energy imports. these decisions pose significant economic and societal challenges for the european union and its member states. in the short term, these problems are being managed by a reliance on energy reserves, energy conservation measures, the use of other transitional fuels, including coal, and energy sharing between member states. in the middle term, the approach is an acceleration of the transition to low fossil fuel energy sources, alongside a transitional reliance on lng imports from other countries, including the united states. for some eu member states, nuclear power seems even more attractive than previously and intensified efforts to make new fuel sources usable, including hydrogen, have also been pushed, including through cooperation with canada in its development. schreurs suggests that the eu’s response to the ukraine war may actually provide an opportunity for the eu to intensify its response to the developing climate crisis through spurring more assertive measures to reduce fossil fuel dependency. should this prove to be the case, this, in itself, could represent the beginning of a paradigm shift in the economic model supporting eu economic prosperity and sustainability. apart from the specific policy elements that schreurs discusses in her article, the eu’s decisions in the energy sphere represent an even more fundamental sea change in the eu’s overall foreign policy orientation, which is also being echoed in its approach to china. this is a recognition that economic interdependence does not necessarily breed political cooperation and peaceful relations. this change may be among the most significant outcomes of the war for the eu. however, what is missing at this point is a definition of the alternative approach. if economic interdependence does not provide an underpinning of support for peaceful relations, what does? older concepts of ‘balance of power’ or ‘containment’ may take hold, but these depend on a strong alliance with the us. this leads us back to the questions that ratti poses about the future direction of eu security policy. canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 9 the nature of a paradigm shift is rarely clear while it is occurring. at this point, we can see all the markings of such a change, but the ultimate direction it will take remains unclear. as regards eu policy, elements of continuity may stubbornly persist due to the difficulties of achieving member state consensus, as primary foreign policy responsibility still resides there. nonetheless, the eu’s previous resistance to a paradigm change in its relations with russia has weakened. in terms of the eu’s relations with other eastern neighbours, signs of change are clearer, as the door has been opened to possible ukrainian and moldovan accession, which was previously not under serious consideration. new openings are available for eu influence in countries like azerbaijan and armenia, where russia’s hold may have weakened as attention has been diverted to ukraine. the geopolitical fault lines in eastern europe and the caucasus are more fragile and malleable than previously, providing openings for the eu to operate more geopolitically there. more fundamentally, eu leaders are willing to acknowledge and pursue the eu’s geopolitical interests alongside its normative commitments, expressed already in 2019 in eu commission president von der leyen’s statement that “[m]y commission will be a geopolitical commission committed to sustainable policies” (european commission 2019). whether these opportunities will be grasped may depend in part on the degree to which the ukrainian situation, including in the aftermath of the war, will preoccupy the eu, both in terms of resources and attention. this, in turn, may help set the nature and the depth of the strategic paradigm shift. canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 10 references barroso, josé manuel durão. 2013. “speech by president barroso at the russia-european union – potential for partnership conference: ‘moving into a partnership of choice.’” european commission. moscow, march 21, 2013. accessed october 4, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/speech_13_249. casier, tom. 2023. “no great russia without greater russia: the kremlin’s thinking behind the invasion of ukraine.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 16 (2): 14-29. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2. clover, charles. 2012. “clinton vows to thwart new soviet union.” financial times. december 6, 2012. accessed october 4, 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/a5b15b14-3fcf-11e2-9f7100144feabdc0. debardeleben, joan. 2018. “alternative paradigms for eu-russian neighbourhood relations.” in eu-russian relations in crisis: understanding diverging perceptions, edited by joan debardeleben and tom casier, 115-136. new york: routledge. ———. 2020. “crisis response, path dependence, and the joint decision trap: the eu’s eastern and russia policies after the ukraine crisis.” east european politics 36 (4): 564-585. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1832474. euractiv. 2014. “mogherini: russia is no longer the eu’s strategic partner.” september 2, 2014. https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/mogherini-russia-is-no-longer-theeu-s-strategic-partner/. eurostat. 2023. “mar’23: eu slashes russian oil; emergency stocks up.” june 19, 2023. accessed october 4, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostatnews/w/ddn-20230619-3. european commission. 2019. “the von der leyen commission: for a union that strives for more.” september 10, 2019. accessed october 4, 2023.https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_5542. ———. 2022. “repowereu: a plan to rapidly reduce dependence on russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition.” may 18, 2022. accessed october 4, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131. foreign affairs council of the council of the eu. 2016. “main results: russia.” march 14, 2016. accessed october 4, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2016/03/14/. hall, peter. 1993. “policy paradigms, social learning and the state: the case of economic policymaking in britain.” comparative politics 25 (3): 275-296. https://doi.org/10.2307/422246. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/speech_13_249 https://www.ft.com/content/a5b15b14-3fcf-11e2-9f71-00144feabdc0 https://www.ft.com/content/a5b15b14-3fcf-11e2-9f71-00144feabdc0 https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/mogherini-russia-is-no-longer-the-eu-s-strategic-partner/ https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/mogherini-russia-is-no-longer-the-eu-s-strategic-partner/ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230619-3 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230619-3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_5542 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2016/03/14/ canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 11 havel, sean. 2022. “strategic power europe: a contradiction in terms?” canadian journal of european and russian studies 15 (2): 25-54. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v15i2.3284. ikani, nikki. 2019. “change and continuity in the european neighbourhood policy: the ukraine crisis as a critical juncture.” geopolitics 24 (1): 20-50. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 14650045.2017.1422122. lavrov, sergei. 2022. “text of the minister of foreign affairs of russia mr. sergey lavrov’s written message on indivisibility of security addressed to heads of foreign/external affairs ministers/secretaries of the us, canada, and several european countries” (unofficial translation). ministry of foreign affairs of the russian federation, february 1, 2022. accessed october 5, 2023. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1796679/. meister, stefan. 2022. “a paradigm shift: eu-russia relations after the war in ukraine.” carnegie europe. november 29, 2022. accessed july 19, 2023. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/11/29/paradigm-shift-eu-russia-relations-after-war-inukraine-pub-88476. nato (north atlantic treaty organization). 2022. “nato-russia council.” accessed october 4, 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm. portela, clara, paulina pospieszna, joanna skrzypczyńska, and dawid walentek. 2021. “consensus against all odds: explaining the persistence of eu sanctions on russia.” journal of european integration 43 (6): 683-99. https://doi:10.1080/ 07036337.2020.1803854. putin, vladimir. 2010. “wirtschaftsgemeinschaft von lissabon bis wladiwostok” [economic union from lisbon to vladivostok]. sueddeutsche zeitung, november 25, 2010. accessed october 4, 2023. https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/putin-plaedoyer-fuerwirtschaftsgemeinschaft-von-lissabon-bis-wladiwostok-1.1027908. ratti, luca. 2023. “nato and the csdp after the ukraine war: the end of european strategic autonomy.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 16(2):73-89. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4150. rostoks, toms. 2023. “russia’s strategy of outsuffering and the war in ukraine.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 16(2):48-72. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4130 russell, martin. 2017. “eurasian economic union: the rocky road to integration.” european parliament, april 20, 2017. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ regdata/etudes/brie/2017/599432/eprs_bri(2017)599 432_en.pdf. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v15i2.3284 https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1796679/ https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/11/29/paradigm-shift-eu-russia-relations-after-war-in-ukraine-pub-88476 https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/11/29/paradigm-shift-eu-russia-relations-after-war-in-ukraine-pub-88476 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4150 https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4130 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/brie/2017/599432/eprs_bri(2017)599432_en.pdf https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/brie/2017/599432/eprs_bri(2017)599432_en.pdf canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 12 ———. 2021. “the nord stream 2 pipeline: economic, environmental, and geopolitical issues.” european parliament. briefing. july. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/brie/2021/690705/eprs_bri(2021)690 705_en.pdf. schreurs, miranda. 2023. “implications of the russian war on ukraine for climate policy and the geopolitics of energy.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 16(2):90-113. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.2765 sjursen, helene and guri rosén. 2021. “arguing sanctions: on the eu’s response to the crisis in ukraine.” in european-russian power relations in turbulent times, edited by mai’a k. davies cross and ireneusz pawel karolewski, 59-83. ann arbor: university of michigan press. solana, javier. 1999. “the eu-russia strategic partnership.” speech by the high representative designate of the european union for common foreign and security policy. council of the european union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/59417.pdf. vihmand-veebel, liia, and viljar veebel. 2023. “linguistic factor in deterrence conversation between russia and the west; if and how russians understand the meaning of ‘deterrence?” canadian journal of european and russian studies 16(2):30-47. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4105 https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.2765 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/59417.pdf https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4105 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 1-13 issn 2562-8429 13 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 issn 2562-8429 assessing the influence of france and germany on eu foreign and security policy fabien terpan university grenoble alpes, sciences po grenoble, cesice https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2529 abstract this article assesses the influence of the franco-german partnership on the development of an eu foreign and security policy since the 1990s, in order to see whether political cohesion between the two member states is a necessary and sufficient condition for the eu to emerge as an actor in the international arena. based on a methodology using secondary literature in a systematic way, the argument unfolds in three parts: first, the article looks at the political cohesion between the two member states in terms of both the building and the content of the eu’s foreign and security policy. then, it seeks to establish a correlation between franco-german cohesion and the existence of an eu position, or lack thereof. finally, the last section explains why the franco-german cohesion is a necessary but insufficient condition for the eu to gain actorness, by looking at other variables pertaining to domestic politics, european politics, and the international environment. four models of interaction between the franco-german cohesion and these other variables are developed: effective consensus; ineffective consensus; diffuse consensus; blocking dissensus. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2529 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 1. introduction in the early 1990s, the franco-german “couple” (soutou 2012) introduced several initiatives aimed at relaunching the european integration process through the adoption of a new treaty on the european union (eu). both governments contributed to the creation of a common foreign and security policy (cfsp), which took over from the european political cooperation and raised the question of europe emerging as a power in a post-cold war context (terpan 2003, 2010, smith 2013). often presented as the ‘engine’ of european integration (schild 2010), france and germany would also become the engine of european foreign and security policy. indeed, they are often considered to be the main driving force behind the inclusion of cfsp in the maastricht treaty. furthermore, the initiatives launched by the french and german governments since 2016, designed to revive the idea of a european defence, would again testify to the leadership function performed by the two member states. however, since its creation by the maastricht treaty, cfsp has faced many difficulties and has been confronted with several crises that have hindered its development. the security-defence dimension of cfsp, in particular, was poorly implemented in the 1990s, at least before the creation of a european security and defence policy as a sub-division of cfsp (1998-99). since then, it has proved difficult for the member states to agree on crisis management operations. france and germany have sometimes been presented as being one source of these difficulties. the effectiveness of the partnership between the two countries would be rather limited (stark 2012, calla & demesmay 2013), as well as their capacity to initiate concrete eu foreign and security action. as a non-permanent member of the united nations security council (unsc), germany abstained, together with china, russia, india and brazil, when the unsc voted on a resolution authorizing military intervention in libya in 2011 (göler & jopp 2011, menon 2011). this decision made a european operation impossible, leading france and the united kingdom to intervene in the framework of nato. this shows how germany can distance itself from the idea, most often defended by france, of the eu emerging as a military power (paterson 2011). the aim of this article is not to comment on the current state of the franco-german relationship, but rather to find a way to assess the degree of cohesion between france and germany on a number of foreign and security issues, with a view to determining its influence at the eu level from 1990 onwards. are these two member states central to the strengthening of cfsp? when paris and berlin are on the same page, are they effective in influencing cfsp? this article is based on the assumption that the closer the french and german positions are, the higher the probability that the eu will defend a unified position. however, the fact that france and germany have defended a common position, and that the eu has adopted a similar position, does not necessarily prove how influential the franco-german partnership is. to ascertain their actual influence, other factors such as the european system of governance and the larger external environment will be taken into account in order and see how they interact with the franco-german partnership. in the remainder of this article, i will present my methodology, which is based on a systematic analysis of secondary literature (section two). section three will seek to give an overall view of convergence and divergence between the two member states’ foreign and security policies in order to evaluate their cohesion, or lack thereof. the fourth section will be devoted to the potential 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 influence of both countries on eu external action, whilst the fifth and last section will situate this influence in a larger system of interactions in order to understand its terms and limits. 2. methods the positions of the two actors will be systematically compared from 1990 onwards, based on an analytical framework composed of three main categories: 1) contributions to the building of european foreign policy; 2) principles and objectives of foreign policy; 3) positions towards different geographical areas. to establish the positions of france and germany, i rely on secondary literature found in 16 journals1 and 16 publishers2, selected on the basis of their reputation, and because of their likeliness to deal with the foreign policies of the two states. some 28 books, 7 book chapters and 20 journal articles have been gathered: they all include elements helping to analyse the positions of france and germany on foreign and security issues. these publications have been systematically studied in order to define the positions of the two states, and their cohesion. cohesion is a measure of the distance between the positions defended by the two partners. three kinds of situations can be distinguished depending on whether the distance is non-existent, short, or large. cohesion is lacking when the distance is large; it is weak when the distance is short; and it is strong when the distance is non-existent. when france and germany defend positions that contradict one another and lead to a disagreement on a foreign policy issue, the distance is said to be large. this was the case when france advocated an eu military operation in libya (2011), while germany voted against it. a short distance is when there is no major contradiction between the positions of the two states, but rather nuances, minor divergences, or different priorities. for example, most commentators say that the relationship with eastern countries is a priority for germany, much more than for france; yet, the policy objectives pursued by the two countries are by and large compatible with each other (smith 2013). finally, there is no distance when the positions are aligned and the two member states are on the same page, which is the case, for example, when they issued a common declaration on the building of cfsp before the maastricht treaty. the degree of cohesion is assessed based on the abovementioned literature. when there is a consensus amongst the authors (more than ¾ of them agree), the distance is characterized as either short, large, or non-existent. when there is no such consensus, the degree of cohesion is uncertain, and the distance might be indicated on the relevant table3 as being short and large at the same time, or short and non-existent. when the distance is not seen to be constant during the whole period, the existence of a fluctuation is mentioned in the right column of the tables. 1 ashgate, bruylant, cambridge university press, cornell university press, la documentation française, lynne riener, manchester university press, oxford university press, palgrave mcmillan, polity, presses de sciences po, princeton university press, routledge, springer. 2 comparative european politics, cooperation and conflict, critique internationale, european foreign affairs review, european security, international affairs, international organization, international peacekeeping, journal of common market studies, journal of european integration, journal of european public policy, journal of conflict and security law, politique étrangère, politique européenne, studia diplomatica, west european politics. 3 tables start in section 3. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 the aim is not only to establish the degree of cohesion between france and germany, but first and foremost to see whether there is a correlation between the franco-german cohesion and the development of an eu foreign and security policy. in other words, does cfsp develop when the french and german positions are aligned, and stagnate when they diverge? to answer this question, the franco-german positions are compared with eu ones, based on the same categorization as in the previous section (contributions to the building of european foreign policy; principles and objectives of foreign policy; positions towards different geographical areas). more specifically, i try to determine whether a lack of cohesion at eu level correlates with divergences between france and germany. by lack of cohesion at eu level, i mean either a lack of decision making on issues that were on the agenda, or a lack of cohesiveness in terms of implementation, with member states diverging from the line defined by the european union (european council, council of the eu, the high representative speaking on behalf of the eu) (saurugger & terpan 2015). to establish the existence of eu cohesion, or lack thereof, the same selection of secondary literature is analysed. even when a correlation exists between franco-german cohesion and eu cohesion, it remains to be seen whether the latter is a consequence of the former. have france and germany really succeeded in reaching common ground at the european level based on a logic of bottom-up and top-down europeanization (smith 2000; gross 2009; wong & hill 2011; baun & marek 2013)? providing evidence to back up this assertion is not an easy task, given the number of factors that can interfere in the process. while franco-german cohesion appears to be a necessary condition for an effective eu foreign and security policy, as seen in the previous section, it is very unlikely, in a european union of 28 member states, that this condition is sufficient, despite the economic and political weight of the two partners. to explain why a common eu position has – or has not – been possible in response to various different circumstances, and to measure the potential influence of the two member states in this context, i propose placing the franco-german tandem in a larger system of interaction, including other member states, eu institutions, and external factors. the franco-german relationship needs to be viewed as an “embedded bilateralism” (krotz & schild 2013). four factors will be taken into account, each of them being classified as either negative (when the factor clearly works against an eu position), positive (when it clearly works in favour of an eu position), quite negative, or quite positive (when the impact of the factor is noticeable, but not so clear). the relative weight of each factor is, of course, an approximation, once again based on the analysis of secondary literature. the objective is not to provide the reader with a precise ‘measurement’ for each case study, but rather to come up with a typology of different situations and different types of factor combinations. two factors are specific to france and germany. the first one concerns domestic politics; the political context (elections, salience and politicization of a problem, the role of public opinion, bilateral relations between the authorities of the two countries) may either lead to the defence of national interests (and be classified as ‘negative’) or work in favour of a franco-german position within the eu (and be classified as ‘positive’). franco-german cohesion, as defined in section 2, is the second factor, which plays a ‘negative’ or a ‘positive’ role in the eu and in cfsp. the remaining factors relate to the environment in which france and germany find themselves. firstly, european governance (eu institutions and member states; schild 2010) might be either conflictual (negative) or consensual (positive), thus hindering or supporting a cfsp position. secondly, 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 external (non-eu) factors may also work in favour of unity (positive) or lack of unity (negative) regarding eu foreign policy. when most of these four factors are classified as “negative,” it means that the situation is least favourable to eu foreign policy. on the other hand, a majority of positive factors denotes a situation in which the conditions are most favourable to eu foreign policy. in the remainder of the article, i will present the research results, following the three steps presented in this methods section: establishing the degree of cohesion between france and germany (section 3); looking for a correlation between franco-german cohesion and eu cohesion (section 4); and introducing other factors explaining eu cohesion in order to see the place that france and germany take within a larger configuration of factors (section 5). 3. reasonably strong political cohesion in all areas except the use of force at first sight, germany and france have very distinct features in terms of international actorness. they have specific interests and seem to be subject to different types of path dependence. germany is still strongly affected by the nazi period (longhurst 2010, stark 2012), which might explain self-restraint in military affairs, strong democratic control over foreign and security policies, and western ties (nato, transatlantic relations, european integration) aimed at coming to terms with the past and anchoring germany in the pro-democracy camp. in addition to this, germany began a normalisation process (gordon 1994, bulmer & paterson 2010) during the cold war and even more so in the post-cold war period, by asserting its interests in the eastern region (ostpolitik) and progressively lifting restrictions in military matters. but the question remains of whether germany will behave like a political and military power, beyond its civilian, economic, and commercial status. france, on the other hand, would still be heavily influenced by the originating ideas of the fifth republic (1958-1969) (kolodziej 1974, cerny 1980, gordon 1993, vaïsse 1998, vaïsse 2009, soutou 2012), when president de gaulle searched for greatness (‘grandeur’), rank (‘rang’), and political autonomy through the development of defence capability (nuclear deterrence), the refusal to depend on the united states, and participation in high-level negotiations, in particular the un security council. however, the french ‘exception’ may have decreased due to several developments: closer relations with nato and the united states4; stronger involvement in the european union (cole & drake 2000, drake 2005, lequesne 2008); and more modest ambitions as an individual state (balme 2009, blunden 2000, treacher 2003, charillon & wong 2011). these differences notwithstanding, the foreign and security policies of the two countries have common ground and shared interest, which justifies a close partnership. the question is whether these factors are enough to create cohesion in the pursuit of their foreign policies. the first way to evaluate franco-german cohesion is to compare how these two member states view the ‘constitutional’ building of a european security and defence policy (table 1). these views are neither incompatible, nor fully identical. 4 france joined nato’s integrated command structure in 2009. 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 table 1: french and german visions of eu foreign and security policy distance between the french and german positions evolution of the distance from 1990 onwards no distance short distance large distance the eu should become a military power x fluctuation a strong role should be given to the high representative and the eeas x stability cfsp should remain intergovernmental x stability a distance exists in relation to the european union becoming a military power. by and large, germany is close to the french position on developing a cfsp backed up with a common security and defence policy (csdp) (treacher 2003, longhurst 2010, daehnhardt 2011, stark 2012, soutou 2012, krotz & schild 2013), but remains reluctant when it comes to launching and financing military operations (menon 2011, norheim-martinsen 2012, stark 2012, terpan 2014). consequently, the question of whether the eu should become a strong international player is not perceived exactly the same way (stark 2012; calla & demesmay 2013). moreover, while the two member states agree on the idea of strengthening the security and defence dimension of cfsp, their cohesion is dependent on domestic politics, in particular in germany where there is more variation. for example, the german refusal to contribute to a european operation in libya, which happened after a period of greater acceptance of military interventions (e.g., kosovo 1999, democratic republic of congo 2005; miskimmon 2007, longhurst 2010), can be explained by the electoral context in germany; angela merkel refused to engage in a risky military intervention at a time when german citizens, dubious about military operations, were voting in local elections. on the other hand, the german government has given a stronger priority to csdp since 2013 and the third government formed by angela merkel. with regard to the ways and means of the eu international actorness (the role of the high representative and her external action service (eeas), as well as the intergovernmental nature of cfsp), the differences are minimal, or non-existent (balfour, carta & raïk 2015). france and germany support the same vision of a cfsp that should be strong and visible, although controlled by member states (treacher 2003; balme 2009; balfour, carta & raïk 2015). franco-german cohesion can also be measured in terms of foreign policy objectives and principles (table 2). not surprisingly, the use of force is the main difference between a reluctant germany and a more interventionist france (menon 2011; stark 2012). however, the distance fluctuates over time. it is quite large in 1990-91, when helmut kohl invoked constitutional limits to justify 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 german non-intervention in the gulf war. at this point the argument disappeared and bundeswehr military engagements multiplied in the 1990s in places such as kosovo and afghanistan, reducing the distance with its french partner (miskimmon 2007, longhurst 2010). later, in 2010, germany returns to a cautious position with regard to an operation in libya, before accepting a french demand to engage more heavily in the fight against terrorist groups in syria in the aftermath of the paris 2013 terrorist attacks. table 2: principles and objectives of foreign policy defended by france and germany distance between the french and german positions evolution of the distance from 1990 onwards no distance short distance large distance deference to multilateralism and international law x stability defence of democracy and human rights x stability position towards the use of force in international relations x x fluctuation the other principles are more consensual. both france and germany emphasise ideals such as multilateralism, respect of international law and un decisions, and defence of democracy and human rights. finally, table 3 focuses on the positions defended by the two member states regarding different geographical areas. points of agreement supersede divergences, and the latter are never considered more than ‘short distance.’ 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 table 3: french and german positions regarding different geographical areas distance between the french and german positions evolution of the distance from 1990 onwards no distance short distance large distance israeli / palestinian conflict x x fluctuations iranian nuclear programme x stability war in iraq x stability crises in libya and syria x relations with mediterranean countries x x stability relations with eastern europe x x stability crises in western balkans x x fluctuations relations with russia x stability peacekeeping in africa x fluctuations relations with asia x stability relations with latin america x stability relations with the us x x fluctuations most of these differences relate to the military. they concern, in particular, the german refusal to intervene militarily in libya (göler & jopp 2011), peacekeeping in the western balkans (divergences in the early 1990s – when germany unilaterally recognized slovenia and croatia – rapidly overcome in the mid-1990s; miskimmon 2007, charillon and wong 2011), and peacekeeping in africa (germany being more reluctant than france about being strongly involved). regarding africa (blunden 2000, calla & demesmay 2013), france is still very active, in particular in its former colonies, and continues to participate in crisis management through 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 military interventions. germany is politically and militarily less active in africa (dijkstra 2010). another difference relates to the nazi era, with germany supporting israel for historical reasons, while france remains closer to the palestinians and arab countries (musu 2010, müller 2013). it can be argued that germany looks east much more than france, while france is more interested in the mediterranean (cardwell 2011) and the middle east than germany. this difference, however, should not be overestimated, as both member states have a strong interest in their neighbouring countries, largely speaking (daehnhardt 2011). yet, not only is the distance between the positions of the two member states rather short, but the points of agreement are also numerous. france and germany are on the same page regarding the war in iraq, the iranian nuclear programme, relations with the mediterranean (some distance: blunden 2000, daehnhardt 2011), and russia (even regarding the war in crimea, krotz & maher 2016). no real distance can be noticed concerning the western balkans, latin america, or asia (wong 2006, daehnhardt 2011, calla & demesmay 2013, ruano 2013). over the whole period, the distance between the french and german positions remains quite stable. when the distance evolves, it is often towards convergence, like in the case of africa and the mediterranean, and facilitated by france’s willingness to europeanize its foreign policy actions (charillon & wong 2011). on transatlantic relations, there seems to be a distance between the two member states, with germany defending a more atlanticist position (stark 2012). this has changed due to france getting closer to nato (comeback to the integrated command of nato) and seeking to get german support on eu-us relations (charillon and wong 2011). once again, the only areas where we can observe fluctuations and difficulties overcoming divergences are linked with the use of force. germany is – or is not – likely to contribute to military crisis management, depending on the context, while france participates in most eu, nato, and unled operations (with the exception of the intervention in iraq in 2003). broadly speaking, french and german foreign policies are quite close to one another. there are a few topics where they do not share exactly the same position, but the distance is always a short one. the main area on which they disagree is militarization. whilst they agree about the idea of a common security and defence policy, the two partners do not have the same view on the use of force. germany is still trying to achieve a balance between a culture of self-restraint and more active participation in peacekeeping and crisis management, whereas france usually favours interventionism. 4. the franco-german partnership as a pre-requisite for an effective eu foreign policy? we have seen in the previous section that france and germany share the same general approach to eu foreign and security policy (see table 1 on “visions of eu foreign and security policy” and table 2 on “principles and objectives of foreign and security policy”), with the exception of military issues and the use of force. their foreign and security policies have been affected by a rather unsteady and ambivalent europeanization process (irondelle 2003, miskimmon 2007, charillon & wong 2011, keukeleire & delreux 2014). this can explain the ups and downs of building an eu foreign and security policy. 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 france and germany have contributed a great deal to the development of cfsp. in the early 1990s, helmut kohl and françois mitterrand strongly influenced the intergovernmental conference on political union through a series of joint initiatives (stark 2012). they overcame their differences and presented proposals that deviated from those of the united kingdom, italy, and the netherlands (laursen & vanhoonacker 1992). in the maastricht treaty, provisions around cfsp were largely due to the influence of the franco-german leaders, although concessions had to be made to more atlanticist member states (treacher 2003). furthermore, the launching of a european security and defence policy in 1998-99 (dumoulin, mathieu & sarlet 2003, koutrakos 2013) not only came from a franco-british initiative agreed in saint-malo (december 1998, schild 2010) but also benefited from strong support from france and germany during the german presidency (first semester of 1999) (stark 2012). the framing of this policy by the european council (cologne, june 1999) mainly reflected the approach defended by the two member states (norheim-martinsen 2012). most of the instruments developed to strengthen the international visibility of the european union, like the high representative, the president of the european council, and the european external action service, resulted from a situation in which france and germany were on the same page, or managed to compromise. since the european council in december 2013, although french and german views have converged again, several initiatives have been introduced in order to make progress towards a european common defence (e.g., european defence action plan, european defence fund, permanent structured cooperation). however, as seen above, there have been fluctuations in the cohesion of the franco-german partnership (miskimmon 2007). in periods of rather low cohesion, cfsp – and even more so, csdp – have stagnated. between the creation of cfsp (1992-93) and the launching of csdp (1998-99), and between the launching of csdp (1998-99) and its recent revival (2013), there was no significant contribution from the two member states. on the contrary, they failed to present the eu as a military actor in bosnia-herzegovina (mid-1990s) and the arab world crises (libya 2011). often instrumental in fostering integration on foreign and security matters, the partnership is in constant need of adjustment when it comes to military issues; this most certainly has an impact on cfsp. turning to the substance of foreign and security policy (table 3), it is obvious that areas of francogerman convergence are also areas where the eu is more likely to agree on common positions. yet, this is not a systematic phenomenon. sometimes the partners agree but fail to gather support from other member states. the war in iraq is a case in point: while some governments supported the franco-german opposition to war, others joined the british position in favour of the intervention. to a lesser degree, relations with russia are not a matter of strong disagreement between berlin and paris but may be more conflictual at the level of the eu 28, where some members have asked for hard sanctions against moscow (in particular with regard to the crimean war), while others favour collaboration (gower & timmins 2013). when france and germany are not on the same page, decision-making at the eu level is impossible, and cfsp might even be put aside as a framework for foreign policy action. disagreement may arise from a unilateral decision made by one of the two partners (recognition of slovenia and croatia by germany in 1991, the french initiative in favour of the union for the mediterranean in 2007). quite often, disagreement follows the same pattern: france promotes a european action while germany is reluctant to follow suit. germany has opposed several french initiatives in africa (e.g., rwanda), has refused to join france in external operations in libya and syria, or has only accepted french proposals after a long period of negotiation (e.g., a strategy 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 regarding the sahel region, operations in the democratic republic of congo) (norheim-martinsen 2012). in these cases, the eu still has a position (non-intervention is a position), but it might be seen as a position by default (inaction caused by lack of consensus). however, when the two partners finally succeed in finding common ground, this usually leads to an active cfsp position. we can see this by looking at the main areas where a short distance separates the two member states but does not prevent eu action: the western balkans; relations with africa/peacekeeping in africa; the israeli-palestinian conflict; and mediterranean policy in the midst of multiple crises (see table 3). in the balkans, and after a period of open divergences (unilateral recognition of slovenia and croatia by germany in 1991), german and french positions grew closer, which led to a joint conflict settlement proposal presented by the foreign affairs ministers alain juppé and klaus kinkel in 1993. as far as crisis management in africa is concerned, germany used to be reluctant about following french initiatives (for example, the intervention in rwanda during the genocide). yet, thanks to a continuous process of bilateral cooperation, germany has accepted command of eufor dr congo (2005) and agreed to adopt an eu strategy in the region of sahel (2011) (norheim-martinsen 2012). the middle east peace process is not an area where berlin and paris can easily find a common position, due to their different approaches (pro-israel for the former, pro-palestinian for the latter). however, they have succeeded in finding a compromise at critical moments, in particular in the late 1990s (the berlin declaration in 1999 regarding the possible recognition of a palestinian state) (soetendorp 2014, el-din 2016). in 2007, nicolas sarkozy proposed the creation of the union for the mediterranean (ufm), to include the countries of the region but not all eu member states. this was a strong point of contention for germany, who feared that the eu mediterranean policy would be circumvented, and that the eu eastern policy would be set aside. one year later, germany and france found a middle path (schild 2010), with the ufm becoming one pillar of the eu neighbourhood policy and the eastern partnership becoming the second pillar. military intervention appears to be the main issue limiting this franco-german inclination towards compromise. this has obliged france and the uk to intervene outside the eu framework in libya (2011) (göler & jopp 2011) and may have contributed to a decrease in the number of csdp military operations between 2008 and 2013. as far as this issue is concerned, franco-german cohesion fluctuates and the prospect of finding a bilateral compromise that could benefit the eu as a whole seems very dependent on the context, as we will see in the next section. thus, in this section we have seen that: 1) franco-german cohesion is a pre-requisite for an effective eu foreign and security policy; 2) the distance between the positions of the two actors have the effect of blocking eu foreign and security policy; and 3) europeanization processes tend to reduce this distance, by removing existing obstacles. 5. the franco-german partnership in a wider system of interactions to some extent, the influence of franco-german tandem can be inferred from the existence of a clear franco-german proposal prior to an eu decision or action, but other pieces of evidence are required to prove an actual influence. this is why the cohesion of the franco-german couple has to be placed in a wider context, where three other factors are added to the picture: domestic politics in france and germany, european governance, and external (non-eu) factors. as specified in the 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 methods section, when these four factors are negative, the cohesion of eu foreign policy is the least likely. when they are positive, the cohesion of eu foreign policy is the most likely. in between these two extremes are situations combining ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ factors. this framework of analysis has been applied to four case studies (table 4), which have been selected on the basis of the degree of unity achieved within eu foreign policy. two of these cases correspond to situations where the eu succeeded in developing its foreign and security policy: the creation of cfsp in 1990-91 and negotiation of the nuclear iranian programme in 2006-07. in the other two cases, the war in iraq (2002-03) and the intervention in libya (2011), divergences clearly prevailed. these four models of interacting factors should help us to understand variations in the influence of the franco-german partnership. table 4: factors influencing the unity of the european union in four case studies case study 1 creation of cfsp (1990-93) effective cohesion case study 2 war in iraq (2002-2003) ineffective cohesion case study 3 negotiations on the iranian nuclear programme (2006-07) diffuse cohesion case study 4 intervention in libya (2011) blocking dissensus domestic politics france and germany positive positive positive negative francogerman position positive positive positive neutral impact of european governance quite negative negative quite positive quite positive external (non-eu factors neutral negative positive quite positive case study 1. the creation of cfsp – effective cohesion the creation of cfsp (table 4) results from a combination of several ‘positive’ factors. this is mainly due to the franco-german domestic context (positive) and cohesion as a ‘couple’ (positive). in the early 1990s, berlin and paris strived to present a united front in the new political world resulting from the end of the cold war (laursen & vanhoonacker 1992; gordon 1993, 1994; treacher 2003; irondelle 2003; charillon & wong 2011; daehnhardt 2011; stark 2012; calla & demesmay 2013). france wants germany to be anchored in the european union for fear that its partner might choose a different path, be it ostpolitik or a solitary form of power (soutou 2012). germany wants german reunification to be accepted by its european partners. public opinion in both countries is consistently supportive of european integration. kohl and mitterrand 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 are said to have a close relationship. they defend a common approach to cfsp, with minor differences on military matters. at this juncture, there is no real bone of contention between the two member states, which can be explained by the fact that difficult topics like a european army are out of the discussion. european and international factors are less favourable to european unity (krotz & schild 2013). european governance can be seen as a ‘quite negative’ factor due to the strong opposition between member states who favoured the nato framework (the united kingdom, supported by the netherlands and italy) and member states who tried to advance the idea of the eu as a security actor (france and germany, supported by belgium, luxembourg, and spain) during the intergovernmental conference on political union (laursen & vanhoonacker 1992; dover 2007; dumoulin, mathieu & sarlet 2003; lequesne 2008; miskimmon 2007; stark 2012; aggestam 2015). yet, all the member states have agreed to negotiate, and there are procedures aimed at finding a common solution. at the international level, the picture is ambivalent, but quite positive, too (gordon 1993, 1994; dumoulin, mathieu & sarlet 2003; miskimmon 2007; balme 2009; koutrakos 2010). the united states is reticent and cautious regarding cfsp. but the end of the cold war provides a unique opportunity to develop a robust european foreign and security policy: with the collapse of the ussr, eu member states are less dependent on the us. finally, this combination of ‘positive’ franco-german factors, ‘quite negative’ eu factors and more ‘neutral’ external factors suggest that the franco-german partnership has exerted a decisive influence on the creation of cfsp. this first model can therefore be called “effective cohesion.” case study 2. the crisis in iraq (2002-2003) – ineffective cohesion. the crisis in iraq offers a more nuanced picture of positive and negative factors. this corresponds to a model of “ineffective cohesion,” which combines strong unity between the two partners with a lack of influence on the outcome of the negotiations. indeed, the franco-german factors are clearly positive – the two governments defend a common position, strongly supported by public opinion in their respective countries – while the other factors are negative (dover 2007; miskimmon 2007; bulmer & paterson 2010; longhurst 2010; daehnhardt 2011; charillon & wong 2011; norheim-martinsen 2012; koutrakos 2013; calla & demesmay 2013; keukeleire & delreux 2014; aggestam 2015). european governance exerts a negative influence due to the existing divergences between two groups of states (supporters and opponents of the us-led intervention) and the lack of leadership capable of resolving these divergences. external factors are also negative, with the united states pressuring several states in order to gain support for its policy. thus, franco-german cohesion is strong, but this does not translate into influence in this case. case study 3. negotiations on the iranian nuclear programme (2006-07) – diffuse cohesion our third case study offers another combination of factors, defined as “diffuse cohesion.” the cohesion between france and germany is rather strong: there is no distance between the positions of both governments, and domestic politics plays a positive role. other factors are also positive, but to a lesser degree (smith 2013; soetendorp 2014; musu 2010; keukeleire & delreux 2014; aggestam 2015). the troïka (france, germany, and the uk), together with the high representative, represent the eu’s position in the negotiation process. european demarches are welcomed by third states, including the united states, although the latter also use the threat of military action to try and get their way. to sum up, many factors work in favour of strong european actorness. yet, the franco-german ‘couple’ is certainly not as influential as it was in the first case 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 study (the creation of cfsp). cfsp was created despite quite strong opposition from a number of member states (united kingdom, italy, netherlands) who were mainly interested in preserving the transatlantic alliance. in the case of the iranian nuclear programme, the european setting / picture is much more favourable, and the uk contributes to a common position together with the french and the germans. diffuse cohesion denotes a situation where franco-german cohesiveness is hard to distinguish from the cohesiveness of the eu as a whole (and to some extent western partners). case study 4: military operation in libya – blocking dissensus our fourth and last case is the only one where franco-german cohesion is weak (göler & jopp 2011; menon 2011; calla & demesmay 2011; koutrakos 2013; aggestam 2015). domestic politics negatively affect this cohesion (paterson 2011). faced with the prospect of forthcoming legislative and local elections, angela merkel fears that german participation in a military operation in libya (2011) could undermine the chances of the christian democrats. among political parties as well as public opinion, military interventions and political power more generally (bulmer & paterson 2013) remain unpopular. external factors, on the other hand, are quite positive. indeed, the uk is in favour of a military operation and could envisage the eu as a framework for intervening in libya. in addition, there are strong humanitarian arguments in favour of the operation; a local population who would welcome it, support from the united states and favourable public opinion in western countries. this fourth model, called “blocking dissensus,” denotes a situation where the divergence between france and germany is the main factor behind a union deadlock. conclusion the purpose of this paper was to evaluate the cohesion between france and germany in foreign and security affairs, and to see how it affects the cohesion of the eu as a whole. we have seen that the french and german positions are fundamentally compatible, in spite of some discordance on geostrategic priorities and the use of force. there have been ups and downs in the partnership, but the partnership itself has never been seriously questioned. the existing discrepancies between the two member states do not mean that cohesion is systematically lacking. when disagreements are minor, it is still possible to reach a common position, thanks to the europeanization processes affecting their foreign policies (the francogerman partnership influences eu governance whilst simultaneously being influenced by the eu; wong & hill 2011, keukeleire & delreux 2014). yet, when reaching a common position proves impossible, it has a blocking effect at the eu level; in several cases, the gap between france and germany on military issues was so huge that eu action was impossible. thus, most of the time, franco-german cohesion is a prerequisite for a european position to be adopted and defended. the idea of a franco-german ‘motor’ of europe still has some relevance but might have been overestimated. their influence does not always have a decisive impact. the four models presented in the last section place the franco-german partnership in a wider perspective in order to determine their influence in relation to the influence of other factors. “effective cohesion” (the creation of cfsp) denotes a situation where franco-german cohesion has played a decisive role compared to other factors. “ineffective cohesion” (the crisis in iraq), on the other hand, means that bilateral cohesion has not been enough to reach a consensus at eu level. when france and germany agree, but their position can hardly be distinguished from that of other (member or non-member) states, 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 this can be seen as “diffuse cohesion” (negotiations on the iranian nuclear programme). finally, “blocking dissensus” pertains to a situation where a franco-german disagreement leads to european deadlock (the intervention in libya). in addition to this, it can be stressed that, apart from the franco-german ‘engine’, other actors may play the role of policy entrepreneur. the high representative has been instrumental in launching csdp operations (buchet de neuilly 2002). the eeas sets the agenda more and more frequently (vanhoonacker & pomorska 2013, balfour, carta & raïk 2015). the building of a sophisticated cfsp (smith 2000) and csdp (dijkstra 2012, 2013) institutional system has been highlighted repeatedly, as well as the influence of large (dover 2007, aggestam 2015, on the uk) and small/medium-sized member states (tonra 2001, lee-ohlsson 2009). 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 references aggestam, l. (2015) power and leadership in european foreign policy: britain, france and germany. routledge. balfour, r., carta, c., & raik, k. (eds.) (2015) the european external action service and national foreign ministries: convergence or divergence? ashgate. balme, r. (2009) ‘france, europe and the world. foreign policy and the political regime of the fifth republic’, in brouard, s., appleton, a. m., mazur, a. g. (eds.), the french fifth republic at fifty. palgrave macmillan, basingstoke. baun, m. j., & marek, d. (eds.). (2013) the new member states and the european union: foreign policy and europeanization. routledge. blunden, m. (2000) ‘france’, in manners, i., whitman, r. (eds.), the foreign policies of the european union member states. pp.19-43. manchester university press. buchet de neuilly, y. (2002) l'irrésistible ascension du haut représentant pour la pesc : une solution institutionnelle dans une pluralité d'espaces d'action européens. politique européenne, 4: 13-31. bulmer, s. et paterson, w. e. (2010) ‘germany and the european union: from “tamed power” to normalized power?’. international affairs, 86: 1051–1073. bulmer, s., & paterson, w. e. (2013) “germany as the eu's reluctant hegemon? of economic strength and political constraints”. journal of european public policy, 20(10): 1387-1405. calla, c. & demesmay, c. (2013) que reste-t-il du couple franco-allemand ? la documentation française. cardwell, p. j. (2011) “euromed, european neighbourhood policy and the union for the mediterranean: overlapping policy frames in the eu's governance of the mediterranean”. journal of common market studies, 49: 219–241. cerny, ph. g. (1980) the politics of grandeur. ideological aspects of de gaulle’s foreign policy. cambridge: cambridge university press. charillon, f. & wong, r. (2011) ‘france: europeanization by default?’, in wong, r. & hill, ch., (eds.). national and european foreign policies, towards europeanization, pp.19-34. routledge. cole, a. & drake, h. (2000) ‘the europeanization of the french polity: continuity, change and adaptation’. journal of european public policy, 7(1): 26-43. daehnhardt, p. (2011) ‘germany’. in wong, r. & hill, ch., (eds.), national and european foreign policies, towards europeanization, pp.35-56. routledge. dijkstra, h. (2010) ‘the military operation of the eu in chad and the central african republic: good policy, bad politics’. international peacekeeping, 17(3): 395‑ 407. 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 dijkstra, h. (2012) ‘agenda-setting in the common security and defence policy: an institutionalist perspective’, cooperation and conflict, (47)4: 454-472. dijkstra, h. (2013) policy-making in eu security and defense: an institutional perspective. palgrave macmillan. dover, r. (2007) europeanization of british defence policy, ashgate. drake, h. (2005) french relations with the european union: europe and the nation states. london: routledge. dumoulin, a., mathieu, r. & sarlet, g., (2003) la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense : de l’opératoire à l’identitaire : genèse, structuration, ambitions, limites. bruxelles : bruylant. el-din, a. n. (2016) eu security missions and the israeli-palestinian conflict. routledge. göler, d. & jopp, m. (2011) ‘l’allemagne, la libye et l’union européenne’, politique étrangère. 2: 417-428. gordon, ph. (1993) a certain idea of france: french security policy and the gaullist legacy. princeton: princeton university press. gordon, ph. (1994) ‘la normalisation de la politique étrangère allemande’, politique étrangère. 2: 497-516. gower, j. & timmins, g. (eds.) (2013) european union, russia and the shared neighbourhood. routledge. gross, e. (2009) the europeanization of national foreign policy: continuity and change in european crisis management, palgrave macmillan. irondelle, b. (2003) europeanization without the european union, french military reforms 1991-1996, journal of european public policy, 10(2): 208-226. keukeleire, s. & delreux, t. (2014) eu foreign policy and national foreign policy, in the foreign policy of the european union, pp.16-34. palgrave macmillan. kolodziej, e. a. (1974) french international policy under de gaulle and pompidou: the politics of grandeur. ithaca: cornell university press. koutrakos, p. (2013) the eu common security and defence policy. oxford university press. krotz, u., & maher, r. (2016) ‘europe’s crises and the eu’s “big three”’. west european politics. 39(5): 1053-1072. krotz, u., & schild, j. (2013) ‘foreign and security policy’, in shaping europe: france, germany, and embedded bilateralism from the elysée treaty to twenty-first century politics, pp.212-230. oxford university press. 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 laursen, f., & vanhoonacker, s. (eds.) (1992) the intergovernmental conference on political union: institutional reforms, new policies and international identity of the european community; professional research paper. martinus nijhoff publishers. lee-ohlsson, f. (2009) ‘sweden and development of the european security and defence policy: a bi-directional process of europeanization’. cooperation and conflict, 44(2): 123-142. lequesne, c. (2008) la france dans la nouvelle europe : assumer le changement d’échelle. paris: presses de sciences po. longhurst, k. (2010) germany and the use of force: the evolution of german security policy 1990-2003. manchester university press. menon, a. (2011) ‘european defence policy from lisbon to libya’. survival, 53(3): 75-90. miskimmon, a. (2007) germany and the common foreign and security policy of the european union : between europeanisation and national adaptation. palgrave macmillan. müller, p. (2013) eu foreign policymaking and the middle east conflict: the europeanization of national foreign policy. routledge. musu, c. (2010) european union policy towards the arab-israeli conflict. palgrave macmillan. norheim-martinsen, p.m. (2012) the european union and military force: governance and strategy. cambridge: cambridge university press. paterson, w. e. (2011) ‘the reluctant hegemon? germany moves centre stage in the european union’, journal of common market studies, 49 (issue supplement1): 57–75. ruano, l. (ed.) (2013) the europeanization of national foreign policies towards latin america. routledge. saurugger, s., terpan, f. (eds.) (2015) member states’ resistance to soft law in foreign and security policy. european foreign affairs review, 20(2), special issue. schild, j. (2010) ‘mission impossible? the potential for franco–german leadership in the enlarged eu’, journal of common market studies, 48(5): 1367–1390. smith m. e. (2000) ‘conforming to europe: the domestic impact of eu foreign policy cooperation’, journal of common market studies, 7(4):613-631. smith, k. (2013). european foreign policy in a changing world. polity. soetendorp, b. (2014) foreign policy in the european union: history, theory & practice. routledge. soutou, g.-h. (2012) ‘l’émergence du couple franco-allemand’, politique étrangère, 2: 727738. stark, h. (2012) ‘paris-berlin : relation solide, rapports asymétriques, politiques antinomiques’, politique étrangère, 4 : 769-781. 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 2019 terpan f. (2003). la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l’union européenne, bruxelles : bruylant. terpan f. (2010). la politique étrangère, de sécurité et de défense de l’union européenne, paris, la documentation française. terpan f. (2014). financing csdp operations. explaining change and inertia in a fragmented and flexible structure, european security, 24(2), 221-263. tonra, b. (2001) the europeanisation of national foreign policy: dutch, danish and irish foreign policy in the european union. ashgate. treacher, a. (2003) french interventionism. europe’s last global player, ashgate. vaïsse, m. (2009) la puissance ou l’influence ? la france dans le monde depuis 1958. paris: fayard. vaïsse, m. (1998) la grandeur. politique étrangère du général de gaulle, 1958-1969. paris: fayard. vanhoonacker, s., & pomorska, k. (2013) ‘the european external action service and agendasetting in european foreign policy’. journal of european public policy, 20(9): 1316-1331. wong, r. & hill, ch., (eds.) (2011) national and european foreign policies, towards europeanization. routledge. wong, r. (2006) the europeanization of french foreign policy: france and the eu in east asia. basingstoke/new york palgrave macmillan. 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 transformative energy policy in federal systems: canada and germany compared arthur benz1, technical university of darmstadt jörg broschek2, wilfrid laurier university abstract the transition of an energy system towards low-carbon resources requires a change in a policy regime sufficiently significant to redirect highly complex technical systems away from their previous path-dependent evolution. to assure the transition, the new path of policy development has to be consolidated. research suggests that the institutional conditions facilitating policy innovation and consolidation vary profoundly across federal systems. ‘dual’ federations such as canada promote policy innovation but lack incentives to stabilize coordinated policies over time. in ‘cooperative’ federations like germany, policy change is more difficult as such systems favor incremental evolution. using a most dissimilar case design comparing canadian and german energy policy developments, this article reveals policy innovation in both federations. in canada, this was facilitated by unilateral actions of federal or provincial governments in a system characterized by dual federalism. german energy policy deviated from the incrementalism of joint decision-making as the federal government negotiated crucial terms of transformative policy directly with corporate interests and circumvented the intergovernmental arena. however, this policy innovation ‘from the center’ contributed to undermining the long-term stabilizing effects of intergovernmental coordination. governments in canada and in germany changed policies but failed to establish appropriate governance structures necessary for consolidating policy change at all levels of the federation. 1 arthur benz is a professor of political science at the technical university of darmstadt. 2 jörg broschek is an associate professor and canada research chair (tier 2) in comparative federalism and multilevel governance in the department of political science at wilfrid laurier university. 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 introduction transforming energy systems to make possible a low carbon economy is a challenge for governments. it requires redirecting the path-dependent evolution of what is a highly complex and technical system through initiating and navigating major policy change. once introduced, governments need to solidify this new path and shield it from efforts to reverse it. a transformative policy is typically accompanied by redistributive conflicts. in the case of an energy transition, these conflicts arise due to the reallocation of subsidies and privileges among economic sectors. corporations differ in their energy consumption and face different costs of reducing carbon emissions. impacts on regions differ since their economic development depends to varying degrees on non-renewable energy sources. these conflicts constitute substantial obstacles for policy innovation. they also challenge efforts to set out on a new energy path, due to power politics among parties and interest groups. in federal systems, transformative policy is further complicated because its territorial effects and redistributive conflicts have to be addressed through intergovernmental coordination. how these effects play out and how conflicts are managed varies depending on the federal structures in question. based on veto-player theory, one would expect a system characterized by ‘dual federalism’, where powers are separated between levels of government, to provide better conditions for significant policy innovation than a federal system where powers are shared; in the latter, federal and regional governments have to come to agreements (scharpf 1988; tsebelis 2002). in contrast, power-sharing federalism seems to provide better conditions for maintaining a new path of policy evolution and adjustment, whereas the separation of powers invites unilateral actions by individual governments and often leads to discontinuities in the transformation process, including significant backlash (painter 1991). canada and germany represent these two different types of federalism. the last decades of energy policy require a more nuanced evaluation of established theoretical assumptions. in both countries, energy transition has become an important aspect of climate change mitigation. in germany, the federal government embarked on a trajectory of paradigmatic policy change by avoiding the constraints of joint decision-making with the governments of the länder (states). coalition governments and corporatist arrangements emerged as the dominant arenas for negotiating the terms of the so-called energiewende (energy transition), while intergovernmental relations played a rather subsidiary role. over time, this shift to hierarchical governance produced considerable policy inconsistencies and, eventually, retardation of transformation. in canada, federal governments in the 1980s and 1990s identified energy transition as a policy issue without, however, making substantial progress. as elsewhere, climate change eventually became a more salient policy issue, but it did not, however, gain the same prominence in election campaigns as national unity, the economy, or health care. this created an incentive for the federal government to “pass the buck” to the provinces rather than embark on a potentially risky path of bold climate action (harrison 1996). when the conservative harper government almost entirely abandoned climate mitigation policy between 2006 and 2015, and sought to establish canada as a global energy superpower, provinces like british columbia and ontario became the primary venues of innovation. since 2015, the liberal trudeau government has attempted to streamline these different approaches within a pan-canadian framework, yet with modest success. while policy turns from the center undermined the stabilizing structures of institutionalized intergovernmental coordination in germany, comparable institutional conditions favoring continuity never existed in canada. in both countries, governments failed to revise modes of intergovernmental governance in order to meet the challenges of transformative policy. 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 by comparing two different federations, this article does not draw any conclusions about the relative advantages of federal or unitary systems for addressing the challenges of energy transition. although federal systems might better organize territorial diversity, different types of federal arrangements vary in their capacities and approaches to managing conflicts arising from the transformation of an energy regime. the following section outlines the concept of transformative policy and its theoretical implications. the second section compares the territorial structures of energy provision in canada and germany, showing how redistributive intraand intersectional conflicts affect territorial politics and how they interact with institutions and party politics in both federations. in light of the theoretical concept of transformative policy, the comparative analysis of energy policy in canada and germany in section three explains why significant policy change occurred, although delayed and less determined in canada than in germany, and why stabilizing this policy is still a challenge in both countries. the conclusion argues that transformative policy requires the adaptation of governance structures, which is still an issue to be addressed in both federations. the challenges of transformative policy the concept of transformation has been applied in social science to describe deep structural changes in economies, societies and political regimes. this article focuses on transformation of a “policy regime”, that is “the governing arrangements for addressing policy problems” (may and ashley 2013, 428). these arrangements include a comprehensive set of ideas and goals, regulative and (re)distributive programs, policy instruments, and institutions determined to design and implement these programs or instruments. usually, governments modify policies without revising a whole regime, and decisions affect specific parts of programs or instruments. in contrast, a transformative policy aims at a comprehensive and significant change of ideas, instruments, institutions, processes, actor constellations, and power structures in the policy field concerned. envisaging a long-term development, it starts by significant policy change followed by a continuous evolution and adaptation of the new policy. in a temporal view, transformative policy can be characterized by two different sequences: the redirection of a path-dependent development, and the continuation of the changed path of policy development. in the first sequence, a government decides on a substantial change of policy. historical institutionalism suggests that it will only succeed when there is a critical juncture that reduces the constraining effects of institutions (soifer 2012). however, critical junctures are also characterized by institutional instability, and such situations do not generally favor significant policy change. an alternative explanation points to the rise of new ideas which crystalize in a new policy paradigm (hall 1993). paradigms are more than just programmatic policy ideas; they encompass broad and general principles that transcend individual policy sectors (skogstad and schmidt 2011, 7). they usually originate outside the established policy regime, often in the transnational realm, and manifest themselves in new ideas and instruments that promote long-term transformative change. they penetrate existing paradigms with which they may collide. ideational change is filtered and mediated through institutions. governments that aspire to advance transformative policy change need to strategically use the opportunities provided by existing institutions. differentiated institutions, in particular, allow actors to benefit from various venues or redundant channels of interaction, not only to change an agenda (baumgartner and jones 1993, 25-28) but also to establish a new policy paradigm. 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 the second sequence starts when a new path of policy change has been established. once this occurs, governments must implement and stabilize the new policy regime as well as adjust policies to varying circumstances arising during the transformation process. it is likely that an evolutionary process incrementally strengthens the new policy regime and downgrades the old one. yet depending on “policy feedbacks” that can enforce or undermine a policy (jacobs and weaver 2015), a restoration of old policies and policy regimes cannot be ruled out. as patashnik (2006) has argued, it is often easier to enact a new policy than to sustain it over time. such effects are particularly relevant in federal systems (karch and rose 2019). here, a larger number of actors may have a vested interest in the established policy regime and these actors can use institutions to hamper or even reverse transformative policy. in terms of structures, a transformative policy is likely to start by “layering” (mahoney and thelen 2010, 16) a new program and institutions over the old policy regime. if implemented successfully, the ensuing process of stabilization of the new path of development incrementally expands the scope of the new regime, which finally “drifts” (2010, 17) towards a transformed policy. this longterm process of policy evolution needs to be supported by guiding ideas amplifying the new policy direction (skogstad and schmidt 2011, 12), as well as appropriate governance structures. such supporting institutional mechanisms facilitate necessary adjustments to changing conditions, therefore stabilizing the new policy against retarding or obstructing ‘counter-action’. the transformation of a policy regime can be justified by the public interest. still, it changes the distribution of resources to private actors, the fiscal capacities of governments, and the allocation of power in politics. if those who end up as ‘losers’ cannot prevent a transformation, they will try to shape the process and affect the implementation of the new policy. managing redistributive conflicts during the whole process constitutes the most challenging task for governments. this is particularly true in federal systems, where many veto points exist (immergut 1990), and where transformation affects the territorial structures of a policy regime. territorial structures of energy policy regimes in canada and germany as mentioned, policy regimes are characterized by an agenda (shared perceptions of problems, aims, and guiding ideas), political conflicts, institutions, and patterns of coordination (governance) to manage conflicts. energy policy is shaped by three determining factors: technological developments, the interests of providers and consumers of energy, and the distribution of power both between the public and private actors and within government. by focusing on federal systems, the territorial dimension – that is the geographical distribution of energy sources and consumption and the organization of federalism and democracy – is particularly relevant. canada and germany display variation in the territorial structures of their energy systems and their types of federal democracy. it is hypothesized that these differences account for the variation seen in the patterns of transformation. in canada, the extraction and export of natural resources has always fulfilled an existential function for economic development, as expressed in the notion of the ‘staples economy’. the sequential development of different staples – from fur and fish to wheat and lumber to oil and gas – has determined the emergence of settlements, infrastructural policy, and even political institutions (innis 2017). canada’s political economy has become much more diversified over the course of the twentieth century (wellstead 2007). yet the regional concentration of carbon-based energy resources (most notably oil and gas in british columbia, alberta, saskatchewan, and newfoundland and labrador) and renewables (in particular hydropower in british columbia, 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 quebéc, manitoba, and newfoundland and labrador) continues to contribute significantly to canada’s economic prosperity. this pattern of regional concentration also shapes interregional conflicts in energy policy development. during the 1990s, the province of alberta was responsible for about 60 percent of canada’s energy production, and the tar sands in the northern part of the province contain the third largest oil reservoir of the world (macdonald and vannijnatten 2003, 76). saskatchewan, the second largest oil producing province of the country, also exports uranium, coal, and gas. partly due to the carbon intensity of oil production, both provinces are also big energy consumers. together with newfoundland and labrador, these “petro-provinces” (carter 2020) have largely contributed to steadily increasing carbon emissions (carter 2020; macdonald 2020). in contrast, manitoba and quebéc, for example, generate more than 95 percent of their energy consumption through hydroelectric power (the carbon brief 2019) and quebéc exports hydroelectric power to the northeastern united states. quebéc has become an important proponent of climate mitigation policy, while alberta and saskatchewan have consistently opposed instruments that would impose stricter regulations on their energy sector. germany’s industrialization was driven by the availability of coal. after wwii, the country became dependent on the import of crude oil. hard coal mining became too expensive compared to imported coal. the expansion of nuclear power compensated for the lack of fossil energy sources, but was contested by the german public (eberlein and doern 2009, 39-46). coal extraction was, and still is, concentrated in certain regions. germany’s nuclear power was mainly produced in the western regions of germany and particularly in baden-württemberg and bavaria. the shutdown of nuclear power by 2022 and coal power by 2038, and the transition to renewables, has significantly changed the regional structure of the energy system. wind turbines are more efficient in the north and in the low mountain ranges in hesse, rhineland-palatinate, and thuringia, while solar energy is more developed in the south. in canada and in germany, energy supply is considered an essential part of public infrastructure. energy markets were liberalized and de-regulated as a result of free trade agreements in north america, and economic integration in europe. the impact of these changes differs among regions. in canada, british columbia, manitoba, newfoundland and labrador, and quebéc resisted the privatization trend and retained vertically integrated utilities, which are responsible for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. in germany, corporatist governance arrangements including associations of industry and unions were dissolved, although they still exist in the coal sector at the länder level. in both federations, state actors – the länder/provinces and the federal government – still play an important role in attracting investment and facilitating infrastructure projects, most notably pipeline and power line construction. with regard to institutions of government and patterns of governance, federal democracies in germany and canada represent different models. canadian federalism features a dual allocation of powers. legislative competencies for energy and environmental policy are distributed between both governmental tiers. the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over their land-locked natural resources, regional development, and property rights. in addition, provinces can levy taxes and royalties. the federal government has nevertheless considerable power in energy and environmental policy through its competencies for international and interprovincial trade, and interprovincial transportation. in addition, a residual clause concerning the peace, order, and good government (pogg) of the canadian constitution affords the federal government the right to bypass the institutional constraints of decentralized powers. on both levels, westminster democracy leads to a concentration of power in the executive. accordingly, elected governments 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 are not required to negotiate coalition agreements, and they have considerable discretion in drafting legislation based on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. canada’s institutional configuration encourages policy innovation, but also swift reversals. intergovernmental cooperation is highly contingent on governments’ willingness to work together, which often makes it difficult to consolidate coherent and encompassing policy solutions over time. in the area of energy and climate mitigation policy, the canadian council of ministers of the environment (ccme) offers a framework for federal, provincial, and territorial cooperation. the ccme was critical to negotiating the 1998 canada-wide accord on environmental harmonization (ccme 1998). other important agreements were reached through peak level negotiations, either horizontally through the council of the federation, which was established in 2004, or vertically through first ministers’ conferences. yet such compromises remain fragile, as agreements are not binding and individual governments can ignore them in practice, refuse to sign, or choose to opt out (macdonald 2020). finally, indigenous peoples have emerged as increasingly important stakeholders in energy policy, especially after the supreme court of canada has strengthened their rights in several landmark rulings made since the 1970s. german federalism, by contrast, is more integrated. the federal level has broad legislative competencies over energy and environmental policy, while the länder have administrative responsibilities to implement federal laws. in addition, the municipalities provide important services, although they lost some relevance due to liberalization, which strengthened big corporations. unlike in canada, this institutional framework creates an incentive for closer coordination. whenever federal legislation affects länder powers, e.g., regulates implementation by länder administration, the federal government has to negotiate with länder governments to prevent a veto by the federal council (bundesrat). both the federal and the länder governments interact through intergovernmental conferences, administrative networks, and within political parties that are part of coalition governments on both levels. unlike in canada, this institutional configuration tends not to stimulate abrupt policy changes. rather, it is more suitable for consolidating and sustaining a transformative pathway once it has been established. interestingly, however, policies in the field of energy transition reveal different dynamics. politics of energy transition in canada initiating energy policy transformation: from mulroney to martin governments during the 1980s, the emergence of the policy paradigm of sustainable development in transnational discourses increasingly challenged established approaches to economic development. climate change surfaced as an increasingly pressing issue. the need to work towards a low-carbon economy clearly resonated in canadian politics (macdonald 2020; may 2007; vannijnatten and macdonald 2003). the progressive conservative government of brian mulroney (1984-1993) envisaged a pioneering role for canada in advancing climate change mitigation policy. environment became a high portfolio cabinet post. the government advanced several policy initiatives on the international and domestic levels, such as the montreal protocol (1987), and the ‘green plan’ (1990). they also made canada’s first commitment to freeze the nation’s greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions at 1990 levels (may 2007, 387-90). 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 the two succeeding liberal governments under jean chretien (1993-2003) and paul martin (20032006) largely followed these initial steps and consolidated the path taken. both governments developed four major programs: the national action program on climate change (1995), the action plan 2000 on climate change (2000), the climate change plan for canada (2002), and the project green (2005). all four programs adopted a transformational rhetoric, emphasizing the need for encompassing and effective long-term measures to significantly reduce ghg emissions. the national action program on climate change, and the climate change plan for canada, are particularly noteworthy as they were developed as a framework agreement with the provinces, the latter for the implementation of different measures to work towards the goals set out in the kyoto protocol, which canada ratified in december, 2002. project green, which also included elements of a cap-and-trade system for large final emitters, however, was never put in place (macdonald 2020). these policy innovations indicate a gradually shifting balance between positive and negative feedback effects. for stakeholders with strong vested interests in the conventional, staples-based model of economic development, the petro-provinces as well as the federal department of natural resources (today: natural resources canada, nrcan), climate policy generated negative feedback effects. for others, most notably provinces like quebéc, environmental groups, and the federal department of the environment (today: environment and climate change canada, eccc), these measures were the first positive steps redirecting energy policy towards a low-carbon economy. canada continuously failed, however, to meet its own ghg emissions reduction targets. this was not only a consequence of policy inconsistencies, but also of a lack in federal leadership to create procedural governance reforms to consolidate initial policy changes. first, energy policy transformation was complicated by energy producing provinces, especially the petro-provinces: alberta, saskatchewan and, since about 2005, newfoundland and labrador (carter 2018; macdonald 2020). their jurisdictional authority over natural resources and regional economic development affords them with considerable power to shape both energy and environmental policy, thereby limiting the institutional scope of the federal level. given the regional concentration of fossil energy resources, these provinces have had a strong incentive to maximize energy production while opposing regulatory environmental constraints to meet canada’s international emission targets (brownsey 2006; carter 2020). second, the energy industry and its powerful representatives, most notably the canadian association of petroleum producers (capp), strongly lobbied both levels of government for a continental energy strategy based on liberalization, deregulation and close integration of the north american energy sector. in close alliance with the oil producing provinces, they anticipated considerable profits from a liberalized, integrated market that would facilitate the extraction of non-renewables, most notably oil and gas (brownsey 2006; 2007). although federal governments initiated transformative policy in the late 1980s and sought to consolidate these programs in the 1990s and early 2000s, they never prioritized climate mitigation policy over conventional economic development goals. and despite some modest efforts to sustain a conversation through the national roundtable on the environment and economy (nrtee), they never envisaged a 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 long-term strategy to orchestrate the ‘politics’ of transformative energy policy change by creating necessary governance capacities in the intergovernmental arena.3 “the empire strikes back”: the harper era the election of stephen harper’s conservative federal government in 2006 resulted in a major backlash. this dynamic resembled a pattern eric patashnik (2006, 32) labelled “the empire strikes back”: canada witnessed the reversal of a very modest reform trajectory that had not yet been sufficiently consolidated through a major reconfiguration of the established policy regime. federalism enabled the harper government to adopt an approach fully aligned with the interests of oil and gas producing provinces. from the perspective of the federal government, the contradictory policy imperative was simply resolved by abandoning any aspirational goals towards reducing canada’s ghg emissions, as exemplified in the government’s exit from the kyotoprotocol in 2011. already before he became leader of the new conservative party of canada, harper identified the international agreement as a “socialist scheme”, and mobilized his supporters to engage in “the battle of kyoto − our campaign to block the job-killing, economy-destroying kyoto accord” (cbc 2007). his aim was to establish canada as a global energy superpower (brownsey 2007). under harper, the federal government used its institutional resources to massively support resource extraction and export, especially by facilitating the expansion of pipeline projects like the trans mountain and keystone pipelines, and by dismantling environmental regulations. two amendments of the navigable waters act in 2009 and 2012, the latter as part of an omnibus bill, as well as the dismantling of the fisheries act in 2012, were particularly controversial as they significantly curtailed the impact assessment process and reduced federal oversight for major pipeline projects in order to facilitate and fast-track energy projects (brownsey 2013). resource extracting provinces, most notably alberta, saskatchewan, and newfoundland and labrador welcomed this approach, which coincided with soaring oil prices between 2005 and 2014, furthering their incentive to maximize resource extraction to realize windfall profits. indeed, a cross-provincial comparison of the four fossil fuel extracting provinces between 2009 and 2014 by carter, fraser and zalik (2017) reveals a trend towards energy policy governance convergence that mirrored the approach of the federal government. in order to accelerate energy projects, governments in all four provinces sought to streamline environmental policy in a way that made public involvement more difficult and avoided cumulative impact assessments. the vacuum in energy governance left by the harper government, however, also created an opportunity for sub-federal policy innovation that would, in the long-term, re-activate canada’s transformative trajectory. as the transnational and domestic discourse on climate change intensified, the balance between positive feedback effects that stabilized the conventional economic trajectory, on the one hand, and negative feedback effects that reflected increasing costs of this regime, on the other hand, began to change. climate change has become a more salient issue in canada as elsewhere since the mid-2000s. global warning has continued to intensify, and its consequences have become increasingly visible – and costly – even in the global north. major flooding (e.g., in alberta in 2013 and in quebéc and ontario in 2017 and 2019), and wildfires (e.g. 3 in addition, canada’s constitutional crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s, along with dramatically rising debts and deficits, further complicated energy policy transformation. these issues not only dominated canadian politics during that time, but also generated profound intergovernmental conflict, which would have been further exacerbated through a more ambitious approach in energy policy. 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 in alberta in 2016 and in british columbia in 2017 and 2018) impacted not only the affected populations, but also the insurance industry and governments. a parliamentary report registered a significant increase in expenditures for the disaster financial assistance arrangement program since 2009 (commissioner of the environment and sustainable development 2016). since 2014, these trends have coincided with sharply dropping oil prices, which have created an incentive for fossil fuel divestment. in light of the ongoing increase of canada’s ghg emissions and inconsistent federal leadership, some provinces became the main arena for continuing the transition towards a low carbon economy during the harper era (chahal et al. 2014; winfield and macdonald 2012). ontario, for example, enacted two ambitious policy innovations, the 2007 climate change action plan and the green energy act of 2009. in addition to new incentives and subsidies for energy efficiency and feed-in tariffs for renewable energy, the former entailed a commitment to phase out coal-fired electricity production by 2014. between 2007 and 2012, the province was able to achieve a significant reduction of ghg emissions, while the trend for the rest of canada was increasing (government of ontario 2014). even the petro-provinces did not deny the climate change challenge and acknowledged their responsibility to act, as reflected in their policy and administrative reforms. alberta had already introduced the climate change emissions management act (ccema) in 2002, saskatchewan created a climate change secretariat in 2007, and newfoundland and labrador established an office of climate change, energy efficiency and emissions trading in 2009. these initiatives, however, never effectively mitigated externalities emanating from nonrenewable resource extraction (carter 2018). in this context, the role of carbon pricing as a more effective policy instrument to reduce ghg emissions has gained importance in canada as elsewhere. again, the (arguably) most important policy innovation was introduced at the subfederal level. british columbia became the first province to introduce a carbon tax in 2008. this reform gained country-wide attention as it effectively contributed to reducing fossil fuel consumption by more than 17 percent per capita within the first five years after it was introduced (elgie and mcclay 2013). an alternative policy choice to a carbon tax was adopted by the governments of quebéc and ontario. within the broader framework of the western climate initiative, a non-profit organization established in 2007 by several us governors with the aim to promote a shared carbon market in north america, quebéc and california created a cap-and-trade system in 2013, which ontario briefly joined in 2018 as part of the provincial government’s new climate change action plan of 2017. provincial steps towards carbon pricing were formative in the sense that they geared the debate towards this instrument to reduce ghg emissions, rather than relying primarily on subsidies for green technologies, information, and voluntary agreements with industries to reduce their emissions. at the same time, carbon pricing remained highly controversial among provincial governments. despite these differences, the provinces began to coordinate their activities horizontally through the council of the federation. since 2007, energy policy has been one of the few persistent topics discussed among premiers during their annual meetings. agreement was reached first on several position papers, which were eventually consolidated into a more comprehensive framework agreement in 2015: the canadian energy strategy (council of the federation 2015). in this agreement, the provinces reinstated the need for ongoing horizontal coordination in order to minimize negative externalities resulting from resource extraction and transport, and to reduce energy consumption. despite the resurgence of sub-federal policy innovation, canada’s approach to tackling climate change through energy policy transformation 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 remained scattered and diffuse, lacking effective mechanisms that would foster stabilization through coordination. restoring transformative energy policy under the trudeau government the election of the justin trudeau liberal government in 2015 brought with it a promise to restore transformative policy within a pan-canadian framework on climate change mitigation. trudeau announced his government would provide national leadership, put a price on carbon, and reduce carbon pollution (liberal party of canada 2015). during the election campaign, trudeau promised meaningful collaboration with all major stakeholders, most notably provinces, territories, and indigenous peoples. however, in terms of policy design, the liberal party’s approach revealed considerable continuity with that of the chretien and martin governments. most notably, it did not entail a commitment to phase out oil and gas extraction; on the contrary, it acknowledged the need to promote fossil fuel extraction and export to secure canada’s economic prosperity, but intended to reinvest revenue from oil exports to drastically reduce ghg emissions domestically (dagg et al. 2018). within less than six months after he had gained office, trudeau hosted two first ministers’ conferences which resulted in the so-called vancouver declaration in march 2016. in this joint communiqué, which partly built on the canadian energy strategy of 2015, the federal government and its provincial and territorial counterparts agreed that a “fair transition to a sustainable, lowcarbon economy is necessary for our collective prosperity, competitiveness, health, and security”. the declaration served as a first step towards a more general framework agreement which was signed in december 2016 by all governments except for saskatchewan and manitoba: the pancanadian framework on clean growth and climate change (pcf). the pcf represents an ambitious framework for reactivating transformative policy. it is encompassing, combining regulatory measures and distributive policy incentives with substantial federal commitments. this achievement was “historic” not only in terms of the degree of policy change the pcf entailed after years of federal inactivism, but also because the trudeau government initially acknowledged that unilateral federal policy innovation is not sufficient; instead, it sought to facilitate close intergovernmental coordination to effectively generate its desired outcomes (chahal et al. 2017, 175). while this abrupt procedural and policy change demonstrated again the innovative capacity of canadian federalism, structural conflicts soon remerged and threatened to jeopardize trudeau’s new pan-canadian approach. saskatchewan’s and manitoba’s refusal to sign the agreement already indicated that the compromise was highly fragile. it did not take long until a major rift between provinces re-emerged. the bone of contention was, and still is, carbon pricing, a core element of the pcf. when the trudeau government announced the introduction of a federal carbon tax applicable only in those provinces that do not have in place a carbon pricing system by the end of 2018, it became obvious that the new collaborative spirit between the provinces and the federal government was hardly sustainable. this conflict further intensified when parliament passed the government’s greenhouse gas pollution pricing act in june 2018, which became an important issue in the canadian federal election of 2019. conservative premiers and politicians heavily opposed this policy instrument, partly for ideological reasons and partly because they considered it as an unconstitutional, unilateral federal interference in provincial jurisdiction. saskatchewan launched a constitutional reference case already before the act was passed in april 2018, and the newly elected conservative governments in ontario (2018) and alberta (2019) followed suit, supported by manitoba and new brunswick. in addition, ontario and alberta immediately 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 repealed legislation that had put in place a provincial carbon pricing system by their predecessors, thus reversing earlier policy innovations. as of this writing, the federal government appears to be winning this battle over carbon pricing with the provinces. while the trudeau liberals were reduced to minority status as a result of the 2019 federal election, the conservative party’s anti carbon tax campaign did not resonate with canadian voters (pammett and clarke 2021, in this issue). what is more, although the final decision of the supreme court of canada on the constitutionality of the federal carbon tax is still pending, two of three provincial courts of appeal followed largely the federal government’s justification of the reform. while the alberta court of appeal ruled the federal carbon tax unconstitutional, saskatchewan’s and ontario’s courts of appeal confirmed that fighting climate change is a matter of “national concern”, which allows the federal level to evoke one branch of the peace, order, and good government clause of the constitution to unilaterally introduce such an instrument. public opinion and all political parties, except for the conservatives, support a more determined approach to tackling climate change. however, the governance structure of the policy regime has not been successfully reconfigured to re-align the interests of core stakeholders and constituencies. the covid-19 pandemic appears to have reinforced this pattern. while provincial governments are preoccupied with developing emergency responses to the public health crisis, the federal government announced it would seize this unexpected opportunity to launch a ‘green’ and ‘more equitable’ recovery strategy. in its fall economic update, the liberal government announced measures like the home energy retrofit program, which includes cad 2.6 billion over seven years to improve energy efficiency of homes or support for zero emission vehicles (department of finance 2020). it also tabled a new accountability framework, which promises to exceed the original ghg emission reduction target for 2030, and commits to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 (house of commons 2020). however, the government does not intend to phase out fossil fuel development and extraction (wells 2020). hence, there is neither a significant departure from previous policy approaches to the energy-climate change mitigation trade-off on the horizon, nor did the federal government announce any plan on how it intends to revive its earlier efforts to establish a more robust governance structure necessary to consolidate transformative energy policy through intergovernmental relations. politics of energy transition in germany initiation of energy policy transformation under the ‘red-green coalition’ government like in canada, energy has been a highly contested issue in german politics. traditionally, the federal government’s energy policy was aimed at the provision of stable and low-cost energy (eberlein and doern 2009; illing 2016, 65-125). during the first two decades after world war ii, coal, crude oil, and nuclear power were the main energy sources used to fuel the economy. debates about a transformation of this energy system started in the 1970s when citizen protests against nuclear power intensified and when the organization of the oil exporting countries (opec) increased crude oil prices in 1973 and again in 1979. early on, experts began to discuss the potentials associated with a decentralized energy system based on renewable sources. the 1986 disaster in chernobyl turned public opinion against nuclear power and, with the rise of the green party during the 1980s, safety concerns with nuclear power plants found expression in federal and länder parliaments. at about the same time, the end of the cold war in the late 1980s and the 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 discovery of off-shore oil and gas resources in the north sea nourished the hope that fossil fuel supplies would be guaranteed for the foreseeable future. the liberalization of energy services in the european common market stabilized the carbon-based energy system but challenged the established policy regime which was based on a close cooperation between energy providers and governments. thus, the last two decades of the 20th century saw increasing conflict in energy policy, and this was expressed in public opinion and in debates among experts. in 1998, the federal government finally set off significant change in german energy policy, against formidable odds linked to the strong influence of major industries, ensuing path dependencies of the policy regime and associated institutional constraints of cooperative federalism. the new social democratic (spd) – green party coalition reached an agreement to phase out nuclear power and to promote renewable energy. the coalition initiated legislation to significantly renovate the previous government’s regulation on renewable energy: the 1990 electricity feed-in act. this act compelled grid operators to distribute power from renewables generated by small power companies and to pay them a guaranteed rate. although the german parliament had passed this law without significant debate (deutscher bundestag 1990, 18162-63), big power companies increasingly opposed this policy over time when they realized the impact the rising share of renewables was having on their industries. yet the legal action they pursued against the law failed. both the federal constitutional court in 1996 and the european court of justice in 2001 dismissed constitutional claims against guaranteed feed-in tariffs. within germany’s newly liberalized energy regime, the 1990 act aimed to prevent a closed shop situation in an energy market controlled by the country’s four grid-operators, but its effects were limited (stefes 2014: 60-63). the spd – green party government substantially revised and extended this policy while at the same time reinforcing its fundamental instrument, the feed-in tariff. the 2000 renewable energy sources act increased the level of remuneration for renewables fed into the grid. the added costs were financed by a surcharge on the regular market price for electricity. unlike the case of the 1990 legislation, this act required the assent of the bundesrat, the legislative body representing germany’s 16 länder. at that time, opposition parties participated in the majority in the länder governments, meaning the bundesrat could be expected to veto federal legislation. however, the länder governments did not obstruct the transformative policy. the legislation on renewable energies was combined in a policy package with a plan to phase out nuclear power. these two separate parts of the legislative program were prepared in different arenas. the legislation on nuclear power transposed an agreement which had been negotiated with the affected private power companies. chancellor gerhard schröder used this public-private agreement to discipline opponents to the legislation on renewable energy within the spd – green party coalition and within his own party, and to weaken potential opposition from within the bundesrat coming mainly from the affected länder (hirschl 2008, 155-158). in a quasi-corporatist arrangement, chancellor schröder fixed the legislative agenda and tied his cabinet’s hands to the negotiated policy. since public opinion favored a phase out of nuclear power, the länder governments refrained from vetoing the bill. consequently, they accepted the renewable energy sources act as a necessary corollary; it fostered the development and application of renewable energy technologies (solar, wind, biofuel, and geothermal power) that could replace nuclear power. certainly, public opinion supported energy transition, but significant policy change was made possible by the shift in power that occurred among the three arenas of negotiations that usually structure the federal legislative process: negotiations within the governing coalition, between federal-länder governments, and between the federal government and private stakeholders. in this 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 case, coalition bargaining and negotiations with private actors dominated joint decision-making in the federal system. the strategic interplay between these arenas also helped to sideline other potential veto players like the social democratic minister of economics, werner müller and the affected firms that had threatened to or did take legal action against the federal legislation. in the end, informal negotiations in overlapping arenas helped to trigger policy transformation. path dependent transformation and policy feedback the new policy instigated a process that transformed electricity supply. guaranteed feed-in tariffs made renewable energy technologies competitive in the electricity market. they enabled small firms, farmers, and house owners to participate in a market that in the past had been dominated by big industries (mautz 2012). incremental adjustments in feed-in tariffs prevented windfall effects that could have undermined the market mechanism. by using tariffs to cover the costs, the financial burden of transformation was allocated to consumers. this had another positive effect for the environment as it incentivized households to save electricity. moreover, by relying on the market mechanism, transformative policy stabilized the path of change. the annual share of renewables in gross electricity consumption has continuously increased, rising from 3.4 per cent in 1990 to 42.1 per cent in 2019 (bmwi 2020, 5). this is not to say that energy transition has not been without obstacles. for example, after the general federal election of 2009, a new coalition government formed by the christian democratic union (cdu) and the free democratic party (fdp) came to power. this coalition continued to promote renewable energy sources, but they revised federal nuclear energy policy. the decision to extend the period of time nuclear power facilities would be permitted to operate would delay the nuclear phase out by almost a decade. while the fdp in particular supported this partial change to federal energy policy, the nuclear energy extension plan was more contested within the cdu. the 2011 nuclear disaster in fukushima provided an opportunity for the intraparty opponents of this revised policy to once again change the country’s energy policy. what the media labeled a ‘turnaround’ in effect meant a reversion back to the policy of the previous government. hence, the coalition did not face any substantial opposition to its policy change in the federal parliament. only the governments of those länder that were directly affected by the immediate shut-down of seven nuclear power plants initially opposed the new policy. but the bundesrat had no veto power over this legislation, and the federal government addressed the concerns of the affected länder in informal and bilateral negotiations. as most of these länder were led by christian democratic governments, they avoided openly opposing the federal government. during the following years, the länder engaged in negotiations on revisions of the “law on renewable energy sources”, which adjusted the framework supporting renewables by reducing feed-in tariffs. when the federal government drafted its plan for climate protection (bmu 2016) which was designed to implement germany’s commitments resulting from the paris agreement on climate change, the länder governments and civil society had the opportunity to issue opinions and suggestions in an organized ‘dialogue’ (bohn et al. 2017). the länder governments also participated in working groups that had been set up by the federal ministry of economics to consult on energy policy in which they were on equal footing with representatives from the private sector and civil society. the ministry for the environment established similar groups for climate policy. as intergovernmental coordination of energy policy occurred in voluntary negotiations, it did not run the risk of ending up in a joint decision trap (scharpf 1988). nevertheless, these efforts to find a consensus on an energy transition path failed and no consensus on the new policy direction was achieved. 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 from joint decision-making to top-down governance the limited powers of the länder governments are surprising given germany’s ‘cooperative federalism’, that energy policy affects all levels of government, and that the federal government has labeled energy transition a ‘joint task’. in german federalism, joint decision-making in legislation and coordination in the performance of joint tasks would usually be the default mode of multilevel governance. energy policy is a matter of federal legislative power, and the assent of the bundesrat is required if länder governments are affected, for instance if they have to implement a law or bear costs. according to the prevailing interpretation of the constitution, these conditions rarely apply in the regulation of energy sources. this does not mean that länder and local governments were excluded from policy-making. they have regularly participated in planning and implementation of federal energy policy. for the most part, coordination between levels of governments remained informal. the länder governments have veto power only in a few matters of federal legislation, one example being with the law defining the need for expansion of the transmission grid. in other instances, länder governments have a voice in the bundesrat and in pre-legislative negotiations, and they occasionally achieve substantial concessions when the federal government is eager to prevent länder governments from delaying legislation. in decisions on new power lines spanning across länder borders, the affected länder governments, like local governments and private actors, can also submit their opinion to the responsible federal network agency (bundesnetzagentur). moreover, the system of intergovernmental relations allows federal and länder governments to consult regularly in conferences and in joint administrative committees. this dense network of communication has provided the federal and länder governments opportunities to mutually influence policies. the länder governments also contributed to the energy transition through complementary measures reducing the use of fossil fuel for heating and in public transport, and by their approval of renewable energy power facilities (in particular wind turbines). they have developed their own energy transition concepts, and defined goals and measures in climate protection programs. these policies have not been coordinated among the länder governments or with the federal government. länder energy and climate goals and measures have thus diverged significantly (ohlhorst 2015; chemnitz 2018). to a certain extent, this diversity has led to informal competition among länder, with each land seeking to develop its own best practices knowing that private organizations monitor the implementation of länder policies. whether these comparative evaluations have had any impact on policy-making is difficult to estimate. although this loosely coupled pattern of interaction may have contributed to policy learning, coordination processes are dominated by the federal government. the responsible ministry of economic affairs and ministry for the environment set up advisory committees and consultative bodies related to all relevant aspects of the energy transition; the bodies include representatives from business, civil society, länder, and municipalities. in addition, the government sponsors private organizations promoting energy transition (krick 2018). these processes aim at gaining acceptance and amount to “consensus management” from above, but they have so far failed to effectively manage social and territorial conflicts (quitzow et al. 2016). social conflicts are expressed by business and consumer organizations that oppose the high costs of the energy transition. territorial conflicts prompted by affected länder or local governments have caused delays in grid expansion and in the phasing out of coal-based power generation. disputes have had to be settled by compromises that externalize costs by further increasing energy prices and burdening tax payers. 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 despite undeniable success in germany’s energy transition, including in comparison to canada, in many areas progress remains sketchy. while a growing share of electricity is being produced from renewable sources, ghg emissions barely declined between 2009 and 2018 (gea 2020, 135), and according to preliminary data, the reduction goal for 2020 could only be reached under the unusual conditions of the covid-19 pandemic. the growth of renewables has been slowed down due to delays in the implementation of new transmission lines, the development of technologies to store electricity, and investments in reducing energy consumption. support for renewables via feed-in tariffs have become more and more contested, and regular adjustments to the renewable energy sources act have been focused on reducing feed-in tariffs and avoiding an over-supply of renewables instead of advancing sector-coupling. despite general public support for clean energy, redistributive effects of transformative policy have led to growing resistance to the expansion of renewable energy sources. for different reasons, growing skepticism is nourished by political parties, in particular the fdp and the right-wing populist alternative for germany (alternative für deutschland), energy consuming industries, and citizens opposing the siting of wind farms in their communities. remarkably, it was not joint decision-making, the typical mode of intergovernmental coordination requiring that federal and länder governments act in agreement which usually ended with incremental change, that slowed down the transformative process. the federal government deliberately evaded the constraining effects of the joint decision-system in federal legislating by strategically shifting the power balance toward the center, where political conflicts had to be settled. federal-länder coordination was subordinated to federal politics, despite the significant territorial effects of the energy transition. over time, federal and länder governments increasingly used informal negotiations to coordinate their policies, which has made the pattern of multilevel governance in energy policy, to some degree, more similar to that practiced in canada. länder have been able to exert some influence in ways somewhat similar to those of private actors. this change of the policy regime came at a price, as informal negotiations excluded political conflicts, which became a matter of party competition and bargaining in coalition governments. redistributive social effects of high electricity prices instigated populist reactions against renewable energy, and territorial conflicts of grid expansion, wind power, and the phasing out of coal power caused delays and high compensation payments. while the federal government did not engage in restoring and adjusting intergovernmental coordination to the challenges of energy transition, policy-making became segmented into separate sectors. to address this problem, the federal government established a ‘platform’ consisting of different working groups under the banner ‘joint task energy transition’. the coordinative effect of the platform’s regular meetings has, however, remained limited; the joint task never materialized into a coherent policy. differences in the energy policy perspectives of the ministry for economic affairs and the ministry for environment contributed to this failure at coordination. as the energy transition became increasingly highly politicized, the federal government’s topdown approach and informal coordination attempts through executive networks proved insufficient to deal with territorial conflicts. when in response to public pressure to advance the energy transition, the federal and länder governments moved on the issue of phasing out coal, they met with strong resistance from the governments of the affected länder as well as heavy industry. to break the impasse, the federal government agreed to compensate the affected regions with 40 billion euros. in the end, they managed to negotiate an agreement on shutting down the last coal-fired power plant in 2038. in july 2020, this compromise was transposed into federal law. for the same reasons, significant steps to transform the transport sector have been pushed less by the german government than by the eu. as the automobile industry is concentrated in a few 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 länder, the governments of these länder have defended the industry against regulative policies, even though overall they tend to be supportive of green energy. comparison and conclusion transformative energy policy seeks to reduce carbon emissions and to change the complex technical systems underpinning energy provision. transforming an energy path is a highly challenging task, given that energy systems are technical systems embedded in social structures and defined by power relations among actors. nonetheless, energy policy can be changed significantly, under particular conditions. achieving new energy legislation is, however, just one aspect of a complex process of change. consolidating a new energy path is a further major challenge. in canada and germany, transformative energy change was initiated through a transnational paradigmatic policy shift that has resonated in domestic political discourses on renewable energy and climate change since the late 1980s. political actors in both countries have acknowledged the need for far reaching change in order to reduce ghg emissions, but they have also encountered significant problems tied to the redistributive consequences of energy policy transformations for affected industries and regions. these conflicts have been mediated through the institutions of federalism and democracy. this study has examined how these institutional conditions have shaped the energy trajectories in both countries. in principle, canadian federalism provides more favorable conditions for initiating transformative policies than does german federalism. federal and provincial governments can unilaterally change policies. however, if coordinated action results from mutual adjustment, unilateral change can lead to a stop-and go policy. transformation becomes self-reinforcing only if one side, be it provincial governments or the federal government, takes the lead and other governments emulate policy changes. in reality, negative externalities of provincial policies have obstructed this process (harrison 2013). in germany, joint decision-making constrains policy change, yet the federal government circumvented these hurdles when it launched a transformative energy policy. it bypassed the intergovernmental arena by activating quasi-corporatist negotiations with industry, and it centralized power to manage intragovernmental conflicts. while coalition governments at the federal level prevented a stop-and-go policy, and climate policy of the eu contributed to stabilize the transition path (lederer, 2021, in this issue), party politics at the center weakened the potential of cooperative federalism to flexibly adjust policies in case of shortcomings. this study also suggests that variation in the institutional incentives of federal systems alone is not sufficient for understanding similarities and differences in long-term patterns of transformative policy. in contrast to a pure institutionalist approach, the concept of transformative policy suggests that it is necessary to take into account how initial steps taken towards a new policy regime alter the affiliations and vested interests of major stakeholders and how positive and negative feedback effects support or undermines regime change over time. transformation requires not only policy reform, but also efforts to adjust the underlying governance structure in a way that encourages important stakeholders to support transformation over time. this crucial step has not been accomplished in either canada or germany. in both countries, institutional legacies have retarded policy dynamics. when the trudeau government tried to turn to policy coordination by 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 cooperation and negotiated agreements with the provinces, confrontative behavior soon reemerged, threatening the fragile intergovernmental compromise reached on the pan-canadian framework on clean growth and climate change. in germany, the federal government used its powers in energy policy to turn joint decision-making into a more top-down governance approach. yet, it was impossible to sideline länder governments. their necessary participation in implementation and their influence on decisions about phasing out coal or fossil fuels in the transportation sector caused feedback effects that weakened the power of those seeking to transform the system into a low-carbon energy direction and slowed down progress. avoiding these feedback effects in a federal system requires adjusting the patterns of governance for transformative policy right from the start. this has not happened in either canada or germany. intergovernmental relations did evolve during the transformative process, but this was due more to the efforts of the federal government to gain power, and the reaction of provincial and länder governments to maintain influence, than to any deliberate policy to consolidate the energy transition through more effective coordination. governance structures are particularly relevant for stabilizing transformative policy and facilitating adjustments to changing conditions and challenges. neither routinized joint decisionmaking nor politicized and ad hoc intergovernmental negotiations seem appropriate to create a robust policy path. while both modes of multilevel governance can commit governments to a coordinated energy policy, a kind of steering committee with delegates from all levels of government, including municipalities and, in the canadian case, indigenous peoples, could facilitate the consolidation of transformative policy. such a body could develop and review the general strategy, while administrative committees could coordinate the implementation of individual reform measures to assure greater coherence. monitoring of implementation processes by experts from the federal and provincial/länder governments, as well as by other independent experts, constitutes a helpful means to identify problems and propose policy adjustments. establishing different layers of multilevel governance can be achieved without reforming the federal system or reallocating powers. rather, it involves altering the patterns of interaction within a policy regime so that it can deal more effectively with the complexity of a policy issue so grand as a low-carbon transformation of an energy system previously dominated by fossil fuels. 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 references baumgartner, frank r. and brian d. jones. 1993. agendas and instability in american politics. chicago: university of chicago press. bmu (bundesministerium für umwelt). 2016. klimaschutzplan 2050. klimaschutzpolitische ziele und grundsatze der bundesregierung. https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/daten_bmu/download_pdf/klimaschutz/klimaschutzplan _2050_bf.pdf. bmwi (bundesministerium für wirtschaft und energie). 2020. zeitreihen zur entwicklung der erneuerbaren energien in deutschland. https://www.erneuerbareenergien.de/ee/navigation/de/service/erneuerbare_energien_in_zahlen/aktuelleinformationen/aktuelle-informationen.html. bohn, axel et al. 2017. evaluierung der stakeholder-beteiligung an der erstellung des klimaschutzplans 2050. abschlussbericht. berlin: prognos ag. https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/daten_bmu/download_pdf/klimaschutz/ksp2050_evalui erung_stakeholderbeteiligung_bf.pdf. brownsey, keith. 2006. “canadian energy policy: supply, sustainability, and a policy vacuum.” in how ottawa spends, 2006-2007: in from the cold: the tory rise and the liberal demise, edited by bruce doern. montreal: mcgill-queen’s university press. _____. 2007. “energy shift: canadian energy policy under the harper conservatives.” in how ottawa spends, 2007-2008: the harper conservatives – climate of change, edited by bruce doern. montreal: mcgill-queen’s university press. _____. 2013. “energy strategy under the harper government: provincial and industry-led.” in how ottawa spends, 2013-2014, the harper government: mid-term blues and long-term plans, edited by bruce doern and christopher stoney. montreal: mcgill-queen’s university press. carbon brief. 2019: the carbon brief country profile canada. https://www.carbonbrief.org/thecarbon-brief-profile-canada. carter, angela. 2018. “policy responses to the climate crisis in canada’s petro-provinces: varieties of carbon entrenchment.” studies in political economy 99 (2): 151-74. _____. 2020. fossilized. environmental policy in canada’s petro-provinces, vancouver: ubc press. carter, angela, gail fraser, and anna zalik. 2017. “environmental policy convergence in canada’s fossil fuel provinces? regulatory streamlining, impediments, and drift.” canadian public policy 43 (1): 61-76. cbc (canadian broadcasting corporation). 2007. “harper’s letter dismisses kyoto as ‘socialist scheme’”. january 30, 2007. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/harper-s-letter-dismisseskyoto-as-socialist-scheme-1.693166. https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/daten_bmu/download_pdf/klimaschutz/klimaschutzplan_2050_bf.pdf https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/daten_bmu/download_pdf/klimaschutz/klimaschutzplan_2050_bf.pdf https://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/ee/navigation/de/service/erneuerbare_energien_in_zahlen/aktuelle-informationen/aktuelle-informationen.html https://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/ee/navigation/de/service/erneuerbare_energien_in_zahlen/aktuelle-informationen/aktuelle-informationen.html https://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/ee/navigation/de/service/erneuerbare_energien_in_zahlen/aktuelle-informationen/aktuelle-informationen.html https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/daten_bmu/download_pdf/klimaschutz/ksp2050_evaluierung_stakeholderbeteiligung_bf.pdf https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/daten_bmu/download_pdf/klimaschutz/ksp2050_evaluierung_stakeholderbeteiligung_bf.pdf https://www.carbonbrief.org/the-carbon-brief-profile-canada https://www.carbonbrief.org/the-carbon-brief-profile-canada https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/harper-s-letter-dismisses-kyoto-as-socialist-scheme-1.693166 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/harper-s-letter-dismisses-kyoto-as-socialist-scheme-1.693166 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 chahal, aman, jacques zak, marc quintaneiro and glen toner. 2017: “politics and policy on the federalprovincial journey to a low-carbon future: a new era of canadian energy/environment federalism?” in how ottawa spends: 2017-2018, canada @150, edited by katherine graham and allan maslove. ottawa: school of public policy and administration. chemnitz, christine, 2018. “der mythos vom energiewendekonsens. ein erklärungsansatz zu den bisherigen koordinationsund steuerungsproblemen bei der umsetzung der energiewende im föderalismus.” in energiewende, politikwissenschaftliche perspektiven, edited by jörg radtke and norbert kersting. wiesbaden: vs verlag. clarke d, harold and jon h. pammett. 2021. “environmental issues in recent british and canadian elections.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 14 (2): 102-128. commissioner of the environment and sustainable development. 2016. reports of the commissioner of the environment and sustainable development. report 2: mitigating the impacts of severe weather. ottawa. https://www.oagbvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_cesd_201605_02_e.pdf. council of the federation. 2015. canadian energy strategy. ottawa. canadian_energy_strategy_eng_fnl.pdf (canadaspremiers.ca) dagg, trevis et al. 2018. “a pan-canadian experiment: pipelines, carbon pricing, and partisan politics test the new era of energy/environmental federalism.” in how ottawa spends: 2018-2019, next?, edited by katherine graham and allan maslove. ottawa: school of public policy and administration. department of finance. 2020. “supporting canadians and fighting covid-19. fall economic statement 2020.” ottawa. https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentfinance/news/2020/11/government-of-canada-releases-supporting-canadians-and-fightingcovid-19-fall-economic-statement-2020.html. deutscher bundestag. 1990. “german parliament, plenary protocol, 11th election period, 229th session.” https:///dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/11/11229.pdf. eberlein, burkard and bruce g. doern. 2009. “mapping the energy challenges. germany and canada in comparative perspective” in governing the energy challenge: canada and germany in a multi-level regional and global context, edited by burkard eberlein and bruce g doern. toronto: university of toronto press. elgie, stewart and jessica mcclay. 2013. “bc’s carbon tax shift is working well after four years (‘attention ottawa’).” canadian public policy 39 (special supplement on environmental policy in canada): s1-s10. gea (german environmental agency). 2020. unfccc-submission. national inventory report for the german greenhouse gas inventory 1990-2018. dessau: umweltbundesamt 2020. https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/1410/publikationen/2020-0415-climate-change_23-2020_nir_2020_en_0.pdf. https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_cesd_201605_02_e.pdf https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_cesd_201605_02_e.pdf https://www.canadaspremiers.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/canadian_energy_strategy_eng_fnl.pdf https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2020/11/government-of-canada-releases-supporting-canadians-and-fighting-covid-19-fall-economic-statement-2020.html https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2020/11/government-of-canada-releases-supporting-canadians-and-fighting-covid-19-fall-economic-statement-2020.html https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2020/11/government-of-canada-releases-supporting-canadians-and-fighting-covid-19-fall-economic-statement-2020.html https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/11/11229.pdf https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/1410/publikationen/2020-04-15-climate-change_23-2020_nir_2020_en_0.pdf. https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/1410/publikationen/2020-04-15-climate-change_23-2020_nir_2020_en_0.pdf. 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 government of ontario. 2014. ontario’s climate change update 2014. toronto. https://www.ontario.ca/page/ontarios-climate-change-update-2014. harrison, kathryn. 1996. passing the buck: federalism and canadian environmental policy. vancouver: ubc press. _____. 2013. “federalism and climate policy innovation: a critical reassessment.” canadian public policy 39 (supplement 2): 95-108. hall, peter a. 1993. “policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policymaking in britain.” comparative politics 25 (3): 275-296. hirschl, bernd. 2008. erneuerbare energien-politik eine multi-level policy-analyse mit fokus auf den deutschen strommarkt. wiesbaden: vs verlag für sozialwissenschaften. house of commons. 2020. “bill c-12. an act respecting transparency and accountability in canada’s efforts to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2050.” first reading, november 19, 2020. https://parl.ca/documentviewer/en/43-2/bill/c-12/firstreading. illing, falk. 2016. energiepolitik in deutschland. 2nd ed. baden-baden: nomos. immergut, ellen m. 1990. political arenas: the effects of representation on health policy. köln: max-planck-institut für gesellschaftsforschung (mpifg discussion paper 90/5). innis, harold. 2017. essays in canadian economic history. toronto: university of toronto press. jacobs, alan m. and kent r. weaver. 2015. “when policies undo themselves: self-undermining feedback as a source of policy change.” governance 28 (4): 441-457. karch, andrew, and shanna rose. 2019. responsive states. federalism and american public policy. cambridge: cambridge university press. krick, eva. 2018. “ensuring social acceptance of the energy transition: the german government's 'consensus management' strategy.” journal of environmental policy 20 (1): 64-80. lederer, markus. 2021. “climate change politics in canada and the eu—from carbon democracy to a green deal?” canadian journal of european and russian studies 14 (2): 9-28. liberal party of canada. 1993. creating opportunity: the liberal plan for canada. https://web.archive.org/web/19961109135653/http://www.liberal.ca/english/policy/red_bo ok/red_index.html macdonald, douglas. 2020. carbon province, hydro province: the challenge of canadian energy and climate federalism. toronto: university of toronto press. mahoney, james and kathleen thelen. 2010. “a theory of gradual institutional change.” in explaining institutional change. ambiguity, agency, and power, edited by james mahoney and kathleen thelen. cambridge: cambridge university press. https://www.ontario.ca/page/ontarios-climate-change-update-2014 https://www.ontario.ca/page/ontarios-climate-change-update-2014 https://parl.ca/documentviewer/en/43-2/bill/c-12/first-reading. https://parl.ca/documentviewer/en/43-2/bill/c-12/first-reading. https://web.archive.org/web/19961109135653/http:/www.liberal.ca/english/policy/red_book/red_index.html https://web.archive.org/web/19961109135653/http:/www.liberal.ca/english/policy/red_book/red_index.html 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 mautz, rüdiger. 2012. “atomausstieg und was dann? probleme staatlicher steuerung der energiewende.” dms der moderne staat 5 (1): 149-168. may, elizabeth. 2007. “brian mulroney and the environment.” in transforming the nation. canada and brian mulroney, edited by raymnd blake. montreal & kingston: mcgillqueen’s university press. may, peter j. and jochim e. ashley. 2013. “policy regime perspectives: policies, politics, and governing.” policy studies journal 41 (3): 426-452. ohlhorst, dörte. 2015. “germany’s energy transition policy between national targets and decentralized responsibilities.” journal of integrative environmental sciences 12 (4): 303322. painter, martin. 1991. “intergovernmental relations in canada: an institutional analysis.” canadian journal of political science 24 (2): 269-288. patashnik, eric. 2006. reforms at risk: what happens after major policy changes are enacted. princeton: princeton university press. quitzow, leslie, weert canzler, philipp grundmann, markus leibenath, timothy moss, and tilmann rave. 2016. “the german energiewende – what’s happening? introduction to the special issue.” utility policy 41: 163-171. scharpf, fritz w. 1988. “the joint decision trap. lessons from german federalism and european integration.” public administration 66 (3): 239–278. skogstad, grace, and vivien a. schmidt. 2011. “introduction: policy paradigm, transnationalism, and domestic politics.” in policy paradigm, transnationalism, and domestic politics, edited by grace skogstad. toronto: university of toronto press. soifer, hillel david. 2012. “the causal logic of critical junctures.” comparative political studies 45 (12): 1572-1597. stefes, christoph h. 2014. “energiewende. critical junctures and path dependencies since 1990.” in rapide politikwechsel in der bundesrepublik, edited by friedbert w. rüb. baden-baden: nomos. tsebelis, george. 2002. veto players. how political institutions work. princeton: princeton university press. wells, paul. 2020. “jonathan wilkinson on canada’s big new climate change plan.” maclean’s, october 16, 2020. https://www.macleans.ca/politics/jonathan-wilkinson-on-canadas-bignew-climate-change-plan/. wellstead, adam. 2007. “the (post) staples economy and the (post) staples state in historical perspective.” canadian political science review 1 (1): 8-25. winfield, mark and douglas macdonald. 2012. “federalism and canadian climate change policy.” in canadian federalism, edited by herman bakvis and grace skogstad. don mills: oxford university press. https://www.macleans.ca/politics/jonathan-wilkinson-on-canadas-big-new-climate-change-plan/ https://www.macleans.ca/politics/jonathan-wilkinson-on-canadas-big-new-climate-change-plan/ 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 vannijnatten, debora and douglas macdonald. 2003. “reconciling energy and climate change policies: how ottawa blends.” in how ottawa spends, 2003-2004: regime change and policy shift, edited by bruce doern. don mills: oxford university press. 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 56-78 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 russia-canada relations in a period of crisis, 2014-2020 natalia viakhireva1 russian international affairs council (riac) abstract this article explores the state of russian-canadian relations from 2014 to 2020, identifying areas where cooperation is still possible. russian-canadian bilateral relations are deeply affected by the crisis in russia-west relations and are at their lowest point since the end of the cold war. despite the sanctions and accusatory rhetoric from politicians on both sides, ‘niche cooperation’ between the two countries is still possible in areas of common interest. cooperation on non-political issues and the use of instruments of alternative diplomacy – track ii diplomacy, para-diplomacy, business diplomacy, and parliamentary diplomacy – are all workable approaches, with the potential for positive interactions during the crisis. one very promising area of cooperation is interaction in the arctic region through bilateral and multilateral frameworks. 1 natalia viakhireva is an expert and program manager at russian international affairs council (riac). 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 introduction political relations between russia and canada from 2014 to 2020 show that bilateral relations have been affected by the crisis in russia-west relations and limited by a war of sanctions and accusatory rhetoric from both sides. in canada, mainstream political discourse does not support dialogue with russia, while in russia, canada itself and russian-canadian relations are not among central topics of political discourse and research. this makes the search for a common dialogue complicated. yet dialogue is important to avoid a new cold war (westdal 2016), and effective diplomacy means first of all “detoxifying” the crisis (kinsman 2018) and engaging with those countries one may disagree with on a number of issues. this article contributes to a better understanding of complex bilateral relations between russia and canada, and assesses whether there are areas where niche cooperation may be feasible, even in light of the continuing tensions between the two countries over fundamental issues. this article first discusses the current russia-west crisis, where relations began deteriorating before the ukraine crisis of 2014. disagreements ran much deeper than different approaches to resolving the situations in ukraine and syria, however, the ukraine crisis remains a significant turning point in relations between russia and western nations (ivanov 2019), including canada, and still poses an additional obstacle to interactions on a wide range of issues. secondly, the article focuses on the state of russian-canadian relations. here, canadian policy toward russia is highlighted, as russia has been mainly reactive in bilateral relations. in turn, canadian policy is a result of global russian actions, which are not aligned with the canadian vision of the ’rule-based international order.’ the article then examines the positions of russia and canada on international events occurring between 2014 and 2020, such as the skripal case and the kerch incident, and the resulting deterioration of russian-canadian relations. differences in the estimation, perception, and interpretation of these events by the two sides are identified, and effort is made to take russian and canadian perspectives into account. this article does not seek to investigate the controversial cases or incidents themselves, nor to assign blame for the current impasse, but rather to consider how those situations have affected the further development of bilateral relations. this article also examines attempts at rapprochement through discussion about inviting russia back to the g8 and pace, as well as russia’s and canada’s position and perspective on these matters. this article focuses on areas where the potential for bilateral russian-canadian relations exists and provides a forward-looking vision for the relationship that might guide efforts to better serve both canadian and russian national interests. given the current conditions, niche cooperation is possible in areas where both sides can find common interests. cooperation on non-political issues, using instruments of alternative diplomacy, is a viable approach. a promising area of russiancanadian cooperation is interaction in the arctic region, which remains the area least affected by the crisis. 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 the decline of russia-west relations as a precondition for the deterioration in russiancanadian relations the root of the problem in russia-west relations lies in the fundamental difference in how russia and the west approach key issues of world order. as russian political scientist kortunov (2019b) argues, russia and the west have a different understanding of “what is fair and what is unfair in modern world politics? what is legitimate and what is not?” they also have different perceptions of the foundations of european and euro-atlantic security. nato enlargement, which russia has opposed since the early 1990s, was one of the main stumbling blocks in relations even before the ukraine crisis. the kremlin has consistently claimed that nato’s eastward movement threatens russian security and that the alliance’s central role in european security has marginalized russia as a non-member (rumer and sokolsky 2019). on the other hand, canada perceives nato as a major contributor to international peace and security and as the cornerstone of canadian security and defence policy (government of canada 2020c). as one of the founding states of nato, canada has been an important and committed member of the alliance. it has constantly supported the major post-cold war transformations in the organization: membership enlargement and functional expansion (bratt 2007, 246). canada also officially approved the plan for the accession of new members at the nato summit in madrid in 1997. in 2008, the nato secretary-general promised membership to ukraine and georgia (brunnstrom and cornwell 2008), which russia perceived as crossing a line by bringing the alliance too close to russian borders. at the 2008 bucharest summit, prime minister harper voiced his support for their membership (government of canada 2008). however, other nato members, such as france and germany, have been more cautious about supporting ukraine’s bid to join the alliance (ctv 2008). canada’s position in favour of supporting georgia and ukraine joining nato opposed russia’s stance, as well as its position on supporting georgia in the russian-georgian conflict of 2008 (westdal 2012) over the status of south ossetia and abkhazia. major disagreements between russia and the west also have included western support for the ‘colour revolutions’ in georgia in 2003, ukraine in 2004, and kyrgyzstan in 2005 (rumer and sokolsky 2019). russian officials saw support for the colour revolutions as reflecting the intention of the us, canada, and other western allies to retain their predominant position in the international system, thus ensuring their “global leadership” (lavrov 2016). the western countries perceived their own actions as part of the process of democracy promotion in post-soviet countries. canadian scholars paquin and beauregard, in their analysis of the foreign crises that occurred between 2004 and 2011 in the caucasus, eastern europe, the middle east and north africa, argue that with regard to these crises canada’s foreign policy alignment primarily tends toward a transatlantic orientation (2013, 618). in most cases, canada has aligned its position with that of the us or its main european partners (2013, 637). paquin and beauregard also conclude that the defense and promotion of democracy were important values for ottawa between 2004 and 2011 (2013, 63233). therefore, differing perceptions and assessments of nato enlargement and the promotion of democracy have contributed to the impasse in russia-west relations in recent decades (macfarlane 2016, 354). another development that has led to the downturn in relations has been the change in russia’s strategic culture. russia wanted to re-establish its position as a key global actor and pre-eminent regional power in eurasia. this change was partly a response to the west’s expansion into the post-soviet space (kanet 2019, 1, 4). 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 russian and western approaches to resolving the crisis in the middle east after the ‘arab spring’ of 2011 and the conflict in syria also differed (tasker 2015). moscow viewed the arab spring and the subsequent instability in egypt, libya, and syria as a continuation of the colour revolutions in georgia and ukraine. moscow also thought that attempts by the us and nato to change regimes across the world were a threat to russia (tsygankov 2018). these developments have challenged russian views of its status in the international system (macfarlane 2016, 354). western countries perceived the processes in the middle east as promotion of democracy. paquin argues that canada aligned its strategy with that of the us throughout the arab spring (2012, 1019). however, there were some significant differences in official statements from ottawa and washington. the harper government did not always emphasize the same themes, values, and principles as the us when responding to these foreign crises. for instance, ottawa was consistently more concerned than washington with the issue of stability in the middle east (paquin 2012, 1003). with this context in mind, a major deterioration in the russian-canadian relationship was spurred by the ukraine crisis of 2014. russia and the west, including canada, do not agree on the causes of the ukraine crisis, nor on how to resolve it. from the perspective of canada and the west, the crisis is a result of “russian ‘aggression,’ which started in 2014 with the ‘illegal invasion and occupation’ of crimea, and has drawn ukraine into a bloody conflict in the east of the country” (government of canada 2020b). this canadian position views russia’s actions as a violation of international law and of ukraine’s territorial integrity. russian officials see the causes of the ukraine crisis as more complex and rooted in the ukrainian state, thus assessing it as an internal conflict (ivanov 2014). in a nutshell, moscow depicts the ukraine crisis as a result of corruption and weak institutions in ukraine and biased western policy. as european and russian scholars, fischer and timofeev (2018) argue, russia views the february 2014 revolutionary changes of power in kiev as an unconstitutional coup supported by the west. moscow also suspected that the new political leaders in ukraine were proponents of nato membership and wanted closer security ties with the west, all at the expense of russia’s security. russia and the west apply different categories to characterize the change of status of crimea. in russia it is called “reunification,” while in the west the term “annexation” is used (fischer and timofeev 2018).2 the above-mentioned conflicts, perceptions, misperceptions, and narratives have negatively influenced bilateral relations. several canadian international programs that had been successfully implemented in russia have been curtailed. in particular, technical cooperation programs and the global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction have been discontinued. after the us, canada was among the first western countries to impose sanctions on russia in 2014. according to the government of canada, this was done “in order to respond to the gravity of russia’s violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of ukraine,” and sanctions extended to the financial, defence, and oil and gas sectors (government of canada 2020a). while areas of tension existed before 2014, as discussed above, former foreign service officer breton and a canadian scholar dutkiewicz (2020) note that there were positive developments in 2 since russia and the west apply different categories to characterize the change of status of crimea (“reunification” vs. “annexation”), the author of this article puts both terms in quotation marks when speaking about the russian and the canadian views. 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 the pre-2014 period within areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. thus, it would be reasonable to keep the relations at least at a ‘low level’ of cooperation in niche areas where both sides can find common interests. as long as such fundamental differences persist, the only possibility is to minimize confrontations (kortunov 2019b). ivanov (2019), former minister of foreign affairs of russia, argues that discussion of the ukraine agenda and wider world issues should be a parallel rather than sequential process. the question of how to rebuild a cooperative russia-west relationship, therefore, remains open. a minimum goal is managing the confrontation. while the space for manoeuvring remains limited, niche cooperation seems possible. russian-canadian relations at the political level 2015-2020 in light of the above-mentioned and other issues, russian-canadian bilateral relations are taking place against a difficult backdrop and are at their lowest point since the end of the cold war. the regime of sanctions between the two countries remains at the forefront, as well as the harsh rhetoric from both sides. from a canadian perspective, russia is not a like-minded country. from a russian perspective, canada is currently seen as one of the western leaders of the “anti-russian crusade” (breton and dutkiewicz 2020). liberal government of canada, 1st term, 2015-2019 following the federal election of 2015, steps taken by the liberal party and the government of canada, as well as by former canadian politicians, led russian politicians to hope for a ‘warming’ in bilateral relations (ria 2016).3 several canadian former politicians, diplomats, and business representatives supported the idea of dialogue with russia, among them jean chrétien, former prime minister of canada, and christopher westdal and jeremy kinsman, both former canadian ambassadors to russia (chase 2015; westdal 2016; kinsman 2018). in 2016, russian minister of foreign affairs, sergey lavrov, said of justin trudeau and his colleagues, “we can expect that there will be opportunities to set our bilateral relations straight. […] the election rhetoric and the rhetoric of the new government indicate that they are ready to resume a dialogue on international issues and restore bilateral cooperation” (mid.ru 2016). lavrov’s statement probably referred to a meeting of chrétien and putin in 2015, and to the views of canadian foreign minister, stéphane dion, who was appointed after the 2015 federal elections. dion called for constructive engagement with russia, recalling that canada was speaking to the russians even during the difficult cold war era. however, due to the policies of the former (conservative) government from 2006 to 2015, russian-canadian interactions had been interrupted. according to dion, while canada would always stand with ukraine, it was time to start working with russia “when we have common interests” (zimonjic 2016). westdal (2016), in an opinion article for the globe and mail, stated that “we seek re-engagement with russia […] to serve major, compelling canadian national security interests in eurasia, the middle east and far beyond. we do so to try to turn the rising tide of a new cold war, […] to stop the ruinous tug of war for ukraine, […] to cooperate in the arctic […] to do business.” 3 all translations from russian are made by the author of the article. 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 however, this was a short period of good intentions and no positive shift followed. the idea of dialogue was a marginal position of individuals in canada, as well as wishful thinking on the part of russian officials. much-anticipated concrete measures and practical steps leading to rapprochement were not taken by either side, although there remained analysts in russia who expected ‘warmer’ relations (issraelyan 2017, 358). a benchmark for them was the non-adoption by the canadians of the justice for victims of corrupt foreign officials act, also known as the canadian ‘sergei magnitysky law’ because of its similarity to the magnitysky law adopted earlier in the us. dion argued that this law, which the liberals pledged to enact, would complicate efforts to re-engage with russia and harm canadians seeking to do business in russia (lum 2016). however, after dion’s resignation, the liberals brought the magnitsky law into force in october, 2017. the canadian magnitsky law includes targeted measures against foreign nationals who were responsible for or complicit in gross violations of human rights, or were public officials or associates of such officials who were responsible for or complicit in acts of significant corruption (government of canada 2019b). moreover, the law permits the freezing of assets and the suspension of visas when officials from russia and other nations are found to be guilty of human rights violations. canadian firms are prohibited from dealing with foreign nationals who have grossly violated human rights. the shift from bad to worse in russian-canadian relations coincided with donald trump’s election in the us in november, 2016. trump’s victory contributed essentially, though not decisively, to the end of a warming period in russian-canadian relations. trudeau was rightly concerned about deteriorating relations with the us and carried out a rotation of the cabinet in january, 2017. the minister of foreign affairs, dion, was replaced by a new minister, chrystia freeland, apparently selected by trudeau because of her strong connections in the us (macdonald 2019). relations with the us, canada’s closest ally and most important economic and security partner, became the top priority and required most of the resources of the canadian administration. other international and foreign policy issues were sidelined. the new cabinet turned out to be unfavourable for russian-canadian relations. freeland is often called trudeau’s trusted ally (scherer and ljunggren 2020; vigliotti 2019). her views may have partly contributed to the prime minister’s shift away from trying to mend relations with russia. colin robertson (2020), a former canadian diplomat, suggests that freeland’s ukrainian origin and heritage might be a reason for her anti-russian beliefs. freeland is not popular in russia and is perceived as being committed to anti-russian sentiments (sidorova 2019, 281). she was previously included in the russian sanctions list and has the status of persona non grata, which may also influence her attitude to russia. dion’s sensible suggestions on relations with russia were not picked up by freeland (robertson 2020), who supported the passage of the sergei magnitsky law. in her statement, freeland described the law as “a clear demonstration that canada takes any and all necessary measures to respond to gross violations of human rights and acts of significant foreign corruption” (macdolald 2017). canadian lawyers and scholars cotler and silver (2020) argue that the magnitsky law represents the very best of canadian human rights foreign policy, but according to canadian scholars carment and belo (2017), the law caused russia’s trust in canada to deteriorate sharply. even though sanctions had proven to be an ineffective instrument in forcing russia to abandon its doctrines, particularly regarding syria and ukraine, canada expanded its sanctions regime (carment and belo 2017). this led to russia 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 imposing countersanctions. according to the russian ministry of foreign affairs, canadian authorities preferred to isolate themselves from russia instead of developing mutually beneficial cooperation, and thus canada lost more than it gained from the sanction measures (tass 2017). following these developments, it became clear that a ‘reset’ in russian-canadian relations would not happen soon, and the action-reaction dealings continued on both sides. the cases indicated below demonstrate further divergence between russia and canada. the poisoning of sergei skripal in the uk adversely affected russian-canadian relations.4 russia was accused by several western countries, including the uk, the us, canada, and germany of highly likely being responsible for the incident, using chemical weapons, and breaching its chemical weapons convention obligations (government of canada 2018). the uk reacted to the incident with a series of measures, including the expulsion of russian diplomats. most eu countries, as well as the us, canada, and ukraine, also expelled russian diplomats to show solidarity with the uk. moscow denied the accusations and announced the expulsion of diplomats from its territory in retaliation. russia and its western counterparts differ in their interpretation of the skripal case, and it is hard to judge the merits of the claims on either side due to lack of evidence (kinsman 2018). but it is clear that the case provided the impetus for a new spike in the russia-west crisis. some of the direct results of this situation are impediments in embassy and consular services and visa processes from both sides, which affect people-to-people ties, tourism, cooperation, and exchanges in science, culture, and education between russia and many western countries, including canada. according to dutkiewicz (harris 2018), there was a risk of a “significant blowback in the canada-russia relationship, especially in matters touching on the arctic.” luckily, the dialogue on the arctic did not cease. the kerch strait incident in 2018 involving ukrainian naval ships also led to divergent interpretations between russia and its western partners.5 russia perceived the incident as a provocation from the ukrainian side, whereas ukraine and its western supporters saw russia’s actions as aggression against ukraine. along with the eu and the us, canada announced new sanctions on 114 individuals and 15 entities (government of canada 2019a). in response, the russian ministry of foreign affairs claimed that “the canadian authorities are playing their russophobic card” (mid.ru 2019). the lack of political dialogue and transparency from both sides heightened misunderstandings. in 2019, trump expressed his support for reinstating russia into the g7, and french president, emmanuel macron agreed that russia should be invited to the g7 summit in 2020 (atwood and klein 2019). other members, such as the uk and canada, reject this possibility (thompson 2020). 4 on march 4, 2018, sergei skripal, a former russian military officer and double agent for the uk’s intelligence services, and his daughter, yulia skripal, were poisoned in salisbury, england, with a nerve agent of novichok family. 5 on november 25, 2018, russian border guards detained two small armored artillery vessels “berdyansk” and “nikopol” in the kerch strait and the raid tugboat “yana kapu” of the ukrainian navy. on board the ships were 24 servicemen of the ukrainian navy and two officers of the security service of ukraine. it was alleged that they had illegally crossed the russian border. ukrainian sailors were arrested and detained until the exchange of detainees between moscow and kiev in september, 2019. in november, 2019, the russian federation handed over to ukraine the ships detained a year earlier. however, kiev intends to seek a guilty plea from moscow, as well as compensation from russia. 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 there is no unity within the g7 regarding conditions for russia’s return. in the west, moscow’s potential return is seen as a “reward for russia’s good behaviour,” however in moscow it is assumed that the g7 needs russia, more than russia needs the g7, in order for the group to solve serious problems in the international community (kortunov 2019d, 31-32; baunov 2019). as kortunov argues, russia would be interested in returning to the g7 only if there were significant changes in the foreign policy of at least some members (2019d, 32). however, russian scholars highlight that there might be a joint interest in returning to the “g7+1” formula (kortunov 2019a). joining the g7 for discussion on problems of common interests, such as the digital economy, international tax reform, trade protectionism, and global inequality could be productive. in the summer of 2019, russia was reinstated in the parliamentary assembly of the council of europe (pace) with french and german support (mounier 2019). kortunov (2019c) suggests those who argue about russia’s membership in pace can be divided into two groups: “pragmatists” and “skeptics.” from a pragmatic perspective, russia’s membership in pace opens a platform for dialogue, which should not be neglected when there are not enough communication lines between moscow and western capitals. however, skeptics do not believe russia’s participation will be constructive. in their opinion, the russian delegation to pace will use the assembly mainly to promote “kremlin propaganda” (kortunov 2019c). canada took the position of the skeptics on this issue, supporting ukraine’s dissatisfaction with the decision. if the goal is conflict resolution and stability in europe and the euro-atlantic space, this refusal to open the channels of communication may be counter-productive. the russian question in the 2019 federal election campaign and post-election period the “russian question” was raised in canadian political discourse shortly before the 2019 federal election in canada, as russia, as well as china and north korea, were suspected of possible election interference (reuters 2019; tass 2019). a university of calgary study identified russia’s interest in competing against canada in the arctic as a reason for such interference, although no evidence was identified (blanchfield 2019). unlike in some western countries, the russian issue was not central to canada’s federal election campaign in 2019. the party leaders touched upon the theme of russia in the framework of arctic security and development, and the crisis in ukraine. the election campaign of 2019 showed the positions of the main canadian party leaders on russia: in their comments in election debates, all of them maintained a mostly negative attitude toward the idea of dialogue with russia (dzsurdzsa 2019; glavin 2019; ndp 2018). as a result, even in a minority liberal government, a positive shift in the russia-canada agenda is very unlikely to take place. shortly after re-election, trudeau reaffirmed canada’s strategy toward russia in a speech at a ‘nato engages’ event in december, 2019, stating that nato must engage with putin from a position of strength rather than one of compromise, and he characterized russia as “a significant challenge” (brennan 2019). nonetheless, there are voices in canada calling for a renewed dialogue with russia. for example, the international relations analyst jocelyn coulon has argued that, “canada had every reason to impose sanctions on moscow for its actions in ukraine, but there was no reason to freeze all relations with russia” (2019b). he points out that it is often forgotten that canada has just two neighbours – the united states and russia – both of whom are great powers. therefore, in his view, it would be desirable for canada to have a productive relationship with moscow (2019b). 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 in its foreign policy, canada considers the views of the us and nato allies. despite the growing difficulties in canada-america relations during trump’s tenure in the white house, the us has remained canada’s closest partner (blank and gattinger 2017, 83, 95). it can be said that the state of russia-us and russia-nato relations has some effect on the development of relations between russia and canada. canadian scholars murray and rioux (2020) argue that canada should become more independent in the world and define a foreign policy that is less dependent on the us and more reflective of the emerging international order. according to canadian scholars sands and carment, there are two countries which canada must get along with – russia and china. canada’s arctic interests intersect with russia’s, and its economic interests require cooperation with china (2019, 286). several factors influence canada’s policy toward russia, primarily disagreement with russia’s actions worldwide, which in many cases are not in line with the canadian vision of the rule-based international order. it can be argued, however, that russia’s policy toward canada on a wide range of issues is primarily reactive, as there is no direct conflict between the two countries. since 2014, russia’s approach has been reduced to retaliatory measures against the sanctions imposed by canada. according to some canadian scholars, such as murray and rioux (2020) and fisher (2020), at the moment, canada has no clear vision for its foreign policy. an absence of a coherent foreign policy may partly explain the lack of a clear sense of canada’s future relations with russia. murray and rioux (2020) underline the need to review and define canada’s national interests, as well as long-term trade and economic objectives. fisher (2020) has claimed that canada is missing “a well-defined vision of what ottawa hopes to achieve and [in] what direction canada is headed.” instead, canada is intending to lead in “revitalizing the rules -based international order” (2020). murray and rioux (2020) emphasize that canada has an important role to play in global affairs, but only with a substantive review of its foreign policy. canada’s current strategy demonstrates the huge importance of the ukrainian factor on the country’s foreign policy. this can be partially explained by the presence of a large, active ukrainian diaspora in canada of 1.2 million people. the country’s leaders would not want to lose the support of this part of the population. however, coulon (2019a), for one, insists that foreign policy “is not intended to promote particularism, although it is tempting for political parties to woo the vote of ethnic communities. but the defence of the national interest demands a cold and dispassionate look at the affairs of the world.” at the same time, damage from the low level of development of russian-canadian political and economic relations is assessed as insignificant for both the russian and canadian economies (nemova and issraelyan 2019, 373). the search for ways to establish political relations is, therefore, not among foreign policy priorities on either the russian or the canadian side. however, restoration of relations is important for several reasons. as paikin (2018), international relations scholar and policy analyst, argues, stronger relations between ottawa and moscow are essential, not only if canada wishes to manage its northern border, but also if canada is genuinely interested in building a new international order in this century, rather than being a mere bystander operating on terms set by other countries. without participation and dialogue with russia, there will be no resolution of several international issues. in turn, russia has expressed interest in a dialogue with western countries, including canada, which would help to increase the level of stability and predictability in international relations. additionally, business circles in both countries have expressed an interest in cooperation. 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 alternative diplomacies and cooperation on artic development as the analysis so far demonstrates, russian-canadian relations continue to cool, and the space for cooperation is becoming narrower, as neither russia nor canada is making any active attempt to restart a political dialogue. in these conditions, niche areas for cooperation become important, such as cooperation on arctic development. similarly, it may be worth exploring increased roles for alternative diplomacy, including track ii diplomacy, science diplomacy, parliamentary diplomacy, business diplomacy, and para-diplomacy. track ii diplomacy montville defines track ii diplomacy as “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict” (1991, 162). academics and experts could take part in track ii level diplomacy, which is valuable in a time of crisis. scholars from canada and russia are concerned over the lack of knowledge the two nations have about each other. most canadians and russians lack understanding about one another, thus inhibiting better comprehension of past, present, and future drivers of competition and cooperation (lackenbauer 2019, iv). reciprocal academic contact and cooperation between russia and canada have significantly reduced since 2014, but it is important to maintain bilateral contacts to prevent an even greater failure in relations. at best, the goal of expert dialogue is to come to a consensus on the ways forward in different aspects of russia-west relations, russian-canadian relations, and to work out recommendations for decision-makers on how to improve relations. one example is the conference, ‘canada-russia dialogue and cooperation in the arctic’ hosted by carleton university in november, 2016 and co-organized by global affairs canada and the embassy of russia to canada. the conference brought together diplomats, researchers from canada and russia, policymakers, government officials, businesspeople, and indigenous leaders, and focused on the need for dialogue between canada and russia concerning the arctic (rubinstein 2016). parliamentary diplomacy the canada-russia parliamentary association was established in 1998. in 2014, ottawa suspended bilateral parliamentarian ties with russia as a result of the ukraine crisis. however, contacts between members of parliament (mps) continue, particularly on issues related to the arctic, and expanding parliamentary dialogue could serve as an effective mechanism for discussing spheres of common interest and potential cooperation. a good example of constructive inter-parliamentary cooperation is the russian-french report on the prospects of relations jointly prepared by parliamentarians from both countries (federation council 2018). parliamentarians from canada and russia could follow this example. para-diplomacy the development of relations between the canadian provinces and the russian regions could contribute to improved relations between moscow and ottawa. this level of cooperation and diplomacy is defined by some experts as para-diplomacy, meaning the activities of subnational units abroad (akimov 2018a, 25-33). these units have enough potential and capability to carry out independent policies abroad, even while remaining part of the nation. as russian scholar 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 akimov argues, parts of the russian federation and the canadian provinces have accumulated extensive experience in developing bilateral contacts (2018b, 9). despite political difficulties, regional cooperation can and should develop as there are specific common grounds for interaction. the most active in this field are the canadian provinces of quebec, british columbia, ontario, manitoba, and alberta, while on the russian side, increasing interest in forging ties with canadian counterparts has been shown by moscow, st. petersburg, the republics of tatarstan and sakha (yakutia), the territories of krasnoyarsk and krasnodar, and the regions of primorye and murmansk (the embassy of the russian federation in canada n.d.). business diplomacy the canada eurasia russia business association (cerba) is working on promoting relations between russian and canadian companies. the association unites over 200 corporations and its main goal is to improve and increase trade relations between canada and russia. according to the association, cooperation between canadian and russian business did not stop with the outbreak of the “war of sanctions” (rcabc 2020). in addition, business diplomacy activists are trying to deal with the phenomenon of self-sanctioning, when foreign companies that are not included in any sanctions list nevertheless prefer to voluntarily avoid business with russia for fear of restrictions. such self-sanctioning inhibits canadian-russian trade relations. nathan hunt, the cerba chairman of the moscow board of directors and a co-founder of the rcabc (russiacanada business council), believes that business diplomacy has the potential to establish bilateral relations, and that active dialogue between business representatives can compensate for the lack of diplomatic communication at a high level. although russia’s policy toward canada is mainly reactive, there are cases of russian proactive behaviour. russian business and industrial circles continue to support the activities of the rcabc, which was established in 2004. the canadian co-chairman gilles breton says, “both canadian and russian stakeholders are doing a great deal to keep the initiative alive and thriving. the rcabc platform responds to real business needs and serves to advance the common economic and commercial interests of our two countries” (rcabc 2020). russian co-chairman alisher usmanov claims that despite the complexity of interstate relations, the council has managed to protect dialogue and business cooperation in many areas (mining and metal manufacturing, energy, information and telecommunication technology, transport) and among the largest russian and canadian companies: kinross gold, bombardier, barrick gold, magna, erm, rosatom, severstal, alrosa, rostselmash, and evraz. besides supporting business ties, the council contributes to educational developments by organizing cultural and sporting events, and bilateral student conferences, and by supporting russian language studies in canada (rcabc 2020). the arctic dealing with common challenges presented by the arctic region was one of the most productive areas in the canada-russia relationship before the crisis of 2014, and it remains the least affected by the crisis. cooperation in the arctic and the north remains a priority in russian-canadian relations and is one of the most promising areas for cooperation. to achieve this cooperation, there are a common preconditions and niches of opportunity, but there are also potential risks. 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 common preconditions russia and canada are two major arctic nations and have similarities in their approach to various issues. both countries share the division of the arctic based on direct longitudinal lines drawn from the north pole. this sector method is more relevant than the median line method which would establish areas proportional to each country’s coastline. canada and russia both strictly respect procedure and try to resolve territorial disputes using negotiations based on international law. for example, russia, canada, and denmark have a territorial dispute over the lomonosov ridge. each of them is seeking to extend the border of its shelf through a submission to the un commission on the limits of the continental shelf. however, this dispute does not prevent the countries from cooperating on other issues in the arctic. the unilateral establishment by some states of the external borders of the continental shelf in the arctic ocean, bypassing earlier agreements, could create increasing tension between the arctic countries (zagorskii 2019, 114). thus, it is crucial to stay within the framework of international law and follow the un rules and procedures. russia and canada also hold similar positions on the northern sea route (nsr) and the northwest passage. russia considers the nsr as its historically developed national transport route and has adopted several acts regulating its navigation. canada claims the northwest passage as part of its historic internal waters, which means the waterways are under the complete control of the canadian government. in both cases, the countries meet disagreement from the us, since the us considers artic waters international. in the case of the northwest passage, the dispute has existed for almost 50 years and the us and canada have ‘agreed to disagree.’ the us-russia situation is riskier due to the overall character of their relations. the us is at a disadvantage due to difficulties in proving that both artic routes can meet the necessary legal criteria for international straits. so far, the debate on the legal status of the nsr waters has no practical implications. however, the situation might change with the arctic sea ice melting and russia planning to use the nsr on a much larger international scale (todorov 2017, 88). russia and canada are concerned about the future actions of non-arctic states on the status of the nsr and the northwest passage. east asian countries advocate greater transparency in the region. they support the idea of loosening russian and canadian control and call for the future “internationalization” of these artic routes (konyshev and sergunin 2015, 38). both countries acknowledge the leading role of the arctic council in strengthening cooperation and defining the rules of behaviour. the council was established at canada’s request in 1996, and the idea was supported by russia. both sides support the idea of priority for the eight arctic states (russia, canada, the us, denmark, norway, finland, iceland, sweden), and have voted for clearly defined procedures for observers, including non-arctic states (nuuk declaration 2011). russia and canada were the first to be critical about china, india, japan, south korea, and singapore gaining observer status in the artic. their main concern was protection of interests of the arctic states and preservation of the effectiveness of decision-making within the council. in 2013, the states listed above, as well as italy, were granted observer status with the main condition that they recognize the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the arctic council member states in the arctic. 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 thus, the arctic council remains a key platform for interaction. general political disagreements at a global level are, however, starting to impact on interaction in the arctic council. for example, in 2019, at a meeting of the heads of the ministries of foreign affairs of the countries of the arctic council, for the first time in the organization’s history, they failed to sign a final declaration because, in contrast to the position of other members, the us declined to acknowledge the paris climate agreement and the un sustainable development goals. also, us secretary of state, mike pompeo, criticized russia’s struggle for influence in the arctic and china’s new silk road project. while this particular case did not involve canada, political confrontation on issues beyond the arctic agenda and negative trends in russian-canadian relations may, in the end, have an undesirable negative effect on the arctic agenda. additionally, the arctic is becoming a more open region with a growing number of active players, state, and non-state actors. therefore, it is crucial to keep this region free from conflicts, both military and economic. russia and canada should look more actively for opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation in the region, bilaterally and multilaterally. divisive issues hard security and lack of trust and transparency are key divisive issues between canada and russia. assessments of military and non-military threats have changed little since 2014, thus there is no arms race in the arctic. however, there is a growing sense of uncertainty about the future direction of military and political developments in the region. the escalation of tension may be due to incorrect mutual interpretations of military activities, including the increased number of military exercises, which are taking place in the context of negative political rhetoric and the absence of trustworthy military communication. to avoid additional risks, it is necessary to restore dialogue and cooperation at the military level (zagorskii 2019, 11, 113). until 2014, the arctic states were cooperating along military and political lines. however, when relations between russia and the west were aggravated by the ukraine crisis, meetings were suspended. as a result, russia no longer has multilateral representation in discussions of regional security issues. according to russian officials, there is no reason for “bringing military working methods to the arctic” (mid.ru 2020). russia was in favour of resuming the previous practice of meetings of the chiefs of staff of the armed forces from the member countries of the arctic council to ensure the required level of confidence (mid.ru 2020). the sides could probably start with expert consultations. the sanctions regime is another issue dividing canada and russia. russia’s policy toward ukraine in 2014 was followed by the regime of mutual sanctions between canada and russia, which also affected the arctic in some regards. however, in terms of scope, content, and duration, the restrictions imposed by canada have been more moderate than those imposed by the us (nemova and issraelyan 2017, 367-371). in december, 2014, canada announced export restrictions on technologies used in russia for oil exploration and production. such restrictions negatively impacted the russian oil and gas industry, which is dependent on foreign equipment and technology. there have been instances when us sanctions have created difficulties in economic cooperation in the arctic. for example, a joint venture between chinese cosco (china ocean shipping company) and canadian teekay, which owns and operates an arc7 ice-class liquefied natural gas (lng) tanker for the yamal lng project, had to change its shareholder structure in order get out of the us sanctions and to continue delivering yamal lng gas to novatek (fadeeva and dzyadko 2019). 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 niches for cooperation until 2014, there was multifaceted cooperation between russia and canada in the arctic (konyshev and sergunin 2013, 150-156). regardless of sanctions and the lack of transparency in hard security issues, there are still areas where the two arctic states have more common interests than disagreements, where cooperation is possible, and where there have been some positive results since 2014. most of this cooperation, however, is taking place in multilateral formats, rather than on a bilateral basis. since 2014, opportunities for economic cooperation and investment have become more limited, and as of 2020, just a few projects are successfully operating. as mentioned above, the russian energy company, novatek, relies on several shipping companies and joint ventures to transport lng produced at its yamal lng facility to markets in europe and asia. the largest of these joint ventures is a partnership between teekay, whose headquarters are in vancouver, and the china lng shipping company (teekay corporation 2017). in the chukotka region, which is part of the arctic zone of russia, the largest canadian investor in the russian economy, kinross gold, has production assets. kinross has had success in russia, operating four mines in the country over the past 24 years. twenty percent of its current production comes from its russian mines, kupol and dvoinoye (canadian mining journal 2019). moreover, as reported in august, 2019, toronto-based kinross gold is expanding its portfolio in russia with the acquisition of a large, open-pit development in the region. several other canadian companies are operating in the russian arctic region. among them are silver bear resources which announced a silver project in mangazeisky in its 2017 operational update (news ykt 2019; silver bear resources plc 2018). science has been a platform for cooperation in the arctic for many years, both during and following the cold war. fortunately, the 2014 crisis had little influence in this sphere. moreover, the agreement on enhancing international arctic scientific cooperation came into force in 2018. this is one example of scientific diplomacy in a period of crisis in relations. the agreement provides a legal framework for regulating research which widens opportunities for better understanding of the region. it is important to build cooperation among the universities of the arctic countries, and to develop student and academic exchange programs to foster future developments in the region. the university of the arctic, a network of more than 150 higher education institutions, could serve as a basis for such cooperation, and indeed, russian and canadian universities already use this network (riss 2016). environmental protection and pollution control are areas of high concern for almost all governments, regardless of their political views. collaboration on these issues should remain depoliticized and could serve as a good example of multilateral cooperation. ensuring environmental safety is a priority of international cooperation in the arctic. main goals include the preservation and protection of the arctic environment and the elimination of the environmental consequences of economic activity in the face of increasing climate change. there is a trend toward the intensification of shipping in polar waters, which brings new opportunities as well as challenges. multilateral discussions on maritime safety and prevention of 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 marine pollution from ships, have taken place under the auspices of the international marine organization. as a result, the international polar code came into force in 2017. it sets binding international standards for commercial ships operating in arctic and antarctic waters, and the ratification of these measures opens a new era of protecting arctic nations and the marine environment. russia was an influential actor along with canada and other arctic coastal states in the negotiations that led to the adoption in 2018 of the agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the central arctic ocean. canada and russia are interested in a stable, secure, and sustainable arctic region and see themselves as responsible actors, dedicated to legal norms and principles. conclusion this study has demonstrated that from 2014 to 2020, there was no positive shift in russiancanadian bilateral political relations. neither side has taken measures toward rapprochement. the cases highlighted in the article – the ukraine crisis, the skripal case, and the kerch incident – are significant as indicators of the different positions of russia and western countries, including canada. however, there is no direct conflict between russia and canada. canadian foreign policy toward russia has been made in response to russian actions (russia’s policy toward ukraine) or presumed russian actions (the skripal case), while russian policy toward canada has been mainly reactive. these policies can be summarized as action-reaction, and sanctions-countersanctions, leading to a crisis in bilateral relations. there are several key factors that explain these negative dynamics. canadian relations with the us and nato partly affect its strategy toward russia. however, most importantly, the ukraine crisis remains one of the central factors currently affecting russian-canadian relations, as the two countries do not agree on the causes of the crisis, nor on how to resolve it. as long as irreconcilable differences exist and parties cannot reach a common political dialogue, managing the confrontation but not overcoming it is a reasonable aim. a policy of small steps and cooperation in areas of common interest could help to reach this goal. analysis shows that cooperation between the two countries is developing in certain niche areas, even during the crisis. there are limited results as regards track ii diplomacy, para-diplomacy, and business diplomacy, but these spheres have the potential for further development. russian-canadian cooperation continues in the arctic, though mostly in multilateral frameworks. despite some negative trends, the countries have enough common interests for cooperation in science, the environment, fisheries and navigations, and search and rescue. the arctic region was one of the most productive areas in the canada-russia relationship before the crisis of 2014 and, as this analysis demonstrates, it remains the area the least affected by the crisis. to provide a basis for future dialogue, when time comes for political, economic and other collaborative opportunities, it is crucial to keep lines of communication and cooperation open, at least in those areas where russian-canadian joint interests currently exist, as illustrated by the arguments of experts from both sides who support the idea of political dialogue between russia and canada (coulon 2019; issraelyan 2017; kinsman 2018; paikin 2018; westdal 2016; breton and dutkiewicz 2020). 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 references akimov, yuri. 2018a. “paradiplomatiya kak sredstvo vyrazheniya regional'noy identichnosti sub"yektov federatsiy.” [paradiplomacy as a means of expressing the regional identity of constituent entities of the federations.] upravlencheskoye konsul'tirovaniye 2 (86): 25-33. _____. 2018b. “rossiysko-kanadskiye otnosheniya na regional'nom urovne v kontse xx-nachale xxi veka.” [russian-canadian relations at the regional level at the end of the xx-beginning of the xxi century.] in vneshnepoliticheskiye inetersy rossii: istoriya i sovremennost'. sbornik materialov pyatoy vserossiyskoy nauchnoy konferentsii 27 aprelya 2018 g, edited by alexander skvoznikov 3-11. samara: samara academy of humanities. available online at https://www.elibrary.ru/download/elibrary_32822504_54871957.pdf. atwood, kylie, and betsy klein. 2019. “trump and macron agree that russia should be invited to next year’s g7 conference, senior admin official says.” cnn, august 21, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/20/politics/donald-trump-russia-g8-g7/index.html. baunov, alexander. 2019. “why macron gave putin such a warm welcome in france.” carnegie moscow center. august 22, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79705. breton, gilles, and piotr dutkiewicz. 2020. “an action brief for canadian-russian bilateral relations.” russia in global affairs, november 5, 2020. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/brief-canadian-russian-relations/. blanchfield, mike. 2019. “russia could meddle in canada’s election due to ‘growing interest’ in arctic: report.” global news, september 8, 2019. https://globalnews.ca/news/5873864/russia-arctic-canada-election-meddling/. blank, stephen, and monica gattinger. 2017. “canada-us relations under president trump: stop reading the tweets and look to the future.” in justin trudeau and canadian foreign policy. canada among nations 2017, edited by norman hillmer and philippe lagasse, 83-102. london: palgrave macmillan. brennan, david. 2019. “trudeau urges tough nato line on russia but refuses to say when canada will meet trump’s spending demands.” newsweek, december 3, 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/justin-trudeau-tough-nato-russia-refuses-canada-meet-donaldtrump-spending-demands-2-percent-1475312. bratt, duane. 2007. “warriors or boy scouts? canada and peace support operations.” in reading in canadian foreign policy. classic debates and new ideas, edited by duane bratt and christopher j. kukucha, 238-248. oxford: oxford university press. brunnstrom, david, and susan cornwell. 2008. “nato promises ukraine, georgia entry one day.” reuters, april 3, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-natoidusl0179714620080403. https://www.elibrary.ru/download/elibrary_32822504_54871957.pdf https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/20/politics/donald-trump-russia-g8-g7/index.html https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79705 https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/brief-canadian-russian-relations/ https://globalnews.ca/news/5873864/russia-arctic-canada-election-meddling/ https://www.newsweek.com/justin-trudeau-tough-nato-russia-refuses-canada-meet-donald-trump-spending-demands-2-percent-1475312 https://www.newsweek.com/justin-trudeau-tough-nato-russia-refuses-canada-meet-donald-trump-spending-demands-2-percent-1475312 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-idusl0179714620080403 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-idusl0179714620080403 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 canadian mining journal. 2019. “gold: kinross makes us$283m acquisition in russia.” canadian mining journal, august 1, 2019. http://www.canadianminingjournal.com/news/ma-kinross-makes-us283m-acquisition-inrussia/. carment, david, and dani belo. 2017. “canada and russia: no room to manoeuvre.” canadian global affairs institute. october 2017. https://www.cgai.ca/canada_and_russia_no_room_to_manoeuvre. chase, steven. 2015. “former pm jean chrétien to meet with vladimir putin in moscow.” the globe and mail, april 24, 2015. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/formerpm-jean-chretien-to-meet-with-vladimir-putin-in-moscow/article24124208/. cotler, irwin, and brandon silver.2020. “the case for a new and improved magnitsky law.” policy. canadian politics and public policy, september 12, 2020. https://policymagazine.ca/the-case-for-a-new-and-improved-magnitsky-law/. coulon, jocelyn. 2019a. “a fix-it guide for canada’s next foreign minister.” opencanada.org, september 25, 2019. https://www.opencanada.org/features/a-fix-it-guide-for-canadas-nextforeign-minister/. _____. 2019b. “a tough mandate for canada’s new foreign minister, françois-philippe champagne.” opencanada.org, november 20, 2019. https://opencanada.org/a-toughmandate-for-canadas-new-foreign-minister-francois-philippe-champagne/. ctv. 2008. “yushchenko thanks harper for support in nato bid.” ctv, may 26, 2008. dzsurdzsa, cosmin. 2019. “andrew scheer hints at a conservative foreign policy, calls for a ‘total reset’ on china.” the post millennial, may 7, 2019. https://www.thepostmillennial.com/andrew-scheer-hints-at-a-conservative-foreign-policycalls-for-a-total-reset-on-china/. embassy of the russian federation in canada, the. n.d. “bilateral relations.” the embassy of the russian federation in canada. accessed march 18, 2020. https://canada.mid.ru/web/canadaen/bilateral-relations. fadeeva, alina, and timofey dzyadko. 2019. “tankery dlya zavoda ‘yamal spg’ osvobodili ot sanktsiy ssha.” [tankers for the yamal lng plant exempted from sanctions by the usa.] rbc, october 22, 2019. https://www.rbc.ru/business/22/10/2019/5daef5429a7947c10e15d4de. federation council of the federal assembly of the russian federation. 2018. “konstantin kosachev: russian-french report offers a good example of constructive interparliamentary.” april 5, 2018. http://council.gov.ru/en/events/news/91340/. http://www.canadianminingjournal.com/news/ma-kinross-makes-us283m-acquisition-in-russia/ http://www.canadianminingjournal.com/news/ma-kinross-makes-us283m-acquisition-in-russia/ https://www.cgai.ca/canada_and_russia_no_room_to_manoeuvre https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/former-pm-jean-chretien-to-meet-with-vladimir-putin-in-moscow/article24124208/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/former-pm-jean-chretien-to-meet-with-vladimir-putin-in-moscow/article24124208/ https://policymagazine.ca/the-case-for-a-new-and-improved-magnitsky-law/ https://www.opencanada.org/features/a-fix-it-guide-for-canadas-next-foreign-minister/ https://www.opencanada.org/features/a-fix-it-guide-for-canadas-next-foreign-minister/ https://opencanada.org/a-tough-mandate-for-canadas-new-foreign-minister-francois-philippe-champagne/ https://opencanada.org/a-tough-mandate-for-canadas-new-foreign-minister-francois-philippe-champagne/ https://www.thepostmillennial.com/andrew-scheer-hints-at-a-conservative-foreign-policy-calls-for-a-total-reset-on-china/ https://www.thepostmillennial.com/andrew-scheer-hints-at-a-conservative-foreign-policy-calls-for-a-total-reset-on-china/ https://canada.mid.ru/web/canada-en/bilateral-relations https://canada.mid.ru/web/canada-en/bilateral-relations https://www.rbc.ru/business/22/10/2019/5daef5429a7947c10e15d4de http://council.gov.ru/en/events/news/91340/ 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 federal state budgetary institution: the northern sea route administration. 2012. “the federal law of shipping on the water area of the northern sea route.” july 28, 2012. http://www.nsra.ru/en/ofitsialnaya_informatsiya/zakon_o_smp.html. fischer, sabine and ivan timofeev. 2018. “selective engagement between the eu and russia.” eu-russia experts network on foreign policy (euren) interim report. october 2018. http://eu-russia-expertnetwork.eu/en/analytics/2019-02-warsaw-report. fisher, matthew. 2020. “canada badly wants a seat on the un security council. are other countries listening?” global news, june 10, 2020. https://globalnews.ca/news/7038514/canada-un-security-council-bid/. glavin, terry. 2019. “one takeaway from the first debate: canada’s foreign policy is an unholy mess.” maclean’s, september 13, 2019. https://www.macleans.ca/politics/one-takeawayfrom-the-first-debate-canadas-foreign-policy-is-an-unholy-mess/. government of canada. 2008. “prime minister harper backs ukraine’s progress toward nato membership.” last modified april, 2008. https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2008/04/prime-minister-harper-backs-ukraineprogress-toward-nato-membership.html. _____. 2017. “justice for victims of corrupt foreign officials act (sergei magnitsky law).” justice laws website. last modified january 12, 2021. https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/j2.3/fulltext.html. _____. 2018. “g7 foreign ministers’ statement.” last modified april 16, 2018. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/04/g7-foreign-ministersstatement.html. _____. 2019a. “canada imposes new sanctions in response to russia’s aggressive actions.” march 15, 2019. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/03/canada-imposes-newsanctions-in-response-to-russias-aggressive-actions.html. _____. 2019b. “justice for victims of corrupt foreign officials act.” last modified october 10, 2019. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relationsrelations_internationales/sanctions/victims_corrupt-victimes_corrompus.aspx?lang=eng. _____. 2020a. “canadian sanctions related to russia.” last modified january 14, 2020. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relationsrelations_internationales/sanctions/russia-russie.aspx?lang=eng. _____. 2020b. “canada’s engagement in ukraine.” last modified april 9, 2020. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/countrypays/ukraine/relations.aspx?lang=eng. http://www.nsra.ru/en/ofitsialnaya_informatsiya/zakon_o_smp.html http://eu-russia-expertnetwork.eu/en/analytics/2019-02-warsaw-report https://globalnews.ca/news/7038514/canada-un-security-council-bid/ https://www.macleans.ca/politics/one-takeaway-from-the-first-debate-canadas-foreign-policy-is-an-unholy-mess/ https://www.macleans.ca/politics/one-takeaway-from-the-first-debate-canadas-foreign-policy-is-an-unholy-mess/ https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2008/04/prime-minister-harper-backs-ukraine-progress-toward-nato-membership.html https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2008/04/prime-minister-harper-backs-ukraine-progress-toward-nato-membership.html https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/j-2.3/fulltext.html https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/j-2.3/fulltext.html https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/04/g7-foreign-ministers-statement.html https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/04/g7-foreign-ministers-statement.html https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/03/canada-imposes-new-sanctions-in-response-to-russias-aggressive-actions.html https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/03/canada-imposes-new-sanctions-in-response-to-russias-aggressive-actions.html https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/victims_corrupt-victimes_corrompus.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/victims_corrupt-victimes_corrompus.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/russia-russie.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/russia-russie.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/country-pays/ukraine/relations.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/country-pays/ukraine/relations.aspx?lang=eng 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 _____. 2020c. “canada and the north atlantic treaty organization.” last modified october 9, 2020. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relationsrelations_internationales/nato-otan/index.aspx?lang=eng. harris, kathleen. 2018. “canada to expel 4 russian diplomats, reject credentials of 3 more.” cbc news, march 26, 2018. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-russia-diplomatssanctions-1.4593062. heininen, lassi, alexander sergunin, and gleb yarovoy. 2014. “russian strategies in the arctic: avoiding a new cold war.” valdai discussion club report. september 2014. https://valdaiclub.com/files/11482/. herszenhorn, david. 2018. “us, europeans and allies kick out more than 100 russian diplomats.” politico, march 26, 2018. https://www.politico.eu/article/tusk-14-eu-countries-expelrussian-diplomats/. huang, christine, and jeremiah cha. 2020. “russia and putin receive low ratings globally.” pew research center, february 7, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/02/07/russia-and-putin-receive-low-ratings-globally/. issraelyan, evgenia. 2017. “rossiya i kanada: otnosheniya na pereput'ye.” [russian-canadian relations: the present stage.] in kanada: sovremennyye tendentsii razvitiya. k 150-letiyu gosudarstva, edited by vasiliy sokolov, 345-60. moscow: ves mir. _____. 2019. “vneshnyaya politika kanady: dolgosrochnyye tendentsii i promezhutochnyye rezul'taty.” [canadian foreign policy: long-term trends and intermediate results.] in ssha & kanada: ekonomika, politika, kul'tura 2: 84-97. ivanov, igor. 2019. “helping ukraine to help ourselves.” russian international affairs council. april 23, 2019. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/helpingukraine-to-help-ourselves/. _____. 2014. “and what about ukraine?” russian international affairs council. march 27, 2014. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/and-what-about-ukraine/. kinsman, jeremy. 2018. “russian expulsions: ‘if there was ever a time for diplomacy, this is it’.” opencanada, april 3, 2018. https://www.opencanada.org/features/russian-expulsions-ifthere-was-ever-time-diplomacy-it/. konyshev valery, and alexander sergunin. 2013. “strategiya kanady v osvoyenii arktiki.” [“canada’s strategy in arctic development.”]. in arkticheskiy region: problemy mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva. [arctic region: issues of international cooperation], edited by igor ivanov, 145-56. moscow: aspect press. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/nato-otan/index.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/nato-otan/index.aspx?lang=eng https://valdaiclub.com/files/11482/ https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/russia-and-putin-receive-low-ratings-globally/ https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/russia-and-putin-receive-low-ratings-globally/ https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/helping-ukraine-to-help-ourselves/ https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/helping-ukraine-to-help-ourselves/ https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/and-what-about-ukraine/ 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 _____. 2015. “arctic region: issues of international cooperation.” riac educational materials, edited by ivanov igor. [“arkticheskiy region: voprosy mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva” uchebno-metodicheskiye materialy rsmd.] moscow, no 1, 2015. https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/educationalmaterials/uchebno-metodicheskie-materialyarkticheskiy-region-voprosy-/. kortunov, andrey. 2019a. “like a suspended gym teacher: why we should not expect russia to be welcomed back into the g7.” russian international affairs council. september 11, 2019. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/like-a-suspendedgym-teacher-why-we-should-not-expect-russia-to-be-welcomed-back-into-the-g7/. _____. 2019b. “russia is winning, but here’s the catch.” russian international affairs council. november 5, 2019. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-iswinning-but-here-s-the-catch/. _____. 2019c. “russia rejoins pace—but the battle isn’t over in europe.” russian international affairs council. june 28, 2019. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-andcomments/analytics/russia-rejoins-pace-but-the-battle-isn-t-over-in-europe/. _____. 2019d. “pochemu «semerka» ne stala «vos'merkoy» ili tridtsat' let otnosheniy moskvy i «gruppy semi».” [why g7 has not become g8 or 30 years of relations between moscow and the group of seven.] rabochaya tetrad' rsmd. riac working paper no. 47, 2019. https://russiancouncil.ru/papers/g7-russia-wp47.pdf. lackenbauer, p. whitney. 2019. “russia, canada, and the ice curtain.” in breaking the ice curtain? russia, canada, and arctic security in a changing circumpolar world, edited by p. whitney lackenbauer and suzanne lalonde. p. i-x. canadian global affairs institute. https://www.cgai.ca/breaking_the_ice_curtain. lavrov, sergey. 2016. “russia’s foreign policy in a historical perspective.” russia in global affairs. march 30, 2016. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/russias-foreign-policy-in-ahistorical-perspective/. lum, fred. 2016. “former us diplomat criticizes canada’s ‘weakness’ on russia.” the globe and mail, may 23, 2016. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/former-us-diplomatcriticizes-canadas-weakness-on-russia/article30123089/. macdonald, laura. 2019. “upsetting the apple cart? implications of the nafta re-negotiating for canada-us relations.” in canada-us relations. sovereignty or shared institutions? edited by david carment and christopher sands, 193-213. london: palgrave macmillan. macdonald, brennan.2017. “magnitsky human rights law, protections for journalists’ sources get royal assent.” cbc news, october 18, 2017. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/royal-assentmagnitsky-law-journalistic-protections-act-1.4361173. https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/educationalmaterials/uchebno-metodicheskie-materialy-arkticheskiy-region-voprosy-/ https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/educationalmaterials/uchebno-metodicheskie-materialy-arkticheskiy-region-voprosy-/ https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/like-a-suspended-gym-teacher-why-we-should-not-expect-russia-to-be-welcomed-back-into-the-g7/ https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/like-a-suspended-gym-teacher-why-we-should-not-expect-russia-to-be-welcomed-back-into-the-g7/ https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-is-winning-but-here-s-the-catch/ https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-is-winning-but-here-s-the-catch/ https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-rejoins-pace-but-the-battle-isn-t-over-in-europe/ https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-rejoins-pace-but-the-battle-isn-t-over-in-europe/ https://russiancouncil.ru/papers/g7-russia-wp47.pdf https://www.cgai.ca/breaking_the_ice_curtain https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/russias-foreign-policy-in-a-historical-perspective/ https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/russias-foreign-policy-in-a-historical-perspective/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/former-us-diplomat-criticizes-canadas-weakness-on-russia/article30123089/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/former-us-diplomat-criticizes-canadas-weakness-on-russia/article30123089/ .%20https:/www.cbc.ca/news/politics/royal-assent-magnitsky-law-journalistic-protections-act-1.4361173 .%20https:/www.cbc.ca/news/politics/royal-assent-magnitsky-law-journalistic-protections-act-1.4361173 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 mid.ru. 2019. “comment by the information and press department regarding new anti-russia sanctions adopted by the united states and canada.” march 15, 2019. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkj e02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb. _____. 2020. “acting foreign minister sergey lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at a news conference on russia’s diplomatic performance in 2019 moscow.” january 17, 2020. https://www.mid.ru/en/posledniye_dobavlnenniye//asset_publisher/mcz7hqumdqby/content/id/4001740. _____. 2016. “sergey lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at a news conference on russia’s diplomacy performance in 2015.” moscow, january 26, 2016. https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/2032328?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkj e02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb. montville, joseph. 1991. “the arrow and the olive branch: a case for track two diplomacy.” in the psychodynamics of international relations: unofficial diplomacy at work, vol. 2, edited by vamik d., volkan et al., 161-175. massachusetts: lexington books. mounier, jean-luc. 2019. “russia’s undiplomatic return to the council of europe.” france 24, june 28, 2019. https://www.france24.com/en/20190628-russia-undiplomatic-returncouncil-europe-ukraine. murray, robert, and jean sébastien rioux. 2020. “planning for canadian foreign and trade policy in post-covid world: robert murray and jean-sébastien rioux in the hill times.” macdonald-laurier institute. april 27, 2020. https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/planningcanadian-foreign-trade-policy-post-covid/. new democratic party (ndp). 2018. “ndp condemns russian actions against ukraine.” november 27, 2018. https://www.ndp.ca/news/ndp-condemns-russian-actions-againstukraine. nemova, ludmila, and evgenia issraelyan. 2017. “uchastiye kanady v antirossiyskikh sanktsiyakh.” [canada’s participation in the sanctions against russia.] in kanada: sovremennyye tendentsii razvitiya. k 150-letiyu gosudarstva, edited by vasiliy sokolov, 361-75. moscow: ves mir. news ykt. 2019. “dan start zapusku gornopererabatyvayushchego kompleksa na baze mestorozhdeniya vertikal'noye v kobyayskom uluse.” [the launch of the mining complex on the basis of the vertical deposit in the kobyaysky ulus was given.] news ykt, september 5, 2019. https://news.ykt.ru/article/91057. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb https://www.mid.ru/en/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/-/asset_publisher/mcz7hqumdqby/content/id/4001740 https://www.mid.ru/en/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/-/asset_publisher/mcz7hqumdqby/content/id/4001740 https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/2032328?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/2032328?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/2032328?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb https://www.france24.com/en/20190628-russia-undiplomatic-return-council-europe-ukraine https://www.france24.com/en/20190628-russia-undiplomatic-return-council-europe-ukraine https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/planning-canadian-foreign-trade-policy-post-covid/ https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/planning-canadian-foreign-trade-policy-post-covid/ https://www.ndp.ca/news/ndp-condemns-russian-actions-against-ukraine https://www.ndp.ca/news/ndp-condemns-russian-actions-against-ukraine https://news.ykt.ru/article/91057 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 paikin, zachary. 2018. “what of a future canada-russia relationship?” russia in global affairs, november 2, 2018. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/what-of-a-future-canada-russiarelationship/. paquin, jonathan. 2012. “is ottawa following washington’s lead in foreign policy? evidence from the arab spring.” international journal 67 (4): 1001-1028. paquin, jonathan, and philippe beauregard. 2013. “shedding light on canada’s foreign policy alignment.” canadian journal of political science 46 (3): 617-643. reuters, thomson. 2019. “canada expects foreign meddling in october election, chrystia freeland says.” cbc, april 5, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-expectsmeddling-chrystia-freeland-1.5085900. _____. 2020. “canada, britain not interested in russia attending g7 despite another trump trial balloon.” cbc, june 1, 2020. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/britain-russia-reaction-g7trump-1.5592933. ria. 2016. “mid kanady: ottava nadeetsya na vozobnovlenie dialoga s moskvoj.” [global affairs canada: ottawa hopes to resume dialogue with moscow.] ria, january 27, 2016. https://ria.ru/20160127/1365671476.html. riss. 2016. “nauchno-obrazovatel'nyy dialog kanadskoy i rossiyskoy arktiki razvivayetsya.” [“scientific and educational dialogue between the canadian and russian arctic is developing.] russian institute for strategic studies. march 23, 2016. https://riss.ru/analitycs/28496/. robertson, colin. 2020. “prime minister justin trudeau: a foreign policy assessment 20152019.” canadian global affairs institute, january 2020. 13-14. https://www.cgai.ca/prime_minister_justin_trudeau_a_foreign_policy_assessment_2015_2 019. rubinstein, dan. 2016. “canada-russia co-operation. arctic forum brings both sides to the table.” carleton newsroom, november 25, 2016. https://newsroom.carleton.ca/story/canada-russia-co-operation/. rumer, eugene, and richard sokolsky. 2019. “thirty years of us policy toward russia: can the vicious circle be broken?” carnegie endowment for international peace. june 29, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policy-toward-russia-canvicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323. russia-canada business council. 2020. “rkads otmetil 15letie s momenta osnovaniya.” [rcabc celebrated the fifteenth anniversary of its founding.] russia-canada business council. january 22, 2020. http://rcabc.ru/20200115/. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/what-of-a-future-canada-russia-relationship/ https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/what-of-a-future-canada-russia-relationship/ https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-expects-meddling-chrystia-freeland-1.5085900 https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-expects-meddling-chrystia-freeland-1.5085900 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/britain-russia-reaction-g7-trump-1.5592933 https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/britain-russia-reaction-g7-trump-1.5592933 https://ria.ru/20160127/1365671476.html https://riss.ru/analitycs/28496/ https://www.cgai.ca/prime_minister_justin_trudeau_a_foreign_policy_assessment_2015_2019 https://www.cgai.ca/prime_minister_justin_trudeau_a_foreign_policy_assessment_2015_2019 https://newsroom.carleton.ca/story/canada-russia-co-operation/ https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policy-toward-russia-can-vicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323 https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policy-toward-russia-can-vicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323 http://rcabc.ru/20200115/ 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 sands, christopher, and david carment. 2019. “conclusion.” in canada-us relations. sovereignty or shared institutions? edited by david carment and christopher sands, 283294. london: palgrave macmillan. saon. 2011. “nuuk declaration.” may 12, 2011. https://www.arcticobserving.org/images/pdf/nuuk_declaration.pdf. sidorova, evgeniia. 2019. “content analysis of the russian press before and after the ukraine crisis: russian-canadian relations in the arctic: hope for better?” canadian foreign policy journal 25 (3): 267-287. scherer, steve, and david ljunggren. 2020. “canada’s trudeau taps ally freeland as finance minister, promises bold recovery plan.” reuters, august 18, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-politics-iduskcn25e1n6. silver bear resources plc. 2018. “silver bear announces operational update at mangazeisky silver project in russia.” april 3, 2018. https://www.silverbearresources.com/news-andevents/news/2018/04/03/silver-bear-announces-operational-update-at-mangazeisky-silverproject-in-russia. tasker, j. paul. 2015. “canada should align with russia to fight isis in syria, ambassador says. alexander darchiev insists his country is focused on defeating isis, not propping up assad.” cbc, october 7, 2015. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-russiacanada-syria-isis-1.3261432. tass. 2017. “mid rf: odobreniye v kanade analoga "akta magnitskogo" naneset ushcherb otnosheniyam s rossiyey.” [russian foreign ministry: approval of the analogue of the magnitsky act in canada will damage relations with russia.] tass, may 18, 2017. https://tass.ru/politika/4263944. _____. 2019. “v kanade ne isklyuchayut vmeshatel'stva v vybory rossii, kitaya ili kndr.” [canada, does not exclude interference in the elections of russia, china or the dprk.] tass, september 18, 2019. https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6900912. teekay corporation. 2017. “sustainability report.” 2017. https://www.teekay.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/2017-sustainability-report.pdf. todorov, andrei. 2017. “the russia-usa legal dispute over the straits of the northern sea route and similar case of the northwest passage.” arctic and north 29: 74-89. http://www.arcticandnorth.ru/upload/iblock/f3f/04_todorov.pdf. tsygankov, andrei. 2018. “the sources of russia’s fear of nato.” communist and postcommunist studies 51 (2): 101-111. vciom (russian public opinion research center). 2019. “friends or enemies.” press release n°2222. october 28, 2019. https://wciom.com/index.php?id=61&uid=1719. https://www.arcticobserving.org/images/pdf/nuuk_declaration.pdf https://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-politics-iduskcn25e1n6 https://www.silverbearresources.com/news-and-events/news/2018/04/03/silver-bear-announces-operational-update-at-mangazeisky-silver-project-in-russia https://www.silverbearresources.com/news-and-events/news/2018/04/03/silver-bear-announces-operational-update-at-mangazeisky-silver-project-in-russia https://www.silverbearresources.com/news-and-events/news/2018/04/03/silver-bear-announces-operational-update-at-mangazeisky-silver-project-in-russia https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-russia-canada-syria-isis-1.3261432 https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-russia-canada-syria-isis-1.3261432 https://tass.ru/politika/4263944 https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6900912 https://www.teekay.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2017-sustainability-report.pdf https://www.teekay.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2017-sustainability-report.pdf http://www.arcticandnorth.ru/upload/iblock/f3f/04_todorov.pdf https://wciom.com/index.php?id=61&uid=1719 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 vice, margaret. 2017. “publics worldwide unfavorable toward putin, russia. but few see russian power and influence as a major threat.” pew research center, august 16, 2017. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/16/publics-worldwide-unfavorable-towardputin-russia/. vigliotti, marco. 2019. “cabinet committee membership reinforces view of freeland as trudeau’s most trusted minister: strategists.” ipolitics, december 23, 2019. https://ipolitics.ca/2019/12/23/cabinet-committee-membership-reinforces-view-offreeland-as-trudeaus-most-trusted-minister-strategists/. westdal, chris. 2016. “stéphane dion is right: magnitsky-style sanctions make no sense for canada.” the globe and mail, may 27, 2016. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/stephane-dion-is-right-magnitsky-stylesanctions-make-no-sense-for-canada/article30186202/. _____. 2012. “a quiet ruin: how did our relationship with russia become so dysfunctional?” literary review, october 2012. http://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/2012/10/a-quiet-ruin/. zagorskii, andrei. 2019. security in the arctic. moscow, imemo. https://www.imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=645&id=4742. zimonjic, peter. 2016. “stéphane dion signals willingness to re-engage with russia.” cbc news, january 27, 2016. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russia-canada-relations-diplomacydion-lavrov-1.3420781. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/16/publics-worldwide-unfavorable-toward-putin-russia/ https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/16/publics-worldwide-unfavorable-toward-putin-russia/ https://ipolitics.ca/2019/12/23/cabinet-committee-membership-reinforces-view-of-freeland-as-trudeaus-most-trusted-minister-strategists/ https://ipolitics.ca/2019/12/23/cabinet-committee-membership-reinforces-view-of-freeland-as-trudeaus-most-trusted-minister-strategists/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/stephane-dion-is-right-magnitsky-style-sanctions-make-no-sense-for-canada/article30186202/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/stephane-dion-is-right-magnitsky-style-sanctions-make-no-sense-for-canada/article30186202/ http://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/2012/10/a-quiet-ruin/ https://www.imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=645&id=4742 https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russia-canada-relations-diplomacy-dion-lavrov-1.3420781 https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russia-canada-relations-diplomacy-dion-lavrov-1.3420781 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 30-54 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ microsoft word pettai_final_pgjune5 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 the baltic states: keeping the faith in turbulent times1 vello pettai2 university of tartu abstract as the baltic states commemorated the centenary of their first appearance as independent states in 2018, their celebrations were mixed with feelings of ambiguity about the road travelled since then. although today we often see estonia, latvia, and lithuania as 'post-communist' countries, their experience with communism was actually much harsher than in central europe, since, for nearly fifty years, the three countries were forcibly a part of the soviet union. this has made their journey back into the european community all that more remarkable, and it has also served to keep these countries somewhat more resistant to the dangers of democratic backsliding. after all, their continued independence and well-being are intricately dependent on keeping the european liberal order intact. nevertheless, the winds of populism have also begun to buffet these three countries, meaning that they have been struggling to keep their balancing act going. this article reviews the development of the baltic states over the last 20 years, both in terms of domestic politics and eu accession and membership. it profiles the way in which the three countries have been trying to keep their faith in democracy and liberalism alive amidst ever more turbulent political and economic times. 1 research for this article has come from the european union’s horizon 2020 research and innovation programme “poprebel: populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century eastern europe: neo-traditionalism and neofeudalism” under grant agreement no. 822682. the publication reflects only the author's view and the ec is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. 2 vello pettai is professor of comparative politics at the university of tartu. 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 introduction it is difficult to begin this manuscript without a personal disclaimer. on september 14, 2003, i went to a cinema in tallinn to see the recently released and widely acclaimed movie about life in post-communist eastern germany, goodbye lenin. as i walked out of the theater reflecting on my time warp back to 1989-1990, i looked around at the sparkling glass high-rises in the downtown area and the trendy shops doing a bustling business on the retail floors. i walked calmly to a nearby taxi stand offering a row of freshly branded kia sedans. i climbed into the first car and asked the driver to take me to a school in my residential part of town. when i reached the school and entered its gymnasium, i seized the ballot being handed to me by the electoral official and proceeded to vote a resounding “yes” to european union accession. in this respect, i am complicit in the broadscale change that will be recounted in this article about political, economic, social, and foreign policy developments in the baltic states since 2004. i am not only one who helped make the decision whether to join the eu or not, but also one who laid the groundwork for that transformation by living in, and commenting on the politics of, the region, going back to before re-independence in 1991. had i known at the time that it would all go so (relatively) fast, i wouldn’t have made some of my more hesitant predictions about how quickly the baltics might emerge from their “post-soviet” shadows. had i known how quickly i would hold in my hand an electronic id card with which i could cast future electoral votes via the internet from practically any corner on earth, i would have been less distraught over how long it would take to overcome soviet bureaucracy. had i been able to imagine baltic soldiers serving in kosovo, lebanon, or mali as part of international peace-keeping missions, i might have been more visionary about how geopolitics might evolve. none of this is to say that what has evolved in the baltic states has been uniquely positive and successful. but it is to take advantage of the benefit of time – not only since 2004, but also going back another 15 years – in order to place into context some of the events and processes we might meanwhile have started to treat with a self-evident presumption. when i was first asked to contribute to this retrospective on eu accession 15 years ago, my mind went back immediately to that sunny autumn day in tallinn, and i knew that this article could not start with just a standard introduction. from here, however, it will proceed in the more conventional manner. namely, it will provide a general overview of political development in the baltic states over the last two decades. thereafter, it will recall some of the main aspects of the pre-2004 accession process. third, it will devote a lengthier section to a discussion of the balts’ experience with membership since 2004. and lastly, it will enumerate some future challenges for the baltic states, both as nations and as member-states in the european union. the title of the article is meant to capture some of today’s uncertainty that arguably is felt in particular by the baltic peoples. these countries have in many ways come the farthest of any of the “new member-states” – all the way from behind the walls of the soviet union. yet, is their faith in the european project that much stronger, or will it, too, erode amid the current period of turmoil? political development the political development of the baltic states since re-independence in 1991 has seen a fairly steady progression toward consolidated democracy. all of the three major indices of democracy that go back to the early 1990s (freedom house, polity, and varieties of democracy) show the three states having already attained a solid level of electoral democracy by 1994. the protection 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 of civil liberties, rule of law, and judicial independence has also been good, with more specific databases such as “nations in transit” or v-dem’s liberal democracy index showing consistent adherence to the norms of liberal governance. even during the last five years, the countries have remained firmly in this camp with no signs of the backsliding seen in some other regional countries. constitutionally, of course, the countries are different, with estonia and latvia sticking to parliamentary regimes and lithuania opting for a semi-presidential form of government. neither regime has proven particularly problematic, although lithuania did undergo an ordeal in 2004, when parliament decided to impeach and then remove from office president rolandas paksas for abuse of power. the three states’ party systems have also evolved in slightly different directions. figure 1 shows the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties – a measure meant to capture not only the direct number of parties, but also their proportional weight. in the early 1990s, we see that lithuania started with the most consolidated party system, anchored very much upon an anticommunist vs. ex-communist cleavage. nationalist politicians organized around the homeland union confronted former communist leaders from the lithuanian democratic labor party. but over the last 15 years, this configuration has become more fragmented, with a series of protest parties emerging and sometimes also disappearing. during this same time, estonia and latvia gradually reduced their number of parties, with estonia actually reaching a point in 2011 where just four parties were elected to parliament. but, since 2010, latvia has shown a renewed trend toward fragmentation. not only have protest parties emerged more forcefully, but also various centrist parties (such as the once-powerful unity party) have splintered. figure 1: effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties in the baltic states in figure 2, we look, therefore, at an additional metric that has been called ‘party system age’ (psa) (kreuzer and pettai 2013). psa attempts to assess how much a given party system has been perturbed over the years by organizational changes in parties, including the formation of electoral alliances, mergers, fissions, and new parties. the argument is that, not only does the relative electoral strength of parties matter, but also whether they are durable organizations that remain 2 4 6 8 10 e ff . nu m . of p ar tie s 92 95 99 03 07 11 15 19 election year estonia 2 4 6 8 10 e ff . nu m . of p ar tie s 93 95 98 02 06 10 11 14 18 election year latvia 2 4 6 8 10 e ff . nu m . of p ar tie s 92 96 00 04 08 12 16 election year lithuania data source: baltic electoral data; own calculations eff. nr. electoral parties eff. nr. parliamentary parties 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 committed to a brand and imply accountability. using this measure, we see that latvia and lithuania have had particular difficulty in consolidating a consistent set of political parties, while estonia has had more success in this realm. figure 2: party system age in the baltic states some of this party fragmentation has also translated into lower levels of cabinet duration. as figure 3 indicates, the first cabinets that have come together after a parliamentary election have lasted the least amount of time in latvia – on average just 372 days, or barely a year. overall, the highest average first-string cabinet duration is in estonia (739 days). however, lithuania has been steadily mounting in this category, being the only country in the baltics to have had a cabinet survive the entirety of a parliamentary term (algirdas butkevičius, 2012-2016). 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 figure 3: average cabinet duration in the baltic states, 1992-2019 a fourth interesting point of reference concerning political development in the baltic states relates to the ideological orientation of their governments. drawing on the parlgov dataset (döring and manow 2019), we can calculate the weighted left-right orientation of each baltic government and plot these values in figures 4-6. we can see that, whereas estonia and latvia have been led predominantly by right-wing governments (with values above the midpoint of 5), lithuania has followed a more alternating path, switching between rightand left-wing cabinets. moreover, the general ideological tilt of estonia and latvia is more to the right, with the few truly left-wing parties being more isolated or relatively moderate. 739 502 373 418 603 620 0 200 400 600 800 m e an d u ra tio n , d ay s estonia latvia lithuania 1st string 2nd string 1st string 2nd string 1st string 2nd string 1st string = first cabinet formed after a parliamentary election 2nd string = all subsequent cabinets before a new election data source: döring and manow (2019), author's own calculations 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 figure 4: left-right orientation of cabinets and opposition in estonia, 1992-2019 figure 5: left-right orientation of cabinets and opposition in latvia, 1992-2018 figure 6: left-right orientation of cabinets and opposition in lithuania, 1992-2018 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 la ar i tar an d vah i i vah i i i vah i i ii siim an n la ar ii kall as par ts ans ip i ans ip ii ans ip iii ans ip iv roi va s i roi va s ii rata s i rata s i i government opposition le ftw in g rig ht -w in g l ef tri gh t id e ol og ic al s ca le legend: left-right orientation of each party in cabinet & opposition weighted by its proportional size in the cabinet/opposition. data source: döring and manow (2019), author's own calculations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 birk av s g ail is ske le i ske le ii kra st s i kra st s i i kris to pa ns i kris to pa ns ii ske le iii ber zin s rep se em sis kalv itis i kalv itis ii kalv itis ii i god m an is ii dom br ov sk is i dom br ov sk is ii dom br ov sk is iii dom br ov sk is iv stra ujum a i stra uj um a ii kuc ins kis government opposition le ftw in g rig h tw in g le ftrig ht id eo lo gi ca l s ca le legend: left-right orientation of each party in cabinet & opposition weighted by its proportional size in the cabinet/opposition. data source: döring and manow (2019), author's own calculations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 slez ev ici us vag no riu s i i pak sa s i kub iliu s i pak sa s i i bra za us ka s i bra za us ka s i i bra za us ka s i ii kirk ila s kub iliu s ii kub iliu s iii but ke vic ius skv er ne lis government opposition le ftw in g r ig ht -w in g le ftri gh t id eo lo g ic al s ca le legend: left-right orientation of each party in cabinet & opposition weighted by its proportional size in the cabinet/opposition. data source: döring and manow (2019), author's own calculations 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 a final hallmark of political development for estonia, latvia, and lithuania has been their overall success in ensuring good governance (vilpišauskas 2014). as measured by the bertelsmann transformation index (2018), the three countries have remained near the top 15 countries in the world in terms of their governance performance (with estonia consistently placing among the top five) (figure 7). while corruption is still often cited as a problem (particularly in latvia and lithuania), the countries’ scores on this indicator have improved noticeably over the last decade. the main focus of concern for the baltic states has been ethnic politics, with estonia and latvia facing the most challenges given their sizeable russian-speaking minorities.3 after 1945, these populations had grown significantly, thanks to soviet policies encouraging slavic migration to the baltic region. by the late 1980s, russian speakers amounted to some 35-40 percent of the population in estonia and latvia.4 although in recent years these proportions have fallen (to 27 percent in estonia and 30 percent in latvia), the risk of ethnic tensions has remained an everpresent danger, not only internally, but also geopolitically, vis-à-vis russia. in particular, estonia and latvia drew sharp criticism for adopting stark legislation in 1991 that denied automatic citizenship to soviet-era settlers, as well as to their descendants (even if they were born in the republics). while legally, the two states were in their right to do so (since these non-citizen populations had come to the baltics under what most western countries had acknowledged was an illegal soviet occupation), the move generated overnight an unprecedented 3 while there is no formal definition of who constitutes a “russian speaker,” for the purposes of this analysis, all ethnic russians, ukrainians, and belarussians (as counted in different national statistical estimates) are encompassed in this category. 4 in lithuania, lithuanians constitute roughly 87 percent of the population, and in 2018, the largest minority groups were split about evenly between poles and russians (5.6 and 4.5 percent, respectively). see dambrauskas (2017). 1 5 10 15 w or ld r a nk in g 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 estonia latvia lithuania data source: bertelsmann transformation index (2018) figure 7: country ranking of the baltic states on the governance performance indicator of the bertelsmann transformation index, 2006-2018 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 proportion of stateless people (up to 40 percent of the population) that overlapped to a very large degree with the non-titular population. as a result, many russian speakers not only were fearful of more restrictive language and education laws that nationalist politicians were now keen to enact under independence, but in addition, they had in many cases lost their basic voting rights in these countries, threatening their ability to make their interests heard at all through the political system. while estonia did agree to give all permanent residents voting rights in local elections, this did not change the national representation of ethnic minorities. as a consequence, the first free estonian parliament elected in 1992 did not have a single russian speaker among its 101 members, despite this minority constituting 35 percent of the population. even today, minority representatives remain underrepresented in both countries’ legislatures.5 in the years that have followed, both estonia and latvia have moved to develop minority integration policies that focused on promoting naturalization among non-citizens as well as improving russian speakers’ ability to communicate in the national languages. as a result of these programs (many of which were financially supported by the european union), by 2017, the share of stateless people in estonia and latvia fell to just 5.9 percent and 11.1 percent, respectively (statistikaamet 2017a; centrālā statistikas pārvalde 2019b). a series of sociological surveys conducted during the 2000s also showed that, while minorities’ knowledge of estonian and latvian was improving only slowly, among younger generations, the progress was steadier. one study from latvia showed that, in 2014, fully 77 percent of young people aged 18-24 who were not native latvian speakers said they could either freely or fluently communicate in latvian (lauze 2016, 56). the comparable figure in estonia was lower, just 63 percent, but still an increase of 15 percentage points over 2011 (kruusvall 2015, 74). still, many flashpoints have ensued between the estonian/latvian governments and their russianspeaking minorities during the last 25 years. most notably, in 2007, an estonian government decision to relocate a world war ii memorial (known as the bronze soldier) in the capital city of tallinn sparked two days of rioting by russian youths (ehala 2009). equally, the latvian capital of riga witnessed sometimes tense demonstrations by russian minority protestors over low pension levels (1998) and educational reforms aimed at increasing the amount of latvian language instruction (2004 and 2017-18). in one notable wave of mobilization in 2012, minority activists were able to force the holding of a national referendum on whether to make russian the second official language of latvia. the constitutional amendment was defeated by a resounding margin of 75 to25 percent. however, it showed that ethnopolitical issues remained a sensitive matter. ethnicity has mirrored itself in the party system with not only prominent estonian and latvian nationalist parties in existence, but also minority-dominant parties holding key stakes in the electoral market (nakai 2014, higashijima and nakai 2016, nedelcu and debardeleben 2016). both the center party in estonia and the harmony center party in latvia claim to be broad-based political organizations, but during elections, the parties obtain between 65 and 75 percent of their vote from russian speakers. their respective support is particularly strong in the two capitals 5 it should be noted that political participation among russian speakers in estonia and latvia is in general much lower than among the titular nations. in this respect, underrepresentation is also prompted by apathy. however, because up to half of the russian-speaking population does not hold citizenship of their home country (because they either remain stateless or have opted for russian federation citizenship), they are also not a segment of the population that politicians will court during elections. the question of citizenship therefore remains a self-reinforcing problem for political interest representation. 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 (tallinn and riga), as well as in russian-speaking regions in both countries (ida-virumaa in estonia and latgale in latvia). for more than 20 years, this factor has caused both parties to be largely rejected during any national coalition formation. only in estonia was this rule broken for a couple of short-lived periods during the 2000s, and never in latvia. while a major shift did occur in estonia in 2016, when the chair of the center party, jüri ratas, became prime minister (and continued in that role after elections in 2019), this was not exactly a landmark watershed of interethnic cooperation, since both of his coalitions included staunch estonian nationalist parties, who saw it as their role to make sure the center party did not push policies that were too favorable for the russian-speaking community. hence, a fair amount of mistrust continued. the eu accession process both the successes and difficulties of the baltic states’ democratic development since 1991 fed into their process of european union accession during the late 1990s and early 2000s. during this initial period, the eu was unsurprisingly hesitant about taking in three ex-soviet republics too soon. not only was there a perception that the three states were too under-developed to cope with eu membership, but also geopolitical concerns were raised, as russia continued to accuse the baltic states (particularly estonia and latvia) of discriminating against russian minorities and neglecting russia’s broader interests (raik 2003). as russian president boris yeltsin sought precariously to modernize russia and turn it to the west, it was unclear whether actively encouraging baltic aspirations to join the eu (not to mention nato) might not overturn the apple cart. from the baltic point of view, the determination to push their case for eu membership was unrelenting. particularly successful was estonia, when in 1997, it was able to land a spot in the first group of ex-communist countries called to start negotiations with brussels. while ultimately this did not lead to these countries joining the eu any earlier, it was an important signal for the baltic states that not only could they make the case that successful political and economic reform can overcome past legacies, but also that geopolitical and ethnic minority issues would not prove a veto to their future integration with the west. as noted, the eu would still pay attention to minority integration policies, most prominently in estonia and latvia (galbreath 2003, gelazis 2004, adrey 2005, hughes 2005, pettai and kallas 2009). this would include not only supporting integration programs and language training, but also encouraging the balts’ active participation in the council of europe’s framework convention for the protection of national minorities and other monitoring forums. but this basic turning point in western assessments of how to deal with the balts’ ethnopolitical challenges was crucial for moving the process forward. in terms of the nuts and bolts of accession, a range of scholarly works and reports have already examined this process in detail (pettai and zielonka 2003, vilpišauskas and nakrošis 2003, hoganbrun 2005, maniokas 2005, feldman 2006, norkus 2007, van elsuwege 2008, jacobsson 2009, grigas et al. 2013, kerikmäe et al. 2018). suffice it to say that, because of their small size and their eagerness to join the eu, the baltic states did not pose much of a headache in terms of any of the major chapters of the acquis communautaire that needed to be negotiated. as vilpišauskas (2003) recounts, estonia, latvia, and lithuania had to do some adjustments in terms of their agricultural policies as well as free trade relations at the time with ukraine. they also negotiated a number of transition periods for raising various excise taxes to eu levels and adopting a range of eu 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 regulations regarding environment, transport, and other areas. for lithuania, two specific issues concerned the eu’s demand for a closure of the soviet-built ignalina atomic energy station and the future of transit movement to and from kaliningrad. the former related to how much the eu would support lithuania financially in this task, while the latter involved assurances that interaction with kaliningrad would remain facilitated without this adversely affecting lithuania’s future chances of joining the schengen border area. by december 2002, all three baltic states had completed their negotiations, and the stage was set for final ratification of the accession via referendums in 2003. during the period of membership negotiation, popular opinion about the european union fluctuated in the baltic states. for example, whitefield et al. (2006, 194) found that support for the eu was strongest among (a) those who believed they would stand to benefit from the new opportunities, (b) those who viewed the eu as a security guarantor for the future, and (c) those who saw the eu as part of a national-cultural return to europe (see also ehin 2001). interestingly, while some surveys showed that support for accession among russian speakers was initially high, this appears to have tapered off by 2004, as many minority residents may have begun to realize that joining the eu would mean a more definitive turning away from russia and the former soviet union. likewise, many russian speakers had become disillusioned with the prospect that the european union might somehow defend their rights more forcefully vis-à-vis the baltic governments. in the event, the fact that neither estonia nor latvia was forced to noticeably change their citizenship policies during the course of accession indicated that minority interests would have to be promoted in other ways (pettai 2004). the final referendum results were relatively unsurprising (figure 8). political elites in all three baltic states pulled all the stops in order to get people to vote yes. the pro-eu campaigns highlighted both the expected economic benefits of membership and the geopolitical significance of locking the three countries into the western community (mikkel and pridham 2004, pettai and ehin 2005). anti-eu arguments focused on retaining national sovereignty and the dangers of being absorbed by a european behemoth. in terms of the ethnic factor, russian speakers in estonia proved to be greater supporters of the eu than those in latvia. even in the overwhelmingly russian-speaking city of narva in estonia’s northeast, the ‘yes’ vote obtained a majority of 57 percent. meanwhile, in latvia, several parts of the eastern latgale region, including the city of daugavpils, voted strongly against membership (up to 67 percent). since only citizens could vote in the referendum, this meant that a sizeable share of the core minority community had reservations about shifting the baltic states toward the european union. 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 figure 8: results of the eu accession referendums in the baltic states, 2004 the experience of membership since 2004, the expectations that the baltic peoples had for eu membership have largely been fulfilled, be it in terms of political integration, economic advancement, national security, or european identities. this section will profile these various issues, while acknowledging that not everything has been smooth sailing. political integration perhaps the most direct manifestation of the balts’ success with eu accession involves being at the table and participating actively in eu institutions. all three nations have had their share of prominent eu commissioners (e.g., dalia grybauskaite, valdis dombrovskis, siim kallas). baltic members of the european parliament have stood out for their focus on eu foreign policy (e.g., in support of ukraine) and in favor of tough sanctions on russia. several baltic meps (such as vytautas landsbergis, tunne kelam, and sandra kalniete) have drawn attention to issues of historical memory in the eu, seeking recognition for the suffering of peoples under communism alongside that under nazism. likewise, the european parliament has been the venue for several russian-speaking politicians from the baltics to advocate their views. the latvian mep tatjana ždanoka was elected three times to the ep and used that rostrum often to criticize her own country about the plight of russian speakers. across the overall spectrum of member-states in the eu, it is not possible to say that the baltic states constitute a particular regional bloc, even in collaboration with the other 2004 accession countries. if anything, the baltic states have sought to maintain close coordination with finland and sweden. this, in turn, has often brought them into alignment with the netherlands and 66.8 33.2 64.0 67.0 32.5 73.0 91.0 8.9 63.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 p er ce n ta ge estonia latvia lithuania data source: baltic electoral data; own calculations yes no turnout 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 denmark – two member-states who are generally seen as more sovereignty-minded with the eu (taylor 2018). at the same time, the baltic states took a relatively cautious stance during 201718, when the european commission launched legal action against the polish government’s alleged attempts to circumscribe the country’s courts. during one public occasion, lithuanian president dalia grybauskaite went out of her way to express solidarity with her southern neighbor (delfi.lt 2018). economic advancement it goes without saying that the economic benefits of eu accession for the baltic states have generally been positive. according to one study, estonia had the highest level of per capita support from the eu’s various structural funds of any former communist member-state. (varblane 2016, 124). this figure amounted to 2540 euros per person during the period of 2007-2013. the comparable totals for latvia and lithuania were around 2000 euros. overall during the entire period of 2007-2020, estonia, latvia, and lithuania were set to receive a total of seven, nine, and 13.6 billion euros, respectively. the share of this funding in relation to each country’s gdp has also grown from around two percent in the mid-2000s to almost five percent by the 2010s (kondortabun and staehr 2015, 2; varblane 2016, 125). with respect to spending, most of this money flowed into transportation projects, environmental sustainability, educational programs, r&d funding, and regional development. in basic terms, this meant investment in new roads, water treatment facilities, job training programs, higher education support, and rural improvements. during the 2010s, prominent attention was given to the ambitious rail baltic project, the creation of a high-speed rail link from tallinn down to the polish border (via the cities of pärnu, riga, and kaunas, with a side branch to vilnius). the objective was to facilitate commercial transport through the region and indirectly extend the link up to finland through an eventual tunnel between tallinn and helsinki. the concomitant environmental costs, however, were equally a point of contestation, since the completely walled-off rail corridor would require special bridges and other accommodations for wildlife and local traffic to cross the straightaway. additional concerns were raised about the long-term cost of maintaining the railway, since eu funds would only be given for building the project. this question of sustainability became a heightened worry as the eu’s financial period of 20142020 started coming to an end. studies of the effects of eu cohesion funding have shown that when the level of such support surpasses a threshold of around 2.3 percent of gdp, its effect is to substitute for member-states’ own spending in these areas, thereby creating a dependency that is difficult to compensate if and when eu funding declines sharply (šlander and wostner 2018, 730). in the baltic states, this effect was particularly apparent in infrastructural spending and research funding. this problem of ‘substitution’ was also driven by the eu’s own strict monitoring of programming and allocation rates among the recipient countries, meaning governments would attempt to spend money as quickly as possible and thereby be particularly tempted to substitute their own national spending with eu funds.6 6 as will be discussed below, the financial crisis of 2009-2010 further exacerbated this trend, since the eu decided to speed up its disbursement of funds in an attempt to spur economic activity in these recipient countries. this meant, however, an even stronger substitution effect taking place(see kondor-tabun and staehr 2015, 17). 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 eu membership for the baltic states therefore had a very important fiscal and financial impact. more broadly, however, it is important to acknowledge the psychological effects of membership in terms of stabilizing investor confidence, commercial relationships, and economic activity in general. although studies of the effect of eu accession on growth rates in the post-communist region have been inconclusive, it is clear that in terms of providing a more viable and promising market economic perspective for the baltic peoples, eu accession was a worthwhile choice. the baltic states have gained more opportunities and perhaps less vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the global market by being tightly integrated with their european neighbors. moreover, the same argument that was noted above regarding political integration applies here: being at the table, in terms of crafting decisions on the euro, european financial regulations, tax harmonization, or any other policy area, matters. however, as one pair of comparative researchers put it, “the economic side of…eastern enlargement is...a hybrid bag of effects for the eu’s eastern countries because membership in the eu is not a tide that lifts all boats” (jovanovic and damnjanovic 2014, 1). this was felt in particular during the global financial crisis of 2009-2010. by now, it is well known that the baltic states took one of the deepest hits in the eu during this collapse, with gdp contracting between 14 and 17 percent in 2009 and unemployment hitting nearly 20 percent. this tumble was even more stark, thanks to the above average growth rates of seven to eight percent during the early 2000s. yet, as many analysts have shown (brixiova et al. 2010, kattel and raudla 2013, staehr 2013), these issues are linked, in that the economic boom starting around 2000 was not only beginning to show signs of going bust in 2008; it was also sent into a freefall when the rest of the world began to ripple from the wider financial crash (lehmann brothers, etc.). in this respect, the baltic countries faced some particularly difficult choices that involved not only the usual options of fiscal austerity, but also how to navigate sensitive (at the time) political ambitions about joining the euro zone. as was often discussed during the crisis, the baltic states might have improved their economic situation by suspending the process of approximating their national currencies with the euro and by devaluating the exchange rate of these monies in order to regain competitiveness in export markets. however, this would have caused domestic problems for people who had to pay back loans in euros. and it would have constituted a major setback in what had heretofore been a very steady and successful eu integration process (kattel and raudla 2013). in the end, the three countries opted for what was known as internal devaluation by radically cutting their national budgets (in particular, public sector wages), tolerating large-scale deficits (up to nearly ten percent of gdp), and suffering some major bank failures (parex in latvia and ukio in lithuania).7 while estonia was able to cover some of these shortfalls thanks to some national savings that had been accumulated during the boom years, latvia and lithuania were less prepared. latvia, in particular, was forced in december 2008 to turn to international donors (including the imf and the eu) for a 7.5 billion euro stabilization package. lithuania, meanwhile, was not able to bring its budget back into balance until 2014. long-term state debt in latvia and lithuania also grew as a percentage of gdp from around 15-20 percent to 40 percent, while estonia’s remained around ten percent (kattel and raudla 2013). 7 for details, see kattel and raudla (2013), staehr (2013). 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 the fact that the baltic states were eu members during this particularly severe global crisis was probably on the whole a good thing. while the eu could not directly engineer economic recovery nor even hold off future periods of speculative economic growth through regulation, it did provide a more integrated context in which to deal with the challenges the balts would face. however, this participation also cut both ways. during 2011 and 2012, the three countries would be pulled into the difficult political decisions that the eu needed to make as result of the greek debt crisis. the three nations’ parliaments would have to ratify their states’ participation in the european stability mechanism (esm), which in many cases proved controversial; in estonia, the decision to help bail out greece would even be contested in that country’s constitutional court. these stresses of eu membership were compounded in 2015, when the baltic states would be called upon to accept a share of the millions of refugees and migrants caught up in turkish, greek, and italian transit camps. ultimately, the quotas set for estonia, latvia, and lithuania were relatively low (between 600 and 1100 people). however, the policy generated a fair amount of backlash for several reasons. one was the impression that these countries themselves were still developing and couldn’t afford the resources to be spent on sheltering and potentially integrating newcomers over the long term. another involved the irony of refugees coming into the country just as the three nations had gone through a period of large-scale out-migration of their own people. since re-independence, the population of the baltic states had gone down by as much as 25 percent (figure 9). .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1 p ro po rt io n 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 year estonia latvia lithuania data sources: statistikaamet 2017b, centrālā statistikas pārvalde. 2019a, lietuvos statistikos departamentas 2019; own calculations figure 9: proportional declines in the resident population of the baltics states, 1995=100% 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 on the one hand, all three countries have had continuously negative population growth (deaths surpassing births) for some 25 years, sometimes amounting to 0.6 percent of the population. on top of that, however, out-migration has been an even greater problem with, for example, a net average of 26,000 people leaving lithuania and 14,000 leaving latvia each year since the mid1990s (see also berzins and zvidrins 2011, lulle 2014). particularly during the economic crisis, the totals soared to up to 77,000 per year in lithuania. in estonia, these numbers have been more modest, and in fact, by 2015, the country had turned around its migration balance, even though the natural population growth rate continued to be negative (figure 10). national security tough decisions regarding the greek debt emergency and the refugee crisis put baltic commitment to european solidarity to the test. these were among some of the first real moments where the balts were asked reciprocate for the staunch support they had been getting from europe regarding some of their own foreign and security policy concerns. on the latter score, the need was often perceived as existential: the eu and nato constituted the two most fundamental pillars of baltic foreign policy. having these two organizations safeguard baltic security was the main reason why estonia, latvia, and lithuania had joined them in the first place. and, by and large, the balts got what they wanted, especially in relation to ever more vigilant stances toward russia. in part, this trend began after the 2007 bronze soldier riots in tallinn, since it soon became clear that russia had tried to exacerbate the events by sending activists of its own to estonia. and it was alleged that russia was behind some of the cyberattacks estonia witnessed during the crisis. wariness of russia continued in 2008 after the armed conflict between russia and georgia over south ossetia. this event, in particular, prompted the balts to begin demanding from nato that the alliance put in place a clearer contingency plan for defending estonia, latvia, and lithuania, should russian expansionism turn in their direction. lastly, after the 2014 russian annexation of -10000 -5000 0 5000 10000 c h an ge , nr o f p er so n s 19 95 20 00 20 05 20 10 20 15 20 20 estonia -40000 -30000 -20000 -10000 0 c h an ge , nr o f p er so n s 19 95 20 00 20 05 20 10 20 15 20 20 latvia -80000 -60000 -40000 -20000 0 c h an ge , nr o f p er so n s 19 95 20 00 20 05 20 10 20 15 20 20 lithuania note: migration data for estonia not available before 2004. source: see figure 9. natural population growth migration balance figure 10: natural population growth rates and migration flows in the baltic states, 1995-2018 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 crimea, the masks were taken off, and a wholesale effort was undertaken to put nato boots on the ground in the baltics. the united kingdom took responsibility for placing rotating troops in estonia, canada in latvia, and germany in lithuania. in addition, the united states played a role in the advanced deployment of materiel. the balts themselves, meanwhile, tried to adhere to the nato call for member states to spend at least two percent of their gdp on defense. estonia fulfilled this criterion, while latvia and lithuania fell somewhat short (in part because of the 2009 financial crisis). within the european union, the baltic states lobbied for tough sanctions against russia, and through mid-2019, these continued to hold, despite occasional calls for their relaxation from other eu countries. this prolonged demonstration of eu unity was a bit of a surprise even for the balts themselves. such policies were all the more challenging given that the eu’s outreach to other neighboring countries like ukraine, georgia, or moldova (via the eastern partnership) had proven less effective than originally hoped. the balts had sought to contribute their own efforts to initiatives through training agreements and policy exchanges with these other countries. this, too, was part of their effort to advance their own security through common eu policies. support for the eu the upshot from the baltic countries’ experience with membership in the eu can be seen in various questions from the eu’s regularly commissioned eurobarometer (2019) surveys. on the whole, balts have expressed average or above-average support for the eu across a number of the questions. in particular, this is apparent from around 2012 onwards, when reverberations from the economic crisis began to subside. for example, when asked whether they are satisfied with how democracy works in the eu, lithuanians respond positively on average 13.5 percent higher than the mean level in the european union (see figure 11). when asked whether they are optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the eu, lithuanians again exceed the eu mean in terms of their optimism, by an average of 15 percent between 2012 and 2019 (figure 12). estonians, too, were generally backers of the eu, although their support did slip noticeably during the refugee crisis. their image of the eu as being positive declined markedly in 2015 and has only slowly recovered since (figure 13). as can be seen in figure 12, their level of optimism about the eu also took a tumble during this period. lastly, latvians exhibited the most reticence about the eu, including immediately after accession in the 2000s (see both figures 12 and 13). at one point during november 2011, the number of latvians with a positive image of the eu was almost equal to that of those with a negative image (21 compared to 18 percent). in this instance, one could see that the bulk of erstwhile supporters of the eu had shifted mostly to a ‘neutral’ stance (60 percent); the number of negative views of the eu didn’t really increase. still, it was a low point. 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 figure 11: levels of baltic satisfaction with the way democracy works in the european union, 2004-2019, eurobarometer surveys 40 50 60 70 % o f r e sp o n d en ts id e n tif yi n g as f ai rl y o r ve ry s a tis fie d 1/1/2004 1/1/2006 1/1/2008 1/1/2010 1/1/2012 1/1/2014 1/1/2016 1/1/2018 eu estonia latvia lithuania 50 60 70 80 % o f re sp o n d en ts id e n tif yi n g a s fa ir ly o r ve ry o p tim is tic 1/1/2007 1/1/2010 1/1/2013 1/1/2016 1/1/2019 eu estonia latvia lithuania figure 12: levels of baltic optimism about the future of the european union, 2007-2019, eurobarometer surveys 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 figure 13: baltic respondents’ image of the european union, 2007-2019, eurobarometer surveys future challenges in 2018, the baltic states celebrated the centenary of their first declarations of independence in 1918. this anniversary was – in contrast to the rest of eastern europe – not one of having actually had a hundred years of statehood. instead, the milestone came with a rather sundry mix of feelings. on the one hand, baltic independence in 2018 had now lasted longer than that between the two world wars. at the same time, the combination of these two periods of independence had yet to surpass the amount of time spent under soviet and nazi occupation from 1940 to 1991. in other words, a curious ambiguity hung in the air regarding what there was to be actually fêted. still, one of the oft-repeated mantras from that year was that the people of estonia, latvia, and lithuania had never in their history lived as well as they did now. by this was meant that not only had the socio-economic status of the three nations improved greatly over the last quarter-century, but also, geopolitically, the countries were much better positioned to deal with regional security threats, as well as to build partnerships with their neighbors. as nation-states, the three baltic peoples also now had the sovereignty and wherewithal to protect and develop their languages and cultures. all of this should have made for buoyant and assertive celebrations. and while there was no shortage of fireworks and other pomp bestowed on the 2018 festivities, there was also a feeling of discontent, particularly in estonia and latvia, as right-wing populist forces gained political momentum. in the october 2018 latvian parliamentary election, a new anti-establishment party called “who owns the state?” came second in polling (14.2 percent) and for a while appeared poised to nominate the next prime minister – until it became clear that the party leader would not be given security clearance by latvian law enforcement agencies. coupled with a strong upsurge by another, previously minor party (the new conservative party), the latvian party system became once again highly fragmented and cut along fairly divisive lines. the appointment of krišjanis 20 30 40 50 60 % o f re sp o n d en ts s ee in g e u a s fa irl y or v e ry p o si tiv e 1/1/2005 1/1/2006 1/1/2007 1/1/2008 1/1/2009 1/1/2010 1/1/2011 1/1/2012 1/1/2013 1/1/2014 1/1/2015 1/1/2016 1/1/2017 1/1/2018 eu estonia latvia lithuania 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 kariņš as prime minister (from parliament’s smallest party) more than three months after the election only served to epitomize the difficult political constellation in which the country was now situated. likewise, in estonia in 2018, observers braced themselves for what was expected to be a swelling of support for the right-wing radical estonian conservative people’s party (ekre) in advance of march 2019 elections. during the electoral campaign, ekre’s leaders railed against a ‘deep state’ they claimed had taken over estonian government; they promised to give power back to the people through more referendums; and they pledged an unprecedented spending program geared towards clearing state debt. when the party scored nearly 18 percent (coming in third), the result was ominous enough for many observers. however, when prime minister jüri ratas (from the secondplace center party) decided to outmaneuver the actual winner of the election (the reform party) and form an alternative majority coalition embracing ekre and the conservative pro patria party in order to stay in office, the level of angst was raised even higher. even in lithuania, prime minister saulius skvernelis was forced in september 2018 to turn to a somewhat more long-standing, but still widely seen as populist, party, order and justice, in order to shore up his majority in parliament. while the basic political orientation of the government didn’t change, the shakiness of the cabinet (and in particular of the junior partner, the social democrats) showed that established parties were crumbling there, too. while some analysts endorsed the inclusion of populist forces in these governments as helping perhaps to blunt their future appeal, it was unclear whether the recipes these politicians offered would actually help to alleviate the problems the two countries faced. lavish promises of new spending on expanded social welfare programs ran counter to a fairly entrenched neo-liberal economic orthodoxy in the baltics. at the same time, in what seemed like a perpetual downward spiral, all three countries were caught up in a succession of retrenchment plans meant to deal with their continuous demographic declines. starting with closed-down rural schools and hospitals, moving to redrawn and consolidated administrative districts, and ending with reductions in the size of parliament itself (broadly discussed in both lithuania and estonia), the actual evolution of government in these countries seemed little like the épanouissement that the centenaries had proclaimed. while the balts still had much to be grateful for in terms of national security via nato and the european union (particularly vis-à-vis russia), these two factors were not givens over the medium term. if the countries did not maintain a solid level of governance and respectability, it was unclear whether partners like the united states (with an increasingly transactionalist view of foreign policy) might not relax some of their security commitments. equally, the european union was in a great period of flux, with brexit topping the agenda. not only was the uk’s departure from the eu a political headache, but also its consequences for future eu budgets would be of great concern for net recipients from the eu like the baltic states. financial support from brussels was set to decline steeply, which in turn would put even more pressure on national finances amid shrinking tax bases. the ambivalent position of the baltic states was thus palpable. as the three nations in europe that had gained perhaps the most, thanks to the end of the cold war – restored national independence, reintegration with the european community, and economic modernization – they had a strong incentive to keep the faith and support the liberal order that had helped them reach their centenary 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 as free peoples. however, many of the same fissures that had begun to afflict that venerable system were also now ripping through their own societies and sapping the strength to develop even further during the next hundred years. in this respect, the baltic states did not differ from some of the symptoms of ‘democratic fatigue’ (rupnik and zielonka 2013) or the ‘hollowing of democracy’ (greskovits 2015) that other postcommunist countries had experienced.8 however, the challenge was to figure out the interplay between distal and proximate factors that contributed to these trends. interestingly, the long-term legacies of soviet rule appeared to have made the baltics slightly more immune to the risk of democratic fatigue in that more people felt a vested interest in making liberal democracy and european integration work after a half-century of foreign incorporation. because the countries had travelled the farthest in terms of political, social, and economic change since 1989, their populations persisted the longest in maintaining a belief in those commitments. hence, to paraphrase a distinction brought out by grigore pop-eleches and joshua tucker (2017), the balts’ experience of living through communism seemed to outweigh their experience of living in post-communism in a positive sense. that having been said, the nature of life in postcommunism had also changed 30 years after the fall of the berlin wall. this existence was no longer simply about the immediate political choices that national leaders made after 1989. it was also about the reverberate effects of developments far outside the region, be it the 2009 global financial crisis, the migration upsurge, or democratic fatigue taking hold in ‘consolidated’ democracies such as the us, the uk, or france. the rise of right-wing populist forces in the baltics therefore seemed to be much more attributable to these broader trends rather than to tendencies within specifically post-communist democratic consolidation. to remedy these emerging ills, a much more concerted and uniform re-equilibration of liberal democracy as a whole would be required. 8 see cianetti (2018) for an especially trenchant analysis with regard to estonia and latvia. on popular support for institutions, see gudžinskas (2017). 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 references adrey, j.-b. 2005. “minority language rights before and after the 2004 eu enlargement: the copenhagen criteria in the baltic states.” journal of multilingual and multicultural development 26 (5):453-68. bertelsmann transformation index. 2018. “bti 2006-2018 scores.“ https://www.btiproject.org/en/data/. accessed february 24, 2020. berzins, a. and p. zvidrins. 2011. “depopulation in the baltic states.” lithuanian journal of statistics 50 (1):39-48. brixiova, z., l. vartia, and a. wörgötter. 2010. “capital flows and the boom–bust cycle: the case of estonia.” economic systems 34 (1):55-72. centrālā statistikas pārvalde. 2019a. “isg010. iedzīvotāju skaits, tā izmaiņas un dabiskās kustības galvenierādī tāji.” https://data1.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/iedz/iedz__iedzskaits__ikgad/isg010.px/. accessed feb 24, 2020. centrālā statistikas pārvalde. 2019b. “irg109. pastāvīgo iedzīvotāju valstiskā piederība gada sākumā.” https://data1.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/iedz/iedz__iedzrakst/irg109.px. accessed february 24, 2020. cianetti, l. 2018. “consolidated technocratic and ethnic hollowness, but no backsliding: reassessing europeanisation in estonia and latvia.” east european politics 34 (3):317-36. dambrauskas, k. 2017. “minority response to ethnic democracy: poles in lithuania after eu accession.” intersections. east european journal of society and politics 3 (4):66-86. delfi.lt. 2018. “lithuania will support poland in dispute with ec – grybauskaitė.” 19 february. döring, h. and p. manow. 2019. “parliaments and governments database (parlgov): information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. development version.” http://www.parlgov.org/. accessed february 24, 2020. ehala, m. 2009. “the bronze soldier: identity threat and maintenance in estonia.” journal of baltic studies 40 (1):139-58. ehin, p. 2001. “determinants of public support for eu membership: data from the baltic countries.” european journal of political research 40 (1):31-56. eurobarometer interactive. 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ chart/index. accessed february 24, 2020. feldman, g. 2006. “neo-liberal nationalism: ethnic integration and estonia's accession to the european union.” in crossing european boundaries: beyond conventional geographic categories, edited by jaro stacul, christina moutsou and helen kopnina, 41-63. new york: berghahn books. 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 galbreath, d. 2003. “the politics of european integration and minority rights in estonia and latvia.” perspectives on european politics and society 4 (1):35-53. gelazis, n. m. 2004. “the european union and the statelessness problem in the baltic states.” eur. j. migration & l. 6 225. greskovits, b. 2015. “the hollowing and backsliding of democracy in east central europe.” global policy 6:28-37. grigas, a., a. kasekamp, k. maslauskaite, and l. zorgenfreija. 2013. the baltic states in the eu: yesterday, today and tomorrow. berlin: jacques delors institute. gudžinskas, l. 2017. “trends in confidence in public institutions: a comparative analysis of the baltic countries.” politics in central europe 13 (1):7-33. higashijima, m. and r. nakai. 2016. “elections, ethnic parties, and ethnic identification in new democracies: evidence from the baltic states.” studies in comparative international development 51 (2):124-46. hogan-brun, g. 2005. “the baltic republics and language ideological debates surrounding european union accession.” journal of multilingual and multicultural development 26 (5):367-77. hughes, j. 2005. “‘exit’ in deeply divided societies: regimes of discrimination in estonia and latvia and the potential for russophone migration.” journal of common market studies 43 (4):739-62. jacobsson, b. 2009. the european union and the baltic states: changing forms of governance: routledge. jovanovic, m. n. and j. damnjanovic. 2014. “eu eastern enlargement: economic effects on new members 2000-2012.” journal of economic integration 29 (2). kattel, r. and r. raudla. 2013. “the baltic republics and the crisis of 2008–2011.” europe-asia studies 65 (3):426-49. kerikmäe, t., a. chochia, and m. atallah. 2018. “the baltic states in the european union.” oxford research encyclopedia of politics doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.186. kondor-tabun, k. and k. staehr. 2015. “eu cohesion policy funding in estonia: background, developments and challenges.” ttu economic research series. kreuzer, m. and v. pettai. 2013. “time as age: measuring the durability of party systems.” paper presented at the annual meeting of the american political science association, chicago, september 1. kruusvall, j. 2015. “keelteoskus ja keelte praktiline kasutamine.” in eesti ühiskonna integratsiooni monitooring 2015: uuringu aruanne, edited by kristina kallas, 72-86. tartu: balti uuringute instituut. 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 lauze, l., ed. 2016. valodas situācija latvijā 2010–2015. lietuvos statistikos departamentas. 2019. “nuolatinių gyventojų skaičius metų pradžioje.” https://osp.stat.gov.lt/en/statistiniu-rodikliu-analize?hash=d7444030-2047-4e17-b2d186852104958b. accessed february 24, 2020. lulle, a. 2014. “baltic triplets? out-migration migration and responses to crisis.” regional formation and development studies 11 (3):135-45. maniokas, k. 2005. “road to negotiations: enlargement instruments and the development of lithuania's status.” in lithuania's road to the european union: unification of europe and lithuania's eu accession negotiation, edited by klaudijus maniokas, ramunas vilpišauskas and darius žeruolis, 19-56. vilnius: eugrimas. mikkel, e. and g. pridham. 2004. “clinching the ‘return to europe’: the referendums on eu accession in estonia and latvia.” west european politics 27 (4):716-48. nakai, r. 2014. “the influence of party competition on minority politics: a comparison of latvia and estonia.” jemie 13:57. nedelcu, h. and j. debardeleben. 2016. “conceptualizing party representation of ethnic minorities in central and eastern europe: a typology of ethnic minority parties.” east european politics and societies 30 (2):381-403. norkus, z. 2007. “why did estonia perform best? the north–south gap in the post-socialist economic transition of the baltic states.” journal of baltic studies 38 (1):21-42. pettai, v. 2004. “l'euroscepticisme balte: un spectre qui ne s'est pas réalisé.” in les européens face ? l'élargissement: perceptions, acteurs, enjeux, edited by jacques rupnik, 251-73. paris: presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques. pettai, v. and p. ehin, eds. 2005. deciding on europe: the eu referendum in estonia. tartu: tartu university press. pettai, v. and k. kallas. 2009. “estonia: conditionality in a legal straightjacket.” in minority rights in central and eastern europe: a failure of conditionality?, edited by bernd rechel, 104-18, basees/routledge series on russian and east european studies, no. 54. london: routledge. pettai, v. and j. zielonka, eds. 2003. the road to the european union volume 2: estonia, latvia and lithuania. manchester: manchester university press. pop-eleches, g. and j. tucker. 2017. communism's shadow: historical legacies and contemporary political attitudes. princeton: princeton university press. raik, k. 2003. democratic politics or the implementation of inevitabilities?: estonia's democracy and integration into the european union: tartu university press. 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 rupnik, j. and j. zielonka. 2013. “introduction: the state of democracy 20 years on: domestic and external factors.” east european politics, societies and cultures 27 (1):3-25. staehr, k. 2013. “austerity in the baltic states during the global financial crisis.” intereconomics 48 (5): 293-302. statistikaamet. 2017a. “rv069: rahvastik sünniriigi/kodakondsuse, maakonna, soo ja vanuserühma järgi, 1.jaanuar.” http://andmebaas.stat.ee/index.aspx?datasetcode=rv069. accessed february 24, 2020. statistikaamet. 2017b. “rv021: rahvastik soo ja vanuserühma järgi, 1. jaanuar.” http://andmebaas.stat.ee/index.aspx?datasetcode=rv021. accessed february 24, 2020. šlander, s., and p. wostner. 2018. “additionality of european cohesion policy.” european review 26 (4):721-37. taylor, p. 2018. “brexit redraws eu alliances.” politico, 14 april. van elsuwege, p. 2008. from soviet republics to eu member states (2 vols): a legal and political assessment of the baltic states' accession to the eu: brill. varblane, u. 2016. “eu structural funds in the baltic countries–useful or harmful?”. estonian discussions on economic policy 24 (2):120-36. whitefield, s., r. rohrschneider, and r. alisauskiene. 2006. “support for the european union in the baltic states.” in public opinion, party competition, and the european union in postcommunist europe, edited by robert rohrschneider and stephen whitefield, 187-202. london: palgrave macmillan. vilpišauskas, r. 2003. “baltic states negotiating the eu entry: process, patterns and results.” in lithuanian political science yearbook, edited by algimantas jankauskas, 119-41. vilnius: institute of international relations and political science. ———. 2014. “lithuania’s double transition after the re-establishment of independence in 1990: coping with uncertainty domestically and externally.” oxford review of economic policy 30 (2):223-36. vilpišauskas, r. and v. nakrošis. 2003. politikos įgyvendinimas lietuvoje ir europos sąjungos įtaka. vilnius: eugrimas. 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 39-63 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 biopolitics and the construction of (mis)trust: public discourse regarding pandemic governance in saint petersburg, russia konstantin galkin1, sociological institute of fctas ras, st. petersburg, russian federation oksana parfenova2, sociological institute of fctas ras, st. petersburg, russian federation abstract this study is dedicated to the development of trust and distrust in the measures taken by the authorities during the covid-19 pandemic. using the concept of biopolitics, the authors analyze the reactions of social network users and their communication with the authorities. for this purpose, throughout the course of one year, the authors have studied posts on one of the official social media groups of the saint petersburg authorities. the posts concerned various anti-covid measures: vaccination, mask requirements, online learning, as well as other restrictions and comments. for the analysis, the authors used the antconc program. based on the findings, the authors identified three discourses. the most prominent two are those of dissent and resistance. the theoretical context in this article is the synthesis of the ideas of foucault and agamben. the authors present a continuum of different discourses, ranging from liberal and oriented to the understanding of biopolitics as a norm of effective management to disciplinary discourses and the perception of measures and restrictions as attempts at control. these are based on users’ distrust, doubts, and unwillingness to follow the prescribed measures. within these two discourses, users communicate with different public authorities more actively. the authorities’ communication, based on references to legislative acts, did not foster trust and increased discontent, while users facing a lack of active resistance to biopolitical measures resorted to evasion tactics such as not wearing masks and using fake qr codes. 1 konstantin galkin is a senior researcher at the sociological institute, federal center of theoretical and applied sociology, russian academy of sciences, st. petersburg, russian federation . 2 oksana parfenova is a senior researcher at the sociological institute, federal center of theoretical and applied sociology, russian academy of sciences, st. petersburg, russian federation . 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 introduction the outbreak of the pandemic evoked distrust of the healthcare system, which manifested in skepticism toward the capabilities of medicine, preventive measures, and, eventually, vaccination. there was a considerable rise in conspiracy theories, including those concerning the origin of the pandemic. this, in turn, affected personal health practices and attitudes toward vaccination (van mulukom et al. 2022). several contemporary studies, which analyze the particularities of the pandemic progression, focus on studying the discourses of denial regarding the role of medicine and vaccines, as well as the denial of the mortality risk of the virus and the discussions of conspiracy theories online (escardó 2021; isupova et al. 2021; lavorgna and myles 2021). on the one hand, the creation of vaccines and the start of the vaccination campaign generated various discourses about vaccination against the new disease, but on the other hand, propelled the discussion between supporters and opponents of vaccination to the next level. this has led to discourses of trust and distrust of vaccination as the best way to combat covid-19. markers of willingness and unwillingness to vaccinate as well as follow the necessary precautionary measures are the key signs of distrust of state biopolitics. further, various protest activities indicate the way people themselves try to modify biopolitics and disciplinary bodily practices, which, of course, include mandatory vaccination (van bavel et al. 2020; rouse 2021). the state measures to combat the pandemic, the most drastic of which were lockdowns and self-isolation of varying degrees of strictness, the requirement to wear masks, and eventually vaccinate, represent the classic concept of biopolitics according to michel foucault, where the state tries to make all citizens behave in a certain manner (foucault 2010). in response to this, citizens show resistance and engage in various discourses, often using social networks and mass media. although russia was among the first to launch a vaccination campaign, citizens’ level of vaccine acceptance was low from the very beginning .3 there were regular scandals and stories about buying vaccination certificates, and as of may 2022, there were 1,101 criminal cases for selling fake certificates. 4 there were quite a few people willing to fake vaccination to get the coveted qr code, such as by using someone else's or an artificiallygenerated certificate or buy a certificate online. obviously, these tactics are the result of the low trust in vaccines. in this regard, the authors consider it worthwhile to study how distrust is built in the context of the biopolitical measures introduced by the authorities, which focus on restrictions and mass preventive vaccination. although today there is a certain pool of research dedicated to radical covid-dissidents and covid-dissidence in general, pandemic-related discourses produced by casual users of social networks are still insufficiently studied (kirzyuk 2021; lyu et al. 2022). the authors suggest that studying commentaries made by ordinary users of social networks allows us to determine and analyze existing discourses about biopolitical measures of the authorities. this determined the focus of the authors’ research interest that did not include specialized communities, for 3 as a result, almost a year and a half since the start of vaccination, russia is in 101st place in the world by vaccination rate gogov. 2024. “statistika vaktsinatsii ot covid-19 v mire” [global covid-19 vaccination statistics]. accessed may 28, 2024. https://gogov.ru/covid-v-stats/world. 4 see e.g. mkru. “‘vmesto ruki kolem v gubku’: koroli fal’shiivykh privivok raskryli skhemu” [instead of injecting the arm, we inject a sponge: fake vaccination kings reveal scheme]. june 27, 2021. accessed july 20, 2024. https://www.mk.ru/social/health/2021/06/27/vmesto-ruki-kolem-v-gubku-koroli-falshivykh-privivokraskryli-skhemu.html?ysclid=l8wxzz4xhv127779942; bashlykova, natal’ia. “ne ukol’no: v rossii vozbudili 1101 del o prodazhe covid-sertifikatov” [no jab: in russia, there have been 1101 criminal cases initiated for selling covid certificates]. izvestia, may 13, 2022. accessed july 20, 2024. https://iz.ru/1333543/nataliabashlykova/ne-ukolno-v-rossii-vozbudili-1101-delo-o-prodazhe-covidsertifikatov?ysclid=l8wy3nqq57494343586. https://www.mk.ru/social/health/2021/06/27/vmesto-ruki-kolem-v-gubku-koroli-falshivykh-privivok-raskryli-skhemu.html?ysclid=l8wxzz4xhv127779942 https://www.mk.ru/social/health/2021/06/27/vmesto-ruki-kolem-v-gubku-koroli-falshivykh-privivok-raskryli-skhemu.html?ysclid=l8wxzz4xhv127779942 https://iz.ru/1333543/natalia-bashlykova/ne-ukolno-v-rossii-vozbudili-1101-delo-o-prodazhe-covid-sertifikatov?ysclid=l8wy3nqq57494343586 https://iz.ru/1333543/natalia-bashlykova/ne-ukolno-v-rossii-vozbudili-1101-delo-o-prodazhe-covid-sertifikatov?ysclid=l8wy3nqq57494343586 https://iz.ru/1333543/natalia-bashlykova/ne-ukolno-v-rossii-vozbudili-1101-delo-o-prodazhe-covid-sertifikatov?ysclid=l8wy3nqq57494343586 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 instance, vaccination opponents or covid-dissidents (which have clearly delineated and structured boundaries) and instead turned to a popular public group, specializing in providing official information. the authors’ principal research interest is the issue of building mistrust in biopolitics among social network users during the pandemic. theoretical context “what is the point of continuing to live, if we can no longer do the things that give meaning to our lives?” (friedrich 2021). this was the question that the german philosopher jörg phil friedrich asked the global community, referring to the fact that the covid-19 pandemic has brought us back to the “bare life” concept of giorgio agamben. this concept implies biological existence being placed outside the law and exclusively within the context of regulations and control imposed by the state and authorities (agamben 2011). during the pandemic, agamben’s ideas have sparked a wave of criticism and prompted attempts to reinterpret the philosophical implications of global epidemics. agamben’s criticism of the general concept of the pandemic is based on three key changes that have occurred in people’s lives since the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic. the first change is technological. with the outbreak of the pandemic, people had fewer opportunities for communication, and all interaction and communication moved online, which disrupted familiar social relations. agamben illustrates this with online learning, which, in turn, creates difficulties in receiving a quality education. the second change is biomedical. it is primarily due to total medicalization. medicine starts to dominate society, and miraculous contexts of salvation are equated with those in religion. medicine becomes a kind of covid religion, lifestyle, a code of necessary rules and commandment-like regulations. the third change is military and mobilization discourse, in which individuality is erased and replaced by society’s endless struggle against the virus and constant mobilization of society’s resources (agamben 2020). this thesis of agamben is well illustrated by the speech of french president emmanuel macron, where he said: “we are at war” (macron 2020). the basic premise of these three changes identified by agamben is that anti-pandemic activities, as well as the introduction of prohibitions, restrictions, and the adoption of military and mobilization vocabulary, reduced life to mere existence and survival. individual freedom is cancelled and replaced by collective struggle. upon consideration of the particularities of the distribution of freedom and power and the demarcation of lines between the two during the pandemic, it is impossible to ignore the concept of biopolitics introduced by foucault as one of the means of regulating the life processes of people in the age of neoliberalism (foucault 2005, 252–277; foucault, 2010; lemke 2001). throughout the course of the covid-19 pandemic, there have been ongoing debates about the role of people in this process. among the disputed issues is the question of the degree to which it is possible to control and dispose of one’s freedom during a pandemic: bodily freedom of movement (dinacci 2021; wynn 2021). broadcast by the authorities and the media, the discourse of restrictions disrupts the familiar routine and changes attitudes toward health and medicine. in this case, the concept of biopolitics becomes a reference point and provides context for theorizing about the distribution of trust in the authorities and medical technologies, as well as for understanding the peculiarities of control in a pandemic. considering the peculiarities of the covid-19 pandemic’s spread and its various scenarios, the authors turn to social and political models identified by foucault, which he considered using the examples of epidemics that existed in europe. foucault distinguished two models common to various types of societies: the “model of exclusion of lepers” and the “model of inclusion of 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 the marginalized” (foucault 2005, 208). in the modern age, society has developed a mechanism to prevent infection, and if the control of leprosy required the exclusion of an infected person and their isolation, the control of a plague called for another disciplinary mechanism, more characteristic of epidemics in modern society that implies that the state policy of epidemic control concerns not only plague victims but the public in general (mamychev 2020; pele and riley 2021). foucault considered this disciplinary mechanism to be the cornerstone of biopolitics in modern societies. it implies that most modern societies do not invoke the model of exclusion of the infected from social life, but on the contrary, integrate the ‘deviants’ into common productivity, which is achieved by the creation of vaccines and medicines. this contributes to the strict labour and political management in the treatment of different epidemics that occur in modern societies (budzi 2022; manichkin 2021). in these circumstances, the role of the concept of biopolitics becomes quite evident. it does not highlight the benefits and drawbacks of ‘control over people’s bodies,’ nor does it praise different forms of power, but it does facilitate understanding of transitional historical states. foucault notes that power, the key element of biopolitics, is a network of constantly strained and active relations rather than a privilege of certain individuals (foucault 2002). thus, the concept of power, according to foucault, is a combination of strategic mechanisms that participate in this network. resistance to the network can happen at two levels. at the first level, there is direct resistance, namely opposition to power, aimed directly at blocking it. the second level involves a restructuring of the network itself, changes and transformations of existing strategic positions, as well as changes within disciplinary practices (giraldo díaz 2006; lemke 2001). the second level, as a rule, is implemented at the expense of resources outside the network. at this level, resistance depends on individual capabilities and the capabilities of specific groups of individuals. discourse is an important resource for the second level since it creates new forms of protest and serves as a kind of “fuel” to resistance to the accepted disciplinary practices of biopolitics (death 2010). it is important to understand that the very concept of biopolitics proposed by foucault is the idea of how government control can develop during a pandemic but not the ideal course of this development. biopolitical theorizing about the processes occurring during pandemics is particularly relevant today. what matters here is not so much the analysis of total restrictions and establishment of control over society as the study of how the pandemic creates new social orders and perspectives and changes communication and subjects of interactions. concepts of biopolitics by foucault and agamben differ in their views on the creation of control mechanisms within the framework of biopolitics. in particular, an important difference is the concept proposed by agamben of the sovereign as a key decision-making figure: “the sovereign is the one who makes a decision on a state of emergency” (agamben 2011, 53). thus, according to agamben, it is the sovereign that has a monopoly on decision-making and determines when it is necessary to introduce and remove restrictions. also, the sovereign in the concept of agamben has the right of flaw— an exclusive right that goes beyond the norm but, at the same time, remains in a relationship with it. therefore, going beyond the norm, according to agamben, is primarily a temporary measure when the rule does not cease to apply but is only temporarily limited or changed (agamben 2011, 235). consequently, the main claim of the sovereign is the right to the possibility of including in the legal field norms and time constraints that were previously outside of it. this is well illustrated by the actions of many governments, which, with the onset of the pandemic, restricted or completely stopped the work of many large enterprises and shopping centers, changed and reduced public transport routes and so on. as noted by agamben, it is precisely human life as such that the actions of all restrictive norms apply. in his opinion, individuals fully entrust their lives to the sovereign, which in turn 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 contributes to the creation of an “obedient body” and regulatory mechanisms, the purpose of which is to anticipate events and minimize risks and losses arising from events (agamben 2011). as foucault himself mentioned, relatively different concepts, disciplinary and regulatory, can be combined together, considering the example of a large city where police disciplinary control is supplemented by mechanisms for regulating life, such as sanitary control, insurance, and various forms of economic behaviour (foucault 2019). the pandemic also clearly illustrates the intersection of two ideas of biopolitics, when the general recommendations of doctors and epidemiologists are interpreted completely differently by the leadership of different countries and, as a result, are perceived differently by the residents of these countries. this is an excellent example of the intersection of concepts—disciplinary (agamben) and regulatory (effective), which was put forward by foucault in terms of combining harsh measures and their softer and more effective application in different regions. based on this, the authors consider biopolitics in the context of a pandemic—a synthesis of rigid and not always productive totalitarian governance through prohibitions and control, which was carried out with varying force in different regions of the world, as well as a soft model of productive governance proposed by foucault involving the use of various tools of soft control and coercion. in this study, in order to analyze various discourses, the authors use a synthesis of two concepts of biopolitics (foucault and agamben) and answer the question of how life is regulated through exceptions and prohibitions. the innovations that shape new discourses and create biopolitical precedents of the covid-19 pandemic include media politics, the broadcasting of restrictions, and various rallying cries. thus, the slogan that “it is fashionable to be safe” divides society into several factions: opponents and adherents of wearing masks as well as those who intensify the discussion concerning the need to wear masks (schubert 2022). researchers who criticize the use of the classical concept of biopolitics do not fully agree to attribute all existing restrictions to a state policy of total control. instead of a one-sided view on the issues and an attempt to explain all measures by total restrictions, there is a proposition to identify several areas of pressure, among which an important one is mediocracy, pressure on the media, and manipulation of the media through appropriate rhetoric (calnan 2020; jayasinghe 2021). based on the work of the media during the covid-19 pandemic, the ebola fever outbreak, and the avian flu epidemic, scientists have documented discourses that can traumatize the public, increasing anxiety and stress for most people (garfin, silver, and holman 2020). what it involves is, first, the heroification of doctors and medical personnel; second, the treatment of the virus as a military enemy and the comparison of self-isolation to military mobilization; third, the discourse of total control, which metathesizes existing restrictions and regulations. all this becomes the subject for discussion, a heated debate among social network users regarding resistance to the policies, media-created agenda of total restrictions, and a loss of individuality. as a result, the virus becomes an invisible enemy that can lurk in every person and has a “hideous” face created by media discourse and the atmosphere around it. what becomes interesting in this situation is not agamben’s consideration of total bans, restrictions, and a loss of anthropocentricity but an examination of the whole context. as latour pointed out, the establishment of pandemic orders takes place in the statistical state, when the individuality of citizens locked in their homes is transferred online, and the depressing cries of ambulance sirens can be heard in the streets, creating a particular fear and realization of inevitability (latour 2020). the italian philosopher lorenzini notes that following foucault’s ideas, we should not focus on the opposition between authorities and the individual during a pandemic and rather consider the danger of the biopower itself, not taking it at face value and criticizing it (lorenzini 2020). 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 the study of biopolitics in a pandemic, which undoubtedly has its origins in foucault’s ideas, is therefore possible through an analysis of media discourses. the covid-19 pandemic, unlike plague epidemics, has become largely a pandemic of media biopolitics, which creates relevant discourses regarding protection against the virus, enforcement of mask requirements, and the need for vaccination (žižek 2020). studies dedicated to the perception of the pandemic show that the key factor in the acceptance (or nonacceptance) of a pursued policy is trust. the majority of studies show a clear quantitative bias towards distrust of state media and the creation of various conspiracy theories, particularly the ideas about deliberate exaggeration of the scale of the pandemic and its consequences (freeman et al. 2020; uscinski et al. 2020). in this study, the authors consider trust as a state construct, focusing on foucault 's work security, territory, population: “the public is the population seen under the aspect of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of behaviour, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements; it is what one gets a hold on through education, campaigns, and convictions” (foucault 2007, 75). one should not treat trust or distrust as entirely exogenous to biopolitics and regulation. instead, they can be considered as key categories under which the population is analyzed, measured, and intervened (e.g. through opinion polls). the question then becomes, what mechanisms did authorities look to in order to govern distrust? the belief in the official concealment of the truth about the pandemic and the creation of a special positive image of vaccination is common among different groups of people, regardless of their financial state, social status, and age. perhaps distrust is the key message of most publications analyzing covid discourses in the media. nevertheless, the restrictive measures themselves as well as the policy of restrictions, are perceived in absolutely different ways. there are accepting and understanding discourses, and there are radical discourses of non-acceptance, specifically labelling the non-acceptance of any restrictive measures (enders et al. 2020; grimes 2021; romer et al. 2020). the inability to protect oneself from disinformation becomes the reason for the search for ideas about global conspiracies, mysticism, and distrust of current policies (goertzel 1994). similar conclusions can be found in social studies of these issues during the pandemic (bodner, welch, and brodie 2020). the loss of control over oneself and, consequently, the appearance of “agency panic” are important in the creation of conspiracy theories (melley 2020, 12). the lack of control over one’s freedom gives rise to many ideas about total surveillance, brainwashing, alien conspiracy, and the all-seeing eye of sauron (melley 2008; sarasin 2020); such ideas allow for the saving of one’s individual freedom. conspiracy theories generate discussions about the necessity to protect oneself from external control and the rejection of any expert control. moreover, within these discourses appears resistance to the activities of political institutions in general and calls for opposition to existing biopolitics. during the covid-19 pandemic, what mattered was the public participation and response as well as individual and collective concern for one’s freedom and safety, which may not only contradict the restrictive measures but, on the contrary, support and accept these measures. therefore, in the context of this analysis, it is important to consider how resistance (or nonresistance) to restrictive measures broadcast by the authorities is discursively framed. to this end, the authors analyzed the comments on the posts in the official public group of the authorities of a russian metropolitan city and demonstrated the specificity of the representations of resistance to the measures (or, on the other hand, trust in and acceptance of them), dictated by the biopolitics broadcast on the internet. the definition of discourse given by the authors in the article tends to the idea of foucault: “discourse is a set of statements about a particular area; it structures the way of speaking on a particular topic and about a particular object, process” (foucault 2006). according to foucault's 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 idea, discourse supports a certain “mode” of knowledge production and also makes possible certain ways of thinking about reality and excludes others. important for a researcher analyzing discourses in the context of foucault's idea is the analysis of the context in which different types of discourses are possible and the study of the classification rules within which discourses are organized, as well as the designation of the rules used to construct pictures of the world and various classification systems (foucault 1984). at the same time, as foucault noted, different discourses do not so much complement each other but, on the contrary, come into conflict with each other. for example, knowledge belonging to one type of discourse may exclude knowledge concerning the same ideas but belonging to other types of discourse. according to this point of view, discourse is a set of interlocking tools that bring together one of the systems of knowledge. this study examines different types of discourse regarding restrictions and controls during the covid-19 pandemic, analyzes various perceptions of the restrictions themselves, and the degree of trust and distrust regarding the imposed norms. thus, the discourse is defined by the authors as “various states of counteraction.” since the theoretical context in this article is the synthesis of the ideas of foucault and agamben, the authors present a continuum of different discourses, ranging from liberal and oriented to the understanding of biopolitics as a norm of effective management to disciplinary discourses and the perception of measures and restrictions as attempts at control. in this study, the synthesis of the ideas of agamben and foucault is tested empirically. the authors’ main objective is to show, based on the analysis of empirical material, possible combinations of different types of biopolitics, ranging from the rigid and disciplinary type of agamben to the more liberal and more managerial in the context of foucault's ideas. this article is a possible empirical illustration of such discourses and does not pretend to attempt a theoretical unification of these concepts since a theoretical unification of the two concepts of biopolitics would certainly require more empirically rich studies in different countries to illustrate the possibilities of combining the discourses. in this article, the authors focus on the fact that biopolitics is a synthesis of norms of effective management and regulatory norms with strict disciplinary rules. when analyzing discourse, this allows the authors to type in detail different combinations in various types of discourse: from populist and aimed at criticizing and rejecting/accepting existing norms and rules to liberal ones that are focused on finding the possibility of effectively managing the pandemic situation. research methodology the study focuses on how users in saint petersburg engaged with pandemic-related publications on the official vkontakte page of a local authority. the main function of this public page is to post news, events, and open discussions of various problems. vkontakte, being the most popular social network in russia, consequently has an audience consisting of different age groups and diverse professional backgrounds. this audience is particularly representative in authorities’ official public groups. in this case, the authors consider the social network as a platform for the presentation of citizens’ opinions and views on the measures related to the pandemic and vaccination. the authors chose saint petersburg because, firstly, it is a large, federally significant city with an active online audience and it has a wide representation of local public authorities on social networks. secondly, covid-19 infection and mortality rates in saint petersburg were one of the highest in the country. this explains the active level of involvement in the vkontakte group; at the time of the study, the total number of subscribers in the group was more than 400,000. moreover, communication in the public group is organized in a way that questions posed by users in the group often receive a response from the official 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 authorities (such authorities include the committee on healthcare, the committee on law and order, the committee on labour and employment, etc.). according to the aim of this research, the authors consider the media as an institution that creates blanket restrictions, which have been reinforced during the pandemic. in this case, it is important to understand the specifics of the media itself, which are considered and analyzed in the study. the authors do not consider the media as an independent institution, nor do they consider independent media in the article itself; on the contrary, in this article, the authors focus on state media, in particular, the official portal of the government on the social media network vkontakte. therefore, in this case, the media are a relay of the official position of the government with all restrictions and actions taken to create restrictions during the pandemic. in the case described on page 5, the authors are talking about the media in general, among which there are certainly independent media that oppose, condemn, and do not accept the general state policy and related restrictions. thus, the sources of media are quite diverse, but in this article, the authors focus on official media. the period of study was one year: january 1, 2021, to january 1, 2022. mass vaccination started in january 2021, and a year-long analysis allowed the authors to observe the establishment of pandemic discourses, including the important topic of vaccination. the authors selected all posts related to the pandemic in one way or another, e.g., various covid restrictions, covid19 vaccination, online learning, infection statistics, etc. the sample consisted of 62 posts with comments (approximately several thousand publications in total). all the selected publications were divided into different thematic blocks. altogether there were four blocks: vaccination (21 publications), pandemic restrictions (21 publications), medical services (12 publications), and covid-19 infection rate (eight publications). the first step of the analysis was implemented using the antconc program. presently, this program is one of the few free and available tools for researchers (kotiurova 2020). for the keywords, the authors selected words most frequently encountered in the comments. in order to determine this, the authors performed a frequency analysis of word usage. the words were selected from the top 300 most frequently used words in regard to all four thematic groups: “vaccination,” “vaccines,” “person,” “vaccine shots,” “antibodies,” “covid,” “committee,” “healthcare,” “diseases,” “vaccinated,” “restrictions,” “doctor,” “immunity,” “health,” “test,” “hope,” “is sick,” “pcr,” “sputnik,” “authorities,” “measures,” “right,” “masks,” “metro,” “clinic,” “data,” and “quantity.” the program also allowed us to analyze different contexts of the keywords’ usage. next, the authors performed a content analysis of text comments and focused on the wording used by commentators in their questions, reactions, and opinions about the various restrictions and vaccinations in the first place, as well as any other news related to the pandemic in one way or another. results of the study all pandemic-related publications provoked keen responses and detailed discussions among users. as the authors prioritized the concept of trust, in the analysis of comments and discourses, the authors focused on the wording of the users’ opinions/assessments/reactions to various actions of the authorities: restrictions, vaccination, work of medical institutions, and pandemic awareness. by analyzing the context in which the keywords were used, the authors identified several different discourses representing different levels of opposition within the issue of trust and distrust of state biopolitics. by distinguishing different types of discourse, the authors would like to note that statements within one type of discourse on any point of biopolitics did 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 not mean that the user would have the same opinion on the other point. in reality, perceptions and opinions are more complicated and often synthetic in their nature. thus, a person who supports vaccination can be opposed to the necessity of wearing masks or, for instance, a user who supports remote work and online learning can, at the same time, oppose mask requirements on public transport. therefore, the authors identified different types of discourse without claiming that every user can be unambiguously attributed as an adherent to one of them. opinions and attitudes toward various anti-covid measures may differ, and as a result, a user can develop and represent different types of discourse. in this analysis, the authors divided all existing kinds of discourse into emotional and, consequently, populist, as well as liberal and rational. the authors analyzed each of the kinds of discourse as a special set of knowledge and looked for features of two models of biopolitics according to the ideas of agamben and foucault. discourse of dissent this discourse is based on criticism, disagreement, and, sometimes, outright denial of biopolitical measures regarding covid-19. at the core of the discourse is a distrust of various degrees of expression directed at the authorities. communication within this discourse is active, both between the users and between the users and the authorities, although the principal recipient of distrust is usually the authorities. the analysis showed that the responses of the authorities often follow the same template, with arguments of the necessity of existing measures in the form of a reference to a specific regulation (a particular covid-19 decree). the authors could not find any other arguments in the authorities’ responses expressed in the categories of care/vulnerability/epidemiological necessity. below, the authors provide several examples. for instance, users criticized the measures related to the closure of food courts as illogical at a time when pools were open: [id*****]5 waterparks are closed while pools are open. weird; when will they open the fast food???( [response] good day! the restrictions imposed by decree 121 regarding food courts, food places and public catering facilities located in shopping malls will remain in force until january 31. the decision to lift or extend the restrictions will be made with regard to the current situation and rospotrebnadzor6 recommendations. the need for remote work for employees aged 65 and above was also a sensitive issue, and the argument in response was limited to a reference to another regulation. [id*****] and what about the compulsory remote work for citizens 65+? (don’t tell anyone what they should do…; they will somehow figure out what to do.; [response]: good day, yulia! this is the response of the committee on labor and employment of saint petersburg. in accordance with the decree of the government of saint petersburg of 13.03.2020 no. 121 the requirement for organizations (individual entrepreneurs) to ensure transfer of employees (executors under civil-law contracts) aged 65 and above, as well as employees (executors under civil-law contracts) with chronic diseases, to remote working mode will remain in force until january 31, 2022). much debated, the mask requirement was also heavily criticized by users. most common wordings regarding masks were negative: “masks don’t work,” “masks don’t protect,” and “masks are useless.” sometimes, dissent and denial were passive. thus, despite the criticism of 5 hereinafter in quotations the spelling and punctuation of the original comments are preserved. the [id*****] is an anonymized identifier of a member of the public who posted on social media. 6 rospotrebnadzor is the federal service for the oversight of consumer protection and welfare . 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 forced online learning, parents had to use this format as there was no choice. in some cases, denial concerns not just specific measures but the danger of the pandemic itself and, thereby, the need to confront it. opponents of vaccination actively pursued their arguments even on moderated platforms, offering to send links that, in their opinion, proved the harm of vaccination in direct messages and persuaded other users to listen to them: [id*****] i can forward it in a dm. here links are banned [to the sources with documents and other facts about side effects]. only what’s the point of proving to you all the same you will not believe until you live through it yourself...no doctor admits that a side effect is from the vaccine, but for example after vaccination a person cannot have children. and they will not blame it on that. although because of the vaccine a person lost their reproductive abilities, as well as got other diseases. this has happened and happens in different countries over the years. representatives of the dissent discourse generally recognized the disciplinary role of the authorities' control during the pandemic but, at the same time, expressed confidence that effective regulation of norms, which would be created not by one state but by people, would be relevant and would allow for a different look at restrictions. however, representatives of this discourse did not give concrete practical examples of such measures. it should also be noted that representatives of this discourse did not express any populist ideas regarding the creation and implementation of effective measures regarding restrictions and the healthcare of the public during the pandemic. in general, such discourse should be attributed to a group of populist discourses, which are aimed at broadcasting emotions of disagreement and indignation while simultaneously accepting and submitting to existing disciplinary norms imposed by biopolitics. adherents of these discourses believed in the possibility of the existence of some abstract liberal model of governance, however, they believed that in the current conditions in russia, the use of such a model is hardly possible. it should also be noted that not all users are ready to openly criticize or deny biopolitical measures. some broadcast doubts, provided arguments, referred to different sources and debated with each other. however, the model of communication with immediate agents of biopolitical measures (the authorities) is constructed in a way that leaves no room to overcome the distrust. thus, the discourse of dissent expresses distrust and unwillingness (where possible) to comply with the introduced measures. moreover, the range of arguments for dissent with the broadcast biopolitical norms is quite wide: from skepticism about the inconsistency of the existing measures (when some public places continued to be open, while others with the same number of people were closed) to references to conspiracy theories, which boil down to propagating the harms and dangers of vaccination. discourse of resistance this discourse is a continuation of the previous one; it also conveys disagreement with anti covid measures, but, at the same time, users express willingness to resist them with action (or inaction) where possible. considerable resentment among users was caused by compulsory vaccination, the introduction of qr codes, and restrictions on movement. arguments often follow the categories of rights. users use such phrases as violation of rights, right of choice, right of movement, right to demand, right to detain, right to introduce qr codes, and civil and constitutional rights. 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 resistance to vaccination is discursively expressed through the declaration of the intention not to vaccinate. these declarations vary in their emotional colouration, from neutral to emotional, containing contrasting comparisons: [id*****] wouldn’t take it for free, take it yourself!!! everything’s gone up in price and all of a sudden it’s free! even if you pay me i won’t do it. i don’t believe it. [id*****] i can give you thirty pieces of silver and my vaccine) but i will not get a shot of untested mixture! as is evident from the comments, users declared that they will not vaccinate and showed their distrust of the covid-19 vaccine as it is an “untested mixture” and it is free, which particularly generated distrust because users considered themselves to be guinea pigs who are being experimented on. resistance to mandatory qr codes was expressed in the declaration of the intention to assert one’s rights: [id*****] apparently someone cannot stomach the truth. so i’ll say it again. starting from august 2, people are suspended from work. even those who are on sick leave, those who have right to medical exemption, those who have had covid a month ago. you can delete my comments all you like. but you cannot intimidate all the people! we will stand up for our rights. here it is worth noting that there is little room for active and legal resistance to biopolitical measures. despite the fact that class action suits against mandatory qr codes have been filed in different regions of russia, there are no precedents of such lawsuits being successful (shmidt 2021). this allows us to suggest that in practice, the discourse of resistance will likely be manifested in the fact that users will invent evasion tactics: not wearing a mask, not vaccinating, trying to get a hold of a fake qr code, etc. this discourse is an emotionally saturated model of resistance and a rejection of rigid and structured norms and rules regarding restrictions in the covid-19 pandemic. the discourse of resistance is characterized by extreme emotionality, which is reflected in populist discussions, pronounced resistance to the policy being pursued and calls against total control aimed at a wide audience. representatives of the discourse view the pandemic situation as an exceptional opportunity to control everything and increase the level of discipline of individuals through vaccination tools. at the same time, there are ideas of liberalizing the norms of biopolitics among representatives of the resistance discourse, but they are connected with the search for ways to avoid compliance with the strict norms of biopolitics and thereby move to independent effective management of their lives during the pandemic. discourse of consent (trust) within this discourse, users demonstrate consent and overall commitment to the proposed anti covid measures in different areas, from restrictive measures to vaccination. the discourse implies support for vaccination, mask requirements, online learning, etc. there is no demand on the authorities, users are more likely to trust the expertise of the authorities in decisions concerning biopolitical matters, including supporting the moderation of anecdotal evidence and “fakes”: [id*****] you know, it just happens that recently i’ve read a good post just on this subject of fakes. here is a public group of the government and it has only verified information, and those who send videos or weird links, of course these are deleted so that other people will not give in to panic (there are many susceptible people). whether 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 to take a shot of vaccine or not is up to you only. here is a screenshot of the article, so it is better to check in several sources and preferably official. as a rule, this type of discourse occurs between users, as supporters of this discourse often not only demonstrated their support of the measures but also tried to persuade others with various arguments. arguments in favour of vaccinations were based on sharing one’s experience or that of relatives (“i/we are vaccinated”), as well as on external arguments about the need for herd immunity, etc.: [id*****] as you have already come to the conclusion that vaccination has not defeated the virus, there are not enough vaccinated people in the world yet to come to this conclusion. to achieve herd immunity, 90% of people need to have antibodies. some users engaged in spreading awareness by explaining how the vaccine affects an organism and often came into conflict with active representatives of the discourses of dissent and resistance as in the following example: [id*****] no one is asking you to vaccinate. why are you so worried about people getting it? everyone should mind their own business. people like you have campaigned against vaccines to the point that in the 21st century people die of measles, tuberculosis and smallpox. you morons![...] in this case, the user partially assumes the function of moderation, pointing out the unacceptability of anti-vaccination agitation and making emotional arguments regarding other diseases. concerning the issues of online learning, users who adhered to the discourse of consent broadcast perspectives about children infecting other family members and becoming transmitters of the disease and, therefore, advocating for the isolation of children. this discourse is associated with the full adoption of measures to combat the pandemic, which are created by the government and, therefore, representatives of this discourse believe in any data regarding the pandemic, including unverified data that children are the main carriers of the disease. this discourse is closer to the idea of biopolitics proposed by foucault and is largely determined by the lack of resistance to the norms imposed by the state. at the same time, representatives of this discourse also recognize the dominance of the agamben concept of biopolitics, which consists of the fact that the norms introduced during the pandemic were not always logical and structured restrictions. however, as most representatives of this discourse noted, there were no alternative opportunities for effective management policy. another characteristic feature of this discourse is trust in the information contained in the official group and, consequently, the acceptance of the norms that were broadcast in it, which tends to the ideas of agamben about the sovereign, total control over bodies and the correctness of the introduction of strict control norms. conclusions the new pandemic order, expressed in an unprecedented increase in state control over citizens and strict biopolitical measures, has generated a strong public response. in this article, the authors studied the different types of discourse present in these responses using the examples of users’ comments on the authorities’ pandemic publications on the social media network vkontakte. the analysis demonstrated that the users have developed three key discourses in response to the biopolitical measures pursued by the authorities during the pandemic. all the discourses identified in the article present a discursive (soft) form of resistance and acceptance of biopolitical measures during the pandemic. the most prominent were the discourses of 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 distrust (the authors identified these as discourses of dissent and resistance) linked to denial (complete or partial) of the introduced measures, doubts about the effectiveness of mask requirements, vaccination, restrictions in work hours of public places and work, and online learning. the particular feature of the discourse of resistance is the manifestation of the intent to flout biopolitical measures (the most common tactic is not to vaccinate). within these discourses of distrust, users communicate most with the authorities since, as a rule, these discussions involve the most troubling and urgent issues and doubts. at the same time, the communication between representatives of different state institutions and users followed the same pattern: in response to their questions, users received template references to some legislative decree regulating a specific restriction. this model of communication with immediate conductors of biopolitical measurers (the authorities) does not help overcome mistrust and only increases the distrust among the users. based on the selection of various types of discourse, the article draws an important conclusion that the pandemic situation has shown the need to rethink the biopolitics model. factors such as vaccination and various restrictions, including the accompanying indecisiveness of the authorities created by the pandemic, exemplify that there cannot be an ideal model of biopolitics associated with agamben’s total restrictions or the fucodian idea of effective governance and liberalization of biopolitics in general. thus, the situation of the pandemic and the peculiarities of biopolitics have shown that to consider the situation of the pandemic, it is important to combine the two discourses of biopolitics by foucault and agamben and consideration of various aspects of the pandemic within the framework of these discourses. in this article, the authors mainly consider discourses related to various types of acceptance and rejection of biopolitics. discourses can be emotionally populist and liberal-rational, and this clarifies the different understandings of total biopolitics as well as the primacy of the sovereign in the works of agamben’s and foucault's more liberalized biopolitics related to the consideration of the concept of biopolitics as measures of effective management and regulation. based on the discourses highlighted in this article, the authors indicate that the concept of biopolitics itself and its application in practice is impossible, drawing on the ideal models of foucault and agamben. using the example of a pandemic and the perception of control and regulation norms, a synthesis of two designated concepts is presented including elements of two existing approaches. the synthesis of two approaches to the analysis of biopolitics allowed the authors to present this concept as consisting of two zones: the zone of the sovereign right of power and the zone of the liberal art of management. as was discovered, the liberal art of management is causally connected with the functions of the naked life of agamben. the covid-19 pandemic, accompanied by various restrictions and calls for vaccination, demonstrated that sovereign exclusion, rejection, and maintenance of discipline through the creation of strict norms and restrictions (the concept of agamben) can be perceived absolutely differently by citizens and agents of biopolitics on the ground and not always coincide with the ideas of total discipline. however, at the same time, restrictions can be perceived as part of necessary and sometimes effective health-saving measures. thus, it is total control measures that become elements of effective management policy within the framework of foucault's model. at the same time, discussions feature the discourse of consent (trust), which implies arguments in favour of vaccination and, to a lesser extent, arguments in favour of mask requirements and online learning. meanwhile, trust is related to the acceptance of existing biopolitics and proposed treatments; the authors demonstrate this on a specific model of the government media, which, in its definition, acts as an institution of civil society. based on the russian case, the authors come to the conclusion about the penetration of biopolitics into civil society. 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 the study of discourses is important as it helps to identify and explain different practices of users. distrust of issues concerning bodily autonomy and health defines a person’s choices regarding mask requirements, vaccination, and the evasion of measures deemed ineffective or sometimes harmful. considering the low commitment to vaccination and virtually total disregard for mask requirements as well as outrage with qr codes, it can be assumed that the discursive dissent and resistance manifest themselves in practice. further continuation of the study involves comparing discourses in the community with offline practices of accepting or not accepting existing restrictions during the pandemic. 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 references agamben, giorgio. 2011. homo sacer. sovereign power and naked life. moscow: europe. ———. 2020. “the invention of an epidemic.” the european journal of psychoanalysis. https://www.asc.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/giorgioagamben-invention-of-an-epidemic.pdf. bashlykova, natal’ia. “ne ukol’no: v rossii vozbudili 1101 del o prodazhe covidsertifikatov” [no jab: in russia, there have been 1101 criminal cases initiated for selling covid certificates]. izvestia, may 13, 2022. accessed july 20, 2024. https://iz.ru/1333543/natalia-bashlykova/ne-ukolno-v-rossii-vozbudili-1101-delo-oprodazhe-covid-sertifikatov?ysclid=l8wy3nqq57494343586. bodner, john, welch, wendy, and ian brodie. 2020. covid-19 conspiracy theories: qаnon, 5g, the new world order and other viral ideas. jefferson, nc: mcfarland. budzi, joseph. 2022. “crisis of neoliberalism and the covid-19 pandemic: reclaiming the welfare state.” african journal of development studies (formerly affrika journal of politics, economics and society) 12 (1): 49–69. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 002073142211251. calnan, michael. 2020. “health policy and controlling covid-19 in england: sociological insights.” emerald open research v2: 1–16. https://doi.org/10.35241/ emeraldopenres.13726.1. death, carl. 2010. “counter-conducts: a foucauldian analytics of protest.” social movement studies 9 (3): 235–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2010.493655. dinacci, lucia. 2021. “new frontiers of corporeality. inhabiting the world during the pandemic.” giornale italiano di educazione alla salute, sport e didattica inclusiva 5 no.1 (january-march): 142–148. https://doi.org/10.32043/gsd.v5i1.315. enders, adam m., uscinski joseph e., klofstad casey, and justin stoler. 2020. “the different forms of covid-19 misinformation and their consequences.” the harvard kennedy school misinformation review 1 (8):1–21. https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-48. escardó, adela. 2021. “notes on a pandemic.” psychoanalytic psychology 38 (2): 103–104. https://doi.org/10.1037/pap0000350. foucault, michel. 1984. the order of discourse. in language and politics, edited by michael j. shapiro, 108–138. oxford: blackwell. ———. 2019. the history of sexuality: the will to knowledge vol. i. london: penguin books limited. ———. 2006. discourse and truth. translated by andrey korbut. minsk: propilei. ———. 2002. intellectuals and power: selected political articles, speeches and interviews. moscow: praxis. ———. 2005. we need to protect society. saint-petersburg: nauka. ———. 2007. security, territory, population: lectures at the collège de france, 1977-78. new york: springer. ———. 2010. the birth of biopolitics. saint-petersburg: nauka. https://iz.ru/1333543/natalia-bashlykova/ne-ukolno-v-rossii-vozbudili-1101-delo-o-prodazhe-covid-sertifikatov?ysclid=l8wy3nqq57494343586 https://iz.ru/1333543/natalia-bashlykova/ne-ukolno-v-rossii-vozbudili-1101-delo-o-prodazhe-covid-sertifikatov?ysclid=l8wy3nqq57494343586 https://doi.org/10.1177/00207314221125151 https://doi.org/10.1177/00207314221125151 https://doi.org/10.35241%2femeraldopenres.13726.1 https://doi.org/10.35241%2femeraldopenres.13726.1 https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2010.493655 https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/pap0000350 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 freeman, daniel, waite, felicity, rosebrock, laina, petit, ariane, causier, chiara, east, anna, jenner, lucy, teale, ashley-louise, carr, lydia, mulhall, sophie, bold, emily, and sinead, lambe. 2020. “coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, mistrust, and compliance with government guidelines in england.” psychological medicine 52 (2): 251–263. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0033291720001890. friedrich, jörg phil. 2021. “corona als generalprobe für die klimakrise” [corona as a dress rehearsal for the climate crisis]. die welt, january 11, 2021. accessed july 29, 2024. https://www.welt.de/kultur/plus223754002/dauerhafter-lockdown-corona-alsgeneralprobe-fuer-die-klimakrise.html. garfin, dana rose, silver, roxane cohen, and holman, e. alison. 2020. “the novel coronavirus (covid-2019) outbreak: amplification of public health consequences by media exposure.” health psychology 39 (5): 355–357. https://doi.org/ 10.1037/hea0000875. giraldo díaz, reinaldo. 2006. “poder y resistencia en michel foucault” [the power and resistance in michel foucault]. tabula rasa (4): 103–122. http://www.scielo.org.co/ pdf/tara/n4/n4a06.pdf. gogov. 2024. “statistika vaktsinatsii ot covid-19 v mire” [global covid-19 vaccination statistics]. accessed may 28, 2024. https://gogov.ru/covid-v-stats/world. grimes, david robert. 2016. “on the viability of conspiratorial beliefs.” plos one 11 (3): e0147905. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0151003. isupova, olga genrikhovna, rozhdestvenskaya, elena yurievna., and anna evgenievna lagereva. 2021. “kovidnyj resentiment v social'nykh setyakh: repertuar motivirovannykh suzhdenij” [covid resentment in social networks: a repertoire of motivated judgments]. monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya: ekonomicheskie i social'nye peremeny (5): 374–398. https://doi.org/10.14515/monitoring.2021.5.2004. jayasinghe, kelum, jayasinghe, tarosha, wijethilake, chaminda, and pawan adhikari. 2021. “bio-politics and calculative technologies in covid governance: reflections from england.” international journal of health policy and management 11 (10): 2189–2197. https://doi.org/10.34172/ijhpm.2021.134. kirzyuk, anna andreevna. 2021. “u menya net strakha": kovid-dissidenty v poiskakh agentnosti i pravdy” [“i have no fear”: covid-dissidents in search of agency and truth]. monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya: ekonomicheskie i social'nye peremeny 2: 484– 509. https://doi.org/10.14515/monitoring.2021.2.1776. kotiurova, irina avramovna. 2020. “corpus-based studies with antconc service at the university.” language and culture no. 52 (december): 36–50. https://doi.org/10.17223/19996195/52/3. latour, bruno. 2020. “what protective measures can you think of so we don’t go back to the pre-crisis production model.” [latour, bruno imaginer les gestes-barrières contre le retour à la production d’avant-crise] aoc, march 29, 2020. http://www.brunolatour.fr/sites/default/files/p-202-aoc-english.pdf. lavorgna, anita, and heather myles. 2022. “science denial and medical misinformation in pandemic times: a psycho-criminological analysis.” european journal of criminology 19 (6): 1574–1594. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370820988832. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0033291720001890 https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/hea0000875 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0151003 https://doi.org/10.14515/monitoring.2021.5.2004 https://doi.org/10.34172/ijhpm.2021.134 https://doi.org/10.14515/monitoring.2021.2.1776 http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/p-202-aoc-english.pdf http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/p-202-aoc-english.pdf https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370820988832 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 lemke, thomas. 2001. “‘the birth of bio-politics’: michel foucault’s lecture at the collège de france on neo-liberal governmentality.” economy and society 30 (2): 190–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140120042271. lorenzini, daniele. 2020. “anarcheology and the emergence of the alethurgic subject in foucault’s on the government of the living.” foucault studies lectures 3 (1): 53–70. https://doi.org/10.22439/fsl.vi0.6153. lyu, hanjia, wang, junda, wei, wu, duong, viet, zhang, xiyang, dye, timothy d., and jiebo luo. 2022. “social media study of public opinions on potential covid-19 vaccines: informing dissent, disparities, and dissemination.” intelligent medicine 2 (1): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.imed.2021.08.001. macron, emmanuel. 2020. “we’re at war.” politico, march 16, 2020.https://www.politico.eu/ article/emmanuel-macron-on-coronavirus-were-at-war/. mamychev, аlexander yurievich, and daria andreevna petrova. 2020. “biopoliticheskie i tsifrovye tendentsii razvitiya politiko-pravovykh praktik v period pandemii” [biopolitical and digital trends in the development of political and legal practices during the pandemic]. territoriia novykh vozmozhnostei. vestnik vladivostokskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 12 (4): 18–29. https://doi.org/10.24866/vvsu/20733984/2020-4/018-029. manichkin, nestor alexandrovich. 2021. “biopoliticheskie aspekty pandemii covid-19: obshchestvennaya diskussiya o svobode i transformatsiyakh social'noi zhizni” [biopolitical aspects of the covid-19 pandemic: public discussion about freedom and transformations of social life]. sibirskie istoricheskie issledovaniya 5: 374–398. https://doi.org/10.17223/2312461x/32/7. melley, timothy. 2000. empire of conspiracy: the culture of paranoia in postwar america. ithaca: cornell university press. ———. 2008. “brainwashed! conspiracy theory and ideology in the postwar united states.” new german critique (103): 145–164. https://doi.org/10.1215/0094033x2007-023. mkru. “‘vmesto ruki kolem v gubku’: koroli fal’shiivykh privivok raskryli skhemu” [instead of injecting the arm, we inject a sponge: fake vaccination kings reveal scheme]. june 27, 2021. accessed july 20, 2024. https://www.mk.ru/social/health/2021/06/27/vmestoruki-kolem-v-gubku-koroli-falshivykh-privivok-raskryliskhemu.html?ysclid=l8wxzz4xhv127779942. pele, antonio, and stephen riley. 2021. “for a right to health beyond biopolitics: the politics of pandemic and the ‘politics of life.’” law, culture and the humanities. https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872120978201. romer, daniel, and hall jamieson, kathleen. 2020. “conspiracy theories as barriers to controlling the spread of covid-19 in the us.” social science & medicine 263 (113356): 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113356. rouse, carolyn m. 2021. “necropolitics versus biopolitics: spatialization, white privilege, and visibility during a pandemic.” cultural anthropology 36 (3): 360-367. https://doi.org/10.14506/ca36.3.03. sarasin, philipp. 2020. “understanding the coronavirus pandemic with foucault?” foucault blog. https://michel-foucault.com/2020/05/02/philipp-sarasin-understanding-thecoronavirus-pandemic-with-foucault-2020/. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140120042271 https://doi.org/10.22439/fsl.vi0.6153 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.imed.2021.08.001 https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-on-coronavirus-were-at-war/ https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-on-coronavirus-were-at-war/ https://doi.org/10.1215/0094033x-2007-023 https://doi.org/10.1215/0094033x-2007-023 https://www.mk.ru/social/health/2021/06/27/vmesto-ruki-kolem-v-gubku-koroli-falshivykh-privivok-raskryli-skhemu.html?ysclid=l8wxzz4xhv127779942 https://www.mk.ru/social/health/2021/06/27/vmesto-ruki-kolem-v-gubku-koroli-falshivykh-privivok-raskryli-skhemu.html?ysclid=l8wxzz4xhv127779942 https://www.mk.ru/social/health/2021/06/27/vmesto-ruki-kolem-v-gubku-koroli-falshivykh-privivok-raskryli-skhemu.html?ysclid=l8wxzz4xhv127779942 https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872120978201 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113356 https://doi.org/10.14506/ca36.3.03 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 shmidt, anna. 2021. “shansov u zaiavitele net.” pochemu v regionakh khotiat sudit'sia iz-za qr-kodov. yuristy ob”iasnili, pochemu vse iski iz-za qr-kodov ostaviat bez udovletvoreniia [applicants have no chance. why regions want to sue over qr codes. lawyers explain why all lawsuits over qr codes will be dismissed]. gazeta.ru, november 17, 2021. accessed june 27, 2024. https://www.gazeta.ru/ social/2021/11/12/14197627.shtml. schubert, karsten. 2022. “biopolitics of covid-19: capitalist continuities and democratic openings.” interalia-a journal for queer studies 16: 97–107. https://doi.org/ 10.17613/e2xw-wj60. uscinski, joseph e., enders, adam, m., klofstad, casey a., seelig, michelle, funchion, john, everett, caleb, wuchty, stephan, premaratne, kamal, and manohar murthi. 2020. “why do people believe covid-19 conspiracy theories?” harvard kennedy school (hks) misinformation review 1 (3): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-015. van bavel, jay j., baicker, katherine, boggio, paulo s., capraro, valerio, cichocka, aleksandra, cikara, mina, crockett, molly j., crum, alia j., douglas, karen m., druckman, james n., drury, john, dube, oeindrila, ellemers, naomi, finkel, eli j., fowler, james h., gelfand, michele, han, shihui, haslam, s. alexander, jetten, jolanda, kitayama, shinobu, mobbs, dean, napper, lucy e., packer, dominic j., pennycook, gordon, peters, ellen, petty, richard e., rand, david g., reicher, stephen d., schnall, simone, shariff, azim, skitka, linda j., smith, sandra susan, sunstein, cass r., tabri, nassim, tucker, joshua a., van der linden, sander, van lange, paul, weeden, kim a., wohl, michael j. a., zaki, jamil, zion, sean r., and robb willer. 2020. “using social and behavioural science to support covid-19 pandemic response.” nature human behavior 4 (5): 460–471. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z. van mulukom, valerie, pummerer, lotte j., alper, sinan, bai, hui, čavojová, vladimira, farias, jessica, kay, cameron s., lazarevic, ljiljana b., lobato, emilio j.c., marinthe, gaёlle, banai, irena pavela, šrol, jakub, and iris žeželj. 2022. “antecedents and consequences of covid-19 conspiracy beliefs: a systematic review.” social science & medicine 301 (114912):1–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114912. wynn, lucinda l. 2021. “the pandemic imaginerie: infectious bodies and military-police theater in australia.” cultural anthropology 36 (3):350–359. https://doi.org/ 10.14506/ca36.3.02. zhuravlev, anatoly laktionovich, and timofey alexandrovich nestik. 2018. “social’nopsikhologicheskaya determinatsiya gotovnosti lichnosti k ispol’zovaniyu novykh tekhnologii” [“socio-psychological determination of a person's readiness to use new technologies]. psychological journal 39 (5): 5–14. https://doi.org/ 10.31857/s020595920000829-7. žižek, slavoj. 2020. pandemic!: covid-19 shakes the world. hoboken, nj: john wiley & sons. https://hcommons.org/deposits/item/hc:44313 https://hcommons.org/deposits/item/hc:44313 https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-015 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114912 https://doi.org/10.14506/ca36.3.02 https://doi.org/10.31857/s020595920000829-7 https://doi.org/10.31857/s020595920000829-7 82 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 64-82 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 a respite from geopolitical tension? russian media depictions of crossborder cooperation with the eu 2014-20211 joan debardeleben2, carleton university orcid id: 0000-0003-1978-2623 abstract this article explores the hypothesis that geopolitical tensions at the macro level (e.g., between the eu and russia) may be mirrored differently at the national and local levels. despite the general eu freeze in relations with russia after the crimean annexation of 2014 until march 2022, the eu continued to provide support for cross-border cooperation (cbc) programs at the local level between actors in russia and those eu states that border russia. the paper examines the manner in which cbc initiatives with the baltic states (estonia, latvia, lithuania, and poland) were treated in russian media in the period following the 2014 ukraine crisis until 2021. the purpose of the media analysis is to determine the extent to which the russian side made a linkage between local cooperation and geopolitical tensions, with polish media coverage providing a comparative reference point. the analysis finds that while geopolitical events can, under extreme circumstances, severely interfere with local dynamics that may promote cooperation in international relations, in the face of less severe geopolitical tension, local cross-border initiatives can proceed relatively undisturbed, particularly if they have a non-political nature. 1 this research was supported by a grant from the social sciences and humanities research council of canada. i am grateful to my research assistants, denis pinchuk and alexander sawicki, for their assistance in identifying and coding russian and polish articles, respectively. 2 joan debardeleben is chancellor's professor in the institute of european, russian, and eurasian studies at carleton university in ottawa, canada; she is also co-director of carleton's centre for european studies. 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 the 2014 russian annexation of crimea adversely affected almost all aspects of relations between the european union (eu) and russia. sanctions were implemented, renewed, and ramped up over time on the eu side. meanwhile, russia followed suit with counter-sanctions. most aspects of the relationship were effectively frozen despite some continuing high-level diplomatic contacts. particularly in the baltic states and poland, where historical legacies bred suspicion of russia, the sense of political vulnerability to russian hybrid warfare threats sharpened in the face of russian misinformation and the mobilization of irregular migration at eu borders by belarus and russia (government of the republic of poland 2021; radin 2017). however, in this highly politicized and tense geopolitical environment, some elements of cooperation remained. some of these were fostered by economic realities and interests. energy exports to many eu member states were maintained, and the development of the nordstream pipeline from russia to germany continued despite protests from poland and the baltic states. other areas of cooperation were continued on the eu side, in part to promote ‘people-to-people contacts’ in line with the long-standing hope of creating a human foundation for positive relations and to improve the lives of border residents. these areas of cooperation included various eu-funded academic programs that remained open to russian participants and the eu’s cross-border cooperation (cbc) programs with russia, with support from eu funding. the continuation of eu-russia cbc programs between 2014 and march 2022 presents fruitful ground to explore whether and how geopolitical tensions filter down to the local level, particularly in border regions, where historic linkages have not only created difficult historical legacies but also, in some cases, possibilities for sustained good relations. dembińska, mérand, and shtaltovna (2020) have put forth the notion of the “autonomy of the local,” positing that “cooperation and conflict are not tightly coupled with the geopolitical level but also shaped by local dynamics of symbolic boundary making” (492). indeed, the maintenance of the eu’s support for cbc initiatives until march 2022 made space for a possible “autonomy of the local” to assert itself, as hypothesized by dembińska, mérand, and shtaltovna (2020, 492); cbc cooperation could potentially both reflect and support more positive local definitions of cross-border identities and linkages, despite the presence of political tension at higher levels. it is the purpose of the article to make a contribution to assessing whether cbc programs in this period of high political tension reinforced or manifested the “autonomy of the local” (dembińska, mérand, and shtaltovna 2020). in assessing whether this is the case, it is important to understand how those programs and associated cooperation efforts were represented and discussed in the public sphere in these border regions. direct participants in cbc projects are limited in number, and while some cbc projects may offer benefits that affect a larger proportion of the population (e.g., in terms of the material outputs), any broader cultural or political influence would depend on the public having knowledge of the programs and an appreciation of their local significance. using the lens of media analysis, this article explores whether and how the geopolitical conflict between the eu and russia between 2014 and 2022 was reflected in public discourse about cbc in russia and whether these media depictions may have nurtured and reflected a distinct local understanding of symbolic boundaries, thus supporting the thesis of “the autonomy of the local.” the focus of the analysis in this article is on cbc projects between russia and the four eu member states bordering russia that joined the eu in 2004 (estonia, latvia, lithuania, and poland). all of these states had a history of conflict with russia, the three baltic states having been forcibly included in the ussr after world war ii and poland, while not part of the ussr, being subjugated within the soviet bloc; parts of poland had also been subject to previous russian control. political 82 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 discourse between these countries has been imbued with a strong overlay of geopolitical tension, augmented by particularly contentious events in the post-cold war period. examples include the bronze soldier controversy of 2007, when estonian authorities relocated a soviet war memorial from the centre of tallinn, and the crash of a polish plane carrying high-level polish officials near smolensk, russia, in 2010, for which many poles blamed russia. other points of controversy between russia, on the one hand, and estonia and latvia, on the other, involve the rights of russian speakers in the latter countries. the reception of belarusian dissidents by these countries, particularly by lithuania and poland, has added to the overlay of tension in those relationships. the analysis excludes another eu country, finland, which also shares an extensive border with russia, because the political dynamic between finland and russia has, until recently, been quite different, involving a more accommodative position taken by the finnish leadership, reflected in finland’s previous abstention from nato membership.3 after the annexation of crimea and up until march 2022, when russia attacked ukraine, the eu continued to support cbc initiatives with russia, including four bilateral programs under the european neighbourhood instrument cross-border cooperation (eni-cbc) program: latviarussia, estonia-russia, lithuania-russia, and poland-russia, as well as programs involving russia and finland.4 these cbc projects with russia operated for the 2014–2020 eu budgeting period alongside some multilateral cbc carry-over projects being completed from the 2007–2013 budgeting period. many projects from the 2014–2020 budget period were still in the implementation stage at the beginning of 2022, although some were completed, with the exception of final reporting. although the eu also had announced the funding of similar cbc programs for 2021–2027, and plans for the funding competitions were already underway, on march 4, 2022, in response to russia’s war on ukraine, the european commission suspended cbc cooperation programs with russia and belarus, indicating a sharp hardening of approach (european commission 2022). no further payments would be made to the russian side, nor were associated activities to be carried out in cooperation with russian participants; the 2021–2027 programs with russia were also suspended. participants on the eu side were permitted to continue their activities in their own countries with the funding available. at the same time, the commission expressed an intention to strengthen cross-border initiatives between eu member states (e.g., poland, hungary, romania, and slovakia) and ukraine. in november 2022, a regulation of the european parliament and council was published with provisions of operation following the program suspension (european parliament and council of the eu 2022). while geopolitical realities clearly affected 3 finland applied for nato membership on may 17, 2022, and was admitted on april 4, 2023 (ministry for foreign affairs of finland 2023). 4 programs involving russia and finland are not discussed in this article. see the following project websites for the programs in estonia, latvia, lithuania, and poland. some of these web pages have been renamed since 2022 or are now archived. the lithuanian program website does not display a name. it is possible that further changes will be made after the publication of this article or that program materials may be archived at a different location. the ministry (national authority) under which the program operated is indicated in parentheses after the web address where the ministry is not indicated as the contact for the website: joint technical secretariat, state shared service centre. “estonian eu external border programme.” accessed march 21, 2024. https://www.estoniarussia.eu/ (ministry of agriculture and regional development of estonia); joint technical secretariat. lithuanian program (untitled website). n.d. accessed march 21, 2024. https://eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/. (ministry of the interior of the republic of lithuania); ministry of environmental protection and regional development of latvia. “cross-border cooperation programme 2014-2020.” accessed march 21, 2024.https://latruscbc.eu; joint technical secretariat, centre of european projects. “poland-russia cross-border cooperation programme 2014–2020.” accessed march 21, 2024. https://www.plru.eu/en/news/ (ministry of development funds and regional policy of the republic of poland). https://eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/ https://latruscbc.eu/ https://www.plru.eu/en/news/ 83 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 cbc cooperation from march 2022, its impact in the earlier period, from 2014 to 2021, is the subject of this study. methodology using documentary materials and media analysis, this study assesses the link between high politics and the local level in relation to cross-border (cbc) programs involving the baltic states and poland, on the one hand, and russia, on the other, in the 2014–2021 period when the geopolitical rupture was high but not as cataclysmic as after february 2022. in the post-march 2022 period, geopolitical events, namely russia’s attack on ukraine and the eu’s reaction to it, definitively disrupted any “autonomy of the local.” however, this may be an exceptional event that does not negate the thesis overall. the 2014–2022 period may be more typical of periods of significant but not paradigm-shifting tension. examining russian media coverage of the cbc programs with the baltic states and poland allows us to assess the degree to which public discourse about them was imbued with geopolitical overtones. if so, this would suggest that geopolitical tensions are injected into the local sphere by political authorities, thus raising doubts about the “autonomy of the local” thesis. if such geopolitical themes are absent and there is an emphasis on local identity or symbolic synergies across the border, this would be consistent with the thesis. russian media articles for analysis were identified using the search utility of the post-soviet digital archive integrum world wide as well as the russian search engine yandex; the period examined is from january 2018, when some projects started, to august 2021. the period in the lead-up to the march 2022 invasion is excluded because already in this period a markedly different level of geopolitical confrontation was present. the search terms used to identify relevant articles included general terminology about the cbc program overall, as well as information about a selection of cbc projects. for these projects, the search included the use of the project name, five to seven keywords relating to each of the selected projects, and geographic terms related to the projects. articles where cbc or a particular project were mentioned only once with no elaboration or where the focus of the article was completely different were omitted from the analysis. for russian articles dealing with polish-russian cooperation, five particular projects were included in the project-specific search, along with a general search query for any project dealing with water quality issues, which was an important focus of several projects for the 2014–2020 period. for estonia, eleven projects were included in the search, for latvia, seven projects, and for lithuania, the two projects relating to governance issues mentioned below. the criteria for including projects in the search were the following. any of the projects that might, from their project description, be more likely to have a geopolitical reference point or political elements were included. very few projects met this criterion, most notably the two lithuanian-russian projects mentioned above. second, a range of different types of projects were included from the various thematic categories in estonia, latvia, and poland, including environmental and water quality themes, heritage and cultural themes, and encouragement of business entrepreneurship. ninetythree russian media articles extracted for analysis from the integrum database were considered relevant and were analyzed. this would not be the full universe of articles that mention cbc projects because the search was limited to specific parameters, as indicated above. 84 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 the selected articles were coded, following a check for cross-coder reliability between the author and a research assistant with native russian language skills. sources identified by the yandex search are not included in the coding exercise at this point as there was a significant overlap with the integrum search; also, many of these were very short news notices. however, some excerpts from these articles are discussed below. the coding scheme for the integrum articles included indicators of the way in which the project or program is described, whether and in what way the eu or eu member states are mentioned, information provided about funding sources, information about partners on both sides, mentions of benefits and achievements, and of obstacles or problems. as a point of comparison for the russian media articles, an analysis of a selection of articles from poland was undertaken.5 the search terms used included the locations of seven of the cbc projects that reflected a cross-section of sectors (i.e., those dealing with culture and history, environment and water quality, and transportation networks). the time frame for the search was january 2018– september 2021. the factiva database was used, supplemented by internet search tools of five local media sources in the warmińsko-mazurskie and pomeranian voivodeships. the factiva search yielded only 12 relevant articles. the search of local media was less successful due to the limitations of the media sources’ search engines, yielding just four additional articles. the search was conducted and articles were coded by a research assistant proficient in the polish language, using a similar coding scheme to that utilized for the russian articles. the polish selection is more limited than the russian one, as the factiva database does not provide as robust coverage for local media in poland as does the integrum database for russia. it is, therefore, unwarranted to conclude that the cbc program got more limited media coverage in poland than in russia. in poland, the program and its projects also received significant visibility through reports on the websites of local communes as well as through media outlets. the analysis of polish media is not intended to be inclusive but to provide a point of comparative reference for the russian media analysis. a confounding variable for this study was the covid-19 pandemic that began in march 2020. completely apart from the geopolitical situation, the pandemic undercut cross-border contacts. the analysis remained sensitive to this complicating factor in reading media treatments of cbc programs. background and theory the cbc programs examined in this article are the most recent in a rich array of regional cooperation efforts in the baltic sea region between russia and the eu. the previous eu-cbc program for the 2007–2013 eu budgeting period involved multi-state initiatives such as the estlat-rus program and the lithuania-poland-russia program; some projects from this period were still in the stage of completion when the 2014 ukraine crisis erupted. in addition, outside the purview of this article, the council of baltic sea states has brought russia together with several european countries for cooperation in a range of policy areas relevant to the baltic sea. for the 2014–2020 budget period, in addition to the cbc programs examined here, the eu supported other bilateral programs relating to karelia, kolarctic, and russia-southeast finland. russia earlier had participated in several euroregions in the baltic sea area (palmowski and federov 2020). federov (2020) mentions various agreements between kaliningrad oblast’ and various polish voivodeships from the early 1990s. when the new pomeranian and warmińsko-mazurskie voivodeships were 5 media from the three baltic states were not analyzed. 85 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 created in poland in 1999, new agreements were signed, which also involved training local government officials and civil society development. in the post-2014 period, the freezing of relations, along with sanctions and counter-sanctions, led to a decrease in trade between russia and the baltic states in 2015–16 but with some areas of recovery from 2017–18 (palmowski and federov 2020). in addition to cbc programs, a special eu local border traffic regime between poland and russia took effect in july 2012 and remained operative until 2016. this enabled visa-free travel between kaliningrad oblast’ (ko) in the russian federation and an extended border region in poland (żęgota 2021), a main benefit for ko residents being favourable shopping opportunities as well as tourism in poland (studzińska and dunaj 2023). this arrangement required a special derogation from the eu’s usual definition of border regions to permit all of ko to be included along with a larger than normal area within poland. some polish and russian leaders apparently considered this initiative as a possible test run for visa-free travel between russia and the schengen zone (debardeleben 2014). this special arrangement was suspended by the polish side in 2016 on the basis of security concerns in the lead-up to the nato summit to be held in warsaw and the international youth days held in krakow in july of that year (kotowicz 2021). this decision injected the geopolitical squarely into the local (sagan et al. 2018); russia, on its side, reciprocated by also suspending the program (tass 2016). examination of polish media coverage of the issue between 2018 and 2021 reveals that the continued suspension of the local border traffic regime by polish authorities was quite controversial, with many calls by local officials and opposition political figures to reinitiate the program (e.g., sandecki 2019; siegień 2019). complaints included reduced economic benefits to border regions in poland due to lower tourism income and less shopping by russian visitors (kurs 2021; siegień 2019), as well as more limited possibilities for cross-border contacts. along with covid travel restrictions introduced in 2020 and restrictions placed by poland and lithuania on travel from russia because of russia’s invasion of ukraine in 2022, opportunities for ko residents to travel to europe were sharply reduced (studzińska and dunaj 2023). a less ambitious local border traffic mechanism had been in place between latvia and russia (staalesen 2012); it remained operative until august 2, 2022, and was suspended by the latvian side when russia closed the latvian consulate in pskov that issued the permits (kommersant 2022; lebedeva 2022). according to sebentsov (2020), over time, the structure of cbc programs has been adapted, to a degree, to respond to russian concerns. on the eu side, these programs are funded within the framework of the european neighbourhood instrument (eni), which is primarily directed at supporting programs with countries involved in the eu’s european neighbourhood policy, which russia declined to join in 2004. russia was, however, given a special status for the eni (previously the enpi, european neighbourhood partnership instrument) to permit access to funding on a cofinancing basis for the cbc programs. various joint management bodies have been established within the various country programs, including a joint monitoring committee, a joint technical secretariat, and a joint project selection committee. these measures were directed at creating a sense of co-ownership. agreeing on the joint parameters of particular cross-border cooperation programs took some time for the 2014–2020 programming period, so most projects began implementation only in 2018, 2019, or even later. the role of russian co-financing increased during this period, reducing the asymmetrical nature of the programs. overall funding for cbc projects is modest, with the eu contributing about twice as much as the russian federation during the 2014–2020 period, according to project documents (see table 1). 86 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 contribution levels of eu member states and participating beneficiaries in the eu member states vary. of national government contributions, estonia provided the highest co-funding level. for two of the eu countries involved, namely lithuania and poland, the only russian partner region was neighbouring kaliningrad oblast’, an exclave of russia separated physically from it by belarus and lithuania. for latvia and estonia, three russian regions (pskov oblast’, leningrad oblast’, and the city of st. petersburg) were involved. in addition to standard projects, several large infrastructure projects received funding, with generally larger budgets or broader scope. table 1: funding for eu-russian cbc programs in the baltics6,7 estonia latvia lithuania poland overall funding (millions €) 34.2 24.8 27.2 62.3 eu maximum contribution 16.8 15.8 17.0 41.6 russian state contribution 8.4 7.9 8.5 20.7 eu member states or co financing contribution 9.0 (ms) 1.0 (ms) 1.7 (cofinancing) n/a russian regions involved st. petersburg leningrad oblast pskov oblast pskov oblast leningrad oblast st. petersburg kaliningrad oblast kaliningrad oblast most of the projects supported by the cbc were of a technical or non-political nature. project categorization differs between the various country programs, but they can be roughly summarized as indicated in table 2. while there was a category for local and regional good governance in the three baltic states, most of these projects had a sectoral focus and did not appear to address decision-making processes or public input. only two projects carried out in lithuania appeared to deal with these themes.8 6 information derived from the cbc websites: https://www.eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/; https://www.estoniarussia.eu/; https://www.plru.eu/; https://latruscbc.eu/. 7 information derived from the cbc websites: https://www.eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/; https://www.estoniarussia.eu/; https://www.plru.eu/; https://latruscbc.eu/. 8 these projects are as follows: “promotion of active dialogue between local authorities and civil societies as foundation of modern self-government in šilalė and slavsk.” n.d. accessed march 21, 2024. https://www.enicbc.eu/lr/en/projects/approved-projects-of-the-1-call-for-proposals/lt-ru-1-019/1242; and “electronic democracy prerequisite for effective dialogue between local authorities and citizens of pagėgiai and sovetsk.” n.d. accessed march 21, 2024. https://www.eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/projects/approved-projects-of-the-2-call-for-proposals/lt-ru-2058/1308. https://www.eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/ https://www.estoniarussia.eu/ https://www.plru.eu/ https://latruscbc.eu/ https://www.eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/ https://www.estoniarussia.eu/ https://www.plru.eu/ https://latruscbc.eu/ https://www.eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/projects/approved-projects-of-the-1-call-for-proposals/lt-ru-1-019/1242 https://www.eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/projects/approved-projects-of-the-1-call-for-proposals/lt-ru-1-019/1242 https://www.eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/projects/approved-projects-of-the-2-call-for-proposals/lt-ru-2-058/1308 https://www.eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/projects/approved-projects-of-the-2-call-for-proposals/lt-ru-2-058/1308 87 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 table 2: themes of cbc projects with four baltic states9 estonia latvia lithuania poland large infrastructure (2)* (4)* 4** 3** business; small-medium enterprise (smep) development 13 10 environment; climate change; associated public health 12 10 border management/security; accessible regions; mobility 2 4 local culture; historical heritage; associated tourism 13 14 social inclusion; community-led initiative; health 7 local and regional good governance 10 9 4 total 25 21 24+4 28+3 *included in other categories as well ** not included in other categories except total as + value the “autonomy of the local” and existing research the “autonomy of the local” thesis put forth by dembińska, mérand, and shtaltovna (2020, 477) is based on the idea that “the degree of conflict and cooperation between russia and europe is partly autonomous from the political-strategic level because it also depends on the symbolic boundaries constructed at the local level.” the authors hypothesized that for countries with a ‘solid’ symbolic boundary, such as estonia, “cooperation around issues of common interest is difficult but open conflict is not frequent” (478). in contrast, they suggested that kaliningrad has a “fluid boundary,” where “[c]ooperation and conflict coexist” (484). cooperation has focused on mobility issues, and the region was, at various points in time, given the status of a free economic zone, which made opportunities for cross-border interaction of interest to both poles and russians in kaliningrad. according to this argument, the interaction at the local level is viewed as being significantly impacted by the identity and interest configurations of local actors. in assessing this argument, it is, however, important to consider that these identity and interest configurations may be strongly affected, on both sides of the border, by the larger political and historical context in which they are formed and operate, thus making “autonomy of the local” responsive to this context. the eu and russia have very different types of decision-making structures and processes, providing widely varying political and social contexts in which local populations and authorities form their understandings and act on them. this is important in two regards that are relevant to this analysis. first, the eu is a multi-level entity, where decisionmaking is anything but centralized, particularly in the foreign policy sphere. member states retain significant autonomy in the foreign policy sphere, although some relevant aspects are subject to supranational rule, such as schengen rules regarding external border controls and requirements for schengen visas. within particular member states, there may also be differing levels of 9 table produced by the author from materials on the websites of the cbc programs. see footnote 6. 88 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 decentralization and varying types of identity formation among specific populations or regions. none of the eu states examined in this article are, however, federal systems. despite its formally federal status, russia, on the other hand, is a centralized state where all authority over foreign policy decisions rests with the central authorities in moscow. regional and local authorities have minimal autonomy in making decisions about interactions with foreign actors. until the most recent crisis point with the west, they were, at times, granted authority to interact with external actors at the same level of governance, i.e., regional actors with regional authorities in another country but not with national-level actors in neighbouring countries. the second difference relates to the geopolitical identity of the eu and russia. decision-makers in the kremlin unabashedly make decisions based on geopolitical considerations and with geopolitical goals in mind, based on their interpretation of identity goals. while identity was contested in russia, at least until the outbreak of the 2022 war (e.g., with some intellectuals or public figures favouring a more european identity focus while others emphasized eurasianism), such differences are generally not reflected in kremlin policy or in predominant public discourse. in contrast, identity politics are openly and publicly contested in the eu and its member states. unlike in russia, eu authorities have, until recently, eschewed geopolitical rationales or motivations for foreign policy decisions, appealing more often to normative or, sometimes, to economic or defensive security considerations. this author has dubbed the eu “an accidental geopolitical actor,” i.e., one that has resisted but gradually been compelled to acknowledge the unintended geopolitical consequences of its actions (debardeleben 2018). this was most notably evidenced in the eruption of the 2014 ukraine crisis when the eu’s offer of association agreements and deep free trade agreements for eastern partnership countries, including ukraine, inadvertently triggered a political crisis in kyiv that ultimately led to russia’s annexation of crimea. during the term of ursula von der leyen, the european commission has, however, more directly acknowledged the importance of geopolitical considerations, alongside normative ones, also reflected in the notion of “principled pragmatism,” which was included in an important eu global strategy document put out in 2016. these two differences between the eu and russia suggest that the dynamic of any ‘local autonomy’ would be quite different on the two sides of the border. the eu explicitly promotes local-level cross-border cooperation, allowing that it should be driven by local stakeholders through a competitive application process, operating within a clearly developed policy framework governed by transparent rules established at the eu level. local actors or member state governments are also expected to make financial contributions to these cbc projects. the eu’s cbc program can thus empower local and regional actors to use the program to realize their own objectives, suggesting that local constructions of identity (and interest) can, at least theoretically, act as important movers in shaping the directions of particular projects. even the overall programmatic project priorities are established by national-level actors in consultation with their russian counterparts. the russian side, on the other hand, is more reactive in its relationship to this eu program framework; it is mainly a recipient rather than an author of the policy. while in some cases, local russian actors have played an important role in initiating or developing particular cbc project proposals, they have done so within a clearly laid out process initiated by the eu. the cross-border programs involving the baltic states and poland all operate within the framework of a common eu-cbc policy. the premise for the eu’s continuing cbc cooperation after 2014 was the possibility of positively impacting the lives of people on both sides of the border as well 89 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 as promoting people-to-people understanding between the eu and russia, potentially shielding local interaction from geopolitical impacts. the projects were also expected to have economic impacts, particularly in addressing the specific economic, environmental, and social problems of marginalized border regions, some of which had previously, in the soviet period, been significant transport conduits (e.g., between st. petersburg and tallinn). experts also identify other broader goals for cbc programs, e.g., the extension of the eu’s geopolitical influence and image-building (deiana, komarova, and mccall 2019) and its “conflict transformational potential” (mccall 2014, 531). găvăneci (2016) develops a similar idea in arguing that “civil society cooperation between estonia and russia avoids the discursive trap ‘of european values’, which conjures up the notion of a geopolitical and civilizational divide” (477). for russia, the continuation of the cbc program after 2014 was accepted according to a different logic, as the russian leadership generally was pushing for an un-freezing of relations with the eu in the post-2014 period. the continuation of the cbc programs could be seen as an indicator that the sanctions implemented by the eu were accompanied by spheres of ‘normal’ relations. local actors in russia might also see these projects as opportunities to promote normalization in their relations with cross-border partners or as providing needed financial support to address pressing local problems, particularly as sanctions imposed economic hardship. several studies of cbc programs and other forms of cross-border cooperation have been carried out by russian, baltic, and western scholars in the period following the events in ukraine in 2014.10 authors disagree about the impact of geopolitical factors on the operation of cbc projects in this time period. makkonen et al. (2018) noted declines in cross-border traffic due to the weakening of the russian ruble as an impact of the geopolitical situation, an important consideration for projects focusing on tourism. palmowski and federov (2009, 6) concluded that “the intensity of cross-border ties has decreased in recent years amid tensions between russia and the west.” bobylev et al. (2020) also cited the negative effects of the 2014 ukraine crisis on cbc, namely remilitarization of the baltic sea, investment risks for western companies involved, complications created for financial institutions affecting cross-border transactions, and a rise in mutual mistrust. studzińska, sivkoz, and domaniewski (2018) observed the economic effects of the crisis. the economic motivations for cross-border shopping may have been affected by the sanctions, as some goods were no longer available in ko; smuggling also occurred. other authors noted a decline in cross-border shopping from russia to eastern finland after 2014 (prokkola 2019). another less expected effect in lappeenranta, finland (located near the transit route from st. petersburg to helsinki) was a greater appreciation of russian tourism in finland (prokkola 2019). zabielska (2020) concluded from interviews with inhabitants of kaliningrad oblast’ that the suspension of the local border traffic regime between kaliningrad oblast’ and poland in 2016 led to a reduction in cross-border cooperation; this was related both to polish-russian tensions and eu-russian tensions. however, bojarowicz (2021) indicated continuing cooperation on the regional level despite the suspension of the local traffic regime, particularly involving poland’s warmińsko-mazurskie voivodeship. cooperation apparently also continued with pomerania (maciejewska-mieszklowka 2021). this cooperation was facilitated by the continuation of the eucbc programs in the 2007–13 period (with many projects not completed by february 2014) and 2014–2020 (maciejewska-mieszklowka 2021). 10 see also debardeleben and nechiporuk 2019. 90 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 koch (2018, 606) also saw past relationships as providing a basis of continuity in finnish-russian cbc cooperation after 2014: “even if finnish-russian eni cbc has been threatened by sanctions after the ukrainian crisis, cooperation activities continue almost unfettered.” koch (2019) further noted that the finnish government successfully pushed back against proposals to include cbc eni projects on the sanctions list after the crimean annexation; the finnish ministries of foreign affairs and of economics affairs and employment “acted as mediators between eni cbc programmes and the eu by representing national interests and defending them in brussels” (126). this illustrates the manner in which both the eu-russian geopolitical context and internal eu political debate have influenced the shape and fate of cbc programs during times of tension. some russian authors have also examined the role of cbc in russian regional and foreign policy. kuznetsov and kuznetsova (2019, 65) noted that the 2020 strategy for spatial development of the russian federation “mentioned border territories in sections on foreign economic ties rather than in those on regional development.” they also drew attention to the special attention devoted to kaliningrad oblast’ by federal policy, presumably due to its exclave status, the goal being “to ensure standards of living and economic growth rates comparable to (or higher than) those in the neighbouring eu countries” (68). relying on interview data from 2014 and 2015, sebentsov (2020) cited several obstacles for the russian side in their cbc participation, including crossborder visa difficulties; the requirement for special russian visas for foreign visitors within the 5 km zone near russia’s external border; and differences in political structures and competences at various levels on the two sides of the border. he also mentioned obstacles identified by “foreign participants,” namely, the centralization of power in russia, which restricts the independence of local actors, a weak civil society, and limited internal funding. nonetheless, sebentsov (2020) also observed some positive developments, in that the russian side was able to take more initiative in developing projects in the 2007–2013 funding period, also creating a sense of joint effort (bobylev et al. 2020). experience gained by potential russian participants, increased understanding of eu rules, and support from russian regional authorities helped to make the program less ‘asymmetrical.’ at the same time, sebenstov (2020) noted that “[a]ccording to interviews with participants of programs and representatives from regional authorities, opportunities for further cbc are closely related to the federal border policy’s direction” (82). bobylev et al. (2020) concluded that “cbc experiences show that the main hindrances came from political factors rather than from the technical inexperience of the participants” (856). eu-based authors have also cited obstacles to cbc which have political aspects. găvăneci (2016), for example, noted delays in the russian federation’s signing of various agreements, as well as visa issues. in addition, civil society organizations on the two sides of the border may have different priorities (găvăneci (2016). on the other hand, previous contact between partners can be helpful. găvăneci’s (2016) research supports sebenstov’s idea of asymmetry, in that russian participants often have to rely on the knowledge of their estonian partners and may feel that their interests are not adequately taken into account. on the other hand, estonian civil society actors also sometimes lack the expertise or resources to fulfill complex eu requirements. drawing on interviews with police officers involved in cross-border cooperation in crime prevention in finland and russia, heusala and koistinen (2018, 366) also cited obstacles to cooperation due to the fact that “the motivation and ability of russian law-enforcement organizations is often paralysed by central government policies, which weaken organizational learning.” based on interviews in finland, koch (2018) concluded that the development of a real partnership mentality is difficult in practice and that distrust on the russian side may be an obstacle, whereas finnish subnational actors have “a high level of institutional trust…towards finnish national and eu institutions” 91 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 (606). on the other hand, cbc projects are not only obstructed by low levels of trust, but they can also help to build trust or foster the creation of a cross-border regional identity, particularly important for kaliningrad oblast’ (żukowski, 2021). findings and discussion while russian national media generally do not make cbc projects a specific focus of attention, regional coverage is extensive. this indicates that the cbc programs and their continuation after 2014 were not a high-profile item at the russian federal level, but they were considered quite important in some cases from a regional or local perspective. overall, the analysis reveals that russian media coverage of these projects and of the cbc program on a regional or local level suggests insulation of the cbc programs from the larger geopolitical context during the study period (2018-2021). there was a sharp disjunction between the general rupture in relations and the depiction of day-to-day cbc activities on the ground; even expected problems of normal project operation were rarely mentioned. only 6.5 percent of the examined articles mentioned any problems, and these had to do with routine issues such as funding being inadequate or slow (33 percent), border/visa problems (17 percent), partner problems (17 percent), or impacts of the pandemic (33 percent). while these percentages look impressive, they are a portion of only the 6.5 percent of articles that mention problems; thus, only two of the 93 articles mention funding issues or the pandemic as a problem (e.g., zamaraeva 2020), and only one article each mentions border/visa issues or partner problems. those that do mention a geopolitical context do so in a limited way. a clear example is an article about the latvia-russia project “from hobby to business,” which acknowledges that the largest part of the funding comes from the european union. the article (zinov’ev 2018) quotes a comment by a local official: “it is amazing, but at the same time pleasant, to realize that under current conditions, with total sanctions against russia from all sides, including the european union, we, a small russian rural settlement, managed to receive a grant, approval for carrying out a project involving crossborder cooperation with latvia….” the official observed that the settlement had been involved in a previous project that was completed. another article relating to a clean water project between estonia and russia refers to the difficult geopolitical situation, but the interviewee, who is a regional expert in water management, reassured the readership when the interviewer asked: “regarding cooperation with foreign partners, and considering the not so simple situation in external political relations, how reliable are they? how strong are the agreements? wouldn’t some kind of force-majeure arise?” (pskovskaia lenta novostei 2019). the expert responded: “i am sure it won’t. because we have good relations with all of our foreign business partners. this is true for the program ‘russia-latvia’ and ‘russiaestonia’. these are business-like and completely friendly relations, and i am sure that we will fulfill all obligations in our joint projects” (pskovskaia lenta novostei 2019). in explaining the motivation of the western partners, he explains that benefits are accorded to both sides. only 19.4 percent of the articles identified the eu explicitly as a funding source, with another 28 percent mentioning euros but not the eu as the source. thirty-four percent of the articles mentioned the eu specifically in some context, but most did not. many of these references were disclaimers, probably understood to be required by the eu, indicating that the content of the publication is the responsibility of the author, not the eu or russian federation. where the eu is mentioned, it is generally with a positive tone, suggesting a normality of relations: “a good 92 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 partnership relationship has developed with the narva city government and with the narva museum. this is a pledge (zalog) for the joint activities in international projects with the european union, aimed at the development of tourist infrastructure and museumification” (trofimov 2018). a short article in komsomol’skaia pravda (alekseev 2018) paraphrased the eu ambassador to russia, who was in kaliningrad oblast’ for the opening of the european film festival, as saying that the region is one of several “where cooperation between russia and the eu functions as before.” the article goes on to quote the ambassador: “it is pleasant to come here, both due to the geographical location, but also your policies– very open to tourism, business…cross-border cooperation of kaliningrad oblast’ with its neighbours is an excellent example of positive interaction, which is being realized on many levels and is useful both for the regions of russia as well as for its neighbours. i support this work.” other articles are less explicit but imply a tone of good relations or cooperation. one article suggests a common cultural context for russia and europe: “ivangorod is unique. it is a particular business card for russia seen from the side of the european union. in europe there is no other place where in one zone two fortresses are visible, located on the territory of different states” (kingisepp.ru 2020). the importance of cross-border projects in their practical implementation is evidenced by the attention given to them by high regional officials. the acting governor of pskov oblast’ and the presidential plenipotentiary envoy to the central federal district were shown drawing attention to the cross-border cooperation framework in an article in the pechorskii district (pskovskaia pravda 2018): “in pechorskii district, the presidential envoy, alexandr beglov, could not overlook another important question: cross-border cooperation in municipalities bordering the european union. now applications are being approved by the european commission and we consider that financing will begin at the end of 2018, said the head of the region.” the article goes on to cite the importance of cooperation with estonia and latvia for rural entrepreneurship, the fishing industry infrastructure, water purification, and improvement of checkpoints on the russian-latvia border. in another article (iluki.ru 2018) about the same visit of the presidential envoy, mention is made of the larger geopolitical context in which the cross-border cooperation is undertaken, particularly the nato membership of estonia and latvia and security questions raised by pskov’s border location. the official reportedly indicated that the border location produced “both constraining, as well as positive factors”: “in the first order is the reality of questions of border security and sociopolitical stability” and “in the opinion of the leader of the region, in recent years sanctions and contra-sanctions have rather seriously complicated trade relations with the baltic area” (iluki.ru 2018). this situation is seen as reinforcing the importance of cross-border cooperation, with the acting governor of the oblast’ quoted as saying, “[o]n the whole, the region actively is participating in international relations, and we plan to expand that work” (iluki.ru 2018). in many cases, reference is made to bilateral cooperation with a particular eu member state without reference to the eu, implying a normalization of state-to-state relations and skirting the fact that cbc programs are heavily financed from brussels. for example, in a typical article, a pskov paper depicts the cooperation in the following way: “in the meantime, there is good news for those who grow crops on their garden plots. under the program of cross-border cooperation between russia and estonia, a horticultural products processing center is being built in logozovichi near pskov” (pskovskaia pravda 2020). another example highlights the breadth of russian-polish cooperation, quoting a polish official: 93 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 kaliningrad oblast and warminsko-mazursko voivodeship in poland intend to continue cooperation in economic, social, cultural, and touristic spheres. the general consul of the republic of poland in kaliningrad, marcin nosal noted that on the level of local government regional cooperation has not stopped, evidenced by hundreds of implemented cross-border projects. in the words of the general consul, a new stage in the program of cross-border cooperation is beginning for 2014-2020, for which 60 million euros have been allocated. (ria novosti 2016) the reference to funding in euros is quite common, without specifying the source as the european union (e.g., ivanov 2021). several of the articles are quite detailed in their technical description of the projects as well as the benefits. other articles involve only very brief mention of the project details. in some cases, co-funding by the russian side is specifically mentioned. project benefits are emphasized in most articles but with a clear local focus. in 65 percent of articles, these are only benefits on the russian side, with 18 percent mentioning benefits on both sides and 16 percent implying mutual benefits. people-to-people understanding was rarely mentioned (only in two articles), even though presumably, regardless of the thematic focus, this could be a project effect. most benefits mentioned were focused on the particular sectoral outputs of the cooperation. most often, references were made to national, regional, and local authorities rather than the eu. often, only the local partner is identified (e.g., “partners in the project are: the department of development and economics of the city of narva on the estonian side and the administration of the municipality ‘city ivangorod of the kingisepp municipal district of leningrad oblast’ on the russian side”) (trofimov 2019). only 18 percent of the articles mentioned eu member state funding. in contrast, 39 percent of the articles mentioned russian funding and the russian government (i.e., central government). official russian government approval is sometimes mentioned (e.g., gorod-kingisepp.ru 2018), but usually, the focus is on local authorities and actors. examination of polish media coverage in the period through december 2021 reveals similar patterns to those found in russian media. the coverage of the projects is overall very positive, emphasizing benefits to the regions of warmińsko-mazurskie and pomerania. most articles focus on particular activities of individual cbc projects, providing considerable details. particular coverage was given to the “two ships” project, which involved the renovation of the sołdek national maritime museum in gdańsk matched with the renovation of the russian ship ‘vityaz’ in kaliningrad oblast’, drawing attention to a common maritime heritage (rzeczpospolita 2018). several articles mention the marginal economic position of the warmińsko-mazurskie region in particular, including the outflow of population, poverty and social exclusion, and inadequate infrastructure. local officials, impatient with delays in the issuance of the call for proposals in 2017, emphasized the critical importance of the program as a source of funding for important development projects (rzeczpospolita 2018). benefits to the russian side are more rarely mentioned, nor are activities there covered in any detail. similar to the russian media, references to the larger geopolitical situation are rare and are only made in a couple of articles. one states, “[w]e can only be glad that something is going well in poland despite the pandemic and despite bad political relations with russia” (rzeczpospolita 2020). the other makes a general reference to the cooling of economic contacts between the warmia and mazury regions of poland and russia after poland’s eu accession, “as political relations between poland and russia cooled,” so not specific to the post-2014 period (rzeczpospolita 2018). problems in interactions with russian partners are also not mentioned. in contrast to the russian media coverage, however, all but four 94 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 of the articles explicitly mention eu funding, while three of the four other articles reference the poland-russia cross-border cooperation programme (without mentioning the eu). although more than half of the articles mention specific russian partners, only one mentions russian financial contributions. this may be, however, because russian funding would go specifically to the russian side, whereas eu funding was designated to support both polish and russian project activities. conclusion as occurred in march 2022 following russia’s invasion of ukraine, geopolitical events can, under extreme circumstances, severely interfere with local dynamics that may promote cooperation in international relations. this can occur through the actions and decisions of the eu that suspend or alter the conditions of such programs; it can also occur due to policies at the national level or even in response to public pressure. in the face of less severe geopolitical tension, however, local cross-border initiatives can proceed relatively undisturbed, particularly if they have a non-political nature. eu, national, and local authorities may view such initiatives as having some functional elements. as hataley and leuprecht suggest (2018), the functions of borders may be different for various state and non-state stakeholders; likewise, the functional importance of cbc will vary for different actors. for eu officials, the functional elements of cbc include localized, practical benefits for the population of an eu member state and associated awareness of eu support for them, thus bolstering the legitimacy of the eu. another potential benefit is that cbc may contribute to long-term objectives of social attitudinal change in the partner country. for a particular member state and localities within it, the benefits are more likely economic or for maintenance of relative regional stability and predictability. for some project beneficiaries on both sides of the border, cbc projects provide funds for infrastructure development or other activities that would not be available elsewhere. for russian national authorities, the functional aspects are more closely tied to geopolitical interests, supporting a discourse of normalization. the analysis of russian media coverage of cbc projects is consistent with the “autonomy of the local” thesis in a general sense, however, with a different nuance than suggested by dembińska, mérand, and shtaltovna (2020). geopolitical considerations are only rarely mentioned in russian media coverage of cbc programs or its projects, and when they are mentioned, they are placed in contrast to local cooperation. the same pattern is present in polish media coverage. this is all consistent with the “autonomy of the local” thesis. however, the largely descriptive nature of media coverage of the projects and programs does not suggest the creation of a discursive space where identity is mediated or constructed. for the most part, cooperation is not framed in identity terms or in terms of impacts on identity but rather in relation to very pragmatic project outputs that are of benefit to specific russian population groups. information about project outputs is communicated to a broader local and regional public through a detailed presentation of project benefits, with an emphasis on the role of local russian partners, local and regional russian political figures and institutions, and a cooperative russian federal government. this framing serves the interests of political actors in russia by projecting an image of effective management of interactions with foreign partners that brings concrete benefits to the public, even in times of geopolitical conflict. 95 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 while discursive identity formation processes may be occurring at another level through direct contacts involving project participants from both sides of the border, the broader impact would be fairly restrictive due to the limited number of russian participants. to assess this, a different methodology would be required, one involving interviews or surveys of local project participants. unfortunately, at the present time, it is not possible to conduct such research in russia, but some insights could be gained from participants on the eu side. this can form the next step in a research agenda to assess the explanatory value of the “autonomy of the local” for understanding crossborder cooperation. 96 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 references alekseev, kirill. 2018. “posol es: kaliningrad – odin iz nemnogikh regionov, gde sotrudnichestvo rossii i evrosoiuza funktsional’no do sikh por” [the eu ambassador: kaliningrad – one of the few regions where cooperation between russia and the european union still functions]. komsomol’skaia pravda, december 7, 2018. accessed february 7, 2024. https://www.kaliningrad.kp.ru/online/news/3320333/. batyk, iwona m., and daniel rzeczkowski. 2020. “cross-border cooperation at the external border of the european union in the context of political, economic and social conditions: the case of the polish-russian neighbourhood.” equilibrium 15 (4): 833-871.  https://doi.org/10.24136/eq.2020.036. bobylev, nikolai, sebastien gadal, viktar kireyeu, and alexander sergunin. 2020. “eu‐russia cross‐border co‐operation in the twenty‐first century: turning marginality into competitive advantage.” regional science policy & practice 12 (5) (october): 841–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/rsp3.12316. bojarowicz, tomasz. 2021. “the attitude of polish political parties towards the kaliningrad region in 1989-2019.” in the kaliningrad region: a specific enclave in contemporary europe, edited by arkadiusz żukowski and wojciech t. modzelewski, 103–18. paderborn: brill schöningh. debardeleben, joan. 2018. “geopolitics of the eu.” in european union governance and policy making: a canadian perspective, edited by emmanuel brunet-jailly, achim hurrelmann, and amy verdun, 359-378. toronto: university of toronto press. ———. 2014. “new eu-russian borders after enlargement: from local to transnational linkages.” in shifting priorities in russia’s foreign and security policy, edited by roger e. kanet and rémi piet, 73–94. burlington: ashgate. debardeleben, joan, and dmitry nechiporuk. 2019. “diverging views of eu-russian borders: points of congruence and difference in eu and russian analyses.” journal of contempo rary european studies 27 (2): 196–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2018.1534727. deiana, maria-adriana, milena komarova, and cathal mccall. 2019. “cooperation as conflict transformation: promises and limitations in eu peacebuilding.” geopolitics, 24 (3): 529– 540. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1599518. dembińska, magdalena, frédéric mérand, and anastasiya shtaltovna. 2020. “conflict and cooperation between europe and russia: the autonomy of the local.” east european politics 36 (4): 477–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1784145. https://www.kaliningrad.kp.ru/online/news/3320333/ https://doi.org/10.24136/eq.2020.036 https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1599518 97 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 european commission. 2022. “commission suspends cross-border cooperation and transnational cooperation with russia and belarus.” press release, march 4. accessed february 7, 2024. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commissionsuspends-cross-border-cooperation-and-transnational-cooperation-russia-and-belarus-202203-04_en. european parliament and council of the european union. 2022. “regulation (eu) 2022/2192 of the european parliament and of the council of 9 november 2022 laying down specific provisions of the 2014-2020 cooperation programmes supported by the european neighbourhood instrument and under the european territorial cooperation goal, following programme implementation disruption.” official journal of the european union l292: 1– 12. accessed march 24, 2024. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/36f8736b-61aa-11ed-92ed-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. fedorov, gennady m. 2020. “on the directions and prospects of cross-border cooperation between russia and the eu countries in the baltic region.” in baltic region—the region of cooperation, edited by gennady m. fedorov, alexander druzhinin, elena golubeva, dmitry subetto, and tadeusz palmowski, 27–35. cham, switzerland: springer. găvăneci, maria. 2016. “cross-border cooperation through mass media representation. the case of russia-estonia border.” eurolimes 21 (spring): 67–86. accessed march 24, 2024. https://www.proquest.com/docview/1900021038?sourcetype=scholarly%20journals. golunov, serghei. 2013. “eu-russian border crossing: the dialogical perspective.” geopoli tics 18 (4): 933–53. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2013.789867. gorod-kingisepp.ru. 2018. “programma prigranichnogo sotrudnichestva s es pomozhet postroit’ promenad i restavrirovat’ krepost’ v ivangorode” [the program of cross-border cooperation with the eu will help build promenade and restore the fortress in ivangorod]. november 21, 2018. accessed through the integrum world wide database. government of the republic of poland, special services. 2021. “a hybrid attack on poland.” august 9, 2021. accessed february 7, 2024. https://www.gov.pl/web/special-services/ahybrid-attack-on-poland. hataley, todd, and christian leuprecht. 2018. “determinants of cross-border cooperation.” journal of borderlands studies 33 (3): 317–328. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2018.1482776. heusala, anna-liisa, and jarmo koistinen. 2018. “‘rules of the game’ in cross-border cooperation: legal-administrative differences in finnish-russian crime prevention.” international review of administrative sciences 84 (2): 354–70. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852315625786. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-suspends-cross-border-cooperation-and-transnational-cooperation-russia-and-belarus-2022-03-04_en https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-suspends-cross-border-cooperation-and-transnational-cooperation-russia-and-belarus-2022-03-04_en https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-suspends-cross-border-cooperation-and-transnational-cooperation-russia-and-belarus-2022-03-04_en https://www.proquest.com/docview/1900021038?sourcetype=scholarly%20journals https://www.gov.pl/web/special-services/a-hybrid-attack-on-poland https://www.gov.pl/web/special-services/a-hybrid-attack-on-poland https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2018.1482776 https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852315625786 98 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 iluki.ru (velikie luki). 2018. “bolee 1 mlrd rublei planiruetsia privlech’ v pskovskuiu oblast’ po programmam prigranichnogo sotrudnichestva” [it is planned to attract more than 1 billion rubles to pskov oblast’ under cross-border cooperation programs]. june 10, 2018. accessed through the integrum world wide database. ivanov, sergei. 2021. “uluchshenie ekologii – zadacha obshchaia” [helping the environment—a shared task]. velikolukskaia pravda, march 31, 2021. accessed march 18, 2024, https://vlpravda.ru/featured/uluchshenie-ekologii-zadacha-obshhaya/. joint technical secretariat. lithuanian program (untitled website). n.d. accessed march 21, 2024. https://eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/. joint technical secretariat, centre of european projects. n.d. “poland-russia cross-border cooperation programme 2014–2020.” accessed march 21, 2024. https://www.plru.eu/en/news/. joint technical secretariat, state shared service centre of estonia. n.d. “estonian eu external border programme.” accessed march 21, 2024. https://www.estoniarussia.eu. kingisepp.ru. 2020. “ivangorodskie realii s vidom na narvskii zamok” [the realities of ivangorod with a view of the narva castle]. november 11, 2020. accessed through the integrum world wide database. koch, katharina. 2019. “the role of territoriality in the european union multi-level governmental cooperation framework of finnish-russian cross-border cooperation.” european urban and regional studies 26 (2):115–133. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0969776417736359. ———. 2018. “the spatiality of trust in eu external cross-border cooperation.” european planning studies 26 (3): 591–610. https://doi:10.1080/09654313.2017.1393502. kommersant. 2022. “soglashenie rossii i latvii ob uproshchennykh poezdkakh budet priostanovleno s 1 avgusta” [the russia-latvia agreement on simplified travel will be suspended starting on august 1]. july 31, 2022. accessed september 4, 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5490903. kotowicz, wojciech. 2021. “the local border traffic between poland and russia – political and security dimension.” in the kaliningrad region: a specific enclave in contemporary europe, edited by arkadiusz żukowski and wojciech t. modzelewski, 135–149. paderborn: brill schöningh. kurs, tomasz. 2021. “apel o powrót małego ruchu granicznego z rosją. czy to dobry pomysł?” [call for the return of local border traffic with russia. is it a good idea?] gazeta wyborcza & wyborcza.pl, august 22, 2021. accessed through the factiva database. https://vlpravda.ru/featured/uluchshenie-ekologii-zadacha-obshhaya/ https://eni-cbc.eu/lr/en/ https://www.plru.eu/en/news/ http://kingisepp.ru/ https://doi.org/‌10.1177/0969776417736359 https://doi.org/‌10.1177/0969776417736359 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5490903 99 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 kuznetsov, alexey v., and olga v. kuznetsova. 2019. “the changing role of border regions in the regional policies of the eu and russia.” baltic region 11 (4): 58–75. accessed february 6, 2024. https://dx.doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2019-4-4. lebedeva, olga. 2022. “latviia zamorozila sogladshenie s rf ob uproshchennykh poezdkakh” [latvia freezes travel facilitation agreement with the russian federation]. deutsche welle, august 1, 2022. accessed february 6, 2024. https://www.dw.com/ru/latvija-priostanoviladejstvie-soglashenija-s-rf-ob-uproshhennyh-poezdkah/a-62666651. maciejewska-mieszkowska, katarzyna. 2021. “the kaliningrad region in the olsztyn media.” in the kaliningrad region: a specific enclave in contemporary europe, edited by arkadiusz żukowski and wojciech t. modzelewski, 119–134. paderborn: brill schöningh. makkonen, teemu, allan m. williams, adi weidenfeld, and virpi kaisto. 2018. “cross-border knowledge transfer and innovation in the european neighbourhood: tourism cooperation at the finnish-russian border.” tourism management (68): 141–151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2018.03.008. mccall, cathal. 2014. the european union and peacebuilding; the cross-border dimension. new york: palgrave macmillan. ministry of environmental protection and regional development of latvia. 2024.“cross-border cooperation programme 2014-2020.” accessed march 21, 2024. https://latruscbc.eu. ministry for foreign affairs of finland. 2023. “finland’s membership in nato.” accessed march 21, 2014. https://um.fi/finlands-membership-in-nato. palmowski, tadeusz, and gennady m. fedorov. 2020. “the potential for the development of russian-polish cross-border region.” geography, environment, sustainability 13 (1): 21– 28. https://doi.org/10.24057/2071-9388-2019-70. prokkola, eeva-kaisa. 2019. “border-regional resilience in eu internal and external border areas in finland.” european planning studies, 27 (8): 1587–1606. https://10.1080/09654313.2019.1595531. pskovskaia lenta novostei. 2019. “glavnyi tekhnolog ‘gorvodokanal’ o chistoi vode i programmakh prigranichnogo sotrudnichesta” [gorvodokanal’s chief technologist on clean water and cross-border cooperation programs]. may 10, 2019. transcript of an interview with andrei aliab’ev carried out by aleksei ovchinnikov, originally broadcast on ekho moskvy in pskov. accessed through the integrum world wide database. pskovskaia pravda. 2018. “polpred i komanda” [the presidential envoy and his team]. pravdapskov.ru, june 25, 2018. accessed through the integrum world wide database. radin, andrew. 2017. hybrid warfare in the baltics: threats and potential responses. santa monica: rand corporation. accessed february 6, 2024. https://www.rand.org/ pubs/research_reports/rr1577.html. https://dx.doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2019-4-4 https://www.dw.com/ru/latvija-priostanovila-dejstvie-soglashenija-s-rf-ob-uproshhennyh-poezdkah/a-62666651 https://www.dw.com/ru/latvija-priostanovila-dejstvie-soglashenija-s-rf-ob-uproshhennyh-poezdkah/a-62666651 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2018.03.008 https://latruscbc.eu/ https://doi.org/10.24057/2071-9388-2019-70 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr1577.html https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr1577.html 100 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 ria novosti. 2016. “kaliningrad i prigranichnye voevodstva pol’shi prodolzhat sotrudnichestva” [kaliningrad and border polish voivodeships will continue cooperation]. december 15, 2016. accessed february 6, 2024. https://ria.ru/20161215/1483741681.html. rzeczpospolita. 2018. “bieg do rosji z przeszkodami warszawy” [running to russia with warsaw obstacles]. january 11, 2018. accessed through the factiva database. ———. 2020. “parowiec jak malowanie” [a steamboat like painting]. november 6, 2020. accessed through the factiva database. sagan, iwona, vladimir kolosov, dominika studzińska, maria zotova, alexander sebentsov, and klaudia nowicka. 2018. “the local border traffic zone experiment as an instrument of cross-border integration: the case of polish-russian borderland.” geographia polonica 91 (1): 95–112. https://doi.org/gpol.0102. sandecki, maciej. 2019. “ankieta ‘gazety wyborczej trójmiast’ tuż przed wyborami parlamentarnymi 2019. 11 pytań do liderów list na pomorzu” [a survey of ‘gazeta wyborcza tricity’ just before the 2019 parliamentary elections. 11 questions for list leaders in pomerania]. gazeta wyborcza & wyborcza.pl, oct. 11, 2019. accessed through the factiva database. sebentsov alexander b. 2020. “cross-border cooperation on the eu-russian borders: results of the program approach.” geography, environment, sustainability 13 (1): 74–83.  https://doi.org/10.24057/2071-9388-2019-136. siegień, paulina. 2019. “maly ruch graniczny z kalinigradem wraca w kampanii do pe” [small border traffic with kaliningrad returns in ep campaign]. gazeta wyborcza & wyborcza.pl, april 24, 2019. accessed through the factiva database. staalesen, atle. 2012. “more visa-free traveling in the baltic.” barents observer, february 23, 2012. accessed february 6, 2024. https://barentsobserver.com/en/borders/more-visa-freetraveling-baltic. studzińska, dominika, alena sivkoz, and stanislaw domaniewski. 2018. “russian cross-border shopping tourists in the finnish and polish borderlands.” norsk geografisk tidsskrift– norwegian journal of geography 72 (2): 115–126. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 00291951.2018.1451365. studzińska, dominika, and julia dunaj. 2023. “kaliningrad as an isolated zone: the impact of the war in ukraine on the daily life of the residents of the kaliningrad region. an introduction to the discussion.” journal of baltic studies, 54 (2): 395–407.  https://doi.org/10.1080/01629778.2023.2197605. tass. 2016. “russia suspends poland-kaliningrad border traffic agreement – ministry.” july 4, 2016. accessed october 2, 2023. https://tass.com/politics/886286. https://ria.ru/20161215/1483741681.html https://barentsobserver.com/en/borders/more-visa-free-traveling-baltic https://barentsobserver.com/en/borders/more-visa-free-traveling-baltic https://tass.com/politics/886286 101 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 trofimov, dmitrii. 2018. “ivangorodskii musei po itogam poslednikh trekh let deiatel’nosti poluchil titul ‘zvezda kul’tury” [the ivangorod museum was awarded the title of ‘star of culture’ based on results of the last three years of its activity]. vostochnyi bereg (kingisepp), february 7, 2018. accessed through the integrum world wide database. ———. 2019. “nachalas’ realizatsiia mezhdunarodnogo proekta ‘rechnye promenady-3’” [implementation of the international project ‘river promenades 3’ has started]. vostochnyi bereg (kingisepp), august 7, 2019. accessed through the integrum world wide database. zabielska, izabela. 2020. “cooperation, partnership and integration in the cross-border area: the role of borders and cross-border cooperation.” ekonomia i prawo 19 (3): 569–583. https://doi.org/10.12775/eip.2020.038. zamaraeva, asia. 2020. “parki bez granits” [parks without borders]. pskovskaia provintsiia, september 9, 2020. accessed through the integrum world wide database. żęgota, krzysztof. 2021. “how to construct cross-border cooperation? local border traffic as a mechanism of shaping the external relations of the european union and schengen area from the perspective of constructivism: the case of the baltic sea region.” journal of baltic studies 52 (3): 397–417.  https://doi:10.1080/01629778.2021.1925717. zinov’ev, aleksandr. 2018. “novoe deviatkino poluchit grant evrosoiuza na realizatsiiu proekta prigranichnogo sotrudnichestva” [novy deviatkino will receive a grant from the european union to implement a cross-border cooperation project]. vesti (sankt-peterburg), december 28, 2018. accessed through the integrum world wide database. żukowski, arkadiusz. 2021. “towards the regional identity of the inhabitants of the polishrussian borderland.” in the kaliningrad region: a specific enclave in contemporary europe, edited by arkadiusz żukowski and wojciech t. modzelewski, 51–74. paderborn: brill schöningh. https://doi.org/10.12775/eip.2020.038 102 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 80-102 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 climate change politics in canada and the eu: from carbon democracy to a green deal? markus lederer1 technical university darmstadt abstract the idea of a green deal transforming industrialized societies’ climate policies in a sustainable manner has become highly popular in various countries. this article focuses on the politics behind green deals in canada and the eu, raising four interrelated issues. first, on a descriptive level, it addresses what has so far been achieved regarding climate policy in both polities. second, at an analytical level, making use of the concept of carbon democracy, the study provides a theoretical explanation of why, until recently, progress has been slow in the eu and hardly visible in canada. third, on a prescriptive level, it argues that the notion of a green deal can be transformative and can thus provide a road to progressive climate policies. finally, in a comparative manner, the analysis reveals canada is still highly reluctant to enact any form of green deal, while the eu, with its notion of a ‘just transition’ and the set-up of a transition fund, has made important progress towards an effective and legitimate green deal that could eventually turn the eu into a green democracy. 1 markus lederer is professor of political science with a focus on international politics at technical university darmstadt. 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 introduction2 climate politics have changed quite dramatically over the last couple of years, but the question arises as to how truly transformative these changes have been. on the global level, the paris agreement of 2015 revitalized multilateral politics after the failure of the international negotiations in copenhagen in 2009. it has also successfully kick-started new carbon governance initiatives at other levels of government (falkner 2016). at the local level, various cities in both canada (e.g., vancouver, montreal, and toronto) and in europe (e.g., london, copenhagen, and berlin) have been hailed as new spheres of authority, and associations like the c40 cities climate leadership group (c40), the covenant of mayors, and the local governments for sustainability (iclei) have undertaken notable initiatives in the environmental area (bulkeley 2014; fuhr, hickmann, and kern 2018). these governance experiments have been supported by transnational actors from the non-profit and for-profit camps (roger, hale, and andonova 2017). domestic climate politics also have gained more attention on the political agenda in countries as diverse as india, vietnam, ethiopia, france, and the united kingdom. and even where official reversals have occurred, most prominently in the united states (us), but also in brazil and china, new dynamics within society or within opposition parties have sometimes become visible. these new progressive approaches, whether in the us, the european union (eu), or canada, have been labelled ‘green deals’ that aim to advance climate policy ambitions and implementation in holistic and just ways. green deals are thus presented as a panacea for solving or at least mitigating many of the current ecological, social, economic, and political crises human society must confront. this article focuses on the politics behind a green deal in canada and the eu, raising four interrelated issues. first, on a descriptive level, it addresses what has so far been achieved regarding climate policy. second, at an analytical level, making use of the concept of carbon democracy, it provides a theoretical explanation of why, until recently, progress has been slow in the eu and hardly visible in canada. third, on a prescriptive level, it argues that the notion of a green deal can be transformative, and can thus provide a road to progressive climate policies. finally, in a comparative manner, the analysis reveals canada is still highly reluctant to enact any form of green deal, while the eu, with its notion of a ‘just transition’ and the set-up of a transition fund, has made important progress towards an effective and legitimate green deal that could eventually turn the eu into a green democracy. but why look at canada and the eu and compare a country with a regional entity? first, regarding their relevance, both polities are large greenhouse gas (ghg) emitters. canada is the ninth largest emitter in absolute terms, and fourth largest on per capita terms, within the club of g20 countries, with almost 19 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per capita (tco2e/capita) per year. the eu 28 is the third largest emitter in absolute terms, and the 15th largest in annual per capita emissions within the g20, at about 8.07 tco2e/capita.3 second, both polities claim to be leaders of progressive climate change politics. the eu has long and successfully portrayed itself as a global climate leader (wurzel, connelly, and liefferink 2017), while, since 2015, the trudeau government in canada has tried to convince the world of the greening of its policies. nevertheless, in december, 2020 both polities were still evaluated by the climate action tracker as “insufficient”, although some signs of deeper change are visible, particularly within the eu (climate action tracker 2020). of course, both the eu and canada are highly diverse polities, 2 i would like to thank two anonymous reviewers as well as the editors of this special issue for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 3 data refers to 2017 and includes land-use; for details, see climate transparency (2020). 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 and it is important to differentiate between front-runners and laggards within each (torney 2019; boyd and rabe 2019). finally, both polities are highly decentralized and are thus perfect showcases for understanding multi-level governance. this article is structured as follows: the first part introduces the concept of ‘carbon democracy’ which posits that the extensive use of carbon laid the foundation for establishing democratic institutions in the first place (mitchell 2011). jason maclean has already labelled canada a carbon democracy, focusing primarily on the oil and gas industries’ ability to influence current politics even with a liberal government in power since 2015 (2018, 54). the second part of the article builds on these insights but goes beyond them by describing canada’s and the eu’s emission profiles, their ambitions, and the current policy instruments deeply enmeshed in the societal and political genome of both polities. the third part elaborates on the politics of a green deal, arguing that major distributive changes and some forms of compensation will be needed as the green deal will not always create win–win solutions, particularly not in the short run. the analysis shows that the eu is slowly moving towards a green democracy, whereas progress is much slower in canada. the conclusion summarizes the argument and identifies possible future research avenues. the concept of carbon democracy decarbonization is possible, and at least in the medium to long run it reduces private and social costs when compared to a business-as-usual scenario (stern 2015; the new climate economy 2018). why then has progress so far been rather slow? to answer this question, we have to look at how politics affects efforts to pursue green transformations. the literature on climate politics has advanced various explanations including veto-players (ike 2020), the capitalist system (brand and wissen 2017), domestic politics (sprinz and weiß 2001), national-subnational interlinkages (balthasar, schreurs, and varone 2019), and, most recently, energy cultures (stephenson, sovacool, and inderberg 2021). the concept of carbon democracy nicely complements these explanations by focusing on the materiality of carbon and the repercussions its rising use has had for the development of specific political systems. theoretically, the argument advanced is in line with historical institutionalism with its strong focus on path-dependencies. it also takes up elements of more recent materialist readings that have identified the strong influence of specific uses of energy on societies and politics (morris 2015 regarding values; smil 2018 regarding civilizations). timothy mitchell’s book, carbon democracy: political power in the age of oil (2011), makes the simple but important point that, historically, carbon energy and democratic politics are closely interlinked, and that changes in how we made use of energy allowed and even determined the way mass politics evolved in western europe and north america (2011, 14). not only has the burning of abundant and low-cost carbon in the form of coal, oil, and gas fueled accelerated economic growth, but also the extraction, transportation, and refinement of fossil fuels have shaped sociotechnical systems that have become very influential politically. this started with the massive extraction and use of coal that enabled large-scale manufacturing, modern cities, and those forces that pushed for democracy (2011, 8). hence, democratic claims had a much higher chance to be realized in countries where large parts of the workforce were involved in digging up and transporting coal, as well as providing a whole new infrastructure for its use. workers thus derived power from how energy extraction, transportation, and use were organized. this could be translated into alliances, and carbon could thus “assemble political agency, by employing the 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 ability to slow, disrupt or cut off its supply” (2011, 19). in short, the use of coal allowed workers to become a highly political force and this was, mitchell argues, more important politically than class culture, ideology, or organization (2011, 27). in the following article, the concept of carbon democracy is used as a prism to interpret the evolution of climate policy-making in canada and the eu, and to understand why progress in moving away from fossil fuels has been rather limited. this approach neither neglects the role of specific actors, nor denies the influence of capitalism. rather, it goes one step further and analyzes the strong role of the carbon centered, socio-technical systems found in both polities. three aspects will merit specific attention. first, the influence that the development of large infrastructures for energy extraction, production, transportation, and consumption have had in empowering some actors, as well as practices, and not others. second, that these actors are represented in specific sectors or regions with consequences for policy-making and specific political structures. and third, that the particular context of infrastructures, actors, and sectors has given rise to a carbon centered worldview that has underpinned and strengthened carbon democracy. carbon democracy at work: comparing the status-quo of climate politics in canada and the eu this section provides a short overview of climate politics in canada and the eu, focusing particularly on their current emission profiles and policies. in the second part, these developments are examined by taking the concept of carbon democracy into account. describing the status quo: emission profiles and policies in canada canada’s climate policy-making has seen various ups and downs and has been rather inconsistent, particularly regarding its international aspirations and domestic actions (macunias and de lassus saint-geniès 2018, 2). in the 1980s and 1990s, canada was one of the most active countries pushing for international climate action, but divergence between its international stance and domestic climate legislation became visible after the turn of the century (macunias and de lassus saint-geniès 2018). starting in 2006, when stephen harper became prime minister, the country’s international position on climate action increasingly aligned with its domestic policies, such that on neither front much happened (2018, 6). canada was in no way close to fulfilling its kyoto target of reducing its ghg emissions by six percent of 1990 levels by 2012; rather its emissions in 2008 were 24.1 percent higher than the 1990 base year. it was thus no surprise that canada withdrew from the kyoto protocol in 2011. after the trudeau government won the election in 2015, canada became an active negotiator during the climate negotiations of 2015 that generated the paris agreement, mirroring the position of the us (macneil and paterson 2016). for example, environment and climate change minister catherine mckenna said after the meeting that “canada is back” (king 2015). in its nationally determined contribution (ndc), canada promised to reduce its ghg emissions by 17 percent by 2020, and 30 percent by 2030, against a 2005 base year. however, its own projections show that it will be hard to achieve these goals (government of canada 2015; 2019). currently ghg emissions are 17 percent higher than they were in 1990, more or less at the same level as they were in 2005. in short “despite a change in tone in paris, trudeau opted to keep the national ghg emission reduction targets set by the harper government, which aligned with us targets” (boyd 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 and rabe 2019, 242). the canadian government has officially distanced itself from donald trump’s anti-paris agreement rhetoric, but on a per capita basis canadian emissions are even slightly higher than those of the us (climate transparency 2020). partially thanks to fracking (which has other highly problematic environmental impacts) the build-up of renewables, and reduction in the use of coal, the us has been able reduce its emissions considerably over the last ten years. as various authors have pointed out (schreurs 2011; boyd and rabe 2019, 252f; boyd 2019), there are significant differences between the canadian provinces. alberta alone is responsible for about a third of canada’s ghg emissions, and emissions from alberta and saskatchewan are still increasing. ontario and quebéc, meanwhile, have managed to reduce their emissions quite substantially and are cooperating with progressive us states. they are also adopting best practices from the us. to fulfill its paris agreement obligations, the canadian government launched the pan-canadian framework (pcf) on clean growth and climate change in 2016 and the greenhouse gas pollution pricing act in 2018. the pcf is highly flexible in allowing the provinces leeway on how to tackle climate change as long as something is happening that puts a price on carbon. thus, british columbia (bc) and alberta introduced a co2 tax, whereas ontario and quebéc started to set up an emission trading system (ets), which ontario abandoned in 2018. in april 2019, the federal government introduced a carbon tax on fossil fuels in four provinces (ontario, manitoba, new brunswick, and saskatchewan) after the provincial governments did not establish legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. evaluating canada’s 2030 pledge, the international monetary fund (imf) claims the country’s current plan will not be sufficient. additionally, a recent world bank report on carbon pricing calculated that to achieve the paris goal, canada’s co2 tax would need to increase from 15 canadian dollars per tonne of co2 today, to between 75 and 150 canadian dollars per tonnes in 2030 (2019, 19). according to the dominating perception, canada is backtracking on its paris agreement commitments and is “falling back on the centrality of its bilateral relationships with the united states and contending that it could only consider acting if america was moving in step” (boyd and rabe 2019, 254-255). currently, deep decarbonization is not on the federal government’s agenda. the country has introduced some new policies but will most likely miss its own ndc target, which was not very ambitious to begin with (kuramochi et al. 2019, 32). describing the status quo: emission profiles and policies in the european union if one compares the eu’s domestic track record with that of canada, the eu is doing better, having built up “the world’s most advanced and comprehensive regulatory frameworks, encompassing both eu-wide policies and targets to be achieved by the member states” (delreux and ohler 2019, 2). the eu has overachieved its kyoto target of eight percent below 1990 co2 emission levels during the first commitment period 2008–2012 by delivering a reduction of 12 percent. the bloc has also fulfilled its pledge for 2020 (20 percent below 1990 levels). the main reason for the eu’s success so far, besides the financial crisis and the de-industrialization of some parts of eastern germany, has been a tremendous increase in the use of renewable energy sources: between 2005 and 2015, there was a 71 percent increase of renewable energy capacity within the eu. still, some serious problems persist. in 2017, there was a 0.6 percent increase of ghg emissions within the eu, even within those sectors covered by the eu ets. this was due to an increase in the use of lignite for power generation. in 2018, there was a reduction of emissions by 2.1 percent, but this happened almost solely due to changes in the power sector, and the transport sector 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 witnessed a slight increase. in 2020, the slowdown due to the various pandemic lock-downs has led to further and substantial decreases in ghg emissions, but it is questionable whether these will be permanent (for a more positive reading, see schreurs and schott 2020 this issue). of course, the eu is not a monolithic bloc. some countries are doing more than others; for example, sweden and denmark, according to the 2019 new climate institute’s climate change performance index, are the two global front-runners regarding their path toward the paris agreement’s targets (burck et al. 2019). countries like estonia, bulgaria, and poland, on the other hand, are doing much worse. in the eu, the european ets has so far been the main instrument in mitigating climate change; it covers about 40 percent of the eu’s emissions in six sectors and in about 11,000 installations. non-ets sectors like agriculture, transport (except air transport), or buildings are in the domain of the member states, with each one having a specific target. the eu ets has been perceived as a success, as it has not only facilitated the reduction of ghg emissions, but has been more successful in those industries that are covered by the scheme than those that are not (ellerman, marcantonini and zaklan 2015). additionally, the ets has not reduced competitiveness of impacted companies (joltreau and sommerfeld 2019). the eu ets, which was reformed in 2018 to avoid a growing surplus of emission rights (wettestad and jevnaker 2019; eu 2018), will also lead to further reductions. its phase four, beginning in 2021, includes a yearly reduction of the cap of 2.2 percent (oberthür 2019, 19). nevertheless, problems are still visible, and they have to do with the various exceptions for specific industries and the grandfathering of a still large amount of emission rights. furthermore, the hard nuts to crack – transport and buildings – have not yet been included, and only recently has much progress has been achieved in these sectors (delreux and ohler 2019, 11). interpreting and comparing the status quo: carbon democracy at work the eu and canada have taken divergent paths and it is evident that the former has produced more progressive climate policy-making. nevertheless, both polities have historically featured the major characteristics of carbon democracy. in canada and the eu (or, more historically correctly, in its member states) broader mass participation in politics was influenced by the extensive use of first coal and later oil. during the “great acceleration” (steffen et al. 2015) after the end of world war ii, canada and europe extensively relied on the socio-technological system of fossil fuels, and they partially still do. in both polities, it was not only that economic growth depended on the burning of coal and oil, but a huge fossil fuel energy infrastructure was also formed. this infrastructure supported and strengthened powerful fossil fuel-based sectors, primarily energy companies in canada and the automotive sector in europe, that came to dominate their economies and fed into the development of a worldview that entrenched the use of fossil fuels. first, regarding energy extraction, production, transportation, and consumption, canada and the eu have both strongly relied on the digging up and burning of coal, oil, and gas. in both regions, infrastructures have been set up that have locked in the use of fossil fuels for the next generation. this has been most evident in the discussions about new pipelines. for canada, the “pipelines for paris” suggestion (maclean 2018) implied that the paris agreement could only gain enough political support in canada if its ratification would not lead to a shut-down of pipelines. this might not have increased the government’s popularity, particularly in alberta, but it certainly entrenched the power of the fossil fuel industry. former alberta premiere alison redford stated, “alberta’s oil sands are the lifeblood of our economy.” indeed, if realized, the ghg emissions of the pacific northwest liquid natural gas project would make up about 10 percent of canada’s remaining carbon budget if calculated on a per-capita emissions basis (2018, 52). even more worrisome, the upstream ghg emissions caused by the trans mountain pipeline, which the government purchased in 2018 and which is estimated to work over a period of 50 years, will by itself consume 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 about 83 percent of canada’s share of its carbon budget if we take the paris agreement’s more lenient target of two degrees celsius as a benchmark (100 percent if a 1.5°c target is taken) (2018, 58). bill mckibben (2020) thus claimed that “canada, which is 0.5 percent of the planet’s population, plans to use up nearly a third of the planet’s remaining carbon budget.” furthermore, the canadian government is, all rhetorical claims withstanding, deeply embedded in the fossil fuel age, as demonstrated by the various direct and indirect subsidies of about 40 billion dollars to oil and gas in 2015 (green 2019). for the eu, nord stream 2 is to transport natural gas directly from russia to germany. this will at first reduce germany’s, and thus the eu’s, carbon emissions, as natural gas will primarily replace lignite. but in the medium to long run, it will have serious environmental impacts in russia, and will lock the eu into a new infrastructure set to deliver 55 billion cubic metres of natural gas that will produce about 106 million tonnes of co2 – the equivalent of the annual emissions of the czech republic (stoczkiewicz 2017). similar to canada, though on a smaller scale overall, the eu is thus partially locking-in its dependence on natural gas. as for coal, in the pcf canada committed itself to a national phase out by 2030, although some leeway is provided on the provincial level (boyd and rabe 2019, 248). within the eu, portugal, greece, hungary, france, germany, and now even poland announced the phaseout of coal. however, the closing of all coal fired power plants will most likely not happen before 2038 when germany and poland have finished their respective phaseouts. second, canada and the eu still have sectors that are hard to green, which has given rise to a variety of veto-players. for canada, this is evident in the case of utilities and energy companies, including the huge field of mining and extraction. these sectors represent a form of “prairie capitalism” that richards and pratts (1979) identified as a trend for canada in some western provinces more than four decades ago and that kellogg (2015) recently ‘revisited’ for the oil and bitumen industries. the argument behind prairie capitalism is analogous to carbon democracy in that it stresses the important influence of large-scale ownership of specific extractive assets. the claim of prairie capitalism is that it is not foreign capital that advances capitalist practices, for example in alberta’s bitumen industry, but rather a regional bourgeoisie, and that therefore canada should not be understood as being part of a colonial periphery but rather of the capitalist center. canada exported fossil fuels worth 134 billion canadian dollars in 2019 (government of canada 2020) and the export-oriented agricultural sector is also highly dependent on fossil fuels. these exports go primarily to the us market, leading to a high level of vulnerability to what happens there, but these industries are largely owned by canadians. a restructuring of these sectors would be very cost intensive (boyd and rabe 2019, 242) and would impact the social fabric of canadian capitalism. but it is not only the ‘bourgeoisie’ that is profiting from canada’s carbon democracy; unions are particularly strong in the fossil fuel-dependent sectors. workers in these sectors often enjoy wages far above average and are reluctant to give up their privileged position (macarthur et al. 2020, 5). in the eu, the fossil fuel sector is less entrenched than in canada, but industrial policy is strongly influenced by companies and unions which depend on fossil fuels; this starts with airbus and includes the automotive sector with its strong union culture. furthermore, the strong welfare state in both polities, and the corporatist politics in the mentioned industries, make ambitious reforms with redistributive effects hard to implement (macarthur et al. 2020). both canada and the eu strongly rely on economic growth, and any policy that does not take this into account might face massive opposition. in europe, this became evident with france’s ‘yellow vest movement’ opposing president macron’s increase of gas prices in 2019. also, in late 2019 the german right16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 wing party alternative für deutschland (afd) announced its intention to contest the financing of renewable energy and any plans to further reduce ghg emissions. climate thus became the third major topic of the party. in canada and the eu, these policies also face strong subnational/national actors that have substantially entrenched veto positions. in both polities the ‘federal’ level has only marginal competences to actually bring change to the socio-technical infrastructure in place. for example, alberta in canada and poland in the eu can be considered spoilers of progressive climate change policies. these actors cannot simply be sidelined. alberta strongly depends on revenues from the oil and gas industry which is responsible for over a third of alberta’s emissions (boyd 2019, 2). despite the fact that alberta is a leader in installing wind power installations, with an installed wind energy capacity of 1,685 mega watt (canwea 2020), it is a “reluctant actor” that moves only when external pressure, usually from the us, is present (boyd 2019, 2; macdonald and vannijnatten 2010). thus, within canada’s strong federalist tradition, “ottawa has limited capacity to control or direct canadian climate policy” (macneil and paterson 2016, 556), and it is particularly at the provincial level that more progressive action is being held back. poland, which depends on coal for its power sector, has emerged as the main spoiler of climate change policies in the eu. the eu has repeatedly compromised on its policy frameworks due to polish pressure (skjærseth 2018). the eu might have some leeway on climate policies but is historically lacking the power to regulate energy issues (szarka 2016) and has only recently started to engage in regulating traffic. the eu 2030 framework also shows that the european commission could not set binding energy efficiency or renewable energy targets on the member states, although it could strengthen procedural obligations of member states regarding their energy and climate plans (oberthür 2019, 24). finally, canada and the eu are carbon democracies not only in that both polities rely on energy in a material sense, but also in their worldviews (for a general debate on worldviews and climate change, particularly mobility, see chuang, manley, and petersen 2020; sovacool and griffiths 2020). canadians’ and europeans’ respective identities are to some extent shaped by a tradition of resource extraction and high mobility. in canada, this is part of the pioneer mentality, where nature is understood as a “hinterland” whose purpose it is to provide goods for its citizens, while european populations might perceive of nature rather as countryside that is also available for human use (dalby 2019, 103). in both polities, a culture of high mobility has evolved that relies on individualized transport. in canada and the eu, legislation has introduced higher emission standards, and both polities have started to subsidize electric mobility, fostering some discussions on smarter mobility (barr 2018), but neither has so far started to rethink transport more fundamentally. transforming carbon democracies through green deals? canada and the eu are carbon democracies, but could this be changed through domestic pressure, as foreseen in the paris agreement (falkner 2016)? after all, various actors within civil society are pushing for more progressive climate policies, resonating with a more general attitude within the population. for example, in canada, more than half of the population supports the introduction of market-based mechanisms to stop climate change and this holds true even for provinces that have historically been reluctant on mitigation actions (pew research center 2017; mildenberger and lachapelle 2019). furthermore, the youth activist fridays for future movements are active in 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 both polities even though they have resonated more within the eu. greta thunberg was invited by ursula von der leyen, president of the eu commission, when von der leyen presented the eu’s new climate law in march 2020. thunberg, nevertheless, criticized the eu’s position as a “surrender” because it failed to keep up with the 1.5 degree target of the paris agreement (bbc 2020). similar to the student protests of the 1960s which called for democratizing western societies, the current youth movement calling for more radical climate policies might have a chance to actually make an impact (marquardt 2020). fridays for future is an indicator that climate change has become politicized in the sense that conflicts in this policy field are becoming more intense and visible (schattschneider 1960; hutter and grande 2014). this implies that climate is gaining in salience with more actors being involved, more polarization in viewpoints, and more alternatives being developed (for a discussion of these elements of politicization, see grande, schwarzbözl, and fatke 2019; hoeglinger 2016). many alternatives are currently being envisioned under the term ‘green deal’, a label which refers to franklin delano roosevelt’s ‘new deal’ which unleashed various public works and investment programs in the us between 1933 and 1939 to counter the effects of the great depression, when the unemployment rate ballooned to 25 percent. this governmental involvement in the us economy was unprecedented, and it made the government the largest employer in the country. furthermore, roosevelt’s new deal also increased the power of the federal government in relation to the states (patterson 1969). the metaphor of the new deal is today advanced by very different camps. in academia, for example, there is a group of scholars who argue that a green deal must be radically transformative, and to be successful it will have to overcome capitalism (pettifor 2019; klein 2019). others have stressed that a green deal could be part of ecological modernization and a green economy (e.g. jänicke 2012; pahle, pachauri, and steinbacher 2016; unep 2011; rifkin 2019). politically, the notion of a green deal was most prominently promoted by democratic congresswoman alexandria ocasio-cortez in the us, who became a figurehead for progressive climate policies in america in 2018. she builds on debates that had been around, at least within the democratic party, since 2006 (bang and schreurs 2011) and that at the same time also had gained a lot of traction in some parts of the labour party in the uk. in the us, the green deal offers to provide a political, as well as economic or societal, answer to the climate problem. although president biden was hesitant to endorse the notion of a green deal during the campaign, his “plan for a clean energy revolution and environmental justice” contains many of the major economic, social, and ecological elements of what the proponents of the green deal have demanded, such as a massive roll-out of new energy infrastructures (biden 2020). hence, the us example shows that climate issues are no longer just another environmental problem, but rather a challenge to how the economic system is structured. furthermore, proponents have a very strong focus on social justice and are trying to reach out to blue-collar workers. how are these ideas taken up in canada and the eu, and do they have a chance to provide an alternative to carbon democracy? the green deal in canada: a variety of bottom-up movements in canada, the idea of a green deal has been embraced by various civil society organizations (e.g., greenpeace, north 99) as well as by local communities and indigenous groups who are pushing for transformative policies that would end canada’s dependence on fossil fuels (macarthur et al. 2020). in 2019, many grassroots initiatives which were opposed to the north american free trade association (nafta) have turned their attention to environmental issues and started to campaign for a ‘new green deal’ (coalition for a green new deal 2019). this campaign serves as a rallying 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 cry that unites various political agendas. for example, the movement of “the pact for a green new deal” was developed through town hall meetings which gathered a diverse set of demands ranging from indigenous rights to green infrastructures. the resulting list was labelled a “green new deal”. the movement for a green deal is particularly strong in quebéc, where a “pacte pour le transition” was introduced and signed by more than 285,000 people in april 2020 (shields 2019). at the federal level, member of parliament peter julian submitted a motion for a “green new deal for canada” in december 2019, a legislative initiative advocating for a green deal in canada which stressed the notion of a just transition (julian 2020). what is evident is that in all statements and formulations of the broader movement, the issue of social justice is a major demand and the notions of indigenous knowledge, as well as climate justice, are particularly stressed (the council of canadians 2019). evaluating the various attempts to bring about a green deal in canada, jessica green (2019) suggests that so far it “is more aspiration than legislation. but the momentum for decisive action on climate change is growing.” one can thus conclude that the idea of a green deal in canada is an attempt to move beyond carbon democracy from the bottom up, building on grassroots movements and stressing justice as well as local and indigenous forms of knowledge (see also macarthur et al. 2020). a new worldview is being promoted, but there is still not enough momentum for a new socio-technical infrastructure to evolve. neither are the existing power structures of the fossil fuel industry – particularly the energy sector – being replaced, nor are the veto positions of fossil fuel dependent provinces being challenged. at least for the foreseeable future, it thus seems unlikely that these bottom-up processes will evolve into a game changer to canada’s carbon democracy and prairie capitalism. the green deal in the eu: top-down approaches in times of covid-19 in europe, the idea of a green deal has been advanced in a top-down fashion more than it has in canada. the concept was promoted by the eu commission, which announced that europe will be the first carbon-neutral continent and which promised to “transform the eu into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use” (european commission 2019, 2). the commission’s president, von der leyen, announced a plan worth one trillion euros that over a period of 10 years will massively restructure europe’s industry toward decarbonization. the first objective was initially set to 50 percent reduction of the eu’s emissions by 2030 (taking 1990 as the base year); however, this target was increased to 55 percent in december 2020 by the european council in order to provide new momentum to the stagnant european economy. the green deal is also much more ambitious in its scope compared to former policy announcements, as it focuses not only on carbon pricing through the eu ets, potentially supported by a carbon border tax to avoid leakage, but also on sustainable investment, e.g., in the fields of buildings, mobility, industrial policy, and a just transition (european commission 2019). in particular, the notion of a just transition fund of about 100 billion euros to compensate those regions and sectors within europe that lose out from decarbonization and to counterbalance adverse distributional effects, potentially through compensation mechanisms, has been perceived as an innovative way to get countries like poland on board (claeys, tagliapietra, and zachmann 2019, 15f). the eu’s green deal has been criticized for the fact that not much of the money is actually new or additional but rather represents a reshuffling of existing funds, generating only 7.5 billion euros in new commitments (varoufakis and adler 2020). it is also highly questionable how green the 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 contributions really are, such as those regarding farm subsidies. furthermore, most of the money is supposed to come from private-sector investments, but the private sector is still under-investing in green technologies. to reach the targets of the green deal, about 25 percent of all new investments will have to go into sustainable technologies, up from only 12 percent now (geinitz 2020). finally, the eu reached an agreement on its future budget for 2020–2027, which includes a covid-19 recovery fund and which foresees 30 percent of allocated resources being used to finance various aspects of the eu’s climate objectives. however, so far in all g20 countries the money spent in the context of covid-19 has supported high-carbon economic production, although the eu is the polity investing most in low-carbon production measures (unep 2020, 38). despite numerous challenges, the overall outlook is positive. first, the green deal will lead to some climate mainstreaming as is already visible with the eu stability pact, where – before the covid19 crisis and the factual cancellation of the pact – the idea was floated that climate measures would not count as fiscal deficits. this is relevant as it allows eu member states to invest more in sustainable technologies and practices without having to fear that austerity measures from the eu commission will follow. the green deal also targets the common agricultural policy and infrastructure investments that so far have not been front-runners of decarbonization, thus developing a strong multi-sectoral component. second, the european measures might have some leverage on the member states, which is not only true for potential buy-in by poland but also due to provisions of ambitious parameters for the frontrunners. for example, the german energy transition might get a necessary boost through tougher european regulations (löschel 2020). other players who tried to stop the commission’s work on the green deal, like the czech president babis, were simply sidelined and could not stop the deal nor the recovery fund (oroschakoff and mathiesen 2020). third, the green deal is supported by the european central bank, and some policy-makers have brought up the idea of green bonds which would, for the first time, provide the eu with revenues independent from the member states (taylor 2021). likewise, the european investment bank will continue to restructure its financing to make it greener. similarly, the green deal is going beyond the piecemeal attempts that characterized earlier european approaches (harvey and rankin 2020). the green deal will be particularly important for european clean-tech companies which need to scale up within the larger european market in order to be on an equal footing with the competitors in the us and china that often underprice european companies due to having gained experiences in larger domestic markets (claeys, tagliapietra, and zachmann 2019, 14). the green deal could, therefore, evolve as a first step for the eu to move beyond the characteristics of a carbon democracy. the eu member states’ phase out of extracting and burning coal, and the concurrent investment in renewable energies, allows the build-up of a new socio-technical infrastructure that is no longer based on fossil fuels. important sectors like the european car industry and even whole countries like poland are now being pressured by the european commission and civil society to make the changes they had long avoided (oroschakoff and mathiesen 2020). a new momentum has been created that will make obstructive policy-making much harder to succeed. finally, with the attempt to integrate progressive climate policies across the whole spectrum, and addressing recalcitrant sectors like traffic, agriculture and building, the eu can no longer be criticized for shallow green-washing. 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 conclusion: from carbon to green democracy? the gist of this article can be summarized in two arguments. first, greta thunberg’s warning at the davos world economic forum in january 2019 that “the house is on fire” came right on time. indeed, the science showing the negative impacts on our planet of anthropogenic climate change is extremely disturbing (ipcc 2018). as this article has argued, contrary to official claims, neither canada nor the eu has so far been a successful firefighter. the socio-technical infrastructure behind the extraction, transportation, and consumption of fossil fuels is still to a large extent structuring their economies, societies, and politics in profound ways. carbon democracy has been deeply entrenched in both polities. too often policy and academic debates on how the climate problem can be solved are framing the issue as another environmental disturbance that needs a technical solution, but ignoring the deep-seated entrenchment of carbon democracy. second, not all hope is lost. fridays for future and other civil society movements are contributing to a strong politicization of climate change. and at least for the eu, the politicization has found a rallying cry in the idea of a european green deal. this could lead to what meadowcraft and others have labelled a “green state” (bäckstrand and kronsell 2015; duit, feindt, and meadowcroft 2016; meadowcroft 2012). however, for canada it is evident that much has to happen to overcome the deep-seated practices of prairie capitalism and carbon democracy. as canada has traditionally aligned its climate policy with that of the us, there is hope that the government may again align its policies with the new us administration that plans to engage more constructively in global climate talks and to change some elements of its fossil fuel socio-economic infrastructure. whether the more positive evaluation of the eu is due to the fact that the eu institutions are more insulated from public pressure, and thus can force decarbonization more strongly than can their counterparts in a country like canada, is an open question that merits further research. in conclusion, decarbonization and the attempt to leave the socio-technical infrastructure of our carbon democracies behind us have slowly evolved into a political and social project that could lead to the much-needed green transformation. 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 references bäckstrand, karin, and anika kronsell, eds. 2015. rethinking the green state: environmental governance towards climate and sustainability transitions. london: routledge. balthasar, andreas, miranda a. schreurs, and frédéric varone. 2019. “energy transition in europe and the united states: policy entrepreneurs and veto players in federalist systems.” the journal of environment & development 29 (1): 3-25. doi: 10.1177/1070496519887489. bang, guri and miranda a. schreurs, 2011. “a green new deal: framing u.s. climate leadership.” in the european union as a leader in international climate change politics, edited by rüdiger k.w. wurzel and james connelly, 235-251. london: routledge. barr, stewart. 2018. “personal mobility and climate change.” wires climate change 9 (5): e542. doi: 10.1002/wcc.542. bbc. 2020. “greta thunberg brands eu’s new climate law 'surrender'.” bbc, march 4, 2020. accessed april 1, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51736134. biden, joe. 2020. “the biden plan for a clean energy revolution and envrionmental justice.” accessed april 1, 2021. https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/. boyd, brendan. 2019. “a province under pressure: climate change policy in alberta.” canadian journal of political science 52 (1): 183-199. doi: 10.1017/s0008423918000410. boyd, brendan, and barry rabe. 2019. “whither canadian climate policy in the trump era?” in canada–us relations: sovereignty or shared institutions?, edited by david carment and christopher sands, 239-260. cham: springer international publishing. brand, ulrich, and markus wissen. 2017. imperiale lebensweise. zur ausbeutung von mensch und natur im globalen kapitalismus. münchen: okeom. bulkeley, harriet. 2014. “climate change and urban governance: a new politics?” in routledge international handbook of social and environmental change, edited by stewart lockie, david a. sonnenfeld, and dana r. fisher, 157-169. london: routledge. burck, jan, ursula hagen, n. höhne, leonardo nascimento, and christoph bals. 2019. “climate change performance index. results 2020.” cologne, bonn, beirut: new climate institute, germanwatch, can. canwea (canadian wind energy association). 2020. “wind energy in alberta.” canwea. accessed december 18, 2020. https://canwea.ca/wind-energy/alberta/. chuang, frank, ed manley, and arthur petersen. 2020. “the role of worldviews in the governance of sustainable mobility.” proceedings of the national academy of sciences 117 (8): 4034. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1916936117. claeys, grégory, simone tagliapietra, and georg zachmann. 2019. “how to make the european green deal work.” bruegel policy contribution no. 14. brussels: bruegel. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51736134 https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ https://canwea.ca/wind-energy/alberta/ 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 climate action tracker. 2020. “countries.” accessed december 15, 2020. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/. climate transparency. 2020. “countries.” accessed december 15, 2020. https://www.climatetransparency.org/countries. coalition for a green new deal. 2019. “what did we hear at the pact for a green new deal town halls?” accessed january 4, 2021. https://act.greennewdealcanada.ca/what-we-heard/. dalby, simon. 2019. “canadian geopolitical culture: climate change and sustainability. the canadian geographer 63 (1): 100-111. doi: 10.1111/cag.12472. delreux, tom, and frauke ohler. 2019. “climate policy in european union politics,” edited by oxford research encyclopedias. duit, andreas, peter h. feindt, and james meadowcroft. 2016. “greening leviathan: the rise of the environmental state?” environmental politics 25 (1): 1-23. ellerman, a. denny, claudio marcantonini, and aleksandar zaklan. 2015. “the european union emissions trading system: ten years and counting.” review of environmental economics and policy 10 (1): 89-107. doi: 10.1093/reep/rev014. european union (eu). 2018. “directive (eu) 2018/ 410 of the european parliament and of the council.” march 14, 2018. brussels: european union. european commission. 2019. “communication from the commission to the european parliament, the european council, the council, the european economic and social committee and the committee of regions: the european green deal.” brussels: european commission. falkner, robert. 2016. “the paris agreement and the new logic of international climate politics.” international affairs 92 (5): 1107-1125. fuhr, harald, thomas hickmann, and kristine kern. 2018. “the role of cities in multi-level climate governance: local climate policies and the 1.5°c target.” current opinion in environmental sustainability 30: 1-6. doi: 10.1016/j.cosust.2017.10.006. geinitz, christian. 2020. “klimavorreiter scheitern am eu-ziel.” frankfurter allgemeine zeitung, february 25, 2020. https://zeitung.faz.net/faz/wirtschaft/2020-0225/bdd240acdbc91dbf5a23905ecf9f14e6/?gepc=s5. government of canada. 2015. “climate change: second biennial report.” ottawa: government of canada. government of canada. 2019. “progress towards canada’s greenhouse gas emission reduction target. canadian environmental sustainability indicators.” ottawa: government of canada. _____. 2020. “energy and the economy.” accessed january 5, 2021. https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/science-data/data-analysis/energy-data-analysis/energyfacts/energy-and-economy/20062. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/ https://www.climate-transparency.org/countries. https://www.climate-transparency.org/countries. https://act.greennewdealcanada.ca/what-we-heard/ https://zeitung.faz.net/faz/wirtschaft/2020-02-25/bdd240acdbc91dbf5a23905ecf9f14e6/?gepc=s5. https://zeitung.faz.net/faz/wirtschaft/2020-02-25/bdd240acdbc91dbf5a23905ecf9f14e6/?gepc=s5. https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/science-data/data-analysis/energy-data-analysis/energy-facts/energy-and-economy/20062 https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/science-data/data-analysis/energy-data-analysis/energy-facts/energy-and-economy/20062 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 grande, edgar, tobias schwarzbözl, and matthias fatke. 2019. “politicizing immigration in western europe.” journal of european public policy 26 (10): 1444-1463. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2018.1531909. green, jessica. 2019. “why canada needs a green new deal.” the star, september 26, 2019. https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2019/09/26/why-canada-needs-a-green-newdeal.html. harvey, fiona, and jennifer rankin. 2020. “what is the european green deal and will it really cost €1tn?” the guardian, march 9, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/what-is-the-european-green-deal-andwill-it-really-cost-1tn?cmp=share_iosapp_other. hoeglinger, dominic. 2016. “the politicisation of european integration in domestic election campaigns.” west european politics 39 (1): 44-63. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2015.1081509. hutter, swen, and edgar grande. 2014. “politicizing europe in the national electoral arena: a comparative analysis of five west european countries, 1970–2010.” journal of common market studies 52 (5): 1002-1018. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12133. ike, vivian. 2020. “the impact of veto players on incremental and drastic policy making: australia's carbon tax policy and its repeal.” politics & policy 48 (2): 232-264. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12346. intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc). 2018. “global warming of 1.5 degree.” summary for policymakers. geneva: ipcc. jänicke, martin. 2012. “'green growth': from a growing eco-industry to a sustainable economy.” energy policy 48: 13-21. joltreau, eugénie, and katrin sommerfeld. 2019. “why does emissions trading under the eu emissions trading system (ets) not affect firms’ competitiveness? empirical findings from the literature.” climate policy 19 (4): 453-471. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2018.1502145. julian, peter. 2020. “a green new deal: motion m-1,” peter julian, ndp. accessed december 18, 2020. https://www.peterjulian.ca/in-the-house-motion-m-1-green-new-deal-for-canada. kellogg, paul. 2015. “prairie capitalism revisited: canada, bitumen, and the resource colony question.” journal of canadian studies 49 (3): 222-255. doi: 10.3138/jcs.49.3.222. kind, ed. 2015. “canada says it’s `back` on climate. but is it?” climate change news, november 20, 2015. accessed february 18, 2021. https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/11/29/canada-says-its-back-on-climate-but-isit/ 2015. klein, naomi. 2019. the burning case for a green new deal. london: allen lane. https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2019/09/26/why-canada-needs-a-green-new-deal.html. https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2019/09/26/why-canada-needs-a-green-new-deal.html. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/what-is-the-european-green-deal-and-will-it-really-cost-1tn?cmp=share_iosapp_other https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/what-is-the-european-green-deal-and-will-it-really-cost-1tn?cmp=share_iosapp_other https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12346. https://www.peterjulian.ca/in-the-house-motion-m-1-green-new-deal-for-canada. https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/11/29/canada-says-its-back-on-climate-but-is-it/%202015 https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/11/29/canada-says-its-back-on-climate-but-is-it/%202015 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 kuramochi, takeshi, n. nascimento, maria jose de villafranca casas, hanna fekete, gustovo de vivero, swithin lui, marie kurdziel, mia moisio, paola tanguy, louise jeffery, tessa schiefer, masahiro suzuki, n. höhne, heleen van soest, michel den elzen, kendall esmeijer, mark roelfsema, nicklas forsell, and mykola gusti. 2019. “greenhouse gas mitigation scenarios for major emitting countries. analysis of current climate policies and mitigation commitments: 2019 update.” cologne: new climate institute. löschel, andreas. 2020. “european green deal und deutsche energiewende zusammen denken!” wirtschaftsdienst 100 (2): 78-79. doi: 10.1007/s10273-020-2566-x. macarthur, julie l., christina e. hoicka, heather castleden, runa das, and jenny lieu. 2020. “canada’s green new deal: forging the socio-political foundations of climate resilient infrastructure?” energy research & social science 65: 101442. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101442. macdonald, douglas, and debora vannijnatten. 2010. “canadian climate policy and the north american influence.” in borders and bridges: canada’s policy relations in north america, edited by g.e. hale and m. gattinger, 177-193. don mills, on: oxford univerity press. maclean, jason. 2018. “paris and pipeleines? canada’s climate policy puzzle.” journal of environmental law and practice 21 (1): 47-74. macneil, robert, and matthew paterson. 2016. “this changes everything? canadian climate policy and the 2015 election.” environmental politics 25 (3): 553-557. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2016.1140280. macunias, silvia, and géraud de lassus saint-geniès. 2018. “the evolution of canada’s international and domestic climate policy: from divergence to consistency? canada in international law at 150 and beyond,” paper no. 21. waterloo: centre for international governance innovation. marquardt, jens. 2020. “fridays for future’s disruptive potential: an inconvenient youth between moderate and radical ideas.” frontiers in communication 5 (48): 1-18. mckibben, bill. 2020. “when it comes to climate hypocrisy, canada’s leaders have reached a new low.” the guardian, february 5, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/05/when-it-comes-to-climatehypocrisy-canadas-leaders-have-reached-a-new-low?cmp=share_iosapp_other. meadowcroft, james. 2012. “greening the state?” in comparative environmental politics. theory, practice, and prospects, edited by paul f. steinberg and stacy d. vandeveer, 6387. cambridge, ma: mit press. mildenberger, matto, and erick lachapelle. 2019. “canadians in every riding support climate action, new research schows.” the conversation, september 5, 2019. accessed january 4, 2021. https://theconversation.com/canadians-in-every-riding-support-climate-action-newresearch-shows-122918. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101442 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/05/when-it-comes-to-climate-hypocrisy-canadas-leaders-have-reached-a-new-low?cmp=share_iosapp_other. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/05/when-it-comes-to-climate-hypocrisy-canadas-leaders-have-reached-a-new-low?cmp=share_iosapp_other. https://theconversation.com/canadians-in-every-riding-support-climate-action-new-research-shows-122918 https://theconversation.com/canadians-in-every-riding-support-climate-action-new-research-shows-122918 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 mitchell, timothy. 2011. carbon democracy: political power in the age of oil. brooklyn, ny: verso. morris, ian. 2015. foragers, farmers, and fossil fuels: how human values evolve. new york, ny: princeton university press. oberthür, sebastian. 2019. “hard or soft governance? the eu’s climate and energy policy framework for 2030.” politics and governance 7 (1): 17-27. doi: 10.17645/pag.v7i1.1796. oroschakoff, kalina, and karl mathiesen. 2020. “how the eu’s green deal survived the coronavirus pandemic.” politico, december 17, 2020. accessed december 20, 2020. https://www.politico.eu/article/how-eu-climate-change-promises-survived-the-coronavirusplague/. pahle, michael, shonali pachauri, and karoline steinbacher. 2016. “can the green economy deliver it all?: experiences of renewable energy policies with socio-economic objectives.” applied energy 179: 1331–1341. doi: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.06.073. patterson, james t. 1969. the new deal and the states: federalism in transition. princeton, nj: princeton university press. pettifor, ann. 2019. the case for the green new deal. london: verso. pew research center. 2017. “globally, people point to isis and climate change as leading security threats,” pew research center, august 1, 2017. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/01/globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climatechange-as-leading-security-threats/. richards, john, and leon pratt. 1979. prairie capitalism: power and influence in the new west. toronto: mcclelland and stewart. rifkin, jeremy. 2019. the green new deal: why the fossil fuel civilization will collapse by 2028, and the bold economic plan to save life on earth. new york, ny: macmillan. roger, charles, thomas hale, and liliana andonova. 2017. “the comparative politics of transnational climate governance.” international interactions 43 (1): 1-25. doi: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1252248. schattschneider, e. e. 1960. the semi-sovereign people: a realist’s view of democracy in america. hinsdale, il: the dyden press. schreurs, miranda a. 2011. “federalism and the climate: canada and the european union.” international journal: canada’s journal of global policy analysis 66 (1): 91-108. doi: 10.1177/002070201106600107. shields, alexadre. 2019. “un an après le pacte, dominic champagne ne désespère pas.” le devoir, november 8, 2019. https://www.ledevoir.com/societe/environnement/566585/unan-apres-le-pacte-de-la-transition. https://www.politico.eu/article/how-eu-climate-change-promises-survived-the-coronavirus-plague/ https://www.politico.eu/article/how-eu-climate-change-promises-survived-the-coronavirus-plague/ https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/01/globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats/ https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/01/globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats/ https://www.ledevoir.com/societe/environnement/566585/un-an-apres-le-pacte-de-la-transition. https://www.ledevoir.com/societe/environnement/566585/un-an-apres-le-pacte-de-la-transition. 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 skjærseth, jon birger. 2018. “implementing eu climate and energy policies in poland: policy feedback and reform.” environmental politics 27 (3): 498-518. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2018.1429046. smil, vaclav. 2018. energy and civilization. cambridge, ma: mit press. sovacool, benjamin k., and steve griffiths. 2020. “the cultural barriers to a low-carbon future: a review of six mobility and energy transitions across 28 countries.” renewable and sustainable energy reviews 119: 109569. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2019.109569. sprinz, detlef, and m. weiß. 2001. “domestic politics and global climate policy.” in international relations and global climate change, edited by u. luterbacher and detlef sprinz. cambridge, ma: mit press. steffen, will, wendy broadgate, lisa deutsch, owen gaffney, and cornelia ludwig. 2015. “the trajectory of the anthropocene: the great acceleration.” the anthropocene review 2 (1): 81-98. doi: 10.1177/2053019614564785. stephenson, j. r., b. k. sovacool, and t. h. j. inderberg. 2021. “energy cultures and national decarbonisation pathways.” renewable and sustainable energy reviews 137: 110592. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110592. stern, nicholas. 2015. why are we waiting? the logic, urgency, and promise of tackling climate change. cambridge, ma: mit press. stoczkiewicz, marcin. 2017. “eu should block nord stream 2 on climate grounds.” climate home news. march 31, 2020. szarka, joseph. 2016. “towards an evolutionary or a transformational energy transition?: transition concepts and roadmaps in european union policy discourse.” innovation: the european journal of social science research 29 (3): 222–242. doi: 10.1080/13511610.2016.1166039. taylor, kira. 2021. “european central bank sets up climate team, considers green bonds.” euractiv, january 26, 2021. https://www.euractiv.com/section/energyenvironment/news/european-central-bank-sets-up-climate-team-considers-green-bonds/. the council of canadians. 2019. “it’s time for a green new deal,” august, 2019. accessed december 18, 2020. https://canadians.org/factsheet-greennewdeal. the new climate economy. 2018. “unlocking the inclusive growth story of the 21st century: accelerating climate action in urgent times.” washington, dc: new climate economy. torney, diarmuid. 2019. “follow the leader? conceptualising the relationship between leaders and followers in polycentric climate governance.” environmental politics 28 (1): 167-186. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2019.1522029. united nations environment (unep). 2011. “towards a green economy: pathways to sustainable development and poverty eradication.” nairobi: unep. ____. 2020. “the emissions gap report 2020.” nairobi: unep. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110592 https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/european-central-bank-sets-up-climate-team-considers-green-bonds/ https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/european-central-bank-sets-up-climate-team-considers-green-bonds/ https://canadians.org/factsheet-greennewdeal 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 varoufakis, yanis, and david adler. 2020. “the eu’s green deal is a colossal exercise in greenwashing.” the guardian, february 7, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/07/eu-green-deal-greenwashursula-von-der-leyen-climate?cmp=share_iosapp_other. wettestad, jørgen, and torbjørg jevnaker. 2019. “smokescreen politics? ratcheting up eu emissions trading in 2017.” review of policy research 36 (5): 635-659. doi: 10.1111/ropr.12345. world bank. 2019. “report of the high-level commission on carbon pricing and competitiveness.” washington, dc: world bank. wurzel, rüdiger k. w., james connelly, and duncan liefferink. 2017. the european union in international climate change politics. still taking a lead. abingdon: routledge. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/07/eu-green-deal-greenwash-ursula-von-der-leyen-climate?cmp=share_iosapp_other. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/07/eu-green-deal-greenwash-ursula-von-der-leyen-climate?cmp=share_iosapp_other. 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 central governments in multi-level governance systems facing the challenge of jurisdictions with rising emissions1 douglas macdonald2, university of toronto asya bidordinova3, university of toronto avet khachatryan4, university of toronto abstract central governments in multi-level governance (mlg) systems seeking to put in place effective climate-change policies face a challenge when emissions in some lower-tier jurisdictions are increasing, pushing total emissions higher. this paper explores the question of how central governments can address that challenge by comparing experiences in the european union (eu), with declining emissions, and canada, where emissions are rising. an important factor is the share of total emissions generated by the rising-emission jurisdictions. central governments can more easily cope with a small share (the eu experience) than a large share (the canadian experience). another factor is the political power of the central government relative to that of the risingemission jurisdictions whose policy it seeks to influence (greater in the eu than canada). given that the eu and canada are both relatively decentralized mlg systems, more research is needed in federated states such as australia, germany, or the united states. 1 data for this article was updated in march 2021 2 douglas macdonald is senior lecturer emeritus with the school of the environment, university of toronto. 3 asya bidordinova is ph.d. candidate in the geography and planning department, university of toronto 4 avet khachatryan is a ph.d. student in the geography and planning department, university of toronto. 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 introduction countries of the world have not yet been able to reduce global greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions in part because reductions made by some countries are overwhelmed by increases in others. between 2005 and 2016, the united states (us) and the european union (eu) reduced emissions by 13.2 percent and 15.6 percent respectively. that combined reduction, however, was overwhelmed by china and india, which together account for about a third of global emissions and whose emissions rose respectively by 65.2 percent and 58.1 percent, contributing to the overall rise in global emissions of 19.3 percent during that time period (environment and climate change canada 2020b). although perhaps less visible, the same phenomenon exists within multilevel governance (mlg) systems. emissions may be declining in some jurisdictions, but that progress will be threatened if there are increases in others. in australia, a number of states have seen their emissions go down between 2005 and 2018, but in the state of western australia they rose 21.1 percent (australian government 2020). twenty states in the united states have experienced emission declines between 1990 and 2017, but the state with the largest emissions, texas, has increased emissions by 16.8 percent over that time period (u.s. energy information administration 2020). this article examines the challenge facing central governments in multi-level governance (mlg) systems due to rising emissions in some of their lower-tier jurisdictions. here the term ‘central governments’ refers to the eu governing bodies and national governments in federated states. the article offers comparative analysis of two central governments, the supranational european union (eu) and the federated state of canada, which have faced this challenge during the time period 1990 to 2018. the case study analysis allows a comparison of climate-policy success with failure: eu emissions in 2018 were 25 percent lower than they had been in 1990, while in canada they were 21 percent higher. these start and end dates are used because 1990 is the base line for the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc) and for many national policy processes, while 2018 is the most recent year for which data is available. accordingly, a ‘rising-emission jurisdiction’ (rej) is one in which emissions were higher in 2018 than in 1990, regardless of how its emissions may have risen or fallen between those dates. in both the eu and canada, five jurisdictions had emissions greater in 2018 than 1990; of these jurisdictions, the rejs in each with the greatest emissions were spain and alberta, which are thus the focus of this article’s examination. additionally, although it is not technically an rej since its emissions have fallen since 1990, poland is examined here because it had emissions higher in 2018 than when it joined the eu in 2004 and because it is a fossil-fuel dependent economy, comparable to alberta. the purpose of this article is to explore answers to this research question: what determines the ability of a central government in an mlg system to cope with the challenge of the rej phenomenon? it is assumed here that central governments facing this challenge have three options. first, they can ignore the problem, counting upon greater decreases in declining-emission jurisdictions (dej) to make up for the increase in the rising-emission jurisdictions. second, they can themselves implement a mitigation policy, using their own policy instruments, within the borders of the jurisdictions with rising emissions to the extent permitted by constitutional and legal division of powers. alternatively, as a third option (or one in combination with the second option), they can use command or diplomacy, or both, to induce the rejs to change course and use their policy instruments to move to a track of declining emissions. 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 the feasibility of the first option depends upon the share of over-all emissions made up by the rejs. if that share is small, it is still possible to have an over-all decrease. if the share is large, this is less likely. the feasibility of the second and third options depends upon the institutional nature of the mlg system, combined with other factors, which determines whether the central government has the constitutional authority and political power necessary to itself regulate or to pressure the rej to change course. actions of the eu governing bodies and the government of canada are compared in terms of those three options. the eu-canada comparison poses the methodological problem of comparing an mlg system made up of sovereign countries with a system made up of subnational jurisdictions. nevertheless, the comparison is valid for several reasons. first, both canada and the eu are extremely decentralized mlg systems. canadian provinces, while not sovereign, often act as the next thing to it, particularly in the case of the two who most often take the bit in their teeth, quebec and alberta. secondly, there is now an established body of eu-canada comparison literature (for instance, schreurs (2011) and other works discussed below) which compares eu member states and canadian provinces. the following analysis contributes to this literature a new factor that can help explain the eu’s success and canada’s failure to achieve their climate targets. this factor is the relative ability of central governments to address the problem of rising emissions in some lower-tier jurisdictions. thirdly, even in comparisons of two federated states, such as the united states and canada, there would be differences, such as checks and balances versus westminsterstyle centralized government, which would make it less than a perfect comparison. like all social science comparisons done outside the laboratory, the comparison is not perfect. here, however, this comparison is valid since it compares two similar entities which have displayed differing abilities to address the rising-emission problem. this article begins with a review of the factors currently identified as explanatory for the eu’s success at reducing emissions, and canada’s failure to cut country-wide emissions, in order to determine how the rej phenomenon relates to those factors. the viability of the first option, that is to ignore rising emissions trends in the rej, is addressed by providing data on the relative shares of total emissions provided by rejs in the eu and canada. this is followed by examination of how each central government has addressed the other two options – doing what it can to address the issue on its own or entering into diplomacy with the hope of encouraging the rej to change course. the conclusion offers thoughts on implications of the case study findings for central governments in other mlg systems faced with the rej challenge. current explanations for the different emission trajectories in the eu and canada various factors are cited in the literature as influencing emission trajectories in the eu and canada. one set of factors is the physical context. a higher rate of population growth in canada than the eu has been cited as a factor explaining the difference in emissions (harrison and sundstrom 2007; macdonald 2008; macdonald et al. 2013). another factor is geographic location. the eu is located next to russia, while canada neighbors the united states. analysts have noted the different motivations of government arising from those locations: eu leaders in the past have wanted to increase use of renewable energy to decrease reliance on imported russian gas because of fears russia could turn off the tap for political reasons (hayden 2011; vogler 2011; macdonald et al. 2013; macdonald 2014; schreurs 2011), although that concern seems to have lessened with 82 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 german support for a new gas pipeline from russia. conversely, canadian policy makers have been subjected to pressure by business interests wanting to ensure that they would not lose competitive advantage by virtue of canada adopting more ambitious climate policies than did the us (macdonald et al. 2013; macdonald and vannijnatten 2010; schreurs 2011). when climate policy first came on the policy agenda in the 1990s, eu mitigation costs were reduced because circumstances other than climate policy had brought about emission reductions. this was particularly the case in the united kingdom (uk), as it moved from coal to gas, and germany, as it modernized the former east german industrial plants (harrison and sundstrom 2007; macdonald et al. 2013; schreurs 2011). rabe (2007) says that almost half of the eu reduction between 1990 and 2004 came about for this reason. nothing similar has occurred in canada, other than the 2008 economic recession which brought about a reduction in canadian emissions unrelated to policy (macdonald 2020). a second group of explanatory factors has to do with the differing motivations of eu and canadian policy makers. eu leaders have been much more interested in putting in place effective and coordinated climate policy than have their canadian counterparts. schreurs and tiberghien (2007) point out that leadership in the eu has come from many places, including individual member states, the european commission, and the european parliament. in part, these leadership roles are explained by public opinion and pressure from environmental non-governmental organizations (schreurs and tiberghien 2007) but also by a perception on the part of those such as the european commission that climate policy is a means of strengthening the underlying goal of european integration (macdonald et al. 2013; macdonald 2014). in addition, member states already acting on the issue wanted to see eu policy impose similar costs upon their competitors in the eu (hayden 2011; macdonald 2014). finally, all eu policy makers wanted to see the eu play a lead role on the issue in the global arena, perhaps because it could not compete with us leadership on military issues (hayden 2011; macdonald et al. 2013; macdonald 2014; schreurs 2011). such a lead role was only possible if effective policy was being put in place within the eu. while some have acted, no canadian provinces have sought to influence national policy equivalent to that of member states such as germany (or, as rabe (2007) notes, of us states such as california). while eu foreign policy sought a lead role on the global stage, with some exceptions, such as the early global leadership of prime minister brian mulroney, canadian federal governments have limited themselves to ensuring harmonization with us policy. federal governments from 1990 to 2005 provided only minimal leadership. the harper conservative government, 2006 to 2015, was not at all motivated to address climate issues and essentially developed no policy (macdonald 2020). only justin trudeau, in power since the fall of 2015, has displayed motivation equivalent to that of eu leaders. difference in the roles of the oil and gas industry is also a contributing factor. schreurs and tiberghien (2007, 28) point to the fact that europe-based oil companies such as bp, shell, and the austrian oil firm omv were more supportive of climate action than were transnational oil companies based in the us, such as exxon mobile. dunn (2005) also reports that bp and shell in the eu were more open to action on the issue than were their us counterparts. falkner (2008) refers to the same difference between oil firms in the eu and the us, and ylä-anttila et al. (2018) identify the role of the fossil-fuel industry as a factor explaining differences in climate policy. this industry in canada has certainly sought to block effective climate policy, mounting an intense, 83 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 although unsuccessful, lobby to stop the chretien government from ratifying kyoto in 2002 (macdonald 2007) and then successfully lobbying for the deregulatory actions of the harper government in 2012 (macdonald 2020). because canada is an oil and gas exporting entity, while the eu is not, the industry in canada holds more structural power than it does in the eu, which is a net importer (schreurs 2011; harrison and sundstrom 2010). that structural power is augmented by the fact oil and gas play a larger role in the canadian economy than in the eu. the particular case of coal, another fossil fuel, is discussed below in relation to poland. another factor is differences in electoral systems. proportional representation has allowed green parties in europe to directly participate in governing in eu member states and the european parliament, while the first-past-the-post system in canada has ensured they are shut out. fiorino (2011) has found that proportional representation correlates with more effective environmental policy; harrison and sundstrom (2007; 2010) make the same argument. some authors have claimed that canadian federalism is a system less likely to generate effective climate policy than is eu multi-level governance (schreurs and tiberghien 2007; harrison and sundstrom 2007; schreurs 2011). others have pointed to the fact that the eu policy has been developed on the basis of an explicit process of negotiating burden sharing agreements, while canadian policy has not (schreurs and tiberghien 2007; schreurs 2011; macdonald et al. 2013; macdonald 2014). schreurs and tiberghien (2007) suggest this has meant that compared to canada, the eu has been able to more readily negotiate with veto actors by providing them financial compensation. differences in physical circumstances, motivations of governments, roles of the fossil-fuel industry, and electoral systems are all valid explanations, each helping to solve the puzzle of the very different eu and canadian emission trajectories. each of them is also a contributing factor in the rej phenomenon. poland and alberta act as they do largely because physical circumstances blessed them with fossil fuel resources, leading them to act in alliance with their fossil-fuel industries, resisting pressure from their central governments. degree of motivation helps explain the political power of central governments relative to that of rej governments because the more motivated the central government is, the more it will devote time and resources to winning in the conflict with the rej government. that motivation is also influenced by the electoral system. proportional representation electoral systems are conducive to compromise and policy continuity; such systems exist in the eu parliament and most eu member states, except france and former eu member the united kingdom. in addition, the principle of power sharing is embedded in eu governance, resulting in negotiated, compromise decisions. in contrast, a first-past-the-post electoral system in canada produces swings in ideology of the governing party – the enormous difference between ‘do-nothing’ harper and ‘activist’ trudeau is not to be found in successive eu governing bodies. the rej phenomenon, accordingly, does not contradict or require changes in explanations currently existing in the literature; instead, it complements them. the rej phenomenon is a useful addition to that literature because it shows how central governments are challenged by lower-tier jurisdictions intent on economic activity which causes their emissions to rise, even while the mlg system as a whole is committed to a decrease. the following pages explore that challenge and the responses of central governments. 84 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 rising and declining jurisdictions’ relative shares the comparison made here shows that whether or not a central government can simply ignore the rej problem depends upon three things: first, relative shares of total emissions generated by rejs and dejs; second, magnitude of the rej share increase between 1990 and 2018; and third, the extent to which rej emissions increased between 1990 and 2018. in the eu, emissions in five member states (austria, cyprus, ireland, portugal, and spain) were higher in 2018 than 1990, and so these are classified as rising-emission jurisdictions (rejs). five canadian provinces also fall into the rej category (alberta, british columbia, manitoba, newfoundland and labrador, and saskatchewan). table 1 below shows that the rej share of eu total emissions in 1990 (9 percent) was much smaller than the rej share in canada that year (49 percent). secondly, the rej share in the eu only increased from 9 percent to 13 percent in 2018. in canada, the share increased from 49 percent to 62 percent. finally, eu rej emissions increased by 13 percent during that time period, while canadian rej emissions increased by 51 percent. for all three indicators, rej emissions in the eu posed a less serious challenge than they did in canada. despite rej emissions increases, total eu emissions declined because of decreases in other member states. in canada, by contrast, decreases in some provinces were overwhelmed by the rej increases. table 1. canada and eu rej and dej shares and change rate, 1990 and 2018, mt 1990 emissions, mt 2018 emissions, mt change rate (1990-2018) canada 603 729 21% rej emissions 297 448 51% dej emissions 304 280 -7% rej share of total 49% 62% european union 5652 4227 -25% rej emissions 487 550 13% dej emissions 5164 3676 -29% rej share of total 9% 13% sources: environment and climate change canada 2020a; european energy agency 2020 this is not to suggest that the eu governing bodies have ignored the rej problem. they have been very active in implementing policies such as the 2005 emissions trading system and the 2008 and 2014 energy and climate packages which were intended to reduce all emissions, including those of the rejs. however, the rejs’ small share of total 1990 emissions, the relatively minor increase in that share up to 2018, and the relatively small increase in total rej emissions have aided in that task. the reverse has been true in the canadian case. thoughts on the importance of rej share, relative to other aspects of the rej challenge are offered in the conclusion. the following discussion focuses on the relative political power of central governments and that of the rejs in canada and the eu. 85 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 political power of central governments vis-à-vis member states/provinces the second factor which influences the rej dynamic is relative political power. this power balance influences the viability of the central government options of itself regulating within rej borders or attempting to influence rej policy. while political power is a challenging, contested subject (clegg and haugaard 2009), this paper examines only explicit forms of power, what fuchs (2007, 56) refers to as “direct observable relationships of power between actors.” arts and tatenhov (2004, 343) conceptualize power as “the ability of actors to mobilize resources in order to achieve certain outcomes in social relations,” and marquardt (2017) applies this to the power relations in climate mlg systems. three factors influencing the relative ability of central governments to mobilize resources in the eu and canada are considered: financial resources; the distribution of authority between levels of government; and the motivation of governments in terms of their willingness to use power. for the first, examination is made of all the rejs in the eu and canada. for the second and third, the rej in each with the greatest emissions – spain and alberta – provide examples. poland is also discussed which, despite the best efforts of the eu governing bodies, has not reduced its emissions since it joined the eu in 2004. financial resources of rejs governmental resources include intangibles, such as perceived legitimacy, but a fundamental indicator of relative political power is the size of annual revenues. bakvis, baier, and brown (2009, 51) note that larger, richer canadian provinces are better able to resist the federal government than are smaller provinces. fioramonti (2017) notes that at the international level power is related to size of the economy. government revenues are one of the sources of political power in climate mlg systems (marquardt 2017). while power reaches far beyond the availability and accumulation of resources, financial and professional resources are capacities that enable governments to make use of constitutional, institutional, and political resources (marquardt 2017). it is true that lower-tier governments within mlg systems can at times play a veto role. by and large, however, governments with more revenue have greater policy capacity. they can do more to hire staff to understand the science, analyze policy options, and prepare technical arguments than can those with fewer financial resources. accordingly, as an indicator of this source of power we focus upon the portion of total eu and canadian gross domestic product (gdp) held by each of the rising-emission jurisdictions. the following two tables show the share of total gdp contributed by the rejs in the eu and canada in 1990 and 2018 (table 2 and table 3). 86 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 table 2. share of gdp held by eu member states with rising emissions, 1990 and 2018, % country gdp 1990 (% total) gdp 2018 (% total) austria 2% 2% cyprus 0.1% 0.1% ireland 1% 2% portugal 1% 1% spain 7% 8% total rej share 11% 13% source: world bank group 2020 table 3. share of gdp held by canadian provinces with rising emissions, 1990 and 2018, % province gdp 1990 (% total) gdp 2018 (% total) alberta 11% 16% british columbia 12% 13% manitoba 4% 3% newfoundland and labrador 1% 1% saskatchewan 3% 4% total rej share 30% 37% sources: royal bank of canada 2020; statistics canada 2009 as can be seen, in the eu, rejs accounted for 11 percent of total gdp in 1990 and that figure had increased to 13 percent in 2018. by contrast, rejs accounted for 30 percent of canadian gdp in 1990 and that share then rose to 37 percent in 2018. the share of total gdp attributed to rejs in europe was smaller and increased less than was the case in canada. since gdp and related government revenues are one source of the political power of governments, these figures suggest that the canadian rejs were more politically powerful relative to the government of canada than were the european rejs relative to the eu governing bodies. it may be that the canadian rejs were better able to counter central government regulation within their borders or central government efforts to induce them to change their policy than were their eu counterparts. table 4 shows the same difference exists between spain and alberta: spain’s share of total gdp was less in 1990 than that of alberta, and it subsequently increased less. table 4. spain and alberta shares of total gdp gdp 1990 (% total) gdp 2018 (% total) spain 7% 8% alberta 11% 16% sources: royal bank of canada 2020; statistics canada 2009; world bank group 2020 this suggests that the political power of the eu governing bodies wishing to regulate within rej borders or induce rej policy change was greater than was the case for the government of canada. this statement is made with caution because financial resources are not the only indicator of power. two other factors influencing relative political power of central governments and rejs are discussed next. 87 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 institutional context comparison is now made of two aspects of the institutional context which influence the relative political power of central governments and rejs. the first is the system-wide degree of centralization, that is, the authority given to the central government to direct the affairs of lowertier jurisdictions. is the central government clearly dominant or simply first among equals? the second is specific to energy and climate change policy and has to do with the competence of the central government in that policy field. if a central government does not have energy and climate competence, its power in the climate policy field is seriously constrained relative to that of lowertier governments (see weibust 2009, 1-3 for discussion of these two aspects of centralization within mlg systems). the question of competence, however, is more complicated than simply whether the central government has it or does not. particularly in the canadian case, the question of whether the federal government wishes to actually use that constitutional authority is also central. degree of system-wide centralization although operating over very different time periods, the institutional structures of the eu and canada in terms of centralization of authority have moved in opposite directions. two examples are discussed: first, central government power to direct activity of a lower-tier jurisdiction; and second, intergovernmental decision-making. compared to canada, the eu has more power to direct lower-tier policy activity. when the first eu treaty was signed in 1951, there was no authority existing at a level above that of the sovereignstate signatories. since then, by a process of negotiating further treaties, such as those of rome (1957), brussels (1965), maastricht (1992), and lisbon (2007), a set of eu governing bodies with powers in some ways akin to those of a national government (and in some ways not) have come into being. in a formal, legal sense, resulting from rulings of the european court of justice, eu law takes precedence over that of member states (jordan et al. 2010). when authorized by the eu treaties, eu governing bodies can pass binding laws (regulations or directives), which are either directly applicable to the citizens or compel the member states to take policy action. this power is enforceable by means of the european court of justice. the government of canada does not have comparable authority to direct a province to implement certain policy measures. while canada was designed by sir john a. macdonald as a highly centralized system, based upon extensive federal power, it has evolved into one of the most decentralized federal systems in existence. the original basis for federal power was two-fold. the first was the power to disallow provincial legislation, any law passed by a province can be ruled out of existence by ottawa. secondly, the federal government can decree that any particular matter has become a subject of federal, rather than provincial, jurisdiction. for a variety of reasons, those two powers are completely out of sync with current federal-provincial relations and have not been used for over 50 years (webber 2015). unlike the eu, the government of canada cannot require a province to implement a given policy. differences in intergovernmental decision-making systems mean that the eu has the power to make decisions which are binding for member states. the canadian federal government does not 88 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 have that power. eu multi-level governance initially used consensus-based decision-making mechanisms, but has drifted towards a qualified majority system for most, albeit not all, decisions. in contrast, governments engaged in canadian intergovernmental relations employ only consensus-based decision-making. the council of the european union (ministers in the different policy domains) has moved from reliance on consensus to use of qualified majority voting, now done by means of a ‘double majority’ (the council decision must be supported by 55 percent of member states, representing 65 percent of eu population). that said, the eu still uses consensual decision-making for its combined energy and climate decision-making. the 2008 and 2014 climate and energy packages were adopted by consensus rather than qualified majority voting (macdonald et al. 2013; skjærseth 2018). canada has not moved at all in the direction of qualified majority voting. canadian federal and provincial governments decide by majority voting. when these governments engage in intergovernmental relations to develop coordinated national programs, however, they use only consensus. intergovernmental environment and climate policy decision-making process is supported by a secretariat, the canadian council of ministers of the environment (ccme), which has no governing powers. decision-making by federal and provincial governments at ccme meetings is always consensual. furthermore, provinces have the right to opt out of any given process or decision, increasing the power of those wishing to play a veto role (macdonald 2020). weibust (2009, 187) makes this comparison: eu member states are often able to negotiate concessions within a directive, but once a directive is passed, they cannot opt out of the directive. nor can they opt out of enforcement provisions. in contrast, none of the standards agreed to by the ccme are binding upon provincial governments, even though they have all been negotiated by those governments, on a consensual basis. in the eu, the council can decide with a qualified majority of member states in most policy areas, which means that member states can be overruled and still have to comply with eu law. in some policy areas (such as tax harmonization and police cooperation) member states can veto legislative proposals. in canada, in the case of a veto-role province whose participation is essential to the success of the program, the federal government and other provinces will do what they can to keep that province as a participant. for that, any intergovernmental agreement reached is likely to be the lowest-common-denominator, due to the influence of the veto province. in summary, the eu mlg system has a greater degree of system-wide centralization than has the canadian. eu governing bodies can direct member states to take policy activity and can make decisions by qualified majority voting. the government of canada cannot direct provincial policy action and canadian intergovernmental relations uses only consensual decision-making. 89 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 energy and climate competence (jurisdiction) and use of that competence the eu began to govern in the policy field of environment, as an area of shared competence with member states, in the 1970s. competence in that area was formally recognized in the 1987 single european act and the 1992 maastricht treaty. climate has been considered part of that environment mandate, but energy has not. the eu began to govern in the policy field of climate in the 1990s and gained formal shared competence in the policy field of energy with the 2009 lisbon treaty. nevertheless, member states have insisted that they are the ones to decide the energy mix in their economies. the october 2014 energy and climate package adopted by the council included an explicit statement that member states had the right to decide their own energy mix (skjærseth 2018). with respect to canada, in the late 1960s, both ottawa and the provinces enacted environmental legislation. after provincial court challenges, the supreme court found that ottawa held jurisdiction in the policy field of environment as a matter of shared responsibility with the provinces. since the late 1980s, it was generally assumed that federal competence also included authority to regulate ghg emissions, but recently a number of provinces have challenged the constitutional legitimacy of the federal carbon tax (winfield and macdonald 2020). on march 25, 2021, the supreme court of canada found the federal government’s carbon tax law to be constitutional. central governments in canada and the eu differ in their willingness to move into their own jurisdictional space. a central government may hold competence but decide it will not use it. in cases of divided competences, the lower-tier governments are thus left as the only ones governing in that policy field. in canada, harrison (1996) found that from the early 1970s to the date of publication, ottawa tended to only implement environmental policy at times of strong public concern when associated electoral rewards were available. from 2006 to 2015, the stephen harper government for the most part did not use the powers available to it to implement climate policy. the eu governing bodies, by contrast, have always been eager to govern in the areas of energy and climate. we return to this subject below when we discuss the differing motivation of the central governments in the eu and canada. to compare the ways in which the eu and canada central governments have used their competence, examples are drawn from their attempts to influence the emissions of spain, poland, and alberta. the three emissions trajectories are shown in figure 1 below. 90 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 figure 1. spain, poland and alberta’s ghg emissions trajectories, 1990 – 2018, mt sources: european energy agency 2020; environment and climate change canada 2020a; climate change connection n.d. there are two options for use of competence, either regulating within rej borders or inducing rej policy change. the eu governing bodies have relied almost exclusively upon the second of these options, that is, on directives. their experiences in applying directives to spain and poland, however, have been very different. in 1986, spain joined the eu as a newly industrialized country with a focus on building industrial and institutional capacities. in the 1990s, spain opposed a proposed eu carbon tax (padilla and roca 2004) and demanded that, should the tax be adopted, spain be exempted. in 2004, however, the socialist government committed to implementing the eu emissions trading system (ets) directive (skjærseth and wettestad 2008), and the new minister of the environment proclaimed an urgent need for action on climate change including through the ets; framing these issues as “a mere matter of compliance with europe” allowed the minister to overcome opposition (costa 2006). in 2008 and 2014, the eu’s focus on emissions reduction and burden sharing mechanisms during the setting of climate targets for 2020 and 2030 motivated spain to strengthen its climate policy (gobierno de espana 2017). spain’s emissions have increased since 1990 but it has moved from an opposing to a supportive stance and is now making an effort to fully participate in the eu climate effort. the spanish example shows two things. first, domestic politics within the rej is an important factor determining the political power of the central government. an important factor here was climate leadership of the socialist government and prime minister zapatero (skjærseth and wettestad 2008; costa 2006). secondly, this example seems to indicate than an rej whose government is not structurally dependent upon fossil-fuel industries may be more willing to accept the need for climate action. 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 poland spain alberta 91 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 in contrast with spain, poland, heavily reliant on coal, has perhaps been the member state most critical and pro-active in weakening eu climate policies. poland led an opposition group to weaken climate policies such as the energy and climate package adopted in 2008 (szczerbiak 2012) and the 2030 climate package adopted in 2014 (bocquillon and maltby 2017). each time the eu was able to secure poland and other opposing member states’ support by making “significant concessions and financial compensation measures” (carey 2015, 11; see also bocquillon and maltby 2017). the eu took poland to the european court of justice in march 2013 over its failure to implement the renewable energy directive, requiring it to achieve 15 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2020; poland eventually implemented the directive in 2015, five years behind deadline (skjærseth 2018). in december 2019, poland could not commit to implementing the 2050 eu climate-neutrality target (erbach 2020; the european council 2019), although it had not vetoed that target. the eu has managed to avoid a veto by poland and convinced that country to expand renewable energy generation. nevertheless, the eu has not brought about a reduction of poland’s emissions from their level in 2004, when the country first joined the eu. in canada, the central government used only persuasion to influence provincial policy as it worked to develop national climate policy from 1990 to 2003. briefly after that the martin government (2003-2005) developed plans to itself regulate within provincial borders, but then lost power. as noted, essentially no action was taken by the harper government. the justin trudeau government has used its carbon tax both as a way of regulating within provincial borders and of influencing provincial policy by threatening to regulate if the province does not itself regulate (winfield and macdonald 2020). in 1990, the alberta government led by premier ralph klein saw prime minister brian mulroney’s effort to develop canadian national climate-change policy as a threat to its oil-dependent economy (macdonald 2020; for discussion of alberta as a “petro-state” see carter 2020). in 2002, in alliance with the oil industry, alberta lobbied fiercely, but unsuccessfully, against prime minister chretien’s decision to ratify the kyoto protocol (doern and conway 1994). at the same time, the alberta government adopted a much less ambitious target to reduce alberta’s emissions than the canadian kyoto target, without invoking any public protest from ottawa. during the harper era, 2006 to 2015, ottawa made no attempt to reduce alberta emissions. in 2015, alberta introduced a carbon tax and put an absolute cap of 100 megatonnes on oil sands emissions, but it has never put a cap on total provincial emissions. in that same year, alberta premier rachel notley stipulated that alberta would only participate in the national climate plan being developed by ottawa and the provinces if the trudeau government approved a new pipeline (which it did and then subsequently purchased the trans mountain expansion pipeline in order to ensure that it was built). the kenney government in 2019 cancelled the carbon tax (which was then replaced by a federal tax; the tax was not extended to industrial emissions because alberta agreed to itself regulate them, meeting the federal design requirements (winfield and macdonald 2020)). in december 2020, the trudeau government introduced new legislation and a new climate plan which may eventually affect alberta emissions. other than that, however, since 1990, the government of canada has had almost no influence upon alberta climate policy, other than some shared cost programs and alberta’s agreement to design its industrial tax to fit ottawa requirements. in fact, ottawa has aided alberta emission growth by providing new pipeline capacity. 92 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 what are the summary results of this comparison of the two institutional contexts? the eu governance system gives its governing bodies greater power to direct member state policy than is found in canada. the eu has always been willing to use that authority, while the government of canada has not. this greater political power has allowed the eu to more successfully address its rej challenge than has ottawa. degree of motivation of central governments the degree of motivation of governments can also be referred to as the ‘degree of interest’ – how much a government wants a particular policy outcome. the question of motivation is central to the political power of central governments in mlg systems because degree of interest determines the resources that a government is willing to bring to bear as it finds itself in conflict with other governments in the system. resources, of course, are one of the main factors determining political power. the focus here is upon the degree of interest of the central government, which determines its willingness to apply resources in order to influence rej governments’ policies. the assumption here is that governmental degree of interest is influenced in particular by three factors. the first is the issue of differing motivations associated with concentrated costs versus diffused benefits. mancur olson (1965) notes that those bearing concentrated costs are more motivated to influence the relevant policy decision than those receiving the associated widely distributed benefits. james q. wilson (1980) has also used distribution of cost and benefit and associated motivation as the basis for a theoretical approach to policy analysis. for this analysis, the central government can be seen as receiving the benefit, in terms of accomplishing its policy objective of over-all emission reduction, and the rej government as receiving the cost. for an rej whose economy is dependent upon fossil fuels, such as poland (skjærseth 2018) or alberta (carter 2020), the cost may be seen to be high, leading the rej to be more motivated than the central government. the second relevant factor is the ideology of the governing party respecting the policy issue. a centrist government with no strong ideological leanings will likely be less motivated than one situated on its ideological left or right. climate change is now an ideologically polarized issue (rabe 2018) and so ideology of the governing party decides both whether a government will or will not act at all and, if the latter, how strongly motivated it will be. the third factor is the one discussed in the literature review above, in which eu governing bodies have been motivated to act on the climate issue because they believe doing so will help them achieve other objectives, such as global leadership or europeanization (schreurs 2011). it seems likely that there has been no great difference between the eu and canada respecting the concentrated cost/diffused benefit issue. for both, the majority of their lower-tier jurisdictions do not have to deal with strong resistance to climate policies coming from carbon-intensive fossil fuel extraction industries. there have also been in each some, such as poland and alberta, who have been motivated to resist central government pressure. in sum, it is impossible to point to a major difference between the eu and canada in terms of the concentrated costs and diffused benefits. with respect to ideology of the governing party, however, there is a major difference between the eu and canada. as discussed previously, most eu member states and the eu parliament use proportional representation electoral systems, which are conducive to consensus-building and political stability. the eu does not have a ‘governing party’ that changes with elections. this lends 93 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 itself to a policy consistency which is aided by the european commission’s agenda setting role. in canada, on the other hand, the first-past-the-post system can be associated with abrupt changes in orientation and policy, since an election can bring a change in the governing party. for the climate issue, this has meant that canada experienced nine years of the stephen harper government, between 2006 and 2015, during which time almost no action was taken by ottawa on climate change (macdonald 2020). the harper government had almost no motivation to address the rej challenge posed by the western oil and gas provinces of alberta and saskatchewan, due to both conservative ideology and the fact of its electoral base being situated in the west. the result is that, unlike the eu, canada, for almost a third of the time it has been making climate policy, has been governed by a central government with a very low degree of interest in the issue. there is also a major difference with respect to the third factor influencing degree of interest. as set out in the second section above, the eu governing bodies have been motivated to act on the climate issue by their concern for a number of other policies, including energy security, a desire to show global leadership, and the belief that climate action would aid european integration. the motivation of the government of canada has been almost the polar opposite. canada has never suffered from energy insecurity. while prime minister mulroney, who worked with un agencies to convene the 1988 toronto conference which put the climate issue on the international agenda, did display global leadership, successor governments prior to justin trudeau’s election in 2015 showed no desire for global climate leadership. instead, they kept their eye firmly on the objective of ensuring, for competitiveness reasons, that canadian and american climate policies were aligned. thirdly, far from aiding national unity, climate policy, given the degree to which alberta and saskatchewan feel threatened by national policy making, has a high potential to aggravate regional tensions. not surprisingly, ottawa has always compromised and weakened its climate policy for exactly that reason (macdonald 2020). with respect to central government degree of interest and associated political power relative to that of rejs, two conclusions are important. first, eu governing bodies have consistently displayed a high degree of interest in implementing effective climate policy, unlike canada with its nine-year hiatus. secondly, eu governing bodies have been more interested in putting in place effective climate policy than have liberal canadian governments. both have had the effect of giving eu governing bodies more political power relative to that of their rejs than that held by the government of canada. conclusion as stated at the outset, the purpose of this analysis has been to explore what determines the ability of a central government in an mlg system to cope with the challenge of the rising emissions jurisdictions (rej) phenomenon? this analysis suggests that a central government has three options: to ignore the problem, confident that decreases elsewhere will allow a total decrease (at least at the early stages before deeper emissions cuts are required); itself regulate within the borders of the rej; or induce the rej to change its policy. at least for the two cases examined, canada and the eu, an important element determining viability of the first option is the relative size of rej emissions. as indicated, the rej share of total eu emissions was smaller than that of canada’s in 1990; the share then increased less than it did in canada by 2018; and total rej emissions increased less than in canada. the eu rej portion of 13 percent in 2018, with only a 94 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 modest increase since 1990, did not have decisive influence – eu total emissions were still able to decline. even if poland is added to the current eu rejs, that share only goes to 23 percent. the canadian 62 percent share in 2018, after a significant rise since 1990, did have such influence. this raises the question of when do the rej share, and changes in that share, begin to decisively influence total emissions? presumably somewhere between the eu and canada cases is located the ‘critical threshold’ – the magnitude of rej share, likely specific to each mlg system, which means an mlg system can no longer ignore the rej factor and still experience an over-all reduction. while space does not allow exploration in this article, the concept of a critical threshold is potentially useful as an analytic concept and a methodological tool. further research may shed light on this topic. the eu and canada cases show that as a central government moves to itself regulate or induce the rej to change, relative political power is also important. the eu rejs had less relative financial resources than their canadian counterparts – the total share of eu gdp held by the five rejs was less in 1990 and increased by less than was the case in canada. to the extent financial resources are the source of the political power of a government within an mlg system, the eu rejs held less political power than did their canadian counterparts. beyond that, the institutional context tended to give eu rejs less power relative to their central government than was the case in canada. the eu governing bodies have authority to issue directives requiring policy action by member states and can take non-compliant member states to the european court of justice. the government of canada has no such authority. once subject to a directive, eu member states cannot opt out of the program. canadian provinces do have an opt-out right, often while still obtaining associated federal monies and without paying an electoral price since standing up to ottawa is almost always good politics. the eu governing bodies also hold more political power relative to their rejs than does ottawa because they are more motivated. eu policy makers have been motivated to put in place effective climate policy as part of their interest in world leadership on the issue, their desire to reduce energy imports, and because it was seen as contributing to their goal of europeanization. given the contribution of oil and gas exports to canadian jobs and economic growth, ottawa has always worked for national climate policy which does not kill the alberta goose laying those golden eggs and has always been shy about invoking threats to national unity. the government of alberta has always been motivated to maximize economic benefit from oil and gas exports, with an associated rise in emissions, and so almost always has been more motivated to maintain the status quo than ottawa to change it. the government of spain, by contrast, has seen the benefits of partaking in a joint eu effort to reduce emissions, including the benefits of burden sharing which seems to help build trust in the fairness of the eu’s climate regime. in sum, rej share and relative political power have been directly relevant to the ability of the central governments of the eu and canada to address the rej challenge. what can central governments in other mlg systems learn from that case comparison? some of the relevant factors, such as location of fossil fuel resources (which helps explain rising emissions in poland and alberta) or institutional context, cannot be changed. degree of government motivation and consistency of that motivation, however, are in the control of the central government. they should learn from the eu example. 95 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 although the eu has avoided poland’s veto and encouraged its transition to cleaner energy, it has failed to convince poland to renege on fossil fuel dependence, which provides yet another lesson. the eu governing bodies hold more political power relative to that rej than does the government of canada relative to alberta and have put in considerable effort, involving both carrots and the stick of court action, to convince poland to change policy, and yet the result is exactly the same as that in canada. neither central government, confronted with a lower-tier government strongly motivated by the nature of its fossil-fuel economy, has been successful in bringing about a decrease in the lower-tier jurisdiction’s emissions. eu failure to reduce polish emissions shows the importance of the first factor examined, the physical fact of rej share of total emissions, relative to political power. that factor gave the eu success in reducing its over-all emissions, despite the inability of the eu governing bodies to bring about emission reductions in its most determined opponent, poland, and in its other rej member states. secondly, it underlines the magnitude of the challenge facing central governments and hence the importance of the subject examined here, the role of rejs in mlg systems. central government success in addressing the challenge, even with the tools available to the eu governing bodies, is not assured. given the magnitude of the challenge, is it reasonable to assume that the us federal government will one day bring about a reduction in texas emissions, or the australian government a reduction in western australia’s emissions? more research is needed in other federal countries to provide a fuller understanding of the rej phenomenon, particularly given the fact that the eu and canada, two relatively decentralized mlg systems, are likely not fully representative of all such systems. 96 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 references arts, bas, and jan van tatenhove. 2004. “policy and power: a conceptual framework between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ policy idioms.” policy sciences 37 (3/4): 339–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-005-0156-9. australian government, department of industry, science, energy and resources. 2020. state and territory greenhouse gas inventories 2018. may 2020. https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-05/nga-state-and-territory-greenhousegas-inventories-2018.pdf bakvis, herman, douglas m. brown, and gerald baier. 2009. contested federalism: certainty and ambiguity in the canadian federation. don mills: oxford university press. bocquillon, pierre, and tomas maltby. 2017. “the more the merrier? assessing the impact of enlargement on eu performance in energy and climate change policies.” east european politics 33 (1): 88–105. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2017.1279605. canada energy regulator. 2020. provincial and territorial energy profiles – alberta. https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/mrkt/nrgsstmprfls/abeng.html?=undefined&wbdisable=true carey, elizabeth. 2015. the european union’s 2030 climate energy package and the cop 21. translation of « le paquet energie-climat 2030 de l’union européenne et la conférence de paris sur le climat (cop 21)», the annuaire français des relations internationales 16. https://www.afri-ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2848__article_thucydide_eu_energy-climate_2030_package_and_the_cop_21.pdf carter, angela v. 2020. fossilized: environmental policy in canada’s petro-provinces. vancouver: ubc press. clegg, stewart r., and mark haugaard. 2009. the sage handbook of power. los angeles: sage. climate change connection. n.d. “canada ghg emissions by region,” accessed on february 12, 2021.https://i2.wp.com/climatechangeconnection.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/canada_ghg_emissions_trend_by_region_1990-2013.jpg costa, oriol. 2006. “spain as an actor in european and international climate policy: from a passive to an active laggard?” south european society & politics 11 (2): 223–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608740600645840. doern, g. bruce, and thomas conway. 1994. the greening of canada: federal institutions and decisions. toronto: university of toronto press. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442653832. dunn, seth. 2005. “down to business on climate change: an overview of corporate strategies.” in the business of climate change: corporate responses to kyoto, edited by kathryn begg, frans van der woerd, and david levy. sheffield: greenleaf publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-005-0156-9. https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-05/nga-state-and-territory-greenhouse-gas-inventories-2018.pdf https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-05/nga-state-and-territory-greenhouse-gas-inventories-2018.pdf https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2017.1279605 https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/mrkt/nrgsstmprfls/ab-eng.html?=undefined&wbdisable=true https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/mrkt/nrgsstmprfls/ab-eng.html?=undefined&wbdisable=true https://www.afri-ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2848_-_article_thucydide_eu_energy-climate_2030_package_and_the_cop_21.pdf https://www.afri-ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2848_-_article_thucydide_eu_energy-climate_2030_package_and_the_cop_21.pdf https://i2.wp.com/climatechangeconnection.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/canada_ghg_emissions_trend_by_region_1990-2013.jpg https://i2.wp.com/climatechangeconnection.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/canada_ghg_emissions_trend_by_region_1990-2013.jpg https://doi.org/10.1080/13608740600645840 https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442653832 97 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 environment and climate change canada. 2020a. national inventory report 1990 –2018: greenhouse gas sources and sinks in canada. ottawa: environment canada. _____. 2020b. global greenhouse gas emissions: canadian environmental sustainability indicators. gatineau: environment and climate change canada. https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/cesindicators/global-ghgemissions/2020/global-ghg-emissions-en.pdf erbach, gregor. 2020. eu legislation in progress: european climate law. european parliamentary research service (eprs), members' research service pe 649.385, april 2020. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/brie/2020/649385/eprs_bri(2020)649 385_en.pdf european energy agency. 2020. annual european union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2018 and inventory report 2020. submission to the unfccc secretariat. april 15, 2020. falkner, robert. 2008. business power and conflict in international environmental politics. new york: palgrave macmillan. fioramonti, lorenzo. 2017. “gross domestic problem. how the politics of gdp shaped society and the world.” in history of the future of economic growth. historical roots of current debates on sustainable degrowth, edited by iris borowy and matthias schmelzer, 91–109. london: routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315543000-5. fiorino, daniel j. 2011. “explaining national environmental performance: approaches, evidence, and implications.” policy sciences 44 (4): 367–89. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-011-9140-8. fuchs, doris. 2007. business power in global governance. boulder: lynne rienner publishers. gobierno de españa. 2017. séptima comunicación nacional de españa. convención marco de las naciones unidas sobre el cambio climático. december 2017. harrison, kathryn. 1996. passing the buck federalism and canadian environmental policy. vancouver: ubc press. harrison, kathryn, and lisa mcintosh sundstrom. 2007. “introduction: the comparative politics of climate change.” global environmental politics 7 (4): 1–18. harrison, kathryn, and lisa mcintosh sundstrom. 2010. “introduction: global commons, domestic decisions.” in global commons, domestic decisions: the comparative politics of climate change, edited by kathryn harrison and lisa mcintosh sundstrom, 1–22. cambridge: mit press. hayden, anders. 2011. “europe's climate and energy policy: lessons for canada in sharing the effort of emissions reductions?” dalhousie euce occasional paper 11 (2011). unpublished paper in possession of the authors. https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/cesindicators/global-ghg-emissions/2020/global-ghg-emissions-en.pdf https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/cesindicators/global-ghg-emissions/2020/global-ghg-emissions-en.pdf https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/brie/2020/649385/eprs_bri(2020)649385_en.pdf https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/brie/2020/649385/eprs_bri(2020)649385_en.pdf https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315543000-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-011-9140-8. 98 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 jordan, andrew, dave huitema, and harro van asselt. 2010. “climate change policy in the european union: an introduction.” in climate change policy in the european union: confronting the dilemmas of mitigation and adaptation?, edited by andrew jordan, dave huitema, harro van asselt, tim rayner and frans berkhout, 3-26. cambridge: cambridge university press. macdonald, douglas. 2007. business and environmental politics in canada. peterborough: broadview press. _____. 2008. “explaining the failure of canadian climate policy.” in turning down the heat: the politics of climate policy in affluent democracies, edited by hugh compston and ian bailey. new york: palgrave macmillan. _____. 2014. “allocating greenhouse gas emission reductions in federated systems: the european union, germany and canada.” in multilevel environmental governance: managing water and climate change in europe and north america, edited by inger weibust and james meadowcroft. cheltenham: edward elger. _____. 2020. carbon province, hydro province: the challenge of canadian energy and climate federalism. toronto: university of toronto press. macdonald, douglas, and debora l. vannijnatten. 2010. “canadian climate policy and the north american influence.” in borders and bridges: canada’s policy relations in north america, edited by monica gattinger and geoffrey hale. don mills: oxford university press. macdonald, douglas, jochen monstadt, kristine kern, david gordon, asya bidordinova, alexey pristupa, and anders hayden. 2013. allocating canadian greenhouse gas reductions amongst sources and provinces. sshrc funded study. toronto: university of toronto. https://environment.utoronto.ca/allocating-canadian-greenhouse-gas-emission-reductionsamongst-sources-and-provinces-learning-from-the-european-union-australia-and-germany/ marquardt, jens. 2017. “conceptualizing power in multi-level climate governance.” journal of cleaner production, 154: 167-175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.03.176. olson, mancur. 1965. the logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. cambridge: harvard university press. padilla, emilio, and jordi roca. 2004. “the proposals for a european tax on co2 and their implications for intercountry distribution.” environmental & resource economics 27 (3): 273–95. https://doi.org/10.1023/b:eare.0000017654.74722.23. rabe, barry. 2007. “beyond kyoto: climate change policy in multilevel governance systems.” governance 20 (3): 423-444. rabe, barry. 2018. can we price carbon? cambridge, mass.: the mit press. royal bank of canada. 2020. provincial outlook may 2020. http://www.rbc.com/economics/economic-reports/pdf/provincial-forecasts/provtbl.pdf https://environment.utoronto.ca/allocating-canadian-greenhouse-gas-emission-reductions-amongst-sources-and-provinces-learning-from-the-european-union-australia-and-germany/ https://environment.utoronto.ca/allocating-canadian-greenhouse-gas-emission-reductions-amongst-sources-and-provinces-learning-from-the-european-union-australia-and-germany/ .%20https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.03.176 https://doi.org/10.1023/b:eare.0000017654.74722.23 http://www.rbc.com/economics/economic-reports/pdf/provincial-forecasts/provtbl.pdf 99 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 schreurs, miranda alice. 2011. “federalism and the climate: canada and the european union.” international journal 66 (1): 91-108. schreurs, miranda alice, and yves tiberghien. 2007. “multi-level reinforcement: explaining european union leadership in climate change mitigation.” global environmental politics 7 (4): 19–46. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2007.7.4.19. skjærseth, jon birger. 2018. “implementing eu climate and energy policies in poland: policy feedback and reform.” environmental politics, 27:3, 498-518, doi: 10.1080/09644016.2018.1429046. skjærseth, jon birger, and jørgen wettestad. 2008. “implementing eu emissions trading: success or failure?” international environmental agreements: politics, law and economics 8 (3): 275–90. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-008-9068-4. statistics canada. 2009. cansim table 384-0002 gross domestic product (gdp), expenditurebased, provincial economic accounts, annual (dollars), last updated april 24, 2009. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/81-582-x/2009003/tbl/f.1.1-eng.htm szczerbiak, aleks. 2012. poland within the european union. new awkward partner or new heart of europe? london and new york: routledge publishing. the european council. 2019. conclusions. european council meeting, december 12, 2019. general secretariat of the council note to delegations. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41768/12-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf u.s. energy information administration. 2020. energy-related co2 emission data tables. table 2. state energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by year, adjusted (1990-2017). https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/ vogler, john. 2011. “eu policy on global climate change: the negotiation of burden sharing.” in making eu foreign policy: national preferences, european norms and common policies, edited by daniel c. thomas. new york: palgrave macmillan. webber, jeremy. 2015. the constitution of canada: a contextual analysis. oxford: hart publishing. weibust, inger. 2009. green leviathan: the case for a federal role in environmental policy. farnham: ashgate. wilson, james q. 1980. “the politics of regulation.” in the politics of regulation, edited by james q. wilson. new york: basic books. winfield, mark, and douglas macdonald. 2020. “federalism and canadian climate change policy.” in canadian federalism: performance, effectiveness, and legitimacy, edited by herman bakvis and grace skogstad. toronto: university of toronto press. file:///c:/users/home/downloads/.%20https:/doi.org/10.1162/glep.2007.7.4.19 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-008-9068-4. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/81-582-x/2009003/tbl/f.1.1-eng.htm https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41768/12-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/ 100 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 world bank group. 2020. gdp (current us$) european union. http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd?downloadformat=csv ylä-anttila, tuomas, antti gronow, mark c.j. stoddart, jeffrey broadbent, volker schneider, and david b. tindall. 2018. “climate change policy networks: why and how to compare them across countries.” energy research & social science 45: 258–65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.06.020. http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd?downloadformat=csv https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.06.020. 101 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 79-101 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 climate and energy politics in canada and germany: dealing with fossil fuel legacies 1 stephan schott2, carleton university miranda schreurs3, technical university of munich abstract canada and germany are both pursuing major energy transitions and far-reaching climate programs and targets, but they differ in terms of policies towards some energy sources and their preferred policy instruments. both countries have committed to large scale emission reductions despite the challenge of regional divestment from fossil fuels: hard coal in north rhine westphalia and the saarland; lignite in the rhineland, in the lusatsia (lausitz) region, and in central germany; coal in alberta, saskatchewan, and nova scotia; and oil and natural gas in western canada. this article compares the current pan-canadian framework (pcf) on clean growth and climate change with the german climate law and the european green deal. relying on these measures, canada and germany set out policies and targets to become climate neutral by 2050. the article identifies critical challenges in the transition away from fossil fuels in both countries and provides insights on the possibility and likelihood of linking policies and regulatory measures across the atlantic. 1 the authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and critiques and anita grace for her excellent editorial work. the article was updated on april 22, 2021. 2 stephan schott is an associate professor in the school of public policy and administration at carleton university. 3 prof. miranda schreurs is chair of climate and environmental policy at the bavarian school of public policy, technical university of munich. 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 introduction canada and germany are two of the largest economies among the top ten greenhouse gas (ghg) emitters globally. in 2020, canada accounted for 1.6 percent and germany for 1.8 percent of global ghg emissions. the two countries, however, have quite different historical experiences with fossil-based energy. while canada started with a relatively clean energy system based to a large extent on hydropower, it became a fossil fuel giant as a result of oil and natural gas discoveries in the west. canada, as a colonial nation, was built on the exploitation of natural resources and indigenous lands through a staples approach (watkins 1963) that has been characterized by sequential periods when specific export commodities were dominant (fish, fur, timber, grain, oil), and associated with wider economic, social, and political consequences. the latest natural resource staples to be developed are oil and gas, with canadian reserves of oil and gas, the vast majority of which are located in alberta, accounting for 10 percent of known global reserves (natural resources canada 2019). in comparison, germany fueled its industrial development with domestic coal and lignite. german coal reserves are significant. of known global reserves of coal, germany accounts for 3.5 percent, poland 2.5 percent, and the european union (eu) as a whole about seven percent (worldometers 2020). during its period of rapid economic growth from the 1960s into the 1980s, germany also invested heavily in nuclear energy (brauers, herpich, and oei 2018; von hirschhausen et al. 2018), and so did canada. while both countries’ economies have been heavily dependent on fossil fuels and had a similar number of nuclear reactors into the 1990s, in the last decades germany has embarked on an energy transition away from nuclear energy and towards renewable energy sources (onshore and offshore wind, solar photovoltaics, geothermal, and green hydrogen). germany plans to shut down the last of its nuclear reactors by 2022. more recently, it has laid out plans to phase out coal no later than 2038. these plans have been complemented by the controversial plan to bridge the transition from coal to renewables, with imports of russian natural gas. canada has also invested in expanding renewable energy and plans to phase out coal by 2030. but canada remains heavily invested in western oil and gas and maintains its nuclear power facilities in ontario and new brunswick. the impacts of canada’s and germany’s shifting energy paths are visible in their greenhouse gas emissions trajectories, which have moved in opposite directions. canada’s carbon dioxide (co2) emissions rose from 453.40 metric tonnes (hereafter m tonnes) in 1990 to 584.85 m tonnes in 2019. in contrast, german emissions declined in this same period from 1018.22 m tonnes to 702.60 m tonnes (crippa et al. 2020). indeed, although canada started out relying on cleaner energy than germany and in 1990 its per capita co2 emissions were only somewhat higher than in germany (respectively, 16.37 versus 12.87 tonnes co2/cap), in 2019 they were substantially higher: 15.69 versus 8.52 tonnes co2/cap (crippa et al. 2020). this difference suggests that canada’s status as an increasingly major oil and gas producer in the past decades has worsened its climate balance despite the phase out of coal in ontario and expansion of renewables in some provinces. in comparison, in germany there have been major industrial shifts which include the shutting down of highly polluting plants and the modernization of infrastructure (particularly in eastern parts of the country after reunification in 1990), a strong expansion of renewable energies, and a move away from highly polluting coal to growing reliance on natural gas which has a lower co2 content. germany has more consistently pursued climate policies than has canada, where changes in party control of the federal government have resulted in swings in the degree of intensity with which canada has addressed climate change. 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 this article examines factors that help explain canada’s and germany’s efforts to transition away from their historic energy paths towards cleaner, more climate-responsible energy systems, with attention to their differing experiences in dealing with powerful fossil fuel interests and carbonintensive industrial actors. as german climate and energy policy cannot be understood without reference to the eu, the article also brings in relevant dimensions of eu climate laws and programs. canada, germany, and the eu have all signed on to the paris climate agreement. canada has committed to reducing its ghg emissions by 30 percent of 2005 levels by 2030 and to working towards achieving net emissions neutrality by 2050. germany is pursuing a 55 percent reduction of 1990 emission levels by 2030, has indicated its intentions to be climate neutral by 2050, and has supported the european green deal, which calls for climate neutrality for the entire eu by 2050 as well. to follow along with european and u.s. pledges to pursue more aggressive emission reduction plans, canada announced on earth day 2021 (april 22nd) a more ambitious target of 4045 % carbon emission reductions by 2030. the article begins with a brief comparison of the energy structures in canada and germany. it then examines the german energy transition, the german climate protection act, and the european green deal, before turning to the pan-canadian framework on clean growth and climate change. next, the article examines the significant challenges that both countries face in pursuing their ambitious climate policies, particularly the need to address the resistance of powerful fossil fuels lobbies, carbon-intensive industrial/financial interests, and impacted regions. also considered is the extent to which and why these alliances may be shifting in germany and canada. the article concludes with discussion of areas where the two countries can cooperate to make progress toward their respective goals in transitioning energy sources and combatting climate change. german climate policy and the german energiewende germany plays a particularly important role within international and eu climate and energy policy-making, at times acting as a driver, and at other times acting as a brake. germany was among the first states to introduce a voluntary climate target in 1990, and in 1995 it hosted the bonn conference which lay the groundwork for the 1997 kyoto protocol negotiations. then environment minister and later german chancellor, angela merkel, helped negotiate the kyoto protocol, and later pushed to assure its international ratification. it was under the german presidency of the european council in 2007 that the groundwork was realized for an integrated european climate and energy program and at the onset of ursula von der leyen’s (a german) term as european commission president that the european green deal was launched in 2019. over the years, germany has set out numerous ambitious climate and energy plans as well as voluntary domestic ghg emission reduction targets. these include the climate protection program of 2000, the integrated energy and climate program of 2007, the climate protection concept of 2010, and the climate protection plan 2050 set in 2016. hundreds of policy measures have been introduced to shift industry, society, and energy producers in cleaner directions, to tighten building efficiency standards, to address excessive consumption and waste, to expand recycling, to further public transport opportunities, and to digitalize the economy to enhance efficiencies. 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 with these goals and actions, germany seeks to spur new industries and become a global climate leader. between 1990 and 2020, germany reduced ghg emissions by 42.3 percent and expanded renewable energy in the electricity sector from three to 45 percent (agora energiewende 2021).4 an initial drop in emissions was tied to unification as many industries in the former east germany could not compete in the new system or meet its higher pollution standards. the german federal environmental agency reports that between 1989 and 1994, co2 emissions in the former east germany dropped by about 43 percent while in the former west germany they remained largely stable. the “wall fall profit” in terms of co2 emission reductions has been estimated to be about 105 million tonnes or about 10 percent of the emission reductions from 1990 levels (eichhammer et al. 2001, 7-11). often overlooked in discussions about the wall fall profit are the tremendous financial and social costs associated with the industrial restructuring of the east; while these were perhaps easy emission reductions, they were certainly very costly. after about the mid-1990s, further emission drops are associated with climate policy measures. more recently, the covid-19 crisis has played a role in the sharp greenhouse gas emissions reductions and in the strong performance of renewable energies. agora energiewende (2021) estimates that without the economic slowdown induced by the pandemic, emissions would have only been about 38 percent below 1990 levels. prior to the pandemic, germany’s climate actions were increasingly criticized, especially by environmentalists, as being too lopsided. while much was being done to build up renewables, too little was being done to address emissions in the hardto-abate sectors due to resistance from some of the country’s most powerful industries, including the coal and automobile sectors. germany’s energy transition (energiewende) and its climate policies have been pushed forward by environmental movements and the green party, public opinion, and the search for new areas of industrial development. public pressure began with calls for a nuclear phase out, transitioned to focus on renewable energy, and more recently to demands for still more far-reaching climate action. for many years, deeper changes to the status quo were challenged by conventional fossil fuel dependent industries and regions (hey 2010; stefes 2016). the christian democratic union (cdu) and its bavarian sister party, the christian social union (csu), with its strong ties to big business interests, and the social democratic party (spd) with its support from the labour unions, initially resisted the demands for a more rapid transition in the country’s energy structure and transport system. this resistance has more recently weakened as public demand for climate action has strengthened. over time, fossil fuel industries have felt compelled to begin investing more actively in the renewable energy sector. phasing out nuclear energy and phasing in renewables the energiewende envisions a shift away from nuclear and fossil fuel dependency, enhanced resource and energy efficiency, and the expansion of renewable energy capacity. the energiewende has its roots in decades of contention over nuclear energy policies. anti-nuclear protests galvanized germany in the 1970s and 1980s. these protests led to the birth of the green party, which over the course of the next decades pressed other political parties to develop more assertive programs for sustainable development (hager 2016). today, german political parties 4 see also the frauenhofer institute’s energy charts: https://www.energy-charts.de/index.htm 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 (with the exception of the alternative for germany (alternative für deutschland)) vie with each other to convince voters that they are the true representatives of green interests. the chernobyl nuclear crisis in 1986 weakened public and political support for nuclear energy; the nuclear crisis in japan in 2011 basically ended support altogether. germany, which once had more than a quarter of its electricity supplied from nuclear energy, will soon be nuclear free. related to the phase out of nuclear energy have been the efforts to promote renewable energy. the growth of renewables began with the 1990 electricity feed-in law requiring grid operators to take renewable energy into the grid, including from small producers, and the expansion of feed-intariffs as a result of the renewable energy law of 2000 (von hirschhausen 2018; clausen 2019). this law was negotiated under a social democratic party – green party coalition (morris and jungjohann 2016). phasing out coal and transport-related emissions despite progress on renewables, germany’s ghg emissions were dropping more slowly than planned before the covid-19 pandemic struck; in fact, it appeared that the country would fail to meet its 2020 greenhouse gas reduction target. progress was stifled by the country’s continued heavy reliance on coal, both hard coal and lignite, in the heating and electricity sectors. hard coal and lignite combined accounted for over 39 percent of electricity generation in 2017. while working to develop the image of a clean manufacturing economy, germany was spewing pollution from its 42.6 gigawatts (gw) worth of coal-fired power generation capacity. transport-related emissions tied to oil and gas use were another problem area. a plan to have one million electric vehicles on the road by 2020 had to be pushed back by two years as neither the industry nor the government prioritized the transition (reuters 2018) and because the industry focused on the internal combustion engine and energy-intensive luxury vehicles (miller and campbell 2019). the slow pace of change in the automobile sector is certainly linked to the power of this industry, which employs over 800,000 people directly and many more indirectly. the pace of improvements in the energy efficiency of the housing stock has also been slow. without a climate law making the realisation of targets mandatory, progress was uneven. germany moves to phase out coal starting in the midto late 2010s, pressure grew internally and externally for germany to do more to address emissions from coal-fired power plants, its single largest source of emissions (stefes 2016; oei 2018). an external source of pressure was the launch by the united kingdom and canada of the powering past coal alliance at the 23rd conference of the parties to the un framework convention on climate change in bonn, germany in 2017 (power past coal alliance 2017). the formation of an international alliance to phase out of coal in bonn was an embarrassment for germany as it was seeking to portray itself as a climate leader but had yet to really tackle its own coal-based emissions. it certainly added to the pressure being created by large public protests. domestic protests have taken many forms, and some are still on-going. in 2018, in north rhine westphalia, protesters built camps in the hambach forest to protect this old growth forest scheduled to be cut down by the energy giant, rwe, in order to get at the lignite below. in 2019, activists broke through police lines to prevent mining equipment from being used in the garzweiler lignite mine, and the following year they broke in and occupied the mine. in parallel actions, in 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 brandenburg, protesters blocked the train tracks leading to one of the country’s dirtiest coal-fired power plants, jänschwalde. the confrontations between police and activists are reminiscent of the conflicts which had taken place decades earlier against nuclear power plants. in this increasingly tense environment, in 2018 the coalition government formed the commission for growth, structural change, and employment (more commonly known as the coal commission). germany often makes use of such commissions to develop consensus among divergent interests on deeply divisive issues. commission members discuss and debate for weeks, months, or in this case over a year until a compromise solution can be found. the commission’s final report was released in february 2019. with just one negative vote, the report called for a total phase out of coal by 2038, with a possible earlier phase out by 2035 (schulz 2020). one year later, the german parliament agreed on a “coal phase out” law. the capacity of power plants using hard coal (anthracite) (22.7 gw in 2017) and those using lignite (19.9 gw in 2017) are to be reduced to around 15 gw each by 2022, with a further reduction to 8 gw capacity for hard coal and 9 gw capacity for lignite-fired power plants by 2030. support of up to 40 billion euro for structural transitions and compensation to power plants in the impacted regions is expected (bundesrat 2020). under pressure from youth activists (especially fridays for future) and fearing loss of voter support in the face of its failure to meet set targets, the ruling cdu/csu spd coalition began work on a climate protection law. the federal climate change act, a major framework law, entered into force on december 18, 2019. in discussing the need for the law, the coalition partners noted the heavy financial burden the country would face if it failed to fulfill its ghg emission reduction targets under the eu’s effort sharing decision (fraktionen der cdu/csu und spd 2019). the act mandates a minimum 55 percent reduction in ghg emissions by 2030 (relative to 1990 levels); sets annual emission budgets for the energy, industry, transport, buildings, agriculture, and waste sectors; and legislates climate neutrality as a goal for 2050. the government is itself to become climate neutral in all of its activities and investments by 2030. the act requires annual performance evaluations and transparency in emissions data provided by an independent evaluation committee. the ministries responsible for under-performing sectors will be required within a three-month period to present an immediate action program (sofortprogramm) with measures for how to address shortcomings. parliament will determine if further regulatory measures are needed (deutscher bundestag 2019). the climate action programme 2030 specifies measures to reach targets. starting in 2020, air flight taxes were increased, a co2 price was established which raised the price of fossil fuels for transport and heating, a new tax incentive for building renovations was introduced, and the value added tax on train tickets was reduced. to address concerns about consumer backlash, electricity prices for residential consumers are to be reduced by cutting the feed-in tariff for renewables, a controversial idea intended to offset the higher prices on oil, gas, and kerosene. amid growing concern about foreign competition in electric vehicle development, the automobile sector has also been targeted. the climate action programme establishes several targets: 40 to 42 percent emissions reductions for the transport sector compared to 1990 levels, seven to 10 million electric vehicles on the road, and a target of one million charging stations for electric vehicles by 2030. as in canada, various purchase incentives for e-vehicles have been introduced. 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 there will, of course, be obstacles to acceptance of some of these measures (schreurs and ohlhorst 2015; bues 2020). the expansion of wind parks, large solar installations, biomass facilities, and electricity storage systems are facing opposition from affected communities and some nature conservation interests. there is also opposition to the phase-out in affected communities. to integrate the public into the implementation process, participatory decision-making initiatives are becoming increasingly common at both the länder (state) and federal levels. an additional problem relates to the possible lock-in effect caused by infrastructure being developed for natural gas, which is being turned to to replace coal. the controversial nord stream 2 pipeline, which is to bring natural gas directly from russia to germany via the baltic sea, is a case in point. eu climate policy and the european green deal eu climate and energy policies set general directions, targets, and expectations for member states, which then have the responsibility for implementation (lederer,2020). german climate and energy policy must be viewed in this context. the eu has managed to maintain a surprising degree of consensus on the importance of climate action despite the diversity of its member states and their rather different energy structures (schreurs and tiberghien 2007; schreurs and tiberghien 2010; jordan et al. 2012; wurzel, connelly, and liefferink 2017). it uses a variety of means ranging from advice to directives and regulations to encourage, cajole, or require member states to do more to protect the environment. this has been the case, for example, in relation to germany’s automobile sector, which historically has lobbied the federal government to oppose more stringent emission regulations. once tighter emission regulations are nevertheless decided upon at the eu level, as has occurred on numerous occasions, the german industry must comply (oki 2020). member states also take their own priorities and interests and elevate them onto the eu’s agenda in an effort to create a level playing field within the eu or to enhance progress on an issue of normative concern, like climate change. germany played a critical part in early efforts to elevate renewable energy to the eu agenda. in the meantime, the eu has issued a series of directives aimed at expanding renewable energy capacity and improving energy efficiency. as a consequence, the growth of renewable energy across the eu has been striking. in 2005, renewable energy in gross final energy consumption for the eu28 stood at nine percent; at the end of 2019 it was 18.9 percent (and 19.7 percent for the eu27) (european environment agency 2019; eurostat 2021). the eu has also managed to keep climate action a union priority despite some ups and downs in member state enthusiasm for stricter action. in 2014, in the lead up to the paris climate agreement, the clean energy for all package was adopted setting ghg emission reduction targets for 2030. these targets were amended upwards in december 2018 to 40 percent ghg emissions reduction (compared to 1990 levels), 32 percent for renewable energy and 32.5 percent for energy efficiency (compared to 2005 levels) (european commission 2019). the european commission (n.d.) reported in 2020 that, between 1990 and 2018, the eu reduced ghg emissions by 23 percent while the economy grew by 61 percent over the same time period, meaning the eu had exceeded its 2020 target to reduce emissions by 20 percent of 1990 levels ahead of schedule. a decoupling from energy use and ghg emissions is occurring (european commission 2020a). 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 with increasing concern in the eu about global warming, pollution, inefficient material use, natural resource depletion, and import dependency for energy and natural resources, in 2019, the european commission proposed a european green deal. it addresses the areas of clean energy, sustainable industry, building renovation, sustainable mobility, food production and consumption, and biodiversity protection. the european green deal aims at climate neutrality and zero pollution by 2050. the eu has set a plan to cut emissions by 55 percent of 1990 levels by 2030 (on the debate behind these targets see abnett 2020; european commission 2020d). part of the eu’s covid-19 recovery package that was spearheaded by germany and france calls for a tax on non-recycled plastics and the introduction of carbon border taxes starting in 2023 on products being produced in countries with lower carbon emission standards than the eu. thirty percent of the total €1.8 trillion package, combining the multiannual financial framework (mff) and next generation eu, is to target climate-related projects (european council 2020). the european green deal bases its climate change targets and goals on ecological modernization discourses, reflecting debates in germany about the economic opportunities for climate change action (machin 2019). a key policy instrument for achieving germany’s climate goals has been the eu emissions trading system (ets), which was launched in 2005 and covers thousands of industries. sectors covered by the ets have to cut emissions by 43 percent compared to 2005 and non-ets sectors by 30 percent (bayer and aklin 2020). early design flaws, and especially the allocation of too many pollution allowances to major industries – a problem that ensued in significant part due to the demands of german industries – limited the effectiveness of the system. subsequent corrections to the ets’ design have improved its functioning to some degree. despite the low prices on carbon resulting from initial design flaws, according to one assessment (bayer and aklin 2020), the ets saved the eu about 1.2 billion tonnes of co2 between 2008 and 2016, equating to reductions of 3.8 percent of total eu-wide emissions compared to a scenario without an ets. with the reforms, the price of carbon has risen from a low of just under three euros per tonne of carbon in april 2013 to over 43 euros per tonne in april 2021.5 under the eu post-covid-19 stimulus package, the ets is to be expanded to the aviation and maritime sectors as well as to the transportation and heating sectors. this pricing of carbon is critical for germany in its efforts to meet its domestic targets as it incentivizes the shift away from fossil fuels. the european commission (2020b) reported an 8.7 percent drop in ghg emissions in 2019 compared to 2018 levels, largely a result of a decline in emissions from stationary sources (with coal being replaced by renewables and gasfired power production), and a significant jump in the carbon price after the fourth eu ets reform. canadian energy and climate change politics canada is among the most decentralized of all federal countries. in 1982, the constitution act (section 92a) strengthened provincial powers over natural resources. each province has exclusive jurisdiction over the development, conservation, and management of its non-renewable resources, which includes energy resources, forests, and hydroelectric power facilities. the federal 5 see the ember eu ets carbon pricing tracking system: https://ember-climate.org/data/carbon-price-viewer/. 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 government has authority over transboundary emissions and interprovincial matters, and has considerable authority to regulate ghg emissions. while the federal government takes the lead in signing international agreements such as the kyoto accord and the paris accord (2015), the effective implementation of such agreements depends heavily on the cooperation of the provinces and territories. due to wavering levels of commitment at both the federal and provincial levels, canada generally has a weak record of following through on international climate change commitments. furthermore, canada is the only g7 nation without a national energy strategy (schott and campbell 2013). the lack of such a strategy makes it difficult to coordinate energy and climate policy and to set specific timelines and targets (benz and broschek, 2020). adding to the complexity is the legacy of the colonial state system. the current liberal government is committed to truth and reconciliation with 94 calls to action (truth and reconciliation committee 2015) and reversing the colonial path in line with the un declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (undrip, un 2007). there are large areas of canada that are either unceded territories or have treaties or modern land claims that provide considerable power and autonomy for indigenous peoples. recently, indigenous leaders and activists have openly demonstrated against large energy projects, such as natural gas and oil pipelines going through british columbia (bc) as well as oil exploration in the arctic (e.g., clyde river vs. petroleum geo-services). a shift to a more meaningful nation-to nation dialogue will require more indigenous representation in decision-making and an enhanced role of the federal government as a power broker and mediator between indigenous peoples and provincial and territorial governments when it comes to overlapping energy and environmental policies (gramiak and schott 2018). energy and climate change policies differ quite significantly within canada. there are important regional differences in terms of provincial efforts to reduce energy-related carbon emissions (decarbonization) and decouple economic activities and energy demand. canada has a relatively clean electricity grid, with 67 percent of electricity coming from renewable sources and 82 percent from non-ghg emitting sources. some provinces are very advanced in terms of their clean electricity grids (e.g., manitoba, québec, bc, newfoundland and labrador, and ontario). five provinces (nova scotia, new brunswick, prince edward island, ontario, and québec) and all three territories (yukon, northwest territories, and nunavut) have achieved some degree of decoupling and decarbonization. however, provinces with resource-dependent economies (saskatchewan, alberta, manitoba, newfoundland and labrador, and bc) are failing to decouple and only bc has managed to make some gains in decarbonization (hughes 2020). in aggregate, canada’s economic growth is still fuelled by increases in energy demand and weak decarbonization efforts due to a split between the post-industrial east and the industrialized fossil fuel dependent west (hughes 2020). since pierre elliot trudeau’s national energy program, there have been five attempts in canada to coordinate energy and climate change policy that have so far failed to offset increasing emissions from oil and gas development in the western provinces (macdonald 2020; winfield and macdonald 2020). a continuation of this attempt is the recent acquisition of the trans mountain pipeline expansion by the federal government to bring albertan oil to a port near vancouver. this project will enable a tripling in the pipeline’s capacity to 890,000 barrels of oil per day but increases alberta’s challenge in meeting its ghg emission reduction targets and sends a mixed message on future industry and energy transition directions. the oil and gas sector has maintained a strong influence on canadian politics for several decades and managed until 2016 to limit any serious climate regulations for the sector. a strong alliance 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 of vested interests linking oil companies, natural gas companies, utilities in the us and canada, and the canadian financial oligopoly (toronto dominion bank, bank of montreal, scotiabank, cibc, and royal bank) successfully counteracted calls for stricter environmental legislation in most provinces and by the federal government. there was also surprising public support and media coverage of climate skeptics, who were falsely perceived as providing a balanced view on climate science. the struggle to develop and implement a pan-canadian framework on clean growth and climate change the election of a liberal government under the leadership of justin trudeau in 2015 indicated a shift in the approach to energy policy, and a more climate-friendly direction compared to the previous approach of the conservative government led by stephan harper. an important step was the development of a more coordinated plan to tackle ghg emissions while enabling clean growth, which was introduced by the liberal government in 2016 in the form of the pan-canadian framework on clean growth and climate change (pcf). as noted above, implementation of effective climate and energy policy requires coordination between the federal and provincial governments. for this reason, the pcf was developed after the declaration of the premiers adopted at the québec summit on climate change in 2015 where it was agreed to take ambitious action in support of meeting or exceeding canada’s 2030 target of a 30 percent reduction below 2005 levels of ghg emissions. this involves a commitment to pursue a collaborative approach between provincial, territorial, and federal governments to reduce ghg emissions, and to enable sustainable economic growth. the pcf explicitly acknowledges the rights of indigenous peoples and their leadership in the adoption of the paris agreement (canada 2016). at that point, saskatchewan was the only province not to sign on to the pcf. the pcf tries to ensure that the provinces and territories have the flexibility to design their own policies and programs to meet emission-reductions targets, with federal support for infrastructure, specific emission-reduction opportunities, and clean technologies. the pcf focusses on carbon pricing with complementary measures by sector, adaptation and resilience, and industrial policy and economic development. to achieve these objectives, the liberal government proposed a clean growth direction with aggressive carbon price targets. a federal levy of 20 dollars per tonne of carbon came into effect april 1, 2019 and applies to provinces that did not adopt their own carbon taxes, cap-and-trade systems or other plans for carbon pricing. the levy will rise by 10 dollars per year until it reaches 50 dollars in 2022. an announcement by the liberal government in december 2020 committed to a further increase of the carbon price beyond 2022. starting in 2023, the price will go up by 15 dollars per tonne a year from the current 30 dollars until it hits 170 dollars in 2030. a major commitment in the liberal’s climate plan is the phase out of traditional coal units across canada by 2030. this will only affect nova scotia, new brunswick, alberta, and saskatchewan but is a major step towards a cleaning of the country’s electricity grids. important highlighted measures are new and enhanced transmission lines between and within provinces and territories, deployment of smart-grid technologies, and the reduction of diesel-powered generation for indigenous peoples and northern and remote communities. in the building sector, new energy efficient measures focus on the goal of adopting a ‘net-zero energy ready’ model building code by 2030 and retrofitting existing buildings through energy efficiency improvements and fuel 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 switching, including in indigenous communities and in social housing initiatives. for the transportation sector, the federal government merely commits to continue implementing increasingly stringent standards for emissions from light duty vehicles and to taking action to improve efficiency and to support fuel switching in the rail, aviation, marine, and off-road sectors. although the pcf committed to develop a canada-wide strategy for zero-emission vehicles (zev) by 2018, and to boost zero emission infrastructure, no specific strategy has been developed. the government has set rather non-ambitious targets for sales of zevs compared to other oecd countries (10 percent of new light-duty vehicle by 2025, 30 percent by 2030, and 100 percent by 2040 (transport canada 2020)), and a 5,000-dollar incentive for the purchase or lease of an eligible battery electric, hydrogen fuel cell, or longer-range plug-in hybrid vehicle, and a 2,500-dollar incentive for a shorter-range plug-in hybrid vehicle. these incentives are topped up with additional subsidies only in québec and bc. canada aims to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector, including offshore activities by 40 to 45 percent by 2025, and to phase down use of hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs) to support canada's commitment to the montreal protocol’s kigali amendment. the enhancement of carbon sinks is stressed, as are the increased use of wood products in construction, the production of renewable fuels and bioproducts, and enhanced innovation to advance ghg efficient management practices in forestry and agriculture. canada will provide infrastructure investment to deal with and prepare for climate risks like floods, wildfires, droughts, and changes in temperature, including thawing permafrost, and extreme weather events (bush and lemmen 2019). the government will support new approaches and ‘mission-oriented’ research approaches to accelerate innovation, to support clean technology, to enhance export potential, to strengthen financing, and to create jobs and a new clean energy sector. a recent announcement committed to net zero emission by 2050 (eccc 2020) with legallybinding, five-year emissions-reduction milestones, support for clean electricity generation, greener buildings and communities, and the electrification of transportation and nature-based climate solutions, such as a commitment to plant two billion trees in a decade. the pcf provides the first guiding framework of its kind which directly affects the provinces’ energy investments and electricity generation. it is overly optimistic, however. the complementary measures do not go far enough, as they mostly focus on carrots and lack timelines and concrete suggestions on how to push emission reductions further in key sectors. oil and gas, and heavy industry are responsible for 37 percent of ghg emissions. without serious advancements in those sectors, canada will not be able to achieve its targeted 511 metric tonnes of co2 equivalent cut by 2030 (see figure 1). 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: canadian ghg emissions by economic sector in 2018. source: (environment and climate change canada 2020) with percentage calculations and illustration by authors. the most recent progress report by environment and climate change canada (eccc) indicates that contributions to emission reductions by sector are not sufficient. canada is projected to overshoot its target by about 105 metric tonnes of co2. to close that gap, canada counts on credits from the western climate initiative (wci 2020) (trade of carbon credits between california and québec), contributions from the land use change and forestry sector, and uncertain advances in clean electricity, greener buildings, electrification of transportation, nature-based climate solutions (mostly planting trees), and greater than anticipated clean technology adoption (see figure 2). oil and gas 26% transportation 25% buildings 13% electricity 9% heavy industry 11% agriculture 10% waste and others 6% 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: contributions to emissions reductions in 2030. source: (government of canada 2019), figure 2: contribution to emissions reductions. the experience to date with the pcf has been mixed. the 2021 climate change performance index (ccpi) ranked the effectiveness of canadian climate change policy 58th (in comparison, germany’s ranks 19th) (burck et al. 2020) with the spread between the countries increasing relative to the previous year when canada was ranked 55th and germany 23rd (burck et al. 2019). the ccpi report gives canada: very low ratings in the categories ghg emissions, renewable energy and energy use. in all three categories, the country is not on track for a well below 2°c compatible pathway. while the country is rated high for its proactive role at international level, experts continue to observe a discrepancy between international climate leadership and national implementation (2019, 23). there are a number of reasons for canada’s mediocre to poor performance. the transportation sector is not advancing at the speed necessary to realize these reductions. there are hardly any regional electric trains or buses. a high-speed train in the most densely populated corridor from windsor, ontario to ville de québec, québec has been discussed for decades but there is no progress in site (railway technology 2020). the electric vehicle and hybrid vehicles targets are not aggressive enough, critical infrastructure is missing, and incentives vary widely across the country. large scale dairy and beef farmers that contribute significantly to ghg emissions, and that command some of the largest dairy prices in the world, are not anticipated to contribute to meeting the 2030 emission reduction goals in the proposed plan. provinces have their own building codes and are slow to adopt new national guidelines. due to the fact that provinces have more control and power over energy policy, building codes, environmental policy and transport infrastructure than in most other countries, it is difficult for canada to coordinate its policies and implement a federal strategy like the pcf. the pcf is, however, the closest canada has come to coordinated action on climate change and future energy 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 developments. the reason for failures in coordination goes back to the first serious attempt in the 1980s under pierre elliot trudeau (the father of canada’s current prime minister), which fueled western alienation and entrenched opposing regional political agendas in federal politics. western resistance, indigenous rights and a new direction for canadian industry the resistance in canada to coordinating energy policies and climate change policies goes back to the failure of the national energy programme (nep) in the 1980s, which contributed to the alienation of the west (perhaps with the exception of bc) from trusting a centralized government acting mostly in what it perceived to be the interests of eastern canada’s service and manufacturing sectors. prime minister justin trudeau is in a precarious situation as his liberal party is committed to implementing and reaching ambitious climate targets while making up with alienated western provinces. in the 2019 federal election, the liberal party did not acquire a single seat in alberta, saskatchewan, or manitoba, and trudeau returned to office with a minority government. for the first time in canadian history, climate change action and policies were a serious election issue. the clear majority of voters cared about climate change action even if it was not necessarily centre stage (clarke and pammett, 2020). andrew scheer’s conservative party did not have a serious stand on climate change policies, which some political analysts claim cost them the election in key conservative ridings in the greater toronto metropolitan area (ibbitson 2019). the last canadian election, therefore, created a new era in climate change policy that could favour climate change policy implementation in the future (the economist 2019). for the time being, however, trudeau’s liberal government needs opposition party support to put through polices, and it faces fierce criticism and resistance from western provinces and conservative provincial governments (e.g., the ford government in ontario; the kenney government in alberta). the federal government had to use the greenhouse gas pollution pricing act to impose a carbon tax on five provinces (saskatchewan, manitoba, ontario, new brunswick, and alberta) that did not have an equivalent system in place. they objected to this imposition (harrison 2020) and launched constitutional court challenges. these five provinces make up half of all provinces and 59.3 percent of the canadian population (canada, n.d.). this does not, however, coincide with public opinion on carbon pricing and climate change action. almost the same percentage of canadians (58 percent) indicated in a poll by nanos for the globe and mail that it would be unacceptable for a province to opt out of the national climate change plan (keller 2019). in addition, imposed carbon taxes are redistributed as tax credits to households in affected provinces, so that there is an incentive to switch to less carbon intensive products and behaviour without affecting household incomes. a larger hurdle will be achieving climate targets without a more direct-action plan for the future of the oil and gas sector. the federal acquisition of the trans mountain expansion pipeline in august 2018 for 4.5 billion dollars was a serious blow to the federal government’s credibility in terms of climate change action and international commitments. the federal government proclaimed that the pipeline would not undermine the government’s commitment to meet or exceed the 2030 paris targets (maclean 2018), but they did not provide estimates on how the project would affect emissions projections. energy economist marc jaccard estimated that the expansion of the pipeline would add 8.8 metric tonnes of co2 equivalent upstream annually, which over a 50-year lifespan could consume 83 percent of canada’s share of the paris agreement (maclean 2018; donner 2016). the federal government seems to some to be pursuing policies with conflicting objections: on the one hand, it supports aggressive cuts to ghg emissions in order to satisfy the paris commitments, while on the other hand it is spending precious public resources 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 that lock in the traditional fossil fuel sector. in order to meet the paris agreement’s two-degree target, mcglade and ekins (2015) estimated that it will be necessary to leave roughly 80 percent of all known fossil fuel deposits in the ground. pearce estimated that canada must resist extracting about 75 percent of its oil reserves and 25 percent of its natural gas reserves (pidcock 2015). the government is committed to limit warming to 1.5 degrees, which would imply even more reserves be left in the ground. at the same time, the oil and gas sector is having an uncertain future, since oil sands extraction cannot compete with other world supplies of lower-priced oil, and is more vulnerable to fluctuation in global oil prices and uncertainty over pipeline expansion (iea 2021). furthermore, since alberta is landlocked, it relies on refineries in the united states and receives a discounted oil price. in early 2020, the alberta government bought a share in the keystone xl pipeline’s extension at a time of major budget deficits. one of the first actions of president biden was to revoke the permit for the pipeline (the white house 2021), killing the project. oil markets have become increasingly volatile with battles over market share in a progressively contested resource sector that is still adding reserves (e.g., off the coast of guyana (baddour 2020)); the sector is also challenged by sharply declining prices of renewable energy and is threatened by rapidly increasing carbon prices. another dilemma is the bc government’s plan to expand its liquid natural gas (lng) export sector to asian markets. despite an early and aggressive carbon tax, the province will not be able to meet its own provincial climate targets (eco justice 2020). the lng expansion requires new pipelines that have divided communities between proponents and opponents. decisions were recently challenged by indigenous hereditary chiefs who questioned the legitimacy of the colonially imposed system of first nation band councils that make decisions on behalf of indigenous groups. this led to demonstrations about the coastal gas link project in bc and nationwide solidarity demonstrations that were only halted by the pandemic lockdown (rastello 2020). the oil and gas industries are recognizing that the current downturn is no exception and that they can no longer rely on conventional markets to sell their products because market prices are too low and unpredictable, and products will be increasingly subject to regulation and carbon pricing. in the oil sands sector, suncor has developed a partnership with enerkem, which turns household garbage into biofuels at a renewable production scale (corporate knights 2020). the oil sector industry and alberta innovates are focusing on innovation and value added to the oil sands resources. bitumen beyond combustion (bbc) is considering opportunities to produce carbon fiber at large scale to produce lighter, more energy efficient vehicles, including electric vehicles, which could potentially quadruple the revenue from alberta’s current bitumen output with an added economic potential of carbon fibre, activated carbon and asphalt binder in the range of 84 billion dollars annually (corporate knights 2020). industry is looking at the development of green hydrogen (from renewable energy) and blue hydrogen (from natural gas with steam methane reforming) as zero carbon fuel solutions. these new directions overlap with german and eu policy directions and interests and suggest some possible areas for future collaboration. these movements, along with a shift in public opinion that acknowledges the climate emergency, suggest that a decline in vested interests is emerging and that alliances are shifting. 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 comparing german and canadian experiences with clean energy transitions recent developments in canada, germany, and the eu suggest that policy makers increasingly recognize that they can no longer avoid addressing climate change. climate change, and the accompanying need for a low-carbon energy transition, has been given greater priority on the policy agenda. with the european green deal and the strength of the green party in german and eu politics, climate change is high on germany’s political agenda. political forces are also shifting in canada where climate change for the first time became a serious federal election issue in 2019, and a national framework is now in place with the pcf. despite political pushback by certain provinces, public opinion is on the side of more aggressive climate change policy, and even the fossil fuel industry is realizing that they need to be creative in pursuing newer and greener directions. industry is starting to understand that canada must advance passed its old staples approach based on the export of its abundant natural resources. industry and provinces such as alberta are realizing that diversification of the economy and a longer vision based on value-added and innovative cleaner technologies are more important than volatile and unpredictable fossil fuel markets and trade partners. still, as much as germany needs to find ways to transition coal regions into regions pursuing cleaner technologies, canada needs to transition its oil and gas sector into cleaner technologies and more value-added processes. certainly, neither canada, germany, nor the eu have done enough to date to mitigate against climate change, yet there are signs of a growing willingness on the part of their governments, industry, and society to support innovative plans and programs that shift energy and economic structures in new directions (balthasar, schreurs, and varone 2019). while all three have at times slid back into entrenched behaviors, more recent climate plans, programs, and targets give some hope that economically difficult choices are possible even in the face of strong industrial or local opposition to sectoral and regional transformations. the comparison shows that overcoming opposition from legacy industries has been and remains challenging. in the case of germany, this can be seen from the lack of progress in reducing emissions from the transport sector despite the efforts of the eu to introduce more stringent emission limits. the difficulty of phasing out legacy industries is also evident in the relatively late phase-out of coal. as a point of reference, the phase-out of nuclear energy began in the 1970s and was legislated first in 1990 and again in 2011; demands for a phase out of coal, on the other hand, took hold much later, only in the 2010s, with legislation only implemented in 2019. the lack of action addressing emissions from the coal and transport sectors has challenged germany’s claims to be a climate leader based on its successes with renewable energy development. although renewable energy has been rapidly expanding for many years, emissions have shown little improvement because of the country’s inability to wean itself of its dependence on coal and conventional automobiles. reaching an agreement to phase out coal was only possible with promises of large compensation programs to the affected industry and regions and increasingly strong demands from the public. certainly, it was also important that the long-term outlook for the coal industry is bleak given global shifts towards introducing prices on carbon emissions as well as the declining costs of renewables. in the case of the transport sector, it may take international competition and top-down eu directives to bring about a faster transition. in the case of canada, a significant hydropower base, the expansion of renewable energy, the north american shale gas revolution, and continued dependence on nuclear energy have made coal redundant, both economically and environmentally. the same has not been true for oil and gas. 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 these industries remain politically extremely powerful in western provinces, but face growing opposition from environmentalists, indigenous groups, the general public, and increasingly the financial sector. still, while oil and gas interests in western provinces remain substantial, developments south of the border are changing the economics of oil and gas. the cancellation of the keystone pipeline sends a powerful message and changes calculations both for alberta and the federal government. the federal government’s plan to overcome western canadian resistance to an energy transition by owning the transmountain pipeline is a political hurdle and puts in doubt the seriousness of their climate change targets and commitments. public opinion in both countries is also increasingly demanding stronger government action to combat climate change. fridays for future has been a powerful force calling for change in germany and has also established a presence in canada. transatlantic energy and climate linkages and low carbon transitions achieving climate neutrality will require action on all fronts. germany and canada have a number of opportunities to work more closely together in achieving their targets and goals while advancing innovative new economic sectors and more socially and environmentally responsible supply chains. the recently ratified free trade agreement (comprehensive economic and trade agreement) that removed most of the tariffs between canada and the eu sets the stage for further cooperation for climate and energy. in both germany and canada, industry is recognizing that change is in the air. canadian oil provinces are more desperate than before to diversify their economies and invest into innovative processes. germany, like other eu states, is similarly eager to be a leader in clean energy technologies. this provides an opportunity to innovate and invest in the clean tech sector, not only in renewable technologies but also in clean fuels, alternative aviation fuels, and new supply chains to extract and process transition minerals and metals (world bank 2017; 2020) and to advance the circular economy. a closer partnership between germany and canada is also of strategic importance. both germany and canada depend on trade and energy relations with partners that are increasingly acting in their own single national interests. for germany (and the eu), energy relations with both russia and the us are complicated. for canada energy relations with the us have changed recently since the us has become an energy superpower in its own right and is now less dependent on canada’s oil and gas sector. the us has also restricted trade and foreign imports (e.g., at the expense of the canadian automotive and aluminum sector) with their ‘buy american’ program that is continued under the biden administration. many materials and metals that are required to enable clean energy development and a green transition are sourced from countries with unstable governments and are extracted with unsustainable and unethical methods (for example cobalt extraction in congo) or are controlled by powerful countries like china. since canada has all of the metals and minerals and some infrastructure and know-how in automotive and energy sectors, and germany has expertise in advancing clean technologies and processes, there are a number of opportunities that could be further explored. four areas for potential transatlantic collaboration are highlighted here. 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 clean energy innovation mission innovation is a global initiative between 24 countries (including canada) and the european commission to accelerate clean energy innovation. the initiative has set eight specific innovation challenges (ics) (ic1: smart grids, ic2: off-grid access to electricity, ic3: carbon capture, ic4: sustainable biofuels, ic5: converting sunlight, ic6: clean energy material, ic7: affordable heating and cooling of building, and ic8: renewable and clean hydrogen). canada and the eu are participating in all of the eight challenges. canada is one of the co-leads on ic4 and ic6, while the eu is one of the co-leads on ic5, ic7, and ic8. germany is a co-lead on ic5 and ic8 as well, but is not participating in ic4. there is, therefore, already a strong partnership between the eu, germany, and canada on clean technology innovation. linking of carbon markets through the pcf, canada is committed to carbon pricing or equivalent emissions reductions with an incremental rise of the carbon price by 10 dollars per tonne of carbon equivalent until it hits 50 dollars in 2022. québec has a cap-and-trade program with california that also involved ontario for a short period of time. that system is similar to the eu ets and could potentially be linked. a larger emissions trading system would reduce the emission reduction cost for some provinces and member states through trade with jurisdictions that have lower abatement costs. a combined system would also ensure the same carbon price, eliminate carbon leakage and would advance trade links and further implementation of ceta. an expanded eu ets would allow for growing emission trading opportunities and a reduced increase in the anticipated eu ets price. development of a just and sustainable energy transition supply chain there is a unique opportunity for canadian-german cooperation on renewable energy and battery technology advancement as well as on establishing socially responsible electric vehicle manufacturing hubs. canada has a crucial supply of nickel, cobalt, and some of the largest known reserves and resources for rare earth metals (nr can 2020), as well as many other vital energy transition minerals. both germany and canada have strong auto-supply chains. canada has promising start-ups in ev buses and trucks (torrie, bak and heaps 2020) and low speed ev passenger vehicles. a natural collaboration between german auto manufacturers, canadian mining companies and auto-supply centres in ontario and québec is sensible especially as us auto manufacturers are withdrawing from canadian production centres. furthermore, corporate finance as well as consumers are demanding more sustainable, just and ethical supply chains, from mineral extraction to material recycling. partnering on advancement of the circular economy an important component of a just and sustainable clean energy supply chain is the development of a circular economy. here, germany and the eu have been leaders. canada could learn from the eu’s initiatives and experiences in developing new collaborative production processes with blue and green hydrogen, battery and ev production, biofuel development (particularly sustainable aviation fuels), and low carbon materials. insights from these innovative production processes could then be used to reform other existing sectors of the economy in order to transition to a large scale (across sectors) circular economy approach. 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 germany and canada can more easily meet their own climate change and energy security objectives if they work together on linking emissions trading and carbon pricing mechanisms, furthering clean energy innovation, advancing circular economy concepts, and developing new supply chains from mining exploration to recycling of crucial metals and minerals. pursuing such transatlantic partnerships will provide opportunities for a more just green transition that reduces inequalities through redistribution of carbon pricing proceeds, the retraining of employees in hard hit sectors, and a meaningful and respectful inclusion of indigenous peoples. the colonial expropriation of the lands of indigenous peoples has had serious environmental consequences and negative social impacts; it has also presented obstacles to the ability of indigenous people to partake in the benefits deriving from energy sector production. as major greenhouse gas emitters, europe and canada have had significant impacts on indigenous peoples and developing countries., and, therefore, share a responsibility to change this situation and find a sustainable path together with the leadership and advice of indigenous peoples and impacted communities. the opportunity of alliances between new industrial branches, environmentalists and indigenous interests to enable a just transition to a low or no carbon economy that is circular and inclusive is on the horizon. governments need to support this direction and make sure it will be realized. 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 references abnett, kate. 2020. “european lawmakers to consider tougher climate law: draft,” reuters, may 8, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-eu-law-idinkbn22k10p. agora energiewende. 2021. “corona-jahr 2020: rekordrückgänge bei co2-emissionen und kohleverstromung,” january 5, 2021. https://www.agora-energiewende.de/presse/neuigkeiten-archiv/corona-jahr-2020rekordrueckgaenge-bei-co2-emissionen-und-kohleverstromung/ . baddour, dylan. 2020. “massive guyana oil find continues to grow with fresh exxon discovery.” forbes, january 27, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/dylanbaddour/2020/01/27/massive-guyana-oil-findcontinues-to-grow-with-fresh-exxon-discovery/#8fc3c1527814. balthasar, andreas, miranda a. schreurs, and frédéric varone. 2020. “energy transition in europe and the united states: policy entrepreneurs and veto players in federalist systems.” the journal of environment and development (29) 1: 3-25. https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496519887489. bayer, patrick, and michaël aklin. 2020. “the european union emissions trading system reduced co2 emissions despite low prices.” proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america (pnas) 117 (16): 8804-8812. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918128117. benz, arthur and jörg broschek. 2020. “transformative energy policy in federal systems: canada and germany compared.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 14 (2):56-78. brauers, hanna, philipp herpich, and pao-yu oei. 2018. “the transformation of the german coal sector from 1950 to 2017: an historical overview.” in energiewende “made in germany”: low carbon electricity sector reform in the european context, edited by christian von hirschhausen, clemens gerbaulet, claudia kemfert, casimir lorenz, and pao-yu oei, 4580. cham: springer. bues, andreas. 2020. social movements against wind power in canada and germany: energy policy and contention. new york: springer. bush, elizabeth, and donald s. lemmen, eds. 2019. canada’s changing climate report. ottawa: government of canada. bundestag. 2020. “gesetzesbeschluss des deutschen bundestages. gesetz zur reduzierung und zur beendigung der kohleverstromung und zur änderung weiterer gesetze (kohleausstiegsgesetz).” drucksache 392/20. july 3, 2020. burck, jan, ursula hagen, niklas höhne, leonardo nascimento, and christoph bals, 2019. “climate change performance index 2020: results.” bonn: germanwatch e.v. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-eu-law-idinkbn22k10p https://www.agora-energiewende.de/presse/neuigkeiten-archiv/corona-jahr-2020-rekordrueckgaenge-bei-co2-emissionen-und-kohleverstromung/ https://www.agora-energiewende.de/presse/neuigkeiten-archiv/corona-jahr-2020-rekordrueckgaenge-bei-co2-emissionen-und-kohleverstromung/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/dylanbaddour/2020/01/27/massive-guyana-oil-find-continues-to-grow-with-fresh-exxon-discovery/%238fc3c1527814. https://www.forbes.com/sites/dylanbaddour/2020/01/27/massive-guyana-oil-find-continues-to-grow-with-fresh-exxon-discovery/%238fc3c1527814. https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496519887489 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918128117 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 burk, jan, ursula hagen, niklas höhne, leonardo nascimento, tasneem essop, sophia binz, violeta helling, and björk lucas, 2020. “climate change performance index 2021: results.” bonn: germanwatch e.v. clarke, harold, and jon h. pammett. 2020. “environmental issues in recent british and canadian elections.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 14 (2): 102-128. clausen, jens. 2019. verbreitung radikaler systeminnovationen. fallbeispiel stromversorgung deutschland. berlin: borderstep institut. climate watch. 2018. washington, dc: world resources institute. https://www.climatewatchdata.org. crippa, monica, diego guizzardi, marilena muntean, edwin schaaf, efisio solazzo, fabio monforti-ferrario, jos olivier, and elisabetta vignati. 2020. fossil co2 emissions of all world countries: 2020 report. luxembourg: european union. deutscher bundestag. 2019. “gesetze zur einführung eines bundes-klimaschutzgesetzes und zur änderung weiterer vorschriften.” bundesgesetzblatt jahrgang, december 12, 2019. teil i nr. 48, bonn. 2513-2520. donner, simon. 2016. “statement on greenhouse gas emissions associated with the trans mountain pipeline expansion,” maribo, august 17, 2016. https://blogs.ubc.ca/maribo/2016/08/17/statement-on-greenhouse-gas-emissionsassociated-with-the-trans-mountain-pipeline-expansion/. eco justice. 2020. “b.c. government breaks promise on key climate deadline.” december 7, 2020. https://ecojustice.ca/pressrelease/b-c-government-breaks-promise-on-key-climatedeadline/. eichhammer, wolfgang, ulla boede, frank gagelmann, eberhard jochem, nicola kling, joachim schleich, barbara schlomann, joch chesshire, and hans-joachim ziesing. 2001. “greenhouse gas reductions in germany and the uk – coincidence or policy induced? an analysis for international climate policy.” environmental research of the federal ministry of the environment, nature conservation and nuclear safety, research report 201 41 133, uba-fb 000193. https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/publikation/long/1987.pdf. european commission. 2019. “communication from the commission to the european parliament, the european council, the council, the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions: the european green deal.” com(2019)640 final. brussels. _____. 2020a. “report from the commission to the european parliament and the council: 2019 assessment of the progress made by member states towards the national energy efficiency targets for 2030 and towards the implementation of the energy efficiency directive as required by article 24(3) of the energy efficiency directive 2012/2/eu, 20.7.” brussels. https://www.climatewatchdata.org./ https://blogs.ubc.ca/maribo/2016/08/17/statement-on-greenhouse-gas-emissions-associated-with-the-trans-mountain-pipeline-expansion/ https://blogs.ubc.ca/maribo/2016/08/17/statement-on-greenhouse-gas-emissions-associated-with-the-trans-mountain-pipeline-expansion/ https://ecojustice.ca/pressrelease/b-c-government-breaks-promise-on-key-climate-deadline/ https://ecojustice.ca/pressrelease/b-c-government-breaks-promise-on-key-climate-deadline/ https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/publikation/long/1987.pdf 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 _____. 2020b. “emissions trading: greenhouse gas emissions reduced by 8.7% in 2019.” may 4, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/emissions-trading-greenhouse-gas-emissionsreduced-87-2019_en. _____. 2020c. “communication from the commission to the european parliament, the council, and the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions: a new circular economy action plan for a cleaner and more competitive europe.” com(2020) 98 final. brussels. _____. 2020d. “proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending regulation (eu) 2018/1999 (european climate law). com/2020/80 final. brussels. _____. n.d. “progress made in cutting emissions.” https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/progress_en. european council. 2020. “special european council.” july 17-21, 2020. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2020/07/17-21/. european environment agency. 2019. “share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption in europe.” https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewablegross-final-energy-consumption-4/assessment-4. eurostat. 2021. “share of energy consumption from renewable sources.” march 30, 2021. https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewable-gross-final-energyconsumption-5/assessment. fraktionen der cdu/csu und spd, deutscher bundestag. 2019. “entwurf eines gesetzes zur einführung eines bundes-klimaschutzgesetzes und zur änderung weiterer vorschriften.” deutscher bundestag drucksache 19/14337. october 22, 2019. frauenhofer ise. 2020. “german net electricity generation in first half of 2020: renewables reach record share of 55.8 percent.” july 1, 2020. https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/en/pressmedia/press-releases/2020/net-energy-production-first-half-of-2020.html. government of canada. 2019. “progress towards canada’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction target.” greenhouse gas projections 14. https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climatechange/services/environmental-indicators/progress-towards-canada-greenhouse-gasemissions-reduction-target.html. _____. 2016. pan-canadian framework on clean growth and climate change. ottawa: government of canada. _____. 1990. canada’s green plan: canada’s green plan for a healthy environment. ottawa: supply and services canada. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/emissions-trading-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduced-87-2019_en. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/emissions-trading-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduced-87-2019_en. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/progress_en https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2020/07/12-21/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2020/07/12-21/ https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewable-gross-final-energy-consumption-4/assessment-4 https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewable-gross-final-energy-consumption-4/assessment-4 https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewable-gross-final-energy-consumption-5/assessment https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewable-gross-final-energy-consumption-5/assessment https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-indicators/progress-towards-canada-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-target.html https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-indicators/progress-towards-canada-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-target.html https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-indicators/progress-towards-canada-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-target.html 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 gramiak, mary, and stephan schott. 2018. “amplifying indigenous voices in national energy governance and the sustainable development strategy.” in how ottawa spends, 20182019: next?, edited by katherine graham and allan m. maslove, 53-67. ottawa: carleton university, school of public policy and administration. gtschow, johannes, louise jeffery, robert gieseke, and ronja gebel. 2017. “the primap-hist national historical emissions time series (1850-2014).” v. 1.1. gfz data services. http://doi.org/10.5880/pik.2017.001. hager, carol. 2016. “the grassroots origins of the german energy transition.” in germany’s energy transition: a comparative perspective, edited by carol hager and christoph h. stefes, 1-26. new york: palgrave macmillan. harrison, kathryn. 2020. “the fleeting canadian harmony on carbon pricing.” policy options, july 8, 2020. hey, christian. 2010. “the german paradox: climate leader and green car laggard.” in the new climate policies of the european union: internal legislation and climate diplomacy, edited by sebastian oberthür, marc pallemaerts, and claire roche kelly, 211-230. brussels: institute for european studies. howlett, michael, and keith brownsey. 2005. “the post-staples state: the political economy of canada’s primary industries.” policy and society 26 (1): 1–7. hughes, larry. 2020. “provinces are meeting their climate targets ?” policy options, march 11, 2020. ibbitson, john. 2019. “the conservative party has lost its way. it can’t go back it’s time to forge a new path,” the globe and mail, october 31, 2019. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-the-conservative-party-has-lost-its-wayit-cant-go-back-its-time/. international energy agency (iea). 2021. “oil 2021analysis and forecast to 2026.” march 20, 2021. https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/resources/oil-2021-analysis-and-forecast-to-2026/. jordan, andrews, harro van asselt, frans berkhout, dave huitema, and tim rayner. 2012. “understanding the paradoxes of multi-level governing: climate change policy in the european union.” global environmental politics 12 (2): 43-66. lederer, markus. 2020. “climate change politics in canada and the eu: from carbon democracy to a green deal.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 14 (2): 9-28. machin, amanda. 2019. “changing the story? the discourse of ecological modernisation in the european union.” environmental politics 28 (2): 208-27. macdonald, douglas. 2020. carbon province, hydro province: the challenge of canadian energy and climate federalism. toronto: university of toronto press. http://doi.org/10.5880/pik.2017.001. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-the-conservative-party-has-lost-its-way-it-cant-go-back-its-time/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-the-conservative-party-has-lost-its-way-it-cant-go-back-its-time/ https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/resources/oil-2021-analysis-and-forecast-to-2026/ 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 maclean, jason. 2018. “paris and pipelines? canada’s climate policy puzzle.” journal of environmental law and practice 32 (1): 47–74. manulak, michael w. 2016. “explaining canada’s foreign environmental policies during the harper era.” in the harper era in canadian foreign policy: parliament, politics, and canada’s global posture, edited by adam chapnick and christopher j. kukucha, 121-134. vancouver: ubc press. mcglade, christoph, and paul ekins. 2015. “the geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global warming to 2 °c.” nature 517: 187–90. miller, joe, and peter campbell. 2019. “german car industry faces ‘day of reckoning’.” financial times, december 1, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/5c304e72-120a-11eaa7e6-62bf4f9e548a. natural resources canada. 2019. “oil resources.” last updated december 16, 2019. https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/energy-sources-distribution/crude-oil/oil-resources/18085. oei, pao-yu. 2018. “greenhouse gas emission reductions and the phasing-out of coal in germany.” in energiewende “made in germany”: low carbon electricity sector reform in the european context, edited by christian von hirschhausen, clemens gerbaulet, claudia kemfert, casimir lorenz, and pao-yu oei, 81-116. cham: springer. oki, takahiro. 2020. “european fuel economy policy for new passenger cars: a historical comparative analysis of discourses and change factors.” international environmental agreements: politics, law and economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-020-09510-7. pidcock, roz. 2015. “meeting two degree climate target means 80 per cent of world’s coal is ‘unburnable’, study says.” https://www.carbonbrief.org/meeting-two-degree-climatetarget-means-80-per-cent-of-worlds-coal-is-unburnable-study-says. powering past coal alliance. 2019. “climate change minsiter claire perry launches powering past coal alliance at cop23,” november 16, 2019. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/climate-change-minister-claire-perry-launchespowering-past-coal-alliance-at-cop23. railway technology.com 2020. “québec-windsor corridor,” online railway technology forum. https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/quebec/. rastello, sandrine. 2020. “canadian pipeline segment faces delay amid indigenous protests,” bloomberg, february 22, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0222/canadian-pipeline-segment-faces-delay-amid-indigenous-protests. reuters. 2018. “germany to reach target of 1 million electric cars later than planned.” september 19, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-autos-iduskcn1lz29e. https://www.ft.com/content/5c304e72-120a-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a. https://www.ft.com/content/5c304e72-120a-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a. https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/energy-sources-distribution/crude-oil/oil-resources/18085. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-020-09510-7 https://www.carbonbrief.org/meeting-two-degree-climate-target-means-80-per-cent-of-worlds-coal-is-unburnable-study-says. https://www.carbonbrief.org/meeting-two-degree-climate-target-means-80-per-cent-of-worlds-coal-is-unburnable-study-says. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/climate-change-minister-claire-perry-launches-powering-past-coal-alliance-at-cop23 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/climate-change-minister-claire-perry-launches-powering-past-coal-alliance-at-cop23 https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/quebec/ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-22/canadian-pipeline-segment-faces-delay-amid-indigenous-protests https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-22/canadian-pipeline-segment-faces-delay-amid-indigenous-protests https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-autos-iduskcn1lz29e 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 schott, stephan, and graham campbell. 2013. “national energy strategies of major industrialized countries.” in international handbook of energy security,” edited by hugh dyer and maria julia trombetta. edward elgar publishing; elgaronline. pp. 174–205. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781007907.00019. schreurs, miranda a. 2011. “federalism and the climate: canada and the european union.” international journal: canada’s journal of global policy analysis 66 (1): 91-108. schreurs, miranda a., and dörte ohlhorst. 2015. “nimby and yimby: movements for and against renewable energy in germany and the united states.” in nimby is beautiful: local activism and environmental activism in germany and beyond, edited by carol hager and mary alice haddad, 60-86. new york: berghahn books. schreurs, miranda, and yves tiberghien. 2010. “european union leadership in climate change: mitigation through multilevel reinforcement.” in global commons, domestic decisions: the comparative politics of climate change, edited by kathryn harrison and lisa mcintosh sundstrom, 23-66. cambridge: mit press. _____. 2007. “multi-level reinforcement: explaining eu leadership in climate change mitigation.” global environmental politics 7 (4): 19-46. schulz, florence. 2020. “german cabinet approves final ‘coal phase-out act,’” euractiv, june 25, 2020. https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/german-cabinet-finally-approvesthe-coal-phase-out/. statistics canada. 2021. “population estimates, quarterly, table 17-10-0009-01.” https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000901. stefes, christoph h. 2016. “critical junctures and the german energiewende.” in germany’s energy transition: a comparative perspective, edited by carol hager and christoph h. stefes, 63-90. new york: palgrave macmillan. the economist. 2019. “pocketbooks and the planet: climate change dominates canada’s election.” october 10, 2019. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/10/10/climate-change-dominates-canadaselection. the white house 2021. executive order on protecting public health and the environment and restoring science to tackle the climate crisis, section 6, january 20, 2021. tiberghien, yves, ed. 2013. minerva’s rule. new york: palgrave macmillan. torrie, ralph, céline bak, and toby heaps. 2020. “building back better: a roadmap to the canada we want.” corporate knights, june 3, 2020. https://www.corporateknights.com/channels/leadership/investing-quality-jobs-build-backbetter-15911930/. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781007907.00019 https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/german-cabinet-finally-approves-the-coal-phase-out/ https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/german-cabinet-finally-approves-the-coal-phase-out/ https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000901. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/10/10/climate-change-dominates-canadas-election https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/10/10/climate-change-dominates-canadas-election https://www.corporateknights.com/channels/leadership/investing-quality-jobs-build-back-better-15911930/ https://www.corporateknights.com/channels/leadership/investing-quality-jobs-build-back-better-15911930/ 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 transport canada. 2020. “zero-emission vehicles.” accessed june 9, 2020, https://www.tc.gc.ca/en/services/road/innovative-technologies/zero-emissionvehicles.html. von hirschhausen, christian. 2018. “german energy and climate policies: a historical overview”. in energiewende “made in germany”: low carbon electricity sector reform in the european context, edited by christian von hirschhausen, clemens gerbaulet, claudia kemfert, casimir lorenz, and pao-yu oei, 17-44. cham: springer. von hirschhausen, christian, clemens gerbaulet, claudia kemfert, casimir lorenz and pao-yu oei, eds. 2016. energiewende “made in germany”: low carbon electricity sector reform in the european context. cham: springer. watkins, melville h. 1963. “a staple theory of economic growth.” the canadian journal of economics and political science 29 (2): 141-158.. https://doi.org/10.2307/139461. winfield, mark and douglas macdonald 2020. “federalism and canadian climate policy.” in canadian federalism: performance, effectiveness, and legitimacy, edited by herman bakvis and grace skogstad, 4th edition. toronto: university of toronto press. worldometers. 2020. coal reserves by country. https://www.worldometers.info/coal/coalreserves-by-country/. wurzel, rüdiger k. w., james connelly, and duncan liefferink, eds. 2017. the european union in international climate change politics: still taking a lead? new york: routledge. https://www.tc.gc.ca/en/services/road/innovative-technologies/zero-emission-vehicles.html. https://www.tc.gc.ca/en/services/road/innovative-technologies/zero-emission-vehicles.html. https://doi.org/10.2307/139461 https://www.worldometers.info/coal/coal-reserves-by-country/ https://www.worldometers.info/coal/coal-reserves-by-country/ 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 103 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 the kremlin’s responses to anti-war voices in russia: setting the tone in the first year of war j.l. black, carleton university1 abstract the “special military operation” (svo) launched by vladimir putin against ukraine on february 24, 2022, took most russians by surprise. they had to be persuaded of its correctness, by any means. this article details the russian state’s methods for sustaining its changing official narrative about the “svo” as well as the ways and means the dissident portion of russia’s citizenry made their objections to the war in ukraine heard during its first year. the kremlin’s already firm grip on the distribution of information was tightened; russia’s wordsmiths were silenced, jailed, or forced to flee the country. school curricula were reorganized so that they became incubators of young russian patriots. the article concludes with conjecture on why the state’s message found such a welcoming audience among russians, at least during the first year of the war. 1 j.l. (larry) black is professor emeritus and distinguished research professor with carleton university’s history department. 104 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 “when war is declared, truth is the first casualty.” (quoted in ponsonby 1928, p. 11) the old adage that truth is the first casualty of war held fast in both the build-up to and the conduct of the “special military operation” (hereafter svo) launched by vladimir putin against ukraine on february 24, 2022. at that time, he claimed to be fulfilling an obligation to “protect the russians and our people” in the donbas, to demilitarize and de-nazify ukraine and to prevent any further expansion of nato toward russia’s borders (rossiyskaya gazeta 2022). his speech rang with vilification of the ‘collective’ west and nato for their failure to take russia’s legitimate security interests into consideration. putin insisted that he had no plans to occupy any ukrainian territory or to impose anything by force (rossiyskaya gazeta 2022).2 with these last two qualifications, the barrage of wartime falsehoods was underway. given that regular surveys showed that the russian people did not regard ukrainians as their enemy, it should not have surprised the kremlin that those segments of the russian population who were paying attention reacted to their president’s sudden pronouncement with shock and dismay. those early reactions are described here, along with the state’s come-lately but increasingly effective efforts to curb them. there are many important components to putin’s war on ukraine. while the media and the political world focus quite naturally on fighting at the front, the extent of the struggle over the distribution of information on the domestic front tends to be ignored or dealt with in bits and pieces. the purpose of this article is to draw attention to the kremlin’s efforts to persuade russians of the rightness of its cause and to the attempts by some russians to counter those efforts during the first year of the war. whereas the long-term effectiveness of the state’s campaign to indoctrinate by persuasion, force, and control of the classroom must be left to future judgements, those findings will have to be based on knowledge of the war of words on the home front, the first stages of which will be found in the picture painted here. message from the kremlin the announcement on february 24 set off an immediate outcry from russia’s startled population. spontaneous demonstrations against the war, single-picket and mass rallies compelled the kremlin to issue new censoring edicts and the government to amend existing laws designed to curb public dissent. legislative guarantees that only one message would be heard culminated on november 4 with an order banning public discussion of unclassified matters in a way that the information might be “used by foreign states, organizations and citizens against russia’s security.”3 that meant 2 for the english-language version, see putin, vladimir. 2022a. “address by the president of the russian federation.” accessed march 20, 2024. en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. the early morning televised announcement was titled “on conducting a special military operation” (o provedenii spetsial’noi voennoi operatsii). 3 prikaz federal’noi sluzhby bezopasnosti rossiyskoi federatsii ot 4 noyabrya 2022 no. 547. 2022. ‘ob utverzhdenii perechnya svedeniy v oblasti voennoi, voenno-tekhnicheskoi deyatel’nosti rossiyskoi federatsii, kotorye pri ikh poluchenii inostrannymi istochnikami mogut byt’ ispol’zovany protiv bezopasnosti rossiyskoi federatsii’” [order of the federal security service of the russian federation of november 4, 2022, no. 547 'on the inclusion of the listing of the information in the field of military, military-technical activity of the russian federation, which, if obtained by other sources, may be used against the security of the russian federation']. registered november 17, 2022 no. 70986. accessed march 25, 2024. publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/view/0001202211170017?index=10&rangesize=1. 105 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 subjects dealing with the structure and size of russia’s armed forces, its weapons, finances, deployments, morale, mobilization, civil defence and more—60 taboos in all.4 anyone sharing such information could be designated a “foreign agent,” a label originally applied only to russian ngos receiving funds from abroad and also dabbling in russian politics (black 2023). the designation had been gradually extended so that by march 2022, it encompassed entities and individuals who expressed criticism of the svo. no matter the degree to which the state came to control the dissemination of information, it was always clear that the realities of war would seep through to russians who wanted to know. thus, within hours of putin commencing his invasion of ukraine, thousands of progressive russians counter-attacked using the catchphrase no to war! (net voine!). an asymmetrical domestic war of words was started. in addition to the torrent of information, misinformation, and disinformation from the state in support of its war on ukraine, dozens of public organizations formed to promote the war effort. some of these took shape of their own accord, others grew out of existing nationalist movements, and more were created by federal, regional, or municipal agencies. among the former groups was the soldiers’ widows (soldatskie vdovy) of russia that, in january 2023, urged putin to call for general mobilization. citing the example of stalin, who thought only “in terms of victory,” the widows accused foreign-based russian opposition publications, such as meduza, of treason (faulconbridge 2023). another self-proclaimed patriotic organization, calling itself the committee for the protection of national interests (komitet zashchity natsional’nykh interesov), listed “traitors” and “cowards and runaways” with their photos and job descriptions on its website inagent.info. among its favourite targets were “foreign agents,” whose names, job descriptions, and even photos were recorded in an “encyclopaedia of foreign agents” (komitet zashchity natsional’nykh interesov 2022). in its turn, russia’s ruling party, united russia (ur), nurtured and exploited the natural tendency of russians to ‘rally round the flag.’ while preparing for regional elections set for september 2023, the ur instructed its members to take advantage of the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the defeat of the nazi troops in the battle of stalingrad by drawing analogies between those eight months in 1942–43 and the eight years of modern-day russians ‘defending’ the donbas. ur members were also asked to arrange lectures on courage and the need to “combat the falsification of history” for secondary school students (makutina 2023). by falsification, ur meant western versions of the second world war’s origins and finish. to mark the historic event more dramatically, a monument to stalin was unveiled at the site of the wwii victory, which was renamed volgograd in 1961. putin visited the city during the festivities and took the opportunity to rail against “nazism in its modern form,” the “collective west,” and the fact that russia was “again being threatened by german leopard tanks with crosses on them” (putin 2023). a campaign to portray putin as a stalin-like, victorious wartime leader was a no 4 prikaz federal’noi sluzhby bezopasnosti. 2022. accessed march 25, 2024. publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/view/0001202211170017?index=10&rangesize=1. 106 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 risk, no-gain tactic, meaning that he and ur needed success in ukraine if all their electoral eggs in that basket were not to be broken (moscow times 2023a). to help galvanize young people, private clubs such as for victory! (za pobedu!) organized volunteers to help children write letters to soldiers at the front, usually giving them the right things to say. “white armband” (#whitepovyazka) flash mobs circulated photos of private citizens, government workers, teachers, and schoolchildren, each wearing a white armband (or bandage) in solidarity with the russian army. the latin alphabet letter “z” appeared everywhere as a sign of support for the war, first on military vehicles and then on private vehicles, t-shirts, caps, buildings, and large posters (bbc 2022a). sweatshirts sporting the slogan “i am not ashamed” (mne ne stydno), along with a small russian flag, were marketed aggressively (kolesnikov 2022). the letter “v,” also from the latin alphabet, cropped up all over the place as well; internationally, the letter was a symbol for “victory,” ironically, the russian state claimed it stood for “strength in truth” (sila v pravde). both letters often were depicted in the black and yellow stripes of the ribbon of st. george, an icon of the red army’s defeat of the nazis. while thousands of blogs, websites, and twitter (now x) accounts were banned for various offences related to the war, pro-war bloggers flourished. these included the grayzone,5 reverse side of the medal,6 and rybar,7 with hundreds of thousands of followers between them. their role in the propaganda efforts of the war attracted attention in april 2023, when prominent prowar blogger vladen tatarsky was assassinated in st. petersburg and received posthumous praise from such luminaries as the spokesperson for the russian ministry of foreign affairs, maria zakharova, and even patriarch kirill—the patriarch of moscow and all russia. the most commonly accessed of these is rybar (fisherman), which publishes detailed reports and accurate maps of the front lines and uses channels on x and telegram, russia’s most widely used global messaging service. western media, such as cnn and bloomberg, and military analysts, such as the institute for the study of war, sometimes turn to rybar, though they recognize its strong biases on the side of russia. rybar was started in 2018 to study issues pertaining to the middle east, at which point it had about 30,000 followers. following putin’s initiation of the “svo,” it rose to more than a million followers. its financial contributors were said to be connected to yevgeny prigozhin, the now-deceased head of the infamous wagner group. the blog also carries posts and notices from russia’s federal security service, the fsb (the bell 2022). anti-war political activism and the state’s response the outburst of anti-war rallies in february 2022 resulted in about 14,000 detentions during the first two weeks after the svo was announced, most of them for a matter of hours or overnight. the most striking journalistic reaction came on the very first day when novaya gazeta issued the gloomiest possible cover: all black with “russia. bombs. ukraine” in large white capital letters.8 state agencies reacted quickly after the next issue carried photos of dead russian soldiers and a burned-out tank near kharkiv, and tv channels dozhd (rain) and ekho moskvy broadcast 5 the grayzone. n.d. accessed march 25, 2024. https://thegrayzone.com/category/russia/. 6 reverse side of the medal. n.d. accessed march 25, 2024. https://t.me/rsotmdivision. 7 rybar. n.d. accessed march 25, 2024. (t-me/rybar). 8 for an image of the cover, see bbc news. 2022. “ukraine war: russia’s nobel winning editor muratov doused with paint.” april 7, 2022. accessed april 18, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61029931. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61029931 107 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 pieces about the ‘war’ in ukraine (novaya gazeta 2022a). as early as the third day, the federal body for control and supervision of the media, roskomnadzor, made it illegal to identify the assault as an “assault,” the war as a “war,” or the invasion as an “invasion” (moscow times 2022a). the magazine cover in question carried an inscription in russian and ukrainian: “the editors of novaya gazeta recognize the war as madness. the editors of novaya do not consider the ukrainian people as enemies, or the ukrainian language as an enemy language.” it was signed on the cover by editor-in-chief dmitry muratov, co-winner of the nobel peace prize in 2021. even with this powerful personal endorsement, or perhaps because of it, the journal was forced to close by march 4. it continues to publish abroad in russian and english as novaya gazeta evropa. although that black cover was unique in its intensity, the shift out of the country was not. according to a report issued a year later by a russian legal aid group called net freedom (setevye svobody), about 1,000 journalists left russia in 2022. entire journalistic teams and individual bloggers fled to europe and the south caucasus, forming what the report called a second runet (russian-language internet) that draws on youtube and telegram to carry their opinions to russians back home (setevye svobody 2022). the staff of dozhd and ekho moskvy were among the émigré journalists who recreated their projects outside of russia. there were stunning individual moments of defiance. one of these came when marina ovsyannikova displayed her opposition to the war on national tv during the march 14 news broadcast on the program vremya for which she had worked as an editor for a decade. sneaking up behind the broadcaster, who seemed not to notice her, ovsyannikova waved a large poster in mixed english and russian with the following text: “no war. ostanovite voinu. ne ver’te propagande. zdes’ vam vrut. [stop the war. don’t believe the propaganda. they are lying to you here.] russians against the war,” while repeating in russian: “stop the war. no to war.” for this extraordinarily bold action, she was taken into custody, heavily fined, and lost her job. ovsyannikova was arrested again in july 2022, this time for brandishing an anti-war placard on the side of the moscow river opposite the kremlin. her sign, all in russian this time, read: “putin is a murderer. his soldiers are fascists. 352 children died. how many more should die for you to stop?” (ovsyannikova 2022). three children’s dolls with red paint on them were spread out at her feet. confined to her house while awaiting trial, in october, she slipped out of the country with her eleven-year-old daughter and was placed on the federal wanted list (ovd-info 2022a). on march 15, one day after ovsyannikova’s first bold protest, anastasia parshkova stood courageously alone in front of the christ the saviour cathedral in moscow, holding a placard saying, in russian: “sixth commandment: thou shalt not kill” (avtozak live 2022). she, too, was scooped up by the police, even though single-person pickets do not need permission to demonstrate. among many personal deeds of protest, the action of feminist artist and lgbtq+ activist sasha skochilenko stands out for its imagination. in april 2022, skochilenko replaced price tags at a supermarket in st. petersburg with data on the death toll in ukraine as a result of russian bombings (moscow times 2022b). arrested and charged with disseminating “knowingly false information,” she remained in detention before appearing on trial in december 2023 (rfe/rl 2022). then there was the twenty-two-year-old moscow baker, anastasia chernysheva, whom authorities detained for posting photos of anti-war confectionaries for sale on instagram. the offending cakes and cookies were often in ukrainian colours and carried the slogan “no to war!”; some even depicted quite obscene references as to what putin could do with himself (stewart and 108 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 hagan 2023). chernysheva was not arrested until april 2023, getting away with this act of defiance for nearly a year. she was fined and released but awaited further charges for “discrediting” russia’s military (moscow times 2023b). one of anastasia’s cakes featured the blue and yellow colours of ukraine’s flag with the caption in russian: “the sun will rise,” taken from the soviet rock band grazhdanskaya oborona’s song of the same name that goes: “the night will be over, so will the hard times, the sun will rise.”9 individual rebellious acts were slowed to a trickle by government actions but not stopped entirely. as of mid-august 2022, 16,437 russians had been arrested for anti-war protests since february 24th, 2022 (ovd-info 2022b). by far, the greater number of the detainees were street demonstrators, but 138 of them were for anti-war posts on social networks, 118 for displaying antiwar symbols and 62 for specific anti-war actions (ovd-info 2022b). at the end of 2022, 380 citizens were on trial for disrespecting and spreading “hatred” of russia’s armed forces (ovdinfo 2022b). the number of incarcerations grew to 19,535 by february 2023, more than 2,000 of them related to anti-mobilization activities (ovd-info 2022b). these data are provided on a regular basis by ovd-info, the leading independent russian website for information on political arrests, criminal proceedings, and human rights violations in russia. founded in 2013, after the notorious bolotnaya square roundup of demonstrators against election rigging, ovd-info took its name from its main target, the department of internal affairs (otdel vnutrennykh del). designated as a “foreign agent” in september 2022, ovd-info remains active and runs a 24/7 hotline open to anonymous reports. community pressure to conform intensified on march 16, 2022, when, during a speech delivered at a meeting intended to work out socio-economic support for the regions,10 putin raged over a litany of western plots against russia. among these was an accusation that the west had created a fifth column (“national traitors”) in russia, thereby encouraging the public to hunt for opponents of the svo (putin 2022b). he declared that “the russian people, will always be able to distinguish true patriots from scum and traitors and simply spit them out like a midge that accidentally flew into their mouths, spit them out on the pavement. i am convinced that a natural and necessary selfpurification of society will only strengthen our country, our solidarity, cohesion and readiness to respond to any challenges” (putin 2022b). with his reference to “self-purification,” putin inspired neighbours to snitch on neighbours, children to snitch on classmates or teachers, and workers to snitch on co-workers. in the stalinist era, this was the hated practice of “denunciations” (putin 2022b). arrests of russian opponents to the war in ukraine rose dramatically after putin declared partial mobilization on september 21, 2022. at least one organization, the youth democratic movement “spring” (vesna), called for an all-russia protest against the mobilization that very day. the appeal urged call-ups either not to report or to surrender once they arrived on the front line. vesna proclaimed: “thousands of russian men—our fathers, brothers and husbands—will be thrown into the meat grinder of war. what will they die for? why will mothers and children shed tears? for putin’s palace?” (dvizhenie “vesna” 2022). 9 for an image of the cake, please see bakery xoxo (@bakery_xoxo). 2022. accessed april 17, 2024. https://www.instagram.com/p/cqpz-tknkf8/?img_index=1. 10 in this instance, “regions” is used to refer to the outlying oblasts and krais. 109 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 partial mobilization briefly re-vitalized large-scale anti-war activities. on the very first day postproclamation, ovd-info tallied at least 1,310 detentions in 39 russian cities, 538 of them in moscow, 479 in st. petersburg, 49 in yekaterinburg, and the rest spread throughout the country (ovd-info 2022c). in the north caucasus, there were brawls between protesters and police in makhachkala, dagestan, and nalchik, kabardino-balkaria (meduza 2022). huge numbers of young men attempted to avoid conscription by leaving the country. direct flights to visa-free armenia, turkey, azerbaijan, and uzbekistan sold out quickly (dziadko and koreniako 2022). on the ground, traffic at finland’s border with russia backed up overnight, and russia’s borders with georgia and kazakhstan were overwhelmed with traffic (kavkaz.realii 2022; lehto 2022). the newly-resurrected and independent novaya gazeta evropa (2022c) claimed on september 25, 2023, that up to 261,000 young men had already fled the country. although that number may seem apocryphal, videos of long line-ups and mob scenes at airports and border crossings suggest that it might not have been greatly exaggerated (tenisheva 2022). a telegram channel titled “relocation guide from the russian federation” [gaid po relokatsii iz rf] listed options for emigration, which countries were accessible, how to find work abroad, how to deal with border control, and so on (gaid n.d.). visits to the “guide,” which was created by istanbul-based ira lobanovskaya in february 2022, soared after partial mobilization was announced, welcoming 1.5 million on september 22 alone. the state duma reacted to the out-flow by adopting legislation setting long prison terms for desertion (10 years) and “voluntary surrender” (15 years). amendments defined draft dodging during a period of mobilization or war as desertion, and even conscientious objectors risked a three-year term (moscow times 2022c). ovd-info (2022d) reported arrests of some 2,500 protesters over the first week of mobilization, and the process itself was so chaotic and inefficient that officials eventually had to send home thousands of men who did not fit the criteria for selection. the situation worsened when citizens learned from social media posts that recruits had been deployed to combat units with too little training and poor equipment. to counter the wave of anger and frustration against the mobilization fiasco, the ministry of defence (mod) distributed videos and displayed large posters showing happy and well-prepared young men going off to fight for their motherland. it was left for body bags to tell the real story. as individual public protest became too dangerous, organized collectives moved to the forefront of opposition to the war. these tended to be dominated by women who opposed positions taken by state-supported groups, such as soldiers’ widows. for instance, members of the feminist antiwar resistance (feministskoe antivoennoe soprotivlenie), or far, stuck small flyers with names of soldiers who were killed or went missing on signposts, information stands, and shop windows. the far movement had its formal beginning the day after russian forces invaded ukraine. on that day, it posted a manifesto on telegram that concluded with the statement: “we are the opposition to the war, to patriarchy, to authoritarianism and militarism. we—are the future and we will win” (feministskoe antivoennoe soprotivlenie 2022). far’s activities spread to dozens of russian cities, where it continues to distribute anti-war and anti-conscription messaging. the resistance works closely with vesna, even as many prominent members of both movements have had to flee the country because of surveillance and harassment from authorities. on international women’s day, march 8, 2022, far asked that women not be given flowers in the traditional manner; rather, flowers bound with blue and yellow ribbons (ukrainian colours) should be laid at war memorials throughout russia. this took place in over 90 russian cities and towns (silina 110 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 2022). far also distributes a newspaper titled “female truth” (zhenskaya pravda), an “anti-war newspaper that it is not ashamed to show mothers and grandmothers!” (zhenskaya pravda n.d.). a particularly artistic mode of protest made its presence known in the form of sophisticated street graffiti. members of the reality (yav) art group, openly, anonymously, or with tag names, painted anti-war murals on the sides of deserted buildings or fences; many of them in banksy style and quality. if the artist was identified, they were detained and fined for “petty hooliganism” (moscow times 2022d). as murals were whitewashed by authorities, others popped up. one prominent graffiti artist, eighty-five-year-old vladimir ovchinnikov, kept painting anti-war murals, paid fines and then did it again somewhere else. one example of his work featured a little girl dressed in ukrainian colours with bombs dropping around her painted on the side of a dilapidated building in borovsk, a village close to moscow. the caption reads: “stop!!!”11 it was painted over by the authorities, and he was fined 35,000 roubles (circa us $560) for “discrediting the russian armed forces” (hopkins 2022). undeterred, he later drew doves on the spot. then, there were the hard-nosed political agencies of dissension. the navalny network, which had 50 regional offices around the country before it was disbanded in 2021 as an “extremist” organization, decided to re-organize precisely to oppose the war in ukraine and mobilization in russia. announced in the first week of october by ivan zhdanov, former director of navalny’s anti-corruption foundation (fond bor’by s korruptsiei – fbk), and his chief of staff leonid volkov, both still in exile, the new body proclaimed that it would operate as a “partisan underground” disseminating information, providing legal assistance, and even sabotaging recruiting offices (volkov 2022). according to some reports, there was also an aggressive underground anti-putin movement in place, calling itself the national republican army (nra). dissident-in-exile ilya ponomarev announced its existence in a youtube video, where he credited the nra with the assassination of darya dugina in august 2022 (utro fevralya 2022). ponomarev, the only state duma deputy to vote against the annexation of crimea in 2014, used the telegram channel titled february morning (utro fevralya) to contradict state propaganda about the war in ukraine. according to one source, at that time, february morning had “27 regional outlets each with its own telegram channel where activists and journalists mingle to gather and share news of anti-putin actions” in russia (ptak 2022). they set up another telegram channel called russian partisan (rospartizan), which provided them with a link to the secretive—and, some say, mythical—national republican army and also to the militant freedom of russia movement (rospartizan n.d.). freedom of russia refers to a paramilitary unit of russians who fight on the side of the ukrainian army; it is also known as the free russia legion. not surprisingly, russia’s ministry of justice’s register of “foreign agents” grew exponentially during the first year of the war. journalists, editors, cartoonists, musicians, bashkir and chuvash activists, the mayor of yekaterinburg, and the ceo of bookmate, a book distribution company, could be found among the nearly 600 people and entities on the list as the first year of war wound down (bbc 2022b). well-established organizations such as russia’s branch of transparency international, the independent pollster levada centre, and newer groups like far and the sports 11 for an image of the mural, please see aaron, jane. 2023. “7 anti-war street artists still working inside russia.” the moscow times, january 2, 2023. accessed april 1, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/02/7-antiwar-street-artists-still-working-inside-russia-a79835. 111 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 lgbt community were so labelled, as were human rights activists and agencies. these latter included russia’s oldest human rights body, memorial, the moscow helsinki group, roskomsvoboda, and the sakharov centre. even environmentalist groups, among them the sakhalin environmental watch, the arkhangelsk’s movement 42, the poltava anti-dumping movement, and the world wildlife foundation, were forced to register as foreign agents. once branded, often without warning or explanation, there was no recourse. the state was forcing all critics and potential critics to stay quiet or to act clandestinely. experienced politicians were not immune. authorities charged three members of yabloko, the only remaining political party in russia that could claim a liberal-democratic platform, with “discrediting the russian army” (zaks.ru 2022). their crime was to publish an open letter to the chair of russia’s investigative committee, aleksandr bastrykin, calling on him to initiate an inquiry on the massacre at bucha (moscow times 2023c). intensified efforts to shut opposition down notwithstanding, instances of individual and unobtrusive opposition to the war continued to crop up; for example, when pictures of civilian residences bombed in dnipro on january 14, 2023, circulated via social media, russians placed flowers and mementos on statues and memorials in russia honouring ukraine and ukrainians. authorities removed them, only to have more show up the next day. in moscow, a statue of ukrainian poet lesya ukrainka was a popular site for such favours (hopkins and heitmann 2023). so were yekaterinburg’s memorial to victims of political repression and st. petersburg’s statue of famous ukrainian poet taras shevchenko. silent acts of disobedience such as these were still common weeks later in at least 60 cities across the country (tenisheva 2023). acts of dissent mentioned so far were political ones. it should not be forgotten that all of russia’s wordsmiths found themselves in jeopardy. many russian winners of international awards for art, drama, literature, and human rights activities fled the country or were sent off to jail. pressure at home on prominent artists, singers, comedians, theatre directors, and writers intensified. the kremlin’s war against words spread beyond the streets and broadsheets into all corners of russian cultural life. deputies in the state duma even debated ways and means to remove actors who had bolted the country from existing films, perhaps even naming them as “traitors” in film credits (lenta.ru 2023). others proposed a blacklist of performers banned from tv and film and recommended that their scenes be cut out of existing films (shevchuk 2023). “human and civil rights” joined “war” and “invasion” as bad words. george orwell’s animal farm (1943) and 1984 (1949) in russian translation began materializing in shop windows and were sometimes distributed on the street by dissenters. taken as a nonetoo-subtle commentary on current affairs in russia, 1984 topped online book sales in russia in 2022, often coupled with the soviet union’s own dystopian science fiction, we (my), written by bolshevik yevgeny zamyatin in 1921 (prakash 2022). in response, the ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson maria zakharova rather pathetically insisted that orwell’s works were really depictions of western liberal societies (ria novyi den’ 2022). russian voices from abroad the laws that brought an end to mainstream media opposition to the war were mostly reactive. for instance, an amendment adopted by the state duma in january 2023 defined any map or chart that challenged russia’s “territorial integrity” as “extremist” material and subjected its creator to heavy 112 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 fines. that meant that any mapmaker who left doubts on russia’s hold on the four areas of ukraine annexed in september, crimea, or even the kuril islands, could be charged with a crime. by this time, most western news sites, instagram, facebook, and twitter were banned in russia. youtube remained, though partially blocked. such well-known russian news and commentary media as mediazona, meduza, moscow times and istories joined novaya gazeta and tv’s dozhd outside of the country and continued to feed accounts of the war and domestic politics to russian audiences via social media. mediazona, founded by leaders of the celebrated punk rock protest group pussy riot, was blocked in russia as early as march 6, 2022, but continued to spread harsh indictments of putin in russia via youtube (mediazona 2022); these included pussy riot renditions. pussy riot’s rhetoric against putin had grown more strident since their first arrest in 2012. they explained their aggressive stance to russians in a video posted on instagram on december 26, 2022: “the music of our anger, indignation, disagreement, [is] a reproachful desperate cry against putin’s bloodthirsty puppets, led by a real cannibal monster, whose place is in the infinity of fierce hellish flames on the bones of the victims of this terrible war” (pussy riot 2022a). their new music video featured the atrocities committed in bucha and culminated with one member of the band, masked and robed, relieving herself on a portrait of putin (pussy riot 2022b). operating out of latvia since june 2022, dozhd claimed to have 14 million unique viewers in russia and up to 22 million altogether.12 its audience grew quickly after the partial mobilization because, according to its editor-in-chief, thousands of russians who were indifferent to the war had suddenly noticed it closer to home. moscow’s reaction to criticism from russians-in-exile was to propose the confiscation of whatever assets they still had in russia and cancel their passports, forcing them into a permanently disgruntled diaspora (borogan and soldatov 2023). deputy chair of the russian security council, liberal turned hawk dmitry medvedev, advocated even stiffer punishment, including the reintroduction of the death penalty (medvedev 2023). rebellious russian voices from abroad grew louder. incubating young patriots aware that opposition to the war rested primarily with the younger generation, authorities in moscow fell back on the soviet principle of vospitanie (upbringing), i.e. using the school system to shape the political thinking of the country’s youth. in soviet days, that meant that schools were expected to graduate keen young communists; in putin’s russia, schools are now expected to graduate keen young patriots. to that end, the russian ministry of education introduced a new short course for all general school classes. titled “conversations about important matters” (razgovory o vazhnom), and launched in the summer of 2022 by putin himself, the lesson started the day for students every monday beginning on september 5, 2022. in the lesson, teachers stressed moments in history that inspired national unity against outside threats (morton 2023). children in the first four grades were taught about the world’s natural wonders and how to support and beautify their own country. stories of heroics in russia’s past and the current war in ukraine were provided for students in the fifth and later grades. these lectures were not optional. the ministry of education provided detailed outlines on its website on what lessons to give and when, with carefully worded instructions on how they should be taught. beginning in february 2023, the 12 the latvian government cancelled dozhd’s licence in december 2022, claiming that it was assisting russian soldiers in ukraine. dozhd has since moved to the netherlands. 113 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 course was also aired on channel one’s regular morning tv show on mondays so that children who missed school that day and their parents could view it at home (razgovory o vazhnom 2023). the purpose of “conversations” was clear: instil patriotism and spread support for the war to all corners of russia. there was pushback. as schools launched the new mandatory curriculum in september 2022, the teachers’ alliance (al’ians uchitelei) posted templates for letters of protest and urged their members and parents to send them to local school directors and other authorities, including the federal ministry of education, as follows: teacher application template! refuse to conduct lessons ‘conversations about important matters!’ not only is teaching these lessons not the teacher's responsibility, it is against your employment contract! the teacher is obliged to comply with all restrictions imposed by the federal law ‘on education.’ therefore, we have prepared a letter template for notifying the director of the impossibility of conducting such lessons (al’ians uchitelei 2022a). one of the templates was titled “we defend schoolchildren from propaganda. how to refute ‘patriotic hour.’” it is not known how many teachers actually submitted a letter of complaint, probably very few, but the resistance was strong enough that the ministry removed direct references to ukraine, the svo, and military propaganda from school manuals on patriotism (al’ians uchitelei 2022b). as the teachers’ alliance pointed out, the russian law on education forbids cpsu-style political ‘agitation’ in schools. to get around this restriction, early in 2023, the ministry of education issued instructions to incorporate the “conversations” into existing history courses for grades 10-11, adding discussions of the causes and consequences of the collapse of the ussr, the ‘reunification’ of crimea with russia, the svo, and other major events of the 20th to early 21st centuries to both the curriculum and final examinations. by winter 2023, new sets of textbooks and teaching aids for history and social science were being readied for primary general (grades 1–4), basic general (grades 5–9), and secondary general education (grades 10–11) (vedomosti 2023). to get teachers on board, the first deputy chief of staff of the presidential administration, sergei kiriyenko, offered unspecified incentives to teachers who inculcate a “feeling of patriotism and a sense of pride” in the “heroes” of the svo (rapsi 2022). speaking to the all-russian forum of class teachers in moscow, he intoned: “we are defending russia and the territory of russia, we are defending the culture of russia, we are defending the history of russia and the memory of the heroes that every russian family has. and this is such a special task” (rapsi 2022). out of school, the same themes were advanced by a state-funded youth movement called big change (bol’shaia peremena) approved by the state duma in may 2022. this new configuration of the soviet pioneers program absorbed several existing youth bodies (tass 2022). in february 2023, the government allocated 18.6 billion roubles (circa us $250 million) for the newly established avangard project, which recreates soviet-style pioneer summer camps for children, this time to nurture patriots.13 the school curriculum add-ons echoed the kremlin’s ever-widening mantra that the fight in ukraine was really against the “collective west.” leading the pack in this connection was dmitry medvedev, who marked russia’s unity day, november 4, 2022, with a virulent anti-west post on telegram, just two days after he proposed reinstating the death penalty for wartime saboteurs. he 13 for the first avangard centre program instituted in 2022, see black 2023. 114 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 characterized the ukrainian leadership as “a bunch of insane nazi drug addicts, a nation drugged and intimidated by them, and a large pack of barking dogs from the western kennel” (moscow times 2022e). occupied regions in ukraine were “sacred” parts of russia’s “thousand-year history,” he contended and would not be ceded to anyone. russia’s mission was to wrest the world out from under the grip of the west, “masters of darkness, the slave masters and oppressors, who dream of their monstrous colonial past and yearn to maintain their power over the world” (moscow times 2022e). known for liberal and reformist views during his one-term presidency (2008–12), medvedev emerged from his cocoon to become the head cheerleader for the russian government’s most extreme anti-western memes (black 2015). chair of the russian security council, nicolai patrushev, confirmed the revised official narrative in an interview on january 9, 2023: “the events in ukraine are not a clash between moscow and kyiv. it’s a military confrontation of nato, above all the us and britain, with russia. fearing a direct engagement, nato instructors push ukrainian men to certain death” (argumenty i fakty 2023). doubtless, these opinions are imbedded in the new school textbooks and are much more likely to be accepted as fact by russians who may still find it hard to think of ukrainians as their enemy. the military contributed to the re-education frenzy as well. first deputy minister of defence and chief of the army general staff, valery gerasimov, advocated that about 140 hours over the student’s final two years of secondary school be allocated to instruction in basic military skills, first aid, and orientation. coupled with another new course offered by the ministry of education, “fundamentals and principles of statehood,” school curricula will be loaded with ‘good citizenship’ and ideological training just as the soviet school system was (bashlykova 2022). additionally, previously fading cadet training was reinvigorated in schools. military education for students in the upper grades, male and female, now includes instruction on how to fire kalashnikov assault rifles, throw grenades, and administer first aid (edwards 2024). cadets hear lessons on the ‘re-integration’ of crimea, the svo, the consequences for russia of western sanctions, and learn how to use gas masks (moscow times 2023d). teachers’ organizations objected, pointing out that such hands-on militarization modules had been cancelled in the 1990s for reasons of safety, but to no avail (edwards 2024). complementing the cadet program was the young army (full title: “all-russia children youth military patriotic social movement ‘yunarmiya’”), a military youth organization founded by defence minister sergei shoigu in 2015 and funded by the mod (staalesen 2022). in addition to basic military training, members of these units prepare documentaries and group photos in support of the war and are regularly subjected to statements from officials encouraging patriotism and insisting that the west has declared an information war against russia. the organization accepts boys and girls from the ages of eight to seventeen. the yunarmiya had some 540,000 members in 2019, spurting to 718,000 by august 2022, and, one may assume, has grown since then (maj. ray finch 2019). there were dozens of other military agencies established for russia’s youth, many of them longstanding but now recharged. these included the eaglets of russia (orliata rossii) for primary school children and civilian clubs and associations to teach military skills, such as warrior (voin) and school of heroes (shkola geroev) to train boys between the ages of two and seventeen how to be war heroes (the bell 2023). clearly, the kremlin hoped that the entire student body would quickly become militarized and unquestioningly patriotic. only time will tell if the domestic campaign is successful. 115 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 conclusion although public opinion polls conducted after a full year of the “svo” revealed widespread confidence in the army and the president, they also showed a steady increase in preferences for a transition to peace talks. in february 2023, nearly 70 percent of respondents to a levada centre survey in the 18–24 age group were in favour of ending the war somehow, while 52 percent of the older generation (55+) wanted the war to continue (levada-tsentr 2023). over 60 percent of all respondents believed the “svo” was going well, nearly 10 percent more than in october 2022. giving up occupied territory was not an option for any age group (levada-tsentr 2023). these respondents were the ones paying attention. after nearly a year, a surprisingly large portion of russia’s population, 47 percent, still appeared to be paying little attention to the war as long as it had not yet affected them directly (levada-tsentr 2023). results from levada centre surveys would suggest that the state’s internal propaganda campaigns were having their desired results, though fear of the authorities may well have shaped the responses (volkov 2023). by shifting domestic wartime propaganda to premises that triggered national consciousness, raising the spectre of a foreign threat, and generating ‘rally around the flag’ sentiments, the state’s narrative fell on more readily receptive ears. putin had certain historical intuitive advantages as well. it seemed that variations of nikolai danilevsky’s nineteenth-century notion that russia and europe represented distinct civilizations fated to compete with one another, and the instinctive leninist conviction that russia is surrounded by enemies (“two immutably hostile camps”) also helped provide putin with a malleable citizenry already open to the state’s preferred storyline (robinson 2022). by the start of the second year of the invasion, opposition voices inside russia had been muted by coercion, harassment, and forced exile. restrictions imposed on the russian population by legislation and public peer pressure already had a feeling of permanence about them as the war moved into its second year. to date, the only potential stumbling block in the way of an orwellian future for the russian home front lies with the ever-growing, angry, and enlightened diaspora, but only when and if it were ever to return home. 116 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 references aaron, jane. 2023. “7 anti-war street artists still working inside russia.” the moscow times, january 2, 2023. accessed april 1, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/02/7anti-war-street-artists-still-working-inside-russia-a79835. al’ians uchitelei (@teachers_union). 2022a. “shablon zaiavleniia ot uchitelia! otkazyvaites’ ot provedeniia urokov ‘razgovory o vazhnom!’” [template of statement from teachers! refuse to teach lessons ‘conversations about important matters’]. telegram, september 7, 2022, t.me/teachers_union/851. ———. 2022b. “zashchitim shkol’nikov ot propagandy. kak otkazat’sia ot ‘patrioticheskogo chasa’” [protect schoolchildren from propaganda. how to resist 'patriotic hour']. telegram, august 30, 2022. t.me/teachers_union/790. argumenty i fakty. 2023. “sekretar’ sovbeza rf patrushev zaiavil, chto u rossiian net nenavisti k prostym ukraintsam” [secretary of the rf security council said that russians have no hatred for ordinary ukrainians]. january 9, 2023. accessed april 2, 2024. https://argumenti.ru/politics/2023/01/807964. avtozak live (@avtozaklive). 2022. “v moskve u khrama khrista spasitelya zaderzhali devushku, kotoraia vyshla na piket protiv vojny” [a girl who protested against the war was detained in moscow in front of the church of christ the saviour]. telegram, march 15, 2022. t.me/avtozaklive/13077. bakery xoxo (@bakery_xoxo). 2022. accessed april 17, 2024. https://www.instagram.com/ p/cqpz-tknkf8/?img_index=1 bashlykova, natal’ia. 2022. “vse v kurse: minoborony podderzhalo vvedenie voennoi podgotovki v shkolakh” [everyone’s aware: the defence ministry supports the introduction of military training in schools]. izvestiya, november 8, 2022. accessed march 25, 2024. https://iz.ru/1421943/natalia-bashlykova/vse-v-kurse-minoborony-podderzhalo-vvedenievoennoi-podgotovki-v-shkolakh. bbc (british broadcasting corporation). 2022a. “chto takoe bukva z: ‘novaia svastika’ ili kremlevskiy fleshmob?” [what is the letter z: ‘new swastika’ or kremlin flash mob?] bbc news. russkaya sluzhba, march 9, 2022. accessed march 27, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-60670375. ———. 2022b. “reestr dlia ‘massovykh repressiy’. pochemu v rosii stanet bol’she ‘inoagentov’” [register for ‘mass repression’. why in russia there is going to be more ‘foreign agents’]. accessed april 2, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63814398. ———. 2022. “ukraine war: russia’s nobel winning editor muratov doused with paint.” april 7, 2022. accessed april 18, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61029931. the bell. 2023. “propaganda in kindergartens.” december 14, 2023. accessed march 24, 2024. https://en.thebell.io/propaganda-in-kindergartens/. ———. 2022. “unmasking russia’s influential pro-war ‘rybar’ telegram channel.” november 22, 2022. accessed march 27, 2024. https://en.thebell.io/unmasking-russia-s-influentialpro-war-rybar-telegram-channel/. https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-60670375 https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63814398 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61029931 117 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 black, joseph laurence. 2023. eternal putin? confronting navalny, the pandemic, sanctions, and war with ukraine. lanham, md: lexington. ———. 2015. the russian presidency of dmitry medvedev, 2008-12. abingdon, uk: routledge. borogan, irina, and andrei soldatov. 2023. “kremlin crosshairs focus on exiles.” center for european policy analysis, january 13, 2023. accessed march 27, 2024. https://cepa.org/article/kremlin-crosshairs-focus-on-exiles. dvizhenie “vesna” (@vesna_democrat). 2022. “net mogilizatsii! vserossiyskaia aktsiia protesta. segodnia, 21 sentiabria, v 19:00. tsentry vsekh gorodov” [no mobilization [letter ’b’ changed to ‘g’ meaning ‘grave-ization] 21 september, 19:00. in all russian city centres]. telegram, september 21, 2022. t.me/vesna_democrat/3630. dziadko, timofei, and artem koreniako. 2022. “na saitakh aviakompaniy ne ostalos’ biletov na blizhaishie reisy” [there are no tickets left on the airline websites for the next flights]. rbc, september 21, 2022. accessed march 27, 2024. https://www.rbc.ru/business/21/09/2022/ 632ac0399a794786ef90e04c. edwards, allyson. 2024. “designing the ‘good russian patriot’: indoctrination, education, and youth in russia.” russian analytical digest, no. 309 (january 31, 2024): 8–12. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securitiesstudies/pdfs/russian_analytical_digest_309.pdf. faulconbridge, guy. 2023. “soldiers’ widows group calls on putin to order major mobilisation for ukraine war.” reuters, january 3, 2023. accessed march 24, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/soldiers-widows-group-calls-putin-order-majormobilisation-ukraine-war-2023-01-03. feministskoe antivoennoe soprotivlenie (@femagainstwar). 2022. “manifest feministskogo antivoennogo soprotivleniia” [manifesto of the feminist anti-war resistance]. telegram, february 25, 2022. t.me/femagainstwar/4. ———. 2022. telegram, march 9, 2022. t.me/femagainstwar/368. maj. finch, ray. 2019. “young army movement. winning the hearts and minds of russia’s youth.” military review (september-october): 112–121. https:// www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/military-review/archives/english/so-19/finchyoung-army.pdf. gaid (@guideofrelocation). n.d. telegram. https://t.me/guideofrelocation. the grayzone. n.d. accessed march 25, 2024. https://thegrayzone.com/category/russia/. hopkins, valerie. “paintbrush in hand, a russian muralist wages his own war.” new york times, december 19, 2022. accessed march 25, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2022/12/14/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-art-dissent.html. hopkins, valerie, and nanna heitmann. 2023. “in moscow, a quiet anti-war protest with flowers and plush toys.” new york times, january 23, 2023. accessed march 25, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/world/europe/moscow-flowers-protest-ukraine-wardnipro.html. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/military-review/archives/english/so-19/finch-young-army.pdf https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/military-review/archives/english/so-19/finch-young-army.pdf https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/military-review/archives/english/so-19/finch-young-army.pdf https://thegrayzone.com/category/russia/ https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/14/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-art-dissent.html https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/14/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-art-dissent.html https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/world/europe/moscow-flowers-protest-ukraine-war-dnipro.html https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/world/europe/moscow-flowers-protest-ukraine-war-dnipro.html 118 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 kavkaz.realii. 2022. “ocheredi na granitse rossii i gruzii” [lineups at the border between russia and georgia]. september 22, 2022, with videos, kavkazr.com/a/32045785.html. kolesnikov, andrei. 2022. “how ‘i am not ashamed’ t-shirts have become a symbol for russia’s new normal.” carnegie endowment for international peace, april 27, 2022. accessed march 27, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/27/how-i-am-notashamed-t-shirts-have-become-symbol-for-russia-s-new-normal-pub-87009. komitet zashchity natsional’nykh interesov. 2022. accessed march 27, 2024. https://inagent.info/. landersen, roy. 2023. “support ukraine independence! join fight against moscow invasion.” may 15, 2023. the militant, 87 (19). accessed march 25, 2024. https://themilitant.com/ 2023/05/06/support-ukraine-independence-join-fight-against-moscow-invasion/. lehto, essi. “finland says traffic ‘intensifying’ on border with russia.” national post, september 22, 2022. accessed march 27, 2024. https://nationalpost.com/pmn/newspmn/finland-says-traffic-intensifying-on-border-with-russia. lenta.ru. 2023. “v gosdume predlozhili v titrakh preduprezhdat’ zritelei o ‘predatel’stve’ aktera” [the state duma suggested warning viewers about an actor’s ‘betrayal’ in the credits]. lenta.ru, january 9, 2023. accessed march 27, 2024. lenta.ru/news/2023/01/09/gusev/. levada-tsentr. 2023. “konflikt s ukrainoi: otsenki fevralia 2023 goda” [the conflict with ukraine: assessments from february 2023]. march 2, 2023. accessed march 27, 2024. levada.ru/2023/03/02/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-otsenki-fevralya-2023-god. makutina, mariya. 2023. “edinorossy postoiat za stalingrad” [united russians will stand for stalingrad]. kommersant, january 31, 2023. accessed march 27, 2024. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5797199. mediazona. 2022. “‘mediazonu’ zablokirovali za osveshenie voiny. zaiavlenie redaktsii — i nashi plany” [mediazona was blocked for covering the war. editorial statement — and our plans]. mediazona, march 6, 2022. accessed march 20, 2024. zona.media/article/2022/03/06/mzblocked. meduza. 2022. “in dagestan, locals fight police on day two of mass protests against mobilization.” september 26, 2022. accessed april 1, 2024. https://meduza.io/en/ news/2022/09/26/in-dagestan-locals-fight-police-on-day-two-of-mass-protests-againstmobilization. medvedev, dmitry (@medvedev_telegram). 2023. telegram, january 8, 2023. t.me/medvedev_telegram/245. morton, elise. 2023. “how russia is molding the minds of schoolkids to support its brutal invasion of ukraine.” business insider, january 29, 2023. accessed march 27, 2024. https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-ukraine-invasion-propoganda-schoolkids-20231?op=1. moscow times. 2022a. “russia bans media outlets from using words ‘war,’ ‘invasion.’” february 26, 2022. accessed march 17, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 2022/02/26/russia-bans-media-outlets-from-using-words-war-invasion-a76605. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/27/how-i-am-not-ashamed-t-shirts-have-become-symbol-for-russia-s-new-normal-pub-87009 https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/27/how-i-am-not-ashamed-t-shirts-have-become-symbol-for-russia-s-new-normal-pub-87009 https://inagent.info/ https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5797199 https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/09/26/in-dagestan-locals-fight-police-on-day-two-of-mass-protests-against-mobilization https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/09/26/in-dagestan-locals-fight-police-on-day-two-of-mass-protests-against-mobilization https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/09/26/in-dagestan-locals-fight-police-on-day-two-of-mass-protests-against-mobilization https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-ukraine-invasion-propoganda-schoolkids-2023-1?op=1 https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-ukraine-invasion-propoganda-schoolkids-2023-1?op=1 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/26/russia-bans-media-outlets-from-using-words-war-invasion-a76605 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/26/russia-bans-media-outlets-from-using-words-war-invasion-a76605 119 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2022b. “trial of russian artist for anti-war supermarket protest begins.” december 16, 2022. accessed march 28, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/15/trial-ofrussian-artist-for-anti-war-supermarket-protest-begins-a79711. ———. 2022c. “russia introduces harsh punishments for wartime desertion, refusal to serve.” september 24, 2022. accessed april 1, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 2022/09/24/russia-introduces-harsh-punishments-for-wartime-desertion-refusal-to-servea7885z ———. 2022d. “yav art group: to protest, it helps to know the law.” december 14, 2022. accessed march 28, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/14/yav-art-groupto-protest-it-helps-to-know-the-law-a79690. ———. 2022e. “medvedev rails against west to mark russian unity day.” november 4, 2022. accessed march 28, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/11/04/medvedev-railsagainst-west-to-mark-russian-unity-day-a79290. ———. 2023a. “stalin monument unveiled to mark 80th anniversary of stalingrad victory.” february 1, 2023. accessed march 23, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 2023/02/01/stalin-monument-unveiled-to-mark-80th-anniversary-of-stalingrad-victorya80113. ———. 2023b. “moscow baker fined over anti-war cakes.” april 28, 2023. accessed march 28, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/04/28/moscow-baker-fined-over-antiwar-cakes-a80978. ———. 2023c. “st. petersburg politician charged over bucha massacre claims.” january 10, 2023. accessed march 28, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/09/stpetersburg-politician-charged-over-bucha-massacreclaims-a79898. ———. 2023d. “in photos: russian high schoolers undergo basic military, first aid training.” april 7, 2023. accessed march 20, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 2023/04/07/in-photos-russian-high-schoolers-undergo-basic-military-and-first-aidtraining-a80751. novaya gazeta. 2022a. “putin vedet voinu s ukrainoi. den’ tretii. onlain” [putin is waging a war with ukraine. day three. online]. novaya gazeta, february 25, 2022. link unavailable as the original newspaper was taken down by the russian government. ———. 2022b. no.20 (3320). february 25, 2024. link unavailable as the original newspaper was taken down by the russian government. ———. 2022c. “istochniki: v fsb nasshitali bolee 260 tysiach pokinuvshikh rossiiu muzhchin. siloviki khotiat zakryt’ granitsu, no putin ne naznachaet obsuzhdenii” [fsb sources counted more than 260 thousand russian men who left. law enforcers want to close the border but putin has not opened the discussion on this]. september 25, 2022. accessed march 28, 2024. https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/09/25/istochniki-v-fsb-naschitalibolee-260-tysiach-pokinuvshikh-rossiiu-muzhchin-siloviki-khotiat-zakryt-granitsu-noputin-ne-naznachaet-obsuzhdenii-news. ovd-info. 2022a. “eks-redaktora ‘pervogo kanala’ marinu ovsyannikovu ob”iavili v rosysk” [former editor of channel one marina ovsyannikova put on wanted list]. october 3, 2022. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/15/trial-of-russian-artist-for-anti-war-supermarket-protest-begins-a79711 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/15/trial-of-russian-artist-for-anti-war-supermarket-protest-begins-a79711 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/14/yav-art-group-to-protest-it-helps-to-know-the-law-a79690 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/14/yav-art-group-to-protest-it-helps-to-know-the-law-a79690 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/11/04/medvedev-rails-against-west-to-mark-russian-unity-day-a79290 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/11/04/medvedev-rails-against-west-to-mark-russian-unity-day-a79290 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/01/stalin-monument-unveiled-to-mark-80th-anniversary-of-stalingrad-victory-a80113 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/01/stalin-monument-unveiled-to-mark-80th-anniversary-of-stalingrad-victory-a80113 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/01/stalin-monument-unveiled-to-mark-80th-anniversary-of-stalingrad-victory-a80113 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/09/st-petersburg-politician-charged-over-bucha-massacreclaims-a79898 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/09/st-petersburg-politician-charged-over-bucha-massacreclaims-a79898 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/04/07/in-photos-russian-high-schoolers-undergo-basic-military-and-first-aid-training-a80751 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/04/07/in-photos-russian-high-schoolers-undergo-basic-military-and-first-aid-training-a80751 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/04/07/in-photos-russian-high-schoolers-undergo-basic-military-and-first-aid-training-a80751 https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/09/25/istochniki-v-fsb-naschitali-bolee-260-tysiach-pokinuvshikh-rossiiu-muzhchin-siloviki-khotiat-zakryt-granitsu-no-putin-ne-naznachaet-obsuzhdenii-news https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/09/25/istochniki-v-fsb-naschitali-bolee-260-tysiach-pokinuvshikh-rossiiu-muzhchin-siloviki-khotiat-zakryt-granitsu-no-putin-ne-naznachaet-obsuzhdenii-news https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/09/25/istochniki-v-fsb-naschitali-bolee-260-tysiach-pokinuvshikh-rossiiu-muzhchin-siloviki-khotiat-zakryt-granitsu-no-putin-ne-naznachaet-obsuzhdenii-news 120 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 accessed march 28, 2024. https://ovd.info/express-news/2022/10/03/eks-redaktorapervogo-kanala-marinu-ovsyannikovu-obyavili-v-rozysk. ———. 2022b. “16,437 zaderzhanii za antivoennuiu pozitsiiu, nachinaia s 24 fevralia 2022” [16,437 detained for their anti-war position, starting with february 24, 2022]. august 24, 2022. accessed march 28, 2024. data.ovdinfo.org/svodka-antivoennyh-repressiy-polgodavoyny#1. ———. 2022c. “zhestkie zaderzhaniia i povestki v voenkomat: itogi aktsii protiv mobilizatsii 21 sentiabria” [violent detentions and summonses to the military recruitment office: the results of demonstrations against mobilization on september 21]. september 22, 2022. accessed march 28, 2024. ovd.news/news/2022/09/22/zhestkie-zaderzhaniya-i-povestki-vvoenkomat-itogi-akciy-protiv-mobilizacii-21. ———. 2022d. “spiski zaderzhannykh v sviazi s aktsiiami protiv voiny s ukrainoi 27 fevralia 2022 goda.” [list of those detained in connection with protests against the war with ukraine 27 february 2022]. ovd-info, february 28, 2022. accessed april 1, 2024. https://ovd.info/news/2022/02/27/spiski-zaderzhannyh-v-svyazi-s-akciyami-protiv-voynys-ukrainoy-27-fevralya-2022. ovsyannikova, marina (@womanwithposter). 2022. telegram, july 15, 2022. https://t.me/ womanwithposter/48. ponsonby, arthur. 1928. falsehood in war-time: containing an assortment of lies circulated throughout the nations during the great war. london: garland publishing company. prakash, prarthana. “george orwell’s dystopian novel ‘1984’ about an autocratic regime that oppresses its citizens is now a bestseller in russia.” fortune, december 14, 2022. accessed march 24, 2024. https://fortune.com/2022/12/14/george-orwell-1984-bookbestseller-russia/. prikaz federal’noi sluzhby bezopasnosti rossiyskoi federatsii ot 4 noyabrya 2022 no. 547. 2022. ‘ob utverzhdenii perechnya svedeniy v oblasti voennoi, voenno-tekhnicheskoi deyatel’nosti rossiyskoi federatsii, kotorye pri ikh poluchenii inostrannymi istochnikami mogut byt’ ispol’zovany protiv bezopasnosti rossiyskoi federatsii’”[order of the federal security service of the russian federation of november 4, 2022, no. 547 'on the inclusion of the listing of the information in the field of military, military-technical activity of the russian federation, which, if obtained by other sources, may be used against the security of the russian federation']. registered november 17, 2022 no. 70986. accessed march 25, 2024. publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/view/ 0001202211170017?index=10&rangesize=1. ptak, guillaume. “the telegram-powered news outlet waging guerrilla war on russia.” wired, august 29, 2022. accessed march 28, 2024. https://www.wired.com/story/februarymorning-russia-ukraine-war/. putin, vladimir. 2022a. “address by the president of the russian federation.” accessed march 20, 2024. en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. ———. 2022b. “soveshchanie o merakh sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi podderzhki regionov” [meeting on the measures of socio-economic support for the regions]. march 16, 2022. accessed march 20, 2024. kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67996. https://ovd.info/express-news/2022/10/03/eks-redaktora-pervogo-kanala-marinu-ovsyannikovu-obyavili-v-rozysk https://ovd.info/express-news/2022/10/03/eks-redaktora-pervogo-kanala-marinu-ovsyannikovu-obyavili-v-rozysk https://fortune.com/2022/12/14/george-orwell-1984-book-bestseller-russia/ https://fortune.com/2022/12/14/george-orwell-1984-book-bestseller-russia/ https://www.wired.com/story/february-morning-russia-ukraine-war/ https://www.wired.com/story/february-morning-russia-ukraine-war/ 121 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2023. “torzhestvennyi kontsert po sluchaiu 80-i godovshchiny razgroma nemetskofashistskikh voisk v stalingradskoi bitve” [gala concert on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the defeat of german-fascist troops in the battle of stalingrad]. february 2, 2023. accessed march 24, 2024. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70434. pussy riot (@pussyriot). 2022a. “our new anti-war music video ‘mama, don't watch tv.’” instagram photo, december 26, 2022. https://www.instagram.com/pussyriot/ p/cmog7gbqqqq/?img_index=1. ———. 2022b. “mama, don’t watch tv/мама, не смотри телевизор (anti-war song).” accessed march 28, 2024. youtube, 3:45. youtube.com/watch?v=zr0gn2lljay. rapsi (russian agency of legal and judicial information). 2022. “kiriyenko predlagaet voznagrazhdat’ uchitelei za vospitanie v geroiakh svo chuvstva patriotizma” [kiriyenko proposes to reward teachers for instilling a sense of patriotism in the heroes of the svo]. october 22, 2022. accessed march 28, 2024. https://rapsinews.ru/incident_news/ 20221022/308402181.html. razgovory o vazhnom (@razgovory_o_vazhnom). 2023. telegram, february 16, 2023. https://t.me/razgovory_o_vazhnom/705. rfe/rl (radio free europe/radio liberty). 2022. ‘“my country thirsts for blood’: russian artist, jailed for war ‘fakes,’ speaks out from custody.” july 18, 2022. accessed march 28, 2024. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-skolchilenko-artist-jailed-ukraine-war-interview/ 31948796.html. ria novyi den’. 2022. “zakharova pro sravnenie rossii s oruelovskii ‘1984’” [zakharova on the comparison of russian with the orweliian 1984]. accessed march 20, 2024. youtube, 2:13. youtube.com/watch?v=vdvkdp6-fby&t=6s. reverse side of the medal (@rsotmdivision). n.d. telegram. https://t.me/rsotmdivision. robinson, paul. 2022. “what can nikolai danilevsky teach us about today’s struggle between east and west?” canadian dimension, november 28, 2022. accessed march 28, 2024. https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/what-can-nikolai-danilevsky-teach-us-abouttodays-struggle-between-east-and-west. rospartizan. n.d. telegram. https://t.me/rospartizan. rossiyskaya gazeta. 2022. “vladimir putin vystupil s obrashcheniem. stenogramma” [vladimir putin delivered an address. a transcript.]. february 24, 2022. accessed march 24, 2024. https://rg.ru/2022/02/24/vladimir-putin-vystupil-s-obrashcheniem-k-rossiianam.html. rybar (@rybar). n.d. telegram. https://t.me/rybar. setevye svobody. 2022. “2022: dva runeta.” drive.google.com/file/d/ 1riypt8dkqaoyw6yz4co9lp9ochbveqsd/view. shevchuk, mikhail. “how cancel culture works in russia.” moscow times, february 10, 2023. accessed march 20, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/10/how-cancelculture-works-in-russia-a80198. silina, maria. “russia’s feminists are protesting the war and its propaganda with stickers, posters, performance and graffiti.” the conversation, april 7, 2022. accessed march 20, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70434 https://rapsinews.ru/incident_news/20221022/308402181.html https://rapsinews.ru/incident_news/20221022/308402181.html https://t.me/razgovory_o_vazhnom/705 https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-skolchilenko-artist-jailed-ukraine-war-interview/31948796.html https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-skolchilenko-artist-jailed-ukraine-war-interview/31948796.html https://rg.ru/2022/02/24/vladimir-putin-vystupil-s-obrashcheniem-k-rossiianam.html https://t.me/rybar https://drive.google.com/file/d/1riypt8dkqaoyw6yz4co9lp9ochbveqsd/view https://drive.google.com/file/d/1riypt8dkqaoyw6yz4co9lp9ochbveqsd/view 122 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 2024. https://theconversation.com/russias-feminists-are-protesting-the-war-and-itspropaganda-with-stickers-posters-performance-and-graffiti-179989. staalesen, atle. 2022. “a wave of war propaganda is gushing over russian youth.” the barents observer, march 16, 2022. accessed march 24, 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/ en/security/2022/03/wave-warmongering-gushing-over-russian-youth. stewart, will, and rachel hagan. 2023. “woman, 22, who baked ‘f*** vladimir putin cakes detained by russian police.” the daily mirror, april 28, 2023. accessed march 28, 2024. mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/woman-22-who-baked-f-29840222. tenisheva, anastasia. 2022. ‘“total chaos’: russian mobilization exodus accelerates amid border closure rumors.” moscow times, september 26, 2022. accessed march 20, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/26/total-chaos-russian-mobilization-exodusaccelerates-amid-border-closure-rumors-a78894. ———. 2023. ‘“i couldn’t stay silent’: anti-war ‘flower protests’ spread to 60 cities across russia.” moscow times, february 10, 2023. accessed march 24, 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/03/i-couldnt-stay-silent-anti-war-flowerprotests-spread-to-60-cities-across-russia-a80129. utro fevralia. 2022. “v rossii sozdana natsional’naia respublikanskaia armiia, osushchestvivshaia pokushenie na dugina” [a national republican army has been established in russia, which carried out the assassination attempt on dugin]. august 21, 2022. youtube, 9:33. youtube.com/watch?v=poft8v8vytc&t=127s. vedomosti. 2023. “putin poruchil predstavit’ predlozheniia po razrabotke uchebnikov po istorii” [putin instructed to submit proposals for the development of history textbooks]. january 13, 2023. accessed march 28, 2024. https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/news/2023/01/ 13/958971-predstavit-predlozheniya-po-razrabotke-uchebnikov-po-istorii. volkov, denis. 2023. “vosmozhny li oprosy v segodniashnei rossii?” [are surveys possible in today’s russia?]. levada-tsentr, february 10, 2023. accessed march 20, 2024. levada.ru/2023/02/10/vozmozhny-li-oprosy-v-segodnyashnej-rossii. volkov, leonid (@leonidvolkov). “snova otkryvaem shtaby naval’nogo. protiv putina, voiny i mobilizatsii” [opening navalny's headquarters again. against putin, war and mobilization]. twitter, october 4, 2022. twitter.com/leonidvolkov/status/ 1577255547963072514. yunarmiya. 2024. accessed april 2, 2024. https://yunarmy.ru/. zaks.ru. 2022. “na vishnevskogo i reznika sostavili protokoly o diskreditatsii armii” [vishnevsky and reznik were charged with discrediting the army]. january 9, 2023. accessed march 24, 2024. zaks.ru/new/archive/view/234829. zhenskaya pravda. n.d. femagainstwar.notion.site/femagainstwar/a35a3040b7ad42bb85d7d9c39ef76fa1. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/03/wave-warmongering-gushing-over-russian-youth https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/03/wave-warmongering-gushing-over-russian-youth https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/news/2023/01/13/958971-predstavit-predlozheniya-po-razrabotke-uchebnikov-po-istorii https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/news/2023/01/13/958971-predstavit-predlozheniya-po-razrabotke-uchebnikov-po-istorii 123 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 103-123 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 russia’s strategy of outsuffering and the war in ukraine toms rostoks centre for security and strategic research at the national defence academy of latvia abstract russia launched a full-scale invasion of ukraine in february 2022, but it has failed to attain its political and military objectives. since then, russia has doubled down on its war effort. this article claims that russia’s decision to continue the war despite initial setbacks and a high number of casualties is the result of using the strategy of ‘outsuffering’ its adversaries. this article explains the origins and instrumentalization of this strategy by vladimir putin, as well as its implications for russia’s war in ukraine, russia’s foreign policy more generally, and russia’s domestic politics. the article concludes that although insensitivity to costs can be an important advantage when states pursue confrontational foreign policy strategies, russia’s attempts to outsuffer its adversaries in a war of attrition raise questions about the viability of this strategy. thus, the strategy’s ominous promise for russia is suffering without end. 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 introduction when the russian defence minister, sergei shoigu, was told two weeks before the start of the war by his british counterpart ben wallace that russia would face steep economic costs if it invaded ukraine, shoigu responded that “we [russians] can suffer like no one else” (harris et al. 2022). leaving aside the obvious point that russians do not have a unique ability to suffer when compared with other nationalities, it is easy to dismiss shoigu’s remark as a mere attempt to brush off a subject that he was uncomfortable with. after all, russia had seemingly developed a world-class military, and it had a clever, albeit risky, plan to accomplish regime change in kyiv in a bold military move. once volodimir zelensky would have either fled or been captured, the remnants of ukrainian military resistance would be dealt with. russia’s plan ultimately failed because the ukrainian leadership chose to stay and fight, and the ukrainians rallied around their leaders. as a result, russia became bogged down in a prolonged, costly, and bloody war against ukraine. it has lost the western energy markets, and eu and nato member states have provided ukraine with military assistance that may not just allow it to stave off russia’s attacks but also conduct offensive operations with the aim of retaking territories occupied by russia. the decisions taken by ukraine’s western partners to provide main battle tanks and f-16 fighter aircraft (yet to be delivered) offer further proof of that. how did russia commit a blunder of such epic proportions that is likely to leave it severely weakened for decades? this article claims that this outcome has been the result of the implicit strategy that russia has adopted in its efforts to confront the west. for a lack of a better term, russia’s approach can be called ‘the strategy of outsuffering.’ the following sections introduce, define, and characterize the strategy of outsuffering. the aim of this article is to explore its origins, key elements, and limitations. the strategy of outsuffering is then used to explain russia’s war against ukraine. the strategy of outsuffering represents a paradox. normally, states do not aim to ‘outsuffer’ their adversaries when they consider the use of military force. instead, they aim to achieve quick and decisive victories, and yet they may end up in grinding fights against their adversaries. literature on conventional deterrence notes that efforts to deter the adversary are likely to fail if the adversary can reasonably assume that its use of military force will produce a fait accompli that will be hard to reverse for the defender (mearsheimer 1983). thus, states use military force in the hope that it would produce quick and decisive victories. sometimes, they succeed, but on other occasions, they miscalculate, and wars become protracted and costly. this description aptly characterizes russia’s war against ukraine. russia’s initial plan was to win quickly (kofman and edmonds 2022), but it became apparent early on that russia failed to achieve the results it anticipated (zabrodskyi et al. 2022). attempting to outsuffer the adversary is hardly what states aim for, but it is their ability to absorb high costs that makes the pursuit of this strategy possible in the first place. since the use of military force in international relations can backfire, the use of this strategy can be considered a risky choice. states usually refrain from pursuing costly military policies unless there are important interests at stake and a relatively safe fallback option. the strategy of outsuffering represents such an option. the article proceeds in the following order. the following section provides an overview of russia’s openly confrontational foreign policy over the past 15 years. the strategy of outsuffering refers to instances when powerful states pursue confrontational foreign policies that pit them against other powerful actors. the second section looks at the origins and key characteristics of the strategy of outsuffering. to that end, it also discusses the practical 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 application of this strategy in russia’s war against ukraine. this section emphasizes the domestic preconditions for the adoption of this strategy. the third section discusses the limitations of this strategy for russia in its current war against ukraine. the article concludes that although the ability to absorb costs can be an important advantage when states pursue confrontational foreign policy strategies, russia’s use of the strategy of outsuffering raises questions about its ability to achieve its stated foreign policy objectives through this strategy and perhaps even to sustain this strategy in the war against ukraine. unless that happens, the strategy’s ominous promise for russia is suffering without end rather than victory through outsuffering ukraine. 1. russia’s confrontational foreign policy and its consequences what are the roots of russia’s confrontational policies? this is a complex question that has been the subject of heated scholarly debate that has intensified since russia’s full-scale invasion of ukraine in 2022. to explain the origins of russia’s foreign policy, this article accepts that foreign policy is an amalgam of various actors, interests, principles, and threat perceptions. foreign policy is also prone to misperception (jervis 2017a). it is useful to conceptualize russia’s foreign policy along five dimensions, as they provide a useful frame for assessing russia’s foreign policy behaviour. the first dimension is global. putin assumed his first presidency in 2000 in a unipolar world at the time when russia seemingly did not have much influence internationally. over time, putin has worked to facilitate the transition to a multipolar system because this would help to extend russia’s influence around the world and reduce other states’ dependency on the us. importantly, the us’ ability to influence russia’s foreign and domestic policies would also be greatly reduced under the conditions of multipolarity. multipolarity would make the world safe for russia to pursue its foreign policy as it sees fit. bringing down the unipolar system, however, is hardly a simple task. confronting the strongest state in the system and going against its policies is likely to be inherently costly. therefore, some degree of suffering was probably expected by russia’s policymakers, and that has probably been the case since the war against georgia. the second dimension is regional. russia considers itself a great power, it has historically been one, and it is likely to persist as a major power in europe (kofman and kendall-taylor 2021). however, russia has also suffered from its economic, technological, and (sometimes) military weakness against western european great powers (omelicheva 2013). this has, at times, reduced russia’s ability to project its power even onto its closest neighbourhood, while allowing for external influence in what moscow sees as its backyard. this has implications for russia’s security and economic interests, and it reduces russia’s ability to shape the domestic and foreign policies of its neighbours. unfortunately for russia, its soft power attraction also lags behind that of the eu and nato (rostoks and sprūds 2015), thus forcing russia to rely on hard power. the third dimension is domestic. russia has grown increasingly authoritarian since the early 2000s, and it has witnessed a series of so-called ‘colour revolutions’ which have led to the ousting of long-time political leaders in yugoslavia, georgia, ukraine, and a few other states. russia has aimed to reduce the potential for external interference in its domestic affairs to ensure domestic stability. after the mass protests in 2011-2013, russian authorities concluded that the protests were us-inspired, which led to further deterioration in us-russia relations (cordesman 2014). opposition to us interference in the domestic affairs of russia and other states around the world has become a key security interest of russia. 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 the fourth dimension is individual. key decisions in russia’s foreign policy are heavily influenced by putin’s personal views and his various roles (hill and gaddy 2015). russia’s aggression against ukraine in 2022 cannot be viewed separately from putin’s personal preferences and interpretation of history (putin 2021). indeed, the attempt at regime change in kyiv is likely to have been motivated by concerns over putin’s personal legacy in russian politics. he did not want to go down in history as the man who took crimea but lost ukraine. to avoid this, he needed to ensure ukraine’s return to russia’s orbit. the final dimension is normative. it includes various widespread beliefs among russian policymakers and the public that reflect their world outlook, views on the nature of international affairs, and russia’s place in the world. in general, russia perceives international affairs as highly conflictual and in zero-sum terms. putin has repeatedly complained about the us hegemony and western hypocrisy, arguably more frequently after the invasion of ukraine in 2022. however, russia’s criticism of the us and the west more broadly also reflects russia’s quest for status and legitimacy. furthermore, there is a value dimension in russia’s opposition to the west that is based on the claim that values that russia represents are fundamentally different from those of the west (kari 2018; person 2022). all in all, russia’s confrontation with the west is not an accident. instead, it is the result of fundamentally different interests and security perceptions between russia and the west. in this regard, the us was and still is the key obstacle that prevents russia from attaining its key foreign policy interests in europe because the interests of russia and the us have been at odds for the most part of the post-cold war era (kramer 2010). russia’s efforts to facilitate a transition to a multipolar world have taken place in the context of a unipolar world. even the soviet union during the cold war was considered one of the two contenders in a bipolar world mainly because of its “massive military capabilities and geopolitical location in the center of eurasia” (brooks and wohlforth 2016, 1) rather than because of its economic might and alliances (walt 2011). in comparison, russian president vladimir putin has faced a more challenging problem since his ascent to power because russia has been considerably less powerful than the combined power of the transatlantic community. faced with the us and nato military power and the eu’s economic power, russia’s approach has been from a position of relative weakness. although russia has had a military advantage vis-à-vis its smaller nato and non-nato neighbours, the overall balance of military and economic power in europe has not been in russia’s favour. this has had far-reaching consequences for russia’s strategy, which has aimed to undermine the unity of the collective west and sow domestic discontent in the eu and nato countries. russia’s strategy vis-à-vis the west has clearly been confrontational since putin’s defiant speech at the munich security conference in 2007 (putin 2007). although there was an attempt to reset negotiations with russia early on during us president barack obama’s first term, this effort was short-lived and largely unsuccessful (deyermond 2013). russia’s annexation of crimea and orchestration of the war in donbas, military intervention in syria with an aim to prevent the fall of bashar al-assad’s regime, and, most recently, unprovoked military aggression against ukraine in february 2022 have decisively demonstrated what russia’s interests and foreign policy ambitions are. its actual ability to pursue those interests and its timeline for achieving foreign policy objectives are debatable, but it has become apparent that russia sees itself as being not just different from the west but also in a highly adversarial relationship with it (giles 2023). before russia’s full-scale invasion of ukraine in 2022, the fundamental domestic and foreign policy differences between russia and the west were not fully internalized by western political decision makers (giles 2019). 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 until 2022, russia’s use of military power was quite successful. russia prevented georgia and ukraine from becoming nato member states. russia annexed crimea through a successful military operation with hardly any shots fired. although the subsequent efforts to create a prorussian entity called novorossiya were thwarted to some extent, the outcome of the military conflict was a relative victory for russia that created a frozen conflict and a diplomatic mechanism—the minsk process—that allowed russia to exert consistent pressure on the government in kyiv. in the meantime, russia has decisively intervened in the syrian war—a military success that made russia an influential player in the middle east and cemented its security cooperation with iran. more importantly, russia projected an image of strength in the minds of western policymakers, who became convinced that russia had become a formidable military power. russia’s military modernization, which began in earnest in the aftermath of its 2008 war with georgia (trenin 2016), had seemingly produced a world-class military ready to take on almost any other military and backed by russia’s modernized nuclear weapons arsenal. more importantly, the upward trajectory of russia’s military modernization was in stark contrast to the downsizing of nato non-us militaries that was taking place at the time. nato’s combined military spending was steadily decreasing until 2014 (nato 2016). the trend was reversed after russia’s annexation of crimea, but the measures taken to strengthen nato’s eastern flank and to provide military support to ukraine were still timid. as us president barack obama remarked in an interview in his final year in office, ukraine was more important to russia than to the us. it was assumed, that there would always be an asymmetry of motivation which would favour russia (goldberg 2016). there were setbacks along the way, but these were relatively minor. the russia-georgia war led to nato defence plans for the baltic states being adopted for the first time since 2004. the annexation of crimea led to increased us military presence in europe and the 2016 nato decision to deploy multinational battlegroups to the baltic states as part of the enhanced forward presence framework (lanoszka, leuprecht, and moens 2020). on the economic front, sanctions that were imposed on russia in the wake of the military conflict in donbas did have a moderate negative effect on russia’s economy, and the impact was compounded by the fall in the price of oil in 2014 (christie 2016). despite economic sanctions being a double-edged sword, negative economic effects on the eu were considerably less than on russia (giumelli 2017). this could be problematic in the long run, as that would tilt the distribution of power between russia and nato in favour of the alliance. russia’s confrontational policies produced costs, but these did not lead to a softening of russia’s policies. the costs arising from russia’s war in ukraine since 2022, however, exceed any preceding costs by far. russia’s military has been fighting a war in ukraine that it is unlikely to win decisively, and the long-term prospects for the russian economy are bleak as the effects of economic sanctions begin to mount. assessments of the impact of unprecedented economic sanctions on russia vary, and the original expectations of russia’s imminent economic collapse have turned out to be unfounded (david et al. 2023; demertzis et al. 2022; jentleson 2022; sonnenfeld and tian 2022). sanctions have affected russia’s ability to produce some of the high-end military platforms, but russia “still possesses a significant degree of adaptability to western sanctions, taking advantage of its prewar stockpiles of older equipment, as well as countries willing to supply moscow with restricted dual-use items and technology via a web of illicit supply chains” (bergmann et al. 2023, 1). however, mediumto long-term prospects for russia’s economy are still inauspicious (demarais 2022). over the course of the war, the focus of discussions on russia’s strategy in ukraine has been mainly on russia’s military strategy and whether it may succeed in defeating ukraine’s military or at least forcing ukraine to accept peace on russia’s terms. in this regard, experts have offered very different assessments (o’brien 2023; rice and gates 2023). the same goes 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 for experts’ views on whether ukraine will be forced to make concessions or not (foreign affairs 2023), the preferable western strategy in providing military and economic assistance to ukraine (mcfaul 2023), and the likely consequences for russia’s domestic politics if it suffers defeat in ukraine (kasparov and khodorkovsky 2023). russia has suffered staggering losses since the start of the war, although precise numbers are unavailable at this point. leaked us government documents from late february 2023 indicate that russia’s casualties were in excess of 200,000 killed and wounded (lamothe and khurshudyan 2023). us general mark milley, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, estimated in an interview, which was published on may 2, 2023, that russia has suffered between 200,000 and 250,000 casualties (kurtzphelan 2023). these figures are likely to have increased considerably over the course of ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, although reliable numbers are hard to come by. russia has paid a steep price for whatever territorial, political, and military objectives that it has sought to attain in ukraine. russia also seems to have embraced joseph stalin’s way of war by throwing mobilized men against the ukrainian defences and trying to overwhelm the adversary with sheer mass (aron 2023). however, even the tenuous gains that the russian military has scored since february 2022 can come to naught if ukraine succeeds in liberating territories that have been occupied since 2014 (vindman 2023; zagorodnyuk 2023). initially, the economic and military costs of russia’s assertive foreign policy were relatively low. more recently, however, considerable losses have accrued in the form of economic sanctions, political and diplomatic isolation, and war casualties. russia’s strategy has been characterized by far-reaching confrontational aims and by the outsized price that russia has paid for its policies. although there is disagreement regarding the likely outcome of the war in ukraine, it is unlikely that russia’s relations with the west will normalize anytime soon. also, the war is likely to continue beyond 2023 because both russia and ukraine still hope that they can achieve a decisive military victory or that they must continue to fight because of the fear of adverse consequences on foreign and domestic political fronts (sebenius and singh 2023). in sum, the costs of war for russia will continue to mount. this begs the question of why russia is trying to outsuffer ukraine and the west. russia’s policies seem even more puzzling if one considers that russia faced no immediate or medium-term threats to its security before the war, including from nato (dickinson 2023). although there is no shortage of claims that it was the threat of nato and eu enlargement that provoked putin back in 2014 (mearsheimer 2014) and then again in 2022, there is little evidence that ukraine either on its own or with nato support was planning to threaten russia. if russia’s invasion of ukraine had anything to do with nato, then it was probably ukraine’s ambition to join nato (and the eu) rather than the willingness of nato members to bring ukraine into the alliance. russia’s accusations that it levelled against ukraine and the west prior to the invasion were, for the most part, unfounded, and some of its complaints, such as that ukraine was run by nazis and that it was developing nuclear weapons, were outrageous (putin 2022a, 2022b). most of the foreign-imposed costs that russia has accrued are self-inflicted wounds. 2. strategy of outsuffering: origins and main characteristics what is the strategy of outsuffering, and what are its characteristics and origins? to begin with, the strategy of outsuffering can be applied to both offensive and defensive contexts. weaker states or non-state actors can try to outsuffer and outlast stronger adversaries to avoid being defeated decisively or even to win. there are many examples where weaker actors have been able to persist and prevail in the face of external aggression (arreguin-toft 2005). these include the american fiasco in vietnam, the french defeat in indochina, the soviet loss in 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 afghanistan, and the us-forced withdrawal from afghanistan in august 2021. in other cases, the aggressor can obtain partial victory, such as the soviet union in the winter war against finland. weaker actors may also fold in the face of military aggression, such as the baltic states did in 1940 under soviet pressure, but overall, it can be expected that also weaker states and non-state actors will try to defend themselves even when the chances of success are uncertain at best. attempts to outsuffer the enemy are used in an offensive context as well, as the examples of german, japanese, and north korean expansionism indicate. however, large-scale wars rarely follow a single pattern, and the unique characteristics of each war make it difficult to generalize. german expansion in europe starting in the late 1930s was initially successful, and only later, after failing to defeat the soviet union decisively, did adolf hitler pursue the strategy of outsuffering, although that did not end well for germany. while japan’s aggression against the us in 1941 was largely motivated by its susceptibility to economic coercion by the us, it was difficult for the us to anticipate a japanese attack because of the conventional wisdom that weaker powers do not attack stronger ones (jervis 2017b). north korea’s aggression against south korea triggered a bloody and costly proxy war between the us on the one hand and the soviet union and china on the other, while north korea had to fight for survival after its attack was repelled and the us forces were pushing the north korean troops towards the yalu river. clearly, there is variation in terms of contexts in which states may try to outsuffer their adversaries. the presence of nuclear weapons in the post-1945 international system only adds to this complexity (monteiro 2014), as great powers in possession of nuclear weapons are unlikely to suffer the fate of nazi germany and imperial japan at the end of the second world war. nuclear powers can outsuffer their adversaries without fearing ultimate defeat in a war. the use of this strategy in an offensive context happens when aggressors miscalculate by either underestimating the strength of the adversary or considerably overestimating their own capacity to conduct a sustained military campaign or engage in strategic competition. the most likely context in which powerful states may be forced to resort to the strategy of outsuffering is where the target of their aggressive policies manages to secure support from other powerful actors. the consequences of russia’s full-scale invasion of ukraine in 2022 largely fit that description. what was supposed to be a quick and decisive victory turned into a long and bloody stalemate. what is the strategy of outsuffering? this strategy is a fallback option for states that pursue confrontational policies that other states are likely to resist. it is chosen when states cannot attain their objectives easily and when they are forced to mount a major effort to attain a favourable outcome in a political, military, and economic confrontation. it is expected that the mobilization of the latent power of a state and the willingness of its population to endure hardships to attain valued foreign policy objectives will help it surmount the countermeasures taken by other states. in military terms, this strategy resembles the war of attrition (echevarria 2017). a similar concept has been used to describe ukraine’s approach to counter russia’s military—the strategy of corrosion (ryan 2022). however, the strategy of outsuffering applies not just to the military realm because it encompasses the overarching political aspects of a state’s foreign policy approach. thus, it can be applied to adversarial situations where states aim to endure through economic, political, and military terms. the strategy of outsuffering does not embrace any particular foreign policy objectives, and in this sense, it is different from the standard range of policy choices that states face in their pursuit of a “grand strategy” (brands 2014). a grand strategy lays out “a country’s most important and enduring interests and a theory of how it will use its resources to defend or advance those 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 interests, given domestic and international constraints” (charap et al. 2021, 5). although there has been some unease about whether the term ‘strategy’ still has a clear and distinct meaning (strachan 2005), debates on grand strategy are indispensable because they flesh out the key elements of a state’s ambition in world politics (drezner 2011). the strategy of outsuffering is strategic in the sense that it offers general principles of behaviour and identifies a variety of factors that affect the implementation of this strategy. strategy is always pursued in a particular political, economic, social, and international context. the problems that a strategy aims to solve are always rooted in practical realities that policymakers are facing (gray 2006). the strategy of outsuffering, however, is not a grand strategy. it primarily focuses on the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’ question, and it is used when a state that is trying to upset the status quo faces the difficult choice between giving up on valued objectives or doubling down in the hope that a more determined effort will force the adversary to back down. the strategy of outsuffering is more general than a purely military strategy with its focus on warfighting. it helps to clarify the reasons why russia did not call off its attack on ukraine when it was warned that its aggression would face steep costs and why russia has persisted in the war against ukraine after initial setbacks. it also helps to explain russia’s earlier acceptance of the costs of economic sanctions in the aftermath of the annexation of crimea and the start of the war in the donbas region in 2014. this was the price of territorial expansionism and the intentional weakening of ukraine. the strategy of outsuffering reflects the determination of a state to pursue foreign policy objectives even when the costs of the chosen policy exceed initial calculations. this strategy is about staying the course and not backing down in the face of adversity and external pressure, and it is a deliberate acceptance of the costs of expansionist policies that is an important characteristic of this strategy. states that pursue this strategy double down on their efforts when they initially fail to achieve stated objectives. this strategy is likely to be pursued by powerful actors who assume that their ability to advance ambitious foreign policy objectives depends on their demonstrated motivation to do so and readiness to mobilize all sources of national power after initial failures. they may enjoy significant advantages in terms of military and economic power vis-à-vis a state that is on the receiving end, but they may be weaker than a coalition of states that may want to thwart its foreign policy ambitions. importantly, suffering is not the aim, but it is the path that a state chooses when it faces a difficult choice between accepting a humiliating defeat or staying in the fight with the hope that it will be able to turn the situation around at a later point. moreover, the strategy of outsuffering is wasteful in the sense that it requires using people and resources to solve problems on the foreign policy front without being fully prepared. russia’s decision in april 2022 to refocus its military campaign against ukraine from taking kyiv to defeating ukraine in the donbas region without solving the military’s manpower problem is a case in point. also, this strategy is characterized by the need to respond to immediate problems and challenges, often at the expense of a state’s long-term interests— the strategy of outsuffering sacrifices the future in exchange for staying in the game in the short term. the strategy of outsuffering reflects a particular characteristic of international politics where the behaviour of other states may not conform to expectations, and the costs of action may be higher than anticipated. in this regard, concepts such as change, motivation, time, and risk are particularly significant. to start with, the strategy of outsuffering involves some degree of foreign policy change (welch 2005), where non-confrontational policies give way to more aggressive and confrontational ones. the challenger divests from a peaceful pursuit of foreign policy objectives in favour of a more muscular approach and then doubles down on the chosen policy, making a negotiated solution to the conflict less likely. 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 the strategy of outsuffering signals the aggressor’s motivation and aims to demonstrate that its determination to pursue specific interests and secure certain outcomes exceeds that of other actors. doubling down on confrontational policies may prompt other actors to defer to the aggressor due to its higher motivation, and this has been recognized in the literature on coercive diplomacy (george 1992). also, the strategy of outsuffering is time-consuming. unless other states acquiesce quickly, it leads to ever-increasing costs that stem from the chosen policy. outsuffering is the context of wills and resources. finally, the strategy of outsuffering involves considerable risk because the possibility of adverse outcomes increases. after all, there may be good reasons why the initial effort has not been successful. doubling down and trying to win after failing to win initially may signal threatening behaviour and result in a large countervailing coalition, as other states respond to the threatening behaviour (walt 1987). the riskiness of the strategy needs to be explored further because it is prospect theory (jervis 1992; kahneman and tversky 1979; levy 1992; mcdermott 1998, 2004; welch 2005) that sheds light on the reasons why policymakers may try to outsuffer their adversaries. prospect theory stipulates that humans treat gains and losses differently, with losses looming larger than gains. losses induce risky behaviour, while gains induce caution. as decision makers find themselves deeper in the domain of loss, they are likely to pursue riskier policies. however, the strategy of outsuffering cannot be reduced to peoples’ sensitivity to losses alone because not all risky decisions involve outsuffering, albeit some of them certainly do. thus, the strategy of outsuffering is chosen by actors who find themselves in the domain of loss and who are ready to embrace a risky strategy to redeem losses accruing from a military operation going badly or costs that stem from geopolitical competition. this has implications for deterrence and compellence as well (schaub 2004), as it might be more difficult to deter political leaders who are in the domain of loss and, consequently, are more prone to take significant risks. russia’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion of ukraine can be considered risky. putin returned crimea to russia in 2014, but russia’s subsequent policies were less successful, as ukraine’s foreign policy was primarily aimed at building closer ties with the eu and nato. russia’s efforts to prevent that from happening were ineffective. russia was in the domain of loss when it decided to reverse its fortunes in ukraine with one bold stroke in february 2022. even in a realistic best-case scenario, with russian forces taking kyiv in a few days after the start of the military operation, russia would face steep costs in terms of international sanctions and insurgency in ukraine. these would seem limited when compared to the military disaster that russia actually endured, but the decision to invade ukraine was risky anyway. the choice in favour of the strategy of outsuffering after the initial attempt to achieve valued foreign policy objectives stands in stark contrast to overconfidence and positive illusions that are prevalent at the start of military conflicts (johnson 2004, 2020). it is unlikely that the logic underpinning the strategy of outsuffering would play a major role at this stage because policymakers are likely to expect to achieve their objectives quickly. there is some debate regarding the extent to which they first have to convince themselves about the correctness of their chosen course of action in order to be able to convince political elites and the general public (jervis 2017b). policymakers may genuinely believe that they will score a quick victory against their foreign adversaries, but they can also have doubts about the viability of the chosen course of action. in this case, they need a reliable alternative course of action that they may pursue if the original plan fails to deliver the desired outcomes. although it is reasonable to assume that russia expected to win quickly against ukraine in february/march 2022, policymakers in moscow were probably aware that they could try to win gradually by using its 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 military, political, and economic power against a nominally weaker opponent to outsuffer ukraine, if russia’s plan for a regime change in kyiv would fail. what are the characteristics of the strategy of outsuffering? overall, this strategy implies the pursuit of foreign policy objectives in the face of mounting costs imposed by other states. the choice in favour of this strategy is likely to be taken by an actor in the domain of loss, and the chosen alternative will bear significant risks. overall, this strategy has five characteristics. first, it is pursued in the name of vital foreign policy interests. the strategy of outsuffering implies a considerable degree of compulsion and a widespread belief among policymakers and the public that ‘there is no other choice.’ putin has repeatedly emphasized that he did not have any other choice but to invade ukraine to prevent grave threats to russia’s national security. although russia’s justification for the war cannot be taken at face value, the use of overwhelming military force against ukraine—a country of more than 40 million people—was hardly an easy decision. second, the strategy of outsuffering is chosen with a long-term view. difficulties faced in the short term are likely to pay off in the long run, and the setbacks and difficulties a state is facing can be surmounted. costs accrued in the process may ultimately mean little if foreign policy objectives are achieved, and the adversary is either defeated or forced to settle the conflict on the terms of the state that pursues the strategy of outsuffering. being weakened in the short term may be less important than achieving important objectives and weakening the adversary in the process. russian leadership likely believes that it can outlast the joint effort of ukraine and its western supporters (face the nation 2023). if russia stays in the fight long enough, it can win because the cost of the conflict is higher for ukraine. while ukraine’s economy has been gravely affected by the conflict, russia’s economy has suffered to a lesser extent. with important interests for russia being at stake in ukraine, short-term costs can be tolerated. keeping ukraine in moscow’s sphere of influence would likely benefit russia in the long term, and the price for doing that—high as it is—may seem less 20 or 30 years from now. third, reputational concerns are a key reason why states may decide to endure hardship rather than accept defeat and scale down their objectives. thus, the strategy of outsuffering can be chosen by political leaders not just because they have become victims of prospect theory, but also because they—rightly or wrongly—believe that at stake is either their personal or national reputations or both. although there is a vibrant academic debate on whether reputations should matter (mercer 1996), there is a near consensus that decision makers take reputational concerns seriously (weisiger and yarhi-milo 2015). thus, the pursuit of the strategy of outsuffering is made more likely not just by important foreign policy interests being at stake but also by actors’ concerns about the negative consequences for their reputation if they admit defeat. in reputational terms, much is at stake for russia in its war against ukraine. although the war has revealed that russia’s military is less powerful than it was assumed before the invasion and most of the military units that took part in the full-scale attack have been severely depleted, its reputation can be at least partially redeemed if eventually, russia manages to hold onto the occupied territories and repel ukraine’s efforts to liberate them. it needs emphasizing, though, that the pursuit of the strategy of outsuffering represents a genuine choice between seeking a negotiated solution and doubling down on confrontation. russia could have settled its conflict with ukraine in the spring of 2022, at least temporarily. also, it could extract concessions from ukraine back then. however, it chose not to pursue a negotiated solution and decided to outsuffer ukraine, although the russian military was arguably in bad shape after being defeated near kyiv. fourth, the strategy presumes a significant loss of power relative to other actors. after all, outsuffering means exactly that—expending sizable resources in the pursuit of important 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 foreign policy objectives. expending military and economic power may leave the actor vulnerable and may even leave them in a precarious position in the long run, especially when valued foreign policy objectives remain unattained. moreover, resorting to plan b means that the original plan has failed, and the strategy of outsuffering may be pursued under conditions that are far more unwelcoming than at the start of the confrontation. thus, the strategy may fail if the costs become too high because the state would no longer have the means to continue its policies. it is a persistent challenge for actors that use this strategy to limit the costs of confrontation and the amount of suffering to an acceptable level. also, improvisation becomes necessary, which may result in even greater losses than anticipated. abandoning the kyiv axis of advance made russia’s subsequent military efforts in the donbas region more difficult because of the heavy losses in the early stages of the war. problems with logistics resulting in an inability to supply troops have haunted the russian military since the early stages of the war (berkowitz and galocha 2022). military mobilization that began in late september 2022 was problematic because russia did not have a wellprepared system to support such an effort. also, the decision to mobilize a few hundred thousand additional military personnel was taken too late, and russia had to send thousands of newly mobilized troops to the frontlines without proper military training. russia’s most capable military units have been decimated, and it will take years to rebuild the expertise and skillset that have been lost (horton 2023; miller et al. 2022). finally, the adoption of the strategy of outsuffering is affected by the worst-case scenario that a state may face if it fails to accomplish its stated objectives. the mobilization of national resources in support of a confrontational policy may not necessarily succeed. if the expected consequences in case the state fails to outsuffer its adversaries are expected to be catastrophic, this strategy is less likely to be chosen. if, however, the fallout from confrontational policies is likely to be limited, that makes the adoption of this strategy more likely. in the context of russia’s aggression against ukraine, the worst-case scenario is probably a combination of military defeat, high economic costs, and the failure to achieve its objectives in ukraine. since russia is a nuclear power, other worst-case consequences, such as the loss of territory beyond donbas and crimea and the military devastation of russia’s cities, are highly unlikely. in the nuclear age, great powers are more likely to escape suffering catastrophic consequences from their foreign policy blunders (monteiro 2014). importantly, the second world war ended with the capture of berlin and the occupation of germany, but the war between russia and ukraine is unlikely to have such catastrophic consequences for russia, albeit less so for putin’s regime. much attention in the context of russia’s aggression against ukraine has been paid to russia’s attempts to deter nato from helping ukraine, but general valerii zaluzhnyi, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of ukraine, and lieutenant general mykhailo zabrodskyi, first deputy chairman of the national security, defense, and intelligence committee of the verkhovna rada of ukraine, identified impunity as the center of gravity in the ongoing war. previously, russia could target ukrainian territory at will with long-range weapons, while ukraine could not respond in kind because it did not have the means to do that (zaluzhnyi and zabrodskyi 2022). as of october 2023, ukraine has received storm shadow, scalp eg, and atacms missiles from its western partners, but these likely come with limitations, meaning, these weapon systems should not be used against russia’s territory. the result of russia’s relative impunity has been its campaign to damage ukraine’s energy infrastructure during the winter of 2022/23. moreover, russia’s nuclear weapons will likely shield it from the loss of territory if ukrainian forces manage to de-occupy large swaths of ukraine’s territory. impunity makes the adoption of the strategy of outsuffering easier because powerful actors can expect to be shielded from the negative consequences of their actions even in the case that the strategy of outsuffering fails to deliver the expected results. 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 the five characteristics explain why states may choose the strategy of outsuffering and whether it represents a feasible option for a state that is pursuing a confrontational foreign policy and whose initial plan has been thwarted. there is, however, another crucial precondition for the strategy, and that is the practical ability of a state to stay the course even when the ultimate outcome is in doubt. the state must be able to mobilize its population and national resources for the purpose of obtaining ambitious foreign policy objectives in a hostile international environment. the government must be able to use the latent power of the state despite domestic opposition. it does not mean that the element of coercion is not present in this strategy. on the contrary, the ability of a government to discipline and mobilize its citizens can be the key reason why this strategy may become viable at all. this involves the government’s ability to remain in control, suppress public dissent, and manufacture public support for risky and costly policies. not all domestic groups may be willing to persevere in the face of adversity, but it is up to the government to rally support for political leaders and their policies. public support can be obtained either through persuasion or compulsion/repression. in russia, there were sporadic protests at the start of the ‘special military operation,’ but eventually, russians seemingly “learned to stop worrying and love the war” (kolesnikov 2023). some of them left the country while it was still possible, and the rest had to adapt to the wartime measures that the government was taking. despite initial statements to the contrary, the russian government eventually opted in favour of partial mobilization of fighting-age men in september 2022. this made possible an almost unlimited supply of manpower to the frontlines, while the military platforms and ammunition that russia inherited from the soviet union allowed it to sustain high-intensity warfare and conduct military offensives. all in all, the key features of the strategy of outsuffering are as follows. it is a strategy that policymakers may decide to pursue grudgingly because the alternative would be to admit defeat either unconditionally or through negotiations and to forfeit important foreign policy objectives. also, this strategy implies a long-term view of the confrontation and a hope that the tables may turn if the state in question manages to persevere long enough. the strategy is likely to generate substantial economic, military, and human costs for the state that is employing it. these costs may worsen the state’s relative position vis-à-vis other actors. importantly, the very existence of the fallback option makes foreign policy change and the pursuit of risky foreign policy objectives more likely. 3. limitations what are the main limitations of the strategy of outsuffering? as russia’s relentless military aggression against ukraine has demonstrated, this strategy has allowed russia to absorb the costs of the war and to remain in the fight without downgrading its military and political objectives in a significant way, but it also has two important drawbacks. first, this strategy considerably weakens the state that is employing it. outsuffering implies the need to absorb military and economic losses, some of which cannot be easily replaced or compensated for. the material foundations of state power and nonmaterial aspects such as morale are significant preconditions for adopting this strategy. thus, it is likely to fail against an opponent that is equally motivated and has sufficient material—financial and military—resources to expend. the above characterization is highly problematic for russia because russia is facing an opponent—ukraine—that is more motivated because russia’s military aggression poses an existential threat. atrocities committed by the russian military in bucha and irpin strengthened the resolve of the ukrainian military and population. ukraine is fighting for survival, and in this regard, it has an edge over the russian troops that at least initially did not anticipate 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 unyielding resistance. the existential character of the war also allowed the ukrainian government to mobilize and arm a large number of fighting-age men. although its military was supposedly smaller than russia’s, ukraine already had, in fact, a large military at the start of the war, and it has grown over the course of the war because ukraine’s government prohibited men aged 18-60 from leaving the country (carpenter and fairchild 2022). as a result, ukraine initially fielded a larger force than russia did. ironically, because the russian president called the invasion a ‘special military operation,’ the russian military had a manpower problem, and its mechanized units were not sufficiently supported by infantry (kofman and lee 2022). the russian military faced a “brutal examination” in early 2022, and it was not up to the task (dalsjö, jonsson, and norberg 2022). the situation within the russian military changed after putin’s announcement of the partial mobilization in september 2022. that decision allowed russia to increase the number of military personnel, but at that point, the availability of military equipment became problematic because russia had already lost thousands of pieces of equipment (mitzer and janovsky 2022). as russia, ukraine, and the west were beginning to prepare for the long war (daalder and goldgeier 2023), russia’s strategy of outsuffering became problematic because ukraine’s military had experienced fewer losses, was becoming increasingly better equipped, and was trained and supplied by the west. this does not mean that russia would necessarily lose the war, but there are preconditions for ukraine to succeed against russia because the conventional military capabilities of the west that can be used to assist ukraine exceed russia’s, despite concerns that western military equipment and ammunition stocks have dwindled. in the economic realm, ukraine’s western backers ensured that its economy did not collapse early in the war, and economic support has been consistent throughout the military conflict. ukraine’s gdp did decrease by more than 30 percent in 2022 (kyiv independent 2023), and the reconstruction of ukraine will cost hundreds of billions of euros after the war’s end. the impact of the war has been less catastrophic for russia’s economy. the initial projections of gdp decrease by 8-10 percent did not materialize, and eventually, russia’s economy contracted only by 2.1 percent of its gdp (european council 2023). its long-term prospects, however, are bleak because of unprecedented economic sanctions, the exodus of working-age russians, reduced revenues from energy exports, and structural adjustment of russia’s economy in favour of the military industry above other sectors of the economy (kotkin, guriev, and bernstam 2023). western economic sanctions have been relatively effective, albeit ensuring compliance has been difficult (tsouloufas and rochat 2023). due to economic sanctions, russia is still selling oil on the world market, but its oil revenues have shrunk when compared to 2022. the short-term effects must be equally worrying for the russian government. information released by the ministry of finance of the russian federation in early february 2023 revealed a bleak picture. russian government’s budgetary revenues in january 2023 decreased by 35 percent when compared to january 2022, oil and gas revenues dropped by 46 percent, there was also a 26 percent drop in non-energy government revenues, and government expenditures were 59 percent higher than a year ago (ministry of finance of the russian federation 2023). to cover the deficit, the russian government sold 3.6 tons of gold and 2.3 billion yuan in january 2023 (bloomberg news 2023). since then, russia’s economy has somewhat recovered and is even projected to grow as russia is gearing up for the long war. there is, however, little optimism regarding its performance in the coming years (prokopenko 2023). in sum, russia’s use of the strategy of outsuffering faces two problems: first, ukraine has the manpower and the will to fight, and second, the collective west seems determined to provide ukraine with economic and military assistance to sustain its war effort. the second major problem for russia, as it pursues the strategy of outsuffering, is how other states perceive russia’s long-term intentions vis-à-vis ukraine and the west more broadly. in 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 a nutshell, can russia be trusted not to attack ukraine again after the end of the ongoing war? russia has had numerous opportunities to de-escalate since february 2022, but it has chosen not to do so. once its initial assault on kyiv failed, russia doubled down in the donbas region, and then later, in the context of ukraine’s successful counterattacks in kharkiv and kherson, russian president vladimir putin announced the formal annexation of the four partially occupied ukraine’s regions (putin 2022c). on the one hand, these measures have demonstrated russia’s resolve. on the other hand, however, there are few, if any, signs that russia would be ready for peace settlement and withdrawal of its forces from ukraine. for ukraine, opting for peace may merely present russia with an opportunity to regroup, rearm, and invade again. ukraine has been russia’s unfinished business since early 2015, and russia tried to achieve a decisive victory in ukraine seven years later. thus, another pause in fighting would be unlikely to indicate that a lasting peace has been achieved. in other words, only a decisive victory by ukraine and the change of political leadership in russia would pave the way to stable peace. this might not necessarily be true, but russia has repeatedly used force against ukraine; therefore, ukraine might choose to prolong the war instead of opting for peace that may prove to be short-lived. although russia may have scaled down its maximalist objectives in ukraine, there is little indication that it is willing to engage in serious diplomacy to end the war (freedman 2022). concerns over russia’s intentions and future actions, however, extend well beyond ukraine. in december 2021, russia presented nato and the us with a series of demands, including the request to remove nato’s troops from eastern and central european states that joined the alliance after 1997, thus ensuring russia’s military preponderance (and nato’s weakness) in northern europe (ministry of foreign affairs of the russian federation 2021). russia’s relations with the west have increasingly been characterized by a lack of mutual trust, and russia’s neighbours have voiced concerns about russia’s intentions (rostoks 2018). examples of russia’s confrontational policies towards the west are too many to enumerate, and they range from russia’s attempts to interfere in the 2016 us presidential election to interference in montenegro and the poisoning of skripals in the united kingdom in 2018. in short, russia and the west are in a state of low-level conflict in which russia weaponizes various aspects of its relationship with the west with the aim of weakening it (galeotti 2022). the overall relationship between the west and russia is unlikely to change anytime soon. to summarize, ukraine has major concerns about its post-war relationship with russia, and so does the west. whatever modicum of trust and mutual goodwill existed before russia’s invasion of ukraine in 2022 has been destroyed. russia’s partners no longer have confidence that russia will fulfil its obligations even if a peace agreement is negotiated and signed. russia’s doubling down on territorial claims in ukraine and its war effort has made an already bad situation considerably worse. if ukraine believes that russia will launch another attack sooner or later, then it would rather continue to fight instead of opting for peace. if the strategy of outsuffering forces adversaries to conclude that peaceful coexistence is not possible, then the only alternative to that is the continuation of hostilities with the aim of degrading russia’s military capabilities to such an extent that it will no longer pose a threat to its neighbours. thus, the strategy of outsuffering becomes self-defeating because it further entrenches existing hostilities and forces adversaries to make worst-case assumptions not just about the other side’s policies but also about its character. this, however, does not preclude the possibility that the strategy of outsuffering may succeed in military and economic terms. 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 conclusion russia’s war against ukraine is nearing the end of its second year, and it is evident that russia has been preparing for a prolonged war. essentially, russia is trying to outsuffer ukraine and its western partners. it remains to be seen, though, if russia succeeds in that or if it will endure suffering without end. the aim of this article has been to outline the basic characteristics of the strategy of outsuffering and to demonstrate how russia has tried to use that strategy in ukraine since 2022. although insensitivity to costs and the ability to absorb losses can be an important advantage when states pursue confrontational foreign policy strategies, this approach has its limitations that may render this strategy ineffective and even self-defeating. the availability of sufficient economic, military, and human resources makes the pursuit of confrontational and risky foreign policy more likely. when policymakers face the choice between winning quickly and winning slowly rather than between winning quickly and losing, they may pursue risky policies because they can be under the impression that the worst-case scenario for their efforts is the attainment of foreign policy objectives through slow and grinding confrontation. victory may ultimately be more costly than anticipated, but it will still be victory, and the interests at stake may warrant the high costs associated with a protracted conflict. negotiated outcomes can be shunned as ineffective because goals and objectives would have to be scaled down during the diplomatic process. such assumptions, however, can be wrong because the economic and military costs may be too high, and the adversaries’ estimations about the intentions of the state that is using the strategy of outsuffering may become too pessimistic to warrant serious dialogue and diplomacy. the pursuit of the strategy of outsuffering may make diplomatic solutions less feasible in later stages of the conflict because deeply entrenched enmity may preclude serious negotiations. returning to shoigu’s remark that russians can suffer like no one else, he might be right, but it might ultimately be irrelevant. russia may be shielded from some of the worst possible outcomes that may result from the use of this strategy, such as the loss of territory and gradual extension of the war on russia’s territory. however, russia’s efforts might also fall short in its quest to bring ukraine under its control. the limitations that are part of the strategy of outsuffering may eventually force russia to seek termination of the war, where it would have to give up on some or even most of its foreign policy objectives. it may still succeed in attaining some of its military objectives in the short or medium term, however, then it will face the longterm costs of the confrontation with the west and a much greater dependency on china. this may ultimately erode public support for russia’s war effort and undermine putin’s regime. in that regard, russia’s experience may offer a cautionary tale of the benefits and costs of the strategy of outsuffering, as wagner chief yevgeny prigozhin’s june 2023 mutiny demonstrated. the high costs and inefficiencies that the strategy generates may cause domestic dissatisfaction and pushback. in the long run, most states aim to thrive, not suffer without end. the strategy of outsuffering warrants further research, not just because the war in ukraine is still ongoing but also because this strategy can be used by other actors. if the strategy of outsuffering is particularly suited for economically and militarily powerful states with a large population and a high degree of social acquiescence either through persuasion or repression, then there are at least two states that fit this description: china and iran. china’s global aspirations have already generated pushback from the us and its allies, while iran’s regional ambitions may cause further instability in the middle east. if russia succeeds in outsuffering ukraine and the west, china and iran may also be tempted to do so despite the high costs involved. both states harbour revisionist intentions, and they expect considerable pushback from the west in that regard. it may turn out that the return of the era of great power competition will also be the golden age of the strategy of outsuffering if revisionist states conclude that 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 there is no other way to achieve valued foreign policy objectives and end the era of western domination in world politics. 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 references aron, leon. 2023. “putin is embracing stalin’s way.” the washington post, january 26, 2023. accessed february 7, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/ 01/26/putin-stalin-war-ukraine-soldiers/. arreguin-toft, ivan m. 2005. how the weak win wars: a theory of asymmetric conflict. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. bergmann, max, maria snegovaya, tina dolbaia, and nick fention. 2023. “out of stock? assessing the impact of sanctions on russia’s defense industry.” center for strategic and international studies. accessed april 14, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/outstock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russias-defense-industry. berkowitz, bonnie, and artur galocha. 2022. “why the russian military is bogged down by logistics in ukraine.” the washington post, march 30, 2022. accessed april 14, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-military-logistics-supplychain/. bloomberg news. 2023. “russia’s deficit hits $25 billion as energy income slumps.” february 6, 2023. accessed february 7, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2023-02-06/russia-racks-up-25-billion-budget-gap-as-energy-incomehalves. brands, hal. 2014. what good is grand strategy? power and purpose in american statecraft from harry s. truman to george w. bush. ithaca: cornell university press. brooks, stephen g., and william c. wohlforth. 2016. america abroad: the united states’ global role in the 21st century. new york: oxford university press. carpenter, charli, and hunter fairchild. 2022. zelensky’s travel ban on ukrainian men could damage war morale. foreign policy, november 14, 2022. accessed january 28, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/14/ukraine-russia-war-zelensky-travel-ban-civilianmen/. charap, samuel, dara massicot, miranda priebe, alyssa demus, clint reach, mark stalczynski, eugeniu han, and lynn e. davis. 2021. russian grand strategy: rhetoric and reality. santa monica, ca: rand corporation, 2021. accessed january 10, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr4238.html. christie, edward h. 2016. “the design and impact of western economic sanctions against russia.” the rusi journal 161 (3): 52-64. https://doi.org/10.1080/.2016.1193359. cordesman, anthony s. 2014. “russia and the “color revolution”: a russian military view of a world destabilized by the us and the west.” center for strategic and international studies, may 28, 2014. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/ legacy_files/files/publication/140529_russia_color_revolution_full.pdf. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/26/putin-stalin-war-ukraine-soldiers/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/26/putin-stalin-war-ukraine-soldiers/ https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russias-defense-industry https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russias-defense-industry https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-military-logistics-supply-chain/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-military-logistics-supply-chain/ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-06/russia-racks-up-25-billion-budget-gap-as-energy-income-halves https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-06/russia-racks-up-25-billion-budget-gap-as-energy-income-halves https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-06/russia-racks-up-25-billion-budget-gap-as-energy-income-halves https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/14/ukraine-russia-war-zelensky-travel-ban-civilian-men/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/14/ukraine-russia-war-zelensky-travel-ban-civilian-men/ https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr4238.html https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1193359 https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140529_russia_color_revolution_full.pdf https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140529_russia_color_revolution_full.pdf 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 daalder, ivo h., and james goldgeier. 2023. the long war in ukraine. foreign affairs, january 9, 2023. accessed february 2, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ long-war-ukraine-russia-protracted-conflict. dalsjö, robert, michael jonsson, and johan norberg. 2022. “a brutal examination: russian military capability in the light of the ukraine war.” survival 64 (3): 7-28. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044. david, andrew, sarah stewart, meagan reid, and dmitri alperovitch. 2023. “russia’s shifting import sources amid u.s. and allied export restrictions.” silverado policy accelerator. https://cdn.sanity.io/files/0wfzc71x/production/ 6745ea42c21d65d6709231e0e7767bd5de57469b.pdf. demarais, agathe. 2022. “sanctions on russia are working. here’s why.” foreign policy, december 1, 2022. accessed january 28, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/01/ ukraine-russia-sanctions-economy-war-putin-embargo-technology-financial-energy/. demertzis, maria, benjamin hilgenstock, ben mcwilliams, elina ribakova, and simone tagliapietra. 2022. “how have sanctions impacted russia?” bruegel. accessed april 15, 2023. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/how-have-sanctions-impacted-russia. deyermond, ruth. 2013. “assessing the reset: successes and failures in the obama administration’s russia policy, 2009-2012.” european security 22 (4), 500-523. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.777704. dickinson, peter. 2023. “russia’s invasion of ukraine was never about nato.” atlantic council, july 18, 2023. accessed july 20, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ blogs/ukrainealert/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-was-never-about-nato/. drezner, daniel w. 2011. “does obama have a grand strategy? why we need doctrines in uncertain times.” foreign affairs, june 17, 2011. accessed april 14, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/does-obama-have-grand-strategy. echevarria, antulio j. 2017. military strategy: a very short introduction. oxford: oxford university press. european council. 2023. “infographic – impact of sanctions on the russian economy.” accessed september 10, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ impact-sanctions-russian-economy/. face the nation. 2023. “cia director william burns on "face the nation with margaret brennan.” accessed april 17, 2023. youtube, 24:18. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=hn4bgqkq2mu. foreign affairs. 2023. will ukraine wind up making territorial concessions to russia? january 24, 2023. accessed january 27, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-theexperts/will-ukraine-wind-making-territorial-concessions-russia freedman, lawrence. 2022. “getting to negotiations.” substack, october 19, 2022. accessed january 28, 2023. https://samf.substack.com/p/getting-to-negotiations. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/long-war-ukraine-russia-protracted-conflict https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/long-war-ukraine-russia-protracted-conflict https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044 https://cdn.sanity.io/files/0wfzc71x/production/6745ea42c21d65d6709231e0e7767bd5de57469b.pdf https://cdn.sanity.io/files/0wfzc71x/production/6745ea42c21d65d6709231e0e7767bd5de57469b.pdf https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/01/ukraine-russia-sanctions-economy-war-putin-embargo-technology-financial-energy/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/01/ukraine-russia-sanctions-economy-war-putin-embargo-technology-financial-energy/ https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/how-have-sanctions-impacted-russia https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.777704 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/does-obama-have-grand-strategy https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hn4bgqkq2mu https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hn4bgqkq2mu https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/will-ukraine-wind-making-territorial-concessions-russia https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/will-ukraine-wind-making-territorial-concessions-russia https://samf.substack.com/p/getting-to-negotiations 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 galeotti, mark. 2022. the weaponization of everything: the field guide to the new way of war. new haven: yale university press. george, alexander l. 1992. forceful persuasion: coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war. washington, dc: united states institute of peace press. giles, keir. 2019. moscow rules: what drives russia to confront the west. washington, dc: brookings institutions press. ———. 2023. russia’s war on everybody and what it means for you. london: bloomsbury academic. giumelli, francesco. 2017. “the redistributive impact of restrictive measures on eu members: winners and losers from imposing economic sanctions on russia.” journal of common market studies 55 (5): 1062-1080. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12548. goldberg, jeffrey. 2016. “the obama doctrine.” the atlantic. accessed july 15, 2023. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/#3. gray, colin s. 2006. strategy and history: essays on theory and practice. london: routledge. harris, shane, karen deyoung, isabelle khurshudyan, ashley parker, and liz sly. 2022. “road to war: u.s. struggled to convince allies, and zelensky, of risk of invasion.” the washington post, august 16, 2022. accessed january 15, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-towar/. hill, fiona, and clifford g. gaddy. 2015. mr. putin: operative in the kremlin. washington dc: brookings institution press. horton, alex. 2023. “russia’s commando units gutted by ukraine war, u.s. leaks show.” the washington post, april 14, 2023. accessed april 17, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/14/leaked-documentsrussian-spetsnaz/. jentleson, bruce w. 2022. “who’s winning the sanctions war?” foreign policy, august 18, 2022. accessed january 29, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/18/russia-ukrainewar-economy-sanctions-putin/. jervis, robert. 1992. “political implications of loss aversion.” political psychology 13 (2): 187-204. https://doi.org/10.2307/3791678. ———. 2017a. perception and misperception in international politics: new edition. princeton: princeton university press. ———. 2017b. how statesmen think. the psychology of international politics. princeton: princeton university press. johnson, dominic d.p. 2004. overconfidence and war: the havoc and glory of positive illusions. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. ———. 2020. strategic instincts: the adaptive advantages of cognitive biases in international politics. princeton: princeton university press. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12548 https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-to-war/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-to-war/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/14/leaked-documents-russian-spetsnaz/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/14/leaked-documents-russian-spetsnaz/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/18/russia-ukraine-war-economy-sanctions-putin/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/18/russia-ukraine-war-economy-sanctions-putin/ https://doi.org/10.2307/3791678 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 kahneman, daniel, and amos tversky. 1979. “prospect theory: an analysis of decision at risk.” econometrica 47 (2): 263-291. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185. kari, martti j. 2018. “russia analysis by finnish intelligence colonel [english subtitles]” mig mag, december 3, 2018. accessed january 25, 2023. youtube, 1:00. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cvonrmsufpw. kasparov, gary, and mikhail khodorkovsky. 2023. “don’t fear putin’s demise.” foreign affairs, january 20, 2023. accessed february 2, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ /dont-fear-putins-demise. kofman, michael, and andrea kendall-taylor. 2021. “the myth of russian decline: why moscow will be a persistent power.” foreign affairs, november/december, 2021, 142152. kofman, michael, and jeffrey edmonds. 2022. “russia’s shock and awe: moscow’s use of overwhelming force against ukraine.” foreign affairs, february 22, 2022. accessed march 23, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-21/russiasshock-and-awe. kofman, michael, and rob lee. 2022. “not built for purpose: the russian military’s ill-fated force design.” war on the rocks, june 2, 2022. accessed on january 23, 2023. https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-illfated-force-design/. kolesnikov, andrei. 2023. “how russians learned to stop worrying and love the war.” foreign affairs, february 1, 2023. accessed april 15, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russians-learned-stop-worrying-and-lovewar. kotkin, stephen, sergei guriev, and michael s. bernstam. 2023. “sanctions and russia: effects, lessons, and the future: a history lab discussion.” hoover institution, august 25, 2023. accessed on september 9, 2023. https://www.hoover.org/research/sanctionsand-russia-effects-lessons-and-future-history-lab-discussion-w-stephen-kotkin. kramer, david j. 2010. “resetting u.s.-russian relations – it takes two.” the washington quarterly 33 (1): 61-79. https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600903418694. kurtz-phelan, dan. 2023. “how to avoid a great-power war: a conversation with general mark milley.” foreign affairs, may 2, 2023. accessed july 15, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/how-to-avoid-great-power-war-mark-milley. kyiv independent. 2023. “ministry: ukraine’s gdp fell by 30,4% in 2022.” january 5, 2023. accessed january 15, 2023. https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ministry-ukrainesgdp-fell-by-30-4-in-2022. lamothe, dan, and isabelle khurshudyan. 2023. “spike in russian combat deaths fuels fears of worse carnage to come.”. washington post, may 2, 2023. accessed july 17, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/05/02/russia-ukraine-combatdeaths/. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cvonrmsufpw https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/dont-fear-putins-demise https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/dont-fear-putins-demise https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-21/russias-shock-and-awe https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-21/russias-shock-and-awe https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/ https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/ https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russians-learned-stop-worrying-and-love-war https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russians-learned-stop-worrying-and-love-war https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600903418694 https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ministry-ukraines-gdp-fell-by-30-4-in-2022 https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ministry-ukraines-gdp-fell-by-30-4-in-2022 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 lanoszka, alexander, christian leuprecht, and alexander moens, eds. 2020. lessons from the enhanced forward presence, 2017-2020. nato defense college. accessed october 20, 2023. https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1504. levy, jack s. 1992. “an introduction to prospect theory.” political psychology 13 (2):171186. mcdermott, rose. 1998. risk taking in international politics: prospect theory in american foreign policy. ann arbor: university of michigan press. ———. 2004. “prospect theory in political science: gains and losses from the first decade.” political psychology 25 (2): 289-312. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679221.2004.00372.x. mcfaul, michael. 2023. how to get a breakthrough in ukraine. foreign affairs, january 30, 2023. accessed on february 2, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-getbreakthrough-ukraine. mearsheimer, john j. 1983. conventional deterrence. ithaca: cornell university press. ———. 2014. “why the ukraine crisis is the west’s fault.” foreign affairs, august 18, 2014. accessed july 14, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-0818/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault. mercer, jonathan. 1996. reputation and international politics. ithaca: cornell university press. miller, greg, mary ilyushina, catherine belton, isabelle khurshudyan, and paul sonne. 2023. “‘wiped out’: war in ukraine has decimated a once feared russian brigade.” the washington post, december 16, 2022. accessed april 17, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimatedukraine/. ministry of finance of the russian federation. 2023. predvaritel’naya otsenka ispolneniya federal’nogo byudzheta za yanvar’ 2023 goda [preliminary assessment of the implementation of the federal budget for january 2023]. february 6, 2023. accessed february 8, 2023. https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=38368predvaritelnaya_otsenka_ispolneniya_federalnogo_byudzheta_za_yanvar_2023_goda. ministry of foreign affairs of the russian federation. 2021. treaty between the united states of america and the russian federation on security guarantees. december 17, 2021. accessed february 2, 2023. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/ ?lang=en. mitzer, stijn, and jakub janovsky. 2022. “attack on europe: documenting russian equipment losses during the 2022 russian invasion of ukraine.” oryx, february 24, 2022. accessed january 27, 2023. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europedocumenting-equipment.html. monteiro, nuno p. 2014. theory of unipolar politics. cambridge: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00372.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00372.x https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-get-breakthrough-ukraine https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-get-breakthrough-ukraine https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimated-ukraine/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimated-ukraine/ https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=38368-predvaritelnaya_otsenka_ispolneniya_federalnogo_byudzheta_za_yanvar_2023_goda https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=38368-predvaritelnaya_otsenka_ispolneniya_federalnogo_byudzheta_za_yanvar_2023_goda https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 nato. 2016. “defence expenditures of nato countries (2008-2015).” january 28, 2016. accessed july 15, 2023. o’brien, phillips p. 2023. “time is on ukraine’s side, not russia’s.” the atlantic, january 14, 2023. accessed october 21, 2023. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/ russia-ukraine-weapon-production-nato-supply/672719/. omelicheva, mariya. 2013. russian foreign policy: a quest for great power status in a multipolar world. in foreign policy in comparative perspective: domestic and international influences on states behavior, edited by ryan beasley, juliet kaarbo, jeffrey lantis, and michael snarr, 94-117. 2nd ed. washington dc: cq press. person, rob. 2022. rob person and mark hertling on social science of war podcast. accessed february 2, 2023. podcast, mp3 audio, 55:00. https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/ welcome-to-the-social-science-of-war-lessons/id1659725018?i=1000590080118. prokopenko, alexandra. 2023. russia is preparing for a long war. the bell, july 28, 2023. accessed september 10, 2023. https://en.thebell.io/russia-is-preparing-for-a-long-war/. putin, vladimir. 2007. speech and the following discussion at the munich security conference on security policy. february 10, 2007. accessed january 13, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034. ———. 2021. “article by vladimir putin ‘on the historical unity of russians and ukrainians.’” june 12, 2021. accessed july 19, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/ events/president/news/66181. ———. 2022a. “address by the president of the russian federation.” february 21, 2022. accessed january 15, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828. ———. 2022b. “address by the president of the russian federation.” february 24, 2022. accessed january 15, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843. ———. 2022c. “signing of treaties on accession of donetsk and lugansk people’s republics and zaporozhye and kherson regions to russia.” accessed january 15, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465. rice, condoleezza, and robert m. gates 2023. “time is not on ukraine’s side.” the washington post, january 07, 2023. accessed january 14, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/07/condoleezza-rice-robert-gatesukraine-repel-russia/. rostoks, toms, and andris spūds (eds.). 2015. the different faces of “soft power”: the baltic states and eastern neighborhood between russia and the eu. riga: latvian institute of international affairs. rostoks, toms. 2018. identifying intentions: latvian policy-makers’ perceptions of russia’s intentions. journal of baltic studies 49 (1): 21-45. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/01629778.2017.1416417. ryan, mick. 2022. the ingenious strategy that could win the war for ukraine. sydney morning herald, may 17, 2022. accessed march 25, 2023. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/russia-ukraine-weapon-production-nato-supply/672719/ https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/russia-ukraine-weapon-production-nato-supply/672719/ https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/welcome-to-the-social-science-of-war-lessons/id1659725018?i=1000590080118 https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/welcome-to-the-social-science-of-war-lessons/id1659725018?i=1000590080118 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/07/condoleezza-rice-robert-gates-ukraine-repel-russia/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/07/condoleezza-rice-robert-gates-ukraine-repel-russia/ https://doi.org/10.1080/01629778.2017.1416417 https://doi.org/10.1080/01629778.2017.1416417 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/the-ingenious-strategy-that-could-win-the-warfor-ukraine-20220517-p5alz4.html. schaub, gary jr. 2004. “deterrence, compellence, and prospect theory.” political psychology 25 (3): 389-411. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00377.x. sebenius, james k., and michael singh. 2023. “russia and ukraine are not ready for talks.” foreign affairs, january 11, 2023. accessed january 29, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-and-ukraine-are-not-ready-talks. sonnenfeld, jeffrey, and steven tian. 2022. “actually, the russian economy is imploding.” foreign policy, july 22, 2022. accessed january 13, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/russia-economy-sanctions-myths-ruble-business/. strachan, hew. 2005. “the lost meaning of strategy.” survival 47 (3): 33-54. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248102. trenin, dmitri. 2016. “the revival of the russian military: how moscow reloaded.” foreign affairs, april 18, 2016. accessed april 16, 2023. https://www-foreignaffairscom.gcmc.idm.oclc.org/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/revival-russian-military. tsouloufas, george, and matthew rochat. 2023. “revisiting the effectiveness of economic sanctions in the context of russia’s invasion of ukraine.” canadian foreign policy journal. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2023.2198247. vindman, alexander. 2023. “what ukraine needs to liberate crimea.” foreign affairs, february 2, 2023. accessed february 5, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ ukraine/what-ukraine-needs-to-liberate-crimea-alexander-vindman. walt, stephen, m. 1987. the origins of alliances. ithaca: cornell university press. ———. 2011. “the end of the american era.” the national interest 116: 6-16. accessed april 16, 2023. https://nationalinterest.org/files/digital-edition/1319494178/ 116digitaledition.pdf. welch, david. 2005. painful choices: a theory of foreign policy change. princeton: princeton university press. weisiger, alex, and keren yarhi-milo. 2015. “revisiting reputation: how past actions matter in international politics.” international organization 69 (2): 473-495. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818314000393s zabrodskyi, mykhailo, jack watling, oleksandr v. danylyuk, and nick reynolds. 2022. preliminary lessons in conventional warfighting from russia’s invasion of ukraine: february-july 2022. royal united services institute for defence and security studies. https://static.rusi.org/359-sr-ukraine-preliminary-lessons-feb-july-2022-webfinal.pdf. zagorodnyuk, andriy. 2023. the case for taking crimea. foreign affairs, january 2, 2023. accessed january 20, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/case-taking-crimea. https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/the-ingenious-strategy-that-could-win-the-war-for-ukraine-20220517-p5alz4.html https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/the-ingenious-strategy-that-could-win-the-war-for-ukraine-20220517-p5alz4.html https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00377.x https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-and-ukraine-are-not-ready-talks https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/russia-economy-sanctions-myths-ruble-business/ https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248102 https://www-foreignaffairs-com.gcmc.idm.oclc.org/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/revival-russian-military https://www-foreignaffairs-com.gcmc.idm.oclc.org/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/revival-russian-military https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/what-ukraine-needs-to-liberate-crimea-alexander-vindman https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/what-ukraine-needs-to-liberate-crimea-alexander-vindman https://nationalinterest.org/files/digital-edition/1319494178/116digitaledition.pdf https://nationalinterest.org/files/digital-edition/1319494178/116digitaledition.pdf https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818314000393 https://static.rusi.org/359-sr-ukraine-preliminary-lessons-feb-july-2022-web-final.pdf https://static.rusi.org/359-sr-ukraine-preliminary-lessons-feb-july-2022-web-final.pdf https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/case-taking-crimea 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 zaluzhnyi, valerii, and mykhailo zabrodskyi. 2022. “prospects for running a military campaign in 2023: ukraine’s perspective.” kyiv post, september 8, 2022. accessed march 24, 2023. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/1369. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/1369 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 european right-wing populist parties’ approach toward china: between anti-globalization and appeal for diversified international partnerships dong tu1 and łukasz zamęcki2 university of warsaw and sichuan university abstract despite the fact that right-wing populist parties (rpps) have gained increased prominence in the last 15 years in europe and the amount of research regarding these parties has been on the rise, rpps' attitude toward the people’s republic of china remains an understudied issue. the aim of this article is to examine questions that have not yet been thoroughly researched: how are the positions of right-wing populist parties (rpps) on china shaped and how are they evolving, what causes such differing positions, and have there been any changes in the rpp’s approach to china since the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic? this article aims to answer these questions by analyzing the policies toward china of selected political parties (primarily, hungary's fidesz, italy's lega nord, france's rassemblement national but also parties such as the polish law and justice, and germany's alternative für deutschland). this article underlines that rpps’ policies on china are formulated based on what they perceive the development of international politics can do “for the people.” their attitudes depend mainly on their stance toward free-market globalization, their need for alternatives in relations with the us and the eu, and their axiological perception of china. 1 dong tu is an associate professor at the college of foreign languages and cultures at sichuan university. 2 lucas zamecki is a political scientist and an assistant professor at the faculty of political science and international studies at the university of warsaw. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 introduction contrary to the prediction that following the initial shock concerning the covid-19 pandemic there might be an opportunity for the european union (eu) and the people’s republic of china (prc) to strengthen their cooperation, there is a new pragmatic turn in dealing with china that is beginning to emerge amongst eu member states. china has seen its reputation “collapse in some of the eu countries that were its closest allies and partners” (krastev and leonard 2020, 14). this reputational breakdown marks a new stage in eu-china relations; however, there are great variations across the eu concerning the position on china. among those, right-wing populist parties (rpps)3 have gained increased prominence in the last 15 years in europe. in a survey conducted for the european council on foreign relations, there is an improved perception of china amidst the supporters of rpps in most eu member states (dennison et al. 2020). in fact, rpps in the eu showcase a strongly diversified approach to china, ranging from the blatant antichinese agenda of france's rassemblement national’s (rn) to the contradictory stances of italy's lega nord (ln) and the more receptive attitude of hungary’s fidesz – hungarian civic alliance (fidesz). as rpps have become an important political force in the recent decades in europe and continue to shape (even if indirectly) particular public policies, the main purpose of this article is to examine the so-far understudied attitude of rpps toward china, shed light on their ever-changing and shifting position on china, explain the causes behind such differing positions and, finally, investigate whether there have been any changes in their approach to china since the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic. many european rpps have a rather positive stance toward vladimir putin’s russia (e.g. rn, fidesz, alternative für deutschland [afd]), but in the case of prc, other variables are at play such as china’s position as an economic superpower, china’s communist ideology or sino-us tensions. additionally, these parties’ positions as either a governing party or opposition also have had an effect on their stance toward china. for example, they may employ a strong anti-china strategy while being an opposition party but modify or even change their stance completely when in power. this article intends to answer these questions by analyzing policies on china (mainly from hungary's fidesz, italy's lega nord [ln], france's rassemblement national [rn] with an additional examination of parties that have been omitted in research so far, such as poland's law and justice [pis] and germany's alternative für deutschland [afd]). these geographically distributed cases representing post-communist and “old eu” states guarantee a broad overview of the studied issue.4 due to the limitations of the analysis, the article focuses only on rpps as they gain higher support than left-wing populist parties and are perceived to be a bigger 3 researchers on european populism deploy a bewildering set of labels to classify european populist parties on the right (borrowing the classical left-right spectrum), such as “radical right populists,” “populist radical right,” “far right,” “right-wing populism,” “extreme right,” and “populist right.” in response, pippa norris (2019) conceptualizes twodimensional cleavages (pluralism-populism and authoritarian-libertarian) to categorize populist and traditional mainstream parties in europe. according to this new categorization, it would be more appropriate to refer to the parties in question as authoritarian-populist or authoritarian-right parties. however, for the sake of convenience and clarity, in this article, the term right-wing populist is adopted to refer to the populist parties under investigation. for more details, please refer to norris (2019). 4 the cleavages in the post-communist societies run along slightly different lines than in the countries of western europe. an important issue of the rpps in central europe is the attitude to the political system they represented before 1989. it can be expected that the rpps from central and eastern europe (cee) put greater emphasis on the communist regime of the prc than western european parties. 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 threat to the stability of european integration and politics. nevertheless, a comparative analysis on the position toward china by left-wing populist parties could be an interesting future area of study considering their attitude toward economic globalization. arguably, the positions of rpps toward china are the result of populism as a “thin-centered” ideology (mudde 2004). their attitude, therefore, results from rpps’ perception of what is “good for the people” in their country's relations with china and, depending on their interpretation of national interest, can shape various proposals of state foreign policies; foreign policy proposals of rpps will vary, depending on the state, due to differing domestic, economic, and political situations. the article is based on secondary research as well as an analysis of statements and speeches of party leaders (china, in most cases, is absent in the political programs of rpps). the starting point for the analysis is 2001. the level of support for right-wing populism in europe increased after 1999 (tap 2019). in 2001, china became a member of the world trade organization (wto), which is one of the reasons that it has become one of the key trading partners of the eu. therefore, in its analysis of the statements of party leaders, this article has concentrated on parties’ positions in the twenty-first century. the research consists of six parts. the introduction is followed by a literature review which points out the research gap in the studies of rpps’ approaches toward china in the existing scholarship. the subsequent three parts explain the ideological content underpinning rpps' foreign policies, review these parties’ approaches to china throughout history, and analyze their approach to china since the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic. the conclusion presents a discussion on how the rpps’ positions toward china vary among parties as an effect of their attitude to the axiological issues, globalization, and the perception of foreign partners (the eu, the united states [us]). what do we know about the foreign policy positions of right-wing populist parties? the existing literature on european right-wing populism has largely ignored rpps’ approach to china. firstly, the general foreign policies of european rpps are an under-researched area in both western and chinese academic circles. secondly, the discussion on the policies of these parties toward china is still missing, although western academia has been making efforts to fill the aforementioned research gap by focusing more attention on populist politicians' foreign policy over the past dozen or so years (e.g. liang 2007, swyngedouw et al.2007, verbeek and zaslove 2015). populist parties’ international agenda toward particular countries remains largely unaddressed among western scholars’ prolific work on european populism so far. much recent research has a special focus on populism’s historical origins and political platforms, its voter patterns and electoral success, its impact on public policy, and government participation.5 this is due to populism’s nature as a direct response to the perceived domestic economic and social problems as well as its comparative marginal place in european politics. however, the evolving party politics plus the increasingly blurred boundary between domestic and international politics in europe require more academic attention on rpps’ international agenda. 5 some examples of this research include albertazzi and mcdonnell 2008, chryssogelos 2011, liang 2007, mudde 2004, mudde 2007, norris 2019, özdamar and ceydilek 2019, rivero 2019, shields 2007, verbeek and zaslove 2017, and zaslove 2008. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 the western academic circle reacted to this trend rather rapidly as more researchers have begun to address rpps’ foreign policy in the last 15 years. liang’s edited volume (2007) deals with the foreign policy of rpps in europe such as the austrian far-right, belgium's vlaams blok (now known as vlaams belang), denmark's people’s party, and france's front national (presently known as rassemblement national). angelos-stylianos chryssogelos’ research (2010; 2011) contributes to this body of knowledge by outlining rpps’ positions on transatlantic relations, eurussia relations, the middle east, and the global economic and financial systems, focusing specifically on their attitudes to aid and development assistance. verbeek and zaslove’s work (2015) analyzes the relationship between populism and foreign policy in general by looking into the case of italy's lega nord. other research on this issue includes the examination of the impact of populist parties’ political radicalization on international policy developments and relations (balfour et al. 2016). two recent contributions to this area are özdamar and ceydilek’s empirical study (2019) of the foreign policy belief systems of seven european populist far-right leaders (marine le pen, viktor orbán, geert wilders, nigel farage, jimmie åkesson, frauke petry, and norbert hofer) and escartin’s analysis (2020) of the extent to which rpps in power shape eu foreign policy, which focused on the case of italy's ln and hungary's fidesz. despite all this research, the policy of rpps toward china remains largely ignored. the situation is similar in chinese academic circles. the past 10 years saw a rapid increase in research of european populism among chinese researchers. according to the database of chinese national knowledge infrastructure (cnki), which is the largest and most-used online academic database in china, there were only six journal articles published on the subject of european populism between 1990 and 2010. between january 2011 and october 2020, there were 99 articles on the same subject. nevertheless, it is quite unfortunate that chinese scholars have largely missed rpps’ foreign policy.6 given the expansion of rpps in the european political sphere, the increasingly important role played by china in the globalization processes, and the growing significance of china as a strategic partner for the eu, it is of utmost academic urgency to research rpps’ approaches and attitudes toward china. populism and foreign policy: the increasing links between domestic and foreign policy globalization in the modern world has led to a gradual disappearance of the distinction between domestic and international politics. domestic events spill over into the international context, and at the same time, international events affect domestic and even local affairs (verbeek and zaslove 2015). in the post-cold war era, globalization has substantially increased the interdependence between national and foreign policies. this trend is particularly revealing in europe where integration has created a multi-level decision-making and governance fabric; eu member states’ interdependence is institutionalized and written into legally binding treaties. the common currency, the european single market, the schengen regime as well as the newly agreed recovery fund package in response to the covid-19 pandemic have blurred the boundaries between regional, national, and european competencies in unparalleled ways (cf. bache 2012). furthermore, the process of european integration has turned a substantial part of member states’ 6 similar to western scholars, chinese academics focus most of their attention on the historical conditions of the european rise of populism, the variations among rpps (for example, between left and right, western and eastern europe), case studies in member states, its impact on european integration, etc. 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 previously exclusive domestic politics into a pan-european one. for example, in recent years, changes in domestic politics led by polish and hungarian right-wing governments have provoked outcries from the european union (zamęcki and glied 2020). in short, eu member states’ autonomy is “arguably constrained as the boundaries defining sovereign states have become blurred” (balfour et al. 2016, 16). regulations created at the eu level shape the framework of economic activity in the member states. this is often raised by populist parties, e.g., when they accuse the eu of its regulations facilitating the penetration of national markets by foreign entities or that the eu norms limit the freedom of economic activity and hinder competition with entities from countries that do not have such strict environmental standards (like china). blurring boundaries is also happening in the field of foreign policy. competing political actors and their differing concepts of national interest are challenging the traditional way of foreign policymaking (hill 2013). in europe, globalization and europeanization have led to a “domestication” of foreign policy as external challenges become more crucial at the national level (balfour et al. 2016). at the same time, political parties have also become increasingly important actors in foreign policymaking (verbeek and zaslove 2015). in that context, the influence of rpps on the foreign policy of its countries can be observed, even if these parties are not part of government coalitions. for instance, akkerman (2018) points out the direct and indirect influence of rpps on immigration policymaking: direct influence comes through holding executive power, while indirect influence is due to the electoral pressure on incumbents from rpps. the analysis of the position of rpps toward china must therefore take into account whether the party is in power or is the opposition. the party in power has other instruments to influence public policies. in relation to the position on china, it is also important to note that when a party comes to power, it may change its stance toward such things as economic relations with china compared to the position it presented while in opposition. parties in power take much more responsibility than when they are in the role of the opposition. another important factor is also what the party competition looks like in a given party system. fagerholm emphasizes that parties tend to “respond to rival parties by shifting their position in the same direction” and that niche parties, like rpps, “do not generally respond to shifts in public opinion, but rather to opinion shifts among their own supporters” (2016, 505). in these new circumstances, european populist leaders have become known for their skills in localizing global complexity. swyngedouw et al. refer to this populist strategy as “the jumping of scales technique” (2007, 83-84). in populist language, international migration, organized crime, and cross-border terrorism are national problems. for example, in the discourse of france’s rassemblement national, european integration is responsible for france’s declining economy and the resulting immigration accounts for unemployment, crime, and the french identity crisis in general (liang 2007). consequently, once immigration is curtailed, the related domestic problems will be solved. cadier (2019) emphasizes that populists in office regard foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics even more than mainstream political parties. the ideological attachment of rpps’ foreign policy the most popular and concise definition of populism as a thin ideology is based on a central dichotomy: “the people” versus “the elite.” in the populist view, society is primarily divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the pure people against the corrupt elite; thus, politics should be an expression of the general will of the former (mudde 2007). this thin ideology does not possess a fully clarified or coherent argument about the political, economic, and social issues 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 in the real world. that is why populism can be attached both to “the left” and “the right.” it cannot exist without assigning itself to other, more fully-fledged political ideologies such as socialism, liberalism, nationalism, or radical-right ideology (verbeek and zaslove 2015). therefore, european right-wing populism7 is based on a combination of populism, radical-right thinking, and authoritarianism. a large number of radical-right and far-right parties in western europe have adopted a populist worldview and succeeded in making electoral gains in the last 15 years. apart from populism, they adopt nativism and authoritarianism as the core of their ideologies (mudde 2007). regarding economic policies, their most visible feature is the opposition to economic globalization.8 rpps’ ideology is also visible in their foreign policy programs. as populism is rooted in the idea of the authentic voice of the people, the national interest (“people’s voice”) becomes the basic starting point in their conceptualization of the international political agenda (verbeek and zaslove 2017); such an ideological orientation results in rpps’ inconsistency on most international issues. european populists have become known for their “changing views on most foreign policy issues ” (özdamar and ceydilek 2019, 138). rpps’ positions on a certain foreign policy issue, which is not as straightforward as expected, is always contingent upon whether they perceive the result as able to benefit the “people” (verbeek and zaslove 2015). such examples are easy to find. on the one hand, this inconsistency is obvious in these parties’ stance on general foreign affairs foreign issues: the french rn changed its attitudes toward russia during and after the cold war in a rather radical way (shields 2007); the austrian freedom party held contradictory positions on relations with the us and russia (meyer 2007); after the election of donald trump in 2016, the european rpp leaders downplayed their anti-americanism and adopted more friendly attitudes toward the us; the italian ln initially supported globalization when it began as a free-market, neo-liberal political movement claiming to represent northeastern italy but shifted to an anti-globalization stance in the late 1990s after its leaders portrayed globalization as a threat to the european-style welfare regime, local employment, and cultural identity (verbeek and zaslove 2015). on the other hand, these rpp attitudes toward europe further exemplify their inconsistency in foreign policy. ln’s position on european integration is based on its own evaluation of the expected effect of integration on the northern region of italy. it supports european integration when it is viewed as a strengthening factor for the region’s position in italy and europe. for example, the party used to defend the idea of a europe of the regions, which is in sharp contrast to its current opposition to the integration perceived as a threat to northern italy’s economy and cultural identity. in a similar vein, france’s rn’s euro attitude has experienced a similar turn from support to opposition. in turn, pis in poland maneuvers from a position that “polexit” is impossible to slogans that “the dictate of the eu” is a threat to polish identity – a culture based on catholicism and poland’s decision-making sovereignty (gpc 2020). 7 similar to the controversy surrounding the name of this “family of parties,” there are a number of suggestions for the label of ideology espoused by these parties, such as radical-right populism or national populism. 8 right-wing populists differ in economic policy to a large extent. for instance, some, like the freedom party in austria, opt for free markets but seek to retain extensive welfare benefits for existing citizens. others, like nigel farage, argue that lower economic growth is a price worth paying if it would reduce the influx of migrants and increase the number of jobs for britons. on the other hand, others, like marine le pen in france and similar figures in eastern europe, propose economically left-wing policies such as more state aid for troubled industries and restrictions on the free flow of capital and goods (therefore, they are termed as left-wing populists by some scholars). for more information, please see eatwell and goodwin 2018; rivero 2019; zaslove 2008. https://www.google.com.hk/search?hl=zh-cn&tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor: 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 therefore, contrary to the common understanding, rpps are not fundamentally anti-globalist or anti-eu. their positions on those issues and consequent development of international policies also depend on internal policy challenges (verbeek and zaslove 2015) and are rather contingent upon what they perceive as beneficial for the ordinary citizens of their countries. the rpps’ ideologies and their approach to china when the dynamic between rpps’ ideological attachment and foreign policy positions are applied to their policies toward china, a number of hypotheses can be made. firstly, european right-wing populists’ anti-globalization sentiment is also valid in their approach toward china. most rpps have been firm in stating that globalization, in both economic and cultural terms, has affected local europeans in a rather negative way; it is argued that neo-liberalism in the international trade regime destroys local production, lowers wages, and results in mass unemployment (kriesi and pappas 2015; mamonova and franquesa 2020). furthermore, the uncontrolled exportation of foreign culture can pose a threat to national traditions and identities; the massive flow of immigrants is argued to be another curse. all in all, the rpps’ belief is that globalization is a threat that benefits the european elites and takes a toll on the livelihood of ordinary europeans. as china’s global influence continues to grow in economic and trade terms, it is likely to fall victim to rpps’ accusations. in their discourse, the continuous relocation of the production line from europe to china and the competitive price of “made in china” products have brought about immensely negative consequences to the manufacturing industry and the employment market in their own countries. in recent years, the rapid growth of chinese investment in europe is also interpreted in rather negative terms. ironically, when donald trump was preoccupied with an anti-globalization agenda, china expressed its wish to push for greater openness of the global market. this simply goes against rpps’ anti-globalist and protectionist agenda. it is, therefore, predictable that china is to blame in rpp’s negative discourse on globalization. in the second place, european rpps pursue a foreign-policy agenda with diversified international partnerships, which may indicate possible positive views of china. these parties’ appeal to end the hegemony of the us in the international order and to build ties with russia promises a relatively friendly tone for china. cooley and nexon (2020) rightly point out that some european rpps promote an international system consisting of multiple great powers rather than one or two superpowers, envisioning a global order that privileges national sovereignty over liberal rights and values because such a multipolar international system will best serve their interests. in this sense, china can be perceived as effective leverage to oppose the usa and the “bureaucracy of brussels.” thus, in some populists’ view, china rises as a powerful challenging force to the current world order and grows to be an alternative partner (e.g., in matteo salvini’s and viktor orbán’s discourse). to conclude, it is expected that there is no unified approach to china among european rpps. rpps’ attitudes toward china depend mainly on their stance on free-market globalization, the perception of the need for alternatives to relations with the us and the eu, and their axiological assessment of the prc’s political system. a historical review of rpps’ approach to china 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 the relation between the ideological identification and the foreign policy orientations of european rpps indicates that their positions on china are also contingent upon the extent to which china’s presence enhances or hinders their perceptions of the “interests of the people.” variations are expected among these parties, and changes are possible within one party over time since rpp’s agendas in various european states are determined by national conditions. the main dimension of attitudes toward china is likely to be grounded in economic terms. the past three decades witnessed a sharp increase in trade between the eu and china. the european commission data shows that the prc is the eu’s largest source of imports and its second-largest export market as of february 2021 (eurostat 2021). this “chinese import shock” is seen as largely responsible for the increase in support for nationalist and radical-right parties (colantone and stanig 2018a). globalization, by means of the chinese import shock, also acted as a key structural determinant of the brexit vote in that “the leave share was systematically higher in regions that have been more exposed to the chinese import” (colantone and stanig 2018b, 201). initially, the european rpps did not take china seriously in foreign policy, given the latter’s comparatively minor influence. especially since for rpps, the more important issue was migration from the middle east and africa. however, along with china’s expansion in the global economy since its entry into wto in 2001, extensive investment policy by the prc’s government and its growing importance as an economic partner for the eu, these parties began to address china in their political agenda. still, important factors shaping the attitude of particular rpps toward china are domestic issues, including the structure of the national economy and inter-party relations in the party system of the state. fidesz the hungarian fidesz is one of the european rpps that hold a friendly stance toward china. hungarian prime minister viktor orbán was among the few european leaders who attended the second belt and road forum on international cooperation in 2019, and hungary was the only eu member state that did not sign the joint statement denouncing china’s belt and road initiative (bri) for hampering free trade (elmer 2018). the hungarian government claims that national interest is above anything else, and it shall not accept any kind of external ideological pressure from the eu. during the 2019 forum in beijing, orbán stated that the chinese belt and road initiative coincides entirely with hungarian national interests because the cooperation proposed under the initiative is an important guarantee for maintaining the order of free trade and the freedom of the world economy (government of hungary 2019). building close ties with china is part of hungary’s “eastern opening” strategy. in a speech delivered in 2010 after becoming prime minister, orbán stated that there should be no doubt that hungarians belong to the western world, but from then on, this fact would imply another connotation: “we are sailing under the western flag, but in the world economy an eastern wind blows. and the sailor that does not take into consideration according to which wind to rotate the sails will doom himself and his cargo” (jacoby and korkut 2016, 500). china is, in fact, among the four pillars of hungary’s “eastern opening” and is a primary target in orbán’s goal of reframing hungary’s geopolitical associations to diversify exports and attract investment in infrastructure projects (jacoby and korkut 2016). since fidesz came into power in 2010, the hungarian government has been building stronger economic and political ties with china by 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 facilitating chinese business and investment, encouraging chinese tourism in hungary, and offering china its political support on certain international issues.9 fidesz’s rapprochement with china under the leadership of orbán can be interpreted as an act of euroscepticism (hargitai 2020) and an effort to manage the pressure from the eu over his undemocratic changes. politically speaking, china, along with singapore, india, russia, and turkey, are models of successful illiberal and non-democratic countries for viktor orbán (jacoby and korkut 2016). economically speaking, closer links to china promise to offer an alternative to european resources (the hungarian order of chinese vaccines in 2021 can serve as an example here). it somewhat complements hungary’s simultaneous movements away from the eu (jacoby and korkut 2016). as orbán said in 2019, chinese companies are making a substantial contribution to the modernization of the hungarian economy, with chinese investments in hungary amounting to a record high of approximately usd 4.5 billion (government of hungary 2019). therefore, china is part of fidesz’s appeal for diversified international partnerships. it should, however, not be forgotten that fidesz did not always hold a positive opinion of china. its sinophile approach is, in fact, a shift from its earlier sinophobic one. for a long time, fidesz presented a rather skeptical stance toward china and chinese activities in hungary. for example, in their unsuccessful campaign in the 2006 election, orbán called for restrictions on chinese immigration in hungary. later, in 2008, he demanded the hungarian government caution china against its human rights record and make tibet an issue in hungary-china diplomatic relations (jacoby and korkut 2016). in addition, on more than one occasion, fidesz representatives have blamed chinese merchants for causing social and economic problems such as smuggling or illegal immigration (nyíri 2007). nevertheless, since returning to power in 2010, fidesz has considerably softened its anti-chinese populist rhetoric and downplayed or even dropped its previous harsh criticism of china. orbán’s position should therefore be seen as purely populist, resulting from the actual needs and the assessment of benefits and thus a disregard for a clear ideological position. as discussed earlier, as of the end of 2021, fidesz regards china as both an alternative partner to the west and a significant guarantee for the interest of the hungarian people. the opposition parties’ policy proposals toward china also affect fidesz. in hungary, the opposition did not play the chinese card in the previous electoral campaigns10; interestingly, the far-right jobbik has the most consistent anti-chinese stance among the main opposition parties. when in 2022, the united hungarian opposition began to criticize fidesz’s chinese policy (including support for the establishment of a branch of the fudan university in budapest), and a change in public opinion regarding china began to be noticeable (dubravčíková et al. 2020; koleszár 2021), viktor orbán softened his clearly pro-chinese stance in the campaign (standish 9 hungary was the first european country to join china’s belt and road initiative in 2015. it also opposed the eu using any strong language in its statement on the south china sea the next year. in 2021, hungary blocked the european union’s proposed statement criticizing china over hong kong. 10 the domestic political situation regarding the direct electoral competitor matters in rpp’s china policy. the challenges posed by eric zemmours for rn, the forum voor democratie for the party for freedom (pvv), the fratelli d'italia for ln are cases in point. rn, pvv and ln constantly modify their discourses on china according to the extent their rivals are questioning the china issue and competing for the dominating discursive power. the situation in hungary is somewhat different. as the governing party, fidesz is supposed to answer the challenges on governments’ policy toward china raised by opposition parties. nevertheless, the subject of china was largely missing in the previous electoral campaigns in hungary over the past decade. https://chinaobservers.eu/author/rekak/ https://www.rferl.org/author/reid-standish/tt_uqi 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 and szalai 2021). this sort of departure is in line with the findings demonstrated in studies on rpps' change in policy positions (özdamar and ceydilek 2019; verbeek and zaslove 2015). lega nord italy’s ln stands out as an interesting contrast to fidesz, not only because of its anti-china position but also due to the consistency in its policy toward china. founded in 1991, the lega nord per l'indipendenza della padania (rebranded as “lega” in 2018 without changing the official name of the party) is a right-wing populist party advocating more autonomy for the country’s wealthier northern region (padania). in its populist rhetoric, the protection of padania’s interest was the primary goal of the party. as discussed in the previous part, ln shifted from a pro-globalization and pro-eu position to its current anti-globalization and eurosceptic stance out of the concern that padania’s declining global and european competitiveness made it a victim of globalization and eu’s politics. its founder and former leader, umberto bossi, portrayed globalization as a threat to local production and local traditions (verbeek and zaslove 2015). by similar logic, china is an object of ln’s accusations. at the end of the 1990s, bossi and other leaders of ln began to worry about china’s upcoming entry into the wto. they saw chinese textile exports as a grave threat to italy’s local textile production. bossi underlined the process of moving italian manufacturing abroad. thus, ln was irritated by the eu’s push to abolish tariffs that, according to them, would expose european countries to competitors like china, and, as a result, european nations would not be able to protect their industries (woods 2009). next to immigration, protectionism became the primary concern of ln and the party called for the defence of italian businesses from china (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2005). during its time in power in the coalition government led by silvio berlusconi between 2001 and 2006, ln made frequent requests to pass protectionist measures by introducing high tariffs against products (i.e. from china) (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2008). furthermore, in 2009, roberto cenni, supported by ln, became the first conservative mayor of prato, tuscany, and after taking office, he backed stricter regulations on chinese trade and law enforcement officers’ raids on chinese garments companies (esparraga 2017). ln has often raised the issue of chinese counterfeits of italian products. since taking the party leadership from bossi in december 2013, matteo salvini persisted in ln’s sinosceptic tone. during his time in office as deputy prime minister between june 2018 and september 2019 in the coalition government of ln and the five star movement (m5s), he was quite suspicious of, if not outright opposed to italy’s rapprochement with china. when asked about his attitude toward china, he mentioned that “china is not a democracy and has a certain spirit of imperialism and control” (reuters 2019). salvini thus identifies with the atlanticist position, at the same time disagreeing with m5s’ argument stating that close ties with china safeguard italy’s national interest. moreover, salvini frequently comments that “italy is china’s colony,” arguing that italy joining the belt and road initiative is an attempt by china to colonize it in economic terms (giuffrida 2019). regarding the issue of huawei, salvini staunchly opposes chinese companies’ involvement in italy’s 5g network (o’neal 2020). in fact, he proposes to suspend italy’s relations with china altogether. nevertheless, when he was in power and was asked about his inconsistency by journalists (that he claims to be against china but takes part in some joint activities with the prc), he explained that “it is fine to encourage an economic understanding between our businesses, but this cannot be a trojan horse that indulges beijing’s geopolitical projects” (lanzavecchia 2020). 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 in 2020, in addition to blaming china for the covid-19 pandemic, salvini also supported hong kong on his social media channels. currently, ln has the sharpest position toward china among the main political parties. to sum up, italy's ln is a case of a european rpp that holds a rather negative but consistent position on china, with the cause of their concerns being focused on the regional labour market and the economy. complaints about “chinese imperialism” mainly stem from economic anxieties but an axiological element in ln’s rhetoric is also noticeable. rassemblement national france's rassemblement national (previously known as front national [fn]) is another european rpp that holds a consistent anti-china position. established as a far-right party, rn incorporated a series of populist elements in its subsequent development. since the 1980s, fn/rn has made immigration its core concern, focusing on french culture and tradition with a definition of national identity that stresses ethnicity rather than values. meanwhile, the idea of protecting french people’s interests motivates rn to be vocal on a wide range of issues such as european integration, law and order, and france’s high rate of unemployment. since the 1990s, rn has gradually shifted to a right-wing populist ideology that combines nationalism and authoritarian political values with strong populist rhetoric. when it comes to relations between france and china, the word “protectionism” dominates rn’s discourses. china is described as a “thief,” an enemy, and a threat. rn’s sinophobic position can be regarded as an extension of its euroscepticism. in condemning the eu’s commercial policy, rn’s former leader jean-marie le pen accuses the eu of promoting an extremely liberal agenda that fails to protect european industries and instead supports the benefits of the countries outside europe, particularly china (vasilopoulou 2010). according to rn, the open border policy practiced by the eu exposes french interests to excessive competition with the us and china (stockemer 2017). rn, under the new leadership of marine le pen, persists in its hardline stance toward china. in her book published in 2012, marine le pen accuses the elites (at both the french and eu levels) of negating the manufacturing industry’s relocation from europe to china over the past 30 years; in her opinion, the reality is dramatic and has, in fact, involved all economic sectors in france (le pen 2012). according to le pen, china is the culprit behind the massive unemployment and income decline in france (2012). in addition to the social dumping, le pen argues that china practices monetary dumping with erratic measures, which consequently results in imbalances in the international monetary system. she refuses to recognize beijing as a market economy, complaining that the absurd eu rules do little to protect the european market (front national 2015b) and argues that “quasi-free trade with china has been devastating to the french and european industries”; moreover, the huge discrepancies in legal, social and environmental standards between china and europe are responsible for the millions of european jobs losses subsequently replaced by chinese workers (le corre 2017). thus, in her rhetoric, china is not simply a threat but a crisis (“la crise chinoise”) (front national 2015a). in recent years, rn has emphasized the excessive dependence of the supply chain of goods on china and the need to protect the french market against goods from the prc (chenu 2019; androuet 2020). given the changing attitudes of french political parties and the french public toward china, rn’s position is not so different from the political mainstream. 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 other cases of rpps the above-mentioned cases illustrate the very typical stances of rpps toward china and the arguments for the antior pro-china position. however, other rpps are also worthy of attention. in 2016, britain's ukip, a forerunner for the leave campaign before brexit, claimed that what china had been and will be doing would impoverish the british people by their control of british companies and the consequent creation of unemployment. the british national party, a far-right nationalist grouping, also depicts china as the enemy (esparraga 2017). their position stems from reluctance toward “laissez-faire globalism.” in contrast, germany's afd stresses the positive impact of germany’s partnership with china: its representatives believe that the rise and revival of china is an imminent reality and that good relations with china are beneficial for europe. in their view, china’s belt and road initiative is a valuable addition to the global economy and brings development to the continental countries. a member of the european parliament from afd stated that “if europe wants to be an independent global player” instead of “an american vassal,” “it must nurture a good relationship,” “trustful partnership,” and even “true friendship” with china (free west media 2020). criticism of china also appears in afd’s discourse in the context of economic competition and fears of “selling off” the german economy to china (weidel 2019). this may give the impression of inconsistency in afd's appeal. however, apart from slogans about the need to protect the national economy, which is typical for rpps, afd’s members of the european parliament (meps) opposed the resolutions condemning china (becker and hail 2020). another noteworthy rpp is poland's pis, whose stance on china is an interesting example of pulls and pushbacks. different from some populist parties in europe, pis’ more multi-faceted stance stems from the fact that it is the ruling party. with its potentially important role in the belt and road initiative, poland was interested in closer cooperation with china, which was exemplified by the visit of the president of the republic of poland, andrzej duda, to china and his good relationship with president xi jinping. however, there are politicians within pis that are reluctant to china (e.g. former minister of national defence, antoni macierewicz); this fact, coupled with the lower-than-expected investment benefits from the bri, bring some doubts about closer cooperation with china, even on barely economic grounds. in addition, relations with the prc have been worsened by pis due to the us' position on huawei’s investments in 5g infrastructure in recent years. poland remains under the significant influence of the united states, which is considered the most important ally on account of the threat from russia. therefore, we can observe an internal tension in the policy toward china in pis (bachulska 2021). one faction that is keener to cooperate with china argues on the basis of economic terms. this group sees the prc entities as potential new investors in numerous (and usually large-scale) investment projects of pis' government. this is particularly true if the polish government foresees a likely reduction in the investment flows from the eu. possible investments by the prc in transport infrastructure including the new central polish airport, located 40 km from warsaw, were considered. their hope is that poland could play the role of a broker for chinese investments and therefore benefit from chinese activities in the eu. the reluctant faction emphasizes china’s incompatibility with the international security architecture based on the dominant role of the us, as the latter is seen as crucial in poland’s security. the two rpps in eastern europe, hungary's fidesz and poland's pis, are expected to be more anticommunist and hence more anti-china, given their historical experience. nevertheless, these two parties’ present approaches toward china showcase an interesting contrast. regardless of their 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 rather similar axiology-based anti-china tone in earlier days, fidesz and pis hold different perceptions of china at the moment. the former proposes to build closer ties with china and hopes to bring huge economic benefits for the hungarian people (though orbán also refers to china to support hungary’s illiberal democratic regime as an alternative to that of western europe). compared to fidesz’s rather positive stance toward china, pis seems more reserved. this contrast could be attributed to pis’ added emphasis on the axiological differences between china and the west, as well as poland’s strong inclination toward the us. in conclusion, european rpps’ policies toward china demonstrate two remarkable features. firstly, there is no unified approach to china among the right-wing populists in europe, even though they share similar ideological underpinnings. secondly, an individual party may change its position on china quite drastically. moreover, the proor anti-china stances presented by these parties indicate that, on the one hand, their sinophobia is an extension of their anti-globalization sentiment in which china is primarily portrayed as a threat to the local production and the root cause for the sluggish local economy. on the other hand, the sinophile orientation is a reflection of their appeal for diversified international partnerships in which china could act as an alternative partner to western hegemony. likewise, for some eurosceptical rpps, china is a counterbalance to brussels. additionally, one can notice that both the proand anti-china camps use the economic benefit/national interest argument to defend their approaches; such is the nature of populism. populists are eventually constrained by the electorate. all in all, “the appeal to the masses will not be made on ideological lines, but on what attracts most votes: chinese direct investment in poland or the fear of the dragon taking french jobs” (esparraga 2017, 3). the attitudes of rpps toward china also clearly show the inconsistency in the appeal of rpps, resulting from the blurred ideological foundations of populism. thus, another variable that exerts even more impact on the changes of attitude toward the prc other than nativist, anti-immigrant, axiological perspectives, or the geopolitical and economic situation of the state is rpps’ position in the government, especially if it is a ruling party. for example, fidesz changed its stance after becoming the governing party; it also partially happened with poland's pis. even matteo salvini, who presented himself as a consistent opponent of the prc, began to conduct business with china during his term in government.11 finally, the attitude of rpps toward china is heavily contingent on the rpps’ earlier attitude toward the usa. parties that are keen to cooperate strongly with the us (especially under trump’s presidency) are less favorable to china. 11 another italian populist party – leftist five star movement (m5s) – can also be used as a case of a shift in policy toward china upon becoming the governing party. starting from its establishment in 2009 to 2018, the m5s had a rather skeptical attitude toward china. the m5s founder, beppe grillo, shared skepticism of the italian government on chinese takeovers in strategic sectors and strongly protested against china’s trade practices in the past (garciaherrero and sapir 2017). however, after coming into office in june 2018, m5s led an unprecedentedly active policy toward china (poggetti 2018), i.e., the government set up a special “china task force” under the ministry of economic development and made explicit its intent to position italy as a leading european partner in cooperation with china’s belt and road initiative. in august 2018, italy signed four bilateral agreements with china (buzzetti 2018) and became the first g7 country that signed a memorandum of understanding on the belt and road initiative with china (horowitz 2019). as m5s’ members in italy’s populist government argue, collaboration with china promises to revive the sluggish italian economy, create its own opportunity, and serve the interest of the italian people. italy’s officials from the m5s also appreciate china’s efforts to provide medical supplies (coratella 2020). furthermore, as recently as august 2020, grillo criticized italy’s realignment with the us and pushed for strengthening ties with china. 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 although the positions of rpps on china vary among the parties, a recent turn toward a more hostile attitude is observable. this can be interpreted with the use of axiological arguments and by applying a geostrategic logic. from the axiological point of view, amongst the frequently raised issues are matters of communism, human rights, and authoritarianism.12 rpps’ policy toward china in times of covid-19 against the backdrop of increasing distrust toward china among european citizens and the hardening tone toward china by certain european politicians, some rpps, although not having undergone a dramatic shift, have gradually turned to a more critical stance toward china, e.g. france's rn and the netherlands' pvv. this is in line with the falling public assessment of china during the months since the pandemic outbreak (silver et al. 2020). the assessment of china during the covid-19 pandemic has worsened (krastev and leonard 2020), however, the “coronavirus diplomacy” of the prc might have created some minor exceptions to this trend. for example, china’s medical equipment sales have been initially well-received by parts of europe.13 the right-wing populist politician who praised the chinese support the most is probably the founder of the serbian progressive party and the president of serbia, aleksandr vucić. on the one side are the sinophobic parties. ln has continued its anti-china rhetoric during the covid-19 pandemic. its leader matteo salvini doubted the good intentions with which china sent the urgently needed medical advisory group and resources to italy in march 2020. on march 25, he and his ln colleague giorgia meloni posted on their personal social media accounts a piece of unconfirmed information claiming that a news program aired in 2015 about chinese lab experiments and research on other coronaviruses was “proof that the novel virus had originated in that same lab” (nardelli and d’urso 2020). a few days later, salvini took things one step further and stated that “if the chinese government knew [about the virus] and didn’t tell it publicly, it committed a crime against humanity” during a debate session in the senate (ferraresi 2020). in regard to this conspiracy theory, marine le pen did not express a clear opinion but stated that it was legitimate to wonder if the virus had escaped from a laboratory. at the same time, she was quite aware that 40% of her supporters in the first round of the presidential election in 2017 believed that the coronavirus was intentionally made, and 15% believed that it was accidentally made (lepelletier 2020). other representatives from france's rn underlined the danger of excessive dependence on a foreign country in supplies of medicine and medical protective equipment (bardella 2020). though not explicitly stated, it is obvious that china is viewed as an unreliable partner, which highlights the thesis that china is critically regarded as the trojan horse of economic globalization. 12 it is also visible among other rpps not studied here. for example, the netherlands' party for freedom (pvv) and geert wilders have questioned the fairness of competing with chinese companies. pvv underlines the systemic rivalry and the differences in values, implying that the chinese engage in industrial espionage while emphasizing the threats associated with chinese investments. wilders refers to china as the “trojan dragon” in europe (pvv 2019). recently, rpps presenting axiological challenges have exposed the issue of hong kong and huawei’s 5g infrastructure. in turn, the true finns party in finland mentions the concerns for the natural environment due to the activities of the chinese. britain's ukip presents a broader axis of geopolitical concerns, with nigel farage calling for a “more tough” stance against china – a stance that can be understood through his ties with the former president of the us, donald trump. 13 e.g., reactions of polish citizens on social media when president xi jinping promised to support poland in a phone discussion with president andrzej duda. https://plus.lefigaro.fr/page/uid/3108481 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 in contrast, on the other side are the pro-china parties. in march 2020, the hungarian prime minister orbán welcomed the flight from china that brought supplies to help hungary battle covid-19, expressed his gratitude for china’s contribution to containing the spread of covid19, and communicated his hopes for future bilateral economic cooperation. this type of discourse indicates that the appreciation of chinese aid and its efforts in combating the pandemic offer more justification for their quest for a partnership with china that would serve as an alternative to a partnership with the west. at the same time, other rpps’ critique of china proved even more valid since china’s global oligopoly of the production of medical resources weakened the capacity of european countries to effectively respond to the virus (such voices were particularly loud in the early stages of the covid-19 pandemic in europe). both of these narratives claim to protect people’s interests, i.e. the health and security of the public during the covid-19 pandemic. discussion and conclusions additional research on european rpps’ policies on china is necessary as these types of parties have seen greater electoral success and have entered mainstream politics at a time when relations between the european union and china have become increasingly multi-faceted. the analysis in this article has demonstrated the following: european rpps do not hold a unified position on china, and their positions on china are contingent upon whether they interpret relations with china as benefiting or damaging “the well-being of the people.” their either proor anti-china position is based on the argument that engagement with china either enhances or harms people’s wellbeing: china can be perceived as a threat to the national economy and (increasingly) as an axiological rival or an alternative partner to the us and the eu in international relations. another important variable turns out to be the position of a given rpp in government and its current attitude toward the us. this logic is also true of rpps’ approach toward china during the covid-19 pandemic. from the early days of the chaotic competition for medical equipment to the subsequent efforts to acquire covid-19 vaccinations in europe, both proand anti-china voices can be heard among the rpps. the parties’ pro or anti-china positions have been strengthened during the crises caused by the pandemic. what is noteworthy is that europe, in general, has toughened its attitude toward china since the beginning of the pandemic. within such an environment, the anti-chinese voices seem to be taking the lead not only among mainstream politicians but also among rpp leaders, at least for the moment. for some european right-wing populists, “the threat of china” might be exploited as a new source of political power. this research mainly deals with these parties’ preferences in their policy toward china, but it is of equal or even more significance to investigate the effect of rpps on the policies toward china at both the state and european levels. firstly, as evidence shows, the mainstream in europe has been absorbing the national-populist and right-wing agenda over the past decades, which “in whatever form, will have a powerful effect on the politics of many western countries for many years” (eatwell and goodwin 2018, 207). the issue of immigration serves as a salient case for this point. being a rather marginal subject in the closing decades of the 20th century, immigration has now successfully found its way into the political agenda of almost every eu member state, a result attributable primarily to the efforts of rpps. another example is the never-to-be-underestimated role of britain's ukip in bringing about the brexit vote. secondly, rpps in government can exert a direct impact on policy outcomes. for instance, a pro-china stance by an rpp in government has https://www.google.com.hk/search?hl=zh-cn&tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor: 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 the capacity to determine the decision-making at both the state and european levels. such examples are not difficult to find. besides, the ongoing debate over sanctions on russia provides a very recent case. apart from the above-mentioned research possibility, it must be admitted that this research’s scope omits to encompass certain points. firstly, rpps’ voices about china’s stance on issues such as taiwan, human rights, and climate change are absent. secondly, there are intricate differences between rpp parties in government and those in opposition as their different statuses exert influence on their rhetoric on china. those limitations, however, create opportunities for more nuanced and meticulous future research endeavours. 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 references androuet, mathilde. 2020. “notre souveraineté pharmaceutique est aussi un impératif” [our pharmaceutical sovereignty is also an imperative]. rassemblement national. accessed may 26, 2022. https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/notre-souverainetepharmaceutique-est-aussi-un-imperatif/. akkerman, tijitske. 2018. the impact of populist radical-right parties on immigration policy agendas: a look at the netherlands. washington, dc: migration policy institute. albertazzi, daniele, and duncan mcdonnell. 2005. “the lega nord in the second berlusconi government: in a league of its own.” west european politics, 28 (5): 952-972. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500310600. albertazzi, daniele, and duncan mcdonnell, eds. 2008. twenty-first century populism: the spectre of western european democracy. london: palgrave macmillan. bache, ian. 2012. “multi-level governance in the european union.” in the oxford handbook of governance, edited by david levi-fau, 628-641. oxford: oxford university press. bachulska, alicja. 2021. “what’s behind poland’s sudden change of heart about china?” china observers in central and eastern europe, july 21, 2021. accessed july 22, 2021. https://chinaobservers.eu/whats-behind-polands-sudden-change-of-heart-about-china/. balfour, rosa, janis a emmanouilidis, catherine fieschi, heather grabbe, christopher hill, timo lochocki, marie mendras, et al. 2016. “europe’s troublemakers. the populist challenge to foreign policy.” european policy centre. https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/europestroublemakers--the-p~257da8. bardella, jordan. 2020. “relocaliser la production : il y a urgence!” [relocate production: it is urgent!]. rassemblement national. accessed may 28, 2022. https://rassemblementnational. fr/communiques/relocaliser-la-production-il-y-a-urgence/ bechis, francesco. 2020. “italy in love.” the center for european policy analysis. accessed may 16, 2021. https://cepa.org/italy-in-love/. becker, von andrea, and georg heil. 2020. “chinas freunde bei der afd” [china's friends at the afd]. tagesschau, november 25, 2020. accessed may 27, 2022.https://www.tagesschau.de /investigativ/kontraste/afd-china-101.html. buzzetti, eugenio. 2018. “quali accordi ha già sottoscritto tria con i cinesi” [what agreements has tria already signed with the chinese]. agenzia italia, august 21, 2018. accessed april 21, 2021. https://www.agi.it/economia/tria_cina_accordi_pechino-4327570/news/2018-0831/. cadier, david. 2019. “how populism spills over into foreign policy.” carnegie europe. accessed may 10, 2021. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78102. https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/notre-souverainete-pharmaceutique-est-aussi-un-imperatif/ https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/notre-souverainete-pharmaceutique-est-aussi-un-imperatif/ https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500310600. https://chinaobservers.eu/whats-behind-polands-sudden-change-of-heart-about-china/ https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/europes-troublemakers--the-p~257da8 https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/europes-troublemakers--the-p~257da8 https://rassemblementnational./ https://rassemblementnational./ https://cepa.org/italy-in-love/ https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/kontraste/ https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/kontraste/ hthttps://www.agi.it/economia/tria_cina_accordi_pechino-4327570/news/2018-08-31/ hthttps://www.agi.it/economia/tria_cina_accordi_pechino-4327570/news/2018-08-31/ https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78102. 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 chenu, sebastien. 2019. “pénurie de médicaments, un enjeu de souveraineté sanitaire” [shortage of medicine, an issue of health sovereignty]. accessed may 27, 2022. https://rassemblement national.fr/communiques/penurie-de-medicamentsun-enjeu-de-souverainete-sanitaire/. chryssogelos, angelos-stylianos. 2010. “undermining the west from within: european populists, the us and russia.” european view 9 (2): 267-277. https://doi.org/10.1007%2 fs12290-010-0135-1 chryssogelos, angelos-stylianos. 2011. “old ghosts in new sheets: european populist parties and foreign policy.” wilfried martens centre for european studies. accessed april 20, 2021. https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/old-ghosts-in-new-sheets-europeanpopulist-parties-and-foreign-policy/. colantone, italo, and piero stanig. 2018a. “the trade origins of economic nationalism: import competition and voting behavior in western europe.” american journal of political science 62 (4): 936-953. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12358. colantone, italo, and piero stanig. 2018b. “global competition and brexit.” american political science review 112 (2): 201-18. http://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055417000685. cooley, alexander, and daniel nexon. 2020. “why populists want a multipolar world.” foreign policy, april 15, 2020. accessed april 22, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/25/ populists-multipolar-world-russia-china/. coratella, teresa. 2020. “the dangers of crisis diplomacy: italy, china, and russia.” european council on foreign relations. accessed may 20, 2021. https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ the_dangers_of_crisis_diplomacy_italy_china _and_russia/. dennison, susi, and pawel zerka. 2020. “together in trauma: europeans and the world after covid-19.” european council on foreign relations. accessed may 24, 2021. https://ecfr.eu/publication/together_in_trauma_europeans_and_the_world_after_covid_19/ dubravčíková, klára et al., 2020. “hungarian public opinion on china in the age of covid-19 enthusiasm overshadowed by skepticism?” central european institute of asian studies. accessed june 20, 2021. https://ceias.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/hu-poll-report.pdf. eatwell, roger, and matthew goodwin. 2018. national populism: the revolt against liberal democracy. london: penguin books. elmer, keegen. 2018. “eu presents (nearly) united front against china’s ‘unfair’ belt and road initiative.” south china morning post (hong kong), april 20, 2018. accessed april 5, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2142698/eu-presents-nearlyunited-front-against-chinas-unfair. escartin, adria rivera. 2020. “populist challenges to eu foreign policy in the southern neighborhood: an informal and illiberal europeanisation?” journal of european public policy 27 (8): 1195-1214. https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/penurie-de-medicamentsun-enjeu-de-souverainete-sanitaire/ https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/penurie-de-medicamentsun-enjeu-de-souverainete-sanitaire/ https://doi.org/10.1007%252 https://doi.org/10.1007%252 https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/old-ghosts-in-new-sheets-european-populist-parties-and-foreign-policy/ https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/old-ghosts-in-new-sheets-european-populist-parties-and-foreign-policy/ https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12358 http://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055417000685 https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/25/ https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_dangers_of_crisis_diplomacy_italy_china%20_and_russia/ https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_dangers_of_crisis_diplomacy_italy_china%20_and_russia/ https://ecfr.eu/publication/together_in_trauma_europeans_and_the_world_after_covid_19/ https://ecfr.eu/publication/together_in_trauma_europeans_and_the_world_after_covid_19/ https://ceias.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/hu-poll-report.pdf. https://www.google.com.hk/search?hl=zh-cn&tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2142698/eu-presents-nearly-united-front-against-chinas-unfair https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2142698/eu-presents-nearly-united-front-against-chinas-unfair 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 esparraga, frank. 2017. “rhetoric of the right: european populist’s view of china.” institute for security and development policy, 205, september 27, 2017. https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/ 2017/09/2017-205-right-wing-populist-view-china.pdf. european commission. 2019. eu-china – a strategic outlook. march 12, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-astrategic-outlook.pdf. european commission. 2020. “eu-china summit: defending eu interests and values in a complex and vital partnership. june 22, 2020.” accessed april 23, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1159. european union agency for fundamental rights (fra). 2020. coronavirus covid-19 outbreak in the eu – fundamental rights implications. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_ uploads/denmark-report-covid-19-april-2020_en.pdf. eurostat. 2021. “china-eu – international trade in goods statistics.” accessed may 28, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=china-eu_-_international _trade_in_goods_statistics. fagerholm, andreas. 2016. “why do political parties change their policy positions? a review.” political studies review 14 (4): 501–11. https://doi.org/10.1111%2f1478-9302.12078. ferraresi, mattia. 2020. “china isn’t helping italy. it’s waging information warfare.” foreign policy, march 31, 2020. accessed april 23, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/31/china isnt-helping-italy-its-waging-information-warfare/. free west media. 2020. “german politician: ‘why should we risk our relations with china?’” may 20, 2020. accessed april 15, 2021. https://freewestmedia.com/2020/05/20/german politician-why-should-we-risk-our-relations-with-china/?from=timeline. front national. 2015a. “communiqué du press” [press release]. august 25, 2015. accessed april 20, 2021. https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/une-strategie-nationale-face-a-la crise-chinoise/. front national. 2015b. “communiqué du press” [press release]. november 9, 2015. accessed may 27, 2022. https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/lue-ne-doit-pas-accorde r-le-statut-deconomie-de-marche-a-la-chine/. garcia-herrero, alicia, and andre sapir. 2017. “should the eu have the power to vet foreign takeovers?” bruegel. accessed june 21, 2021. https://www.bruegel.org/2017/09/shouldthe-eu-have-the-power-to-vet-foreign-takeovers/. giuffrida, angela. 2019.“italy rattles us and eu with likely support for china’s belt and road.” the guardian, march 20, 2019. accessed april 17, 2021. https://www.theguardian. com/world/2019/mar/20/italy-rattles-us-and-eu-with-likely-support-for-chinas-belt-androad. https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/ https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1159 https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/denmarkhttps://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/denmarkhttps://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=china-eu_-_international https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=china-eu_-_international https://doi.org/10.1111%2f1478-9302.12078 https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/ https://freewestmedia.com/2020/05/20/ https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/une-strategie-nationale-face-a-la-crise-chinoise/ https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/une-strategie-nationale-face-a-la-crise-chinoise/ https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/lue-ne-doit-pas-accorder-le-statut-deconomie-de-marche-a-la-chine/ https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/lue-ne-doit-pas-accorder-le-statut-deconomie-de-marche-a-la-chine/ https://www.bruegel.org/ https://www.theguardian./ https://www.theguardian./ https://www.theguardian./ 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 government of hungary. 2019. “the belt and road initiative coincides with hungarian national interests.” april 25, 2019. accessed march 10, 2021. https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/theprime-minister/news/the-belt-and-road-initiative-coincides-with-hungarian-nationalinterests. gazeta polska codziennie (gpc). 2020. "weto. non possumus! interwiew with jarosław kaczyński." [veto. we cannot. interview with jaroslaw kaczynski] october 14, 2020. accessed april 21, 2021. https://gpcodziennie.pl/780485-weto-non-possumus.html. happold, matthew. 2000. “ii. fourteen against one: the eu member states' response to freedom party participation in the austrian government.” the international and comparative law quarterly 49 (4): 953–63. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020589300064770. hargitai, tibor. 2020. “how eurosceptic is fidesz actually?” politics in central europe 16 (1): 189-209. https://doi/org/10.2478/pce-2020-0009. hill, christopher. 2013. the national interest in question. foreign policy in multicultural societies. oxford: oxford university press. horowitz, jason. 2019. “defying allies, italy signs on to new silk road with china.” the new york times, march 23, 2019. accessed april 13, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/ 23/world/europe/italy-china-xi-silk-road.html. jacoby, wade, and umut korkut. 2016. “vulnerability and economic re-orientation: rhetoric and in reality in hungary’s ‘chinese opening.’” east european politics and societies 30 (3): 496-518. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325415604355 koleszár, réka. 2021. “hungary-china relations: is it time for a change?” china observers in central and eastern europe, october 28, 2021. https://chinaobserververs.eu/hungary-chinarelations-is-it-time-for-a-change/. krastev, ivan, and mark leonard. 2020. “europe’s pandemic politics: how the virus has changed the public’s worldview.” european council on foreign relations. accessed march 20, 2021. https://ecfr.eu/publication/europes_pandemic_politics_how_the_virus_ has_changed_the_publics_worldview/. kriesi, hanspeter, and takis s. pappas, eds. 2015. european populism in the shadow of the great recession. colchester: ecpr press. lanzavecchia, otto. 2020. “china deserves a nuremberg trial, italy’s league leader says.” formiche, june 12, 2020. accessed april 17, 2021. https://formiche.net/2020/06/chinanuremberg-trial-italy-league-leader/. le corre, philippe. 2017. “future of french engagement with asia rides on vote.” nikkei asia, may 3, 2017. accessed april 23, 2021. https://asia.nikkei.com/viewpoints/philippe-lecorre/future-of-french-engagement-with-asia-rides-on-vote?page=1. lepelletier, pierre. 2020 “coronavirus : marine le pen trouve légitime de se demander si le virus ne s'est pas «échappé» d'un laboratoire” [coronavirus: marine le pen finds it legitimate to https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/the-belt-and-road-initiative-coincides-with-hungarian-national-interests. https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/the-belt-and-road-initiative-coincides-with-hungarian-national-interests. https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/the-belt-and-road-initiative-coincides-with-hungarian-national-interests. https://gpcodziennie.pl/780485-weto-non-possumus.html https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020589300064770 https://doi/org/10.2478/pce-2020-0009 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/ https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/ https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325415604355 https://chinaobservers.eu/author/rekak/ https://chinaobservers.eu/hungary-china-relations-is-it-time-for-a-change/ https://chinaobservers.eu/hungary-china-relations-is-it-time-for-a-change/ https://cmailcarletonca-my.sharepoint.com/personal/heatherpyman_cunet_carleton_ca/documents/cjers%20from%20v/cjersv/cjers%20unassigned%20volume%20articles/zamecki%20and%20dong/2022-9-20+tu+zamecki+kozlova+edit%20jd%20oct%2011.docx https://cmailcarletonca-my.sharepoint.com/personal/heatherpyman_cunet_carleton_ca/documents/cjers%20from%20v/cjersv/cjers%20unassigned%20volume%20articles/zamecki%20and%20dong/2022-9-20+tu+zamecki+kozlova+edit%20jd%20oct%2011.docx https://formiche.net/ https://asia.nikkei.com/ https://plus.lefigaro.fr/page/uid/3108481 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 wonder if the virus did not "escape" from a laboratory]. le figaro, march 30, 2020. accessed may 28, 2022. https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/coronavirus-marine-le-pentrouve-legitime-de-se-demander-si-le-virus-ne-s-est-pas-echappe-d-un-laboratoire20200330. le pen, marine. 2012. pour que vive la france [for france to live]. paris: éditions grancher. liang, christina schori, ed. 2007. europe for the europeans: the foreign and security policy of the populist radical right. aldershot: ashgate. mamonova, natalia, and jaume franquesa. 2020. “populism, neoliberalism and agrarian movements in europe. understanding rural support for right-wing politics and looking for progressive solutions.” sociologia ruralis, 60 (4):710-731. https://doi.org/10.1111/soru. 12291. ministero dello sviluppo economico. 2018. “mise: costituita la task force cina” [mise: china task force established]. august 20, 2018. accessed april 12, 2021. https://www.mise.gov. it/index.php/it/194-comunicati-stampa/2038553-il-mise-lancia-la-task-force-cina. meyer, berthold. 2007. “austria between felt permanent neutrality and practiced european engagement.” peace research institute frankfurt, research paper no. i/10–2007. https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/hsfk/hsfk_downloads/austria_10.pdf. mudde, cas. 2004. “the populist zeitgeist.” government and opposition, 39 (4): 541–63. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x. mudde, cas. 2007. populist radical right parties in europe. cambridge: cambridge university press. nardelli, alberto, and joey d’urso. 2020. “italy’s far-right and nationalist leaders are pushing debunked conspiracy theories about the coronavirus to millions of followers.” buzzfeed news, march 26, 2020. accessed april 23, 2021. https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/ coronavirus-matteo-salvini-giorgia-meloni-conspiracy. norris, pippa. 2019. “varieties of populist parties, philosophy and social criticism.” philosophy and social criticism, 45 (9-10): 981-1012. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453719872279. nyíri, pal. 2007. “chinese entrepreneurs in hungary.” in hand-book of research on ethnic minority entrepreneurship, edited by leo-paul dana, 534-554. cheltenham: edward elgar. o’neal, adam. 2020. “matteo salvini’s european vision.”, wall street journal, september 11, 2020. accessed april 17, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/matteo-salvinis-europeanvision-11599849126. özdamar, özgür, and erdam ceydilek. 2019. “european populist radical right leaders’ foreign policy beliefs: an operational code analysis.” european journal of international relations 26 (1): 137-162. https://doi.org/10.1177%2f1354066119850254 https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/coronavirus-marine-le-pen-trouve-legitime-de-se-demander-si-le-virus-ne-s-est-pas-echappe-d-un-laboratoire-20200330 https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/coronavirus-marine-le-pen-trouve-legitime-de-se-demander-si-le-virus-ne-s-est-pas-echappe-d-un-laboratoire-20200330 https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/coronavirus-marine-le-pen-trouve-legitime-de-se-demander-si-le-virus-ne-s-est-pas-echappe-d-un-laboratoire-20200330 https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12291 https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12291 https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/hsfk/hsfk_downloads/austria_10.pdf http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/coronavirus-matteo-salvini-giorgia-meloni-conspiracy https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/coronavirus-matteo-salvini-giorgia-meloni-conspiracy https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453719872279 https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453719872279 https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453719872279 https://doi.org/10.1177%2f1354066119850254 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 parenti, fabio massimo. 2020. “cina-ue-italia: contenere l’irresponsabilità statunitense” [chinaeu-italy contain us irresponsibility]. il blog di beppe grillo, august 27, 2020. accessed april 21, 2021. https://beppegrillo.it/cina-ue-italia-contenere-lirresponsabilita-statunitense. poggetti, lucrezia. 2018. “italy charts risky course with china-friendly policy.” mercator institute for china studies. https://merics.org/en/analysis/italy-charts-risky-course-chinafriendly-policy. party for freedom (pvv). 2019. “notaoverlag china” [note china]. october 3, 2019. accessed april 23, 2021.https://pvv.nl/37-fj-related/raymond-de-roon/10039-notaoverleg-china.html. reuters. 2019. “italy's salvini says china cannot be in control of sensitive data.” may 20, 2019. accessed april 21, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-italy-china-salviniidukkcn1sq0sn. rivero, ángel. 2019. “populism and democracy in europe.” in routledge handbook of global populism, edited by carlos de la torre, 201-215. london: routledge. shields, james g. 2007. the extreme right in france: from petain to le pen. london: routledge. silver, laura, kat devlin, and christine huang. 2020. “unfavorable views of china reach historic highs in many countries.” pew research center. accessed june 26, 2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reachhistoric-highs-in-many-countries/. standish, reid, and szalai balint. 2021. “orban walks tightrope on china ahead of hungarian elections.” radio free europe/radio liberty, november 22, 2021. accessed may 26, 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-china-orban-election/31573850.html. stockemer, daniel. 2017. the front national in france: continuity and change under jeanmarie le pen and marine le pen. cham: springer. swyngedouw, marc, koen abts, and maarten van craen. 2007. “our own people first in a europe of peoples: the international policy of the vlaams blok.” in europe for the europeans: the foreign and security policy of the populist radical right, edited by christina schori liang, 81-102. aldershot: ashgate. timbro authoritarian populism index (tap). 2019. timbro authoritarian populism index 2019. https://populismindex.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/tap2019c.pdf. vasilopoulou, sofia. 2010. “euroscepticism and the radical right: domestic strategies and party system dynamics.” accessed april 21, 2021. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/16390512.pdf. verbeek, bertjan, and andrej zaslove. 2015. “the impact of populist radical right parties on foreign policy: the northern league as a junior coalition partner in the berlusconi governments.” european political science review 7 (4): 525–46. http://doi.org/10.1017/s1755773914000319. https://beppegrillo.it/cina-ue-italia-contenere-lirresponsabilita-statunitense https://merics.org/en/analysis/italyhttps://pvv.nl/37-fj-related/raymond-de-roon/10039-notaoverleghttps://www.reuters.com/article/ https://doi.org/10.1177%2f1354066119850254 https://doi.org/10.1177%2f1354066119850254 https://www.rferl.org/author/reid-standish/tt_uqi https://www.rferl.org/author/balint-szalai/jtkuqt https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-china-orban-election/31573850.html. https://populismindex.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/tap2019c.pdf. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/16390512.pdf. http://doi.org/10.1017/s1755773914000319. 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 verbeek, bertjan, and andrej zaslove. 2017. “populism and foreign policy.” in the oxford handbook of populism, edited by cristobal kaltwasser, paul taggart, paulina ochoa espejo, and pierre ostiguy, 384-405. new york: oxford university press. weidel, alice. 2019. “china düpiert die elektroauto-planwirtschaft in deutschland und der eu” [china duped the electric car planned economy in germany and the eu].december 13, 2019. accessed may 26, 2022. https://www.afd.de/alice-weidel-china-duepiert-die elektroauto-planwirtschaft-in-deutschland-und-der--eu/. woods, dwayne. 2009. “pockets of resistance to globalization: the case of the lega nord.” patterns of prejudice 43 (2): 161-177. https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220902793906. zamęcki, łukasz, and viktor glied. 2020. “article 7 process and democratic backsliding of hungary and poland. democracy and the rule of law.” online journal modelling the new europe, 34: 57-85. https://doi.org/10.24193/ojmne.2020.34.03. zaslove, andrej. 2008. “exclusion, community, and a populist political economy: the radical right as an anti-globalization movement.” comparative european politics 6 (2): 169-189. https://www.afd.de/alice-weidel-china-duepiert-diehttps://www.afd.de/alice-weidel-china-duepiert-diehttps://doi.org/10.1080/00313220902793906 https://doi.org/10.24193/ojmne.2020.34.03 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 1-24 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 covid-19 and the russian regional response: blame diffusion and attitudes to pandemic governance matthew blackburn, university of warsaw1 derek s. hutcheson, malmö university, sweden2 bo petersson, malmö university, sweden3 elena tsumarova, north-west institute of management russian academy of national economy and public administration, russia4 abstract as was the case with other federal states, russia’s response to the covid-19 pandemic was decentralized and devolved responsibility to regional governors. contrary to the common highly centralized governance in russia, this approach is thought to have helped insulate the government from criticism. using local research and analysis based on a national representative survey carried out at the height of the pandemic during the summer of 2021, the article charts the public response to the pandemic across russia. it examines the regionalization of the response, with an in-depth focus on two of the russian cities with the highest infection rates but differing responses to the pandemic: st. petersburg and petrozavodsk. there are two main findings: at one level, the diffusion of responsibility meant little distinction was made between the different levels of government by the population; at another level, approval of the pandemic measures was tied strongly to trust levels in central and regional government. 1 matthew blackburn is a research fellow at the department of political science at the university of warsaw and an affiliated researcher at the institute of russian and eurasian studies at uppsala university. 2 derek s. hutcheson is professor of political science at malmö university, sweden. 3 bo petersson is professor of political science and co-director of the research platform russia, ukraine and the caucasus regional research (rucarr) at malmö university, sweden. 4 elena tsumarova is an assistant professor at the department of comparative political studies north-west institute of management russian academy of national economy and public administration. 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 introduction while the covid-19 pandemic presented a serious challenge to political systems across the globe, the very criteria for success in covid-19 governance are divisive. how to weigh saving lives and avoiding the overloading of hospitals against economic damage, mental health crises, and the violation of civil liberties? the question of which countries have paid too high a price or persisted with ineffective measures for too long remains vital for future pandemic management and discussions about the relative strengths and weaknesses of democratic and autocratic governance. early observations about the benefits of autocratic rule for covid-19 management have not been borne out; democracies and autocracies alike experienced outbreaks and overwhelmed healthcare systems. lockdowns and vaccination drives have involved different methods in autocratic and democratic contexts, but the results have varied in ways that suggest factors other than political regime type are important. the focus of this article is on the russian federation, whose special brand of electoral authoritarianism has previously been understood by many as being halfway between liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism. during the covid-19 pandemic, contradictory trends were observed in russian politics, with the devolution of covid-19 governance to the regions combined with hyper-centralizing constitutional reforms further empowering the president and a wave of repressive laws enforced against political opposition and civil society in 2021. this article examines the extent to which the delegation of responsibility to the regions affected levels of public trust in the state’s handling of the covid-19 pandemic and explores how variations in covid-19 policies played out in regional case studies. the main empirical question is whether the delegation of responsibility to the regions led to successful displacement or a sharing of the blame for the management of the crisis. this article examines the public reaction to covid-19 governance through surveys on nationwide and regional levels as well as an in-depth focus on russia's second-largest city, st. petersburg, and the provincial capital of petrozavodsk. this article uses these layers to analyze the public response to the antipandemic measures and the regional diversity of the approaches to it. the authors of this article find that policy responses to covid-19 were highly regionalized but that people tended not to differentiate between federal and regional authorities when it came to the responsibility for handling the crisis. the authors argue that this reflects broader attitudes to governance and the state in russia. trust in the respective levels of government was the largest predictor of approval of covid-19 governance; this suggests that the kremlin’s devolution approach to covid-19 management was relatively successful. overall, this article identifies a relationship between less invasive covid-19 governance and higher covid-19 governance approval ratings, which suggests that limits on state intervention in everyday life are still an important component of the ‘social contract’ behind the putin system. nonetheless, with developments surrounding the war in ukraine and the mobilization of military reserves in the autumn of 2022, that ‘social contract’ is surely now under more serious pressure in the postcovid period. electoral authoritarianism and covid-19 governance: framing the russian case during the first phases of the pandemic, political leaders across the globe seemed markedly indecisive and devoid of clear strategies of action (arukwe 2022). there was a general tendency for authoritarian regimes to react later and harder to the pandemic than more democratic ones (nelson 2021). electoral authoritarian regimes such as russia, iran, and kazakhstan hardly 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 distinguished themselves as successful managers of the pandemic (åslund 2020). intuitively, one could explain this by pointing out that electoral authoritarianism lacks the key advantages of both liberal democratic and closed authoritarian states. electoral authoritarianism, with its flaunting of democratic practices, lacks liberal democracies’ strengths in information capacity, which, through openness on gathering and disseminating key data, serves to combat pandemics. electoral authoritarianism also lacks the advantages of closed authoritarian states that can use full coercive capacity to enforce strict measures to curb their spread (mao 2021). electoral authoritarian regimes thus risk falling in between the two poles and excelling in neither domain. in determining russia’s position as electoral authoritarian at the time of this study (2020-21),5 there are three points to be made on governance, social trust, and legitimacy in russia. the first is that the system has been rather resilient and broadly achieved the consent of the governed (greene and robertson 2019; loftus 2022) with polling data showing increased trust in certain parts of the state in comparison with the yeltsin period (levada 2021) and broad agreement with the kremlin’s statist agenda (volkov and kolesnikov 2018). secondly, in contrast to closed authoritarian systems like china, russia has, prior to 2021-22, had a less invasive state. state responses to protests have been selective and not uniformly repressive (greene 2014). thirdly, the basic restoration of state capacity and the delivery of basic state outputs, while below the level expected in many western countries, has been considered an acceptable compromise between an invasive soviet-style state and the erratic liberal reforming state of the 1990s in much of russian society. it is clear that the basic achievements of holding russia together and having a functional state, things not considered urgent in most western societies, are marked as key achievements amongst both russian elites and the masses, with most of the credit going to the president. the popularity of these statist priorities, visible in polling data, taken together with the paradox of rather minimalistic expectations toward the state, must be kept in mind when examining responses to covid-19 governance. to summarize the social contract (at least as it existed until the start of the war in ukraine in 2022) – the president or regime ensures the state is “strong” insofar as territorial integrity, social order, macro-economic stability, national independence, and great power status are retained. meanwhile, the people put up with corruption, weak institutions, and governance-related problems with the proviso that the state does not become too invasive or predatory to them as individuals. issues such as democratization, civil rights, the rule of law, and improving institutions are tacitly understood to be off the agenda. the political context of the coronavirus pandemic and russia's model of federalism prior to the outbreak of the covid pandemic, economic stagnation, falling approval ratings (levada 2022), and question marks over president vladimir putin’s political future after his fourth presidential term (2018-24) cast clouds over the kremlin’s political agenda for 2020. in a step that sought to regain political momentum, putin announced sweeping constitutional changes in january 2020. the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic partly interfered with this agenda, forcing putin to cancel several of his 2020 planned events and conduct his affairs from his office over video link (blackburn and petersson 2021). this approach was out of step with the image putin had promoted over the last two decades as a brave and decisive man of action 5 here we must add the caveat that since the outbreak of the intensified war on ukraine at the end of february 2022, there is evidence russia is shifting to a closed authoritarian system. this is, however, subsequent to our article’s timescale (03.2020-01.2022), and we argue that russia remained an electoral authoritarian regime during the period we examined. 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 (frye 2021; petersson 2021). in the end, he spent close to a year in a specially constructed underground facility – a point capitalized on by alexey navalny, who lampooned the president as an “old man in a bunker,” fearful of contracting the disease. with putin taking a back seat, the stage was seemingly set for regional governors to show what they could do. two factors played a role in the decentralization of the responsibility for managing the pandemic: the country’s size (a single policy devised in moscow surely could not apply uniformly to regions several thousand kilometres away) and the question of where responsibility (or blame) would lie. by the presidential decree originally issued on april 2, 2020, the regional governors of the russian federation were mandated to “implement a set of restrictive and other measures aimed at ensuring the sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population within the boundaries of their territories” (presidential decree 2020). russia’s decentralized approach followed the model of many other federal countries by sharing the management of the pandemic between the centre and the constituent federal subjects and delegating significant authority downwards (chattopadhyay et al. 2022). yet, in the russian case, some key points must be made about the nature of centre-region relations and why this approach stood out. firstly, from his very first years as president, putin has deployed centralized methods of state-building to wrest power back from the regions, reducing their autonomy stage by stage (busygina 2016).6 while constitutional amendments brought about the hyper-centralization of power in 2020, the decentralization of covid-19 governance should be seen as an exceptional short-term measure rather than any permanent reform of federalism in administrative or fiscal terms (burkhardt 2020). secondly, by making regional governors accountable for the management of the crisis, the central authorities could shift blame downwards (smyth et al. 2020; blackburn and petersson 2021; terzyan 2021; shirikov et al 2023). the simple rationale was that the political centre takes the credit for impressive nation-level achievements while regional leaders, deprived of sufficient resources, are the ready-made fall guys when chaos and disorder strike at the local level (busygina 2019; smyth et al. 2020; malinova 2020; petersson 2021). this reserves the privilege of the president to step in at the very last moment and seemingly put things right. thirdly, over the last ten years, being in the position of regional governor has increasingly reflected not the approval of the local population but of the kremlin. for example, between 2017-2019, more than two-thirds of governors were removed (ivanov and petrov 2021) and often replaced by outsiders with strong kremlin connections (but no local roots) that were parachuted into regional leadership roles. regional governors of this new type simply cannot be expected to contradict the president or enter into public disputes with the federal centre. they conform to the key positions of state media on most issues and accept the primacy of key federal prerogatives, gaining, in return, a free hand in other matters. this loyalty is unsurprising; such governors owe their positions to the political centre and their fate is very much tied up with that of the president and the political system as a whole. the authors of this article agree with busygina and filippov (2021) that the regional authorities are essentially no less invested in maintaining the stability of the system than the kremlin itself. the conformity of regional governors should be noted. no governors broke ranks at any stage to complain about a lack of resources or criticize the federal authorities. they all followed the order to conduct the june/july referendum on constitutional amendments in 2020, regardless of the covid-19 situation in their region. a comparison of excess mortality and reported covid 6 direct gubernatorial elections were abolished in 2004, and when they were restored in 2012, this included a municipal and presidential filter to easily exclude unacceptable oppositional candidates (blakkisrud 2015, 115). 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 statistics indicated that many of them appear to have manipulated covid-19 death statistics to ensure conformity to the narratives in state media (busygina and filippov 2021; kofanov et al., 2022). the image presented of a unified power vertical without dissenters is combined with deliberate distortion of russia’s covid-19 response, which is bound to have an effect on public opinion. research design and hypotheses to investigate attitudes on state management of covid-19, the authors of this article examine three levels: (1) the nationwide attitudes toward how federal and (2) regional authorities handled the pandemic seen in an aggregate perspective across russia; (3) a specific qualitative focus on two case studies: st. petersburg and petrozavodsk. there has been near-universal acknowledgement for centuries that legitimate government rests on trust between the rulers and the ruled (newton et al. 2017). at the most basic level, trust is “the belief that others will, so far as they can, look after our interests, that they will not take advantage or harm us” (newton 1999, 170). central to this study are four hypotheses that connect the population’s trust in the respective levels of government with their expectations of policy delivery when it comes to covid-19 governance: • h1: it would be expected that those who trust the federal authorities more than the regional ones are more likely to approve how federal authorities handled the covid19 pandemic. • h2: conversely, those who trust the regional authorities more than the federal ones will give more credit for handling it well to the regional authorities. • h3: support for federal measures will be positively correlated with trust in the federal government. • h4: support for regional measures will be positively correlated with trust in the regional government. to assess the above hypotheses, data are used from a specially commissioned national representative survey conducted in the russian federation in june 2021 (malmö university/levada-center 2021). fieldwork was conducted in the form of face-to-face interviews conducted in russian in a representative set of 97 urban and 40 rural locations from june 17-28, 2021. the survey contained 28 questions (plus demographic information). it was commissioned by malmö university and carried out by the levada center, russia’s leading independent sociological company. the national representative sample size was n=1623, with a deepened representative sample at the city level in three major cities (st. petersburg, ekaterinburg, and petrozavodsk) of 300 or 301 respondents, respectively. in total, the weighted sample size was n=2525. the refusal rate was 42 percent, and the margin of error is not more than +/3.4 percent at the 95 percent confidence level. despite the issues of surveying public opinion in authoritarian countries (robinson and tannenberg 2019), the authors of this article have reasons to assume that the survey results in this article are not overly affected by these factors.7 7 first, the national representative survey is conducted using random probability sampling, removing any bias from self-selection. second, the questions on covid and trust in different levels of government were asked as supplementary questions in a survey that was about the relatively politically uncontentious matter of urban governance and city use during covid. third, though russia has long had electoral authoritarian tendencies and non-systemic political opposition has been marginalized, it is only since the start of the war in ukraine that there 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 in two separate questions, respondents were asked about how effective they thought the federal (the president and russian government) and regional authorities (governor and government of the federal subject) had been in the fight against the covid-19 pandemic on a four-point scale (very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, extremely ineffective). in addition, there was a battery of questions on people's trust in russian political institutions as well as their interest in politics. respondents were asked to assess “to what extent [they] trust[ed]” each of the institutions on a seven-point ascending scale. st. petersburg and petrozavodsk are appropriate as case studies for a number of reasons. at least on the basis of the official figures, the country’s second city and the republic of karelia (of which petrozavodsk is the capital) were two of the top three federal subjects in russia in the relative infection rates per one million of the population.8 the choice of these two cities as case studies is also justifiable in their geographic proximity in the northwestern federal district and the similarity of the epidemiological patterns in this geographical area (gladkikh et al. 2022).9 the pandemic: epidemiological and political impacts on the nationwide level the covid-19 pandemic has so far come in five distinct waves across russia, starting with the initial pandemic in the spring of 2020 that led to the first flurry of restrictions on mobility (particularly in moscow), which were eased in time for the popular vote on the constitutional changes in june/july 2020. several further peaks followed, as shown in figure 1. in a country as large as russia, there was inevitably some regional variation in the ebbs and flows of the pandemic and its impact on the population. the early reactions to the pandemic focused on restrictive measures to create social distancing tailored to local specificities by regional governments. while the effects of the first wave of the covid-19 pandemic in russia were not overwhelming in terms of infection and mortality rates, it brought serious economic has been a widespread crackdown on dissenting views amongst the general population. finally, the empirical facts from the survey itself (and others like it) indicate that 38 percent of respondents said that they “did not trust” the president, and 32 percent said that they “did not approve” of putin's policies as president. these are higher than the numbers who actively voted for a candidate other than putin in the 2018 presidential election – indicating that people are, at best, no more reluctant to admit to dissenting political views in a survey than at the ballot box. moreover, the long-running series of approval ratings of putin's actions conducted by the same polling agency (levada) shows fluctuations that map clearly onto real political events (for example, falling after the 2011-12 election protests and the 2018 pension reform and rising after the annexation of crimea in 2014). in other words, at least until the start of the war in ukraine in 2022, there was evidence that representative surveys reflected trends in public opinion, both upwards and downwards. 8 based on comparative figures at https://russian-trade.com/coronavirus-russia/?ysclid=lbt5u2rqmq241548499 (accessed december 18, 2022) compared with official population statistics from the russian state statistical agency (rosstat 2022). st. petersburg's official total of over 1.5 million confirmed cases from march 2020 to july 2022 was the highest relative rate of infection of any federal subject, encompassing 28.5 percent of the population. the republic of karelia, with its capital petrozavodsk, had a relative infection rate of 22.5 percent of the population, placing it third. since those figures reflect only positive test numbers (and not every ill person is tested), it is highly likely that the actual numbers are underreported, as they are in most countries. nonetheless, these verified figures represent the minimum numbers of people who actually contracted covid-19 or died from it and hence still point to the illness as a substantial public health issue. a further important caveat is that there were significant question marks over the reliability of russian infection and death statistics (dixon 2021; timonin et al. 2021). st. petersburg's and karelia's relatively high numbers may be down to better reporting or less falsification in these regions than in others. updated figures beyond july 2022 can be found at https://russiantrade.com/coronavirus-russia/respublika-kareliya/ and https://russian-trade.com/coronavirus-russia/sanktpeterburg/. 9 there is a necessary caveat—applicable in many countries—that the positive case numbers do not necessarily represent the exact pattern of infected people due to limited testing. about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 hardship. the russian government was not willing to alleviate this hardship with any serious support measures. macroeconomic stability and security were prioritized as opposed to offering large handouts or furloughs, which surely would have been popular with the public. initial polling did not show a particularly impressive gain in approval ratings for the russian government in handling the covid-19 pandemic (levada 2021), unlike many other countries, which saw substantial (if often short-lived) increases in approval ratings for the incumbent governments (yam et al. 2020). instead, approval ratings for the russian president fell from 68 percent in january 2020 to 59 percent in april 2020, recovering to 69 percent in september 2020 and fluctuating in the 65-69 percent range from november 2020 to january 2022. taking the 67 percent approval rating from january 2020 as a starting point, approval ratings for regional governors, assigned responsibility for the pandemic’s management, declined to 58 percent by july 2020 but remained around 60-62 percent for the first half of 2021 until falling back to the 57-59 range until january 2022 (levada 2021). in the pandemic’s second half, more emphasis was put on mitigating covid-19 via vaccination. despite being the first country in the world to license a vaccine—and having three domestically produced vaccines (gamcovidvak – sputnik v, covivak, epivakcorona) to choose from—there was relatively slow vaccine uptake within russia compared to many western european states (maleva et al. 2021). thus, like most other countries around the world, russia introduced anti-covid measures on epidemiological grounds that simultaneously had restrictive effects on civil liberties and damaged the economy (barceló et al. 2022). surprisingly, however, russia ended up relaxing restrictions quicker than many other states, and did not declare a state of emergency, or return to uniform nationwide lockdowns. interestingly, a year into the pandemic, a comparative poll (gallup international 2021) showed russia to be in fourth place globally in terms of citizens unwilling to sacrifice their human rights to try and prevent the spread of covid-19 (39 percent) and in second place in unwillingness to take a vaccine if it was available (46 percent). the public relations development agency (kompaniya razvitiya obshchestvennykh svyazei – kros), which prepares the “national index of anxiety” four times a year, found that by the last quarter of 2021, fear of qr-code rules actually displaced covid-19 as the main concern of russians (kros 2021). this sentiment, which rejects an invasive state and prefers the private sphere to be left intact, was seemingly ignored in measures to force vaccination via employers and bills to introduce qr-code legislation in the state duma in november 2021. the latter provoked small-scale protests involving approximately 60-200 people in towns and cities across russia (lomakina 2021). the authorities ultimately abandoned this more invasive federal legislation, showing the limits of the state’s ambition in covid-19 governance when confronted with signs of serious dissent. 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: daily covid case numbers 2020-22 source: world health organization, https://covid19.who.int/data, accessed july 16, 2022. the survey was carried out at approximately the mid-point of the overall pandemic cycle in june 2021. at the time, just over a year had passed since the initial first wave, and the second wave of winter 2020-21 had receded. a few weeks after the survey—in july 2021—there was a further outbreak of new infections. thus, the survey measured satisfaction with the authorities’ responses at a point when the initial lockdowns had receded into memory and before there was widespread controversy over vaccine mandates or qr-code/covid passport usage. the focus is, therefore, on people’s approval of the authorities’ actions during the first year of lockdowns and other sanitary measures. opinion was evenly split at the most basic level on how well the authorities had dealt with the covid-19 pandemic, as table 1 shows. only a small number thought that either the federal or regional authorities had dealt with the pandemic “very” effectively (16 and 12 percent, respectively), but the majority across russia—just over three-fifths of respondents—thought the federal authorities' response has been more effective than ineffective. only slightly fewer thought the same about their regional governments. a kendall’s tau-b correlation was run to determine the relationship between the two variables (assessments of the effectiveness of federal and regional authorities, respectively). there was a strong statistically significant positive correlation between the perceptions of both levels’ responses (τb = 0.690, p < .001). this indicates, preliminarily, that people did not make as much differentiation between the two levels of government as initially might have been expected. 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 table 1: “how do you assess the effectiveness of the federal authorities (president and the russian government) and the regional authorities (governor and government of your province / republic / krai /city of federal importance) in the fight against coronavirus?” (percent of respondents, excluding “don’t know”) federal authorities regional authorities very effective 16 13 rather effective 46 47 rather ineffective 25 27 very ineffective 13 14 total 100 100 n= 2341 2332 source: malmö university/levada center survey 2021, q.17 and q.18. margin of error +/-3.4 percent at 95% confidence interval. firstly, the authors disaggregated individual respondents’ views on covid-19 performances of the two levels of government relative to each other.10 though this did not allow the authors to measure the attitudes toward any particular regional government (which will be returned to later in the detailed focus on two regions), it gives a general nationwide picture of the perceptions about the two levels of government. overall, the difference is not substantial. in 74 percent of cases, respondents held the same perception of responses to the covid-19 pandemic of both levels of government.11 turning to the hypotheses, the authors found evidence for the first two in table 2: people who trusted one level of government more than the other were more inclined to rate the effectiveness of that level’s attempts to deal with the pandemic positively relative to the other. in the majority of cases, people saw both levels of government as being equally effective and expressed the same levels of trust in each. however, amongst the minority that trusted one level of government more than the other, a slightly larger proportion of them approved of that level’s management of the pandemic more than the other levels. 10 the respondents' scores (on a scale of 1 to 4) for the two questions (respectively) about the federal and respective regional authorities were subtracted from each other using the formula ‘covid-diff’ = q.17 [federal authorities] – q.18 [regional authorities]. the scale was descending, meaning that “1” indicated a high degree of effectiveness and “4” the lowest. negative scores indicate that the federal government was seen as more effective, positive ones indicate the opposite. the maximum score is +3 (federal authorities very ineffective and regional authorities very effective) and the minimum is -3 (federal authorities very effective and regional authorities very ineffective). for question wording, see table 1. 11 of the quarter of the sample who did not share this view, slightly more (16 percent compared with 11 percent) thought that the federal authorities had performed better than the regional ones, but the distribution was almost normally distributed around a mean just below zero (mean = -0.08 and standard deviation = 0.65). in short, perceptions of the two levels did not vary strongly. 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 table 2: assessments of covid measure effectiveness relative to trust in federal and regional governments (percent of respondents, excluding ‘don’t know’) 12 trust federal more effective both levels same regional more effective total (trust) n= trust regional more 9 75 16 100 467 same trust in each 14 78 9 100 1182 trust federal more 23 68 9 100 512 total (effectiveness) 15 75 10 100 2161 source: own calculations deriving from malmö university/levada center survey 2021, q.17 and q.18. margin of error +/-3.4 percent. correlation between the two variables: τb = 0.134, p < .001 it should be noted that the authors have hitherto examined the relative levels of trust in the two levels of government, not the absolute trust levels. now, the levels of trust in russian institutions, particularly the federal and regional governments, will be examined.13 hypotheses 3 and 4 suggested that approval of the covid-19 measures of the respective levels of government would be positively correlated with trust in those levels of government. at the federal level (hypothesis 3), 85 percent of those who trusted the president and 87 percent of those who trusted the russian government thought that the federal authorities had dealt with the crisis effectively, including more than a quarter who thought that it had been dealt with “very effectively.”14 by contrast, only a minority (31 percent and 38 percent, respectively) of those who did not trust these institutions felt positively inclined in their assessments of the covid-19 measures.15 there was a statistically significant positive correlation between the levels of trust in the russian government and satisfaction with the federal government’s response (τb = 0.444, p < .001). there was a very similar pattern when it came to attitudes toward the regional authorities’ covid-19 measures. of those that trusted their regional authorities, 84 percent thought that their measures dealing with the pandemic had been effective. by contrast, 62 percent of those that did not trust the authorities felt that the measures had been ineffective. the relationship between trust in the respective regional government and satisfaction with the regional response was slightly weaker than for the federal government but still positive and statistically significant (τb = 0.386, p < .001). thus, there is preliminary evidence to suggest that hypotheses 3 and 4 have some validity: trust in the respective authorities connects with approval for their actions. 12 trust was measured on a seven-point scale, where “1” represented the lowest level of trust. 13 on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 is the lowest level of trust), the mean scores for seven institutions ranged from 3.0 (state duma) to 4.35 (president). the federal and regional governments had mean scores of 3.70 (standard deviation of 2.11) and 3.62 (standard deviation of 1.95), respectively. the other institutions were the police, the army, and the local authorities, which had means between 3.57 and 3.70. 14 “trust” and “distrust” are respectively taken to be points 1-3 and 5-7 of the seven-point ascending trust scale (4 is considered to indicate neither trust nor distrust). overall, 38.2 percent and 34.6 percent, respectively, indicated “trust” (a score between 5 and 7) in the federal and regional governments, compared with 52.1 percent who trusted the president. “effectively” includes those who considered the authorities' response to be “very effective” or “somewhat effective” (points 1 and 2 on a four-point descending scale), while “ineffectively” combines the other two categories (“rather ineffective” and “very ineffective,” points 3-4 on the same scale). the “don’t know” responses were excluded. 15 there was a positive spearman rank correlation (when the differing directions of the scales were accounted for) of 0.528 and 0.522, respectively (significant at the p<0.01 level) between assessments of the federal authorities' handling of the covid-19 pandemic and the levels of trust in the president and federal government. the original seven-point and four-point scales were used for the correlation coefficient rather than the simplified scales mentioned above. 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 there could, of course, be many other factors that lie behind the public’s approval for authorities’ actions on covid and the authors needed to control for them. to examine this in more detail, the authors turn to two multivariate ordinary least squares (ols) regression analyses, one each in which the dependent variables are—respectively—the levels of approval of the federal and regional authorities’ actions in dealing with covid-19.16 a number of independent variables are included: • trust in the respective authorities. • efficacy: two questions that ask about the extent to which ordinary people feel they can influence the federal and regional authorities (respectively) are included in the models. • frequency of media usage: the authors hypothesize that frequent viewing/reading of state media will impact positively on approval for the authorities’ actions regarding the pandemic at the respective levels.17 • interest in politics: people’s general interest in politics may also be connected to their attitudes toward the authorities’ handling of covid-19 – given that the restrictions were not just public health measures but also political decisions. • two measures of economic welfare: size of house/apartment and self-perceived current economic situation. the smaller a person’s dwelling (number of rooms), the more likely they would arguably have felt the spatially restrictive nature of the self-isolation measures. those in a poorer economic situation may have also suffered more from the economic shocks of the pandemic and the disruptions to work. • in both models, a range of socio-demographic factors is included as controls – sex, age, and education level. the authors can hypothesize that older people—who were more objectively vulnerable to serious symptoms or mortality from covid-19—would have been more likely to approve of restrictions put in place to protect public health and that better-educated people would have had more understanding of the dynamics of the pandemic. the full list of variables is provided in appendix 1 (pg. 53) the results are shown in table 3. for ease of comparison, the models for federal and regional governments are presented in a single table. however, they refer to two slightly different models regressed to the dependent variables of approval of the authorities’ action at the respective state levels. the table lists the standardized beta coefficients from ordinary least squares (ols) multivariate regression analysis. models 1a and 1b refer to the effectiveness of the federal authorities in dealing with covid-19, and models 2a and 2b use the effectiveness of the regional authorities in the respondents’ regions as their dependent variable. 16 the federal government, rather than putin personally, was formally in charge of the pandemic response, and hence it is trust in the government rather than the president that is used as the dependent variable. 17 as is well documented, the russian media market is dominated by state-owned or state-loyal television and printed outlets (hutcheson 2018). in the survey, 72 percent of respondents said that they “regularly” or “sometimes” watched national state television, and 62 percent said the same about regional television. newspaper readership is much lower (but with slightly more people reading regional rather than national press): only 20 percent said that they regularly or sometimes read federal newspapers and 24 percent looked at regional press (malmö university/levada center survey 2021, q.27). whilst the media generally lack the critical role of western media, in circumstances such as during the pandemic, they also serve as semi-official sources of public information. 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 focusing first on people’s satisfaction with the federal authorities’ covid-19 measures, there are statistically significant relationships between the dependent variables and some of the demographic factors. as predicted, older people, people who perceived their families to be materially better off, and people who lived in larger dwellings were more likely to regard the federal government’s approach to covid-19 as effective. interestingly, individuals with lower levels of education were slightly more likely to regard the measures as effective, perhaps reflecting a less critical examination of the government’s pronouncements on the matter. collectively, however, the coefficient of determination shows that these socio-demographic factors account for only 5 percent or so of the variance. once attitudinal questions are added to the model, the model obtains more explanatory power (adj. r2 = 0.308). by far, the biggest predictor of a person’s attitude toward the effectiveness of the federal authorities in dealing with covid-19 was their inherent trust in the federal government. the respondent’s sense of efficacy played the next-biggest role. in other words, the assessments of the covid-19 measures were largely related to whether a person expected the government to make the right decisions and felt part of the governing system of the country. the extent to which a respondent followed state television or used the internet seems to have played little role in their attitudes toward the restrictions, though there is a statistically significant (but minimal) correlation between newspaper readership and attitudes to the government’s actions. this perhaps indicates that frequent newspaper readers were slightly less likely to approve of pandemic restrictions, which may arise from the fact that printed media tend to be slightly less indiscriminate than visual media. table 3: ols regression, predictors of attitudes toward effectiveness of covid-19 pandemic measures (standardized beta coefficients), all-russia sample effectiveness of federal authorities effectiveness of regional authorities 1a 1b 2a 2b adj. r2 0.054 0.308 0.039 0.218 sex 0.065** 0.010 0.097** 0.046* age 0.150** 0.059** 0.095** 0.040 education -0.073** -0.048** -0.081** -0.063** house size 0.025 0.053** -0.008 0.024 family financial situation -0.166** -0.045* -0.188** -0.084** trust russian govt 0.430** trust regional authorities 0.394** influence on federal authorities -0.144** influence on regional authorities -0.109** interest in politics 0.003 0.067** read federal newspapers 0.047* read regional newspapers -0.041** watches federal tv -0.138 watches regional tv -0.077** uses internet 0.012 0.031 source: own calculations deriving from malmö university/levada center survey 2021. n=2525. significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01 turning to the question of what predicts approval of regional authorities’ actions in managing the pandemic, a similar pattern emerges. the same (weak) relationship exists between attitudes toward pandemic restrictions, age, and financial standing. once again, levels of trust in the regional authorities and perceived influence over them are the largest predictors of whether a person thought that their regional government had handled the covid-19 pandemic 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 effectively. however, these explain less of the variance for regional than for federal authority approval.18 taken together, the evidence above indicates that hypotheses 1 to 4 also hold when controlling for other factors. nationwide, there was a significant connection between people’s evaluations of the effectiveness of pandemic restrictions and their trust in the authorities. moreover, those who had greater trust in one or the other level of government were more inclined to evaluate that level of government’s covid-19 restrictions more favourably. however, the differences in perceptions of responsibility between the two levels were not large – indicating that the ‘blame displacement’ game perhaps worked, in reality, more like ‘blame diffusion’ (or creditsharing): voters regarded both levels of government as being roughly equally responsible for dealing with the pandemic. the regionalization of covid-19 measures hitherto, the authors of the article have primarily examined the picture of the country as a whole. however, as noted earlier, the response to the spread of covid-19 was strongly regionalized, and this article now turns to the sub-national level. russia covers an eighth of the world’s land mass and ranges at one extreme from densely packed metropoles (moscow has a population density of nearly 5000 persons per square kilometre) to remote wilderness (chukotka has only 0.07 persons per square kilometre). it would thus have been surprising if the pandemic measures had been uniform across the country. how to characterize the range of regional responses? the expert foundation “petersburg politics” attempted a systematization of early regional pandemic measures, arriving at a rating of “virus sovereignty” based on the correlation between the level of covid-19 transmission and the restrictions in regions over the first month of the pandemic (petersburg politics foundation 2021) three groups of regions were identified: (1) a high level of “virus sovereignty” – regions in which people’s mobility inside and between regions was limited as the regions were practically sealed off (the republic of chechnya, chelyabinsk province, astrakhan’ province, the republic of karelia); (2) a middle level that included regions in which restrictions dealt with regulations of trade or special passes to leave one’s home (rostov province, kemerovo province, st. petersburg); (3) the lowest level of “virus sovereignty”: regions with minimal restrictions such as a self-isolation regime with recommendations not to leave the region (tambov province, republic of udmurtia, yaroslavl province). following this rating, it is evident that at least during the first wave of the pandemic, the republic of karelia had a high level of "virus sovereignty," while st. petersburg had a middle one. however, as the pandemic developed, the very strong restrictions in karelia were not repeated in future waves, while in st. petersburg, strong restrictions were maintained for a long period of time. notwithstanding the strong parallels when it came to the epidemiological side of the pandemic, the public policy response differed. during the first wave of the pandemic in st. petersburg, initial measures were similar to those taken in moscow and most regions of the country: students in schools and kindergartens were allowed to choose whether or not to physically attend (they were later transferred to an online format); mass events (initially containing over 1,000 attendees), visits to entertainment and shopping centers, bars and restaurants were 18 interestingly, there was a small but statistically significant effect from following regional television – possibly accruing from the fact that regional news tended to focus more on concrete restrictions in particular places rather than the more general macro-level covid-19 news in the national media. 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 banned.19 in petrozavodsk’s first wave, a number of restrictions were also adopted against the rapid spread of the new infection, such as suspending public transport, tourist activities, and enforcing a lockdown and tightening controls on entry to the region. by the summer of 2020, restrictions were gradually eased in both st. petersburg and petrozavodsk. from may 11 onwards, restrictions were relaxed in petrozavodsk in preparation for the nationwide vote on constitutional amendments that was held from june 25 to july 1. the only recommendations remaining were the wearing of masks indoors, sanitizing public spaces, and maintaining social distance. however, no control over the observance of these recommendations was implemented. in st. petersburg, some of the measures were cancelled by the end of june; the majority of enterprises were able to return to work as long as they complied with the restrictions, such as limits on the number of customers inside of a business and the maintenance of at least 1.5-metre distance between the customers. at the same time, the city authorities organized special events dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the end of the great patriotic war, despite the existing ban on mass events (government of st. petersburg 2020). by contrast with karelia, the most serious restrictions were imposed in st. petersburg during the second wave of the covid-19 pandemic in the fall of 2020 (postanovlenie 2020b). these restrictions mostly concerned restaurants and bars, which were prohibited from operating after 10:00 pm. at the end of november 2020, the authorities closed all cultural and entertainment institutions. also, from december 30th, 2020 to january 3, 2021 all restaurants, bars, and cultural and entertainment establishments were ordered to be shut down. such harsh measures caused discontent among entrepreneurs, who declared their intention to ignore the announced requirements to save their businesses. a "map of resistance" was organized, on which the restaurants and bars that ignored the restrictions were marked (mingazov 2021). it is noteworthy that the authorities in petrozavodsk did not return to restrictions in the second or third waves of the pandemic. despite the significant increase in the number of cases during the fall covid-19 wave of 2020 and the summer and fall waves of 2021, the only major closures thereafter related to a return to remote learning for students.20 after the introduction of the vaccine in the winter of 2021, the authorities focused on mass vaccination efforts. collective immunity passports were developed for organizations that had a minimum of 60 percent of employees who were vaccinated. such a passport allowed enterprises to keep working, regardless of the covid-19 epidemiological situation (rasporyazhenie 2021, art. 8.6). meanwhile, in st. petersburg, the local government demanded that state and municipal organizations achieve 65 percent vaccination rates among their employees, with the eventual goal of reaching 100 percent by september 1, 2021. those who refused to be vaccinated for reasons other than medical necessity were subject to various penalties, up to and including suspension without salary (postanovlenie 2021a). in the fall of 2021, during the next wave of the pandemic, st. petersburg authorities introduced mandatory qr-code verification while visiting any public places. in late october, the authorities reinstated several of the restrictions that had existed in the spring of 2020 (postanovlenie 2021b). 19 among the measures of the st. petersburg authorities were the prohibition on visiting parks, squares, playgrounds, and religious institutions. failure to comply with this requirement brought a fine of 3,000 roubles (approximately 37 euros at the exchange rate in the spring of 2020) (postanovlenie 2020a). 20 for covid-19 statistics in karelia during the whole pandemic, see gogov.ru (2022). 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: number of positive cases per 100,000 people (seven-day retrospective rolling average), st. petersburg and karelia. source: authors’ own recalculations based on raw data at https://russian-trade.com/coronavirus-russia/respublikakareliya/ and https://russian-trade.com/coronavirus-russia/sankt-peterburg/ though a cross-sectional analysis of the levels of restrictions in every region is not possible, the authors can hypothesize that, in regions with less restrictive regimes, there should have been greater satisfaction with the handling of the pandemic than in regions where the restrictions were more extensive. all other things being equal, the authors expected to see more approval of the authorities’ actions in petrozavodsk than in st. petersburg. assessing the public response to regional restrictions the differential trajectories of the two case studies gave the authors a chance to re-examine the hypotheses discussed in the all-russian example with a more regional focus. in short, though the path of transmission was fairly similar in st. petersburg and petrozavodsk, the trajectories of the restrictions differed. taken together, the authors could, therefore, expect that the residents of russia’s second city may have been less satisfied with the authorities’ response to the covid-19 pandemic by the summer of 2021 than those in the karelian capital. this expectation was made on the basis that the residents of petrozavodsk had been subjected to fewer restrictions on their daily life for most of the pandemic, and that this difference would primarily manifest itself in the attitudes to the regional authorities’ responses (which differed) rather than the federal rules (which were uniform across the country). the counter-hypothesis would be that the public would be more satisfied with the more restrictive regimes on the basis that they may feel that the authorities were taking greater measures to protect them. the aforementioned national representative survey contained deepened representative samples in the two case study cities (n=300 in each location). it is thus possible to examine them against 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 the background of the all-russian picture. as table 4 shows, the people of petrozavodsk (where measures were slightly less restrictive after the initial phase) displayed higher levels of satisfaction with the authorities’ responses than the residents of st. petersburg (where there were several more lockdowns and closures). in both cases, people approved of the federal authorities more than the regional ones. overall, the number of people who thought the federal authorities’ actions had been effective was roughly the same – 57 percent in st. petersburg and 59 percent in petrozavodsk, albeit with a higher proportion of residents in petrozavodsk thinking that the government’s response had been “very” effective. there was a slightly larger difference in attitudes toward the regional governments’ responses. only 8 percent considered the st. petersburg city authorities to have handled the crisis “very effectively,” compared with 17 percent of petrozavodsk residents. at the other end of the spectrum, 49 percent of st. petersburg residents (compared with 44 percent in petrozavodsk) considered the response to have been “ineffective” to a greater or lesser extent. the mean values are not significantly different from each other. in both cases, approval ratings of the authorities’ actions were slightly lower than in the russian federation as a whole – though the margin of error is slightly larger due to the smaller sample size. notwithstanding the more vocal opposition to some of the measures in st. petersburg, the more restrictive measures appear to have made only a small difference to the approval of the authorities’ actions. table 4: “how do you assess the effectiveness of the federal authorities (president and the russian government) and the regional authorities (head of the republic and government of the republic of karelia/ mayor and city government of st. petersburg, respectively) in the fight against coronavirus?” (percent of respondents, excluding “don’t know”) petrozavodsk st. petersburg federal regional federal regional very effective 22 17 12 8 rather effective 37 39 45 43 rather ineffective 29 28 24 30 very ineffective 12 16 19 19 total 100 100 100 100 n= 259 254 273 270 source: malmö university/levada center survey 2021, q.17 and q.18 (regional extended samples only) the authors replicate the models above for the two case studies, in order to explore whether the levels of trust in the regional government and the feelings of efficacy were the main contributors toward the public’s support or otherwise for the respective regional authorities’ covid-19 actions. 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 table 5: ols regression, predictors of attitudes toward effectiveness of covid-19 measures on the part of regional authorities (standardized beta coefficients), region-specific samples petrozavodsk st. petersburg 2a 2b 2a 2b adj.r2 0.048 0.237 0.039 0.218 sex 0.040 0.003 -0.007 0.003 age 0.238** 0.194* 0.216** 0.218** education -0.106 -0.107 -0.135* -0.121 house size 0.060 0.060 -0.025 0.020 family financial situation -0.076 0.031 -0.132* -0.085 trust regional authorities 0.369** 0.422** influence on regional authorities -0.185** -0.064 political interest 0.029 0.076 reads regional newspapers -0.014 0.016 watches regional tv -0.073 -0.034 uses internet 0.008 -0.012 the results in table 5 from petrozavodsk and st. petersburg indicate a slightly different picture from the national one. though trust in the relevant authorities remains the main significant predictor of a person’s attitudes toward the pandemic, age has a much stronger effect as a significant predictive variable in st. petersburg and petrozavodsk. this perhaps indicates that in densely populated cities, rather than the smaller towns in which many russians live, older people were more conscious of the risks associated with covid-19. around 80-85 percent of the russian covid-19-related deaths in the first year of the pandemic occurred amongst those over 60 (bashkatova 2021) and there is evidence that this may have played a role. re-running the regression analysis only for cities with a population of over 100,000 inhabitants indicated that age was a significant predictor of support for the authorities (older people were more likely to approve) at the p<0.01 level, whereas it was not so for rural areas. this gives a preliminary indication, which could be the subject of future research, that older people in densely populated areas may have been more aware of (or afraid of) the risks arising from covid-19 and hence more supportive of the authorities’ attempts to combat it. there is one further difference between st. petersburg and petrozavodsk: the extent to which people’s sense of efficacy played a role in conditioning their views on covid-19. this variable is absent in the st. petersburg case, which, as seen above, had more stringent restrictions for a longer period and in which there was some resistance to the restrictions around the time of new year’s and christmas of 2020-21. again, this perhaps gives a tentative indication that the public felt less able to influence the situation in st. petersburg, where there were strict protocols put in place by the municipal authorities, than under the more lenient restrictions in petrozavodsk. however, the explanatory factors between the two cases remain fairly similar. trust in the authorities remains the overwhelming explanatory factor for supporting the pandemic measures in both cases – giving further evidence that there was a connection between generalized political trust and the perceived legitimacy of the response to the pandemic. conclusions much analysis of covid-19 pandemic governance in russia, be it in the media or academic/expert views, has focused on the most contradictory, dysfunctional, and negative 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 elements: putin’s cynical ‘blame game,’ using the façade of decentralization and preparing regional governors as ‘fall guys’; the chaotic interaction between competing institutions in pandemic governance; the manipulation of covid-19 mortality statistics and state media propaganda’s twisting of reality; the failure to provide economic support despite huge financial reserves; and the bombastic vaccine diplomacy showcased at a time when low vaccination uptake at home made russia vulnerable to new waves of the pandemic. yet, our findings suggest the outright majority inside russia do not see things in such a negative light. rather than identifying a ‘blame game’ that was detrimental to russia, it seems more natural to see ‘blame diffusion’ (or even ‘credit diffusion’) across the political system. in other words, many saw the various levels of governance as marching in unity according to one plan. the president and the governors were perceived as one team, albeit with putin as the boss. this majority view was based on the relatively high levels of trust in the russian state and the president as a leader. a minority (ranging between 15-30 percent) had lower trust in state institutions and more critical views of the president; this minority also took a more critical view of how the covid-19 pandemic was handled, both by federal and regional authorities. this suggests regional authorities were broadly considered legitimate or illegitimate in accordance with how far the president is seen as such. the findings indicate that although different regions took different approaches to deal with the public health crisis, the public did not necessarily perceive their actions as such. returning to the broader question of russia’s regime type, the findings indicate that the ‘social contract’ of post-soviet russia remained an important explanatory factor, although there is a need for more qualitative verification of these attitudes. there was a strong connection between generalized trust in the authorities and how much the public approved of the restrictions. the authors of the article can speculate that this is because the public saw the state’s role as one that ensured their safety rather than—as more oppositionist-minded people with less trust in the authorities might have regarded them—as measures that were tainted by association to authoritarian misgovernance, corruption, pompous patriotic rhetoric, or straightforward propaganda. a secondary factor was a sense of efficacy – indicating that people who felt that they had some influence over the instruments of the state were also more likely to approve of its actions at both the federal and the regional level. this again highlights the point that segments of russian society were more confident in the state’s basic abilities, accepted the state’s claims more often than not, and saw their own role as citizens in more positive terms. such attitudes were not obviously shaken by the adversities of the covid-19 pandemic and reflect the core support base of the russian political system. acknowledgements this work was completed with the assistance of a grant from the swedish international centre for local democracy (icld). the work was also financed by nawa (the polish national agency for academic exchange) as part of the ulam programme under the proposal number: ppn/ulm/2020/1/00081 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 references arukwe, nnanna onuoha. 2022. “covid-19 pandemic in africa, ‘copy-and-paste’ policies, and the biomedical hegemony of ‘cure.’” journal of black studies, 53 (4): 385-410. https://doi.org/10.1177/00219347221082327. åslund, anders. 2020. “responses to the covid-19 crisis in russia, ukraine, and belarus.” eurasian geography and economics 61 (4-5): 532-545. https://doi.org /10.1080/15387216.2020.1778499” https://doi.org /10.1080/15387216.2020.1778499. barceló, joan, robert kubinec, cindy cheng, tiril høye rahn, and luca messerschmidt. 2022. “windows of repression: using covid-19 policies against political dissidents?” journal of peace research 59 (1): 73-89. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211062389" https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211062389. bashkatova, anastasia. 2021. “pozhilyye rossiyane umirayut v uskorennom tempe” [elderly russians are dying at a faster rate]. nezavisimaya gazeta, september 19, 2021. accessed december 16, 2022. https://www.ng.ru/economics/2021-09-19/1_8255_russians.html. blackburn, matthew, and bo petersson. 2021. “parade, plebiscite, pandemic: legitimation efforts in putin’s fourth term.” post-soviet affairs 38 (4): 293-311. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2021.2020575. blakkisrud, helge. 2015. “governing the governors: legitimacy vs. control in the reform of the russian regional executive.” east european politics 31 (1): 104-21. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2014.956925. burkhardt, fabian. 2020. “executive politics in russia in times of the pandemic: shifting responsibility and blame as a technology of governance.” pex 28. accessed november 13, 2021. https://pex-network.com/2020/05/28/executive-politics-in-russia-in-times-ofthe-pandemic-shifting-responsibility-and-blame-as-a-technology-of-governance. busygina, irina. 2016. "putin's russia: the state-building strategy." russian politics 1 (1): 7094. https://doi.org/10.1163/24518921-00101004. busygina, irina. 2019. “are post-soviet leaders doomed to be populist? a comparative analysis of putin and nazarbayev.” european politics and society 20 (4): 502-518. https://doi.org/10.1163/24518921-00101004. busygina, irina and filippov, m. 2021. “covid and federal relations in russia.” russian politics, 6 (3), 279–300. https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00603001 chattopadhyay, rupak, felix knüpling, diana chebenova, liam whittington, and phillip gonzalez. 2022. federalism and the response to covid-19. new york: routledge. dixon, robyn. 2021. “in russia, experts are challenging official pandemic figures as too low. they refuse to be silenced.” washington post, october 17, 2021. accessed december 16, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-covid-countfake-statistics/2021/10/16/b9d47058-277f-11ec-8739-5cb6aba30a30_story.html. about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 forbes, 2020. “v sankt-peterburge poyavilas' ‘karta soprotivleniya’ vystupayushchikh protiv kovidnykh ogranicheniy barov” [a “map of resistance” of bars fighting against coronavirus restrictions has appeared in st. petersburg]. december 8, 2020. accessed december 13, 2022. https://www.forbes.ru/newsroom/biznes/415697-v-sanktpeterburge-poyavilas-karta-soprotivleniya-vystupayushchih-protiv. frye, t. 2021. weak strongman: the limits of power in putin’s russia. princeton: princeton university press. gallup international. 2021 “almost a year with pandemic: people around globe still mobilized against the threat, with hope for vaccines. yet potential problems become more significant." january 21, 2021. accessed december 16, 2022. https://www.gallupinternational.bg/en/44307/a-year-of-global-coronavirus-pandemic-global-surveyvaccines-attitudes/. gogov.ru. 2022. “statistika covid-19 v karelii za vse vremya” [total covid-19 statistics in karelia]. accessed december 13, 2022. https://gogov.ru/covid-19/krl#data. gladkikh, anna, vladimir dedkov, alena sharova, ekaterina klyuchnikova, valeriya sbarzaglia, olga kanaeva, tatyana arbuzova, nadezhda tsyganova, anna popova, edward ramsay, and areg totolian. 2022. “epidemiological features of covid-19 in northwest russia in 2021.” viruses 14 (5) https://doi.org/10.3390/v14050931. golosov, grigorii v. 2016. "why and how electoral systems matter in autocracies." australian journal of political science 51 (3): 367-385. https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2016.1182617. government of st. petersburg. 2020. “na dvortsovoi ploshchadi proshel parad v chest' 75-y godovshchiny pobedy v velikoi otechestvennoi voine” [palace square hosted a parade dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the great patriotic war]. accessed december 16, 2022. https://www.gov.spb.ru/press/governor/191136/. greene, samuel a. 2014. moscow in movement: power and opposition in putin's russia. stanford: stanford university press. greene, samuel a., and graeme b. robertson. 2019. putin v. the people. the perilous politics of a divided russia. new haven: yale university press. hutcheson, derek s. 2018. parliamentary elections in russia: a quarter-century of multiparty politics. oxford: oxford university press/british academy. ivanov, yevgeny, and nikolay petrov. 2021. “transition to a new model of russian governors’ appointments as a reflection of regime transformation.” russian politics 6 (2): 153–84. https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00602001. izvestiya. 2021. “putin rasskazal o svoem zdorovi’e” [putin talked about his health]. october 11, 2021. accessed december 12, 2022. https://iz.ru/1234021/2021-10-11/putinrasskazal-o-svoem-zdorove. kompaniya razvitiya obshchestvennykh svyazei (kros). 2021. “national’nyi indeks trevozhnostei” [national index of anxiety]. accessed december 16, 2022. about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank#data about:blank about:blank about:blank 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 https://www.cros.ru/upload/iblock/ccc/kh2iezq12ene2ugf1m5t34ibmvqcdx2y/index_rep ort_q4_2022.pdf . kofanov, dmitrii, vladimir kozlov, alexander libman, and nikita zakharov. 2022. “encouraged to cheat? federal incentives and career concerns at the sub-national level as determinants of under-reporting of covid-19 mortality in russia.” british journal of political science: 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123422000527. levada 2021. “doverie politikam, odobrenie institutov i polozhenie del v strane” [trust in politicians, approval of institutions and assessment of the situation in the country]. accessed december 12, 2022. https://www.levada.ru/2021/07/30/doverie-politikamodobrenie-institutov-i-polozhenie-del-v-strane-4/. levada. 2022. “odobrenie deyatel’nosti vladimira putina” [approval of vladimir putin’s work]. accessed june 13, 2022. https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/. loftus, suzanne. 2022. “legitimacy and societal consent under putin’s leadership: state capacity and national identity.” russian politics 1 (7): 1-30. https://doi.org/ 10.30965/24518921-00604010. lomakina, yana. 2021. “v voronezhe, yekaterinburge, irkutske i drugikh gorodakh rossii proshli mitingi protivnikov qr-kodov” [voronezh, ekaterinburg, and irkutsk had protests of those opposed to qr codes]. tjournal, november 15, 2021. accessed december 16, 2022. https://tjournal.ru/news/475351-v-voronezhe-ekaterinburgeirkutske-i-drugih-gorodah-rossii-proshli-mitingi-protivnikov-qr-kodov-glavnoe. maleva, tatiana m., marina a. kartseva, and sophia v. korzhuk. 2021. “socio-demographic determinants of covid-19 vaccine uptake in russia in the context of mandatory vaccination of employees.” naselenie i ekonomika 5 (4): 30–49. https://doi.org/10.3897/ popecon.5.e77832. malmö university/levada center survey. 2021. “vash gorod, vashe vliyanie, vash golos” [your city, your influence, your voice], national representative survey, russian federation, n=2525. fieldwork conducted through face-to-face interviews in a representative set of 97 urban and 40 rural locations from 17-28 june 2021. malinova, olga. 2020. “framing the collective memory of the 1990s as a legitimation tool for putin’s regime.” problems of post-communism 68 (5): 429-441, doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2020.1752732. mao, yexin. 2021. “political institutions, state capacity, and crisis management: a comparison of china and south korea.” international political science review 42 (3): 316-332. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512121994026. mingazov, sergei. 2020. “v sankt-peterburge poyavilas' ‘karta soprotivleniya’ vystupayushchikh protiv kovidnykh ogranicheniy barov” [in st. petersburg, there is now a ‘resistance card’ used by those opposed to covid restrictions]. accessed december 16, 2021. https://www.forbes.ru/newsroom/biznes/415697-v-sanktpeterburge-poyavilas-karta-soprotivleniya-vystupayushchih-protiv. about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 nelson, m.a. 2021. “the timing and aggressiveness of early government response to covid19: political systems, societal culture, and more.” world development, 146, 105550. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105550. newton, kenneth. 1999. “social and political trust in established democracies.” in critical citizens: global support for democratic government, edited by pippa norris, 169-187. oxford: oxford university press. newton, kenneth, dietlind stolle, and sonja zmerli. 2017. “social and political trust.” in the oxford handbook of social and political trust, edited by eric m. uslaner, 37-56. oxford: oxford university press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.20. petersburg politics foundation. 2020. “reiting fonda ’peterburgskaya politika’ za mart 2020 goda” [the rating of petersburg politics foundation for march 2020. accessed december 16, 2022. https://fpp.spb.ru/fpp-rating-2020-03#_toc37150664. petersson, bo. 2021. the putin predicament: problems of legitimation and succession in russia. stuttgart: ibidem verlag. postanovlenie. 2020a. “postanovlenie pravitel’stva sankt peterburga ot 3.04.2020 №182 [regulation of st. petersburg government]. official internet portal of legal information. accessed 13th december 2022. http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/view/ 7800202004070013. postanovlenie. 2020b. “postanovlenie pravitel’stva sankt peterburga ot 22.10.2020 № 863” [regulation of st. petersburg government]. st. petersburg legislation. accessed december 13, 2022. https://www.gov.spb.ru/law/d?nd=566068380&prevdoc=564437085&point=mark=0ae iptm19bscaq0pl55sc000002d1r93v3s3vvvvvu31luvk50aeipt8. postanovlenie, 2021a. “postanovlenie pravitel’stva sankt peterburga ot 30.06.2021 №549” [regulation of st. petersburg government]. st. petersburg legislation. accessed december 13, 2022. https://www.gov.spb.ru/law/d?nd=607857187&prevdoc=564437085&point=mark=06f 1j041mktnf4185gq0g000000d24n4udq3m3339g121l1sf1p2dt10. postanovlenie, 2021b. “postanovlenie pravitel’stva sankt peterburga ot 18.10.2021 №766” [regulation of st. petersburg government]. st. petersburg legislation. accessed december 13, 2022. https://www.gov.spb.ru/law/d?nd=608967048&prevdoc=564437085&point=mark=06f 1j041mktnf4185gq0g000000d24n4udq3m3339g121l1sf1p2dt10. presidential decree. 2020. “ukaz prezidenta rossiiskoi federatsii ot 02.04.2020 №239 "o merakh po obespecheniyu sanitarno-epidemiologicheskogo blagopoluchiya naseleniya na territorii rossiiskoi federatsii v svyazi s rasprostraneniyem novoi koronavirusnoi infektsii (covid-19)” [decree on measures to ensure the sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population in connection with the spread of coronavirus infection]”. official internet portal of legal information. accessed may 16, 2022. http://ips.pravo.gov.ru:8080/default.aspx?pn=0001202004020025. about:blank about:blank about:blank#_toc37150664 about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 rasporyazhenie, 2021. “rasporyazhenie glavy respubliki karelia ot 18.06.2021 №342-r” [decree of the head of the republic of karelia]. accessed december 13, 2022. https://gov.karelia.ru/upload/iblock/f1f/redaktsiya_ot_18_iyunya_342_r.pdf. robinson, darrel, and marcus tannenberg. 2019. “self-censorship of regime support in authoritarian states: evidence from list experiments in china.” research & politics 6 (3): 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168019856449. rosstat. 2022. “regiony rossii: sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie pokazateli” [regions of russia: socio-economic indicators]. russian federal state statistical agency. accessed december 18, 2022. https://rosstat.gov.ru/folder/210/document/13204 sharafutdinova, gulnaz. 2022. “is politics always the same? response to comments on the red mirror: putin’s leadership and russia’s insecure identity.” nationalities papers 50 (3): 624-627. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2021.98. shirikov, anton, valeriia umanets, and yoshiko herrera. 2023. “russia: muddling through populism and the pandemic.” in populists and the pandemic: how populists around the world responded to covid-19, edited by nils ringe and lucio rennó, 173-183. london: routledge. smyth, regina, gulnaz sharafutdinova, timothy model, and aiden klein. 2020. “the russian power vertical and the covid-19 challenge: the trajectories of regional responses.” ponars eurasia, policy memo no. 646. accessed december 16, 2022. https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-russian-power-vertical-and-the-covid-19-challengethe-trajectories-of-regional-responses/. terzyan, aram. 2021. “russia and covid-19: russian adaptive authoritarianism during the pandemic.” journal of liberty and international affairs 7 (3): 345-355. https://doi.org/10.47305/jlia2137345t. timonin, sergey, ilya klimkin, vladimir m. shkolnikov, evgeny andreev, martin mckee, and david a. leon. 2021. “excess mortality in russia and its regions compared to high income countries: an analysis of monthly series of 2020.” ssm – population health. 17 (101006): 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2021.101006. volkov, denis, and andrei kolesnikov. 2018. “the perils of change: russians’ mixed attitude toward reform.” carnegie moscow center, february 6, 2018. accessed december 16, 2022. https://carnegie.ru/2018/02/06/perils-of-change-russians-mixed-attitudes-towardreform-pub-75436. yam, kai chi, joshua conrad jackson, christopher m. barnes, jenson lau, xin qin, and hin yeung lau. 2020. “the rise of covid-19 cases is associated with support for world leaders.” proceedings of the national academy of sciences – pnas 117 (41): 2542925433. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2009252117. about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank about:blank 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 appendix 1: variables included in the ols regression models inclusion in models model 1 (federal covid response)/ model 2 (regional covid response) dimension question scale (max/min) 1 dependent variable how do you assess the effectiveness of the federal authorities in the fight against coronavirus? 4-point ascending (1= very ineffective; 4 = very effective) 2 dependent variable 2 how do you assess the effectiveness of the regional authorities in the fight against coronavirus? 4-point ascending (1= very ineffective; 4 = very effective) 1 trust to what extent do you trust the russian government? 7 point ascending (1=do not trust at all; 7= full trust) 2 to what extent do you trust the regional authorities in your region? 7 point ascending (1=do not trust at all; 7= full trust) 1 efficacy to what extent do you think people like you can have a direct influence on the actions of the federal authorities? 4-point descending (1= large extent; 4=not at all) 2 to what extent do you think people like you can have a direct influence on the actions of the regional authorities? 4-point descending (1= large extent; 4 = not at all) 1 & 2 political interest how interested are you in politics? 4-point descending (1= very interested; 4 = not at all) 1 political information how often do you i) read allrussian (federal) newspapers ii) watch central television 4-point descending for each measure (1= regularly; 4= not at all). 1 political information how often do you i) read regional, local newspapers ii) watch regional, local television 4-point descending for each measure (1= regularly; 4= not at all). 1 & 2 political information how often do you use the internet 4-point descending (1= regularly; 4= not at all). 1 & 2 demographic sex binary 2-category (1= male, 2= female) 1 & 2 age 5 ordinal categories, ascending (1= 18-29; 1053 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 year brackets up to 5= 60+) 1 & 2 education 6 ordinal categories, ascending 1 & 2 how many rooms in the apartment/house where you live numerical, ascending. 1 & 2 how would you assess your family's current financial situation? 5-point descending (1= very good, 5 = very bad) 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2022: 29-54 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) about:blank about:blank about:blank 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 europeans but outside of the eu the eu soft power of attractiveness in ukraine between the orange revolution and euromaidan viktoriya thomson1 carleton university abstract the role of the eu in the promotion of europeanization and the eu political identity in potential member states of eastern europe prior to the 2004 enlargement was important for these states’ future acceptation in the eu community. however, most research and literature have discounted the role of the eu and its attractiveness in the countries neighbouring with the eu that did not have a prospect of joining the eu in 2004. this article studies the process of formal and informal europeanization in ukraine before and after the orange revolution, which occurred five months after the bloc’s 2004 enlargement, and euromaidan of 2013. despite the eu’s passive leverage in ukraine between 2004 and 2013, and the country’s weak prospects for potential membership, the eu’s soft power of attractiveness was still an effective tool that was used by ukrainian political elite and media in promoting informal europeanization after the 2004 enlargement. furthermore, confidence in the eu was associated with support for such liberal values as human rights, tolerance of minorities, and political efficacy. this article posits that notwithstanding weak incentives and support offered from the eu to implement formal europeanization in ukraine, the eu attractiveness was successfully applied by local elite and media to promote the informal europeanization. 1 viktoriya thomson, phd, carleton university 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 introduction studies of the impact of the european union (eu) in post-communist states indicate that the eu pre-accession process significantly improved states’ willingness to implement political and economic reforms (herrmann, risse and brewer 2004; vachudova 2009). moreover, the eu created two sets of requirements for potential candidates – normative (or formal) and informal (hansen 2006, 117). the formal mandatory requirements for future membership included an established market economy, free and fair elections, and the rule of law. the informal ones were those that built on the idea of “we feeling” and conforming to european values (hansen 2006; castiglione 2009). applicant states’ identification with the values in a common community, such as the eu, was perceived as necessary for sustaining political stability within the eu. “when communities have a strong feeling of shared identity, political leaders can draw on this as a resource to promote the legitimacy of institutions” (herrmann, risse and brewer 2004, 4). democracy promotion was one of the most powerful discourses that was used by the eu in the process of its assessment of prospective future members (raik 2004). for eastern european states that joined the eu in 2004, the path to membership was formally stringent. nevertheless, these states’ future as part of the eu was not in doubt because of their european ideals and their acceptance of the shared system of values (kubicek 2009). the process of european integration was perceived as their return to the place where they belonged, or a “return to europe” (vachudova 2005, 83). this was not the case for the former soviet republics, with the exception of the baltic states, which had been annexed by the ussr before the second world war. the role of the eu in these countries was more difficult to define and measure, considering that “the painful discussion of membership” was never raised (hansen 2006, 116). the eu european neighborhood policy (enp) in the states of the former ussr combined relatively high demands for reform with weak conditionally (commission of the european communities (commission) 2003; gawrich, melnykovska and schweickert 2009, 19), which led to limited incentives to comply with those demands. furthermore, after the 2004 enlargement, the discussion shifted towards “enlargement fatigue” rather than future expanding of the boundaries of the european community (schimmelfennig 2008). the 2004 orange revolution in ukraine, which took place less than six months after the eu enlargement, brought hopes for the country’s democratization and closer collaboration with the eu.2 however, the eu’s conditionality rules were not clearly defined due to the remote prospects of eu membership for ukraine (dimitrova and dragneva 2013) and ukraine’s inability to meet the three criteria used in the assessments, such as 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) market economy; and 3) administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement eu acquis, and ability to take on the obligations of membership (commission, accession criteria). instead of membership, the eu applied the soft power of attractiveness, built on a state’s eu membership aspirations rather than on the realistic prospect of eu accession. although some argue that no amount of soft power can replace the lack of capability and absence of effective hard power 2 the orange revolution was a peaceful protest against the results of the second round of the presidential election which were falsified to advance then prime minister yanukovych. the result of the orange revolution was a re-election of the second round that led to a victory of viktor yushchenko. for more details see wilson (2005). 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 from the eu (nilsen 2013, 725; börzela and schimmelfenning 2017, 279), this article contends that the eu soft power of attractiveness was effectively applied by the political elite and media in their creation of discourse about ukraine’s europeanization. citizens’ attitudes towards the eu were correlated with their political orientations and values. citizens who professed higher degrees of confidence in the eu expressed higher levels of political awareness, political competence, tolerance and political activity – orientations and values that are associated with liberal values and that are promoted by the eu as european values. these correlations were stronger for young and well-educated citizens. this article contributes to the discussion of the eu’s role in non-members states political and civil development by illustrating that the eu power of attraction remained an important political instrument in ukraine after 2004. in the absence of formal europeanization, the political elite and media’s promotion of this concept may have impacted citizens’ level of confidence in the eu, which increased after the orange revolution. this article is divided into five sections. the first part discusses the concept of europeanization, passive and active leverage, and soft power by the eu. the second part looks at the relations between the eu and ukraine after 2004 and before 2013. the third part analyses the ukrainian leadership and media’s promotion of the eu and europeanization in ukraine. following this, the author looks at citizens’ perception of the eu and the relationship between the level of confidence in the eu and citizens’ political values and orientations. the conclusion provides the main findings of this research. methodology the research in this article was developed and assessed through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. the texts of the official documents between the eu and ukraine were analyzed to assess their relationship. a content analysis of the presidential speeches in ukraine after the orange revolution and before euromaidan, and of the titles of newspapers articles (450 in total) of the leading political newspaper dzerkalo tyshnya (mirror weekly)3 was performed to evaluate how the concept of european identity and europeanization was promoted in ukraine by its media and political elite. in order to test citizens’ support for the eu and their espousal of the eu corresponding liberal political values, this paper draws on the results of public opinion from the world values survey in ukraine before and after the orange revolution and the results of european values survey and international foundation for electoral systems. 3 this newspaper, together with newspapers den’ and kommentarii, is considered neutral and independent in its coverage of the political events in ukraine (szostek 2014). although it is not the most circulated (57,000 as of 2006), it is considered one of the most influential newspapers by political elite (bbc 2006). 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 europeanization, eu passive and active leverage, soft power scholars who study the role of the eu define europeanization as a process in which states adopt eu rules (schimmelfennig and sedelmeier 2005, 7), or as the emergence and the development of a distinct structure of government to the european level (risse 2001, 3). the adaptation and emergence may be formal with a focus on the institutionalization of the eu rules, or discursive (informal europeanization) by incorporating “a rule as a positive reference into discourse among domestic actors” (schimmelfenning and sedelmeier 2005, 7). the eu gained two types of leverage in the pre-accession states prior to their membership – active and passive (vachudova 2005). active leverage is defined as deliberate policies of the eu towards candidate states. “active leverage is animated by the fact that the tremendous benefits of eu membership create incentives for the state to satisfy the enormous entry requirements, setting the stage for the effectiveness of conditionality within the eu’s pre-accession process” (vachudova 2005, 4). the higher the potential for eu membership, the more likely that candidate countries will implement political and economic reforms that meet eu requirements. in contrast, passive leverage is defined as the attraction of the eu membership without deliberate conditionality exercised in the eu’s pre-accession process (vachudova 2005, 63). the passive leverage is similar to the notion of the eu’s soft power, which is mostly based on the idea of the eu attractiveness (tuomioja 2009; nielsen 2013). soft power is defined as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. it arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideal and policies” (nye 2004, 77). soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others (nye 2008, 95). joseph nye identifies three primary sources of a country’s soft power: its culture (in the places where it’s attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to these values at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority) (2008, 96). in the case of the eu, soft power was based on the idea of a collective european identity and the eu’s commitment to certain normative principles, particularly democracy and human rights (nielsen 2013, 730). therefore, to become european in cultural terms was to adopt european values, “to become more like the eu with the latter assessing the degree of normative convergence/divergence” (wolczuk 2016, 65). for candidate states, to become european meant that they not only had to fulfil the official criteria for accession but that they were obligated to express their europeanization and sense of belonging to the european community (neumann 1998; herrmannn, risse and brewer 2004). very often, this involved applicant countries constructing and implementing discourse on how their state’s identity is relevant to the concept of ‘europe’ in comparison to other states (neumann 1998, 405). “in their competition for accession to western organizations, the central and eastern european (cee) states, furthermore, combined the assertion of their own european identity with the claim “that the next state to the east is not european” (neumann 1998, 406). from this perceptive, the enlargement was understood as the expansion of the international community and inclusion of the countries that have similar liberal values and norms as the eu (schimmelfenning 2001). the eu’s soft power of shared identities helped candidate countries to be persistent in their democratic commitment even after their accession (sedelmeier 2012). 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 potential membership in the eu was not discussed for enp countries. the 2004 enlargement, although perceived as successful at that time, limited the eu’s ability or willingness to engage in further enlargement (wolczuk 2016).4 moreover, the countries that were going to integrate to the eu after the 2004 enlargement were “less capable of managing the ‘overload’ of eu requirements than the countries that joined the eu in 2004” (raik 2004, 594) due to their different preconditions. for that reason, the eu built relations with these countries within the enp’s strategy that offered the neighbourhood countries “a stake in the eu’s internal market, through gradual economic integration, but not membership, conditional on the adoption of eu rules.” (wolczuk 2016, 61). the eu rules and criteria for the enp countries are often portrayed as a kind of wilderness of exclusion, a scenario of a weak voice and asymmetric dependency (wallace 2005; smith 2005). they did not provide sufficient incentives for the countries to implement them, nor did they have a clear final goal as in the case of accession to the eu. “it was the fallacious assumption that conditionality patterns which were successful for the cee countries would also be successful for post-soviet countries with no-membership perspective” (moskalenko and streltsov 2015, 112). as a result, for many commonwealth of independent states (cis) members, the principle of exclusion from the eu enlargement process was a constant reminder that they belonged to a different category of states (hansen 2006, 130). the eu’s soft power in these countries was based on their membership aspiration rather than a concrete promise of membership association (sasse 2008; pridham 2011; langbein and wolczuk 2012). as was stated by lehne, “the core elements of the eu’s offer to enp partner countries have been summed up as the ‘three ms’: money, mobility, and markets” (2014, 12), which were not strong enough to result in long-term transformation. furthermore, the eu’s ability to promote democracy in these countries was constrained by the stability-democratization dilemma that made the “eu often reluctant to push incumbent regimes towards democratization” (börzel and lebanidze 2017, 25) which could trigger instability within the region. research also demonstrates that during neighborhood europeanization domestic actors could use weak eu conditionality for their own political agenda to regain or consolidate their power (borzel and risse 2012; boerzel and pamuk 2012; gawrich 2009). “domestic actors have other choices in responding to europeanization than endorsing or resisting eu induced reforms; they can instrumentalize eu policies and institutions to advance their own interests, decoupling them from their normative contents” (börzel and pamuk 2012, 80). was this the case in ukraine? as this article demonstrates, despite limited formal europeanization after 2004 enlargement and weak eu conditionality, the country’s leadership and media actively promoted the concept of european identity and informal europeanization. and although more research is needed to test causal relations between informal europeanization and political values, this article shows that citizens’ support for the eu, which increased after 2004, was correlated with liberal democratic values. 4 except west balkans. 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 eu and ukraine relations: formal europeanization although the question of ukraine’s future membership in the eu was not then discussed, in 1994 ukraine signed the partnership and co-cooperation agreement (pca).5 in 2003, the eu introduced the european neighborhood policy (enp) which was then launched in 2004 (commission 2003). the main goal of the enp was “to provide a framework for the development of a new relationship which would not, in the medium-term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the union’s institutions” (commission 2003, 5). since the eu was preoccupied with the future accession of ten new members,6 ukraine was not a priority for that organization in the years leading up to the orange revolution. nonetheless, the concept of european identity was reflected in the 2004 presidential election campaign of viktor yushchenko, the opposition candidate who competed against prime minister yanukovych (organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce) 2005). soon after his victory, newly elected president yushchenko declared the europeanization of ukraine as one of his main priorities. in his inauguration speech in january, 2005, he declared: our way to the future is the way followed by united europe. we are the people of the same civilization sharing the same values. history, economic prospects and the interests of people give a clear answer – where we should look for our fate. our place is in the european union. my goal is – ukraine in united europe (ukrayinska pravda 2005). this optimism was not reciprocated by the eu. “the orange revolution presented the eu with a dilemma: despite the pan-european expression of support for democratization in ukraine, there were divergences between member states on how to deal with ukraine” (wolczuk 2016, 61). nevertheless, the enp action plan was signed in february, 2005, one month after yushchenko’s inauguration speech. the enp action plan contained two parts and included a list of priorities for ukraine, such as free and fair elections, judicial reform and adoption of a nuclear waste strategy (wolczuk 2009). europe was absorbing its new states and recovering from the rejection of the constitutional treaty by france and the netherlands in 2005 (hobolt and brouard 2010). ukraine’s desire to have a closer relationship with the eu beyond the enp action plan, worried the eu (averre 2005, 187). the eu switched towards a value-based foreign policy strategy, implemented through activities such as cultural and academic exchanges (jarvie 2017). in 2005, ukraine did not meet the three copenhagen criteria for accession, namely: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) market economy; and 3) administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement eu acquis, and ability to take on the obligations of membership (commission, european neighborhood policy and enlargement). the ukrainian market economy was only partially developed, the rule of law was incomplete, and more importantly, the level of corruption was still high (transparency international 2005). nevertheless, the european parliament passed a 5 “partnership and co-operation agreement between the european communities and their member states, and ukraine,” european union, communities, council and commission. 6 on may 01, 2004, eight countries of the eastern europe joined the european union. for details about the eu accession in eastern europe, see raik (2004). 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 declaration calling for the european council, the european commission, and the eu member states to speed up the process of ukraine’s integration and possibly future eu membership (hansen 2006, 124). in december of 2005, the council of the european union granted ukraine market economy status (commission 2005). the relations between ukraine and the eu could have improved after the 2006 ukrainian parliamentary election when the parties of the orange team gained the majority of the seats. however, they failed to secure a parliamentary coalition and thus lost the position of prime minister to viktor yanukovych. political infighting within ukraine not only created an image problem for the country but decreased the eu’s willingness to collaborate with ukraine (pridham 2011, 25). the eu-ukraine visa liberalization dialogue commenced in october 2008, which may be attributed in part to an external event. conflict broke out between georgia and russia in august of 2008 over the territories of south ossetia and abkhazia. the hostilities compelled the eu to reconsider its future policies towards the post-communist countries. as a result, the eu offered ukraine the eastern partnership, which “was established in part as a response to the russian invasion of georgia in 2008” (macfarlane and menon 2014, 96). the eastern partnership, which was signed in may,2009, provided ukraine with the prospect of visa liberalization, signing of the association agreement, and opportunities for establishing deep and comprehensive free trade areas (dcfta) for partner countries (council of european union 2009). however, the prospect of political association for ukraine was not a sufficiently strong incentive for reforms. for conditionality rules to be effective they should be stated in the official documents and legally specified in the eu acquis and international treaties with the real prospect of integration to the eu (langbein and wolczuk 2012). this was not the case for signing the association agenda (aa). “both the european neighborhood policy and eastern partnership avoided the question of potential enlargement to the states of this region. instead, the eu offered ‘association’: closer political ties, deep and comprehensive free trade, and the possibility of visa liberalization” (macfarlane and menon 2014, 96). within ukraine, this created frustration regarding its prospects of joining the eu, thus causing negative feelings in the ukrainian society and often leading to disappointment among its pro-european part (moskalenko and streltsov 2015, 112). the european commission’s many progress reports stated that ukraine needed to undertake significant economic and democratic reforms prior to consideration of a possible future application for membership (commission 2008, 2009a). relations between the eu and ukraine deteriorated further after the 2010 presidential election that brought viktor yanukovych to power (smith 2015). the election was recognized as fair and free by osce (osce 2010). once in power, yanukovych instituted constitutional changes to strengthen his power and took steps to improve fractured relations with russia by signing the kharhiv agreement, which reduced the price of gas for ukraine for the next 10 years from russia in exchange for an extension of russia’s lease of the sevastopol naval base for the next 25 years.7 the opposition strongly criticized the agreement since it was perceived by many inside and outside ukraine as subordination to russia (unian 2010). however, yanukovych, 7 on april 21, 2010, yanukovych signed the kharkiv agreement, which reduced the price of gas for ukraine for the next ten years from russia in exchange for an extension of russia’s lease of the sevastopol naval base for the next 25 years (pan 2010). 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 acknowledging ukraine’s economic dependence on russia, was determined to strengthen ukraine’s relationship with its northern neighbor. the european commission’s (2011) final progress report posited that the ukrainian judicial system had still not been reformed after 20 years of independence (commission 2012). extensive corruption and an unfavorable environment for businesses were also cited as obstacles to ukraine’s future integration. in these circumstances, “the eu used the negotiation process on the association agreement to address the lack of democratic change” (borzel and lebanidze 2017, 19). in march 2012, the eu and ukraine initialled the text of the association agreement and its dcfta (commission 2012), which indicated ukraine’s willingness to adhere to the priorities of the agreement prior to its implementation in 2013. however, in the spring of 2013, the eu stated that “in 2012, ukraine did not address most of the key recommendations contained in last year’s european neighbourhood policy progress report” (commission 2013, 3). nevertheless, in february, 2013, president yanukovych reaffirmed ukraine’s commitment to the signing of the agreement by the time of eastern partnership summit in vilnius in november, 2013, thus promising formal europeanization of ukraine (delegation of the european union to ukraine 2013). however, it was argued that “yanukovych was spared to meet the demand of the eu to free yulia timoshenko and adopt an anti-corruption law and an election reform as the conditions for signing the association agreement” (borzel 2015, 524). instead he accepted russia’s economic support, including low gas prices and postponed the signing of the aa. euro-integration and discursive europeanization in annual presidential addresses to the parliament despite modest progress in the official relations between the eu and ukraine, the eu, eurointegration, and european identity were actively promoted by politicians for their electoral purposes. a contextual analysis of the annual speeches to parliament (verhovna rada (rada)) of president yushchenko and president yanukovych between 2005 and 2013 reveals the extent of emphasis placed upon eu integration.8 both presidents in their official annual addresses emphasized the importance of euro-integration and collaboration with the eu and attempted to capitalize on the mechanism available to them to promote closer ties with the eu (wolczuk 2016, 62). they also sought to promote the discourse of ukraine europeanization, thus signalling the country’s european identity and belonging to the eu community. the highest frequency for the root word ‘europe’ was in 2006, one year after the orange revolution. president yushchenko, in his first official address to the parliament, mentioned 54 times the words europe, european, euro-integration. 8 the author used the nvivo program to calculate the frequency of the words “europa” (europe), “eurosoyuz” (european union), “europeyskyy” (european) and “eurointegratsiya” (euro-integration) among the top 1000 frequent words in each speech. 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: eu and euro-integration in presidential addresses, 2005-2013 data source: this figure represents the frequency of the words “europe’, “european union”, “euro-integration” and “european” in each presidential address among the top 1000 frequent words (using nvivo). in 2007, the year after the orange coalition collapsed, yushchenko did not address the parliament, in contravention of his constitutional obligation.9 in 2008 and 2009, the frequency of the mention of the topic of eurointegraiton significantly decreased to 24 and 27. at the same time, president yushchenko stated in his 2008 address: “[w]e are continuing the logic of geopolitical processes of united europe. ukraine has created conditions for democracy and freedom” (rada 2008). within the same speech, yushchenko mentioned that “our middle term goal – progress in european and euro atlantic integration as an indicator and results of real changes within the country.” in 2009, his last presidential speech, yushchenko referred to ukraine as a country that historically belonged to eu community. “we have continued global historical process of uniting europe. our integration into european and euro atlantic unions is not an abstract idea. every step is a real return of ukraine to european world” (rada 2009). significantly, the references to the topic of the eu and euro-integration were not limited to president yushchenko, who was reputed to be pro-western. in his first official address after his election in 2010, president yanukovych employed the words eu, europe, european and eurointegration 38 times. moreover, yanukovych referred to euro-integration, europe and the eu, in higher numbers than his predecessor. in 2010, yanukovych made the following comments: the most important priority in our foreign policy was and is euro-integration. not only for the course of our foreign policy, but as a vector of our overall transformation. the most important question in our relationship with the eu is the signing of the association agreement between ukraine and the eu, including the creation of the deep and comprehensive free trade area and the implementation of a visa free regime (rada 2010). in 2011, yanukovych mentioned the association agreement between the eu and ukraine as a confirmed plan. “today ukraine is having active negotiations about this agreement. signing of this agreement will create preconditions for ukraine’s full integration into the european economic, social, cultural and legal community” (glavnoe 2011). in 2013, the year of the euromaidan, the frequency of the use of the words euro-integration, europe, and the eu in his annual address approached 2006 levels at 52 times. president yanukovych stated that the “signing of the association agreement between ukraine and the eu will promote economic growth and increase the welfare of ukrainian citizens” (niss 2013, 243). the discrepancy between 9 the parliament implemented a decree about yushchenko not following the constitution of ukraine (postanova verkhovnoyi rady 2007). 54 24 27 38 51 40 52 0 50 100 2006 yushchenko 2008 yushchenko 2009 yushchenko 2010 yanukovych 2011 yanukovych 2012 yanukovych 2013 yanukovych 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 yanukovych’s statements and official actions in 2013, when he postponed the signing of the association agreement, led to political protests in 2013-2014. discursive europeanization in ukrainian media beyond having two presidents who actively promoted the europeanization of ukraine, eurointegration was also widely promoted by the ukrainian media. for example, the national weekly newspaper dzerkalo tyznya (mirror weekly), extensively covered the topic of the eu and ukraine’s prospective membership in the first two years after the orange revolution. almost every issue from january to early july covered the eu, with generally positive coverage. out of 51 issues in 2005, the eu was mentioned 23 times on the front pages.10 terms including “positive signal”, ‘membership”, “hope”, “the agreement”, and “community” were mentioned in the titles of the articles. such positive coverage continued in 2006, when the words eu, eurointegration, and european were mentioned 28 times on the front pages. in 2007, the year when the orange coalition collapsed, and the public was disappointed with the performance of the orange team government, there was a decline in the coverage of the topic of the eu to 20 times. titles such as “asian eu”, “the end of euro-federalism”, and “euro-chaos” were published by the newspaper. in 2008, the frequency of mentions increased to 27 times, which was almost at the 2006 level. titles such as “our future in the eu depends on ourselves”, “ukrainians want into the eu”, “in support of the eu plans”, and “perspectives of the visa dialogue with the eu” appeared in connection to the euro-integration. the coverage declined in 2009 and 2010, when the frequency was 25 and 16, respectively. the lowest frequency was observed in 2010, the year when viktor yanukovych was elected. the words eu and euro-integration were mentioned 16 times in 49 issues. the tone of coverage also changed. words such as “warning”, “scary”, “readmission”, “concern” and “rethink” were used in the titles of the articles about eu in the newspaper. interestingly, the word russia was mentioned twice in the titles of the articles about eu in 2010. in the three years leading to the euromaidan, the frequency of use of the phrases eu and eurointegration increased to 23, 19, and 26. however, it never reached the level of 2006. the coverage was also more critical of the ukrainian government than previously. titles such as “yanukovych closed a window to europe”, “europe gave ukraine d for the fight against corruption”, and “eu asked kyiv to stop selective justice” appeared. the name of former prime minister tymoshenko, who was imprisoned in 2011, appeared four times in the titles of the articles about the eu. in 2013, the newspaper coverage of the eu was intensive, especially in the months leading to the eu summit in vilnius. titles included, “the right choice – eu”, “by foot to the eu”, “subway to europe”, “european parliament recommends signing”, and “in europe step by step-from visa-free to the association”. articles informed the public about the importance of signing the association agreement, thus increasing pressure on the government to sign it. 10 the search words were the same as for the analysis of the presidential speeches: “eurosoyuz” (european union), “europa” (europe), “europeyskyy” (european) and “eurointegratsiya” (euro-integration). 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: the coverage of the eu by mirror weekly, 2005-2013 data source: the figure was created by the author based on the analysis of the frequency of the articles on the front pages of the newspapers. the articles for 2013 did not include the month of december when euromaidan started. the ukrainian media not only raised awareness of the ‘europeanization’ in ukraine after the orange revolution, but they informed ukrainians about the choices of the ukrainian government concerning the eu. hence, favorable coverage of the eu and ukraine’s potential to join the eu may have influenced citizens’ perceptions of ‘belonging’ to the eu after the orange revolution. the negative and more pessimistic tone about ukraine’s prospects in the eu in the years leading to the euromaidan, combined with criticism of the government’s ineffectiveness, could have made citizens more willing to unite against the government in 2013. citizens’ confidence in the eu and political identities citizens’ perceptions of the eu, and their degree of identification with the eu, differed over time. the results of the world values survey (wvs) before and after the orange revolution (1996 and 2006) and the 2008 european values (ev) survey of public opinion in ukraine showed that the percentage of citizens who had “great deal or quite a lot” of confidence in the eu increased from 43.5 percent in 1996 to 48.5 percent in 2006. in 2008, confidence in the eu decreased by 10 percent to 38.5 percent, the lowest since 1996. importantly, the majority of ukrainians nationwide did not have confidence in the eu. figure 3: confidence in the european union, 1996 2008 data source: the figure was created by the author based on the results of online analysis of the wvs (1996, 2006) and evs (2008) in ukraine. the survey question asked was: “i am going to name a number of organizations. for each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” the [european union]. across the regions, western ukraine, due to its history and closer geographic proximity to the eu,11 had the highest level of confidence in the eu, with 70.1 percent expressing high confidence in the eu. the lowest confidence was in eastern and southern ukraine, regions that historically 11 the region of galicia (western ukraine) was part of austro-hungarian empire and later poland. 23 28 20 27 25 16 23 19 26 0 10 20 30 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 number of articles 43.5 48.5 38.5 56.5 51.5 61.5 0 50 100 1996 2006 2008 a great deal/quite a lot not very much/none at all 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 belonged to the territories of the russian empire prior to the 1917 revolution, and to the soviet union after 1921. these also were the regions that experienced the largest decline in the level of confidence in the eu between 1996 and 2006. young citizens expressed high levels of confidence in the eu in 1996, but not in 2006. in 2006, the highest confidence in the eu was found in the 30-49 year-olds, (the group that was 18-25 in 1996). before and after the orange revolution, ukrainians with the highest level of education (university complete) expressed the highest level of confidence in the eu in comparison to those with primary and secondary level of education. table 1: confidence in the eu (region, education and age) 19962006 1996 region western eastern central southern a great deal/quite a lot 70.1 55.2 66.9 65.5 age 18-25 26-36 36-47 48-58 59-69 a great deal/quite a lot 80.3 71.4 79.5 72.9 71.4 education primary secondary university complete a great deal/quite a lot 60.4 74.3 75.5 2006 region western eastern central southern a great deal/quite a lot 82.8 37.1 57.7 53.6 age up to 29 30-49 50 and up a great deal/quite a lot 54 61.4 54.6 education primary secondary university complete a great deal/quite a lot 12.2 52.9 68 2008 region western eastern central southern a great deal/quite a lot 70.5 26.3 44.2 23 age a great deal/quite a lot education primary secondary university complete a great deal/quite a lot 18.2 31.6 71.4 data source: created by the author based on data from wvs and evs. the question was asked as followed: “i am going to name a number of organizations. for each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? the [european union]. the table represents the category “a great deal” and ‘quite a lot” combined. public opinion regarding the potential membership in the eu after the orange revolution, revealed differences based on age, education, language at home, and region of residence. respondents with higher levels of education, and who spoke ukrainian at home supported the membership in the eu. the lowest support was observed in the eastern and southern regions and among those who spoke russian as the primary language at home. table 2: membership in the eu, 2008 education primary incomplete secondary secondary complete secondary and specialized university incomplete university complete would vote in favor 20.3 40.7 44.7 38.4 46.4 45.1 would vote against 23.2 23.1 30.9 27.3 30.4 28.3 age 18-29 30-44 45-59 60+ would vote in favor 45 41.2 41.7 35.7 would vote against 22.1 31.6 28.1 28.4 language at home ukrainian russian would vote in favor 52.5 27.2 would vote against 17.3 38.6 region western central southern eastern kyiv would vote in favor 78.8 72 44.7 38.4 77.8 would vote against 21.2 28 55.3 61.6 22.2 data source: table created by the author based on data files from ifes (2008). 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 the next step in examining political identities is to assess whether citizens’ level of confidence in the eu was associated with their political orientations and actions. table 3 illustrates that ukrainians who expressed a prominent level of confidence in the eu reported higher levels of interest in politics, higher levels of interpersonal trust, and higher levels of political participation. they also had a higher level of national pride in comparison to those who did not have confidence in the eu. higher confidence in the eu was also correlated with a higher level of intolerance for accepting bribes. these differences in political orientations of ukrainians increased in 2006. the results of the chi-square test of independence indicated that there were relationships between confidence in the eu and political values and orientations in 1996 and 2006 that were statistically significant for some categories. for example, confidence in the eu in 1996 was positively correlated with the following characteristics and actions: trust in people of another religion and race, intolerance for accepting a bribe, signing a petition and attending peaceful demonstrations. in 2006, confidence in the eu was positively correlated with membership in different forms of organizations (labour unions, art clubs, and charitable and professional organizations) as well as with interpersonal trust and participation in political activities table 3: confidence in the eu/political orientations, values and actions, 1996-2006 data source: table was created by the author based on the data filed from wvs (1996, 2006). the cases were selected in two groups:1 (great deal and/ a lot) and 2 (not very much, not at all). for a level of trust, the percentage represents those who answered, “trust completely” and “somewhat” combined. for questions on justifiability, the percentage represents those who answered category 1never. (the questions were recorded from 1 to 10, where 1 – never justified and 10-always justified). dv/iv eu (a great deal/a lot) eu (not very much/not at all) chisquare test p-value eu (a great deal/a lot) eu (not very much/not at all chisquare test pvalue 1996 1996 2006 2006 interest in politics (very interested and somewhat interested) 49.4 39.1 .000 58.5 46.2 .001 how proud of nationality? (very and quite proud) 67.7 60.3 .009 80.2 68.4 .000 membership of labor unions 36.6 37 .647 24.2 20.3 .310 membership of political party 2.4 2.4 .310 10.8 4.7 .003 membership of professional organizations 3.1 3.1 .262 8.4 6.4 .032 membership of church or religious organization 9.8 9.4 .186 20.9 14.6 .035 most people can be trusted 34.4 28.9 .026 36 23.6 .000 trust: your family n/a n/a 97.8 97.4 .742 trust: people you know personally n/a n/a 86.3 81.4 .151 trust: people you meet for the first time n/a n/a 23.9 16.1 .043 trust: people of another religion n/a n/a 51 29.5 .000 trust: people of another nationality n/a n/a 55.5 34 .000 justified: claiming government benefits for each you are not entitled (category 1never justified) 42 42.7 .738 43 35 .417 justified: avoiding a fare on public transport 27.8 27.9 .114 31.9 29.5 .209 justified: cheating on taxes 41.3 39.8 .036 38.2 33.3 .322 justified: someone accepting a bribe 72.7 67.4 .000 55.2 48.5 .032 justified: homosexuality 68.3 67 .087 51.6 51.8 .232 justified: abortion 30.4 27 .443 28.4 31.3 .020 justified: divorce 16.9 18.6 .265 18.5 19.9 .066 political action recently done: signing a petition 17.6 15.1 .000 8 8.1 .975 political action recently done: joining in boycotts 4.8 5.7 .124 3.3 3.3 .982 political action recently done: attending peaceful demonstrations 22 19.3 .005 23.3 12.6 .000 men make better political leaders than women? 62.8 60.3 .013 53 50.5 .370 having a strong leader is better 54.7 56.5 .002 66.5 63.7 .245 education (complete university) 23.4 22.9 .839 35.6 25.6 .037 number of cases 955 548 361 396 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 why are these findings important? ukrainians who had confidence in the eu showed more democratic political orientations in comparison to those who did not have confidence or who had low confidence in the eu. ukrainians who expressed confidence in the eu were more politically aware, political competent, and consequently politically active. these are orientations that perceived as democratic (norris 1999; 2011). they are also orientations that are associated with values and norms that are promoted by the eu. as stated in 1993 at the copenhagen european council on the eu membership, “[m]embership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities and market economy” (european council 1993,13). moreover, according to kataryna wolczuk, “[w]hile there are significant cultural disparities within the eu, key shared european values – liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law – have been defined as what turns the participating states into a community” (2016, 64). it is evident that ukrainian citizens who had confidence in the eu expressed higher support for liberal values that are promoted by the eu. the association between the confidence in the eu and democratic political orientations of ukrainians after the orange revolution became even stronger. those who expressed higher confidence in the eu increased their trust in people, whereas those who had low or no confidence in the eu decreased their trust towards people. furthermore, the confidence in the eu in 2006 was positively correlated with the variable “i see myself as a citizen of the european union.” this indicates that those who expressed support for the eu also were more likely to perceive themselves as citizens of the european community. table 4: correlation between confidence in the eu and citizens’ perception of belonging to the eu, 2006 1 2 1. confidence in the eu … .446** 2. i see myself as a citizen of the eu .446** … note: *p<.05, **p<.01, p<.001, 2-tailed data source: table was created by the author based on the data filed from wvs 2006 ukrainians who had higher confidence in the eu not only possessed more democratic orientations and values, but they also perceived themselves as belonging to the “community of the european union” (schimmelfennig 2001). and although this group of citizens was in the minority in comparison to the whole population, they expressed values and orientations that are common to the eu normative principles. at the same time, the data showed no difference in stated tolerance of gender equality and homosexuality – attitudes that are associated with a population that is more accepting and are indicative of democratic changes (inglehart and welzel 2003). ukrainians also had high tolerance towards unlawful actions such as accepting bribes and cheating on taxes between 1996 and 2006, indicating that they have not developed strong preferences for the normative rules and principles of obedience. in the year of 2013, when asked if ukraine would be better off if it had closer economic relations with europe or russia, 39.1 percent of ukrainians chose europe and 37.3 percent chose russia. however, when testing for correlations between support for europe or russia and political orientations and values, the results show that those who chose closer collaboration with europe once again had higher level of education, were younger, were more often employed full time, and spoke ukrainian at home. they also expressed higher interest in politics and political activities. the biggest difference was observed in responses relating to the justification of actions such as limiting the rights of citizens to protest and limiting freedom of the media. the majority of those 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 who supported closer collaboration with russia (82.7 percent and 72.3 percent) agreed with limitations to these freedoms. among those who supported closer collaboration with europe, only 17.3 percent and 27.2 percent agreed with such limitations. this group of citizens also expressed higher levels of political efficacy and support for democratic freedoms – core values of the european union community. table 5: support for eu versus russia and political orientations, values and actions, 2013 dv/iv europe russia chi-square, p value interest in politics (very interested and somewhat interested) 65 56.2 .006 membership of labor unions 7.1 11.7 .000 membership of political party 1.4 4.6 .000 membership of church or religious organization 1 .3 .000 justified: limit the rights of citizens to protest (category 1justified) 17.3 82.7 .000 justified: limit freedom of the media 27.2 72.3 .000 justified: limit authority of the courts 41.7 58.3 .081 it is more important that political leaders maintain order than protect democratic rights of citizens (strongly agree and somewhat agree) 38 65.1 .000 how necessary are non-government organizations or ngos for ukraine (essential and necessary combined) 87.3 80.3 .001 people like you can have influence on decisions made by the government (strongly agree and somewhat agree) 23.5 16.7 .078 i have a role to play in solving problems in my country (strongly agree and somewhat agree) 25.3 20.2 .030 political action recently done: signing a petition 8 10.6 .104 political action recently done: attending peaceful demonstrations or protests 17.7 10.2 .002 political action recently done: using social media to express your views on political issues 8.3 3.2 .000 what is your employment (full time at one job) 38.5 37.9 .000 education (complete university) 33.8 25.2 .000 age group .000 18-29 30 16.1 30-44 30.3 26.9 45-59 21.2 23 60+ 18.5 34 number of cases 528 498 1026 data source: table was created by the author based on the data filed from ifes (2013). the cases were selected in two groups:1 (closer collaboration with europe) and 2 (closer collaboration with russia). for questions on justifiability, the percentage represents those who answered category 1 justified. these findings may help to explain the november 2013 protests following president yanukovych’s decision to postpone the signing of the association agreement with the eu. those citizens who supported closer collaboration with europe, according to the data, possessed intolerance towards injustice and corruption and supported democratic freedoms, which are the core principles of the eu. in combination with a higher level of interest in politics, and higher levels of political efficacy and participation, they could express their readiness to stand for their values and for their place in the european community.12 yet the official europeanization on the part of the eu, and the ukrainian government’s implementation of political and economic reforms that would speed up the process of country’s democratization, was missing. 12according to olga onuch (2014), who interviewed 1304 protesters between 26 november, 2013 and 10 january, 2014 in kyiv, the early protesters solely focused on supporting closer eu ties. 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 conclusion the conditionality rules that were applied by the eu before the 2004 enlargement were based on official criteria of assessment and unofficial rules of belonging to europe. although they were not easy to achieve, the incentive of membership encouraged candidate countries to follow these rules. in ukraine, after the orange revolution, the eu refrained from the use of active leverage towards ukraine, which would have required particular programs and policies for future implementation. instead, the eu employed soft power of membership aspiration, built on a commitment to shared values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, without the promise of potential membership (kubicek 2017). although ukraine’s future membership in the eu was not discussed, the discourse of ukraine’s europeanization was actively promoted and implemented within the country. as this research has demonstrated, the idealistic image of the eu and its prosperity was actively promoted by president yushchenko and later president yanukovych as well as by the ukrainian media. both presidents used the idea of ukraine’s future within the eu for political and electoral purposes. it was built on the ideas of european values and beliefs and their similarities with ukrainian values and orientations and through the enticing practical possibility of visa-free travel to countries of the schengen zone for ukrainians. a comparison of political orientations of ukrainians based on their level of confidence in the eu before and after the orange revolution showed that there was a correlation between confidence in the eu and more democratic political orientations. some ukrainians reported increased confidence in the eu as well as identification with eu liberal values such as support for democratic freedoms and rights, and intolerance of injustice. those who showed higher confidence in the eu had a higher level of interest in politics, higher membership in the socio-political groups, higher political participation, tolerance, and level of trust towards other people. the confidence in the eu was also positively correlated with citizens’ perception of their belonging to the eu. the highest level of confidence in the eu was observed among the young citizens who possessed high levels of education, resided in western or central regions, and were fully employed. this group of citizens also expressed high level of political awareness, political efficacy, and political participation in 2013, the year of euromaidan. at the same time, ukrainians expressed a mixed of materialist and post-materialist orientations, which are associated with lesser developed democracies and unstable economies (inglehart and welzel 2003). the main findings of this research indicate that the eu soft power of attractiveness was an effective tool that was used by political elites and media in ukraine to promote discursive europeanization without the implementation of formal europeanization, which was too costly to achieve without strong incentives from the eu. in these circumstances, it is essential to increase the credibility of political and economic conditionally of the eu by offering a membership perspective. otherwise the eu is missing an opportunity to increase its transformative impact (börzel and schimmelfennig 2017) and domestic elites may take much longer time to introduce reforms and fulfil the requirements of the eu (moravcsik and vachudova 2005) because “[t]he cultural and legal dimensions of inclusion do not compensate for the geopolitical exclusion” (wolczuk 2016, 70). 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 references averre derek. 2005. “russia and the european union: convergence or divergence?” european security 14 (2): 175-202. bbc news. 2006. “the press in ukraine.” updated october 31, 2006. accessed january 6, 2020. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4073375.stm. börzel, tanja, and yasemin pamuk. 2012. “pathologies of europeanisation: fighting corruption in the southern caucasus.” west european politics 35 (1): 79–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.631315. börzel, tanja a. 2015. “the noble west and the dirty rest? western democracy promoters and illiberal regional powers.” democratization 22 (3): 519-35. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.1000312. börzel, tanja a. and bidzina lebanidze. 2017. “the transformative power of europe: beyond enlargement: the eu’s performance in promoting democracy in its neighbourhood.” east european politics 33 (1): 17-35. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2017.1280473. börzel, tanja a. and frank schimmelfennig. 2017. “coming together or drifting apart? the eu’s political integration capacity in eastern europe.” journal of european public policy 24 (2): 278-96. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1265574. casier, tom. 2011. “the eu’s two-track approach to democracy promotion: the case of ukraine.” democratization 18 (4): 956-977. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.584734. council of european union. 1993. “european council in copenhagen – conclusions of the presidency.” 21-22 june 1993. accessed may 10, 2019. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf. ____. 2009. “joint declaration of the prague eastern partnership summit.” prague, may 7. accessed august 24, 2018. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31797/2009_eap_declaration.pdf delegation of the european union to ukraine. 2013.“16th eu-ukraine summit: joint statement.” 26.02.2013. accessed december 25, 2019. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/2013_ 02_25_1_en.htm. dencik, lina. 2011. media and global civic society. london: palgrave macmillan. european commission. 2009a. “communication from the commission to the european parliament and the council. taking stock of the european neighborhood policy (enp). progress report ukraine.” accessed july 09, 2017. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/depa/dv/depa_20100610 _05_/depa_20100610_05_en.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31797/2009_eap_ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31797/2009_eap_declaration.pdf http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/2013_02_25_1_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/2013_02_25_1_en.htm https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/depa/dv/depa_20100610_05_/depa_20100610_05_en.pdf https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/depa/dv/depa_20100610_05_/depa_20100610_05_en.pdf 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 ____. 2009b. “eu-ukraine association agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the association agreement.” european commission association agenda. accessed june 10, 2017.http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/2010_eu_ukraine_association_agenda _en.pdf. ____. 2005a. “eu-ukraine summit, kiev, 1 december 2005.” accessed may18, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_05_337. ____. 2012. “implementation of the european neighborhood policy in ukraine. progress in 2011 and recommendations for action.” may 15, 2012. accessed june 24, 2017. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1292439/2016_1338190766_progress-report-ukraineen.pdf. ____. 2013. “implementation of the european neighborhood policy in ukraine. progress in 2012 and recommendations for action.” brussels, march, 20, 2013. accessed december 25, 2019. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1001a639-cc45-4229-9b749af140bdf84b. ____. 2008. “implementation of the european neighborhood policy in 2007. progress report ukraine.” accessed may18, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2008/en/2-2008-402-en-1-0.pdf. ____. 2005b. “the commission proposes negotiations with ukraine on short-stay schengen visas.” september15, 2005. accessed may 26, 2017. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_ip-05-1142_en.htm. ____. 2003. “wider europe — neighborhood: a new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbors.” november 3, 2003. accessed june 10, 2017. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf. ____. “european neighborhood policy and enlargement negotiations. conditions for membership.” accessed november 15, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en. ____. “accession criteria. european neighborhood policy and enlargement negotiations.” updated june 12, 2016. accessed july 9, 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm. european communities, council and commission. 1998. “partnership and co-operation agreement between the european communities and their member states, and ukraine.” 98/149/ec, ecsc, euratom. gawrich, andrea, inna melnykovska, and rainer schweickert. 2009. “neighbourhood europeanization through enp: the case of ukraine.” journal of common market studies 48 (5): 1209-1235. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02110.x. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/2010_eu_ukraine_association_agenda_en.pdf http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/2010_eu_ukraine_association_agenda_en.pdf https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1292439/2016_1338190766_progress-report-ukraine-en.pdf https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1292439/2016_1338190766_progress-report-ukraine-en.pdf https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1001a639-cc45-4229-9b74-9af140bdf84b https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1001a639-cc45-4229-9b74-9af140bdf84b https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2008/en/2-2008-402-en-1-0.pdf http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ip-05-1142_en.htm http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ip-05-1142_en.htm http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02110.x 82 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 hansen, flemming splidsboel. 2006. “the eu and ukraine: rhetorical entrapment.” european security 15 (2): 115-35. herrmann, richard k., thomas risse, and marilynn b. brewer. 2004. transnational identities. becoming european in the eu. new york: rowman & littlefield. hobolt, sara binzer and sylvain brouard. 2011. “contesting the european union? why the dutch and the french rejected the european constitution.” political research quarterly 64 (2): 309-322. inglehart, ronald. 1997. modernization and postmodernization: cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies. new jersey: princeton university press. inglehart, ronald and christian welzel. 2003. “political culture and democracy: analyzing cross level linkages.” comparative politics 36 (1): 61-79. jarvie, emily. 2017. “the limit of the eu soft power in ukraine.” euroscope: world edition, march 7. accessed october 10, 2018. http://euroscopeworld.mediajungle.dk/2017/03/07/the-limit-of-eu-soft-power-in-ukraine/. keane, jonh. 2003. global civil society? new york: cambridge university press. kubicek, paul. 2017. “dancing with the devil: explaining the european union’s engagement with ukraine under viktor yanukovych.” journal of contemporary european studies 25 (2): 143-62. ____. 2009. “problems of post-post-communism: ukraine after the orange revolution.” democratization 16 (2): 323-343. langbein, julia and kataryna wolczuk. 2012. “‘convergence without membership? the impact of the european union in the neighbourhood: evidence from ukraine.” journal of european public policy 19 (6): 863-81. lavenex sandra and frank schimmelfennig. 2011. “eu democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from leverage to governance?” democratization 18 (4): 885-909. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.584730. lehne, stefan. 2014. time to reset the european neighbourhood policy. washington, d.c.: carnegie endowment for international peace. accessed january 21, 2020. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/time_reset_enp.pdf. macfarlane, nil and anand menon. 2014. “the eu and ukraine.” survival 56 (3): 95-101. moskalenko oleksandr, and streltsov volodymyr. 2015. “the european parliament in the euukraine relations from independence to orange revolution.” eastern journal of european studies 6 (2): 111-29. 83 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 national institute of strategic studies (niss). 2013. “annual address of president yanukovych to the parliament and people of ukraine.” http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/poslannia_2013-c7954.pdf. nielsen, kristian l. 2013. “eu soft power and the capability-expectations gap.” journal of contemporary european research 9 (5): 723-39. neumann, iver b. 1998. “european identity, eu expansion, and the integration/exclusion nexus.” alternatives: global, local, political 23 (3): 397-416. nizhnikau, ryhor. 2015. “institutional change in the eastern neighborhood: environmental protection and migration policy in ukraine.” southeast european and black sea studies 15 (4): 495–517. norris, pippa. 1999. critical citizens: global support for democratic governance. new york: oxford university press. ____. 2011. democratic deficit: critical citizens revisited. new york: cambridge university press. nye, joseph s. jr. 2008. “public diplomacy and soft power.” the annals of the american academy of political and social science 616 (1): 94-109. ____. 2004. soft power. power in the global information age. london: routledge. onuch, olga. 2014. “who were the protesters?” journal of democracy 25 (3): 44-51. organization for security and co-operation in europe (osce). 2005. “ukraine: presidential election, 31 october, 21 november and 26 december 2004.final report.” accessed july 16, 2017. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674. ____. 2010. “ukraine’s presidential election, 17 january and february 7, 2010. final report.” accessed september 20, 2017. “http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/67844. pan, philip p. 2010. “ukraine to extend russian naval base lease, pay less for natural gas.” washington post, april 22, 2010. accessed june 22, 2017. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/21/ar2010042103836.html. postanova verkhovnoyi rady. 2007. “pro shchorichne poslannya presydenta.” n27, art. 378. accessed february 20, 2018. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1011-16. pridham, geoffrey. 2011. “ukraine, the european union and the democracy question.” romanian journal of european affairs 11(4): 1835. raik, kristi. 2004. “eu accession of central and eastern european countries: democracy and integration as conflicting logics.” east european politics and societies 18 (4): 567–94. http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/poslannia_2013-c7954.pdf http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/67844 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/21/ar2010042103836.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/21/ar2010042103836.html 84 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 risse, thomas, james caporaso, and maria green cowles. 2001. “europeanization and domestic change. introduction.” in transforming europe: europeanization and domestic change, edited by m. cowles, j. caporaso and t. risse, 1-20. ithaca, ny: cornell university press. sasse, gwendolyn. 2008. “the european neighbourhood policy: conditionality revisited for the eu's eastern neighbours.” europe-asia studies 60 (2): 295-316. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130701820150. schimmelfennig, frank. 2005. “the community trap: liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the eastern enlargement of the european union.” in the politics of european union enlargement: theoretical approaches, edited by frank schimmelfennig and ulrich sedelmeier 142-171. london: routledge. ____. 2001. “the community trap: liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the eastern enlargement of the european union.” international organization 55 (1): 47-80. schimmelfennig, frank and ulrich sedelmeier. 2005. the europeanization of central and eastern europe. new york: cornel university press. sedelmeier, ulrich. 2012. “is europeanisation through conditionality sustainable? lock-in of institutional change after eu accession.” west european politics 35 (1): 20-38. smith, karen. 2005. “the outsiders: the european neighbourhood policy.” international affairs (royal institute of international affairs 1944-) 81 (4): 757-73. smith, nicholas ross. 2015. “the eu and russia's conflicting regime preferences in ukraine: assessing regime promotion strategies in the scope of the ukraine crisis.” european security 24 (4): 525-40. solonenko, iryna. 2009. “external democracy promotion in ukraine: the role of the european union.” democratization 16 (4): 709-31. szostek, joanna. 2014. “russia and the news media in ukraine: a case of ‘soft power’?” east european politics and societies and cultures 28 (3): 463-86. tuomioja, erkki. 2009. “the role of soft power in the eu common foreign policy.” international symposium on cultural diplomacy, accessed may 20, 2019. http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/articles/speakers/detailed/erkkituomioja/erkki-tumioja_-_the-role-of-soft-power-in-eu-common-foreign-policy.pdf. transparency international. 2005. “transparency international corruption perceptions index 2005.” accessed may 15, 2020. http://www.icgg.org/downloads/ti_press_release_05.pdf. ukrayinska pravda. 2005. “inaugural address of the president of ukraine viktor yushchenko to the ukrainian people on independence square,” 24 january 2005. accessed may 17, 2020. https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2005/01/23/3006391/. http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/articles/speakers/detailed/erkki-tuomioja/erkki-tumioja_-_the-role-of-soft-power-in-eu-common-foreign-policy.pdf http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/articles/speakers/detailed/erkki-tuomioja/erkki-tumioja_-_the-role-of-soft-power-in-eu-common-foreign-policy.pdf http://www.icgg.org/downloads/ti_press_release_05.pdf https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2005/01/23/3006391/ 85 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 unian. 2010. “experts – plus and minus of kharkiv agreement between yanukovych and medvedev.” accessed june 24, 2017. http://www.unian.ua/politics/353679-eksperti-proplyusi-i-minusi-harkivskih-ugod-yanukovicha-medvedeva.html. vachudova, milada. 2009. “corruption and compliance in the eu’s post-communist members and candidates.” journal of common market studies 47 (9): 43-62. ____. 2005. europe undivided: democracy, leverage & integration after communism. new york: oxford university press. verkhovna rada ukrayiny. 2008. “annual address of president yushchenko to the parliament and people of ukraine.” http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0013100-08/print. ____. 2009. “annual address of president yushchenko to the parliament and people of ukraine.” http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0004100-09 . ____. 2010. “annual address of president yanukovych to the parliament and people of ukraine.” http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0003100-10. wilson, andrew. 2005. ukraine’s orange revolution. new haven, london: yale university press. wolczuk, katerina. 2016. “ukraine and europe: reshuffling the boundaries of order.” thesis eleven 136 (1): 54-73. ____. 2009. “implementation without coordination: the impact of eu conditionality on ukraine under the european neighborhood policy.” europe-asia studies 61 (2): 187-211. http://www.unian.ua/politics/353679-eksperti-pro-plyusi-i-minusi-harkivskih-ugod-yanukovicha-medvedeva.html http://www.unian.ua/politics/353679-eksperti-pro-plyusi-i-minusi-harkivskih-ugod-yanukovicha-medvedeva.html http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0013100-08/print http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0004100-09 http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0003100-10 86 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 64-86 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 not supposed to be born? narratives of unwanted pregnancy, impossible motherhood, and children born of war rape in germany and bosnia and herzegovina1 agatha schwartz, university of ottawa christabelle sethna, university of ottawa danielle lyn carron, carleton university abstract this article examines the intergenerational impact of sexual violence in conflict zones by drawing from two published literary narratives—the german wartime diary by anonymous, a woman in berlin, and the novel based on women’s testimonies of war rape and unwanted pregnancies in bosnia by slavenka drakulić, s.: a novel about the balkans—in addition to published testimonies and unpublished interview data by children born of war rape (cbowr) in germany and bosnia and herzegovina. applying feminist narrative analysis, the authors demonstrate the situation of “impossible motherhood” and the experiences of children who were not supposed to be born. the article focuses on the narrative process marked by trauma but also by agency and resilience to challenge dominant stories of war and unwanted pregnancy following rape in armed conflict. the authors propose a resolution for tensions around the ethnic and national identity of cbowr along what they call maternal lineage as opposed to the imposition of the children’s stigmatized paternal heritage. 1 this work was supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (sshrc) under grant number 430-2016-00232, titled “‘children of the enemy’: narrative constructions of identity following wartime rape and transgenerational trauma in post-wwii germany and post-conflict bosnia” with agatha schwartz as the principal investigator and christabelle sethna, mythili rajiva, and tatjana takševa as coinvestigators. danielle lyn carron was one of the student researchers hired to work on this project. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 introduction the appearance of american second-wave feminist susan brownmiller’s blockbuster, against our will: men, women and rape coincided with agitation for women’s reproductive rights and opposition to american involvement in a war that encompassed the rape and murder of vietnamese civilians as well as the birth of vietnamese children fathered by american soldiers (brownmiller 1975). significantly, brownmiller held that in peacetime and wartime, rape is a traumatic experience common to women, rape in wartime is a magnification of rape in peacetime, and the sequelae of rape, apart from injury, disease, and death, are unwanted pregnancy, abortion, and the birth of children. in a recent article on the use of sexual violence in the current war in ukraine, acclaimed croatian writer and feminist slavenka drakulić reiterates some of brownmiller’s findings, emphasizing that in armed conflict, rape is used as a weapon of war (drakulić 2022). drakulić establishes a parallel between ukraine and two earlier episodes of sexual violence in conflict zones, namely the mass rape during the war in former yugoslavia, especially in bosnia and herzegovina2 during the early 1990s, and the rape of german women at the end of wwii.3 between 1992 and 1995 in war-torn multi-ethnic bosnia, the serbian-led yugoslav army aided by local serb militia engaged in ethnic cleansing that included the systematic mass rape and forced impregnation of primarily bosniak (muslim) women (schwartz and takševa 2020; skjelsbaek 2012; snyder et al. 2006; stiglmayer 1994). at the time, the spotlight on bosnia brought renewed focus on the mass rape of german women at the end of wwii, primarily by members of the red army, which was controversial, given germany’s war guilt and responsibility for the holocaust (gebhardt 2015b; grossmann 1995, 2011). this article invokes these two episodes in twentieth-century european history using a selection of narratives to analyze the complex interplay of victimization and stigmatization on the one hand and agency and resilience on the other. the authors examine the far-reaching personal and social consequences of sexual violence against women in conflict zones, with an emphasis on unwanted pregnancy, abortion, and children born of war rape (cbowr). these themes are introduced through an analysis of two published literary narratives of war rape from the perspective of the women—the german wartime diary by anonymous, a woman in berlin (1954), and a novel based on the survivors’ testimonies in bosnia by drakulić, s.: a novel about the balkans (1999)—and through published and unpublished first-person narratives from elderly (in the case of germany) and young adult (in the case of bosnia) cbowr. while the specific categories to which these narratives belong may differ, they can all be subsumed under the umbrella term “life writing” as defined by suzette henke, who expands the category traditionally limited to autobiography to include memoirs, diaries, and letters but also various “personally inflected fictional texts” (henke 1998, xiii). taken together, these narratives shed light on the intergenerational impact of sexual violence in the context of what yana hashamova describes as “impossible motherhood” (hashamova 2012, 214). this concept wrestles with the tension between what the authors of this article call maternal lineage versus paternal heritage, thereby giving rise to the contested identities of cbowr and the possibility of a solution 2hereafter referred to as “bosnia” for brevity’s sake. 3similar to drakulić, daina s. eglitis also draws on the legacy of these two episodes of sexual violence in conflict to explain the use of rape as a strategy of war used by the russian forces in ukraine (eglitis 2022). 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 beyond the lines of ethnic and national divisions surrounding their existence. regardless of the different historical contexts and the decades that separate these two episodes of sexual violence in war as well as the generational gap between the two groups of cbowr, the similarities revealed in the narratives are remarkable.4 methods and methodologies as feminist scholars, the authors of this article seek to capture what is remembered, what is put into words, and what is left out of the narratives in order to understand how the narrators construct an image of an acceptable self that gives them agency over loss but also over dominant patriarchal discourses about war, violence, and ethnic and national identity. in addition to the published literary narratives in the english translations of anonymous and drakulić, a personal testimony—mundtot by jürgen schubert published in german—, a published collection of firstperson narratives translated from german into english as thistleflowers ̶ russian children in germany by a collective of the same name, and interview data from bosnian cbowr available online were used. finally, open-ended, semi-structured life history interviews (woods 2010) with some members of thistleflowers (distelblüten) were conducted in german between 2016 and 2017 by one of the authors of this article (schwartz). they were recorded, transcribed, and translated into english with the participation of other research team members. the broadly formulated interview questions allowed the participants to tell their stories on their terms and self-identify as they wished. the interviews met the requirements of the university of ottawa’s research ethics board. all data are used in a way that strictly respects the participants’ consent. the authors base their method of interpretation on a combination of feminist oral history and narrative methodology. feminist oral history emphasizes the importance of valuing women’s experiences in a patriarchal cultural context that has historically silenced and controlled their voices (anderson and jack 1991). according to marianne hirsch, it is about restoring “experiences and life stories that might otherwise remain absent from the historical archive” (hirsch 2012, 15). in order to access those stories, feminist researchers need to engage in “listening with the third ear” (anderson and jack 1991, 19) to better comprehend how difficult experiences may be avoided or expressed indirectly in a narrative. in analyzing such narratives, one must focus both on the “whats” and the “hows” of the narrative process. jaber f. gubrium and james a. holstein define the “whats” as the content and the themes encompassed by the narrative, while the “hows” are the ways through which the experiences related in the narrative are formulated (gubrium and holstein 2009, 7). despite the various narrative forms examined, the narratives are united by the fact that they are rooted in difficult memories around which “the will to tell a story cannot be taken for granted” and where “one can also easily think of situations where the facts of the narration are too painful or traumatic for direct expression” (slembrouck 2015, 247). therefore, listening with the third ear enables the researcher to understand the complex narrative interplay of trauma and loss but also resilience and survival. 4as other scholars have demonstrated, rape in war is a complex phenomenon and may not necessarily be used as a strategy in every episode of armed conflict (kulick 2022; wood 2010). however, regarding both wwii (beevor 2002; mühlhäuser 2017; roberts 2008) and the war in bosnia (allen 1996; snyder et al. 2006), it has been repeatedly argued that rape was used as a weapon of war, and the same has been said for numerous other episodes of armed conflict as well. the aim of this article, however, is not to further theorize sexual violence in war. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 rape as a weapon of war, cbowr, and impossible motherhood the mass rape of women in bosnia and rwanda in the 1990s heightened global awareness of sexual violence against women in conflict zones and its use as a weapon of war, perpetrated to violate the collective body of the enemy (card 1996; ivekovic and mostov 2002; seifert 1996). while rape in war had already been considered a war crime in wwii (albeit with few penalties for the perpetrators), it was at the international criminal tribunal for the former yugoslavia (icty 1993-2017) that for the first time, war rape was included as a crime against humanity. feminist interventions into the icty and the international criminal tribunal for rwanda (ictr 1994–2015) helped define rape as a means of perpetrating genocide through the interplay of misogyny, ethnic hatred, and racism in the systematic mass rape and forced impregnation of women (schwartz and takševa 2020). however, some researchers criticized the “homogenising narrative of rape as an instrument of the genocide” (buss 2009, 160) and the ways in which it reinforced gender and ethnic stereotypes along the victim and perpetrator line (simic 2012). although the definition of rape came under scrutiny in recent years—as it can mean oral, vaginal, or anal penetration with a body part or an object and may or may not involve coercion, violence, or the threat of violence (branche and virgili 2012; močnik 2018)—and it could be complicated by what anna hájková (2013) calls “sexual barter”, the authors’ attention is on one of the main outcomes of wartime sexual violence: unwanted pregnancies and cbowr.5 estimates of rape-related pregnancies are usually in the five percent range (gebhardt 2015a) but may be higher (lee 2017). although abortion may be legal in some countries in wartime, contraception and/or abortion services are often unavailable, illegal, or difficult to obtain in a timely fashion from medical personnel, making women especially vulnerable to an unwanted pregnancy resulting from rape (seto 2013; swiss and giller 1993). cbowr is a subcategory of children born of war (cbow), and according to researchers studying the intergenerational impact of sexual violence against women in conflict zones, it needs special consideration. while both categories of children face stigmatization and rejection (carpenter 2007, 2010; lee 2017; lee, glaesmer, and stelzl-marx 2021; lee and mochmann 2015; satjukow and gries 2015; stelzl-marx and satjukow 2015), cbowr face additional challenges given their violent conception (glaesmer 2015; roupetz, delic, and glaesmer 2021; schwartz 2020). in the words of virginia m. bouvier: “there is a tremendous knowledge gap surrounding the issue of children born of conflict-related sexual violence, and even less public policy to address the needs of these children” (bouvier 2016, 8). the derogatory names applied to cbowr in diverse conflicts—“russian brat” in germany or “chetnik bastard” in bosnia— signal the discrimination they face in common but also the patriarchal premium on what we call paternal heritage that is used by their mothers’ ethnic community to obscure, deny, or even obliterate their maternal lineage. the longstanding belief that paternity alone is responsible for the transmission of identity ethnicizes and nationalizes rape, setting cbowr apart from the ethnic identity of the mother (močnik 2020). 5similar research on men and boys has grown significantly in recent years (clark 1996; gebhardt 2015a; touquet and gorris 2016). however, the authors’ focus in this article is only on women. 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 the stigmatized paternity of cbowr defies the idea of nations as ethnically homogenous and works to abort cbowr from an ethnically “pure” national body. cbowr can be subjected to infanticide, abandonment, institutionalization, maternal neglect, or adoption. like their mothers, they can be rejected by their communities, their sense of belonging may be questioned, and their well-being compromised (lee 2017; mochmann 2017; roupetz, delic, and glaesmer 2021). in her exploration of drakulić’s s.: a novel about the balkans, hashamova asserts that mothers who raise such children are trapped in a situation of impossible motherhood. the term itself may sound misleading as it could suggest that mothering cbowr is inevitably an impossible task to accomplish, which is not always the case. what is implied in impossible motherhood is rather the struggle of loving one’s own flesh and blood because it is othered as the child of an ethnic “ultimate other” (hashamova 2012, 241) and due to the strong social pressures to reject and abandon children fathered by the enemy. the authors suggest that one possibility of resolving this difficult situation for both mother and child is to circumvent the patriarchal significance placed on paternity. the acceptance of maternity, albeit reluctant, can be accomplished only by the psychological and, eventually, legal erasure of the child’s paternal heritage and the mother’s and child’s sole identification with the child’s maternal lineage. this process, however, is a daunting task to the point of making mothering cbowr almost unfeasible. nena močnik elaborates on the impossibility of impossible motherhood for bosnian women rape survivors and their cbowr. the women’s struggle between their identity as a “war-rape survivor, on the one hand, and a mother, on the other” (italics in the original) (močnik 2020, 4) is exacerbated when they are unable to count on any emotional support, receive neither reparations nor public recognition, or are perceived to have been “sexually disgraced” (močnik 2020, 56). mothers of cbowr and cbowr themselves both risk being marked in terms of personal identity exclusively as casualties of war, and their plight can be instrumentalized for a host of reasons (i.e. to render defeated nations as more victim than victimizer, bring perpetrators to court, or demand justice and reparations) (helms 2013; močnik 2018, 2019). both mothers and children walk a tightrope between silence and speech, victim and survivor, passivity and agency as opposed to following, individually or collectively, heavily mediated and over-determined scripts of victimhood (schwartz and takševa 2020). while some demonstrate extraordinary resilience, it should not be downplayed that they often experience palpable traumatic outcomes affecting their physical and mental well-being across generations (močnik 2020). a woman in berlin and s.: a novel about the balkans the selected two narratives from the german and bosnian contexts, respectively, illustrate how sexual violence in conflict zones affects the women and the choices they face in dealing with its undesired outcomes, first and foremost, unwanted pregnancy and, subsequently, cbowr. through these narratives, the authors introduce and contextualize the themes discussed in this article. one of the best-known literary narratives dealing with wartime rape and its consequences is a woman in berlin by anonymous. the diary was first published in english in 1954 and in german in 1959 (after being translated into several languages) and republished 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 in germany posthumously in 2003.6 it has been called “one of the most important personal accounts ever written about the effects of war and defeat” (beevor 2005, xxi) and was used by max färberböck as the basis for his homonymous 2008 feature film anonyma – eine frau in berlin. however, despite this narratives’ relevance, the author’s credibility “was disputed, an all-too-common pattern in dealing with rape victims” (gebhardt 2016, 12). nazi germany had conducted a ferocious campaign on the eastern front that included german troops’ mass rape of women and the annihilation of jews, slavs, and communists (mühlhäuser 2010, 2017). by early january 1945, the red army’s counteroffensive had turned the tide of war. the author depicts the shelling, deprivations, and mass rape after the red army occupied berlin in late april 1945, some weeks before the capitulation of germany. the women of berlin tremblingly await the soviet army as their arrival is preceded by numerous accounts of rape— some by survivors who fled to berlin—on the eastern front. soviet soldiers are configured as rapacious “wolves,” ignorant “ivans,” and drunken “mongols,” reflecting years of racialized nazi anti-soviet propaganda (grossmann 1995b, 50). anonymous is surprised to find a russian-made condom in a room she was cleaning, admitting she “didn’t know they [russians] even knew there were such things. in any case, where german women were concerned, they didn’t feel it was worth the trouble” (anonymous 2005, 158). although she is convinced that she will not become pregnant, rumours circulate that “every second woman is,” followed by the reassurance that “you could go to anyone and have it taken care of,” (195) implying the existence of abortion providers who may or may not be medical personnel. the narrative leaves a gap, however, as to whether the narrator herself may eventually fall among the high percentage of women who became pregnant against their will. the diarist decides to protect herself from random attacks and humiliations by attaching herself to a soviet major. their personal relationship may be categorized as sexual barter as it shields anonymous from the predations of other soldiers and allows her access to much-needed resources while providing the major with the company of an educated woman. toward the end of the diary, anonymous, contrary to her earlier optimism regarding the improbability of pregnancy, visits a doctor who confirms that her period is late. the doctor attributes her late period to the fact that she, like many other malnourished women in wartime, may be calorie deficient and clouds the answer to anonymous’s question whether she provides abortions for pregnancies resulting from sexual violence in ambiguity: “it is better not to speak of such things” (246). in this brief episode, the narrator is likely an unreliable one. is it the doctor trying to shroud wartime abortions in silence, or is it the narrator herself who diverts the reader’s attention from a suspicion of unwanted pregnancy brushed off under the rationalization of calorie deficiency? after all, how could have numerous other calorie-deficient women become pregnant? it could well be that anonymous was pregnant and that the doctor performed an abortion on her, but admitting to it would have been taboo even for this unusually frank narrative. hence the innuendo: “it is better not to speak of such things.” more than half a century after the end of wwii and the publication of anonymous’ diary, drakulić published s.: a novel about the balkans, which also thematizes rape in war and 6 the authors of this article respect the author’s wish to refer to herself as anonymous although a german journalist made her alleged identity public following the posthumous new edition of the diary (schwartz 2015). 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 unwanted pregnancy but within the context of the war in bosnia. while the collapse of the soviet union led to the peaceful unification of divided germany, the politically independent socialist federal republic of yugoslavia was heading for a bloody breakup. following years of ethnic hatred propagated by the media during the 1980s, women’s bodies, along with abortion rights, became discursively manipulated in the creation of nationalist body politics (schwartz and takševa 2020; žarkov 2007). the brutal war that erupted in 1991 was fuelled by diverging political interests and tainted by ethnic cleansing that included mass rape perpetrated by all warring parties (serbs, croats, and bosniaks). serbian nationalist forces carried out the largest number of atrocities, particularly against bosniaks. part of this strategy was the systematic use of rape and forced impregnation (allen 1996; sharrat 2011). rape camps were established in hangars and other buildings (rajiva and schwartz 2018) where, according to various estimates, between 25,000 and 40,000 bosniak women were imprisoned, tortured, and raped, many of whom were released only after their pregnancies had progressed beyond the possibility of a safe abortion.7 these historical events are explored in drakulić’s fictionalized account of real-life stories in s: a novel about the balkans. the author chose the novel as a literary form so that readers could identify more closely with a central character constructed as a composite of narratives by women and girls who later testified about their own rapes (kabić 2012). a feature film directed by juanita wilson, based on the novel and entitled as if i am not there (following closely the croatian title of the novel, kao da me nema), was released in 2010. whereas the prospect of cbowr hovers ominously in the background of a woman in berlin, it is realized front and centre in s. the first two sentences of the novel read: “the child is lying naked in his cot. he is stretched out on a sheet, perfectly still, his arms and legs splayed, like someone surrendering” (drakulić 1999, 1). the story is told in flashbacks. like anonymous, s. is an educated, single, working woman. originally from multiethnic sarajevo, she is a teacher in a small muslim village in bosnia when serbian soldiers attack, round up the inhabitants and take them to a camp. many men and boys are killed, whereas the women and girls are imprisoned. some, including s., are placed in a “woman’s room” (8) and selected daily for gang rape, torture, and beatings. some disappear from the camp and are presumed dead. although the context in which the rapes happen is very different from the one in berlin, the women in both situations are locked into a space from which there is no escape. in s., it is the camp, whereas for anonymous and her neighbours, it is their apartment building and the occupied city where hiding from the rapist soldiers is rendered virtually impossible. in either scenario, the women are reduced, as argued by holger pötzsch, drawing on giorgio agamben’s concept of “bare life,” to bodies that become “disposable objects that can be mistreated or killed without legal consequences for the perpetrator” (pötzsch 2012, 20). s. believes initially that she will be spared because of her ethnic serb mother, but she soon grasps that she is considered muslim because her father is bosniak. here is clear proof of the overvaluation of paternity; despite the fact that s. self-identifies also through her maternal lineage, in the eyes of her ethnically divided community, the latter is rendered irrelevant. unlike the situation in a woman in berlin, where the rapists are from another country and culture, s. recognizes a few of the serbian soldiers as former neighbours 7 some research data indicate that croatian and serbian women in bosnia were also sexually abused and subjected to forced impregnation (helms 2013; stiglmayer 1994). 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 who speak her own language, reinforcing the extent of the collapse of civil society during the bosnian conflict. comparable to anonymous, s. deliberately seeks out a relationship with a high-ranking soldier—the camp’s commander—as a safeguard against sexual violation by others. although she calls it a form of self-preservation, she, too, remains conflicted about her actions of sexual barter. like anonymous, s. believes she cannot become pregnant because she and the other women stopped menstruating due to calorie deficiency, torture, and abuse. yet when the camp is emptied in a prisoner exchange and she becomes a refugee, first in zagreb and subsequently in stockholm, the croatian doctor who examines her confirms that not only is she pregnant but that, despite the abortion policies that were still in place at the time, her pregnancy is too advanced for a safe abortion. s. feels that the war continues in her womb, which no longer belongs to her. she develops no connection to the child growing inside her; she does not consider it her own and refers to it as a burden, a tumour, a disease, a parasite she carries as if she were “a mere receptacle, temporarily housing it, like a rent-a-womb” (italics in the original) (145). the paragraph from which this quotation, rendered in italics, is taken is written in first person. this technique is used in places throughout the narrative, suggesting that drakulić incorporated the words of actual survivors. although the two episodes of war rape thematized in a woman in berlin and in s. are separated historically, temporally, and geographically as well as being set in their distinctive cultural contexts, the treatment of women in times of conflict and the consequences they face are very similar. all s. can think about throughout this unwanted pregnancy is for the child to be stillborn, a subconscious desire for infanticide. f., one of s.’s roommates at the refugee camp in zagreb, kills her newborn by pressing the pillow over the little body. while s. does not see a future “for a being conceived by force, in hatred” (144), she resists the temptation to do the same, having “seen so much death that the very thought of it makes her sick” (5). initially agreeing to an adoption at the stockholm hospital where she gives birth, she decides to keep her infant son after noting his strong resemblance to her presumably murdered sister. by the end of the narrative, she surmises that only mothers can decide the future of such children, not their absent rapist fathers. she promises to tell her son that he is “her child, hers alone. that he has no father – because this is the truth” (199), reinforcing their bond by breastfeeding him. according to hashamova (2012), the embrace of these “manic defences” (241) is intended to erase psychologically the child’s paternity (what the authors of this article call paternal heritage), theoretically permitting s. to meet the challenges of impossible motherhood. the agency and resilience she is capable of tapping into despite the trauma haunting her come from the realization that she, a woman who has survived incredible violence, also has the power to show her own flesh-and-blood son “that the hate from which his life emerged can be transformed into love” (drakulić 1999, 199). while it is difficult for the mother to disentangle her love for her son from the trauma surrounding his conception, the mother-child bond becomes the means through which the maternal lineage serves to identify the child. abortion policies in germany and former yugoslavia in order to better contextualize the choices the women in the two above narratives face, one ought to understand the respective abortion policies that were in place in germany and yugoslavia at the time. in germany, it is estimated that between 860,000 and two million 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 women may have been raped by members of the red army but also by the western allies – american, canadian, french, and british forces (gebhardt 2015b, 2019; grossmann 2007; lilly 2007; sander and johr 1991-92). despite a ban against “fraternization” with the enemy, sexual violence as well as consensual relationships and sexual barter were common, and while marriages in the soviet zone were not possible, in the american zone, thousands of legal marriages were contracted (goedde 1999). whether through rape, sexual barter, or consensual romantic relationships—and despite a high rate of abortions—thousands of children were born. the basis for the german statute regarding abortion originated in the 1851 prussian civil code, outlawing all forms of abortion; it was adopted into the imperial penal code of the german empire in 1871 as paragraph 218 and remained in effect post-wwi under the weimar republic (telman 1998). while a constitutional revision in 1926 made limited revisions, permitting abortions under the strict medical indication of “endangerment to life,” all other rationalizations of abortions, including advertising of services, remained criminalized until the end of wwii (grossmann 1995a, 8). in nazi germany, pro-natalist measures encouraged healthy aryan german women and men to breed for the fatherland. access to sterilization and abortion services narrowed over time, and occasionally, the death penalty for abortionists was implemented (bock 1983; grossmann 1995a). however, racial hygiene laws not only interdicted sexual intercourse between so-called aryan germans and jews but encouraged compulsory sterilization and abortion as well as euthanasia for the mentally and physically disabled, jewish, roma, and mixed-race populations. however, all these measures did not stop the rape of jewish, roma, and slavic women by german troops (burds 2009; hedgepeth and saidel 2010; mühlhäuser 2017). pregnancies resulting from sexual contact between allied soldiers and german women toward the end and in the immediate aftermath of wwii introduced a “foreign” element into the german population (grossmann 1995b, 49). of particular concern were children fathered by african americans, although the same was true for children fathered by the soviets (brauerhoch 2015; stelzl-marx 2009). various priorities intersected in the debate over the legalization of abortion. women’s organizations called for the distribution of birth control and the introduction of a social indication into abortion legislation (grossmann 1995a). protestant leaders deemed abortion permissible to prevent the birth of foreign children in germany, while the catholic church remained staunchly opposed to the practice (schmidt-harzbach 1984). access to abortion varied by region. in bavaria (which was in the american military occupation zone), it was not only restricted by the stronghold of the catholic church but was also forbidden by the us military government. in august 1945, the bavarian government legalized abortion under strict medical necessity. however, by the end of 1946, abortions were only allowed if a rape could be proven and was reported within a week, but compliance with these logistical requirements was often unmanageable (gebhardt 2015b). in the soviet zone, the situation was more liberal. in berlin, as of may 1945, doctors could approve abortion into the late stages of pregnancy if the woman filled out an affidavit certifying she had been raped by a foreigner. women were required to describe their attacker, emphasize his ability to overpower them, and explain that they tried to resist (fehrenbach 1998). a berlin doctor recalled: “women came to me, and i helped them. other colleagues did so as well. they weren’t reported, they weren’t written down. these abortions were done and no one asked any questions” (schmidt-harzbach 1984, 60). this echoes the experience of anonymous and her conversation with the doctor. illegal abortions and, especially in rural settings, home remedies remained the most (even if not the most reliable) accessible option for women seeking to end a pregnancy, far outnumbering 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 legal or quasi-legal abortions in all occupational zones. however, objections and legal restrictions on abortion soon re-emerged (grossmann 1995a). unlike germany, in yugoslavia, abortion was legal as per medical indication since 1929 (kingdom of yugoslavia). post-wwii, socialist yugoslavia expanded this regulation rendering it available upon request. in 1969, abortion became freely available in the first trimester and was permissible at any stage of pregnancy related to the endangerment of the woman’s life. yet it was the 1974 constitution that formally enshrined access to contraception and fertility regulation, making the socialist federal republic of yugoslavia the first state to affirm it was “a human right to decide freely on childbirth” (kapor-stanulović and david 1999, 296-97). the eruption of the war in bosnia brought special provocations to established sexual health norms. unlike in wwii germany, forced impregnation and imprisonment past gestational limits for an abortion were intentional on the part of the perpetrators as a form of ethnic subjugation that would later be classified as a war crime and a means of genocide (lee 2017). the sparse availability of public healthcare within a war zone impacted the ability to terminate unwanted pregnancies. as in germany, some women procured their own miscarriages using traditional medicines (skjelsbaek 2012). although the yugoslav abortion legislation was still in place, the ongoing conflict presented restricting circumstances for both doctors and patients. as a result of the war, bosnian hospitals were frequently at capacity and lacking supplies, thus often unable to assist the women. those pregnant women who found their way to medical facilities may have undergone a journey that took months, ultimately preventing them from having an abortion due to gestational limits. drakulić’s novel illustrates this situation. still, abortions did take place; statistics for sarajevo showed that before and after the war, there were two births for every abortion, whereas, during the war, this ratio was reversed (disdarevićstojkanović 1999), suggesting that most women who were forcibly impregnated sought to end the pregnancy. the vast majority of women who carried their unwanted pregnancy to term relinquished the newborns after birth. post-delivery, they displayed relief noticeably distinct from prepartum states ranging from emotional numbness to depression and suicidal ideation. although the women also experienced other distressing events―detention, displacement, and the murder of family members―many rejected counselling and kept their rapes, abortions, and the children conceived as a result of rape a secret (kozaric-kovacic et al. 1995). what official reports often bypass, and what drakulić’s novel captures on the basis of real-life narratives, is the phenomenon of infanticide committed against cbowr when abortion was deliberately denied or unavailable under these extreme circumstances. cbowr in germany and bosnia: the struggle to affirm maternal lineage the authors of this article agree with hashamova that the ending of drakulićʼs novel could be construed as hopeful and interpret the central character’s acceptance of her newborn son as coming to terms with her trauma by rejecting the patriarchal premium placed on the child’s identity and prioritizing the maternal lineage. however, drakulić herself questioned what the acceptance of cbowr might mean for mother and child: “really, what do you tell such a child as he or she is growing up? the truth? imagine the child’s horror” (drakulić 1999, 8). within the context of impossible motherhood, even when the mothers maintain their silence about their ordeal, it is projected onto the children by their community and ultimately internalized by them, resulting in the phenomenon that “even if the parent never says a word, traumas may end up on 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 the shoulders of subsequent generations” (močnik 2020, 123). this mechanism of intergenerational trauma transmission was identified by aleida assmann as located in the transfer of embodied experience within families (quoted in hirsch 2012) and it has been observed by researchers specifically in the case of cbowr (haberkern 2021).8 despite their different historical, temporal, and geographic contexts, the experiences of cbowr in germany and bosnia show remarkable similarities in terms of the intergenerational transmission of trauma and, consequently, the strain of erasing psychologically (and ultimately legally) their paternal heritage at the expense of sole identification with their maternal lineage. until recently, in germany, the truth of cbowr (and cbow in general) was not part of cultural memory. these now elderly adults have begun to break the silence surrounding their origins mainly as a result of research interest in them, which continues to this day as they are part of the oldest surviving generation of cbowr.9 barbara stelzl-marx states that “russian child” or “russian brat” were common abusive words into the 1960s (stelzl-marx 2009, 351).10 it is, therefore, hardly surprising that members of the thistleflowers group chose silence well into their old age; it only began to crack given the socio-political shifts that took place after 1990 with the end of the cold war era. particularly with the media coverage of the war in former yugoslavia, german psychologists and researchers began to show interest in the remaining german survivors of sexual violence in wwii opening up a new research field that quickly began to expand: cbowr (mochmann 2017). the first “russian child” to go public with his story was jürgen schubert in 1999. born in 1946 in north rhine-westphalia in west germany to a german refugee woman from silesia, he was treated as a “war casualty” (schubert 1999, 72) and labelled the “child of a criminal” (schubert 1999, 83) carrying the stigma of germany’s defeat and his mother’s rape by a soviet officer. before his passing in 2017, schubert joined the thistleflowers group founded in 2014 by winfried behlau. group members view themselves as hardy thistle flowers, symbolizing both trauma and resilience. their goal is to raise public awareness of their and other cbowr’s “shadow children” existence (behlau 2015, 6). in his memoir, schubert explicitly stated that his motivation to go public with his story was rooted in his desire to help war children of younger generations, specifically those born as a result of the war in bosnia, so that “they don’t have to go through the same experiences” (schubert 1999, 80). unlike schubert, behlau, and the younger generation of the bosnian cbowr, many of the thistleflowers members wish to retain their anonymity and do not use their full names, which reflects their decades-long stigmatization. 8 lisa haberkern lists various terms that are used to refer to trauma transmission across generations (secondary traumatization, intergenerational transmission, transgenerational transmission etc.). as the authors of this article only looked at the trauma transmission between mother and child, the term intergenerational transmission is more appropriate than transgenerational transmission, which implies several generations. 9the recent four-year project eurowarchild launched in oslo in 2022 is seeking the participation of both german (representing the oldest generation) and bosnian cbow (including cbowr), in addition to a third, youngest generation of children fathered in conflict situations – the children fathered by european fighters of isis. see university of oslo. “eurowarchild.” accessed march 10, 2023. https://www.stk.uio.no/english/research/projects/eurowarchild./ 10unless otherwise specified, all translations from german and bosnian sources are by schwartz. 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 in 2015, behlau edited a volume by the same name as the group containing members’ individual life narratives. it was published in german and translated into english that same year. in this publication and in various interviews, behlau made public that he was conceived as a result of a russian soldier’s rape of his mother and, like schubert, was referred to as a “war casualty” in his birth certificate: “that was the same as if a house had collapsed somewhere and a damage had arisen, i was now just like that property damage” (interview with behlau 2016). for the group’s members, in addition to raising public awareness about their and other cbowr’s existence, the process of communicating and composing their life narratives has opened up a space for working through their traumatic memories. behlau, who had a difficult relationship with his mother during his youth, stated, “and only since i have now, so to speak, opened up…there is something that fell off, so that i think i’ve totally changed my way of dealing with people” (interview with behlau 2016). unlike behlau, ulrike prefers to use her first name only. she was a child given up for adoption at age three and raised by a loving couple. like behlau, ulrike emphasizes how speaking and writing about her past has helped her come to terms with her conflicted feelings about her identity: “and since 2007, i have written down about thirty pages of my biography. i have also been writing a diary for many, many years. and i would say that writing helped me a lot to express my feelings” (interview with ulrike 2017). the importance of speaking up and shaking off trauma and stigma is thus a process of empowerment and is also emphasized by cbowr in bosnia. these children were labelled “chetnik bastards,” “malignant cells of cancer,” and “mistakes of war” (“rede vor der un” 2019). now young adults, aided by the growing national and international media and research interest in cbowr, they began organizing at a far earlier age than their german counterparts and founded the ngo zaboravljena djeca rata – forgotten children of war in 2018 with the assistance of bosnian psychotherapist amra delić. it brings together bosnian cbowr and cbow, the latter including those fathered by peacekeepers, born of forced marriages between members of hostile armies and children of women trafficked in conflict zones (begagić 2018). they have led region-wide campaigns “advocating for rights for the children of war and women survivors of all ethnic groups” (schwartz and takševa 2020, 135). ajna jusić, a psychologist, feminist, and a young adult born of rape, serves as the president of the group (anadolija 2018; un women 2019). her story, and that of her mother, inspired the internationally acclaimed 2006 bosnian film grbavica (directed by jasmila žbanić). the film was instrumental not only in breaking the silence over the fate of the bosnian women and cbowr but also in leading to a long overdue acknowledgement of these mothers as civilian victims of war. as stated by jusić, until recently, the bosnian cbowr did not receive adequate recognition or state support (un women 2019). aided by the activism of forgotten children of war, a new law recognizing these children as civilian victims of war was adopted in july 2022 in the brčko district in bosnia and herzegovina. jusić expressed her hope that the law would soon be applied in the entire bosnian federation as well as in the republika srpska (kurt 2022).11 11the 1995 dayton peace agreement divided bosnia and herzegovina, formerly a republic within yugoslavia, into the federation of bosnia and herzegovina and the republika srpska, as well as the small brčko district belonging to both entities. 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 many cbowr may never find out the truth about their violent conception. in germany, mothers remained silent about their children’s paternity whether they had been raped or engaged in a romantic liaison. behlau was told the truth of his paternity by his mother as a teenager, although he had already had doubts about his birth certificate (interview with behlau 2016). renate heard about her mother’s rape as an adult after her mother had passed away. she recalls being told by a family friend that “my mother had been raped by a mongolian and that i was the child of this rape. the food practically got stuck in my throat when i heard that; it was a shock which burdens me to this day” (interview with renate 2016). her shock not only reverberates with the sexual violence done to her mother but also with the powerful remnants of nazi racial ideology. like renate, ulrike discovered the truth about her biological origins as an adult following her adoptive parents’ death. she finally gained access to birth documents that she used to trace her biological mother, who was still alive at that time (interview with ulrike 2017). one of the most poignant aspects of the narratives of many cbowr is their acknowledgement that they were not supposed to be born, echoing the previous findings that in the last phases of the war in germany, abortions were widespread. indeed, some thistleflowers members recognized that their mothers wanted to abort them. schubert suggests that his mother took up with a soviet officer who was an orthodox jew, perhaps engaging in sexual barter. since she claimed she had been raped, she received permission to have a legal abortion but either decided not to proceed with it or the abortion was botched. she abandoned her son under family pressure, and he grew up in an orphanage. unlike schubert, behlau grew up with his birth mother, who decided to keep her unwanted “russian brat” but wanted to “smack [him] against the wall.” previously, she had tried various home remedies to terminate her pregnancy (interview with behlau 2016). renate tells a similar story about her mother: “my mother wanted to abort [me], but that failed. when she was pregnant with me in the eighth month, she was sent in a cattle wagon to an internment camp in saxony-anhalt. and i am certain, had i been born in the camp, i wouldn’t be here today” (interview with renate 2016). how could renate be so certain about her mother’s intention to abort or possibly commit infanticide? renate adds that her mother had endured other pregnancies before her birth but that she was “the only surviving child and i assume that they were killed.” listening with the third ear, the interviewer questioned whether her siblings were killed in the war. renate replied, “no no no. my mother was never married. everything happened in these three years in the camp. all russian children, all russian children” (interview with renate 2016). the gaps in renate’s narrative are telling. she does not directly attribute the death of her siblings to abortion or infanticide. instead, she accepts that they were all fathered out of wedlock by russians―in all likelihood by rape―during her mother’s internment in east prussia. yet the narrative omits details that are too painful or uncomfortable to express, putting renate’s fragile survival into perspective. the violent conception of cbowr and the prospect of abortion or infanticide have a serious impact on maternal bonding, reinforcing the impossibility of impossible motherhood. the german cbowr narratives reflect what psychological research has demonstrated regarding “poor mother-child attachment” between mothers who survived sexual violence in conflict and their cbowr (roupetz, delic, and glaesmer 2021, 115), illustrating one of the most difficult aspects of impossible motherhood. schubert’s childhood and adolescence were characterized by maternal rejection, disappointment, and institutionalization – a fate shared by many cbowr. schubert was often kept drugged at the orphanage while behlau and renate, growing up with birth mothers who remained single, report being beaten with leather belts, which, 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 although not an uncommon method of disciplining a child in post-war germany, devolved into abuse. behlau’s mother often slapped him hard, asserting that she had to “beat the bad character out of the child”; behlau contemplated, “how could the child be of good or at least acceptable character with a criminal for a father?” (behlau 2015, 79). the authors of this article could also interpret this as an attempt of the mother to both physically and metaphorically erase her son’s paternity lineage. renate shared similar memories of physical abuse: “i had to lean over the stool, expose my bottom and then she had a leather strap, and she hit me green and blue…yes, and then i was always told that i am nothing, i am no good, and i will never become anything” (interview with renate 2016). it took both behlau and renate decades to forgive their mothers and realize, as expressed in the interviews, that they were likely suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, exacerbated by the economic hardship of the post-war years. unlike the recent positive developments in bosnia, women raped by the allies did not receive any state compensation in germany, neither for their violation nor for their cbowr, an omission never rectified. according to gebhardt, even though a 1955 legislation made federal funds available for german cbowr, given the virtually impossible requirement to have witnesses of the rape testify, most applications were turned down (gebhardt 2015a). moreover, the women were slandered on sexual grounds. behlau recorded that when his mother went repeatedly to a welfare office to beg for financial aid, she had to “listen to ignorant comments and insults such as ‘must have had fun back then…’” (behlau 2015, 85). this intersection of sexism, humiliation, stigmatization, and economic hardship intensified the weight of impossible motherhood for both mothers and children. for behlau, the inclusion of more positive memories about some nurturing aspects of his relationship with his mother only became possible thanks to his activism, writing, and work with researchers following his mother’s passing in 2017 (behlau 2018). bosnian cbowr report similarly conflicted feelings towards their birth mothers. lejla damon was born to a bosniak mother named safa on christmas day in 1992. damon’s story has become an international media item when she was adopted, with safa’s consent, by a bbc journalist couple who raised her in britain. in a 2018 radio interview in ottawa, damon describes why her mother rejected her, raising the threat of infanticide: “i reminded her of all the men that had raped her. i was a constant reminder that if she held me, that she would strangle me” (lofaro 2018). safa’s reaction is reminiscent of s. in drakulić’s novel. throughout her unwanted pregnancy, s. is also unable to separate her child’s existence and identity from the violence that had led to its conception. psychologists described this reaction to cbowr as the identification of the child with the perpetrator of the violent act, which leads to a reliving of the trauma and, ultimately, rejection of the child – something s., unlike safa, eventually overcame (roupetz, delic, and glaesmer 2021). damon grew up in london and became an anti-war activist (n1 sarajevo 2018). her adoptive parents did not hide the truth of her origins from her. she first visited bosnia and met safa in 2016, remaining in contact with her and her half-sister born after the war. damon came to appreciate why her mother, who suffers from multiple health issues mainly as a result of rape, gave her up for adoption: “as much as i suppose she hated me and she wanted to get rid of me, she also agreed for me to be adopted, so it was kind of one of those things where it is a second chance…it’s taken a while for me to see that as a positive without it being all about rejection” (lofaro 2018). with the help of loving and supportive adoptive parents, damon has come to understand that for her deeply traumatized birth mother, mothering a child of rape was indeed impossible. this recognition has allowed damon to accept her birth mother and embrace her biological maternal lineage. 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 alen muhić, another member of forgotten children of war, was also born to a bosniak woman who was raped. she abandoned her baby in a goražde hospital, where he was soon adopted by a bosniak hospital worker and his wife. muhić learned the truth about his origins when a schoolmate threw the label “chetnik bastard” at him. like damon, muhić believes that being adopted into a loving family gave him a chance at a better life, although he grapples with his paternal heritage: “the biggest war for me is the one i fight with myself…i was not born from love; i was born from hate” (mainichi 2018). his concern echoes s.’s fear about her son’s future in drakulić’s novel because he, too, was conceived from hate. muhić has since met his birth mother, who now lives in the usa and has a new family. her terrible ordeal, however, haunts her to this day (sullivan 2021). today, muhić is happily married, a proud father, and a nurse at the same hospital where he was born. in october 2019, he gave a powerful speech at the un on behalf of bosnian cbowr, insisting that they “do not want to be portrayed falsely as ‘malignant cells of cancer’ that are spreading the seeds of hatred” and that they “are not the mistakes of war but only human beings and should be treated as such” (“rede vor der un” 2019). muhić implicitly formulates the rejection of the cbowr’s paternal heritage as, in a patriarchal society, it continues to tie ethnic identity to the violent legacy of war and interethnic strife, putting continuous roadblocks to peaceful cohabitation. allowing cbowr to embrace their maternal lineage is part of establishing lasting peace in a community still haunted by its violent past. unlike the women who birthed damon and muhić and gave them up for adoption, jusić’s mother, sabina bašić, decided to keep her. in the film grbavica, based on the story of bašić and her daughter, a bosniak woman’s maternal ambivalence toward the child conceived through rape in a camp is poignantly expressed as she moves from wanting an abortion to giving up and eventually breastfeeding her newborn, echoing the experience of s.: i wanted to kill her. i pounded my stomach with my fists to make her fall out of me. it was no use. my belly grew. even then they [the rapists] came. in twos, threes, every day. in the hospital, after i gave birth, i said: ‘i don’t want her. take her away.’ i heard her crying. i heard her through the walls. the next day my milk started flowing. i said: ‘ok, i’ll feed her, but only once!’…and when they brought her, when i took her in my arms, she was so tiny. and she was so beautiful. i had already forgotten that there was anything beautiful in this world. (žbanić 2006)12 hashamova suggests that grbavica “takes up where drakulić’s novel leaves off” some fourteen years later but underlines a significant divergence between s. and the enacted story of real-life bašić (hashamova 2012, 241). as a single mother, s. is able to prioritize her infant son’s maternal lineage over his paternal heritage in relative security in peaceful, far-away sweden. conversely, in the film, single mother esma (portraying bašić) must raise her daughter in the very same community that was destroyed by war, masking her daughter’s paternal heritage with lies about a hero bosniak father, the impossibility of her impossible motherhood on full display when she finally tells her adolescent daughter: “you’re the bastard of a chetnik” (quoted in hashamova 2012, 243). 12 on the difficulties and ambivalent attitudes in mothering children born of rape see lee and mochmann 2015, 35; takševa 2017. 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 once fifteen-year-old jusić encountered the truth about her paternity, she struggled for months, thinking that her mother must hate her as a constant reminder of her traumatic experience (nova tv 2018). what helped mother and daughter come to terms with their relationship was the therapy they received at medica zenica, an ngo founded in bosnia by swiss gynecologist monika hauser – the founder of medica mondiale. unlike her daughter, bašić has only recently been able to speak publicly about the complexities of mothering a cbowr, encouraged by her daughter’s activism, which she believes will contribute to raising awareness about both the fate of the children and the fate of women raped in the war. she admits that there were trying periods when she was unable to look at her daughter partly because of her physical resemblance to her rapist father: “when she was three, she had to shave off her eyebrows because i couldn’t look at her. there were a thousand painful situations. but when all that was over, she became my greatest support” (fena 2019). the mother still has doubts about whether life would have been better for her daughter had she given her up for adoption, but today, they both affirm their strong bond (kožul 2020).13 bašić and jusić’s story illustrates the stage of acceptance of cbowr as identified by psychologists, namely, “identification of the child as an independent human being, leading to acceptance of the maternal role and taking responsibility for a biographical turnaround” (roupetz, delic, and glaesmer 2021, 116). more recently, on the facebook page of forgotten children of war, jusić powerfully expressed her self-identification through her maternal lineage stating, “my identity is ‘i am my mother’s child’ and this is something everybody has to accept. we are not, and never will be children of the enemy” (zaboravljena 2022). her words echo those of muhić spoken at the un. it has taken the thistleflowers children seventy years to come to terms with their stigmatized identity. in his contribution to the thistleflowers volume, schubert shakes off the long-held and externally imposed negative labels he had to live with most of his life by stating, “i am a gift of the allies” (italics in the original) (schubert 1999, 39). for some bosniak cbowr, like jusić, muhić, and damon, this process has taken considerably less time due to the heightened global awareness of sexual violence in conflict zones, in addition to the availability of counselling services in bosnia. there was no such assistance for the german cbowr, and many of them decided or were able to access those services only in later adulthood. in addition, technological developments such as the internet have also facilitated the organizing and media outreach of the bosnian cbowr at a much younger age. what is common to both groups is that they and their mothers were rejected by their respective ethnic and national communities and discriminated against when it came to social benefits. the bosnian cbowr were stigmatized and discriminated against by the state in relation to children whose fathers died in the war as putative heroes. until recently, they had problems with legal documents that required the inclusion of the father’s name. it is an injustice that the group forgotten children of war has successfully fought to rectify. since 2021, several municipalities in bosnia have introduced new forms that require the name of one parent instead of the name of the father alone, thus breaking with long-held patriarchal traditions that favour paternal heritage over maternal lineage (arnautović 2021) and leading to the legal acceptance of the latter. 13 in her essay based on a bosnian mother-daughter story, tatjana takševa is interested specifically in the investigation of empowered motherhood through an analysis of the lived experiences of women mothering cbowr, a perspective that goes beyond the explorations of the present article (takševa 2019). 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 conclusion this article has used two examples of twentieth-century armed conflicts in europe―germany toward the end of wwii and bosnia in the 1990s―to illustrate, through a feminist narrative analysis of selected published and unpublished narratives and interview data, the intergenerational impact of rape in war. with a focus on unwanted pregnancy, abortion, and cbowr, the authors introduced the terms “maternal lineage” and “paternal heritage,” suggesting that the recognition of the former constitutes a feminist reconceptualization of the identity of cbowr and a potential solution to the conflicts of impossible motherhood. the analysis has demonstrated that through the validation of maternal lineage, the children’s inclusion into their mothers’ ethnic and national community is enabled, and consequently, the stigmatization they both experience because of the overvaluation of the paternal heritage of cbowr can be overcome. while the selected narratives highlight the violence faced by both the women and cbowr, they also demonstrate their resilience and display evidence of posttraumatic growth. tedeschi and calhoun describe post-traumatic growth in people who survived traumatic situations as a “perception of inner strength” and a “changed philosophy of life” (tedeschi and calhoun qtd. in szymanski and rosenfeld 2014, 266) without taking away from the pain and suffering that marked their lives. although there are substantial numbers of cbowr in germany and bosnia, to date, only a handful of them have been willing to go public, making it all the more important to acknowledge the stories through which they express their conflicted ethnic and national identities but also their own agency. behlau’s message to his younger bosnian counterparts is “speak up and do not feel guilty. and say, you are strong; it happened to your mother, but you are innocent and do not have to pay for what your father has done” (interview with behlau 2016). the bosnian cbowr who broke their silence did so at a much younger age than their german counterparts from whose experiences they are able to learn. their greater self-confidence, made possible by greater international awareness about cbowr and cbow, is reflected also in the fact that they, unlike many of the german cbowr, are willing to be identified by their full names. while millions of women continue to experience sexual violence in conflict zones and suffer from its consequences (porter 2018; taylor 2022), and thousands of children continue to be born as a result, it is important to note that the very existence of cbowr and cbow defies not only myths of ethnically homogenous nationhood but also the destructive nature of wars that fractures communities and sows animosity. saskia mitreuter sees in cbow not a challenge for societies but a chance towards peace building internationally as they can help to bridge differences (mitreuter 2021). in his speech at the un, muhić broadcast a similar message on behalf of bosnian cbowr stating, “i don’t hate anyone. hate destroys and that’s why i have chosen love. it builds bridges and instils hope. love is more powerful than hate because love can end violence!” (“rede vor der un” 2019). his words echo the trajectory of s. in drakulić’s novel in accepting her child born of rape as a triumph of love over death, violence, hatred, and destruction. silke satjukow and rainer gries call cbow “children of the future” (satjukow and gries 2015, 364). with new generations of cbowr growing up and being conceived (ciobanu 2022), it is all the more important to learn from the narratives of the two generations juxtaposed in this article. german and bosnian cbowr are meant to encourage other children born under similar circumstances and their mothers to break their silence and share their stories to continue to raise awareness about the complex realities of armed conflict and its aftermath, fighting against 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 sexual and other forms of violence, stigmatization, ethnic division lines, and hatred in both wartime and peacetime. 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 references allen, beverly. 1996. rape warfare: the hidden genocide in bosnia herzegovina. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. anadolija. 2018. “ajna jusić, dijete rata: potrebno je pričati” [a child of war: it is necessary to speak up]. buka portal, december 5, 2018. accessed october 10, 2022. http://ba.n1info.com/vijesti/a300931/ajna-jusic-dijete-rata-potrebno-je-pricati.html. anderson, kathryn, and dana c. jack. 1991. “learning to listen: interview techniques and analyses.” in women’s words: the feminist practice of oral history, edited by sherna berger gluck, and daphne patai, 11-26. new york: routledge. anonymous. 2005. a woman in berlin: eight weeks in the conquered city. a diary. translated by philip boehm. new york: picador. arnautović, marija. 2021. “borba djece rodjene nakon ratnog silovanja: bez imena oca u formularimaˮ [the fight of cbowr: forms without the fatherʼs name]. radio slobodna evropa, may 28, 2021. accessed june 15, 2022. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/ a/udruzenje-zaboravljena-djeca-rata-inicijativa-ime-jednog-roditelja/31278763.html. beevor, antony. 2005. “introduction.” in a woman in berlin, translated by philip boehm, xiiixxi. london: virago press. ———. 2002. the fall of berlin 1945. harmondsworth: penguin books. begagić, lamija. 2018. “djeca rođena kao posljedica rata: odrastanje izvan svih kategorija” [children born of war: growing up outside of all categories]. diskriminacija, october 26, 2018. accessed may 10, 2022. http://diskriminacija.ba/price/djeca-ro%c4%91ena-kaoposljedica-rata-odrastanje-izvan-svih-kategorija?fbclid= iwar3a1y0odsxep8tnzwr5hmd-q_2jddygray-ft4ubdsiagbpfeiktufyv1o. behlau, winfried, ed. 2015. thistleflowers: russian children in germany. translated by ursula scott. ganderkesee: con-thor. ———. 2018. “thistleflowers: russian children in germany. from a silenced rape child to a writer, editor, and public speaker.” keynote address delivered in ottawa, canada, march 13, 2018. bock, gisela. 1983. “racism and sexism in nazi germany: motherhood, compulsory sterilization, and the state.” signs 8 (3): 400-421. https://doi.org/10.1086/493983. bouvier, virginia m. 2016. “gender and the role of women in colombia’s peace process.” united states institute of peace, november 3, 2016. accessed july 10, 2023. https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/11/gender-and-role-women-colombias-peaceprocess. http://ba.n1info.com/vijesti/a300931/ajna-jusic-dijete-rata-potrebno-je-pricati.html https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/udruzenje-zaboravljena-djeca-rata-inicijativa-ime-jednog-roditelja/31278763.html. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/udruzenje-zaboravljena-djeca-rata-inicijativa-ime-jednog-roditelja/31278763.html. http://diskriminacija.ba/price/djeca-ro%c4%91ena-kao-posljedica-rata-odrastanje-izvan-svih-kategorija?fbclid=iwar3a1y0odsxep8tnzwr5hmd-q_2jddygray-ft4ubdsiagbpfeiktufyv1o http://diskriminacija.ba/price/djeca-ro%c4%91ena-kao-posljedica-rata-odrastanje-izvan-svih-kategorija?fbclid=iwar3a1y0odsxep8tnzwr5hmd-q_2jddygray-ft4ubdsiagbpfeiktufyv1o http://diskriminacija.ba/price/djeca-ro%c4%91ena-kao-posljedica-rata-odrastanje-izvan-svih-kategorija?fbclid=iwar3a1y0odsxep8tnzwr5hmd-q_2jddygray-ft4ubdsiagbpfeiktufyv1o https://doi.org/10.1086/493983 https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/11/gender-and-role-women-colombias-peace-process https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/11/gender-and-role-women-colombias-peace-process 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 branche, raphaëlle, and fabrice virgili, eds. 2012. rape in wartime. new york: palgrave macmillan. brauerhoch, annette. 2015. “‘toxi’. zur filmischen repräsentation schwarzer kinder im nachkriegsdeutschland” [‘toxi.’ representations of black children in post-war german films]. in besatzungskinder: die nachkommen alliierter soldaten in österreich und deutschland, edited by barbara stelzl-marx and silke satjukow, 321-351. vienna: böhlau. brownmiller, susan. 1975. against our will: men, women and rape. new york: fawcett books. burds, jeffrey. 2009. “sexual violence in europe in world war ii, 1939-1945.” politics and society 37: 35-73. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059601108329751. buss, doris. 2009. “rethinking rape as a weapon of war.” feminist legal studies 17 (2): 145-163. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10691-009-9118-5. card, claudia. 1996. “rape as a weapon of war.” hypatia 11 (4): 5-18. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3810388. carpenter, r. charli, 2007. born of war: protecting children of sexual violence survivors in conflict zones. bloomfield, ct: kumarian. ———. 2010. forgetting children born of war: setting the human rights agenda in bosnia and beyond. new york: columbia university press. ciobanu, claudia. 2022. “ukrainian war rape victims abandoned by polish state.” balkan insight, july 12, 2022. accessed march 27, 2023. https://balkaninsight.com/2022/ 07/12/ukrainian-war-rape-victims-abandoned-by-polish-state/. clark, janine natalia. 2019. “the vulnerability of the penis: sexual violence against men in conflict and security frames.” men and masculinities 22 (5): 778-800. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184x17724487. cohen, sascha. 2015. “how a book changed the way we talk about rape.” time magazine, october 7, 2015. accessed july 3, 2022. https://time.com/4062637/against-our-will-40/. disdarevic-stojkanovic, jadranka. 1999. “reproductive health care situation in bosniaherzegovina.” medicine and law: 213-216. drakulić, slavenka. 1999. s.: a novel about the balkans. translated by marko ivić. london: penguin books. ———. 2022. “kriegsstrategie vergewaltigung” [rape as a strategy of war]. emma 3 (362): 22-23. accessed july 11, 2023. https://www.emma.de/artikel/kriegsstrategievergewaltigung-339379. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059601108329751 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10691-009-9118-5. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3810388 https://balkaninsight.com/2022/07/12/ukrainian-war-rape-victims-abandoned-by-polish-state/ https://balkaninsight.com/2022/07/12/ukrainian-war-rape-victims-abandoned-by-polish-state/ https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184x17724487 https://time.com/4062637/against-our-will-40/ ttps://www.emma.de/artikel/kriegsstrategie-v ttps://www.emma.de/artikel/kriegsstrategie-v 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 eglitis, daina s. 2022. “the crimes of bucha have a long history.” new eastern europe, april 21. accessed february 11, 2023. https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/04/21/thecrimes-of-bucha-have-a-long-history/. fehrenbach, heide. 1998. “rehabilitating fatherland: race and german remasculinization.” signs 24 (1): 107-127. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3175674. fena. 2019. “sabina bašić, majka ajne jusić, žrtve ratnog silovanja: kćerka mi je bila najveća snaga da sve preživim” [sabina bašić, mother of ajna jusić, victim of war rape]. biscani.net, march 22, 2019. accessed april 4, 2022. https://www.biscani.net/sabinabasic-majka-ajne-jusic-zrtve-ratnog-silovanja-kcerka-mi-je-bila-najveca-snaga-da-sveprezivim/. gebhardt, miriam. 2015a. “eine frage des schweigens? forschungsthesen zur vergewaltigung deutscher frauen nach kriegsende” [a question of silence? research theses regarding rape of german women at the end of the war]. in besatzungskinder: die nachkommen alliierter soldaten in österreich und deutschland [children of the occupation: the descendants of allied soldiers in austria and germany], edited by barbara stelzl-marx and silke satjukow, 62-90. vienna: böhlau. ———. 2015b. als die soldaten kamen: die vergewaltigung deutscher frauen am ende des zweiten weltkriegs [when the soldiers came: the rape of german women at the end of world war ii]. munich: deutsche verlags-anstalt. ———. 2016. crimes unspoken: the rape of german women at the end of the second world war. translated by nick somers. cambridge, uk: polity press. ———. 2019. wir kinder der gewalt: wie frauen und familien bis heute unter den folgen der massenvergewaltigungen bei kriegsende leiden [we children of violence: how women and families still suffer from the consequences of the mass rapes at the end of wwii]. munich: deutsche verlags-anstalt. glaesmer, heide. 2015. “die besatzungskinder in deutschland nach dem zweiten weltkrieg aus psychosozialer perspektive.” [children of the allies in germany after wwii from a psychosocial perspective.] in wir besatzungskinder: töchter und söhne alliierter soldaten erzählen [we the children of the occupation: daughters and sons of allied soldiers tell their stories], edited by ute baur-timmerbrink, 84-97. berlin: ch. links. goedde, petra. 1999. “from villains to victims: fraternization and the feminization of germany, 19451947.” diplomatic history 23 (1): 1-20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/ 24913688. grossmann, atina. 2011. “the ‘big rape’: sex and sexual violence, war, and occupation in post-world war ii memory and imagination.” in sexual violence in conflict zones: from the ancient world to the era of human rights, edited by elizabeth heinemann, 137-151. philadelphia. university of pennsylvania press. https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/04/21/the-crimes-of-bucha-have-a-long-history/ https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/04/21/the-crimes-of-bucha-have-a-long-history/ https://www.jstor.org/stable/3175674. https://www.biscani.net/sabina-basic-majka-ajne-jusic-zrtve-ratnog-silovanja-kcerka-mi-je-bila-najveca-snaga-da-sve-prezivim/ https://www.biscani.net/sabina-basic-majka-ajne-jusic-zrtve-ratnog-silovanja-kcerka-mi-je-bila-najveca-snaga-da-sve-prezivim/ https://www.biscani.net/sabina-basic-majka-ajne-jusic-zrtve-ratnog-silovanja-kcerka-mi-je-bila-najveca-snaga-da-sve-prezivim/ https://www.jstor.org/stable/24913688. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24913688. 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 ———. 1995a. reforming sex: the german movement for birth control and abortion reform, 1920–1950. oxford: oxford university press. ———. 1995b. “a question of silence: the rape of german women by occupation soldiers.” october 72: 42-63. https://doi.org/10.2307/778926. ———. 2007. jews, germans and allies: close encounters in occupied germany. princeton: princeton university press. gubrium, jaber f., and james a. holstein. 2009. analyzing narrative reality. los angeles: sage publications. haberkern, lisa. 2021. “transgenerational transmission of memories.” in children born of war: past, present and future, edited by sabine lee, heide glaesmer, and barbara stelzl-marx, 192-211. london: routledge. hájková, anna. 2013. “sexual barter in times of genocide. negotiating the sexual economy of the theresienstadt ghetto.” signs 38 (3): 503-533. https://doi.org/10.1086/668607. hashamova, yana. 2012. “war rape: (re)defining motherhood, fatherhood, and nationhood.” in embracing arms: cultural representation of slavic and balkan women in war, edited by helena goscilo and yana hashamova, 233-251. budapest: central european university press. hedgepeth, sonia m., and rochelle g. saidel, eds. 2010. sexual violence against jewish women during the holocaust. waltham ma: brandeis university press. helms, elissa. 2013. innocence and victimhood: gender, nation and women’s activism in postwar bosnia-herzegovina. wisconsin: university of wisconsin press. henke, suzette a. 1998. shattered subjects: trauma and testimony in women's life writing. new york: st. martin's press. hirsch, marianne. 2012. the generation of postmemory: writing and visual culture after the holocaust. new york: columbia university press. ivekovic, rada, and julie mostov. 2022. “introduction: from gender to nation.” in from gender to nation, edited by rada ivekovic and julie mostov, 9-25. ravenna: a longo editore. kabić, slavija. 2012. “‘namenlos, gesichtslos, austauschbar’: menschlichkeit und bestialität im roman als gäbe es mich nicht von slavenka drakulić” [without a name and face, exchangeable: humanity and bestiality in the novel as if i am not there]. in opfer―beute―boten der humanisierung? zur künstlerischen rezeption der überlebensstrategien von frauen im bosnienkrieg und im zweiten weltkrieg [victim―prey―heralds of humanization? on the artistic reception of the survival strategies of women in the bosnian war and world war ii], edited by marijana erstić, slavija kabić, and britta künkel, 87-113. bielefeld: transcript verlag. https://doi.org/10.1086/668607 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 kapor-stanulovic, nila, and henry p. david. 1999. “former yugoslavia and successor states.” in from abortion to contraception: a resource to public policies and reproductive behavior in central and eastern europe from 1917 to the present, edited by henry p. david and joanna skilogianis, 279-316. london: greenwood press. kozaric-kovacic, dragica, vera folnegovi smalc, jarmila skrinjaric, nathan m. szajnberg, and ana marusic. 1995. “rape, torture and traumatization of bosnian and croatian women: psychological sequelae.” american journal of orthopsychiatry 65 (3): 428-433. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0079656. kožul, dejan. 2020. “ajna jusić: mi djeca rata svojim majkama vraćamo dostojanstvo” [we children of war give back our mothersʼ dignity]. portal novosti, january 8, 2020. accessed april 10, 2002. https://www.portalnovosti.com/ajna-jusic-mi-djeca-ratasvojim-majkama-vracamo-dostojanstvo. kulick, orysia. 2022. “gender and violence in ukraine: changing how we bear witness to war.” canadian slavonic papers 64 (2-3): 190-206. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/00085006.2022.2108264. kurt, senka. 2022. “djeca rođena zbog rata po prvi put prepoznata kao civilne žrtve rata” [cbow recognized for the first time as civilian war casualties]. interview, july 15, 2022. accessed march 10, 2023. https://interview.ba/2022/07/15/djeca-rodena-zbog-rata-poprvi-put-prepoznata-kao-civilne-zrtve-rata/. lee, sabine. 2017. children born of war in the twentieth century. manchester: manchester university press. lee, sabine, and ingvill c. mochmann. 2015. “kinder des krieges im 20. jahrhundert” [20th century war children]. in besatzungskinder: die nachkommen alliierter soldaten in österreich und deutschland, edited by barbara stelzl-marx and silke satjukow, 15-38. vienna: böhlau. lee, sabine, heide glaesmer, and barbara stelzl-marx, eds. 2021. children born of war: past, present and future. abingdon: routledge. lilly, j. robert. 2007. taken by force: rape and american gis in europe during wwii. new york: palgrave macmillan. lofaro, joe. 2018. “u.k. woman shares family’s bosnian war story of rejection, reunion.” cbc, march 18, 2018. accessed january 20, 2022. https://www.cbc.ca/news/ canada/ottawa/lejla-damon-bosnia-war-family-1.4576261. mainichi. 2018. “children of bosnian war face secrets of their own roots 25 years after conflict.” july 1, 2018. accessed october 5, 2022. https://mainichi.jp/english /articles/20180701/p2a/00m/0na/003000c. https://www.portalnovosti.com/ajna-jusic-mi-djeca-rata-svojim-majkama-vracamo-dostojanstvo https://www.portalnovosti.com/ajna-jusic-mi-djeca-rata-svojim-majkama-vracamo-dostojanstvo https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2022.2108264 https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2022.2108264 https://interview.ba/2022/07/15/djeca-rodena-zbog-rata-po-prvi-puthttps://interview.ba/2022/07/15/djeca-rodena-zbog-rata-po-prvi-puthttps://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/lejla-damon-bosnia-war-family-1.4576261 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/lejla-damon-bosnia-war-family-1.4576261 https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180701/p2a/00m/0na/003000c https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180701/p2a/00m/0na/003000c 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 mitreuter, saskia. 2021. “questions of identity in german occupation children born after world war ii: approaching a complex phenomenon with mix-method analyses.” in children born of war: past, present and future, edited by sabine lee, heide glaesmer, and barbara stelzl-marx, 153-165. abingdon: routledge. mochmann, ingvill c. 2017. “children born of war: a decade of international and interdisciplinary research.” historical social research/historische sozialforschung 42 (1): 320-346. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44176035. močnik, nena. 2019. “collective victimhood of individual survivors: reflecting the uses and impacts of two academic narratives two decades after the war-rapes in bosniaherzegovina.” east european politics 35 (4): 457-473. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/21599165.2019.1676739. ———. 2020. trauma transmission and sexual violence: reconciliation and peacebuilding in post conflict settings. london: routledge. ———. 2018. “narrated silence in sexual scripts of war rape survivors: hidden transmission of violent sexual patterns.” sexuality & culture 22: 1361-1375. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12119-018-9530-6. mühlhäuser, regina. 2010. eroberungen: sexuelle gewalttaten und intime beziehungen ulimher soldaten in der sowjetunion, 1941-1945 [sexual violence and intimate relationships of german soldiers in the soviet union 1941-1945]. hamburg: hamburger edition. ———. 2017. “reframing sexual violence as a weapon and strategy of war: the case of the german wehrmacht during the war and genocide in the soviet union, 1941–1944.” journal of the history of sexuality 26 (3): 366-401. https://doi.org/ 10.7560/jhs26302. n1 sarajevo. 2018. “adopted rape child turns into anti-war activist.” july 17, 2018. accessed august 2, 2022. http://ba.n1info.com/english/news/a273568/adopted-rapechild-turns-into-anti-war-activist.html. nova tv. 2018. “potresne 24ulim djece koja 24ulim začeta silovanjem za vrijeme rata u bih” [movingstories of cbowr in bosnia]. september 30, 2018. accessed october 15, 2022.youtube video, 12:40. https://youtu.be/vqr6tze_rm8. porter, catherine. 2018. “canada struggles as it opens its arms to victims of isis.” the new york times, march 16, 2018. accessed october 16, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/03/16/world/canada/canada-refugees-yazidi.html. pötzsch, holger. 2012. “rearticulating the experience in war in anonyma: ‘eine frau in berlin.’” nordlit 30. http://dx.doi.org/10.7557/13.2370. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44176035. https://doi/ https://doi/ https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12119-018-9530-6 https://doi/ http://ba.n1info.com/english/news/a273568/adopted-rape-child-turns-into-anti-war-activist.html http://ba.n1info.com/english/news/a273568/adopted-rape-child-turns-into-anti-war-activist.html https://youtu/ https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/world/canada/canada-refugees-yazidi.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/world/canada/canada-refugees-yazidi.html http://dx/ 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 rajiva, mythili, and agatha schwartz. 2018. “haunting and the aesthetics of trauma in a woman in berlin and for those who can tell no tales: redefining cultural memory.” slavonica 23 (2): 75-90. https://doi.org/10.1080/13617427.2018.1555923. “rede vor der un in new york unserer freunde aus der gruppe bow in 30. oktober 2019” [speech at the un in new york by our bosnian friends from the group bow]. 2019. https://www.russenkinder-distelblueten.de/forum/born%20of%20war.html. roberts, andrew. 2008. “stalin’s army of rapists: the brutal war crime that russia and germany tried to ignore.” the daily mail, october 24, 2008. accessed november 15, 2014. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1080493/stalins-army-rapists-thebrutalwar-crime-russia-germany-tried-ignore.html. roupetz, sophie, amra delic, and heide glaesmer. 2021. “an intergenerational perspective on conflict-related sexual violence against women: female survivors and their children born of rape.” in children born of war: past, present and future, edited by sabine lee, heide glaesmer, and barbara stelzl-marx, 111-135. london: routledge. sander, helke, director, and barbara johr. 1991-92. befreier und befreite [liberator and liberated]. documentary. satjukow, silke, and rainer gries. 2015. “bankerte!” besatzungskinder in deutschland nach 1945 [children of the occupation in germany after 1945]. frankfurt am main: campus. schmidt-harzbach, ingrid. 1984. “eine woche im april. berlin 1945. vergewaltigung als massenschicksal” [a week in april, berlin 1945. rape as mass destiny]. feministische studien 3 (2): 51-65. https://doi.org/10.1515/fs-1984-0206. schubert, jürgen. 1999. mundtot. nachkriegsbiographie eines nicht gewollten besatzerkindes [the post-war biography of an unwanted occupation child]. frankfurt am main: verlag für akademische schriften (vas). schwartz, agatha. 2016. interview with renate. september 11. ———. 2017. interview with ulrike. april 24. ———. 2016. interview with winfried behlau. august 26. ———. 2015. “narrating wartime rapes and trauma in a woman in berlin.” clcweb: comparative literature and culture 17 (3). https://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.2655. ———. 2020. german studies review 43 (2): 311-329. https://doi.org/10.1353/gsr.2020.0046. schwartz, agatha, and tatjana takševa. 2020. “between trauma and resilience: a transnational reading of women's life writing about wartime rape in germany and bosnia and herzegovina.” aspasia 14: 124-143. https://doi:10.3167/asp.2020.140109. https://doi.org/10.1080/13617427.2018.1555923 https://www.russenkinder-distelblueten.de/forum/born%20of%20war.html http://www/ https://doi.org/10.1515/fs-1984-0206. https://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.2655 https://doi.org/10.1353/gsr.2020.0046 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 seifert, ruth. 1996. “the second front: the logic of sexual violence in wars.” womenʼs studies international forum 19 (1-2): 35-43. https://doi.org/10.1016/02775395(95)00078-x. seto, donna. 2013. no place for a war baby: the global politics of children born of wartime sexual violence. new york: routledge. sharlach, lisa. 2000. “rape as genocide: bangladesh, the former yugoslavia, and rwanda.” new political science 22 (1): 89-102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713687893. sharrat, sara. 2011. gender, shame, and sexual violence: the voices of witnesses and court members at war crimes tribunals. london: ashgate. simic, olivera. 2012. “challenging bosnian womenʼs identity as rape victims, as unending victims: the ʻotherʼ sex in times of war.” journal of international womenʼs studies 13 (4): 129-142. https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol13/iss4/9. skjelsbaek, inger. 2012. “sexual violence in times of war: a new challenge for peace operations?” in women and international peacekeeping, edited by louise olsson and torunn l. tryggestad, 69-84. new york: routledge. slembrouck, stef. 2015. “the role of the researcher in interview narratives.” in the handbook of narrative analysis, edited by anna de fina and alexandra georgakopoulou, 239-254. hoboken nj: john wiley & sons. snyder, cindy, wesley j. gabbard, j. dean may, and nihada zulcic. 2006. “on the battleground of women’s bodies: mass rape in bosnia-herzegovina.” affilia 21: 184195. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886109905286017. stelzl-marx, barbara. 2009. “die unsichtbare generation. kinder sowjetischer besatzungssoldaten in österreich und deutschland” [the invisible generation: childrenof the soviet occupation in austria and germany]. historical social research/historische sozialforschung 34 (3): 352-372. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar287321. stelzl-marx, barbara and silke satjukow. 2015. besatzungskinder: die nachkommen alliierter soldaten in österreich und deutschland. vienna: böhlau. stiglmayer, alexandra. 1994. “the rapes in bosnia-herzogovina.” in mass rape: the war against women in bosnia-herzegovina, edited by alexandra stiglmayer, translated by marion faber, 82-169. lincoln: university of nebraska press. sullivan, stacy. 2021. “a mother, a son, and a wartime secret.” elle, march 28, 2021. accessed october 15, 2022. https://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a35905487/ bosnia-war-rape-alen-muhic/. swiss, shana, and joan e. giller. 1993. “rape as a crime of war: a medical perspective.” jama 270 (5): 612-615. https://10.1001/jama.1993.03510050078031. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395(95)00078-x https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395(95)00078-x https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol13/iss4/9. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886109905286017 https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoarhttps://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoarhttps://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a35905487/bosnia-war-rape-alen-muhic/ https://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a35905487/bosnia-war-rape-alen-muhic/ https://10.0.3.233/jama.1993.03510050078031. 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 szymanski, kate, and nancy rosenfeld. 2014. “trauma narrative: recovery and posttraumatic growth – a clinical perspective.” the unspeakable: narratives of trauma, edited by kate szymanski, vikki cecchetto, and magda stroińska. new york: peter lang. takševa, tatjana. 2017. “raising children born of wartime rape in bosnia.” in mothers under fire: mothering in conflict areas, edited by tatjana takševa and arlene sgoutas, 155180. toronto: demeter press. ———. 2019. “raising children born of war in bosnia: reframing perspectives on mother love through a mother–daughter case study.” in intersections of mothering: feminist accounts, edited by carole zuffrey and fiona buchanan, 141-155. london: routledge. taylor, harry. 2022. “russian soldiers raping and sexually assaulting women, says ukraine mp.” the guardian, march 27, 2022. accessed march 31, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/27/russian-soldiers-raping-and-sexuallyassaulting-women-says-ukraine-mp. tedeschi, richard g., and lawrence g. calhoun. 1995. trauma and transformation: growing in the aftermath of suffering. thousand oaks: sage publications. telman, d.a. jeremy. 1998. “abortion and women’s legal personhood in germany: a contribution to the feminist theory of the state.” new york university review of law & social change 24 (91): 91-148. touqet, helen, and ellen gorris. 2016. “out of the shadows? the inclusion of men and boys in conceptualisations of wartime sexual violence.” reproductive health matters 24 (47): 36-46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rhm.2016.04.007. united nations women. 2019. “i am generation equality: i am a child born out of wartime rape.” november 18, 2019. accessed october 13, 2022. https://www.unwomen.org/ en/news/stories/2019/11/i-am-generation-equality-ajna-jusic-forgotten-children-of-war. university of oslo. “eurowarchild.” accessed march 10, 2023. https://www.stk.uio.no/ english/research/projects/eurowarchild. wood, elizabeth jean. 2010. “rape is not inevitable in war.” yale journal of international affairs. july 20, 2010. accessed march 8, 2023. https://www.yalejournal.org/ publications/rape-is-not-inevitable-in-war. woods, roger. 2010. “introduction: the purposes and problems of german life writing in the twentieth century.” in german life writing in the twentieth century, edited by birgit dahlke, dennis tate, and roger woods, 1-24. rochester ny: camden house. zaboravljena djeca rata – forgotten children of war association. 2022. september 17. accessed september 20, 2022. https://www.facebook.com/436947599996393/posts/ 1733256800365460/. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/27/russian-soldiers-raping-and-sexually-assaulting-women-says-ukraine-mp https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/27/russian-soldiers-raping-and-sexually-assaulting-women-says-ukraine-mp https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rhm.2016.04.007 https://www.unwomen.org/‌%20en/news/stories/2019/11/i-am-generation-equality-ajna-jusic-forgotten-children-of-war https://www.unwomen.org/‌%20en/news/stories/2019/11/i-am-generation-equality-ajna-jusic-forgotten-children-of-war https://www.stk.uio.no/english/research/projects/eurowarchild https://www.stk.uio.no/english/research/projects/eurowarchild https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/rape-is-not-inevitable-in-war https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/rape-is-not-inevitable-in-war https://www.facebook.com/436947599996393/posts/1733256800365460/ https://www.facebook.com/436947599996393/posts/1733256800365460/ 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 žarkov, dubravka. 2007. the body of war: media, ethnicity, and gender in the break-up of yugoslavia. durham: duke university press. žbanić, jasmila, dir. 2006. grbavica: the land of my dreams. sarajevo: coop 99/deblokada. 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (1)2023: 1-29 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2022: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 strategic power europe: a contradiction in terms? sean havel1 abstract the increasing number and severity of security crises around the european periphery have called into question the preparedness and capability of european states. civil wars, mass migration, unstable institutions, and direct kinetic conflict are features of a degrading security order in which european states must provide a strategic response. one such response has seen the european union (eu) become increasingly involved in security issues, namely the defence industry. programs such as the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) are now enabling member states to organize civil-military responses to crises and coordinate the defenceplanning cycles of 25 european countries through the eu. this article examines why member states have begun to use the eu to develop military capabilities and assets at scale. furthermore, it investigates the role of differentiation in enabling these developments and how both individual geopolitical and economic factors contribute to this collective institutional development. 1 sean havel received an ma from the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies, carleton university 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 introduction in 2022, the european security order faces multiple crises of collective defence far more dangerous and potentially escalatory than those seen during the cold war. around europe lies a neighbourhood marked by open conventional warfare, political instability, and rising extremism. in response to these crises of security, efforts have been undertaken to increase the political coherence and military capability of european states under the european union (eu) through its common security and defence policy (csdp). 2017 was a milestone year that saw the establishment of a legally binding permanent structured cooperation (pesco) – a culmination of efforts to reimagine the eu as a security actor in international affairs, enabled to influence the direction of the european military procurement process while being given crisis response mechanisms. pesco’s goal, as defined by article 42 of the lisbon treaty, is to “take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability” of eu national forces (council of the eu 2017). this article explores why, in the current context, member states have opted to use the eu to enable their capabilities and manage ongoing security crises when such efforts have not made such headway in the past. furthermore, it explores whether this transformation signifies that the eu is developing into a ‘strategic power,’ an actor able to rationalize its security environment and act upon it in the context of intergovernmental differentiation. can this form of intergovernmentalism shape the eu into a strategic power or is this a contradiction in terms? the implication of differentiation in understanding member state responses to eu defence policy early theories on the development of the eu assumed that integration would not include aspects of defence, otherwise known as 'high politics' (verdun 2018). nevertheless, over time, a series of steps were taken towards a more integrated security policy, from the petersberg declaration calling for integration to develop joint european peacekeeping capabilities to the st. malo declaration's call for autonomous action backed by credible military forces. these early achievements culminated in 1999 with the european security and defence policy (esdp), renamed the common security and defence policy (csdp) under the lisbon treaty in 2009. while the eu has attained degrees of ‘actorness’ in some areas of international relations, most notably trade, the development of the eu as a security actor remains member-state driven, resulting in a general lack of coordination and ability to collectively manage security crises. cottey notes that it is important to understand the eu as an ‘astrategic actor,’ defining ‘astrategic’ as the lack of “(1) clear assessment of the external environment, (2) the identification of priorities and pivot points where an actor may hope to have a decisive impact and (3) the development of the ways and means to implement the strategy” (2019, 280). initiatives lack agreed on priorities to unify the security agenda; large multinational initiatives are based on consensus between states that have differing conceptions of their strategic priorities relative to one another (2019). the development of the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) has exemplified, in part, this reality, being comprised of 60 projects including training, facilities; land, formations, systems; maritime; air, systems, cyber, c4isr, enabling, joint, and space. what is key is that in each project, member state involvement remains differentiated, with individual countries involved in several pesco projects. this differentiation thereby allows for diverse experiences and approaches to facilitate integration, forgoing the idea of a europe moving at a single pace (howorth 2019a). in the presence of 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 differentiation, multiple variables will impact each member state’s decision-making, a reflection of the diversity that is permissible in security affairs within the eu. two features of recent security-relevant developments in the eu relate heavily to the interests of the member states: an accommodation of strategic preferences through differentiation and its nexus with military-economic interests. schimmelfennig writes that differentiation is a remedy to the political stagnation seen in eu-level policies: “it mitigates the stark choice between uniform and no integration. it allows governments to cooperate at a level of integration that is closer to their respective preferences than either uniform or no integration” (2019, 180). this follows a liberal-intergovernmentalist logic in which state preferences are made more certain when domestic actors are strong enough to shape policies. the assumption is that integration is not driven by concerns about sovereignty but by social welfare concerns (2019). hoeffler offers a perspective that goes beyond this, explaining that the presence of differentiation itself does not explain why policy-making will take place; it is the construction of that interdependence being seen at the european level that matters (2019). theories of eu integration can then be understood in terms of how they layer upon one another to describe emergent structures between member states. fundamentally, liberal intergovernmentalism (li) is such a theory, layering the three principles of national preference formation through the competition of societal actors, the efficiency and outcomes of interstate bargains by way of asymmetrical interdependence (the uneven distribution of gains), and institutions that help to implement, elaborate, enforce, and extend contracts between states (moravcsik 2018). it can be argued that li is a collection of theories rather than one, referred to by moravcsik as “theoretical elements” that aim to explain not just why integration occurred but how and why it continues (2018). explanations of integration focusing on preference formation have certainly created a better understanding of eu defence integrations, such as the structure of armaments organizations in pursuing preferences (devore 2014), the increasing marketization of the european military-industrial complex (britz 2010), and defence conglomerates' growing influence on political processes (kluth 2017). li, therefore, allows for a systematic appraisal of the domestic factors that contribute to the formation of member state preferences regarding eu defence cooperation, including the role of economic actors that permeate defence areas. it must be questioned, however, whether preference formation under an li framework really remains state-based, given the presence of pan-european defence actors. structural realities created by the presence of both a single market and an integrated political space indeed influence policy formation in all european capitals; it is a question of which structural realities matter to those states. while this study relies on the assumptions of li in analyzing national preferences and domestic dynamics in the formation of pesco, concepts from other theoretical frameworks are also useful in understanding institutional change with regard to european strategic autonomy. examining interdependence requires an appreciation of non-economic policy domains (hoeffler 2019), namely the security interests of states. realism stresses the global structural realities of security in a world without any supranational authority to manage relations between states. individual eu member states react differently to these structural factors, which affects their ranking of security priorities such as the degree of concern about unilateral american actions (posen 2004; walt 2009), the unreliability of american hegemony in defending europe’s security concerns (hyde-price 2006), the priority of efforts to constrain the german power (jones 2003), or assessments of the threat from russia. as will be discussed in the concluding 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 section of this article, the neo-functionalist concept of spillover may also be helpful in understanding the dynamics within the eu once initiatives like pesco take hold. following manners and rosamond (2018), this analysis recognizes that dialogue and interdisciplinarity yield richer discussions on research strategies, helping to create multiple unique accounts of the eu (2018). this article begins with an overview of the developments that have occurred within the csdp in recent years, outlining the security, economic, and institutional dynamics that have helped shape the process. it then focuses on the drivers of eu policy – the member states themselves. this section will utilize the framework proposed by svendsen, outlining that in studying differentiated policies such as pesco it is helpful to use practices of actors as identifications of intent and policy preference (2019). practices are defined as “socially competent performances” that “situate knowledge in what people do or say” (svendsen 2019, 996). in doing so, this analysis will examine state actors based on three characteristics: (1) their security and threat conception; (2) their economic restructuring and military-industrial framework; and (3) their participation in pesco2 as an indicator of how and why these states are using these new institutional mechanisms to respond to the previous two previous variables. three states were selected based on their relative positions in european defence: france, being the strongest supporter of an autonomous eu capability and heavily involved in the eu’s southern neighbourhood; germany, being the cautious mediator in managing european political affairs and holding concerns for eu’s security; and poland, as an adamant supporter of nato and a traditional skeptic of these initiatives (franke and varma 2019). semi-structured interviews with member state officials were utilized to better understand the perspectives of these states. national documentation and current involvement in defence initiatives were also examined. furthermore, this analysis used existing literature on these nations' respective arms industries to situate economic rationales, supplied in part by the stockholm international peace research institute, national think tank publications, and transparency international documentation. strategic preferences and domestic interests: forces realizing the eu as a security actor although earlier institutional mechanisms were created at the eu level to facilitate security cooperation between european states, notably the creation of the military committee of the european union (eumc) and eu military staff (eums) in 2003, many of these mechanisms remained unable to fully manage europe’s increasingly insecure neighbourhood. eu external missions under the early csdp (then esdp) were limited in both scope and size, with 14 missions launched within the first three years between 2003 and 2005 and an additional 12 missions from 2006-2008. these missions were not based on any form of eu command structure but were managed through nato or a national command, never having their own operational headquarters (howorth 2019). according to biscop, nations had in part “lost the habit and the expertise to analyze the world around them in geopolitical terms” (2015, 170), with few external conflicts directly threatening the security of the eu. 2 data on pesco involvement is of the author’s own formulation based on data taken from the pesco website, https://pesco.europa.eu/. accessed on january 5, 2021. see appendix i. 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 notwithstanding the neighbourhood policy (2004) and later regional institutional attempts3 to build a ‘ring of friends’ through diplomacy, by mid-2014, the peripheral situation became what former swedish pm bildt called “a ring of fire” (taylor 2015). in the south, the arab spring dramatically shifted the political climate of the greater middle east. notably, the collapse of libya after a successful nato air campaign saw european states limited in their ability to deploy ground forces due to equipment shortages (hallams and schreer 2012), only approving the symbolic eufor libya operation, which was never activated (fabbrini 2014). this further destabilized north africa and the sahel, with unguarded weapons caches in libya giving armed groups the equipment necessary to expand in the region. the instability included the near collapse of mali on multiple occasions due to successive coups and helped to make the sahel a haven for violent extremist groups and routes for human trafficking to europe, with 50,000 fatalities occurring between 2014-2019 due to these conflicts (kuperman 2013). to the east, european states met with an increasingly worrying hybrid threat from russia when it invaded georgia in 2008 and ukraine in 2014 after both endorsed a foreign policy directed toward europe. notably, russia further began to conduct an increasingly hostile cyber warfare campaign that involved at least 27 european states as well as the us and canada as early as 2004 (limnell 2018). the european parliament has identified "evidence of organised social media manipulation in 70 countries, compared to 48 countries in 2018, and 28 countries in 2017” by foreign actors such as russia (eprs 2020), which has targeted western democratic systems in a series of information warfare campaigns. aside from its ‘hybrid war’ on european nations, russia’s invasion of ukraine in 2022 reintroduced the threat of direct kinetic conflict to the european continent. this event has called into question notions of a strategic status quo with moscow and has added to the urgency of a needed collective response, which includes the lend-lease of military assets. the security challenges faced by europeans can be described as divided in strategic directions between the south and the east. haroche has called these asymmetric crises, which unevenly affect european states and thereby generate less interdependence as different responses are required (2017, 228). southern challenges mainly deal with hybrid threats from non-state actors, being enabled by conditions of instability in the parent country. maintaining stability in these regions means shielding europe from state failure, terrorism, piracy, organized crime, or uncontrolled migration flows (simon and pertusot 2017). analysis by the european parliamentary research service suggests that the southern neighbourhood is “prone to an explosive domino effect that could still undermine the eu's security and internal political order with irregular migratory flows and humanitarian emergencies” (eprs 2021). this correlates with concerns raised within member states, specifically france, pointing to the multiple crises that result from state failure, especially in northern africa and the middle east. fears in this domain are only increasing due to contributing factors such as climate change, the proliferation of weaponry, and demographic trends in the southern neighbourhood (jolly and olivier 2018). crisis management tools are therefore sought after by states worried about the state of affairs in this region; as one eu official commented, most eu states cannot perform the military component of a comprehensive approach efficiently. “contrary to nato, the eu can actually do independently an integrated approach. so they have the full range of tools necessary to do a comprehensive approach from diplomacy, trade, humanitarian, sport, development, 3 for example, the eastern partnership and the union for the mediterranean. 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 cooperation, mediation, whatever you want” (interview a with eu security official, online, 2020). this makes increasing the intervention component of the csdp enticing at a strategic level, especially given the reality that nato’s expeditionary era came to an end. by the time of the wales (2014) and warsaw (2016) summits, nato began to effectively abandon any idea of establishing new expeditionary forces and focused on creating a tripwire in eastern europe and establishing the very high readiness joint task force to present a deterrent to direct russian aggression against central and eastern european countries, taking valuable eu forces away from csdp missions elsewhere (howorth 2018; zima 2018). nato functions differently from the eu; as it is the key defensive institution against classical threats, it is not an organization built to manage hybrid or systemic threats from non-state actors. it is also dominated by american industry, which to some member states, especially france, represents a strategic issue rectified by the encouragement of a european military industrial capacity (interview d with eu security official, online, 2020). states focused on the eastern neighbourhood equally face hybrid threats but from a centralized authoritarian state in the form of russia. since vladimir putin’s 2007 munich speech, which openly expressed disapproval of nato expansion,4 russia has made increasingly hostile moves to ‘contain’ perceived american expansionism, culminating in its invasion of ukraine in 2022. even before russia’s attempt to eliminate ukrainian statehood in 2022, central-eastern eu member states, such as the baltic states, poland, slovakia, and the czech republic, feared an increasingly hostile posture from the kremlin. this has created the preference for nato to lead the way in managing collective security, being an organization with a primary purpose of defending against conventional threats. for these states, the role of the eu is then to build capabilities. zima has suggested a strategic coherence between the new nato configuration and eu initiatives such as pesco that are able to stimulate industrial production that would be seen as supporting alliance efforts (2018, 51). the strategic incoherence seen is best explained by an eu practitioner who believes that the eu is differentiated by member states’ strategic priorities: countries like poland, the baltic states, to a lesser extent romania, still feel quite threatened by russia, and therefore, they see their military more for territorial defence, and are therefore also more focused on nato on many occasions…there are, however, a number of countries who also look at what was happening in yugoslavia, for instance in kosovo, but also in africa, and they would like to see the eu to be capable of handling such a crisis on their own. if you look at the crisis in libya, where, once again, the us said, ‘well, it's your problem in the end.’ europe was not able to do anything without support of strategic assets from the us. more and more european countries are saying ‘okay, at least for that type of relatively limited military engagement, we should be able to act independently without first having to go across the ocean to beg uncle sam if he could lend us a couple of air-to-air refuelers, perhaps an aircraft 4 “i think it is obvious that nato expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in europe. on the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. and we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?” (putin 2007). 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 carrier or two, and satellite communication, and so forth.’ (interview a with eu security official, online, 2020). the eu security architecture is emerging as a product of these collective policy preferences, with the institutionalization reflecting the need to tackle divergent and diverse security crises perceived by member states. while nato remains the key security organization against traditional threats, it is limited in three major ways. first, nato may not always be available, such as in the case of the eu embargo against libya where the action was vetoed by turkey. second, nato may not be welcome in a region such as the maghreb. third, nato does not have the right toolkit since law enforcement, rule of law, financial and diplomatic support, sanctions, and development are all things that are unavailable directly through nato (interview c with eu security official, online, 2020). as such, the perception by select member states and practitioners is that another mechanism is required. since 2015, in response to the eu’s degrading security situation, member states have reinvigorated the transition that the eu began in 1999 with the founding of the csdp. the eu has moved from being primarily an economic organization into a political entity that could actively support the foreign and security policies of its members. an important development was the eu global strategy (eugs), outlining guiding principles for eu action and identifying key threats (council of the european union, 2016). important to this was the acknowledgement that an integrated approach to conflicts and crises specifically suited the eu as its civil-military tools would be able to build state resilience and counter hybrid threats (tomat 2021, 150-151). furthermore, eugs was a comprehensive exercise in eu policy coherence, the details of the document being developed in consultation with member states, think tanks, and other organizations (eugs 2016). the increased coherence and communication between stakeholders further aided in establishing the 2016 eu level of ambition (loa) that set out three member state goals to enable the eu in security: responding to external conflicts and crises through crisis management tools, building the capacities of partner countries surrounding the eu, and protecting the union from external threats (council of the eu 2016). with a policy foundation created, reforms then began to focus on the operationalization of eu missions to achieve the loa. between 2012 and 2016, efforts to create a formal operational command were embodied in the eu operations centre – an ad-hoc formation not formerly part of the eu chain of command. in 2017, the military planning and conduct capability (mpcc) was established, which is a permanent command and control structure within the eu military staff. it currently manages eu efforts in somalia, mali, and the central african republic. according to interviews with eu practitioners and eu documentation, the end goal is for the mpcc to take control of all non-executive csdp missions and up to one eu battlegroup-size executive military csdp operation decided by the council (eeas, 2018). with its own integrated qualified military body, the eu could now independently manage operations at scale, forming a qualified command and control (c2) structure. this aspect is currently being enhanced by the eumilcom project to create the capacity for scaling the c2 structure for larger operations. in 2019, at the political level, the eu created a directorate called the integrated approach for security and peace (isp), the goal of which is to coordinate the political-strategic planning of military and civilian csdp operations while managing activities on all parts of the conflict cycle from conflict prevention and mediation to disarmament. during the covid-19 pandemic, the isp has already engaged in creating an integrated approach to 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 repatriating stranded eu citizens (tomat 2021). isp represents a significant step in facilitating foreign and security policy coherence in both diplomatic and operational fields. the second aspect of the eu’s transformation has been the establishment of a military-industrial field within the eu. even though the eu could politically organize missions abroad, it has not done so and it continues to lack the capability to conduct them without risking lives. one eu official mentioned a distinct lack of transport, air refuelling, and intelligence capabilities: “if you look at the number of personnel, they [member states] are actually able to do major military warfare, but not at the level that we have come to expect without any casualties…those assets we are lacking”5 (interview a with eu security official, online, 2020). some eu states remain reliant on the us for basic military assets, while the majority are unable to conduct anything outside of basic warfighting, let alone a civilian-military approach to conflict (biscop 2018). in one example, an eu official commented that during a deployment in the sahel, an eu military mission was unable to identify a suspected surveillance drone over its own base of operations for a significant period (interview b with eu security official , online, 2020). to tackle these issues in capability, the eu has been mandated to aid research and procurement of these capabilities. this fulfilled two long-term goals member states shared: to have the ability to act against security challenges and to build an autonomous european defence industry (interview e with eu security official, online, 2020). this process began officially in 2017 with the launch of pesco. twenty-five eu member states activated the pesco framework, which was, until that point, dormant in the lisbon treaty6 pesco aims to increase the ability of eu militaries to deal with security crises and bolster their national militaries. compared to the initiatives of the past, pesco legally binds eu member states to take part in at least one capability project such that countries are free to associate themselves with any projects they deem fit. at the beginning of this study, pesco had 46 active projects7 in areas like training, facilities; land, formations, systems; maritime; air, systems; cyber, c4isr; enabling, joint; space. what is important to understand is that pesco projects are not meant to create capabilities controlled by the eu, but instead they will be member state-owned (interview c with eu security officia,l, online, 2020). a central initiative within pesco is the crisis response operation core (croc), a project meant to create “a coherent full spectrum force package” at the eu level (pesco secretariat 2021). biscop notes that this “could become the central pesco project and serve as a guiding framework for the other projects” (2020, 3). this sentiment is further echoed in other interviews conducted with eu security officials, with one stating that it could be the “core of the european integrated forces,” with work already started on an eu ‘rapid response database’, a list of available assets and capabilities (interview (e) with eu security official, online, 2020). this means that pesco is not just about building capabilities but also about coordinating europe's diverse militaries. a series of other initiatives have been built in conjunction with pesco to promote further autonomy for the european defence industry. this architecture begins with the capability development plan (cdp), a document that is constructed by the european defence agency 5 this could be in reference to assets such as long-range air and sea transport, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, air-to-air refuelling and deployable networks. 6, with the exception of denmark and malta. the former is not a member of the csdp and the latter chose to optout of the pesco framework. 7 as of march 2022, the number of projects is 60. 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 (eda) and member states to prioritize the development of needed capabilities (european defence agency 2018). the next stage in the process is the coordinated annual review on defence (card), which provides an overview of existing capabilities in europe and identifies opportunities for cooperation (2018). card, pesco, and the new european defence fund (edf) then coordinate the funding of projects to develop required capabilities. before 2020, this process was managed by the european defence industrial development programme (edidp), a precursor to the edf, and the ongoing preparatory action on defence research (padr), the former providing significant funding8 towards capability development (european commission 2020b). these initiatives paved the way for the modern funding apparatus under the edf, which, as of 2021, had eight billion euros at its disposal to invest into capability development projects (european commission 2020a). as a result, the eu is increasingly becoming an organization that deals directly with the military industrial development cycle, developing the projects that european states require. the most recent initiative by member states and the eu began in 2020 with the development of the strategic compass. the impetus for this project was driven by the idea that while a global strategy exists, the eu does not have a way to implement the strategy (interview (a) with german defence official, online, 2020). the compass represents a strategic turn and definitive guide for eu security and defence, a unified threat analysis that sought to operationalize the loa (fiott 2020). earlier versions of the compass focused on crisis management, a comprehensive threat analysis, and areas of action focused on diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic tools, forming “the foundation of a robust european self-image [that] could enable the eu to not only cope with the security policy realities of the 21st century but also play an adequate role in shaping the world” (europe’s strategic compass: a critical reflection 2020).9 the 2022 edition of the compass shifted away from this language, acknowledging that the eu is surrounded by instability and conflicts: “we are confronted with a dangerous mix of armed aggression, illegal annexation, fragile states, revisionist powers and authoritarian regimes” (council of the european union 2022, 8). to address this, the compass outlines four policy ‘strands’: (1) act, involving the creation of an eu rapid deployment capacity of 5000 troops and operationalization of an eu command and control framework to conduct csdp missions; (2) secure, committing to a consistent three-year eu threat analysis, a single intelligence capacity, joint cyber defence policy, and joint eu hybrid threat coordination; (3) invest, committing to the completion of one-third of pesco projects by 2025, the augmentation of the european defence fund to make eu defence industrial cooperation the norm, and increase incentives for member state procurement in key areas identified by the european defence agency; (4) partner, aiming to deepen cooperation with regional organizations and multilateral defence partnerships including nato, while working bilaterally to provide security assistance to partners in the eu periphery (council of the eu 2022). what has been described is a strategic turn for the eu developed in response to an increasingly unstable and dangerous world order. 8 investing 500 million euros in 16 military projects targeting the development of the european defence industry and to research and development. 9 note: this source remains unpublished due to privacy concerns. it was obtained and used with permission from interviewees. 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 notwithstanding the nature of the compass itself, the manner of involvement of particular member states in these eu-level defence initiatives has thus far not challenged the principle of differentiation and attempts to do so by creating high-level standardized involvement have been met with failure. once states became involved in such initiatives, national economic interests started to aid in the rationalizing of policy preferences. pesco is not just a coordination project; it is a series of initiatives that looks to develop new capabilities, enable their production, and prepare them for sale in a european defence market. it reflects the move of most european countries to ‘europeanize’ their procurement, with domestic bias dropping from 65 percent in early 1991 to 43 percent in 2017 and inter-eu procurement increasing from 10 percent to 53 percent in the same period (kluth 2017). rufanges et al. have written extensively on the presence of both national and transnational lobbyists who have been heavily involved in adding the section 2 provisions in the lisbon treaty, which affirm that “member states shall undertake progressively to improve their military” and help to facilitate the eda’s creation in 2004 (2016, 317). this includes the largest eu defence firms who have formed themselves into the european organisation for security (eos)10 – a lobbying group that includes thales, naval group, airbus, and leonardo, the top 25 arms companies in the world by sales (sirpi 2019). clearly, the liberal-intergovernmentalist logic of interest groups also applies to decision-making. due to the high cost of research and development for military capabilities, it is often impossible for companies to acquire enough funding from banks or capital markets, necessitating states to pay up-front for the products they will purchase (devore 2014). mawdsley has also brought attention to the reality that in most national contexts, it is the structural constraints brought upon by the largest military industries in europe that have aided in the european preference formation (2019). indeed, it is those large corporations that now dominate the policy-making and regulatory process (2019). the nexus between economy and security then meets the differentiated nature of the eu’s new initiatives. to fully understand why cooperation occurred as it has, an analysis of the security and economic considerations of key member states is required, along with an understanding of their practice in existing institutional arrangements such as pesco. germany’s mediation of the union under its differentiated approach to security against the initial french suggestion that the pesco mechanism should be a 'two-speed' model involving only those countries most committed, german officials countered by suggesting that this approach would divide the eu (maulny and bernardini 2019). germany thereby championed the idea that, in principle, every member state must join eu operations and missions: “if somebody could have stepped out, because he is not part of pesco, we would have created a problem at the beginning” (interview b with german defence official, online, 2020). pesco became inclusive and diverse yet coordinated. member states could pursue their own national objectives while collectively meeting minimal eu guidelines to synchronize capability development and avoid duplication. as one german defence official commented: “we only can survive if everybody is happy” (interview c with german defence official, online, 2020). furthermore, pesco would aid in giving germany the impetus to develop 10 european organisation for security (eos). “eos members” accessed september 15, 2022. http://www.eoseu.com/members 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 neglected armed forces, simultaneously strengthening its economy through the defence sector (major and molling 2019). germany’s goal to further integrate european defence is driven by its deteriorating security environment. its 2016 white paper mentions an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from north africa through the horn of africa and towards the middle east that impairs the security of trade routes (bmvg 2016). for its part, germany has slowly increased its involvement in this theater, deploying over a thousand personnel from the armed forces to mali (dw 2020b) and being further involved in 11 other operations, notably in syria, iraq, and afghanistan (dw 2020a). in addition, german leaders recognize that russia represents a disunifying force in europe, even though it sought economic arrangements in energy trade (dw 2020c). interviewees stressed that the russian threat had prompted eastern eu members to look elsewhere for credible security guarantees, namely the us. one interviewee commented: “what russia can do on very short notice…60,000 troops in one week. how do you want to bring the spanish division to poland? it will take months to do so, but the americans are able to do it” (interview a with german defence official, online, 2020). germany does not have the capabilities to ensure its forces are safe when conducting crisis management or even standard military operations, with its armed forces facing structural issues, including personnel shortages, neglected equipment, and inefficient procurement (menon 2020). with the ambition to create an eu 'force package' by 2025 (interview a with german defence official, online, 2020), germany will require new political impetus and support. creating commitments at the eu level then facilitates needed rearmament at a national level and bridges the gap between strategic cultures by focusing on interoperability between similarly committed member states. this will allow germany to build on its idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ that involves the eu being able to act on its own in conflict zones and capable enough to replace the us in strategic areas where it is withdrawing (interview c with german defence official, online, 2020). reflecting this mindset of eu interoperability and capability, germany has involved itself in 38 percent of active pesco projects. it is supporting initiatives such as the tiger mark iii attack helicopter, the new eurodrone project, an integrated unmanned ground system (ugs), and initiatives to coordinate eu countries in joint operations, including croc, the networks of logistics hubs in europe (netloghubs), and co-basing. the latter looks to create shared basing rights between project partners, including shared overseas facilities for future naval deployments abroad (jonnet 2020). according to german officials, croc represents the central force package that will utilize developed capabilities in eu missions abroad (interview a with german defence official, online, 2020). the sum of these projects will enable eu forces to be deployable and efficiently coordinated, translating into coordination between nato countries for territorial defence. germany’s involvement in european defence is further driven by key economic actors that have aided in the development of these initiatives. its defence market is both highly privatized and highly europeanized, with large pan-european defence firms such as airbus and mbda being prominent players. the latter two are partially owned by the german government, with an 11 percent stake in airbus and mbda being partially owned by airbus itself (transparency international 2020). this makes procurement a transnational affair. germany’s largest defence company, rheinmetall, only ranked 27th in terms of global arms sales as of 2020 (sipri 2020) and remains mostly privatized, with the majority of shareholders being large financial 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 institutions.11 additionally, the privatized nature of the industry has created opportunities for consolidation, with rheinmetall looking to purchase krauss-maffei wegmann, its secondlargest domestic company, limiting the procurement options for the government (tids 2020). in response to the ongoing pandemic, germany has chosen to support its defence industry using relief money and buying new ships and fighter platforms from domestic companies and multinational companies like airbus (sprenger 2020). according to transparency international, the current procurement process in germany is vulnerable to corporate actors because the process itself is partially outsourced to the private sector (tids 2020). similarly, according to the eu transparency register, german-based companies are also prominent lobbyists in the eu, including airbus,12 rheinmetall,13 thyssenkrupp,14 and krauss-maffei wegmann15 (european commission and european parliament 2020). the large presence of multinational corporations and privatized interests means that there is an interest to become involved in eu defence initiatives for their economic benefit. the surge in eu-wide defence spending through pesco creates opportunities for companies to generate profits. additionally, germany's arms industry is too heavily globalized to conduct capacity-building projects on germany's own terms. devore has noted that the capacity to pursue state preferences has diminished due to the increasing ability of corporate actors to impose their own preferences for greater profit margins (2014). new armament programs benefit powerful corporate actors, which operate within germany and are already linked internationally to other eu countries. balancing between the expectations of its western and eastern allies while attempting to settle affairs at home will continue to be a problem for germany into the future. yet the benefits outweigh the cost of managing this cooperation. transnational firms benefit from increased economic activity, while the differentiated nature of pesco means that all eu member states can meet their security needs and aid in the development of each other's capabilities. if successful, this would result in the augmentation of eu cooperation under a common framework while increasing the interoperability of european forces to better secure both the southern and eastern flanks of the eu itself. in sum, germany is managing the process simply because the eu is its largest strategic enabler and will be for the foreseeable future. french challenges to national security and the necessity of collaborative intervention contrary to its early aversion to a pesco based on inclusivity, future commitment, and lenient benchmarks (fiott et al 2017), france has continued to champion the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ in order to safeguard its interests in a differentiated eu security architecture. emmanuel macron has defined the term to mean that europe needs to “rethink itself politically and act politically to define common objectives that are more than merely delegating our future to the market” (2020). for macron, ‘strategic autonomy’ is not merely about developing the 11 for more information on the shareholder structure see: rheinmetall. 2020. “rheinmetal shareholder structure.” december 31 2020. accessed june 30 2021. https://ir.rheinmetall.com/websites/rheinmetall/english/1040/shareholder-structure.html 12 investing 1,750,000€ 1,999,999€ in lobbying. 13 investing 400,000€ 499,999€ in lobbying. 14 investing 700,000€ 799,999€ in lobbying. 15 investing 300,000€ 399,999€ in lobbying. 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 ability to intervene abroad but also about developing a european political identity that will reduce the costs of its foreign entanglements (erforth 2020). this policy comes at a time when france is becoming increasingly entangled in foreign conflicts across north africa and combating a form of islamic extremism that is effective at mobilizing terrorist attacks on french soil (jankowski et al 2018). in response, france has deployed 5100 troops across the sahel, 740 in the congo and central africa, and over 3000 across different partners in africa (ministère des armées 2021). in libya, france also aids in the maintenance of the eu-backed arms embargo, coming into direct conflict with turkey in 2020 over its maintenance (marcus 2020). overextended across its many military theatres, france has tried to create multilateral responses to ease its burden. yet in interviews, haroche has documented that other eu countries considered france’s conflicts in africa its own responsibility (2017). from france’s perspective, many eastern eu countries were “obsessed with russia,” unwilling to commit to operations elsewhere, with a french diplomat commenting that “eu missions are increasingly less robust, and we often reach operational capacity thanks to non-member states’ support” (cited in haroche 2017, 244-245). in an attempt to modify its role in the sahel, france has ended operation barkhane, with its forces being lowered to 2500 in 2022 from the original 5000, in favour of a european and regional coalition to secure the region (roussy 2021). to coordinate this, france will require the commitment that it has long sought from its eu allies. france thereby faces the double challenge of lacking coordinated civil-military capabilities and an institution to create the political will to use them. in addition to seeing the csdp as being geopolitically necessary, france also represents the third largest defence exporter in the world, with exports growing by 59 percent between 20122016 and 2017-2021 (sipri 2022). the french armaments industry represents an important lobby to justify policy action being taken. just like germany, france undertook a massive phase of privatization and internationalization during the 1980s. it saw the creation of new paneuropean defence firms such as the european aeronautic defence and space company (eads)-airbus, which was an aggregate of french, german, and spanish national industries as well as the privatization of firms such as dassault electric and thomson-csf, now known as thales group (calcara 2017). however, as calcara indicates, unlike the privatized defence industry in germany or spain, the french government has maintained a great deal of influence on its defence industry. france controls 11 percent in airbus (airbus, 2021), 25 percent of thales group (thales group, 2021), 11 percent in safran (safran, 2021), and continues to own naval group and nexter systems (calcara 2017). this has placed the state near publiccontrolled groups, enhancing government oversight but providing “avenues for managers to bargain for compensation when state policy adversely impacts companies’ profits” (2017, 531). the eos lobbying group, for example, includes many french defence companies such as airbus, naval group, and thales.16 this does not necessarily mean that the french state has control over its arms industry but the market structure of the industry represents mutual dependence: “the proximity of the state to public-controlled groups enhances government oversight but also it provides avenues for managers to bargain for compensation when state policy adversely impacts companies’ profits” (2017, 532). french firms have therefore been 16 european organisation for security (eos). “eos members” accessed september 15, 2022. http://www.eoseu.com/members 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 able to ‘capture’ the government’s preferences and to persuade french policy-makers to strongly engage in eda’s institutionalization and in day-to-day collaborative projects. thales, a national champion in france, has accounted for the majority of the transition and purchases in the development of eu systems (kluth 2017, 171). in 2020, france’s arms exports increased by 72 percent due to it selling advanced fighter and naval equipment to the developing world (makenzie 2020). a flexible international policy will thereby allow france to continue to sell its arms abroad competitively, something it has not shied away from in the past, as exemplified by the mistral deal with russia before the 2014 ukraine crisis (le monde 2014). france has also not been immune from increased european integration in military equipment despite this stance. its adoption of the hk416 rifle as of 2020 from a consortium involving french manufacturer heckler & koch sas france and heckler & koch gmbh represents a europeanlevel consolidation of a key piece of equipment – the standard rifle (asaf 2020). demonstrating these european-facing interests, france has become pesco’s most involved nation, participating in 70 percent of active projects. significant for the french defence industry, many of these are developing a multitude of new capabilities, such as the european patrol corvette (epc), airborne electronic attack plane, and tiger mark iii attack helicopter. france is furthermore involved in all ten enabling and joint cooperation programs, coordinating five of them, such as co-basing, the energy operational function, and timely warning and interception with space-based theater surveillance (twister). to meet its expeditionary needs, it has further involved itself in croc while also taking the lead in the eu military partnership project meant to integrate eu military strategic cultures. france is therefore driving much of pesco’s interoperability development, signalling a high interest in enabling multilateral responses under the eu. france represents a concerned party involved militarily in the eu’s southern neighbourhood. geopolitically, it has a key interest in obtaining the support it needs to protect its forces and meet its political objectives. economically, its extensive defence industry sees the development of eu capabilities as projects that will increase its share of the global defence market. that marriage between the geopolitical and economic aspects of integration has given france a position within the eu to coordinate its own response with partner countries in developing that ‘exclusive club,’ which the eu was originally intended to be. poland’s threat conception and national utilization of eu defence above all other countries, poland's strategic thinking hinges upon preserving nato and us security guarantees. unlike france and germany, poland initially remained tepid over the reinforcement of an eu security policy. during the negotiations for pesco's adoption, poland maintained two key positions: nato should not be undermined by new eu security structures, and a 'two-speed' europe in defence should not become a reality (terlikowski 2018, 4). in interviews, polish officials mentioned that certain member states began to add the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ to foundational eu documents without defining the term. it was only in 2020 that its content was formally discussed in the formation of the strategic compass (interview with polish defence official, online, 2020). the unclarified term led poland to delay its commitment to pesco, with them joining it three days before the eu council’s enactment (terlikowski 2018). pesco has given poland two major positive results: it has allowed poland to pursue its own interests and maintain a relationship with washington. 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 polish involvement in eu affairs has been a pragmatic one. the 2020 national security strategy of poland mentions russia’s buildup of offensive military capabilities in both conventional forces and in hybrid warfare, including cyber-attack and disinformation (polish national security strategy 2020). events in georgia and ukraine helped to convince polish military leadership that previous non-military mechanisms to manage russia are no longer sufficient, with hard power being seen as necessary to counter external threats (moldovan 2018). nato and the us have been major pillars of poland’s sovereignty through deterrence. however, threats in hybrid warfare and cybersecurity have also prompted poland to involve the eu in helping to establish nato-eu task forces in those fields (biskup 2020). less talked about are poland’s concerns with europe’s southern neighbourhood, which has led to the establishment of frontex (szymańska 2017). this is in concert with responses to perceived terrorist threats in the south, a major reason why poland has remained one of the most involved countries in csdp operations and capability-building initiatives (terlikowski 2018). according to an interviewee, once poland joined pesco, the polish conception became focused on its national objectives: “our participation in projects was most driven by our national military capability development process. so, whenever we joined the projects, it was solely based on the added value from our national point of view” (interview with polish defence official, online, 2020). the defence industry in poland is an anomaly within the eu, being its last truly nationalized defence industry. as of 2014, the majority of the polish military industry had been consolidated into the polish armaments group (pgz), its holdings being almost entirely stateowned and its sales reliant on the home market (terlikowski 2017, 4), representing only the 68th largest defence company in the world by total sales (sipri 2020). this means for the development of its defence technological base, poland is also reliant on technology and knowledge transfers from other countries, in contrast with the larger multinational firms that have the competitive edge (terlikowski 2017, 4). therefore, having an entirely state-owned and controlled defence industry directly links poland’s geopolitical policy to its military industry, unlike germany or france where the relationship can be seen as reciprocal. in this aim, poland initially involved itself in pesco projects that looked to benefit its homeland defence industry, currently involved in 22 percent of active projects. capability development has focused on three key projects, namely the integrated unmanned ground system (ugs),17 maritime (semi-) autonomous systems for mine countermeasures (masmcm), the harbour & maritime surveillance and protection (harmspro),18 and the integrated european joint training and simulation centre (eurosim).19 unlike germany and france, many of poland's logistical involvements thus far have focused on those projects most operable within a nato framework. this includes military mobility (mm), the network of logistics hubs (netloghubs), and the european medical command. poland’s limited participation in pesco is due in large part to the already established political-industrial links between poland and the us. notwithstanding the difficulties that third-state participation in eu 17 providing poland with a key technology transfer in the realm of unmanned ground vehicles for fire support, transport, and other force enablers. 18 these two focused on the securitization of near-coastal maritime environments aiding in baltic security. 19 the latter being a capability which will give access to advanced simulation technology, aiding in the training of polish soldiers. 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 defence initiatives creates, poland has sought to involve the us as much as possible: “we want to keep them also open for the partners from outside of the eu…our military industry is both connected to [the] european framework as well as we have particular close contact with our american partners” (interview with polish defence official, online, 2020). even outside of pesco, poland has gone against ‘buying european’ to purchase f-35 fighter jets (brozowksi 2020). when asked about the purchase, a polish defence official commented: “the f35 is the most blatant example of what the eu doesn't have to offer. it's the only fifth generation fighter aircraft available worldwide” (interview with polish defence official, online, 2020). with poland’s involvement in pesco, it is foreseeable that american involvement will be present in at least some of its projects. notwithstanding the global pandemic, poland has undertaken a substantial rearmament program consisting mainly of american equipment with the exception being a new main battle tank being proposed as a pesco project (terlikowski 2021). interviews with polish officials revealed interesting perspectives about the development of the strategic compass, which they evaluated as being very productive: “we already have it more or less agreed or compiled…we have it available now. it was quite surprising for me but the list of threats and challenges the eu can see right now, it’s highly convergent. i mean there are 27 states, which largely agree, there is no disagreement on that…the main goal is…having the list of actions inclusive enough to accommodate all of the concerns of the member states, so we're being realistic” (interview with polish defence official, online, 2020). to justify its own security spending, poland needed to emphasize its own security challenges in the compass. it followed the national security strategy’s position that poland should “seek greater involvement of the european union in activities directed at improving security in the eastern neighbourhood” (polish national security strategy 2020). placing all of the member states under an eu project further ensured that poland could control its development. the differentiation seen in pesco had thereby allowed poland to selectively develop its own defence industry. differentiation further allowed a level of coherence in policy, which would ensure poland’s security partners would enhance their own capabilities. with the advent of the ukraine war, poland was able to further emphasize its own security challenges in the compass. the eu formally acknowledged the russian threat in the eastern neighbourhood and pesco was firmly placed to augment aging pan-european capabilities against it. discussion the three cases described have demonstrated the results of positive differentiation and the bargaining present within those states. in the german case, the eu was seen as the basis for its continued economic and political security. the push for differentiation by germany allowed for the diverse experiences of other member states while also facilitating its own defence needs in the process. for france, the eu provided an institution that could mobilize the funds and the political will necessary to assist in its geopolitical struggles. the current government in paris looks favourably on the development of new capabilities and institutional functions, especially those that can enable the eu to work more efficiently in crisis situations. poland, while initially skeptical, has embraced eu-level cooperation as a way to increase its defence industry’s prowess and to counter existential threats from russia. its involvement in pesco, with the possibility of third-state cooperation, allowed poland to include washington in the new defence process as its staunch ally. there also exists a strong lobby for the development of military capability, with germany and france presenting cases of private interests shaping the defence 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 narrative at both the domestic and eu levels. while security concerns are important, the type of cooperation that has emerged is also defined by primary interests present within particular member states, which often have a key economic dimension. the pesco framework is first and foremost about ensuring that the eu loa is fulfilled, not strategic autonomy (interview e with eu security official, online, 2020). this ensures that member states can meet basic security expectations while also allowing those states that wish to achieve the full spectrum force package to generate usable forces under the eu. this development, therefore, does not imply that the eu is developing any form of actorness but rather involves the eu taking on the role of a coordinator. despite disagreement of what is needed to be done, member states have begun to, at least in part, adopt the idea that the eu, as an economic entity, can help solve stagnant military industrial developments in the face of an international system becoming less certain and more volatile. the eu is now a part of the military development and planning process of european states and there exists a requirement to maintain this new framework. initial moves towards this integration were fraught with issues due to a focus on national preferences over functional requirements. however, differentiation allowed key policy frameworks to be developed and spillover into new policy areas may occur to enhance this institutional capability (schimmelfennig 2018). guay had described the early efforts in the 1990s as driven by spillover. the first component of this was an expectation that integration in one policy area would lead to pressures for further integration in other related areas. a second component was the role of non-state actors and institutions in pushing integration beyond the lowest common denominator between member states (guay 1997). finally, as meyer explains, ‘sociological spillover’ between political-industrial actors can occur when groups that interact with one another develop a shared identity (2006). eu security officials interviewed for this article commented on the socialization of member state military staff through programs like military erasmus, which facilitates the “conditions for exchanges of young officers during their initial education and training.” one interviewee described the process: let's say mid-level officers ranked majors, lieutenant colonels who come back from an orientation course say, 'well, i wasn't aware of what the european union was doing in security and defence. wouldn't it be great if this were to be taught at the national staff courses?' and then, of course, i say yes, and actually, there are a number of member states where we have already convinced them to integrate an orientation course in their national staff colleges (interview a with eu security official, online, 2020). in the case of the eu’s newest military initiatives, it is possible to see the emergence of a limited common understanding of security concerns among eu states. as shown by this analysis, ongoing threats have prompted action by member states, driven by internal economic and market interests. spillover requires pressure to maintain this momentum. now that the member states have been spurred by ongoing crises, internal factors and institutional realities can begin to intervene. functional spillover could very well occur as the eu is granted increased authority over defence matters. while pesco is member state-driven, those states are increasingly seeking consultation with eu actors in the selection of projects. the pesco secretariat is a joint eda, eeas, and the eums body that provides an assessment of the capabilities in operational aspects, coordinates the assessment of project proposals, and seeks to prevent the duplication 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 of existing initiatives. according to an eu security official, the secretariat now assesses all new pesco projects based on a cooperative angle (what they can bring towards the development of eu industrial autonomy) and an operational angle (how far the project will deliver in making a difference towards future missions and operations) (interview e with eu security official, online, 2020). it was even mentioned that member states saw a larger role for the secretariat, the exact role, however, being unclear (interview e with eu security official, online, 2020). the very inclusion of member states in these initiatives has resulted in their defence industries coming to expect eu funding for the development of increasingly more expensive capability development projects. the eda itself was created due to increasing costs and the need for greater efficiency in procurement (barrinha 2010). the trends show that future research and development costs are becoming so inflated that the development of next-generation platforms is becoming impossible domestically, especially in the face of economic uncertainty (kleczka et al. 2020). this could very well prompt both industrial actors and military officials to increase collective development and the funding of pan-european initiatives, notwithstanding the clear monetary benefits these non-state actors gain from an expansion of domestic defence industries. sociological spillover may very well be the most important factor in driving the future of eu initiatives. as the eu becomes more involved in military affairs, so will its practitioners, leaders, and corporations. the eu has embarked upon a formative and functional change of tone as an institution, and as member states experience additional security crises abroad and across europe, greater security cooperation will be incentivized. the eu is one institution that has the capacity to facilitate that function. the status quo still embraces differentiation in specific projects, but a principled change is underway, namely a commitment to manage security concerns collectively and to create conditions for strategic action. until this change happens, however, the idea of an eu as a strategic power will remain a contradiction in terms. 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 references aggestam, lisbeth, and adrian hyde-price. 2020. “learning to lead? germany and the leadership paradox in eu foreign policy.” german politics 29 (1): 8–24. doi:10.1080/09644008.2019.1601177. allinson, tom, and imane mellouk. 2020. “us troop drawdown from sahel puts pressure on europe.” deutsche welle, january 31, 2020. accessed june 30 2022. https://p.dw.com/p/3x76e. asaf (association de soutien à l’armée française). 2020. la dga passe une nouvelle commande de 12 000 fusils d’assaut hk 416 f pour les armées [dga places a new order for 12,000 hk 416 f assault rifles for the armed forces]. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.asafrance.fr/archives/resultats-de-recherche-archives/item/armement-ladga-passe-une-nouvelle-commande-de-12-000-fusils-d-assaut-hk-416-f-pour-lesarmees.html?acm=15417_236. airbus. share price and information. 2021. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.airbus.com/investors/share-price-and-information.html averre, derek. 2009. “competing rationalities: russia, the eu and the ‘shared neighbourhood’.” europe-asia studies 61 (10): 1689–1713. doi:10.1080/09668130903278918. barrinha, andré. 2010. “moving towards a european defence industry? the political discourse on a changing reality and its implications for the future of the european union.” global society 24 (4): 467–485. bbc (british broadcasting corporation). 2020. “trump orders withdrawal of us troops from somalia,” december 5, 2020. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55196130. beake, nick. 2021. "belarus plane: 'perfect storm' prompts eu to act fast." bbc, may 25, 2021. accessed june 14, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57239522. biava, alessia. 2011. “the emergence of a strategic culture within the common security and defense policy.” european foreign affairs review 16 (1): 41–58. biden, joseph. 2020. “why america must lead again: rescuing us foreign policy after trump.” foreign affairs 99 (2): 64–76. biscop, sven. 2015. the state of defense in europe: dependence, deterrence and deployment. global affairs 1 (2): 169–182. doi:10.1080/23340460.2015.1034976. ———. 2018. “european defense: give pesco a chance.” survival 60 (3): 161–180. doi:10.1080/00396338.2018.1470771. 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2020. “battalions to brigades: the future of european defense.” survival 62 (5): 105–118. doi:10.1080/00396338.2020.1819654. biskup, przemysław. 2020. “poland’s policy towards the united kingdom.” in yearbook of polish foreign policy 2017, edited by sławomir dębski and karol wasilewski, 85–97. warsaw: polish institute of international affairs. https://pism.pl/publications/yearbook_of_polish_foreign_policy_2017. britz, malena. 2010. “the role of marketization in the europeanization of defense industry policy.” bulletin of science, technology & society 30 (3): 176–184. doi:10.1177/0270467610367492. brzozowski, alexandra. 2019. “pentagon warns eu against blocking us firms from defence fund.” euractiv, august 19, 2019. accessed june 13, 2021. https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/pentagon-warns-eu-againstblocking-us-firms-from-defence-fund-2/. brozowski, alexandra. 2020. “amid beefed up security cooperation, poland inks contract for us-made f-35 fighter jets.” euractiv, february 3, 2020. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.euractiv.com/section/defense-and-security/news/amid-beefed-up-securitycooperation-poland-inks-contract-for-us-made-f-35-fighter-jets/. bmvg (bundesministerium der verteidigung) 2016. white paper on german security policy and the future of the bundeswehr. berlin. accessed june 30, 2022. https://www.bundeswehr.de/resource/blob/4800140/fe103a80d8576b2cd7a135a5a8a86d de/download-white-paper-2016-data.pdf. calcara, antonio. 2019. “making sense of european armaments policies: a liberal intergovernmentalist research agenda.” comparative strategy 38 (6): 567–581. doi:10.1080/01495933.2019.1674084. caporaso, james. 2018. “europe’s triple crisis and the uneven role of institutions: the euro, refugees and brexit.” journal of common market studies 56 (6): 1345–61. doi:10.1111/jcms.12746. council of the european union. 2017. “council decision (cfsp) 2017/2315 of 11 december 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (pesco) and determining the list of participating member states.” december 11, 2017. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32017d2315&from=en. ———. 2016. “council conclusions on implementing the eu global strategy in the area of security and defence.” 14149/16. november 14, 2016. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugs-conclusions-st14149en16.pdf ———. 2020. council decision (cfsp) 2020/1639 of 5 november 2020 establishing the general conditions under which third states could exceptionally be invited to 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 participate in individual pesco projects.” november 6, 2020. https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32020d1639&from=en. ———. 2022. “a strategic compass for security and defence. for a european union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security.” march 21, 2022. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/st-73712022-init/en/pdf. cottey, andrew. 2019. “astrategic europe.” journal of common market studies 58 (2): 276– 291. cox, michael. 2017. “europe – still between the superpowers.” global policy 8 (s4): 9–17. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12427. dębski, sławomir, and karol wasilewski. 2020. yearbook of polish foreign policy 2017. warsaw: polish institute of international affairs. https://pism.pl/publications/yearbook_of_polish_foreign_policy_2017. devore, marc. 2014. "producing european armaments: policymaking preferences and processes.” cooperation and conflict 49 (4): 438–463. doi:10.1177/0010836714525052. jensen, donald, and peter doran. 2018. “chaos as a strategy: putin’s ‘promethean’ gamble.” center for european policy analysis. https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/644196_46af11fbc287466f96a9ecdfbad0fa7c.pdf. deutsche welle (dw). 2020a. “germany extends bundeswehr mission in mali.” may 29, 2020. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-extends-bundeswehrmission-in-mali/a-53621405. ———. 2020b. “mali: german soldiers injured in smoke grenade explosion.” april 29, 2020. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/mali-german-soldiers-injuredin-smoke-grenade-explosion/a-53277891. ———. 2020c. “nord stream 2: germany unhappy with new us sanctions.” june 14, 2020. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-germany-unhappy-withnew-us-sanctions/a-53805296. ———. 2021. “us wants to 'strengthen' iran nuclear deal.” february 22, 2021. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/us-wants-to-strengthen-iran-nuclear-deal/a-56655385. eprs (european parliament research service). 2020. towards a more resilient europe postcoronavirus: an initial mapping of structural risks facing the eu. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/stud/2020/653208/eprs_stu(2020) 653208_en.pdf. ———. 2021. towards a more resilient europe post-coronavirus: options to enhance the eu's resilience to structural risks. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-extends-bundeswehr-mission-in-mali/a-53621405 https://www.dw.com/en/germany-extends-bundeswehr-mission-in-mali/a-53621405 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/stud/2021/659437/eprs_stu(2021) 659437_en.pdf. erforth, benedikt. 2020. “multilateralism as a tool: exploring french military cooperation in the sahel.” journal of strategic studies 43 (4): 560–582. doi:10.1080/01402390.2020.1733986. european commission. 2020a. “communication from the commission to the european parliament, the european council, the council, the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions: the eu budget powering the recovery plan for europe.” may 25, 2020. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/?uri=com%3a2020%3a442%3afin. ———. 2020b. towards a european defence union european defence industrial development programme 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ en/fs_20_1076. european commission and european parliament. 2020. transparency register: airbus. accessed june 30, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/ displaylobbyist.do?id=2732167674-76. ———. 2020. transparency register: krauss-maffei wegmann. accessed june 30, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=524 127838990-69. ———. 2020. transparency register: rheinmetall. accessed june 30, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=708 107818892-23. ———. 2020. transparency register: thyssenkrupp. accessed june 30, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=456 211534646-58. eda (european defence agency). 2018. capability development plan. https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-06-28factsheet_cdpb020b03fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f. european external action service (eeas). 2018. factsheet: the military planning and conduct capability (mpcc). https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf. ———. 2016. shared vision, common action: a stronger europe a global strategy for the european union’s foreign and security policy. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/ eugs_review_web_0.pdf. fabbrini, sergio. 2014. “the european union and the libyan crisis.” international politics 51 (2): 177–195. doi:10.1057/ip.2014.2. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=com%3a2020%3a442%3afin https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=com%3a2020%3a442%3afin https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-06-28-factsheet_cdpb020b03fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-06-28-factsheet_cdpb020b03fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 fiott, daniel. 2020. “uncharted territory? towards a common threat analysis and a strategic compass for eu security and defence.” european union institute for security studies.https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/euissfiles/ brief%2016%20strategic%20compass_0.pdf. foot, daniel, antonio missiroli, and thierry tardy. 2017. “permanent structured cooperation: what’s in a name?” european union institute for security studies: chaillot papers (142) https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/euissfiles/cp_142_online.pdf. franke, ulrike, and tara varma. 2019. “independence play: europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy.” european council on foreign relations, july 18, 2019. https://ecfr.eu/special/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy/. guay, terrence r. 1997. “the european union, expansion of policy-making, and defense industrial policy.” journal of european public policy 4 (3), 404–421. doi.org/10.1080/13501769780000071. hallams, ellen, and benjamin schreer. 2012. “towards a ‘post-american’ alliance? nato burden-sharing after libya.” international affairs 88 (2): 313–327. doi:10.1111/j.14682346.2012.01073.x. haroche, pierre. 2017.” interdependence, asymmetric crises and european defence cooperation.” european security 26 (2): 226–252. doi:10.1080/09662839.2017.1294579. ———. 2018. “france, poland and the relaunch of eu defence cooperation.” in france and poland: facing the evolution of the security environment, edited by barbara jankowski and amélie zima, 77–84. issue 59. paris: institut de recherche stratégique et de l’école militaire (irsem). hodge, carl cavanagh. 2013. “full circle: two decades of nato intervention.” journal of transatlantic studies 11 (4): 350–367. doi:10.1080/14794012.2013.843883. hoeffler, cathrine. 2019. “differentiated integration in csdp through defence market integration.” european review of international studies 6 (2): 43–70. hoffmann, stanley. 2000. “towards a common european foreign and security policy?” journal of common market studies 38 (2): 189–198. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00216. hollis, rosemary. 2012. “no friend of democratization: europe’s role in the genesis of the ‘arab spring.’” international affairs 88 (1): 81–94. doi:10.1111/j.14682346.2012.01058.x. howorth, jolyon. 2018. “strategic autonomy and eu-nato cooperation: threat or opportunity for transatlantic defence relations?” journal of european integration: transatlantic relations in times of uncertainty: crises and eu-us relations 40 (5): 523–537. doi:10.1080/07036337.2018.1512268. 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2019a. “differentiation in security and defence policy.” comparative european politics. 17 (2), 261–277. doi:10.1057/s41295-019-00161-w. ———. 2019b. “european defence policy and subsidiarity: the imperative of the eu level.” european view 18 (1): 62–70. doi:10.1177/1781685819838431. hyde-price, adrian. 2006. “‘normative’ power europe: a realist critique.” journal of european public policy 13 (2): 217–234. doi:10.1080/13501760500451634. irish, john, and robin emmott. 2020. "france-turkey tensions mount after nato naval incident." reuters, july 7, 2020. accessed june 30. 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-france-turkey-analysis-iduskbn2481k5. jolly, édouard, and colonel olivier passot. 2018. “instability and uncertainty. strategic review of security and defence challenges from a french perspective” in france and poland: facing the evolution of the security environment, edited by barbara jankowski and amélie zima, 37-38. issue 59. paris: institut de recherche stratégique et de l’école militaire (irsem). jones, seth. 2003. “the european union and the security dilemma.” security studies 12 (3), 114–156. doi:10.1080/09636410390443107. jonnet, edouard. 2020. “common naval bases for european navies.” institut de recherche stratégique de l’école militaire. https://www.irsem.fr/data/files/irsem/documents/ document/file/3271/rp%20irsem%2092%20-%20jonnet%20%20common%20naval%20bases.pdf. kleczka, mitja, caroline buts, and marc jegers. 2020. “addressing the ‘headwinds’ faced by the european arms industry.” defense & security analysis 36 (2): 129–160. klose, stephan. 2018. “theorizing the eu’s actorness: towards an interactionist role theory framework.” journal of common market studies 56 (5): 1144–1160. doi:10.1111/jcms.12725. kluth, michael. 2017. “european defence industry consolidation and domestic procurement bias.” defence & security analysis 33 (2): 158–173. doi:10.1080/14751798.2017.1302576. kriesi, hanspeter. 2016. “the politicization of european integration.” journal of common market studies 54: 32–47. doi:10.1111/jcms.12406. kuperman, alan. 2013. “lessons from libya: how not to intervene.” quarterly journal: international security. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/ kuperman%20policy%20brief%20published%20version%202.pdf. le monde. 2014. “pourquoi la vente de mistral à la russie embarrasse la france” [why the sale of the mistral to russia embarrasses france]. july 22, 2014. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-france-turkey-analysis-iduskbn2481k5 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2014/07/22/pourquoi-la-france-estembarrassee-par-la-vente-de-mistral-a-la-russie_4461142_4355770.html. limnell, jarno 2018. “russian cyber activities in the eu.” in hacks, leaks and disruptions: russian cyber strategies, edited by nicu popescu and stanislav secrieru, 65–74. european union institute for security studies (euiss). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21140.10. macron, emmanuel. 2020. “interview granted to le grand continent magazine by the french president emmanuel macron.” november 16, 2020. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/11/16/interview-granted-to-le-grandcontinent-magazine-by-the-french-president-emmanuel-macron. major, claudia, and christian molling. 2019. “pesco: the german perspective.” armament industry european research group. https://www.iris-france.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/ares-36.pdf. makenzie, christina. 2020. “here’s what’s behind france’s 72 percent jump in weapons exports.” defence news, march 10, 2020. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.defencenews.com/global/europe/2020/03/10/heres-whats-behind-frances72-jump-in-weapons-exports/. manners, ian, and ben rosamond. 2018. “a different europe is possible: the professionalization of eu studies and the dilemmas of integration in the 21stcentury.” journal of common market studies. 5628–38. doi:10.1111/jcms.12771. marcus, jonathan. 2020. “libya crisis: france suspends nato mission role amid turkey row.” bbc. july 2, 2020. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-53262725". maulny, jean-pierre, and livia di bernardini. 2019. “moving pesco forward: what are the next steps?” armament industry european research group. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ares-39.pdf. mawdsley, jocelyn. 2019. “armaments decision-making: are european states really different?” comparative strategy 37 (4): 260–271. doi:10.1080/01495933.2018.1497319. mcnamara, kathleen. 2018. “authority under construction: the european union in comparative political perspective.” journal of common market studies 56 (7): 1510– 1525. doi:10.1111/jcms.12784. menon, rajan. 2020. “the sorry state of germany’s armed forces.” foreign policy, june 18, 2020. accessed june 30, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/18/trump-withdrawtroops-germany-military-spending/. meyer, christoph. 2006. “the quest for a european strategic culture: changing norms on security and defence in the european union.” london: palgrave macmillan. 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 baun, michael, and dan marek. 2019. “making europe defend again: the relaunch of european defence cooperation from a neoclassical realist perspective.” mezinárodní vztahy 54 (4): 27–46. ministère des armées. 2021. “dispositif opérationnel français déployé à travers le monde” [french operational system deployed throughout the world]. june 15, 2021. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.defence.gouv.fr/operations/rubriques_complementaires/ carte-des-operations-et-missions-militaire. moldovan, anton-gabriel. 2018. “poland’s national security policy in a new regional security environment. case study: national security strategy of poland (2014).” torun international studies 1 (11): 89–102. moravcsik, andrew. 1993. “preferences and power in the european community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach.” journal of common market studies 31 (4): 473–524. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x. ———. 2018. “preferences, power and institutions in 21st-century europe.” journal of common market studies 56 (7): 1648-1674. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12804. north atlantic treaty organization (nato). 2020. “nato 2030: united for a new era.” november 25, 2020. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/ pdf/201201-reflection-group-final-report-uni.pdf. ojanen, hanna. 2006. “the eu and nato: two competing models for a common defence policy.” journal of common market studies 44 (1): 57–76. doi:10.1111/j.14685965.2006.00614.x. parker, a. 2016. “donald trump says nato is ‘obsolete,’ un is ‘political game’.” the new york times, april 2, 2016. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/04/02/donald-trump-tells-crowd-hedbe-fine-if-nato-broke-up/. permanent structured cooperation (pesco) secretariat. 2021. “eufor crisis response operation core (eufor croc).” accessed june 30, 2021. https://pesco.europa.eu/project/eufor-crisis-response-operation-core/. peterson, john. 2018. “present at the destruction? the liberal order in the trump era.” the international spectator 53 (1): 28–44. doi:10.1080/03932729.2018.1421295. polyakova, alina, and benjamin haddad. 2019. “europe alone what comes after the transatlantic alliance.” foreign affairs 98 (4): 109–120. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2019-06-11/europe-alone. posen, barry. 2004. “esdp and the structure of world power.” the international spectator 39 (1), 5–17: doi:10.1080/03932720408457057. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2019-06-11/europe-alone 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 president of the republic of poland. 2020. “national security strategy of the republic of poland.” ministerstwo obrony narodowej. warsaw, may 12. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/national_security_strategy_of_the_republic_of _poland_2020.pdf. putin, vladimir. 2007. “speech and the following discussion at the munich conference on security policy.” munich, february 10. accessed june 15, 2022. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/copy/24034. ratti, lucca. 2006. “post-cold war nato and international relations theory: the case for neo-classical realism.” journal of transatlantic studies 4 (1): 81–110. doi:10.1080/14794010608656841. rehrl, jochen, ed. 2021. “handbook on csdp: the common security and defence policy of the european union.” european security and defence college. isbn: 978-3-902275-516. roussy, caroline. 2021. “fin de l’opération barkhane : une étonnante convergence avec l’agenda présidentiel français?” [end of operation barkhane: a surprising convergence with the french presidential agenda?] institut de relations internationales et stratégiques. june 24, 2021. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.irisfrance.org/158618-fin-de-loperation-barkhane-une-etonnante-convergence-aveclagenda-presidentiel-francais/. rufanges, calvo jordi xifra, and almiron núria. 2016. “the arms industry lobby in europe.” american behavioral scientist 60 (3), 305–320: doi:10.1177/0002764215613406. rynning, sten. 2011. realism and the common security and defence policy. journal of common market studies 49 (1), 23–42: doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02127.x. safran. 2021. “structure du capital et des droits de vote” [ownership structure and voting rights] april 30, 2021. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.safran-group.com/fr/finance/actionsafran/structure-du-capital-et-des-droits-de-vote. schimmelfennig, frank. 2019. “the choice for differentiated europe: an intergovernmentalist theoretical framework.” comparative european politics 17 (2): 176–191. doi:10.1057/s41295-019-00166-5. silove, nina. 2016. “the pivot before the pivot: u.s. strategy to preserve the power balance in asia.” international security 40 (4): 45–88. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00238. simon, luis, and vivien pertusot. 2017. “making sense of europe’s southern neighbourhood: main geopolitical and security parameters.” institut français des relations internationales. ari 10/2017. accessed june 15, 2022. https://www.ifri.org/en/ publications/publications-ifri/making-sense-europes-southern-neighbourhood-maingeopolitical-and. 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 sprenger, sebastian. 2020. “germany wants to beef up its defence firms with pandemic relief funds.” defence news, june 10, 2020. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.defencenews.com/global/europe/2020/06/10/germany-wants-to-beef-up-itsdefence-firms-with-pandemic-relief-funds/. stanicek, branislav. 2020. “turkey: remodelling the eastern mediterranean conflicting exploration of natural gas reserves.” european parliamentary research service. pe 652.048. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/brie/2020/652048/ eprs_bri(2020)652048_en.pdf. stockholm international peace research institute (sipri). 2020. “the sipri top 100 arms‐ producing and military services companies, 2020.” december. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/fs_2112_top_100_2020.pdf. ———. 2022. “summary: sipri yearbook 2022: armaments, disarmaments, and international security.” stockholm. accessed july, 2022. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/yb22_summary_en_v3.pdf svendsen, øyvind. 2019. “brexit and the future of eu defence: a practice approach to differentiated defence integration.” journal of european integration 41 (8): 993–1007. doi:10.1080/07036337.2019.1622540. szymańska, jolanta. 2017. “poland’s policy in the european union.” in yearbook of polish foreign policy, edited by sławomir dębski and karol wasilewski. polish institute of international affairs, 53-68. https://pism.pl/publications/ yearbook_of_polish_foreign_policy_2017. taylor, paul. 2015. "eu 'ring of friends' turns into ring of fire." reuters. september 27, 2015. accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrantsneighbourhood-analysi-iduskcn0rr09020150927. terlikowski, marcin. 2017. “defence and industrial policy in poland: drivers and influence.” armament industry european research group. https://www.iris-france.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/ares_defence_industrial_policy_in_poland_july_2017.pdf. ——— . 2018. “pesco the polish perspective, policy paper.” armament industry european research group. https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 10/ares-32.pdf. ——— . 2021. “poland.” in collective collapse or resilience? european defence priorities in the pandemic era, edited by corentin brustlein, 65-74. focus stratégique, french institute of international relations, 103. https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-delifri/focus-strategique/collective-collapse-or-resilience-european-defense. thales group. 2021. “share and shareholding 2021.” accessed june 30, 2021. https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/investor/retail-investors/share-and-shareholding. 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 the white house. 2017. “national security strategy of the united states of america.” october 12, 2017. white house press team. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/nss-final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. tomat, stefano. 2021. “eu foreign policy coherence in times of crises: the integrated approach.” european foreign affairs review 26 (1): 149-156. transparency international defense and security (tids). 2020. “defense industry influence in germany analysing defense industry influence on the german policy agenda.” transparency international defense & security. https://ti-defense.org/publications/ defense-industry-influence-germany/. verdun, amy. 2018. “theories of european integration and governance.” in european union governance and policy making: a canadian perspective, edited by emmanuel brunetjailly, achim hurrelmann, and amy verdun, 106-124. toronto: university of toronto press. walt, stephen 2009. “alliances in a unipolar world.” world politics 61 (1): 86–120. doi:10.1017/s0043887109000045. zima, amélie. 2018. “nato after the warsaw summit: back to basics?” in france and poland: facing the evolution of the security environment, edited by barbara jankowski and amélie zima, 41-50. issue 59. paris: institut de recherche stratégique et de l’école militaire (irsem). interviews (conducted virtually) • interview with eu official (a), november 26, 2020. • interview with eu official (b), december 10, 2020. • interview with eu official (c), december 9, 2020. • interview with eu official (d), december 14, 2020. • interview with eu official (e), november 24, 2020. • interview with eu official (f), november 21, 2020. • interview with german official (a), november 19, 2020. • interview with german official (b), november 19, 2020. • interview with german official (c), november 19, 2020. • interview with polish official, january 29, 2021. 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(2) 2020: 25-54 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 emergency power in hungary and the covid-191 attila antal, eötvös loránd university abstract this paper aims to examine the manifestations and abuses of the exceptionalist legal order in hungary during the period of the covid-19 pandemic. since the refugee crisis of 2015, the orbán regime has been using the instruments of exceptional governance in a continuous way, which has become more and more pronounced in the context of the crises of recent years, especially the covid-19 pandemic. in this paper, the author first presents the literature on the state of exception and its use by authoritarian populist regimes. then, the author will discuss how the orbán regime employs the tools of exceptional governance in an authoritarian manner, with a particular focus on how the tools of exceptional governance have become part of the constitutional structure. finally, the author will explain the risks and anti-democratic dangers of the use of extraordinary measures of governance without checks and balances. 1 this paper was prepared and written within the postdoc project “the state of emergency in the era of global ecological and pandemic crisis” financed by the national research, development and innovation office, postdoctoral excellence program of hungary, id-number: 139007, hosting institution: elte faculty of law and the jános bolyai research scholarship, hungarian academy of science. this paper builds on the research summarized in the recent book of the author of this article (antal 2022a) and is an improved version of his earlier working paper (antal 2021b) as well as an online lecture at the 53rd aseees annual convention held on december 3, 2021. 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 introduction this is an era of overlapping emergencies: the climate and ecological disasters, global capitalism’s permanent crisis, migration challenges, and the covid-19 pandemic. considering the hungarian political regime, this paper investigates how exceptional measures have been applied and how they have been constitutionally restructured by the authoritarian populist orbán regime. the author of this paper argues that the main outcome of the exceptional measures is the rise of a new executive power, and it demonstrates how heavily authoritarian regimes rely on several kinds of states of exception. the author also argues that behind the strengthening of the emergency power, there is also the rise of unlimited executive power, which is nothing more than the legal and political fulfilment of the power that the two-thirds majority in the parliament represents. the orbán regime began to transform the system of the special legal order created by the fundamental law of hungary (the country’s constitution) and, independently of this, created a structure of extraordinary governance under the fundamental law. as a result of the ninth amendment to the constitution, the executive branch has jurisdiction over all the legal orders enshrined in it; moreover, since 2015, the orbán regime has developed exceptional measures of governance tools under the constitution to address different emergency situations (migration crisis, covid-19, and military conflicts). in the case of the permanent state of exception of the orbán regime, it can be said that the orbán administration has used the covid-19 pandemic to manufacture a political crisis. the paper briefly discusses the impact that the 2022 hungarian national election campaign and the russian invasion of ukraine in february 2022 had on the hungarian emergency powers. the orbán regime has thus exploited the possibility of governing using extraordinary measures: by transforming the means at the constitutional level and subordinating the government; moreover, by applying sub-constitutional extraordinary measures without limitations. the covid-19 pandemic proved to be a turning point: the leaders of the orbán regime realized that there were great opportunities to use exceptional government measures and tools, which also carried serious societal risks and further distanced hungary from democracy. 1. conceptual framework 1.1 authoritarian populism, emergency and exceptional m in this paper, the governing and political structure of hungary after 2010 has been characterized as authoritarian populism, which refers to a specific phenomenon, as the orbán regime has systematically moved the hungarian political system from a relatively stable liberal democratic position to a hybrid regime (levitsky and way 2002, 2010).2 this kind of political system, which contains far more authoritarian than democratic elements, can be characterized as authoritarian populism (antal 2019). according to samuel rogers, “the hungarian regime has developed a special kind of populism, however, because not only is it nominally democratic, relatively politically stable, possesses authoritarian components such as a broad control of the media and judicial influence, it now has developed the capacity to influence state structures to the extent that the external dimensions of the hungarian political economy are altered” (rogers 2019, 3). 2 it is precisely because of the complete transformation of the hungarian political system that the author of this article uses the term “orbán regime,” which suggests that the post-2010 multi-cycle government is not just a series of reelected governments but can be understood as a political setup built against the liberal democracy of 1989-2010. 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 the authoritarian populism of the orbán regime, and thus the system of using exceptional government measures, is rooted in the neoliberalization and weimarization of eastern european politics (antal 2019, 43-73). the unstoppable breakthrough of neoliberalism in the western part of the euro-atlantic world in the 1980s and the former soviet bloc in the 1990s accelerated a situation similar to that of the 1920s and 1930s – new weimarization (morelock 2018, xxviii).3 neoliberalism requires massive state regulation in conjunction with liberalization, free trade and investments, and a suitable legal framework for capitalist labour. the investigation of the togetherness and collusion of neoliberalism and authoritarian populism dates back to thatcherism in the late 1970s. in his edited volume, critical theory and authoritarian populism, jeremiah morelock (2018) argues that the term authoritarian populism basically refers to prejudice and populism focused mostly on nazism, but it has a broader meaning and refers to the pitting of ‘the people’ against ‘elites’ in order to have the power to drive out, wipe out, or otherwise dominate those ‘others’ who are not ‘the people.’ generally, this involves social movements fuelled by prejudice and led by charismatic leaders who seek to increase the governmental force to combat pluralism. the orbán regime aims to create permanent enemies and exceptional situations based on prejudice that can only be resolved by a charismatic leader. michael hardt and antonio negri argue that the separation of war from politics was a fundamental goal of modern political thought and practice among both liberal and non-liberal political theorists (hardt and negri 2004). this consensus has collapsed, and authoritarian populist regimes are introducing the kinds of permanent states of exception as elaborated by giorgio agamben (agamben 1998, 2005). as michael head stated: “the early years of the twenty-first century have seen increasing resort to emergency-type powers or claims of supra-legal executive authority, including by the western countries regarded as the world’s leading democracies” (head 2016, 1). due to the covid-19 pandemic and global social crises, the rise of emergency powers defines this time more than ever. the solid contours of war have disappeared; moreover, war and peace are merged to some extent, and the developing emergency powers remarkably indicate these tendencies. authoritarian populist regimes sense these trends and prefer using the emergency measures of government. these systems are using the power of the penal state to create political enemies and annihilate them as modern forms of homo sacer (agamben 1998). the emergency measures and the modern forms of deprived social groups, as contemporary homo sacer, have become the main accompanying parts of the authoritarian populist regimes of this time. in this sense, it was not the covid-19 crisis and the crisis management of these regimes that increased the risk of authoritarianization in hungary since the authoritarian turn had already commenced earlier, and the exceptional government measures only contributed to the evolving autocracy. in this paper, it is argued that authoritarian crisis management was based on the never-ending exceptional government even before the covid-19 pandemic. the conditions for hungarian authoritarian rule already existed prior to the pandemic and were used to define how the government would respond to it. the use of the covid-19 pandemic was simply the next level of exceptional government in hungary. during the pandemic, the hungarian prime minister, viktor orbán, relied on the exceptional government that has been 3 the term “weimarization” refers, on the basis of the inter-war experience of the german weimar republic, to the strengthening of far-right parties and the drastic weakening of moderate pro-democracy parties, as a result of the economic, political, and constitutional crisis (morelock 2018, xiv–xix). 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 in place since the refugee crisis of 2015, and the pandemic merely shaped the new contours of the exceptional measures. authoritarian populism is the use of exceptional measures for the sake of maintaining political power, and the covid-19 crisis gave a new rise to this phenomenon. according to agamben (2014), there is a seminal transformation in conjunction with the idea of government, “which overturns the traditional hierarchical relation between causes and effects. since governing the causes is difficult and expensive, it is safer and more useful to try to govern the effects” (agamben 2014). as will be explained below, in the case study of hungary, authoritarian populist regimes use objective crises (wars, public health, migration) for their own political purposes and engage in internal, subjective crisis management where the resolution and treatment of social problems caused by objective crises are not important. thus, as agamben puts it, the main political objective is the permanent management of crises, to maintain and rule the exceptional situation without any real social objectives. authoritarian populist regimes have started to manage the effects of a crisis that they themselves created, and this is a considerable change. agamben described this situation in the following way: the ancient regime aimed to rule the causes; modernity pretends to control the effects. and this axiom applies to every domain, from economy to ecology, from foreign and military politics to the internal measures of police. we must realize that european governments today gave up any attempt to rule the causes, they only want to govern the effects. (agamben 2014) the exceptional or the putative exceptional situations offer the authoritarian populist regimes a convenient opportunity to criminalize certain political groups and claim that these groups are enemies and that regimes protect people from these enemies that they themselves created. this is a situation where the normal sets of governance are replaced by police forces, and the normal becomes exceptional where anything is conceivable (antal 2019, 29-30). 1.2 the structure of emergency measures in the hungarian fundamental law regarding governance using exceptional measures, there are two possible paths. the first is the use of exceptional measures as defined by a constitution, and the second is the introduction of exceptional legal regimes under a constitution. the distinction is crucial because, in the case of exceptional governance measures enacted by a constitution, the rules can provide the legislature and courts with strong control over the executive branch of government that uses these exceptional instruments. at the same time, exceptional measures of government under the constitution are, in all respects, the exclusive prerogative of the executive power. the orbán regime, as will be demonstrated in the next section, has defined governance by extraordinary measures by introducing exceptional states under the fundamental law from 2015 onwards. however, recent amendments to the constitution have completely redrawn the structure of the hungarian special legal order. the orbán regime has treated the emergency measures as priorities since their inception, but the shift of the governmental system to extraordinary instruments had not yet begun in 2010, since the orbán regime basically created the everyday practice of governing by extraordinary measures in the context of the refugee crisis of 2015 and the subsequent covid-19 pandemic. the new fundamental law, adopted in 2011 and having entered into force on january 1, 2012, significantly redefined the exceptional measures: it introduced the terminology of the “special legal order” and unified the previous, rather fragmented rules. in hungary, the constitution of the former state socialist regime, act 20 of 1949, formally remained in force after the fall of the communist regime. 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 the liberal democracy created by the constitutional amendment of 1989 basically regulated the following main forms of special legal order at the constitutional level: state of national crisis (in the event of war or danger of war; article 19 section [3] [h]);4 state of emergency (in the event of armed actions aimed at overturning constitutional order or at the acquisition of exclusive control of public power; article 19 section [3] [i]);5 state of danger (in the event of natural disasters that endanger the lives and property of citizens; article 19 section [3] [i]).6 in 1993, the category of “unexpected attack” was added to existing forms of special legal order (article 19/e).7 moreover, in 2004, another new form, the state of preventive defence (article 35 section [1] [m]),8 has been incorporated into the constitution of 1949. after 2010, the fundamental law created five types of special legal orders (nagy and horváth, 2022), and a new one was added in 2016. the “state of national crisis” is the most serious form of extraordinary measure, which allows for the widest range of deviation from the normal legal order: the national assembly shall declare a state of national crisis and set up a national defence council in the event of the declaration of a state of war or an imminent danger of armed attack by a foreign power (danger of war) (article 48 and 49). the second form concerns domestic conflicts: the national assembly shall declare a “state of emergency” (article 48 and 50) in the event of armed actions aimed at subverting the lawful order or at exclusively acquiring power, and in the event of serious acts of violence massively endangering life and property, committed with weapons or with instruments capable of causing death.9 in the event of a danger of external armed attack or in order to meet an obligation arising from an alliance, the national assembly shall declare a “state of preventive defence” for a fixed period of time, and shall simultaneously authorize the government to introduce extraordinary measures laid down in a cardinal act (article 51). in 2016, the sixth amendment of the fundamental law incorporated the fifth extraordinary situation called “state of terrorist threat” into the fundamental law (article 51/a), which is a direct and abusive application of extraordinary measures to the migration crisis. the next form is about the “unexpected attack” of external armed groups into the territory of hungary: until the decision on the declaration of a state of emergency or state of national crisis, the government shall be obliged to take immediate 4 the national assembly “…in the event of a state of war or imminent threat of armed attack by a foreign power (threat of war), declare a state of emergency and establish a defence council” article 19 section (3) (h). 5 the national assembly “…declares a state of emergency in the event of armed acts intended to overthrow the constitutional order or to seize exclusive power, serious acts of violence, whether armed or not, or a disaster or industrial accident, which threaten the safety of life and property on a massive scale” article 19 section (3) (i). 6 the government “takes the necessary measures to avert a natural disaster or its consequences which threatens the safety of life and property… and to protect public order and public security” article 35 section (1) (i). 7 “in the event of an unexpected invasion of the territory of hungary by external armed groups, the government shall take immediate action to avert an attack or to protect the territory of the country with national and allied air defence and air defence forces, in order to protect constitutional order, the security of life and property, public order and public safety, in accordance with the defence plan approved by the president of the republic, with forces commensurate with the attack and prepared for it, until the decision to declare a state of emergency or a state of emergency” article 19/e. 8 the government “may, following the initiation of the proclamation of a pre-emptive state of defence, introduce measures other than those provided for in the laws affecting the functioning of the public administration, the hungarian defence forces and law enforcement agencies” article 35 section (1) (m). 9 article 50: “(1) the hungarian defence forces may be deployed during a state of emergency if the use of the police and the national security services proves insufficient. (2) during a state of emergency, if the national assembly is prevented from acting, the president of the republic shall decide on the utilisation of the hungarian defence forces under paragraph (1). (3) during a state of emergency, the extraordinary measures laid down in a cardinal act shall be introduced by the president of the republic in a decree.” 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 action (article 52).10 last, but not least in the event of a natural disaster or industrial accident endangering life and property, or in order to mitigate its consequences, the government shall declare a “state of danger” (article 53). this demonstrates that even before the turning point of the refugee crisis, the hungarian government was the main constitutional actor with the highest authority in the vast majority of special legal orders. 2. authoritarian application of emergency measures in hungary: overlapping state of exception after 2015, the orbán regime chose to deal with the various crises (migration, covid-19) not within the constitutional framework analyzed in this paper but by creating a system of extraordinary governance below the constitutional level. the orbán governments have not primarily enacted exceptional legal orders contained in the fundamental law but have essentially used parliament to gain broad powers to manipulate exceptional legal orders. in the recent past, two main forms of states of exception evolved in the hungarian political regime: (1) the authoritarian governments created a permanent state of exception based on the case of the migration crisis of 2015; (2) parallel with the further escalation of the migration crisis, the orbán administration introduced an overlapping set of states of emergencies for the covid-19 pandemic (see table 1). it has been argued that the orbán government used the state of exception for the migration and covid-19 crises in an authoritarian way to maintain and reinforce its political power. this does not mean that the extraordinary measures and instruments to tackle and address the global climate and ecological crisis should be given up. here, the author of this paper proposes that there is a need for democratic control over the extraordinary measures that would be introduced in the context of the global climate and ecological crises. it is becoming increasingly difficult to establish a democracy-based state of exception because the executive power based on authoritarian populism has begun to replace the rule of law with the extraordinary measures mentioned above. table 1: the forms of state of exceptions in hungary (2015-2023) (source: antal 2022a, 124) the overlapping state of exceptions (2015-2023) 10 article 52: “(1) in the event of an unexpected incursion of external armed groups into the territory of hungary, until the decision on the declaration of a state of emergency or state of national crisis, the government shall be obliged – if necessary, in accordance with the armed defence plan approved by the president of the republic – to take immediate action using force proportionate to and prepared for the attack, to repel the attack, to defend the territory of hungary with domestic and allied readiness forces of the air defence and air forces, in order to protect lawful order, life and property, public order and public safety“ 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 emergency caused by mass immigration coronavirus-related state of exception health crisis emergency timetable regulation timetable regulation timetable regulation from september 15, 2015, local application modification of the act lxxx of 2007 on asylum decree of government 269/2015 1st wave: from march 11, 2020 to june 18, 2020 decree of government 40/2020 empowerment law 1: act xii of 2020 from june 18, 2020 to december 18, 2020 act cliv of 1997 on healthcare system decree of government 521/2013 from march 9, 2016, entered into force at national level 2nd wave: from november 3, 2020 to february 8, 2021 decree of government 478/2020 empowerment law 2: act cix of 2020 it has been prolonged several times (until september 7th, 2023) 3rd wave: from february 22 2021 decree of government 27/2021 empowerment law 3: act i of 2021 2.1 the refugee crisis as a “tailored state of exception” the two-thirds majority of fidesz in 2010 is rooted in the party’s populist attitude and commitment towards “law and order” (haney 2016, 353). at the center of the emerging authoritarian populist regime is nationalism based on blaming and criminalizing others and otherness. the penal nationalist crime control is not only focused on protecting the people but also on defending the nation against external and internal groups. haney stresses that in eastern europe, “the response to the migrant crisis also reveals, for penal nationalists punitiveness has become the basis of national sovereignty – it is as if being ‘soft’ on punishment will mean a loss of national independence and autonomy” (haney 2016, 357). the exceptional politics started with the refugee crisis of 2015 and the biopolitical hate campaign unfolded in the following ways: biological demonstration of the “enemy”; hate campaign on the streets; the fencing of the border and moving beyond the migrant crisis; the campaign against brussels, ngos, george soros, and inner enemies. in hungary, the refugee crisis did not cause a serious social and political challenge, however, the government was able to create a long-lasting, exceptional situation without any real danger (antal 2019, 116-121). the orbán administration, using the migration crisis, introduced and prolonged the state of exception in legal terms (antal 2019, 113-121; antal 2020; antal 2021a). following the clashes at the southern border of hungary, the government committed to creating the most secure basis for 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 the moral panic caused by the government. therefore, the modification of the act lxxx of 2007 on asylum of september 15, 2015, introduced a new kind of state of emergency called the “emergency caused by mass immigration.” the executive power has full authority over the state of exception; it can be ordered by a government decree overall or in a specific territory of hungary. the government declared a state of crisis caused by mass immigration in two southern counties of hungary on september 15, 2015, by the decree of government 269/2015 (hungarian government 2015). by doing so, the government introduced a state of exception without any real bases and centralized every related exceptional power. the government extended the local state of exception to the nationwide level by the decree of government 41/2016 (hungarian government 2016) and the emergency caused by mass immigration has been continuously prolonged until september 2023 (table 1). there are overlapping states of exceptions because the exceptional measures induced by the refugee crisis have been merged with the state of exception due to the covid-19 pandemic. the emergency based on the migration crisis is a tailored one because it has been declared without any valid social danger; this is why the biological demonstration of the fabricated “enemy” was crucial for the administration. at the beginning of the migration crisis, between september 1-5, 2015, thousands of refugees gathered outside keleti railway station in budapest (bbc 2015). the refugees at keleti were handled in an inhuman and unacceptable way, and they were supported only by hungarian and international ngos. in the field of discursive politics, the government aimed to rule the communication sphere from the beginning, using the phrases “migrant” and “migration with economic purpose” (this phrase was used by the orbán administration, stirring chauvinistic emotions and moral panic) instead of using the term “refugees” (gerő and sik 2020). moreover, the representatives of the orbán government denied that the migration crisis had been caused not just by economic factors but, first of all, by humanitarian disasters, civil war, and climate change. the hungarian anti-refugee campaign reached its peak with the fencing of the hungarian border. in 2015, the hungarian government built a barrier on its border with serbia and croatia (the guardian 2016). the razor wire has become the biopolitical symbol of the hungarian government’s hate campaign. this type of handling of refugees does not comply with european regulations. moreover, the biopolitical aim of the government is to keep away refugees with their inhuman treatment of them (rodgers and kallius 2015). the government interpreted the migration issue as a potential danger of terrorism. moreover, it created a new state of exception by the amendment of the constitution with the sixth amendment, adopted on june 14, 2016, by the votes of fidesz-kdnp and the radical right party jobbik. this new regulation authorized the parliament to declare at the initiative of the government a “state of terrorist threat.” the hate campaign did not stop with the refugee crisis, and the government started to create and manage other crises based on the circulation of anger and hate. this required new enemies and the populist weapon turned against brussels, hungarian human rights ngos, george soros, and other inner “enemies.” the government had legalized the state racism maintained since 2015, and the seventh amendment, enacted on june 28, 2018, constitutionalized this scheme. the amendment declared that no “foreign population” shall be settled in hungary, and it claimed that the protection of the constitutional identity and christian culture of hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the state. with this new regulatory direction and mandate, the administration has laid down some constitutional basis for the xenophobia and the everlasting politics of hatred (antal 2022b). 2.2 the covid-19 crisis and the persistence of exceptional governance the global pandemic crisis has thoroughly rewritten orbán's original political plans for the next general election of 2022 (antal 2020). the orbán administration did not expect such a crisis to 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 evolve and spread the way it did. orbán was able to change his political strategy and take the pandemic seriously. at first, given that orbán did not know exactly how devastating the crisis would be, the government tried to continue the exceptional measures enacted for the refugee situation. on march 6, 2020, orbán spoke of migration and coronavirus as equal challenges (orbán 2020a); moreover, on march 10, he argued “there is a clear link between illegal migration and the coronavirus epidemic” (orbán 2020b). there was a tipping point after that as orbán and his communication strategists perceived the fear of the hungarian people and the fractions behind the government, and this proved to be crucial because people recognized there was no link between immigration and the pandemic. nevertheless, orbán found the political potential of the pandemic and started to manage it in a militaristic fashion. the prime minister saw higher political risk in economic, rather than in epidemiological, consequences. orbán argued that “we should fight against this crisis by not giving up our goals…the workfare economy and the possibility of a proud life” (orbán 2020c). the main explanation for the new state of exception is the class compromise behind the hungarian political system. in line with the waves that have unfolded since the outbreak of the covid-19 crisis, the hungarian government has declared three states of exception due to the pandemic: march 11, 2020 (government decree 40/2020 declaring a state of emergency),11 november 3, 2020 (government decree 478/2020 declaring a state of emergency),12 february 8, 2021 (government decree 27/2021 declaring a state of emergency).13 each extraordinary period was associated with the so-called “empowerment laws,” which are special authorizations of the incumbent hungarian government by the parliament that includes an authorization to implement long-term governance by decrees. the fundamental law otherwise provides the government with the possibility of governing by decree, but this is severely time-limited: decrees are only valid beyond 15 days if the parliament authorizes the government to extend the decrees before the expiration of the 15 days. the empowerment laws eliminate these constitutional limitations. the first empowerment law (act 12 of 2020)14 ensured unlimited access to governing by decree, and it was repealed on june 18, 2020. a time limit has been incorporated into the second and third laws (act 109 of 2020 and act 1 of 2021),15 which granted the government special rights for 90 days. due to this empowerment, the government is entitled to suspend the application of certain laws, deviate from statutory provisions, and take other extraordinary measures, such as restricting mass events, visits to institutions, and increasing border control. moreover, during the first wave of the pandemic, the government proclaimed a special form of a state of exception called “health crisis emergency” and it was in force until december 18, 2020, but then it was not re-promulgated. in the first period of the covid-19-related state of exception, it became clear that the government would have all the political power and control over legal instruments with the renewal of the state 11 government decree 40/2020, hungarian national law repository. accessed january 30, 2023. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2020-40-20-22 12 government decree 478/2020, hungarian national law repository. accessed january 30, 2023. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2020-478-20-22 13 government decree 27/2021, hungarian national law repository. accessed january 30, 2023. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2021-27-20-22 14 act 12 of 2020, hungarian national law repository. accessed january 30, 2023. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/202012-00-00 15 act 109 of 2020, hungarian national law repository. accessed january 30, 2023. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2020109-00-00 and act 1 of 2021, hungarian national law repository. accessed january 30, 2023. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2021-1-00-00 https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2020-40-20-22 https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2020-478-20-22 https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2021-27-20-22 https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2020-12-00-00 https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2020-12-00-00 https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2020-109-00-00 https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2020-109-00-00 https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2021-1-00-00 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 of exception. instead, orbán chose the option of enacting emergency powers without restrictions and ruling by decrees, meanwhile, the opposition was blamed for the lack of national unity. the enabling law was necessary for orbán, not just for the restriction of the opposition but also to strengthen the social base of the government majority (antal 2021, 2022). this demonstrated that providing direct help for the working class was far from a priority for orbán. the administration has always been much more afraid of the economic consequences of the pandemic than its epidemiological ones. neoliberal and state-capitalist approaches have primarily been imposed after 2010 through such actions as the strengthening of the private health sector, a withdrawal of funds from public health, and the downsizing of the epidemiological administration (dorit 2021). the orbán regime has used government power to weaken public health services, putting hungarian society in an unheard-of situation in terms of the covid-19 outbreak. the “embedded” neoliberal atmosphere remained essential from the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic, with most of the government’s economic measures being focused on protecting businesses and capital instead of protecting the workers. moreover, the government introduced a new “slave act” in the event of an epidemiological emergency by providing employers with a freely ordered 24-month working time frame (meaning that anyone can be required to work overtime through telework at any time) (eşençay 2020). meanwhile, the business circles close to the government received large sums of public funds, and the government started to carry out its neoliberal healthcare reforms. before the epidemic peaked, nearly 36,000 hospital beds had been emptied and seriously ill people and their families were put into a desperate position. it is also important to note that the same harsh realpolitik characterized the orbán regime's treatment of ngos; as with its handling of the political opposition, the government saw the covid-19 pandemic as an opportunity to attack ngos (kövér, antal and deák 2021). during the second wave of the covid-19 crisis, strict restrictions were introduced including a curfew between eight o’clock in the evening and five o’clock in the morning, restricted opening hours for shops and other businesses, online learning for universities and secondary school students in grade nine and above, restaurant closures, and the holding of sporting events without spectators (the mayor 2020). for the orbán administration, helping businesses close to the government was more important than protecting workers affected by the epidemic. furthermore, instead of addressing the health and social crisis affecting hungarian society, the government continued the cultural war against the university of theatre and film arts in budapest (euronews 2020) as well as envisioning the latest amendment to the fundamental law, which is a clear attack on lgbtq communities, and proposed the same-sex and single parents adoption ban (bbc 2020). this shows that the government has abused the exceptional situation and used the mandate not to address the social and political crisis but to further consolidate orbán's regime. the experiences of the three waves of the pandemic demonstrated that the hungarian pm perceived the political risk in economic rather than epidemiological terms, so he introduced measures to protect the economy first, not the workers. this fact explains why the hungarian government relied on the exceptional legal regime, even when all epidemiological measures could have been imposed under normal circumstances. introducing the exceptional measures, orbán argued the following: “we should fight against this crisis by not giving up our goals…the workfare economy and the possibility of a proud life.” (orbán 2020c). nevertheless, orbán has discovered the political potential of the pandemic and begun to manage it in such a way as not to mitigate the negative social effects of objective crises but to broaden the scope of executive power. the state of emergency put new powers into the hands of orbán and, at the same time, it offered new 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 opportunities in conjunction with the debate on climate change. orbán recognized the political opportunities that exceptional governance offered in terms of overlapping crises and used the experience from the migration crisis to address the covid-19 pandemic. 2.3 constitutional restructuring of exceptional measures using the experience of governing through extraordinary measures under the fundamental law, the orbán regime has completely reshaped the system it created in 2012 (nagy and horváth 2022). according to the fundamental law article 53 section (1): “during the period of special legal order, the government may adopt decrees by means of which it may, as provided for by a cardinal act, suspend the application of certain acts, derogate from the provisions of acts and take other extraordinary measures.”16 the ninth amendment of the fundamental law, enacted in december 2020,17 reduced the previously mentioned types of special legal order: state of war, state of emergency, and state of danger. in the event of a declaration of war or a danger of war, external armed attack, an act with an impact equivalent to an external armed attack, an imminent danger of either, or the performance of a collective defence obligation arising from an alliance, the national assembly may declare a state of war. according to the fundamental law article 49, section (3): “during a state of war, the government shall exercise the powers delegated to it by the national assembly, and shall decide on the deployment of the hungarian defence forces abroad or within hungary…”18 in the event of an act aimed at overthrowing or subverting the constitutional order, at exclusively acquiring power, or a serious unlawful act massively endangering life and property, the national assembly may declare a state of emergency. under article 51, section (1), the fundamental law states: “the government may declare a state of danger in the event of an armed conflict, war situation or humanitarian catastrophe in a neighbouring country, or a serious incident endangering life and property, in particular a natural disaster or industrial accident, and in order to eliminate the consequences thereof.”19 under the ninth amendment to the fundamental law, the new structure of extraordinary government would have entered into force on july 1, 2023, however, the 10th amendment to the fundamental law brought this forward to november 1, 2022. moreover, it introduced a state of danger due to armed conflict, war, or humanitarian disaster in a neighbouring country. under the new constitutional regime, the government had power over all constitutionally exceptional measures without any checks and balances. according to the venice commission, in all three cases (state of war, state of emergency, and state of danger), the government will have “a central role (instead of the national defence council in the case of the state of national crisis; and instead of the president of the republic in the case of the state of emergency). the reason is that after the promulgation of the special legal order, it is 16 fundamental law, hungarian national law repository. accessed january 30, 2023. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2011-4301-02-00. 17 ministry of justice. 2023. “ninth amendment to the fundamental law of hungary.” the fundamental law of hungary. accessed march 30, 2022. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/en/2011-4301-02-00. 18 fundamental law, hungarian national law repository. accessed january 30, 2023. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2011-4301-02-00. 19 fundamental law, hungarian national law repository. accessed january 30, 2023. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2011-4301-02-00. https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/en/2011-4301-02-00 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 necessary to ensure fast, operative and responsible decision-making in both the political and the legal sense, for which the government appears to be suitable in the hungarian constitutional system” (venice commission 2021, 8). 3. consequences: the dangers of unlimited and elastic emergency measures despite the easing of restrictions related to the pandemic, with the government's proposal, the national assembly extended the state of emergency until september 2021. at the same time, according to current plans, the mass migration crisis will be in effect until september 7, 2023. the orbán government has extended the overlapping states of exceptions. according to the regulation, the exact time when the government is entitled to recall the state of emergency depends on the executive power itself (antal 2021b, 2022a). the national assembly still does not have any authority to control the exceptional measures. in fact, due to the two-thirds majority, the parliament does not form a counterweight against the government. the administration proposed a law not just recalling the state of emergency but creating temporary regulation, which will produce a new form of state of exception. the government authorized itself to declare the medical state of exception through a decree. this new emergency measure remained totally uncontrolled by the legislature and will be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive power. under the circumstances of the medical state of exception, inter alia, the operation and opening of shops, the sale and consumption of certain products, the use of health services, people-to-people contact, passenger traffic, freight transport, the operation of all institutions and events, and any other activities which may contribute to the spread of an epidemic, may be restricted or prohibited by government decree. the application of certain laws may even be suspended by the government, or it can deviate from certain legal provisions. literally, this means that the orbán government will have legal authority to establish a state of emergency without the authorization of parliament. this means that there is no need to accept a new enabling act and the legislature does not have any legal or political authority regarding the extraordinary measures. the administration has created a kind of state of emergency that can be activated anytime without any prior authorization – the normal legal and political order has become peremptory fluid. behind the endless and overlapping state of exceptions, there is also a rise in the unlimited executive power (antal 2019, 35-41); contemporary authoritarian populist regimes can be equipped with extraordinary government measures, which means managing the crisis that they created. following agamben (2005, 2014), this phenomenon can be called the “permanent state of exception.”covid-19 is a global epidemiological crisis, and the hungarian executive power has found a way to create a new political crisis based on the pandemic. the theory of a state of exception’s first and isolated appearance was carl schmitt’s book dictatorship, originally published in 1921 (schmitt 2014). there was a rise in debate on the state of exception between 1934 and 1948 because of the collapse of european democracies; discourse on the state of exception unfolded within the framework of constitutional dictatorship. the debate was maintained by article 48 of the weimar constitution, which granted emergency powers to the president of the reich (head 2016). in the framework of schmitt’s “lengthening shadow” (head 2016, 1), the state of exception and constitutional dictatorship are inseparable. in 1926, schmitt summarized his definition on dictatorship: dictatorship is the exercise of state power freed from any legal restrictions, for the purpose of resolving an abnormal situation – in particular, a situation of war and rebellion. hence two decisive 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 elements for the concept of dictatorship are on one hand the idea of a normal situation that a dictatorship restores or establishes, and on the other the idea that, in the event of an abnormal situation, certain legal barriers are suspended in favor of resolving this situation through dictatorship. (quoted in hoelzl and ward 2014, xxiii) schmitt distinguishes the two types of dictatorship in conjunction with the regulation of the state of emergency; on the one hand, “a dictatorship that, despite all its extra-legal authorization, remains within the prescriptions of a constitutional order and in which the dictator is constitutionally mandated (commissary dictatorship); and on the other hand, a dictatorship in which the whole existing legal order is rendered obsolete and a completely new order is intended (sovereign dictatorship)” (quoted in hoelzl and ward 2014, xxiv). if commissary dictatorship is about the continuous extension of the state of exceptions, sovereign dictatorship prevails now as the constitutional system seized and institutionalized by a sovereign dictator. in his political theology, schmitt argues that “sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (schmitt 2005, 5); in this sense, ultimate sovereignty means a constitutionalized dictatorship. contemporary authoritarian populist regimes and leaders are convinced that there is a core need to reformulate and acquire political sovereignty. in this sense, authoritarian populism can be seen as a rise of the executive power; this attempt has been reinforced by the covid-19 crisis. at the early stage of the pandemic, agamben warned of the “disproportionate response” in conjunction with covid-19 and argued that “what is once again manifested is the tendency to use a state of exception as a normal paradigm for government. the legislative decree immediately approved by the government ‘for hygiene and public safety reasons’ actually produces an authentic militarization…” (agamben 2020). the dangers indicated by agamben, including the abuse of government overreach, proved to be real, and the orbán regime was able to perpetuate the exceptional situation. however, agamben was heavily criticized for not considering the pandemic a serious enough threat: “agamben thus fears that exceptional measures pushed through today are dangerously disproportionate. if the reader thinks that makes agamben sound like coronavirus denialists such as bolsonaro or trump, then i must confess they are right. just like these authoritarian leaders sacrifice global health to their own egos, it seems like agamben dangerously underestimates the threat the coronavirus poses” (christaens 2020). on the one hand, an unprecedented social and health catastrophe has occurred. on the other hand, it has produced a tremendous political effect, and as the hungarian case study confirms, exceptional and emergency-type measures and unlimited executive power of authoritarian regimes all re-emerged. the invasion launched by vladimir putin against ukraine has demonstrated that the orbán regime's exceptional governance induced by the refugee crisis and pandemic is not at all necessary for everyday governance. even in the campaign leading up to the 2022 elections, the orbán regime did not renounce emergency law and order, and with the outbreak of the russia-ukraine war in february 2022, it did not introduce new exceptional measures but kept in force and relied on the previous ones. the refugee crisis, the pandemic, and the russo-ukrainian war have made it clear that the orbán regime is not interested in solving social and political crises but in managing the fear, chaos, and uncertainty that arise from them. in the context of the war, orbán has given the impression that the opposition supports hungary's involvement in the conflict, that it endangers the hungarian people and that only the government can and will prevent such a threat posed by political aspirations that run counter to the government. the official government communication insists that 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 “hungary’s united opposition is jeopardizing the security of the hungarian public by making irresponsible remarks in connection with the war in ukraine, and their economic policies would compromise their livelihoods.” (about hungary 2022).20 since 2015, the authoritarian populist orbán regime has used the tools of emergency governance in a highly manipulative way, essentially blurring the line between normal and exceptional. as michael head puts it: “emergency is an inherently ‘elastic’ concept, open-ended and politically manipulable. from the 1933 reichstag fire, seized upon by hitler to justify decree-making power, to the false claims of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ utilised by the us and its allies to invade iraq in 2003, governments have inflated or fabricated pretexts for supposedly pre-emptive emergency measures” (2016, 246). democracy's future depends on whether it can be freed from the grip of the state of exception. one of the most significant democratic concerns about the orbán regime's use of the special legal order is the government's reliance on extraordinary measures not covered by the fundamental law. instead, the regime applies such extraordinary governance measures, which have no constitutional constraints. the orbán regime has thus exploited the legitimate possibility of governing by extraordinary measures in two ways: by transforming the means at the constitutional level and subordinating the government, moreover, the application of sub-constitutional extraordinary measure without limits. 20 what makes this statement interesting is that it comes from fidesz’s communications director istván hollik and that it was published on the about hungary website – the official english-language site of the hungarian government. all this shows how intertwined government and party relations have become in the orbán regime. 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 references about hungary. 2022. “fidesz: united opposition is jeopardizing hungary.” . march 28, 2022. accessed january 30, 2023. https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/fidesz-united-oppositionis-jeopardizing-hungary. antal, attila. 2019. the rise of hungarian populism: state autocracy and the orbán regime. bingley: emerald publishing. ———. 2020. “orbán’s enabling act: ruling the post-pandemic world.” rosa luxemburg stiftung brussels office and trademark belfast, april 7, 2020. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.brexitblog-rosalux.eu/2020/04/07/orbans-enabling-act-ruling-the-postpandemic-world/. ———. 2021a. “the orbán administration’s class politics and the spread of covid-19.” berlin journal of critical theory 5 (1): 131-149. https://www.bjct.de/files/ issues%20of%20the%20bjct/bjct_1-2021.pdf ———. 2021b. “the climate and ecological emergency in the era of a state of exceptions.” graz law working paper no 07-2021: 1-17. accessed january 30, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.2139/ssrn.3865589. ———. 2022a. hungary in state of exception authoritarian neoliberalism from the austrohungarian monarchy to the covid-19 crisis. lanham: lexington books. ———. 2022b. “the constitutionalised image of enemy in the hungarian fundamental law.” ssrn working paper: 1-26. accessed november 30, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.4287382. agamben, giorgio. 1998. homo sacer: sovereign power and bare life. translated by d. hellerroazen. stanford: stanford university press. ———. 2000. means without end: notes on politics. minneapolis: university of minnesota press. ———. 2005. state of exception. translated by kevin attell. chicago: university of chicago press. ———. 2014. “from the state of control to a praxis of destituent power.” roar magazine, february 4, 2014. accessed january 30, 2023. https://roarmag.org/essays/agambendestituent-power-democracy/. ———. 2020. “the invention of an epidemic.” european journal of psychoanalysis. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/coronavirus-and-philosophers/. british broadcasting corporation (bbc). 2015. “migrant crisis: activist convoy drives to hungary.” september 6, 2015. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-34166882. https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/fidesz-united-opposition-is-jeopardizing-hungary https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/fidesz-united-opposition-is-jeopardizing-hungary https://www.brexitblog-rosalux.eu/2020/04/07/orbans-enabling-act-ruling-the-post-pandemic-world/ https://www.brexitblog-rosalux.eu/2020/04/07/orbans-enabling-act-ruling-the-post-pandemic-world/ http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3865589 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3865589 https://roarmag.org/essays/agamben-destituent-power-democracy/ https://roarmag.org/essays/agamben-destituent-power-democracy/ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34166882 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34166882 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2020. “hungary government proposes same-sex adoption ban.” november 11, 2020. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54902048. christaens, tim. 2020. “must society be defended from agamben?” critical legal thinking, march 26, 2020. accessed january 30, 2023. https://criticallegalthinking.com/2020/03/26/ must-society-be-defended-from-agamben/. deutche welle (dw). 2022. “hungary’s orban extends emergency powers, points to ukraine.” . may 25, 2022. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.dw.com/en/hungarys-orbanextends-emergency-powers-points-to-ukraine/a-61918348. euronews. 2020. “hungarian students blockade university in protest against orban reforms.” september 4, 2020. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/04/ hungarian-students-blockade-university-in-protest-against-orban-reforms. eşençay, selen. 2020. “human rights under quarantine: “viktatorship” in hungary.” king's college london, december 16, 2020. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.kcl.ac.uk/ human-rights-under-quarantine-viktatorship-in-hungary. gerő, márton, and sik endre. 2020. “the moral panic button: construction and consequences.” in europe and the refugee response, edited by elżbieta m. goździak, izabella main, and brigitte suter, 39-58. london: routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429279317. geva, dorit. 2021. “orbán’s ordonationalism as post-neoliberal hegemony.” theory, culture & society 38(6): 71-93. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276421999435. the guardian. 2016. “hungary’s pm plans ‘more massive’ fence to keep out migrants.” august 26, 2016. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ aug/26/hungarys-pm-plans-more-massive-fence-to-keep-out-migrants. haney, lynne. 2016. “prisons of the past: penal nationalism and the politics of punishment in central europe.” punishment & society 18 (3): 346-368. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1462474516645686. hardt, michael, and antonio negri. 2004. multitude: war and democracy in the age of empire. new york: penguin. head, michael. 2016. emergency powers in theory and practice. the long shadow of carl schmitt. london: routledge taylor & francis. hoelzl, michael, and graham ward. 2014. “introduction to dictatorship. from the origin of the modern concept of sovereignty to proletarian class struggle.” in dictatorship by carl schmitt, x-xxix. cambridge, ma: polity press. hungarian government. 2015. “government declares state of crisis due to mass migration in two counties.” september 15, 2015. accessed january 30, 2023. https://20152019.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/government-declares-state-of-crisis-dueto-mass-migration-in-two-counties. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54902048 https://www.dw.com/en/hungarys-orban-extends-emergency-powers-points-to-ukraine/a-61918348 https://www.dw.com/en/hungarys-orban-extends-emergency-powers-points-to-ukraine/a-61918348 https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/04/hungarian-students-blockade-university-in-protest-against-orban-reforms https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/04/hungarian-students-blockade-university-in-protest-against-orban-reforms https://www.kcl.ac.uk/human-rights-under-quarantine-viktatorship-in-hungary https://www.kcl.ac.uk/human-rights-under-quarantine-viktatorship-in-hungary https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429279317 https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276421999435 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/26/hungarys-pm-plans-more-massive-fence-to-keep-out-migrants https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/26/hungarys-pm-plans-more-massive-fence-to-keep-out-migrants https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/government-declares-state-of-crisis-due-to-mass-migration-in-two-counties https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/government-declares-state-of-crisis-due-to-mass-migration-in-two-counties https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/government-declares-state-of-crisis-due-to-mass-migration-in-two-counties 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2016. “hungarian government declares state of emergency due to mass migration.” march 9, 2016. accessed january 30, 2023. https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/ministry-ofinterior/news/hungarian-government-declares-state-of-emergency-due-to-mass-migration. kövér, ágnes, antal attila, and deák, izabella. 2021. “civil society and covid-19 in hungary: the complete annexation of civil space.” nonprofit policy forum 12 (1): 93-126. https://doi.org/10.1515/npf-2020-0060. levitsky, steven, and lucan a. way. 2002. “the rise of competitive authoritarianism.” journal of democracy 13 (2): 51–65. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0026. ———. 2010. competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the cold war. cambridge: cambridge university press. the mayor. 2020. “hungary reintroduces state of emergency.” november 4, 2020. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.themayor.eu/en/a/view/hungary-reintroduces-state-ofemergency-6285. morelock, jeremiah. 2018. “introduction: the frankfurt school and authoritarian populism – a historical outline.” in critical theory and authoritarian populism, edited by jeremiah morelock, xiii–xxxviii. london: university of westminster. nagy, zoltán, and horváth attila. 2022. emergency powers in central and eastern europe: from martial law to covid-19. budapest: ferenc mádl institute of comparative law, pázmány péter catholic university. orbán. viktor. 2020a. “order is the basis of freedom.” budapest, march 6, 2020. accessed january 30, 2023. https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/order-is-thebasis-of-freedom. ———. 2020b. “prime minister viktor orbán informed his eu counterparts about situation in hungary.” budapest, march 10, 2020. accessed january 30, 2023. https://20152019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/prime-minister-viktor-orban-informed-hiseu-counterparts-about-situation-in-hungary. ———. 2020c. “let’s not give up our goals.” budapest, april 2, 2020. accessed january 30, 2023.https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/let-s-not-give-up-ourgoals. rodgers, amy, and minna annastiina kallius. 2015. “behind the iron fence: why hungary’s anti-migrant fence will be a disaster.” huffington post, july 28, 2015. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-rodgers/hungary-migrantfence_b_7882824.html. rogers, samuel. 2019. “hungarian authoritarian populism: a neo-gramscian perspective.” east european politics 36 (1): 107–123. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1687087. https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-interior/news/hungarian-government-declares-state-of-emergency-due-to-mass-migration https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-interior/news/hungarian-government-declares-state-of-emergency-due-to-mass-migration https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/order-is-the-basis-of-freedom https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/order-is-the-basis-of-freedom https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/prime-minister-viktor-orban-informed-his-eu-counterparts-about-situation-in-hungary https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/prime-minister-viktor-orban-informed-his-eu-counterparts-about-situation-in-hungary https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/prime-minister-viktor-orban-informed-his-eu-counterparts-about-situation-in-hungary https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/let-s-not-give-up-our-goals https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/let-s-not-give-up-our-goals https://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-rodgers/hungary-migrant-fence_b_7882824.html https://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-rodgers/hungary-migrant-fence_b_7882824.html 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 schmitt, carl. 2005. political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty. chicago: university of chicago press. ———. 2014. dictatorship. from the origin of the modern concept of sovereignty to proletarian class struggle. translated by george schwab. cambridge, ma: polity press. venice commission. 2021. “ninth amendment to the fundamental law and explanatory memorandum.” opinion no. 1035/2021. accessed january 30, 2023. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdlref(2021)045-e. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ref(2021)045-e https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ref(2021)045-e 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 59-77 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 1-5 issn 2562-8429 russia-canada relations special issue: introduction megan swift1 university of victoria those looking for good news stories on canada-russia relations in recent years will have found instead headlines with keywords and phrases such as ‘disinformation’, ‘cyber threats’, ‘propaganda’, ‘kremlin lashes out’, ‘dysfunctional’, ‘election meddling’, ‘major threat’, ‘damaged relations’, ‘failure of democratization’, and ‘anti-russian sanctions’. canada-russia relations are indeed at a low ebb following the 2014 annexation of crimea and crisis in ukraine. yet as the world’s two largest states, northern nations, neighbours across the pacific, and as two powerful stakeholders in the arctic, it is worth exploring what canada and russia hold as common interests and examining possibilities for moving toward greater cooperation. as the experts gathered together for this issue show, political interactions are the loudest but by no means the only fronts for interrelations. beyond the headlines, at less visible levels, cooperation is already taking place, or is poised for development. this special issue includes analyses of five crucial spheres of involvement: foreign affairs, trade, media, global politics, and military security. the authors are scholars from russia and canada who work at universities and scholarly institutes in russia, canada, the united states and the united kingdom. their analyses delve into the complexities of canada-russia relations and the long-term causes of the deteriorated relationship. they underline a pattern of misunderstanding and mistrust that, on the canadian side, is able to draw from a well-developed pool of cold war tropes and, on the russian side, keeps perspectives on canada often undifferentiated from policy and media about the united states.2 given that we are at a critical point in canada-russia relations, it is crucial to have scholarly initiatives that can bring together expert knowledge and unbiased assessment, but until recently a research group with this specific focus has been lacking.3 this current issue is a project of the canada-russia research initiative (crri), a 2018 initiative housed at the university of victoria. the organization and its website (thecrri.ca) were launched by anna tsurkan, who gathered 1 megan swift is an associate professor of russian studies in the department of germanic and slavic studies at the university of victoria. 2 the leading organization dedicated to russia-canada affairs in russia is the russian association for canadian studies, based in moscow. 3 other scholarly initiatives in canada focus on canada-europe relations, such as the jean monnet network on eucanada relations at carleton university, or on eu-russia relations, such as the between the eu and russia (bear network) at mcgill university, and the jean monnet chair in the eu’s relations with russia and the eastern neighbourhood at carleton university. all three of these initiatives have received support from the erasmus+ programme of the european union. file:///c:/users/heather%20pyman/appdata/local/microsoft/windows/inetcache/content.outlook/4sdjzg2v/thecrri.ca) 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 1-5 issn 2562-8429 together a network of researchers working in the field of canada-russia relations. the first event of the crri, co-organized by tsurkan and megan swift in partnership with the canadian international council, was a conference on ‘arctic. media. security’ at the university of victoria in november, 2019. in november, 2020, the crri hosted a well-attended webinar on the ‘past, present and future of arctic cooperation’ that featured distinguished panelists, her excellency alison le claire, honourable lloyd axworthy, and former ambassador jeremy kinsman. a roundtable, ‘introducing the canada-russia research initiative’, will take place in august 2021 at the meeting of the international council for central and eastern european studies. this special issue is one of several projects intended to raise the profile and the quality of the dialogue around russia and canada. this issue begins with zachary paikin’s global perspective. paikin, a researcher at the center for european policy studies and senior visiting fellow at the global policy institute, looks at the changing relationship of russia and the west in terms of the balance of power. he asks to what extent the neo-liberal hegemony established in europe is coming under re-negotiation, given the fact that washington has lost legitimacy in recent years by exercising unilateral power against an accepted post-war framework of multi-lateral european relations. in this same time period, russia has undergone a eurasian turn, focusing its attention toward non-european partners, which is creating an overall sense of a shifting european power dynamic. natalia viakhireva, a program manager at moscow’s russian international affairs council, provides a forthright analysis of foreign affairs in the last half-decade, the period that culminated in the current state of obstructed russia-canada relations. she argues that the way forward will not be through engagement at the political ‘top’, but rather through avenues of para-diplomacy wherein both sides can find areas of common ground. the most promising of these avenues is cooperation on arctic affairs, where russia and canada hold two of the five permanent seats on the arctic council (along with norway, denmark and the united states). russia and canada, in fact, see eye to eye on vital issues, including determinations of national coastlines and territorial waters, an issue that will affect crucial commercial, transport, military, and environmental ventures in the years to come. the arctic is thus one avenue that presents an opportunity for these two northern leaders to work in mutual communication. anna tsurkan’s article on cross-national media reporting, on the other hand, digs into one of the most contentious levels of engagement between canada and russia. the founder and project coordinator of the canada-russia research initiative, tsurkan begins by examining how canada reported the possibility of russian election interference in and around the federal election of 2019, and how russian media responded to these allegations. she concludes that even when no evidence of election meddling was found, as was the case in 2019, the way that canadian media outlets reported about russia reinforced certain narratives that, in effect, became the story. the same can be said about russian media reporting on canada, which consistently used negative language. nancy teeple, a fulbright scholar at the university of norwich and post-doctoral fellow at the north american and arctic defence and security network, looks at the question of military security in the penultimate article of the collection. she argues that we reached a crucial turning point in 2020, given that key arms control treaties came to an end without a concrete signal of their renewal. referencing the conclusions of viakhireva’s article, teeple suggests that security in the arctic is going to be a primary concern of the future, and one in which canada and russia will inevitably be important actors. 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 1-5 issn 2562-8429 many of the issues discussed here are reflected in the 2019 report on european security published by the german educational non-profit think tank friedrich ebert stiftung. their report is based on a poll of 1,000 respondents in each of seven countries in different regions of a transforming greater europe: germany, france, russia, poland, ukraine, serbia, and latvia. when asked whom they consider the greatest current threat to national security, france and germany perceived it was the united states, not russia, that posed the largest menace (russia was indeed perceived as the greatest security threat in latvia, poland, and ukraine). the report also described a “prevailing public perception that there is a common europe and that russia is part of it” (krumm et al. 2019, 66). without minimizing the extent of the strain in russia-west relations caused by the 2014 crisis in ukraine, there is an overall sentiment that “without russia, any talk of security in europe is pointless” (2019, 6). in other words, russia can, should and must be included in important conversations going forward. based on the articles in this special issue, it is clear that deteriorated relations are likely to continue in russia-canada foreign affairs for the foreseeable future against the backdrop of a transforming europe and a shift in the global balance of power. however, new areas of importance are emerging, especially in the arctic, where canada and russia have good reasons to work together for mutual benefit. there will be much to watch, discuss, and analyze in the coming years. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 1-5 issn 2562-8429 references krumm, reinhard, alexandra dienes, simon weiss, sebastian starystach, hans-henning schroder and stefan bar. 2019. security radar 2019 wake-up call for europe. friedrich ebert stiftung. https://www.fes-vienna.org/e/new-publication-security-radar-2019-wakeup-call-for-europe. https://www.fes-vienna.org/e/new-publication-security-radar-2019-wake-up-call-for-europe https://www.fes-vienna.org/e/new-publication-security-radar-2019-wake-up-call-for-europe 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 1-5 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 economic and social balance of 15 years of eastern enlargement béla galgóczi1 european union trade institute abstract the eastern eu enlargement (2004, 2007, 2013) is still one of the success stories of the eu (and unprecedented in the world), but at the same time it is controversial and is perceived as controversial. one of the core problems has been its unbalanced character: the whole process had a clear `single market` focus and the values of a `social europe` were of secondary importance. based on a neofunctionalist approach the paper discusses the integration of the new member states from the point of view of economic and income convergence. along with a literature review, data on wages, productivity and output will be analysed to demonstrate that upward convergence of the poorer new member states towards the eu average had been stalled in wake of the 2009 crisis. the resulting cleavages put the core hypothesis of the neofunctionalist approach that eu integration has a `direction` in terms of an upwards convergence into question. 1 béla galgóczi is a senior researcher at the european union trade institute. 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 introduction the european union (eu) is a historically unique supranational entity. it has a single market (free movement of goods, capital, services and people) with eu level institutions and legislation founded on a set of common values but essentially still based on the national sovereignty of its member states. labour markets, social policies, and wage-setting are all within national competence. heterogeneity has always been a characteristic feature of the eu, but since its eastern enlargement from 2004 on, this has grown enormously. income gaps, mostly between the east and the west, are up to a ratio of one to ten. although it is true for the whole eu that the welfare state there is more pronounced than in the rest of the world, regional and country differences are huge, and different models co-exist. this paper attempts to draw a balance of fifteen years of eastern enlargement based on aggregate social and economic outcomes in the region. while economic matters have played an important role in assessing outcomes, they are only a part of the picture; this paper does not discuss political economy developments, governance structures, or varieties of capitalism issues. after laying out some theoretical considerations, section 1 discusses economic convergence and its importance in eu integration. section 2 addresses wage convergence and demonstrates how it has lost momentum in the wake of the crisis and falls short of initial expectations. section 3 examines the background and the main drivers of wage increases, including the role of minimum wage policy, foreign direct investment and labour mobility. section 4 draws a balance of the fifteen years of eastern enlargement. economic convergence and the single market driven integration theoretical considerations when considering european integration, this article builds on the neofunctionalist approach (schmitter 2005), which conceptualizes the state as an arena in which societal actors operate to realize their interests. neofunctionalism sees international cooperation as a response to scale economies in the provision of public goods. whereas functionalists argue that the only feasible way to bypass state sovereignty is by transferring specific state functions to specialized international agencies, neofunctionalists emphasize the potential for deeper and broader governance at the regional level. their key interest is the direction of regional integration, not its outcome. neofunctionalists identify a series of mutually reinforcing processes that lead to further integration. although crises may delay integration, the guiding assumption is that, over time, policy spillover and supranational activism will produce an upward trend. the term european integration itself reflects the neofunctionalist premise of having a process that has a direction. from this perspective, the causal path is characterized by path dependence. postfunctionalism roots the response to the eurocrisis in domestic politics, and in particular, in the rise of nationalist opposition to european integration that petrified governments even as the economic costs of inactivity rose (hooghe and marks 2018). the result was a spiral of crisis and inadequate response. in line with könig and ohr (2012), this article argues that economic and political integration are complementary, offering a sharp distinction between shallow and deep integration, with the latter combining economic and political integration. it also builds on theoretical work on the socio-economic heterogeneity of the eu (höpner and schäfer 2008), but it goes beyond the 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 mere recognition of this by regarding it as a core–periphery cleavage with profound implications for the political and economic relations between member states. although studies of core–periphery relations have always been a part of european integration studies (bachtler et al. 2014), the usual perspective has focused on convergence rather than divergence as a cleavage or divide. the analysis that follows will show that the earlier convergence dynamic between poorer and richer member states of the eu that was characteristic up the crisis has been stalled with consequences for the development perspectives of the periphery. asymmetrical integration it is important to bear in mind that the de facto economic integration (free trade, free capital movements) of the central-eastern europe (cee) region took place right after its opening up during the early 1990s. the accession of cee countries to the eu (eight central-eastern european countries2 in 2004, romania and bulgaria in 2007, croatia in 2013) can be seen as a political-institutional act that completed this process by drawing these countries under the eu legislative framework. freedom of services was extended to the cee region at the time of the accession, while free labour mobility has been granted in a gradual process (completed in 2011 for the 2004 accession countries, and in 2014 for 2007 entrants, with restrictions still applying for croatia until 2020). this early opening up of the markets for vulnerable transformation economies that were under the double shock of losing their former markets in the east and the widescale restructuring of their economies with applied neoliberal policy reforms has been identified as an original sin in causing unnecessary transformation pain (mencinger 2013). several analysts also argue that the very idea of the european social model has always taken a back seat in the process of european integration (streeck 2000; scharpf 2002; martin and ross 2004). accordingly, the single market project has always been at the core of integration – backed by hard law and its flagship project the emu, albeit on the basis of an incomplete architecture, as learned during the crisis; the social dimension has always been based on declarations, wish lists, and soft targets like those set out in the eu 2020 strategy. the historical founding principle of the eu concentrated on peace, but it was the prospect of upwards income convergence that embodied the european dream for millions of people. this is especially true for cee citizens whose, incomes were a fraction of those in the luckier western part of the continent. the perspective of income convergence – between poorer and richer member states and among the poorer and richer regions within states – has been an underlying feature of european integration from the outset. in this respect, a look at fifty years of eu history up the 2008-09 crisis provides confirmation of the project’s unprecedented success. as a world bank (2012:57) report states, “the european convergence in consumption levels in the last four decades is unmatched. except for east asia, the rest of the world has seen little or no convergence.” indeed, by the early 1990s, the incomes of more than one hundred million people in the poor southern regions of europe (greece, southern italy, portugal, and spain) had increased, moving closer to those of the more prosperous areas of europe. similarly, between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, the income levels of one hundred million people in central and eastern europe were dynamically converging towards levels in the richer parts of the continent. the ambition of upward convergence seemed to function for several decades. however, the year 2008, with the onset of the financial crisis, marked a halt in these processes of convergence and catching up on the part of the less prosperous countries and regions, raising questions about the sustainability of the progress achieved in earlier phases of european integration. as europe’s flagship project, the single currency, has had difficulty responding to 2 czech republic, estonia, hungary, latvia, lithuania, poland, slovakia, and slovenia 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 the external shock imposed by the financial crisis, and with adjustment therapy forcing some member states into a diverging downward spiral, this essential and fundamental mission seems to be at risk. the applied strategy of asymmetrical and downward adjustment, in which mostly peripheral, lower-income countries were affected, resulted in a persistently growing gap between surplus and deficit countries that manifests itself in a diverging europe. divergence and convergence in the wake of the crisis paradoxically, it was less the effect of the acute crisis in 2009 and 2010 that marked a turning point, and more the applied austerity policy in the eu and the macroeconomic surveillance mechanism within the european semester that put wages under pressure. according to these policy recommendations (that appear as hard constraints for national policy makers), wage increases in the past were not sustainable, and cee, similarly to the southern periphery of the eurozone, had lost its competitiveness. thus, a downward wage correction was on the agenda. in the case of countries where financial help through an imf-eu bailout had been provided (in the cee region in latvia, hungary and romania), wage cuts were often among the conditions of providing stand-by credit facility. in other countries, the pressure appeared in a more indirect way, but most of them were subject to wage corrections, as well. between 2008 and 2016, convergence in terms of gdp per capita lost momentum, convergence in nominal wages came to a standstill, overall growth rates were far behind pre-crisis rates, investments collapsed, and inward foreign direct investment (fdi) flows slowed down. data on per capita gdp are shown in table 1, following the years before and then after the 2008 crisis. individual countries show different levels of performance, as in 2018, most cees had gdp per capita between 65 percent and 75 percent of eu15 levels (at purchasing power parity, pps), up from 35-45 percent for the same countries in 1997, and also up from 50 to 65 percent in 2007. the czech republic and slovenia are above this middle range, with 83.7 percent and 81 percent in 2018, respectively, while bulgaria and romania are behind (46.6 percent and 59.7 percent in 2018, respectively). although upward convergence has lost some momentum since the crisis, the catching-up process between 2008 and 2018 is still apparent. most dynamic convergence was shown by the baltic states and slovakia, while slovenia and the czech republic were slower, and hungary and croatia were sliding back within the group. romania and bulgaria showed significant improvements but are still the two poorest member states in the eu. 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 table 1: gross domestic product at current prices per head of population (%), pps, eu15=100 1997 2008 2016 2018 czech republic 64.7 75.6 81.2 83.7 hungary 43.1 56.3 63.6 65.1 croatia 44.2 56.8 56.3 58.3 poland 39.6 50 64.1 66.9 slovakia 44.3 64.4 72.6 72.4 bulgaria 25 39.2 44.5 46.6 estonia 34.4 61.9 69.1 74.6 latvia 28.5 53.1 60.2 64.4 lithuania 31.1 56.7 70.5 74.7 romania 24.7 44.5 54.5 59.7 slovenia 67.2 80.9 77 81.0 data source: ameco (2019), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/resultserie.cfm after a setback in the wake of the crisis, economic convergence (in gdp per capita terms) continues and the overall balance of the last 20 years is positive. figure 1 illustrates economic convergence in a dynamic perspective for the period 2008-2017 for poorer member states, including all cee countries, greece, and portugal by putting per capita gdp (as share of eu28 average) in correlation with growth performance (change in real gdp between 2008-2017). indeed, there is a negative correlation between 2008 income levels of the countries and their growth performance during the period 2008-2017, illustrating that poorer countries tended to grow faster than richer ones. at the same time, croatia, portugal, slovenia, and greece had negative growth in this period and were falling behind, while bulgaria and hungary were below the convergence trendline. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/resultserie.cfm 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: convergence (catching-up process) in real gdp per capita: poorer member states compared to the eu28 average, 2008-2017 source: etui (2019) based on eurostat convergence in wages behind economic convergence theoretical considerations standard microeconomic theory applies a clear relationship between productivity, wages, and labour demand, where wages correspond to the marginal productivity of labour in the context of the profit-maximising behaviour of firms (borjas 2010). at the microeconomic level, the theory also implies that labour demand would increase if productivity per unit of labour input increased (at given wages), just as a further extension of production would increase firms' profits. this microeconomic mechanism is commonly put forward as the underlying justification for a wage–setting rule, to the effect that restraining wage increases below the rate of productivity growth will increase employment levels. profit maximisation applies to private sector enterprises only, and to apply this pattern to the macroeconomic level has several limitations and controversies, as will be shown. even if this argumentation sounds plausible in the short term, given the links between wage moderation and employment growth when productivity is growing at the microeconomic level, the mediumand long-run effectiveness of such policies is much less clear. undoubtedly, there is a strong relationship between the growth of productivity and the growth of wages in a national economy, but this is not a mechanical one, as standard economic theory suggests, and as international financial institutions and the european commission mostly apply eu15 bg cz ee gr hr lv lt hu pl pt ro si sk y = -0.5663x + 46.055 r² = 0.5102 40 65 90 115 -40 -20 0 20 40 real gdp per capita (in eu28 pps) (eu28=100) in 2008 c h a n g e i n r e a l g d p p e r c a p it a ( % ) 2 0 0 8 -2 0 1 7 poorer member states richer member states faster growth slower growth 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 in their policies. this paper argues that a more complex view is needed, addressing the following issues: what comes first, productivity or wages? changes and developments certainly matter, but the level (of productivity and wages) is also important. additionally, should wages and productivity be examined at the national or sectoral level of the economy, in regard to tradeable and non-tradeable sectors? specificities of transformation economies also need to be taken into account. an alternative approach on the link between wages and productivity is presented by the concept of ‘efficiency wages’ (shapiro and stiglitz 1984). under most efficiency wage models, the link between wages and productivity is no longer straightforward, even in the short run. efficiency wage models reject the premise that wages are aligned to the marginal productivity of workers under perfect competition. in contrast, these models argue that paying higher-than-market wages can be a rational choice for firms, e.g., in order to increase the work effort of employees. in this sense, efficiency wage models imply a kind of ’reverse causality’: rather than wages being set according to productivity, they have to be set at a particular level in order to achieve a specific level of productivity (shapiro and stiglitz 1984). in terms of catching up transformation economies, ‘efficiency wages’ can have a role in breaking out from the low wage trap. development of relative wage levels to eu15 from the 2004 ‘big bang’ eu enlargement up to the 2009 crisis, it has been taken for granted that wage convergence for poorer new member states to the high-income core of the eu is only a matter of time. even if foreign investors saw the relatively low wages (and labour costs) in cee as a comparative advantage and used this often as a threat to squeeze out wage concessions from workers in their western european home countries, wages in cee were moving upwards. wage convergence had been indeed dynamic, and by the mid-2000s, cee policy makers were starting to think about a future beyond a low wage-based economic model. then came the crisis, and the trend of upward wage convergence took a sudden end. eu crisis management policies had a major role in reinforcing the low wage-based competitiveness model in the region, causing new cleavages in europe. with a long period of stagnation after the crisis, wage convergence was stuck for several years, and while a new dynamism started in 2016, it came too late and was not enough to compensate for the losses (figure 2). hungary and croatia saw their relative wage levels sliding back from their peak in 2008, while slovenia had stagnating wage levels. a trend break in wage convergence is visible for all cee countries. still, when taking two decades of wage convergence into account (expressed in nominal eur terms for each cee country as a percent of the eu15 average), the overall catch-up of wages was substantial, as in 1998, wage levels at this measure ranged from 6.4 percent (bulgaria) to 47.5 percent (slovenia), whereas in 2019, the range was between 21.6 percent (bulgaria) and 64.1 percent (slovenia). 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: two decades of wage convergence of cee new member states, 1998-2019, at nominal eur terms in % of eu15 average data source: ameco (2019) wages lagging behind productivity wages in cee were also lagging behind productivity and in terms of relative levels; wages were consequently more behind eu15 levels than were relative productivity levels, as figure 3 shows. this was the case in 1995, as well as in 2017, for all countries of the region. while, for example, slovakia in 2017 had 49 percent of the average productivity level of eu15 countries, its relative wage level was only 38 percent. this is an indication that wage levels in cee are not only much behind western european levels, but also behind what their own economic performance should have allowed. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2 0 1 9 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 9 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 9 1 9 9 8 si ee hr sk cz lv lt pl hu ro bg 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 figure 3: wage and productivity levels in cee in percent of eu15, at nominal eur terms source: galgoczi (2017) based on ameco data in spite of a decade of dynamic catching up, wages in cee are still comparably low. even if we adopt the mainstream interpretation of wages and productivity at the national level, cee wages appear to be lower than what productivity levels accordingly would suggest. wage shares wage shares in gdp are an important measure of how wealth created by an economy (in terms of gdp) is being distributed between labour and capital. in most countries in western europe (euro area 12 [ea-12] countries), wage shares of gdp were falling during the last two decades. although the trajectories of those shares in cee countries gave a more mixed picture in spite of the longer-term downward trend, western european countries display clearly higher shares than cee countries (janssen 2015). the average wage share of cee countries in 2015 was 7 percentage points lower than that of the ea-12 countries in western europe. this is an indication that their wage levels are even lower than their economic development potential should allow. figure 4 shows the development of wage shares in a longer perspective for a number of cee countries. poland saw the largest decrease of its wage share, from 65.8 percent in 1995 to 53.9 percent by 2015, followed by hungary (from 65.9 percent to 55.7 percent). the czech republic and slovakia had no significant changes over the past 20 years but had the lowest wage shares in the region, with 52 percent and 49 percent respectively, in 2015. 6 .0 0 6 .0 0 1 8 .1 0 1 5 .7 8 5 .9 9 8 .1 1 1 1 .6 3 1 4 .9 7 9 .6 7 6 .9 7 5 .5 1 1 9 .6 7 1 6 .3 5 7 .6 8 9 .8 9 1 6 .1 0 1 9 .9 2 1 0 .1 9 1 9 .5 0 2 3 .7 5 3 0 .2 3 3 1 .5 3 3 5 .5 9 3 8 .0 9 3 8 .4 8 4 0 .5 1 4 5 .3 4 1 9 .4 5 2 8 .5 4 3 6 .8 7 3 8 .3 3 4 1 .3 1 4 0 .3 5 4 9 .0 9 4 8 .8 2 4 9 .2 3 b g r o h u p l l t l v s k c z e e 1995wage 1995prod 2017wage 2017prod 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 figure 4. development of the wage share in gdp (%) for cee countries (1995-2015) source: galgoczi (2017) based ameco data main drivers of wage developments apart from slovenia, cee countries have the lowest trade union density and collective bargaining coverage rates in the eu, and further erosion takes place from year to year (visser 2014). the weak role of collective bargaining in wage setting in cee countries can also be demonstrated by a persistent positive wage drift between collectively-agreed-upon and actual wages in these countries (delahaie et al. 2015). in the early 2000s up to the crisis, actual wage increases in cee countries have tended to be higher than agreed wage increases settled through collective bargaining (borbély and neumann 2015). this is just the opposite of what has been the main phenomenon in western europe, and in particular, in germany: there, actual wage increases were regularly lower than what had been collectively agreed (negative wage drift due to opt-outs and low coverage). in cee, however, actual wage increases were regularly overshooting collectively-agreed-upon wages in most of the period up to the crisis. this suggests that other factors beyond collective bargaining must have played a major role. dynamic growth in the period before and after enlargement and up to the crisis has certainly created a favourable environment for wage increases in the region. two main drivers were, however, particularly important in their direct or indirect effects: foreign direct investment (fdi) and cross border labour mobility to western europe. foreign direct investments fdi stock has made up a high share of the gdp of individual cees, characteristically between 60 and 80 percent. after a setback of fdi inflows to the region in the wake of the crisis, since 2015, fdi inflows picked up again and stabilised at a yearly 2.6 percent of gdp during 2016 and 2018 (adarov et al. 2019). foreign investment enterprises provide a major part of the exports in the region; they tend to have higher productivity and pay higher wages than the national or branch-level average. foreign direct investments were an important driver of upwards wage dynamism, but this did not happen automatically. the primary effect of fdi is to increase productivity that would be also reflected in higher wages than the sectoral or regional average. the pressure on wages was kept on by foreign investors, as wage increases – even if dynamic – were kept below the rate of productivity increases. 45 50 55 60 65 70 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 euro area 12 germany hungary poland czechia slovakia 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 it is a matter of bargaining regarding how much of the productivity gains can be translated into higher wages, and there are signs now that the bargaining climate is turning more favourable for labour. fdi relies strongly on skilled labour, and in recent years, the lack of its availability all over the region has become a major issue. the automobile manufacturing cluster that includes southern poland, the czech republic, slovakia, northern hungary, and western romania is facing increasing difficulty recruiting skilled workers and engineers. mounting labour shortages were reported in hungary, from a number of firms in the automobile sector, including bosch, audi, and mercedes (gergely 2016), and they started poaching workers from plants in neighbouring countries. in previous years, labour shortages were limited to engineers and skilled labour; recently, manual workers are more and more affected (előd 2016). in early 2016, the trade union organisation at the audi plant in györ, northern hungary, announced the first strike in 23 years, aimed at a significant general wage increase and improvements in working conditions (reuters 2016). cooperation between the trade unions of the german headquarters and the subsidiaries took on new momentum when ig metall opened transnational partnership offices, one near the audi plant in györ (2014) and one near the mercedes plant in kecskemet (2016), to assist hungarian organizations in the fight for higher wages and better working conditions (ig metall 2017). as far as fdi is concerned, the big wave of reorganising the division of labour in europe postenlargement has come to the end of its cycle. mass privatization programmes have been completed, and, in a number of countries, re-nationalisation strategies are even emerging (sass 2017). profit repatriation by foreign investment enterprises has become a major concern in the region. in the wake of the 2008-09 crisis, the role of fdi was subject to a critical rethinking with regard to the contribution of foreign investments to sustainable future growth, with a distinction being made between ‘good‘ and ‘bad‘ fdi. fdi focused on exploiting domestic markets (banking, retail, utilities) and possibly repatriating realised profits was seen as unwelcome (hungary and poland have introduced specific taxes for these sectors), while fdi aimed at strengthening export capacities in mainly the manufacturing sector (automotive and ict), but also business services, was seen as most welcome and enjoyed further support. one of the major concerns in the cee region is the existence of a dual economy featuring highly productive (mainly fdi-driven) export-oriented activities, alongside mostly domestically owned and domestic market-oriented sectors with low productivity. this productivity gap is a hurdle for future development and for catching up with developed economies. the productivity divide between sectors within cee economies is often greater that the productivity gap with germany in the same sector. in hungary, for example, productivity in motor vehicle manufacturing in 2015 was more than four times higher than in retail services, while german productivity in vehicle production was ‘only’ 2.4 times higher. the economic model where the ‘comparative advantage’ of the region was based on low production costs (and thus wages) is no foundation for long-term development. the case of the automotive industry also demonstrates that the mostly low value-added subcontracting role played by the region in global value chains (gvcs) has reached its limits (pavlinek et al. 2017:31). in pavlinek`s words, this model offers the perspective of “truncated development”. with lower levels of fdi, and with their limited and subordinated position in existing gvcs, cee member states need to embark on a more balanced ‘high road’ development model. 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 freedom of movement within the eu a second factor that had an impact on wage growth in cee was outward labour mobility within the eu. higher wage levels in the west were among the most important pull factors in labour mobility from the cee region. figure 5 shows the share of working age population for eu member states living in another member state. apart from the czech republic and slovenia, all cee countries are affected. for romania, the nearly 20 percent loss of its working population is a huge drain of human resources. large-scale outward migration from certain countries (particularly from poland, romania and the baltic states) has resulted in labour market bottlenecks in certain sectors; in particular, teachers, doctors, nurses, and bus drivers were often hard to recruit in these countries. figure 5: eu citizens of working age (20-64) living in another member state by country of citizenship (in % of home country population of the age group) data source: eurostat, 2018 (lfst_lmbpcita demo_pjangroup) a study (holland et al. 2011) found that, between 2004 and 2009, emigration led to an increase in wages by 0.44 percent in the czech republic, 0.68 percent in hungary, and 2.73 percent in poland. a consequence was that wages in these sectors got a further boost, by means also of government-initiated public sector wage increases. from time to time, governments made unilateral increases of public sector wages with an attempt to balance the effects of labour market tensions in the case of specific professions that arose mainly due to these two drivers. for instance, in 2002, the then-governing socialist administration in hungary announced a rise in the wages of teachers and nurses in the public sector by 50 percent. (this was an election promise with the argument to compensate public service workers for low wage growth in the past, but with a view to tackling emerging labour market tensions.) a similar increase had been made in 2012, when austerity measures of the previous years were partially rolled back, with the declared objective of slowing down the outward migration of health professionals from hungary, linked to a commitment of not moving for work abroad for five years. in poland, a law was passed in 2006 to guarantee doctors’ wage levels providing a 40% increase in pay for hospital doctors in order to tackle personnel shortages due to emigration (holt 2010). meanwhile, hospital doctors in the czech republic agreed to a wage settlement after a long and bitter battle in which nearly a quarter of the country’s 16,000 doctors threatened to quit and leave the country unless they received pay raises. the settlement was approved by the 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 government in february 2011, after which doctors who had tendered resignations, which were due to be effective from march 1, 2011, withdrew them. under the settlement, doctors saw their pay rise by around 33 percent (stafford 2011). in the baltic states, several rounds of double-digit wage increases took place, mostly for doctors, nurses, and teachers. trade unions in this period saw more opportunity for bargaining for higher wages. at the same time, wages in certain public sector professions were also raised by the state, in order to offer mobile workers who left the country to work in another member state an incentive to return. beyond anecdotal evidence, a number of studies also confirmed the positive effect of outward migration in certain professional groups. dustmann et al. (2015) identified a positive wage effect of emigration for poland, showing that, between 1997 and 2007, wage increases were highest in the skills categories of workers that were overrepresented in the emigration flows. an iza working paper (zaiceva 2014) also found that outmigration has increased the wages of stayers, especially for employment categories where labour had become relatively scarce. according to an imf working paper (atoyan et al. 2016), countries that have experienced significant outflows of skilled workers (e.g., the baltic states, romania, and bulgaria) have also seen greater upward pressures on domestic wages. the authors estimated the contribution of skilled emigration to nominal wage growth to be up to 10 percent during the period of 1995-2012. the study found that low substitutability between skilled emigrants and natives in the sending countries and higher reservation wages associated with remittances have contributed most to this outcome.3 in addition, increasing opportunities to work abroad may have strengthened workers’ bargaining power in the labour market in the short term. minimum wage increases in lack of proper collective bargaining coverage, it was often minimum wage policy that gave an impetus to wage increases throughout the entire wage scale. in 2017, the share of minimum wages in percent of the average wage ranged from 37.1 percent in the czech republic to 47.4 percent in poland, while in slovakia, romania, and hungary, it made up 39.3 percent, 44.6 percent, and 45.9 percent, respectively. in 2018, minimum wages increased by seven percent in poland, eight percent in slovakia and hungary, and 9.4 percent in the czech republic and romania. in january 2019, the monthly national gross minimum wage was 520 euros in poland, the czech republic, and slovakia, 464 euros in hungary, and 445 euros in romania. figure 6 shows hourly minimum wages expressed in euros for eu member states. cee minimum wages are still a fraction of those in the core of western europe, with minimum wages in luxembourg being almost seven times higher than in bulgaria. apart from latvia and lithuania, minimum wage increases in 2019 (on the basis of 2018) were close to 10 percent. 3 reservation wages are the lowest wage rate at which a worker would be willing to accept a particular type of job. remittances received by family members tend to push up the wage expectation of these persons and thus the lowest acceptable wage when taking up a job (remittances are thus seen as having a negative effect on the labour supply). 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 figure 6: national minimum wage per hour (january 2019, in euros) source: etui (2019) based on wsi database it can be also expected that tighter labour markets would lead to pressure for more wage increases. underemployment rates are historically low, as figure 7 shows. labour market slack in the czech republic and hungary, in 2018, with 3.4 percent and 6.5 percent respectively, was even lower than before the crisis. given the continuing scarcity of skilled labour, foreign investment enterprises embedded in clusters with wide-spun supplier networks in the region will be less resistant to paying higher wages, and their threat potential to move farther or back to their home country will be rather limited. figure 7: labour market slack in the eu member states (percentage of extended labour force aged 15–74), 2008q2, 2013q2 and 2018q2 source: etui (2019) based on eurostat, lfs drawing a balance of 15 years of eu accession according to eurobarometer surveys of the last decade (figure 8), trust in the european union has decreased in most of the cee countries since enlargement (with the exception of latvia and lithuania, where trust in the eu in 2018 was at the same level as in 2007). apart from the 11.97 10.039.91 9.8 9.66 9.19 8.85 5.45 5.1 4.4 3.61 3.39 3.39 3.21 3.11 3.05 2.99 2.92 2.69 2.68 2.54 1.72 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 lu fr nl ie be de uk es si mt pt gr lt ee cz pl sk hr hu ro lv bg 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 national minimum wage per hour (january 2019, left-hand axis) development of hourly minimum wage jan 2018-jan 2019 (in % based on national currency, right-hand axis) gr es it fi fr ie ea cy hr eu se pt be lv lu nl ee at uk dk sk bg ro si de lt pl hu mt cz 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2008q2 2013q2 2018q2 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 czech republic and slovenia, by the end of 2018, trust in the eu in the cee region was, however, still at a higher level than the eu average. figure 8: trust in the eu (% of respondents) data source: european commission (2018) economic and wage convergence is of paramount economic and political importance for all of the cee countries. disenchantment with slower-than-expected catching-up with the core eu countries can be seen all over the region and can be regarded as one of the factors behind the erosion of trust in the eu. stalled wage convergence between the east and the west also undermines social cohesion in the entire eu. with free flow of capital, services and people, this creates adverse effects both in the east and the west – such as `brain drain` from the east, undermining the human resource potential of those countries, while cee workers in the west may be seen as a threat to wage levels there. the lack of a credible convergence perspective for the poorer member states to richer ones, and of the lack of prospects for a better future for the lower income groups within both richer and poorer member states, may pose a threat to the future of the eu. summing up, while the eastern eu enlargement is still one of the success stories of the eu (and unprecedented in the world), it is still controversial. the biggest problem is the unbalanced character of european integration. although cee member states have profited and made significant progress, due to stalled convergence in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis and due to a lack of a clear development perspective, the benefits of eu membership are often questioned. 0 50 100 cz sl eu sk pl hu lv ro ee bg lt spring 2007 autumn 2013 autumn 2018 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 references adarov, a., m. ghodsi, g. hunya, and o. pindyuk. 2019. “foreign investments mostly robust despite global downturn; shift into services.” fdi in central, east and southeast europe, wiiw fdi report no. 2019-06, https://wiiw.ac.at/wiiw-fdi-reports-ps-11.html (accessed july 31, 2019). atoyan et al. 2016. “emigration and its economic impact on eastern europe.” imf staff discussion note sdn/16/07, washington d.c., international monetary fund. bachtler, j., c. mendez, and f. wishlade, eds. 2014. eu cohesion policy and european integration: the dynamics of eu budget and regional policy reform. aldershot: ashgate. borbély s. and l. neumann 2015. similarities and diversity in the development of wages and collective bargaining in central and eastern european countries: a comparison of hungary, slovakia and the czech republic, in van gyes g. and schulten t. (eds.) wage bargaining under the new european economic governance, brussels, etui. http://www.etui.org/publications2/books/wage-bargaining-under-the-new-europeaneconomic-governance (accessed july 31, 2019). borjas g. 2010. labour economics. 5th ed., boston: mcgraw hill. delahaie n., s. vandekerckhove and c. vincent 2015. wages and collective bargaining systems in europe during the crisis, in van gyes g. and t. shulten (eds.) wage bargaining under the new european economic governance, brussels, etui. http://www.etui.org/publications2/books/wage-bargaining-under-the-new-europeaneconomic-governance (accessed, july 31, 2019) dustmann c., t. frattini and a. rosso a. 2015. the effect of emigration from poland on polish wages, scandinavian journal of economics, 117 (2), 522–564. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpb21/cpapers/effectemigrationfrompoland.pdf (accessed july 31, 2019). előd f. 2016. az audi-sztrájk csak a kezdet, felzúdulás jöhet az autóiparban [the audi strike is just the start, in hungarian], index, 23 march 2016. http://index.hu/gazdasag/2016/03/23/audi_sztrajk_autoipar_munkaerohiany/ (accessed july 31, 2019). etui 2019. benchmarking working europe 2019, etui, brussels. https://www.etui.org/publications2/books/benchmarking-working-europe-2019 (accessed july 31, 2019). european commission 2018. standard eurobarometer 90 – annex, november 2018, brussels, european commission. galgoczi, b. 2017. why central and eastern europe needs a pay-rise?, working paper, etui, brussels. https://www.etui.org/publications2/working-papers/why-central-and-easterneurope-needs-a-pay-rise (accessed july 31, 2019). https://wiiw.ac.at/wiiw-fdi-reports-ps-11.html http://www.etui.org/publications2/books/wage-bargaining-under-the-new-european-economic-governance http://www.etui.org/publications2/books/wage-bargaining-under-the-new-european-economic-governance http://www.etui.org/publications2/books/wage-bargaining-under-the-new-european-economic-governance http://www.etui.org/publications2/books/wage-bargaining-under-the-new-european-economic-governance http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpb21/cpapers/effectemigrationfrompoland.pdf http://index.hu/gazdasag/2016/03/23/audi_sztrajk_autoipar_munkaerohiany/ https://www.etui.org/publications2/books/benchmarking-working-europe-2019 https://www.etui.org/publications2/working-papers/why-central-and-eastern-europe-needs-a-pay-rise https://www.etui.org/publications2/working-papers/why-central-and-eastern-europe-needs-a-pay-rise 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 gergely k. 2016. fordulat a magyar autóiparban ebből nagy harc lehet [labour shortages in the hungarian automobile sector, in hungarian], napi, 16 march 2016. http://www.napi.hu/magyar_vallalatok/fordulat_a_magyar_autoiparban_ebbol_nagy_ha rc_lehet.611531.html (accessed july 31, 2019). holland d., t. fic , a. rincon-aznar , l. stoke and p. paluchowski 2011. labour mobility within the eu: the impact of enlargement and the functioning of the transitional arrangements, final report, study for the dg employment, social affairs and inclusion, european commission, london, national institute of economic and social research. holt e. 2010. doctors in eastern europe prepare to walk out over pay, lancet, 376 (9737), 221222. http://thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/piis0140-6736(10)61128-2.pdf (accessed july 31, 2019). hooghe, l. and g. marks 2018. ‘cleavage theory and europe’s crises: lipset, rokkan and the transnational cleavage’, journal of european public policy 25(1): 109–135. höpner, m. and a. schäfer 2008., ‘grundzüge einer politisch-önonomischen perspektive auf die europäische integration’, in höpner, martin and schäfer, armin (eds), politische ökonomie der europäischen integration. frankfurt a. m.: campus, 11–44. ig metall 2017. ig metall baut kooperation mit ungarischer metallgewerkschaft vasas aus, pressemitteilung 06/2017, 28 february 2017. https://www.igmetall.de/06-201724928.htm (accessed july 31, 2019). könig, j. and r. ohr 2012. “the european union: a heterogeneous community? implications of an index measuring european integration,” universität göttingen, mimeo. janssen r. 2015. structural reforms and wages: commission winter forecasts deliver contradictory policy messages, social europe, 12 february 2015. https://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/02/structural-reforms/ (accessed july 31, 2019). mencinger j. 2013. from the collapse of socialism to the crisis of capitalism: experiences of central and eastern european countries, ljetopis socijalnog rada 2013., 20 (1) 7-30, university of ljubljana. martin, a. and g. ross 2004. ’introduction: emu and the european social model’, in: martin a. and g ross (eds.), euros and europeans. monetary integration and the european social model. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2004, pp. 1-19. pavlínek, p., r. aláez-aller, c. gil-canaleta and m. ullibarri-arce 2017.: foreign direct investment and the development of the automotive industry in eastern and southern europe, etui working paper, https://www.etui.org/fr/publications2/workingpapers/foreign-direct-investment-and-the-development-of-the-automotive-industry-ineastern-and-southern-europe (accessed july 31, 2019). http://www.napi.hu/magyar_vallalatok/fordulat_a_magyar_autoiparban_ebbol_nagy_harc_lehet.611531.html http://www.napi.hu/magyar_vallalatok/fordulat_a_magyar_autoiparban_ebbol_nagy_harc_lehet.611531.html http://ec.europa.eu/social/blobservlet?docid=7120&langid=en http://ec.europa.eu/social/blobservlet?docid=7120&langid=en http://ec.europa.eu/social/blobservlet?docid=7120&langid=en http://ec.europa.eu/social/blobservlet?docid=7120&langid=en http://thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/piis0140-6736(10)61128-2.pdf https://www.igmetall.de/06-2017-24928.htm https://www.igmetall.de/06-2017-24928.htm https://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/02/structural-reforms/ https://www.etui.org/fr/publications2/working-papers/foreign-direct-investment-and-the-development-of-the-automotive-industry-in-eastern-and-southern-europe https://www.etui.org/fr/publications2/working-papers/foreign-direct-investment-and-the-development-of-the-automotive-industry-in-eastern-and-southern-europe https://www.etui.org/fr/publications2/working-papers/foreign-direct-investment-and-the-development-of-the-automotive-industry-in-eastern-and-southern-europe 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 reuters 2016. strike threat at audi flags risks for hungarian growth sector, 30 march 2016. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-audi-hungary-strike-idukkcn0ww15g (accessed july 31, 2019). scharpf, f. 2002. ‘the european social model: coping with the challenges of diversity’, journal of common market studies, 40(4): 645-670. shapiro c. and j. stiglitz 1984. equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device, american economic review, 74 (3), 433-444.streeck, wolfgang (2000) ‘competitive solidarity: rethinking the ‘european social model’, in: karl hinrichs, claus offe, herbert kitschelt, helmut wiesenthal (eds): kontingenz und krise, campus, frankfurt, new york,pp. 245-62. sass, m. 2017. is a live dog better than a dead lion? seeking alternative growth engines for visegrad countries, in: galgóczi, béla; drahokoupil, jan (eds.). condemned to be left behind? can central and eastern europe emerge from its low-wage model?, brussels: etui, 47-81. schmitter, p.c. 2005. ‘ernst b. haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism’, journal of european public policy 12(2): 255–272. stafford n. 2011. czech doctors win wage increases after three year campaign, bmj, 342. doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.d1371 (accessed july 31, 2019). streeck, w. 2000. ‘competitive solidarity: rethinking the ‘european social model’, in: karl hinrichs, claus offe, herbert kitschelt, helmut wiesenthal (eds): kontingenz und krise, campus, frankfurt, new york,pp. 245-62. zaiceva a. 2014. post-enlargement emigration and new eu members’ labor markets, iza world of labor 2014: 40. http://wol.iza.org/articles/post-enlargement-emigration-andnew-eu-members-labor-markets/long (accessed july 31, 2019). visser j. 2014. ictwss database on institutional characteristics of trade unions, wage setting, state intervention and social pacts, version 4, amsterdam institute for advanced labour studies. world bank 2012. eu11 regular economic report: coping with external headwinds. zagreb: world bank office. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-audi-hungary-strike-idukkcn0ww15g https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.d1371 http://wol.iza.org/articles/post-enlargement-emigration-and-new-eu-members-labor-markets/long http://wol.iza.org/articles/post-enlargement-emigration-and-new-eu-members-labor-markets/long 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 20-38 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 brexit: a critical juncture for canada’s transatlantic relations?1 achim hurrelmann, carleton university2 abstract this article assesses how brexit—the withdrawal of the united kingdom (uk) from the european union (eu)—has impacted canada’s relations with its european partners. based on a historical institutionalist framework, the article reviews three key dimensions of brexit: economic disintegration, political differentiation, and populist mobilization. in each dimension, it assesses whether brexit constituted a critical juncture for canada’s transatlantic relations—meaning that it increased institutional contingency—and then reviews which forms of change occurred since the 2016 referendum. the analysis shows that brexit did indeed give rise to public debates about new directions in canada-uk and canada-eu relations. however, the changes that unfolded in the years after brexit remained incremental and relatively subtle. in the economic dimension, a limited set of new canada-uk institutions were added without undermining canada-eu institutions. in the political dimension, institutional configurations remained stable. in the populist dimension, an increased politicization of transatlantic relations in the discourse of canadian political parties did not have broader societal resonance. 1 research for this article was supported by an insight grant from the social sciences and humanities research council of canada (file 435-2019-0770). the author is indebted to his co-investigators petra dolata, patrick leblond, and frédéric mérand. all three provided helpful comments; frédéric mérand also conducted many of the expert interviews on which parts of the analysis are based. the author also wishes to thank russell foster and three anonymous reviewers for the canadian journal of european and russian studies for their feedback and suggestions. 2 achim hurrelmann is a professor of political science and the co-director of the centre for european studies at carleton university in ottawa, canada. 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 the withdrawal of the united kingdom (uk) from the european union (eu)—triggered by a referendum in 2016 and implemented in 2020—has not only transformed politics in the uk and the eu but also impacted both polities’ international partners (adler-nissen et al. 2017; chaban et al. 2021). for these partners, brexit implied that relations with the uk and with the eu, which used to be firmly integrated in many policy fields, needed to be disentangled. this challenge was particularly intricate and sensitive for states that are former parts of the british empire, since many of these continued to view the uk both as their principal european ally and as their main entry point—economically, politically, and culturally—to european institutions and societies. canada is a case in point. the significance of the uk as a frame of reference for canadian foreign policy is hard to overstate. given the postcolonial connections to the uk, canadian governments, businesses, and large parts of the public have long considered the uk canada’s most important european partner (chaban 2019; hurrelmann 2020; rayroux 2019). yet canada-uk relations were, for more than forty years, embedded in european integration. the importance of the eu for canada’s transatlantic relations was affirmed by the canada-eu comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) and strategic partnership agreement (spa), both of which entered into force on a provisional basis in 2017, before brexit had taken effect. these agreements exacerbated the challenge of disentangling canada-uk and canada-eu relations in a post-brexit environment. almost eight years after the referendum, this article attempts a first assessment of how canada’s relations with its european partners—both the uk and the eu—have been reconfigured after the uk’s departure from the eu. which challenges did brexit pose for the canada-uk and canadaeu relationship? how have policy makers on both sides of the atlantic navigated these challenges? how much change in canada’s transatlantic relations has occurred as a result? the analysis presented here is based on a historical institutionalist conceptual framework. historical institutionalism describes institutional developments as the outcome of longer-term path dependencies, set in motion by decisions taken at critical junctures at which fundamental institutional change becomes possible (thelen 1999). this article examines whether brexit has constituted such a critical juncture for canada’s transatlantic relations and whether it has set canada’s relations with its european partners on new institutional paths. the analysis in this article distinguishes three dimensions of brexit, each of which has distinct implications for canada: economic disintegration, political differentiation, and populist mobilization. after setting the analytical framework by discussing the concept of critical junctures and their relationship to institutional change, the article will explain these three dimensions and examine developments in canada’s transatlantic relations in each respect. it draws on a diverse set of empirical sources, including economic statistics, policy documents, public statements by politicians, and expert interviews with canadian and european diplomats. the final section compares developments in the three dimensions and discusses factors that account for the identified institutional trajectories. conceptual considerations: critical junctures and institutional change in a historical institutionalist framework, critical junctures are defined as relatively short periods of heightened institutional contingency that interrupt and configure longer periods of pathdependent institutional development. the concept of critical junctures was first introduced to political science by lipset and rokkan (1967, 37-38) in their seminal analysis of western 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 european party systems, whose distinct shape they traced back to “decisions and developments at three critical junctures in the history of each nation,” namely responses to the reformation, democratic revolution, and industrial revolution. drawing on lipset and rokkan, collier and collier (1991, 29) define a critical juncture as “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies.” critical junctures are understood to be brought about by external shocks or crises which upset previously existing institutional configurations and create an opening for far-reaching institutional change (collier and collier 1991, 30-39). while collier and collier’s (1991) definition equates critical junctures with institutional change, later discussions have problematized the relationship between critical junctures and their institutional ramifications. capoccia and kelemen (2007) argue that critical junctures should be seen as periods during which institutional change is particularly likely but that critical junctures do not necessarily result in change. they write: tempting as it may be to equate critical junctures and change, this view is not commensurable with an emphasis on structural fluidity and heightened contingency that are the defining traits of critical junctures. contingency implies that wide-ranging change is possible and even likely but also that re-equilibration is not excluded. if an institution enters a critical juncture, in which several options are possible, the outcome may involve the restoration of the pre-critical juncture status quo. hence, change is not a necessary element of a critical juncture. if change was possible and plausible, considered, and ultimately rejected in a situation of high uncertainty, then there is no reason to discard these cases as “non-critical” junctures. (capoccia and kelemen 2007, 352) based on this understanding, the study of critical junctures requires analysts to determine whether a particular situation is indeed characterized by increased contingency (capoccia 2015; 2016; capoccia and kelemen 2007)—in the words of capoccia and kelemen (2007, 348), whether there is “a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest.” this entails an assessment of whether political agents “face a broader than normal range of feasible options” in making political decisions and whether “their choices among these options are likely to have a significant impact” on institutional development (capoccia 2016, 91-92). if this assessment confirms heightened contingency—that is, if the constellation qualifies as a critical juncture—the second step of analysis reviews the impact of the agents’ choices on stability or change in institutional configurations. this approach to studying critical junctures requires a theory-guided analysis that is open to considering plausible historical counterfactuals (capoccia 2015; 2016; capoccia and kelemen 2007). the analysis presented here applies this framework to the case of brexit. for each of the three dimensions of brexit, it asks two questions: first, can brexit be described as a critical juncture for canada’s transatlantic relations? in other words, did it result in a period of heightened institutional contingency and an increased potential for change in the relationship? to address this question, the article draws on statements by politicians and political observers that reveal what they perceived as plausible options for institutional development after brexit, as well as on expert interviews with diplomats that recall decisions that were considered and taken in the post-brexit period. the reliance on these sources, rather than on speculative scenarios, ensures that the options for institutional development that are 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 considered in the analysis are indeed plausible and thus abide by what has been called the “minimal-rewrite rule” in counterfactual analysis (mahoney and barrenechea 2019, 316-318; tetlock and belkin 1996, 23-25). second, did brexit produce institutional change in canada’s transatlantic relations? in addressing this question, this study follows streeck and thelen (2005) by distinguishing disruptive institutional change from various forms of incremental change. disruptive change is characterized by institutional breakdown and replacement, while incremental change means that existing institutions survive, but the broader institutional system transforms due to processes of displacement (changing priorities between existing institutions), layering (adding new institutions on top of existing ones), conversion (applying existing institutions to new purposes), or drift (failing to adapt existing institutions to a changing environment) (streeck and thelen 2005, 1831; see also mahoney and thelen 2010).3 while the idea of critical junctures is often associated primarily with disruptive change (capoccia 2016, 100-101), streeck and thelen emphasize that it applies to incremental change as well, as developments at “critical moments or periods” may initiate or accelerate incremental institutional transformation (streeck and thelen 2005, 20). incremental change is not necessarily less far-reaching than disruptive change, though it may take longer to unfold (streeck and thelen 2005, 8-9). for the analysis of brexit, this means that we need to assess both the form (disruptive or incremental) and the scope (continuity or discontinuity) of change in canada’s transatlantic relations. the following sections apply this analytical model to the three major dimensions of brexit: economic disintegration, political differentiation, and populist mobilization. we will then discuss factors that account for the identified patterns of institutional development. brexit as economic disintegration the first dimension of brexit is economic. leaving the eu—at least if pursued according to the “hard brexit” option eventually selected by the uk government—meant that the uk would no longer form part of the eu single market and customs union. for international partners such as canada, this economic disintegration implied that the uk would no longer be covered by the trade agreements they had concluded with the eu, but also that new trade agreements with the uk, concluded outside of the eu framework, would become a possibility (neuwahl 2021). the situation that canada faced in transatlantic economic relations in the years after brexit was paradoxical: the comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) was fully negotiated by the time of the referendum, and the uk government had been one of its most enthusiastic supporters. the agreement continued to move through the approval process despite brexit, leading to its provisional application beginning in september 2017. the provisional application included the uk, which was also one of the first states to complete the required domestic ratification of the agreement (hurrelmann and wendler 2024). notwithstanding these developments, it was clear that ceta would cease to apply to the uk after the end of the brexit transition period when the withdrawal from the eu would take full effect. 3 streeck and thelen’s (2005) original typology also includes the mode of exhaustion (gradual withering away of existing institutions). this mode of incremental change is not included here as it has to be viewed, as streeck and thelen (2005, 29-30) themselves admit, as a mode of “institutional breakdown rather than change.” 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 by the time of the brexit referendum, the uk was by far canada’s most important economic partner in europe, accounting for approximately 40% of canada’s merchandise exports to the eu and canadian foreign direct investment (fdi) in eu countries. as a project of economic disintegration, brexit opened up opportunities for several plausible trajectories of change to these trade and investment patterns. on the one hand, many economists predicted that brexit would lead to trade and investment diversion away from the uk. after all, british ports would no longer be attractive as entry points into the eu single market, and investment in the uk would be subject to increased uncertainty. “even if the united kingdom renegotiated its current [trade] agreements keeping all their provisions,” wrote graziano, handley and limão (2020, 555), “they would likely be less credible and thus result in trade disintegration relative to a pre-brexit world.” on the other hand, there were also commentators who perceived a potential for a further deepening of canadauk economic relations, given that the uk would no longer be constrained in its trade and investment policy by the eu’s more protectionist member states. less than 24 hours after the referendum, conservative mp pierre poilievre took to twitter to demand an “immediate” free trade deal “with an independent uk” (figure 1). in the months that followed, the idea of a canadaaustralia-new zealand-uk (canzuk) trade agreement gained popularity in conservative circles on both sides of the atlantic (bell and vucetic 2019). considering vested interests in existing economic linkages, it would not have been realistic to expect disruptive change in canadauk or canada-eu economic relations, such as the wholesale collapse of one relationship at the expense of the other. however, noticeable forms of incremental change—for instance, divergent trade and investment patterns—were clearly a possibility. it is, therefore, plausible to view brexit as a critical juncture in the economic dimension. figure 1: tweet by pierre poilievre about brexit, june 24, 2016. did brexit produce this kind of change? we can approach this question by looking at the negotiation of new trade agreements but also by examining trade and investment patterns in canada-uk and canada-eu relations. in the first respect, change remained relatively limited. this is largely due to the positioning of the canadian federal government, strongly supported by the bureaucracy of global affairs canada, which emphasized economic continuity and maintaining good relations with both transatlantic partners. while canada would have had the legal option of requesting amendments to ceta or even ending the agreement’s provisional application after brexit had taken effect (neuwahl 2021, 251), this option was never seriously considered. postbrexit relations with the uk were built independently of the continued application of ceta, but only in ways that ensured that relations with the eu would not be undermined. a canadian diplomat explained this approach in one of our interviews: following the referendum, the experience we had working with the europeans was that they were very emotional on this issue. we had a duty to be neutral. so, on everything we could do with the british, we were very transparent with the europeans. 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 we had our interests at stake, and they understood it. but it was very important that we did not interfere with their own ongoing negotiations with the united kingdom, that we did not cause material harm by what we said, that we did not take a position. for example, if we had publicly announced support for brexit or publicly announced that we were going to have a super-ambitious agreement with the united kingdom, that would have risked damaging our relationship with the european union because the brexiteers would have taken advantage of it. (interview #10, canadian diplomat, july 2020, translated from french) while canada’s clear preference was for a “soft brexit”, with the uk remaining in the eu’s single market and customs union, a trade dialogue with the uk was launched as soon it became clear that the uk government had decided to pursue a “hard brexit” option (interview #7, canadian diplomat, july 2020). canadian negotiators made sure to conduct these talks in a way that showed great sensitivity to eu concerns, for instance, by paying careful attention to label these talks a “dialogue,” rather than formal “negotiations” while the uk was still an eu member state (interview #4, canadian diplomat, july 2020). after the uk had left the eu, negotiations could formally begin. they were characterized by a mutual interest in ensuring continuity in canadauk trade after the end of the brexit transition period, but they were “real negotiations,” as a british diplomat insisted (interview #16, uk diplomat, august 2021). canada temporarily suspended talks in early 2020, when the publication of draft british customs schedules led to uncertainty on whether the concessions that the uk had promised to canada would be granted more broadly to all trading partners. after this issue had been resolved, a trade continuity agreement (tca) was negotiated under considerable time pressure and concluded in december 2020. the tca incorporates the provisions of ceta with some changes, especially on tariff quotas (interview #11, canadian diplomat, june 2021; interview #13, canadian diplomat, june 2021). importantly, canada did not grant a cheese quota to the uk, though it did agree to transitional measures until the end of 2023. negotiations for a new canada-uk trade agreement to replace the tca were launched in march 2022, with the goal of reaching an agreement by 2024. however, these negotiations were suspended by the british government in january 2024 over continued disagreements with the canadian side, especially on agricultural trade (british chambers of commerce 2024). a canzuk agreement was not pursued; instead, the uk acceded to the comprehensive and progressive agreement on trans-pacific partnership (cptpp), of which canada is also a member (stephens 2021). in sum, the new trade agreements linking canada and the uk did not break substantial new ground, nor did they supplant canada-eu agreements. they can be characterized as a form of layering that added new institutions without undermining existing ones. the second perspective that can be employed to assess the economic impact of brexit looks at economic indicators for trade and investment relations. these reflect how brexit has affected the choices of private economic actors. as figures 2 and 3 show, there was no collapse of canadian exports or outgoing foreign direct investment (fdi) to the uk. however, in both respects, canadauk economic relations remained stable, while canada-eu economic relations saw increases. this divergence in trajectories appears particularly pronounced after the end of the brexit transition period on december 31, 2020. the pattern of canada’s economic relations with european partners post-brexit, while relatively stable overall, is thus closer to the scenario of trade and investment diversion away from the uk than to the scenario of intensifying canada-uk linkages. 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: canadian merchandise exports to the uk and the eu27 (monthly, in millions cad) data source: statistics canada. table 12-10-0011-01 international merchandise trade for all countries and by principal trading partners, monthly (x 1,000,000). accessed august 11, 2023. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/ en/tv.action?pid=1210001101. figure 3: canadian fdi in the uk and the rest of europe (annually, in millions cad)4 data source: statistics canada. table 36-10-0659-01 international investment position, canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in canada, by industry and select countries, annual (x 1,000,000). accessed august 11, 2023. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610065901. in conclusion, although brexit as an instance of economic disintegration was never likely to lead to disruptive institutional change in either canada-eu or canada-uk economic relations, it can 4 statistics canada data for “europe” in figure 3 includes non-eu states, such as switzerland and norway. 0.00 500.00 1,000.00 1,500.00 2,000.00 2,500.00 3,000.00 3,500.00 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 eu27 uk linear (eu27) linear (uk) 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 europe w/o uk uk https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1210001101 https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1210001101 https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610065901 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 be seen as a critical juncture in the economic dimension: brexit implied a potential for incremental shifts in priorities among canada’s transatlantic economic partners. in the end, the change that did occur was subtle and is best described as an example of layering. new institutions for canada-uk trade were added to ceta, but the latter proved to be the more impactful economic agreement, and canada-eu economic relations outperformed canada-uk relations, at least in the short term. there were no path-breaking changes, but the incremental changes that did occur point to a divergence in economic trajectories in relations between canada’s two transatlantic partners. brexit as political differentiation the second dimension of brexit views it as an instance of political differentiation. in line with theories of differentiated integration in the eu context (leuffen, rittberger, and schimmelfennig 2022), this characterization refers to the fact that the uk’s withdrawal from the eu has meant greater diversity in political arrangements in europe, as the uk would no longer be bound by, or even be required to coordinate with, eu foreign policy stances. as a result, the uk gained leeway in its bilateral relations with non-eu countries such as canada and the ability to act more independently in plurilateral or multilateral settings. when assessing the impact of this change on canada, it is important to keep in mind that the eucanada strategic partnership agreement (spa), which governs the political relationship, never constituted an exclusive rulebook comparable to ceta in the economic realm. regardless of brexit, canada, the uk, and eu member states continued to collaborate in the context of international organizations and forums, such as the united nations (un), the north atlantic treaty organization (nato), or the g7/g20. in addition, canada always had bilateral political relations with the uk which were not subordinate to those with the eu, as well as plurilateral pacts—such as the five eyes intelligence network—that involve the uk but not other eu member states. expanding these forms of canada-uk relations was possible without concluding a major new bilateral agreement like the tca. one scenario of change enabled by brexit was, therefore, the development of closer bilateral canada-uk cooperation, no longer constrained by the need to coordinate with other member states in the eu institutions, or closer canada-uk collaboration in plurior multilateral settings, taking advantage of the uk’s new policy flexibility. once again, however, the opposite scenario—a loss of influence of the uk in canada’s transatlantic relations— was also within the realm of possibility. after all, the eu could be perceived as a strategically more important partner, and the eu commission as more closely aligned politically with the priorities of the liberal federal government than the uk under the leadership of conservative brexiteers. as a global affairs canada official explained: [for] canada, the eu is an enormous and important partner. not just for upstream security issues, the kinds of preventive security that i talked about, [but also] for our fundamental prosperity; not just on market access, but also on regulating emerging important sectors, [as well as] on the values agenda and the ability to speak out for human rights and for the rule of law and for democracy globally. no one is going to put that at risk for some close ties with the uk. (interview #6, canadian diplomat, july 2020) it was clear, of course, that canada had an interest in protecting its political relationship with both the uk and the eu. like in the economic realm, it was therefore not plausible to expect disruptive change—a collapse of existing canada-uk or canada-eu ties. yet brexit opened the door for 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 changes in the two relationships’ respective priorities. it can, therefore, be characterized as a critical juncture for canada’s transatlantic political relations that raised plausible alternative options for incremental change. once again, however, the amount of change that did occur post-brexit proved more limited than what some observers had predicted. the canadian government and foreign affairs bureaucracy maintained a strong commitment to protecting the strategic partnership with the eu. at the same time, the uk—not least through its high commission in ottawa—successfully emphasized its value as a political partner. as a british diplomat posted to ottawa explained in one of our interviews, the high commission devised a communication strategy that deliberately highlighted policy areas in which the uk was strongly aligned with the canadian government’s priorities: the [communication] strategy flows from…perception surveys, and they have shown that while perceptions of the uk are generally very positive, the things that matter most on canadians’ minds are the more traditional elements of the relationship, things like security, defence, historical connections, while some of the areas where actually a lot of the successful work is being done—let’s say, for example, on the science innovation side—don’t get quite that much attention. part of the strategy has been to focus on the more modern elements of the relationship, for example, scientific cooperation, joint work on vaccines, climate science work. and then another strand has been around—and this is partly linked to brexit—reminding canadians that the fundamental values of the uk haven’t changed that much on issues like gender equality, lgbt+ rights, media freedom, inclusion, and diversity. actually, the uk and canada are very much in close agreement, and our prime ministers, prime ministers trudeau and johnson, on things like gender equality, women’s education, lgbt+ rights, are pretty much entirely aligned. and making more of that part of the relationship is especially important and also plays well to a liberal audience here. (interview #2, uk diplomat, june 2020) canada, for its part, discovered that the uk was sometimes easier to work with than the eu. in the period after brexit took effect, a small number of bilateral policy statements with the uk were issued without the eu’s involvement. for example, the canadian and uk foreign ministers issued a joint statement in february 2021 condemning “targeted raids” against human rights organizations and independent journalists in belarus (global affairs canada 2021a). jointly with the us secretary of state, the two ministers also expressed concerns in march 2021 about “china’s human rights violations and abuses in xinjiang” (global affairs canada 2021b). the release of such foreign policy statements without eu involvement did not go unnoticed by eu diplomats (interview #15, eu diplomat, july 2021). but members of the canadian foreign affairs bureaucracy were themselves uneasy with the practice and how it might be perceived by the eu and moved to restrict its use. as an official in global affairs canada explained: it's certainly true that [agreeing on statements is] faster with the uk because they don't have 27 member states. but there is a significance and importance in continuing to do things with the eu. and i constantly have to remind other parts of my department and the government about the importance of doing things jointly. and you might have seen the belarus announcement today [june 21, 2021]: eu, canada, uk, and the us, we did it all together. and we’d like to see that more when we can. the problem is that in this business, and it depends on your minister, but at the political level, they are really keen to get things done because things move so quickly, and it has to get out quickly 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 in this 24/7 communication environment. and when it takes too long to get approvals because the eu has to go to all their member states, sometimes we have to go out with a smaller group, even though we would much prefer to be going out with the eu. so, we’ve done our best and we will continue to try and make sure that we can act jointly. and it’s something [of which] i remind people, i think i said this before, it’s like your friends get divorced and you want to make sure that you maintain a good relationship and a strong relationship with both parties. (interview #15, canadian diplomat, june 2021) while there was hence limited enthusiasm on the canadian side for pursuing bilateral initiatives with the uk, the british government did not seek canadian participation in what was arguably its boldest post-brexit foreign policy initiative, the australia-uk-us (aukus) agreement, announced in september 2021. the new security alliance, focusing on the indo-pacific, upset eu states—especially france—and caught the canadian government off-guard. while canada had little interest in the construction of nuclear-powered submarines, the initial focus of aukus, the fact that canada had not been consulted raised concerns about being relegated to a second-tier partner within the five eyes alliance (carvin and juneau 2023). for this discussion of brexit, the case of aukus is important because it underlines that ambitious forms of political cooperation between canada and the uk, even where they would have been possible, were not pursued in the post-brexit period. we can conclude that brexit, as an instance of political disintegration, constituted a critical juncture because it implied increased institutional contingency: the potential that one of canada’s transatlantic political relationships would develop more dynamically and thus take priority over the other. however, such a shift in canada’s transatlantic relations did not happen. only limited forms of new canada-uk cooperation were added to the existing forms of transatlantic partnership. overall, the picture is one of continuity: canada-eu relations remained on an established trajectory, and canada-uk relations saw only minor extensions. brexit as populist mobilization the final dimension in which we can analyze brexit focuses on the 2016 referendum and its aftermath is a case of populist mobilization. along with the us presidential election that brought donald trump to power later in the same year, brexit has been analyzed as part of a “populist backlash” against globalization that transformed patterns of political competition across western democracies (norris and inglehart 2019). the international impact of brexit, in this respect, lies in its potential to serve as a template for changes in the partisan politics of other countries, which may directly or indirectly influence these countries’ domestic and foreign policies. with respect to canadian politics, it was unclear by the time of the referendum whether brexit would be perceived as a relatively distant and non-salient foreign policy event or whether it would be subject to domestic politicization. canada had, at the time of the referendum, not seen significant examples of the twenty-first-century wave of populism. the trudeau government, first elected in 2015, was still in its honeymoon period with voters and enjoyed broad popularity. its initial public statements on the referendum were low-profile; like other international allies of the uk, the trudeau government supported the remain position endorsed by british prime minister david cameron. the opposition conservatives were in the middle of a leadership race. most of the 14 conservative leadership contenders did not take a public position on the referendum, which 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 had deeply split their sister party in the uk. however, one of the perceived front-runners (and eventual winner of the leadership race), andrew scheer, enthusiastically embraced the brexit narrative.5 in an op-ed published in the national post before the referendum, scheer argued that brexit was necessary to protect “british political traditions” from being undermined by unelected supranational bureaucrats in the eu: local decisions by local representatives – that’s the core of the westminster system of responsible government that we inherited from britain. yet that’s no longer what’s practised in the uk. the supremacy of parliament – the will of the people expressed through their elected representatives – is increasingly being replaced by the dictates of eu bureaucrats in brussels. the consequence is less self-determination, less local decision making and less economic dynamism. britain’s foreign economic relations with historic partners such as canada are now subject to an effective veto from countries such as romania and bulgaria. then there’s the host of eu regulations covering everything from hair dressers to vacuum cleaners and olive oil…a stronger, more independent and economically dynamic united kingdom would not only be good for the country itself, it would also be good for canada and the entire world. (scheer 2016) scheer’s intervention was remarkable not only because it embraced the anti-eu arguments promoted by the leave campaign but also because it explicitly linked brexit and canadian foreign policy. it illustrates that brexit had the potential to introduce populist politics and the transnational political cleavage—pitting green-alternative-libertarian (gal) against traditional-authoritariannationalist (tan) positions (hooghe and marks 2018)—into canadian foreign policy debates. as an instance of populist mobilization, brexit can hence once again be seen as a critical juncture, with the potential to transform patterns of political competition not only in the uk but also in canada. how much change has occurred in this respect? at the level of political party discourse, there are clear indications that brexit-related arguments did indeed gain prominence in canadian debates. after scheer had been elected conservative party leader, prime minister justin trudeau quickly jumped on the bandwagon of brexit’s domestic politicization. in a house of commons debate in january 2019, nominally on the dismissal of canada’s ambassador to china, he brushed off scheer’s questions by ridiculing the opposition leader’s pro-brexit stance. scheer quickly retorted by pointing out that he had backed the winning side in the british referendum (figure 4). figure 4: house of commons question period exchange between andrew scheer and justin trudeau, january 30, 2019 hon. andrew scheer (leader of the opposition, cpc): mr. speaker, it is clear that our international partners are quickly losing respect for the prime minister, and it is no wonder. after clowning around in india, inviting a convicted terrorist along, he was then forced to accept concession after concession from donald trump, all the while managing to anger our partners in japan and australia. now canadians are paying for his mistakes when it comes to our relationship with china. once again, why did he show such weakness and wait so long to fire his own ambassador? 5 the runner-up, maxime bernier, went on to found a populist political party, the people’s party of canada (ppc). however, brexit was never a major policy or campaign issue for bernier or the ppc. 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 right hon. justin trudeau (prime minister, lib.): mr. speaker, on china, we will continue to stand up for the rule of law; we will respect our international obligations, and we will always put the safety of canadians first. we will take no lessons from the leader of the opposition, whose only pronouncement on foreign policy has been to come down on one side of the most divisive, destructive debate to happen in the u.k. for an awfully long time. people will understand that we take no lessons from the harper conservatives or from the current conservative leader on canada's place in the world. hon. andrew scheer (leader of the opposition, cpc): the prime minister came down on the losing side of that debate in the united kingdom, mr. speaker. going back to china, for days the prime minister allowed canada’s position to be weakened by having his own personal representative interfere with an independent process, politicizing the issue by giving a briefing in his old political constituency. why did it take so long for the prime minister to fire his ambassador? right hon. justin trudeau (prime minister, lib.): mr. speaker, the member opposite just did it again: he came down clearly on one side of the most divisive foreign policy debate to hit the united kingdom in a long time. he even boasted about it, saying that he was pro-brexit before brexit was cool. quite frankly, we will take no lessons from the members opposite on the matter of canada’s standing in the world and the great work we are doing on foreign policy. source: hansard number 374, january 30, 2019. accessed april 15, 2024. https://www.ourcommons.ca/documentviewer/en/42-1/house/sitting-374/hansard. in the federal election campaign later that same year, scheer reiterated his support for brexit, while trudeau issued a tweet that linked scheer’s stance to “far-right, american-style politics” (figure 5). these statements are important because they show that both leaders relished talking about brexit even when there was no political necessity to do so. from the perspective of electoral strategy, this kind of discourse makes sense. research on canadian public opinion and media debates shows that conservative voters, and right-of-centre media outlets such as the national post, tend to respond much more favourably to brexit and have a much more critical view of the eu than liberal/ndp voters or centrist/left-of-centre news outlets (hurrelmann, mérand, and white 2021; hurrelmann et al. 2023). in other words, when publicly positioning themselves in favour or against brexit, trudeau and scheer were sending messages which they knew would be well-received in their respective political base. https://www.ourcommons.ca/documentviewer/en/42-1/house/sitting-374/hansard 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 figure 5: tweet by justin trudeau about andrew scheer, october 7, 2019. despite these examples of domestic politicization, canada did not see a sustained public debate about brexit and its implications for canadian foreign policy. research on media discourses shows that public interest in brexit was short-lived; the topic was discussed largely as a foreign policy event and disappeared from media headlines as soon as the parameters of the uk’s withdrawal and future relationship with the eu had been settled (hurrelmann et al. 2023). while there is evidence that the gal-tan cleavage has become more relevant in canadian politics since 2016, brexit has not been one of the major driving forces of this development (graves 2021). rather, political debates that accentuate the cleavage have focused on the trump presidency in the us, the response to the covid-19 pandemic, as well as “culture wars” on issues such as lgbtq+ rights. that is not to say that brexit has had no effects in the populist mobilization dimension. even in the absence of larger-scale political resonance, its domestic politicization by canada’s political parties—especially the conservatives’ willingness to embrace explicit anti-eu rhetoric—has been noticed by canada’s international partners. as a result, there is a clear weariness among diplomats from the eu and its member states about the potential of a conservative government in ottawa and how it would position itself towards the eu. in one of our interviews, an eu diplomat expressed this quite explicitly: [i]n diplomacy, you deal with all governments you get. and i mean, we had, i think, a good relationship with the harper government, too. canada is a democratic country that elects democratic governments. so that's not a problem. but i think it’s also fair to say that…the positions of the liberal government are more in line with what i would call mainstream eu policy positions. the eu takes every government we get. but i think it’s also fair to say, now that european politicians have been pretty outspoken about it, how relieved they were that mr. biden is president in the us…that there are preferences for some administrations over others. (interview #15, eu diplomat, july 2021) 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 in sum, when it comes to populist mobilization, brexit can again be seen as a critical juncture, with the potential to introduce new styles of debate and political cleavages into canadian politics. the evidence on change in this dimension is mixed: brexit has impacted the ways in which canadian political parties perceive canada’s transatlantic relations; it has, in an incremental fashion, introduced more explicit partisanship into debates about the country’s transatlantic priorities. in the terminology of streeck and thelen (2005), this change can be associated with the mode of conversion: debates about canada-eu and canada-uk relations have become less consensual and increasingly politicized. at the same time, the broader societal resonance of brexitrelated debates, and their impact on the transformation of political cleavages that structure party competition, has remained limited. the changes in political cleavages that have occurred in canada since 2016 do not appear to have been driven by brexit. brexit: a critical juncture, but limited change the analysis presented thus far has demonstrated that brexit, in each of its three dimensions, implied a potential for change in canada’s transatlantic relations. brexit, therefore, deserves to be described as a critical juncture for canada’s relations with its european partners. at the same time, the change that has manifested following the 2016 referendum was not path-breaking. where brexit did trigger changes, they remained incremental in form—layering in the first dimension, conversion in the third—and limited in scope (figure 6). figure 6: summary of findings dimension of brexit critical juncture institutional change economic disintegration yes: potential for new trade agreements and for divergence in canada-uk and canada-eu trade and investment patterns limited, incremental change: institutional layering of new trade agreements; signs of divergence between canada-uk and canada-eu economic relations political differentiation yes: potential for change in priority accorded to canada-uk vs canada-eu political relations no meaningful change: continuity in canada-uk and canada-eu relations; no major initiatives that shift priorities populist mobilization yes: potential for domestic politicization of brexit, contributing to rise in gal-tan political cleavage limited, incremental change: institutional conversion through increased politicization of party discourse about transatlantic relations, but limited resonance in broader public debates this raises the question of why brexit did not bring about more far-reaching institutional change. my analysis has identified three main factors. first, throughout the period examined here, canada was led by a federal government interested in continuity in transatlantic relations. the governing liberal party has long supported strong relations with the eu and its predecessor institutions. it was under the liberal government of pierre trudeau—the current prime minister’s father—that 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 formal relations with the european communities were first established (mahant 1981; potter 1999, 19–50). european integration appeals to the liberal party’s vision of foreign policy because it reflects the party’s commitment to liberal internationalism; canada-eu relations are also in line with the liberal party’s preference for economic diversification away from the us (hurrelmann 2020, 122). in addition, as mentioned previously, the liberal government perceived a strong alignment with the policy priorities of the european commission, for instance, on issues such as climate change. prime minister justin trudeau emphasized this alignment when addressing the european parliament in 2017: [o]ver the course of our historic partnership, canada and the eu have stood side-byside on the things that matter. things like maintaining global security. advancing the values of peace and justice. and ensuring our peoples’ prosperity through trade and investment. we’ve worked together on issues like climate change, and the rights of women and girls around the world. and, ladies and gentlemen, i am confident that we will achieve tremendous things together in the years to come…the european union is a truly remarkable achievement, and an unprecedented model for peaceful cooperation. canada knows that an effective european voice on the global stage isn’t just preferable – it’s essential. (trudeau 2017) because of its perceived like-mindedness with the eu,6 the canadian government did not pursue policy options in canada-uk relations that could be seen as undermining the canada-eu relationship. this canadian stance may have been different if brexit had occurred under a federal government led by the conservative party (interview #8, canadian diplomat, july 2020), whose foreign policies have tended to emphasize traditional alignments with the uk and the commonwealth. the second factor that contributed to continuity in canada’s transatlantic relations post-brexit was the fact that brexit as a political event was quickly overshadowed by other developments that took political leaders’ attention. the most important of these were the trump presidency in the us (2017–21), the covid-19 pandemic (2020–22), and the full-scale russian invasion of ukraine (ongoing since 2022). these issues not only took away much of the oxygen from what could have been fiery transatlantic debates about brexit; they also, by and large, put the emphasis on policy matters on which canada, the eu, and the uk perceived shared values, interests, and objectives: defending the multilateral international order against trump’s attacks; limiting the spread and economic damage of covid-19; countering russian aggression. they hence encouraged the three transatlantic partners to collaborate (interview #5, german diplomat, june 2020; interview #10, canadian diplomat, july 2020). the crisis context was also a strong disincentive to pursuing postbrexit strategies that would have added further disruptions to the transatlantic relationship. thirdly, and relatedly, the quick succession of international crises in the post-brexit years also meant that the attention of political leaders in transatlantic relations was mostly not focused on brexit. this lack of political “bandwidth” was another factor that militated against major postbrexit initiatives, whether to strengthen canada-uk or canada-eu relations. a canadian diplomat posted to france explained this with respect to the priorities of the canadian government: 6 the eu is, of course, not a homogenous entity. a differentiated analysis of eu politics needs to distinguish the various eu institutions and analyze the distinct political priorities of the 27 member states. however, such complexities usually remain unacknowledged in canadian discourses about the eu. 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 and meanwhile, canada was very, very focused on renegotiating nafta. we had a new minister of foreign affairs at the beginning of 2017, freeland, who was devoted almost exclusively to the american question. overall, in the past five years, [canada and the eu] have had an increased appetite to work together, but realities forced us to focus on questions of vital interest on which canada-eu relations were not necessarily a priority, neither for brussels and paris nor for ottawa. (interview #9, canadian diplomat, july 2020; translated from french)7 with political leaders occupied by crises elsewhere, the political management of brexit in the canada-uk and canada-eu relationships was largely left to bureaucratic politics. it was driven by diplomatic actors with a good understanding of what it takes to align potentially competing international relationships, professional training in how to shield international relations from partisanship in domestic politics (interview #3, canadian diplomat, june 2020), and an aversion against anything that might rock the boat. several of our canadian interviewees stressed that the desired continuity in transatlantic relations required active efforts to keep the eu engaged, to ensure that its debates about “strategic autonomy” would not result in a “fortress europe” mentality and a turn away from transatlanticism (interview #6, canadian diplomat, june 2020; interview #12, canadian diplomat, june 2021). this perception contributed to a policy approach on the canadian side that carefully emphasized the need to balance canada-uk and canada-eu relations. the combination of these three factors—the liberal government in canada, the emergence of crises that turned political attention away from brexit, and the dominance of bureaucratic politics—made brexit significantly less transformational at the policy level than even veteran diplomats would have expected. an eu diplomat posted to ottawa reflected on this in one of our interviews: was brexit a challenge? i have to say that we approached brexit thinking it would be a very big challenge. and somehow it was—i’ll be careful with the expression—it was a kind of an uneventful big event, because we had discussed all that so long, we were so well prepared [for] what was going to happen when brexit takes place…we were thinking, how are we going to react if things turn sour between london and brussels and how will canadian public opinion react, what are we going to do? and finally, it went relatively smoothly overall. (interview #1, eu diplomat, june 2020) conclusion while existing scholarship on brexit has focused mainly on the uk’s and the eu’s internal politics, the uk’s withdrawal from the eu had international ramifications. for canada, brexit was relevant as an instance of economic disintegration, political differentiation, and populist mobilization. as we have seen in this article, brexit constituted a critical juncture for canada’s transatlantic relations in each respect, characterized by increased institutional contingency and several plausible options for institutional development. however, the change that did unfold in the 7 the american focus on renegotiating nafta, along with the general lack of enthusiasm in both the trump and the biden administration for major new trade agreements, also meant that the uk government’s hope for the quick negotiation of a uk-us trade agreement was not realized. such an agreement would have put pressure on canada to intensify its economic relationship with the uk. 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 years after brexit remained incremental and relatively subtle; it can be characterized as limited institutional layering in the economic dimension (addition of new canada-uk institutions without undermining canada-eu institutions) and limited institutional conversion in the populist mobilization dimension (increased politicization of transatlantic relations in party discourses without broader societal resonance). these patterns of institutional change emerged from the preferences of the governments of the day (especially on the canadian side), the development of major international crises that competed with brexit for political attention, and the dominance of bureaucratic politics in addressing the transatlantic fallout of brexit. while it is hence tempting to characterize the aftermath of brexit in canada’s transatlantic relations as “uneventful,” we must bear in mind that incremental change will take longer to unfold than disruptive institutional transformation. analysts of canadian foreign policy and transatlantic relations are therefore well-advised to continue monitoring the described instances of institutional change to assess their longer-term policy effects, and also to examine if they prove stable should there be changes in government on the canadian, british, or eu side—as well as potentially in the us. 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 references adler-nissen, rebecca, charlotte galpin, and ben rosamond. 2017. “performing brexit: how a post-brexit world is imagined outside the united kingdom.” british journal of political science and international relations 19 (3): 573–591. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1369148117711092. bell, duncan, and srdjan vucetic. 2019. “brexit, canzuk, and the legacy of empire.” british journal of politics and international relations 21 (2): 367–382. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118819070. british chambers of commerce. 2024. “trade with canada: what happens next?” january 29, 2024. accessed february 14, 2024. https://www.britishchambers.org.uk/news/2024/ 01/trade-with-canada-what-happens-next/. capoccia, giovanni. 2015. “critical junctures and institutional change.” in advances in comparative-historical analysis, edited by james mahoney and kathleen thelen, 147– 179. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. ———. 2016. “critical junctures.” in the oxford handbook of historical institutionalism, edited by orfeo fioretos, tulia g. falleti, and adam sheingate, 89–106. oxford: oxford university press. capoccia, giovanni, and r. daniel kelemen. 2007. “the study of critical junctures: theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism.” world politics 59 (3): 341369. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100020852. carvin, stephanie, and thomas juneau. 2023. “why aukus and not caukus? it’s a potluck, not a party”, international journal 78 (3): 359–374. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 00207020231195109. chaban, natalia. 2019. “perceptions, expectations, motivations: evolution of canadian views on the eu.” australian and new zealand journal of european studies 11 (3): 45–62. https://doi.org/10.30722/anzjes.vol11.iss3.15107. chaban, natalia, arne niemann, and johanna speyer, eds. 2021. changing perceptions of the eu at times of brexit: global perspectives. abingdon, oxfordshire: routledge. collier, ruth berins, and david collier. 1991. shaping the political arena: critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in latin america. princeton: princeton university press. global affairs canada. 2021a. “joint statement by canada’s minister of foreign affairs of canada and united kingdom’s foreign secretary on crackdown on belarusian civil society.” february 17, 2021. accessed february 14, 2024. https://www.canada.ca/ en/global-affairs/news/2021/02/joint-statement-by-canadas-minister-of-foreign-affairs-ofcanada-and-united-kingdoms-foreign-secretary-on-crackdown-on-belarusian-civilsociety.html. global affairs canada. 2021b. “foreign ministers’ joint statement on xinjiang.” march 22, 2021. accessed february 14, 2024. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/03/ foreign-ministers-joint-statement-on-xinjiang.html. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117711092 https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117711092 https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118819070 https://www.britishchambers.org.uk/news/2024/01/trade-with-canada-what-happens-next/ https://www.britishchambers.org.uk/news/2024/01/trade-with-canada-what-happens-next/ https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100020852 https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231195109 https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231195109 https://doi.org/10.30722/anzjes.vol11.iss3.15107 https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/02/joint-statement-by-canadas-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-canada-and-united-kingdoms-foreign-secretary-on-crackdown-on-belarusian-civil-society.html https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/02/joint-statement-by-canadas-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-canada-and-united-kingdoms-foreign-secretary-on-crackdown-on-belarusian-civil-society.html https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/02/joint-statement-by-canadas-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-canada-and-united-kingdoms-foreign-secretary-on-crackdown-on-belarusian-civil-society.html https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/02/joint-statement-by-canadas-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-canada-and-united-kingdoms-foreign-secretary-on-crackdown-on-belarusian-civil-society.html https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/03/foreign-ministers-joint-statement-on-xinjiang.html https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/03/foreign-ministers-joint-statement-on-xinjiang.html 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 graves, frank. 2021. “polarization, populism, and the pandemic: implications for canadian outlook on the world.” in canada among nations 2020: political turmoil in a tumultuous world, edited by david carment and richard nimijean, 165–188. new york: springer. graziano, alejandro g., kyle handley, and nuno limão. 2020. “brexit uncertainty: trade externalities beyond europe.” aea papers and proceedings 110: 552–556. https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20201021. hooghe, liesbet, and gary marks. 2018. “cleavage theory meets europe’s crises: lipset, rokkan, and the transnational cleavage.” journal of european public policy 25 (1), 109– 135. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1310279. hurrelmann, achim. 2020. “canada’s two europes: brexit and the prospect of competing transatlantic relationships.” in changing perceptions of the eu in times of brexit, edited by natalia chaban, arne niemann and johanna speyer, 116–131. abingdon, oxfordshire: routledge. hurrelmann, achim, frédéric mérand, and stephen e. white. 2021. “eurosphere or anglosphere? canadian public opinion on brexit and the future of transatlantic relations.” canadian journal of political science 54 (3): 571–592. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423921000470. hurrelmann, achim, sarra ben khelil, asif hameed, akaysha humniski, and patrick leblond. 2023. “did brexit change perceptions of the eu and the uk in canada? an analysis of canadian newspaper commentaries.” canadian foreign policy journal 29 (1): 36–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2022.2151483. hurrelmann, achim, and frank wendler. 2024. “how does politicisation affect the ratification of mixed eu trade agreements? the case of ceta.” journal of european public policy 31 (1), 157–181. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2202196. leuffen, dirk, berthold rittberger, and frank schimmelfennig. 2022. integration and differentiation in the european union: theory and policies. 2nd ed. new york: palgrave macmillan. lipset, seymour martin, and stein rokkan. 1967. “cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction.” in party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives, edited by seymour martin lipset and stein rokkan, 1–64. new york: free press. mahant, edelgard e. 1981. “canada and the european community: the first twenty years.” journal of european integration 4 (3): 263–279. mahoney, james, and rodrigo barrenechea. 2019. “the logic of counterfactual analysis in casestudy explanation.” british journal of sociology 71 (1): 306–338. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/1468-4446.12340. mahoney, james, and kathleen thelen. 2010. “a theory of gradual institutional change.” in explaining institutional change: ambiguity, agency, and power, edited by james mahoney and kathleen thelen, 1–37. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. neuwahl, nanette. 2021. “brexit and canada: stopgap solutions for the eu-canada comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) or a new beginning?” international studies 58 (2): 248–264. https://doi.org/10.1177/00208817211005625. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1310279 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423921000470 https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2022.2151483 https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2202196 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12340 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12340 https://doi.org/10.1177/00208817211005625 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 norris, pippa, and ronald inglehart. 2019. cultural backlash: trump, brexit, and authoritarian populism. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. potter, evan h. 1999. transatlantic partners: canadian approaches to the european union. montreal: mcgill-queen’s university press. rayroux, antoine. 2019. “the eu’s reputation in canada: still a shallow strategic partnership?” in shaping the eu’s global strategy: partners and perceptions, edited by natalia chaban and martin holland, 55–75. new york: palgrave macmillan. scheer, andrew. 2016. “a strong britain is an independent britain.” national post, june 20, 2016. accessed february 14, 2024. http://nationalpost.com/opinion/andrew-scheer-a-strongbritain-is-an-independent-britain. stephens, hugh. 2021. “the u.k. applies to join the cptpp: what are the implications for canada?” the school of public policy publications: spp communiqué 14:12. accessed february 14, 2024. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3834048. streeck, wolfgang, and kathleen thelen. 2005. “introduction: institutional change in advanced political economies.” in beyond continuity: institutional change in advanced political economies, edited by wolfgang streeck and kathleen thelen, 1–39. oxford: oxford university press. tetlock, philip e., and aaron belkin. 1996. “counterfactual thought experiments in world politics: logical, methodological, and psychological perspectives.” in counterfactual thought experiments in world politics: logical, methodological, and psychological perspectives, edited by philip e. tetlock and aaron belkin, 3–38. princeton: princeton university press. thelen, kathleen. 1999. “historical institutionalism in comparative politics.” annual review of political science 2: 369–404. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.369. trudeau, justin. 2017. “address by prime minister justin trudeau to the european parliament.” february 17, 2017. accessed february 14, 2024. https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/02/16/ address-prime-minister-justin-trudeau-european-parliament. http://nationalpost.com/opinion/andrew-scheer-a-strong-britain-is-an-independent-britain http://nationalpost.com/opinion/andrew-scheer-a-strong-britain-is-an-independent-britain https://ssrn.com/abstract=3834048 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.369 https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/02/16/address-prime-minister-justin-trudeau-european-parliament https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/02/16/address-prime-minister-justin-trudeau-european-parliament 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 interviews interview #1, eu diplomat posted to ottawa, conducted on zoom, may 2020. interview #2, uk diplomat posted to ottawa, conducted by phone, june 2020. interview #3, canadian diplomat, global affairs canada, conducted on zoom, june 2020. interview #4, canadian diplomat, global affairs canada, conducted on zoom, june 2020. interview #5, german diplomat posted to ottawa, conducted on zoom, june 2020. interview #6, canadian diplomat, global affairs canada, conducted on zoom, june 2020. interview #7, canadian diplomat posted to eu member state, conducted on zoom, july 2020. interview #8, canadian diplomat posted to eu member state, conducted on zoom, july 2020. interview #9, canadian diplomat posted to eu member state, conducted on zoom, july 2020. interview #10, canadian diplomat posted to eu, conducted on zoom, july 2020. interview #11, canadian diplomat posted to eu member state, conducted on zoom, june 2021. interview #12, canadian diplomat, global affairs canada, conducted on zoom, june 2021. interview #13, canadian diplomat posted to eu, conducted on zoom, june 2021. interview #14, canadian diplomat, global affairs canada, conducted on zoom, june 2021. interview #15, eu diplomat posted to ottawa, conducted on webex, july 2021. interview #16, uk diplomat posted to ottawa, conducted by phone, august 2021. 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 4-25 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions 21 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 issn 2562-8429 abstract the article investigates the persistence in the political sphere of the peculiar five stars movement (5sm) in italy. it does so by analyzing how the support base was mobilized on the ground in order to provide important insights on the contemporary italian (and european) crisis of representation. the 5sm responded to the political vacuum caused by the decline of the traditional mediating role of the italian party system with a unique project. the absence of a traditional political plan in favour of a platform whose issues are supposedly decided by the 5sm’s activists, supported by a complex structure inclusive of both vertical and horizontal features, as well as an original style of communication and an ideology that officially tries to capitalize on the participative side of web 2.0, offered the activists the hope of being in control of their future. such a liquid core of the movement and the way it was perceived by the activists became key to the fortunes of the 5sm. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2530 university of victoria eugenio pazzini of the five star movement in italy lust for the vacuum: understanding the persistence https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2530 22 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 introduction the meteoric rise of the comedian beppe grillo’s five stars movement (5sm) to become the major single party in italian politics at the national elections of 2013 and 2018, starting only four years after its creation in 2009, has naturally attracted worldwide attention. the movement seemed to be peculiar in the electoral history of western democracies for a number of reasons, including the following. first, it is important to note its rather radical ideology that mixes aspects of populism and cyber-libertarianism, calling for direct democracy through the net (deseriis 2017a, 1; natale and ballatore 2014, 105). second, the movement’s ‘post-ideological’ claim is that it has transcended right and left divisions. third, the 5sm uses populist rhetoric that aggressively attacks the two ‘castes’ of politicians and ‘traditional media’ (bordignon and ceccarini 2013, 436). finally, the movement uses a very peculiar organizational structure constructed through new online communication media which, despite its lacking a traditional party platform, has vertical and horizontal elements (floridia and vignati 2013; tronconi 2018), resembling features of both political parties and social movements (diamanti 2014). emerging in a country whose recurring crises made it prone to the rise of populist parties and therefore their study (tarchi 2015; tarrow 1979), analyzing the legacy of the 5sm might contribute to the understanding of important trends. in fact, the emergence and persistence of such a political actor not only exemplifies, but goes beyond what most commentators have envisaged for the populist response to the crisis of representative democracies. the 5sm rejects in a classic populist manner the complete political establishment using aggressive tones and styles of communication. in addition, utilizing novel digital technologies, the actor questions contemporary party systems and, by claiming to override the mediation of political parties in favour of a direct form of online participation, it brings back old concerns about democracy and the critical role of political parties (ostrogorski, 1964; berger, 2017). arguably, the 5sm’s communication, organization, and absence of a fixed political plan provide a unique answer to the wider crisis of democracy, whose implications might have significant impacts on the future of italian (and western) politics. in order to understand the persistence of the 5sm, this article focuses on how support was mobilized on the ground through communication and organization employed by the political actor. the 5sm responded to the political vacuum caused by declining trust in the italian party system with a project that provided the feeling of empowerment to its activists. it is the absence of a fixed political plan in favour of an evolving platform whose issues are supposedly to be decided by the 5sm’s activists, supported by a complex structure comprised of both vertical and horizontal features, as well as an original style of communication and ideology, that officially try to capitalize on the participative side of web 2.0, that made the fortunes of the 5sm. this rather ‘liquid’ entity is key to understanding the legacy of the 5sm. initially, grillo’s blog gained an early reputation as a reliable channel of counter-information that, in turn, helped consolidate the anti-establishment traits of the comedian in a cultural environment of growing political mistrust. the web provided beppe grillo and gianroberto casaleggio (co-founder of the movement, whose ‘casaleggio associati’ managed grillo’s online communication) a way of circumventing media gatekeepers, as well as influencing the discourses, structures, and ways of mobilizing the populace. the founders constructed an entity that does not have a political plan, while it does have autonomous and decentralized elements at the local level that contrast with an authoritarian control of the head office at the national level. 23 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 in a full populist move, they called for people’s sovereignty through direct democracy online, supported by the autonomy of the local level and the fact that, theoretically, the political plan is to be decided by the 5sm’s members. thus, the shared lack of a political imaginary became their strength. the perceived availability of such empty space turned into political potential and, despite the tight control at the head office by grillo and the casaleggio associati, the 5sm kept consolidating support. this paper is structured in three parts. firstly, it will define the cyber-populist ideology of the 5sm. secondly, it will analyze how its ideology and web-based form of communication were key to expanding its support base over time. thirdly, it will dissect the complex structure of the 5sm, demonstrating how its horizontal and vertical features and the lack of a defined political plan intersected with the way it communicated with the support base. ultimately, one should be able to better comprehend the peculiarity of the 5sm’s structure and their ‘success’. cyber-populism in order to identify the ideology of the 5sm, cyber-populism (natale and ballatore 2014), one should begin by defining populism. the latter is a contested and contentious issue. nonetheless, in recent years, most scholars seem to agree that populism can be defined as a ‘thin’ ideology (mudde 2004) that ultimately divides society into two antagonistic and homogeneous groups. a ‘thin’ ideology, as opposed to ‘thick’ ones such as liberalism or socialism, is composed of a limited set of core ideas (mudde 2007, 17). these do not provide any structural frameworks for how to achieve social change, and therefore are often attached to ‘thicker’ ideologies. for the sake of this analysis, one can extrapolate three defining traits. populism firstly includes a positive image of a unitary and monolithic ‘people’, thus being people-centered. secondly, it offers a negative view of the ruling elites normally blamed for ongoing problems and is therefore anti-elitist. thirdly, there has to be a vision of the allocation of power invoking greater sovereignty for such ‘people’. this in turn means that such a unitary block can reject the constitutionalist division of powers between the many institutions, as well as the right of minorities, if they are not part of such ‘people’ (wirth et al. 2016). a political communication expressing a populist ideology would, over time, showcase statements regarding the unity of the people, defining its boundaries and stressing its virtues, as well as highlighting negative feelings toward the ruling elites and demanding greater sovereignty for the people (wirth et al. 2016). a further distinction shall be made in terms of the communication style, which refers to the way such content is presented. here, the connection between a populist style and a populist ideology is even looser. in fact, many mainstream actors use a populist style to make a message more appealing and interesting. for instance, one might use simplification, emotional and colloquial language to stress vicinity with the ‘people’, as well as use dramatization, black and white rhetoric and absolutism to stress the manichean view of society. finally, one can induce the claim to people’s sovereignty with references to the wisdom of the common man, common sense and simple decisions (wirth et al. 2016). a communication strategy that shows support for only one of these features, such as the many mainstream actors employing a people-centered approach, does not fully qualify as populist, but it nonetheless shows features of it. an actor who sends out more populist messages than another can be classified as more populist than the other, rather than just qualify as one or not. it 24 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 follows that populism becomes a matter of degree, while the concept relates more to the message than to the sender of the message (mudde 2004). having defined populism, now the paper can move on to cyber-populism. the latter merges discourses coming from the web with the ideology of populism in the belief that ‘the government of the people, by the people, for the people is achievable by means of information communications technology’ (deseriis 2017a, 441). such ideology has been given slightly different names: technopopulism (deseriis 2017a), populism 2.0 (gerbaudo 2014; 2017), web-populism (lanzone & woods 2015), or cyber-populism (natale and ballatore 2014). this paper prefers the latter definition of cyber-populism, as it draws a direct link with its cyber-libertarian and populist roots. for instance, these origins are detectable in the construction of ‘the people’. cyber-populists used the ‘new media’ as one of the lowest common denominators, as the empty signifier (laclau 2005), to build a common identity. here, the main addressee of populism, the common person, is readapted to fit the condition of modern social network societies. thus, the ability to connect becomes the lowest common denominator, and the common person is actualized to fit the online users of the net. all the unsatisfied demands therefore converge and find their element of commonality through the web, so that the latter is key in the discursive construction of such ‘people’. indeed, one can find many expressions of the type ‘we internet people’; while often, even the selfie becomes a method of political identification (gerbaudo 2014, p.69). populist claims to sovereignty can be found in a number of discourses of contemporary populist actors who often call for direct democracy online. the interactivity of web 2.0, with its likes, retweets, comments, and sharing of content and ideas have led some early activists such as casaleggio, the aforementioned co-founder of the 5sm, to think of it as informal mass democracy. following the principle of “one person, one vote,” some of these actors developed the notions of democracy 2.0. building on the idea of collective knowledge, where the sharing of ideas and amendments can lead to better results, the pirate parties employed the concept of liquid democracy and used decision-making software as liquid feedback. through these means, cyber-populists believe they can do away with the need for representation, instead enforcing direct democracy (gerbaudo 2014, 70). echoes of cyber-populism can be found in the swedish, german, and icelandic pirate parties, but also in the ‘99%’ of occupy wall street and in the spanish indignad@s, partido x, and podemos. similarly, grillo and casaleggio did invoke direct democracy through the net (deseriis 2017a, 1; natale and ballatore 2014, 112). according to its charter, “the movimento 5 stelle is not a political party, its objective being the realization of an effective exchange of opinions and democratic debate outside the associational and party bonds and without the mediation of directive of representative bodies, recognizing to the totality of internet users the role of government normally entrusted to a minority” (non-statuto m5s, art. 5). founded in 2009 to bring together the “experiences of the blog, the meetups, the rallies, and a number of other popular initiatives” (non-statuto m5s, art. 5), the five stars of the logo represent the five starting issues: safeguarding of water and the environment, and the growth of public transport, connectivity and development. moreover, by statute, the movement has no official physical location, but has instead to be found online (non-statuto m5s, art. 4). thus, the 5sm defines itself as challenging representative democracies and established party systems with online resources. the stated goal is to achieve a direct democracy where people rule without intermediaries such as politicians and political parties, an objective that is accordingly achievable through means of information and communication technology. to achieve this 25 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 objective, its people the ‘citizens’ are discursively equated with internet users, while the rule of the people normally exercised through direct democracy translates into online democracy (or edemocracy). in this regard, in early 2016, the 5sm launched their platform of e-democracy, ‘rousseau.’1 the internet here is the discursive tool through which grillo creates a people and builds the dichotomous division of society that characterizes a populist ideology. here, the evil enemies, comprised of the corrupted political, economic, and media elites, take advantage of the people whose power has been taken away. the 5sm argues that italy is an oligarchy rather than a democracy, as the main established parties reduced the duty of governing to the protection of their own interests and privileges. such parties, regardless of their political ideology, are unitary in their corruptness and represent the ‘caste’. grillo repeated constantly that the installation of such a hypocritical political class was possible only through tools that allowed for truth-covering and lying, and the removal of such evil elites could only happen through his impartial channels of communication. on the one hand, there is a deceitful, unlawful, lying unitary elite with which bankers and, sometimes, the european union, are associated, while on the other hand, there are the honest ‘citizens’ (and the 5sm) who have virtuous qualities, but have lost their sovereignty and dignity (lanzone and woods 2015, 58). alongside such a dichotomous worldview, one can also observe a number of ideas stemming from cyber-libertarian discourses. firstly, the utopian claims of grillo and casaleggio also resemble cyber-libertarian features. from the early days of the movimento until today, the two founders depicted the web as a mythical entity. they argued that it is a transparent and coherent being with a disruptive agenda and its own laws. it is able to cure the ills of italy and the rest of the world, leading towards a brighter future. the web is the ‘supermedium,’ as it will change political, social, informational, and organizational processes (natale and ballatore 2014, 113). a first consequence of the new medium would be to foster democracy by reducing corruption through transparency. an example is when grillo states that “it would be great if this money could be monitored on the web. […] one doesn’t steal through the web,” which resulted in 5sm parliamentarians having to publish their wages online (casaleggio and grillo in natale and ballatore 2014, 114). moreover, just as cyber-utopians are faithful to their self-organizing systems, so are the two founders faithful to the possibility of doing away with representative democracy. underplaying the role of new intermediaries (like themselves, the blog and/or big digital corporations), they have constantly argued that the internet does not need nor want intermediaries (natale and ballatore 2014, 115). furthermore, the new technologies of communication with their horizontal networks will ultimately eradicate the need for representation and hierarchy (floridia and vignati 2014, 70). for grillo, however, such a concept of online democracy does not simply equal a conversation between individuals sitting in front of their screens, replying or posting comments or proposals through the blog, the meetups, or their new platform of e-democracy, rousseau. in grillo’s words, online democracy will also result in offline participation, with decentralized offline local groups 1 rousseau is the platform of e-democracy developed and owned by the ‘casaleggio associati’ shortly before casaleggio’s death in april 2016. the ambitious platform divides into ten areas, some of which are still in development. briefly, the platform is intended to allow for voting in local, regional, and national legislations and for choosing candidates via majority voting. the platform also allows for proposing one’s own legislation and for voting on expulsions, even though the functionality of such new options is still a matter of debate within the 5sm. there are also a number of criticisms, as the platform is not open-source, and ‘casaleggio associati’ has exclusive access to the databases of all registered members, transactions, and votes (deseriis 2017b). 26 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 of collaboration, where citizens will have to contribute in person in order to change things. in the 5sm’s words, it is the common person that has the duty to re-appropriate their own power (natale and ballatore 2014, 116). accordingly, the oppression of the economic, political, technocratic, and media elites has taken away dignity, but the new media environment is providing an opportunity to citizens that are willing to participate. in this context, the 5sm pretends to be the political expression of such an opportunity. through the internet, the 5sm claims to regain the full control that the corrupted caste of politician has taken away. connecting with the base regardless of the perhaps naïve-sounding optimistic determinism of cyber-populism, with its equation of citizens with online users and the assumption of their will to participate in politics, the five stars movement did grow in support over the last decade. to some extent, this is due to use that it made of the changing media landscape in communicating within the italian context of low trust towards the political and media establishments. over the last decades, scholars have noted how western european countries have shown converging trends such as declining party membership and identification, declining voter turnout, and increasing volatility of the vote, suggesting that political parties were losing their representative functions (mair 2002, 89; kriesi 2014). nonetheless, some countries saw their party systems being more discredited than others. this is surely the case with italy. here, the structural changes regarding the supra-national level of governance, the impacts of globalization, and the economic crisis of 2008 added problems to an already-fragile political establishment. the political crises and the various episodes of corruption had the italian public highly skeptical of its government, with an average low level of trust throughout the 90s that reached its historical trough in the aftermath of the economic crash of 2008 (tarchi 2015; verbeek and zaslove 2016). in addition, the country also presented a low level of media pluralism, with half of the national television stations owned by berlusconi’s mediaset conglomerate (vaccari 2015, 33). such media empires did not invest in digital technologies and, likewise, the political parties ignored digital forms of communication, as they appeared politically unimportant. by 2008, however, the number of web 2.0 users increased dramatically, with important political consequences. in short, the media change amplified the divide between the political establishment and its associated forms of communication (the traditional media) and the ‘people’. the increased autonomy of the meaning-making process of online users and the relevant role of personalized algorithms in filtering information exposed users increasingly to information they were willing to receive, therefore fostering mistrust (castells 2009, 132). as the consumption of such new media assumed mass proportions, this suspicious way of thinking towards the media and political establishment also became a mass phenomenon (van zoonen 2012, 58). as a consequence, the government and the traditional mass media and journalism are often seen as a manipulative ‘power block’ (aupers 2012, 26). conversely, web 2.0 was perceived as increasingly more ‘truthful’ and ‘democratic,’ as it supposedly provided direct access to information. the old institutionalized media could not address the interests and demands of an always more segmented society with its limited number of publications, thus appearing increasingly more unresponsive compared to the new tools (quandt 2012). the small sub-networks of social media were more likely to be personalized and their 27 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 immediacy appeared more responsive. in addition, social media communication resembled to an extent the real life one-on-one communicative structure, as users mainly have friends or acquaintances online. populists, in what krämer (2017) names the ‘meta-function’ of the web, often exploit the low trust in traditional media. this was surely the case for grillo and casaleggio, who turned out to be two entrepreneurs of the situation. they were able to connect to popular anxieties and reproduce them, understanding the impacts of the changing media landscape. in fact, the comedian established himself as an anti-establishment public figure and, with the help of casaleggio, used the web to circumvent media gatekeepers and state a symbolic distinction from the traditional media and political establishment. for decades, the comedian depicted himself as a victim of media and politics that excluded him from television. in 1986, he was censored from national television after polemical jokes towards the then-in-power socialist party of bettino craxi, and managed to return on national television only in 1993 with two successful monologues critical of banks, politicians, and italian lifestyle (bordignon and ceccarini 2016, 134). grillo then dedicated himself to live events in theatres with only a few appearances on pay-tv channels such as ‘telepiù’. he mixed entertainment with issues of public interest, and his shows took on an increasingly marked aspect of counter-information (natale and ballatore 2014, 107). in january 2005, the ‘casaleggio associati’, owned by gianroberto casaleggio, launched the blog ‘beppegrillo.it’. at the same time, grillo went on a number of tours named after the url of the website. one could argue that this marks when his shows turned into political campaigns (natale and ballatore 2014, 108). the blog had a post per day showcasing a variety of multimedia content, videos, interviews, satirical mashups, and political communiques. moreover, publicized by the live shows, the webpage was soon to be the most visited in italy. grillo launched various single-issue campaigns on the platform, from a number of referenda to environmental issues, the abolition of public financing of parties and media, and attempts to make mps with criminal records ineligible to run for re-election (natale and ballatore 2014, 108). at this time, the internet in the country was used politically only by grillo and the few underground and alter-globalization movements, which gave the tool an even more marked element of counter-information. grillo’s blog always tried to exercise an element of surprise, with a post per day containing relatively in-depth analyses on issues of common interest. furthermore, such posts were careful to address a number of unsatisfied demands within italian society. these ranged from employment issues – publishing a number of testimonies of underpaid youth in illegal, precarious positions, or on zero-hour contracts – to focusing on stories regarding the mafia and environmental issues, the recycling of toxic waste, denouncements of corruption, and opposition to the ‘grandi opere’ (major infrastructure works). the blog also published stories of activist groups such as the no tav movement in northern italy (diani and fabbri 2015, 223). in this regard, many activists agree that grillo’s figure, personality, and web savviness were necessary to contrast with the communication wall of the political establishment (biorcio 2015). conversely, while grillo was building ties with the electorate, the italian political system was slowly re-descending into crisis, with berlusconi struggling with court cases and the left concentrated on opposing him. in addition, until 2013, the 5sm was the only political actor to be active on social media, which provided further practical benefits. firstly, some contend that social media can benefit political actors by broadening their repertoire of communication (della porta and mattoni 2015, 45). for instance, the degree of openness of social media can allow for higher participation and the potential for a collective process of content creation. the cost of entry is now 28 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 far lower for anyone and attentive political actors can notice how users react to certain posts as well as to the overall opinions on different topics. secondly, bartlett et al. (2013) argue that the degree of directness and openness of the communicative sphere can benefit populism in particular. social media provide a seemingly more direct connection to the people than existing media did. the new media evolve from ‘like-minded’ peer networks that can work as a direct linkage to the populace, circumnavigating the journalistic gatekeepers (engesser et al. 2017, 1113). anti-elitist and people-centered statements that claim to be willing to allocate power to the people can benefit from the immediacy of a tweet or a facebook post. taking part in likes, shares, comments, and conversation could easily seem to reduce that gap between the political actor and its followers, as communication might seem direct and unmediated. one difference is the fact that, given the short nature of online posts, comments, or tweets, ideologies will be expressed in fragments (engesser et al. 2017, 114). senders then aim at keeping the post as easy as possible to make it more comprehensible in the shorter sentences allowed by social media. ambiguous and open ideologies such as populism are well-suited to such fragmented messages, allowing users to complement such ideologies with their own elements, comments, posts, and shares. in addition, many have noticed how, over the last twenty years, a number of politicians have given increasing importance to the ‘media logic’ and the way they appear on televised politics (mazzoleni 2008; moffitt 2016, 72; kriesi 2014, 366). they use a language style imbued with simplification, emotional, colloquial language, and dramatization. while not necessarily linked to a populist ideology, this language could predispose an audience to the acceptance and preference of messages containing a degree of polarization (moffitt 2016, 73). such trends have remained unchanged with the advent of social media, where catchy slogans, humor, and outspokenness are a common language, as one is normally connected with friends online (bartlett 2014, 94). in this regard, then, one could argue that web 2.0 complements older media. despite such advantages, the 5sm was nearly unchallenged on social media until 2013. by november 2012, grillo had 700,556 followers on facebook, while the second-most-followed politician was leftist nichi vendola with 236,436; bersani, the leader of the democratic party, was third, with only 146,088 (bartlett et al. 2013, 29-34). this provided the comedian higher online visibility and resonance than any other politician. however, after the 5sm gained an unexpected 25 percent in the national elections of 2013, both the northern league and the democratic party had to renovate, and elected two new, young, media-savvy leaders: matteo salvini and matteo renzi respectively. the two politicians are not only highly visible on social media but also benefit from positive coverage on national television, therefore playing with a clear advantage in terms of visibility. renzi, employing a people-centered style of communication, even took primacy on twitter. salvini, too, is highly active on both facebook and twitter. thus, apart from an initial lack of competition, the social media landscape was soon to become as highly saturated with politics as in the rest of the western world. and yet, despite a decline following the 2013 elections, the 5sm continued to consolidate (bordignon and ceccarini 2016), reaching a 32 percent share at the 2018 national elections. while accurate communication might have been able to capture a great deal of frustration that followed the economic crisis, recent studies demonstrate that a vote of protest by itself does not suffice to 29 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 account for their ‘success’ (passarelli and tuorto 2018). therefore, the use of social media and the blog cannot fully explain the persistence of political support for 5sm, and there must be other factors at play. a peculiar structure arguably, the key is to consider how such ideology and communication intersected with the peculiar structure of the 5sm, more precisely analyzing how its support is mobilized on the ground. this is effected via a novel structure with highly decentralized aspects whose inspiration emerged once again from the internet. at the local level, the movement shows an extremely loose structure, independent from the central office. the latter would rarely interfere with the meetup groups, leaving the activists fully in charge of plans, initiatives, and local communication (tronconi 2018). such governance presents elements of participative democracy (floridia and vignati 2014) and resembles features of social movements (diamanti 2014; tronconi 2018). it is nonetheless contrasted by the tight control at the central level over the elected candidates that allows for no dissent when it comes to issues of national relevance (tronconi 2018). as far as the local level is concerned, during the v-day rallies in 2007, grillo advocated for activists’ action at the grassroots level through the online platform meetup, a simple platform that provides an online space to plan initiatives and meetings. thanks to the early communicative work of grillo and a few activists, the movimento started expanding to local areas through meetings launched on the platform. such lobbying work often managed to intercept and intersect with already-mature local protest groups, happy at acquiring a national voice. soon, some groups elected candidates within their own localities. the process expanded quite rapidly, and by 2012, the movement had won the first major city council in parma and had achieved success in sicilian regional elections. in 2015, the five stars meetups reached over 2,000 units with 135,000 members in 2016 (tronconi 2018). at the early stages, the leaders of the movement were grillo and casaleggio. under their direct leaderships, a number of unspecified staff managed the blogs, meetups, and social media accounts, developed the database of the activists and subscribers, and authorized the use of the 5sm’s logo for electoral campaigns (tronconi 2018). these ‘headquarters’ rarely interfered with local decisions, allowing local groups a great deal of autonomy (except for important and mediatized localities such as the councils of rome and parma). the activists claimed that local decisions were only taken through the assembly and that its freedom was total (biorcio 2015, 23). in fact, local assemblies could deliver on any issue relating to the locality, ranging from the choice of candidates to the manifestos and political plans, as well as issues of administrative transparency. to participate in the process was easy. the few requirements stipulated in the ‘non-statute’ were: being a resident in the area of interest, not having previously been part of any political parties, and having a clean criminal record (grillo 2009), giving birth to an entity grouping very diverse political cultures within it. arguably, such quasi-complete autonomy would prove to be one of the major agents of the political ‘success’ of the 5sm, as, in an attempt to put the preached direct democracy into practice, it did make its activists feel empowered. in this regard, the openness and directness of the blog, the meetups, and the other social platforms such as facebook and twitter were important contributors to the organization of the movement, especially at the local level. while final decisions were taken face to face in the assemblies, the meetups served as a source of information for the sharing of ideas and coordination for the activists. 30 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 the openness of the platform also contributed to maintaining these local entities leaderless. furthermore, such a mode of communication not only enabled grillo and casaleggio to monitor the reactions of their followers, but also allowed sympathizers and observers to follow the development of the meetup of a given locality, reducing the cost of entry. arguably, in this structure, one can see the extent of the application of the ideas of cyber-populism. the web provided a model of organization that was then adapted, or at least attempted to be adapted, into the reality of a social movement. in addition to the connection of loosely decentralized meetup groups that emerged outside the institutions, the 5sm applied the cyberlibertarian belief that digital information should be easily shareable, editable, and actionable, pushing citizens to take political action into their own hands. one can also find the notion embedded in the open source mode of governance that ‘a network can govern itself,’ as the structure and the local decisions are open to inputs by the base of their members and activists. activists argue that, at a theoretical level, this is an attempt to actualize the concept of collective intelligence, wherein the collaboration and competition of many individuals bring about the possibility of a new politics (biorcio 2015, 188). in short, the 5sm has elements of ‘participative’ democracy. while often overlooked, these strains do exist and are visible in the practices at the local level, which are therefore comparable to those employed by contemporary social movements such as ‘occupy,’ the ‘indignados,’ and the pirate parties in northern europe (floridia and vignati 2014, 5). however, what does not appear in the narrative of grillo, but cannot be overlooked in academic study, is the contradictory strong element of verticality. indeed, it is easy to notice how the central office repeatedly attempted to limit the actions of its candidates. while autonomy at the ground level of the meetups was quasi-complete, the central office limited its national representatives in any way it could to avoid factions and disobedience. this was especially evident after the success at the national election of 2013, when the 5sm suddenly entered national institutions with 109 deputies and 54 senators, as well as european parliamentarians and a number of regional and local councillors, including in the municipalities of rome, turin, and livorno (tronconi 2018, 173). even though grillo never ran for the presidency, and from 2017 called himself a guarantor rather than a leader, he intervened more than once in expelling members from the movement. while on some occasions this might have proven beneficial by providing unity, there is an undisputed lack of checks and balances. for instance, the expulsions of parliamentarians reached 40 in 2017, while the 2016 exclusion of pizzarotti, the mayor of parma, after a public dispute with grillo, and despite the positive reviews of pizzarotti’s work, attracted great attention. similarly, the expulsion of marika cassimatis, for undisclosed internal reasons, raised numerous concerns within the movimento. cassimatis even resorted to suing the 5sm. this brings to the fore a first critique: the lack of internal democracy. a second important criticism is the overall lack of transparency, ironically a major theme in 5sm discourse. in this regard, the management and the communication have always been in the hands of ‘casaleggio associati srl’, which is officially a profit-based e-commerce company that has at least generated revenue from advertisements on the website. while this was arguably understandable, as those revenues helped kick-start a movement that was refusing public funding, it is worrying that the relationship of the company with the 5sm has not been made fully clear to date. 31 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 likewise, ‘rousseau,’ the long-awaited platform of e-democracy, is managed and owned by the president of the ‘casaleggio associati,’ davide casaleggio, son of the founder gianroberto, who died in 2016. davide appears at e-commerce conferences and seems interested in practices of consumer surveillance and data analytics, while his position in the 5sm is not clear, leaving many suspicious (politi and roberts 2017). moreover, despite employing many discourses on the freedom of information, what strikes experts is the fact that the platform is not open-source, leaving at least doubts about the anonymity of voting on the platform (deseriis 2017b). hence, it seems accurate to speak of both a horizontal and a vertical element. one of the consequences of this tension is the fact that the movement has been hard to classify. some define the 5sm as a hybrid actor (bordignon 2014), while others argue that it does not belong to any political category; it is not a movement party, not a personal party, and not a business firm party (tronconi 2018). even entrance into italian institutions and the much-discussed institutionalization did not really remodel the 5sm into a more familiar political entity. the online registering of its members, the addition of online primaries, and voting over specific issues did not solve its organizational gaps, leaving many wondering how a political force could sustain a longterm battle without having the solid organization of parties, and their multiple levels of decisionmaking, with fixed codes of conduct and dynamics of coordination. in addition, the founders as much as the activists contributed to such confusion. while they never stated how the movement ought to be, they were always careful in differentiating themselves from the rest of the political establishment. one can observe an element of negativity recurring throughout the discourse of the 5sm. for instance, the project was born as a non-party, founded with a non-statute, with its members coming from outside the world of politics, opposing the traditional political system in favour of a new participatory conception of politics. the logo of the 5sm by itself does not define a political program of the same type as traditional parties but is an aggregation of a number of demands unaddressed by mainstream parties. furthermore, the 5sm showcases members making statements from both a right-wing position critical of immigration, refugees, and the eu, and a left-wing one in favor of civil rights and critical of neoliberal capitalism. this led some to label it as a catch-all, anti-party party (diamanti 2014). one could argue that the 5sm always left an undefined space, a liquid core characterizing its political essence. while the above arguments are well-known, the point here is that it is precisely the lack of a clear political platform, supported by its unique structure, novel ideology, and channels of communication, which account for the ongoing electoral success of the 5sm, and which have provided it with internal coherence through making claims to having implemented direct democracy. for instance, grillo argues that the 5sm willingly does not take a priori positions on issues such as immigration and membership of the european union, as they have to be decided from below. this is the major dialectical strength of the movement. the lack of official standpoints on topical issues, aided by the platforms of communication on which one can find any sort of statement, proposal, and viewpoint are, in the 5sm’s words, proof of their democratic spirit. while this argument is debatable, it has worked to date in favour of the 5sm, which has avoided having a clear political platform in the manner of traditional parties and managed to keep together an ideologically diverse electorate (bordignon and ceccarini 2016, 142). the peculiar structure of the 5sm, especially at the local level, gives coherence to such a political project that lacks an official plan. the activists, especially those elected into the institutions, have often lamented the problems emerging from a political force that lacks internal multi-level coordination (biorcio 2015). nonetheless, they claim it to be their nature: fluid and dynamic. they 32 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 claim to be oriented towards the movement because of its lack of leaders, hierarchies, and ideologies, while they undertake activism as a civic duty. moreover, the majority appreciate the ease and openness of the movement and the fact that one can get close without having to take part in it. besides, they all counterpose the alleged transparency, horizontality, and lack of ideology and structure of the movimento with the ‘hierarchical’ and ‘corrupted’ traditional party structure (biorcio 2015, 14). they acknowledge that such a nature will lead to problems that some members might not be fit for political positions, while others will act corruptly or focus opportunistically on their own careers. however, they argue that the goal of renovating politics allows for mistakes, as they are inevitable when one tries to put new methods into practice. some even defined the movement as a container, an empty space to be filled in by the activities of the members (biorcio 2015, 24). arguably, it is the perceived vacuum of this container that provides the feeling of political empowerment to the activists, the hearth of the 5sm’s success. this also parallels the ideology of cyber-populism. the latter, by being ‘thin,’ does only provide a few core ideas, in this case, the rule of the people by means of information technology. this ideology does not prescribe any social or economic reform or a clear path for how to achieve digital democracy. while it identifies a somewhat precise enemy in the political class, addressing the post-crisis frustration, it does also leave various doors open, which allows activists to fill them up with their hopes. nonetheless, this does not mean that the support is stable. the complex interconnection of structure, communication, and political praxis – that up to now remained somehow coherent – might not cope with the challenge of governing, especially if such duty is shared in a coalition. governing requires internal unity, but the 5sm’s support theoretically derives from its openness to input from the base. it is therefore important for the central office of the 5sm not to openly oppose the will of its base, attempting to maintain the perception of unchanged connectedness. while they might get away with negotiating on issues on which they did not initially adopt clear stances, such as immigration, they are less likely to gain tolerance from their voters if they fail to deliver on their classical issues, such as corruption, environmental struggles, and income levels. in depending upon their coalition partners, the leaders of the 5sm are therefore placed under the greatest pressure since their entrance into politics. the fact that during this past decade they have been able to address their challenges is no guarantee that they will do so now. conclusion in conclusion, the 5sm attempted to place the political projects in the hands of the members of the movimento, at least at a rhetorical level. this was arguably the key determinant in comprehending the long-standing support for the 5sm. hence, a few implications follow. firstly, this history demonstrates that there are considerable numbers of citizens interested in participating in the public sphere, in contrast to the many claims of political apathy. in turn, and alongside most of the literature on the topic, the findings of this case study also confirm the deep crisis of representation within the traditional italian party system. the quality of the response of the 5sm, however, does raise a number of questions. to begin with, many wonder whether this answer to the crisis of representation is a ‘good’ one or whether the emergence of such discourses can have negative consequences for the health of 33 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 contemporary democracies. surely, the 5sm did manage to re-engage citizens who were previously not participating in the political sphere. however, some warn of the undemocratic potential of the widespread acceptance of a discourse imbued with the categorical rejection of the political opposition. secondly, the discourses of the 5sm imply that the internet will offer a more effective way of mobilising citizens and their ‘collective intelligence’ compared to what can be achieved using traditional political parties. this raises the question of whether the technological utopianism intrinsic in the discourse might be beneficial. for instance, the 5sm’s concept of decentralizing political actions with the use of online platforms of e-democracy, such as ‘rousseau,’ can have benefits, cut costs, and speed up processes of democratic politics at the local level. this nurtures hope for innovative forms of a more direct democracy. however, activists cannot afford to uncritically accept claims of direct democracy online, as the internet presents instead a great number of spins and subtle forms of control. before embracing such a utopian view of the web, there should at least be widespread social awareness of the importance of data, which is far from being the case today. ultimately, it is important to monitor the influence of 5sm elsewhere in europe. in spain, ciudadanos and podemos have both made use of online resources and have, to some extent, employed similar discourses. similarly, the claims of superseding rightand left-wing ideologies are also used by right-wing populist parties, such as the front (now rassemblement) national in france. further research should move in this direction, discovering the motivation of their supporters and comparing them with the 5sm. the autonomy that interested the 5sm’s supporters might also suggest novel approaches for the eu, favouring perhaps the need for closer contacts with local realities and disempowered citizens. whether the 5sm will be able to be perceived as an incubator of hope after its first experience in a ruling government goes past the scope of this paper. it is nonetheless important to keep monitoring how this novel political experiment evolves, and to what extent the mixture of populism and digital media will influence the contemporary party system. 34 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 references aupers, s. (2012). ‘trust no one’: modernization, paranoia and conspiracy culture. european journal of communication, 27(1), 22-34. barlett, j., froio, c., littler, m., & mcdonnell, d. (2013). social media is changing politics across europe. london: demos. bartlett, j. (2014). populism, social media and democratic strain. in c. sandelind (ed.) european populism (pp. 99-117). stockholm: fores. retrieved from: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/104297/1/korr%20igen.pdf#page=121 berger, a. a. (2017). political parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. routledge: chicago. biorcio, r. (2015). gli attivisti del movimento 5 stelle: dal web al territorio. milano: franco angeli, bordignon, f., & ceccarini, l. (2013). five stars and a cricket. beppe grillo shakes italian politics. south european society and politics, 18 (4), 427-449. bordignon, f., & ceccarini, l. (2014). protest and project, leader and party: normalisation of the five star movement. contemporary italian politics, 6(1), 54-72. bordignon, f., & ceccarini, l. (2016). the five stars continue to shine: the consolidation of grillo’s ‘movement party’ in italy. contemporary italian politics, 8(2), 131-159. castells, m. (2009). communication power. oxford university press: oxford. della porta, d., & mattoni, a. (2015). social networking sites in pro-democracy and antiausterity protests: some thoughts from a social movement perspective. in c. fuchs & d. trottier (eds.), social media, politics and the state: protests, revolutions, riots, crime and policing in the age of facebook, twitter and youtube (pp. 39-67). new york: routledge. deseriis, m. (2017). technopopulism: the emergence of a discursive formation. triplec: communication, capitalism & critique. open access journal for a global sustainable information society, 15(2), pp. 441-458. deseriis, m. (2017b, may). direct parliamentarianism: an analysis of the political values embedded in rousseau, the" operating system" of the five star movement. in edemocracy and open government (cedem), 2017 conference for (pp. 15-25). ieee. diamanti, i. (2014). the 5 star movement: a political laboratory. contemporary italian politics, 6(1), 4-15. diani, m. & fabbri, m. (2015). social movements italian-style: from the no-global to beppe grillo. in mammone, a., parini, e. g., & veltri, g. a. (eds.), the routledge handbook of contemporary italy: history, politics, society. new york: routledge. http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/104297/1/korr%20igen.pdf#page=121 35 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 engesser, s., ernst, n., esser, f., & büchel, f. (2017). populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology. information, communication & society, 20(8), 1109-1126. floridia, a., & vignati, r. (2013, september). deliberativa, diretta o partecipativa: quale democrazia per il movimento 5 stelle. in the annual convention of the italian society of political science. retrieved from: https://www.sisp.it/files/papers/2013/antonio-floridiaerinaldo-vignati1769.pdf floridia, a., & vignati, r. (2014). deliberativa, diretta o partecipativa?. le sfide del movimento 5 stelle alla democrazia rappresentativa. quaderni di sociologia, (65), 51-74. gerbaudo, p. (2014). populism 2.0. in fuchs, c., & trottier, d. (eds) “social media, politics and the state: protests, revolutions, riots, crime and policing in the age of facebook, twitter and youtube”. (pp. 40-67). gerbaudo, p. (2017). from cyber-autonomism to cyber-populism: an ideological analysis of the evolution of digital activism. triplec: communication, capitalism & critique. open access journal for a global sustainable information society, 15(2), 478-491. grillo, b. (2009, september 9). comunicato politico numero venticinque. [web log message] retrieved from: http://www.beppegrillo.it/2009/09/comunicato_politico_numero_venticinque.htm l krämer, b. (2017). populist online practices: the function of the internet in right-wing populism. information, communication & society, 1-17. kriesi, h. (2014). the populist challenge. west european politics, 37(2), 361-378. laclau, e. (2005). on populist reason. london: verso. lanzone, l., & woods, d. (2015). riding the populist web: contextualizing the five star movement (m5s) in italy. politics and governance, 3(2). mair, p. (2002). populist democracy vs party democracy. in democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 81-98). palgrave macmillan uk. mazzoleni, g. (2008). populism and the media. in albertazzi & mcdonnell (eds.). twenty-first century populism: the spectre of western european democracy. (pp. 49-64). moffitt, b. (2016). the global rise of populism: performance, political style, and representation. stanford university press. mudde, c. (2004). the populist zeitgeist. government and opposition, 39(4), 541-563. mudde, c. (2007). populist radical right parties in europe. cambridge: cambridge university press. natale, s., & ballatore, a. (2014). the web will kill them all: new media, digital utopia, and political struggle in the italian 5-star movement. media, culture & society, 36(1), 105121. https://www.sisp.it/files/papers/2013/antonio-floridia-%20e-rinaldo-vignati-%201769.pdf https://www.sisp.it/files/papers/2013/antonio-floridia-%20e-rinaldo-vignati-%201769.pdf http://www.beppegrillo.it/2009/09/comunicato_politico_numero_venticinque.htm%20l 36 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 non-statuto m5s (10/12/2009). retrieved 25/10/2019 from: http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/regolamentomovimento-5 stelle.pdf ostrogorskij, m. j. (1964). democracy and the organization of political parties: the united states (vol. 2). new jersey: transaction publishers. pappas, t. (2018). the problem with italy is not populism. il mulino. retrieved from: https://www.rivistailmulino.it/news/newsitem/index/item/news:news_item:4383. passarelli, g., & tuorto, d. (2018). the five star movement: purely a matter of protest? the rise of a new party between political discontent and reasoned voting. party politics, 24(2), 129140. politi, j., & roberts, h. (2017, sep, 17). five star movement: the unanswered questions about italy’s populist party. financial times. retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/546be098-989f-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b quandt, t. (2012). what’s left of trust in a network society? an evolutionary model and critical discussion of trust and societal communication. european journal of communication, 27(1), 7-21. tarchi, m. (2015). italia populista: dal qualunquismo a beppe grillo. bologna: il mulino. tarrow, s. (1979). italy: crisis, crises or transition? west european politics, 2(3), 166-186. tronconi, f. (2018). the italian five star movement during the crisis: towards normalisation? south european society and politics, 23(1), 163-180. vaccari, c. (2015). the features, impact and legacy of berlusconi's campaigning techniques, language and style. modern italy, 20(1), 25-39. van zoonen, l. (2012). i-pistemology: changing truth claims in popular and political culture. european journal of communication, 27(1), pp. 56-67. verbeek, b., & zaslove, a. (2016). italy: a case of mutating populism? democratization, 23(2), 304-323. wirth, w., esser, f., wettstein, m., engesser, s., wirz, d., schulz, a., & schemer, c. (2016). the appeal of populist ideas, strategies and styles: a theoretical model and research design for analyzing populist political communication. zurich: nccr working paper, 88. http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/regolamento-%20movimento-5-%20stelle.pdf http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/regolamento-%20movimento-5-%20stelle.pdf https://www.rivistailmulino.it/news/newsitem/index/item/news:news_item:4383 https://www.ft.com/content/546be098-989f-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b 37 canadian journal of european and russian affairs, vol 13 (1) 2019 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 no great russia without greater russia: the kremlin’s thinking behind the invasion of ukraine tom casier, university of groningen abstract this paper argues that to understand the invasion of ukraine, it is necessary to have better insights into the kremlin’s particular worldview and russia’s place within it. this view is based on a sense of entitlement to great power status going hand in hand with an identity of itself as a country that extends beyond the actual borders of the russian federation. what makes the position unique is that the geopolitical and identity arguments are inseparable: in the kremlin’s worldview, russia can only be a great power if it also exists as greater russia. this structural factor is labelled the geopolitics-identity nexus. to explain why the invasion happened in 2022, three additional process factors are outlined: a radicalization of the view of ukraine as russian lands, driven by the feeling of existential crisis when tensions over ukraine escalated in 2014; an escalation of policy options resulting from consecutive failures in russia’s ukraine policy; and a reversal of the argument that russia has to be a great power to exist within its 1991 borders into the argument that russia has to expand its territory to be a great power. 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 introduction in the avalanche of the early analysis of russia’s war against ukraine, a large part of the discussion focused on the motivations of the kremlin to launch a major offensive on february 24, 2022. in the discipline of international relations, moscow’s decision has often been read as a confirmation of a particular theoretical view. yet major events like the current war invite critical self-reflection rather than the hardening of theoretical positions. after all, this is a war that many—including foreign policy experts close to the kremlin—were not expecting. taking a step back to grasp the complexity behind russia’s decision may therefore be a more fruitful approach. the analysis starts from the idea that russia’s often-voiced security concerns cannot explain the decision to go to war for different reasons. first, the war has dramatically aggravated russia’s security situation rather than improving it. second, there is a huge discrepancy between russian-western tensions over security prior to the war and russia’s aim of territorial expansion as the main objective of the war. any explanation necessitates a better understanding of the kremlin’s worldview. in particular, it is argued that in this worldview, russia’s sense of entitlement to a great power status has blended with a form of identity thinking whereby russian lands extend well beyond russia’s borders. it is against the background of this geopolitics-identity nexus that the kremlin has come to see territorial expansion as an essential part of its ‘greatpowerness.’1 it constitutes a key structural factor required to understand the kremlin’s decision to go to war. yet it does not explain why this major war was launched in 2022 and not in the three decades preceding. therefore, the paper suggests three complementary process factors that explain how the kremlin’s thinking radicalized between 2014 and 2022. the first section reflects critically on some recurring interest-based explanations of the war and pleads to take the worldview of the kremlin into account. this paves the way for developing the central argument of the paper, whereby the geopolitics-identity nexus is seen as a key structural element crucial to understanding the decision. the following section focuses on the process factors that explain the dynamics of the process and considers both the radicalization of identity thinking and policy failures. in the last section, some reflections are made about the significance of these findings for the ongoing war and europe’s security order. explaining russia’s war against ukraine a variety of explanations have been provided for russia’s decision to start a full-scale war against ukraine on february 24, 2022. the one that received the most attention was undoubtedly john mearsheimer’s structural realist explanation. renewing the argument he originally launched to explain the ukraine crisis in 2014, mearsheimer continued to state that the west was to blame. the conflict, he stated, is “all about the west’s efforts to make ukraine a western bulwark on russian borders” (mearsheimer 2022). it is the west that, through its actions, posed “an existential threat” to russia and left it “no choice” but to react (mearsheimer 2022). others have explained the war from radically different theoretical perspectives. yudin (2022), for example, spoke from a critical theory perspective and linked the war to neoliberalism. he qualified the putin regime as a “radical version of neoliberalism” and argued that the decision to invade has been wrongly understood in terms of geopolitical goals superseding economic interests (yudin 2022, 1). yudin states, “this war is not so much a collision of two imperial powers as it is a war waged by capital unchained. putin’s successful 1 although the word ‘greatpowerness’ is not an english word, it has been widely used as a translation of the russian word velikoderzhavnost’. see, for example, smith 2014. 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 experience of building a neoliberal state and corrupting global elites made him consider brute force as the ultimate political argument” (yudin 2022, 9). drawing on resource dependency theory, johannesson and clowes (2022) claimed that “russian control of both ukraine’s energy markets and resources for its own use and their strategic denial to the eu was the key motive for russia’s aggression towards ukraine” in 2014 (7). they claimed that “scholars have not fully considered how russian control over the more strategic areas of ukraine could close the [resource] gap” (johannesson and clowes 2022, 6). what all these explanations have in common is that they use abstract, theoretical schemes and apply them to the reality of the war, not to test these theories, but to offer a particular framework for interpretation and select information in function of that. to put it more bluntly, the reality gets adapted to the theory rather than the theory to the reality. in the case of mearsheimer, this means that exclusive attention is given to one line of argumentation by the kremlin. in particular, in 2021 – the year preceding the war, putin systematically built up a discourse of russia’s security being threatened by the west. in april 2021, he spoke about a “red line” for russia’s core security interests that could not be crossed and would invite an “asymmetrical, swift and tough” response, adding: “we ourselves will determine in each specific case where [the red line] will be drawn” (putin 2021b). by the end of the year, in december 2021, this undefined threat was translated into three unconditional demands that became the diplomatic focus in us-russia relations: no further expansion of nato to the post-soviet space, no deployment of offensive weapons in the proximity of russia, and the withdrawal of nato military infrastructure from countries that joined nato after 1997. it was clear—and telling— that these were unrealistic demands that did not have the slightest chance of being met. interestingly, when the war was about to break out in february 2022, these elements faded into the background in the russian discourse (putin 2022a and 2022b). it is only considerably later during the war that the kremlin will return to framing the war as a war with the west and russia only defending itself – something that stands in sharp contrast with the reality of the war. the one-sided focus on russia’s security rhetoric ignored a second discourse, equally coming from the kremlin, which was identity-based and spoke about ukraine as essentially ‘russian lands.’ in the summer of 2021, putin (2021a) published an article in which he presented a long and selective reading of history to make the claim that russians and ukrainians, as well as belarusians, are part of one “triune nation.”2 he questions the borders of ukraine and speaks of an “artificial division of russians and ukrainians.” in retrospect, it can certainly be argued that many analysts have not taken putin’s article seriously enough. dmitry shlapentokh, for example, argued that “putin’s article was not just one of his intellectual exercises; as events have revealed, it was also implicitly a plan for possible actions. russia’s invasion of ukraine demonstrates that putin’s vision must be taken seriously” (shlapentokh 2021, 9). that the article was more than the gimmick it was taken for became clear with his speech on february 21, 2022, a few days before the invasion, where putin (2022a) made similar, very elaborate ‘historical’ arguments, calling ukraine a bolshevik creation and suggesting it should be undone. however, there is more than this twofold discourse of the kremlin about security and ukrainian sovereignty. a lot speaks against the assumption that the war can be explained on the basis of russia’s security concerns.3 first, the fact that tensions over security between russia and the 2 the term “triune” is used in the kremlin’s official translation. the term triune expresses the idea of three in one, referring to the religious idea of the holy trinity. 3 alternative explanations have gone in many different directions referring to a clash of values, putin’s personality, the diversion from domestic issues to russia’s ‘expansionist’ and ‘revisionist’ nature (see stubb 2022 for this multi-factor analysis). maria mälksoo argued that “russian imperialism and colonialism are among the many blind spots of the academic field of ir” (mälksoo 2022, 4). götz and staun (2022) looked into russia’s strategic culture and singled out russia’s sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis the west and sense of greatpowerness as key factors. 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 west preceded the 2022 war does not mean these tensions have caused the war. a lot more evidence is required to make that point. second, the prospect of eventual accession to nato was offered to ukraine back in 2008.4 this was not less than 14 years before the invasion, and the offer was nothing but a political statement. accession was simply not on the agenda. third, the question remains how the war against ukraine would have alleviated russia’s security concerns. russia is now involved in the biggest interstate war in europe since the second world war, and its outcome is very uncertain. it is the target of unprecedented western sanctions. it has seen the export of its oil and gas to eu countries dwindle. finland and sweden are due to become nato members. moreover, russia is often isolated and has arguably lost a lot of its influence both regionally and globally, as, for example, the summit meeting of the european political community in prague in october 2022 underlined.5 european states have drastically increased their defence spending. germany, a country that has been so crucial in the reconciliation between the west and the soviet union (and later russia), has gone through a ‘historic shift’ and is an active supplier of lethal weapons to ukraine. in an interview briefly before the invasion of ukraine, dmitri trenin—a pre-eminent russian foreign policy analyst—made an important point: no degree of nato expansion, including to incorporate ukraine, will threaten the military balance and deterrence stability…therefore, in terms of military security, it’s correct to say i don’t see nato expansion as such a terrible threat…but there is another factor: a country that becomes a nato member undergoes profound reformatting, which touches upon all walks of life. the country transforms politically and ideologically. while ukraine is outside of nato, it’s still possible that the entire country or some part of it may decide that the slavic identity, the ‘russian world,’ and other things matter, and this may lead to a normalization of relations with russia, and even closer relations with it. at least, from moscow’s vantage point, such a possibility remains. but if a country joins nato, that’s it: that ship has sailed. in this sense, yes, there is a threat but not a military one; rather, it’s geopolitical and geocultural. (trenin 2022) trenin suggests that russia’s real concern is not security related but is derived from a combination of geopolitical and cultural factors. it is about ‘losing’ ukraine to the west. this article argues that this blend of geopolitical and identity-based thinking is key to understanding the kremlin’s attitude. at the same time, this argument is an invitation not to discuss russia’s motivations purely in terms of rationality or irrationality. rather, it is necessary to understand the kremlin’s ‘worldviews,’ the representations that inform their decisions but do not represent rational, ‘objective’ calculations. in other words, what matters is not whether this war was rational but how it seemed ‘reasonable’ to the russian leadership. according to katzenstein and seybert, standards of reasonableness are variable and diverse (2018, 88). they represent different worldviews, historical memories, emotions, moral prescriptions, etc. they filter information and thus explain how the same information may lead to different choices and risktaking. the analysis in the rest of the paper demonstrates that the kremlin’s motivation cannot be understood without reference to a blend of geopolitical and identity reasoning. the latter 4 art. 23 of the bucharest summit declaration states that “nato welcomes ukraine’s and georgia’s euro-atlantic aspirations for membership in nato. we agreed today that these countries will become members of nato” (nato 2008). 5 the european political community is a broad intergovernmental forum that was proposed by french president macron and seeks coordination of foreign policy positions beyond the eu member states. 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 combines the idea that russia is entitled to being a great power and that it can only be so by being ‘greater russia’ – a russia that extends beyond the borders of the russian federation and minimally encompasses the slavic core of the former soviet union. this will be presented as a key structural factor essential to explaining why the kremlin decided to launch a large-scale war against ukraine. this, however, leaves another element to be answered. simply put: why did it happen when it happened, in 2022? why not in 2014, and why not prior to that? while many different elements may have played a role, this paper focuses on the radicalization that took place between 2014 and 2022: a radicalization of this blended geopolitical and identity thinking that reinforced the view of ukraine as ‘russian lands,’ as well as a radicalization of the policy options to find a permanent solution for the perceived ‘ukraine problem’ and russia’s feeling of an ‘existential crisis’ after the events in ukraine in 2014 (youngs 2017). these elements constitute the process factors that help to explain why the kremlin decided to start a far-reaching war in 2022. structural factor: the geopolitics-identity nexus ever since the demise of the soviet union, the objective of regaining great power status for russia has been a key objective of its leaders (see inter alia freire 2019; miskimmon & o’loughlin 2017; tsygankov 2005). this ambition is at the heart of its strategic culture (götz and staun 2022). it has been a constant objective; what has changed is the way in which moscow seeks to achieve it. the seeking of great power status is not simply a result of geostrategic thinking, as expressed in brzezinski’s famous statement: “without ukraine, russia ceases to be a eurasian empire. russia without ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly asian imperial state…” (brzezinski 1997, 46). presented this way, geopolitical thinking appears as purely objective, unbiased by cognition. yet the geopolitical reasoning in the kremlin cannot be disconnected from the way it perceives russia and its relations with others and is interwoven with its identity as empire. the kremlin lacks the capacity to think of russia as something else but a great power, as something else but an empire. the collapse of the soviet union did not lead to the disappearance of the imperial mindset. russia never went through its post-colonial moment and has never taken the first step to come to terms with its own colonial past (mälksoo 2022). as a result, russia’s current war can be seen as “an epitome of its struggle to reconnect with its past imperial self” (mälksoo 2022, 7). of course, this colonial past has its own specifics. russia was a “pre-modern empire” (lieven 2002) that expanded its territory gradually by conquering neighbouring lands and absorbing diverse populations and cultures into its empire. as a result of its rapid expansion, it grew as an empire before it developed a clear concept of nation. some of the newly conquered territories were russified, while others maintained their identities to some extent. in contrast to modern colonial empires, such as the british empire, the borders between the centre and periphery of the empire, between the fatherland and the colonies, were never clear-cut. as a result, when the soviet union collapsed and russia was reduced to the borders of the russian federation, the country maintained a complex relationship with its national identity. it had difficulties in dissociating itself from its imperial past. akopov aptly describes the sentiment of “national loneliness” that dominates the russian mindset (akopov 2020, 296). russia on its own is not considered to be complete; it is a “fortress of solitude” (akopov 2020, 305). as a result, russian thinking continues to be imbued with “fraternalist narratives concerning brotherly links and paternalistic relationships to the russian leaders, who continue to consider former soviet states, especially ukraine and belarus, as ‘naturally’ belonging to 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 russia’s cultural and political sphere of influence” (akopov 2020, 295-296). they appear powerfully at the policy level, inter alia in the idea of russia as a “state-civilisation” (tsygankov 2017; akopov 2020). these representations never entirely disappeared from the russian mindset, but—as will be argued in the next section—received a new boost after the start of the 2014 ukraine crisis, of which the outcome was read in the kremlin as ‘losing’ ukraine to the west – very much in line with trenin’s geocultural argument above. these sorts of representations are clearly visible in many of putin’s statements. in his article on ukraine in 2021, he made the following statement about ukraine and russia: “together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. for we are one people” (putin 2021a). in his television address on february 21, 2022, he added that “modern ukraine was entirely created by russia or, to be more precise, by bolshevik, communist russia” and “never had stable traditions of real statehood” (putin 2022a). in sum, ukraine was defined as “an inalienable part of our [russia’s] own history, culture and spiritual space” (putin 2022a) and this is, per definition, understood to mean it is essentially russian and, therefore, russia can make legitimate claims to it. in other words, there is an essentialist claim as to what is russian, fully determined by the centre and not leaving any agency to ukraine. nothing illustrates the russian claims better than putin’s reference (and apparent comparison) to tsar peter the great a few months into the war: “it seemed [peter the great] was at war with sweden, he took something from them. he did not take anything from them, he returned [what was russia’s]…well, it seems it has also fallen to us to take back and strengthen [territories]” (putin 2022c). this way of thinking pictures russia not as an empire that came about by territorial expansion but as an empire entitled to the territories it once controlled, territories that are essentially theirs. this allows putin to position russia not as an imperialist force or colonizer but exactly the opposite. in his speech on the occasion of the annexation of four ukrainian regions in september 2022, he managed to present russia as the spearhead of the “anti-colonial movement,” thus obfuscating russia’s imperialist role at the time of a brutal, expansionist war: “deep down, the western elites have remained the same colonisers. they discriminate and divide peoples into the top tier and the rest…while we – we are proud that in the 20th century our country led the anti-colonial movement” (putin 2022d). it is this type of reasoning that also paves the way for a harsh language of vilifying all forces that do not recognize russia in this role. they get labelled as either ‘russophobes’ or ‘nazis.’ both terms have historical roots. the term russophobia was already widespread around the time of the nineteenth-century crimean war (figes 2010). fighting nazism has been mythologized as russia’s historic mission in a selective reading of history and a reductionist claim that the victory over nazism was an exclusive russian achievement. the idea that russia ‘naturally’ extends beyond the current borders of the russian federation is traditionally intertwined with the concept of derzhavnost, a concept that translates the idea of ‘greatpowerness’ but with the underlying assumption of destiny. according to legvold, derzhavnost “has a meaning all its own, one missing from the english language, simply because the phenomenon is missing. only the russians in moments of distress revert to an affectation of great-power standing—that is, to asserting their natural right to the role and influence of a great power whether they have the wherewithal or not” (legvold 2007, 114) russia is thus entitled to ‘greatpowerness’ and this has always been central to its self-identity. the idea that russia is bigger than the current russian federation has been present in its foreign policy ever since the collapse of the soviet union. it was, most visibly, translated into the concept of russkiy mir (russian world), grasping the meaning of a russian-speaking diaspora existing outside the federation’s borders. however, the way the concept was used politically 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 has evolved significantly over time. suslov (2018) argues that the concept has evolved from a de-territorialized concept in the 1990s to more geopolitical interpretations. as of 2009, the “russian world” was equated with the idea of an “autonomous, expanding state-civilization’” (suslov 2018, 346), forming an alternative to the west and reflecting irridentist claims. already prior to the ukraine crisis, there is thus both a deeply-rooted idea of russia’s destiny to ‘greatpowerness’ and an evolution to a more territorial interpretation of greater russia. how this developed into the decision for territorial expansion through war can arguably be explained by policy failure and a sense of frustration over the (perceived) lack of recognition of russia as a great power. the next section will zoom in on this evolution, in particular, the escalation of the kremlin’s policy towards ukraine as a result of relative policy failure and a radicalization of its identity thinking. this represents the process factor, the dynamic element that helps to explain why the invasion happened in 2022. process factors: radicalization and policy failure what the world witnessed between early 2014 and the invasion of ukraine in february 2022 was a radicalization of great power imaginaries along the nexus of geopolitical and identity arguments. without claiming to offer an exhaustive explanation, this paper argues that this radicalization happened along three lines. the first line is constituted by the way the ukraine crisis was perceived by russia’s leaders in 2014. the ukraine conflict [of 2014] has undoubtedly been pivotal. it threw into question russia’s self-understanding as a great european power and smashed to smithereens the two main pillars of the kremlin’s long-term strategy: maintaining good working relations with europe, especially with germany and france, and promoting the ‘eurasian integration’ of former soviet lands. (torbakov 2021) the developments in ukraine in february 2014 radicalized the kremlin’s reasoning, rooted in a blend of geopolitics (russia’s entitlement to great power status) and identity thinking (russia being ‘by nature’ larger than the borders of the russian federation). ukraine drifting away from the ‘russian world’ was perceived as a ‘loss’ of ukraine to the west, causing not simply geostrategic concerns but an “existential crisis” (youngs 2017). according to freire, ukraine “ended up reflecting russia’s anxiety over its own identity-building, contributing to ontological insecurity. russia was again losing a part of the self, by losing ukraine” (freire 2020, 13). earlier mentioned ideas of russia’s loneliness, detached from part of its own self, got a new boost after the 2014 ukraine crisis, leading to widespread debates on russia’s identity (torbakov 2019). it was echoed powerfully in the words of vladislav surkov, former advisor to putin, who saw the ukraine crisis as “the end of russia’s epic journey to the west” and a return to “one hundred (two hundred? three hundred?) years of geopolitical solitude” (surkov 2018). these debates fostered a revival of the concepts of ‘greater’ and ‘historical’ russia, leading to expansionist and irridentist positions (akopov 2020, 295). the second line of radicalization was in the policy field. russia redesigned its foreign policy vis-à-vis ukraine in the wake of the events of early 2014. perceiving the developments as a western take-over of ukraine, the kremlin mainly focused on undermining western control in ukraine, destabilizing the country by provoking war in the donbas, and annexing crimea. russia tried to keep a foot in the door, for which the minsk ii agreement was to serve as a 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 vehicle.6 based on the idea of far-reaching autonomy for the donbas, moscow would de facto maintain a degree of veto power in ukraine’s policy. in other words, its strategy was largely based on “negative compulsory power” aimed at “preventing effective control by and to the advantage of the west,” making ukraine a liability for its western partners rather than a benefit (casier 2018, 103). this strategy was not very successful, partly because the minsk ii agreement was not implemented, and the military effort in the donbas ended up in a stalemate. moreover, moscow’s policy lacked coherence and clear long-term objectives beyond destabilization. the ukraine policy was scattered over different decision-making bodies and largely ineffective (watling and reynolds 2022). an attempt at centralization was undertaken when the responsibility for moscow’s ukraine policy shifted from vladislav surkov to dmitry kozak on january 25, 2020 (hurak and d’anieri 2022, 121; watling and reynolds 2022, 6-7). despite this change, it remained unclear what the permanent solution for the ‘existential’ ukraine ‘problem’ would be. watling and reynolds (2022) argue that consecutive failures in russia’s ukraine policy led to a radicalization of policy scenarios, driven by trial-and-error rather than a coherent set of strategic goals. next to annexing crimea and fuelling a war in the donbas, the kremlin tried a variety of tactics to put pressure on ukraine: economic coercion, exploiting energy dependence, ‘passportization’ in the donetsk and luhansk people’s republics, the naval blockade of the kerch strait, religious influence, support for pro-russian politicians, intelligence operations, attempts at toppling the regime, and troop mobilization along the border in 2021 (hurak and d’anieri 2022; watling and reynolds 2022). all these tactics delivered few results. ukraine was not won back but only further alienated from russia. eventually, this pushed the kremlin to a scenario of recognition of the people’s republics of donetsk and luhansk on february 21, 2022, followed swiftly by a military invasion on the 24th. with this change, russia abandoned a strategy of using relatively limited means to resort to maximal effects, as it had done by taking over crimea by stealth or denying its role in the donbas war. it now opted for brutal and massive warfare, aimed at territorial expansion. finally, the third line of radicalization was in the reversal of the geopolitics-identity argument. back in 2003, putin stated that “such a country as russia can only survive and develop within the existing borders if it stays as a great power. during all of its times of weakness…russia was invariably confronted with the threat of disintegration” (putin quoted in tsygankov 2005, 132). ‘greatpowerness’ was thus presented as a condition for russia’s survival and development within its given borders (tsygankov 2005). the argument was not that russia had to expand in order to be a great power. in his early years as president, putin explicitly rejected imperial ambitions (legvold 2007; tsygankov 2005).7 the argument was that only as a great power russia can continue to exist and flourish within its current borders; only as a great power can disintegration be prevented. this argument was radically reversed in the run-up to the invasion of ukraine. perceiving that it was withheld its recognition as a ‘great power’ and that its rise to ‘greatpowerness’ was hampered by the west (krickovic 2017), russia changed course and opted for territorial expansion as an alternative way to establish itself as a great power. in the mindset of the kremlin, russia could only be great russia if it constituted a greater russia. it needs to be underlined that there is no objectivity or geopolitical necessity in this. rather, it echoes a deeply rooted way of thinking that connects russia’s great power status with territorial expansion. 6 the minsk ii agreement was signed in february 2015 seeking to put an end the war in eastern ukraine. it was built on the idea of the restoration of the state border between ukraine and russia in the conflict zone and autonomy for the donetsk and luhansk districts. the latter would have allowed russia to exert significant influence in ukrainian politics. 7 the concept of derzhavnost was not understood by putin in his early years as president to mean imperial ambitions but rather “economic revitalisation” (legvold 2007, 116). 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 this equation between russia’s great power status and the size of the territory can be explained in different ways. in one interpretation, it is simply historical continuity, with moscow inevitably returning to an old tradition of connecting strong statehood with territorial expansion. legvold, for example, stated: “more than usual, russia, while amid the upheaval, sinks back into a tortured quest to define its very identity, one manifestation of which is an ostentatious preoccupation with its great-power standing (or derzhavnost) and the other, a sharpened version of its permanently vexed relationship to the west” (legvold 2007, 92). this lines up with the continuity thesis, which assumes that the essence of russian foreign policy does not change over time, as its national interests remain constant, resulting in a return to policies of antiwesternism and expansionism. self-evidently, a thesis like this leaves a lot to be explained in terms of variation in russia’s foreign policy and protracted periods of time whereby these hallmarks were not valid. when considered as the only explanation for today’s war against ukraine, the argument risks becoming historically determinist. an alternative explanation takes into account the process dynamics. russia’s current expansionist policy is then not an inevitable return to the traps of the past but the outcome of domestic and international processes that resuscitate this way of thinking. it is within these dynamics that the radicalization of territorial, irridentist thinking about ukraine and the escalation of policy options can be situated. this is not to say that historical factors do not matter. they do so strongly, as images of russian derzhavnost and empire feed and propel this way of thinking. as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, it is the fact that russia has never come to terms with its own imperial past that prevents it from breaking these dynamics of radicalization. the significance of the geopolitics-identity nexus for the war russia’s war against ukraine is the biggest interstate war in europe since the second world war, and its human toll is already an unspeakable tragedy. on the basis of the above, there are reasons to assume that—in the absence of major game changers—the war will be fought till the end, whatever exactly this may mean in practice. for ukraine, accepting any peace deal with territorial concessions is hard to imagine. the belief prevails in kyiv that any peace deal will be temporary and that russia will be back one day – precisely because of the geopoliticsidentity nexus that guides its foreign policy thinking. after all, ukraine had russian guarantees for its territorial integrity through the budapest memorandum of 1994 – guarantees that proved worthless with the annexation of crimea in 2014. the brutal invasion of february 2022 took away any doubts about the kremlin’s intentions and readiness to use massive force and destruction to achieve territorial expansion. for russia, withdrawal is equally hard to imagine, not just because it means losing face, but because it would threaten the survival of the regime itself. moscow has annexed four territories of ukraine in september 2022 that it now considers to be an integral part of the russian federation, despite the fact that it does not even fully control them at the time of writing. as argued above, this territorial expansion into ukraine is disconnected from the security concerns russia claimed vocally and escalated in its rhetoric throughout 2021. the war provoked the total collapse of what was left of the post-cold war security order (alcaro 2022; casier 2022). most importantly, with the invasion of ukraine, russia went one step further in breaking a major taboo, the linchpin of the european post-world war ii security order: the inviolability of borders. the lesson learnt from two destructive world wars was that territorial expansion by force poses the biggest threat to security and easily spills over into uncontrollable war. the principle of the inviolability of borders is one of the most fundamental principles of 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 international law. it obtained a central place in the un charter and was at the heart of the 1975 helsinki final act. the war has turned russia into the biggest security threat in europe, and as a result, all previous discussions about the legitimacy of moscow’s security concerns are futile and bygone. the war has redrawn the european security landscape. there is a united transatlantic front that has imposed unprecedented sanctions on russia and has massively delivered increasingly heavy arms to ukraine. the eu has upgraded its security role. it has delivered eur 5.6 billion in military assistance to ukraine through the european peace facility (council of the eu 2023). moreover, it set up the unparalleled european union military assistance mission for ukraine (eumam), aimed at strengthening the capacity of the ukrainian armed forces through training (eeas 2022). in a way that was hard to imagine before the invasion, eu countries have largely cut themselves off from russian natural gas, with the import now being around one-fifth of what it was the previous year (zachmann, sgaravatti, and mcwilliams 2023) and oil imports from russia (except oil transported by pipeline) being phased out by the end of 2022. equally important, the eu granted ukraine candidate member status. despite the fact that this will only be the beginning of a long accession process and that huge obstacles have to be overcome, the symbolic significance of this can hardly be overestimated. in a context in which the kremlin denies ukraine the right to sovereign statehood, this offers a forceful recognition of its statehood. moreover, it indicates a change in the eu’s strategy away from its policy of association and privileged relations under the eastern partnership towards a policy of enlargement for the region. in light of trenin’s argument above, where he claims russia’s real concern is that countries slip out of russia’s geocultural sphere, offering ukraine the prospect of accession to the eu is a most significant step. complementary to the argument above that the war has drastically aggravated the security situation moscow has expressed concern about, this means that russia will also find it harder to maintain its geocultural sphere and the influence that comes with it. post-war ukraine will likely be firmly anchored in the west. while it is far too early for conclusions, this effect will probably not be limited to ukraine but may leave a deep imprint on moscow’s relations with its traditional partners within the eurasian economic union and within the collective security treaty organisation. without a change of spirit and regime, this loss of influence will be hard to digest in russia. conclusion it is important to be careful not to end up living in a ‘defactualised world’ because of the love for theories (arendt 1972, 36). russia’s war against ukraine presents a test for international relations theories, which are too easily used as a universally applicable framework to give a certain interpretation of the war. instead, it is necessary to understand the complexity and test the validity of theoretical assumptions against the reality of the current war, including domestic particularities. against this background, this paper has argued that russia’s decision to launch a large-scale war against ukraine is not the result of escalating tensions with the west, whereby russian security concerns prompt it to act. it has introduced the idea of a geopolitics-identity nexus that is crucial to understanding the kremlin’s decision to go to war. this nexus suggests that in the kremlin’s worldview, russia’s sense of entitlement to ‘greatpowerness’ got anew entangled with its self-identity, whereby the russian lands extend beyond the borders of the russian federation. the imaginary that informed the decision embodies a ‘geocultural’ sphere, a ‘civilization’ of its own that comes with a geographic notion that cannot be reduced to the 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 borders of 1991. in other words, in the kremlin’s worldview, russia can only be a great power if it also exists as greater russia. while this worldview is not alien to russia’s thinking throughout history, it was argued that different process factors have led the russian leadership to fill in this nexus radically. three elements of change were indicated: a radicalization of the view of ukraine as russian lands, prompted by the feeling of an existential crisis when tensions over ukraine escalated in 2014; an escalation of policy options resulting from consecutive failures in russia’s ukraine policy; and a reversal of the argument that russia has to be a great power to exist within its 1991 borders into an argument that russia has to expand its territory to be a great power. these elements do not pretend to give a complete or exhaustive explanation for the kremlin’s decision to wage war, but they form essential components to understand why it did. 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 references akopov, sergei. 2020. “russia’s ‘fortresses of solitude’: social imaginaries of loneliness after the fall of the ussr.” social science information 59 (2): 288-309. https://doi.org/10.1177/053901842092596. alcaro, riccardo. 2022. “europe’s post-cold war order is no more.” iai commentaries 22 (8): 1-6. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom2208.pdf. arendt, hannah. 1972. crisis of the republic. new york: hardcourt brace jovanovich. brzezinski, zbigniew. 1997. the grand chessboard: american primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. new york: basic books. casier, tom. 2018. “the different faces of power in european union – russia relations.” cooperation and conflict 53 (1): 101-117. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836717729179. ———. 2022. “russia’s war in ukraine. a watershed for europe.” nação e defesa, no. 162, 71-89. https://www.idn.gov.pt/pt/publicacoes/nacao/documents/ned162/ tom%20casier.pdf. council of the european union. 2023. “ukraine: council agrees on further military support under the european peace facility.” accessed february 10, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/02/ukraine-councilagrees-on-further-military-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/. european external action service (eeas). 2022. european union military assistance mission ukraine. accessed february 10, 2023. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/ files/documents/2023-eumamukraine.pdf. figes, orlando. 2010. crimea: the last crusade. london: penguin. freire, maria raquel. 2020. eu and russia competing projects in the neighbourhood: an ontological security approach. revista brasileira de política internacional 63 (1): 1-18. https://www.scielo.br/j/rbpi/a/jct5x3btdhvhptqkccdnrtf/?lang=en. ———. 2019. the quest for status: how the interplay of power, ideas, and regime security shapes russia’s policy in the post-soviet space. international politics 56 (6): 795-809. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0164-y. götz, elias, and jørgen staun. 2022. “why russia attacked ukraine: strategic culture and radicalized narratives.” contemporary security policy 43 (3): 482-497. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633. hurak, ihor, and paul d’anieri. 2022. “the evolution of russian political tactics in ukraine.” problems of post-communism 69 (2): 121-132. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10758216.2020.1819162. johannesson, jokull, and david clowes. 2022. “energy resources and markets – perspectives on the russia–ukraine war.” european review 30 (1): 4-23. https://doi.org/ 10.1017/s1062798720001040. https://doi.org/10.1177/053901842092596 https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom2208.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/02/ukraine-council-agrees-on-further-military-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/02/ukraine-council-agrees-on-further-military-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023-eumamukraine.pdf https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023-eumamukraine.pdf https://www.scielo.br/j/rbpi/a/jct5x3btdhvhptqkccdnrtf/?lang=en 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 katzenstein, peter, and lucia seybert. 2018. “protean power and uncertainty: exploring the unexpected in world politics.” international studies quarterly 62 (1): 80-93. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx092. krickovic, andrej. 2017. “the symbiotic china-russia partnership: cautious riser and desperate challenger.” the chinese journal of international politics 10 (3): 299-329. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pox011. legvold, robert. 2007. “russian foreign policy during periods of great state transformation.” in russian foreign policy in the 21st century & the shadow of the past, edited by robert legvold, 77-143. new york: columbia university press. lieven, dominic. 2002. empire: the russian empire and its rivals. new haven: yale university press. mälksoo, maria. 2022. “the postcolonial moment in russia’s war against ukraine.” journal of genocide research. forum: russia's war on ukraine, 1-11. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/14623528.2022.2074947. mearsheimer, john j. 2014. “why the ukraine crisis is the west’s fault: the liberal delusions that provoked putin.” foreign affairs 93 (5): 77–89. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 24483306. ———. 2022. “john mearsheimer on who gains the most from the ukraine-russia war & what could end putin's assault.” crux. accessed february 10, 2023. youtube video, 23:16. https://youtu.be/xgizxgyzi84. miskimmon, alister, and ben o’loughlin. 2017. “russia’s narratives of global order: great power legacies in a polycentric world.” politics and governance 5 (3): 111-120. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1017. north atlantic treaty organization (nato). 2008. “bucharest summit declaration. issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the north atlantic council in bucharest on 3 april 2008.” press release (2008) 049. accessed february 10, 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm. putin, vladimir. 2021a. “article by vladimir putin ‘on the historical unity of russians and ukrainians.’” july 12, 2021. accessed february 10, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 ———. 2021b. “presidential address to the federal assembly.” manezh central exhibition hall, moscow, russia, april 21, 2021. accessed february 10, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65418. ———. 2022a. “address by the president of the russian federation.” february 21, 2022. accessed february 10, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828. ———. 2022b. “address by the president of the russian federation.” february 24, 2022. accessed february 10, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx092 https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2022.2074947 https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2022.2074947 http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306 http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306 https://youtu.be/xgizxgyzi84 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65418 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2022c. “putin compares himself to peter the great in russian territorial push.” guardian news. accessed february 10, 2023. youtube, 1:09. https://youtu.be/n2sfjjl7_zk. ———. 2022d. “signing of treaties on accession of donetsk and lugansk people’s republics and zaporozhye and kherson regions to russia.”. accessed february 10, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465. shlapentokh, dmitry. 2021. “putin and ukraine: power and the construction of history.” new zealand international review 47 (3): 6-9. link.gale.com/apps/doc/a704090490/ aone?u=ocul_carleton&sid=bookmark-aone&xid=ec72a574. smith, hanna. 2014. “russian greatpowerness: foreign policy, the two chechen wars and international organisations.” phd dissertation. university of helsinki. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/33724422.pdf . stubb, alexander. 2022. “alex stubb on why mearsheimer is wrong about the war in ukraine.” accessed february 10, 2023. stg series. accessed february 10, 2023. youtube, 22:12. https://youtu.be/vlb-prqdybg. surkov, vladislav. 2018. “odinochestvo polukrovki (14+)” [the loneliness of a half-breed (14+)]. rossiya v global’noy politike. accessed october 3, 2022. http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/odinochestvo-polukrovki-14-19477. suslov, mikhail. 2018. “‘russian world’ concept: post-soviet geopolitical ideology and the logic of ‘spheres of influence.’” geopolitics 23 (2): 330-353. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1407921. torbakov, igor. 2019. “‘middle continent’ or ‘island russia’: eurasianist legacy and vadim tsymburskii’s revisionist geopolitics.” in cultural and political imaginaries in putin’s russia, edited by niklas bernsand, and barbara törnquist-plewa , 37-62. leiden: brill. ———. 2021. “towards ‘island russia.’” eurozine, may 14, 2021. accessed february 10, 2023. https://www.eurozine.com/towards-island-russia/. trenin, dmitri. 2022. “are we on the brink of war? an interview with dmitri trenin.” carnegie endowment for international peace, january 29, 2022. accessed february 10, 2023. https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/86304. tsygankov, andrei p. 2017. “towards a new strategy of civilisation concentration. civilizational geopolitics at the turn of an era.” russia in global affairs, june 6, 2017. accessed february 10, 2023. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/towards-a-newstrategy-of-civilizational-concentration-18758. ———. 2005. “vladimir putin's vision of russia as a normal great power.” post-soviet affairs 21 (2): 132-158. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199336203.003.0011. watling, jack, and reynolds, nick. 2022. “the plot to destroy ukraine.” royal united services institute (rusi), february 15, 2022. https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202202-ukraineweb.pdf. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/33724422.pdf https://youtu.be/vlb-prqdybg http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/odinochestvo-polukrovki-14-19477 https://www.eurozine.com/towards-island-russia/ https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/86304 https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/towards-a-new-strategy-of-civilizational-concentration-18758 https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/towards-a-new-strategy-of-civilizational-concentration-18758 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/‌9780199336203.003.0011 https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202202-ukraine-web.pdf https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202202-ukraine-web.pdf 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 youngs, richard. 2017. europe’s eastern crisis. the geopolitics of asymmetry. cambridge: cambridge university press. yudin, greg. 2022. “the neoliberal roots of putin’s war.” emancipations: a journal of critical social analysis 1 (4): 1-13. https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=emancipations. zachmann, georg, giovanni sgaravatti, and ben mcwilliams. 2021. “european natural gas imports.” bruegel. accessed february 10, 2023. https://www.bruegel.org/publications/ datasets/european-natural-gas-imports/ . https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=emancipations https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=emancipations https://www.bruegel.org/publications/datasets/european-natural-gas-imports/ https://www.bruegel.org/publications/datasets/european-natural-gas-imports/ 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 14-29 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 an evaluation of the proposed serbia-kosovo land swap deal and its potential status under applicable international law ryan mak, university college, london (ucl), uk1 abstract with only about half of the members of the united nations recognizing its declaration of independence, the lack of universal consensus on kosovo’s independence in 2008 has put the country’s status legal status as a legitimate state in limbo. the serbia-kosovo land swap deal has been proposed as a way to break the deadlock and potentially lead to the international recognition of kosovo. this article evaluates the applicable legal standards under international law form both of the scenarios—that kosovo is and is not a sovereign state. it explored the issues from the perspectives of purely territorial exchange, groups of people in terms of the legality of population exchanges and rights of self-determination and minority rights. it also investigates the implication of the land swap on individual human rights issues under the existing legal framework, thereby considering if the deal is compliant with international law and providing food for thought. 1 ryan mak has a master of laws in international law with distinction from university college london (ucl), uk 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 1. introduction the idea of land swaps, which involve an exchange of land between different parties, is not new to public international law. many states have made land swap deals, an example is india and bangladesh signed the land boundary agreement (2015) to exchange several of their respective enclaves (ministry of external affairs, government of india 2015). exchanges of land and populations between a sovereign state and what it perceives as its breakaway region, which is also a partially recognized state itself, is, however, relatively uncommon. moreover, as lesaffer (2016) noted, despite the demarcation of borders derived from the concept of modern sovereign states, land swaps have become increasingly rare. this can partly be explained by globalization and the increase of cross-border jurisdictions, which remove the need for hard borders and homogenous communities and territories. the proposed land swap deal (hereafter referred to as “the deal”) between the republic of serbia and the partially recognized state republic of kosovo —which serbia calls the autonomous province of kosovo and metohija—has generated great controversy. the deal first emerged in 2018 when their respective presidents announced they were considering border changes to reach an unprecedented peace settlement between the two entities. kosovo president hashim thaçi proclaimed it was time for kosovo to reach a binding legal agreement with serbia and openly urged other countries not to oppose such an agreement, even if it may involve correcting borders (gray and heath 2018). this is mainly because it would potentially pave the way for serbia to finally recognize the unilateral declaration of independence of kosovo, which may, in turn, aid both their bids for european integration and lead to kosovo being admitted to the united nations (un) as a member state. specific details of the deal have yet to be finalized and announced publicly because negotiations were conducted behind closed doors (gray and heath, 2018). although no concrete plan is known currently, it is widely believed the deal would involve transferring the land of the majority ethnic albanian municipalities of bujanovac and preševo (hereafter referred to as the “preševo valley”) in serbia to kosovo; while, in return, the majority ethnic serbian region of north kosovo, including the municipalities of north mitrovica, leposavić, zvečan, and zubin potok would be transferred from kosovo to serbia. it is rumoured that the serbian municipality of medveđa would also be transferred to kosovo, but it is uncertain whether it would eventually be included in the deal because it has an ethnic serbian majority, albeit with a considerable ethnic albanian minority. in contrast, the majority ethnic serbian enclaves in kosovo proper, which constitute the “association of serb majority municipalities,” including štrpce, gračanica, novo brdo, ranilug, klokot, and parteš, are believed not to form part of the deal and would instead be officially incorporated into kosovo instead (huszka 2018). however, as populations do reside on the land in question, redrawing borders in kosovo almost inevitably would also lead to chaotic population exchanges (rossi 2018). this article will be based on the deal as stated above. it is worth noting that neither government has disclosed precise details of the deal, and the deal has been criticized and rejected by prominent world leaders like former german chancellor angela merkel largely due to fear of restoking ethnic tensions and violence in the balkans (gray 2018). as there currently lacks any progress on the deal, it may seem that the deal is non-existent or even off the table. however, although the idea of a land swap under the deal may sound contingent and hypothetical, the idea of it as one of the principles of territorial modification is still worth discussing as a possible dispute resolution mechanism under international law using the specific example of kosovo for illustration and future reference. 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 this article argues that redrawing state borders and any inevitable exchange or transfer of populations based on ethnic lines under such a deal between belgrade and pristina would be unlawful under international law. as populations reside on the land concerned, it would be difficult to imagine that redrawing borders in the case of kosovo would not affect the populations in the region. however, the author does not imply that there is an element of forced population transfer or exchange connected with the deal. nonetheless, it is worthwhile to discuss population exchange in order to consider the larger legal parameters of such a swap since this could arise under other circumstances as well. as such, apart from investigating the legality of land swaps from a purely territorial perspective, this article will also analyze the proposed deal based on the legality of population exchanges as a group, their right of selfdetermination, and the general human rights of all individuals involved. this article will specifically concentrate on the legality of such a deal under international law, which has been much more shallowly explored when compared to its practical and legal consequences and ramifications in literature. in accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of kosovo (kosovo advisory opinion), the international court of justice (icj) held that the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 by kosovo did not violate any applicable rule of general international law (icj 2010, para 122). this article does not attempt to resolve the complicated question of statehood for kosovo, notwithstanding its recognition by serbia may be a potential consequence of the deal because it is largely irrelevant to the legality of the deal itself. that said, this article recognizes the status of statehood would create different implications for what is and is not the relevant binding law regarding the applicable legal regimes. thus, this article will evaluate the deal based on both scenarios that kosovo is and is not a sovereign state, where relevant, to provide a more comprehensive legal analysis on the issue. the main aim of this article is to explore the legality of the deal by evaluating it against relevant applicable international law and contribute to existing literature on the deal itself, such as pavkokić’s (2018) analysis on how likely it would materialize based on domestic constitutional hurdles in serbia and kosovo respectively, and rossi (2018) who investigated the potentially dangerous ramifications of the deal and how they are undesirable (rossi 2018). another objective of the article is to use the deal and situation in kosovo as a form of case study to draw out implications for and ultimately stimulate a broader debate surrounding the current status of territorial and population exchanges under international law and their compatibility with other areas of international law like human rights and self-determination overall. 2. territorial exchange: legality of land swaps firstly, this article argues that territorial change through land swaps is largely permitted under international law if they purely involve an exchange of territory with no population exchanges involved. considering kosovo as an independent state, there are precedents supporting land swaps on an inter-state level. one example is belgium ceded a small peninsula to the netherlands, which gave a piece of its territory containing a water lock in return (lesaffer 2016). although the land exchanged was unequal in area, it helped to simplify the border and reflected the change in course of river meuse (reuters in brussels 2016). however, it is important to note the land exchanged was uninhabited and small. to the extent that the territory is uninhabited, the land swap under the deal would likely be legal like the belgian and dutch case. the proposed deal would also involve exchanging inhabited territories across the river ibar, separating north kosovo from kosovo proper, resulting in more complications because consent from its inhabitants is required, which will be discussed in detail in part 3. furthermore, as alvarez-jimenez observed, once the icj had held that a boundary agreement existed between the relevant parties, it would be extremely reluctant to declare it as unlawful, as evident in cameroon v nigeria and qatar v bahrain 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 (alvarez-jimenez 2012, 509). this principle would apply to territorial agreements concluded under the deal from an inter-state angle, making the land swap legal if no populations are involved. if kosovo is considered a part of serbia instead, there are also relevant examples of land swaps to draw upon. under the 1995 dayton peace accords annex 2 article i, the two entities comprising bosnia and herzegovina (bih), namely republika srpska (rs) and the federation of bih, agreed to establish the inter-entity boundary line, which involved swapping territories (osce 1995). article ii also stipulated that both entities can adjust the line by mutual consent. in international law terms, the agreement on the inter-entity boundary line was entered into force upon signature by the two entities and the bih government under article viii after endorsement by croatia and the federal republic of yugoslavia (fry), the predecessor state of serbia and montenegro. this made the agreement legally effective and created a precedent for land swaps on an intra-state level. like kosovo, republika srpska was also part of a constituent republic of the now-dissolved former socialist federal republic of yugoslavia (sfry) rather than a constituent republic in itself. the main distinguishing factor is that a deal that finalizes territorial boundaries between serbia and kosovo would likely remove objections from serbia and other states and might lead to greater international legal recognition of kosovo as a state, whereas the dayton accords were designed to ensure rs remains part of bih. however, this article is purely concerned with the legality of the deal, not its legal consequence of opening a pandora’s box for the balkans, nor attempts to resolve the question of kosovo’s statehood. thus, as they both share similar starting points, there is no reason why the serbia-kosovo deal would be illegal purely from a territorial exchange perspective when territorial swapping under the dayton accords had already been permitted by the major powers. however, human rights group al-haq argued that land swap agreements can be illegal, as evident in agreements concluded between israel and the palestinian authority due to the clear imbalance of power between the two parties involved (al-haq 2011). in legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied palestinian territory, the icj held that the fourth geneva convention (gciv) article 49 (6) regarding the prohibition of an occupying power from deporting or transferring “parts of its own civilian population into the territories it occupies" is absolute and cannot be derogated even for imperative military reasons (icj 2004, para 135). yet the deal can be distinguished from that of palestine concerning the applicable law. firstly, the palestine case does not concern land swaps without population exchanges as is discussed here. next, although palestine shares a similar status to kosovo as a partially recognized state, international humanitarian law (ihl) does not apply to the deal because gciv regarding protection of civilians in times of war only applies to situations of occupation following an international armed conflict. serbia cannot be seen as an occupying power of kosovo because kosovo was, in fact, an autonomous province of serbia before the dissolution of sfry based on the principle of uti possidetis juris2 (hasani 2003, 93). after the kosovo war in 1999, serbia no longer de facto controls kosovo which unilaterally declared independence in 2008. even north kosovo, which is inhabited by a majority of ethnic serbs, has been under the jurisdiction of the nato-led kosovo force (kfor) and the united nations interim administration mission in kosovo (unmik) since 1999, not serbia itself (unmik 2008). as this is not a situation of occupation, ihl is not the relevant applicable legal framework and regime to the deal. hence, the concept of a land swap itself is likely lawful under a deal when there is only territory being exchanged and no population is involved. 2 latin for “as possess under law” in a principle of international law which provides that newly formed states should retain the internal borders that their preceding independent area had before their independence 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 3. group and peoples: population exchange, minority rights, and self-determination compared to the question of territorial change which only involves exchanging uninhabited land, population exchanges are generally more controversial because they involve moving groups of people across national boundaries and the law on this issue is less clear due to its inherent complexities. although it is established above that land swaps without population exchanges may be permitted under international law, redrawing borders under a deal inevitably would lead to chaotic population exchanges as people do live on such land (rossi 2018). this article argues that it is very difficult to meet the required legal standard and would consequently violate their right of self-determination and minority rights, which are protected under international law. 3.1 legality of population exchanges land swaps involving the exchange of populations, as envisaged by the deal, could be difficult to fulfill using the conditions of international law. according to the council of europe (coe) rapporteur egidijus vareikis, population transfers entail the permanent movement of a large group of people defined by their ethnicity or religion from one region to another (council of europe parliamentary assembly 2011, 4). this article argues that the deal would be largely illegal if it involved population transfers because it would be realistically difficult to obtain free and informed consent from the populations involved in the exchange. there were cases where population exchanges were accepted as a lawful and legitimate way to settle ethnic conflicts, as seen in the exchange of greek and turkish populations after the first world war when the ottoman empire was dissolved (motta 2013, 365). under the 1923 lausanne convention article 1, this exchange was compulsory, and the populations involved were banned from returning to their original country of residence (republic of türkiye ministry of foreign affairs ministry of foreign affairs 1923). another example was the 1940 treaty of craiova which exchanged populations between romania and bulgaria when bulgaria retook southern dobruja (ilc 1973, 41). both treaties show population exchanges were historically tolerated and had even become a legally acceptable norm until the second world war. however, population exchanges have largely been outlawed under international law today when they are carried out involuntarily. according to the 1997 un draft declaration on population transfer and the implantation of settlers article 3 (un declaration), an unlawful population transfer refers to one “without the free and informed consent of the transferred and any receiving population” (ecosoc 1997). although this declaration is technically non-binding, the concept of free and informed consent is widely considered vital in determining whether a population transfer would be considered lawful (council of europe parliamentary assembly 2011). meindersma (1997) also observed that population exchanges would accord with international law only if they were “carried out voluntarily” (653). this implies obtaining consent from the populations involved is the key factor in determining whether the exchange is voluntary and, hence, lawful. the main obstacle to traverse is how to determine what free and informed consent means precisely because there is currently no uniform definition, which is tricky and makes it highly difficult for states to fulfill this requirement. according to the un office of the high commissioner for human rights (ohchr), “free” consent implies there is no coercion, intimidation, or manipulation; meanwhile, “informed” consent means information is provided covering aspects including purpose, scope, and potential risks (ohchr 2013). although these definitions apply to the rights of indigenous peoples, they could serve as a useful reference for the context of population exchanges. it would be difficult to ensure any content obtained 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 would be free from coercion in view of the underlying hostile ethnic tensions in kosovo. as neither government has disclosed precise details of what was discussed, it is uncertain whether any consent would be informed as this depends on the amount and type of information provided and on the ability of the population to comprehend such information. when the criteria applied are opaque, the information they receive would likely be incomplete, making it difficult to satisfy the requirement of informed consent. turning to obtaining consent itself, referenda are usually regarded as the most democratic and straightforward method since the opinions of the wider population are considered. to achieve this, referenda under strict international supervision from the european union (eu), the organization for security and co-operation (osce) or un monitors, where the populations are asked an unambiguous question, can be considered as an adequate mechanism to obtain consent. however, the required percentage of the population for approval, 50 percent or a two-thirds supermajority, remains highly contested. the geographical scope of the hypothetical referendum is also uncertain. it could be purely limited to the relevant ethnic groups, expanded to the entire population of the affected areas or even the entire country as a unit. furthermore, it is difficult to demarcate specifically which constituencies should be involved in the decision-making process because there is an inevitable selective bias. this then leads to problems of who has the right to choose these criteria and the basis on which these criteria should be chosen. these problems hypothetically could be resolved by direct agreement between the governments of serbia and kosovo. they might also be determined through an independent thirdparty arbitrator like the european commission if required. nonetheless, these uncertainties demonstrate that obtaining consent is not straightforward at all. another problem is to determine who would decide whether the chosen criteria fulfill the requirement of free and informed consent under international law because the office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights (ohchr) noted that it is difficult to verify such consent and even urged to establish new mechanisms and procedures for verification (ohchr 2013). regardless of who eventually became the ultimate arbiter, the criteria applied would not satisfy the wishes of all the relevant parties because it is highly unlikely everyone affected by the deal would be given a veto over this population exchange, so serbia and kosovo would find it hard to completely satisfy this requirement under international law. obtaining the necessary legal consent could also be unnecessarily challenging and long-winded. an example is the exchange of populations and territory between tajikistan and uzbekistan, which was completed only 16 years after signing the exchange agreement. professor burnashev from the kazakhgerman university explained that the process took so long because the central authorities reaching a solution does not mean that locals at the community level who live close and have relatives on both sides of the border agreed with it (cabar 2021). similar problems would likely surface in kosovo when exchanging populations living in and around north kosovo and preševo valley, meaning it could take a long time before the deal would be ratified in practice as legal. furthermore, the consent of serbs living in enclaves within kosovo proper, which form the “association of serb majority municipalities” like gračanica, might be completely ignored because it is rumoured that the proposed deal does not include them as part of the population exchange (huszka 2018). they would vigorously oppose the deal because they would want to avoid being permanently trapped within the majority ethnic albanian kosovo, thus prolonging the time for the deal to become legal. frank (2017, 414), however, observed that population transfers continue to be an extreme option to resolve modern major international crises due to a lack of alternatives. according to this idea, it is necessary to uphold the distinction between voluntary and compulsory population transfers because, although it might sound artificial, the element of consent acts as the key distinguishing factor to determine the legality of 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 the exchange. after all, the status of kosovo has been in limbo since 1999 despite constant talks, which has deeply hindered both sides regarding their international standing and prospects of attaining longlasting peace. prolonging the conflict serves the interests of neither of the parties, so while it may be an unconventional measure, one could argue that a deal that involves population exchanges could be considered as the way to break the deadlock and impasse because such a deal could potentially lead to the international recognition of kosovo. however, there is no guarantee peace could be obtained through this deal because population exchanges might reignite ethnic tensions. even assuming peace would be the outcome, this does not necessarily mean the deal would be lawful, and the result might come at the expense of justice for the populations involved. as özsu (2014, 125) argued, it is difficult to conceive that people would voluntarily submit themselves to community-wide displacement from their homeland, so the distinction between voluntary and compulsory transfers seems to be untenable, especially in the current age. this explains why even kupchan (2018), who strongly supported the deal, conceded that this population exchange would amount to a “peaceful ethnic cleansing” due to demographic changes which would consequently occur (kupchan 2018). international law has already developed such that individuals and groups should not be subject to population exchanges either as participants or recipients (meindersma 1994). thus, it remains unlikely any population exchanges under the deal could be considered lawful since it would be difficult to obtain free and informed consent. 3.2 right of self-determination & minority rights next, this article argues that the deal also poses further challenges under international law when considering minority rights and the right of self-determination pursuant to un charter article 1(2) and international covenant on civil and political rights article 1, which enshrine the rights of people to freely determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. as lister (2016, 22) argued, any serious theory of self-determination must address the problem of population transfers if it aims to be comprehensive. population exchanges are inherently linked with the concept of self-determination and minority rights because the exchange would directly affect the destiny of the respective national or ethnic populations as a group. having concluded above that it would be highly difficult to meet the legal standard of obtaining free and informed consent, it follows that implementing the deal would likely violate the right of self-determination for the populations to be exchanged because swapping territory without their free and informed consent means neglecting their right to determine their own fate and status. un declaration article 7 stipulates that population transfers cannot be legalized by international agreements when they violate fundamental human rights norms or peremptory norms of international law, which include the right of selfdetermination (ecosoc 1997). groups required to accept the changes in territory would also likely lose their right to govern themselves without any outside political interference because they may now find themselves on the wrong side of the border and cut off from their parent state. a relevant example is the serbs living in enclaves within kosovo proper, who would be completely excluded from the deal, as rumoured, unlike their counterparts in north kosovo (huszka 2018). there is currently no indication that the deal includes the possibility of allowing them to retain their serbian citizenship. although they would likely be accorded relevant minority rights under iccpr article 27, which protects their rights to practice their own religion and use their own language, it is worth noting that serbia and kosovo are currently governed by transitional and hybrid regimes where the rule of law and democratic principles are weak (freedom house 2023), so the rights of no one, let alone minorities, in both places, are fully assured. by 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 forcing serbs to officially become citizens of kosovo, their wish to remain as part of serbia would be ignored, which in turn undermines and violates their right to self-determination. according to the international law commission (ilc) articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (arsiwa) article 41(1), “states shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach” of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. under article 40(2), a breach “is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible states to fulfil such obligation.” here, the obligation refers to upholding the right of selfdetermination of the populations involved. article 41(2) further stipulates that states shall not recognize situations “created by a serious breach” as lawful, “nor render aid or assistance” to maintain such situations. the ilc recently recognized the right of self-determination as a peremptory norm of general international law according to conclusion 23 on jus cogens3 which was adopted by the commission on first reading in 2019 (ilc 2019, 147). if the deal is evaluated from an inter-state perspective, both serbia and kosovo would be legally obliged not to mutually assist each other in any serious breaches of the right of selfdetermination and should also cooperate together to bring those breaches to an end. on the contrary, if kosovo is considered as a part of serbia instead, outside countries must also not recognize the situation created by the deal as lawful when free and informed consent of the populations is lacking. it is true that the deal might not violate the right of self-determination if both serbia’s and kosovo’s governments consulted all the affected populations concerned and subsequently reached an agreement between them because this would constitute free and informed consent, making the exchange voluntary. however, as free and informed consent of the populations could unlikely be legitimately obtained, the right of self-determination remains likely to be violated consequently. one could also argue the deal is lawful because it gives effect to and even strengthens kosovo’s right of self-determination to overcome its current lack of universal recognition. yet it must be noted that kosovo was not a constituent federal republic of the former yugoslavia like slovenia but rather an autonomous province of serbia. this unique status means kosovo could not itself directly be a self-determination unit when the dissolution of sfry occurred based on the principle of uti possidetis juris and thus had no right to claim sovereignty, a point even noted by dr. hasani (2003), the professor of international law at the university of pristina. instead, the idea of kosovo having the right to self-determination is mostly based on the highly contested concept of remedial secession. simon (2011, 108) argued that grave human rights violations by serbia during the kosovo war in 1998, such as the ljubenić and prekaz massacres,4 gave kosovo a right to secede from its parent state (simon 2011, 108). in the kosovo advisory opinion, the icj considered it unnecessary to resolve this question because it was beyond the scope of the question posed by the un general assembly (icj 2010, para 83). the ambiguous icj jurisprudence indicates the legality of remedial secession remains largely unclear. as van den driest highlighted, remedial secession is far from being completely crystallized into customary international law (cil) as a universally accepted ground leading to the right of external self-determination both in terms of state practice and opinio juris,5 but this topic will not be explored in detail as it is largely unrelated to the legality of the deal (van den driest 2013, 223). furthermore, at the time of writing, nearly half of the 193 un member states do not recognize kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. this number remains considerable and significant because it shows there is no universal consensus on the issue. thus, it remains unclear if kosovo is entitled 3 a principle which forms the norm of international law that cannot be set aside. 4 ljubenic and prekaz massacres occureed in march 1999 and march 1998 respectively when serbia forces attacked the villages of ljubenic and prekaz resulting in the death of many civilians and nato’s intervention. 5 latin for “an opinion of law.” 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 to such a right as a matter of state practice under customary international law in the first place, let alone for it to be strengthened by the deal. 4. individual: human rights finally, moving from group to the individual level, this article argues the deal likely would contravene the human rights obligations of both serbia and kosovo under existing legal frameworks, which act as additional thresholds that must be met before the deal could be considered as compliant with international law. this will be analyzed from the perspective of the european convention on human rights, state responsibility for human rights breaches and the international covenant on civil and political rights. 4.1 european convention of human rights (echr) a relevant legal framework is the european convention of human rights (echr) which binds serbia, being a council of europe member state but not non-member kosovo. this could be problematic because it potentially creates a divergence from serbia in human rights obligations. the obligations of serbia visà-vis serbia proper and kosovo will be analyzed respectively below. when considering serbia proper only, conducting involuntary population exchanges under the deal would likely violate echr article 8(1), which states that “everyone has the right to respect for their private and family life, home and correspondence” and article 8(2), which stipulates there shall be “no interference by a public authority” to exercise this right barring a few legitimate exceptions. regarding interference with the right to respect for one’s home, in cyprus v turkey, the european court of human rights (ecthr) held that forcible deportation and excursion of greek cypriots by turkey to other places in cyprus constituted an interference with their private life (echr 1976, para 209). meanwhile, in slivenko v latvia, the ecthr found that removing one from the country where they had developed uninterruptedly since birth against their own will and causing them to lose their homes through deportation orders constituted an interference with their “private life” and “home” under echr article 8(1) (echr 2003, para 96). applying these cases to the deal, when free and informed consent of the individuals involved is lacking, forcing them to abide by the land swap would theoretically amount to removing them from their native homeland against their own will and causing their homes to be lost, particularly when eviction orders are issued. this not only deprives such individuals of the right to develop relationships with other ethnic groups whilst embracing their individual social identity but also could constitute deportation and expulsion were they to flee their homes, meaning echr article 8 is likely breached since it constitutes an interference of their private life. moreover, the expropriation of properties during the population exchange would likely raise restitution claims to the serbian government for a fair and equitable outcome for the deprivation of their personal possessions. on the contrary, when assessing the extent of serbia’s responsibility for acts occurring in kosovo, the legal concept of effective control applies. if it is established that serbia has effective control over kosovo’s territory, the obligations it needs to fulfill would consequently increase. in loizidou v turkey (preliminary objections), the ecthr held that the responsibility of a state may arise when it exercises effective control over an area as a consequence of military action and that the obligation to secure rights and freedoms in the area derives from such control, whether exercised directly through its armed forces or indirectly through a subordinate local administration (echr 1995, para 62). as turkey had effective control over the self-proclaimed “turkish republic of northern cyprus” (trnc) through occupation by its troops, the 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 court concluded that acts causing cypriot greek refugees to lose control of their property and subsequently preventing their re-access were capable of falling within turkish “jurisdiction” within the meaning of echr article 1(1) (echr 1995, para 63–64). considering the attribution and responsibility of serbia for what happens within kosovo, the above, however, largely does not apply here because serbia does not have de facto control over kosovo. this point is reinforced and substantiated in azemi v serbia, in which the ecthr held that there are objective limitations preventing serbia from securing rights and freedoms in kosovo because serbia did not exercise any control over the united nations interim administration mission in kosovo nor kosovo’s judiciary, nor militarily, economically, or politically supported kosovo’s institutions. the court also held it could not point to any positive obligations serbia had towards the applicant from kosovo because even serbian courts themselves confirmed that serbia had not exercised effective control in kosovo since 1999, so serbia cannot be held responsible under echr article 1 (echr 2013, para 47–49). hessbruegge (2013) noted echr binds only state parties, and the ecthr lacks jurisdiction ratione personae 6 to hear complaints directed against de facto authorities, so it can only indirectly address them by adjudicating cases against states having influence over such authorities. istrefi (2004) also highlighted that kosovo remains a “no man’s land” when it comes to the application of human rights under the echr. here, there is no basis to attribute the conduct of the kosovar administration to serbia because, unlike turkey vis-àvis the turkish republic of northern cyprus, kosovo is a de facto breakaway territory with its own police force and military, so it cannot be seen as being controlled by serbia directly nor pulling the strings behind. thus, the responsibility of serbia for human rights breaches and violations in kosovo itself, as opposed to serbia proper, remains limited in the council of europe context. 4.2 state responsibility for human rights breaches notwithstanding the above, the limited responsibility does not mean that serbia can assist or encourage further human rights breaches in kosovo. the legal basis for this can be found in ilc arsiwa article 16, which sets out that a state aiding or assisting another state “in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is also internationally responsible for doing so if (i) that state knows the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act and (ii) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that state.” in application of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (bosnia and herzegovina v serbia and montenegro) (genocide convention), the icj held that this provision reflects customary international law and while it mostly concerns situations characterized by the relationship between two states, it nonetheless merits consideration even when the situation is not in such context (icj 2 2007, para 420). this point is strengthened by judge ad hoc mahiou, who, in his dissenting opinion, stated that although the provision does not seem directly applicable since the entity in question, republika srpska (rs), has no international status, it follows that states which provided aid or assistance will be responsible insofar as it facilitated the commission of an internationally wrongful act (icj 2 2007, para 124). before applying the above legal principle to the deal, it is important to note the genocide convention, which is broad and extraterritorial in its application, is not the relevant applicable regime in this case because there is no indication that genocide would occur as a result of the deal. however, notwithstanding 6 latin for “by reason of the person”—a legal term referring to the capacity of a person to possess the rights and obligations under international law. 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 this difference, the genocide convention case remains relevant to the deal because the application of ilc arsiwa article 16 regarding internationally wrongful acts extends beyond genocide and is applicable to other wrongful acts such as breach of human rights obligations. if kosovo is considered an independent sovereign state, serbia is responsible for not encouraging and triggering further human rights breaches in kosovo because ilc arsiwa article 16 applies on an inter-state level, and the icj already held that article 16 reflects customary international law (cil) (icj 2 2007, para 420). this means it would be an internationally wrongful act if serbia assists kosovo in breaching its international obligations of human rights regarding respect for private and family life through the deal because signing the deal would indicate that serbia knew the circumstances of the act. this legal principle is not limited to relations between kosovo and serbia; it is applicable to other countries in the world too. an example is when the us, under the trump administration, offered active support for the deal during the 2020 kosovo and serbia economic normalization agreements in order to pursue its foreign policy objectives regarding israel, including but not limited to backing normalization agreements between israel and several arab nations (walker and macdowall 2018). this support would likely amount to aiding serbia in committing breaches of its human rights obligations under international law, which could have made the us contravene the articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (arsiwa) article 16. if kosovo is considered an entity within serbia, it is similar to republika srpska (rs) in being a constituent part of a larger territorial state. as mentioned above, the icj held that arsiwa article 16 can largely still be applied to relationships between a state and a non-state entity, so it could theoretically be applied to the relationship between serbia and kosovo (icj 2 2007, para 420). however, unlike rs, the capacity of serbia to influence what happens in kosovo is hugely different. regarding the notion of “due diligence,” the icj held in the genocide convention that when assessing whether a state has duly discharged the obligation concerned, its capacity to influence effectively the actions of persons involved is relevant. this capacity to influence may vary greatly among different states depending on the geographical distance of the state from the scene of events and the strength of all links between authorities of that state and the main actors. it must also be assessed by legal criteria because it is clear every state may only act within the limits permitted by international law (icj 2 2007, para 430). here, although kosovo geographically borders serbia proper, the authorities of serbia cannot control what happens in kosovo, which de facto falls under the jurisdiction of the kosovar authorities, so the strength of connection and capacity to influence are very weak. the threshold of effective control applied by the icj is also more stringent than that of the echr because, as rooney (2015) noted, the latter is aimed at improving human rights protection. when kosovo already fails to meet the effective control test under the echr, it is even more difficult for it to do so before the icj. one might attempt to argue that albania has effective control over kosovo because of their close ethnolinguistic ties and frequent cross-border exchanges between tirana and pristina. however, as the international crisis group (1998) noted, their political division for over 80 years has caused both communities to evolve very differently. there is currently no evidence to indicate albania controls the institutions of kosovo to the extent of russia visà-vis transnistria and serbia vis-à-vis rs during the yugoslav wars. therefore, as kosovo is not within serbia’s sphere of influence, the extent of responsibility and obligations of serbia for what happens in kosovo are incredibly limited. hence, there is little serbia can do to prevent human rights breaches within kosovo proper itself directly if kosovo is not considered an independent state. however, if it is, both serbia and kosovo and other countries are obliged under arsiwa article 16 not to assist in breaching international human rights obligations through the deal. 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 4.3 international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr) serbia ratified the international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr) on march 12, 2001, through its succession from the federal republic of yugoslavia (fry). to the extent that kosovo is not considered an independent sovereign state, it would become bound by the iccpr as a territorial component of serbia. serbia would thus be responsible for ensuring its iccpr obligations are fulfilled throughout all its territory, including kosovo. however, if kosovo was considered an independent sovereign state instead, its ratification of the relevant treaties would become crucial. so far, kosovo has yet to independently ratify the iccpr and become a party to it, which may indicate it is not obliged to follow the covenant. nonetheless, its lack of ratification does not necessarily mean kosovo is not bound by customary international human rights law (ihrl). in his report on human rights in transnistria, un senior expert thomas hammarberg (2013, 4) highlighted that customary international law obligates de facto authorities to uphold the most fundamental human rights norms and obligations. also, as simmons (2009) and stone (2012, 162) noted, the iccpr has generally agreed to reflect cil due to its ratification by more than 170 states indicating sufficient state practice. when the iccpr reflects customary international law, kosovar authorities are legally obliged to respect fundamental human rights and ensure there is no violation within kosovo under international law. another relevant point on kosovo being bound by the iccpr concerns the law on state succession. the un human rights committee (unhrc) took the view that protection of rights under the iccpr devolves with the territory and continues to belong to the people accorded such protection even if there is a change in government, including dismemberment in more than one state or state succession (unhrc 1997). when serbia ratified the iccpr in 2001, it intended to include the kosovar territory, so when kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008, it can be said that the rights under the iccpr continue to apply within kosovo because the kosovo authorities are simply acting in the place of the serbian government. even if this cannot be established, the same principle applies to the united nations interim administration mission in kosovo and the nato-led kosovo force when they took control over kosovo in 1999 from the federal republic of yugoslavia (fry) because the unhrc considered that the iccpr remained applicable in kosovo (el-khoury 2020, 347). aside from the rights to private and family life in the echr, which are also protected under the iccpr, another relevant potential violation by the deal is iccpr article 12(1), which states that everyone lawfully within the territory of a state shall have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose their residence. any population exchange and demarcation of new international borders between serbia and kosovo as a result of the deal would hinder the freedom of movement for people on both sides of the border. more importantly, the deal would effectively deny people the right to choose their residence when they need to flee their homes and be transferred to another territory through the land swap without obtaining their consent. hessbruegge (2013) highlighted that ihrl leaves protection gaps where de facto authorities operating beyond the reach of the territorial state commit human rights violations due to the state-centric nature of international law. as kosovar authorities operate beyond the reach of serbia, it may seem that they can violate human rights without much consequence since they are not state parties to these human rights treaties. even if the iccpr is said to reflect customary international law, the role of the unhrc in monitoring the implementation of the iccpr vis-à-vis non-state parties like kosovo may still be limited because of the lack of jurisdiction over such cases. it is also true that according to the vienna convention on the succession of treaties 1978 article 9, a unilateral declaration made by a successor state providing for the continuance in force of treaties vis-à-vis its territory does not mean obligations or rights under 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 those treaties have successfully become so for the successor state or other state parties to such treaties. however, according to article 22 of kosovo’s own constitution, adopted following its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the echr and iccpr are “directly applicable in kosovo” and, in case of conflict, “have priority over provisions of laws and other acts of public institutions” (constitute project 2016). article 22 fully demonstrates the willingness of kosovo to be bound by both international conventions despite being a partially recognized state. by doing so, kosovo cannot claim to be completely free from any international responsibility and would still largely need to comply with ihrl when implementing the deal. hence, the deal would be largely unlawful under international law when considering the human rightsbased paradigm. given the number of potential human rights violations that might occur if the deal became a reality, the forebearers of human rights law arguably have already foreseen such situations arising and seek to limit the damage caused to individual rights. both parties should, therefore, seriously reconsider if they ever push ahead with the deal and, if so, proceed with huge caution to prevent human rights violations being committed as a result of the deal. 5. conclusion as has been argued throughout the article, as it currently stands, the proposed deal would be unlawful under international law when evaluated against the relevant applicable legal standards. although it is established that redrawing borders through land swaps can be legal when no people are involved, the deal would inevitably involve population exchanges, and it is very difficult to meet the required legal threshold regarding free and informed consent due to uncertainties surrounding the definition. the lack of consent would cause the deal to likely violate the right of self-determination for both serbs and kosovars who live on different sides of the border. it also likely would violate the human rights of individuals, especially regarding their right to private and family life under echr article 8 and under the iccpr, since it may lead to the deportation of people. regardless of whether kosovo is considered an independent state, the kosovar authorities and the serbian government both have the responsibility to prevent potential human rights violations within their respective territories and must not assist each other in violations through the deal. by analyzing the deal through different areas of international law, this article hopes to have achieved its primary aim of evaluating its legality more holistically from multiple perspectives. this article also seeks to provide food for thought should the deal ever proceed. the analysis conducted does not suggest that the deal needs to be completely prohibited and scrapped. after all, both sides' willingness and manifested intention to resolve a longstanding ethnic conflict deserve appreciation and should be continued. nonetheless, this article does serve as an acute reminder for both serbia and kosovo that significant modifications may be required to comply with the relevant international legal standards on human rights and self-determination. this would consequently create less litigation surrounding the deal to the benefit of both governments and improve their international reputation. the parties could also come up with alternative creative solutions, such as facilitating a new freedom of movement scheme allowing people on both sides and even other neighbouring balkan countries to cross borders without hindrance to resolve their conflict rather than purely relying on the deal itself. this would reduce the risk of contravening international law and appease negative opinions of the deal, which are already evident on the ground in both serbia and kosovo, especially from those involved in the exchange. although some may say resolving their differences through the deal can accelerate both countries’ legal accession into the eu, particularly for serbia since it has already achieved candidate status, this does not make the deal legal. with the increased globalization in the twenty-first century, the idea of redrawing 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 borders to create an ethnically pure community denies the desire and right of these different communities to coexist and live together as peaceful neighborsu. it also goes against the trend of facilitating greater harmonization in europe as a matter of policy objective, given that both serbia and kosovo aspire to eventually become members of the eu. the deal might, in fact, derail the peace process because international law generally prefers stability. while keeping the status quo is by no means perfect, it is arguably the lesser of two evils compared to enforcing a population exchange, which might disrupt the existing fragile peace that is already rare to find in the balkans. looking forward, if the deal were to go ahead, it would likely create massive ramifications for kosovo, with the possibility of destabilizing the region and reigniting old ethnic tensions. the deal might also have further knock-on domino effects for the wider balkan region. growing calls of republika srpska to secede from bosnia and herzegovina create the possibility for yet another land swap in the quest for statehood (karcic 2018). similar proposals of population transfers have also arisen in other areas of the world to resolve inter-state conflicts, such as the one between armenia and azerbaijan concerning the nagornokarabakh region and between china and india regarding kashmir (shats 2019). this means the analysis conducted in this article remains relevant to the discourse surrounding land swaps in general; it is not limited to the kosovo context and can be applied to other regions as well. thus, it can act as an invitation for more legal research in this area. however, whether the deal will ultimately be published and how both parties can reach a political settlement within the parameters of international law are questions which only time can answer. 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 references al-haq. 2011. “‘land swap’ agreements under occupation are illegal.” december 8, 2011. accessed july 14, 2023. https://www.alhaq.org/publications/6949.html. alvarez-jimenez, alberto. 2012. “boundary agreements in the icj’s case law, 2000-2010.” european journal of international law 23 (2): 495–515. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chs015. azemi v serbia. 2013. app no. 11209/09. echr. cabar (central asian bureau for analytical reporting). 2021. “how are negotiations on the border between tajikistan and uzbekistan being conducted?” june 21, 2021. accessed july 27, 2023. https://cabar.asia/en/?p=46356. council of europe parliamentary assembly. 2011. enforced population transfer as a human rights violation. https://assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2011/ajdoc49_2011.pdf. constitute project. 2016. “kosovo’s constitution of 2008 with amendments through 2016.” accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/kosovo_2016.pdf?lang=en. cyprus v turkey. 1976. app no. 6950/75. echr. ecosoc (united nations economic and social council). 1997. human rights and population transfer: final report of the special rapporteur mr. al-khasawneh. june 27, 1997. e/cn.4/sub.2/1997/23. el-khoury, naiade. 2020. “human rights treaties and the law of state succession in the event of secession.” max planck yearbook of united nations law online: 340–354. https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413_023001012. european court of human rights (echr). 1976. no. 6950/75. ———. 1995. no. 15318/89. ———. 2003. no. 48321/99. ———. 2004. no. 48787/99. ———. 2013. no. 11209/09. frank, matthew james. 2017. “making minorities history: population transfer in twentieth-century europe.” oxford: oxford university press. freedom house. 2023. “nations in transit 2023.” accessed february 28, 2024. https://freedomhouse.org/ country/serbia/nations-transit/2023/. gray, andrew. 2018. “angela merkel: no balkan border changes.” politico, august 13, 2018. accessed february 20, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-no-balkan-border-changeskosovo-serbia-vucic-thaci/. gray, andrew, and ryan heath. 2018. “serbia, kosovo presidents broach border changes for historic deal.” politico, august 25, 2018. accessed april 21, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/ aleksandar-vucic-hashim-thaci-serbia-kosovo-balkans-eu-enlargement-alpbach-forum/. hammarberg, thomas. 2013. “report on human rights in the transnistrian region of the republic of moldova.” united nations, february 14, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chs015 https://assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2011/ajdoc49_2011.pdf https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/nations-transit/2023/ https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/nations-transit/2023/ 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 hasani, enver. 2003. “uti possidetis juris: from rome to kosovo.” the fletcher forum of world affairs 27 (2): 85–97. http://hdl.handle.net/10427/76986. hessbruegge, jan arno. 2013. “introductory note to european court of human rights; catan and others v. moldova and russia.” international legal materials 52 (october): 14–17. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2409108. huszka, beata. 2018. “a high risk, high reward gamble: what are the benefits of a kosovo-serbia land swap?” lse blog, november 14, 2018. accessed may 24, 2023. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/11/14/a-high-risk-high-reward-gamble-what-are-thebenefits-of-a-kosovo-serbia-land-swap/. icg (international crisis group). 1998. “kosovo – the view from tirana: executive summary.” accessed july 26, 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/kosovoview-tirana. icj (international court of justice). 2007. application of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (bosnia and herzegovina v serbia and montenegro). accessed october 30, 2024. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/91. ———. 2004. legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied palestinian territory. accessed october 30, 2024. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/131. ———. 2010. accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of kosovo, advisory opinion. accessed october 30, 2024. https://www.icjcij.org/case/141. icl (international law commission). 1973. “yearbook of the international law commission volume ii.” united nations. https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1973_v2.pdf. ———. 2019. “report of the international law commission seventy-first session.” united nations. https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_74_10.pdfistrefi. istrefi, kushtrim. 2004. “azemi v serbia in the european court of human rights: (dis)continuity of serbia’s de jure jurisdiction over kosovo.” ejil:talk! march 13, 2004. accessed july 17, 2023. https://www.ejiltalk.org/azemi-v-serbia-in-the-european-court-of-human-rights-discontinuity-ofserbias-de-jure-jurisdiction-over-kosovo/. karcic, hikmet. 2018. “serbia-kosovo land swap deal looms large over bosnian elections.” trt world, october 6, 2018. accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/serbiakosovo-land-swap-deal-looms-large-over-bosnian-elections-20700. kryeziu, visar, and llazar semini. 2018. “tension flares in kosovo over possible land swap with serbia.” ap news, september 29, 2018. accessed july 30, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/ 6ca6a84c80ef48a6b04ebff333105fea. kupchan, charles. 2018. “an offensive plan for the balkans that the us should get behind.” new york times, september 13, 2018. accessed march 16, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/ 13/opinion/kosovo-serbia-land-swap.html. lesaffer, randall. 2016. “demarcating sovereignty: a history of dutch-belgian land swaps.” oupblog, february 22, 2016. accessed july 20, 2023. https://blog.oup.com/2016/02/demarcatingsovereignty-a-history-of-dutch-belgian-land-swaps/. http://hdl.handle.net/10427/76986 https://ssrn.com/abstract=2409108 https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1973_v2.pdf https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_74_10.pdfistrefi 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 lister, matthew. 2016. “self-determination, dissent, and the problem of population transfers.” in the theory of self-determination (asil studies in international legal theory), edited by fernando tesón. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. loizidou v turkey. 1995. “preliminary objections.” app no 15318/89. echr, march 23, 1995. meindersma, christa. 1994. “legal issues surrounding population transfers in conflict situations.” netherlands international law review 41 (1): 31–83. https://doi.org/10.1017/ s0165070x00008354. ———. 1997. “population exchanges: international law and state practice—part 2.” international journal of refugee law 9 (4): 613–653. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/9.4.613. milanovic, marko. 2019. “does the european court of human rights have to decide on sovereignty over crimea? part i: jurisdiction in article 1 echr.” ejiltalk! september 23, 2019. accessed august 10, 2023. https://www.ejiltalk.org/does-the-european-court-of-human-rights-have-todecide-on-sovereignty-over-crimea-part-i-jurisdiction-in-article-1-echr/. ministry of external affairs, government of india. 2015. india & bangladesh land boundary agreement. https://mea.gov.in/uploads/publicationdocs/24529_lba_mea_booklet_final.pdf. motta, giuseppe. 2013. less than nations: central-eastern european minorities after wwi, volume 1. newcastle upon thyne: cambridge scholars publishing. ohchr (office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights). 2013. free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/ issues/ipeoples/freepriorandinformedconsent.pdf. osce (organization for security and co-operation in europe). 1995. the general framework for peace in bosnia and herzegovina. december 14, 1995. https://www.osce.org/files/ f/documents/e/0/126173.pdf. özsu, umut. 2014. formalizing displacement: international law and population transfers. oxford, uk. oxford university press. pavković, aleksandar. 2018. “how likely –and dangerous– is a kosovo/serbia ‘land swap’?” verfassungsblog, september 14, 2018. accessed march 14, 2022. https://verfassungsblog.de/howlikely-and-dangerous-is-a-kosovo-serbia-land-swap/. raxhimi, altin. 2019. “kosovo academics brace for controversial ethnic land swaps.” nature, january 25, 2019. accessed 26 july 2023. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00293-9?. republic of türkiye ministry of foreign affairs. 1923. lausanne peace treaty vi. convention concerning the exchange of greek and turkish populations signed at lausanne, january 1923. accessed october 30, 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-vi_-conventionconcerning-the-exchange-of-greek-and-turkish-populations-signed-at-lausanne_.en.mfa. reuters in brussels. 2016. “belgium and netherlands agree to swap land to simplify border.” the guardian, november 29, 2016. accessed july 18, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/nov/29/belgium-and-the-netherlands-agree-to-swap-land-to-restore-border. rooney, jane. 2015. “the relationship between jurisdiction and attribution after jaloud v netherlands.” netherlands international law review 62: 407–428. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-015-0041-y. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0165070x00008354 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0165070x00008354 https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/9.4.613 https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00293-9 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 rossi, michael. 2018. “a land swap between kosovo and serbia would be deeply problematic and potentially dangerous.” lse blog, august 17, 2018. accessed march 28, 2023. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/08/17/a-land-swap-between-kosovo-and-serbia-wouldbe-deeply-problematic-and-potentially-dangerous/. shats, daniel. 2019. “following kashmir reorganization, china and india should negotiate a land swap.” the diplomat, december 17, 2019. accessed august 8, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/ following-kashmir-reorganization-china-and-india-should-negotiate-a-land-swap/. simon, thomas w. 2011. “remedial secession: what the law should have done, from katanga to kosovo.” georgia journal of international and comparative law 40: 105–173. accessed october 30, 2024. https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/gjicl/vol40/iss1/6. simmons, beth. 2009. “civil rights in international law: compliance with aspects of the ‘international bill of rights.’” indiana journal of global legal studies 16 (2): 437–481. accessed october 30, 2024. https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol16/iss2/4. slivenko v latvia. 2003. app no 48321/99. echr. stone, john h. dilfender. 2012. “assessing the existence of the right to translation under the international covenant on civil and political rights.” max planck yearbook of united nations law online 16 (1): 159–181. https://doi.org/10.1163/18757413-90000018. unhrc (united nations human rights committee). 1997. cpr general comment no. 26: continuity of obligations. ccpr/c/21/rev.1/add.8/rev.1 accessed october 30, 2024. https://www.refworld.org/legal/general/hrc/1997/en/7943. unmik (united nations mission in kosovo). 2008. “unmik and kfor condemn violence in north mitrovica.” reliefweb, march 17, 2008. accessed july 28, 2022. https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/ kosovo-unmik-and-kfor-condemn-violence-north-mitrovica. van den driest, simone. 2013. remedial secession: a right to external self-determination as a remedy to serious injustices. antwerp: intersentia. walker, shaun, and andrew macdowall. 2018. “us-backed kosovo land swap border plan under fire from all sides.” the guardian, september 3, 2018. accessed july 15, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/03/us-backed-kosovo-land-swap-border-planunder-fire-from-all-sides. https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol16/iss2/4 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 45-63 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 the economic successes and sources of discontent in east central europe1 rachel a. epstein2 university of denver abstract by some measures, the european union’s eastern enlargement, and the attendant securitization of east central europe through membership in the north atlantic treaty organization, have brought significant economic and welfare benefits to the former soviet satellites or republics that have joined these organizations. all of their economies are considerably larger than in 1989. foreign investment has helped fuel significant growth in the region, and financial linkages between east and west had a stabilizing influence during and after the us financial crisis of 2008-09. but economic success in absolute terms has not prevented a sense of disappointment from settling over the region, nor has it forestalled an illiberal backlash in a number of countries, which has had economic, political, and in some cases ethno-populist dimensions. this article examines some of the main economic trajectories around growth, consumption, investment, and finance. it explains why, despite numerous positive measures, both economic and political liberalism are under intensifying scrutiny. growing inequality within countries, as well as continuing inequality – including power disparities between east and west europe – have fueled discontent with the terms on which many east central european states have integrated into the eu. 1 the author would like to thank anushka bose and chuck aoki for their research assistance on this project. 2 rachel a. epstein is a professor at the josef korbel school of international studies at the university of denver. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 introduction east central europe (ece) has historically been the seat of major empires. it has also been the source of cultural, spiritual, and political innovation. but ece has also been the site of foreign domination and occupation, shifting borders, forced population movements, diaspora settlement and oppression, in addition to the most brutal and comprehensive forms of ethnic cleansing. in the 20th century alone, events in munich, yalta, and katyń were illustrative of the ways in which the then still relatively new nation-states of the region fell victim to foreign political manipulation, ally abandonment, and mass atrocities. of course, every country in the world faces limits on its sovereignty. but emerging from world war ii, such limits in ece were extreme; in every country except yugoslavia, soviet takeovers and western acquiescence made a mockery of alleged statehood conferred in the aftermath of world war i (mazower 1998; rothschild and wingfield 2000). the open-door policies of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and the european union (eu) in the 1990s represented a radical break with the bleak history depicted above. nato enlargement, beginning in 1999, and eu enlargement, beginning in 2004, gave the relatively small east central european states an unprecedented opportunity to shape their own political trajectories and international allegiances, and a significant voice within two of the world’s most powerful international institutions. membership in nato and the eu enhanced these countries’ political power through, depending on the organization, voting rights, resources, institutional representation, and security guarantees. debates about the true motivations and interests at play driving enlargement notwithstanding (schimmelfennig 2001; reiter 2001; moravcsik and vachudova 2003; epstein 2008), there is little doubt that the post-1989, post-enlargement phase of europe’s evolution is more democratic, peaceful, representative, and economically open for ece than any previous transnational political or institutional arrangement. the focus of this article then is to explain why, despite demonstrably enhanced political efficacy as well as wealth in ece, there is nevertheless widespread skepticism of the same political and economic liberalism that underpinned ece’s recent dramatic reversal of fortunes. more specifically, the analysis in this article highlights the degree to which income levels between east and west europe have converged, foreign investment has fueled growth, and financial integration has curbed volatility. in each of these areas, despite a seeming increase in equality, and closer connections between east and west europe, there are still lingering disparities, both within and between countries. these disparities provide justification for economically nationalist and euroskeptic narratives. while economic inequality and dependence are not the only issues that have contributed to the rise of some increasingly authoritarian forms of governance in ece, economic dissatisfaction has been an aggravating factor. very often, scholarly work examining developments in ece focuses on socio-political factors affecting the region (e.g. trencsényi 2014; vachudova forthcoming in 2020). factors include ethno-nationalist mobilization, rhetoric and policies against migrants and asylum-seekers, curbs on checks and balances among democratic institutions, and ongoing corruption under the guise of purported corruption elimination efforts. the argument here, by contrast, is that underlying economic conditions in ece provide a foundation for illiberal and populist politicians, particularly as those conditions reinforce power disparities between east and west europe, as well as power and wealth differentials within countries. if at least some populations “evaluate the economy through the prism of identity, relying less on traditional measures like economic growth, social spending, or unemployment and more on perceptions of fairness and concerns about keeping 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 outsiders away” (vachudova 2019, 698), politicians can plausibly use some of the underlying economic conditions outlined in this article as evidence of east central european victimhood. to be clear, majorities in the eu’s new member states (nms) strongly favor eu membership, even as pluralities, if not majorities, have also elevated political parties that are highly critical of eu policies. at the same time, the analysis here argues that ece’s continuing economic subordination, stemming from a long legacy of relative under-development compared to the west, has contributed to this paradox. income convergence measures of income convergence that correct for purchasing power parity show that both the transition that began in 1989, and the eu’s enlargement in 2004, correlate with strong output convergence between eastern and western europe. however, measures of absolute output in ece lagged significantly behind the ‘old eu-15’. these different measures have affected lived experiences of east central european populations; accordingly, they impact who can take full advantage of the eu’s single market (or opportunities in the global economy). a country’s share of absolute output is a more accurate measure of power within the eu or larger economy than gdp adjusted for purchasing power. it is by this former measure that ece countries lag significantly behind many of their western counterparts. according to measures that adjust for purchasing power parity across countries, eu enlargement has generated strong income convergence between ece and the eu 28, as demonstrated in table 1. several developments are of note here. first, since 2004, every country except slovenia has gained ground vis-à-vis the eu as a whole. the us financial crisis and the eurozone crisis that followed were particularly devastating for slovenia, which explains its relative stasis compared to many other nms. second, poland, romania, slovakia, and the baltic states stand out for having moved particularly rapidly in the direction of convergence. third, ece countries are no longer the poorest as a group in the eu. the us, european and global financial crises moved greece and portugal closer to the bottom of the eu 28. in 2019, the czech republic surpassed spain according to the gdp per capita adjusted for purchasing power. one should note that these are the convergence statistics that the european commission and its attendant statistics bureaus prefer to publicize. they not only show economic progress, but do so in a way that takes into the account the cost of living across countries. in that sense, correcting for purchasing power parity is a good measure of relative welfare. even if the polish złoty or the hungarian forint are volatile or weak compared to other major currencies, including the euro, the table below nevertheless measures how far the currency goes within any given polity or economy, irrespective of that volatility or weakness. from a welfare perspective, the eu can convincingly argue that the eu is in fact a “convergence machine” (world bank 2012). 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 table 1: east central european gdp per capita in purchasing power standards (eu 28 = 100) 2004 2007 2011 2013 2017 bulgaria 35 41 45 46 49 croatia 57 61 60 59 62 czech republic 79 84 83 83 89 estonia 55 68 69 75 79 hungary 62 61 65 67 68 latvia 47 60 56 62 67 lithuania 50 61 65 73 78 poland 49 53 64 67 70 romania 34 42 51 54 63 slovak republic 56 67 73 76 76 slovenia 86 87 83 81 85 data source: eurostat, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ gdp_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_price_level_indices. note that bulgaria and romania joined the eu in 2007 and croatia joined in 2013. all of the other countries depicted here joined in the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004. income convergence can also be measured in absolute terms, as demonstrated in table 2. aside from the fact that table 2 does not adjust for purchasing power parity, it also compares the nms to the eu’s older 15 member states, rather than to the eu 28. both of these differences in measurement provide a more sobering assessment of ece’s convergence with the west. while table 1 is a good measure of relative welfare in various eu countries, table 2 is a better measure of absolute economic output and therefore of relative power in the eu. absolute output reveals who can readily travel or seek education abroad; it also identifies which countries are more likely to suffer from brain drain, and, on the other side, which countries are likely to be able to afford other countries’ assets and to hire their workers. whereas poland went from 49 percent of the eu 28 to 70 percent by 2017 when corrected for purchasing power, in absolute terms the country moved from just over 18 percent of the old eu 15 average to approximately 30 percent. these statistics reveal that easterners and westerners can avail themselves of the eu’s common market to significantly varying degrees – whether one is considering business, travel, or educational opportunities. not surprisingly, brain drain has often been a phenomenon of young, skilled people moving from east to west, while foreign investment has flowed from west to east. while both trends potentially lead to economic and power equalization over time (ebrd 2009), there is no guarantee that they will – particularly if relative deprivation in the east hampers innovation and human capital formation that would otherwise help build the local economy (bohle and greskovits 2019). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/gdp_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_price_level_indices https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/gdp_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_price_level_indices 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 table 2: east central european gdp per capita as a percentage of the old eu-15 average (not adjusted for purchasing power parity) 2004 2007 2011 2013 2017 bulgaria 8.94 11.76 14.99 15. 65 17.88 croatia 24.92 28.14 29.47 28.15 29.08 czech republic 30.71 37.37 43.08 41.45 44.26 estonia 23.55 34.46 35.37 39.73 42.28 hungary 27.76 28.96 29.4 28.25 30.91 latvia 16.88 29.12 27.93 31.16 33.89 lithuania 17.85 25.55 29.12 32.54 36.25 poland 18.22 23.87 28.18 28.5 30.13 romania 9.58 16.81 17.6 19.81 23.51 slovak republic 28.6 33.34 36.94 37.67 38.26 slovenia 46.64 50.15 50.54 48.63 51.28 data source: world bank, available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd?end= 2017&locations=gr-pt-de-at-fr-be-fi-lu-se-gb-nl-es-dk-ie-it-lt-pl-ro-sk-si-bg-hr-cz-ee-hulv&start=2017&view=bar even as absolute income in ece has trailed its west european counterparts, consumption in ece relative to gdp has rivaled that of the old eu-15 (deuber 2011). as with measures of income, there are competing interpretations of what increasing consumption means, with both supporters and detractors of increasing consumption in ece. on the one hand, expanding consumption certainly signals elevated welfare (farkas 2013). on the other, consumption in the current period does not contribute to growth in later periods unless it generates additional income or reduces current expenses. if current account deficits are financing consumption, as was the case in the runup to the eurozone crisis, there is potential for volatility and lost opportunity for productive investment (world bank 2012; jacoby 2014). andrew janos had long argued that later industrialization and development in ece compared to the west resulted in increased demand for consumption at the expense of financing underlying productive capacity (janos 2000; epstein 2014a). slow income convergence in absolute terms, in conjunction with relatively high consumption in ece, has been one source of dissatisfaction with east central european growth models; this pattern does not necessarily presage full convergence (galgóczi and drahokoupil 2017). frustration in ece with income inequality, uneven access to educational and business opportunities in the eu, and perceived economic subordination are directly observable in the policies and rhetoric of many east central european countries. in poland, hungary, romania, slovenia, the czech republic, and slovakia, policy-makers have variously tried to domesticate foreign-owned services and industry and have imposed taxes targeted at foreign-controlled sectors. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd?end=2017&locations=gr-pt-de-at-fr-be-fi-lu-se-gb-nl-es-dk-ie-it-lt-pl-ro-sk-si-bg-hr-cz-ee-hu-lv&start=2017&view=bar https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd?end=2017&locations=gr-pt-de-at-fr-be-fi-lu-se-gb-nl-es-dk-ie-it-lt-pl-ro-sk-si-bg-hr-cz-ee-hu-lv&start=2017&view=bar https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd?end=2017&locations=gr-pt-de-at-fr-be-fi-lu-se-gb-nl-es-dk-ie-it-lt-pl-ro-sk-si-bg-hr-cz-ee-hu-lv&start=2017&view=bar 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 at the same time, they have cultivated political loyalty among formerly independent institutions such as central banks. they have developed industrial policy apparatuses capable of supporting indigenous innovation in the service of domestic investment and ownership, with the goal of moving domestic production up the value chain. to be sure, rhetoric has at times been more fulsome than policy has been effective. nevertheless, the re-orientation away from economic liberalism and unbridled openness that has occurred since the 2008-09 us and then the european financial crises has been notable (see, for example, johnson and barnes 2015; appel and orenstein 2018; greskovits 2019; naczyk 2019; piroska and mérő 2020). foreign direct investment developments with respect to foreign direct investment (fdi) into ece have similarly yielded decidedly mixed results, with some unanticipated political consequences. fdi has led to increases in some wages, technical upgrading in select firms, and overall increased economic output in ece. but because of the absolute output differentials depicted in the previous section, inward investment into ece has been far larger than outward investment. economic and power asymmetries are the result. in particular, the west has been able to avail itself of lower production costs in the east (but not vice versa). as such, profit-making, managerial control, innovation, and therefore power have accrued to western countries more readily than to eastern ones. fdi has been large-scale, welfare enhancing, and transformative in terms of technical upgrading. bohle and greskovits argue that fdi created a ‘manufacturing miracle’ in much of ece (2012), while medve-bálint has pointed out that in the aughts and after, ece was receiving more fdi than brazil, china, india, russia, or mexico (2014). bruszt and langbein (forthcoming) argue that eu membership in connection with the drive for fdi built unprecedented state capacity in ece. in all, one can argue that fdi has contributed to more wealth, improved welfare, and increased international linkages for ece – exactly what had been hoped for by proponents of eastern enlargement. but fdi has also generated inequality within countries, cultivated east central european dependence on western investors, and failed to create significant innovation capacity in the nms. while even the most illiberal leaders in ece have been loath to challenge manufacturing fdi (though there have been more explicit challenges with respect to fdi in finance), economic nationalism and development initiatives in ece respond in direct ways to the dissatisfaction spawned by fdi’s power asymmetries. power asymmetries are manifest in the ‘dependent capitalism’ in ece that emerged in the wake of state-socialism’s collapse. the origins of this asymmetry rest in part in the huge wealth disparities between east and west europe by 1989, but also in the industrialization and broadbased education of the communist regimes (nölke and vliegenthart 2009; bohle and greskovits 2012). low-wage but highly educated (in global comparative terms) workers attracted fdi to ece across all economic sectors (medve-bálint 2014). key features of the dependent capitalist model included an emphasis on cost competition, not just through low wages, but also through favorable tax treatment for multinational corporations (mncs) (appel 2011; galgóczi and drahokoupil 2017; appel and orenstein 2018). research and development, including design and engineering processes, were concentrated in west european countries from which the fdi flowed. fdi financing was also controlled by foreign owners – either through firm financing or through the majority foreign-owned banking sectors in most of ece (epstein 2008; nölke and vliegenthart 2009). 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 west european fdi, while bringing jobs, capital, and some skills and technology upgrades, also posed risks for ece. for one, the vertical character of investment, with most high value added and financing functions concentrated in west european headquarters, meant that eastern populations were working in manufacturing facilities focused on ‘downstream’ assembly and processing, while technological skill transfers were limited (nölke and vliegenthart 2009). second, while the direct effects of fdi were strong for firms in ece on the receiving end, the indirect effects for domestic sectors were much weaker (hanousek et al 2011, 20-1). domestically owned firms in ece were on balance not able to achieve commensurate competitiveness with their foreign-owned counterparts (farkas 2013, 16-17). the cost competition model predicated on low taxes and low wages also limited the extent to which ece could spend more on skills, training, and research and development (r&d). that same cost competition model also meant that ece’s comparative advantage was at constant risk of erosion, since higher rates of economic growth in the periphery were pushing wages up over time (imf 2013). while “nationally owned businesses would be concerned about these long-term developments” of low levels of spending on training and research, as well as declining comparative advantage, “western headquarters do not care much about these tendencies, given their potential to relocate production in the long term” (nölke and vliegenthart 2009, 687). german automotive fdi into the visegrád 4 (v4)3 confirms arguments above about the partially disempowering effects of the kinds of fdi that have penetrated ece on a large scale. by 2012, germany had 20 percent of the global market in passenger cars. at the same time, approximately 5.5 million cars were produced in germany (a figure that had remained essentially constant for over a decade), while german firms manufactured over seven million cars elsewhere. foreign production of german cars registered a three-fold increase between 1992 and 2011. approximately three million units a year were produced in ece in 2012 (imf 2013, 13, box 1). for car production in ece, german firms dominated (pavlínek 2015, 212). german automotive fdi was organized according to “vertical specialization” or “fragmentation of production” in which lead firms outsourced aspects of production, processing, and assembly to gain efficiencies (imf 2013; gerőcs and pinkasz 2019). in practice in ece, vertical specialization referred to activities “under which germany exports intermediates that are further processed in downstream facilities in the eu, including the ce4 [referring to the visegrád 4] and then reexported directly or indirectly outside the eu to the rest of the world” (imf 2013, 12, first background note). thus, highly specialized activities, including design, engineering, and nonstandardized production took place in germany, while ece provided assembly platforms for semistandardized industrial components. in addition, as german car producers innovated in electric engines in the expectation that combustion would eventually be eclipsed, more of the standardized production of newer versions of older models with combustion engines was re-located to ece. higher standardization of production in lower-end models meant decreasing investment per unit produced and increasing pressure on returns in ece (gerőcs and pinkasz 2017). workers in investing versus receiving countries have experienced fdi’s power asymmetries directly. whereas in a coordinated market economy like germany’s, wage and benefits bargaining for workers takes place on a sectoral level in connection with a highly centralized national system of industrial relations (hall and soskice 2001), the cost competition model in the v4 depends on firm-level negotiations. this has created competitive and insecure labor markets in ece, which have moderated wage inflation. over the same period in which germany’s foreign auto 3 the visegrád 4 refers to poland, hungary, slovakia and the czech republic. 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 manufacturing has increased, the proportion of unskilled workers in germany has declined and unemployment has remained low. given their broad participation in industrial relations, german labor unions have often willingly agreed to the re-location of lower-end production and assembly to ece. german jobs lost in highly standardized manufacturing have been replaced with more positions in specialized production, engineering, and design at higher training and compensation levels. germany’s global export power, reflected in successive years of current account and trade surpluses, depends on its own wage restraint (jacoby 2017), but german wages and purchasing power remain much higher than equivalent measures in ece. in its own assessment, the imf highlighted the extent to which fdi, technology transfer to ece, and knowledge-intensive manufacturing there had increased east central european technological sophistication and contributed to income convergence between east and west europe. however, it was probably premature to conclude, as the imf’s german interlocutors did, that “[p]roduction within a vertically specialized chain is not a ‘zero sum game’” (imf 2013, 14). in a wide-ranging dialogue between imf researchers and policy-makers and industrialists from the v4 and germany in june 2013, three points about regional value chains highlighted power disparities. first was the “lively debate” among participants about whether “export growth in knowledge-intensive sectors – especially automobile production – really represented technology transfer and human capital development, or simply entailed low-skilled assembly jobs within a high-tech industry” (imf 2013, 14). since the imf researchers themselves pointed to the precarious position of ece in those value chains under conditions of income convergence, and the need for east central european firms to develop their own supply chains to sell intermediate goods downstream “following the chinese example”, even defenders of the fdi model saw a need for more innovative capacity in ece (imf 2013, 15). a second indication that relative gains mattered, and that germany had the upper hand, was the german attitude toward labor mobilization in ece. as already noted, germany and its lowercost production chain partners had starkly different industrial relations. german labor unions exercised joint authority (with management) over major business decisions, whereas east central european workers only bargained with their foreign owners at the firm level. the v4 were warned, therefore, that the “potential gains in employment as a result of production spillovers [from german investment] should be kept in mind when considering labor market reforms or during negotiations between industry and labor unions” (imf 2013, 14). third and finally, it was not just labor quiescence that german investors found desirable. even as the imf was recommending more investment in human capital, skills, and innovation in ece, german participants were emphasizing that nothing along those lines was needed at that juncture because “there was no imminent threat to the position” of the v4 in the value chain, “despite narrowing cost differentials” (imf 2013, 14-15). this was akin to the world bank arguing a year earlier that because the european union was a “convergence machine,” the nms did not need a developmental strategy, or to be “ferocious” like their asian counterparts. they needed only to be “disciplined” to attract foreign investment so that economic development and technology transfer could be secured in ece through “osmosis” (world bank 2012, 25). analyses from the imf and the world bank embraced a division of labor between east and west europe through fdi that had provoked considerable skepticism in ece by 2010, if not before. foreign direct investment also often produces the unintended consequence of increased inequality within countries, which has been the case in ece (medve-bálint 2014). not surprisingly, measures of income inequality have increased in ece since the transition began. the gini coefficient, in 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 which zero represents an equal distribution of wealth across a population and one represents wealth concentration in one person, is by no means at the high end for much of ece, with countries such the czech republic, slovakia, and slovenia achieving equal or greater equality than denmark or sweden. these countries were all below the oecd average of .315 in 2015, and significantly below the us (.415 in 2015).4 while east central european countries such as poland, bulgaria, romania, and the baltic states were above the oecd average in 2015, what might be more important than the static comparisons are the trends over time, and the ways in which the sense of rising inequality fuels policies that promise to change the status quo. for much of the transition, for example, from 1995 to 2016, income inequality within the new eu-13 (all of the postcommunist entrants plus malta and cyprus) was on the rise. it was only in 2016 that inequality within these countries begins to abate, driven mostly by inequality declines in poland and romania.5 foreign direct investment has had complex effects in ece that have produced wealth, opportunity, and upgrading alongside subordination and marginalization of groups that have not been direct beneficiaries of foreign capital. the sense of lost opportunity was therefore palpable in some countries – with prime minister viktor orbán railing against “debt slavery” in hungary and former prime minister jan krzysztof bielecki in poland pointing out that “capital has a nationality” (see respectively johnson and barnes 2015; naczyk 2019, 17). in response to perceived dependence, these politicians and others have devised economic programs to limit that dependence, engage in more welfare redistribution to combat some of the inequality-inducing effects of fdi, and increase domestic savings, investment, and innovation. financial integration and foreign bank ownership according to one interpretation, eu enlargement, and ece’s radical economic openness, has generated major gains for both east and west in financial integration and foreign bank ownership. fdi in east central european finance brought resources and expertise. moreover, as documented in a recent study (epstein 2017), ece’s bank funding stability was far stronger than in western europe, precisely because of high levels of foreign bank ownership in the east as opposed to in the west. nevertheless, foreign bank presence has been a politically contentious issue in some nms because of the ways in which domestic bank ownership is perceived to provide greater economic opportunity and autonomy – a privilege that many west european countries maintained for themselves even as western institutions counseled east european countries to privatize their banks with foreign capital (epstein 2008; 2014b). most countries around the world have long discouraged high levels of foreign bank ownership in their domestic markets, preferring to maintain politically susceptible financial institutions in the service of protecting the domestic deposit base, securing credit to the local government and economy, and insulating themselves against foreign political manipulation (pauly 1988; epstein 2017). ece proved a major exception to this trend beginning in the 1990s when international institutional pressure, banking crises, and a dearth of managerial expertise and capital pushed all 4 gini coefficient statistics are from the world bank, available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/si.pov.gini accessed 10 january 2020. 5 zsolt darvas, “this is the state of inequality in europe,” bruegel and the world economic forum, 4 may 2018. available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/european-income-inequality-begins-to-fall-once-again, accessed 10 january 2020. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/si.pov.gini https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/european-income-inequality-begins-to-fall-once-again 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 the post-communist aspirants to the eu except slovenia to privatize the bulk of their banking assets with foreign capital (epstein 2008). ece became the most highly penetrated banking market in the world, with foreign ownership levels in most cases well over half and in some instances approaching 100 percent (see table 3). the biggest investors were from austria, italy, belgium, and france, but banks from portugal, the netherlands, ireland, germany, sweden, norway, denmark, and greece also had a significant presence in the region. table 3: east central europe, new member states of the eu country percentage of foreignowned banks, assets: 2008 and 2013 bulgaria 84 70 croatia (joined the eu in 2013) 91 90 czech republic* 84 85 estonia 98 97 hungary 84 84 latvia 66 65 lithuania 92 93 poland 77 68 romania 88 89 slovakia 99 85 slovenia 31 34 data source: ebrd 2009 and ebrd banking survey for 2013. *source for czech republic is claessens and van horen 2015 because the country exited ebrd programs before this data was collected. while there is debate about the developmental consequences of high levels of foreign bank ownership for ece (ebrd 2009; bonin et al 2014), scholars agree that foreign bank ownership was a stabilizing force for the region during and following the us financial crisis. parent banks in western europe maintained their exposures to ece through the crisis, re-capitalizing their subsidiaries on an ongoing basis. there were no major failures or closures of foreign-owned banks during the crisis, though a number of locally owned or managed banks in ece faced insolvency, requiring emergency nationalization, government bailouts, or closure.6 high levels of foreign bank ownership in ece markets stabilized capital flows and limited fiscal fragility for ece governments (bonin and louie 2016). 6 examples of ece domestic banks that required substantial government assistance or closure included parex bank in latvia, a number of the state-owned banks in slovenia and by 2014, fibank in bulgaria. 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: total banking assets in the nms, 2006-2009 data source: schoenmaker and peek 2014, 6 stabilization due to foreign bank ownership in ece through and after the us financial crisis is surprising in that it contravened analyst expectations and historical experience. reflecting back on the asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, economist robert wade remarked in 2007 that, “no country should let its banking system be taken over by foreign banks.” his reasoning was that “at times of crisis banks rely heavily on their home state and are likely to sacrifice operations in developing countries in order to protect their home base” (wade 2007, 84). wade was not alone in his skepticism of foreign bank behavior in crises. by 2008-9, countless news articles, blog posts, and reports on ece focused on the seemingly dangerous combination of foreign bank ownership, home regulatory pressure, foreign exchange exposure, supervisory prerogatives and escalating uncertainty. paul krugman, a princeton university economist and new york times columnist, published a blog post in october, 2008, equating southeast asia in 1997 to east central europe in 2008.7 neither wade nor his counterparts were exactly wrong. west european banks came under precisely the pressure from home governments that wade specified. the surprise was in the degree to which europe’s transnationalized banks fought back against a national approach to bank rescue and enlisted the support of international institutions to try to preserve their market position and long investment time horizons in ece. the comparison of funding volatility between east and west europe adds still more weight to the argument that europe as a whole should seriously consider banking market openness as part of the solution to financial and currency instability. in this respect, eastern europe is a model for western europe. volatility in cross-border funding among west european eurozone states was far more severe than in ece precisely because foreign bank ownership levels in the west were low. while western europe presented a veneer of financial integration before the crisis due to high levels of cross-border debt, a clear lesson of the crisis is that these flows are prone to retreat behind national 7 see krugman’s blog post from october 31, 2008: https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/eastern-europe2008-southeast-asia-1997/ accessed 20 july 2019. 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2006 2007 2008 2009 total bank assets (2006-2009) bulgaria czech rep. estonia hungary latvia lithuania poland romania slovakia slovenia https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/eastern-europe-2008-southeast-asia-1997/ https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/eastern-europe-2008-southeast-asia-1997/ 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 borders when risk reigns (deuber and epstein 2019). that is exactly what happened. for the eurozone, a west european home bias in lending upended the european central bank’s monetary transmission, compounded downturns, accelerated contagion, and exacerbated bank-state doom loops in which government borrowing costs and bank balance sheets both deteriorated at once (epstein 2017). in ece, by contrast, western banks’ business models made it difficult and costly to indulge a home bias in lending. western bank owners allowed eastern loan-to-deposit ratios in many countries to climb to well over 100 percent. letting subsidiaries fail, while legal, would have damaged relations with host authorities and resulted in existentially threatening losses for those western banks that had spent more than a decade building up mass-market share in the postcommunist world. retreating to small and overbanked markets at home was never an option. this explanation for western banks’ continuing exposures is at odds with the more widely accepted vienna initiative explanation – a voluntary bank rollover agreement orchestrated by a range of international organizations (epstein 2014b; 2017). despite widespread skepticism of ece’s approach to opening its banking markets to foreign entrants in the 1990s and 2000s, both from within the region and outside of it, some distinct advantages have flowed to ece as a consequence. foreign bank acquisition through subsidiaries proved stabilizing through the crisis and contributed to higher credit ratings in the region, and thereby lower borrowing costs (grittersová 2017). foreign owners brought managerial expertise and capital. transnationalized bank ownership also created an interdependence between east and west that made it difficult for western firms to relegate the fortunes of eastern markets to west european economic nationalism. to be sure, foreign banks also brought economic volatility through the funding of credit booms (deuber and epstein 2019) – a source of vulnerability that much of ece has reduced through lower current account deficits. on balance, however, foreignowned banks supported growth and structural cohesion between east and west. why, then, have high levels of foreign bank ownership come under increasing scrutiny since the crisis, with poland and hungary in particular re-asserting much higher levels of domestic control through ownership? as in the other two empirical cases discussed here, income convergence and fdi, the apparent economic successes mask deeper power disparities. if states have traditionally tried to maintain politically susceptible banking sectors in the interest of credit provision, macroeconomic management, crisis response, and power projection, west european states have behaved much more conventionally than their east european counterparts. whereas table 3 shows very high levels of foreign bank ownership in the nms, table 4 shows the extent to which west european eurozone states have restricted foreign entry into their banking markets. 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 table 4: foreign bank ownership in the 15 older eu members country percentage of foreignowned banks, assets: 2008 and 2013 austria 28 26 belgium 14 47 denmark (not in the eurozone) 18 18 finland 84 84 france 6 5 germany 12 13 greece 14 0 ireland 36 36 italy 6 6 luxembourg 95 92 netherlands 2 4 portugal 24 23 spain 2 2 sweden (not in the eurozone) 0 0 united kingdom (not in the eurozone) 18 11 data source: claessens and van horen 2015 the four largest eurozone economies are highlighted because germany, france, italy, and spain have been purposeful about excluding foreign entrants (bini-smaghi 2013; donnelly 2014; goyer and valdivielso del real 2014), as have many other eurozone countries, with the partial exceptions of belgium, finland, and luxembourg (the last of which is a financial center). thus, even if western banks have brought new technology, funding, and improved credit ratings to ece, there is nevertheless the sense in some east central european countries that western investment has been exploitative and/or has resulted in lost economic opportunity. the earlier reference to former polish prime minister jan krzysztof bielecki’s observation that capital always has a nationality is a case in point. naczyk argues that domestic managers at foreign-owned multinational corporations, and particularly at banks, were greatly frustrated by the fact that outof-country headquarters always had final decision-making authority. during the crisis of 2008-9, even if foreign parent bank recapitalization of local subsidiaries continued, local managerial authority was nevertheless curtailed and managerial development was stymied (naczyk 2019). these findings are consistent with earlier research showing both a concern among foreign investors that they limit research and development (r&d) capacity in host countries by keeping innovation capacity at home (nölke and vliegenthart 2009) and the continuing national embeddedness of capital, particularly among many (but not all) banks (epstein 2017, chapter 4). foreign bank ownership, then, has had nationalist policy effects. viktor orbán’s mortgage restructuring schemes that thrust high costs on foreign-owned lenders and poland’s economic development plan under the law and justice party both point to the extent to which politicians can leverage high levels of foreign ownership in banking (and other industries) to mobilize political support for more economically nationalist policies (bohle 2014; piroska and mérő 2020).8 poland, 8 for a summary of morawiecki plan (“responsible development plan”) of pis (law and justice) in poland, see: http://cecgr.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/cec_in_depth_the_morawiecki_plan.pdf. http://cecgr.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/cec_in_depth_the_morawiecki_plan.pdf 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 hungary, slovakia, and romania all implemented bank taxes. in romania’s case, the bank tax (eventually scaled back from the original proposal) was in part to deal with “banking greed.”9 this was another recent example of banking’s high political salience – and with good reason. despite relatively propitious outcomes for ece in the most recent period, foreign bank ownership or lending under conditions different from those specified here have often wreaked havoc on host markets. moreover, none of the nms that are not in the eurozone have opted to join european banking union – another sign of the continuing preference in ece for a national approach to bank oversight in the aftermaths of the us and eurozone economic crises. from a liberal economic perspective, the nms have on balance both followed liberal prescriptions and reaped the benefits from doing so. yet robust electoral support for those same liberal principles has not always followed. we would do well to remember robert gilpin’s admonishment that the problem with liberals is that they take it for granted that all reasonable people agree on the unalloyed benefits of enhanced riches, to the exclusion of concerns about power and control (gilpin 1975). the populations of east central europe are no less reasonable than anyone else. their economic subordination, its wealth-inducing effects notwithstanding, has led to varying degrees of euro-skepticism, illiberalism, and nationalism, in keeping with a number of other advanced industrialized countries. conclusion together, eu and nato membership created a new geopolitical and economic context in which the countries of east central europe have enhanced autonomy, voice in international organizations, access to large and wealthy markets, and significant subsidies in some cases (see also vachudova 2005). to be sure, eu membership encouraged economic openness, but economic reformers in ece at times liberalized even more than was required by international organizations (appel and orenstein 2018). liberalization in the form of privatization, freer trade, and foreign direct investment have generated income gains, higher consumption, increased credit provision, enhanced productivity, and technological upgrades. and yet the political response has been far from euphoric. while majorities prefer to remain in the eu in all of the nms, euro-skepticism and illiberalism also have enormous appeal. the analysis presented here suggests that ongoing power differentials between new and old eu members, particularly as they manifest in absolute income and the one-way character of foreign direct investment, account for some of the disillusionment. unequal economic positions provide a basis on which populist politicians can plausibly argue that east central european populations are victims who are not reaping the full and just rewards of eu membership. there are at least two critiques of the claims made here. the first is that dependent capitalism is not an accurate way to characterize the relationship between (mostly) western investors and eastern host markets (bruszt and langbein 2020). this approach suggests that there may be illiberalism, corruption, and other dysfunction in ece, but it is not because of economic developments or the eu’s liberalizing agenda. on the contrary, while the eu had championed liberalization in certain areas, it also has a politically and developmentally based program of 9 see boris groendahl, “romania’s ‘greed tax’ reminds banks of eastern europe’s risks,” bloomberg, 19 december 2019. available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-19/romania-s-greed-tax-remindsbanks-of-eastern-europe-s-risks accessed 21 july 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-19/romania-s-greed-tax-reminds-banks-of-eastern-europe-s-risks https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-19/romania-s-greed-tax-reminds-banks-of-eastern-europe-s-risks 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 redistribution through its structural funds program. even more important, the eu has both actively and passively contributed to state capacity building in ece. thus the ‘dependent capitalism’ literature tends to understate east central european agency. according to bruszt and langbein, illiberalism cannot stem from relative deprivation and disempowerment because those are not, in fact, features of the current context in ece. a second plausible objection that complements the first is that east central european skepticism of democracy, economic liberalism, and the eu is firmly rooted in domestic politics and history (trencsényi 2014). the communist-era prohibition against thoroughgoing investigations into past atrocities, including local populations’ culpability, allowed politicians to take liberties in constructing historical narratives. in particular, where political party turnover in the transition facilitated the regeneration of formerly communist parties into competitive socialists (including in poland and hungary), nationalists claimed a viral incursion had poisoned the transition from the beginning – and that the virus itself was inextricably linked to liberalism. in addition to trencsényi’s argument about local political discourses concerning communism, transition, and culpability, one could also argue that democracy is still comparatively new in ece and that relatively untested democratic institutions are therefore more susceptible to political and partisan pressure. however, neither of these alternative explanations for illiberalism in ece necessarily invalidates the argument presented here about the salience of perceived economic subordination and relative deprivation. the eu can build state capacity and at the same time lack control over purchasing power differentials that result in high volumes of net inward investment, brain drain from ece, and high current account deficits in the run-up to the us and european financial crises. moreover, the economic context could spawn more than one kind of narrative about the possibilities and perils of economic liberalism. not just in ece but in many countries across the globe, critics of economic integration and interdependence have made, and won, the argument against liberalism in its many forms, at least in the most recent period. the global nature of illiberalism’s rise suggests that developments in ece may not be entirely historically specific. rather, east central europe provides the lens through which we might view and come to understand larger global trends, as has so often been the case of this part of the world. 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 references appel, h. 2011. tax politics in eastern europe: globalization, regional integration and the democratic compromise. ann arbor: university of michigan press. appel, h. and m. a. orenstein. 2018. from triumph to crisis: neoliberal economic reforms in postcommunist countries. new york: cambridge university press. bini smaghi, l. 2013. austerity: european democracies against the wall. brussels: centre for european policy studies. bohle, d. 2014. “post-socialist housing meets transnational finance: foreign banks, mortgage lending, and the privatization of welfare in hungary and estonia.” review of international political economy 21 (4): 913-48. bohle, d. and b. greskovits. 2012. capitalist diversity on europe’s periphery. ithaca: cornell university press. bohle, d. and b. greskovits. 2019. “politicising embedded neoliberalism: continuity and change in hungary’s development model.” west european politics 42 (5): 1069-1093. bonin, j. p., i. hasan, and p. wachtel. 2014. “banking in transition countries.” in the oxford handbook of banking, edited by a. n. berger, p. molynewx, and j. o. s. wilson, 963-82. new york: oxford university press. bonin, j. p. and d. louie. 2016. “did foreign banks stay committed to emerging europe during recent financial crises?” journal of comparative economics 45 (4): 793-808. bruszt, l. and j. langbein. 2020. “manufacturing development: how transnational market integration shapes opportunities and capacities for development in europe’s three peripheries.” review of international political economy. forthcoming. claessens, s and n. v. horen. 2015. “foreign banks: trends, impacts and financial stability.” washington, d.c., imf working paper no. 12/10. deuber, g. 2011. “post-crisis banking sector outlook in cee.” osteuropa wirtschaft 56 (3-4): 169-94. deuber, g. and r. a. epstein. 2019. “forward-looking implications of the vienna initiative.” in ten years of the vienna initiative, 2009-2019, edited by mark allen. luxembourg: european investment bank. donnelly, s. 2014. “power politics and the undersupply of financial stability in europe.” review of international political economy 21 (4): 980-1005. epstein, r. a. 2008. in pursuit of liberalism: international institutions in postcommunist europe. baltimore, md: johns hopkins university press. epstein, r. a. 2014a. “overcoming ‘economic backwardness’ in the european union,” journal of common market studies 52 (1): 17-34. 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 epstein, r. a. 2014b. “when do foreign banks ‘cut and run’? evidence from west european bail-outs and east european markets.” review of international political economy 21 (4): 847-877. epstein, r. a. 2017. banking on markets: the transformation of bank-state ties in europe and beyond. oxford: oxford university press. european bank for reconstruction and development. 2009. transition report: transition in crisis? london: ebrd. farkas, b. 2013. “changes in the european convergence model.” monthly report 1/13. vienna: institute for international economic studies. galgóczi, b. and j. drahokoupil, eds. 2017. condemned to be left behind: can eastern europe emerge from its low-wage fdi-based growth model? brussels: etui. gerőcs, t. and a. pinkasz. 2019. “central and eastern europe’s dependent development in germany automotive value chains.” budapest, centre for economic and regional studies of the hungarian academy of sciences – institute of world economics. working paper no. 253. gilpin, r. 1975. u.s. power and the multinational corporation. new york: basic books. goyer, m. and r. valdivielso del real. 2014. “protection of domestic bank ownership in france and germany: the functional equivalency of institutional diversity in takeovers.” review of international political economy 2 (4): 790-819. greskovits, b. 2019. “re-politicizing embedded neoliberalism: shifting patters of eu integration and dependency in the visegrád states.” unpublished manuscript. grittersová, j. 2017. borrowing credibility: global banks and monetary regimes. ann arbor: university of michigan press. hall, p. a. and d. soskice, eds. 2001. varieties of capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparative advantage. new york: oxford university press. hanousek, j., e. kočenda, and m. maurel. 2011. “direct and indirect effects of fdi in emerging european markets: a survey and meta-analysis.” economic systems 35 (3): 301–22. imf. 2013. “german-central european supply chain: cluster report.” imf country report 263, washington, d.c.: international monetary fund. jacoby, w. 2014. “the eu factor in fat times and lean: did the eu amplify the boom and soften the bust?” journal of common market studies 52 (1): 52–70. jacoby, w. 2017. “surplus germany.” 2017 paper series, no. 8. washington, d.c.: transatlantic academy. janos, a. c. 2000. east central europe in the modern world: the politics of the borderlands from preto post-communism. stanford: stanford university press. 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 johnson, j. and a. barnes. 2015. “financial nationalism and its international enablers: the hungarian experience.” review of international political economy 22(3): 535-569. mazower, m. 1998. dark continent: europe’s twentieth century. new york: vintage books. medve-bálint, g. 2014. “the role of the eu in shaping fdi flows to east central europe.” journal of common market studies 52 (1): 35–51. naczyk, m. 2019. “taking back control: indigenous managerial elites’ push for state-led developmentalism in poland’s dependent market economy.” paper prepared for the 31st annual eaepe conference, 12-15 september, warsaw. nölke, a. and a. vliegenthart 2009. “enlarging the varieties of capitalism: the emergence of dependent market economies in east central europe.” world politics 61 (4): 670–702. moravcsik, a. and m. a. vachudova. 2003. “national interests, state power, and eu enlargement.” east european politics and societies 17 (1): 42-57. pauly, l. w. 1988. opening financial markets: banking politics on the pacific rim. ithaca: cornell university press. pavlínek, p. 2015. “foreign direct investment and the development of the automotive industry in central and eastern europe.” in foreign investment in eastern and southern europe after 2008: still a lever of growth? edited by b. galgóczi, j. drahokoupil and m. bernaciak, 209-255. brussels: european trade union institute. piroska, d. and k. mérő. forthcoming in 2020. “managing the contradictions of development finance on the eu’s eastern periphery: development banks in hungary and poland.” in the reinvention of development banking in the european union, edited by d. mertens, m. thiemann and p. volberding. oxford: oxford university press. reiter, d. 2001. “why nato enlargement does not spread democracy.” international security 25 (4): 41-67. rothschild, j. and n. m. wingfield. 2000. return to diversity: a political history of east central europe since world war ii. new york: oxford university press. schimmelfennig, f. 2001. “the community trap: liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the eastern enlargement of the european union.” international organization 55 (1): 47-80. schoenmaker, d. and t. peek. 2014. “the state of the banking sector in europe.” economics department working papers no. 1102. paris: organisation for economic co-operation and development. trencsényi, b. 2014. “beyond liminality? the kulturkampf of the early 2000s in east central europe.” boundary 2 41 (1): 135–52. vachudova, m.a. 2005. europe undivided: democracy, leverage and integration after communism. new york and oxford: oxford university press. 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 vachudova, m.a. 2019. “from competition to polarization in central europe: how populists change party systems and the european union.” polity 51 (4): 689-706. vachudova, m.a. (forthcoming in 2020). “ethnopopulism and democratic backsliding: two playbooks, one strategy, many sources of opposition and support.” east european politics. wade, r. 2007. “the aftermath of the asian financial crisis: from ‘liberalize the market’ to ‘standardize the market’ and create a ‘level playing field’.” in ten years after: revisiting the asian financial crisis, edited by b. muchhala, 73-94. washington, d.c.: woodrow wilson international center for scholars. world bank. 2012. golden growth: restoring the lustre of the european economic model. washington, d.c.: world bank. 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (2) 2019: 1-20 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 102 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 environmental issues in recent british and canadian elections harold d. clarke1, university of texas at dallas jon h. pammett2, carleton university abstract the 2019 elections in britain and canada illustrate the difficulties in communication between a concerned public and prospective office-holders on the most critical set of issues of our times. an increased level of public awareness and concern about the state of the environment has been expressed in public opinion polls, social movement activity has increased, and green parties have expanded their appeal. despite these developments in recent years, environmental issues have not been able to exert a major impact on individual voting behaviour in elections, or on overall election outcomes. issues related to the environment are usually treated, by both politicians and the public, in valence terms. valence issues are ones upon which there is broad consensus about the goals of public policy, and political debate focuses not on "what to accomplish" but rather on "how to do it" and "who is best able". regarding the environment, general formulations like global warming and climate change prompt politicians to offer concerned rhetoric and engage in virtue signaling, but specific policy proposals are often absent. this paper examines four reasons why environmental/climate change issues did not have a major impact on the 2019 canadian and british elections. first, environmental concern in society at large was imperfectly translated into election issues. second, the major political parties produced inadequate and unconvincing environmental manifestos. third, environmental issues were not central to most voting decisions. fourth, environmental issues had limited impacts on election outcomes. 1 harold d. clarke is ashbel smith professor in the school of economic, political and policy sciences at the university of texas at dallas. 2 jon h. pammett is distinguished research professor of political science at carleton university, ottawa, canada. 103 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 introduction whether defined as global warming, climate change, or simply the environment, issues related to the state of the physical world have captured the public’s attention and generated widespread concern. to date, however, the effects of these issues on voting behaviour and election outcomes have been modest. this article will focus on the 2019 national elections in the united kingdom (uk) and canada, countries with comparable parliamentary systems of government. the contexts of these elections illustrate two situations where environmental issues faced different kinds of problems. in britain, environmental concern was swamped by protracted and bitter controversy over whether the country should leave the european union (eu) and, if so, under what conditions. in canada, environmental concerns were joined by other large problems (the health system, the economy) at the top of the issue agenda. we focus on the role which democratic theory gives to elections as the main mechanism for systematic public instruction to governments about the desirable direction of public policy (clarke, jenson, leduc and pammett 2019). of course, elections are only one avenue for influence on policy, but they are the one which involves the population at large. as we shall see, the governments produced by the 2019 elections in the two countries were granted "policy mandates' on the environment that were no clearer than those accorded to their predecessors. worldwide, concern over climate change varies in its urgency. in the pew research center’s 2018 survey of global threats, climate change was at the top in half of the 26 countries surveyed, with people in other countries being more concerned about terrorist threats and cyberattacks (poushter and huang 2019, 3). however, in the ipsos monthly poll of “what worries the world”, the september 2019 results show that climate change was only number eight on the list, following unemployment, crime and violence, financial and political corruption, poverty and social inequality, healthcare, education, and taxes (ipsos 2019). after the coronavirus pandemic captured the world’s attention in early 2020, covid-19 surged to the top of such lists, further depressing identification of the danger posed by climate change. that said, recognition of more imminent threats to health or the economy does not necessarily diminish underlying environmental concerns (meyer and smith 2017). the 2019 british and canadian national elections were both held in conditions of increased public concern about the environment, and in particular "climate change". figures 1 and 2 illustrate the emergence of the environment as a salient issue. in britain, where the survey question allowed respondents to identify three important issues, data from 2010 to 2019 show that public concern started to rise in 2017, and by 2019 the environment trailed only brexit and the health service as national problems (figure 1). it is reasonable to conclude that, absent brexit, the trio of healthcare, the economy and the environment would have dominated the british issue agenda. in canada, environment/climate change emerged as the top single national issue in 2019, followed by the economy and health (figure 2). as in britain, this situation contrasts with much of the recent past, when fewer than 10% of respondents to national surveys identified the environment as the most important problem facing the country. however, an abacus data poll in late march of 2019 suggested that climate change might be more significant than usual in the forthcoming federal election. results showed that 12% said it would be “my top issue” (anderson and coletto, march 27, 2019). in retrospect this was an underestimate, since 26% of 104 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 those participating in the 2019 canadian election study (ces)3 spontaneously mentioned the environment as their top concern. identification as an important national problem notwithstanding, the environment failed to have a major impact on the most recent canadian and british elections for several reasons. one of these, which we will not discuss at length here, is undoubtedly related to the nature of the electoral system in both countries. as political scientists long have recognized, a single-member plurality electoral system makes it difficult for small parties to elect members of parliament (e.g., duverger, 1954). the british and canadian green parties, with action to alleviate climate change at the top of their agendas, are typical examples. in several elections stretching back to the 1980s in both countries, these two parties never elected more than one member of parliament. the situation remained largely unchanged in 2019 with three green mps being elected in canada and one in britain (everts and harada, 2020: carter and pearson, 2020). however, in other electoral contexts, the greens have done much better. for example, in the european parliament elections of may 2019, conducted under proportional representation in the member states, the greens elected their highest total of meps ever, with the environment the most important issue in that election (pearson and rudig, 2020). similarly, in germany, the greens captured 67 of 709 seats in the bundestag (lower house) in 2017 and were represented in 11 of 16 länder (state)-level governments. figure 1: brexit/europe, economy, environment and health care as important issues, great britain, june 2010-december 2019 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 p e rc e n ta g e economy health environment europe, brexit 28 26 44 49 78 17 12 5 source: yougov and utd-essex surveys. 3 the 2019 ces data and supporting documentation are available at www.ces-eec.ca 105 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: economy, environment and health care as important issues, canada, april 2004october 2019 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 p e rc e n ta g e health economy environment 26 22 10 44 6 4 source: nanos research; www.nanos.co imperfect translation into election issues when considering the salience of environmental issues, we will first examine how often respondents to election surveys mention these issues as most important for their voting decisions. the significance of environmental issues can vary according to how they are defined, as they are susceptible to various formulations. key to the importance of this, or any other, issue type is the link to a party or party platform – are they differentially associated with various parties? knowing this, we can move later to examining the patterns of voting choice based on the issues with a view to observing whether the voting patterns are skewed to benefit any party. ces survey data show that mentions of the environment (also using general terms like global warming or climate change) as the most important election issue are generally quite sparse. until the turn of the 21st century, less than one percent of answers to open-ended election survey questions about respondents’ most important election issues referenced the environment. since then, there have been more mentions, but the norm prior to 2019 was around two or three percent. as figure 3 shows, the exception was 2008 when close to nine percent of the survey respondents did so, likely in response to the widely publicized proposal of liberal leader, stephane dion, to implement a "green shift" in taxation through a carbon tax plan and various offsets. http://www.nanos.co/ 106 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 3: most important issues in the 2004-2019 canadian federal elections 7 9 35 20 32 31 37 24 18 10 3 8 1 3 9 1 2 32 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2004 2006 2008 2011 2015 2019 p e rc e n t economy health environment source: 2004-2019 canadian election study surveys. in general, references to "the environment" as an important election issue are an example of public concern with a classic valence issue. these are major problem-type issues, which all parties agree are threats to national or personal well-being and promise to address in various ways (see, e.g. clarke, kornberg and scotto 2009). classic examples of valence issues are slowdowns to economic growth and rising unemployment and deficiencies in healthcare and other social welfare measures. with valence issues, all parties claim to be on the same side, public opinion is strongly skewed in that direction, and the parties compete to convince the electorate that they should be trusted to deal with the situation. parties which have the advantage in public trust on a particular valence issue strive to raise its salience, while their rivals try to promote other issues, ones that they think will favour them. in the canadian context, raising the salience of the environment usually has been difficult. this is partially because the green party, which has established a link to the issue in the public mind, has experienced difficulty competing due to the single-member plurality electoral system. overall, environmental issues have had relatively minor effects on voting in canadian elections or the results of these contests. the environment can be blended with other issues in elections, including several that usually operate as valence issues. four prominent ones are economic growth, employment, taxation, and energy. links with these issues might work to the advantage of the environment; for example, implementing environmental protection policies might create new jobs and stimulate the development of new sources of energy production. often, however, these other issues have dynamics of their own, which do not involve the environment. more detrimentally, in elections environmental issues are susceptible to framing on other dimensions in ways that work to their disadvantage. examples are debates regarding the cost-effectiveness of government subsidies to 107 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 environmentally-friendly industries or efforts to encourage consumers, such as the construction and installation of solar panels or the purchase of electric cars. the dispute over the benefits or drawbacks of nuclear power for the environment has a separate discourse. in the canadian context, the most important way in which discussions of environmental policy have been diverted has involved the subject of carbon taxation. there have been two prior canadian federal elections where the subject of carbon taxation has been an important issue. the first instance, little remembered today, was in 1980. the 1980 election came as a result of the defeat of the progressive conservative (pc) minority government, led by joe clark, which came to power only in may of the previous year. the clark government was defeated in parliament over its budget in which finance minister john crosbie proposed a tax of 18 cents a gallon (four cents a litre) on gasoline at the pump. it is not entirely clear why the conservatives did this, since the proposal was never mentioned in the previous campaign, although it was justified in terms of both revenue and conservation. the budget bill was voted down in parliament and the pcs were defeated in the ensuing election (leduc and pammett 2016). did the proposed tax influence the election result? in an analysis of voting patterns between 1979 and 1980, there is a slight overall pc advantage over the liberals among those citing the budget, gasoline prices and the 18 cent tax as most important issues in the election. true, this came mainly from 1979 conservative voters staying with their party in 1980, but switching patterns only slightly favoured the liberals. the main negative factor for the pcs was not the budget or the tax but, rather, a very negative public judgment on clark, which was arrived at for many reasons. what was clear was that protection of the environment got lost in the discussion of the tax and the ineptitude of the government (clarke, jenson, leduc and pammett 1984, 167171). the 2008 canadian federal election was also called "early", in this case when stephen harper’s minority government, in power since 2006, judged the circumstances were right to try for a majority. one of the reasons for this was the announced policy of the liberal party, then led by stephane dion. dion had been a surprise victor in the liberal leadership convention held two years before. although he had been environment minister in the previous liberal government of paul martin, dion had opposed the carbon tax plan advanced by another candidate, michael ignatieff, during the leadership campaign. however, dion was converted to the idea, and proposed an elaborate "green shift" taxation plan during the election campaign. through a combination of tax decreases and proposed rebates to low-income people, the proposed tax was defined as revenue neutral, so the campaign position was that it was a tax shift not a tax increase. however, the harper conservatives saw their opportunity to attack the liberal proposal as a "tax on everything", given the ubiquitous nature of carbon. they promoted their leader’s economic competence and offered a "cap and trade" alternative for environmental policy. the conservatives won re-election, but not a majority (pammett and dornan 2008). once again, we can ask, how strategically disastrous was the green shift proposal in 2008? public opinion both before and after the election showed a small majority in support of the proposal. examining voting patterns showed a small net gain for the liberals among those voters in both 2006 and 2008 who thought it was the most important election issue. in this case, however, environmentally-concerned voters were scattered across the electoral landscape, with the new democratic party (ndp) and the greens also gaining from the issue. and responding to 108 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 a question asking “which party would be best at protecting the environment?” the majority answer was the green party, indicating an overall hesitancy about the liberals. the liberals failed to forge a strong "link to party" on the issue. and once again, the discussion during the campaign largely bypassed the seriousness of the condition of the environment. the carbon tax situation became an issue in the 2019 election in a different guise. the liberals had not intended to impose a carbon tax at the federal level. rather, they conceived of it as a "backstop" to be employed only in cases where provinces did not adopt plans consistent with federal requirements. as it turned out, several provinces refused to do so, including ontario, new brunswick, and the three western provinces of saskatchewan, manitoba, and alberta. therefore, a carbon tax was applied in these provinces, offset by federal rebates. recent canadian public opinion polling has shown that carbon taxation is not necessarily the toxic policy position it is sometimes thought to be, a finding consistent with some of the election findings reported earlier. in 2012, a survey found that 51 percent favoured a carbon tax, with support highest in british columbia and quebéc (lachappelle, borick and rabe 2012). similar findings (49 percent support and 44 percent opposed) are reported from another study over the 2011-15 period (mildenberger et al. 2016). an angus reid poll in october 2018 gave the national figures of 54 percent support and 46 percent opposed, although those figures were obtained only after the rebates were announced (angus reid 2018). in november 2018, abacus data reported that 59 percent of respondents agreed that “a national carbon price is a step in the right direction”, and also that 57 percent said that “if [they] were an mp, [they] would vote for a carbon tax” (anderson and coletto 2018). in the event, the carbon tax was not a major issue in the 2019 election on its own, but emerged as a provincial rights issue in the western provinces. once again, the seriousness of the environmental/climate change situation was not centre stage in that discussion. in britain, one analysis states that “the issue salience of climate change rose sharply in the uk during 2019, with the result that the election took place in the context of record levels of concern about the environment” (carter and pearson 2020, 746). nevertheless, the basis of issue choice between the major parties in the election was dominated by brexit. looking back to the 2016 referendum campaign on continued membership in the european union, there was not much discussion about how brexit might affect environmental protection efforts. the referendum produced a leave majority and, subsequently, there has been considerable attention given to the implications of leaving the eu for continued cooperation on various issues including the environment (hepburn and teytelboym 2017; farstad, carter and burns 2018). arguments have gone both ways. the conservatives have claimed that brexit would give the uk an opportunity to fashion a climate change policy of its own, which could be a better one. in contrast, the liberal democrats have maintained that brexit needs to be reversed so that a strong eu climate change policy would still be in force. under the leadership of jeremy corbyn, labour did not advocate a strong pro or con brexit policy and was largely bypassed when environmental policy after brexit was discussed. 109 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 4. top three most important issues in the 2015, 2017 and 2019 british general elections 18 60 59 53 64 57 67 39 37 9 7 23 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2015 2017 2019 p e rc e n t europe/brexit health economy environment source: 2015, 2017, 2019 utd-essex election surveys. the british election issue agenda in 2019 was dominated by two topics: brexit and the state of the national health service (nhs). when presented with a list of issues and asked to designate three as “most important”, 59 percent of the respondents in the 2019 university of texas at dallas (utd)-university of essex national election survey chose brexit, but nearly as many, 57 percent chose the nhs.45 as figure 4 shows, the nhs also had been a very salient issue in the two preceding (2015, 2017) general elections, while relations with the european union became a highly controversial topic in 2017 in the wake of the 2016 brexit referendum and the acrimonious controversies and manifold uncertainties it precipitated. in contrast, the economy was persistently salient, although the percentage citing it declined from 67 percent in 2015 to 37 percent in 2019. historically, the environment has been a very minor issue in british general election campaigns and environmental concerns do little to explain the decisions voters make (clarke et al. 2009). parties and their leaders typically focus their campaigns on classic valence issues, emphasizing their ability to deliver economic prosperity, provide generous funding for the nhs, and protect the citizenry from threats to national and personal security. in this regard, figure 4 shows that only seven percent of the 2015 utd-essex election survey respondents selected the environment 5 information about the 2015, 2017 and 2019 utd-university of essex election study data is available from the authors upon request. the data will be archived on the harvard dataverse (dataverse.harvard.edu) in the spring of 2021. 110 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 as one of their top three issues.6 nine percent did so in 2017. however, similar to their canadian counterparts, british voters responded differently in 2019, breaking the longstanding pattern of apparent disregard. nearly one-quarter of them designated the environment as an important issue. as will be discussed below, however, this heightened identification of the environment as an election issue had only minor effects on the choices canadian and british voters made in 2019. inadequate election manifestos great britain has a long history of party manifestos being published by political parties prior to every national election. these documents are expected, and indeed ostensibly sold, by all the major parties during the campaign. the 2019 election was no exception, but the three major parties differed substantially in the amount of attention they devoted to the environment. the conservatives devoted only two of 64 pages to short statements of environmental promises in their document, get brexit done (conservative party 2019). emphasizing that “conservation is, and always has been, at the heart of conservatism”, the party promised to make investments in green technology, help industry to create new green jobs, and place a moratorium on fracking for oil (2019, 55). the conservatives also promised to improve britain’s natural environment by tree planting and creating new national parks, and they made a point of saying “we will make no changes to the hunting act” (2019, 43), in reference to an issue which had divided the party due to the banning of the traditional practice of using dogs to hunt foxes and other animals. labour, in contrast, promised nothing less than “a green industrial revolution that will create one million jobs in the uk to transform our industry, energy, transport, agriculture and our buildings, while restoring nature”, as the first item in its manifesto (labour party 2019, 12). the party also proposed creating several state institutions, like a sustainable investment board, a national investment bank, a local transformation fund, a uk national energy agency and 14 regional energy agencies, and a complete new sustainable transport system (2019, 13-21). for their part, the liberal democrats’ plan, stop brexit build a better future, proposed “a ten-year emergency programme” to “insulate all britain’s homes by 2030”, as well as to generate the majority of power from renewable sources (liberal democratic party 2019, 41). a long list of government actions follows in the liberal democratic manifesto. the liberal democrats’ pledge to stop brexit meant they wanted to see eu environmental regulations retained, but the ambiguous labour stand on brexit meant it was unclear how their proposed environmental agenda would tie in with european climate change policies. in 2019, the canadian liberal party invited voters to choose forward: a real plan for the middle class, which promised to meet a number of climate change targets (liberal party of canada 2019). the liberals aimed to “achieve net-zero emissions by 2050” by “set[ting] legallybinding, five year milestones, … appoint[ing] a group of scientists, economists and experts, … introducing new carbon-reducing measures, [and] giving workers access to the training, support 6 earlier british national election surveys employing an open-ended format for voters’ issue concerns record even fewer mentions of the environment or related themes such as climate change or global warming (see, e.g. clarke et al. 2009). 111 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 and new opportunities needed to succeed in the clean economy” (2019, 29). these general statements are followed by pledges to plant two billion trees over 10 years, lower heating bills, and “help every canadian child learn how to camp” (30-35). for the conservative party of canada (cpc), andrew scheer’s plan for you to get ahead proposed to remove carbon taxes and replace them with “green technology”, create “a cleaner and greener natural environment” and take “the climate change fight global” (2029, 38). finally, canada’s ndp promised to “declare a climate emergency and put in place ambitious, science-based greenhouse gas reductions targets” which will “create over 300,000 good jobs in all communities” (2019, 43-44). some of these climate change plans were more ambitious than others; those of the conservative parties in both countries were relatively minimal. occasionally, the manifestos offered a choice; the canadian liberal party proposed to “continue to lead with a price on pollution” (2019, 29) whereas the conservatives would not use taxes to address climate change (2019, 39). none of the major party programs in either country addressed a potential environment-economy tradeoff, whereby job losses might occur in traditional energy industries. the closest any of them came to this was the reference in the manifesto of the british labour party to "transition" as part of the green industrial revolution and to a climate apprenticeship program (labour party 2019, 18) to help with training in the green economy. usually, however, the goals were lofty, the language determined, and the proposals to create government agencies, boards, commissions, and consultations, together with new green jobs, numerous. nowhere were public sacrifices demanded, vital public policy choices outlined, or diminished futures predicted. future targets were often a long way away, as with the liberal party of canada’s pledge to “achieve net-zero emissions by 2050” (2019, 29). life in an environmentally-sustainable future would go along much as usual, except things would be better. the air would be cleaner, there would be fewer temperature extremes, and there would be lots of new "green" jobs. environmental concerns were presented as valence issues in all the party programs in both countries. environmental protection was totally "upside" – there were no shortor long-term costs or tradeoffs involved. the only party to touch on a controversial policy was the reference by the conservative party of canada to their determination to do away with a carbon tax. this position was not news to canadian voters, as the conservative party had opposed a carbon tax policy for many years, and had refused to countenance the idea when stephen harper was in power. the overall environmental component of the manifestos of both the canadian and british conservative parties was generally considered to be weak, and was a recognition that voters of both parties would be making decisions based on other issues, as will be shown in the next section. all the canadian parties, however, tried to show their leaders in environmentally friendly situations, with pictures of conservative leader andrew scheer walking in the forest, and the liberals’ justin trudeau and the ndp’s jagmeet singh both paddling canoes! the environment and voting in 2019 as discussed above, valence issues typically dominate national election agendas in canada, britain, and elsewhere. following the lead of seminal research by stokes (1963; 1992), studies of voting behaviour in the two countries have documented that judgments about party performance on key valence issues such as the economy and healthcare typically have important effects on the 112 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 choices voters make (e.g. clarke et al. 2009; clarke, kornberg and scotto 2009; see also anderson 2010). the environment is a valence issue – overwhelming majorities of people prefer safe, sustainable environmental conditions and, accordingly, political debate focuses not on what the goal should be but rather "how to get there" and, especially, "who is best able to do it". implicitly recognizing that they lack the omniscience long assumed by neo-classical economic theorists, voters acting in a world of high stakes and abundant uncertainty downplay the details of policy controversies and rely heavily on two key heuristics (cues) when making up their minds.7 one heuristic is partisanship; research shows that sizable numbers of canadian and british voters have flexible party identifications which they are willing to update in light of recent party performance (clarke and mccutcheon 2009; clarke, jenson, leduc and pammett 2019). party leader images are a second influential heuristic. information about party leaders is in plentiful supply – leaders dominate the political stage during election campaigns and are the focus of intense, ongoing media attention in periods between elections. voters use this information to form impressions of leaders’ competence and responsiveness to public needs and demands. in turn, these leader images provide important cues that do much to guide voters’ ballot choices. the indirect effects of issues will be considered shortly. the valence politics theory of electoral choice informs our analysis of the impact of environmental concerns on voting in canada and britain in 2019. we specify a multivariate model using partisan identifications, party leader images, and judgments about classic valence issues (the economy, health services) as central predictor variables.8 to assess the impact of environmental concerns, we focus on judgments about whether job creation should be given priority over protecting the environment. other predictors include attitudes towards brexit (in great britain), immigration and general left-right ideological orientations. several sociodemographics (age, educational attainment, gender, income, region of residence) are also included. since the dependent variables are dichotomies (e.g., vote liberal = 1, vote another party = 0), we use binomial logit procedures to estimate model parameters (e.g., long and freese 2014). we employ data from the 2019 ces for the canadian analysis and data from the 2019 utd-essex election survey in the british analysis. 7 on the importance of heuristics in human decision-making more generally see, e.g., gigerenzer (2008). 8 details about the construction of variables used in the canadian and british voting models are available from the authors upon request. 113 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 5: most important predictors of voting in the 2019 canadian federal election jobs-env, -0.04 singh, -0.05 trudeau, -0.06 may, 0.18 green id, 0.21 left-right, -0.10 cpc id, -0.10 trudeau, -0.15 ndp id, 0.28 singh, 0.32 jobs-env, 0.04 may, -0.07 singh, -0.08 cpc id, 0.14 trudeau, -0.18 jobs-env, 0.05 scheer, -0.12 singh, -0.14 green id, -0.15 liberal id, 0.18 trudeau, 0.67 scheer, 0.53 vote green vote ndp vote cpc vote liberal liberal id, -0.05 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 change in vote probabilities note: probabilities calculated from binomial logit analyses of factors affecting voting for various parties. 114 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 5 displays key results of this modeling exercise for voting in the 2019 canadian federal election.9 this figure shows the ability of the most influential, statistically significant predictors to change the probability of voting for various parties. considering liberal party voting first, and focusing on the five strongest predictors, we see that feelings about party leader justin trudeau are very important. as voters’ feelings about him increase from highly negative to highly positive, the probability of voting liberal increases by .67 points (on a 0-1 scale). feelings about the leaders of the conservative and new democratic parties are also influential factors in liberal voting, but these effects are considerably weaker. specifically, as feelings about conservative leader andrew scheer move from negative to positive, the probability of voting liberal declines by .12 points. the comparable decrease as feelings about ndp leader jagmeet singh go from negative to positive is .14 points. as expected, the probability of voting liberal is also influenced by being a liberal or a green party identifier – liberal identifiers are .18 points more likely to vote liberal and green identifiers are .15 points less likely to do so. judgments that job creation should have priority over the environment have statistically significant, but small, effects. all else being equal, voters favouring jobs over environment have a .05 points greater probability of voting liberal. these results for liberal voting are echoed in the analyses of voting for other canadian parties. party leader images are consistently paramount. specifically, the probability of voting conservative increases by .53 points as feelings about cpc leader andrew scheer moves from negative to positive. the comparable increase for ndp voting as feelings about party leader jagmeet singh increase is .32 points and that for green voting as feelings about party leader elizabeth may increase is .18 points. similar to the liberal analysis, the list of the other top five predictors is dominated by partisanship variables. the only exception is left-right ideological orientations which, when moved across the scale from left to right, reduce the likelihood of ndp voting by .10 points. again, the direct impact of favouring jobs over the environment is very modest, increasing the probability of a conservative vote by .04 points and reducing the probability of a green vote by an equal amount. 9 estimated parameters for the canadian and british vote models are presented in appendices a and b, respectively. 115 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 figure 6: how beliefs about whether jobs should have priority over environment affected feelings about party leaders in the 2019 canadian federal election 41.3 39.3 43.3 44.8 35.2 46.2 51.7 52.5 30 35 40 45 50 55 strongly disagree disagree neither agree strongly agree jobs should have priority over environment l e a d e r d is li k e -l ik e s c o re trudeau scheer singh may note: feelings about canadian party leaders measured on 0-100 dislike-like scale. the dominance of leader images in these analyses suggests the possibility that environmental concerns exerted significant indirect effects on voting by working to shape feelings about the leaders. to assess this possibility, we performed a second set of multivariate analyses using these feelings (measured on a 0-100 dislike-like scale) as dependent variables. in addition to the "priority of jobs over environment" variable, predictors included all those used in the voting model described above. figure 6 summarizes the model estimates of the impact of the jobs over environment variable on leader images. as shown, the largest effects are for conservative leader andrew scheer, and green leader elizabeth may. in scheer’s case, average feelings about him are 35.2 among voters who “strongly disagree” that jobs should be given priority over the environment to 44.8 among those who “strongly agree” with this proposition. the effect on feelings about elizabeth may are larger but, as expected, move in the opposite direction, decreasing from 52.5 among those favouring the environment to 39.3 among those prioritizing jobs. effects for the ndp and liberal leaders are considerably smaller. in both cases, these leaders are more warmly received by voters who favour the environment over jobs, with feelings about jagmeet singh moving from 51.7 to 46.2 and from 43.2 to 41.3 for justin trudeau. 116 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 overall, these results indicate that attitudes toward the environment mattered in the 2019 canadian federal election, but the effects are largely indirect and modest in size.10 figure 7: most important predictors of voting in the 2019 british general election scotland, -0.08 johnson, -0.08 pro-brexit, -0.09 corbyn, -0.11 lib dem id, 0.20 swinson, 0.27 age, -0.13 labour id, 0.23 corbyn, 0.34 lib dem id, -0.11 age, 0.12 conservative id, 0.12 corbyn, -0.19 johnson, 0.55 conservative id, 0.17 vote conservative vote labour vote liberal democrat scotland, -0.13 johnson, -0.19 -1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 change in vote probability note: probabilities calculated from results of binomial logit analyses of factors affecting voting for various parties. 10 this finding remains unchanged if mentions of the environment as most important issue are used in the multivariate analyses of voting and feelings about party leaders rather than priority accorded to the economy versus the environment. 117 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 results of similar multivariate models of factors affecting voting in the 2019 british general election are shown in figure 7. given the very small number of green party voters in the utdessex survey, we do not do a separate analysis of voters for that party. the major message of figure 7 in the present context is the absence of direct effects of environmental concerns on conservative, labour, and liberal democrat voting. neither designating the environment as a most important issue nor giving priority to the environment over the economy is a top-five predictor of voting for any of these parties. and, only in the labour analysis, does one of these predictors (environment as a most important issue) have a significant effect, working to decrease the probability by .04 points. similar to the canadian analyses, the major predictors of voting in the 2019 british election are leader images and partisanship. for example, very positive rather than very negative feelings about conservative leader boris johnson increase the probability of a conservative vote by .55 points. comparable changes in feelings about labour leader jeremy corbyn and liberal democrat leader jo swinson boost the likelihood of voting labour or liberal democrat by .34 and .27 points, respectively. figure 7 also shows that partisan attachments had several "top five" effects, although the strength of these effects was considerably less than the impact of leader images. figure 8: how beliefs about priority of environment versus economy affected feelings about party leaders in 2019 british general election 4.6 3.7 4.0 4.8 3.0 3.5 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 economy not sure environment priority economy or environment l e a d e r d is li k e -l ik e s c o re johnson corbyn swinson note: feelings about british party leaders measured on 0-10 dislike-like scale. 118 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 as in the canadian case, we also investigate whether environmental concerns have indirect effects by influencing how british voters react to the party leaders. for this purpose, we employ multivariate models identical to the voting analyses just described. the results show that designating the environment as an important issue and giving priority to the environment over jobs have negative effects on feelings about boris johnson. in contrast, favouring the environment rather than jobs has positive effects on feelings about jeremy corbyn and jo swinson. as figure 8 illustrates, average feelings about johnson on a 0 (dislike) to 10 (like) scale only move from 4.8 among those favouring the economy to 4.6 among those emphasizing the environment. effects on feelings about corbyn and swinson are somewhat larger. average feelings about corbyn increase from 3.0 among voters prioritizing the economy to 3.7 among those favouring the economy, with the comparable scores for swinson being 3.5 and 4.0. these modest indirect effects of environmental concerns on electoral behaviour via leader images provide additional testimony of the failure of environmental issues to "cut through" in the 2019 british general election. limited impact on election outcomes finally, we look at the limited possibilities for environmental/climate change issues to affect the overall results of the 2019 canadian and british elections. to do this, survey respondents choosing environment as their most important issue (canada) or as one of their three most important issues (britain) have been identified in tables 1 and 2, for comparison with respondents choosing other issues. to create this table, we identified the reported status and behaviour of the respondents in the previous election (2015 in canada and 2017 in britain) and cross-tabulated this with reported vote in 2019. by computing percentages over the entire complement of 2019 voters, we can measure the effect of the environment issue on the magnitude and direction of overall flows of the vote between the two most recent elections. 119 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 table 1: effects of the environment, economy and other issues in the 2019 canadian federal election a. environment liberal cpc ndp bq green switch to 0.9 0.05 1.3 1.0 1.6 remain with 5.0 0.8 1.4 0.8 0.7 re)enter 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.5 total 6.6 1.6 3.5 2.0 2.8 b. economy liberal cpc ndp bq green switch to 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.3 remain with 3.6 4.8 0.7 0.1 0.1 re)enter 0.6 0.7 0.3 -- 0.1 total 4.8 6.5 1.7 0.4 0.4 c. all other issues liberal cpc ndp bq green switch to 2.2 4.2 3.8 2.2 1.2 remain with 12.4 13.3 3.4 1.5 0.8 re)enter 2.2 2.3 1.9 0.4 0.8 total 14.6 19.8 9.1 4.1 2.8 source: 2019 ces pre-election survey 120 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 table 2. effects of brexit, nhs, economy and environment in the 2019 british general election a. brexit liberal other conservative labour democrat green party switch to 6.2 3.1 3.6 .7 3.4 remain with 27.7 10.2 4.3 .5 3.2 re)enter 2.0 1.1 .5 .7 1.3 total 35.9 14.4 8.4 1.5 7.9 b. nhs, health care liberal other conservative labour democrat green party switch to 5.7 4.5 3.0 .9 2.6 remain with 17.9 14.2 4.5 .3 3.0 re)enter 1.6 1.4 .4 .3 .9 total 25.2 20.1 7.9 1.5 6.5 c. economy liberal other conservative labour democrat green party switch to 2.9 .7 2.1 .5 1.5 remain with 10.0 7.6 2.7 .6 1.8 re)enter 1.4 1.2 .3 .1 .8 total 14.3 9.5 5.1 1.2 4.1 d. environment liberal other conservative labour democrat green party switch to 1.7 1.4 1.4 .7 1.1 remain with 5.1 5.7 2.4 .1 .9 re)enter .3 .5 .5 .2 .4 total 7.1 7.6 4.3 1.0 2.4 source: 2019 utd-essex election survey panel 1 in table 1 shows that there was a modest impact of environment on the outcome of the 2019 canadian election, in the sense that all parties except the conservatives benefitted. in particular, the largest number in this panel (five percent of 2019 voters) are 2015 liberal voters who stayed with their party because of the environment issue. the largest amount of vote switching between the two elections was comprised of people moving to the greens, but this is a relatively small number overall (1.6 percent of 2019 voters). the data in table 1 thus emphasize that the environment was only one issue among many with quite modest effects on the 2019 canadian federal election. the economy was almost as important to the liberals, and considerably more important to conservative voters. a wide variety of other issues was cited by 121 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 people choosing the various parties. the limited impact, and the nebulous way the environment issue was defined in the party manifestos, means that the resulting liberal government had little explicit instruction from the public about the policies they should undertake, except, of course, that those policies should move "forward" and create "good jobs". who would disagree? in britain, the pattern of issue choice was considerably different, but the impact of the environment (table 2, panel d) was, if anything, less important than it was in canada. (bear in mind that three issue choices were allowed in the question in britain, so all the totals are higher than those in table 1 for canada.) the overall effect of environmental issue voting did not favour any of the larger parties, and the impact was considerably lower than that for the economy (panel c), the healthcare system (panel b), and especially for brexit (panel a), an issue vital to the conservative victory in the election. given the minimal specifics expressed in the victorious conservative party manifesto, and uncertainties about brexit arrangements to be negotiated with the eu, the election did precious little to clarify the future course of british environmental policy. conclusion: not easy going green the environment is primarily presented as a valence issue in canadian and british elections. defined as a large societal problem which all parties and their leaders promise to address if elected, it has competed with several other well established valence issues; this was certainly the case in the two electoral contests considered in detail here. the other two most important valence issues, the economy and healthcare, can be presented as complementary to environmental concerns, in that a "green" economy can create jobs, and a cleaner environment can alleviate demands on the health system. often, however, there is competition among these three valence issues for salience, funding, and policy direction. money spent on the environment can mean money not spent on hospitals and the health system. strict environmental regulation and carbon taxes can be presented as costing jobs and emptying the public’s wallets. this helps to explain why in times of economic recession, or in times of health emergencies, environmental issues can get pushed to the sidelines. a further illustration is provided by the fact that the 2020 coronavirus pandemic forcefully depressed public opinion identifying the environment as the most important problem facing the country to, in the canadian case, less than half its january value in april and may (nanos 2020). our analysis of the party manifestos presented earlier shows that none of the parties contesting the 2019 canadian and british elections presented environmental protection in terms which competed with other fields; rather, voters were invited to tacitly assume that the economy would be buoyed by green jobs and a cleaner environment would produce a healthier population. when they are addressed by the parties, and all parties devote attention (sometimes considerable attention) to environmental issues in their manifestos, their words sound sincere and their proposed actions sound sensible. all the major parties are adept at creating virtue-signaling "environmental action plans" which do not demand sacrifices on the part of voters, such as the plans to plant large numbers of trees proposed by several parties in both countries in 2019. when dealing with the subject of jobs, parties try to avoid colliding with environmental concerns by proposing to create "new green jobs" rather than focusing on job losses in fossil fuel industries. carbon taxes are not stressed, but when parties are brave enough to admit to plans to impose 122 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 them, these taxes are offset with rebates or with subsidies to promote purchasing electric vehicles. electricity pricing not being a responsibility of national governments, any additional costs there may be ignored. the result, as we have shown here, is that environmental issues, despite being identified as major problems, have not been major factors influencing voting behaviour or election outcomes in canada or britain, despite the amount of virtuous rhetoric expended on them during campaigns. where environmental issues do influence votes, there is seldom a link to a party that is robust enough to strongly favour one of them, and we have seen that many voters citing the environment as their most important issue use this as a rationale for staying with the party they supported in the previous election. overall flows of votes based on environmental issues from one party to another are not large enough to determine the outcomes of elections, certainly not the two elections examined here. can we envision future british or canadian elections where environmental issues, whether defined as climate change or in some other form, have a major impact on voting and results? it is tempting to argue that this would happen only if three conditions are met. first, a large segment of the public must be convinced that that there is, in fact, an environmental crisis that requires immediate action, a crisis so severe that it supercedes other more immediate events and conditions. second, there must be a clear differentiation among the political parties as to the actions they wish to take. third, electorates must be willing to undergo the dislocations and sacrifices, financial and otherwise, that may be necessary for effective action to address the issue. we may be waiting some time yet for these circumstances to occur. "kicking the can down the road" can be a very tempting strategy for power-seeking parties and their leaders. 123 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 references anderson, bruce and david coletto. 2018. “can the conservatives win in 2019 by running against carbon pricing?” abacus data, november 4, 2018. https://abacusdata.ca/can-theconservatives-win-in-2019-by-running-against-carbon-pricing-its-no-slam-dunk/ _____. 2019. “will climate change be a ballot box question in 2019?” abacus data, march 27, 2019. https://abacusdata.ca/will-climate-change-be-a-ballot-box-question-in-2019/ anderson, cameron. 2010. “economic voting in canada: assessing the impact of subjective conditions and electoral context.” in voting behaviour in canada, edited by cameron anderson and laura stephenson. vancouver: university of british columbia press. angus reid. 2018. “carbon pricing: rebate announcement tips opinion in favour of federal plan, slim majority now support it.” october 31, 2018. http://angusreid.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/2018.10.31_climatechangefinal.pdf carter, neil, and mitya pearson. 2020. “‘a climate election’: the environment and the greens in the 2019 uk general election.” environmental politics 29 (4): 746-751. clarke, harold d., david sanders, marianne c. stewart and paul whiteley. 2009. performance politics and the british voter. cambridge: cambridge university press. clarke, harold d., jane jenson, lawrence leduc and jon h. pammett. 1984. absent mandate: the politics of discontent in canada. toronto: gage. _____. 2019. absent mandate: strategies and choices in canadian electoral politics. toronto: university of toronto press. clarke, harold d., allan kornberg and thomas j. scotto. 2009. making political choices: canada and the united states. toronto: university of toronto press. clarke, harold d. and allan mccutcheon. 2009. “the dynamics of party identification reconsidered.” public opinion quarterly 73 (4): 704-728. conservative and unionist party. 2019. get brexit done: unleash britain’s potential. london. conservative party of canada. 2019. andrew scheer’s plan for you to get ahead. no location stated. duverger, maurice. 1954. political parties their organization and activity in the modern state. london: methuen. everts, sarah and susan harada. 2020. “the climate referendum: the greens, the others, and the politics of climate change.” in the canadian federal election of 2019, edited by jon h. pammett and christopher dornan. montreal: mcgill-queen’s press. farstad, fay, neil carter and charlotte burns. 2018. “what does brexit mean for the uk’s climate change act?” the political quarterly 89 (2): 291-297. https://abacusdata.ca/can-the-conservatives-win-in-2019-by-running-against-carbon-pricing-its-no-slam-dunk/ https://abacusdata.ca/can-the-conservatives-win-in-2019-by-running-against-carbon-pricing-its-no-slam-dunk/ https://abacusdata.ca/will-climate-change-be-a-ballot-box-question-in-2019/ http://angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2018.10.31_climatechangefinal.pdf http://angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2018.10.31_climatechangefinal.pdf 124 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 gigerenzer, gerd. 2008. rationality for morals: how people cope with uncertainty. oxford: oxford university press. hepburn, cameron and alexander teytelboym. 2017. “climate change policy after brexit.” oxford review of economic policy 33 (1): s144-s154. ipsos. 2019. what worries the world? september, 2019. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-11/what-worries-theworld-september-2019.pdf labour party. 2019. a time for real change: the labour party manifesto 2019. london. liberal democratic party. 2019. stop brexit: build a better future. london. liberal party of canada. 2019. choose forward: a real plan for the middle class. no location stated. lachapelle, erick, christopher p. broick and barry rabe. 2012. “public attitudes toward climate science and climate policy in federal systems: canada and the united states compared.” review of policy research 29 (3): 334-357. leduc, lawrence and jon h. pammett. 2016. dynasties and interludes: past and present in canadian electoral politics, 2nd edition. toronto: dundurn. long, j. scott and jeremy freese. 2014. regression models for categorical dependent variables using stata, 3rd edition. college station: stata press. mayer, adam and e. keith smith. 2017. “rethinking economic conditions and environmental attitudes: macroeconomic effects, individual experiences, and subjectivity.” social currents 4 (4) no pages available. mildenberger, matto, peter howe, erick lachapelle, leah stokes, jennifer marlon and timothy gravelle. 2016. “the distribution of climate change public opinion in canada.” plos|one 11 (8): e0159774. nanos. 2020. nanos weekly issue tracking, week ending may 29, 2020, www.nanos.co. new democratic party of canada. 2019. a new deal for people: new democrats’ commitments to you. no location stated. pammett, jon h. and christopher dornan. 2009. the canadian federal election of 2008 toronto: dundurn. pearson, mitya, and wolfgang rudig. 2020. “the greens in the european elections.” environmental politics 19 (2): 336-343. poushter, jacob and christine huang. 2019. “climate change still seen as the top global threat, but cyberattacks a rising concern.” pew research center, february, 2019. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-11/what-worries-the-world-september-2019.pdf https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-11/what-worries-the-world-september-2019.pdf 125 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 stokes, donald e. 1963. “spatial models of party competition.” american political science review 57: 368-77. _____. 1992. “valence politics.” in electoral politics, edited by dennis kavanagh. oxford: clarendon press. 126 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 appendix a binomial logit models of voting in the 2019 canadian federal election party predictor liberal cpc ndp green bq β β β β β party leaders: trudeau .048*** -.025*** -.016*** -.017*** -.011** scheer -.014*** .047*** -.011*** -.015*** -.015*** singh -.017*** -.011*** .034*** -.011*** -.013** may -.005** -.012*** -.003 .039*** .002 blanchet -.000 -.003 -.005** .000 .049*** party identification: liberal .940** -.723*** -.374** -1.120*** -.966*** cpc -.812*** 1.144*** -1.458*** -1.491*** -.061 ndp -1.126*** -1.024*** 1.536*** -.727*** -1.159** green -1.758*** -.842** -.510** 1.504*** .354 bq -2.508*** -1.843*** -1.538*** -2.220*** 1.158*** environment v jobs .097** .102* -.025 -.330*** -.006 economic evaluations .255*** -.224** -.244*** .203 -.178 health care .260* -.379* .439*** -.710** -.623 left-right ideology .011 .033 -.098*** .099** -.109* nativism index -.031** -.011 .000 .001 .097*** socio-demographics: age -.003 .049 -.071** .016 .054 education .047 .007 -.046 .015 -.158* gender -.049 -.114 -.008 .069 .322 income .016 .127*** -.055 -.035 .013 region†: atlantic .028 -.076 .123 .443* -- quebéc -.240 -.550*** -.476*** -.465* -- prairies -.687*** .660*** .201 -.559** -- british columbia -.229* .112 .208 .107 -- constant -1.759*** -1.791*** -.589 -2.292*** -2.660*** mckelvey r2 = .67 .78 .47 .46 .68 *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; one-tailed test † ontario is region reference category --bq vote in quebéc only 127 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 appendix b binomial logit models of voting in the 2019 british general election party liberal predictor conservative labour democrat β β β party leaders johnson .503*** -.272*** -.172*** corbyn -.235*** .356*** -.232*** swinson -.110* -.136** .392*** party identification conservative 1.344*** -2.692*** -.249 labour -1.184*** 2.305*** -.671 liberal democrat -1.493** -.607 2.310*** brexit party -1.053* -1.798 .668 other parties -.749* .031 .218 favour leaving eu .452*** -.070 -.846*** economy v environment .156 .065 -.048 environment as issue .031 -.527* .182 economic evaluations .224* -.146 -.069 nhs evaluations -.014 .002 -.044 left-right ideology .034 -.003 -.002 anti-immigration attitudes .243* .226* -.130 socio-demographics age .027*** -.029*** .004 education .122 .119 -.022 gender -.679*** .138 .116 income .047 -.016 .132*** country† scotland .245 -1.885*** -.200*** wales -.000 -.322 -.918* constant -2.630*** .037 -3.993*** mckelvey r2 .82 .80 .62 n = 1446 *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; one-tailed test † england is country reference category 128 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(2) 2020: 102-128 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 83 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 from media capture to platform capture: reflections on three decades of a free czech media todd nesbitt, university of new york in prague (unyp), czech republic.1 abstract this paper examines the evolution of the media in the czech republic during the first three decades as an independent state (1993-2023). the paper reflects on the media’s role in the changing political landscape, where economic and political interests intertwine, exploring the transition from a state-controlled system to a media landscape characterized by extensive foreign ownership and, ultimately, a concentrated domestic ownership market. it traces the initial privatization of media outlets, followed by the flood of foreign ownership it attracted to an unexpected shift in ownership, marked by the exit of international media companies and the rise of domestic oligarchs, resulting in a media environment distinguished by influence over ideology. the paper balances the nation’s thirtieth anniversary by suggesting that the challenges of media capture that characterized the preceding decade have begun to recede, only to be replaced by a new type of capture, this time in the context of platforms. 1 todd nesbitt is dean of the school of communication and media at the university of new york in prague (unyp), czech republic. 84 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 reflections on three decades of free czech media when this paper was started in august 2021, political observers in the czech republic were analyzing the significance and ramifications of the revelation that the prime minister, the 859th richest person in the world, was the subject of a lengthy police investigation over claims of fraud involving 1.7 million euros (eur) in subsidies from the european union. emails from his official political party being investigated were obtained directly from the servers of his multibillion-euro chemical, agricultural, and media conglomerate, with which he had allegedly severed ties years prior in order to comply with a domestic conflict-of-interest law. as was in donald trump’s america, the incredulity provoked by this framing no longer draws much attention; it is merely the latest in a long succession of scandals characterized by a cocktail of great wealth, contentious business dealings, and controversial behaviour. it is duly noted by the news media but will disappear in a few days, as prime minister andrej babiš’s advisors know very well. this is the state of affairs at the height of the power of one of central europe’s most notorious media moguls. fast-forwarding two years later to the thirtieth anniversary of the czech state finds a rather dramatic change. a narrow loss for babiš’s right-wing populist ano (czech for “yes”) party in the october 2021 election by a broad coalition of parties has resulted in the governing coalition making good on a critical campaign promise. this promise to pass an amendment to conflict-ofinterest legislation has resulted in the almost immediate unseating of andrej babiš as media magnate, forcing the sale or the holdings of his media empire to another oligarch, albeit one without obvious political ambitions. with the passing of the so-called lex babiš legislation, the end of the possibility of direct influence over a large share of the media by a politician has arrived. it perhaps symbolically marks the transformation from three rather tumultuous stages of classic media capture to a new stage of platform capture, and thus, a new chapter in the development of media in an independent czech republic has arguably been born. this paper traces the stages the czech media have gone through in the three decades of the country’s existence and argues that the most critical stage for media and democracy may only be beginning. beginnings political transformation does not take place overnight. as change bubbles under the surface of regimes, turbulence is felt in the media environment as well. albeit perhaps naïve and chaotic in nature, the pre-transition stage of the media in czechoslovakia is often considered to have begun with anticipation and maneuvering in light of the imminent transformational change in society and faded with the increased role of foreign investment in the media market. the role of the media under the communist government in czechoslovakia was not unlike other central and eastern european regimes, fulfilling primarily functions of state propaganda and ‘educational’ capacities as opposed to more commercial and entertainment-oriented roles in democracies (gulyas 1999, 82). this is not to suggest the role was inconsequential—quite the opposite, the mass media in the age of medium scarcity in czechoslovakia (two broadcast television networks, three national radio stations plus regional stations, approximately thirty national and regional newspapers, and a broad range of magazines catering to various 85 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 demographics and interests) undoubtedly played a key role in society, however, one may have known that media consumption must be approached from a critical angle (jirák and köpplová 2008). the key legislative moment, opening the proverbial floodgates of a free press, was an amendment to the press law of 1966, effectively removing obstacles to private publishing, as well as deregulating the right to publish, making it a simplified, informational process. although there were originally plans to create a comprehensive media law combining the broadcast and print sectors, in the end, the key mass mediums were to follow different paths to independence (waschková císařová and metyková 2015). a combination of uncontrolled and state-controlled privatization followed, and by the emergence of an independent czech republic in 1993, the media market had been more or less privatized, or, in the case of the former state broadcasters (czechoslovak television and czechoslovak radio), had transformed into public organs. in terms of the print sector, prior to 1989, publishers were either political parties or organizations based around the state apparatus (youth organizations, ministries). these structures remained intact in the immediate revolutionary months following november 1989, although internally, journalists stopped taking orders from publishers and voted amongst themselves for editors to lead the publications (benda 2007; šmíd 2004). this was followed by the phenomenon frequently referred to as “spontaneous privatization,” in which journalists formed joint stock companies and gained publishing rights over their titles ‘overnight.’ due to the non-existence of any effective regulatory framework for the dissolution of state properties and the hunger and enthusiasm for a free press, “legalized theft” was allowed to take place (benda 2007, 89). in the broadcasting sector, the two state institutions of czechoslovak radio and czechoslovak television that had held a monopoly over broadcasting prior to 1989 were dismantled, albeit more slowly than the publishing sector. in 1991, the legal context was changed with the passing of the radio and television law (the act on the operation of radio and television broadcasting, 468/1991/sb.), which, among other liberal aspects, allowed for foreign ownership with few conditions. among these was the formation of a company (obchodní společnost) on domestic territory, with some expectations for the development of domestic programming (benda 2007; šmíd 2004). legislation was passed creating a dual broadcasting system in the same year (act of the czech national council on czech television number 483/1991 & czech radio 484/1991). in spite of the arrival of the long-awaited possibility for the emergence of free media, not a great deal of lasting activity took place in the early years of the transition. in terms of broadcast, it would take a couple of more years for private broadcasting to emerge. in the newspaper market, besides the takeover of existing titles described earlier, only two new dailies emerged in 1990, both having clear connections with the past. one was lidové noviny—a paper published in the first czechoslovak republic (1918 to 1938), later revived and published in an illegal samizdat format from 1987, and hospodářské noviny—formerly an economic weekly published by the rudé právo publishing house of the communist party of czechoslovakia. attempts at national dailies associated with political parties took place, but all of them were short-lived. the only new weekly and daily newspapers to see the light of day were produced by one of the first foreign publishers in the czech market (ringier— switzerland), with the publishing of an economic-focused weekly (českomoravský profit, 1991), and the first czechoslovak tabloid (blesk, 1992)—both modelled after similar papers in the home country. 86 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 internationalization this appearance of the first media entity with foreign capital in a free czechoslovakia was, in some ways, a very minor happening, in others, it was a historically significant event. for a country accustomed to focusing inward, it might be considered an unworthy moment to dwell on, since much attention was focused on who in the ransacked domestic environment would be able to put together a new, completely free daily. on the other hand, the emergence of a fully funded nonsoviet-affiliated foreign media entity was, at the very least, a revelation but certainly not one that could be predicted to become the dominant approach in the domestic press in a few short years. due to the fact that press ownership regulations were particularly lenient toward foreign investors in many central european countries, particularly the czech republic, poland, and hungary, those nations with the most welcoming media rules saw the greatest inflow of foreign investment into the area (wyka-podkówka 2014). thus, what began as a relatively minor occurrence in the chaotic recent post-revolutionary period very quickly became a trend impossible to ignore. this openness meant that not following any particular schema, over the course of the decade, both the print and broadcast market in the czech republic began to be dominated by foreign interests. the press saw continued expansion from ringier, with the national daily newspaper market eventually being divided between them and two german publishers, rheinisch-bergische verlagsgesellschaft mbh (rbvg) and verlagsgruppe handelsblatt. the regional press became consolidated owing to the merging of a number of regional titles under another publisher from germany, verlagsgruppe passau. the lifestyle magazine sector was gradually consolidated by french and german regional powerhouses. the private broadcasting sector also became dominated early by foreign entities starting in 1993, first in radio, with the emergence of the national broadcast market of the french conglomerate lagardere, and in television, with the first central european broadcast venture consisting of a joint venture with central european enterprises (cme) featuring us capital. cme would go on to become a powerhouse in the central and eastern european region with television enterprises in six countries, despite a turbulent period of struggles for ownership attributed to a lack of political capital (sparks 1999). the result of the flow of foreign media initiatives via investment and capital injections or sole ownership ventures meant that in the first year of the new century, the czech republic not only outpaced all other central and eastern european countries in terms of foreign investment in media but also represented a significant level of ownership (štětka 2010, 873–874). in the field of media studies, the impact of ownership—whether direct or indirect—on media output has been and remains a widely deliberated theme. foreign, or transnational ownership became an area of heightened concern as the deregulation and liberalization of media markets spread in the late 1980s and 1990s in the united states and western europe (bagdikian 2002; mcchesney and herman 1997; thussu 2006), particularly in terms of concentration and conglomeration (doyle 2002). two major concerns with foreign ownership include the possible manipulation of news content to the detriment of the local environment in the context of editorial independence and an extensive focus on commercialized and profitable content at the expense of content needed for a healthy public sphere (štětka 2012). both of these criticisms were prominent throughout central and eastern europe as foreign investment in media companies increased, and concentration became an issue (hanretty 2014). a number of scholars and observers have reflected on the emergence of foreign dominance in the domestic media as opposed to local initiatives. the reason for the lack of euphoric free-market 87 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 publishing has been attributed to, for the most part, a problem of capital, exacerbated by a lack of willingness or availability of domestic investors to finance new publications in a printing environment characterized by a desperate need for technological innovation (šmíd 2004, 8). in addition, the inviting regulatory environments of central and eastern europe (cee) soon was to attract the interest of foreign capital, and the czech republic, with the most open market, was a prime location for media companies interested in expansion, particularly from switzerland and germany. far from being interpreted as a hostile invasion, others felt that foreign capital provided a sort of guarantee against internal tyranny represented by the glowing coals of communist interests (wyka-podkówka 2014, 35). as a result, for approximately a decade and a half after the pre-transition stage, the czech media environment consisted of a rather remarkable consolidation of investment in local media by foreign, predominantly european-based media owners. the print market became particularly concentrated, at its peak, featuring 88 percent of national daily newspapers with foreign ownership and a virtual monopoly in the regional daily sector with 100 percent controlled by one foreign company, verlagsgruppe passau gmbh. the broadcast market rose to the top of the scale of ownership concentration among cee countries, with both the private television and radio markets dominated by foreign capital, and movements toward conglomeration were also becoming reality, with trends in cross-media ownership appearing (štětka 2010, 877). with issues of media ownership, objective numbers appearing in quantitative studies strike fear in the hearts of many, but the reality behind them is often much more subjective. studies based on counting look dangerous on paper, but proving the impact on culture based on numbers is notoriously difficult. in the fog of uncertainty, however, it is no less scary. understanding the real impact of the stunning foreign investment in the czech media has been approached by some scholars, but conclusions are difficult and often lack systematic, comprehensive, and empirical approaches. concerns voiced in various papers have focused mostly on the impact on diversity and public opinion formation as opposed to the spread of ideology. some have asked to what extent a commercial, popular, often tabloid approach to content creation and dissemination has had a negative impact on the ideals of a quality public sphere (štětka 2012, 437). others have considered to what extent western approaches to the professional roles of journalists were at odds with local perceptions of development (volek 2010). the traditional concern of to what extent foreign capital and media initiatives came at the expense of nurturing indigenous media industries has also been voiced (gulyas 1999). perhaps the strongest words depicting the impact of foreign investment came from an often-quoted passage in a paper by the european federation of journalists declaring the new “foreign capital monopoly” to “the old state monopoly,” and directly implicating ownership factors in “the failure of czech newspapers to exercise the important role of public watchdog” (european federation of journalists 2004). as the old saying goes, actions speak louder than words, and thus the exit of foreign companies from central and eastern europe toward the end of the first decade of the twentieth century seems to have left behind any ideological assumptions behind the motivation for foreign ownership, pointing toward profit as the overwhelming reason for the stage of investment in the czech media. this motive would change significantly as the czech republic moved into a new stage of ownership featuring wealthy local business and industry figures. 88 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 tycoons? moguls? oligarchs! although concerns regarding excessive foreign ownership did exist as described earlier, one key aspect that the phenomena did arguably provide was stability. not only was there an absence of direct instrumentalization by owners, but the profit factor, as being the overwhelming motivation for a significant presence on the market, was not at odds with the prevailing neoliberal views on the economy domestically nor internationally. this was all—rather unexpectedly—changed with the gradual exit of international media companies from the central and eastern european region. generally attributed to falling revenues as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 (štětka 2012, 433–456), the print media market in the czech republic was to significantly and abruptly change in 2013. this marked an end to over two decades of the “classic” or “pure” style of media ownership of primarily media-based holdings, to owners with major holdings in nonmedia areas (tunstall 1983, 115–120). in the space of weeks, two of the largest print companies on the market were sold to three of the wealthiest business persons in the country, creating a trio of billionaire local media owners with national reach—each with extensive holdings in the areas in the industries of energy, agriculture, and investments. andrej babiš bought mafra from rheinische post, while daniel křetínský and patrik tkáč bought ringier axel springer's domestic interests. the four, along with zdeněk bakala, owner of economia, comprised a triad of domestic media proprietors, completely replacing foreign media owners. two years later, vltava labe press was sold by verlagsgruppe passau to the penta investment group, bringing home the longcriticized regional press monopoly to another non-media owner with significant business interests. the final chapter in the transfer of international to local owners took place in 2020 with the domestic ppf taking over control of central european media enterprises ltd. (cme) operations in the czech republic. therefore, 30 years after the dawn of a rather remarkable period of foreign investment in media, an entirely new period appeared, with only semantics surrounding what to call the new owners remaining blurred. indeed, štětka engaged with the question of how to address the new media owners. drawing from koltsova (2006), åslund (2007), mount (2012) and page and winters (2009), he mused over the appropriateness of the “oligarch” term for the new czech media owners, suggesting that due to the “oligarchic” approach to media ownership (investment behaviour similar to individuals in states where such owners are routinely termed as “oligarchs”), the term seemed to fit (štětka 2015). the implications brought about by these acquisitions are difficult to exaggerate. in many ways, it represents a textbook case in media capture, in others, the plot of a hollywood blockbuster. in either of these visions, the leading role was to be inevitably played by andrej babiš. after emerging on the political scene with his political party ano in 2011, he went on to become one of the most powerful media moguls in the country less than two years later with his purchase of the mafra media conglomerate from the retreating german owner. roughly half a year later, in an almost entirely self-funded campaign, he led his party to near victory in parliamentary elections. after holding positions of minister of finance and deputy prime minister, the victory of ano in the 2017 elections led to his becoming prime minister. promising to run the state as a business, with a populist strategy that would ostensibly benefit “ordinary people,” what followed was the emergence of a technocratic populist government (buštíková and guasti 2019, 302–330), complete with anti-elite meanderings and rejection of left-right politics, propelled by a stunning political marketing team, capturing the popular imagination. 89 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 perhaps the greatest legacy of the post-international owners’ period was that the media scene in the czech republic would no longer be faceless—arguably, one of the most typical characteristics of the ‘internationalized’ period was that of virtual owner anonymity. the anonymous side of the domestic media environment would now consist of the rather rabid disinformation environment, which emerged at roughly the same time (štětka et al. 2021, 90–109). the new mainstream czech media environment, however, would be associated with faces and names, with reputations impossible to ignore and political connections often worn on their sleeves. this is not to say all yearn for visibility; often, it is quite the contrary. however, the billionaire backgrounds and, in many cases, controversial holdings which made them their fortunes, combined with local influence (as opposed to foreign owners), made the ownership model significantly different. the very reason for the exit of foreign media investors—lack of financial perspective and, in most cases, outright losses, was not an issue for the new owners. their motivations clearly stem from the possibility of influence—even if this consists of building a philanthropic image. in terms of media ownership, the domestic environment remains far from tendencies in advanced economies seeking synergetic and portfolio diversification purposes and remains at the classic, initial stage of industrial interests investing in media for reasons of influence (noam 2018, 1096–1130). lex babiš and the end of an era parliamentary elections brought about a rather surprising change in the autumn of 2021 with the victory of a broad coalition of parties (“spolu”) formed to supplant andrej babiš and consequently ano from power, foreshadowing a dramatic change in the domestic political environment and the media environment. babiš’s mafra thus needed to transform from a position of reporting on the government with delicate soft censorship to a new, opposition-oriented, attack approach, and dealing not only with the impact of the long-awaited court case related to eu subsidy fraud (the so-called čapí hnízdo case) but also influencing the upcoming presidential election of 2022, in which babiš would be a leading candidate. babiš’s remarkable acquittal four days before the election was doubtlessly a triumph, but seemingly too late for his marketing team to use it to turn the tide of public opinion in his favour in the second concurrent battle for the presidency of the czech republic. simmering in the background of these events was an election promise the newly elected government coalition vowed to make good on—an amendment to the conflict-of-interest law, which aimed to limit ownership by politicians, a potential legislative coup which could possibly bring an end to the reign of babiš over czech media and politics and dramatically reduce the threat of future cases of political instrumentalism. in august of 2023, the so-called lex babiš legislation was signed into law by the former opponent of babiš in the presidential election, petr pavel. the bill strengthens oversight by the office of supervision of the management of political parties and movements and specifically restricts senators, deputies, government officials, and the president from operating radio and television broadcasters and publishing publications. it only applies to the actual owner of the media operator and not to the controlling person to avoid circumventing the prohibition. subsidies and investment incentives intended for government officials via corporations are also prohibited. the consequences of the passing of the amendment were immediate. within one month, mafra would be sold. unsurprisingly, the purchase was made by another billionaire with significant 90 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 industrial interests and no track record in media. speculation abounds about the intentions of the new owner (karel pražák—owner of investment group kaprain), who, at the press conference after the purchase, said that it is unclear if they would keep the media company or sell it to one of the many interested parties (irozhlas 2023). from media capture to platform capture the concept of media capture in its classic, original form describes the impact of government and/or vested interests networked with politics on influencing the media (green 2021; mungiupippidi 2008; schiffrin 2017). czech republic was arguably rather immune to this classic form of media capture in the foreign ownership stage but became increasingly vulnerable to it as local owners bought up the majority of the media from exiting foreign owners (vojtěchovská 2017). indeed, non-media owners with wealth that allows them to maintain loss-making media outlets in exchange for an agenda-setting role in public affairs, furthermore willing to loosen standards to make the news media more profitable, has been an identifying characteristic in the period since the transition to local owners of the last decade (kotisova and waschková císařová 2021). with new legislation forbidding media ownership by politicians, it is possible to see the exit of babiš and his media empire as the symbolic closing of the third stage in the independent czech republic’s media development. the czech media environment in the late babiš era had begun to adopt more and more characteristics of the expanding understanding of capture, which has become more complex as a result of the transformation of the revenue model for the media in the context of the decline of scarcity and the rise of digital media (schiffrin 2021, 8–10). indeed, the concept of media capture has progressed from the original instrumentalist focus and taken on a pivotal role in describing the confounding nature of the functioning of the contemporary news media in the context of a heavily concentrated, global, digital platform-based environment featuring transnational media entities such as x, tiktok, alphabet companies including google and youtube, and meta companies including facebook and instagram. the traditional capture threat of commercial and political interests using their leverage to impact public opinion has become compounded by a business model that has collapsed in the face of significant technological change (nechushtai 2017; partin 2020). platform capture acknowledges that news organizations of all types rely on platforms to gain access to their networks, audiences, data, publishing guidelines, funding, and advertising revenue, and this dependence informs editorial, organizational, and commercial decisions (radsch 2023). the trend is not limited to a few western democracies; the threat to the survival of the news media is global. the widespread threat of platform capture is partially due to the fact that digital news has surpassed traditional media, owing to smartphones and 4g networks becoming increasingly affordable (jin 2013). as a direct result, social media and other digital platforms are not merely another important newsroom delivery channel but the overwhelming main channel. in the united states, for example, recent data shows 86 percent say they often or sometimes get news from digital sources, with half of all us adults saying they at least sometimes get news via social media (liedke and wang 2023). in the czech republic, the share of individuals reading news online in 2022 was 83 percent (eurostat 2023). the most visited site for news in the czech republic is novinky.cz, owned by the local internet portal seznam.cz. however, with those using social media in czechia as a primary source of news at 53 percent and rising (štětka 2022), it is not clear how 91 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 long this popularity will last. other areas of platform capture may be instructive: seznam also owns a formerly very popular local search engine which for years was able to capture a fair share of the search market, but in recent years has declined significantly, with it now hovering close to the european average of 90 percent for google (statcounter 2024). beyond accessibility, another reason that the public turns to digital platforms is due to a decline in trust in traditional media (coster 2023). in countries where a lack of trust in the media is high, citizens seek alternative sources. at 34 percent, the czech republic has a very low trust in the media (mihelj and štětka 2022), and thus, the movement toward digital platforms is instructive. since digital platforms are a key source of disinformation and polarization (ardia et al. 2020; baines, o’shaughnessy, and snow 2020; lópez-garcía et al. 2021; wooley and howard 2019) citizens seeking ‘alternative narratives’ may be at risk as they become accustomed to accessing news and information via digital platforms, particularly in the highly active czech disinformation environment (štětka, mazák, and vochocová 2020). studies have shown that czechs are indeed vulnerable to disinformation and conspiracies being spread online, with one survey showing very serious levels at 40 percent (stem 2021). although perhaps well-monitored by a collection of ngos and, to a minor extent, the ministry of the interior, mechanisms do not exist to protect the public from an ever-hostile disinformation scene. perhaps the most decisive way in which platform capture influences the public sphere is through its impact on the traditional foundations of the financing of the news media (holder et al. 2023). to support media ventures in the global advertising desert created by the duopoly of alphabet (google) and meta (facebook, instagram), smaller organizations are faced with the prospects of financial capture through being forced to rely on various levels of funding, including philanthropists with expectations and native advertising (schiffrin 2017). in a number of countries around the world—including the czech republic—google and local publishers have been signing payment deals. non-disclosure agreements govern these arrangements; thus, neither the amounts nor the precise formula used to determine the payments are frequently disclosed to the public (schiffrin and mateen 2023). those that have made deals with google in terms of paying for news are destined to have a distinct advantage—it is not clear if the sums google is paying a select number of czech media organizations for the right to distribute their news content will grow with new ventures appearing (jetmar 2021). additionally, a reluctance to criticize negative practices by big media companies in the areas of competition, commerce, privacy and more, or ‘bite the hand that feeds them,’ takes the plague of capture elsewhere. there is an obvious power imbalance between newsrooms that are running on small margins and some of the biggest and most profitable digital corporations in the world. finally, a major concern with platform capture is the decline in quality as a result of the lack of funding for independent news ventures. thus, not only professional journalists themselves but also news organizations are declining, adding to the phenomenon of ‘news deserts’ (dear 2023). to summarize, research on the understudied area of platform capture points toward the speeding up of the demise of the news business model, the promotion of polarization, and the allowing of false information to proliferate and thrive (usher 2021). evidence of these factors in the czech republic is clear, and rapidly, platform capture is arguably becoming a more serious threat than the receding one of classic media capture via instrumentalization of non-pure media owners. 92 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 from here to where? the tale of media ownership among countries in central and eastern europe (cee) bears many similarities and points for comparison, with all going through major transformations from statecontrolled to free market economies in which free media plays a decisive role. hallin and mancini’s (2004) concept of instrumentalization, or the manipulation of the media by outside parties, politicians, social groups, or businesses looking to gain political clout and utilize the media to meddle in politics, has been a significant feature in all cee states resulting in various degrees of capture. the last three years of babiš’s reign as prime minister saw the czech republic’s position in reporters without borders (rsf) rankings, which regularly monitor objective threats to media pluralism, stagnant at 40. reports confirmed assumptions: czechia ranked extremely high risk in areas connected to media ownership concentration issues, the impact of commercial forces and owner influence on content and editorial autonomy, and social inclusiveness (štětka and hájek 2021). in each case, all roads clearly lead back to the state of ownership. the weak, dated legal context in competition did little to protect the plurality of voices, and that same regulatory area discouraged transparency of ownership by making virtually no demands on owners. questions of editorial autonomy were obvious with the explicit conflict of interest posed by the country’s arguably most visible politician at the helm of a key media conglomerate, not to mention those raised by other owners with business interests in key areas. however, there is evidence that after three decades as an independent state, the czech media clearly have fared the best of their closest neighbours. looking at the visegrad group (v4) in terms of data from reporters without borders, the czech republic ranked a remarkable seventeenth place in 2024 (after ranking a record high fourteenth place in 2023), slovakia at twenty-ninth, poland at forty-seventh, and hungary at sixtyseventh (reporters without borders 2024). it cannot be ignored that there is reason for optimism in terms of the domestic media environment. the lex babiš amendment to media legislation has dismantled the risk of direct political influence and reduced the risk of direct media capture. although influence by business tycoons owning large amounts of legacy media remains an obvious threat, the continuation or reflowering of a berlusconi-babiš scenario has been avoided—lest there be the unlikely impact on ‘internet media,’ which the new amendment does not include. additionally, a positive progression is that the relatively small, independent media opposition still shows no indication it cannot survive. as reviewed in this paper, the three-decade development of the independent czech media has seen three dominant stages: internationalization, rampant commercialization, and influence by domestic oligarchs. a fourth stage, that of platform capture, is an emerging reality. with distrust in mainstream media at an all-time high and continued migration toward online news, citizens are left to the whims of a rabid domestic disinformation environment and a lack of funding for longterm news media enterprises with no connection to global tech companies. as marincea (2023) notes in assessing the state of the romanian media, “the challenge that we are now facing is how to regulate and control the spread of a media business model that is clearly increasingly harmful to societies’ health, democratic politics, public education and knowledge, without strengthening censorship and authoritarian practices, without using the same tools that brought us here or giving extra power to unaccountable it corporations” (101). in recent times, there has been increased discussion concerning the decline of democracy, the death of liberalism and the triumph of illiberalism, global trends which are strongly evident in central and eastern europe. štětka and mihelj (2022), building upon habermas’s (1989) public sphere 93 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 concept, offer a definition of the threat to democracy in a media context, seeing an illiberal public sphere as “a communicative space comprising both traditional and new media that promote and amplify illiberal actors, views and attitudes” (3). although the authors note that the illiberal public sphere is in its infancy in the czech republic, the direct threat of its development can be seen in nearby states in the “frontline of illiberalism” (10) of eastern europe, such as hungary and serbia. as mentioned earlier, the basis for escalation in the context of platform capture is clear: the spread of illiberal themes and moods from social media and messaging sites from the margins to the mainstream, the decline of trust in legacy media and institutions, and a hyperactive disinformation environment. a pan-european approach to dealing with digital media giants and stemming the bleeding of local news may bring positive results to the domestic environment through the european union’s media freedom act, which comes into force on august 8, 2025, but it is not clear to what extent dependency will be impacted. for the time being, the stages of foreign ownership, power, and commercialism that the czech republic knew in the early stages of its development may be making a comeback in the form of platform capture but at a decidedly more complex level. 94 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 references ardia, david, ringel, evan, smith ekstrand, victoria, and ashley fox. 2020. “addressing the decline of local news, rise of platforms, and spread of misand disinformation online.” the center for information, technology, and public life (citap). accessed june 16, 2024. https://citap.unc.edu/news/local-news-platforms-mis-disinformation/#executive-summary. åslund, anders. 2007. how capitalism was built: the transformation of central and eastern europe, russia, and central asia. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. bagdikian, ben h. 2002. the media monopoly. boston: beacon press. baines, paul, o’shaughnessy, nicholas, and nancy snow. 2020. the sage handbook of propaganda. london: sage publications ltd. bannerman, sara. 2022. “platform imperialism, communications law and relational sovereignty.” new media & society 26 (4): 1816–1833. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448221077284. benda, josef. 2007. vlastnictví periodického tisku v letech 1989 – 2006 [ownership of periodical press from 1989 to 2006]. prague: karolinum. buštíková, lenka, and petra guasti. 2019. “the state as a firm: understanding the autocratic roots of technocratic populism.” east european politics and societies 33 (2): 302–330. https://doi.org/10.1177/088832541879172. celovsky, boris. 2001. konec českého tisku [the end of the czech press]. šenov u ostravy: tilia. coster, helen. 2023. “fewer people trust traditional media, more turn to tiktok for news, report says.” reuters, june 13, 2023. accessed november 10, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/fewer-people-trust-traditional-mediamore-turn-tiktok-news-report-says-2023-06-13/. dear, jeremy. 2023. “fixing a global news problem.” columbia journalism review, february 13, 2023. accessed november 10, 2024. https://www.cjr.org/special_report/disruptingjournalism-how-platforms-have-upended-the-news-part-7.php. downey, john, and sabina mihelj. 2012. central and eastern european media in comparative perspective. new york: routledge. doyle, gillian. 2002. media ownership – the economics and politics of convergence and concentration in the u.k. and european media. london: sage publications ltd. european federation of journalists. 2004. “eastern empires: foreign ownership in central and eastern european media: ownership, policy issues and strategies.” accessed november 15, 2024. https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/asiapacific/article/eastern-empires. eurostat. 2023. “share of individuals in czechia reading news online from 2013 to 2022.” statista, march 7, 2023. accessed june 18, 2024. https://www.statista.com/statistics/ 1237656/czechia-internet-users-reading-online-news/. https://citap.unc.edu/news/local-news-platforms-mis-disinformation/#executive-summary https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/fewer-people-trust-traditional-media-more-turn-tiktok-news-report-says-2023-06-13/ https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/fewer-people-trust-traditional-media-more-turn-tiktok-news-report-says-2023-06-13/ https://www.cjr.org/special_report/disrupting-journalism-how-platforms-have-upended-the-news-part-7.php https://www.cjr.org/special_report/disrupting-journalism-how-platforms-have-upended-the-news-part-7.php 95 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 green, snezana. 2021. “media capture i: the first steps – capturing the regulator and public service broadcaster.” media development investment fund. accessed november 10, 2024. https://www.mdif.org/news/media-capture-i-the-first-steps-capturing-the-regulator-andpublic-service-broadcaster/. gross, peter. 2002. entangled evolutions. washington, dc: woodrow wilson center press. gulyas, agnes. 1999. “structural changes and organisations in the print media markets of postcommunist east central europe.” javnost – the public 6 (2) 61–74. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13183222.1999.11008711. habermas, jürgen. 1989. the structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. cambridge, uk: polity press. hallin, daniel c., and paolo mancini. 2004. comparing media systems beyond the western world. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. hanretty, chris. 2014. “media outlets and their moguls: why concentrated individual or family ownership is bad for editorial independence.” european journal of communication 29 (3): 335–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323114523150. herman, edward, and robert w. mcchesney. 1997. the global media: the new missionaries of corporate capitalism. london: cassell. holder, patrick, mateen, haaris, schiffrin, anya, and haris tabakovic. 2023. “paying for news: what google and meta owe u.s. publishers.” social science research network, november 13, 2023: 1–46. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4704237. holy, ladislav. 2009. the little czech and the great czech nation: national identity and the post-communist transformation of society. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. irozhlas. “babiš prodal mafru, synthesii a londu miliardáři pražákovi” [babiš sold mafra, synthesia, and lond to the billionaire pražák]. september 1, 2023. accessed november 10, 2024. https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/mafra-kaprain-odkup-medialni-spolecnostisynthesia_2309011327_fos. jakubowicz, karol, and miklós sükösd. 2008. finding the right place on the map: central and eastern european media change in a global perspective. chicago: intellect books. jetmar, jakub. 2021. “google začal platit za zprávy pěti českým vydavatelům” [google has started paying for news to five czech publishers]. médiář, april 20, 2021. accessed november 10, 2024. https://www.mediar.cz/google-zacal-platit-za-zpravy-peti-ceskym-vydavatelum/. jin, dal yong. 2013. “the construction of platform imperialism in the globalization era.” triplec: communication, capitalism & critique 11 (1): 145–72. https://doi.org/ 10.31269/triplec.v11i1.458. jirák, jan, and barbara köpplová. 2008. “the reality show called democratization: transformation of the czech media after 1989.” global media journal 4 (1), 7–23. koltsova, olessia. 2006. news media and power in russia. new york: routledge. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4704237 https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/mafra-kaprain-odkup-medialni-spolecnosti-synthesia_2309011327_fos https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/mafra-kaprain-odkup-medialni-spolecnosti-synthesia_2309011327_fos https://www.mediar.cz/google-zacal-platit-za-zpravy-peti-ceskym-vydavatelum/ 96 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 kotisova, johana, and lenka waschková císařová. 2021. “‘i know which devil i write for’: two types of autonomy among czech journalists remaining in and leaving the prime minister’s newspapers.” the international journal of press/politics, 28 (1): 238–256. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211045229. liedke, jacob, and luxuan wang. 2023. “news platform fact sheet.” pew research center, november 15, 2023. accessed november 10, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/ journalism/fact-sheet/news-platform-fact-sheet/. lópez-garcía guillermo, palau-sampio, dolors, palomo, bella, campos domínguez, eva, and pere masip, eds. 2021. politics of disinformation: the influence of fake news on the public sphere. hoboken, nj: john wiley & sons, inc. luhan, martin. 2021. “máme plán na posílení nezávislost médií” [we have a plan to strengthen media independence]. marketing & media 22 (1): 22–24. mager, astrid. 2023. “european search? how to counter-imagine and counteract hegemonic search with european search engine projects.” big data & society 10 (1): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517231163173. marincea, adina. 2023. “a century of media capture in romania.” southeastern europe 47 (1): 81–107. https://doi.org/10.30965/18763332-47010004. mihelj, sabina, kondor, katherine, and václav štětka. 2022. “establishing trust in experts during a crisis: expert trustworthiness and media use during the covid-19 pandemic.” science communication 44 (3): 292–319. https://doi.org/10.1177/10755470221100558. mount, francis. 2012. the new few: the magnetic rise of the ruling class. london: simon & schuster. mungiu-pippidi, alina. 2008. “how media and politics shape each other in the new europe.” in finding the right place on the map: central and eastern european media change in a global perspective, edited by karol jakubowicz and miklós sükösd, 69–78. chicago: intellect books. nechushtai, efrat. 2017. “could digital platforms capture the media through infrastructure?” journalism 19 (8): 1043–58. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884917725163. noam, eli. 2018. “beyond the mogul: from media conglomerates to portfolio media.” journalism 19 (8): 1096–1130. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884917725941. page, benjamin i., and winters, jeffrey. a. 2009. “oligarchy in the united states.” perspectives on politics 7 (4): 731–751. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592709991770. partin, william clyde. 2020. “bit by (twitch) bit: ‘platform capture’ and the evolution of digital platforms.” social media + society 6 (3): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 2056305120933981. radsch, courtney. 2023. “the challenge of platform capture.” columbia journalism review february 27, 2023. accessed november 12, 2024. https://www.cjr.org/special_report/ disrupting-journalism-how-platforms-have-upended-the-news-part-8.php. reporters without borders. 2013. “world press freedom index – 2013.” accessed november 10, 2024. https://www.refworld.org/docid/5108f621e.html. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211045229 https://doi.org/10.1177/10755470221100558 https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884917725941 https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592709991770 https://www.cjr.org/special_report/disrupting-journalism-how-platforms-have-upended-the-news-part-8.php https://www.cjr.org/special_report/disrupting-journalism-how-platforms-have-upended-the-news-part-8.php 97 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2023. “world press freedom index – 2023: czech republic.” accessed november 15, 2024. https://rsf.org/en/czech-republic. ryabinska, natalya. 2014. “media capture in post-communist ukraine.” problems of postcommunism 61 (2): 46–60. https://doi.org/10.2753/ppc1075-8216610204. schiffrin, anya. 2017. “introduction.” in in the service of power: media capture and the threat to democracy, edited by anya schiffrin, 1–8. washington, dc: center for international media assistance. ———. 2021. “introduction.” in media capture: how money, digital platforms, and governments control the news, 3–22. new york: columbia university press. schiffrin, anya, and haaris mateen. 2023. “google and meta owe us publishers $14 billion a year | techpolicy.press.” tech policy press, november 12, 2023. accessed november 10, 2024. https://www.techpolicy.press/google-and-meta-owe-us-publishers-14-billion-ayear/. statcounter. 2024. “search engine market share czech republic: oct 2023 – oct 2024.” accessed november 10, 2024. https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-marketshare/all/czech-republic. sparks, colin. 1999. “cme and broadcasting in the former communist countries.” javnost the public 6 (2): 25–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.1999.11008709. šmíd, milan. 2004. vliv vlastnictví médií na jejich nezávislost a pluralitu [the impact of media ownership on their independence and pluralism]. prague: open society fund. stem. “mýtům a konspiracím o covid-19 věří více než třetina české internetové populace stem” [myths and conspiracies about covid-19 believed by more than a third of the czech internet population – stem]. march 2, 2021. accessed november 10, 2024. https://www.stem.cz/mytum-a-konspiracim-o-covid-19-veri-vice-nez-tretina-ceskeinternetove-populace/#more-6335. štětka, václav. 2010. “between a rock and a hard place? market concentration, local ownership and media autonomy in the czech republic.” international journal of communication 4: 865–885. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/790/463. ———. 2022. “czech republic.” reuters institute for the study of journalism, june 15, 2022. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2022/czech-republic. ———. 2012. “from multinationals to business tycoons.” the international journal of press/politics 17 (4): 433–56. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161212452449. štětka, václav, mazák, jaromír, and lenka vochocová. 2021. “nobody tells us what to write about: the disinformation media ecosystem and its consumers in the czech republic.” javnost the public 28 (1): 90–109. https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2020.1841381. štětka, václav. 2015. “the rise of oligarchs as media owners.” in media and politics in new democracies: europe in a comparative perspective, edited by jan zielonka, 85–98. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747536.003.0006. https://www.techpolicy.press/google-and-meta-owe-us-publishers-14-billion-a-year/ https://www.techpolicy.press/google-and-meta-owe-us-publishers-14-billion-a-year/ https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161212452449 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747536.003.0006 98 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 štětka, václav, and roman hájek. 2021. “monitoring media pluralism in the digital era: application of the media pluralism monitor 2021 in the european union, albania, montenegro, north macedonia, serbia & turkey. country report: czech republic.” european university institute. accessed november 12, 2024. https://data.europa.eu/ doi/10.2870/64492. thussu, kishan daya. 2006. international communication: continuity and change. london: hodder education. tunstall, jeremy. 1983. media moguls. london: routledge & kegan paul. usher, nikki. 2021. “from media capture to platform capture.” in media capture: how money, digital platforms, and governments control the news, edited by anya schiffrin, 30–45. new york: columbia university press. vojtěchovská, martina. 2017. “the gradual takeover of the czech media system.” in in the service of power: media capture and the threat to democracy, edited by anya schiffrin, 97–110. washington, dc: center for international media assistance. https://www.cima.ned.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/cima_mediacapturebook_f1.pdf volek, jaromír. 2010. “czech journalists after the collapse of the old media system: looking for new professional self-image.” in comparative media systems: european and global perspectives, edited by bogusława dobek-ostrowska, karol jakubowicz, miklós sükösd and michał głowacki, 335–252. budapest: central european university press. waschková císařová, lenka, and monika metyková. 2015. “better the devil you don’t know: post-revolutionary journalism and media ownership in the czech republic.” medijske studije 6 (11): 6–18. https://hdl.handle.net/10779/uos.23434553.v1. woolley samuel c., and philip n. howard. 2019. computational propaganda: political parties politicians and political manipulation on social media. oxford: oxford university press. wyka-podkówka, angelika. 2014. “twenty-five years after the fall: from communist monopoly to foreign control over local owners: media ownership and its effects on journalism in central europe.” the political economy of communication 2 (1): 33–48. accessed november 10, 2024. https://www.polecom.org/index.php/polecom/ article/view/29. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2870/64492 https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2870/64492 https://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/cima_mediacapturebook_f1.pdf 99 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 83-99 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 124 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 misreading russia leigh sarty, carleton university1 abstract a key part of the contemporary “russia challenge” is the west’s tendency to misread that country, both its capacity for reform and the west’s own impact on the choices that have shaped its trajectory. excess faith in the power of the market and the applicability of social science theories skewed western policy toward russia in the 1990s, fuelling the xenophobic and nationalistic narratives that laid the foundations of putinism. misreading russia’s historical insecurities after the collapse of the ussr ensured that us triumphalism would play badly in moscow, contributing to the toxic environment amidst which putin ultimately opted to invade ukraine. none of this justifies the recent excesses of the putin regime, but it does help to make them intelligible. appreciating how the west has misread and mismanaged russia in the past should contribute to more realistic and more effective approaches in the future. 1 leigh sarty is an adjunct professor at the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies and a senior fellow at the norman paterson school of international affairs at carleton university. he is also a senior fellow at the bill graham centre for contemporary international history at the university of toronto. 125 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 introduction scholars of russia have a lot to grapple with these days. gabuev (2023) has penned a lament for “the russia that might have been” (2023), while alperovitch and radchenko hold out the hope that “another russia is possible” (2022). radio free europe/radio liberty has reported more than a few calls to “rethink russian studies” (prince 2023). the disorientation is understandable. just over three decades ago, presidents boris yeltsin and george bush spoke of “friendship and partnership” (wines 1992, 1); by 2014, moscow’s annexation of crimea and armed intervention in donetsk and luhansk had marked a resurgence of the cold war (legvold 2016). but russia’s full-scale invasion of ukraine on february 24, 2022, surprised even severe putin critics and plunged east-west relations into much darker, unprecedented territory. this dispiriting turn of events has been particularly hard on those russia watchers who experienced a turn of comparable proportions, the gorbachev revolution of the late 1980s that heralded democratization, new thinking, and an end to forty years of cold war. how could such high hopes be dashed in just a couple of decades? the answer, this article will suggest, lies in part in the way western scholars and policymakers have understood russia. historical illiteracy, faith in what yale historian timothy snyder (2018) has called “the politics of inevitability,” and the chimera of social science rigour have combined to distort discourse on russia, resulting in misplaced optimism and an underappreciation of the basic drivers of the country’s development. at the same time, those of us trying to engage and understand russia from the outside have underappreciated our own role in influencing the perceptions and choices of the leadership in the kremlin. in particular, the laudable but ultimately flawed conviction that democratic values and institutions are universally applicable has reinforced those aspects of russia’s political culture and strategic thought that have rendered it fearful of the west. once the fundamentals of moscow’s international behaviour are identified and the often-unintended impact of western (mis)understandings and actions made clear, the seemingly unintelligible and even tragic vicissitudes of russian foreign policy begin to make sense. what follows are the reflections of a member of the generation who witnessed the promise of the gorbachev era and who then went on to work on canada-russia relations in what is today known as global affairs canada (gac). over a span of nearly forty years, i had the privilege both to study russia—as a graduate student and as gac’s scholar in residence—and to engage with it diplomatically during two postings at canada’s moscow embassy and as director for russia and east europe at gac. the analysis presented here is, therefore, unabashedly subjective and intended to be thought-provoking rather than definitive. if readers are led to appreciate that the way the “russia challenge” has been framed, understood, and managed by the west is an integral part of the challenge itself, this piece will have served its purpose. my argument is premised on the notion that one can speak meaningfully of a post-cold war consensus in the west’s policy toward russia, the “west” broadly understood to encompass those developed democracies formally and informally aligned with its most powerful representative— the united states. this is not to say that there were no distinctions between individual countries’ approaches to moscow or that the consensus did not have its critics. however, the belief that the collapse of the ussr in 1991 represented an opportunity to advance peace and prosperity was broadly shared and informed thinking both in foreign ministries and in the academy. understanding how and why this promise went badly wrong helps to explain the challenge that 126 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 the collective west faces today with russia over ukraine despite the emerging cracks in collaborative efforts. first principles2 half a century ago, the hungarian émigré historian tibor szamuely’s posthumously-published classic, the russian tradition, boldly declared that “[t]he factor that has probably contributed most towards shaping russia’s history has been her geographical position” (szamuely 1974, 10). my own near half-century in russian affairs has convinced me that szamuely was right. all states prioritize security; to do otherwise in a world that lacks a sovereign and where conflict is always possible is to invite depredation (jervis 1978; mearsheimer 2001; waltz 1979). for russia, meeting this challenge has been uniquely burdensome because of its geographical position. the lands that the princes of muscovy first gathered and expanded close to a thousand years ago were notoriously flat; the quality of the soils at their disposal was notoriously poor. the absence of natural barriers and attendant vulnerabilities fostered insecurities that today can be said to have been “built into the very structure of russian history” (harris 2016, 6). this is because the effort to achieve security in an environment where this proved difficult locked russia into patterns of behaviour that heightened its sense of insecurity rather than alleviating it. from the earliest times, the insecurity of the physical environment, compounded by a hunger for new lands as thin northern soils rapidly depleted, led russia’s rulers to seek security through an expansionist foreign policy (pipes 1974). as historian geoffrey hosking (1997, 4) wrote: “like a cumbersome and nervous amoeba…[muscovy] expanded to fill the space it was able to dominate.” for more than half a millennium now, russia’s international behaviour has been characterized by what stephen kotkin (2016, 4) has described as “a kind of defensive aggressiveness.” the tragedy unfolding in ukraine is its latest manifestation. geography also helps to account for russia’s authoritarian political culture. the challenge of surviving a “hostile and threatening environment” (keenan 1986, 122), it has been suggested, favoured the “extreme centralization” (131) of authority that has long characterized russian political life. while the more desirably located denizens of the west could afford to enjoy “individual socialization,” their russian counterparts, for whom deference to authority was crucial in surmounting military and economic insecurities, could not (keenan 1986, 127). for richard pipes (1974), these environmental challenges explained russia’s unique development as a “patrimonial state” where, in marked contrast to the west, a clear distinction between power and property never emerged, and unchecked authoritarianism became the norm. the most significant consequence of russia’s physical setting is its proximity to a technologically superior and, therefore, menacing west. overcoming backwardness relative to the dynamic societies that emerged on the western edge of the eurasian landmass from about 1500 defined the evolution of the russian state. as marshall poe (2003, 39) observed, “by a cruel turn, the [sixteenth century] moscovite elite, having just constructed a new and quite typical premodern empire, found themselves face-to-face with what was gradually becoming the most dynamic force in world history.” the consequences were profound. geoffrey hosking has shown how the allencompassing, state-led mobilization necessary for ‘backward’ russia to compete militarily with an economically superior west “destroyed or emasculated…[t]he political, economic and cultural institutions of what might have become the russian nation,” that is, a polity built on civic 2 the discussion in this section draws on sarty 2022. 127 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 institutions and a shared sense of community. for hosking, “autocracy and backwardness [in russia] were symptoms and not causes: both were generated by the way in which the building and maintaining of empire obstructed the formation of a nation” (hosking 1997, xxvii). this double bind—the need to compete with a more powerful west from a position of relative weakness—accounts for the wellspring of russian authoritarianism: the preponderance of the state over society. the argument is familiar to historians. paul milyukov, the prominent historian and liberal politician of the early twentieth century, put it this way: “compelling national need resulted in the creation of an omnipotent state on the most meagre material foundation; this very meagreness constrained it to exert all the energies of its population—and in order to have full control over these energies it had to become omnipotent” (quoted in szamuely 1974, 28). milyukov’s near-contemporary, the widely-read russian imperial historian vasily klyuchevsky, was more pithy: “the state grew fat, but the people grew lean” (quoted in kotkin 2016, 4). this is the engine of russian history: a ceaseless quest for security in conditions of relative backwardness that has skewed the country’s development. approaches to this challenge have varied over the centuries. peter the great undertook to match and surpass russia’s great power rivals through ‘westernization.’ spurred by russia’s humiliating defeat in the crimean war, alexander ii launched the ‘great reforms’ of the mid-nineteenth century; sergei witte and piotr stolypin spearheaded state-led industrialization to maintain the empire’s competitiveness in the twentieth. vladimir lenin’s bolsheviks seized power in november 1917 as harbingers of world revolution who rejected all historical precedent, yet by march 1918, lenin was prioritizing traditional security needs in his acceptance of the treaty of brest-litovsk. joseph stalin justified the brutal industrialization campaign of the first five-year plan by warning that “the weak get beaten”— a phrase vladimir putin would repeat seven decades later as he began to roll back russia’s post-soviet democratic reforms (cited in kotkin 2017, 73). russian methods of governance have varied over time. efforts to surmount the chronic inefficiencies inherent in a state of such preposterous size have created a pendulum of reform and reaction. but the security imperative has always remained paramount. enter gorbachev assessments of mikhail sergeyevich gorbachev vary. broadly hailed in the west as the visionary who brought an end to the cold war, he is reviled at home as the man who precipitated the collapse of a superpower. archie brown, the oxford scholar who tagged gorbachev’s rise at the outset and followed him closely thereafter, has described his subject as “a genetic error of the system” (brown 1997, 88) and “a highly untypical product of the soviet nomenklatura” (brown 1997, 316). but i am inclined to agree with stephen kotkin (2001, 776) that “[f]ar from an aberration, gorbachev was a quintessential product of the soviet system.” his core challenge was the same as that of all of his predecessors: securing state survival in a competitive world. his approach evolved and became radicalized only as the true extent of that challenge became apparent. when gorbachev first took office in march 1985, he was very much a typical apparatchik and communist true believer, albeit a highly dynamic one. this essential continuity is worth emphasizing. to be sure, the gorbachev phenomenon cannot be fully understood without reference to the changes in soviet society from stalin’s death in 1953 through to the 1980s (lewin 1989) or to the belief that gorbachev was “a second khrushchev” who promised to realize the intelligentsia’s dream of a “humane socialism” (kotkin 2001, 776). but when gorbachev and his future foreign minister eduard shevardnadze agreed late in 1984 that the whole soviet system was “rotten” (quoted in 128 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 brown, 81), the spur to act was not philosophical. it came from a fear that, as gorbachev later wrote, the soviet union was “clearly losing the competition with its historic capitalist rivals”. the age-old curse of trying to match the west had by the early 1980s become an insurmountable burden for the geriatrics who had been running the country since the toppling of nikita khrushchev in 1964. defence expenditures running upwards of 40 percent of the state budget were a key part of “what ail[ed] the soviet system,” not to mention that the gap between soviet and western living standards had been growing since the mid-1970s (colton 1986, 32). five months after gorbachev became general secretary, his close ally alexander yakovlev, former soviet ambassador to canada and the intellectual architect of perestroika, painted a stark picture: “the country is growing weaker,” yakovlev warned. “by the year 2000 we’re going to be a second-rate power” (quoted in taubman 2017, 245). the utter failure of gorbachev’s attempt at revival speaks to the true magnitude of the challenge that he faced. his selection as general secretary of the communist party placed him at the pinnacle of a sprawling state whose bloat and corruption evoked the brilliant nineteenth-century satire of nikolai gogol. as gorbachev’s biographer puts it, practices such as cooking statistics, covering up mistakes, and lying to one’s superiors “weren’t new; they were as russian as the vodka that comforted those who engaged in them” (taubman 2017, 247). however, this reality put gorbachev in an unenviable position: “even after he became soviet leader, he didn’t know exactly how bad the situation really was” (taubman 2017, 238). as the scale of the obstacles to reform became apparent, gorbachev pursued increasingly radical measures, from elections for new governing bodies to eliminating the communist party’s monopoly rule. the isolated perch of a lifetime apparatchik meanwhile blinded him to the role that force and fear had played in running a command economy and keeping the country’s disparate nationalities in line. the ‘omnipotent’ yet deeply dysfunctional state forged to counter the more powerful west so distorted the leadership’s grasp of its circumstances that efforts to ameliorate the crisis instead precipitated the soviet union’s collapse. however inevitable gorbachev’s failure appears in retrospect, it was difficult not to get caught up in the excitement of those times. kremlin watchers looked on in growing amazement as the relaxation of state censorship, known as glasnost (openness), shattered longstanding taboos in the realms of history and literature. pillars of soviet military doctrine were called into question, heralding ‘new thinking’ and a transformation of the cold war standoff with the west. as a canadian graduate student in moscow in 1988, i witnessed the thrill as soviet citizens spoke publicly of the failures of socialism and the prospect that theirs, at last, might become “a normal country.” but even as moscovites dared to dream of a better future, their skepticism remained undiminished. in a piece i wrote on my return, i assured readers of the globe and mail that while perestroika was “for real,” it was “not a sure bet” (sarty 1989). the optimism of the late 1980s endured, however, in the foreign policy establishments of western capitals. it is difficult to convey today the intoxicating spirit of that period. the cold war, the defining condition of world politics for close to half a century, was over, and the west had won. the director of a prominent canadian think tank suggested, provocatively but not entirely without foundation, that the 1990s might promise “peace in our time” (wood 1990). francis fukuyama asserted that the reformist trends then underway in the communist world marked “the end of history,” (fukuyama 1989) the triumph of liberal democracy over the last of its twentieth-century challengers. though fukuyama made clear that the spread of liberal democracy was by no means assured, nuances were somehow lost in the ‘can-do’ environment of the 1990s (sarty 2021). the 129 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 notion that democracy had proved itself as the inevitable wave of the future had an enormous impact on western policy toward gorbachev’s kremlin successor, boris yeltsin. the yeltsin years yeltsin spoke directly to the popular longings evidenced during perestroika, expressing determination to place russia squarely on the “civilized path” of the west (quoted in colton 2008, 218). unlike his predecessor, however, the brusque apparatchik from sverdlovsk did not shy away from the draconian measures that mainstream economists then deemed essential to shift the moribund post-soviet economy decisively toward the market. freeing prices on january 2, 1992, brought products back to the store shelves, but it also sparked inflation that wiped out people’s savings, upended livelihoods, and sowed deep resentments. the privatization of state enterprises through the mid-1990s lifted the stultifying burden of central planning but favoured insiders and fuelled an ever-deepening divide between average russians and a new class of the superrich. western advisors such as harvard’s geoffrey sachs figured prominently in this process, in which the obvious pains of so-called “shock therapy” were regarded as a price worth paying for the gains of market reform. russia’s relations with the west in the yeltsin era were thus decisively shaped by “the politics of inevitability,” timothy snyder’s term for the prevalent 1990s belief that with liberal capitalism triumphant and all alternatives vanquished by “the end of history,” the market reigned supreme (snyder 2018, 6-7). this meant that, to the limited extent that the human costs of russian shock therapy reached western capitals, they could be safely dismissed as unfortunate bumps on the road to an inevitably brighter, market-based future. as the canadian department of foreign affairs’ desk officer for russia in 1994, i can vividly recall noting with satisfaction that some 60 percent of formerly state-owned enterprises were then in private hands. my colleagues and i saw this as encouraging progress away from communism and any attendant costs as worthwhile. in retrospect, it has become clear that, under the uniquely dysfunctional conditions of early post-soviet russia, measures intended to advance the market and shared prosperity rewarded corrupt, monopolistic behaviour that created mighty oligarchs and spread staggering social inequality (goldman 2003; reddaway and glinski 2001). the fact that these costs could be associated with western advisors and the governments who supported them played into the nationalist and xenophobic narratives that would subsequently undergird the putin regime (galeotti 2019; hill and gaddy 2015). it is worth reflecting on how the west misread russia in the 1990s. the late harvard-based economist marshall goldman, who was one of shock therapy’s most prolific critics, once lamented that those who insisted that russian history and culture had not prepared russians for a market economy “were often dismissed as special pleaders” (goldman 2003, 25). yet, as goldman pointed out, the very particular circumstances of russia’s economic development—the dominance of the state in late-tsarist capitalism, the deference to authority, and the sapping of initiative over more than 50 years of soviet central planning—made a smooth transition to the market extremely unlikely. the absence of even a semblance of market institutions and the prevalence of corrupt, monopolistic behaviour was a recipe for the distorted outcomes that russians are still living with today (goldman 2003). though contemporary critics flagged the gap between shock therapy’s prescriptions and post-soviet realities, broad support in western capitals for yeltsin and ‘reform’ remained unshaken (murrell 1993). 130 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 it would appear to be self-evident that national traits unique to russia could reduce the effectiveness of policy recommendations formulated elsewhere. how could history and political culture not matter? yet such was western hubris at the end of the cold war that this truism could be overlooked. understanding why this was so takes us back to fukuyama’s “end of history” (fukuyama 1989) which can be seen as the culmination of intellectual and political currents dating back to the eighteenth-century enlightenment. the notion that laws of nature and human behaviour could be revealed and applied and the life of man perfected traces its origins to that time (robertson 2020). it was hard-baked into the political culture of the revolutionary upstart that had just appeared on the international scene: the united states (mead 2001). when the us emerged after the second world war as the most powerful country on earth, its approach to world politics was informed by the same faith in science and progress that had inspired the american founding fathers. as nils gilman (2003, 14) has documented in fascinating detail, the dominant paradigm in us academic and government thinking about international affairs in the 1950s and 1960s was a theory of “modernization,” holding that “the whole world was destined to converge with the model of modernity limned by the united states.” though modernization theory was largely discredited by the 1970s, the 1989 collapse of the berlin wall and victory in the cold war restored the theory’s optimistic, western-centric ethos to the policymaking mainstream. this is not to say that the makers of the west’s russia policy were entirely blind to the challenges that the country faced in the 1990s. however, a weakened, less menacing moscow had less hold on global attention than during the cold war, and faith in the idea that, however chaotic, russia was putting communism behind it and moving toward democracy and the market made it easier to overlook the danger signs and hope that all would somehow be well. even as enduring corruption and chronic socioeconomic inequality continued to raise eyebrows well after yeltsin had left the scene, two leading scholars argued that these were “common flaws of middle-income capitalist democracies” that were in no way “incompatible with further economic and political progress” (shleifer and treisman 2004). the explicit assumption was that russia’s ‘flaws’ did not render it unique, that it was on track to develop like any other middle-income capitalist democracy, in accordance with the confident postulates of social science theory. the state of russia and eastwest relations in 2023 proved quite conclusively that it was not. the fate of boris yeltsin’s attempt to put his country on a “civilized path” places russia’s distinctiveness in stark relief (quoted in colton 2008, 218). timothy colton’s (2008) masterful biography traces the first post-soviet president’s rapid evolution from populist reformer to beleaguered modern-day tsar, whose apparatchik mindset, reliance on so-called “red directors” (the existing managerial elites who steered and distorted market reforms to their benefit), and the decision to leave the membership of the security services more or less intact had begun to alienate his erstwhile democratic allies before 1992 was out. in his 1994 memoir, yeltsin compared his efforts to the reforms of peter the great, which, he suggested, “have not been completed to this day…although we [russians] have become europeans, we have remained ourselves” (cited in colton 2008, 227). all the intoxicating forces of transformation unleashed by the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s were no match for the weight of russian history. putinism the leitmotif of the late yeltsin years was weakness. the economic consequences of the ussr’s collapse had barely bottomed out by 1998. the disastrous 1994-5 war in chechnya manifested centrifugal forces that threatened to tear the country apart, while nato’s march toward 131 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 enlargement and actions against fellow slavs in yugoslavia underlined moscow’s diminished stature abroad. nothing better symbolized russia’s enfeeblement than the president himself, who seemed never to recover fully from the heart surgery that he underwent in late 1996. the state of yeltsin’s health became a running joke. moscow cab drivers in those days were never at a loss for ribald humour at the expense of their president, whom they contrasted with the scandal-plagued— yet plainly healthy—us president bill clinton. this is the essential context for understanding the origins and nature of putinism. in the words of fiona hill and clifford gaddy (2015, 739), by the time putin arrived in moscow in the mid-1990s, “[p]ractically every political group and party across the russian political spectrum, from right to left, felt that the post-soviet dismantling of the state had gone too far and advocated the restoration of russian ‘state power.’” vladimir vladimirovich putin was the direct beneficiary of this sentiment. his claim to the presidency was built on his commitment to restoring the power and authority of the russian state, which he framed explicitly in terms of the country’s historical destiny. “we must know our history,” putin intoned in his inaugural speech on may 7, 2000, “know it as it really is, draw lessons from it and always remember those who created the russian state, championed its dignity and made it a great, powerful and mighty state” (quoted in dawisha 2014, 267). casting the 1990s as an aberration and putin’s presidency as russia’s return to its proper path highlights the divergence between russian and western perspectives on the country’s post-soviet trajectory. it explains karen dawisha’s (2014, 7) important observation that while most western analysts have depicted the putin era “as a democracy in the process of failing,” the more accurate lens is “as an authoritarian project in the process of succeeding.” putin and the elites who support him have seen themselves as correcting the errors of the 1990s and their consequences; by painting that decade in ever more dire terms, they foster their legitimacy as the stewards of a strong russian state that guarantees order at home and secures russian interests abroad. central to this narrative is the argument, already prominent by the mid-1990s, that “the west had taken advantage of russia’s weakness” during the gorbachev and yeltsin years (hill and gaddy 2015, 712). the familiar pattern of russian history has asserted itself. though their methods differed, both gorbachev and yeltsin sought to regain their country’s competitive edge in the ongoing encounter with an ever more powerful west. the contention that this had backfired, that russia’s international circumstances were by 1999 more perilous than ever before, was an effective tool in the hands of those who had always taken a jaundiced view of market and democratic reforms. such views were particularly widespread in the security services, where putin made his career and from whose ranks he drew his closest and most long-standing allies. once this background is understood, the logic of the decision to invade ukraine becomes apparent. it was not the random act of a paranoid madman. it was the culmination of forces that had been building since the collapse of the ussr, forces which traced their origins to russia’s centuriesold search for security in the face of a globally preponderant west. as putin biographer philip short (2022, 656) put it, “[f]or more than 30 years, putin had seethed at what he saw as russia’s humiliation following the break-up of the soviet union. now he had decided to do something about it.” to be sure, putin’s state of mind is not irrelevant to the story. his advancing age and pandemic-induced isolation undoubtedly sold him on the distorted ‘intelligence’ that assured him that the ‘rotten’ ukrainian state would yield in a matter of days. however, failing to appreciate the larger historical and geopolitical canvas that renders february 24, 2022, intelligible is to misread russia. 132 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 misreading russia why does the west misread russia? broadly speaking, there have been two culprits at work, both rooted, i would suggest, in our own ethnocentrism. the first is the conceit that the natural and social sciences are comparable, that the latter, like the former, can be understood by developing generalizations and deducing explanatory laws. while i cannot pretend to do justice to this realm of ontological debate (my graduate days in political science are long behind me), inattention to russia’s distinctiveness contributed to the tumult of the 1990s and tarred well-intentioned efforts to assist russia with the brush of insensitivity. it seems odd that efforts to understand russia in terms of its unique history and political culture should be subject to criticism but such has been the case, with those efforts excoriated by “social science theorists who [have] painted area studies scholars as hopelessly particularistic and as obstacles to scientific progress” (hanson 2014). that area studies should find itself on the defensive speaks to the institutional weight of academic approaches that value the chimera of scientific rigour above all else. to assert that russia can only really be understood on its own terms is to question whether human behaviour can be generalized and cover laws developed to the degree that merits calling politics a ‘science.’ more may be at stake than a simple search for truth; it is no wonder that our grasp of what makes that country tick should have suffered as a result. the second reason that policymakers and scholars alike misread russia is their failure adequately to appreciate how washington’s universalist pretensions—aided and abetted by its nato allies— have been perceived in moscow. one would be hard-pressed to imagine an approach better tailored to aggravate russia’s historical sensitivities than the triumphalism of post-cold war us foreign policy. to be clear, this is not for a moment to justify putin’s actions; it is to assert that when we reconstruct the world as putin sees it, those actions become intelligible. for anyone steeped in russia’s long history of insecurities bred by the competition with a technologically superior west, us president george w. bush’s 2003 assertion that “the advance of freedom is the calling of our time” (bush 2003) had a chilling effect—particularly since it followed a us-led coalition’s armed intervention to topple iraq’s saddam hussein. a year later, putin (2004) charged that a savage terrorist attack in the north caucasian town of beslan had been abetted by international forces seeking “to tear from us a ‘juicy piece of pie.’” in the same speech, he admitted that insufficient attention had been paid to defence and security issues and quoted stalin’s famous 1931 warning that “the weak get beaten” (putin 2004). in other words, putin had no time for the lofty-sounding aspirations that followed on the heels of “the end of history,” particularly when pitched in terms of ‘universal’ values that were indistinguishable from western national interests. to believe that being told by us president bush that “democracies are good things to have on your border” (quoted in charap and colton 2017, 1794) would alleviate putin’s concerns about nato enlargement is a striking example of misreading russia. it bears underlining how much putin’s thinking has been shaped by the postulates of realism 101: in a world that lacks any higher authority, state survival is paramount and thinking the worst of your adversaries is only prudent. yet the perilous specifics of russian history have rendered putin’s take on realpolitik dangerously extreme. while there is much to criticize about the west’s approach to russia following the collapse of the ussr, putin’s assertion, in his february 2022 announcement of the invasion of ukraine, that “the united states and its western partners…tried to put the final squeeze on us, finish us off, and utterly destroy us” falls wide of the mark (putin 2022). 133 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 we may have overestimated russia’s compatibility with the reforms that we promoted in the 1990s, but the desire to see a democratic partner play a constructive role in international relations was as sincere as it was rooted in self-interest. no rational western policymaker has ever actively sought russia’s destruction. yet this is the conclusion putin has drawn from the frustration of his efforts to win the security guarantees and privileges that he believes to be russia’s due, conditions the west can never meet because we hold that the countries bordering russia have the right to choose their own paths. east-west relations have reached a total impasse, and the tragedy unfolding in ukraine is the result. it is not whitewashing the putin regime to acknowledge that it took two to arrive at this outcome. there is no excuse for the savagery that russia is now visiting on ukraine. no civilized person can escape revulsion at the current excesses of the putin regime, but there is also no escaping the fact that the west is not blameless and that our misreading of russia helped us to arrive at the place we are now. conclusion at the beginning of this article, i referenced alexander gabuev’s (2023) lament for “the russia that might have been.” once a leading scholar at the carnegie foundation’s moscow center (prior to its closure in 2022), gabuev is among the thousands of bright young russians who have left the country since the full-scale invasion of ukraine. his is as informed a perspective as one could wish for, that of a thoughtful and well-connected representative of the generation that has seen its hopes dashed by the excesses of late putinism. yet the analysis i have put forward here suggests that even an observer as expert as gabuev is capable of misreading russia. gabuev (2023) fears that putin’s war in ukraine may have “permanently foreclose[d] the promise of russia occupying a peaceful and prosperous place in the twenty-first-century world order.” this outcome “was not predestined”; it was the product of “the choices that putin and the country’s elites have made over the past two decades” (gabuev 2023). instead of seeing eu and nato enlargement as bringing regional stability and enhancing russian security, putin and his cronies “increasingly focused on revanchism and animosity toward the united states” and replaced discussions about “a new, more open russian state…with propaganda and imperial nostalgia” (gabuev 2023). this characterization of the putin era is entirely accurate, with one important exception: the assertion that putin’s path represented a ‘choice’ and that viable, more western-friendly alternatives existed. my argument is that russia’s fate has been predetermined by geography and history. state survival in the face of a superior and, therefore, threatening west has always overridden all other considerations. it has fostered the growth in russia of a bloated and deeply corrupt state at the expense of an atomized and largely powerless civil society. gabuev (2023) himself notes that putin’s imperialist authoritarianism “fell on fertile ground following the trauma of the soviet collapse.” the ground was fertile precisely because of the specific historical conditions that the present article has sought to elucidate. it provides further validation of karen dawisha’s (2014) characterization of the putin era as an authoritarian project that succeeded, not as an attempt at democracy that failed. to believe in “the russia that might have been” is to overestimate the prospects for fundamental change in a country so steeped in geopolitics and history. but does this mean we have to abandon all hope? russian authoritarianism is scarcely monolithic; methods of governance have evolved as leaders and circumstances have changed. reform has given way to reaction, and vice versa, over 134 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 the whole course of russian history. it would be folly to suggest that this pattern has now ground to a halt, to contend that what we saw in 2023 is what we get for all time. yet my analysis indicates that we should err on the side of caution. a combination of ethnocentrism and self-interest led the west to expect more of russia in the 1990s than its circumstances made possible. we, in turn, are an inextricable part of those circumstances. the power imbalance dictated by the west’s enduring superiority in both hard and soft power puts a firm limit on how far russia can ever evolve in our direction. security will always come first. i understand that this interpretation of the current east-west impasse represents historical determinism. i have argued, in effect, that things are as they are because they had to be so. this is also a glaring example of commentary reflecting the time in which it is written. i have framed the entire sweep of russian history through the lens of 2023, which found both russia’s internal conditions and its relations with the west at their lowest point in living memory. as a lifelong russophile, nothing would make me happier than to be proven wrong, to be shown that the present is an aberration and that the governance pendulum will swing once again toward the promise of a better life for russians and a more peaceful world for them and their neighbours. but these are the longings of my heart. sadly, my head and a lifetime in russian affairs tell me otherwise. 135 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 references alperovitch, dmitri, and sergey radchenko. 2022. “another russia is possible: the kremlin will eventually tire of its reliance on china.” foreign affairs, august 29, 2022. accessed july 6, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/another-russia-possible. brown, archie. 1997. the gorbachev factor. new york: oxford university press. bush, george w. 2003. “president bush discusses freedom in iraq and middle east.” november 6, 2003. accessed february 29, 2024. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html. charap, samuel, and timothy j. colton. 2017. everyone loses: the ukraine crisis and the ruinous contest for post-soviet eurasia. new york: routledge. colton, timothy j. 2008. yeltsin: a life. new york: basic books. ———. 1986. the dilemma of reform in the soviet union. new york: council on foreign relations. dawisha, karen. 2014. putin’s kleptocracy: who owns russia? new york: simon and schuster paperbacks. fukuyama, francis. 1989. “the end of history?” the national interest 16 (summer): 3–18. gabuev, alexander. 2023. “the russia that might have been: how moscow squandered its power and influence.” foreign affairs, march 13, 2023. accessed july 6, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-might-have-been. galeotti, mark. 2019. we need to talk about putin: why the west gets him wrong. london: ebury press. gilman, nils. 2003. mandarins of the future: modernization theory in cold war america. baltimore: johns hopkins university press. goldman, marshall i. 2003. piratization: russian reform goes awry. new york: routledge. hanson, stephen e. 2014. “in defence of regional studies in a globalized world.” association for slavic, east european, and eurasian studies, november 24, 2014. accessed july 7, 2023.https://www.aseees.org/news-events/aseees-blog-feed/defense-regional-studiesglobalized-world. harris, james. 2016. the great fear: stalin’s terror of the 1930s. oxford: oxford university press. hill, fiona k., and clifford g. gaddy. 2015. mr. putin: operative in the kremlin. washington, dc: brookings institution press. hosking, geoffrey. 1997. russia: people and empire 1552-1917. cambridge: harvard university press. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/another-russia-possible https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-might-have-been?mc_cid=7f4b59f73b&mc_eid=14f1517ee6 https://www.aseees.org/news-events/aseees-blog-feed/defense-regional-studies-globalized-world https://www.aseees.org/news-events/aseees-blog-feed/defense-regional-studies-globalized-world 136 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 jervis, robert. 1978. “cooperation under the security dilemma.” world politics 30 (2): 167–214. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958. kotkin, stephen. 2001. armageddon averted: the soviet collapse, 1970-2000. oxford: oxford university press. _______. 2016. “russia’s perpetual geopolitics: putin returns to the historical pattern.” foreign affairs 95 (3): 2–9. accessed july 13, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/russias-perpetual-geopolitics. ———. 2017. stalin: waiting for hitler, 1929-1941. new york: penguin press. legvold, robert. 2016. return to cold war. cambridge: john wiley and sons. lewin, moshe. 1989. the gorbachev phenomenon: an historical interpretation. berkeley: university of california press. mead, walter. 2001. special providence: american foreign policy and how it changed the world. new york: alfred a. knopf. mearsheimer, john j. 2001. the tragedy of great power politics. new york: w.w. norton & company. murrell, peter. 1993. “what is shock therapy? what did it do in poland and russia?” post-soviet affairs 9 (2): 111–140. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.1993.10641362. pipes, richard. 1974. russia under the old regime. new york: penguin books. poe, marshall t. 2003. the russian moment in world history. princeton: princeton university press. prince, todd. 2023. “moscow’s invasion of ukraine triggers ‘soul-searching’ at western universities as scholars rethink russian studies.” radio free europe radio liberty, january 1, 2023. accessed july 6, 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-war-ukraine-westernacademia/32201630.html. putin, vladimir. 2004. “address by president vladimir putin, september 4.” accessed july 10, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22589. ———. 2022. “address by the president of the russian federation, february 22.” accessed july 23, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. reddaway, peter, and dmitri glinski. 2001. the tragedy of russia’s reforms: market bolshevism against democracy. washington, dc: united states institute of peace press. robertson, ritchie. 2020. the enlightenment: the pursuit of happiness, 1680-1790. london: allen lane. sarty, leigh. 1989. “is perestroika for real?” the globe and mail, january 31, 1989. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/russias-perpetual-geopolitics https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/russias-perpetual-geopolitics https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.1993.10641362 https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-war-ukraine-western-academia/32201630.html?fbclid=iwar3chihigdtx3gbqdgetoekti83loecraqwdxpyq7anbblhja4lopinmggy https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-war-ukraine-western-academia/32201630.html?fbclid=iwar3chihigdtx3gbqdgetoekti83loecraqwdxpyq7anbblhja4lopinmggy http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22589 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 137 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2021. “us and them: east-west relations reconsidered.” international journal 76 (2): 315–331. https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020211017182. ———. 2022. “russia’s fear of the west.” defence research and development canada. https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/pdfs/unc411/p815968_a1b.pdf. shleifer, andrei, and daniel treisman. 2004. “a normal country.” foreign affairs 83 (2): 20– 38. accessed august 8, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2004-0301/normal-country. short, philip. 2022. putin. new york: henry holt and company. snyder, timothy. 2018. the road to unfreedom. new york: crown publishing. szamuely, tibor. 1974. the russian tradition. london: secker & warburg. taubman, william. 2017. gorbachev: his life and times. new york: w.w. norton and company. waltz, kenneth n. 1979. theory of international politics. new york: random house. wines, michael. 1992. “bush and yeltsin declare formal end to cold war; agree to exchange visits.” the new york times, february 2, 1992. accessed july 13, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/02/world/bush-and-yeltsin-declare-formal-end-to-coldwar-agree-to-exchange-visits.html. wood, bernard. 1990. “peace in our time? a canadian agenda into the 1990s.” montreal: canadian institute for international peace and security. https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/pdfs/unc411/p815968_a1b.pdf https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2004-03-01/normal-country https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2004-03-01/normal-country https://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/02/world/bush-and-yeltsin-declare-formal-end-to-cold-war-agree-to-exchange-visits.html https://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/02/world/bush-and-yeltsin-declare-formal-end-to-cold-war-agree-to-exchange-visits.html 138 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 124-138 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 too much development or not enough democracy? exploring an anomaly in the democratization of post-communist countries alo raun, tallinn university abstract this study of 28 post-communist regimes distinguishes a group of countries significantly less democratic than predicted by its very high human development index score: russia, kazakhstan, and belarus. it also appears that contrary to theoretical assumptions, such ‘developed dictatorships’ convert their economic growth into human development remarkably well. to measure such conversion, a new tool, the growth conversion index, is introduced. considering these results, the explanatory power of several theories is briefly examined. while some theories imply possible explanations (e.g., the concept of patronal politics and the conditional approach to resource dependence), none of them sufficiently disclose the actual workings of such conversion mechanism, implying the need for more in-depth studies.1 1 some sections of the article draw upon or are republished in revised form from a previous publication in east-west studies (raun, 2022). 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 introduction comparing 40 years of data, adam przeworski et al. (2000) found that the average economic growth rates of democracies and dictatorships are similar. this downplayed one argument supporting the positive agenda of democracy and democratization; thus, they proposed to observe social development (or the quality of life of ordinary citizens) instead: “although democracies are far from perfect, lives under dictatorships are grim and short” (przeworski et al. 2000, 271). a similar approach has prevailed in several studies (examples include gerring, thacker, and alfaro 2012; gerring et al. 2021; kudamatsu 2012; wang, mechkova, and andersson 2019) and seems intuitively plausible, but is, on the other hand, empirically challenging. could it be argued that while democracy does not bring faster economic growth, it still provides better human welfare when compared to autocracies?2 as one of the most prominent indices measuring basic well-being, the human development index (hdi) by the united nations development programme (undp) indicates, the answer to the question concerning development is not that simple. several autocracies display substantial human development: when comparing undp and freedom house data, it appears that as many as 19 out of 66 countries with a very high human development score are autocracies, outperforming dozens of democracies. this is not just a question about regimes that have been autocratic and affluent for decades (such as singapore, saudi arabia, or bahrain) since several post-communist countries have followed a similar path. seven autocracies (“partly free” or “not free” according to freedom house) from central and eastern europe and the former soviet union belong to the very high human development category (hungary, montenegro, kazakhstan, russia, belarus, georgia, and serbia) and most of them outperform democratic countries from the same region, e.g., bulgaria (freedom house 2023; undp 2022). thus, at least when the undp approach is concerned, it is evident that a very high level of human development is possible under autocracies. since such a model has proved its resilience over the decades with new cases emerging, it is reasonable to analyze this phenomenon in more detail instead of ignoring such countries as anomalies. the aforementioned trend challenges not only modernization theory,3 the alternative approach proposed by przeworski et al. (2000), and related scholarly research but also the prospect of further democratization in the world and in the postcommunist realm in particular. the debate about the relationship between development and regime type has gained prominence due to the democratic backsliding of the last decade, e.g., hungary, poland (gora and wilde 2022) and the stabilization of autocratic regimes delivering a very high level of human development (e.g., russia and kazakhstan), challenging several approaches and highlighting the need for further investigation. 2 following alan siaroff (2005), this article uses “autocracy” as an umbrella term referring to all non-democratic regimes, encompassing both hybrid cases and full autocracies, both “partly free” and “not free” according to freedom house. 3 according to which socioeconomic development is the dominant explanatory variable for democracy (see diamond 1992; landman 2003). 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 correspondingly (and following its exploratory approach), the first purpose of this article is to map and briefly examine the relationship between democracy and human development in postcommunist countries. being a part of a more sophisticated research project focusing on high social/human development in post-communist autocracies, this article aims to gain familiarity with the phenomenon and relevant literature to help formulate a relevant theoretical framework for a more definite investigation. ensuing from the controversy emphasized by undp development data and drawing on previous research by the author (raun 2022), a special interest is taken in the cases that display, on the one hand, very high human development scores but are, on the other hand, not democracies. it will be analyzed whether the modernization logic ‘the higher the level of human development, the higher the score of democracy’ applies to the region, but also whether any anomalous cases emerge that contradict that overall trend. hence, the first research question asks: is there a group of developed post-communist countries that are significantly less democratic than predicted by their human development score? besides the snapshot of such an anomaly, the dynamics behind it will be briefly measured—with the aim of capturing not only the level but also the pace of development (the growth behind it). as one of the results of the analysis conducted in this article demonstrates, a group of countries emerges with a very high human development score but remarkably low democracy records (hereafter referred to as ‘the developed dictatorships’). following the exploratory approach of the article, this group will be briefly statistically analyzed. it will be evaluated whether the developed dictatorships appeared initially (in the 1990s) more developed than other autocracies in the region. alternatively, their notable level must be in large part achieved later, and thus, one is witnessing the demonstration effects of the current regimes. if the latter is the case, another explanation deserves attention: it could be argued that their very high human development score is the result of their absolute economic growth since the faster it is, the more resources there are at the disposal for such things as investments in health and education sectors. therefore, as a next step, it will be measured whether these countries convert their economic growth into human development (expressed by hdi) better than the average autocracies in the region and how well do they fare compared to democracies. for this purpose, a novel indicator (growth conversion index) will be introduced. the aim of this part of the article is to specify the observed anomaly by exploring the relationship between hdi and the economic growth in developed dictatorships.4 the results of the statistical analysis in this article, especially the emergence and the demonstration effects of the aforementioned anomalous group and the remarkably high growth conversion rate of some of its members, challenge, to a degree, several theories that are employed to explain postcommunist authoritarianism (e.g., modernization theory and the proposition by przeworski et al. 2000, rentier state theory, and the neopatrimonialism approach). such comparatively positive developmental outcomes could facilitate the resilience of any regime, be it democratic or autocratic, and are often not expected to emerge under autocracies. thus, following the explorative 4 a more detailed analysis of possible explanations of the anomaly is out of the scope of the current paper but could be the focus of another article. 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 design of this research, the second purpose of the article is to examine the main theoretical approaches based on their ability to explicate the results of the empirical analysis in this paper. the second research question asks: which theoretical approaches appear more promising in explaining the remarkably high human development score combined with a high rate of conversion of economic growth into human development in the post-communist developed dictatorships? several main theoretical approaches employed to explain the resilience and operating mechanisms of (post-communist) autocracies are briefly mapped based on, first and foremost, their ability to explain the inner logic that stimulates some regimes to convert their economic growth relatively successfully into human development. for example, how successfully do they disclose the actual workings of the hidden conversion mechanism that differentiates between such countries as kazakhstan and azerbaijan—cases that, on one hand, display comparable structural features (e.g., oil wealth) but on the other manifest opposite levels of growth conversion? due to the limitations of a scientific article, this part is designed to offer a very preliminary explanation. the results of the analysis are designed to be used in future more in-depth articles, and thus, the theories will be analyzed from the perspective of synthesizing them in the future. to sum up, the answer to the first research question briefly explores the anomaly of developed dictatorships (both the level and growth of hdi), and the second research question tests the ability of theories to explain that phenomenon. in this comparative case study, the relationship between development and democracy will be explored based on 28 post-communist countries in the regions of the former soviet union (fsu) and central and eastern europe (cee).5 first, a large-n framework is applied to test all postcommunist countries, followed by small-n comparative analyses of the discovered cluster and the explanatory power of relevant theories. within this framework, the article broadly adheres to the deviant case study approach, both by disconfirming a deterministic argument and by probing new explanations (seawright and gerring 2008). following the problem setting at the beginning of the article and the approach suggested by diamond (1992), this article employs the widely used hdi by undp as the main measure of development. it is ontologically based on the capabilities approach to human welfare (advocated by amartya sen and martha nussbaum) and measures capabilities in health, education, and income that are the basic building blocks of well-being and opportunity, universally valued around the world. in addition to having examples such as diamond (1992) and a solid philosophical background, this approach is preferred because measurable, intuitively sensible, and reliable indicators exist to represent them (gandjour 2008; measure of america, n.d.; undp 2023). in contrast to the gross national income (gni), gross national product (gnp), and gross domestic product (gdp), hdi is more sensitive to the social dimension of development. compared to another popular approach, employing infant mortality rate and similar indices, hdi is more nuanced. combining three subindices, it is a proxy that measures the ‘grimness and shortness’ of 5 the total number of countries in these regions is 29, but kosovo is excluded due to a lack of data. for simplification purposes, cee and fsu are referred to as one region in the article. 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 life that przeworski et al. (2000) stressed.6 to measure democracy, in order to retain comparability with diamond (1992), one of the most prominent and oldest annual surveys of democracy, freedom in the world index (fiw) by freedom house (2022) is used. the article focuses on autocracies, i.e., countries classified as “partly free” (most hybrid regimes) and “not free” (more closed cases) by freedom house.7 capturing the demonstration effects of the new post-communist regimes, the study uses data mostly from the years 1995 and 2019. the starting point is a year by when the turbulence of the initial post-soviet transition was mostly over, and 2019 is a symbolic end of an era or at least a partial retreat from the political phenomenon focused on in this article; it was the year of nursultan nazarbayev's resignation as the president of kazakhstan. the year 2020 was marked by belarus' presidential elections and major protests, and in 2022, russia attacked ukraine, followed by unprecedented sanctions imposed upon vladimir putin’s regime. the article adheres to the approach that emphasizes the importance of descriptive arguments in political science but also favours studies that combine description with initial explanation (gerring 2012). thus, this is an exploratory article that focuses on mapping the phenomenon of the developed dictatorships in the former soviet union region. the results of the article also refer to the need for in-depth case studies of the different regimes singled out in the initial analysis, which is out of the scope of this paper. considering the space limitations of the article and following its exploratory approach, however, it is possible to map potential explanations to the anomaly, determining the three most promising theoretical approaches that form the basis of further analysis and synthesis of theories. the article is structured as follows: first, a brief overview of the literature on the relationship between (human) development, democracy and autocratic resilience is provided. next, the methodology employed in this article is analyzed, focusing on developing the growth conversion index. this is followed by two empirical and analytical sections addressing the research questions. the former concentrates on mapping relationships between development and democracy and between economic and human development, with the latter section focusing on charting relevant theories. from democratization to development and autocratic resilience this section briefly reviews literature focusing on the role of institutions in fostering human development and aiming to explain autocratic resilience (in post-communist countries) in the 21st century. it draws on material previously published in an exhaustive literature review on the subject by the author.8 comparative democratization studies have been dominated by four main traditions: 6 see also anand and sen 2000. 7 for statistical analysis, the more informative 13-point scale of numerical ratings by freedom house is used in this article. 8 see raun 2022. 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 modernization theory (examples include boix and stokes 2003; diamond 1992; lipset 1959), historical approaches (moore 1966; rueschemeyer, huber stephens, and stephens 1992), the transitionalist school (oʹdonnell and schmitter 1986; rustow 1970) and more recently also by a ‘new structuralist’ (and often game-theoretical economic) approach (acemoglu and robinson 2006; boix 2003; levitsky and way 2010; pengl 2013; teorell 2010). for over half a century, the modernization school has considered economic development the dominant explanatory variable for democracy. the majority of such (predominantly quantitative) studies claim that socioeconomic development progressively accumulates the kind of social changes that make a society ready for democratization (landman 2003). yet, comparing 40 years of data, przeworski et al. (2000) found that although there is a correlation between development and democracy, there may be no causation. in other words, political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise; rather, such a movement is random. there have also been attempts to advance the modernization approach. as a fruitful example, larry diamond proposed hdi to be a better development variable to associate with democracy (compared to national income). diamond upheld his idea statistically: he compared hdi with the freedom in the world index (fiw) by freedom house and found strong statistical correlations. hdi showed a substantially stronger correlation with the index of democracy (0.71 significant at the 0.0001 level) than per capita gross national income—0.51 at 0.0001 (diamond 1992, 459-460). this finding advanced the modernization approach by introducing hdi as a possible predictor of democracy. thus, a partly similar approach is employed in this article. the role of a political regime and its institutions in fostering human development has been the focus of several studies, with most of them addressing the comparison between democracies and autocracies. an extensive literature finds that democracy improves the quality of life (examples include gerring, thacker, and alfaro 2012; gerring et al. 2021; kudamatsu 2012; wang, mechkova, and anderson 2019); meanwhile, others dispute this approach (halleröd et al. 2013; miller 2015; ross 2006; truex 2017). on the other hand, relatively limited attention has been devoted to studying differences in the human development performance of different forms of autocracy. based on the data on child mortality and school enrolment, cassani (2021) finds that competitive authoritarian regimes, which hold elections and allow for some degree of contestation, outperform other non-democracies, except for hereditary autocracies. according to him, the competitive authoritarian situation motivates incumbents to improve citizen living conditions (mostly performance-based legitimation9). the idea of competitive authoritarianism as a regime in between democracy and other types of autocracy also finds support in cassani and garbone (2016) on the example of sub-saharan africa. miller (2015) argues that autocracies that hold elections achieve better results in healthcare and education than other non-democracies. these conclusions are, however, challenged by other authors. kim and kroeger (2018) assert that autocratic multiparty elections do not affect infant mortality. in addition, wang, mechkova, and andersson (2019) claim that democratization has a threshold effect on health outcomes. thus, the question is 9 see von soest and grauvogel 2017. 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 not settled, and further research is necessary. although these studies underscore the need to be more specific concerning the human development implications of institutional variations of autocracy and establish several significant statistical relationships, they fail to analyze in sufficient detail the explanatory mechanisms concerning the reasons why some (hegemonic party) autocracies can sustain and advance a very high human development index score, which is the focus of this article. post-soviet autocratic resilience several authors have also focused on analyzing the phenomenon of hybridization and autocratic resilience, especially after the dissolution of the soviet union. in this section, such theories are discussed, focusing on their explanatory power concerning the post-communist developed dictatorships, which also display remarkably high conversion of economic growth into human development. most prominent explanations for autocratic resilience as well as approaches potentially more sensitive to aspects focused on in this article are briefly mapped. they will be additionally assessed in the section that focuses on answering the second research question.10 some of the most notable researchers in this area, steven levitsky and lucan a. way (2010), have developed the concept of competitive authoritarianism—a hybrid regime where a power struggle is real but unfair. accordingly, three main variables explain the trajectories of competitive authoritarian regimes: linkage to the west, organizational power of the regime, and western leverage. russia and belarus—the countries this article is focusing on—started out as competitive authoritarian countries after the dissolution of the soviet union, but in the course of time, they transformed into full authoritarianism, being examples of how low linkage to the west and high organizational power contribute to authoritarian stability (levitsky and way 2010). martin k. dimitrov (2009), however, partly challenges and partly advances levitsky and way's approach by adding an even more prominent component—the popularity of the authoritarian ruler. according to dimitrov (2009), popular autocrats (like in russia and kazakhstan) possess the support of the populace, and they seldom need to resort to using brute force. they use three strategies to ensure their popularity—economic populism, anti-western nationalism, and muzzling the media—producing a high level of legitimacy and stability. economic populism is in accordance with the market social contract, a concept dimitrov introduced together with linda j. cook (cook and dimitrov 2017). considering the high cost of open repression in today’s world, it is useful to leverage other mechanisms to make the regime more resilient, such as catering to the consumption needs of the population (cook and dimitrov, 2017). recently, sergei guriev and daniel treisman (2022) proposed a similar but more elaborate concept of spin dictators. they are incumbents that employ a ruling strategy that has as its key elements manipulating the media, engineering popularity, faking democracy, limiting public violence, and opening up to the world. according to the authors, the first rule of spin dictators is to be popular, and the most common tool to achieving 10 for a more in-depth account on relevant literature see raun (2022). 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 it is fostering economic performance. as their modus operandi they are focused more on shaping public opinion (spin) than on violent repression (fear). when looking at the region that is the focus of this article, neopatrimonialism, rentier states, and similar schools appear to be prominent. the proponents of the neopatrimonialism theory (isaacs 2011; paiziev 2014; peyrouse 2012) have argued that most or many former soviet countries are not governed by legal-rational bureaucratic systems and that this also explains their failure to become democratic. according to erali paiziev (2014), the secret of the longevity of the authoritarian regimes of kazakhstan and uzbekistan is the fact that they manage to profit from formal, non-formal, traditional, and non-traditional institutions and practices; the mixture of all these can be described as neopatrimonialism. one of the key elements of this theory is the patronclient relationship where, in order to secure his regime’s resilience, the leader uses public resources to buy the loyalty of the elite (his cronies) (bratton and van de walle 1994; erdmann and engel 2007; guliyev 2011). a similar approach is the selectorate theory, where rulers, to remain in power, pay limited attention to the welfare of the electorate but to that of ‘the selectorate,’ which is— under authoritarian conditions—typically the elite (bueno de mesquita et al. 2003). the neopatrimonalism approach is similar to the concept of patronal politics by henry e. hale (2015). concerning autocracies with contested elections, the author acknowledges the importance of the personalized exchange of rewards and punishments, but he also takes the power of public opinion seriously. the leader needs mass support, and to achieve that, he or she implements several public policies. mass support is vital since it shapes the expectations of both the people and the elite (the latter being more important)—it either facilitates or hinders leadership change. according to hale (2015), post-soviet patronal presidential systems feature a significant and powerful accountability mechanism forcing their leaders to cater to and cultivate public opinion. while neopatrimonialism was initially used to explain underdevelopment, some countries with a comparable political system became rich but did not democratize; many of them are rentier states, which depend on profits earned from oil and other natural resource exports to maintain their state budgets (luciani 1987). such income damages the motivation to collect and raise taxes, and consequently, the regime does not need to provide political representation to the people in exchange for raising taxes (ross 2001). however, since several resource-abundant countries (including post-communist cases) do not fit easily into the above-mentioned criteria, a conditional approach to the resource curse and rentierism has emerged, claiming other aspects mediate (or enforce) the relationship between mineral wealth and the efficiency of political institutions (gel’man 2010; jones luong and weinthal 2010; raun 2007). as a prominent example, pauline jones luong and erika weinthal (2010) assert that mineral-rich states are cursed not by their wealth per se but rather by the ownership structure they chose to manage their mineral wealth (e.g., state ownership with control) and that weak institutions (particularly fiscal regimes) are not inevitable in mineral-rich states. overall, despite this not being an exhaustive review of theories of democratization and authoritarian resilience in the region, this section illustrates the variety of approaches and the difficulties of selecting one over another. this article helps to advance this debate by exploring 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 statistical evidence from post-communist countries and testing the potential of these theories in explaining the results. measuring democracy, development and growth conversion to map the phenomena that the first research question is focusing on, the relationship between democracy and development is statistically analyzed, employing correlation and cluster analysis and constructing a proxy indicator of growth conversion. in the final section of the article, theoretical approaches with the inclination to explain the mechanisms behind such an anomaly (cf. second research question) are charted. research synthesis as a method is used to evaluate relevant theories (cooper 2010). the list of the main variable codes is shown in table 1. table 1: variables of democracy and development code variable fiwa freedom in the world average numerical rating (7 to 1)b hdia human development index score (0 to 1)c inca score of hdis subindex of income (0 to 1)c dif dif index (imbalance between levels of democracy and human development)d gci growth conversion index (economic growth into human development)d notes: a the three-letter variable code (e.g., inc) describes the indicator in general. in case it is followed by two digits, it marks the indicator for a specific year (e.g., inc19 is the income index for year 2019). b freedom house (2023); author’s calculations. c undp (n.d.); author’s calculations. d author’s calculations. following diamond (1992), this article employs the widely used hdi by undp as a measure for development and the fiw index by freedom house for democracy. hdi combines the sub-indices of income, education, and health. as a result, countries are listed based on their hdi score—a number on a continuous scale between 0 and 1. according to the fiw, countries are classified as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” this is based on numerical ratings. although since 2020, freedom house has used a 100-point scale as their main approach, in this article, their traditional scale from 1 to 7 (free = 1–2.5; partly free = 3–5; not free = 5.5–7 points) is used, because even freedom house (2022; 2023) uses the traditional scale for historical comparisons. based on these indices, clusters of countries were computed, and indicators were created. this study is based on data from the years 1995 and 2019. data from 1995 is used only for the growth conversion index; this is the first year hdi data is available for at least three-quarters of the countries in the study. it is also assumed that by 1995, the turbulence of the initial transition had 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 concluded in most of the cee and fsu countries, providing the possibility to focus on measuring the demonstration effects of the regimes that followed. in most cases, the decline of hdi that followed the collapse of the soviet system was over by 1995 (undp, n.d.). finally, to measure economic development, the income index that was used to create hdi is employed. even though the correlation between democracy and development is strong in the region that is focused on in this article, it is not linear, making it meaningful to search for deviating cases. for this purpose, a proxy measure is calculated, employing the residuals of the regression analysis with the hdi score for 2019 as the independent variable and the fiw score for the same year as the dependent variable (z-standardized, fiw results inverted). this measure, dif, is calculated using the following formula: 𝐷𝐼𝐹 = 𝐹𝐼𝐼19 − 𝜇fii19 𝜎fii19 − 𝐻𝐷𝐼19 − 𝜇hdi19 𝜎hdi19 where: dif – indicator dif (residual) fii19 – fiw score for 2019, inverted hdi19 – hdi score for 2019 μfii19 – mean fii19 score μhdi19 – mean hdi19 score σfii19 – the standard deviation of fii19 σhdi19 – the standard deviation of hdi19 hence, dif is expected to show the difference between the actual level of democracy according to the fiw and that projected by hdi, especially helping scholars to detect the strongest anomalies. data used to calculate dif can be found in appendix 1. however, it is only the first part of the process of mapping the phenomenon described in the introduction to the article since it describes the amount of deviation, not whether the country is also comparatively highly developed but at the same time delivering a low level of democracy. to map such countries, dif will be used next as one input in a cluster analysis in conjunction with indicators of development (hdi19) and democracy (fiw19). while exploring the developed dictatorships cluster, it will be asked whether the growth of the hdi score of the countries is simply the result of high economic growth (fuelled by oil exports) or is the national income of these countries also rather successfully converted into human development. following the line of reasoning in the human development approach (anand and sen 2000), it is expected that when national income grows, a responsible government directs a significant share of it to develop such things as the health and education sectors. this, in turn, results in the enhancement of the quality of life of its citizens, that is the growth of human development (and the relevant index score). on the other hand, based on the theory of neopatrimonialism (e.g., bratton and van de walle 1994), one could assume low conversion to human development in autocratic countries since a large share of resources is expected to be directed to benefit ‘the clients’ of the leader at the expense of the populace. to estimate such a 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 conversion rate, the growth conversion index (gci) will be developed. this measure is a proxy since it does not imply the effort of the regime directly but of the society as a whole and does not consider all the aspects of human development directly. however, it helps to shed light on the anomaly observed in this article and introduces a more in-depth analysis of the phenomenon. gci measures the efficiency of converting economic growth into human development (hdi). since the human development level is affected over a longer time span, a wider temporal distance is expected to better describe such a conversion; therefore, data from 1995 and 2019 are compared. the hdi for 1995 is available only for 22 countries out of the 28 that are analyzed in this article, but the possibility of keeping the time span as long as possible outweighs the alternative of replacing 1995 with later data (cf. discussion in the introduction).11 the gci is calculated employing the residuals of the regression analysis where the hdi score for 2019 is the independent variable and the hdi score predicted for 2019 based on the growth of the income index between 1995 and 2019 is the dependent variable. the high correlations between the hdi and income index for both 1995 and 2019 (0.957 at 0.000 and 0.939 at 0.000, respectively) confirm the mutual convertibility of the results. data used to calculate gci can be found in appendix 1. its formula is as follows: 𝐺𝐶𝐼 = 𝐻𝐷𝐼19 − 𝐻𝐷𝐼95 × 𝐼𝑁𝐶19 − 𝐼𝑁𝐶95 𝐼𝑁𝐶95 where: gci – growth conversion index (residual) hdi19 – human development index for 2019 hdi95 – human development index for 1995 inc19 – income index for 2019 inc95 – income index for 1995 one could argue that it is problematic to compare hdi and the income index since there is a smaller empirical overlap between the two. considering this, it is important to understand what the income component represents in hdi. according to sudhir anand and amartya sen (2000), it does not reflect gni but is a proxy that reflects basic capabilities not already incorporated in the two other measures (longevity and education). it describes basic concerns that must be captured in any accounting of elementary capabilities. as anand and sen (2000, 86) put it: “for example, going hungry is a deprivation that is serious not just for its tendency to reduce longevity, but also for the suffering it directly causes. similarly, resources needed for the shelter and for being able to travel may be quite important in generating the corresponding capabilities.” thus, it is an indirect indicator of some capabilities not well reflected in the measures of education and longevity. in 11 for 1995, data is missing for bosnia and herzegovina, georgia, north macedonia, turkmenistan, uzbekistan, and montenegro (undp, n.d.). 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 conclusion, following this logic of the creators of the hdi, the income index can be employed in this article. anomalous autocracies, human development, and growth conversion this section briefly maps and analyzes the phenomenon of very high human development without democracy in the region, employing correlation and cluster analysis as well as the growth conversion index. the correlation between economic development and democracy is strong in the region (-0.641 at 0.001) and even stronger when hdi is applied as the indicator for development (-0.729 at 0.001). therefore, in general, modernization theory finds support in as much as correlation is concerned and not causation. however, as the comparison of undp and freedom house data showed, there are stable autocracies with a very high human development score that counter that mainstream trend. while statistical analysis often regards such countries as outliers, in this article, such an approach is regarded as problematic. in this way, not only stable regimes but also major players in global politics and the economy are neglected (e.g., russia). considering the region in focus, in addition to russia, kazakhstan, belarus, montenegro, hungary, georgia, and serbia appear to be autocratic and, at the same time, have a very high human development score (freedom house 2023; undp 2022). therefore, it is credible to assume that the relationship between (human) development and democracy is non-linear, and it is reasonable to analyze it further. it will be considered whether these seven countries constitute a deviant group of postcommunist autocracies. table 2: difference between predicted and actual levels of democracy country difa country difa russia -1.710 latvia 0.103 belarus -1.695 slovakia 0.198 kazakhstan -1.479 georgia 0.213 azerbaijan -0.636 bosnia and herzegovina 0.224 slovenia -0.456 armenia 0.287 hungary -0.451 croatia 0.340 poland -0.366 romania 0.456 montenegro -0.303 albania 0.482 turkmenistan -0.235 bulgaria 0.645 czechia -0.187 ukraine 0.735 uzbekistan -0.066 tajikistan 0.756 estonia -0.060 north macedonia 0.814 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 country difa country difa serbia 0.060 moldova 0.946 lithuania 0.098 kyrgyzstan 1.288 average 0.000 notes: a difference between the actual level of democracy and the one estimated by human development for year 2019. source: author’s calculations next, countries that are more developed than their level of human development presumes are mapped using the new measure dif (cf. previous section). as shown in table 2, four autocracies emerge at the top of the list: belarus, russia, kazakhstan, and azerbaijan. the first three were expected to emerge based on the initial mapping of outliers. on the other hand, the other four cases mentioned above (montenegro, hungary, georgia, and serbia) fail to be examples of that anomaly, representing the general trend (score close to zero). as an exception, hungary shows a score comparable to azerbaijan, but since it is a case of de-democratization of a once consolidated democracy, it is not reasonable to analyze it in more detail in this article. next, to map a group of countries delivering a very high level of human development in conjunction with a low level of democracy, a cluster analysis is conducted using dif and measures of democracy and development as indicators.12 as depicted in table 3, a group of countries— labelled here as ‘developed democracies’—appears unquestionably more democratic and developed than others.13 however, a contrasting group, ‘underdeveloped autocracies,’ emerges as clearly the least developed and almost the most autocratic group. the two other groups are situated mostly between these two. among them, ‘the grey zone’ countries score closest to the regional average democracy score, and their development score is also not far from the average. the final cluster, the ‘developed dictatorships,’ is, on the other hand, an extreme case with its dif score dramatically deviating from the average and all the other countries. they appear ‘too autocratic’ considering their level of development. regarding the article’s first research question, the latter group is the most valuable finding from the cluster analysis: it is a group of countries where a very high human development score coexists with full autocracy. the countries belonging to this group are russia, kazakhstan, and belarus. the fourth candidate, azerbaijan, with its lower level of human development, did not appear anomalous enough and is categorized under ‘underdeveloped autocracies’ instead. the other four countries with a very high human development score (hungary, 12 the four-cluster model is preferred over the three-cluster alternative since it helps to differentiate between hybrid regimes and more traditional authoritarian cases. in the process, z-standardization is applied. 13 the titles of the clusters are descriptive. while characterizing most cases, they are not intended to describe the regime type of each country in the group. as an example, autocratic hungary and montenegro are included in the group ‘developed democracies.’ 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 montenegro, georgia, and serbia) did not demonstrate comparably low levels of autocracy. this forms the answer to the first research question. table 3: patterns of democracy and development within clusters cluster members difa hdi19b fiw19c cluster 1: the grey zone albania, armenia, bosnia and herzegovina, georgia, moldova, north macedonia, serbia, ukraine .470 .784 3.38 cluster 2: underdeveloped autocracies azerbaijan, kyrgyzstan, tajikistan, turkmenistan, uzbekistan .221 .711 6.20 cluster 3: developed dictatorships belarus, kazakhstan, russia -1.63 .824 6.33 cluster 4: developed democracies bulgaria, croatia, czechia, estonia, hungary, latvia, lithuania, montenegro, poland, romania, slovakia, slovenia .001 .865 1.75 average .000 .810 3.50 notes: source: author’s calculations a difference between the actual and estimated levels of democracy for 2019 (mean). b level of human development (hdi for 2019; mean). c level of democracy (fiw index for 2019; mean). although ward’s method employing squared euclidean distance based on z-standardized transform is used for clustering, for comprehensibility original indicators are shown in the table. according to the anova, the values of the f-statistics are 41.397 (hdi19*cluster) and 61.844 (fiw19*cluster), and according to the kruskal-wallis h test, the value of the chi-square statistic for dif is 11.961 (dif*cluster), each is significant at 0.01. as expected, results of bonferroni’s post-hoc test show that the group most important regarding the research question, ‘the developed dictatorships’, differs significantly from ‘the grey zone’ and from ‘the developed democracies’, when level of democracy is considered, and from ‘underdeveloped autocracies’, when level of development is considered. in addition, tamhane’s post-hoc test shows, as expected, that the dif-score of ‘the developed dictatorships’ differs significantly from all other clusters, proving the 4-cluster solution useful. next, the cluster—developed dictatorships is described in more detail in order to better understand the anomaly. previous tests can be considered a snapshot depicting years of development. thus, it does not tell scholars how these very high development scores were achieved. are these countries also anomalous when it comes to the pace (growth) and efficiency of human development? was this group of countries already initially more developed comparatively speaking (cf. soviet legacy), or has their level been achieved during the current regime? are these countries converting their economic growth into human development better than the average autocracies in the region? while a more in-depth analysis is out of the scope of this article, the question of conversion will be given more attention next. the aim is to better describe the phenomenon in relation to several 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 theories examined in this article. for example, the high absolute growth of hdi does not describe the share of national income (gni) directed to human development. since both kazakhstan and russia are major oil exporters (cf. rentier state approach), the export of natural resources may fuel their economic growth so intensively that human development follows almost incidentally. therefore, even if the growth of the national income of these countries is remarkable, their efficiency in converting it into human development could remain poor, implying a more ordinary case of ‘bad-governance-cum-oil-wealth’ (e.g., as the neopatrimonialism approach presumes). table 4. growth conversion, income, and development country gcia, i regimeb δhdic δincd cluster czechia 0.066 f 0.139 0.079 4 croatia 0.058 f 0.148 0.097 4 slovenia 0.043 f 0.127 0.086 4 russia 0.024 nf 0.122 0.103 3 kazakhstan 0.019 nf 0.161 0.145 3 latvia 0.014 f 0.186 0.174 4 hungary 0.011 pf 0.108 0.100 4 estonia 0.009 f 0.163 0.155 4 romania 0.005 f 0.134 0.135 4 ukraine 0.004 pf 0.093 0.085 1 lithuania -0.011 f 0.172 0.182 4 poland -0.012 f 0.135 0.143 4 bulgaria -0.013 f 0.106 0.118 4 serbia -0.016 pf 0.107 0.116 1 albania -0.019 pf 0.158 0.162 1 kyrgyzstan -0.019 pf 0.108 0.104 2 slovakia -0.023 f 0.108 0.129 4 belarus -0.026 nf 0.163 0.176 3 moldova -0.028 pf 0.112 0.134 1 tajikistan -0.029 nf 0.119 0.118 2 azerbaijan -0.120 nf 0.152 0.231 2 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 country gcia, i regimeb δhdic δincd cluster armenia -0.124 pf 0.149 0.226 1 democracies f, h 0.140e 0.142e 0.130e autocracies g, h -0.027e 0.129e 0.142e ‘dev. dictatorships’ 0.006e 0.149e 0.141e total average h -0.009e 0.135e 0.136e notes: a growth conversion index, author’s calculations. b ranking of democracy in 2019 (fir19). free = f; partly free = pf; not free = nf (freedom house, 2023). c human development index, difference between scores for 1995 and 2019. d index of income, difference between scores for 1995 and 2019. e significant at 0.05 level. f ranked free in 2019 (freedom house, 2023). g ranked not free or partly free in 2019 (freedom house, 2023). h mean of only the countries with gci score. i standard deviation of gci is 0.045 with only 4 cases exceeding it. considering the question of the initial level and regime demonstration effects, the results are mixed. while analyzing levels of hdi for 1995 and the growth of hdi between 1995 and 2019 (δhdi, table 4), it appears that, on average, developed dictatorships (hdi95 = 0.675) used to be slightly more developed than the average of countries that are today autocratic (hdi95 = 0.650), and they definitely outpace other clusters when absolute growth is concerned (δhdi = 0.149). however, it appears that on a country level, the differences are remarkable. russia had a better starting position (hdi95 = 0.702), but it did not grow comparatively fast (δhdi = 0.122). kazakhstan and belarus, on the other hand, started from a medium level of human development (hdi95 = 0.664 and 0.660, respectively), but grew even faster than the average among democracies (δhdi = 0.161 and 0.163, respectively). however, the results must be considered with some caution due to a lack of data from 1995, as almost one quarter of the countries are left out of the analysis. as a theoretically more challenging aspect, next, it will be measured whether developed dictatorships convert their national income into human development better than other autocracies. for this purpose, the growth conversion index (gci) developed in the previous section is used. as seen in table 4, a general trend emerges: democratic countries (fiw = 1 to 2.5) show better growth conversion than autocracies. within the latter, three subgroups emerge, out of which one functions contrary to the mainstream logic. it appears that, opposite to expectations, some autocracies (russia, kazakhstan, hungary, and ukraine) have a positive score of gci and appear to convert their economic growth into human development better than several democracies, with russia and kazakhstan located amongst the top five most successful converters. eight autocracies show negative gci, as expected, with six of them constituting the second logical group with a conversion rate close to the average of autocracies (-0.027). finally, two extreme cases, azerbaijan 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 and armenia, constitute the third group, with their negative gci score exceeding even two standard deviations. despite being the most autocratic, members of the anomalous cluster developed dictatorships (gci — 0.006) deliver higher gci scores than other autocracies, and two of its members, russia and kazakhstan, appear as success stories of conversion. this finding emphasizes the anomaly of that group of countries. they (full autocracies ranked “not free” by freedom house) are able to sustain the pace of human development similar to several consolidated democracies and therefore challenge the demonstration effects of democracy. however, when looking at single cases, belarus appears to differ from other members of the developed dictatorships group, delivering merely the average growth conversion of autocracies (—0.026) and being situated in the lower half of the chart (as one would expect from a full autocracy). this finding does not change the answer to the first research question. however, it helps to evaluate theoretical concepts (in the next section) and highlights aspects to be analyzed in future more in-depth research. additionally, oil-exporting azerbaijan, the country that was the fourth case with the anomalous level of indicator dif, appears to be the contrasting case (compared to russia and kazakhstan), showing an extremely low rate of conversion (gci = -0.120), and an example of a ‘traditional’ authoritarian case where (oil) wealth is poorly converted into human development (cf. rentier state theory, neopatrimonialism school). in conclusion, yes, on average, post-communist developed dictatorships convert their economic growth into human development score remarkably well—better than other autocracies in the region. they are even able to sustain a conversion rate common in several post-communist democracies. this is due to the irregular cases of kazakhstan and russia. thus, it is suggested that further research should focus more on understanding the phenomena of these two countries. the results in this section also imply that modernization theory is unable to explain these three cases; thus, in the next section, better alternatives will be mapped. this article focuses on the capability approach to well-being according to which health, education, and command over resources (like food, travel, and shelter) are universal basic components of well-being (measured by hdi). the aspects examined in this article are, of course, not the only components of human development, and other features and measures could be incorporated in further studies (e.g., level of corruption). the potential of theories in explaining the anomaly arising from the second research question, this section briefly analyzes the potential of theoretical approaches to explain the remarkably high hdi score and, first and foremost, the conversion of economic growth into human development in the post-communist developed dictatorships. drawing on an analysis from the author's previous publication in east-west studies (raun 2022), these aspects were mapped in the article, and the results of the analysis in the previous section (growth conversion performance in particular) appear to challenge several theories. next, the main theoretical approaches employed to explain the resilience and operating mechanisms of (postcommunist) autocracies are outlined as possible avenues for a more in-depth study of the phenomenon. 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 first, the authors of the concept of competitive authoritarianism, levitsky and way (2010), explain autocratic consolidation in russia and belarus via low to medium western influence (linkage and leverage) and the relatively strong organizational power of the regime. it is probable that the situation is also similar in kazakhstan. although it seems plausible that a strong state apparatus helps incumbents to remain in office and to pursue their policies more efficiently, the authors unfortunately fall short of explaining why a leader of a strong authoritarian state should favour redistribution and rather efficient growth conversion ‘at the expense’ of the enrichment of his cronies (raun 2013). second, the concept of neopatrimonialism, prominent in explaining the autocratic resilience in central asia and russia, appears remarkably problematic in the case of the developed dictatorships. a prominent feature of this theory is the patron-client relationship, where the ruler remains in office by abusing state resources to ensure the loyalty of the elite at the expense of the populace (guliyev 2011). under such circumstances, however, one would expect that national income is poorly converted to benefit social development. yet, instead of a low score on the growth conversion index, the developed dictatorships stand in contrast to other autocracies by delivering both very high levels of human development and a high rate of conversion, comparable even to several democracies. therefore, although elements of neopatrimonialism may be present in these countries, the neopatrimonialism approach appears deficient in explaining the anomaly observed in this study. based on the selectorate theory (bueno de mesquita et al. 2003), as a more promising avenue, one could argue that multi-party elections (even as a façade) combined with a relatively modern society create a situation that supports better growth conversion. as a successful survival strategy, incumbents could incorporate large segments of a wider population (voters) into the selectorate and the winning coalition. in order to win their support, the leaders may be more eager to invest in health, education, and other public goods that benefit the wider populace. next, ‘traditional’ rentier state theory (luciani 1987) appears deficient in explaining the observations made in this article. the fiscal situation in post-communist developed dictatorships is too different. one can compare, for instance, kuwait—a typical gulf (rentier) state—and kazakhstan: the tax burden constitutes 1.4% of gdp in kuwait versus 15.1% in kazakhstan; 56.6% share of government expenditure (in 2022) compared to 21.2% in kazakhstan. even the share of oil exports in government revenues is below 40% in kazakhstan (heritage foundation 2022; imf 2022). however, there is a conditional approach to resource dependence, claiming other aspects mediate (or enforce) the relationship between mineral wealth and the efficiency of political institutions. as jones luong and weinthal (2010) assert, the decisive question is who owns and controls the mineral reserves—is it the state or private companies—and whether the latter are of domestic or foreign origin. according to the authors, strong fiscal regimes are most likely to emerge in the case of private domestic ownership of the mineral sector, as was the situation in russia until 2005. the second-best scenario, private foreign ownership, existed in kazakhstan until the same year, with other main mineral-rich post-communist countries as examples of more problematic structures. at the same time, kazakhstan and russia appeared as the most anomalous cases of (positive) growth 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 conversion. thus, more predictable, and responsible fiscal regimes could support positive structural outcomes and encourage translation of economic growth into human development. the concepts of popular autocrats and the market social contract also appear promising. according to dimitrov (2009), all three strategies of popular autocrats (economic populism, muzzling the media, and anti-western nationalism) are present in russia, while belarus and kazakhstan are examples of economic populism. the latter comes close to the market social contract approach (cook and dimitrov 2017). all these countries employ social spending that could be seen as investments in popular support—at least more than the neopatrimonial logic expects. for example, the gini index for belarus and kazakhstan is as low as 24.4 and 27.8 (world bank, n.d.); in russia, approximately 20% of the gdp is spent on the social system (mccullaugh 2013), and the rate of poverty decreased tenfold in 12 years in kazakhstan—from 50% to 5% by 2012 (undp 2016). it is possible that such a focus on the poorer segments supports human development. this could also mean better growth conversion since there is less money to be directed via patron-client networks. on the other hand, the quality and sustainability of social spending may have an effect and need to be addressed in future assessments of these concepts. on the other hand, the empirical observations made in this article can be rather successfully explained using the concept of patronal politics (hale 2015). it combines, in a way, the neopatrimonialism approach with the centrality of public support in explaining authoritarian resilience. hale describes russia, belarus, and kazakhstan as if they were the success stories of patronal politics—cases of ‘nonrevolution’ where presidents had never become ‘lame ducks’ or where handpicked successors were popular enough to win the competition (russia in 2000, 2008, and 2012). according to hale’s (2015) approach, elections with real candidates make patronal presidents interested in securing mass support. it seems logical to assume that one main way to achieve that is to invest in economic and social performance and that one of its by-products is the positive development of the hdi score as well as a better-than-expected growth conversion rate. thus, patronal politics is one of the more promising explanations for the phenomenon where a remarkably high hdi score is combined with a high rate of conversion of economic growth into human development. the concept of spin dictators by guriev and treisman (2022) comes close to the approach by hale, especially in emphasizing the importance of popular support. according to them, all the main components of a spin dictatorship are present in both russia and kazakhstan: manipulating the media, engineering popularity, faking democracy, limiting public violence, and opening up to the world. the main aspect that differs in putin’s russia is its militancy. nazarbayev’s kazakhstan, on the other hand, deviates by displaying stronger traits of a cult of personality. according to the authors, in case an incumbent follows the spin dictator strategy, his first rule is to become and remain popular, and the most common way to achieve this is to foster economic performance. this strategy could, in this way, translate to a higher hdi score and explain the remarkable rate of growth conversion in these countries. however, one must consider that there are over 30 spin dictatorships in the world, thus, this theory can mostly provide a broader framework. in addition, some fear dictatorships—according to guriev and treisman (2022), the other kind of autocracies— have a very high hdi score (e.g., saudi arabia). another relevant aspect is that belarus, the third country examined in this article, is classified as a fear dictatorship instead (already before 2020). 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 in sum, the concept of spin dictatorship appears as one of the more promising explanations that could be included in a future theoretical synthesis. in conclusion, the analysis in this chapter indicates that the neopatrimonialism approach, the traditional rentier state theory, western linkage and leverage in conjunction with the organizational power of the regime, at best, only partly help to explain the high levels of development and conversion described in the previous chapter. the concept of popular autocrats (together with the market social contract) and the selectorate theory emerge as more promising avenues for further research of the anomaly. the concepts of patronal politics and spin dictatorship, however, rather successfully incorporate public politics into the legitimation and survival strategy of modern autocrats. corresponding performance-based politics may also translate into human development. in addition, the conditional approach to resource dependence by jones luong and weinthal (2010) highlights kazakhstan and russia—the two countries that appeared the most anomalous in this study—as cases of (previously) more responsible ownership structures of mineral reserves and more sustainable fiscal regimes. these three approaches display a high possibility of being combined in future analysis of the anomaly mapped in this article. however, existing theories provide only initial or general explanations of how the growth conversion process could take place. none of them sufficiently disclose the actual workings of the conversion mechanism and related legitimacy-building process, serving mostly as guidelines for more in-depth studies. thus, to get a better understanding of its causal mechanisms, the phenomenon discussed in this article deserves further investigation. as implied, several aspects may have cumulative explanatory effects and could, therefore, be combined in a further study of the anomaly. this is the answer to the second research question. conclusion this article explored the relationship between development and democracy in post-communist countries with a focus on anomalous autocracies delivering higher levels of human development scores than their low level of democracy presupposes. the human development of 28 countries was studied employing both descriptive and inferential statistics as well as research synthesis. in the process, cluster analysis and a new measure, the growth conversion index (gci), were employed. acknowledging that the aspects in focus in this article are not the only components of human development, it focused on the capability approach to well-being according to which health, education, and command over resources (like food, travel, and shelter) are universal basic components of well-being (measured by the human development index). an outlying group, the developed dictatorships, was observed, consisting of russia, kazakhstan, and belarus. this group appeared to be better at converting national income into human development than other autocracies in the region, despite at the same time being full autocracies. their average gci score was close to the average of democracies, with russia and kazakhstan appearing among the top five converters. the results of the analysis imply that a high human development index score can coexist with a low level of democracy as a stable success strategy, thus challenging democratization as the path to economic as well as social well-being. at least in 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 the post-soviet space (except for the democratic baltic states), russia and kazakhstan appear as the flagships of human development (according to the undp approach), in spite of being clearly undemocratic and, over time, becoming increasingly autocratic. in addition, major theoretical approaches used to explain post-communist autocratic resilience were briefly mapped according to their ability to explain the high hdi score and high growth conversion. while modernization theory, the neopatrimonialism school, and the traditional rentier state approach appeared significantly deficient, several theories emerged as more promising avenues for further research of the anomaly. amongst them are the concept of patronal politics by henry e. hale (2015) and spin dictatorships by sergei guriev and daniel treisman (2022) as well as the conditional approach to resource dependence by pauline jones luong and erika weinthal (2010), displaying a high possibility to be combined in the future analysis. although these theories indicated possible explanations, none of them sufficiently disclosed the actual workings of the conversion mechanism, thus serving mostly as guidelines for more in-depth studies and implying the necessity to combine aspects from different concepts. the need for further study also seems evident since, over decades, developed dictatorships have proven to be sustainable and self-reproducing and thus, one should not rule out the possibility that this phenomenon may even be expanding. 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 references acemoglu, daron, and james a. robinson. 2006. economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. anand, sudhir, and amartya sen. 2000. “the income component of the human development index.” journal of human development 1 (1): 83-106. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/14649880050008782. boix, carles. 2003. democracy and redistribution. cambridge: cambridge university press. boix, carles, and susan c. stokes. 2003. “endogenous democratization.” world politics 55 (4): 517-49. https://doi.org/.1353/wp.2003.0019. bratton, michael, and nicolas van de walle. 1994. “neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in africa.” world politics 46 (4): 453-489. https://doi.org/10.2307/2950715. bueno de mesquita, bruce, alastair smith, randolph m. siverson, and james d. morrow. 2003. the logic of political survival. cambridge, ma: mit press. cassani, andrea. 2021. “varieties of autocracy and human development.” in research handbook on democracy and development, edited by gordon crawford and abdul-gafaru abdulai, 134-150. cheltenham: edward elgar publishing. cassani, andrea, and giovanni carbone. 2016. “citizen wellbeing in african competitive authoritarian regimes.” zeitschrift für vergleichende politikwissenschaft 10: 191-213. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-09216-0_11. cook, linda j., and martin k. dimitrov. 2017. “the social contract revisited: evidence from communist and state capitalist economies.” europe-asia studies 69 (1): 8-26. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1267714. cooper, harris. 2010. research synthesis and meta-analysis: a step-by-step approach. los angeles: sage. diamond, larry. 1992. “economic development and democracy reconsidered.” american behavioral scientist 35 (4/5): 450-499. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642920350040. dimitrov, martin k. 2009. “popular autocrats.” journal of democracy 20 (1): 78-81. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0057. erdmann, gero, and ulf engel. 2007. “neopatrimonialism reconsidered: critical review and elaboration of an elusive concept.” commonwealth & comparative politics 45 (1): 95-119. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040601135813. freedom house. 2023. freedom in the world. country and territory ratings and statuses, 19732022. accessed january 8, 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/202203/country_and_territory_ratings_and_statuses_fiw_1973-2022%20.xlsx. https://doi.org/10.2307/2950715 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-09216-0_11 https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642920350040 https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040601135813 https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/country_and_territory_ratings_and_statuses_fiw_1973-2022%20.xlsx https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/country_and_territory_ratings_and_statuses_fiw_1973-2022%20.xlsx 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2022. freedom in the world 2022 methodology. accessed january 8, 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/202202/fiw_2022_methodology_for_web.pdf. gandjour, afschin. 2008. “mutual dependency between capabilities and functionings in amartya sen’s capability approach.” social choice and welfare 31: 345-350. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0283-7. gel’man, vladimir. 2010. “the logic of crony capitalism: big oil, big politics, and big business in russia.” in resource curse and post-soviet eurasia: oil, gas, and modernization, edited by vladimir gel’man and otar marganiya, 97-122. lanham: lexington books. gerring, john. 2012. “mere description.” british journal of political science, 42 (4): 721-746. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123412000130. gerring, john, carl henrik knutsen, matthew maguire, svend-erik skaaning, jan teorell, and michael coppedge. 2021. “democracy and human development: issues of conceptualization and measurement.” democratization 28 (2): 308-332. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1818721. gerring, john, strom c. thacker, and rodrigo alfaro. 2012. “democracy and human development.” journal of politics 74 (1): 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381611001113. gora, anna, and pieter de wilde. 2022. “the essence of democratic backsliding in the european union: deliberation and rule of law.” journal of european public policy 29 (3): 342-62. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1855465. guliyev, farid. 2011. “personal rule, neopatrimonialism, and regime typologies: integrating dahlian and weberian approaches to regime studies.” democratization 18 (3): 575-601. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.563115. guriev, sergei, and daniel treisman. 2022. spin dictators: the changing face of tyranny in the 21st century. oxford: princeton university press. hale, henry e. 2015. patronal politics: eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspective. new york: cambridge university press. halleröd, björn, bo rothstein, adel daoud, and shailen nandy. 2013. “bad governance and poor children: a comparative analysis of government efficiency and severe child deprivation in 68 lowand middle-income countries.” world development 48: 19-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.03.007. heritage foundation. 2022. “2022 explore the data.” index of economic freedom. accessed january 8, 2023. http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-variables. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/fiw_2022_methodology_for_web.pdf https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/fiw_2022_methodology_for_web.pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0283-7 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123412000130 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381611001113 https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.563115 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.03.007 http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-variables 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 imf (international monetary fund). 2022. “republic of kazakhstan. staff report for the 2021 article iv consultation. imf country report no. 22/113.” accessed december 20, 2022. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/journals/002/2022/113/article-a000-en.xml. isaacs, rico. 2011. party system formation in kazakhstan: between informal and formal politics. abingdon: routledge. jones luong, pauline, and erika weinthal. 2010. oil is not a curse: ownership structure and institutions in soviet successor states. new york: cambridge university press. kim, nam kyu, and alex m. kroeger. 2018. “do multiparty elections improve human development in autocracies?” democratization 25 (2): 251-272. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1349108. kudamatsu, masayuki. 2012. “has democratization reduced infant mortality in sub-saharan africa? evidence from micro data.” journal of the european economic association 10 (6): 1294-1317. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01092.x. landman, todd. 2003. issues and methods in comparative politics: an introduction. london: routledge. levitsky, steven, and lucan a. way. 2010. competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the cold war. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. lipset, seymour martin. 1959. “some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy.” the american political science review 53 (1): 69-105. https://doi.org/10.2307/1951731. luciani, giacomo. 1987. “allocation vs production states: a theoretical framework.” in the rentier state. nation, state and integration in the arab world, edited by hazem beblawi and giacomo luciani, 63-82. london: croom helm. mccullaugh, marcy elisabeth. 2013. “from well to welfare: social spending in mineral-rich post-soviet states.” phd diss., uc berkeley. accessed december 20, 2022. http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2m23n81t. measure of america. n.d. about human development. accessed december 20, 2022. https://measureofamerica.org/human-development/. miller, michael k. 2015. “electoral authoritarianism and human development.” comparative political studies 48 (12): 1526-62. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015582051. moore, barrington. 1966. social origins of democracy and dictatorship: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. boston: beacon press. oʹdonnell, guillermo, and philippe c. schmitter. 1986. transitions from authoritarian rule: tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. baltimore: johns hopkins university press. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01092.x 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 paiziev, erali. 2014. “gods of central asia: understanding neopatrimonialism.” ma thesis, central european university, hungary. accessed december 20, 2022. http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2014/paiziev_erali.pdf. pengl, yannick. 2013. “strong theories, weak evidence: the effect of economic inequality on democratization.” living reviews in democracy 4: 1-14. accessed december 20, 2022. https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/cisdam/cis_dam_2015/workingpapers/living_reviews_democracy/pengl.pdf. peyrouse, sebastien. 2012. “the kazakh neopatrimonial regime: balancing uncertainties among the ‘family,’ oligarchs and technocrats.” demokratizatsiya 20 (4): 345-70. https://demokratizatsiya.pub/archives/20_4_115r0286t7381151.pdf. przeworski, adam, michael e. alvarez, jose antonio cheibub, and fernando limongi. 2000. democracy and development: political institutions and well-being in the world, 19501990. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. raun, alo. 2007. “tooraineekspordi mõju demokratiseerumisele: kasahstani näide.” [the impact of raw material export on democratization: the case of kazakhstan.] ba thesis, university of tartu. ———. 2013. “how to survive the western democratising pressure?” studies of transition states and societies 5 (1): 85-8. accessed december 20, 2022. http://publications.tlu.ee/— index.php/stss/article/download/134/108. ———. 2022. “exploring ‘overdeveloped’ post-communist autocracies.” east-west studies 12 (2021/2022): 50-67. accessed january 8, 2023. http://publications.tlu.ee/— index.php/eastwest/article/view/1123. ross, michael l. 2001. “does oil hinder democracy?” world politics 53 (3): 325-61. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2001.0011. ———. 2006. “is democracy good for the poor?” american journal of political science 50 (4): 860-74. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00220.x. rueschemeyer, dietrich, evelyne huber stephens, and john d. stephens. 1992. capitalist development and democracy. cambridge, uk: polity press. rustow, dankwart a. 1970. “transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model.” comparative politics 2 (3): 337-63. https://doi.org/10.2307/421307. seawright, jason, and john gerring. 2008. “case selection techniques in case study research: a menu of qualitative and quantitative options.” political research quarterly 61 (2): 294308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077. siaroff, alan. 2005. comparing political regimes: a thematic introduction to comparative politics. peterborough: broadview press. 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 teorell, jan. 2010. determinants of democratization: explaining regime change in the world, 1972–2006. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. truex, rory. 2017. “the myth of the democratic advantage.” studies in comparative international development 52 (3): 261-77. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-015-9192-4. undp (united nations development programme). n.d. “human development insights. human development reports.” accessed may 22, 2022. http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/137506. (detailed data at the possession of the author, available upon request). ———. 2023. “what is human development? human development reports.” accessed january 8, 2023. https://hdr.undp.org/about/human-development. ———. 2016. national human development report 2016: kazakhstan. accessed december 20, 2022. https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents//nhdr2016pdf.pdf. ———. 2022. human development report 2021-22: uncertain times, unsettled lives: shaping our future in a transforming world. new york. accessed january 8, 2023. https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/global-report-document/hdr2021-22pdf_1.pdf. von soest, christian, and julia grauvogel. 2017. “identity, procedures and performance: how authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule.” contemporary politics 23 (3): 287-305. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2017.1304319. wang, yi-ting, valeriya mechkova, and frida andersson. 2019. “does democracy enhance health? new empirical evidence 1900–2012.” political research quarterly 72 (3): 554-69. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918798506. world bank. n.d. “gini index. databank.” world development indicators. accessed january 8, 2023. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators#. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918798506 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-57 issn 2562-8429 appendix 1. data used to calculate dif and gci country fiw19a fii19b hdi95c hdi19d dife inc95f inc19g ehdi19h gcii albania 3 5 0.637 0.795 0.482 0.584 0.746 0.814 -0.019 armenia 4 4 0.627 0.776 0.287 0.519 0.745 0.900 -0.124 azerbaijan 6.5 1.5 0.604 0.756 -0.636 0.513 0.744 0.876 -0.120 belarus 6.5 1.5 0.66 0.823 -1.695 0.613 0.789 0.849 -0.026 bosnia and herzegovina 4 4 0.78 0.224 0.474 0.756 bulgaria 2 6 0.71 0.816 0.645 0.706 0.824 0.829 -0.013 croatia 1.5 6.5 0.703 0.851 0.340 0.755 0.852 0.793 0.058 czechia 1 7 0.761 0.9 -0.187 0.819 0.898 0.834 0.066 estonia 1 7 0.729 0.892 -0.060 0.734 0.889 0.883 0.009 georgia 3 5 0.812 0.213 0.525 0.751 hungary 3 5 0.746 0.854 -0.451 0.768 0.868 0.843 0.011 kazakhstan 6 2 0.664 0.825 -1.479 0.676 0.821 0.806 0.019 kyrgyzstan 4.5 3.5 0.589 0.697 1.288 0.483 0.587 0.716 -0.019 latvia 1.5 6.5 0.68 0.866 0.103 0.689 0.863 0.852 0.014 lithuania 1 7 0.71 0.882 0.098 0.706 0.888 0.893 -0.011 moldova 3.5 4.5 0.638 0.75 0.946 0.609 0.743 0.778 -0.028 montenegro 3.5 4.5 0.829 -0.303 0.811 north macedonia 3 5 0.774 0.814 0.678 0.765 poland 2 6 0.745 0.88 -0.366 0.727 0.87 0.892 -0.012 romania 2 6 0.694 0.828 0.456 0.724 0.859 0.823 0.005 russia 6.5 1.5 0.702 0.824 -1.710 0.738 0.841 0.800 0.024 serbia 3.5 4.5 0.699 0.806 0.060 0.661 0.777 0.822 -0.016 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-58 issn 2562-8429 appendix 1. data used to calculate dif and gci country fiw19a fii19b hdi95c hdi19d dife inc95f inc19g ehdi19h gcii slovakia 1.5 6.5 0.752 0.86 0.198 0.743 0.872 0.883 -0.023 slovenia 1 7 0.79 0.917 -0.456 0.812 0.898 0.874 0.043 tajikistan 6.5 1.5 0.549 0.668 0.756 0.437 0.555 0.697 -0.029 turkmenistan 7 1 0.715 -0.235 0.558 0.756 ukraine 3 5 0.686 0.779 0.735 0.653 0.738 0.775 0.004 uzbekistan 6.5 1.5 0.72 -0.066 0.481 0.645 notes: a freedom in the world numerical rating for 2019 (freedom house, 2023). b fiw19 inverted. average (mean) is 4.5 and its standard deviation 2.018 (author’s calculations). c human development index for 1995 (undp, n.d.). d human development index for 2019 (undp, n.d.), average (mean) of hdi19 is 0.810 and its standard deviation 0.063. e indicator dif (author’s calculations). f income index for 1995 (undp, n.d.). g income index for 2019 (undp, n.d.). h predicted value of hdi (only countries included in calculating gci; author’s calculations). i growth conversion index score (difference between hdi19 and ehdi19; author’s calculations). 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (3)2023: 30-56 issn 2562-8429 58 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 western hegemony and russia’s eurasian turn: probing the liberal order’s place in contemporary international society zachary paikin1 centre for european policy studies abstract with the resumption of great power rivalry, the western-led liberal order appears to have failed to become synonymous with global order itself. russia’s “pivot to the east” and its deepening partnership with china have raised fundamental questions concerning the future role and preeminence of liberal states – including canada – in the emerging global order. given dueling european and eurasian elements of russian identity and foreign policy discourse, russia remains a good case study for probing the extent to which a future world order can root itself in a monist frame in today’s pluralistic world. this paper explores this question from a perspective rooted in the english school of international relations, with the aim of deriving conclusions regarding the liberal international order’s ability to maintain its hegemonic position in global international society. 1 dr. zachary paikin is a researcher at the centre for european policy studies in brussels and a nonresident research fellow with the institute for peace & diplomacy in toronto. 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 introduction the end of the cold war was initially greeted with calls for a europe “whole and free”, embodied in the paris charter that was adopted in 1990. dating back to the mid-eighteenth century, russia had been recognized as a great power in the “european family” of states (watson 1984a, 70-71). the end of hostility between the western and eastern blocs was supposed to presage russia’s “return to europe”, having been cut off from the bulk of the continent for several decades by the iron curtain. however, what these idealistic calls precisely implied for the future of europe’s political and security order remained unclear. soviet leader mikhail gorbachev initially spoke of the need for an inclusive “common european home”, although his vision was that of a “house with several rooms” (casier 2018, 21). gorbachev envisioned a convergence of equals between capitalist and communist blocs along the lines of european social democracy (tsygankov 2013, 5), with eastern european countries becoming either neutral or finlandized to ensure that moscow’s security interests would be met after the withdrawal of soviet troops and the collapse of their one-party regimes (gvosdev and marsh 2013, 209-210). however, according to sakwa, this was met with a western foreign policy aimed at pursuing “russia’s adaptation to the stringencies of an existing [american-led] order, not the creation of an expanded community” (2017, 18). the united states (us) settled into a “primacy mindset” – a foreign policy strategy rooted in “disregard for the core interests of potential adversaries” (lind and press 2020). following a series of increasingly sharp disagreements throughout the post-cold war era over the nature of state sovereignty, the legitimacy of military interventions, and the principles that should underpin the euro-atlantic and global orders, the 2013-14 ukraine crisis made it clear that “the era is over of building an all-europe house using blueprints devised immediately following the cold war” (lukyanov 2019). these developments affect not only the future of the european political and security system but also the foundations of the so-called liberal international order. the failure of the russian economic and political system to develop fully along liberal lines implies that the western-led liberal order has not succeeded in becoming identical to global order itself, nor even necessarily the “dominant element in the global system” (chalmers 2019). this raises questions concerning the future place of liberal states and the liberal order in a world where, despite its many successes and elements of appeal, liberalism has not become synonymous with universalism. with washington’s global hegemony now being challenged in the context of a renewed great power contest (allison 2020; feigenbaum 2020), such questions have become of direct relevance to canada, a country that has benefited significantly from deep economic integration and close security cooperation with the united states in the post-cold war era. this article will explore the enduring normative and identity-related elements of russia’s relationship with europe against the backdrop of moscow’s ‘pivot to the east’ and its recently launched ‘greater eurasia’ vision, with the aim of uncovering the extent to which the westernled liberal international order can retain its global appeal. using a framework drawn from the english school of international relations (es), it will first dwell on the place occupied by the liberal order within international society. it will then examine the extent of russia’s eurasian turn before deriving conceptual conclusions regarding the liberal order’s ability to maintain its hegemonic status in global affairs. in doing so, it will explore ways to find synergies between varying es approaches while also dwelling on the implications of contemporary normative contestation for canadian foreign policy. 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 hegemony, international society and the liberal order for most of modern history, international orders have been bounded by general wars and have featured a hegemonic state in addition to one or several challengers (knutsen 1999, 6-8). such wars have usually been fought over which rules and principles should underpin the order and the english school has usually been thought of as a good home to theorize on questions of legitimacy in world affairs (coker 2015, 37-88; clark 2011, v). from yugoslavia to libya to ukraine, questions of legitimacy have been at the heart of some of the central disputes between russia and the west throughout the post-cold war period, including the rights that great powers should legitimately be accorded and the instances in which state sovereignty can legitimately be set aside. the english school’s core conceptual contribution to the discipline is the notion of “international society” – that international relations have the capacity to proceed according to a social logic rather than a merely systemic one. wight defines an international society as a common set of norms that “define the boundaries of a social system” and “condition [states’] behaviour and identity” (1977, 13). modern international society possesses several “primary institutions” – not formal bodies as conceived of by liberal theory but rather core principles that are “essential for producing and maintaining order” (flockhart 2016, 12). among these, for instance, is the balance of power, contractually negotiated among states rather than operating automatically or mechanistically as neo-realists would contend (barkin 2010, 130).2 es scholars have disagreed on what constitutes social interaction in international affairs. earlier contributions to the school contended that states that became “sufficiently involved with one another” constituted an international system, whereas an international society was forged only when interactions crossed over from the merely regulatory and into the realm of shared norms and values (watson 1992, 311). more recent scholarship, however, asserts that there can be no such thing as a preor non-social system, as the mere act of mutual recognition is inherently social (reus-smit and dunne 2017, 31). perhaps most famously, earlier accounts claim that the norms and institutions of the contemporary international society of states were formed in modern europe before expanding – with mixed results – across the globe through periods of colonialism, industrialization, and decolonization (watson 1984b, 32; bozeman 1984, 405). by contrast, recent accounts emphasize international society’s “globalization” through a “polycentric pattern of expansion,” with entities such as the sinosphere, the islamicate, and latin christendom all interacting with one another over the course of history and the latter only eclipsing all others in the nineteenth century (phillips 2017, 43-60). these divergent views on whether cultural heterogeneity should be equated with the erosion of social norms inform differences among es scholars with respect to how contestation should be conceptualized. due to their conceptualization of the balance of power as representing a primary institution of international society, earlier voices within the school feared that “antisocial primacy” pursued by a “rogue hegemon” could lead to the erosion of the ties that bind international society’s actors together (clark 2011, 37-38). more recent accounts, however, have come to view contestation as not just “incorporative or corrosive, but as an engine of international social development” (reus-smit and dunne 2017, 36). 2 donnelly contends that neo-realists’ privileging of anarchy as the core notion on which the international system is based leaves them poorly positioned to contribute to discussions surrounding international order, as anarchy merely illustrates one fashion in which global affairs are not ordered (2017, 244-245). 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 recent discussions surrounding the resumption of great power rivalry have centred to a significant extent on its impact on the so-called liberal international order. however, the scope and breadth of this order has been the subject of significant contention. some effectively consign the order to the western alliance and its associated norms and institutions (sakwa 2017, 18-44). such a conceptualization views the liberal order as oscillating between periods of “enlargement” and “consolidation” or “defence” (jahn 2013, 29) and is therefore compatible with flockhart’s (2016) notion that the post-cold war world has come to be composed of several competing orders rather than a single overarching order. others, by contrast, emphasize the progression that liberal internationalism has undertaken since the industrial revolution, viewing it more as a philosophy for “how to organize international space” along broadly “open, rules-based and progressively oriented” lines (ikenberry 2018, 12). if such a conceptualization were to account for the existence of a global international society of states, then this would be a society far more open to liberal ordering practices. according to this view, what is occurring today is most likely to be characterized as a “crisis of the american governance of liberal order and not of liberal order itself” (ikenberry 2013, 92). a third perspective sees the liberal order not as necessarily representing an international convergence of ideals but rather as embodying the growing global appeal of the norms of independence and interdependence since world war ii (sørensen 2016, 200-205). although these accounts all point to different embodiments of the liberal order, it is possible to fuse them into a coherent whole. cox notes that a “system of state power” underpins the liberal order (2013, 115). in other words, although the principles that the liberal order nominally upholds enjoy a degree of support at the level of global international society, the order nonetheless relies on the transatlantic alliance and its appendages. such a conceptualization therefore contends that the liberal order may co-exist and compete with other international orders, leaving an imprint on international society without having come to encompass it entirely (paikin 2020). with sakwa contending that today’s international society is rooted in a “structure of western hegemony”, one can therefore conceive of a western-led liberal international order that occupies a hegemonic position within global international society, but due to the latter’s distribution of power and cultural-normative diversity, has not become completely synonymous with it (2017, 43). in a world composed of multiple regional or identity-based international orders, it is therefore not merely states, but orders as well, that can be hegemonic. lebow defines order as “legible, predictable behaviour in accord with recognized norms” and contends that an order must possess a degree of solidarity among its members to remain robust (2018, 305-306).3 furthering its well-known gramscian characterization as being rooted in a mixture of coercion and consent, hegemony has more recently been defined as “a status bestowed by others” – resting on “recognition by them” – that “confers special rights and responsibilities on a state (or states) with the resources to lead” (clark 2011, 35). as such, the agreed-upon legitimacy of one’s hegemonial status is key to that status being maintained. legitimacy, for its part, has been described as “an inherently social phenomenon”, with the legitimacy of an actor or action depending on “perceptions made with reference to prevailing intersubjective understandings” (reus-smit 2014, 341-8).4 3 this emphasis on predictability is also discussed by tang, who notes that “an order exists within a social system whenever there is some predictability within the system” (2016, 34). 4 lebow (2008, 67) similarly distinguishes between the greek notions of hegemonia as legitimate authority and arche as the raw exercise of power. 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 a hegemonic state or order must therefore demonstrate restraint and a desire to play by perceived rules if it is to retain its hegemonic status. however, the liberal order’s dual existence as one international order among many but possessing a degree of universal appeal at the level of international society lends itself to an inherent tension, as the states that underpin the order act to advance their own interests and not just the values and principles that the order nominally upholds.5 monteiro, employing a structural realist framework, notes that the imbalance of power distribution in unipolar systems renders the uncertainty over the hegemon’s intentions even starker, even if it aims to maintain the status quo in its relations with other major powers (2014, 159). from a normative perspective, the state of rivalry that this engenders increases the likelihood that the hegemon will make missteps, or be forced into situations where it is unable to show restraint, which in turn affects the durability of its hegemonic status, even if it fails to affect the unipolar distribution of power.6 moreover, in addition to open multilateralism and rules-based cooperation, “there is an expectation that a liberal international order will move states in a progressive direction, defined in terms of liberal democracy” (ikenberry 2018, 11). it is therefore the hegemonic character – both material and normative – and the nature of the liberal order that have helped to drive normative contestation in the post-cold war era. the challenges facing the western-led liberal order outlined above are therefore interpreted by the two most prominent es accounts of international society in differing – but ultimately similar – ways. the earlier ‘expansion’ narrative would contend that the contradictions generated by the liberal order’s hegemonic position will ultimately lead to the erosion of international society’s shared norms, potentially reverting it to a systemic rather than a social state. this is a problem exacerbated by the hegemonic position of european international society as the point of origin of global international society’s contemporary norms. in other words, it is not just the liberal order’s position that is currently in jeopardy but the very notion of western normative leadership as well, suggesting the emergence of a new global system of cultural heterogeneity and diffuse influence. while the second account – the ‘globalization’ narrative – does not view western normative hegemony as being as important a structural feature of international society, it takes such heterogeneity for granted. therefore, the structure of the emerging global order as understood by both major accounts is broadly similar, although the ‘globalization’ narrative does not fear the emergence of a non-social system from today’s nascent great power rivalry. where earlier scholars would see normative erosion, more recent ones see increasing normative complexity. in all cases, however, the outcome is change of a fundamental, historically contingent, and structurally similar nature (see table 1). the fact that the content of international society is becoming increasingly complex is not incompatible with the notion that shared norms and identities between powers may be relatively thin in a culturally diverse world. 5 sakwa captures this inherent duality in the western-led order by dubbing it a “power system combined with a liberal values order” (2017, 282). similarly, nye calls the postwar liberal order “a combination of wilsonian liberalism and balance of power realism” (2019, 71). 6 acharya succinctly describes this phenomenon in practical terms, noting that the “degree of us dominance of the world will decline, even if the us itself does not” (2018, 135). 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 table 1: english school interpretations of post-cold war contestation and change account of global international society post-cold war society and order driver of change outcome expansion diverse global international society, hegemonic liberal order tension/contradiction between order and society produces crisis of legitimacy thin/complex global order and society globalization normative contestation as inherent feature of international society how to characterize the emerging global order has been the subject of considerable debate. rather than draw a stark contrast between liberal and illiberal states, some have begun to envision a world that is merely increasingly ‘post-liberal’ (milbank and pabst 2016). others question whether there was ever a liberal order of global scope to begin with, noting that in the post-cold war era “the international order got closer to having a liberal quality but never quite passed the threshold” (barnett 2019).7 in line with flockhart’s (2016) conceptualization of a ‘multi-order world’, acharya foresees a world of “parallel and intersecting orders” featuring a “more diverse, complex, and fragmented multilateralism” in which a form of “pragmatic globalism” can take the place of an “ideologically charged liberal internationalism” (2018, 76; 158-59). coker provides a different conceptual take, claiming that the world today features a number of “civilizational states”, including china, with civilizational uniqueness inherently placing constraints on any universalist impulses in global affairs (2019, 167).8 in all cases, there exist significant structural impediments to the spread of liberal norms and values on a global scale. mounting tensions and divergent relations the end of the cold war was initially marked by russian attempts to integrate into the western-led order, with moscow even flirting with the idea of allowing a north atlantic treaty organization (nato) or organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce) military presence in those areas of the former soviet union that were experiencing ethnic-based tensions, while also supporting the western security agenda in places such as serbia and iraq (tsygankov 2013, 72-86). however, this trend of unambiguous support for the western-led liberal order encountered an early roadblock in the december 1993 parliamentary elections, which saw nationalists make gains as russia’s traditional reservoir of support for statism began to reassert itself in the wake of popular “fears of insecurity, instability, and poverty” (2013, 64). this reservoir is buttressed by the centuries-old “politics of ‘catching up’ modernization” present in russia which “traditionally imagines that the gap with more developed countries 7 sushentsov (2019) also notes that the notion of an international order as a “western centric system of liberal democracies” was never fully considered by russia to be “global, legitimate and efficient.” 8 a more limited claim allows for a form of “universal solidarity” emerging that does not require “conformity” with the “vision of the good life” emphasized by the hitherto hegemonic state or order (linklater and suganami 2006, 153). 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 will be closed through the leadership of the state” (kudrin and mau 2018, 17-25). other factors cited as underpinning popular support for statism in russia include “resigned acceptance” of the status quo and the absence of plausible alternatives (bressler 2008, 123), as well as a desire to fulfill a sense of national “mission” as a cultural mediator between east and west (richter 1996, 81), reflective of the elite perception of russia’s “special status and aura – no longer an empire in the traditional sense, but certainly more than an ‘ordinary’ nation-state” (lo 2015, 16). as these early post-cold war challenges – which preceded nato expansion and the 1999 kosovo intervention – were partly rooted in enduring elements of russian distinctiveness, this gives credence to more recent es accounts that see contestation as an unavoidable feature of global politics. events over the ensuing years exhibited clearer instances of tensions fostered in response to western hegemony and perceived overreach. in addition to the alliance’s eastward expansion, nato’s decision to intervene in yugoslavia without un support “caused the first serious postcold war rupture” in russia-west ties, with moscow’s view of the west as “dangerously unilateralist and militarily menacing” becoming entrenched despite both sides resuming cooperation over the ensuing years (hill 2019, 94-8). the kosovo crisis cast doubt on the ability of russia to integrate into a transformed west that could accommodate moscow’s independent interests. in key instances, it appeared as if nato members tended to “formulate common positions amongst themselves” and then “engage in rather desultory and non-binding conversations” with russia (smith and latawski 2003, 112). in the mid-2000s, the zero-sum nature of european union (eu)-russia relations in the context of the “colour revolutions” laid to rest any notion that a brussels-centric model could consolidate the wider european space into a single political and economic order, while the prospect of further nato expansion helped to bring about the 2008 russo-georgian war. various scholars capture this dilemma in conceptual terms, with lukin contending that the west attempted to adopt the model for german unification as the model for european unification, pushing for a single set of standards across the entire continent (2018, 5). or, as neumann put it, western countries prioritized the pursuit of “sameness” of values in place of the more traditional competition that has characterized international politics (1995, 207). both principal es narratives can account for these developments, which can be seen as a deliberate attempt at normative transformation and a form of tension that is the by-product of the liberal west adopting “some sort of tutelary relationship” with international society (sakwa 2017, 42). after the annexation of crimea in 2014, moscow engaged in attempts at territorial revisionism in ukraine, revealing a continued focus on europe despite the breakdown of the pan-european security system (kolesnikov 2015). this reflects the fact that the ukraine crisis was caused in part by clashing regulatory orders in eastern europe and the south caucasus, with the russianled eurasian economic union (eaeu) designed to provide kyiv with an alternative to the proposed eu association agreement (studin 2018a; sherwood 2018, 56). however, russia’s focus soon shifted eastward, emphasizing not only its previously declared “pivot to the east” but also a new vision of an integrated “greater eurasia” spanning the entire supercontinent (karaganov 2016). in contrast with the more monistic view of global order advanced by the liberal west, moscow asserts that europe is welcome to join the greater eurasian community if it agrees to uphold its pluralistic principles, even if this fledgling vision is still lacking in detail (lukin 2018, 187). some contend that the greater eurasia project is designed to buy russia time to respond conceptually to china’s belt and road initiative and position itself as an equal co-architect of an emerging supercontinent-wide order (paikin et al. 2019, 238; lo 2019a). others assert that russia’s eastward pivot has less to do with searching for an alternative to the west and is more 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 concerned with deepening ties with an economically dynamic asia and the need to develop siberia and the russian far east (lukin 2018, 174). this reflects the fact that most russian and chinese policy commentators stress that the deepening sino-russian entente is aimed primarily at solving common problems rather than balancing against the west (sakwa 2017, 294). such an understanding would emphasize that russia has genuinely grown to value its relationship with china and is not merely using it instrumentally to secure its “strategic rear”, even though the gradual de-securitization of their relationship grants both parties greater freedom to pursue their core interests in eastern europe and east asia respectively (kofman 2019). lukin contends that the ukraine crisis marks a “pivotal” year in which russia’s eurasian turn became “actual” and not just “verbal” (2018, 15).9 in any case, initial post-cold war aspirations to forge a “greater europe” have been superseded by a new overarching paradigm, with nato enlargement having ensured that russia and west “do not run a shared security system for europe” (buzan and wæver 2003, 429). these divisions within europe writ large highlight the thin character of the russia-west relationship that has consolidated over the past three decades, but also increased complexity evidenced by the proliferation of rival geopolitical discourses and imaginaries. buzan succinctly captures this phenomenon, resulting from postcold war liberal monism and hegemonism, noting that “the continued projection of contested western values (human rights, democracy, the market) on to the rest of the world creates considerable scope for differentiation between the west and the rest” (2012, 25). clashing visions and regulatory orders between leading actors have driven the resurrection of the russia-west rivalry, with implications for canada. while brussels has maintained that “selective engagement” with moscow is still in the eu’s interest, ottawa distinguished itself in the western community by its particularly stern response to russia’s intervention in ukraine (popeski 2015), as well as through its inconsistent positions in the context of the euromaidan revolution. while the canadian government initially indicated support for an agreement reached with protestors to institute a coalition government and hold early elections (government of canada 2014), the subsequent fall of the yanukovych government saw a call just three days later by prime minister stephen harper for ukrainians to reject “the past” (the canadian press 2014). reciprocal sanctions were imposed between ottawa and moscow and, with the brief exception of an attempt to re-engage on arctic issues under stéphane dion’s tenure as foreign minister, relations between the two countries have remained at a post-cold war low. while a rising “eurasian” discourse has marked russia’s relationship with europe in the wake of the ukraine crisis, it has also been contended that moscow has pivoted “to itself” rather than to the east, with the aim of charting a course as a “major independent player” in place of joining a larger whole such as the west (lee 2020). in essence, russia is gradually finding its bearings as an independent actor for the first time in its post-communist history. if this results in an increasingly assertive international posture, there could be uncertainty over moscow’s future behaviour in regions adjacent to canada such as the arctic, where thus far russian aims have largely been geared toward preserving regional stability (buchanan 2020). 9 morozov similarly notes that 2014 represented a “watershed in russia’s relations with the west,” although he qualifies this by noting that it did not lead to any fundamental change in putin’s international security discourse (2015, 139). 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 russia between east and west while one should not downplay the notion that clashing interests helped to bring about today’s state of rivalry between russia and the west, interests are partly the product of the context in which they are forged. for example, it could be against moscow’s interests to integrate fully into the existing european economic and regulatory order, given the current structure of the russian economy and polity (greene 2016; kluge and richter 2020). however, russia’s interest in unambiguously rejecting the geographic growth of the western-led order is not always evident. trenin (2019a) has called moscow’s fixation on nato expansion a “fundamental error of russian foreign policy” rooted in an “outdated mode of strategic thinking that assigns excessive importance to the factor of geography and strategic depth” no longer relevant in a world of strategic aviation and nuclear weapons . he also describes the kremlin’s role in helping to re-entrench the image of a hostile russia on the world stage as a “strategic defeat”. according to sushentsov and wohlforth (2020), it is nato ‘centrality’ – the notion that the major issues of euro-atlantic security are decided between americans and europeans with little meaningful input from russia – that drives contestation between russia and the west rather than the transatlantic alliance’s expansion, which suggests the importance of statusrelated concerns rather than a divergence of immutable material interests. geographic determinism aside, the notion that entrenched interests drive zero-sum rivalry between russia and the west does not sit well with the reality that russia initially attempted to join the west after the cold war. despite mounting disagreements with the west, moscow’s aims remained limited for much of the post-cold war period. after the 2003 invasion of iraq, which it opposed, high-level russian politicians largely eschewed attempts to entrench russia’s position as a pole in a multipolar world, preferring instead to focus on shaping euro-atlantic decision-making to enhance their country’s security and prospects for further economic development (smith 2012, 145). similarly, rather than actively balance against the overwhelming power of the united states throughout the 1990s, moscow’s attention was centred on more limited foreign policy aims designed “to keep the international order from impinging” at a moment of significant instability and volatility in global affairs (rozman 2014, 197). although the advent of a brussels-centric conception of europe had become unrealistic and no “mode of reconciliation” was found between it and more pluralistic visions of european order, the aim of constructing a series of “common spaces” from lisbon to vladivostok remained in place until the 2013-14 ukraine crisis (sakwa 2015a, 558-62). even as russia-west ties frayed in subsequent years, moscow has been keen to stress that the eaeu is complementary to the eu, although without compromising on its insistence on an “equal” relationship with europe (sakwa 2017, 147). russia’s “pivot to the east” remains in many ways unformed. while the deepening strategic partnership between russia and china has led both countries to “agree on most international issues”, stronger bilateral military cooperation is not akin to the establishment of a deeper alliance aimed at entrenching a comprehensive set of post-western norms and institutions (lo 2019b). kortunov (2019) cites the views of those who believe that russia will always be destined to be a second-class player in the asian theatre behind the likes of china and india, thus leaving “a russian return to the european fold as foreordained”. neumann, for his part, suggests that russia’s debate over europe has been so central to its identity formation in recent centuries that it is difficult to imagine it disappearing in its entirety (1995, 210). rozman even considers eurasianism to be “faulty as a cultural ideal” (2014, 202), which is in line with traditional binary accounts of the world’s european and asian “cultural and administrative traditions” (watson 2006, 69). morozov contends that russia developed a “subaltern” relationship with europe as early as the start of the sixteenth century, when trade moved to the 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 high seas from its more traditional landand river-based routes, rendering russia a supplier of commodities to the “global core” at the beginning of its imperial development (2015, 86-90). the central position occupied by europe and the broader west in russian identity formation is visible in that even in instances when russia tries to distinguish itself from european political trends including liberalism, it often posits itself as embodying “true” european values (neumann 1995, 194). however, russia’s concern over questions of status has also produced a tendency to distinguish itself through non-european identities or discourses. although europe has long been the main “other” against which russia has measured itself, the latter’s inclusion into european international society “divided the intellectual culture” of the country along the lines of the extent to which it is (or should be) european or western (neumann 1995, 202). lo cites a belief held by some russians that their country is “not european or asian, christian or muslim; it is all those things, a civilization unto itself” (2015, 17). nearly all of russia’s “most important economic and political centres”, including moscow, nizhny novgorod, yekaterinburg and novosibirsk, are located “deep in the mainland” of eurasia and not in or adjacent to the european peninsula (silaev and sushentsov 2018, 9). moreover, russia began its current “pivot to the east” in the early 2010s, even before the onset of the conflict over ukraine, suggesting that russia’s eurasian turn is not merely a reaction to western policies (bolt and cross 2018, 12; bordachev 2018, 83). some go so far as to assert that in the centuries that followed tsar peter the great’s initial efforts at westernization, russia had already begun to decouple, in identity-related terms, from europe. while the russian political elite in the eighteenth century insisted that their country was firmly european and culturally superior to asia, nineteenthcentury intellectuals often saw russia as embodying an east-west hybrid or a “world of its own”; by the end of the second world war, and as communism spread, moscow had become more comfortable asserting its affinities with asia (tolz 2001, 151). such views highlight the enduring elements of diversity in global international society, casting doubt on the durability of any monist and expansionist liberal hegemony. moscow’s recent pivot toward eurasia has been accompanied by a conservative turn in the country’s political discourse, with putin beginning to espouse the “conservative values of the majority” upon his return to the kremlin in 2012 (sakwa 2017, 125). however, even many russian liberals view nato as a threat to their country’s security, despite their ideological preferences and desire for a modicum of cooperative relations with the west (tsygankov 2013, 92). even in the absence of a turn away from liberalism, the russian leadership has determined that integrating with the west would prevent it from retaining its sovereignty (lukin 2018, 176-7), “freedom of action” (trenin 2019b), and “independent strategic concerns” (sakwa 2017, 244). the mere establishment of “friendly relations” with the us and europe is now viewed as necessitating moscow’s “complete political submission” (lukin 2018, 15). for a country that considers independent great power status as being “inseparable from national identity”, acquiescence to the vision of a global order rooted in american leadership is impossible (petersson 2013, 11).10 10 although the trump administration was accused of abandoning the principle of american global leadership, it nonetheless went further in some respects than the obama administration in challenging russian interests by providing lethal assistance to ukraine, increasing the american military presence in eastern europe, withdrawing from the intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) and open skies treaties, directly striking the russian-backed al-assad regime in syria, and pulling out of the iran nuclear deal (jcpoa). as such, while it is possible that a gradual decoupling has begun to occur between liberal ordering practices and washington’s pursuit of primacy, the dynamic of moscow’s inability to acquiesce to key aspects of an american-dominated order has remained unchanged. for further analysis of this dynamic, see paikin (2019). 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 russia’s launching of the eaeu and the consolidation of rival regulatory orders in the wider european space has led to calls for dialogue and bridge-building between these orders (dienes et al. 2019, 33-52). however, in large part, hope for high-level discussions has been met instead by mere “informal contacts” between the european and eurasian commissions, with the eu preferring to engage with eaeu member states on a bilateral basis (van der togt 2020). even a more ambitious harmonization of both projects would represent an “integration of integrations” rather than russia’s integration into the western order as initially envisioned by many after the cold war. studin (2018b) suggests that canada now faces a somewhat related dilemma regarding the need to construct “interstitial regimes between international blocs”, including between the eaeu and the “post-nafta architecture for north america – across the arctic space”. a regulatory logic for relations between blocs lends credence to the ‘expansion’ es narrative that sees the decline of sociability as the advent of systemic relations, while the proliferation of new institutional architecture would conform to the ‘globalization’ account’s prediction of increasingly complex content being the result of normative contestation. russia has been influenced by both the west and the east throughout its long history. even the liberal yeltsin-era foreign minister andrei kozyrev spoke as early as 1992 about the importance of not definitively choosing between east and west (bolt and cross 2018, 34-5; lukin 2018, 73), even if moscow’s overriding aim was to pursue integration with the latter.11 moreover, the debate surrounding whether western liberalism is suitable for russia is merely a product of the past two centuries and is separate from the more longstanding questions concerning how russia can catch up with western countries’ technological, military, and economic prowess (kuchins and zevelev 2012, 182). this highlights how the difficulties associated with russia integrating into any western hegemonic order are compounded by the liberal character of the contemporary west. the result – even in the case of a country such as russia with its european affinities – is a global order featuring salient elements of normative thinness and diversity. although moscow’s eastward turn may be partial and the politics of eurasianism may take multiple forms, the rise of the eurasian dimension in russian political discourse is likely to buttress the relative importance of statism and great power status in the realm of national identity, solidifying some of the dividing lines that have prevented moscow from reaching an accommodation with the contemporary liberal order (laruelle 2017, 145-56). liberal order and international society revisited enduring elements of russian distinctiveness and its concerns over international status, when combined with disagreements over the shape of post-cold war europe, have led to the erosion of the liberal order’s hegemonic position. trenin highlights washington’s reduced reach by asserting that moscow’s actions in ukraine “essentially took russia out of the post-cold war system” and that its subsequent campaign in syria “broke the de facto monopoly of the us and its allies on military interventions” (2018, 20). any hegemon’s status in international society is “permanently conditional” and “subject to ongoing contestation in terms of its degree of legitimacy” (clark 2011, 49). if the us wishes to “retain its own monopoly” and not forge a collective hegemony with other great powers, it may now be forced to “seek social sanction within a more limited constituency” (2011, 66). 11 for more on how russian bicontinentalism is intertwined with russia’s great power identity, see sakwa (2015b). 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 however, having already embarked on a large-scale project to transform international society, a ‘retreat’ to a strictly bounded community would generate the perception that washington’s pursuit of continued pre-eminence was being decoupled from its liberal ordering practices. on the other hand, doubling down on the liberal order’s pursuit of universal scope would lead to a continued a roadblock in the form of international society’s embedded normative polycentrism (phillips 2017, 43-60; watson 2006, 54). in either instance, the perceived legitimacy of the liberal order’s hegemonic position in international society would be downgraded. the first of these two options reflects the challenge to the liberal order’s global hegemonic position posed by the trump administration, in which the united states is accused of abandoning a set of ordering principles once it no longer appears to be in its interest to pursue them. but the latter option reveals how the liberal order’s hegemonic position was already beginning to erode before the election of donald trump. an es approach can therefore serve to illustrate the extent to which the trump administration has been more of a catalyst than the cause of the advent of a global order beset by great power rivalry. this contrasts with liberal scholars such as ikenberry who have asserted that the crisis of the liberal order “can only be averted by more liberal order” (2013, 101). the aforementioned structural challenges facing the liberal order can inform canadian foreign policy under the trudeau government and beyond, which in recent years has been geared toward an explicit effort to uphold the “rules-based international order” (government of canada 2017). since the liberal international order has failed to become synonymous with international society, it would be logical to draw the conclusion that the former must eventually “come to terms with other ideas about and approaches to world order” (acharya 2018, 158). per this logic, if canada has an abiding interest in maintaining stable relations with its arctic neighbour russia, then its commitment to strengthening global multilateralism must be calibrated to acknowledge the limited global appeal of western norms and hegemony. yet if canada adopts a more hands-off approach toward promoting liberal norms and values, it has the potential to affect ottawa’s relations with washington under the biden presidency, given the former us vice president’s stated commitment to restoring american global leadership (biden 2020). while the precise nature of us international engagement under the biden administration remains to be determined, the very notion of leadership has the potential to generate a self-sustaining posture of primacy. as shapiro (2020) notes, [a]lliances create their own logic that helps justify ever greater u.s. engagement on the global stage. once an alliance is created, you must defend it and therefore need to constantly expand your military infrastructure and even the alliance itself. to do otherwise is to leave allies exposed and risk losing the credibility that holds the whole system of leadership together. therefore, even in the absence of a us-led effort to spread the geographic frontiers of the liberal order, antagonistic relations with other great powers are likely to endure. when paired with the high level of canadian dependence on the united states in a post-cold war era that has featured continental free trade and a hegemonic liberal west, the task of reaching a new canadian foreign policy equilibrium is a significant challenge. early es writers such as wight contended that a states system often develops into a universal empire such as in the chinese and hellenistic-roman worlds (1977, 33-43). however, despite russia’s centuries-long participation in the european balance-of-power system, no such universal empire has been produced in post-cold war europe. some may point to the fact that russia and china have thus far not been able to advance their own “broad set of alternative ideas for the organization of world order” (ikenberry 2018, 23). however, the presence of a 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 clear alternative is not always necessary for change to occur at the international level, with lebow contending that an order may break down when “the discrepancy between behaviour and the principles of justice” on which existing hierarchies rest becomes “great and obvious” – a concise conceptual description of the difficulties resulting from the liberal order’s inherent tensions outlined above (2008, 26). in fact, in the international realm rather than the domestic one, orders are “more sensitive to unit-level change” due to the presence of fewer actors (2008, 507). russia’s ambiguous relationship with europe – to say nothing of its conflict with the westernled liberal order – can provide an indication of the norms informing global international society in today’s era of rivalry. the english school’s list of primary institutions has included the balance of power, great power management, and sovereignty, among others (buzan 2014, 10112). if one adopts a europe-centric ‘expansion’ account, then certain primary institutions such as the balance of power and great power management, which russia inherited from europe in the centuries after westphalia, have since become an obstacle to russia’s integration into the western political community. the legitimacy of those two primary institutions, while expressed in universal bodies of today’s international society such as the united nations, sits uncomfortably with the principles that are unique to the liberal order, an order averse to the notion of spheres of influence and rooted in us leadership (allison 2020). the persistence of institutions such as great power management and the balance of power is crucial to the notion, central in russia’s identity and foreign policy discourse, that moscow plays an important and legitimate role in upholding a stable global order (rumer and sokolsky 2020). the fact that contestation continues to occur over the shape, or even the very legitimacy, of these institutions in the context of a largely unipolar distribution of power demonstrates that the english school remains a useful lens through which to analyse contemporary great power relations. this utility is reinforced by moscow’s often “constitutionalist” foreign policy predisposition in recent decades, preoccupied with who gets to make international rules rather than with what the rules precisely are (allison 2013, 203). regarding the institution of sovereignty, various scholars have cast doubt on the traditional account that it had consolidated in any recognizable form by 1648 (bartelson 1995, 137; teschke 2003). contemporary es and constructivist scholars have illustrated how nonwestern powers played a significant role in developing the norm of sovereignty, extended to all on the principle of human equality, as it is understood today (philpott 2001; reus-smit 2013, 181; buzan 2014, 141). sovereignty only became fully synonymous with nonintervention in the twentieth century, and in prior centuries was deeply intertwined with the notions of the right to wage a just war or the balance of power between faiths (morozov 2015, 142-43; tilly 1992, 61). therefore, moscow’s attachment to the norm of sovereignty can be interpreted more as an expression of support for the institutions of global international society rather than the norms of a west-centric liberal order.12 again, this shows the utility of an es approach in interpreting contemporary great power relations, as it enables us to understand the (admittedly inconsistent) “conservative institutionalist” and not just instrumental nature of moscow’s defence of certain international normative tenets (sokov 2018). a comprehensive es analysis bringing together the assumptions of earlier and later accounts demonstrates the diffuse and decentralized character of the emerging international society. however, this does not necessarily imply that the momentum favouring deeper cooperation 12 sakwa’s (2017, 47) conception of russian neo-revisionism explicitly contends that russia perceives itself to be challenging the liberal order while defending the autonomy of international society, a position which aligns with the conclusions reached in this article. 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 and some normative convergence will cease in its entirety, as international society’s pluralistic fabric is historically linked with the centuries-old impulse toward some form of universal solidarity (buzan 2014, 99-100).13 nonetheless, it has now become clear that even russia, a power heavily influenced by european international society for centuries, has been unable to find a satisfactory place for itself in the western-led order commensurate with that order’s norms and expectations. it therefore stands to reason that china, which never aspired to join a ‘greater west’ as russia did after the fall of the iron curtain, will also have difficulty forging an intimate relationship with the west that is rooted in shared identities and common understandings surrounding the legitimate shape of key norms and institutions (sakwa 2017, 291). if one acknowledges a distinction between systemic and social realms, then the liberal international order may be capable of functioning as an international system focused on common rules of external behaviour, but not as a world order encompassing the diverse identities and normative preferences of global international society.14 conclusion the existence of some form of hegemony has traditionally been the norm in international society (buzan 2014, 52-53). with the resumption of great power rivalry, the liberal order as currently conceived has clearly failed to retain its hegemonic capabilities, to say nothing of its professed universal appeal. whether this contestation leads to greater instability or to the further development of international society’s agreed-upon norms and institutions, the outcome is invariably a form of change.15 it is possible that a more inclusive form of collective great power hegemony may take the liberal order’s place once the dust from the current global disorder has settled, which may not be entirely dissimilar to the ‘diffused hegemony’ of great powers that composed the concert of europe (kofman 2018; watson 1992, 239-240). however, if relations between great powers continue to exhibit a primarily rivalrous character, one may be forced to contemplate the conceptual contours of order – and even, to a certain extent, universalism – without hegemony, with implications for liberal and non-liberal states alike.16 such an order would not exhibit the contradictions of liberal hegemony nor the tensions between a monist liberal order and pluralist international society, although washington may still gear its international posture toward preserving its material primacy (beckley 2020). therefore, although canada’s relative material dependence on the united states might endure, some of the more normative constraints on canadian foreign policy in terms of recalibrating 13 sørensen encapsulates this idea by predicting a “more decentred world” even as “globalization, global institutions and common global problems” continue to tie humanity together (2016, 20). 14 zakaria (2019) captures this by noting that american engagement with communist china has been successful in moderating beijing’s external behaviour over the long term, and that it was not primarily designed to transform the country’s internal economic and political system in any fundamental fashion. 15 this is also in line with the expectations of scholars cited in this article who study hegemony’s normative dimensions. lebow claims that his “cultural theory” of international relations privileges “process over structure and change over stability” (2008, 58). watson notes that swings in his “pendulum” model, which measures the relative power and influence possessed by a hegemonic state, appear more permanent than they actually are (1997, 123). 16 lebow already contends that the international orders of the modern era “were not imposed by a dominant power but the product of negotiation and compromise among multiple parties” (2018, 145-146). however, this question is even more conceptually germane in the context of the post-cold war world, which features the first international order of genuinely global scope (khanna 2019, 2), not rigidly divided by blocs or explicitly featuring a core and a periphery. 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 its relations with russia may wane, albeit only after the current cycle of normative contestation has run its course. 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 references acharya, amitav. 2018. the end of american world order. 2nd edition. cambridge: polity. allison, graham. 2020. “america and the new spheres of influence.” foreign affairs, february 10, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheresinfluence. allison, roy. 2013. russia, the west, and military intervention. oxford: oxford university press. barkin, j. samuel. 2010. realist constructivism: rethinking international relations theory. cambridge: cambridge university press. barnett, michael n. 2019. “the end of a liberal international order that never existed.” the global, april 16, 2019. https://theglobal.blog/2019/04/16/the-end-of-a-liberal-internationalorder-that-never-existed/. bartelson, jens. 1995. a genealogy of sovereignty. cambridge: cambridge university press. beckley, michael. 2020. “why this could be an illiberal american century.” foreign affairs, october 6, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-06/illiberalamerican-century-rogue-superpower. biden, jr. joseph r. 2020. “why america must lead again.” foreign affairs, january 23, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-leadagain. bolt, paul j. and cross, sharyl n. 2018. china, russia, and twenty-first century global geopolitics. oxford: oxford university press. bordachev, timofei. 2018. “russia’s eurasia moment: politics, economics, business.” in eurasia on the edge: managing complexity, edited by p. dutkiewicz, r. sakwa and f. lukyanov, 69-90. london: rowman & littlefield. bozeman, adda. 1984. “the international order in a multicultural world.” in the expansion of international society, 1992, edited by h. bull and a. watson, 387-406. oxford: oxford university press. bressler, michael l. 2008. “politics.” in understanding contemporary russia, edited by m.l. bressler, 91-127. boulder, co: lynne rienner. buchanan, elizabeth. 2020. “why russia wants stability in the arctic.” the maritime executive, september 27, 2020. https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-why-russia-wantsstability-in-the-arctic. buzan, barry. 2012. “how regions were made, and the legacies for world politics: an english school reconnaissance.” in international relations theory and regional transformation, edited by t.v. paul, 22-47. cambridge: cambridge university press. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence https://theglobal.blog/2019/04/16/the-end-of-a-liberal-international-order-that-never-existed/ https://theglobal.blog/2019/04/16/the-end-of-a-liberal-international-order-that-never-existed/ https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-06/illiberal-american-century-rogue-superpower https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-06/illiberal-american-century-rogue-superpower https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-why-russia-wants-stability-in-the-arctic https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-why-russia-wants-stability-in-the-arctic 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 buzan, barry. 2014. an introduction to the english school of international relations. cambridge: polity press. buzan, barry and ole wæver. 2003. regions and powers: the structure of international security. cambridge: cambridge university press. the canadian press. 2014. “john baird leading canadian delegation to ukraine.” february 25, 2014. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/john-baird-leading-canadian-delegation-to-ukraine1.2551235. casier, tom. 2018. “gorbachev’s ‘common european home’ and its relevance for russian foreign policy today.” debater a europa 18: 17-34. chalmers, malcolm. 2019. “which rules? why there is no single ‘rules-based international system’.” royal united services institute, april 2019. https://rusi.org/occasionalpapers/which-rules-why-there-is-no-single-rules-based-international-system. clark, ian. 2011. hegemony in international society. oxford: oxford university press. coker, christopher. 2015. the improbable war: china, the united states and the logic of great power conflict. new york: oxford university press. coker, christopher. 2019. the rise of the civilizational state. cambridge: polity. cox, michael. 2013. “power and the liberal order.” in after liberalism?: the future of liberalism in international relations, edited by r. friedman, k. oskanian and r.p. pardo, 103-116. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. dienes, alexandra, sergey afontsev, peter balás, rodica crudu and diana galoyan. 2019. “economic integration.” in a consensus proposal for a revised regional order in postsoviet europe and eurasia, edited by s. charap, j. shapiro, j. drennan, o. chalyi, r. krumm, y. nikitina & g. sasse, 33-52. santa monica, ca: rand corporation. donnelly, jack. 2017. “beyond hierarchy.” in hierarchies in world politics, edited by a. zarakol, 244-265. cambridge: cambridge university press. feigenbaum, evan a. 2020. “why the united states and china forgot how to cooperate.” carnegie endowment for international peace, april 28, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/28/why-united-states-and-china-forgot-how-tocooperate-pub-81673. flockhart, trine. 2016. “the coming multi-order world.” contemporary security policy 37 (1): 330. government of canada. 2014. “canada welcomes political change taking place in ukraine.” ottawa, february 22, 2014. https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/02/canadawelcomes-political-change-taking-place-ukraine.html. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/john-baird-leading-canadian-delegation-to-ukraine-1.2551235 https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/john-baird-leading-canadian-delegation-to-ukraine-1.2551235 https://rusi.org/occasional-papers/which-rules-why-there-is-no-single-rules-based-international-system https://rusi.org/occasional-papers/which-rules-why-there-is-no-single-rules-based-international-system https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/28/why-united-states-and-china-forgot-how-to-cooperate-pub-81673 https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/28/why-united-states-and-china-forgot-how-to-cooperate-pub-81673 https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/02/canada-welcomes-political-change-taking-place-ukraine.html https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/02/canada-welcomes-political-change-taking-place-ukraine.html 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 government of canada. 2017. “address by minister freeland on canada’s foreign policy priorities.” ottawa, june 6, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/globalaffairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html. greene, samuel a. 2016. “future approaches to the us.” eu institute for security studies – russian futures: horizon 2025, no. 26, edited by h. haukkala and n. popescu: 41-46. gvosdev, nikolas k. and christopher marsh. 2013. russian foreign policy: interests, vectors, and sectors. washington, dc: cq press. harrison, ewan. 2009. “the contradictions of unipolarity.” in rethinking realism in international relations: between tradition and innovation, edited by a. freyberg-inan, e. harrison and p. james, 76-101. baltimore, md: johns hopkins university press. hill, william h. 2019. “russia’s search for a place in europe.” survival: global politics and strategy 61 (3): 93-101. ikenberry, g. john. 2013. “the liberal order and its discontents.” in after liberalism?: the future of liberalism in international relations, edited by r. friedman, k. oskanian and r.p. pardo, 91-102. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. ikenberry, g. john. 2018. “the end of liberal international order?” international affairs 94 (1): 723. jahn, beate. 2013. “liberalism – in theory and history.” in after liberalism?: the future of liberalism in international relations, edited by r. friedman, k. oskanian and r.p. pardo, 15-32. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. karaganov, sergei. 2016. “from east to west, or greater eurasia.” russia in global affairs, october 25, 2016. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/from-east-to-west-or-greatereurasia-18440. khanna, parag. 2019. the future is asian: global order in the twenty-first century. london: weidenfeld & nicolson. kluge, janis and michael richter. 2020. “the lisbon-vladivostok illusion.” riddle, march 20, 2020. https://www.ridl.io/en/the-lisbon-vladivostok-illusion/. knutsen, torbjørn l. 1999. the rise and fall of world orders. manchester: manchester university press. kofman, michael. 2018. “raiding and international brigandry: russia’s strategy for great power competition.” war on the rocks, june 14, 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/raiding-and-international-brigandry-russias-strategyfor-great-power-competition/. kofman, michael. 2019. “towards a sino-russian entente?” riddle, november 29, 2019. https://www.ridl.io/en/towards-a-sino-russian-entente/. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/from-east-to-west-or-greater-eurasia-18440 https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/from-east-to-west-or-greater-eurasia-18440 https://www.ridl.io/en/the-lisbon-vladivostok-illusion/ https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/raiding-and-international-brigandry-russias-strategy-for-great-power-competition/ https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/raiding-and-international-brigandry-russias-strategy-for-great-power-competition/ https://www.ridl.io/en/towards-a-sino-russian-entente/ 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 kolesnikov, andrei. 2015. “why the kremlin is shutting down the novorossiya project.” carnegie moscow center, may 29, 2015. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/60249. kortunov, andrey. 2019. “russia’s troubles and options.” global brief (fall/winter 2019). https://globalbrief.ca/2018/10/russias-troubles-and-options/. kuchins, andrew c. and igor zevelev. 2012. “russia’s contested national identity and foreign policy.” in worldviews of aspiring powers: domestic foreign policy debates in china, india, iran, japan and russia, edited by h.r. nau and d.m. ollapally, 181-209. oxford: oxford university press. kudrin, alexei and vladimir mau. 2018. “the principles and goals of the russian states in the twenty-first century.” in russia: strategy, policy and administration, edited by i. studin, 17-30. london: palgrave macmillan. laruelle, marlene. 2017. “when eurasia looks east: is eurasianism sinophile or sinophobe?” in the politics of eurasianism: identity, popular culture and russia’s foreign policy, edited by m. bassin and g. pozo, 145-160. lanham, md: rowman and littlefield. lebow, richard n. 2008. a cultural theory of international relations. cambridge: cambridge university press. lebow, richard n. 2018. the rise and fall of political orders. cambridge: cambridge university press. lee, jongsoo. 2020. “russia, china, and the indo-pacific: an interview with dmitri trenin.” the diplomat, september 18, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/russia-china-and-the-indopacific-an-interview-with-dmitri-trenin/ lind, jennifer and daryl g. press. 2020. “reality check: american power in an age of constraints.” foreign affairs, february 10, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-02-10/reality-check. linklater, andrew and hidemi suganami. 2006. the english school of international relations: a contemporary reassessment. cambridge: cambridge university press. lo, bobo. 2015. russia and the new world disorder. baltimore: brookings institution press. lo, bobo. 2019a. “greater eurasia: the emperor’s new clothes or an idea whose time has come?” ifri, russie.nei.reports no. 27, july 2019. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/bobo_lo_greater_eurasia_2019.pdf lo, bobo. 2019b. “once more with feeling: russia and the asia-pacific.” lowy institute, august 20, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/once-more-feeling-russia-and-asiapacific. lukin, alexander. 2018. china and russia: the new rapprochement. cambridge: polity. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/60249 https://globalbrief.ca/2018/10/russias-troubles-and-options/ https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/russia-china-and-the-indo-pacific-an-interview-with-dmitri-trenin/ https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/russia-china-and-the-indo-pacific-an-interview-with-dmitri-trenin/ https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-02-10/reality-check https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/bobo_lo_greater_eurasia_2019.pdf https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/once-more-feeling-russia-and-asia-pacific https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/once-more-feeling-russia-and-asia-pacific 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 lukyanov, fyodor. 2019. “dawn breaks on new era in eu-russia relations.” carnegie moscow center, july 8, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79452. mezhuyev, boris v. 2008. “modern russia and postmodern europe.” russia in global affairs, march 2, 2008. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/modern-russia-and-postmodern-europe/. milbank, john and adrian pabst. 2016. the politics of virtue: post-liberalism and the human future. london: rowman and littlefield. monteiro, nuno p. 2014. theory of unipolar politics. cambridge: cambridge university press. morozov, viatcheslav. 2015. russia’s postcolonial identity: a subaltern empire in a eurocentric world. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. neumann, iver b. 1995. russia and the idea of europe: a study in identity and international relations. abingdon: routledge. nye, jr., joseph s. 2019. “the rise and fall of american hegemony from wilson to trump.” international affairs 95 (1): 63-80. paikin, zachary. 2019. “world order revisited: resilience and challenges.” minsk dialogue council on international relations, january 9, 2019. https://minskdialogue.by/en/research/opinions/world-order-revisited-resilience-andchallenges. paikin, zachary. 2020. “great power rivalry and the weakening of collective hegemony: revisiting the relationship between international society and international order.” cambridge review of international affairs 34 (1), doi: 10.1080/09557571.2020.1720602 paikin, zachary, kaneshko sangar and camille-renaud merlen. 2019. “russia’s eurasian past, present and future: rival international societies and moscow’s place in the post-cold war world.” european politics and society 20 (2): 225-43. petersson, bo. 2013. “mirror, mirror… myth-making, self-images and views of the us ‘other’ in contemporary russia.” in russia’s identity in international relations: images, perceptions, misperceptions, edited by r. taras, 11-23. abingdon: routledge. phillips, andrew. 2017. “international systems.” in the globalization of international society, edited by t. dunne and c. reus-smit, 43-62. oxford: oxford university press. philpott, daniel. 2001. revolutions in sovereignty: how ideas shaped modern international relations. princeton, nj: princeton university press. popeski, ron. 2015. “harper's tough stance on ukraine out of step with international reality.” cbc news, october 1, 2015. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/stephen-harper-ukraineopinion-1.3251864. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79452 https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/modern-russia-and-postmodern-europe/ https://minskdialogue.by/en/research/opinions/world-order-revisited-resilience-and-challenges https://minskdialogue.by/en/research/opinions/world-order-revisited-resilience-and-challenges https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/stephen-harper-ukraine-opinion-1.3251864 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/stephen-harper-ukraine-opinion-1.3251864 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 reus-smit, christian. 2013. “the liberal international order reconsidered.” in after liberalism?: the future of liberalism in international relations, edited by r. friedman, k. oskanian and r.p. pardo, 167-86. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. reus-smit, christian. 2014. “power, legitimacy, and order.” the chinese journal of international politics 7 (3): 341-59. reus-smit, christian and tim dunne. 2017. “the globalization of international society.” in the globalization of international society, edited by t. dunne and c. reus-smit, 18-41. oxford: oxford university press. richter, james. 1996. “russian foreign policy and the politics of national identity.” in the sources of russian foreign policy after the cold war, edited by c.a. wallander, 69-94. boulder: westview press. rozman, gilbert. 2014. the sino-russian challenge to the world order: national identities, bilateral relations, and east vs. west in the 2010s. stanford: stanford university press. rumer, eugene and richard sokolsky. 2020. “etched in stone: russian strategic culture and the future of transatlantic security.” carnegie endowment for international peace, september 8, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/08/etched-in-stone-russian-strategicculture-and-future-of-transatlantic-security-pub-82657. sakwa, richard. 2015a. “the death of europe? continental futures after ukraine.” international affairs 91 (3): 553-79. sakwa, richard. 2015b. “dualism at home and abroad: russian foreign policy neo-revisionism and bicontinentalism.” in russia’s foreign policy: ideas, domestic politics and external relations, edited by d. cadier and m. light, 65-79. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. sakwa, richard. 2017. russia against the rest: the post-cold war crisis of world order. cambridge: cambridge university press. shapiro, jeremy. 2020. “the future of u.s. global leadership.” boston review, june 15, 2020. http://bostonreview.net/war-security-politics/jeremy-shapiro-future-us-global-leadership sherwood, leah. 2018. “eurasian security constructs and institutional capacity.” in eurasia on the edge: managing complexity, edited by p. dutkiewicz, r. sakwa and f. lukyanov, 5368. london: rowman & littlefield. silaev, nikolai and andrei sushentsov. 2018. “strategic security in eurasia.” in eurasia on the edge: managing complexity, edited by p. dutkiewicz, r. sakwa and f. lukyanov, 7-20. london: rowman & littlefield. smith, martin a. 2012. power in the changing global order: the us, russia and china. cambridge: polity. smith, martin a. and paul latawski. 2003. the kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-cold war european security. manchester: manchester university press. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/08/etched-in-stone-russian-strategic-culture-and-future-of-transatlantic-security-pub-82657 https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/08/etched-in-stone-russian-strategic-culture-and-future-of-transatlantic-security-pub-82657 http://bostonreview.net/war-security-politics/jeremy-shapiro-future-us-global-leadership 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 sokov, nikolai. 2018. “the putin-trump summit: in helsinki, three worldviews will clash.” the national interest, july 15, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/putin-trumpsummit-helsinki-three-worldviews-will-clash-25766. sørensen, georg. 2011. a liberal world order in crisis: choosing between imposition and restraint. cornell: cornell university press. sørensen, georg. 2016. rethinking the new world order. london: palgrave. studin, irvin. 2018a. “ten theses on russia in the 21st century.” global brief (winter 2018). https://globalbrief.ca/2017/11/chapter-1-ten-theses-on-russia-in-the-21st-century/. studin, irvin. 2018b. “canada’s four-point game, part ii.” global brief (winter 2018). https://globalbrief.ca/2017/11/canadas-four-point-game-part-ii/. sushentsov, andrey. 2019. “russia – a global revisionist?” valdai discussion club, june 12, 2019. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-a-global-revisionist/. sushentsov, andrey a. and william c. wohlforth. 2020. “the tragedy of us–russian relations: nato centrality and the revisionists’ spiral.” international politics 57 (3): 427-50. tang, shiping. 2016. “order: a conceptual analysis.” chinese political sciences review 1: 3046. teschke, benno. 2003. the myth of 1648: class, geopolitics and the making of modern international relations. london: verso. tilly, charles. 1992. coercion, capital and european states: ad 990-1992. hoboken: wileyblackwell. van der togt, tony. 2020. “the eu and the eurasian economic union: dealing with a common chinese challenge.” institut für sicherheitspolitik, april 30, 2020. https://www.institutfuersicherheit.at/the-eu-and-the-eurasian-economic-union-dealingwith-a-common-chinese-challenge/. tolz, vera. 2001. russia: inventing the nation. london: bloomsbury. trenin, dmitri. 2018. “russia as a disruptor of the post-cold war order: to what effect?” raisina files: debating disruption in the world order 3, edited by r. passi and h.v. pant: 18-23. new delhi: observer research foundation. trenin, dmitri. 2019a. “20 years of vladimir putin: how russian foreign policy has changed.” the moscow times, august 27, 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/27/20years-of-vladimir-putin-how-russian-foreign-policy-has-changed-a67043 trenin, dmitri. 2019b. “it’s time to rethink russia’s foreign policy strategy.” carnegie moscow center, april 25, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78990. tsygankov, andrei p. 2013. russia’s foreign policy: change and continuity in national identity. lanham: rowman & littlefield. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/putin-trump-summit-helsinki-three-worldviews-will-clash-25766 https://nationalinterest.org/feature/putin-trump-summit-helsinki-three-worldviews-will-clash-25766 https://globalbrief.ca/2017/11/chapter-1-ten-theses-on-russia-in-the-21st-century/ https://globalbrief.ca/2017/11/canadas-four-point-game-part-ii/ https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-a-global-revisionist/ https://www.institutfuersicherheit.at/the-eu-and-the-eurasian-economic-union-dealing-with-a-common-chinese-challenge/ https://www.institutfuersicherheit.at/the-eu-and-the-eurasian-economic-union-dealing-with-a-common-chinese-challenge/ https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/27/20-years-of-vladimir-putin-how-russian-foreign-policy-has-changed-a67043 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/27/20-years-of-vladimir-putin-how-russian-foreign-policy-has-changed-a67043 https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78990 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 wallander, celeste a. 1996. “ideas, interests, and institutions in russian foreign policy.” in the sources of russian foreign policy after the cold war, edited by c.a. wallander, 207-218. boulder: westview press. watson, adam. 1984a. “russia and the european states system.” in the expansion of international society, 1992, edited by h. bull and a. watson, 61-74. oxford: oxford university press. watson, adam. 1984b. “european international society and its expansion.” in the expansion of international society, 1992, edited by h. bull and a. watson, 13-32. oxford: oxford university press. watson, adam. 1992. the evolution of international society: a comparative historical analysis. abingdon: routledge. watson, adam. 1997. the limits of independence: relations between states in the modern world. abingdon: routledge. watson, adam. 2006. hegemony & history. abingdon: routledge. wight, martin. 1977. systems of states. london: continuum international publishing. zakaria, fareed. 2019. “the new china scare.” foreign affairs, december 6, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-12-06/new-china-scare https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-12-06/new-china-scare 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 restrictive covid-19 policies in the eu countries and russia: an institutional approach1 artur demchuk2 lomonosov moscow state university, institute for the us and canadian studies, russian academy of sciences vladimir kapitsyn3 lomonosov moscow state university artem karateev4 institute of scientific information on social sciences, russian academy of sciences abstract based on empirical quantitative data, the article provides a comparative analysis of the course of the first covid-19 pandemic wave in the countries of the european union and russia in 2020, with a particular interest in the differences in policies implemented to counter infection as well as the specifics and stringency of government response measures. special attention is paid to the countries' institutional characteristics (including the quality of healthcare, management, public trust in the government, and value orientations), which, according to the authors’ hypothesis, determine the specifics of the measures taken and their effectiveness. using the developed index of severity of the epidemiological situation and regression analysis, institutional characteristics that most influence the effectiveness of restrictive measures and the easiest passage of the pandemic wave were identified. it is also shown that, despite significant differences between russia and the eu, restrictive policies in russia during the first wave of covid-19 were largely in line with those of eu countries and that patterns and models identified on the basis of eu data accounting for institutional characteristics can predict the severity of the epidemiological situation in russia with sufficient quality. 1 this research was performed by a team of researchers from the “preservation of the world cultural and historical heritage” – a program of the interdisciplinary scientific and educational school of moscow state university. 2 artur demchuk is the head, chair of comparative politics at the department of political science, lomonosov moscow state university, and leading research fellow, institute for the u.s. and canadian studies, russian academy of sciences. 3 vladimir kapitsyn is a professor of comparative politics at the department of political science, lomonosov moscow state university. 4 artem karateev is a researcher at the department of political science, institute of scientific information on social sciences, russian academy of sciences. 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 introduction the covid-19 pandemic that has engulfed the whole world has become a serious challenge – a stress test of the systemic functioning of the state. the pandemic has tested the state’s ability to effectively mobilize resources for an adequate response to emergencies, to make optimal decisions in the context of limited time and a high degree of uncertainty, and to ensure the proper functioning of healthcare, economic, and social protection systems. it is still impossible to give the exact date for the end of the pandemic, but the global community has already gained enough experience (both successful and unsuccessful) in combating the spread of covid-19, its treatment, and managing the negative economic and social consequences of the pandemic. looking to the future, it is now important to determine the mitigating factors and measures in order to be better prepared for potential future pandemics. it is particularly important to examine the initial phase of the pandemic – when the nature of the virus was not yet known, and there were no means of control other than restrictive measures. in this regard, comparative cross-country studies are an important tool to reach such conclusions. in this study, for the purposes of statistical analysis, the authors analyze the experience of all 27 member states of the european union, the united kingdom, and the russian federation. this choice was due to the fact that russia has experienced rather severe consequences of the pandemic compared to other countries, although it implemented strict measures to combat its effects. understanding the reasons for this discrepancy is essential to clarify the predictors of the effectiveness of covid-19 measures. to do so, it is important to analyze the experiences of other countries. the comparison with the eu countries and the uk results from: 1) the geographical proximity; 2) the similar timing of the outbreak of the pandemic (march-august 2020); 3) the fact that russia introduced measures to combat the pandemic and protect businesses and the population, which are largely based on similar measures in the eu; 4) the assumption that the covid-19 statistical data from the eu are more reliable than the data from other regions with which russia could be compared; 5) the similarities between russia and the eu including common social, economic, and political features that allow for the comparison of institutional characteristics. the authors’ hypothesis is that the stringency of covid-19 measures and the severity of the pandemic are remarkably related to institutional characteristics. to predict severity, it is important to consider not only the restrictive measures but also the institutional conditions under which these measures are used and which largely determine their effectiveness. the authors expect that the inclusion of institutional characteristics in the severity model will significantly improve its predictive power. the authors also assume that despite the significant differences between russia and the eu, patterns and models based on eu data that take institutional characteristics into account will have good predictive quality in russia as well. thus, the aim of this study is to compare the passage of the first wave of the pandemic in russia and eu countries in order to – describe the relationships between the stringency of restrictive measures (1), the severity of the pandemic (2), and institutional characteristics (3). – to develop a model describing the severity of the pandemic based on the stringency of restrictive measures and institutional characteristics; – to determine how russia fits into european trends. 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 literature review the severe consequences of the pandemic were not only due to the fact that the virus was new, and physicians lacked the resources to deal with it but also the fact that governments were not prepared for a pandemic. in this regard, global research on covid-19 responses and their effectiveness since the spring of 2020 fills an important knowledge gap and reduces future risks when similar situations arise. initially, such studies lacked verified information, contributing to their delayed appearance. a more complete picture of the political reflection of the “first wave” of the covid-19 pandemic did not emerge in russia until late 2020 (belik and kolosov 2020; abisheva et al. 2021; timofeev 2020). the titles of the published works show that relatively little attention has been paid to the problem of the interdependence between the severity of the epidemiological situation and the stringency of governmental measures.5 a team of researchers from the universities in the united kingdom (uk) and the united states (us), with the participation of scientists from the higher school of economics (hse) in russia, used data from the covid-19 public health protective policy index project to study variables that correlate with the overall stringency of public health measures in federal policies and the contribution of federal and subnational institutions to covid-19 policies (shvetsova et al. 2021). the issue of stringency of anticovid-19 measures was also discussed in political science journals in canada (paquet and schertzer 2020). in the special issue of the canadian journal of political science, articles examined the stringency of anticovid-19 measures provided by policy-making institutions, including “protective public health response,” “patterns of policy aggressiveness,” and “statutory-regulatory regimes” (rayment and vanden beukel 2020). in particular, the indicator of municipal policy “aggressiveness” in countering covid-19, the relationship between municipal policy measures and potentially relevant features of the local context in canada—type of province, population size, cases of covid-19, and local ideology—was analyzed (armstrong and lucas 2020). geographically, there is a mismatch: first-wave pandemic policies in russia and eastern europe (including only the countries that are member states of the eu) have been “overshadowed” by the study of the eu (balog-way et al. 2021), the uk, and the us (balog-way and mccomas 2020). for example, eastern european countries were rarely included in the global samples based on the study of perceptions of pandemic risks (dryhurst et al. 2020). the risks of a pandemic in the first half of 2020 and the readiness of the healthcare system in the us and the uk (where the level of risk perception of covid-19 was particularly high) were studied most intensively. the lack of attention to eastern europe is especially noticeable compared to many articles studying the onset of the pandemic in china (xuefei ren 2020); in russia, researchers also conducted a lot of analysis on china and india during the first wave of the covid19 pandemic (emelyanova, kapitsyn, and karateev 2022). a large-scale study by capano et al. (2020) did not mention russia and eastern european countries. nevertheless, the subject matter and methods of the study are noteworthy for the purposes of this article. capano et al. compare the effects of different country conditions on responses to the covid-19 pandemic. the pandemic is considered as a “natural experiment” in which governments, faced with roughly the same challenges, take a variety of protective and restrictive measures, which is interesting for comparing policy instruments and the factors that led to their choice. in their study, capano et al. have created models to help develop responses to the pandemic (2020). 5 one of the few studies was conducted at lomonosov moscow state university in 2021-2022. another notable exception is the work of political scientist norbert kersting (kersting 2021; kersting and graubner 2020). 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 in russia, the first wave of the pandemic was studied extensively (chubarova and sharova 2020). although the correlation between the severity of the situation, the stringency of measures, and the effectiveness of institutions was not specifically considered, nevertheless, it was still possible to identify the influence of spatial parameters. russian regional experts used models to describe the spatial diffusion of covid-19 in regions across russia and explained the relationship between the spread of the virus and the economic specialization of the regions, their population density, urbanization, per capita income, demographic features, and the level of excess mortality. the “network – places – scaling of infection” model is justified, which explains the mechanisms of covid-19 spread and the development of counteraction measures. a pandemic is considered a multidimensional interaction in space and time of complex biological, social, and organizational systems that includes the spread of the disease, restructuring of institutions, restrictive measures, and the dissemination of information. the russian experience was compared with regional data from poland, italy, iceland, britain, germany, sweden, and denmark. polish authors krzysztofik, kantor-pietraga, and spórna (2020) considered spatial and functional features of the fight against the virus in different regions of the country, as well as multidimensional conditions for the spread of the virus in its trans-industrial regions (2021). other authors apply a spatial approach to solving the problem of optimal distribution of human resources in the first wave of the pandemic (jarynowski, wójta-kempa, and krzowski 2021). severity of the situation in the first covid-19 pandemic wave italy was the first country in europe to suffer from covid-19. the delay in implementing strict measures, in no small part, explains the exponential growth in the number of infected in italy, where there was a serious overload of emergency rooms. in just three weeks (february 21–march 11, 2020), the virus infected 12,462 people, of which 827 died. after italy, the virus quickly spread to germany and the uk, then to scandinavia and eastern europe. in germany, the first case of infection was registered in bavaria on january 27, 2020 (schilling et al. 2021). as soon as someone tested positive for covid-19, they were instructed to enter mandatory isolation, which prevented the further spread of the virus. delayed reporting and an increase in the number of asymptomatically infected people distorted statistics on covid-19. the main indicators that most accurately expressed the severity of the situation were mortality rates, the number of hospitalizations and severe cases of the disease, and the number of occupied intensive care beds. based on the analysis of a set of these variables, in april 2020, experts from the deep knowledge group in london identified germany as the country most successfully countering the spread of covid-19 in europe. germany was second after israel in the world ranking of the security of states in the face of the pandemic. russia, the uk, italy, and spain were not included in the top 40 places on this list. on the contrary, these nations were in the top 20 countries most exposed to “coronavirus risks.”6 moscow, being a densely populated metropolis and the largest transportation, financial, and industrial hub of russia, initially became a hotbed for the spread of covid-19 and occupied a leading position in terms of the total number of cases and deaths. in russia, the first cases were identified at the end of january 2020, 6 eu reporter. “#deep knowledge group ranks #israel 1st in the #covid-19 health safety countries ranking.” 2020. eu reporter. april 3, 2020. accessed january 22, 2023. https://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/ 2020/04/03/deepknowledgegroup-ranks-israel-1st-in-the-covid-19-health-safety-countries-ranking/. https://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2020/04/03/deepknowledgegroup-ranks-israel-1st-in-the-covid-19-health-safety-countries-ranking/ https://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2020/04/03/deepknowledgegroup-ranks-israel-1st-in-the-covid-19-health-safety-countries-ranking/ 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 and the peak number of active patients during the first period of the pandemic occurred in may 2020. at the same time, it is necessary to point out the distinctions in the spread of covid-19 in different regions. this is especially true for some geographically remote regions of russia and regions with a significant shift in labour migration, for example, the regions of murmansk and magadan, the komi republic, and the yamalonenets autonomous okrug (chubarova and sharova 2020). using spatial analysis of the situation in russian regions, zemtsov and baburin explained the relatively high morbidity rate in moscow, the moscow region, st. petersburg, and the nizhny novgorod region by the high mobility of people and commerce in these regions. the spatial models used by these authors made it possible to consider the russian dynamics of morbidity and mortality in 2020 in the context of the global dynamics of morbidity and mortality. the study demonstrated the importance of restrictive measures. however, the effectiveness of the anti-covid-19 policies varied by region and depended on many local economic, geographical, social, and legal factors such as population density (especially in agglomerations), mobility of the population (tourists, entrepreneurs, migrants), law enforcement practices, the level of poverty, the socio-demographic structure of the population (including the proportion of elderly people and their short-term movements, location of bus stations, organization of testing and hospitalization, and the dissemination of information – advertising, propaganda) (zemtsov and baburin 2020). a comparison of mortality rates in russia and the eu countries demonstrates that during the first covid19 wave, indicators of total mortality in russia (13 deaths per 100 000 population) were at the level of germany (12) and denmark (11.5), were significantly lower than in belgium (86), spain (63), italy (59), sweden (58), and france (48) but higher than in austria (8), hungary, slovenia (7), and poland (6) (chubarova and sharova 2020). at the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic, the danger of the virus was underestimated. due to the underestimation of the situation, the protective and restrictive measures taken did not play a very important role, and the role of institutional characteristics (general quality of health care, sanitation level, urbanization, etc.) increased, which emphasizes the importance of studying these characteristics. stringency of restrictive measures as is often the case with an unknown phenomenon, the first cases of covid-19 in western and eastern europe did not cause an adequate political reaction, although they did not go unnoticed. countries lacked the proper experience in dealing with this virus to take sufficient precautions. all countries needed some period of time to understand the nature of the virus, the symptoms that it produced, and its level of contagiousness. without this data, any epidemiological response and preventative measures were rather “blind.” however, most eu member states and russia had some kind of a “grace period” compared to the previously affected east asian countries. european countries could use data from china, where the first confirmed covid-19 cases were recorded in december 2019. in february 2020, the world health organization (who) – china joint mission on coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19) working there on behalf of the who received valuable information from chinese doctors.7 on january 27, 2020, before the pandemic was declared, the who had already 7 who. report of the who-china joint mission on coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19). 16-24 february 2020. accessed february 28, 2022. https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-finalreport.pdf . 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 warned that even though researchers had not fully decoded the coronavirus genome, it was nevertheless necessary to adjust the global risk level to “high,” noting that some infected people become contagious before they feel unwell (berres 2020). on january 30th, 2020, the who declared a global health emergency. italy was the first country in europe to introduce restrictions on leaving home, and closing schools and offices. on february 22, 2020, the italian government issued the first decree introducing lockdowns in 11 cities in northern italy. on march 2, 2020, the third decree on restrictions was issued, which identified three zones: “red” (closed), “yellow” (medium-risk), and “green” (low-risk). on march 10, 2020, the decree on the nationwide lockdown came into force. however, there was contradictory information, and the response measures were not always justified. the italian minister of health stated that the virus can be transmitted only by direct contact with a sick person. the minister of economy and the minister of infrastructure and transport announced efforts to contain the economic damage, but with only 0.01% of the area locked down, it was not advisable to suspend flights to other regions (ruiu 2020). although the virus spread in several regions, some schools reopened, and some bars and shops organized public events, including advertising events to attract visitors. germany and most european countries initially took a cautious approach to the adoption of restrictions but moved to tougher measures shortly after; the swedish government chose a more restrained approach, relying on recommendations and voluntariness as opposed to restrictions. in may 2020, there was a noticeable easing of restrictions in germany, with almost all european countries starting to lift some restrictions in june 2020. during and after the lockdown, the number of covid-19 cases decreased; several comparative studies in european countries have shown the significant impact of strict mobility and contact restrictions on reducing covid-19 incidence (bobyleva, anshin, and ptitsyn 2020; osipov, safonov, and kuzmina 2020; blümel and busse 2020; eckner 2020). in germany, strong contact restrictions imposed on march 9, 16, and 23, 2020 led to an overall decrease in the number of infections. this, of course, does not mean that nonpharmaceutical measures solve everything. however, while there were ongoing difficulties with testing and the procurement of personal protective equipment (ppe) and medical supplies, as well as no vaccines available, non-pharmaceutical measures were crucial. the significance of restrictive measures became evident in the example of the eastern european countries during the second half of 2020. compared to the eu’s “core” countries (germany, france, belgium, netherlands), countries in eastern europe had a relatively low incidence rate during the winter and spring of 2020 but then experienced a sharp breakdown (from august through to the end of 2020). there was a sharp short-term increase in the mortality rate in the czech republic. the main reason was the abrupt transition from severe restrictions (when there were few cases of covid-19 and very low mortality) to the liberalization of control over the mobility of the population (greer et al. 2021, 413). there were numerous discussions about the adequacy of restrictive measures. scientists from the university of oxford have developed indicators that are convenient for comparing the policies of different countries – the government response index, the stringency index and other indices, which included the type and volume of school closures, travel restrictions, corporate financial assistance, and investment in vaccine development.8 8 mathieu et al. “covid-19: stringency index.” our world in data. accessed february 28, 2022. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-stringency-index. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-stringency-index 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 there were difficulties with assessing the activities of the eu governing bodies to combat the pandemic because during the first stage of the pandemic, there were disputes about the contribution of the european commission to the distribution of materials (medicines, masks, etc.), and the fight against the spread of covid-19 (especially restrictive measures) focused mainly on the level of national states. therefore, the authors did not make a comparison with the level of the eu’s general anti-covid-19 policies. as for russia, by the end of january 2020, it promptly closed its borders with china and chinese citizens were banned from entering the country. in march 2020, in a short period of time, the following measures were introduced: quarantine for people who tested positive for covid-19 and mandatory isolation for individuals who had contact with those who were exposed to the virus. in order to enforce these measures, a home quarantine monitoring system named “social monitoring” (a smart phone application that sends requests for location confirmation and monitoring using gps/glonas) was introduced. in russian regions, governors and mayors took restrictive measures at the local level. in february-march 2020, people with symptoms of upper respiratory tract infection who travelled to china (italy was later added to the list) were quarantined in hospitals, remaining there until they received two negative test results. as covid-19 spread across europe, the russian government closed all international borders on april 4, 2020, and only began allowing some international flights from the beginning of august 2020 (greer et al. 2021, 414). institutional characteristics one of the approaches to understanding why countries applied certain restrictive policies and why the measures taken gave certain results is to consider the institutional characteristics of countries. this approach assumes that governments apply measures taking into account the available “institutional capacity.” on the other hand, “institutional capacity” determines (to some extent) how effective the measures are. according to this conceptual model, it would be logical to assume that even the most successful management decisions made in conditions of unsatisfactory institutional performance are doomed to low efficiency. of particular importance here is the identification of characteristics that are most associated with the success of the measures. this approach can also help to assess the readiness of countries for possible future epidemiological challenges. the difficulty in this area of research is the selection process of institutional characteristics to consider, taking into account their great diversity and quantity. interest in studying the relationship of institutional characteristics to covid-19 policies has already been outlined in a number of publications. the authors of a study conducted at the university of michigan analyzed the issues arising from the pandemic, focusing on the countries of eastern europe that have common institutional features (hungary, czech republic, bulgaria) (greer et al. 2021, 413-4). this study demonstrated the breadth of institutional characteristics that influence the severity of the pandemic. hungary, czech republic, and bulgaria have lower indicators of public administration efficiency and regulatory quality, including a lower level of investment in this area compared to developed eu countries (for example, germany and france). according to the global health index, hungary, the czech republic, and bulgaria ranked 35th, 42nd and 61st, respectively,9 which determined their lower level of preparedness in dealing with the pandemic (greer et al. 2021). however, the high level of investment and modernization of technological equipment in the uk and sweden did not help with their preparedness for the pandemic. 9 world bank. “worldwide governance indicators.” accessed february 28, 2022. https://info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi/home/reports. 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 with comparable populations, there are institutional differences between hungary, bulgaria, and the czech republic. while hungary and bulgaria are more comparable, the czech republic’s institutions are functioning more efficiently, even though the level of democratic consolidation has declined in all three countries since 2010 (engler et al. 2021). in terms of social policy, the czech republic and hungary combine elements of the bismarckian welfare state with neoliberal policies. the responsible attitude and competence of the three governments may be called into question when they (especially the czech republic and bulgaria) quickly eased restrictive measures in april–may 2020, which contributed to a rapid increase in the incidence of covid–19 in july–august 2020; in september–october 2020, the peak incidence was reached. in less neoliberal and more authoritarian hungary, authorities kept some restrictive measures throughout the summer so that only at the end of august 2020 there was an increase in the incidence of diseases. the testing and tracking systems in all three countries were overloaded, which means that the time provided by the successful actions in march 2020 was not used productively and this likely correlated with the low efficiency of administration in these countries. a critical role was played by the preservation of basic sanitary and epidemiological services as well as the work of infectious disease specialists in primary healthcare (sheiman, shishkin, and shevksy 2018), which helped to contain the spread of covid-19. sample description since the aim of this study was to assess the extent to which the first wave of the pandemic in russia resembled that of the one in eu countries and what explains the differences between the cases, data from 27 eu countries, the uk, and russia were used for the study. data for the uk were included in the study even though the country was no longer formally a member of the eu at the time of the first wave of coronavirus (uk membership was terminated on january 31, 2020). methodology to describe the severity of the epidemiological situation in a particular country, a previously developed severity index10 was used and calculated according to the following formula: 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑋1𝑖 (𝑙𝑠) +𝑋2𝑖 (𝑙𝑠) +𝑋3𝑖 (𝑙𝑠) +𝑋4𝑖 (𝑙𝑠) 4 , where )(1 ls ix is the linearly scaled peak number of cases detected per 100 000 population, based on the 7-day moving average, for the i-th country; )(2 ls ix – linearly scaled number of days from the onset of the pandemic in the country to the peak for the i-th country; )(3 ls ix – linearly scaled number of days from the peak to the time when the peak value decreases by 40% for the i-th country; )(4 ls ix – linearly scaled peak number of deaths caused by covid-19, based on the 7-day moving average for the i-th country, calculated per 100 000 population. qualitative interpretation of all components of the index: the higher they are, the more severe the epidemiological situation was. 10 a detailed description of the process for calculating the index and the results obtained by country are provided in another article by the authors (demchuk et al. 2021). 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 the severity index allows for a comparison of the course of a pandemic wave in various countries with diverse populations and at different time intervals. moreover, its application to the situation in europe (where all countries experienced the first wave at about the same time) seems justified. the severity index is a convenient generalizing characteristic of the situation in the country. to describe the severity of protective and restrictive measures imposed by the government, the stringency index was selected,11 which was developed by researchers from oxford university as part of the “covid19 government response tracker” project.12 this index considers nine indicators or events (see appendix a for details). the stringency index has been calculated by the authors of the project since january 2020 and covers more than 180 countries, considering the stringency of the measures for all nine indicators. in this study, the authors used the averaged data from the stringency index for the period starting from the onset of the pandemic in a country to its peak (i.e., the period described by the parameter 2x of the severity index). the authors of this article refer to this averaged characteristic as si. thus, si describes the average severity of the measures that allowed to curb the upward trend in the daily number of cases in a given country. seven groups of indicators were used to describe the institutional characteristics of the countries, including demographic, economic, health, cultural, and other parameters (see appendix b for more details). data relevant to the study at the time of the onset of the first wave of the pandemic in europe were used. further data analysis was performed by pair correlation analysis of stringency, severity, and institutional characteristics to estimate the relationship between them. in some cases, the study of the correlation between individual components of the severity index on the one hand and institutional characteristics on the other was used to determine the features of the influence of institutional characteristics. to estimate the effects of institutional characteristics on the severity of the first covid-19 wave, the principal component regression (pcr) technique was used. for this purpose, the data were centred and scaled so that the obtained parameters of the multivariate linear regression equation could be compared with each other. to assess the extent to which russia fits in or diverges from the eu trends, the authors included a dummy variable in the pcr model and also compared the correlation coefficients between severity and institutional characteristics and between stringency and institutional characteristics for two samples: with and without russia. data analysis relationship between the severity of the epidemiological situation and the stringency of the measures in the first phase, the relationship between the severity of the situation (x variable) and the stringency of the measures (si variable) was analyzed. the correlation analysis showed a negative pearson linear 11 oxcgrt. “methodology for calculating indices.” accessed march 1, 2022. https://github.com/oxcgrt/covidpolicy-tracker/blob/master/documentation/index_methodology.md. 12 university of oxford. covid-19 government response tracker. accessed april 12, 2022. https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/covid-19-government-response-tracker. 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 correlation coefficient of –0.37 (95% confidence level), which can be interpreted as a moderate negative relationship (figure 1). in other words, more stringent measures correspond to a lower severity of the situation. this result is logical and consistent with the goals of the measures introduced – to protect the population from covid-19, stricter measures should be more protective. figure 1. relationship between the severity of the epidemiological situation and the stringency of the measures. source: authors’ calculations high variability of severity and stringency indicators at the same time, a wide range can be seen with respect to the regression line. this means that two countries with the same stringency of measures can have very different severity, and conversely, countries with similar severity can have very different stringency. in belgium and latvia, the stringency of the measures was approximately the same (they are roughly on the same vertical line) but the severity of the situation was significantly different. cyprus and slovenia had similar severity levels but very different stringency levels. 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 the reasons for this range may be: – the influence of additional factors (especially those related to the institutional characteristics of the countries) – inaccuracies in national statistics – in some cases, the measures were not introduced as a preventive measure but as a response to the current unfavourable epidemic situation in the country. thus, the explanatory model becomes more complex: on the one hand, as has been shown, the measures taken reduce the severity, but on the other hand, the severity of the situation encourages more stringent measures. if in the first case there is a negative correlation, in the second case there is a positive correlation. the superposition of these two trends leads to a rather large spread of points in the scatterplot. it should be noted that the correlation coefficient obtained is much closer to –1 than the coefficient obtained in the previous sample studies conducted by the authors for countries around the world. this may suggest that the eu’s restrictive policies were, on the whole, more well-thought-out and timely than the global average. the position of the eastern european countries is quite compact: with very similar stringency scores (between 70 and 80), they have a relatively low dispersion in severity. the exception is bulgaria, where high severity was observed under weaker restrictions. nevertheless, despite its particular position on the scatterplot, bulgaria fits the “stronger restrictions – lower severity” trend. overall, the eastern european countries of the eu show a very strong correlation between stringency and severity, which is -0.82. this indicates the closeness of institutional characteristics, approximately similar conditions, and a similar impact of restrictive measures on severity. russia is not in the best position in the european comparison. it is far from the trend line: relatively strict measures are associated with rather high severity. however, this is not to say that the situation in russia is very different from that of the eu countries; it is similar to that of italy, luxembourg, and ireland. best policies analyzing the position of countries in the two-dimensional space of the stringency of measures and epidemic severity (figure 1), the authors can identify the zone at the bottom left, which corresponds to the easy passage of the pandemic wave and, at the same time, relatively lax measures. the countries with the best policies—combining the possibility of the low severity of the epidemiological situation and low stringency of measures—are germany, estonia, and latvia. adjacent to these countries are austria, denmark, finland, slovenia, and greece. the covid-19 policies of these countries can be seen as an example of how to best learn from this experience. the role of institutional characteristics to examine how the severity of the epidemiological situation in a country and the stringency of the measures taken are related to its institutional characteristics (as well as to understand which characteristics are responsible for a country falling the lower left part of the scatterplot), a pair linear correlation analysis was performed. the pearson coefficients are shown in table 1. in order to assess the combined impact and individual effect sizes of the institutional characteristics, the authors conducted a multivariate regression analysis. the objective was to obtain a linear regression model 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 for pandemic severity (dependent variable x) using institutional characteristics (c1, c2, …) and the stringency of restrictive measures (si) as independent variables. in addition, a dummy variable d (d=0 for eu countries and d=1 for russia) was included in the model to estimate the difference between russia and the eu: 𝑋 = 𝑎1𝐶1 + 𝑎2𝐶2 + … + 𝑏 𝑆𝐼 + 𝑓 𝐷 + 𝑎 , where a, a1, a2, …, b, f are model parameters estimated from the data. the linear form of the model can be debated, but the authors chose it for its simplicity and its ability to provide an easy comparison of the contribution of institutional characteristics to epidemic severity reduction. in future research, it is reasonable to use other types of models, including nonlinear models. since some of the institutional characteristics (e.g. population density, safe sanitation, employment rate, government trust index, media trust index, and broadband subscriptions) have a weak correlation with the severity index (see table 1), they are excluded from the set of independent variables. survival/selfexpression values and traditional/secular values were not used as predictors in the regression model due to incomplete data. as some independent variables demonstrated a strong correlation among themselves, the principal component regression (pcr) technique was used to avoid multicollinearity and, thus, wide confidence intervals for the model parameters. the data were centred and scaled to allow comparison of the regression model parameters. the first two pcs have a cumulative proportion of explained variance equal to 73.4 % and therefore used to build a regression model: 𝑋 = 𝑑1𝑃𝐶1 + 𝑑2𝑃𝐶2 + 𝑑 the calculated parameters (d1, d2) both have p-values of less than 0.05. the resulting coefficients for institutional characteristics (a1, a2,…,an) are shown in table 1. the coefficient b for si is –0.180, the coefficient f of the dummy variable d is 0.017, and the constant d is equal to –0.009. the amount of variance explained by the model (r-squared) is 0.33. thus, the authors see that the inclusion of institutional characteristics in the severity prediction model increases the amount of variance explained from 0.13 (figure 1) to 0.33. 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 table 1. relationship between severity and institutional characteristics and between the stringency index and institutional characteristics indicator correlation coefficient between indicator and severity index (x variable) regression parameter for severity model (slope) correlation coefficient between indicator and stringency of protective and restrictive measures (si variable) 1 area 0.45 0.207 –0.45 2 population 0.40 0.228 –0.42 3 population density –0.05 – 0.13 4 urban population 0.42 0.093 –0.34 5 health expenditures 0.50 0.091 –0.41 6 life expectancy at birth 0.40 0.009 –0.17 7 safe sanitation 0.13 – –0.27 8 gdp per capita, ppp 0.40 0.001 –0.05 9 employment rate 0.00 – –0.14 10 government trust index 0.03 – –0.15 11 media trust index 0.03 – –0.12 12 survival / self-expression values 0.37 – –0.56 13 traditional / secular values –0.15 – –0.40 14 fragile states index –0.28 –0.003 0.36 15 democracy index 0.35 –0.024 –0.46 16 government effectiveness 0.21 0.038 –0.42 17 regulatory quality 0.26 0.005 –0.45 18 ict development index (idi) 0.31 0.093 –0.45 19 broadband subscriptions 0.12 – –0.31 source: authors’ calculations discussion the importance of the “scale” factor and health expenditures when analyzing the scatterplot (figure 1), it is noticeable that, in addition to russia, such large and populous eu countries as spain, sweden, france, italy, the uk, and poland are above the trend line. the position above the trend line means that with such stringent restrictions, one could expect a much better situation in severity and that the actual observed severity is higher than expected. the only large eu country that falls 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 below the trend line is germany. it is also noteworthy that only a few countries with a small territory and population are above the trend line. the relationship between severity and land area and the relationship between severity and population size is confirmed by the data in table 1. the correlation coefficient between severity and area is 0.45 (the second highest coefficient in the column), and the regression parameter is 0.207 (one of the highest). the coefficient between severity and population size is 0.40, and the regression parameter is 0.228. in other words, the larger the area and the larger the population, the more severe the pandemic wave. thus, the “scale” of the country turns out to be one of the main factors leading to severe consequences of the pandemic. smaller countries seem to be more manageable, and therefore, the restrictions introduced are more appropriate and achieve a greater impact. in particular, the inconvenience of managing large and/or populous areas led to a system in which restrictions were regulated at the regional level rather than the national level (this practice was also adopted by russia). it is important to note that there is a positive correlation between health expenditures and severity. this means that countries with higher expenditures experienced a more severe pandemic. while logically it was expected that high expenditures would mean a good healthcare system in which the pandemic wave should pass more easily, it is also worth noting that there is a positive relationship between pandemic severity and other institutional characteristics of the same group: life expectancy and sanitary conditions of the population. these results can be explained by several reasons: first, high healthcare expenditures are not the same as high healthcare efficiency (as seen, for example, in the us during the summer of 2020). second, good healthcare financing usually means relatively affordable healthcare, better diagnostics, sufficient medicine and test materials, and adequate procedures for collecting and processing health statistics. as a result, countries with higher health expenditures are likely to have higher detection rates of individuals infected with covid-19. this suggests that morbidity and mortality statistics from covid-19 are likely to be underestimated in countries with low health expenditures. third, higher life expectancy indicates not only good quality healthcare but also people’s attitudes towards their health. people who are concerned about their health often seek the help of doctors and have more frequent checkups. this also leads to more frequent detection of the virus. at the same time, it can be noted that there is a negative relationship between the stringency of the measures and indicators 5, 6, and 7 (health expenditures, life expectancy at birth, and safe sanitation). this is apparently due to the fact that governments are largely guided by the state of the healthcare system, sanitary conditions, and public health when making decisions about the introduction of certain covid-19 measures. the higher these indicators are, the more the authorities assume that the healthcare system, sanitary conditions, and public health offer reliable protection for the population from the pandemic and, as a result, introduce weaker measures. in other words, effective healthcare, good sanitary conditions, and the health of the nation should compensate for lax protection and restriction measures. for a deeper understanding of the relationship between “scale” and severity, as well as the relationship between health expenditures and severity, one can turn to an analysis of how these institutional characteristics relate to the components of the severity index. the results of this analysis, presented in table 2, lead to the following conclusions: 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 – the components 1x (peak number of detected cases) and 4x (peak number of deaths) have a stronger correlation with the health expenditures than with the “scale” indicators. it can be concluded that the proportion of registered infected and deceased people depends on the quality of healthcare. – the “scale” indicators, in turn, are more strongly related to the components 2x (days from the beginning to peak of the pandemic) and 3x (days from peak to 40% decrease) than health expenditures. 2x and 3x describe time parameters and the duration of the wave. therefore, it looks quite logical: it is the size of the population and territory that determines how long the pandemic lasts and how long the wave recedes. based on these results, the authors can show that the positive relationships between severity and indicators 1, 2, and 5 (area, population, and health expenditures) are not random and confirm the assumption that the positive relationship between health expenditures and severity is due to higher quality of diagnosis and better medical statistics. table 2. correlation coefficients between selected institutional characteristics and severity index components indicator severity index (x) peak number of detected cases ( 1x ) number of days from the beginning of the pandemic in the country to the peak ( 2x ) number of days from the peak until the peak value decreases by 40 % ( 3x ) peak number of deaths ( 4x ) 1. area 0.45 0.12 0.35 0.41 0.36 2. population 0.40 0.12 0.17 0.33 0.44 5. health expenditures 0.50 0.66 0.02 –0.14 0.52 source: authors’ calculations the situation in russia is almost completely consistent with these conclusions: health expenditures in russia are relatively low compared to eu countries. they correlate with a low 4x value (0.12), while the eu average is 0.58. high values of area and population indicators for russia are accompanied by high values of 2x (56 days) and 3x (58 days) instead of 34 and 14 days, respectively, in europe. interestingly, area, and population have a striking negative correlation with stringency. it can be seen that the larger the area and population, the weaker the restrictions. this can likely be explained by the fact that the more stringent the measures are, the more difficult it is to control their implementation in a large area and/or with a large population. small states with a small population are considered better suited to introduce stringent measures and effectively monitor their implementation. thus, the “scale” of the country proves to be a crucial factor in protecting the population and reducing the severity of the pandemic. at the same time, it is important to emphasize that the “scale” factor affects the components ( 2x and 3x ), which are almost unaffected by health expenditures. this means that an increase in health expenditures is unlikely to 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 compensate for the “scale effect.” this may explain, in particular, the difficult course of the pandemic in the us in spite of the very high health expenditures. the role of urbanization another factor that has a noticeable impact on both severity and stringency is urbanization. at the same time, a weak correlation between severity, stringency, and population density should be noted. it could be supposed that the urbanization indicator reflects close physical contact of the population rather than population density. additionally, the urban population feels the consequences of the introduction of restrictive measures and the breakdown of the usual way of life to a greater extent than the rural population,13 which, among other things, affects the psychological state of the population and is expressed through the opposition to restrictions. at the same time, the difference in the signs of the correlation coefficients between urbanization and severity and between urbanization and stringency is remarkable. a positive relationship between urbanization and severity seems logical, while a negative relationship between urbanization and stringency could indicate that governments underestimate the urbanization factor when introducing protection and restriction measures. two factors could account for this underestimation. first, during the initial wave of the pandemic, epidemiologists did not yet fully identify the modes of transmission of covid-19. second, when the measures were introduced, it was assumed that the urban population could count on better healthcare and better sanitation and was thus better protected from the pandemic. wealth vs. system effectiveness gross domestic product (gdp) based on purchasing power parity (ppp) per capita shows a surprisingly small effect on severity, according to the obtained regression model. most likely, a similar result is a consequence of the imposition of three effects: – eu countries, like russia, have a fairly good level of gdp ppp per capita (although with russia, a high level of income inequality should be mentioned). this parameter is more than two times higher than the world average in all countries in the sample. thus, gdp ppp per capita can be considered consistently high in all the countries studied, which has no critical impact on the situation of the population or the state of infrastructure or on other factors that, in turn, may influence the severity of the pandemic. – well-being can positively influence the severity (this relationship can be interpreted similarly to the interpretation of the positive relationship between severity and health expenditures). – at the same time, a high gdp ppp per capita should reduce severity because the population presumably has better healthcare and more opportunities to receive proper medical help. in general, it must be noted that at the time of the pandemic outbreak, it was not the available resources (which can be indirectly assessed by gdp ppp per capita) that were critical for reducing its consequences but the ability to use these resources effectively. it is, therefore, no coincidence that government effectiveness and the democracy index (often interpreted as an indicator of institutional quality) carry more weight in the authors’ model. the relationship between system effectiveness indicators and severity should take into account the noticeable negative relationship between system effectiveness and the stringency index. the data obtained 13 gfk. “issledovanie gfk: effekt covid-19 [gfk study: the effect of covid-19].” accessed march 21, 2022. https://www.gfk.com/ru/press/issledovanie-gfk-ehffekt-covid-19 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 can be interpreted as indicating that authorities have implemented less stringent restrictive measures with confidence in the effectiveness of the system. better policies and institutions should compensate for weaker restrictions. in general, it appears that the more effective governments are, the more they rely on their ability to control the situation. at the same time, the positive correlation between the indicators of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and severity may indicate that these capabilities are overestimated. another reason for this positive correlation is that the high level of government effectiveness and regulatory quality means both the efficiency of healthcare and the effectiveness of identifying covid-19 cases. the impact of ict the level of development and dissemination of information and communication technologies (indicators 18, 19) is likely to lead to a reduction in severity. people can be expected to leave their homes less often and have less frequent physical contact if they have electronic means of communication, opportunities to work at home, study, use services, and purchase goods online. however, it seems that this behaviour of the population is overestimated, as both indicators 18 and 19 demonstrate a positive correlation with severity. this positive correlation can also be explained by the fact that high information and communications technology (ict) penetration is a sign of a high level of prosperity and high health expenditures in a country; the mechanism of influence of these characteristics on severity has been described above. russia follows european trends the question of how russia fits into european trends should be divided into two parts: 1) did the restrictive policy in russia during the first wave of covid-19 largely correspond to eu trends? and 2) how do the results of this policy compare to the results in the european union? the answer to the first question is positive. this can be seen both from the sequence of events (eu countries started introducing restrictive measures before russia, so it was an obvious step for the russian leadership to take into account the experience of the eu) and from the particular measures taken in russia (russia largely replicated similar measures taken by eu countries, with some differences related to the stringency of the restrictions adopted but not their nomenclature). it can be noted that restrictive policies in russia during the first wave of covid-19 were largely in line with eu trends. russia took into account institutional capacity to the same extent as the policies of european countries did. this conclusion is supported by the quantitative results of this study: for almost all institutional characteristics, the inclusion or exclusion of russia in the sample does not lead to noticeable changes in correlation coefficients between these characteristics and the stringency of measures. the answer to the second question is more complex. on the one hand, as is seen in figure 1, russia is quite far from the trend line. on the other hand, this figure is only a projection of a more complex multidimensional space in which the severity of a pandemic is influenced not only by the stringency of the measures but also by other factors. in the obtained model, the authors have tried to account for this multidimensionality, considering not only stringency but also institutional characteristics. russia's alignment with european trends can be assessed by the constant f for the dummy variable d included in the model. its value close to 0 shows that russia fits well with the european trends and that the severity of the covid-19 wave in russia can be successfully predicted using the patterns observed in the eu. the model shows that at a given level of stringency and under the given institutional conditions, the registered severity of the epidemic situation in the russian federation is quite expected. the error given by the model in estimating the severity for russia is only 0.06 on a scale of 0 to 1. 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 these results may indicate that: – the impact of some institutional characteristics on severity in russia differs from the impact of these characteristics in eu countries – some of the protective and restrictive measures have somewhat different effects in russia than in eu countries – at the same time, these differences can be explained to some extent by the trends observed in the eu thus, despite the existing economic, political, social, and cultural differences, russia’s restrictive policies during the first wave of the pandemic were generally consistent with those of eu countries. however, the results for russia were more severe than could be expected based on the trends in eu countries. one of the reasons for this result seems to be that the introduction of protective and restrictive measures has simply followed the example of eu countries, not taking sufficient account of russian specificities, in particular, the “scale effect.” of course, the russian authorities had little time to adapt these measures to russian conditions when “borrowing” them. it is also worth noting that at the beginning of the pandemic, it was quite difficult to assess the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of foreign experiences since, at that time, scientists did not even have a clear understanding of the mechanism and transmission of the virus. further research further research on this topic could address the following issues: 1) search for other institutional characteristics that may affect the stringency of restrictive measures as well as the severity of the epidemic; 2) clarify the shape of the relationship between institutional characteristics, stringency, and severity – in particular, it is important to test the hypothesis of an increase or decrease in the effect of institutional characteristics, since the relationship may not be linear; 3) clarify the regional specificities of the relationships between the studied characteristics. regarding the first point, it seems particularly important to include characteristics indicating population values in the explanatory model of severity. based on the correlation analysis, it can be assumed that severity is significantly influenced by values. the prevalence of self-expression and secular-rational values correlates with weaker restrictive measures. indeed, in the spread of secular-rational values, governments can rely on the population’s conscious and voluntary refusal to travel, make physical contact, etc. conversely, a higher degree of survival values leads to poorer compliance with restrictive measures, which on the one hand, increases their stringency, and on the other hand, intensifies the severity of the pandemic. thus, russian and international studies (gubernatorov 2020) demonstrate that people who have no income and/or savings are more likely to downplay the real risk of covid-19 infection and violate the protective measures established by the authorities. 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 references abisheva, marian, taissiya marmontova, raushan dulambayeva, and bauyrzhan baglay. 2021. “covid19 country strategies counteraction: a system analysis experience.” vestnik volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. seriia 4, istoriia, regionovedenie, mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 26 (5): 167–179. https://doi.org/10.15688/ jvolsu4.2021.5.13. adeel, abdul basit, michael catalano, olivia catalano, grant gibson, ezgi muftuoglu, tara riggs, mehmet halit sezgin, olga shvetsova, naveed tahir, julie vandusky-allen, tianyi zhao, and andrei zhirnov. 2020. “covid-19 policy response and the rise of the sub-national governments.” canadian public policy 46 (4): 565–584. https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.2020-101. armstrong, david a., and jack lucas. 2020. “measuring and comparing municipal policy responses to covid-19.” canadian journal of political science 53 (2): 227–238. https://doi.org/10.1017/s000842392000044x. balog-way, dominic h.p., and katherine a. mccomas. 2020. “covid-19: reflections on trust, tradeoffs, and preparedness.” journal of risk research 23 (1): 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1758192. balog-way, dominic h.p., darrick evensen, ragnar löfstedt, and frederic bouder. 2021. “effects of public trust on behavioural intentions in the pharmaceutical sector: data from six european countries.” journal of risk research 24 (6): 645–672. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13669877.2019.1694962. belik, mikhail, and alexandr kolosov. 2020. koronavirus covid-19 kak faktor razvitija mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva v sfere bor'by s infekcionnymi zabolevanijami. [covid-19 coronavirus as a factor in the development of international cooperation in the fight against infectious diseases.] vestnik irkutskogo universiteta 23: 283–284. berres, irene. 2020. “wie das coronavirus die welt herausfordert” [how coronavirus is challenging the world]. spiegel, january 27, 2020. accessed january 22, 2023. https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/coronavirus-wie-der-neue-erreger-die-weltherausfordert-a-51b195f1-f4b5-4fc2-9704-960c4c1d6bb6. blümel, miriam, and reinhard busse. 2020. “the german health care system.” in international profiles of health care systems 2020, edited by roosa tikkanen, robin osborn, elias mossialos, ana djordjevic, and george wharton: 83–92. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 347011106_international_profiles_of_health_care_systems_2020. bobyleva, alla, valeriy anshin, and andrei ptitsyn. 2020. 2020. “novye vyzovy: sravnitel'nyj analiz mezhdunarodnyh reaktivnyh antikrizisnyh mer v svjazi s pandemiej covid-19” [new challenges: comparative analysis of international reactive anticrisis measures in response to covid-19.] gosudarstvennoe upravlenie, elektronnyj vestnik. 81: 24–48. https://doi.org/ doi: 10.24411/20701381-2020-10077. https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.2020-101 file:///c:/users/annakozlova/downloads/8.%20https:/doi.org/10.1017/s0008423920000 file:///c:/users/annakozlova/downloads/8.%20https:/doi.org/10.1017/s0008423920000 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 bourouiba, lydia. 2021. “fluid dynamics of respiratory infectious diseases.” annual review of biomedical engineering 23 (1): 547–577. https://doi.org/ 10.1146/annurev-bioeng-111820-025044. bverfg (bundesverfassungsgericht). urteil des ersten senats vom 10. juni 2009 [judgement of the first senate of june 10, 2009]. accessed january 25, 2022. https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/ shareddocs/entscheidungen/de/2009/06/rs20090610_1bvr070608.html. capano, gilberto, michael howlett, darryl s. l. jarvis, m. ramesh, and nihit goyal. 2020. “mobilizing policy (in)capacity to fight covid-19: understanding variations in state responses.” policy and society 39 (3): 285–308. https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2020.1787628. chubarova, tatyana, and sharova, maria. 2020 “gosudarstvennaja politika kak faktor, vlijajushhij na razvitie pandemii covid-19: vyvody dlja rossii”. gosudarstvennoe upravlenie. elektronnyj vestnik [state policy as a factor influencing the development of the covid-19 pandemic: conclusions for russia]. gosudarstvennoe upravlenie, elektronnyj vestnik 83: 84–107. http://e-journal.spa.msu.ru/ uploads/vestnik/2020/vipusk__83._dekabr_2020_g./chubarova_sharova.pdf eu reporter. “#deep knowledge group ranks #israel 1st in the #covid-19 health safety countries ranking.” 2020. eu reporter. april 3, 2020. accessed january 22, 2023. https://www.eureporter.co/ frontpage/2020/04/03/deepknowledgegroup-ranks-israel-1st-in-the-covid-19-health-safetycountries-ranking/. demchuk, artur, vladimir kapitsyn, artem karateev, natalya emelyanova, irina dashkina, mikhail pashin, and sergei kolesnikov. 2021. “vozmozhnosti kolichestvennogo analiza vzaimosvjazi tjazhesti pandemii covid-19 i institucional'nyh harakteristik stran mira” [the possibilities of quantitative analysis of the relationship between the severity of the covid-19 pandemic and the institutional characteristics of the countries of the world]. acta biomedica scientifica (east siberian biomedical journal) 6 (6-2): 133–144. https://doi.org/10.29413/abs.2021-6.6-2.14. the economist intelligence unit. 2020. “democracy index 2019.” accessed march 30, 2022. https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=democracyindex2019. european commission. standard eurobarometer 92. 2019. public opinion in the european union. autumn 2019. accessed january 29, 2023. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/ file?deliverableid=72800. dryhurst, sarah, claudia r. schneider, john kerr, alexandra l. j. freeman, gabriel recchia, anne marthe van der bles, david spiegelhalter and sander van der linden. 2020. “risk perceptions of covid-19 around the world.” journal of risk research 23 (7-8): 994–1006. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1758193. eckner, constantin. 2020. “how germany has managed to perform so many covid-19 tests.” the spectator. april 6, 2020. accessed january 22, 2022. https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/howgermany-has-managed-to-perform-so-many-covid-19-tests. emelyanova, natalia, kapitsyn, vladimir, and karateev, artem. 2022. “covid-19 v indii: gosudarstvennye struktury v uslovijah pandemijnoj real'nosti i 'kovidnogo apokalipsisa' [covid-19 in india: government structures in the context of pandemic reality and the ‘covid apocalypse’]. polylogos. 6, no. 1 (19). https://doi.org/10.18254/s258770110019123-7. 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 engler, sarah, palmo brunner, romane loviat, tarik abou-chadi, lucas leemann, andreas glaser, and daniel kübler. 2021. “democracy in times of the pandemic: explaining the variation of covid-19 policies across european democracies.” west european politics 44 (5-6): 1077–1102. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1900669. feng, shuo, chen shen, nan xia, wei song, mengzhen fan, and benjamin cowling. 2020. “rational use of face masks in the covid-19 pandemic.” the lancet 8 (5):434-436. https://doi.org/10.1016/s2213-2600(20)30134-x. the fund for peace. 2021. “fragile states index: annual report 2021.” https://fragilestatesindex.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/fsi2021-report.pdf. genschel, philipp, and markus jachtenfuchs. 2018. “from market integration to core state powers: the eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and integration theory.” journal of common market studies 56 (1): 178–196. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12654. greer, scott l., elizabeth j. king, elize massard da fonseca, and andre peralta-santos, eds. 2021. coronavirus politics. the comparative politics and policy of covid-19. ann arbor: university of michigan press. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11927713. gfk (growth from knowledge). “issledovanie gfk: effekt covid-19 [gfk study: the effect of covid19].” accessed march 21, 2022. https://www.gfk.com/ru/press/issledovanie-gfk-ehffekt-covid-19. gubernatorov, egor. 2020. “chetvert’ rossiyan nazvali epidemiyu covid-19 vydumkoi zainteresovannyh lic [a quarter of russians called the covid-19 epidemic an invention of stakeholders].” rbc. may 28, 2020. accessed april 4, 2022. https://www.rbc.ru/society/28/05/2020/ 5ece85a79a7947d7e297532e. itu (international telecommunication union). “country ict data.” accessed march 15, 2022. https://www.itu.int/en/itu-d/statistics/pages/stat/default.aspx. ———. 2017. measuring the information society report 2017 1 (31). accessed january 27, 2022. https://www.itu.int/en/itu-d/statistics/documents/publications/misr2017/ misr2017_volume1.pdf. jarynowski, andrzej, monika wójta-kempa, and łukasz krzowski. 2020. “an attempt to optimize human resources allocation based on spatial diversity of covid-19 cases in poland.” medrxiv. https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.10.14.20090985. kavanagh, matthew, and renu singh. 2020. “democracy, capacity, and coercion in pandemic response: covid-19 in comparative political perspective.” journal of health political policy law 45 (6): 997– 1012. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-8641530. kersting, norbert. 2021. “covid-19-pandemie und politische institutionen” [covid-19 pandemic and political institutions]. politische vierteljahresschrift 62: 325–339. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615021-00302-5. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1900669 https://doi.org/10.1016/s2213-2600(20)30134-x https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11927713. https://www.rbc.ru/society/28/05/2020/5ece85a79a7947d7e297532e https://www.rbc.ru/society/28/05/2020/5ece85a79a7947d7e297532e https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-021-00302-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-021-00302-5 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 kersting, norbert, and david graubner. 2020. “die digitale transformation der deutschen verwaltung analysen zu marktversagen und daseinsvorsorge in zeiten der covid-19-pandemie” [the digital transformation of the german administration analyzes market failures and public services in times of the covid-19 pandemic]. in zukunft denken und verantworten, edited by wolfgang roters, horst gräf, and hellmut wollmann. 231–52. wiesbaden: springer vs. king, elizabeth j., and victoria i. dudina. 2021. “covid-19 in the russian federation government control during the epidemic.” in coronavirus politics: the comparative politics and policy of covid-19, edited by scott l. greer, elizabeth j. king, elize massard da fonseca, and andré peralta-santos, 436– 56. ann arbor: university of michigan press. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11927713. 26. krzysztofik, robert, iwona kantor-pietraga, and tomasz spórna. 2021. “multidimensional conditions of the first wave of the covid-19 epidemic in the trans-industrial region. an example of the silesian voivodeship in poland.” sustainability 13 (8), 4109:1-17. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13084109. ———. 2020. “spatial and functional dimensions of the covid-19 epidemic in poland.” eurasian geography and economics 61 (4-5): 573–586. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2020.1783337. löblová, olga, julia rone, and endre borbáth. “covid-19 in central and eastern europe: focus on czechia, hungary, and bulgaria.” 2021. in coronavirus politics: the comparative politics and policy of covid-19, edited by scott l. greer, elizabeth j. king, elize massard da fonseca, and andré peralta-santos, 413–35. ann arbor: university of michigan press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.11927713.25. mathieu, edouard, hannah ritchie, lucas rodés-guirao, cameron appel, charlie giattino, joe hasell, bobbie macdonald, saloni dattani, diana beltekian, esteban ortiz-ospina, and max roser. 2020. "coronavirus pandemic (covid-19)." our world in data. accessed january 22, 2023. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-stringency-index. matuschek, christiane, friedrich moll, heiner fangerau, heiner fangerau, johannes c. fischer, kurt zänker, martijn van griensven, marion schneider, detlef kindgen-milles, wolfram trudo knoefel, artur lichtenberg, balint tamaskovics, freddy joel djiepmo-njanang, wilfried budach, stefanie corradini, dieter häussinger, torsten feldt, björn jensen, rainer pelka, klaus orth, matthias peiper, olaf grebe, kitti maas, peter arne gerber, alessia pedoto, edwin bölke, and jan haussmann. 2020. “face masks: benefits and risks during the covid-19 crisis.” european journal of medical research 25, 32: 1-8. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40001-020-00430-5. oxcgrt (oxford coronavirus government response tracker). “methodology for calculating indices.” accessed march 1, 2022. https://github.com/oxcgrt/covid-policy-tracker/blob/master/ documentation/index_methodology.md. osipov, timur, sergej safonov, and elena kuzmina. 2020. “perspektivy koncepta "postpandemicheskogo obshhestva" [prospects of the concept of ‘postpandemic society’]. vestnik irkutskogo universiteta 23: 75–76. https://xn--74-6kcik0b0aabedif4s.xn-p1ai/files/content/29/legal_order_2021_2_16-23.pdf. oslon, aleksandr. 2021. sociologija pandemii. proekt koronafom [the sociology of the pandemic. the project coronafom]. moscow: institute of the public opinion foundation. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.11927713.25 https://ourworldindata.org/covid-stringency-index https://doi.org/10.1186/s40001-020-00430-5 https://правопорядок74.рф/files/content/29/legal_order_2021_2_16-23.pdf https://правопорядок74.рф/files/content/29/legal_order_2021_2_16-23.pdf 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 pankevich, natalia, and rudenko, victor. 2021. “samoizoljacija kak pravovoj rezhim: opyt rossii” [selfisolation as a legal regime: the experience of russia]. pravoporjadok: istorija, teorija, praktika 2 (29): 16–23. https://xn--74-6kcik0b0aabedif4s.xn--p1ai/files/content/29/ legal_order_2021_2_16-23.pdf. paquet, mireille, and robert schertzer. 2020. “covid-19 as a complex intergovernmental problem.” canadian journal of political science 53 (2): 343–347. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423920000281. rayment, erica, and jason vanden beukel. 2020. “pandemic parliaments: canadian legislatures in a time of crisis.” canadian journal of political science 53 (2): 379–384. https://doi.org/10.1017/ s0008423920000499. ren, xuefei. 2020. “pandemic and lockdown: a territorial approach to covid-19 in china, italy and the united states.” eurasian geography and economics 61 (4–5): 423-434. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/15387216.2020.1762103 ruiu, maria laura. 2020. “mismanagement of covid-19: lessons learned from italy.” journal of risk research 23 (7–8): 1007–1020. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1758755. saner, emine. 2021. “the psychology of masks: why have so many people stopped covering their faces?” the guardian. october 26, 2021. accessed january 22, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/26/the-great-cover-up-why-the-uk-stopped-wearingface-masks. schilling, julia, kristin tolksdorf, adine marquis, mirko faber, thomas pfoch, silke buda, walter haas, ekkehard schuler, doris altmann, ulrike grote, and michaela diercke. 2021. “die verschiedenen phasen der covid-19-pandemie in deutschland: eine deskriptive analyse von januar 2020 bis februar 2021.” [the different phases of the covid-19 pandemic in germany: a descriptive analysis from january 2020 to february 2021]. bundesgesundheitsblatt – gesundheitsforschung – gesundheitsschutz 64: 1093–1106. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00103-021-03394-x. sheiman, igor, sergei shishkin, and vladimir shevksy. 2018. “the evolving semashko model of primary health care: the case of the russian federation.” risk management and health policy 11: 209–220. https://doi .org/10.2147/rmhp.s168399. shvetsova, olga, julie vandusky-allen, andrei zhirnov, abdul basit adee, michael catalano, olivia catalano, frank giannelli, ezgi muftuoglu, dina rosenberg, mehmet halit sezgin, and tianyi zhao. 2021. “federal institutions and strategic policy responses to covid-19 pandemic.” frontiers in political science 3: 1-14. doi: 10.3389/fpos.2021.631363. technische hochschule köln. “sustainable society index.” accessed january 11, 2023ws3w https://ssi.wi.th-koeln.de/documents/version2/2019-preliminary.pdf. tarkhov, sergei. 2021. “geography of the passenger turnover dynamics at airports in europe and russia’s regions in the first year of the covid-19 pandemic.” regional research of russia 11(4):435–453. doi:10.1134/s2079970521040250. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423920000499 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423920000499 https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2020.1762103 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1758755 http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s2079970521040250 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 timofeev, ivan. 2020. “covid-19 i politika sankcij: analiz sobytij” [covid-19 and the policy of sanctions: an event analysis]. vestnik of saint petersburg university. international relations 13 (4): 449–464. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2020.402. united nations department of economic and social affairs: population division. 2022. “life expectancy at birth.” accessed april 2, 2022. https://population.un.org/wpp/download/files/ 1_indicators%20(standard)/excel_files/3_mortality/wpp2019_mort_f07_1_life_expec tancy_0_both_sexes.xlsx. university of oxford. “covid-19 government response tracker.” accessed april 12, 2022. https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/covid-19-government-response-tracker. who (world health organization). “global health expenditure database.” accessed december 16, 2022. https://apps.who.int/nha/database/country_profile/index/en. ———. report of the who-china joint mission on coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19). 16–24 february 2020. https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-oncovid-19-final-report.pdf. world bank. “gdp per capita, ppp (current international $).” accessed january 10, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.pp.cd?view=chart. ———. “land area (sq. km).” accessed january 22, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/ag.lnd.totl.k2?end=2020&start=1961&view=chart. ———. “population density.” accessed january 22, 2023. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ en.pop.dnst?view=chart. ———. “population, rotal.” accessed january 22, 2023. https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/sp.pop.totl. ———. “urban population (% of total population).” accessed december 11, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.urb.totl.in.zs?view=chart. ———. “worldwide governance indicators.” accessed february 28, 2022. https://info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi/home/reports. world values survey. “data & documentation. wave 7: 2017-2022.” accessed january 20, 2022. https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvscontents.jsp. ———. “findings and insights.” accessed january 20, 2022. https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ wvscontents.jsp?cmsid=findings zemcov, stepan, baburin, vjacheslav. 2020. “covid-19: prostranstvennaja dinamika i faktory rasprostranenija po regionam rossii” [covid-19: spatial dynamics and diffusion factors across russian regions]. izvestiya rossiiskoi akademii nauk. seriya geograficheskaya 84 (4): 485–505. https://doi.org/10.31857/s2587556620040159. https://population.un.org/wpp/download/files/1_indicators%20(standard)/excel_files/3_mortality/wpp2019_mort_f07_1_life_expectancy_0_both_sexes.xlsx https://population.un.org/wpp/download/files/1_indicators%20(standard)/excel_files/3_mortality/wpp2019_mort_f07_1_life_expectancy_0_both_sexes.xlsx https://population.un.org/wpp/download/files/1_indicators%20(standard)/excel_files/3_mortality/wpp2019_mort_f07_1_life_expectancy_0_both_sexes.xlsx https://apps.who.int/nha/database/country_profile/index/en https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.pp.cd?view=chart https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ag.lnd.totl.k2?end=2020&start=1961&view=chart https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ag.lnd.totl.k2?end=2020&start=1961&view=chart https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/home/reports https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/home/reports https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvscontents.jsp 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 appendix a. the components of stringency index 1. school closing (c1) 2. workplace closing (c2) 3. cancel public events (c3) 4. restrictions on gatherings (c4) 5. close public transport (c5) 6. stay at home requirements (c6) 7. restrictions on internal movement (c7) 8. international travel controls (c8) 9. public info campaigns (h1) appendix b. seven groups of indicators that were used to describe the institutional characteristics of the countries 1) geography and demographics: – area14 – population15 – population density16 – urban population (% of total population)17 2) state of the healthcare system, sanitary conditions and public health: – health expenditures (in us dollars per capita)18 – life expectancy at birth19 – safe sanitation (sustainable society index – indicator 3)20 3) welfare of the population: – gdp per capita, ppp (current international $)21 14world bank. “land area (sq. km).” accessed january 22, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ ag.lnd.totl.k2?end=2020&start=1961&view=chart. 15 world bank. “population, total.” accessed january 22, 2023. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl. 16world bank. “population density.” accessed january 22, 2023. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ en.pop.dnst?view=chart. 17world bank. “urban population (% of total population).” accessed december 11, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.urb.totl.in.zs?view=chart. 18who. “global health expenditure database.” accessed december 16, 2022. https://apps.who.int/nha/ database/country_profile/index/en. 19 united nations department of economic and social affairs: population division. 2022. “life expectancy at birth.” accessed april 2, 2022. https://population.un.org/wpp/download/files/1_indicators%20(standard)/excel_files/3_mortality/ wpp2019_mort_f07_1_life_expectancy_0_both_sexes.xlsx. 20technische hochschule köln. “sustainable society index.” accessed january 11, 2022. https://ssi.wi.thkoeln.de/documents/version2/2019-preliminary.pdf. 21world bank. “gdp per capita, ppp (current international $).” accessed january 10, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.pp.cd?view=chart. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ag.lnd.totl.k2?end=2020&start=1961&view=chart https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ag.lnd.totl.k2?end=2020&start=1961&view=chart https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl https://apps.who.int/nha/database/country_profile/index/en https://apps.who.int/nha/database/country_profile/index/en https://population.un.org/wpp/download/files/1_indicators%20(standard)/excel_files/3_mortality/wpp2019_mort_f07_1_life_expectancy_0_both_sexes.xlsx https://population.un.org/wpp/download/files/1_indicators%20(standard)/excel_files/3_mortality/wpp2019_mort_f07_1_life_expectancy_0_both_sexes.xlsx https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.pp.cd?view=chart 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 – employment (sustainable society index – indicator 20)22 4) public confidence in institutions, the media, and the government: – government trust index (eurobarometer)23 – media trust index (eurobarometer)24 5) values and cultural characteristics of the population: – survival / self-expression values (world values survey)25 – traditional / secular values (world values survey)26 6) political system: – fragile states index (the fund for peace)27 – democracy index (democracy index, 10-14)28 – government effectiveness (world governance indicators)29 – regulatory quality (world governance indicators)30 7) level of ict development and dissemination: – ict development index (idi) (measuring the information society report)31 – broadband subscriptions 32 based on fixed-broadband subscriptions and active mobilebroadband subscriptions (international telecommunication union) indicators33 22 “sustainable society index.” https://ssi.wi.th-koeln.de/documents/version2/2019-preliminary.pdf. 23 european commission. standard eurobarometer 92. 2019. public opinion in the european union. autumn 2019. accessed january 29, 2023. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableid=72800. 24 european commission. standard eurobarometer 92. 2019. public opinion in the european union. autumn 2019. accessed january 29, 2023. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableid=72800. 25world values survey. “findings and insights.” accessed january 20, 2022. https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ wvscontents.jsp?cmsid=findings. 26 “findings and insights.” accessed january 20, 2022. 27the fund for peace. 2021. “fragile states index: annual report 2021.” https://fragilestatesindex.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/fsi2021-report.pdf. 28the economist intelligence unit. 2020. “democracy index 2019.” accessed march 30, 2022. https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=democracyindex2019. 29world bank. “worldwide governance indicators.” accessed february 28, 2022. https://info.worldbank.org /governance/wgi/home/reports. 30 “worldwide governance indicators.” 31 itu. measuring the information society report 2017 1 (31). accessed january 27, 2022. https://www.itu.int/en/itud/statistics/documents/publications/misr2017/misr2017_volume1.pdf. 32 currently, the spread of broadband access is considered to be one of the main indicators of the country's involvement in the information society. also, the presence or absence of broadband access is considered to be the main line of the digital divide (digital divide). 33 itu. “country ict data.” accessed january 27, 2022. https://www.itu.int/en/itu-d/statistics/pages/stat/ default.aspx. https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/home/reports https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/home/reports https://www.itu.int/en/itu-d/statistics/pages/stat/‌default.aspx https://www.itu.int/en/itu-d/statistics/pages/stat/‌default.aspx 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 55-81 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to doubleblind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 the european union’s response to islamophobia: an assessment debanjali ghosh1 university of calgary abstract the european union (eu) is home to more than 25 million muslims who form an integral part of its society. however, in the aftermath of 9/11 and several other terrorist attacks in europe most of which were perpetrated by islamic fundamentalists there has been evidence of strong antimuslim sentiments among members of the larger community which is reflective of an underlying sense of islamophobia. this has manifested itself in a variety of forms ranging from hostility against islam to negative discrimination against muslims and the use of violence to target them, thereby increasing the potential for greater societal cleavages and conflict. the eu as a supranational entity strives to create an inclusive and tolerant society and as such is committed to the ideals of human rights, equality and non-discrimination. tackling the challenges posed by islamophobia and its various manifestations then becomes a priority for this organisation. against this backdrop, the objective of this research paper is to assess the eu’s response to islamophobia by examining the initiatives undertaken by it, and focusing on their adoption by the member states of france and germany. 1 debanjali ghosh is a phd candidate in the department of political science at the university of calgary, canada. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 introduction the eu recognizes the prevalence of racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance based on race, religion, ethnicity, descent, national origin, skin colour, sexual orientation and more. home to more than 25 million muslims who form an integral part of its society, this supranational entity has experienced the emergence of strong anti-muslim prejudices in the post-9/11 era which is rooted in islamophobia. this has been acknowledged in its contribution to the report of the special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (2020)2 which highlights the persistence of antimuslim hostility, discrimination and hate crimes against muslims. the eu firmly rejects all such attitudes and behaviours as incompatible with its core principles that strive to create an inclusive and tolerant society and is committed to the ideals of human rights, equality and nondiscrimination. in this context, the objective of this research article is to unpack the eu’s response to islamophobia in the first two decades of the 21st century. review of literature pre-existing literature on islamophobia refers to this phenomenon as “unfounded hostility towards islam” (runnymede trust 1997, 4), which results in sentiments not only of dread or hatred of islam as a religion but also a “fear or dislike of all or most muslims” (runnymede trust 1997, 1). as elahi and khan (2017, 7) point out, this translates into hostility against islam, negative discrimination against muslims, and the exclusion of the community and its members from mainstream society and politics. it has been argued that islamophobia is a new and more sophisticated form of biological and cultural racism (marranci 2004; rana 2007; ciftci 2012; lauwers 2019; mirza 2019) with one reinforcing the other. muslims are perceived to be a group of individuals who are visibly ‘different’ because of their innate and unchangeable biological and/or cultural characteristics which form the building blocks of their identity. biologically, this difference is highlighted through physical features like skin colour and hair or bone structure (marranci 2004, 106; mirza 2019, 310) which creates the identity of muslims as a ‘foreign’ race, different from the ‘native’ europeans. culturally, the ‘foreignness’ is marked by language, religion, ethnicity, customs and heritage (lauwers 2019, 307-11; mirza 2019, 310) with islam’s violent, intolerant, theocratic, and sexist nature being deemed incompatible with europe. the element of ‘foreignness’ in islamophobia connects it to xenophobia i.e., the dislike and fear of strangers or foreigners who are perceived to be the “carriers of a different culture”, and have the potential to jeopardize the integration of the host society by altering the existing national cultural identity through their differing practices (de master & le roy 2000, 425). this results in an ‘attitude of hostility’ against the non-natives of a given population (yakushko 2018: 13). practitioners of islam in a non-islam majority state are perceived as threatening foreigners irrespective of their race, nationality and legal status (poole and richardson 2010), implying that even muslims who have been settled in europe for generations are perceived to be outsiders. according to taras (2008), xenophobic attitudes have further been strengthened by immigration and the projection of immigrants and asylum-seekers as potential sources of threat to the security 2 the eu. 2020. eu contribution to the report of the special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief 2020. accessed october 04, 2021. https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/religion/islamophobiaantimuslim/regional%20institutions/europeanunion.pdf https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/religion/islamophobia-antimuslim/regional%20institutions/europeanunion.pdf https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/religion/islamophobia-antimuslim/regional%20institutions/europeanunion.pdf 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 and wellbeing of the eu and the european society. it has been linked to the wider debates on socioeconomic insecurity, unemployment, and criminal activities such as drug trafficking, illegal trade, home-grown terrorism and the sexual exploitation of young caucasian women (lazaridis & wadia 2015, 4; lazaridis & tsagkroni 2015, 209). these concerns form the crux of the anti-immigrant rhetoric of right-wing political parties, which have, in the past few years enjoyed electoral successes both at the supranational level of the eu and the national level of the member states, indicating proliferation of their views. while the number of far-right members of the european parliament (mep) increased by 50 percent after the european parliamentary elections 2014 (isal 2014), at the national level, right-wing parties like the national rally (france), the freedom party (austria), the sweden democrats, the northern league (italy), the people’s party (denmark), vlaams belang (belgium), and pim fortuyn list and the freedom party (the netherlands) have experienced electoral gains (leonard & kaunert 2019). the construction of immigration as a national security threat in the post-9/11 era, especially by right-wing leaders like viktor orbán, the prime minister of hungary who dubbed it as ‘trojan wooden horse of terrorism’ (wintour 2017) has reinforced the ‘migration-security’ nexus. while boswell (2007, 590) argues that the securitization of migration is largely absent in the context of europe, others like squire (2015), karamanidou (2015), and leonard and kaunert (2019) strongly believe in the prevalence of securitization of migration. according to karamanidou who traces the securitization of migration to the pre-9/11 era (2015, 40), the narrative has been institutionalized through the establishment of agencies like the frontex, as well as through domestic laws and policies, all of which only heightens the notion of migrants as security threats (karamanidou 2015, 37). further, it has concretized the identities of natives and immigrants as mutually opposing and irreconcilable, and paved the way for exclusionary politics based on ‘otherness’ (squire 2009; lazaridis & wadia 2015, 2). the use of surveillance techniques and policing focusing on immigrants and ethnic minorities makes the members of these communities more vulnerable to exploitation and has contributed towards higher levels of insecurity among them. this has especially been the case for individuals from muslim majority countries or resident muslim minority communities (lazaridis & wadia 2015: 2). the twin tower bombings coupled with subsequent terrorist attacks carried out by the islamic fundamentalists in parts of the western world has led to the conflation of islam as a religion with international terrorism and created the perception of muslims being the ‘enemy within’. a 2011 report titled intolerance, prejudice and discrimination which compared attitudes regarding islam in eight countries found that in most of the member states surveyed, islam was perceived as a religion of intolerance (zick et al. 2011, 13). a similar study also found that a staggering 83 percent of those surveyed in spain, 70 percent in germany and 50 percent in france believed muslims to be religious fanatics (ciftci 2012, 300). more recently, it has been found that within the eu member states, an average of 37 percent of the population shares an unfavourable opinion of muslims (the european commission 2019b, 13). this negative perception of islam has translated into social, economic and political practices (lauwers 2019, 310) that are tantamount not only to marginalization, exclusion or negative discrimination but also result in aggression and violence against the group. several studies published by the eu agency for fundamental rights (fra) along with those like the european union minorities and discrimination survey reports (eumidis and eu-midis ii of 2009 and 2017 respectively) have highlighted the nature and extent of islamophobia. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 nevertheless, a critical survey of the available literature reveals that although there has been an indepth analysis of islamophobia as a phenomenon, its connection to the wider debates on immigration and asylum, and its numerous manifestations, there appears to be little discussion on how the eu has responded to this challenge. the objective of this research is to make a contribution to the existing body of literature by providing an analysis of the eu’s efforts to combat this phobia. methodology the study investigates two research questions: first, what initiatives have been taken by the eu to combat islamophobia and second, are these effective ways of approaching the issue? to answer the first question, the study will look at the various initiatives undertaken by the eu to tackle islamophobia. the eu does not define the term islamophobia but instead chooses to address it collectively along with other forms of prejudices like afrophobia, colourism and others under the broader rubric of racism and xenophobia. hence, the study looks at initiatives that directly relate to anti-muslim prejudices and those that address categories like religion or belief, ethnicity and race. based on elahi and khan’s (2017) markers of islamophobia, the initiatives are broadly categorized into two, namely, those that address hostility and negative discrimination. ‘exclusion from mainstream’ has been deliberately omitted since addressing hostility and negative discrimination automatically tackles the issue of marginalization. with the eu being a supranational entity, the effectiveness of the eu’s measures depends on its adoption by the member states. hence, in answering the second question, the study investigates the implementation of the eu’s initiatives by the member states of france and germany, which have the highest and second-highest muslim population in western europe respectively. both countries have also experienced an overall increase in hate crimes between 2016 and 2020 as is reflected in figure 1 which has been compiled using data from the office for democratic institutions and human rights (odihr) of the organization for security and co-operation in europe (osce)3. 3 data used for france: osce-odihr hate crime reporting “france” 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020; data used for germany: osce-odihr hate crime reporting “germany” 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020. 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: hate crimes recorded by the police for france & germany compiled using data from the office for democratic institutions and human rights (odihr) of the organization for security and co-operation in europe (osce) . the research covers a time period between 2000 and 2020. it focuses on sources of primary data, especially those published by the eu such as the council directives, reports of the european commission and the european parliament among others. for the member states of france and germany, greater reliance has been placed on the documents issued by governmental agencies such as the premier ministre in france and the federal anti-discrimination agency (ads) of germany. country reports published by the european commission between 2016 and 2021 along with studies by the fra also provide key insights. however, with regard to data on hate crimes, osce-odihr provides invaluable data. finally, the study does refer to some secondary sources such as reports by human rights first and human rights watch as well because of the detailed data collected by them. measures to combat islamophobia in the eu the eu condemns any form of rejection, exclusion, and vilification of individuals or groups based on the perception of their being outsiders or foreigners, and inciting violence or hatred against them (council of the european union framework decision 2008, article 1). at the supranational level, the eu has made sincere efforts to promote greater discussion on xenophobia and racism to create greater awareness and sensitivity about the issues. indirectly, the eu’s measures to tackle racism and xenophobia address islamophobia as well. specific measures to deal with this form of prejudice has been rare. the following section highlights some of the important initiatives undertaken by the eu. 1835 1505 1838 2640 2672 3598 7913 8113 8585 10,240 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 hate crimes recorded by the police for france & germany (2016-2020) france germany 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 hostility a prominent manifestation of islamophobia is hostility directed against muslim individuals, their property, and institutions of the islamic faith. this is reflected through hate crimes which are criminal acts motivated by prejudices based on fundamental characteristics like religion, language or ethnicity that is shared by members of the target group (fra 2018b, 16; council of the european union 2008, article 4) and can incorporate within its ambit both physical violence and the threat thereof as well as hate speech. the eu has emphasized the prevention and countering of antimuslim hatred by making it a priority funding area under the eu’s rights, equality and citizenship programme (the european commission 2019b, 14). moreover, its first colloquium on fundamental rights on “tolerance and respect: preventing and combating antisemitic and antimuslim hatred in europe” (2015) resulted in the establishment of the eu high level group on combating racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance, which now plays a pivotal role in combating islamophobia. despite lacking a uniform definition of hate crimes, the eu has strived to provide a common response to it through the framework decision on combating racism and xenophobia (2008/913/jha) which provides for the criminalization of specific forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia. it necessitates the member states to criminalize the disquisition and dissemination of print or electronic materials that encourage hatred and incites violence against groups based on their fundamental characteristics like race or religion, skin colour, ethnicity, descent and so on, both physically as well as in online spaces (the european commission 2019b, 3). the eu’s concern with hate crimes has also paved the way for stronger cyber legislations. muslims have been identified as the most vulnerable group (the european commission 2019b, 13) with the maximum number of flagged contents online being related to anti-muslim hatred (fra 2017b, 82). the “code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online” (2016) has resulted in voluntary agreements between the european commission and organizations like facebook, twitter, microsoft, youtube, and several others, enabling these organizations to review and remove illicit content within 24 hours of notification (the european commission 2016a). this has been complemented by the commission’s “tackling illegal content online: towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms”, which along with promoting good practices to deter, detect and remove damaging content also lays down guidelines to fight against hate speech on the internet with the cooperation of the member states and other relevant stakeholders (european commission, 2017c). comprehending the nature and extent of hate crimes depends upon the availability of related data and as such the european commission works closely with the fra to collect and analyse data on discrimination, racism, intolerance and hate crimes. the eu’s efforts on data collection have also been reflected through the subgroup on methodologies of the eu high level group on combating racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance which not only brings together all the member states for recording hate crime data but also involves regional organizations like the odihr, the european commission against racism and intolerance (ecri) as well as civil society organizations. the high level group’s elaborate guideline titled “improving the recording of hate crime by law enforcement authorities key guiding principles” covers five key areas ranging from the very necessity to collect data on hate crimes to flagging such crimes as soon as 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 they are reported, and developing indicators to identify ‘motivation bias’ while investigating them (the european commission 2017b, 6-10). the eu has also identified the importance of providing support to victims of hate crimes through the victims’ rights directive, which establishes a minimum standard of rights for the victims and is responsive to their needs for protection and support. article 22 of the directive acknowledges that victims of such prejudice based crimes, especially children and the disabled, are often vulnerable to repeated attacks, intimidation and retaliation, which necessitates individual assessments based on the victim’s personal characteristics, the nature and type of the crime as well as the circumstances of it (the eu 2012, victims’ rights directive 2012/29/eu). while the victims of hate crimes often choose not to report them, national law-enforcement authorities also fail to identify them largely due to a lack of understanding or awareness on their part. the eu has undertaken sincere efforts to build trust and confidence among the victims by creating measures that can help strengthen the recording of such crimes. the eu agency for law enforcement training has introduced a variety of both offline and online training courses that strike a balance between policing and the protection of fundamental rights to create greater sensitivity among rank and file. the ten key guiding principles introduced by the european commission play an important role in identifying targets and building synergies, ensuring positive impact and sustainability of the strategy in the long run, and monitoring and appraising the outcomes (the european commission 2017a). moreover, engaging with civil society organizations also boosts the capacity building of law enforcement agencies. since these organizations actively engage with victims of hate crimes by providing support, they are not only able to offer insight into the local patterns of such crimes but also encourage the victims to report the same. the european commission itself has introduced training on anti-muslim hostility to educate its staff members regarding the stereotyping of islam and muslims to create greater awareness (the european commission 2019b, 14). some progress was also made with the creation of the post of a coordinator to deal with anti-muslim hatred in 2015 and the appointment of afzal khan as special representative for muslim communities for the socialists and democrats group in the european parliament. hostility against muslims often translates into negative discrimination against individuals and groups in spheres such as housing and the labour market which has been taken up by the following section. negative discrimination the eu has two main anti-discrimination laws which indirectly address islamophobia, namely, the racial equality directive (2000/43/ec) and the employment equality directive (2000/78/ec). the racial equality directive established a framework to ensure that individuals are treated equally irrespective of their race and ethnicity in both public and private sectors in areas related to employment, social security and protection, healthcare, education, and access to goods and services (council directive 2000/43/ec). the employment equality directive also establishes a guideline for equal treatment, but specifically in the area of employment and occupation, and prohibits discrimination by employers directly, indirectly or through harassment on the grounds of religion4 (council directive 2000/78/ec). it further encourages social dialogue to promote equal 4 when it is irrelevant to the occupation. 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 treatment at the workplace and emphasizes equal access to employment as a crucial means to social integration (council directive 2000/78/ec). the eu’s equality directives have encouraged the establishment of equality bodies like the bodies for the promotion of equal treatment by the member states (the european commission 2019b, 3). the european commission has also adopted the “recommendation on standards for equality bodies” to improve their performance in addressing discrimination on the grounds of religion, ethnicity, skin colour and more, especially in the field of employment. focus has also been directed to promoting workplace diversity and creating more inclusive atmospheres by encouraging employers to promote diversity and equal opportunities in the workplace. the eu platform too has played a pivotal role in supporting the sharing of good practices and guidelines to create more inclusive workplaces that respect socio-cultural diversity (the european commission 2019b, 6). to summarise, the eu’s response to islamophobia is a combination of general measures addressing xenophobia and racism coupled with certain islamophobia-specific measures, though the former by far outnumber the latter. while the variety and scale of measures have undoubtedly been commendable, the effectiveness of these initiatives to counter islamophobia remains to be determined. effectiveness of the eu’s measures to gauge the effectiveness of the eu’s measures, this study first focuses on their implementation by the member states of france and germany and complements the discussion through a critical assessment of the initiatives at the supranational and national levels. adoption of the eu’s initiatives by france & germany both france and germany have undertaken multiple measures to ensure the implementation of the eu’s guidelines. they have ensured the criminalization of hate crimes through their respective national laws. incitement to either discrimination or hate and harm of individuals or groups because of their ethno-religious background and race was already prohibited under the french law on the freedom of the press (1881)5. france’s criminal code further charges act motivated by ethnicity, race and religion as felonies and misdemeanours6. the country has also encouraged reforms in the criminal justice system which would enable faster prosecution of hate crime cases as was highlighted by 2015 report of the délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme (dilcra). the 2017 amendment further simplified hate crime laws and strengthened the penalty provisions related to it (osce-odihr 2017a). in a first, the vulnerability of muslims as targets of such crimes was recognized and initiatives have been undertaken to protect mosques, muslim schools and meeting places (dilcra 2015). unlike france, hate crimes were not treated as a separate category in germany prior to 2017. instead, they were perceived to be ‘politically motivated crimes’ which included those driven by race, religion and belief, ethnicity and origin. after 2017, hate crimes have come to be tracked separately. the country’s efforts to combat these is reflected in the federal government strategy to prevent extremism and promote democracy (the federal government 2016), the national action plan to fight racism (the 5 government of france. n.d. “everything you need to know about freedom of expression in france”. accessed march 03, 2022. https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/everything-you-need-to-know-about-freedom-of-expression-in-france 6 it provides an exhaustive list of such behaviours which includes acts ranging from murder and physical assault to any form of sexual aggression, the desecration of corpses and graves, and property damage (criminal code of france). https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/everything-you-need-to-know-about-freedom-of-expression-in-france 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 federal government 2017) and the country’s efforts to improve the recording and prosecution of hate crimes. for example, the federal ministry of justice in 2020 funded a project of the german institute for human rights to foster improvements in hate crime prosecution and pave the way for cooperation between the relevant stakeholders such as the police and public prosecutor’s office (osce 2020b). further, both countries have implemented the counter-islamophobia kit (cik)7 which analyses prevalent anti-muslim narratives and attempts to create a directory of the best practices in countering islamophobia across the eu that would also act as a guideline for policymakers. following the eu, france and germany have undertaken significant steps to combat hate speeches. france’s national plan against racism and anti-semitism 2018-20208 (dilcrah n.d., 5) addresses offline as well as internet-based hatred while the avia law (2020) strives to ensure the quick removal of hate-related content from online platforms. similarly, germany’s network enforcement act (netzdg) 2018 strives to combat online hate speeches and provides for the reporting of specific types of “criminal content” to the police (lomas 2020). it mandates social media operators with over 2 million users to remove “clearly illegal” content within 24 hours of receiving a complaint and “other illegal content” within 7 days, with the failure to comply resulting in hefty fines of as much as €50m (fra 2019, 96; lomas 2020). in a major development, hatemotivated insults too have come to be categorized as a criminal offence to protect vulnerable groups like muslims (ap news 2021, german government makes hate-motivated insults a crime). recognizing the importance of collecting data on hate crimes, both countries have put in place mechanisms for the collection of such data which includes the recording of anti-muslim hate crimes specifically. regular surveys have been conducted by the french authorities to gather and publish data on hate crimes (fra 2017b, 79-80). the country has also proposed an annual survey of victims to gain better knowledge of racism (dilcra 2015). interestingly, there has been an emphasis on reforming the methodology of data collection to ensure the inter-connectedness between databases (human rights first 2016, 13). in germany too, procedures for recording hate crime data by the police has become more detailed since 2017. these two member states have also transposed the victim’s rights directive into their respective national laws. both france and germany provide for the protection of victims in general and during criminal investigations under articles 18, 19 and 20 of the directive (european parliament 2017, 61). in france, victims are given a special status (european parliament 2017, 66) and supported through organizations such as the national victim support and mediation institute (inavem), which strives to promote and coordinate victim support missions, and encourages awareness of victims’ rights (european parliament 2017, 54). the german government has also sought to strengthen provisions for the protection and support of hate crime victims as a part of its project on combating racism to which it has committed €1b between 2021-2024 (european commission 2021b, 7). they have also taken note of the eu’s efforts to sensitize law enforcement agencies regarding hate crimes. in france, the prosecution system has been made more victim-centric through efforts to develop a network of magistrates and investigators specializing in hate crimes by the ministries of justice and the interior (osce-odihr 2018a). the ministry of the interior’s “national office to 7 university of leeds. n.d. counter-islamophobia kit. accessed december 4, 2020. https://cik.leeds.ac.uk/ 8délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la haine anti-lgbt (dilcrah). https://cik.leeds.ac.uk/ 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 combat hatred” aims to coordinate intelligence gathering and investigations related to anti-muslim hate crimes among others (fra 2020b, 66). similar attempts have also been undertaken in germany which has sought to sensitize its law-enforcement agencies to improve police response and equip the judicial system to better deal with such crimes. the german federal ministry of the interior (bmi) along with the criminological research institute of lower saxony (kfn) and the german police university (dhpol) have developed a study on the “best practices of co-operation between safety authorities and civil society concerning the avoidance of crime guided by prejudices” (osce-odihr 2017b) to train the police in good international practices and to improve collaboration with civil society organizations. both have also been mindful of the eu’s anti-discrimination directives. while france has transposed them through multiple legislations like the law 2001-1066, law 2004-1486 and law 2008-496 (european commission 2021a, 6), germany has incorporated the eu’s directives into labour, civil and public law through the general equal treatment act (agg) of 2006. france’s law 2001-1066 strengthened the prohibition of distinction among people based on race or religion and guarantees respect for all beliefs as highlighted in the french constitution of 1958 (european commission 2016b, 33). it amended both the penal and the labour codes by extending and elaborating the grounds prohibiting discrimination outlined by article 19 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (european commission france 2016, 34). together, the three laws have come to incorporate employment-related-discrimination as well (european commission 2021a, 6) which has been complemented by article 158 of the law on social modernisation (200273) to cover discrimination in the sphere of housing (european commission france 2016, 32) and law no. 2008-496 which focuses on the protection of race and ethnic origin in all other areas covered by the directive 2000/43/ec, such as access to supply of goods and services, healthcare and education, social protection and more (european commission 2021a, 14). the german agg (2006) provides the most extensive protection for discrimination based on race and ethnic origin (federal anti-discrimination agency n.d.) although, it also prohibits discrimination based on religion or belief and more. the act has brought about amendments in germany’s pre-existing legislations and covers a variety of areas from employment and education to the provision of goods and services, and housing (federal ministry of justice general act on equal treatment, 2006). in line with the eu’s efforts, both french and german laws provide a broader understanding of discrimination which includes direct and indirect discrimination as well as harassment and the instruction to discriminate (european commission 2021a, 6-7). similarly, the countries have also established equality bodies to tackle all discrimination related cases. france’s organic law no. 2011-333 created a constitutional equality body (european commission france 2016, 32) which consolidated the french ombudsman, the children’s defender, the national commission on security ethics and the former high authority for the fight against discrimination and for equality (european commission 2021a, 10). in germany, the agg 2006 paved the way for the establishment of the federal anti-discrimination agency that not only helps people protect their rights against negative discrimination but also provides related information and legal aid, and works closely with other government organizations such as the ministry of family affairs, senior citizens, women and youth (european commission 2021b, 13). additionally, germany has other specialized equality bodies as well, such as the federal government commissioners for migration, refugees and integration, and for matters related to ethnic german resettlers as well as national minorities (european commission 2021b, 13). 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 the above discussion reveals that both france and germany have followed the eu’s initiatives and created elaborate provisions at the national level to enforce them. the final section of this research critically assesses the developments and caveats in the eu’s response to islamophobia. an assessment a thorough examination of the eu’s initiatives and their adoption by the member state yields a mixed report card marked by both positive developments, and challenges hampering further progress. in accordance with the eu, both france and germany have made alterations to their existing legislative frameworks to criminalize incitement of hatred or discrimination against any community based on religion, ethnicity, race or nationality. the eu has been able to make a significant impact on addressing hate speech online. its initiatives have paved the way for the swift response to racist and xenophobic comments in cyberspace. according to the fourth monitoring exercise of the code, companies were estimated to assess 89 percent (the european commission 2019a, 1) of the flagged content within 24 hours and removed nearly 72 percent (2019a, 1) of what was deemed to be hate speech. the results of the sixth evaluation further reveal that 90.4 percent and 81 percent of the flagged content was reviewed within 24 hours in 2020 and 2021 respectively (european commission 2021c). the eu’s success in this sphere has also encouraged other platforms such as instagram, snapchat, dailymotion, tiktok and linkedin to participate in the code of conduct as well, which together cover over 85 percent of europe’s social media (the european commission 2019b, 6; european commission 2021c). based on data from the sixth evaluation, the performance of three such platforms have been highlighted in figure 2. the removal of hate speech increased from 28 percent to 59 percent in the second evaluation of the code of conduct (fra 2018a, 79) in some eu member states in over six months and further increased to 72 percent in 2019 (the eu 2019, 2). france and germany have also experienced positive developments in this regard, which is reflected in figure 3, compiled using data from the sixth monitoring exercise. facebook has been known to delete hundreds of hate-motivated contents ranging from insults and incitement to hatred or violence (fra 2019, 96) in both countries. furthermore, france has also attempted to make hate crime reporting easier by creating a user-friendly interface on the platform for receiving, processing, and referring notifications of unlawful content (pharos). it was estimated that the number of cases reported on pharos has increased by 73 percent between 2014 and 2016 (human rights first 2016, 13). 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: rate of removals for tiktok, twitter, and instagram compiled based on data from the sixth evaluation. figure 3: rate of removals for france and germany compiled using data from the sixth monitoring exercise however, in spite of the transposition of the eu’s directives, their effectiveness appears to be limited. in france, the very grounds of discrimination like race, ethnicity and religion or beliefs remain undefined as these concepts are not recognized as legal categories (european commission 2016b, 34-35). moreover, law 2001-1066 is directed solely towards the protection of individuals, their beliefs and allegiances and does not extend to groups. consequently, religious minorities like muslims are not recognized as a legal category because of which minority rights granted to individuals by virtue of their membership of a minority ethno-religious or cultural group remain jeopardized (european commission 2021a, 13). in germany, stronger protection against discrimination based on ethnicity indicates its precedence over other grounds. additionally, the exclusion of nationality as a basis for discrimination (federal anti-discrimination agency n.d.) because of the non-recognition of the ‘existence of different human races’ by the state also leads 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 instagram twitter tiktok rate of removals for tiktok, twitter, and instagram (%) 2020 2021 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1st monitoring (dec. 2016) 2nd monitoring (may 2017) 3rd monitoring (dec. 2017) 4th monitoring (dec. 2018) 5th monitoring (dec. 2019) 6th monitoring (october 2021) rate of removals for france and germany (%) france germany 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 to a narrower interpretation. nationality often becomes linked to ethnicity and religion, resulting in multiple discrimination regarding which neither the eu nor france and germany have elaborate mechanisms. additionally, the agg has been found to be inadequate in protecting muslims in the fields of education and labour. the 2013 report of the german federal anti-discrimination agency highlighted that approximately 700,000 muslim students experienced disadvantages due to their faith (arani 2015, 22). in the sphere of employment, data reveals that prospective candidates who identify with their faith on their cv receive fewer calls for job interviews as compared to equally qualified candidates who do not (the european commission 2019b, 13). according to the fra (2017), almost one in three muslims experienced such discrimination. twenty-two percent of the eu population feel negatively about having a muslim neighbour while roughly three in ten persons were found to be uncomfortable having a muslim colleague (fra 2020a). in fact, 21 percent of the respondents were not even open to employing muslim women because of their headscarves (fra 2020a). these findings are substantiated by other studies as well. research published in 2015 confirms that employers are much less likely to contact muslim job applicants than their jewish and catholic counterparts (abdelkader 2017, 46). while job applicants with authentic german surnames received interview requests from 18 percent (abdelkader 2017, 55) of the companies, only three percent (2017, 55) of the businesses extended similar invitations to applicants from the muslim community. it has been reported that discrimination on race and ethnicity while accessing employment is high in the case of france as well (fra 2021, 99). the special eurobarometer 393 on discrimination in the eu (2012) found that discrimination based on religion or beliefs were 66 percent in france, which was the highest figure recorded by the survey (howard 2016). both french and german muslims have found it difficult to procure longterm stable employment (2017, 55)9 and grapple with issues in the labour market such as observing friday congregational prayer or wearing the hijab. in reference to the victims’ rights directive, both countries already had comprehensive victim support services in place well before its transposition. even so, in france, the directive led to a greater focus on the individual assessment of victims and the growth of integrated referral systems while in germany, it made the criminal justice system more victim-oriented (european parliament 2017, 66-68). noticeably, germany has not adopted the directive in its entirety. it has implemented a few provisions like those related to the right to interpretation and translation, and legal aid (european parliament 2017, 52 & 57) while most of the other measures remain only partially transposed or completely absent. like france, it has not adopted the definition of ‘victim’ as per the directive (european parliament 2017, 50-51) but unlike france, which has provided for the right to information and support by victims, the right to access victim support services through referral mechanisms, guarantees on the return of victims’ property and measures to promote restorative justice (european parliament 2017), it was found to be lacking in these areas. germany argues that the right to access victim support services were already in place before the directive, but the european parliament (2017, 54) has been unable to locate specific legal statutes, ordinances or acts dealing with the same. the country was also found to lack measures related to the accompaniment by a relative, the right to be heard, rights in the event of a decision not to prosecute, and cooperation with the other member states to coordinate actions on victims’ rights (european parliament 2017 54-59 & 64). other provisions, like the victims’ rights to receive information about their case has only partially been transposed (european parliament 2017, 54). moreover, though it penalizes hate crimes more severely, there exist no special provisions for the victims and 9as compared to the german workforce, the number of marginally employed muslim workers having very low income was estimated to be around 11 percent higher in germany (arani 2015, 31). 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 generalized support was found to be less developed than specialized support (european parliament 2017, 66). on the sensitization of law enforcement, no information could be found on france but for germany, victims and their support organizations have expressed concerns regarding the role of the german police. it was reported that police interrogation was directed more towards the victims rather than the accused. allegedly, the police failed to identify hate crimes, discouraged victims from lodging formal complaints and neglected to start investigations (human rights watch 2011, 3 & 16). such experiences lead to an erosion of trust in the system and impede the ability to provide victim support. it also results in a devastating number of unreported hate crimes. according to eumidis, 82 percent (fra 2009, 13) of the hate-motivated crimes remained unreported in the year preceding the survey. in the eu-midis ii survey, nearly 64 percent (fra 2017a) of the participants did not report their most recent experience of discrimination. in both cases, a lack of trust was identified as the principal cause coupled with a pervasive belief that reporting such crimes would not lead to any changes in their circumstances and might even lead to further harassment by the authorities. redressal against negative discrimination also appears to suffer from similar challenges. the rate of reporting negative discrimination has been low. the fra (2017) found that only around 12% of muslims report incidents of discrimination across the eu. another study reveals that of the 79 percent muslim respondents who did not report their discrimination experience, 59 percent believed it would not lead to positive changes while 38 percent thought of it as a ‘normal’ incident and 33 percent were unaware of the procedures to report it (arani 2015, 19). for muslim women, reporting anti-muslim hatred and discrimination becomes more challenging because of the intersectional discrimination faced by them. indeed, equality bodies have faltered either due to the lack of staff and funding or because of the absence of a political will and concerns have been raised about their independence in several member states including germany (fra 2021, 104) where the agg has failed to establish easily accessible institutions to handle complaints (arani 2015, 34). hence, while several initiatives to address xenophobia and racism have been undertaken, there is a considerable lack of awareness and knowledge about such measures at the grassroots level. the eu-midis survey revealed that 39 percent (fra 2009, 10) respondents were unaware of the existence of anti-discrimination legislation in the employment sphere while 44 percent (2009, 1011) of the respondents were unaware of anti-discriminatory legislation in the sphere of housing. there was also little to no awareness about the availability of support systems to victims of hate crimes. only 16 percent (2009, 13) of the respondents were aware of organizations that supported hate crime victims. in eu-midis ii, 71 percent of the respondents (fra 2017a, 15) had no knowledge of victim support systems while 62 percent (2017a, 15) remained unaware of the existence of equality bodies. this highlights the gap between policy-making and policy implementation which coupled with the lack of detailed data collection on hate crimes and discrimination in various spheres makes it difficult to assess the actual impact of these measures. the european commission monitors the implementation of the eu’s directives and can initiate infringement procedures in the event of non-compliance. however, it has largely been unable to tackle the non-conformation or half-hearted conformation by the member states. although the eu has undertaken several measures and the commission has pushed for action, there appears to be a lack of political will among the eu countries to comply. this becomes explicit in the failure of the eu to establish a uniform understanding of hate crimes which would pave the way for a common criminal-law approach by which the same hate crime would be tagged as a punishable offence in 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 all the member states (council of the european union 2008). the commission’s efforts to ensure the authentic implementation of the framework decision on racism and xenophobia (2008/913/jha) has largely been unsuccessful (fra 2020b, 63). with hate crimes being essentially a matter of criminal justice that is the jurisdiction of the member states, there is also tension regarding who has the final say on hate crimes. the recording and penalization of hate crimes depend on the ability to identify them which is then adversely impacted by the lack of a uniform definition. the eu has encouraged the member states to develop their individual practices in terms of data recording based on their varying experiences and the availability of resources. there is thus no single methodology that is used to collect this type of data, making information collected by the member states incomparable. some progress has been made relating to data collection on hate crimes with 19 eu countries collecting and publishing such data, and 15 de-constructing the figures in terms of bias motivations, circumstances of the offences, vulnerable population groups, and police responses (fra 2018b, 11). even among those that collect data, the progress has not been uniform. only a few countries like france and germany have established procedures for data collection while the rest have largely been recalcitrant in this regard (fra 2018a, 77; fra 2019, 92). additionally, there exists no record of the sentencing of hate-motivated crimes even in france and germany which would demonstrate the extent to which recorded cases are prosecuted by the state. the eu’s initiatives like the code’s code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, the race and employment equality directives and the victim’s rights directive have largely been left to the member states for implementation. it has been found that none of the member states, including france and germany, have completely transposed the directives. in fact, in less than 50 percent of the member states (fra 2018a, 77; fra 2019, 92), little attempt has been made to implement strategies and dedicated action plans against racial or ethnic discrimination and related intolerance, particularly in the sphere of employment. they were also unable to reach a consensus regarding the implementation of the long-pending equal treatment directive (fra 2020b, 32; fra 2021, 69). the greatest challenge to the eu perhaps comes from institutional racism. in the post 9/11 period, muslims have come to be perceived as the ‘enemy within’ in many european countries and have been known to be disproportionately targeted by the state’s security measures. after the 2015 paris attacks, 3594 muslim houses, mosques and prayer halls were raided (enar 2016). however, such intensive operations resulted in only six criminal investigations for terrorism and only one ongoing trial (enar 2016). both the eu-midis ii and a national survey in france reveal that a higher proportion of muslims was stopped and searched as compared to other communities. this is especially the case for young men of arab and african descent, who are twenty times (fra 2018a, 79) more likely to be stopped and searched than any other male group. similar kinds of religious profiling were also found to be prevalent in germany regarding black and minority communities (open society justice initiative 2009, 82). these coupled with other measures such as prohibitions on the building of mosques, minarets and prayer rooms, restricting the entry of foreign clerics, and subjecting muslim institutions to intensive surveillance run the risk of undermining fundamental rights and paves the way for increasing hostility and discrimination against them since it gives the rest of the society the ‘permission to hate’ (poynting and mason, 2006) and creates a continuous cycle of intolerance which generates more and more violence. since such measures are justified by the states on the grounds of national security, there is little political will or scope for the eu’s intervention. 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 conclusion to conclude, the eu’s response to islamophobia has been feeble at best. it has introduced a substantial number of measures that are relevant to combating the phenomenon, however, these have largely missed their mark and failed to create a positive impact. the eu recognises islamophobia as a challenge to societal stability. nonetheless, it chooses to address them through more general measures on racism and xenophobia. this coupled with the lack of eu-wide data on anti-muslim incidents reduces its visibility. the eu’s efforts have been commendable in as much that they cover a wide range of issues from the criminalization of hate crimes and prohibition of negative discrimination to the sensitization of law enforcement agencies, the establishment of equality bodies and victims’ rights. however, in reality, these measures have had limited effectiveness. there has undoubtedly been some progress concerning stronger cyber legislations addressing hate speeches on the internet and in creating safer online spaces. it has motivated social media platforms and member states like france and germany to be more proactive in removing hate-related content. however, the lack of political will and the limited implementation of the eu’s measures have jeopardized most of the initiatives and adversely affected future progress. since all of the initiatives are centred around the understanding of hate crimes, the lack of consensus on its understanding has been a major setback. moreover, the eu has been unable to ensure the participation of all member states in collecting hate crime-related data. such data is not categorized to reflect the number of anti-muslim incidents or related cases handled by the equality bodies. as a result, any assessment of the effectiveness of the eu’s measures has to depend on general data related to racism and xenophobia. additionally, although the eu monitors these bodies regularly and has even introduced infringement procedures against some, in several of the member states they have collapsed. it is also important to note that despite the adoption of the eu’s measures, france and germany, have experienced an overall increase in hate crimes in the past few years which questions the effectiveness of these measures. in both member states, equality bodies have come to be criticized because of their ineffectiveness as well. finally, the eu has also been unable to take a strong stand against racial profiling by its member states. it also recognizes ‘gendered islamophobia’ and multiple discrimination, but has nevertheless failed to undertake specific measures to mitigate its effects. since islamophobia is driven by misperceptions regarding islam, programmes disseminating education and awareness on islam can also play a positive role in breaking down prejudices and combating intolerances. however, this has largely been absent in the eu’s efforts. as europe continues to grapple with the complexities of xenophobia and racism, particularly rising islamophobia in the 21st century, its greatest challenge will come in terms of generating a political will strong enough to resist anti-muslim prejudices not only at the societal level but also at the institutional level of policy-making in the member states. looking towards the future, as society continues to grapple with islamophobia, increasing the visibility of this phenomenon coupled with stronger measures that specifically address anti-muslim prejudices and ensuring stricter compliance by the member states will be indispensable in fostering greater cohesion. 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 references abdelkader, engy. 2017. “a comparative analysis of european islamophobia: france, uk, germany, netherlands, and sweden”, journal of islamic and near eastern law, 16 (1): 3160, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/870099f4. ap news. 2021. “german government makes hate-motivated insults a crime”. ap news. may 12, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/europe-crime-religion-government-and-politics7911c439c6a230c3a950271779f5ec02 (accessed march 03, 2022). arani, aliyeh yegane. 2015. anti-muslim racism and islamophobia in germany alternative report on the 19th – 22nd state report of the federal republic of germany in accordance with article 9 of the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (icerd). the network against discrimination and islamophobia. accessed march 15, 2022. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/treaties/cerd/shared%20documents/deu/int_cerd_ng o_deu_20112_e.pdf . boswell, c. 2007. “migration control in europe after 9/11: explaining the absence of securitization”, journal of common market studies, 45 (3): 589-610. ciftci, sabri. 2012. “islamophobia and threat perceptions: explaining anti-muslim sentiment in the west”, journal of muslim minority affairs, 32 (3): 293-309. criminal code of france. accessed february 24, 2022. https://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/18771. de master, sara and le roy, michael k. 2000. “xenophobia and the european union”, comparative politics, 32 (4): 419-436. dilcra. 2015. mobilizing france against racism and anti-semitism 2015-2017 action plan. accessed february 11, 2022. https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piecejointe/2015/05/dilcra_mobilizing_france_against_racism_and_antisemitism.pdf. dilcra. n.d. national plan against racism and anti-semitism 2018-2020. accessed march 02, 2022. https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piecejointe/2018/06/national_plan_against_racism_and_anti-semitism_2018-2020.pdf . elahi, farah and khan, omar. 2017. “introduction: what is islamophobia?”, in farah elahi and oman khan (eds.) islamophobia still a challenge for us all, runnymede trust, london. enar. 2016. “eu counter-terrorism law opens door to discrimination and human rights abuses”. https://www.enar-eu.org/eu-counter-terrorism-law-opens-door-to-discrimination-andhuman-rights-abuses-1253. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/870099f4 https://apnews.com/article/europe-crime-religion-government-and-politics-7911c439c6a230c3a950271779f5ec02 https://apnews.com/article/europe-crime-religion-government-and-politics-7911c439c6a230c3a950271779f5ec02 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/treaties/cerd/shared%20documents/deu/int_cerd_ngo_deu_20112_e.pdf https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/treaties/cerd/shared%20documents/deu/int_cerd_ngo_deu_20112_e.pdf https://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/18771 https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2015/05/dilcra_mobilizing_france_against_racism_and_antisemitism.pdf https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2015/05/dilcra_mobilizing_france_against_racism_and_antisemitism.pdf https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2018/06/national_plan_against_racism_and_anti-semitism_2018-2020.pdf https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2018/06/national_plan_against_racism_and_anti-semitism_2018-2020.pdf https://www.enar-eu.org/eu-counter-terrorism-law-opens-door-to-discrimination-and-human-rights-abuses-1253 https://www.enar-eu.org/eu-counter-terrorism-law-opens-door-to-discrimination-and-human-rights-abuses-1253 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 federal anti-discrimination agency. n.d. guide to the general equal treatment act explanations and examples. accessed march 11, 2022. https://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/shareddocs/downloads/de/publikationen/weg weiser/agg_wegweiser_engl_guide_to_the_general_equal_treatment_act.pdf?__blob=publi cationfile&v=14. fra. 2009. eu-midis european union minorities and discrimination survey. accessed on december 9, 2020. https://lastradainternational.org/lsidocs/eumidis_mainreport_conference-edition_en_.pdf . fra. 2017a. eu-midis ii european union minorities and discrimination survey. accessed december 18, 2019. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-eu-midisii-main-results_en.pdf. fra. 2017b. fundamental rights report 2017. luxembourg: eu. fra. 2018a. fundamental rights report 2018. luxembourg: eu. fra. 2018b. hate crime recording and data collection practice across the eu. luxembourg: eu. fra. 2019. fundamental rights report 2019. luxembourg: eu. fra. 2020a. fighting discrimination on grounds of religion and ethnicity, 2020. accessed october 16, 2021. https://fra.europa.eu/en/speech/2020/fighting-discrimination-groundsreligion-and-ethnicity. fra. 2020b. fundamental rights report 2020. luxembourg: eu. fra.2021. fundamental rights report 2021. luxembourg: eu. government of france. nd. “everything you need to know about freedom of expression in france”. accessed march 03, 2022. https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/everything-you-needto-know-about-freedom-of-expression-in-france. howard. 2016. implementation of the employment equality directive the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of religion or belief. the european parliament. accessed march 07, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/stud/2016/536345/eprs_stu(2016)53 6345_en.pdf. human rights first. 2016. breaking the cycle of violence countering antisemitism and extremism in france. new york, usa. human rights watch. 2011. the state response to “hate crimes” in germany a human rights watch briefing paper. accessed february 17, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/state%20response%20to%20%27 hate%20crimes%27%20in%20germany.pdf. https://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/shareddocs/downloads/de/publikationen/wegweiser/agg_wegweiser_engl_guide_to_the_general_equal_treatment_act.pdf?__blob=publicationfile&v=14 https://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/shareddocs/downloads/de/publikationen/wegweiser/agg_wegweiser_engl_guide_to_the_general_equal_treatment_act.pdf?__blob=publicationfile&v=14 https://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/shareddocs/downloads/de/publikationen/wegweiser/agg_wegweiser_engl_guide_to_the_general_equal_treatment_act.pdf?__blob=publicationfile&v=14 https://lastradainternational.org/lsidocs/eumidis_mainreport_conference-edition_en_.pdf https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-eu-midis-ii-main-results_en.pdf https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-eu-midis-ii-main-results_en.pdf https://fra.europa.eu/en/speech/2020/fighting-discrimination-grounds-religion-and-ethnicity https://fra.europa.eu/en/speech/2020/fighting-discrimination-grounds-religion-and-ethnicity https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/everything-you-need-to-know-about-freedom-of-expression-in-france https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/everything-you-need-to-know-about-freedom-of-expression-in-france https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/stud/2016/536345/eprs_stu(2016)536345_en.pdf https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/stud/2016/536345/eprs_stu(2016)536345_en.pdf https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/state%20response%20to%20%27hate%20crimes%27%20in%20germany.pdf https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/state%20response%20to%20%27hate%20crimes%27%20in%20germany.pdf 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 isal, sarah. 2014. “'alarming' rise in support for far-right european parties”. the parliament magazine. june 10, 2014. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/alarmingrise-in-support-for-farright-european-parties (accessed february 15, 2022). karamanidou, lena. 2015. “the securitisation of european migration policies: perceptions of threat and management of risk” in gabriella lazaridis and khursheed wadia (eds.) the securitisation of migration in the eu debates since 9/11. palgrave macmillan: uk. lauwers, anna sophie. 2019. “is islamophobia (always) racism?”, critical philosophy of race, 7 (2): 306-332. lazaridis, gabriella and tsagkroni, vasiliki. 2015. “securitisation of migration and far right populist othering in scandinavian countries” in gabriella lazaridis and khursheed wadia (eds.) the securitisation of migration in the eu debates since 9/11. palgrave macmillan: uk. lazaridis, gabriella and wadia khursheed. 2015. “introduction” in gabriella lazaridis and khursheed wadia (eds.) the securitisation of migration in the eu debates since 9/11. palgrave macmillan: uk. léonard, sarah and kaunert, christian. 2019. refugees, security and the european union. routledge: london. lomas, natasha. 2020. “germany tightens online hate speech rules to make platforms send reports straight to the feds”, accessed march 03, 2022. https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/19/germany-tightens-online-hate-speech-rules-to-makeplatforms-send-reports-straight-to-the-feds/. marranci, gabriele .2004. “multiculturalism, islam and the clash of civilisations theory: rethinking islamophobia”, culture and religion, 5 (1): 105-117. mirza, noreen. 2019. “everyday living with islamophobia”, culture and religion, 20 (3): 302 321. open society justice initiative. 2009. ethnic profiling in the european union: pervasive, ineffective, and discriminatory. open society institute: new york. accessed february 18, 2022. https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/8cef0d30-2833-40fd-b80b9efb17c6de41/profiling_20090526.pdf . osce-odihr. 2016a. hate crime reporting "france". accessed march 26, 2019. https://hatecrime.osce.org/france?year=2016. osce-odihr. 2016b. hate crime reporting "germany". accessed february 15, 2022. https://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2016. osce-odihr. 2017a. hate crime reporting "france". accessed march 26, 2019. http://hatecrime.osce.org/france?year=2017. osce-odihr. 2017b. hate crime reporting “germany”. accessed march 26, 2019. http://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2017. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/alarming-rise-in-support-for-farright-european-parties https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/alarming-rise-in-support-for-farright-european-parties https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/19/germany-tightens-online-hate-speech-rules-to-make-platforms-send-reports-straight-to-the-feds/ https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/19/germany-tightens-online-hate-speech-rules-to-make-platforms-send-reports-straight-to-the-feds/ https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/8cef0d30-2833-40fd-b80b-9efb17c6de41/profiling_20090526.pdf https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/8cef0d30-2833-40fd-b80b-9efb17c6de41/profiling_20090526.pdf https://hatecrime.osce.org/france?year=2016 https://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2016 http://hatecrime.osce.org/france?year=2017 http://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2017 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 osce-odihr. 2018a. hate crime reporting “france”. accessed october 26, 2019. https://hatecrime.osce.org/report-data/france/2018. osce-odihr. 2018b. hate crime reporting “germany”. accessed march 26, 2019. https://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2018. osce-odihr. 2019a. hate crime reporting “france”. accessed december 12, 2020. https://hatecrime.osce.org/france?year=2019. osce-odihr. 2019b. hate crime reporting “germany”. accessed december 12, 2020. https://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2019. osce-odihr. 2020a. hate crime reporting “france”. accessed february 15, 2022. https://hatecrime.osce.org/france?year=2020. osce-odihr. 2020b. hate crime reporting “germany”. accessed february 15, 2022. https://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2020. poole, e., and richardson, j. e. (eds.). 2010. muslims and the news media. london, uk: i.b. tauris. poynting, scott and mason, victoria. 2006. “tolerance, freedom, justice and peace”? britain, australia and anti-muslim racism since 11 september 2001”, journal of intercultural studies, 27 (4): 365-391. rana, junaid .2007. “the story of islamophobia” souls a critical journal of black politics, culture, and society, 9 (2): 148-161. squire, vicki. 2015. “the securitisation of migration: an absent presence?” in gabriella lazaridis and khursheed wadia (eds.) the securitisation of migration in the eu debates since 9/11. palgrave macmillan: uk. taras, ray. 2008. europe old and new transnationalism, belonging, xenophobia. rowman and littlefield publishers: toronto. the council of the european union. 2008. framework decision 2008/913/jha on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. accessed december 4, 2020. https://www.refworld.org/docid/493e8fea2.html. the council of the european union. 2017. council directive 2000/78/ec of 27 november 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. accessed december 12, 2020. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/html/?uri=celex:32000l0078&from=en. the eu. 2012. directive 2012/29/eu of the european parliament and of the council of 25 october 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing council framework decision 2001/220/jha. accessed december 3, 2020. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/html/?uri=celex:32012l0029&from=en. https://hatecrime.osce.org/report-data/france/2018 https://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2018 https://hatecrime.osce.org/france?year=2019 https://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2019 https://hatecrime.osce.org/france?year=2020 https://hatecrime.osce.org/germany?year=2020 https://www.refworld.org/docid/493e8fea2.html https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/html/?uri=celex:32000l0078&from=en https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/html/?uri=celex:32000l0078&from=en https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/html/?uri=celex:32012l0029&from=en https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/html/?uri=celex:32012l0029&from=en 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 the eu. 2019. progress on combating hate speech online through the eu code of conduct 2016-2019. council of the eu. accessed december 23, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/aid_development_cooperation_fundamental_rights/ assessment_of_the_code_of_conduct_on_hate_speech_on_line_-_state_of_play__0.pdf. the eu. 2020. eu contribution to the report of the special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief 2020. accessed october 04, 2021. https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/religion/islamophobiaantimuslim/regional%20institutions/europeanunion.pdf. the european commission. 2000. council directive 2000/43/ec of 29 june 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. accessed february 10, 2022. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32000l0043&from=en. the european commission. 2016a. “code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online”. accessed march 9, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamentalrights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/countering-illegal-hate-speechonline_en. the european commission. 2016b. country report non-discrimination france. accessed march 03, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2016-frcountry_report_nd_final_en_0.pdf . the european commission. 2017a. hate crime training for law enforcement and criminal justice authorities: 10 key guiding principles. accessed december 4, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupdetail.groupdetaildoc&id =30378&no=1. the european commission. 2017b. improving the recording of hate crime by law enforcement authorities key guiding principles. accessed december 6, 2020. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/ec-2017-key-guiding-principlesrecording-hate-crime_en.pdf. the european commission. 2017c. “communication on tackling illegal content online towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms”. accessed december 23, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-tackling-illegal-contentonline-towards-enhanced-responsibility-online-platforms. the european commission. 2019a. conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, results of the fourth monitoring exercise. accessed december 4, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/code_of_conduct_factsheet_7_web.pdf. the european commission. 2019b. countering racism and xenophobia in the eu. accessed september 13, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/swd_countering_racism_and_xenophobia_in_th e_eu.pdf. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/aid_development_cooperation_fundamental_rights/assessment_of_the_code_of_conduct_on_hate_speech_on_line_-_state_of_play__0.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/aid_development_cooperation_fundamental_rights/assessment_of_the_code_of_conduct_on_hate_speech_on_line_-_state_of_play__0.pdf https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32000l0043&from=en https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32000l0043&from=en https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2016-fr-country_report_nd_final_en_0.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2016-fr-country_report_nd_final_en_0.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupdetail.groupdetaildoc&id=30378&no=1 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupdetail.groupdetaildoc&id=30378&no=1 https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/ec-2017-key-guiding-principles-recording-hate-crime_en.pdf https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/ec-2017-key-guiding-principles-recording-hate-crime_en.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-tackling-illegal-content-online-towards-enhanced-responsibility-online-platforms https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-tackling-illegal-content-online-towards-enhanced-responsibility-online-platforms https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/code_of_conduct_factsheet_7_web.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/swd_countering_racism_and_xenophobia_in_the_eu.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/swd_countering_racism_and_xenophobia_in_the_eu.pdf 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 the european commission. 2021a. country report non-discrimination france. accessed march 03, 2022. https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/5530-france-country-report-nondiscrimination-2021-pdf-1-75-mb. the european commission. 2021b. country report non-discrimination germany. accessed march 03, 2022. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/93afb47b-0ec311ec-b771-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-pdf/source-252661209. the european commission. 2021c. sixth evaluation of the code of conduct. accessed march 04, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/factsheet-6th-monitoring-round-of-thecode-of-conduct_october2021_en_1.pdf. the european parliament. 2017. the victims’ rights directive 2012/29/eu european implementation assessment. accessed february 14, 2022. https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2017/dec/ep-study-victimsdirective.pdf. the federal government. 2016. federal government strategy to prevent extremism and promote democracy. accessed march 04, 2022. https://www.bmfsfj.de/resource/blob/115448/cc142d640b37b7dd76e48b8fd9178cc5/strate gie-der-bundesregierung-zur-extremismuspraevention-und-demokratiefoerderung-englischdata.pdf. the federal government. 2017. national action plan against racism positions and measures to address ideologies of inequality. druckund verlagshaus zarbock gmbh & co. kg, frankfurt am main: germany. accessed february 22, 2022. https://www.bmi.bund.de/shareddocs/downloads/en/publikationen/2018/napen.pdf?__blob=publicationfile&v=4. the federal ministry of justice. n.d. general act on equal treatment, 2006. accessed march 07, 2022. https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_agg/englisch_agg.html#:~:text=the%20purpose%20of%20this%20ac t,disability%2c%20age%20or%20sexual%20orientation. the runnymede trust. 1997. islamophobia a challenge for us all. report of the runnymede trust commission on british muslims and islamophobia. wintour, patrick. 2017. “hungary to detain all asylum seekers in container camp”. the guardian. march 07, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/07/-hungary-to-detain-allasylum-seekers-in-container-camps (accessed march 03, 2022). yakushko, oksana. 2018. modern-day xenophobia critical historical and theoretical perspectives on the roots of anti-immigrant prejudice. palgrave macmillan: switzerland. zick, andreas et al. 2011. intolerance, prejudice and discrimination a european report, forum berlin, translated by meredith dale, berlin. https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/5530-france-country-report-non-discrimination-2021-pdf-1-75-mb https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/5530-france-country-report-non-discrimination-2021-pdf-1-75-mb https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/93afb47b-0ec3-11ec-b771-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-pdf/source-252661209 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/93afb47b-0ec3-11ec-b771-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-pdf/source-252661209 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/factsheet-6th-monitoring-round-of-the-code-of-conduct_october2021_en_1.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/factsheet-6th-monitoring-round-of-the-code-of-conduct_october2021_en_1.pdf https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2017/dec/ep-study-victims-directive.pdf https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2017/dec/ep-study-victims-directive.pdf https://www.bmfsfj.de/resource/blob/115448/cc142d640b37b7dd76e48b8fd9178cc5/strategie-der-bundesregierung-zur-extremismuspraevention-und-demokratiefoerderung-englisch-data.pdf https://www.bmfsfj.de/resource/blob/115448/cc142d640b37b7dd76e48b8fd9178cc5/strategie-der-bundesregierung-zur-extremismuspraevention-und-demokratiefoerderung-englisch-data.pdf https://www.bmfsfj.de/resource/blob/115448/cc142d640b37b7dd76e48b8fd9178cc5/strategie-der-bundesregierung-zur-extremismuspraevention-und-demokratiefoerderung-englisch-data.pdf https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_agg/englisch_agg.html#:~:text=the%20purpose%20of%20this%20act,disability%2c%20age%20or%20sexual%20orientation https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_agg/englisch_agg.html#:~:text=the%20purpose%20of%20this%20act,disability%2c%20age%20or%20sexual%20orientation https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_agg/englisch_agg.html#:~:text=the%20purpose%20of%20this%20act,disability%2c%20age%20or%20sexual%20orientation https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/07/-hungary-to-detain-all-asylum-seekers-in-container-camps https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/07/-hungary-to-detain-all-asylum-seekers-in-container-camps 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 1-23 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 the impact of the 2020 constitutional changes on authoritarian constitutionalism in russia: judicial pragmatism between the russian constitutional court (rcc) and the state alexandra yao1 abstract in 2003, the russian government abruptly arrested mikhail khodorkovsky, then ceo of yukos, the largest private oil company in russia at the time. yukos was sold for parts through courtmandated auctions and eventually acquired by state oil company rosneft. the yukos affair transformed russia’s oil industry, energy sector, and state relationship with private enterprises. in response, yukos shareholders appealed the injustice to international courts and have fought to enforce a usd 50 billion compensation ruling for nearly two decades. this article follows the timeline of the yukos trials, assessing russia’s aggressive resistance to the yukos compensation ruling and focusing on the 2020 russian constitutional amendments that legalized selective compliance of international rulings. the analysis concludes that the constitutional changes represent a critical juncture moment for the russian constituional court (rcc) that transforms its relationship with the executive branch, offsetting the rcc’s balancing act of judicial pragmatism with the state by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. this article examines possible motivations for this change, which include the yukos trials. 1 alexandra yao is a phd student at the department of political science at the university of british columbia 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 introduction in 2003, yukos, the largest private oil company in russia at the time, was in the middle of merger talks with chevrontexaco and exxonmobil an unprecedented deal which would have created the largest oil company in the world. later that year, yukos’ ceo mikhail khodorkovsky was arrested on charges of tax fraud. yukos was sold for parts through court-mandated auctions and eventually acquired by state oil company rosneft. the yukos affair transformed russia’s oil industry, energy sector, and state relationship with private enterprises. since yukos was auctioned off at staggeringly low prices without due process, yukos shareholders suffered a tremendous loss of capital and appealed the injustice to the international courts. for nearly two decades, the shareholders and the russian government have continued to overturn and reinstate the compensation ruling of a usd 50 billion payout. the yukos trials have been processed in the european court of human rights (ecthr), the permanent court of arbitration (pca), hague district court, and hague court of appeal. as of september 2021, the trials continue in the supreme court of the netherlands. new developments in response to the yukos trials, such as the 2020 russian constitutional amendments that legalized selective compliance of international rulings, reflect russia’s aggressive resistance to the yukos compensation ruling. these developments threaten the constitutional rights and freedoms of russian citizens and private enterprises. the focus of this paper is as follows: what are the implications of the recent constitutional changes on authoritarian constitutionalism in russia, specifically judicial pragmatism between the russian constitutional court (rcc) and the state? this article concludes that the constitutional changes represent a critical juncture moment for the rcc that transforms its relationship with the presidency. the rcc’s balancing act of judicial pragmatism with the state has been offset by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. this article examines possible motivations for this change, among which are the yukos trials. 1990s: hopeful beginnings immediately after the fall of communism, judicial scholars were hopeful for the modernization of the constitution of the russian federation and federal legislature (mishina 2020, 63). their goal was radical legislative transformation. the initial judicial reforms of the 1990s exceeded expectations, including political competition, free speech, freedom of the press, democratic elections, and other democratic institutions previously nonexistent during the soviet union (partlett and krasnov 2019, 644-67). the constitutional court of the russian federation was established in accordance with european standards and was the first judicial agency in russian history with the power to legally evaluate the actions of actors in the highest levels of government, which includes the actions of the president. the law on the constitutional court espoused judicial immunity, irremovability, and impartiality to establish judicial autonomy (mishina 2020, 71). in 1991, the law of the russian federation on mass media declared freedom of the press and the removal of soviet norms of censorship and ideological restrictions on independent journalism (2020, 71). the 1996 russian criminal code emphasized protection of the individual and outlined 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 its core principles of legality, equality of individuals before the law, and criminal liability based only on guilt, justice, and humanism (articles 3-8 of the 1996 criminal code of the russian federation [rf]). inspired by the constitution of the fifth republic in france, the 1993 constitution of the rf also established a semi-presidential system (mishina 2020, 72). the fundamental principles of the 1993 constitution of the rf explicitly recognized the exercise of “[state power in the rf] on the basis of separation of legislative, executive and judicial branches,” (article 10 of 1993 constitution of the rf) and the independence of these three branches. articles 118-123 went on to establish the immunity, irremovability, and inviolability of judges (articles 118-123 of 1993 constitution of the rf). this was a remarkable achievement, especially since judicial independence was nonexistent under soviet rule, as the courts operated as an arm of the repressive government apparatus (mishina 2020, 75). the constitution also established a judicial system composed of the rcc, the supreme court, federal courts of general jurisdictions, courts of arbitration, and justiceof-the-peace courts (article 118 of 1993 constitution of the rf). further, the 1996 criminal code decriminalized many anti-soviet crimes including “anti-soviet agitation, propaganda, sodomy, vagrancy, illegal currency transactions, [and] speculation” (mishina 2020, 73). the criminal code also placed crimes against a person in superior priority to crimes against the state, thus privileging humanization and democratization. authoritarian constitutionalism in the past, studies of authoritarian constitutionalism focused on countries such as singapore (tushnet 2015, 391-462), turkey (isiksel 2013, 702-26), south africa (davis 2019, 57-75), myanmar (crouch 2020, 487-515), and non-russian former soviet republics (newton 2019, 20939). there was little scholarship on authoritarian constitutionalism in russia because, as maria popova (2017) argued, russia did not adhere to tushnet’s definition where “the autocrat sets the substantive law, often in negotiation with his governing coalition” (65). alexei trochev and peter solomon (2018) counter that tushnet’s definition of authoritarian constitutionalism is so “demanding” (212) that most authoritarian states would not fit the bill. trochev and solomon (2018) argue that there is a balancing act of authoritarian constitutionalism in russia. this paper builds on their balancing act argument by analyzing the recent 2020 constitutional changes to demonstrate how the balancing act has been disrupted. authoritarian constitutionalism in russia: a balancing act despite the achievements of the 1990s judicial reforms, the russian judiciary was still open to manipulation and political pressure. this has led to a trend of authoritarian constitutionalism, especially between the rcc and the executive branch. during their respective terms between 2001-2016, president putin and president medvedev amended the 1994 federal constitutional law on the constitutional court of the russian federation a collective total of 15 times, making key changes to rcc regulations including salary changes, relocations, and age limits to test the loyalty and compliance of the rcc (trochev and solomon 2018, 204-5). 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 trochev and solomon have previously written about how the rcc’s defence of russian sovereignty against international judicial bodies is one of the rcc’s adjustments to vladimir putin’s increasingly authoritarian regime (trochev and solomon 2018). they argue that the rcc engages in a balancing act between two governance regimes – the constitutional regime and the regime of political expediency, resulting in what they categorize as the russian version of authoritarian constitutionalism. popova (2017) disagrees, arguing that while singapore has authoritarian constitutionalism, russia does not, since the political regime only selectively adheres to constitutionalism. among many examples, she cites the yukos affair and khodorkovsky’s arbitrary arrest as evidence of the kremlin’s disregard for constitutionalism and political use of the law (2017, 67). her article predicted the kremlin’s preference for “greater politicization of the judiciary” (2017, 74). this article builds upon her prediction by demonstrating how the political regime has erased the remaining independence of the judiciary and departed further from authoritarian constitutionalism. for the purposes of this investigation, judicial pragmatism refers to practical judicial decision making in recognition of limitations to legal formalism. judicial pragmatism allows judges the freedom to “follow the law to the letter or openly disregard it, depending on the context” (hendley 2017, 4), allowing them to cater to political realities while pursuing judicial activism on lower risk cases. in this sense, judicial pragmatism is “activist” (posner 1995, 4) in that it is “a rejection of the idea that law is something grounded in permanent principles and realized in logical manipulation of those principles, and a determination to use law as an instrument for social ends” (405). judicial pragmatism by the rcc includes “adaption to institutional changes” (trochev and solomon 2018, 204), “adaption to personnel changes” (206), and “tolerating disobedience with judgments” (211) as well as adaption to the kremlin’s needs and expanding judicial activism on non-politically sensitive cases. trochev and solomon (2018) demonstrate that one of the key ways the rcc has carefully maneuvered the tensions in the duality between constitutionalism and political expediency is by presenting itself as an effective defence against ecthr international encroachment upon russian national sovereignty. they illustrate how the rcc’s defence of selective compliance is necessary to adjust to new political realities and preserve (some) autonomy for rcc judges to continue other important work in expanding domestic judicial activism (trochev and solomon 2018). similarly, khalikova (2020) has highlighted how the rcc has balanced restricted judiciary freedom on politically sensitive issues, on the one hand, with the greater freedom to adjudicate social rights issues on the other. the duality is maintained so long as the regime of political expediency maintains the exercise of unrestrained power that can “bypass constitutional restraints and prevail over constitutional values” (trochev and solomon 2018, 202) and the constitutional regime maintains the “operation of formal constitutional rules and rules of european human rights law, which both constrain and guide russia's leaders in ruling their country” (202). richard sakwa (2020) has also argued that the russian government benefits from a “dual state model” where the “administrative regime” (45) gains legitimacy and authority from the constitutional regime principles, and yet can continue to subvert constitutional principles. published in early 2020, sakwa’s book agrees with trochev and solomon’s argument that the administrative regime is “balanced by the constitutional state” (47). this article assesses whether the recent constitutional changes that function as domestic defences of national sovereignty against international courts have now subverted the duality of the two governance regimes by firmly subjugating the rcc and other branches of power directly under presidential control, erasing their 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 constraint on russian government leadership. the former balancing act between the administrative and constitutional regime has now been undone. current literature this article contributes to the scant literature surrounding authoritarian constitutionalism in russia and literature on the yukos trials as publications catch up to the recent constitutional changes, new yukos trials, and their implications for the future. before the 2014 pca's compensation ruling, scholars studied how the yukos affair was politically motivated and not simply an issue of fraud and tax evasion or property redistribution as russian authorities claim (gustafson 2012). in recent years, researchers have examined the yukos trials and their impact on russia’s relationship with the ecthr and the council of europe (aksenova and marchuk 2018). there is a general consensus that the yukos trials were the most significant factor, inter alia, that affected the 2015 rcc defence mechanism to check ecthr's jurisdiction (kornya 2017) and subsequently the role of the 2020 constitutional amendments on the trials (krimmer 2020, 86-94). scholars have also focussed on how the landmark judgment 21-p/2015 and the rapid russian constitutional changes in 2020 signify a disengagement with international courts and superiority of national sovereignty over international law (kalinichenko and kochenov 2021, 341-46). others have also categorized the 2015 russian defence mechanism as among the slew of other similar cases in germany, italy, uk, and others in the broader recent global trend of backlash against international courts (voeten 2020, 407-22). the central contribution of this article is that it examines the current state of authoritarian constitutionalism in russia in the context of the yukos trials, which accelerated a series of constitutional changes as a form of domestic defence of national sovereignty. the research methodology of this investigation mainly involves scrutiny of legal documents (case judgments, statutes, constitutional amendments), news articles, and relevant literature (scholarship on the yukos trials, constitutional changes in russia, authoritarian constitutionalism, and backlash politics). research for this article included relevant rcc judgments, federal laws, and the case files of the yukos trials from the ecthr, pca, hague district court, hague court of appeal, and the supreme court of the netherlands. the legal documents were presented in english, russian, or french and were accessible online. the yukos trials: the elephant in the room timeline of the yukos trials after the collapse of the soviet union in 1991, the russian government underwent a process of rapid privatization. part of this process involved the government selling valuable state-owned companies at low prices to private owners in loans-for-shares auctions (sim 2008, 6). mikhail khodorkovsky, the then owner of menatep bank, acquired yukos between 1995 and 1996. in order to foster economic growth in poorer regions, the russian government issued a low-tax-region program in the 1990s, allowing local authorities to either partially or fully exempt their corporations from corporate-profit tax. yukos then relocated its trading companies to these internal offshore tax havens, selling oil to its own trading companies at low prices and then reselling the oil abroad at market prices, all while profiting from the low tax rates on the sales. during the yukos trials, the russian federation asserted that yukos “increased step by step from sham shell to sham 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 shell, generating artificially inflated profits through non-arm's length transactions” (yukos universal limited (isle of man) v. the russian federation 2014). the russian federation accused yukos of “fraudulently evad[ing] billions of dollars of russian corporate profit tax from 1999 to 2004 [by] abusing the [low-tax-region] program” (yukos universal limited (isle of man) 2014 at 109). while profiting from tax optimization methods, yukos became one of the largest oil companies in the world by 2002 (krimmer 2020, 87). by 2003, khodorkovsky had become popularly known as the richest man in russia and entered merger talks with sibneft, exxonmobil and chevrontexaco. in october 2003, khodorkovsky was arrested on charges of forgery, fraud, and tax evasion. on december 19, 2004, yukos’ major production company ‘yuganskneftegaz’ was acquired by a shell company baikalfinansgroup. four days later, baikalfinansgroup sold those shares to state-owned oil company rosneft (chernykh 2011, 1240). so far, two international courts have released rulings on the trials between yukos shareholders and the russian government. on july 18, 2014, the pca ruled that russia must pay usd 50 billion in damages to the yukos shareholders in full by january 14, 2015 or interest would begin to accrue (yukos universal limited (isle of man) 2014). two weeks later, the ecthr issued a just satisfaction judgment of eur 1.9 billion to be paid by russia (oao neftyanaya kompaniya yukos v russia 2014). subsequently, at the state duma’s (lower house of parliament) request, the rcc began to revisit and review the constitutionality of the federal laws pertaining to russian compliance with the european convention of human rights. on july 15, 2015, the rcc issued their judgment no. 21p/2015 that ranked ecthr authority (and therefore international law) subsidiary to rcc jurisdiction, thus making selective compliance of international rulings legal (postanovlenie konstitutsionnogo suda rossiĭskoĭ federatsii ot 14 iiulia 2015). referring to the anchugov and gladkov v. russia case from july 14, 2013, the rcc judgment argued that implementation of the ecthr’s judgment would violate the constitution of the rf. to substantiate their defence, the rcc also cited similar case law by the german constitutional court, italian constitutional court, austrian constitutional court, and the uk supreme court. on december 14, 2015, president putin signed a federal law empowering the rcc to evaluate international court decisions and their compliance with the rf constitution to verify their enforceability (federal'nyĭ zakon 2015). the rcc has applied the defence mechanism to two ecthr rulings: anchugov and gladkov v russia and the yukos compensation ruling. on april 19, 2016, the rcc issued judgment no. 12p/2016, which reviewed and denied the possibility of implementing the ecthr’s anchugov and gladkov v russia ruling (constitutional court of the russian federation 2016). the following day, on april 20, 2016, the hague district court overturned the pca’s usd 50 billion ruling on the grounds that the case was outside of the pca’s jurisdiction (the russian federation v. veteran petroleum limited, yukos universal limited, hulley enterprises limited 2016). next, on january 19, 2017, the rcc successfully stopped the implementation of the yukos compensation ruling, to which rcc judge aranovsky and judge yaroslavtsev dissented (postanovlenie konstitutsionnogo suda rossiĭskoĭ federatsii ot 19 ianvaria 2017). on february 18, 2020, the hague court of appeal reinstated the compensation ruling (veteran petroleum limited, yukos universal limited, hulley enterprises limited v. the russian federation 2020). the next month, putin introduced a slew of constitutional amendments including the precedence of russian constitutional law over international law, making selective compliance of international rulings constitutional. by june 2020, the supreme court of the netherlands accepted the russian government's appeal to challenge the hague court of appeal's 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 ruling. by december 2020, russia passed a law banning constitutional court judges from publishing dissenting opinions (gustafson 2012, 272-318). at the time of writing, the supreme court of the netherlands' final judgment is still pending. between january 15, 2015, and january 14, 2021, approximately usd 7 billion of interest has accrued, bringing the total of the awards to usd 57 billion. significance of the yukos trials scholars agree that khodorkovsky’s aggressive economic policies designed to increase foreign investment, increasingly defiant criticism of state policies, funding for opposition parties, proamerican stance along with rumours of political ambition, all contributed to the singling out of his company yukos (gustafson 2012, 272-318). since yukos was no different from other oil companies in its perfectly legal tax optimization methods, the yukos affair made an example of khodorkovsky and reasserted the primacy of state authority over big business as well as the power of state coercion, especially given his wealth and visibility (tompson 2005, 159-81). more importantly, putin’s power and legitimacy are directly tied to russia’s economic performance on the global stage, particularly within the energy sector (sim 2008, 69). after rosneft acquired yukos, russia’s economy benefited significantly, which translated into political longevity for putin. the yukos government takeover marked the beginning of a series of selective state acquisitions of private companies across a variety of industries, in a process of creeping nationalization. the oecd economic survey of the russian federation reported 29 major state acquisitions between 2004-2006 alone (not including state acquisitions of foreign assets) across the banking, electric power, nuclear construction, machine-building, media, aviation, auto, oil and gas, and titanium sectors (oecd 2006, 38). the role of state-owned enterprises (soes) in the russian economy is unusually significant as soes dominate the country’s top ten firms, especially the banking, energy, and transport sectors (oecd 2014, 28-29). more recently, in 2016, the private oil company bashneft was sold to state-owned rosneft without a public tender (us department of state 2021). with the capital flight from russia and sharp decline in foreign direct investments, it is expected that exiting private shareholders will continue to sell their assets to state-owned enterprises. the yukos compensation ruling is significant to russian state interests not only because it threatens a usd 57 billion financial cost but because it would alter the business-state institutional relationship (reasserted by the yukos affair and solidified by creeping nationalization of key industries) as well as set legal precedence of state responsibility for corrupt asset renationalization. constitutional changes: offsetting the balancing act judgment 21-p/2015 after the 2014 pca compensation ruling, a group of state duma members requested that the rcc revisit the constitutionality of federal laws regarding russian compliance with the ecthr, ostensibly to review a separate ecthr ruling: anchugov and gladkov v russia. on july 4, 2013, the ecthr had ruled that russia had violated article 3 of protocol no. 1 of the convention by not allowing convicted prisoners the right to vote in parliamentary elections (anchugov and gladkov v. russia 2013). however, this was in direct conflict with article 32(3) of the russian constitution that states prisoners do not have the right to vote or be elected. russian resistance against the 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 anchugov and gladkov v russia ruling was reinforced by hirst v uk (2005), a similar case concerning prisoner voting rights that also received pushback from domestic courts in the uk against the ecthr case law. this straightforward conflict between an ecthr ruling and the rf constitution was the perfect opportunity to develop the first domestic defence mechanism: rcc issued judgment no. 21-p/2015, ranking ecthr rulings subsidiary to rcc jurisdiction, and setting a precedent for future international court rulings (postanovlenie 2015). judgment no. 21p/2015 was further solidified later that year by putin, who signed a federal law authorizing rcc evaluation of enforceability of international court decisions (federal constitutional law no.7/2015) (federal'nyĭ zakon 2015). similar to the uk, russia took the opportunity of clear-cut, straightforward judicial conflict and applied it to a political agenda of limiting ecthr jurisprudence. after applying the defence mechanism to the anchugov and gladkov v russia ruling in 2016 (judgment 12-p/2016) (constitutional court of the russian federation 2016), the rcc unsurprisingly then applied it to the yukos award in 2017 (judgment 1-p/2017) (postanovlenie 2017). constitutional amendments 2020 when the hague court of appeal reinstated the yukos award in early 2020, putin fast tracked sweeping changes to the russian constitution (isachenkov 2020). the changes included the expansion of presidential control, which had been in motion prior to the reinstallation of the yukos award but were accelerated by the court of appeal’s decision, given the urgency and political sensitivity of national sovereignty against unsavoury international jurisdiction. prior to 2020, few amendments have been made to the 1993 constitution. aside from minor changes, the most substantial of any amendments made was the extension of the presidential term from four to six years and the state duma deputy terms from four to five years in 2008, and the expansion of presidential power on the procuracy in 2014 (teague, 2020, 303). of the 2020 constitutional amendments, articles 79 and 125 are directly relevant to the yukos trials. article 79 now stipulates that “decisions of international organizations adopted on the basis of provisions of international treaties of the [rf] which in their interpretation contradict the constitution shall not be subject to implementation in the [rf] (article 79 of the constitution of the rf 2020).” while the previous russian law and court decisions were addressed to the ecthr specifically, article 79 now expands the supremacy of national sovereignty to include any and all international courts and organizations to which russia is connected. the new wording of article 79 thus expands to include the energy charter treaty (ect) (crucial to the yukos trials that are based on russia’s alleged breach of obligations of the ect that russia signed but never ratified) and the 1958 new york convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (which the yukos shareholders cite in their subsequent attempted enforcement proceedings of the award since russia signed and ratified the new york convention in 1960). clearly, this effort was designed to address future yukos decisions such as those from the hague and the simultaneous enforcement proceedings. an added 5.1(b) to article 125 formally empowers the rcc to determine the possibility of enforcing international rulings if they “contradict the fundamentals of the public legal order of the [rf].” this constitutionalized the rcc’s authority to decide on the enforceability of “decisions of interstate bodies adopted on the basis of provisions of international treaties of the rf […,] a foreign or international (or interstate) court, [or] a foreign or international private arbitration court (arbitration)” (article 125(5-1.b) of the constitution of the rf 2020). specific mention of 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 interstate, foreign, and international courts, and foreign or international private arbitration courts demonstrates how this addendum was again designed to address any and all future yukos decisions. the amended article 83(f-3) of the constitution grants the president power to submit requests to terminate powers of a whole host of judges including the chairman, deputy chairman and judges of the constitutional court, the chairman, deputy chairpersons and judges of the supreme court, and judges of courts of cassation and appellate courts (article 83(f-3) of the constitution of the rf 2020). this termination request can be in case of any “act besmirching the honor and dignity of the judge” (article 83(f-3) of the constitution of the rf 2020), giving the president the right to fire judges at will based on ambiguous criteria, revoking the irremovability of judges, and neutralizing the authority of constitutional court judges to constrain state leadership. several key amendments also significantly expanded the powers of the president to a staggering degree. amended article 83(a) grants the president power to “remove the chairman of the government of the russian federation [aka the prime minister] from office” (article 83(a) of the constitution of the rf 2020) at his own discretion, without needing confirmation from the state duma or consultation with the federal council. previously, if the president wished to remove the chairman (prime minister), as a condition, he had to dismiss the entire government as well (teague 2020, 326). the european commission for democracy through law (known as the "venice commission"), an advisory body for the council of europe, has warned that under the new constitutional amendments, “the lack of regulation of the removal process in the constitution, appears to increase the possibility of influence of the executive over the constitutional court (european commission for democracy through law 2020, 17).” in reference to trochev and solomon’s authoritarian constitutionalist balancing act, the constitutional changes have allowed “the regime of political expediency” (2018, 202) to expand its power over “the constitutional regime,” (202) severely offsetting the duality of the two regimes by threatening judicial independence and constitutionalism. amended article 107(3) grants the rcc power to exercise a “preventive constitutional review by request of the president” (mishina 2020). the president has formally and constitutionally enlisted the rcc to help him block federal laws he dislikes while removing parliament’s ability to overcome a presidential “super veto” (teague 2020, 324). grigoriev has noted that while the amendment appears redundant since the president controls the duma, it is an effective failsafe in case the opposition should gain a larger representation in parliament (grigoriev 2021, 47). previously, the rcc maintained a balancing act by presenting itself as an effective defence against international encroachment as a quid pro quo for judicial autonomy on other issues. now, the rcc is increasingly being directly employed by the government as an apparatus of power and losing judicial autonomy altogether. the most notorious of the amendments, article 81(3-1) limits presidential terms to two per individual but also resets putin’s clock by nullifying his past presidential terms. this means he could run again for president in 2024 and 2030, potentially extending his term in office until 2036, at which point he will be 84 years old (grigoriev 2021, 28). the constitutional amendments in 2020 have firmly subjugated the rcc under government control, dissolving the prior balancing act and duality between the constitutional regime and the 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 regime of political expediency in russia. the amendments signal a “re-sovietization” of the russian legislature and negates the initial efforts in 1993 to commit to norms of international law, principles of democratization, and constitutional rights and freedoms. the amendments signal a clear disregard of international treaties and laws by subordinating them to the interests of national sovereignty. the president has not only significantly expanded his own powers and influence on all executive branches but has also made it far more difficult to strip him of his immunity once his presidency ends. amended article 93 now requires that in order for a president to be “deprived of immunity,” he must be charged with “high treason or of commission of another serious crime” (article 93(1) of the constitution of the rf 2020). this decision must be passed by a two-thirds majority in the upper house and at least one third vote of the state duma (article 93(2) of the constitution of the rf 2020). the charge must be confirmed by the supreme court as well as concluded by the constitutional court. for context, there have been a sum total of three attempts of impeachment (“two in 1993 under the 1978 constitution of the rsfsr and one in 1999” (mishina, 2020, 99) and in all attempts they never managed to collect enough votes. with the new amendments, the feat would require such an orchestration of government members upon which the president has direct termination control over, it has been rendered impossible, unless the judges, chairpersons, and deputy chairpersons are willing to “[pay] with their posts” (mishina 2020, 92). dissenting opinions by november 2020, the state duma passed amendments to the federal constitutional law “on the constitutional court of the russian federation” to prohibit the publication of dissenting opinions of rcc rulings (state duma committee on state building and legislation 2020). though rcc rulings are passed by a majority vote, individual judges could previously publish dissenting opinions expressing their disagreement in written form. they carry no legal force and are usually added to the case file and published along with the rcc’s final decision. the law does not ban dissenting opinions outright, but they are no longer publicized and will be accessible only in archives and out of the public eye. this carries severe legal consequences as it undermines the independence of the judiciary and undercuts the principles of open justice and pluralism. silencing dissenting opinions also means rcc judgments will appear unanimous should the rcc need to refuse future yukos decisions. amicus curiae on january 28, 2021, the rcc removed paragraph 34.1 on legal organizations and legal academics and scholars providing opinions on cases from their rules of procedure, thus ending the practice of amicus curiae (friends of the court) (rosbiznesconsulting 2021). while legal scholars and independent experts will no longer be able to present opinions to trials of public interest, the rcc is not rejecting opinions from government agencies. this development stands in stark contrast to the past, when in spite of protest from putin’s lawyers, rcc judges would request amicus curiae submissions on politically sensitive cases from ngos that the government had attempted to silence politically (trochev and solomon 2018, 201). former constitutional court judge tamara morshchakova noted how the regulations on amicus curiae reflected the readiness of the rcc to take into account views on issues of public importance and recognize citizen participation in state affairs. she noted that the court is now holding closed sessions and denying trial participants access to relevant evidence and case materials without justification. access to forensic information is also becoming increasingly restricted (shturma 2021). the removal of amicus curiae only strengthens this process of restricting citizen participation and access to legal proceedings of public 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 interest. legal scholars agree that this development is unnecessary, seriously harms the credibility of the rcc, and cements the perception of the rcc as a vehicle of the government (rights in russia 2021; nagornaia 2021). conclusion in conclusion, the constitutional changes have transformed the rcc’s relationship with the russian presidency. designed to strengthen domestic defences of national sovereignty against international encroachment, the constitutional changes have offset the rcc’s balancing act of judicial pragmatism with the state by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. among the possible reasons behind these changes are the yukos trials. although trochev and solomon convincingly argued that the rcc has thus far maintained authoritarian constitutionalism in russia by navigating a balancing act and catering to government needs in order to exercise limited judicial autonomy, that balancing act has now been offset by the recent constitutional changes. the new amendments and constitutional changes have removed the necessary checks and balances which allow for judicial autonomy of the rcc by formally erasing the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. in particular, the changes directly countermand the efficacy of the rcc in its balancing act by reducing their efficiency, removing their ability to publish dissent, and empowering the rcc to function as a vehicle of the government. without an independent judiciary and clear separation of powers between branches of state governance, the balancing act has been nullified. this bodes severe consequences for the rule of law in russia and threatens the constitutional rights and freedoms of russian citizens and private enterprises. the extent to which russia has successfully dodged the yukos ruling and neutralized rcc judicial autonomy has severe implications for the effectiveness of human rights advocacy and state accountability in international tribunals. this study on the constitutional changes and eradication of authoritarian constitutionalism in russia raises further questions on what mechanisms are available for rights advocates to seek justice in the face of this challenge. what does this mean for victims who initiate or have initiated legal proceedings against powerful states in international courts and the subsequent enforcement of politically unsavoury rulings? what can stakeholders of international justice do to adjust to these challenges? the growing leniency from the institutional bodies themselves in reaction to the backlash and tightening of state sovereignty raises further questions on the integrity of international legal institutions and their efficacy in rights protection in the future. it is also likely that resistance against international judicial mechanisms and the eradication of rcc judicial autonomy are linked to ngo repression in russia. further study of the functioning of the rcc in russia and reactions to the yukos trials (especially how they will progress beyond the supreme court of the netherlands) could contribute to the dialogue between academics and rights activists on how resistance and backlash affect legal mobilization for rights advocates in civil society and the legitimacy of international human rights systems. 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 references aksenova, marina, and iryna marchuk. 2018. “reinventing or rediscovering international law? the russian constitutional court’s uneasy dialogue with the european court of human rights.” international journal of constitutional law 16 (4): 1322–46. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moy088. anchugov and gladkov v. russia. 2013. no. 11157/04 and 15162/05, echr. bowring, bill. 2020. “russia and the european convention (or court) of human rights: the end?” revue québécoise de droit international (december): 201–18. https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rqdi/2020-rqdi06138/1078537ar.pdf . carothers, thomas. 2002. “the end of the transition paradigm.” journal of democracy 13 (1): 5–21. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0003. chernykh, lucy. 2011. “profit or politics? understanding renationalizations in russia.” journal of corporate finance 17 (5): 1237–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.009. crouch, melissa. 2020. “pre-emptive constitution-making: authoritarian constitutionalism and the military in myanmar.” law & society review 54 (2): 487–515. https://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12471. davis, dennis m. 2019. “authoritarian constitutionalism: the south african experience.” in authoritarian constitutionalism, edited by helena alviar garcía and günter frankenberg, 57–75. cheltenham: edward elgar publishing. https://www-elgaronlinecom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/view/edcoll/9781788117845/9781788117845.00008.xm l. diamond, larry. 2002. “elections without democracy: thinking about hybrid regimes.” journal of democracy 13 (2): 21–35. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0025. european commission for democracy through law (venice commission). 2020. “opinion on the draft amendments to the constitution (as signed by the president of the russian federation on 14 march 2020) related to the execution in the russian federation of decisions by the european court of human rights." https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdlad(2020)009-e. ———. 2021. russian federation constitution. https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-the-russianfederation-en/1680a1a237. ———. 2016. “russian federation judgment no. 12-п/2016 of 19 april 2016 of the constitutional court.” https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdlref(2016)033-e. "federal'nyĭ zakon o poluchenii ks prava priznavat' resheniia mezhdunarodnykh sudov neispolnimymi. federal'nyĭ zakon o vnesenii izmeniniĭ v fz 'o konstitutsionnom sude rossiĭskoĭ federatsii'" [federal law on the constitutional court obtaining the right to recognize decisions of international courts as unenforceable. the federal act on amending the federal act 'on the constitutional court of the russian federation']. 2015. rossiĭskaia gazeta. https://rg.ru/2015/12/15/ks-site-dok.html. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moy088 https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rqdi/2020-rqdi06138/1078537ar.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.009 https://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12471 https://www-elgaronline-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/view/edcoll/9781788117845/9781788117845.00008.xml https://www-elgaronline-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/view/edcoll/9781788117845/9781788117845.00008.xml https://www-elgaronline-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/view/edcoll/9781788117845/9781788117845.00008.xml https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0025 https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2020)009-e https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2020)009-e https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-the-russian-federation-en/1680a1a237 https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-the-russian-federation-en/1680a1a237 https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ref(2016)033-e https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ref(2016)033-e https://rg.ru/2015/12/15/ks-site-dok.html 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 grigoriev, ivan s. 2021. “what changes for the constitutional court with the new russian constitution?” russian politics 6 (1): 27–49. https://doi.org/10.30965/2451892100601003. gustafson, thane. 2012. wheel of fortune. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. https://www-degruytercom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/document/doi/10.4159/harvard.9780674068018/html. hendley, kathryn. 2017. everyday law in russia. ithaca: cornell university press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docid=4813218. hirst v. the united kingdom. 2005. (no. 2), no. 74025/01, echr 681. isachenkov, vladimir. 2020. “putin fast-tracks effort to extend his rule in russia.” associated press news, january 16, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-newsrussia-constitutions-business-8a93f5457f64b46fc3a4d142c6478198. isiksel, turkuler. 2013. “between text and context: turkey’s tradition of authoritarian constitutionalism.” international journal of constitutional law 11 (3): 702–26. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mot024. kalinichenko, paul, and dimitry vladimirovich kochenov. 2021. “amendments to the 1993 constitution of the russian federation concerning international law (2020).” international legal materials 60 (2): 341–46. https://doi.org/10.1017/ilm.2021.10. khalikova, yulia. 2020. “russia’s censored judges.” riddle russia, december 4, 2020. https://www.ridl.io/en/russia-s-censored-judges/. kornya, anastasia. 2017. "otkaz ot vypolneniia reshenii espch ne stanet reguliarnoĭ praktikoĭ" [refusal to comply with ecthr decisions will not become a regular practice]. vedomosti, january 20, 2017. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/01/20/673787-otkazreshenii-espch. krimmer, maren. 2020. “the yukos arbitration saga and russia’s constitutional amendments.” juridica international 29: 86–94. https://juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2020_29_86.pdf. levitsky, steven, and lucan a. way. 2010. competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the cold war (problems of international politics). cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511781353. ———. 2002. “elections without democracy: the rise of competitive authoritarianism.” journal of democracy 13 (2): 51–65. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0026. mälksoo, lauri. 2021. “international law and the 2020 amendments to the russian constitution.” american journal of international law 115 (1): 78–93. https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.87. ———. 2016. “russia’s constitutional court defies the european court of human rights: constitutional court of the russian federation judgment of 14 july 2015, no 21п/2015.” european constitutional law review 12 (2): 377–95. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1574019616000237. marchuk, iryna. 2020. “powerful states and international law: changing narratives and power https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00601003 https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00601003 https://www-degruyter-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/document/doi/10.4159/harvard.9780674068018/html https://www-degruyter-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/document/doi/10.4159/harvard.9780674068018/html http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docid=4813218 https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-russia-constitutions-business-8a93f5457f64b46fc3a4d142c6478198 https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-russia-constitutions-business-8a93f5457f64b46fc3a4d142c6478198 https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mot024 https://doi.org/10.1017/ilm.2021.10 https://www.ridl.io/en/russia-s-censored-judges/ https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/01/20/673787-otkaz-reshenii-espch https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/01/20/673787-otkaz-reshenii-espch https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511781353 https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0026 https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.87 https://doi.org/10.1017/s1574019616000237 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 struggles in international courts.” uc davis journal of international law and policy 26 (1): 65–97. mishina, ekaterina. 2020. “how putin’s constitutional amendments affect the judiciary.” institute of modern russia, august 4, 2020. https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/3147-howputin%e2%80%99s-constitutional-amendments-affect-the-judiciary. ———. 2020. the long shadows of the soviet past: a picture of judicial reforms in the transition era. moscow: liberal mission foundation. https://liberal.ru/wpcontent/uploads/legacy/files/articles/7689/the_long_shadows_of_the_soviet_past_final. pdf. nagornaia, marina. 2021. "konstitutsionnyĭ sud otkazalsia ot instituta amicus curiae" [the constitutional court abandons the institute amicus curiae]. advokatskaia gazeta, february 3, 2021. https://www.advgazeta.ru/novosti/konstitutsionnyy-sud-otkazalsya-ot-institutaamicus-curiae/. newton, scott. 2019. “plus ça change…the riddle of all central asian constitutions.” in authoritarian constitutionalism, edited by helena alviar garcía and günter frankenberg, 209–39. cheltenham: edward elgar publishing. oao neftyanaya kompaniya yukos v russia. 2014. no. 14902/04, echr. organisation for economic co-operation and development. 2006. oecd economic surveys: russian federation 2006. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/eco_surveysrus-2006-en. ———. 2014. oecd economic surveys: russian federation 2013. https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-rus-2013-en. palombino, fulvio maria. 2019. “introduction.” in duelling for supremacy: international law vs. national fundamental principles, edited by fulvio maria palombino, 1–5. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108601245.001. partlett, william, and mikhail krasnov. 2019. “russia’s non-transformative constitutional founding.” european constitutional law review 15 (4): 644–67. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1574019619000403. pichl, maximilian. 2019. “constitution of false prophecies: the illiberal transformation of hungary.” in authoritarian constitutionalism, edited by helena alviar garcía and günter frankenberg, 240–64. cheltenham, uk: edward elgar publishing. popova, maria. 2017. “putin-style ‘rule of law’ & the prospects for change.” daedalus 146 (2): 64–75. https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00435. posner, richard a. 1995. overcoming law. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. "postanovlenie konstitutsionnogo suda rossiĭskoĭ federatsii ot 14 iiulia 2015 no. 21-p g. sanktpeterburg 'po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti polozheniĭ stat'i 1 federal'nogo zakona 'o ratifikatsii konventsii o zashchite prav cheloveka i osnovnykh svobod i protokolov k neĭ', punktov 1 i 2 stat'i 32 federal'nogo zakona 'o mezhdunarodnykh dogovorakh rossiĭskoĭ federatsii', chasteĭ pervoĭ i chetvertoĭ stat'i 11, punkta 4 chasti chetvertoĭ stat'i 392 grazhdanskogo protsessual'nogo kodeksa rossiĭskoĭ federatsii, chasteĭ 1 i 4 stat'i 13, punkta 4 chasti 3 stat'i 311 arbitrazhnogo protsessual'nogo kodeksa rossiĭskoĭ federatsii, chasteĭ 1 i 4 stat'i 15, punkta 4 chasti 1 stat'i 350 kodeksa administrativnogo https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/3147-how-putin%e2%80%99s-constitutional-amendments-affect-the-judiciary https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/3147-how-putin%e2%80%99s-constitutional-amendments-affect-the-judiciary https://liberal.ru/wp-content/uploads/legacy/files/articles/7689/the_long_shadows_of_the_soviet_past_final.pdf https://liberal.ru/wp-content/uploads/legacy/files/articles/7689/the_long_shadows_of_the_soviet_past_final.pdf https://liberal.ru/wp-content/uploads/legacy/files/articles/7689/the_long_shadows_of_the_soviet_past_final.pdf https://www.advgazeta.ru/novosti/konstitutsionnyy-sud-otkazalsya-ot-instituta-amicus-curiae/ https://www.advgazeta.ru/novosti/konstitutsionnyy-sud-otkazalsya-ot-instituta-amicus-curiae/ https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/eco_surveys-rus-2006-en https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/eco_surveys-rus-2006-en https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-rus-2013-en https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108601245.001 https://doi.org/10.1017/s1574019619000403 https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00435 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 sudoproizvodstva rossiĭskoĭ federatsii i punkta 2 chasti chetvertoĭ stat'i 413 ugolovnoprotsessual'nogo kodeksa rossiĭskoĭ federatsii v sviazi s zaprosom gruppy deputatov gosudarstvennoĭ dumy'" [the decision of the constitutional court of the russian federation of july 14, 2015, № 21-п in saint petersburg "re the judgment on the constitutionality of section 1 of the federal act 'on the ratification of the convention on the protection of human rights and basic freedoms and protocols,' paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 32 of the federal act 'on international agreements of the russian federation,' part 1 and 4 of section 11, paragraph 4 of part 4 of section 392 of the code of civil procedure of the russian federation, part 1 and 4 of section 13, paragraph 4 of part 3 of section 311 of the code of arbitration procedure of the russian federation, part 1 and 3 of section 15, paragraph 4 of part 1 of section 350 of the code of the administrative legal proceeding of the russian federation and paragraph 2 of part 4 of section 413 of the code of criminal procedure of the russian federation initiated by a group of members of the state duma]. rossiĭskaya gazeta. https://rg.ru/documents/2015/07/27/ks-dok.html. "postanovlenie konstitutsionnogo suda rossiĭskoĭ federatsii ot 19.01.2017 № 1-п po delu o razreshenii voprosa o vozmozhnosti ispolneniia v sootvetstvii s konstitutsieĭ rossiĭskoĭ federatsii postanovleniia evropeĭskogo suda po pravam cheloveka ot 31 iiulia 2014 goda po delu 'oao 'neftianaia kompaniia 'iukos' protiv rossii' v sviazi s zaprosom ministerstva iustitsii rossiĭskoĭ federatsii" [the decision of the constitutional court of the russian federation of 19.01.2017 no. 1-п regarding the resolution of the question of the possibility to execute in accordance with the constitution of the russian federation the judgment of the european court of human rights of july 31, 2014 in the case of 'oao 'oil company 'yukos' v. russia concerning the request of the ministry of justice of the russian federation]. 2017. ofitsial'nyĭ internet-portal pravovoĭ informatsii. http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/view/0001201701200011. rosbiznesconsulting. 2021. "ks reshil otkazat'sia ot instituta 'druzej suda'" [the constitutional court decided to abandon the institute 'friends of the court']. february 4, 2021. https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/601b7c7d9a7947e57550f040. rights in russia. 2021. “constitutional court decides to do away with the practice of ‘amicus curiae.’” february 23, 2021. http://www.rightsinrussia.org/amicus-curiae/. sakwa, richard. 2020. the putin paradox. london, uk: bloomsbury publishing. schedler, andreas. 2006. electoral authoritarianism. boulder: lynne rienner publishers. schmitter, philippe c. 1994. “dangers and dilemmas of democracy.” journal of democracy 5 (2): 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1994.0036. sherwin, emily. 2020. “russian parliament fast-tracks putin’s constitutional changes.” deutsche welle, january 23, 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/russian-parliament-fast-tracksputins-constitutional-changes/a-52106277. shturma, iana. 2021. "konstitutsionnyĭ sud vybral odinochestvo" [the constitutional court chose solitude]. gazeta.ru, february 4, 2021. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2021/02/04/13466756.shtml. sim, li-chen. 2008. the rise and fall of privatization in the russian oil industry. london, uk: palgrave macmillan. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docid=455418. smirnova, maria. 2019. “russia.” in duelling for supremacy, edited by fulvio maria https://rg.ru/documents/2015/07/27/ks-dok.html http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/view/0001201701200011 https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/601b7c7d9a7947e57550f040 http://www.rightsinrussia.org/amicus-curiae/ https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1994.0036 https://www.dw.com/en/russian-parliament-fast-tracks-putins-constitutional-changes/a-52106277 https://www.dw.com/en/russian-parliament-fast-tracks-putins-constitutional-changes/a-52106277 https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2021/02/04/13466756.shtml http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utoronto/detail.action?docid=455418 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 palombino, 1st edition, 297–319. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108601245.016. ———. 2015. “russian constitutional court affirms russian constitution’s supremacy over ecthr decisions.” ejil: talk!, july 15, 2015. https://www.ejiltalk.org/russianconstitutional-court-affirms-russian-constitutions-supremacy-over-ecthr-decisions/. state duma committee on state building and legislation. 2020. “o vnesenii izmeneniĭ v federal'nyĭ konstitutsionnyĭ zakon 'o konstitutsionnom sude rossiĭskoĭ federatsii' [v chasti privedeniia v sootvetstvie s polozheniiami konstitutsii rossiĭskoĭ federatsii)" [on amendments to the federal constitutional law 'on the constitutional court of the russian federation' (in terms of bringing it in line with the provisions of the constitution of the russian federation)]. https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/1024643-7. teague, elizabeth. 2020. “russia’s constitutional reforms of 2020.” russian politics 5 (3): 301– 28. https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00503003. the russian federation v. veteran petroleum limited, yukos universal limited, hulley enterprises limited. 2016. no. c/09/477160 / ha za 15-1, c/09/477162 / ha za 15-2, c/09/481619 / ha za 15-112. the hague district court. tompson, william. 2005. “putting yukos in perspective.” post-soviet affairs 21 (2): 159–81. https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.21.2.159. trochev, alexei, and peter h. solomon. 2018. “authoritarian constitutionalism in putin’s russia: a pragmatic constitutional court in a dual state.” communist and post-communist studies 51 (3): 201–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.06.002. tushnet, mark. 2015. “authoritarian constitutionalism.” cornell law review 100 (2): 391–462. united states department of state – bureau of economic and business affairs. 2021. “2021 investment climate statements: russia." https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-investmentclimate-statements/russia/. veteran petroleum limited, yukos universal limited, hulley enterprises limited v. the russian federation. 2020. no. 200.197.079/01. the hague court of appeal. voeten, erik. 2020. “populism and backlashes against international courts.” perspectives on politics 18 (2): 407–22. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592719000975. yukos universal limited (isle of man) v. the russian federation. 2014. no. aa 227. permanent court of arbitration. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108601245.016 https://www.ejiltalk.org/russian-constitutional-court-affirms-russian-constitutions-supremacy-over-ecthr-decisions/ https://www.ejiltalk.org/russian-constitutional-court-affirms-russian-constitutions-supremacy-over-ecthr-decisions/ https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/1024643-7 https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00503003 https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.21.2.159 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.06.002 https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-investment-climate-statements/russia/ https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-investment-climate-statements/russia/ https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592719000975 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 24-41 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 curating russia: the shchukin collection, the nation, and border crossing across regimes leah rasmussen1 university of maryland, college park abstract russia’s place in the world endured dramatic shocks over transitions between tsarist, soviet, and post-soviet regimes. questions of identity and nation consumed cultural and political elites alike. art plays a critical role within the state not only for its financial value, but also as a source of power. this article investigates how the russian federation employs this artistic cultural heritage through its use and displays of the collection of late tsarist moscow merchant sergei shchukin. these holdings enable the russian state and cultural leaders to participate in an increasingly globalized art world. leading western museums compete to exhibit henri matisse’s pivotal painting, dance, commissioned by shchukin and remaining in russia throughout the tsarist and soviet periods, ending up in the hermitage museum. throughout russian and soviet history, western european art has served as a cultural legitimizing force that ties both the country and its history to the artistic traditions of the west, which retains a dominant position in the global art world. 1 leah rasmussen is a phd student at the department of history at the university of maryland – college park 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 introduction speaking to author pavel buryshkin from exile in paris in the 1930s, sergei shchukin relayed “i have not been collecting only for myself and all for myself but also for my country and my nation. whatever happens in our country, my collection should stay there…” (cited in boguslavskij 1995, 328). nation has been invoked across russian regimes as a critical concept in russia’s self-identity and its global interactions with the west. in recent years, the cultural diplomatic efforts of the russian federation have increased, reflecting its desire to showcase its national patrimony and inclusion as a european state. this article traces henri matisse’s dance, commissioned by moscow merchant and art collector sergei shchukin in 1909. it highlights important themes in russian art, culture, and transnational relations to understand how the art of one nation can become central to the national patrimony of another. the arrival of matisse’s canvas in moscow, with its bright, illuminated nude figures, served to liberate russian avant-garde artists from the bounds of european convention and tradition, linking their peripheral city to the french artistic core. following the 1917 russian revolution, the canvas that marked a turning point in the history of modern art was retained and nationalized by the soviet state and would, over the course of the twentieth century, be subject to the restrictive legislations of a regime that sought strict control over cultural goods. dance’s movement through the soviet era nonetheless endowed it with accumulated meaning both in its place and power within a soviet russian cultural patrimony. dance’s re-emergence in the west following the end of the union of soviet socialist republics (ussr) became a significant global cultural event. century-long contestations over its presence and place within the russian national patrimony deepened in the post-soviet era as challenges were launched against the 1917 nationalization decrees that had inducted dance into both the national heritage and the state’s currency reserves. art plays a critical role in discourses of national culture. multiple nations and regimes have staked claims to dance as part of their national patrimony including those of tsarist russia, the ussr, the russian federation, france, and europe more broadly. matisse is considered to play a defining role in the course of the history of modern art. dance gained prominence over time as it was subject to the will of the state and was celebrated by educated societies in russia and abroad and coveted by those who sought to retrieve and view it. as a result of art’s ability to cross borders and take residency within national institutions, multiple claims could co-exist as to the place of dance within national patrimonies. from 1991, close to a century after sergei shchukin commissioned dance and hung it in the staircase of his moscow home, the russian federation has taken extraordinary measures to protect its prized possession. whereas russia recognizes and defends the place of dance within its borders and patrimony, seeking to challenge the power mechanisms of core-peripheral culture relations, western exhibitions claim it singularly as a product of france, of the west, ignoring its duality and celebrating its return. the relationship between national and transnational emerges as a complicated yet critical pathway to understanding the importance of dance and the complexity of russian national culture and its place within global pantheons of art. this article uses dance to support and extend to the present homi bhabha’s view that “in the fin de siècle, we find ourselves in the moment of transit, where space and time cross to produce complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion” (1994, 2). the production and relations of power complicate this transit, with a clear european center that leaves russia on its artistic margins and a peripheralized national patrimony. edith clowes argues that russian ideas of self and other in the post-soviet era remain a work in progress. russians at once consider russia as a global cultural center but recognize that it is not 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 seen that way in the west (clowes 2011). russian and soviet views, the western gaze, and ideas of national patrimony have evolved across time and regimes. chike c. aniakor writes that “[a]rt objects are historical documents. they reflect the social and historical conditions of their creation…” (1995, 436). this article argues that the moment of creation is complicated and cannot be seen as stagnant. aniakor challenges us to consider the intertwined historical, societal, and political context of works of art. this article follows hannah barbosa cesnik in “[r]ecognizing cultural patrimony as active rather than passive opens the possibility of ownership to something beyond constructed national borders but less than a global-free for all” (2021). finally, i recognize important recent work that places collectors at the center of moving art across borders (quodbach 2020). this article argues that sergei shchukin—even as a collector on the periphery— played a singularly important role in building the patrimonies of western europe and russia as well as propelling russian art in new directions. these directions continue to gain international recognition nearly a century after joseph stalin stopped the innovations of the avant-garde in their tracks. this article culminates in the 2008 from russia: french and russian master paintings exhibit at the royal academy of arts in london, moving through time and space to see how dance and related works were understood and identified with over a century. an interview conducted with co-curator of from russia, ann dumas, offers insight into the legal and cultural environment of the exhibit. this article also uses hermitage director mikhail piotrovsky’s memoir and a work coauthored by shchukin’s grandson, andré-marc delocque. i seek to determine the value that modern french art has come to develop within the russian patrimony—how the national and transnational blend and how pre-revolutionary modern art survived multiple controversies to emerge as a strong symbol of russian heritage. collecting the nation sergei shchukin’s purchase of a landscape by claude monet from french art dealer paul durandruel in 1898 marked a “decisive breakthrough in the russian art world’s relationship to modern western art” (dorontchenkov 2009, 1). before this point, russian artists and collectors had seen russian art as separate from europe; now, with shchukin’s purchase and the “drive towards the west” of sergei diaghilev and the artists from the world of art collective (1898-9), russian art redefined itself within a wider european art pantheon. shchukin and his contemporary, ivan morozov, both textile merchants from moscow and outsiders to the russian art world, turned to the west, to the art of france for their market. they rapidly earned international acclaim for their eye and approach in amassing two of the “best and largest collections of contemporary french art in all of europe” (dorontchenkov 2009, 77). each encountered broad resistance as they collected contemporary and provocative works of art. shchukin continued his focus on french art, setting as his goal to assemble one of the most significant, transnational collections anywhere in europe. in doing so he would place russia squarely at the forefront of collecting practices and a modern artistic world. shchukin’s early collecting was defined by the canvases of paul gauguin, claude monet, and vincent van gogh. he collected impressionists until 1904 before turning to post-impressionism. in 1903, shchukin brought to russia the work of paul cézanne, an artist who would become revered by the russian avant-garde and whose influence on the russian art scene endured through the soviet era (reid 2001, 153-184). shchukin’s tastes were fluid, responding quickly to european tides and advancements in contemporary art, which he began purchasing in 1906 with his first 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 work by henri matisse. shchukin’s singular focus on the future led matisse’s dance to cross russia’s borders and become a central piece in its national patrimony and achieve a critical, enduring role in the global history of modern art. figure 1: henri matisse, 1909, dance ii henri matisse, 1909, dance ii. collection of the state hermitage museum, st. petersburg. wikimedia commons. accessed april 18, 2022. public resistance to shchukin’s collections mounted as artists found inspiration in the influx of french art fresh from the studio. the foreignness of his canvasses jolted visitors who toured the collections in his home, which he opened to the public on sundays beginning in 1909. one of shchukin’s guests “marked up the painting of c. monet with a pencil in protest against the impressionists” (shchukin 1913, 38). such intense reactions from visitors demonstrated that while the pieces earned the russian collectors a privileged place on the world stage, sections of the russian public did not accept the paintings. as in europe, impressionist art faced hostility to its challenges of accepted styles and perhaps, in the case of russia, patriotic feelings. shchukin’s home emerged nonetheless as an ersatz academy of modern art, attracting students and members of the educated public and inspiring russia’s own modernist turn through galleries that captured in their entirety the development of select artists. in 1909, shchukin commissioned the first of two works from henri matisse, at the time a relatively unknown artist amongst the european avant-garde. shchukin reveled in how his role as a collector enabled him to enter the paris studios and galleries to discover artists and elevate their careers (armand hammer foundation, 1986). dance, a large-scale mural, was slated for the staircase of shchukin’s home. matisse’s dance represented his mastery of colour as he balanced a near imperceptible sophistication overridden by the primitive, almost barbaric, scene captured in his pivotal work. the naked figures in dance caused a scandal when first publicly displayed at the salon d’automne in 1910 as they confronted and drastically altered not only the proportions of the human form but also represented complete physical abandonment in their hypnotic dance. the russian critic of the newspaper odessky listok (odessa news) described the scene in paris: 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 explosions of indignation, anger and raillery are incessant around these pictures. in effect, their toxic colours give the impression of a demonic cacophony, whilst the lines, which are simplified to such a point that they almost disappear, and the astonishingly ugly shapes, express the painter’s idea in a way that is both rash and insistent. the world created by matisse in his naively cannibalistic panels is, i have to say, frankly distasteful. (cited in semenova and delocque 2018, 174) shchukin himself initially recoiled at the painting’s apparent barbaric nature, nearly cancelling the commission out of fear of public opinion and the attention it would draw upon its transport to moscow. he shook off fears of offending the russian orthodox church and other conservative elements in moscow, writing to matisse: “i find your panel dance of such nobility that i am resolved to brave our bourgeois opinion and to hang on my staircase a subject with nudes” (kostenevich 1990, 39). for artists in russia, dance both symbolized and enabled their emancipation. the artists who had emerged out of moscow’s studios during these years—natalia goncharova, mikhail larionov, vasily kandinsky, and marc chagall— still worked to evoke a sense of russianness through established tradition in works they exported to the west and had yet to challenge french artists’ technical mastery. in the free forms of matisse’s dancing figures, the conventions that had governed modern art were dismantled. russian artists, no longer bound by european criteria to create within the realms or “isms” characterizing the european avant-garde, moved to infiltrate the european-dominated scene (dorontchenkov 2009). alexandre benois captured this dynamic in an article written for rech’ (speech) in 1911 where he wrote that while it is possible for artists to learn or achieve “perfection” through imitation, they “cannot learn something in order to unlearn it” (benois 2009, 104-105). in other words, the creativity and ingenuity required to achieve the success of the french could not be attained by the russians if they continued to merely mimic and avoid necessary experimentation on the canvas. however, the import of dance, its crudeness and simplicity, offered a path other than mimicry and the efforts to raise themselves and russian art to the caliber of the french. benois elaborates on the freedoms attained in matisse’s work: when you recall all the crudeness, provincialism, and absurdity there is in [russian] art you can become frightened and begin to share in the general alarm that the parisian example will muddle our very uncultured artistic youth. but now there is also hope. what if it is this crudeness and simplicity that matisse wants to acquire by force and that we already have that will save us by creating in us that desirable “childlike disposition” out of which new art is to emerge? (benois 2009, 104-105) through these primitive forms, matisse made the modern art world accessible to russian artists. it allowed them to bypass the technical mastery that earlier modern art forms had seemingly required, even with their looser strokes. in the same way that matisse wanted to be seen as “worthy of creating his own new traditions, of starting anew,” (benois 2009, 104-105) so did the russian avant-garde who took from him, from shchukin’s panels, permission to break free and carve their place on the global stage. shchukin had captured and imported works from the west before the paint was even dry with the express purpose of exposing russian artists to the bold strokes of the french avant-garde and their new definitions of art. shchukin sought to inspire and expose, and leave the artists to form their own mind, their own response, more directly and concurrently than had previously been possible 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 because of russia’s distance from the ateliers of paris. however, shchukin’s singular focus on the french scene evoked disdain, even from those who benefitted from his collections. vasily kandinsky, who in 1908 was the first artist to write about the descent into pure abstraction, grew increasingly annoyed with shchukin’s disinterest in what he considered the equally innovative and inspired works of the russian avant-garde. convinced his abstracts were “just as good” as matisse’s, kandinsky wrote to his friend gabriele munter: shchukin never buys anything from me. he is a long way from sharing our ideas. i think that only artists who have been hugely successful in paris can awaken his interest. but where is such success to be found today? he believes that the two greatest contemporary artists are matisse and picasso. apparently, he doesn’t think about me, truly. nevertheless, my composition 2 and 5 would fit in very nicely at this place: i can see them there already. (cited in semenova and delocque 2018, 221) this ambivalence proliferated among russian artists, whose works were left unpurchased by shchukin and therefore remained unrepresented on the walls of his home, which had gained recognition as a temple of modernity. questions of patriotism, nationality, and a national patrimony remained open and controversial. did shchukin’s commissions, as a russian citizen, entrench these works as russian? this question of what makes a piece of art national remains unclear in art history even today. shchukin’s collection resonated within and beyond russia’s borders for its ability to break down the barriers to the contemporary art scene that resulted from the country’s distance from europe. the art of the commission itself speaks to a creativity, a boldness, and an active participation in the creation of a work that, this article argues, makes the commissioner an actor in its production. if we take this to be the case, then shchukin’s commissions, most particularly that of dance and music, can be labelled or considered as russian artistic productions, in line with those produced by russian artists even as the artist is himself french. the placement of the works in shchukin’s house and their visibility to both artists and the public alike sparked a wave of creative innovation that remains recognized as critical to russian national culture over a century later. the first world war stopped shchukin’s activity as a collector; however, he assumed the role of mentor, commentator, and guide for russian artists and sought to act as an enlightener of moscow’s public. leaders of the artistic scene in russia considered shchukin as “one of their number” even as his colleague ivan morozov, who collected the works of russians, was not (semenova and delocque 2018, 221). in the first seventeen years of the twentieth century, shchukin’s collecting had easily outpaced collectors in europe as well as russia. he had collected works snubbed by the then major art institutions and galleries of the west. the war and the subsequent 1917 bolshevik revolution scarred shchukin, whose tastes and position in society were under threat by new state ideologies. uncertain of a bolshevik future, shchukin left the country shortly after the revolution. in his wake he was forced to abandon his business and holdings, including his art collection, which had grown to 225 works by the first world war, consisting mainly of prominent french artists. by this time, shchukin’s efforts had already succeeded in closing the gap between a european artistic core and a russian periphery. though he would never again collect art with the same frenzied passion exhibited in his moscow assemblage, shchukin, prior to his death in paris in 1936, fervently believed that the works he left behind should ultimately remain within russian borders (cited in boguslavskij 1995, 328). 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 patrimony and isolation in soviet russia the value and power that dance had gained from its place within shchukin’s home and the wider russian art community earned it a critical role within a russian national patrimony, which endured throughout the soviet period. the bolsheviks acknowledged the place of the painting and works collected by shchukin and morozov, nationalizing them and realizing their monetary value. in the post-stalin era, the state turned to art for its power to legitimize both the ussr’s superpower status and ostensibly global culture. despite the soviet state’s systematic removal of shchukin’s name and that of his legendary collection from public memory in russia and abroad, its prominence remained in the eyes of the educated elite both inside and beyond state borders, where these featured works retained their place within the western art pantheon. vladimir lenin signed a decree on october 29, 1918 to nationalize the shchukin collection, reframing it as one of state-led national and world importance. the decree read: considering the national importance of the shchukin’s art gallery, being the exceptional collection of the great european – predominantly french – masters of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century and recognizing its significance in the field of national education, the soviet of people’s commissioners decrees…the nationalization of the shchukin’s art gallery. (cited in boguslavskij 1995, 326) the decree, which also nationalized morozov’s collections, brought them and their properties under the all-russian collegium for the affairs of museums and the protection of monuments of art and antiquity (vserossiĭskaia kollegiia po delam muzeev i okhrane pamiatnikov iskusstva i stariny), a branch of the people’s commissariat for education (narodnyĭ komissariat prosveshcheniia), on december 19, 1918. nationalizing the collection confirmed the place that shchukin’s art had earned in the national— and now soviet— patrimony in its education of the public and ability to propel avant-garde artists who largely supported bolshevik rule and provided creative support. inventoried, the morozov and shchukin collections remained intact at their respective residences, the palaces being renamed the state museum of new western art no. 1 and 2 respectively (muzeĭ novoĭ zapadnoĭ zhivopisi, mnzzh 1 and 2). the museums were amalgamated into the former morozov residence and renamed the state museum of new western art (gosudarstvennyĭ muzeĭ novogo zapadnogo iskusstva, gmnzi) in 1923.2 the creation of a museum dedicated solely to the exhibition of modernist works was revolutionary. it stood as the first museum of modern art in the world, preceding by six years new york’s museum of modern art (moma).3 gmnzi reflected the bolshevik belief of the power of this art to attack western bourgeois conventions and simultaneously showcase soviet russia’s ability to capture and display works of global importance at a time when soviet innovation was the subject of western fascination. nevertheless, the museum also appeared to the public as one that highlighted western decadence, producing art of 2 there is some confusion with the dates of this preliminary stage of the amalgamation. some sources quote 1922 and some as 1923 for the year that the collections were administratively merged. at which time the museum’s abbreviation changed from mnzzh 1 and 2, to gmnzi. the amalgamation in different sources cites 1923 and 1928 as the possible dates of the physical amalgamation of the collections. this paper uses 1923 as the date. 3 the revolutionary nature of the state museum of new western art stood in its collections of european modernist works. though other establishments, including the vienna secession, had been exhibiting and introducing new movements including the modernists since the turn of the century, the establishment of a museum dedicated solely to modern art is what contributed to the distinction of the gmnzi. 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 such abstraction that it was seemingly divorced from social reality as it had been purchased by wealthy russian collectors. the communist leadership nonetheless refused calls to divide these works among state museums or to remove them from the public eye, seeing the potential of gmnzi to rival the hermitage in global importance (mileeva 2013). the soviet regime under stalin was desperate for revenue to finance economic modernization and turned to these impressive works of art as sources of income. works recognized as some of the most significant in the lives of select artists, including cézanne and van gogh, were sold off and would go on to reside in some of the world’s most prestigious institutions.4 an intense campaign to save dance from suffering the fate of many of its contemporaries succeeded through emphasizing the work’s intrinsic and symbolic value to the state (newestmuseum). despite the occasional sales of valued art, gmnzi, and the collections housed there, survived the 1930s and gained a certain notoriety as they were sent, along with most of the prominent museum collections of the state, to the urals prior to the nazi invasion during the second world war. this shift in dance from being recognized under lenin as a work of national importance within a new socialist patrimony to being seen under stalin for its monetary potential shifted its power from national education and pride to the national currency reserves. in 1946, the ussr launched campaigns against cosmopolitanism and formalism to blunt perceived dangers of western influence after the wartime alliance to defeat germany crumbled and the cold war began. gmnzi was closed, its collections divided between the pushkin museum in moscow and the state hermitage museum in leningrad (present-day saint petersburg). artworks once praised for their high quality and educational importance were now proclaimed as socially and dangerously destructive in the soviet council of ministers decree 672 on march 6, 1948: the formalist collections belonging to the museum of modern western art, bought in the countries of western europe by muscovite capitalists in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, have spread formalist views and the veneration of decadent bourgeois imperialist culture, causing severe damage to the development of russian soviet art... the council of ministers hereby decrees the full liquidation of the moscow state museum of modern western art. (cited in semenova and delocque 2018, 246) matisse’s dance, considered a subversion of bourgeois values four decades earlier, was now itself labeled as bourgeois. in challenging convention, the painting’s bright, joyous, and ambiguous figures appeared to threaten the cultural stability of stalin’s regime. labelled as alien, unknown, or even hostile, this art loomed over new soviet ideas even though their very existence had served to challenge former conventions of western art. dance and other works in shchukin’s collection left moscow for the “cultural capital” of leningrad. it was placed in storage in the state hermitage museum, out of view from the public in compliance with state orders. hidden away, this work became cemented in the soviet currency reserves. curators and liberal segments of the educated public considered this a dark turn in what they saw as a declining appreciation for culture and the simple tragedy of removing these works from the public eye (iavorskaia 2009, 307-309). 4 four of the most significant works sold during this period included cézanne’s portrait of madame cézanne in the greenhouse; van gogh’s night café from the morozov collection; degas’ the singer from the café concert; renoir’s the maid. the decree of the sale, dated may 9, 1933, was signed by the deputy chairman of the council of people’s commissars v.v. kuibuster (newest museum, n.d.). 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 the forced assimilation in the 1930s of soviet russian artists into socialist realism, a propagandistic style of art that stripped away individual advancements to the global field, had monumental repercussions for soviet culture. the assimilation effectively removed soviet russia from transnational conversations required to continue placing soviet art into the prominent place it held in the early bolshevik years and soviet art became othered in the global art world. stalin’s death and the subsequent de-stalinization echoed throughout the museums and galleries of the soviet union. the soviet government became dependent on pre-revolutionary western (predominantly french) art collected by morozov and shchukin to highlight their importance within the global realms of culture and art as befitting a postwar, post-stalinist superpower. works of modern art which had remained hidden following the decrees of the 1940s gradually emerged from museum storerooms. conventional, realist art arrived first, followed in the mid-1950s by the works of pablo picasso and henri matisse. dance once more assumed pride of place alongside its companion music in leningrad’s hermitage museum. the re-emergence of what many recognized to be a prized collection generated significant excitement, as the current director of the hermitage, mikhail piotrovsky, recalled: “as [khrushchev-era] political freedom grew, so did the radical nature of the paintings on show from sisley to picasso. for many it was a turning point in their understanding of art in general” (piotrovsky 2015, 238). just as they did prior to 1917, the cubist forms of picasso, the nude figures of gauguin, and the exaggerated forms of matisse sparked controversy amongst patrons who gathered in the exhibition halls on the hermitage’s third floor, which had become synonymous with modern art in the 1950s (piotrovsky 2015, 238). in the hermitage, the resistance to the restoration of modern art was led by artists and art historians clinging to stalinist ideology. they condemned both the prominent placement of works of matisse and others at the hermitage and the sending of select pieces abroad as part of pan-european art retrospectives. operating within the still-strict confines of the state’s cultural directives, museum staff, seeking political cover, claimed that these works displayed how western culture had degraded and fallen from the ideals of classicism praised in the soviet union. for some time, this logic, along with the powerful support the pieces received among members of the educated elite who recognized their global value, subdued opposition. in his memoir, piotrovsky (2015) highlighted an incident in 1963 when an angry commission from the academy of arts descended upon the hermitage, outraged by their presentation and hanging of the “barbaric” modern pieces (238). antonina izergina, the curator of french painting at the hermitage and the widow of late museum director iosif orbeli, stood before the commission and praised the significance of the shchukin collection in educating the masses. piotrovsky (2015) recalled the crowd being outraged by izergina’s words that culminated with her reading the decree signed in 1918 that had nationalized the shchukin collection and ended with the words “v.i. lenin” (242). the commission’s efforts to remove the paintings from public view and subsequent opposition failed, allowing these works to remain as critical touchstones for debate on not only the value and role of modernist art but also their place within a national museum. piotrovsky cites this as a point where these paintings assumed a solid place within russian national identity both in spite and because of their controversial nature (2015, 242). alongside these soviet internal debates, the artistic works that composed the shchukin and morozov collections remained vital measures of modernism in europe. after the re-emergence of these paintings to the hermitage, western institutions placed them high on their wish lists to be displayed in international exhibitions (wnet and alvin h. perlmutter inc 1973). in 1954, 54 picasso works from the shchukin and morozov collections were loaned to france for an exhibition 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 in paris entitled "picasso from the museums of leningrad and moscow and parisian collections," even as the works remained prohibited from view in the soviet union. the soviet government used dance and related works to present themselves as a european civilization. through invoking them once more into the global canon, the soviet union could advance an image that would portray it in an enlightened light. the paris exhibition faced an immediate and unexpected intervention from the heirs of sergei shchukin who resided in france and who challenged the legality of the soviet state’s ownership of works that had once belonged to their family. they claimed that the works were taken illegally under lenin’s nationalization decrees and without compensation (boguslavskij 1995, 325-341). the paris exhibition organizers took immediate action, removing works that pertained to the suit. they were rushed to the soviet embassy to protect them from any legal proceedings and the risk of confiscation. this legal threat circumscribed soviet desires to exhibit works of european importance—dance was never sent abroad despite multiple requests—and promote the state’s place as an advanced culture. several potential exchanges were negotiated throughout the 1950s and thereafter including between american and soviet institutions headed by the moma. alfred h. barr jr, the moma director who had published on matisse, undertook years of close talks to uncover the “hidden masterpieces” of the soviet state through displays in several us museums (mikkonen 2013, 57-76). soviet officials refused barr’s request when he could not provide guarantees that any works loaned would be returned to the ussr at the exhibit’s end. dance dually functioned as part of a soviet and russian patrimony in the eyes of vanguard intellectuals and cultural bureaucrats as well as an object of currency and a tool of cultural diplomacy. the soviet-era erasure of shchukin’s name from the works he commissioned and collected enabled dance and others to be seen, however, primarily as western creations, representative of those systems. it would only be after the end of the soviet union—in part due to the lawsuits that had come to highlight this very erasure—that shchukin’s name was reinstated and became embedded in a now post-soviet russian national patrimony. the effort taken by soviet officials to protect these paintings from civil actions was a direct result of their desire to secure for the state a power and legitimate position as a global cultural actor. in the post-soviet period, the motivation for this protection transformed to one sparked by the painting’s place within the national cultural identity of the russian state. matisse and the other european modernists form the foundation for contemporary art and artists who still respond to the movements set in motion a century earlier. matisse’s work inspired american artists throughout the twentieth century; his influence was notably revived and recognized in the experiments of colour and abstraction in the works of mark rothko and roy lichtenstein as explored in the after matisse exhibition that began at the queens museum of art and travelled throughout the united states from 1986-1988. dance remained a critical work in the global trajectory of modern art even as it remained behind the borders of the soviet union until its collapse. though ‘dance’ was a theme that carried into several of matisse’s canvases from 19051913, dance or dance ii, as the hermitage panel is known, stands apart from the other iterations of the painting for its boldness in both colour and scale.5 shchukin’s commission holds a trance 5 henri matisse’s panel dance (la danse) commissioned for shchukin is also known in some contexts as dance ii. dance i, a large-scale work that served as a preliminary sketch for shchukin’s panel, used paler colours for the dancing figures and has significantly less detail than the final work. dance i resides in the collection of the museum of modern art (moma) in new york city. 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 like energy enabling the audience to see and feel the painting’s movement, unique for its freedom of form and use of red instead of a light pink nude that lacks the same artistic depth. exhibiting dance as the soviet union collapsed and the russian federation emerged, dance topped the wish lists of western institutions that were hopeful it would be allowed to leave the country. institutions were eager to be the first to bring it outside of russia/soviet union since it left france in 1910. from september 24, 1992 to january 19, 1993, selected matisse works including dance travelled to the moma in new york city to take part in henri matisse: a retrospective. the most comprehensive exhibition assembled on the french master comprised 400 works, carefully curated to explore the range and depth of the artist, offering an opportunity to reassess the role his pieces play in the history of twentieth-century art. it marked the first time the works from the hermitage and pushkin museum had been exhibited in the united states – a point of pride detailed within the moma’s exhibition materials. the retrospective’s curator, john elderfield, defines matisse’s impact in the exhibition catalog writing that “[matisse] altered painting so decisively…that our experience of any painting must be affected by what he achieved” (elderfield 1992, 14). as dance gained international popularity, issues of nationalization and ownership jeopardized its place within a renewed russian national patrimony. the indoctrination of the 1918 nationalization decrees into russian law and soviet caution in transnational lending had diminished legal threats from shchukin’s heirs, but the heirs saw a weakened state under boris yeltsin and a prime opportunity to challenge nationalization. in 1993, legal action was launched in french courts against the pushkin museum, the state hermitage museum, the pompidou centre in paris, and by extension, the russian federation, concerning the loan of certain paintings to the paris gallery (boguslavskij 1995, 325). the suit claimed that lenin’s decree, which ostensibly brought the paintings into the legal possession of the soviet union and, later, the contemporary russian state, could not be considered valid in france as french law dictated the necessity of compensation for confiscated property. shchukin’s heirs demanded the return of the collection to its “rightful” owner – irina shchukina, shchukin’s youngest daughter. the russian government responded on multiple fronts to protect artistic treasures considered as valuable national property. expecting support from european governments in the post-cold war era, yeltsin’s officials wrote to the french ministry of foreign affairs referring to the principle of state immunity, which they claimed was inherent in international law. the russian embassy in france took an active role “in the legal preparations of russian museums and assisted in ensuring that the directors of the museums involved could take part in the trial” (boguslavskij 1995, 329). an effective challenge to the shchukin family’s claims in court would allow the portrayal of the new russia as a deserved home for these paintings of national and global significance. for their part, the claimants highlighted moral and ethical issues that dated from the tsarist empire and the ussr, citing the un declaration of human rights in their opening arguments. the suit emphasized the difficult fate of russian emigrants such as shchukin and the oblivion surrounding his name in russia. where the claimants appealed to emotion, the defendants clung to international law. on june 16, 1993, the verdict absolved the russian federation of the responsibility for repatriation of shchukin’s collected works to his heirs. the verdict further absolved the russian government of any monetary compensation to shchukina as generally dictated under french law for confiscation of personal property by a state, recognizing lenin’s nationalization of the 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 collection and later indoctrination into the constitution of the russian federation as legitimate. shchukina’s claims were dismissed. the victory launched new initiatives to advance transnational exhibitions between european and russian museums even as underlying legal issues remained unsettled. the shchukin and morozov collections were treated with particular care. russian museums also continued to face severe financial constraints as state funding had dropped precipitously in the 1990s and the threat of needing to sell important artworks to survive loomed (cameron and lapierre 2007, 65-77). to the curators at the royal academy of art in london (ra), bringing dance to the united kingdom and germany was the foundation of what would become "from russia: french and russian master painting from moscow and leningrad 1870-1925" (ann dumas, unpublished interview by author, may 7, 2021). a joint venture with the museum kunstpalast in dusseldorf, the exhibition – which had been in planning for over five years – would unite the modernist collections of russia’s four primary art institutions. for the first time, it would introduce this critical period in the development of the modern art in both russia and abroad through 120 paintings by russian and french artists (dumas and rosenthal 2008). ann dumas and sir norman rosenthal, curators at the royal academy, worked closely with the russian institutions who presented them with a selection of works available for their venture. they agreed that the exhibition would be staged around dance. the official catalogue called the exhibition “a testimony to the glorious history of russian collecting and russia’s influence in the development of modern art” (dumas and rosenthal 2007, 5). however, it was nearly cancelled just months before its anticipated opening. russia faced renewed threats of seizure of their assets abroad in the early years of the 2000s by other individuals and entities seeking to recover imperial and soviet-era debts. in 2005, the state hermitage museum threatened a moratorium on overseas loans following the temporary capture of 54 paintings of picasso, matisse, and cézanne at the swiss border. piotrovksy claimed that “works of art are now being used as hostages in trade disputes” (o’connell 2008, 2). the dispute was resolved quickly in russia’s favour by the swiss federal council but produced new russian demands for legal guarantees of immunity from seizure for future exhibitions. such laws were already on their way to becoming commonplace, with several states already adopting protections. however, the united kingdom state immunity act of 1978 proved insufficient for russia. russia argued that the 1978 act needed updating to explicitly include items owned by national museums, not just property owned by a foreign state (o’connell 2008, 2). this grey area would have been sufficient for russia to pull the plug on the exhibit. the threat to withhold loans from russian museums launched the royal academy and uk legislators alike to push updated laws through parliament prior to the slated arrival of the russian collections. anticipation over "from russia" had built for years, culminating in an extensive media campaign that left the promise of substantial crowds for the blockbuster exhibition. the russian state’s decision to prevent the export of the promised paintings in the fall of 2007 shifted media coverage to negotiations between states and the respective museums. the exhibition’s prestige led former british prime minister tony blair to “len[d] his support at a decisive moment in the negotiations” (dumas and rosenthal 2007, 5) as the british government passed the tribunals, 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 courts, and enforcements act of 2007 (arts council england, 2007).6 "from russia" opened at the royal academy on january 26, 2008. "from russia," curated by ann dumas and sir norman rosenthal, presented a specific narrative or perception of russia’s place within the european art world and of russian national identity within the nine galleries devoted to the exhibition. chosen from lists presented by the russian museums partaking in the transnational exchange, the ra curators opted to segregate works painted in france that comprised the shchukin and morozov collections from those created by russian artists in the same period. divisions were maintained, even as the rooms were meant to explore the “interaction between russian and french art from the last third of the nineteenth century” (dumas and rosenthal 2008). dumas later stated that she felt placing the accomplishments of the russian artists from the turn of the twentieth century next to those of the french masters would do the russians a disservice as they are incomparable in terms of technical capabilities and subject matter (ann dumas, unpublished interview by author, may 7, 2021). walking from one gallery of the "from russia" exhibit to the next, a viewer sees the undeniable influence of renowned modernist paintings but misses the transnational influences and the impact of shchukin’s french pieces that allowed russian artists to come into their own. dance sits in a gallery that overwhelms its audience with the abundant wealth of the french collections. masterpiece after masterpiece, visitors are compelled to stop in their tracks. only in subsequent galleries do curators draw attention to european artistic influences on russia. an educated viewer would see the effects of parisian studios that would have been experienced vicariously by many of the artists represented in sunday tours of shchukin’s home. moments of ingenuity and a russian style might mix with french influences in the visitor’s mind from previous galleries. europe’s recognition of dance and the curatorial decisions to separate it from russian art symbolizes both the extent and the limits of russia’s successful contributions to the global artistic pantheon. "from russia" demonstrated the lengths that the russian state would go to protect these masterpieces that played a significant role in defining russian modernism and that have, over time, regimes, and space earned pride of place within the national patrimony and the national culture of the contemporary russian state. the exhibition, however, curated through a western lens, challenges this central place for russia in modernist art and the dual nationality of its central work. in separating the french works from those of russia, the curators perpetuated a core-peripheral model of art history. the segregated approach of "from russia” enforced a perspective of french works as dominant and fully european, ignoring the role of collectors such as shchukin and giving the impression that they are isolated from russia and from the margins of the art world. it is true that the impressionists, post-impressionists, modernists, and others retain a privileged, almost unassailable place among viewing audiences as representing the power of france and western europe in the artistic world. in considering pieces only at the point of the artist’s conception, the exhibit negated at once the role of the collector and the accumulated meaning of a work, which, in the case of french art, was their direct impact on russian modernism. while the curation potentially sought to reflect the collection as it hung in russia’s ersatz academies and former museums of modern art, themselves segregated prior to and just following the bolshevik revolution, it ignored the impact and meaning that has accumulated through these canvases, which placed them securely within a russian national heritage. 6 the tribunals, courts, and enforcements act 2007 provided immunity from seizure for cultural objects being loaned from overseas to temporary public exhibitions in approved museums or galleries in the united kingdom. 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 "from russia" functioned as an act of cultural diplomacy between british and russian governments. at the same time, it enforced a historical perspective that dissimulates the transnational provenance of dance. i argue that the commissioning of dance endowed it with dual citizenship in both france and russia as it traveled from matisse’s studio in 1910 to its place in moscow and then as it evolved to gain its contemporary identity and place within the hermitage museum in st. petersburg. the exhibition demonstrates the difficulties for russia, as a peripheralized nation, to overcome barriers to have paintings in its national patrimony recognized as such in the global art world in a manner that stretches beyond the artists but also includes collectors, curators, and other critical figures central to these dialogues. outside of the realm of cultural diplomacy, the case of dance connects russia and the broader soviet sphere to calls to decolonize western-centric models of history. the region’s removal from the global art world throughout most of the twentieth century, followed by the tumultuous experience of transformations to market-type economies, rendered it vulnerable to powerful cultural actors and institutions in north america and western europe. the lack of transnational recognition of dance and other european art commissioned and purchased by shchukin and morozov began with the abrupt stalin-era turn to socialist realism and their subsequent absence from the international stage. this very absence has contributed to the significance that comes from displaying them internationally in this post-soviet age as the popularity of "from russia" demonstrates. we see this also in the louis vuitton foundation exhibitions that, in 2016-2017 and 2021-2022 respectively, displayed the shchukin and morozov collections separately. the art newspaper reported that the blockbuster show in 2016-17 attracted a record number of visitors to the exhibition which signified the “symbolic unification of the shchukin collection” (kishkovsky 2019a). the collectors’ names and accomplishments, suppressed in the soviet period, now form part of the excitement in international exhibitions. exhibits now include pieces of the russian avant-garde also loaned by russian museums that seek to show their own vision of a national cultural identity. conclusion on june 13, 2019, russian president vladimir putin granted russian citizenship to sergei shchukin’s grandson, andré-marc delocque, more than a century after his family went into exile (kishkovsky 2019b). the citizenship ceremony coincided with the opening of "shchukin: biography of a collection," an exhibition that reunited shchukin’s collection inside russia’s borders for the first time since they were divided between the pushkin and hermitage museums in 1948. delocque’s legal suits launched against the russian federation had forced the state to face the question of the legality of lenin’s decrees that were indoctrinated into the constitution in 1991. yet, in the same moment that they evoked questions of monetary repatriations and debates which commonly plague contemporary museums, the lawsuits demonstrated the valued place and protections that these paintings evoke by virtue of their history. their meaning in russia developed over the course of the modern age as a result of their direct influence on the russian avant-garde. this meaning was expanded through the soviet era for the ability of shchukin’s collection to communicate across borders, both in its art and collecting practices, within these global pantheons that have historically been dominated by the legitimizing force of western europe as the cultural core. shchukin’s collecting practices were inspired by the nationalism embedded in the collection of the renowned pavel tretyakov, who accumulated russian art beginning in 1856. shchukin’s eye 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 enabled the russian vanguard to reach new heights as it bridged artists to the burgeoning western scene at the turn of the twentieth century. the importance of these paintings by european masters captured in the collection, their survival through the soviet period, reinstatement as critical cultural and national touchstones, thereafter sealed their place as central pieces of russian art. in his commission of dance and the history that has come to define it in the post-modern era—as it moved between institutions that stood for soviet openness to the rolled-up confines of the urals during the second world war and as its “formalist” fate was contested in the years that followed— shchukin assisted in creating a piece that, in spite of its western origins in the studios of france, would come to symbolize the fragmented and divided foundations of russian national identity. considered one of the key paintings of the twentieth century, dance has been inculcated into russia’s national cultural heritage and now hangs in the state hermitage museum. 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 references aniakor, chike c. 1995. “cultural objects as history and national patrimony: a moral challenge.” proceedings of the annual meeting (american society of international law) 89: 434-438. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25658955. armand hammer foundation. 1986. impressionist to early modern paintings from the u.s.s.r.: works from the hermitage museum, leningrad, and the pushkin museum of fine arts, moscow. new york: harry n. abrams incorporated. arts council england. 2007. “immunity from seizure.” https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/protecting-cultural-objects/immunity-seizure#section-1. barbosa cesnik, hannah. 2021. “the inheritance of nations: to what extent does a work of art belong to the people of the world?” the american scholar 90 (3). https://theamericanscholar.org/the-inheritance-of-nations/. benois, alexandre. 2009. “moscow impressions.” in russian and soviet views of modern western art: 1890s to mid-1930s, edited by ilia dorontchenkov and translated by charles rougle, 104-105. berkeley: university of california press. bhabha, homi k. 1994. the location of culture. new york: routledge classics. boguslavskij, mark m. 1995. "case notes: irina shchukina's suit (on the decision of a french court)." international journal of cultural property 4 (2): 325-341. doi:10.1017/s0940739195000336. cameron, sylvie, and laurent lapierre. 2007. "company profile: mikhail piotrovsky and the state hermitage museum." international journal of arts management 10 (1): 65-77. clowes, edith w. 2011. russia on the edge: imagined geographies and post-soviet identity. ithaca: cornell university press. dorontchenkov, ilia. 2009. russian and soviet views of modern western art: 1890s to mid-1930s, translated by charles rougle. berkeley: university of california press. dumas, ann, and sir norman rosenthal. 2008. from russia. london: royal academy of arts. elderfield, john. 1992. henri matisse, a retrospective. new york: the museum of modern art. guerman, mikhail. 1997. kandinsky. new york: parkstone press. honigsbaum, mark. 2005. "one man's multimillion-dollar legal battle threatens chaos in art world." the guardian . november 29, 2005. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/nov/29/arts.artsnews. iavorskaia, nina. 2009. "an eyewitness account of the closing of the museum of modern western art." in russian and soviet views of modern western art: 1890s to mid-1930s, edited by ilia dorontchenkov and translated by charles rougle, 307-310. berkeley: university of california press. kandinsky, wassily. 1946. wassily kandinsky on the spiritual in art, edited by hilla rebay. new york: solomon r. guggenheim foundation. kishkovsky, sophia. 2019a. a symbol for russia: how mikhail piotrovsky created the modern hermitage. https://www.sothebys.com/en/articles/a-symbol-for-russia-how-mikhailpiotrovsky-created-the-modern-hermitage. https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/protecting-cultural-objects/immunity-seizure#section-1 https://theamericanscholar.org/the-inheritance-of-nations/ https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/nov/29/arts.artsnews https://www.sothebys.com/en/articles/a-symbol-for-russia-how-mikhail-piotrovsky-created-the-modern-hermitage https://www.sothebys.com/en/articles/a-symbol-for-russia-how-mikhail-piotrovsky-created-the-modern-hermitage 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2019b. “putin grants russian citizenship to collector sergei shchukin’s grandson ahead of blockbuster pushkin show.” art newspaper. https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2019/06/18/putin-grants-russian-citizenship-tocollector-sergei-shchukins-grandson-ahead-of-blockbuster-pushkin-show. kostenevich, albert. 1990. "matisse and shchukin: a collector's choice." art institute of chicago museum studies 16 (1): 26-43. mikkonen, simo. 2013. "soviet-american art exchanges during the thaw: from bold openings to hasty retreats." in art and political reality, edited by m. kurisoo, 57-76. tallinn: art museum of estonia kumu art museum. mileeva, maria. 2013. “utopia in retreat: the closure of the state museum of new western art in 1948,” in utopian reality: reconstructing culture in revolutionary russia and beyond, edited by christina lodder, maria kokkori and maria mileeva, 215-216. boston: brill publishing. newestmuseum. n.d. history chronology: 1892-1948. http://www.newestmuseum.ru/history/chronology/index.php?lang=en. o'connell, anna. 2008. "the united kingdom's immunity from seizure legislation." law society economy working papers (20): 1-12. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24583/1/wps200820_oconnell.pdf. piotrovsky, mikhail. 2015. my hermitage: how the hermitage survived tsars, wars, and revolutions to become the greatest museum in the world. new york: skira rizzoli. quodbach, esmee. 2020. america and the art of flanders: collecting paintings by rubens, van dyck, and their circles. pennsylvania: pennsylvania state university press. reid, susan e. 2001. “socialist realism in the stalinist terror: the industry of socialism art exhibition 1935-41.” the russian review 60 (2): 153-184. semenova, natalya, and andre-marc delocque. 2018. the collector: the story of sergei shchukin and his lost masterpieces. new haven: yale university press. shchukin, sergei. 1913. katalog kartin sobraniia s.i, shchukina [catalogue of paintings of s.i. shchukin]. moscow. wnet, and alvin h. perlmutter inc. 1973. on loan from russia. https://www.films.com/ectitledetail.aspx?titleid=151536. https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2019/06/18/putin-grants-russian-citizenship-to-collector-sergei-shchukins-grandson-ahead-of-blockbuster-pushkin-show https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2019/06/18/putin-grants-russian-citizenship-to-collector-sergei-shchukins-grandson-ahead-of-blockbuster-pushkin-show http://www.newestmuseum.ru/history/chronology/index.php?lang=en http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24583/1/wps2008-20_oconnell.pdf http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24583/1/wps2008-20_oconnell.pdf https://www.films.com/ectitledetail.aspx?titleid=151536 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 15(1) 2022: 43-60 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 26 gender in the eu-canada comprehensive economic trade agreement: third-generation trade agreement as a gateway to policy coordination? crina viju-miljusevic 1, carleton university agnieszka weinar2, carleton university abstract this article considers the place of trade and gender in eu-canada relations, with a particular focus on ceta and its functioning in a broader sense. more specifically, the authors seek to understand the process of defining the trade and gender agenda under the ceta framework and the practical ways the eu and canada have sought to respond to them. the authors examine the challenges and opportunities related to women’s participation in the eu-canada trade flows, what the instruments developed to support them were, what tools were at their disposal, whether ceta had had a real impact on their business activities, as well as the dynamics of the policy exchange and learning. the authors find that ceta delivers solid structures to design and implement concrete actions, leading to more policy coordination between the eu and canada on trade and gender issues. however, there are still several gaps that need to be addressed, with the lack of disaggregated data being the most important. 1 crina viju-miljusevic is an associate professor in the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. she is also the associate director of the centre for european studies at carleton university. 2 agnieszka weinar is a research adjunct professor at the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 27 1. introduction the canada-european union comprehensive economic trade agreement (ceta), signed in 2016, was a groundbreaking agreement in many ways. it has been touted by some (rioux, deblock, and wells 2020; leblond and viju-miljusevic 2022) as a third-generation trade agreement, i.e., including provisions that build and deepen the multilateral trade commitments far beyond the agreement on tariffs.3 besides the unprecedented fact that it removed 98 percent of all tariffs between the two parties a year after being signed, ceta included a broad range of solutions that facilitated business exchanges between canada and the european union (eu), such as standards, procurement rules, or even policy alignments.4 still, ceta does not have a specific chapter on gender like the more recent trade agreements signed by canada. however, in a rather extraordinary show of mutual understanding and value alignment, leaders from eu and canada agreed to push for an increased uptake of entrepreneur roles among women and support women-led businesses in the context of ceta (statistics canada 2018).5 since the core ceta text does not have a clear reference to gender and trade, the eu and canada agreed to recommendation 002/2018 on trade and gender.6 most importantly, it was among the first decisions of the ceta joint committee taken after the provisional implementation had been agreed, which testifies to the political importance of the issue. this political direction was justified by data showing that women-led businesses are significantly less numerous, smaller, and less internationally minded than those led by men. both parties agreed that the challenges women face when engaging in business are mainly related to logistical, border, and administrative obstacles as well as wide-ranging gender discrimination, which can limit opportunities (government of canada 2020). the statistics provided by the global affairs canada report “trade and gender” outline that “two-way canadian merchandise trade with the eu averaged $94.7 billion cad annually during 2018 and 2019...up by 25.5% compared to 2016 – the last full-year before preferential tariff treatment under ceta was applicable” (government of canada 2021). women-owned and equally owned canadian businesses make up a larger portion of importers as compared to exporters, but a smaller portion of imports compared to exports by value. in 2017, women-owned and equally owned businesses comprised 18 percent of export value, 17.5 percent of import value, 21.4 percent of exporters, and 26.2 percent of importers. the number of jobs directly or indirectly supported by goods exports occupied by women is 36,032. this number includes canada’s 11 largest eu export partners: germany, netherlands, france, italy, belgium, spain, ireland, finland, latvia, poland, and sweden, which accounted for about 92 percent of exports to the eu in 2019. the information is aggregated without providing details about age, immigrant status, degree, or country. the information was presented only for the year 2017, thus not allowing for an assessment of the impact of ceta. 3 for a description of third-generation trade agreements see leblond and viju-miljusevic 2022. 4 european commission. n.d. eu-canada comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta). accessed august 2, 2024. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eucanada-agreement_en. 5 initiatives to promote women’s business ownership have been promoted by different countries, including canada and the eu member states, as the literature has shown that business ownership is an important trigger for growth, innovation and employment (adema et al. 2014; coleman and robb 2012). 6 ceta joint committee issued recommendation 002/2018 on trade and gender: ceta joint committee. recommendation 002/2018 of 26 september 2018 of the ceta joint committee on trade and gender. 2018. accessed july 10, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/rec-002.aspx?lang=eng. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/rec-002.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/rec-002.aspx?lang=eng 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 28 since 2018, the eu and canada have engaged in a series of activities and initiatives focusing, on the one hand, on supporting women entrepreneurs to take advantage of ceta and, on the other, to stir the debate on women and trade in international fora, leading by example. in fact, the authors can argue that the very fact of giving ceta open-ended, deliberative structures, typical for thirdgeneration trade agreements, has made such policy cooperation possible. using trade leverage as a tool for policy change is not new. in fact, european integration is a prime example of such dynamics, as are the trade agreements signed by the eu with many other countries around the world.7 what is, however, unusual in the case of ceta is that the eu has not been the coordination proponent. canada, as its partner, has used ceta as a gateway to develop a new direction of eu-canada cooperation, leveraging a trade agreement with a powerful partner to boost its policy profile on gender equality promotion on the international scene. quite uncharacteristically, the eu followed suit. six years on, and with covid in the rearview mirror, how much has this dynamic achieved? what are the prospects of the trade and gender policy coordination to make a lasting impression on the canada-eu trade? this article considers the place of trade and gender in the eu-canada relations, with a particular focus on ceta. more specifically, the article analyzes the process of defining the trade and gender policy coordination agenda under the ceta framework and the practical ways the eu and canada have sought to respond to the requirements of recommendation 002/2018. the article is structured as follows. it begins with a brief review of ceta as a third-generation trade agreement and a discussion of the analytical framework and research methodology employed by the authors. the next section analyzes the policy developments, which is followed by the conclusion. the article aims to present a broad-brush picture of eu-canada policy coordination on gender and trade under ceta, a first attempt to map this issue. 2. canada and eu approaches to trade and gender in preferential trade agreements (ptas) 2.1 canada and eu approaches to gender and trade canada sought to consider gender mainstreaming in its free trade agreements (ftas) by introducing gender equality chapters and other gender-related provisions into trade agreements early on during prime minister justin trudeau’s first mandate. canada-chile (2017) and canadaisrael (2018) were the first examples of that policy trend. in addition to a specific chapter, genderrelated provisions are found in chapters on investment, labour, and cooperation, as well as the preamble (government of canada 2023). other trade agreements with no specific chapter on trade and gender, such as the canada-us-mexico agreement (cusma) signed in 2019, include comprehensive gender provisions in chapters on labour, investment, and small and medium-sized enterprises.8 additionally, in 2020, canada, chile, and new zealand signed the global trade and gender arrangement (gtga)—the first cooperation agreement on trade and gender, which includes more detailed gender-related provisions. 7 see among others, vogel 1995, meunier and nicolaides 2006, young and peterson 2006, drezner 2008, bach and newman 2007, dür and zimmermann 2007, bartels 2007, antoniades 2008, newman and posner 2015, poletti and sicurelli 2018, ferraris 2020, velluti 2020, lenz 2021, pelkmans 2021. 8 government of canada. 2019a. canada-united states-mexico agreement (cusma). trade and gender provisions summary. accessed july 10, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/gender_equality-egalite_sexes.aspx?lang=eng. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/gender_equality-egalite_sexes.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/gender_equality-egalite_sexes.aspx?lang=eng 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 29 the eu has committed to gender mainstreaming in its external policy since 2020 with the eu’s gender action plan iii and the gender equality strategy 2020–2025.9 in december 2022, chile and the eu concluded negotiations on a modernized association agreement, which includes a dedicated chapter on trade and gender.10 the gender chapters in these trade agreements focus on women’s participation, women’s rights, and gender mainstreaming.11 despite being considered progressive, as they acknowledge the intersection between trade and gender, gender chapters in trade agreements are criticized for their inability to result in meaningful changes. some of the reasons for such limited impacts are related to exclusion from dispute settlement mechanisms, being stand-alone chapters which do not apply to other areas of the trade agreements, and lack of resources for ngos that should lobby for policy development (hannah, roberts, and trommer 2022). 2.2. ceta as a third-generation trade agreement and its (lack of) focus on gender ceta was hailed by the european external action service as a “landmark” agreement, “the best, the most ambitious and the most progressive form of trade agreement…that the eu has ever concluded,” a novel agreement, as well as the template for future agreements, such as the transatlantic trade and investment partnership and the eu-uk trade and cooperation agreement (delegation of the european union to canada 2021). one of the main goals of ceta is to minimize non-tariff barriers between the two parties involved. the eu and canada have adopted aspects of the drive for “good regulatory practices (grps) through the regulatory cooperation forum.”12 ceta’s regulatory cooperation forum (rcf) is unique, as there are very different institutional realities in transatlantic economic and political systems. ceta is considered by some a third-generation trade agreement. despite not being a widely used category of trade agreements, the authors agree with the scholarship (leblond and viju-miljusevic 2022; rioux, deblock, and wells 2020) that considers the innovations of ceta pointing to a third generation of trade agreements. ceta is deeper than firstand second-generation trade agreements, it includes the liberalization of different policy areas such as investment, government procurement, sustainability, and intellectual property rights. it addresses non-trade objectives such as human rights, environment, and labour rights, and it includes an extensive institutional framework that facilitates cooperation after the agreement has started to be implemented (leblond and viju-miljusevic 2022). for a complete description see table 1 in annex. although it is still too early to say 9 european commission. 2020a. gender action plan – putting women and girls’ rights at the heart of the global recovery for a gender-equal world. accessed march 15, 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2184 ; european commission. 2020b. gender equality strategy. achievements and key areas for action. accessed march 15, 2024. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/genderequality-strategy_en. 10 other trade agreements that included a gender chapter: chile-argentina (entered into force 2018), uk-japan (entered into force 2021), uk-australia (entered into force 2023), uk-new zeeland (signed in 2022). 11 gender mainstreaming ensures that gender perspectives are taken into account at every level and in all areas of cooperation (hannah, roberts, and trommer 2022). 12 directorate-general for trade (european commission). 2020. eu-canada comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta). article 21.6. accessed on march 14, 2024. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-traderelationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2184 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 30 definitively how effective such cooperation mechanisms are, the case of trade and gender can shed light on the pathways to achieve policy coordination and implement policy outcomes.13 despite being considered one of the most advanced trade agreements negotiated up to date, ceta does not include a separate chapter on gender issues. however, it includes a sub-paragraph related to gender and trade in the investment chapter. article 8.10 2(d) states that “a measure or series of measures constitute ‘targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds’ if…a differential treatment based on gender, race or religious belief cannot be justified on the basis of objective and legitimate grounds, such as measures that are designed or applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, including health, the promotion of gender equality, environment (including climate protection) or safety.”14 this is considered a milestone as it is the first appearance of the word “gender” instead of “women” or “sex” in a trade agreement between g20 economies. additionally, it is the first time when such a provision is justiciable under a dispute settlement (still in need of ratification by the eu member states at the current time) (fabian 2021). additionally, ceta has created the opportunity for the two parties to have regular meetings and propose common initiatives that would support women-led businesses to take advantage of ceta. 3. methodological approaches and data collection the analysis is based primarily on three types of sources. a) policy documents produced post-2018 by the european commission and government of canada on the trade and gender agenda as well as relevant policy reports and action plans. the documents reviewed considered the level of implementation of recommendation 002/2018. b) supporting expert interviews with representatives of women-led business organizations. the specific inquiry on ceta-related training and mentoring schemes was addressed to 23 organizations in canada supporting women entrepreneurship. the choice was driven by an online search, starting with the global affairs canada information system, women entrepreneurship knowledge hub database and export development canada’s website. reaching out to these organizations yielded a low response rate, with seven responses in total and only three having ceta-relevant trade promotion programs. experts from these three organizations were asked to participate in the study. in the european union, the authors identified europe enterprise network (een) and wegate as relevant organizations and conducted an interview with representatives of each organization. the 13 the current assessments of the ceta temporary implementation are mainly focused on the quantitative achievements related to bilateral trade increases due to tariff reduction and tariff utilization rates as well as the number of smes involved in canada-eu trade (government of canada (office of the chief economist) 2020; european union 2022). government of canada (office of the chief economist). 2022. ceta@5 delivering trade benefits during unprecedented times. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/economist-economiste/analysisanalyse/benefits-ceta5-avantages_eng.pdf; gopa com. 2022. five years of ceta: sustainable and reliable trade in uncertain times. september 19, 2022. accessed july 10, 2024. https://ceta-5-years-anniversaryevent.b2match.io/page-861. 14 directorate-general for trade (european commission). 2020. eu-canada comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta). article 8.10 2(d). accessed on july 10, 2024. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-traderelationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/benefits-ceta5-avantages_eng.pdf https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/benefits-ceta5-avantages_eng.pdf https://ceta-5-years-anniversary-event.b2match.io/page-861 https://ceta-5-years-anniversary-event.b2match.io/page-861 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 31 questionnaire focused on trade promotion instruments implemented by the organizations that were interviewed, with the interviews being conducted using zoom. c) supporting expert interviews with trade representatives from the eu member states and canada (trade commissioner service representatives—tcss). potential candidates for interviews were contacted by email, using the email addresses available publicly on the relevant websites. the authors contacted 23 member state trade representatives (eu chambers of commerce in canada and trade councillors in eu embassies in canada). there were six responses: spain, austria, ireland, poland, italy, and germany. moreover, the authors contacted 18 trade commissioners, but only six replied, and three contributed to the research with detailed data (italy/malta, poland, and finland). the interviews were conducted using zoom and followed a pre-approved questionnaire.15 the interviews were not recorded, and the answers were anonymous. in several instances, the experts were not available for an interview, but they shared general information in writing about their country’s trade promotion instruments focused on women in the context of ceta or beyond. the relevant list is available in annex 1. the authors encountered several impediments to data collection that have impacted the size of their final datasets. for qualitative data, an important obstacle was a lack of openness of women’s business organizations to participate in this project. the level of engagement was very low, resulting in a less than 20 percent response rate from the population contacted. this behaviour might be explained by the extreme fragmentation of the business associations working with women entrepreneurs in canada and by the fact that there are no networks that work as a governmentsupported service rather than those based on membership fees. in fact, the most accessible organizations were those supported by local governments (municipal or provincial). moreover, the response rate by the eu member states and tcs representatives can be explained by the limited resources of the public services—in fact, the authors have received responses stating that there is no capacity in the public service to reply to research inquiries. in the process of searching and collecting statistical information, the main problem was a lack of necessary disaggregated data with detailed ownership characteristics such as nationality, age, and geography of doing business. this issue was caused by two main reasons: (i) the privacy act, which governs the federal government’s collection, retention, use, and disclosure of personal information; (ii) the methodology behind data collection of statistical institutions in canada and europe does not involve the collection of detailed information.16 based on this research, disaggregated data does not exist due to the nature of the methodology used to collect and protect personal data, and thus, the authors could not complete a statistical analysis of the impacts of ceta. 4. ceta’s gender policy framework in action trade and gender commitments under ceta are based on the core values and policies developed by partners over the years. the eu has been actively involved in promoting gender equality and addressing gender-related issues through various policies. gender equality is one of the 15 ethics clearance 116437. 16 government of canada. 2024. privacy act. accessed august 23, 2023. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p21/page-1.html. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p-21/page-1.html https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p-21/page-1.html 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 32 fundamental values of the eu enshrined in its treaties. for example, the treaty of rome of 1957 establishing the european economic community requires each member state to apply the principle of equal pay for women and men. the 1992 maastricht treaty on the european union includes the protection of women in the agreement on social policy, while the treaty of amsterdam of 1997 places gender equality as one of the eu’s goals and defines the principle of non-discrimination based on gender among other characteristics. for the eu, “[g]ender equality is at the core of european values and enshrined within the european union (eu) legal and political framework. the eu and its member states are at the forefront of the protection, fulfilment and the enjoyment of human rights by women and girls and strongly promote them in all external relations, also beyond development cooperation.”17 thus, the eu has portrayed itself as a frontrunner in promoting gender equality through its external policies. the literature analyzing the adoption and implementation of gender equality principles in eu external relations, including through its trade policy and, thus, trade agreements, has developed quickly.18 canada, on the other hand, was portrayed as a champion on gender equality only since the election of prime minister justin trudeau. however, fabian (2021) and hannah, roberts, and trommer (2022) show that canada has a long history of policymaking in the field of gender and trade that crosses partisan lines.19 canada has also been recognized as an international agenda-setting leader for trade and gender. for example, it is a key architect of the world trade organization (wto) joint declaration on trade and women’s economic empowerment and other wto initiatives. 4.1 ceta trade and gender action plan the gender-related policy ambition of ceta was first introduced in september 2018 during the inaugural women ministers meeting, a pivotal event attended by prominent figures such as chrystia freeland, then minister of foreign affairs of canada, and federica mogherini, then high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy, and vice president of the commission. this gathering set the stage for subsequent discussions on the integration of gender considerations into trade policies.20 on september 26, 2018, the ceta joint committee issued recommendation 002/2018 on trade and gender. it was developed and adopted within the legal context of article 26.1.5(t) of ceta, which empowers the ceta joint committee to make recommendations “suitable for promoting the expansion of trade and investment.”21 the following recommendations were made: 1. “the ceta joint committee recommends that the parties cooperate to improve the capacity and conditions for women, including workers, businesswomen and entrepreneurs, to access and fully benefit from the opportunities created by ceta.” 17 council of the eu. 2015. council conclusion on the gender action plan 2016-2020 (gap ii) 13201/15. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24467/st13201-en15.pdf. 18 pollack and hafner-burton 2000; bretherton 2001; lister and carbone 2006; hoskyns 2008; true 2009a/b; ulmer 2007; van der vleuten et al. 2014; debusscher and manners 2020. 19 please see fabian (2021) for a detailed description of the key milestones of the canadian gender and trade governance. 20 iisd sdg knowledge hub. women foreign ministers’ meeting, montreal, quebec, september 21–22, 2018. accessed june 5, 2023. http://sdg.iisd.org/events/women-foreign-ministers-meeting/. 21 government of canada. 2017. text of the comprehensive economic and trade agreement – chapter twenty-six: administrative and institutional provisions. accessed july 10, 2024.https://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/26.aspx?lang=eng. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24467/st13201-en15.pdf http://sdg.iisd.org/events/women-foreign-ministers-meeting/ https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/26.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/26.aspx?lang=eng 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 33 2. “recognising the need to better understand the impact of trade on gender equality and women’s participation in the economy, the ceta joint committee recommends that the parties start their cooperation activities by: a) sharing methods and procedures for the collection of gender-disaggregated data, the use of indicators, monitoring and evaluation methodologies, and the analysis of gender-focused statistics related to trade; b) exchanging experience and best practices for conducting gender-based analysis of trade policies; and c) exploring the implication for the design and implementation of trade agreements, including ceta.”22 it is interesting that the first recommendation focuses in general terms on ceta cooperation, while the second one, with three sub-recommendations, has a clear international dimension. this focus reflects a broader international trend that seeks to bridge the gender gap in trade, aligning with global initiatives such as the united nations sustainable development goals (sdgs), specifically sdg 5 on gender equality. the accent on the international aspect can be interpreted as going beyond eu-canada bilateral trade under ceta. that approach creates some confusion as to what “gender and trade” means in bilateral cooperation, what the real scope of the recommendation is, and what the parties really want to achieve. progress achieved on these points was to be reported periodically. the joint activity report from september 21, 2020 has been the only such document available publicly to date. 23 the report shed light on nine activities, which had been implemented for 18 months, between 2018 and 2020. three distinct types of initiatives have been implemented: exchanges on policy, stakeholder engagement, and collaboration in multilateral fora. exchanges on policy: canada and the eu engaged in videoconferences and discussions aimed at enhancing the understanding of gender-related issues in trade policies. this exchange of knowledge covered topics such as gender equality laws, policies, programs, and the impact assessment of trade agreements on gender. these activities focused on policymakers and decisionmakers in both economies, fostering a deeper appreciation for gender-inclusive trade policies. stakeholder engagement: several initiatives were launched to engage stakeholders and womenowned businesses. roundtable discussions, workshops, and webinars were organized to gather input and insights from women entrepreneurs. the activities provided platforms for women to share their challenges and opportunities in accessing the benefits of trade under ceta. notable events included the trade and gender roundtable, co-hosted by eu commissioner cecilia malmström and canada’s minister of international trade diversification, jim carr, and a ceta trade and gender workshop in brussels, which included over 80 participants from civil society. collaboration in multilateral fora: canada and the eu actively participated in international fora focused on promoting gender-responsive trade agreements. they contributed to a world trade organization (wto) workshop exploring the role of trade agreements in advancing gender 22 ceta joint committee issued a recommendation 002/2018 on trade and gender. accessed june 5, 2023.https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cetaaecg/rec-002.aspx?lang=eng. 23 oas foreign trade information system. 2020. “joint activity report to the ceta joint committee.” accessed may 28, 2024. http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/can_eu/committees/ceta_gender_joint_activity_report_09_2020_e.pdf. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/rec-002.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/rec-002.aspx?lang=eng http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/can_eu/committees/ceta_gender_joint_activity_report_09_2020_e.pdf 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 34 equality. these collaborative efforts underlined their leadership in shaping global discussions on gender-inclusive trade policies. key partners and stakeholders included various government bodies, civil society organizations, women entrepreneurs, and international institutions such as the wto and un women. the involvement of both canadian and eu officials, along with contributions from women entrepreneurs, facilitated cross-border knowledge sharing and insights. the ceta trade and gender recommendation work plan 2020–2021, published also in september 2020, did build partially on the previous work plan.24 however, it drifted even more away from the core ceta mandate focused on bilateral relations towards a multilateral approach and involvement on an international level. out of the six initiatives, only one focused strictly on the business of supporting women under ceta: an exchange of the ex-post assessment of the impact of ceta on gender equality. the rest included sharing data methods, developing genderresponsive trade agreements, applying a gender lens to wto work, and hosting webinars on financing and standards, all involving multilateral relations and not focusing on ceta.25 the closer analysis of these documents allows for two main conclusions. first, “gender” in “trade and gender” specifically means women. this referred to women as a social construct, hence the talk about the barriers to entrepreneurship and trade, but also women as a biological entity, hence the event on standards in industrial production, such as protective gear. second, there has been a marked change of focus from the political narratives launched in 2018 to the most recent documents (2020). the goal of a tangible strengthening of ceta and improving women entrepreneurship in bilateral trade has slowly disappeared from bilateral exchanges for the benefit of a general debate on trade issues and discussion focused on the recommendations of international organizations.26 the bilateral approach has visibly lost steam. from this perspective, the fate of the recommendation is uncertain. moreover, the aftermath of the covid-19 pandemic, often referred to as a “she-cession,” has brought into sharp focus the formidable challenges faced by women in business, particularly those operating smes, on both sides of the atlantic.27 regrettably, the post-pandemic ceta activities between the eu and canada have not substantively addressed this pressing concern. 4.2 between policy and implementation the official bilateral efforts aimed at implementing the gender and trade priorities within the framework of ceta have yielded limited progress. the emphasis on gender, trade, and entrepreneurship has predominantly remained within the sphere of canadian interest. however, despite the decline in bilateral interactions, the institutions and organizations on both sides of the atlantic have independently pursued the development of initiatives and assistance for women’s entrepreneurship. below the authors present the initiatives undertaken in the eu and in canada 24 government of canada. 2020. ceta trade and gender recommendation: eu-canada work plan 2020-2021. accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/ceta_work_plan-aecg_plan_travail-2020-2021.aspx?lang=eng. 25 unfortunately, there has been no official report on implementation of the work plan at the time of writing. 26 see, for example, the 2023 report on gender equality in the eu. accessed june 5, 2024. https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-04/annual_report_ge_2023_web_en.pdf. 27 “she-cession” refers to the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on the employment of women. see e.g. bluedorn et al. 2021. “gender and employment in the covid-19 recession: evidence on ‘she-cessions.’” international monetary fund. accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2021/03/31/gender-and-employment-in-the-covid-19-recessionevidence-on-she-cessions-50316. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/ceta_work_plan-aecg_plan_travail-2020-2021.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/ceta_work_plan-aecg_plan_travail-2020-2021.aspx?lang=eng https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-04/annual_report_ge_2023_web_en.pdf https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2021/03/31/gender-and-employment-in-the-covid-19-recession-evidence-on-she-cessions-50316 https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2021/03/31/gender-and-employment-in-the-covid-19-recession-evidence-on-she-cessions-50316 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 35 domestically to support the gender and trade agenda. the authors have identified activities that could support the implementation of the first recommendation—promoting women’s engagement in transatlantic trade. 4.2.1 european union initiatives supporting women entrepreneurship at the eu level, the european commission undertook many initiatives, events, and funding programs to support women in business, especially in the post-pandemic period. there are five main pan-european networks listed on the commission’s website.28 among them, the flagship initiative wegate (2020–2023)—a dedicated online platform aimed at women entrepreneurs.29 this platform provided a wealth of resources, networking opportunities, and practical information tailored to the needs of women-led businesses. it offered guidance on various aspects, from business development to funding opportunities, thereby facilitating the growth and sustainability of women-owned enterprises. other eu-level initiatives are rather scarce, however, one initiative that can be mentioned is women techeu—a program that seeks to address the gender gap in the technology sector by supporting women-led tech startups. 30 through grants, mentoring, and training, women techeu aims to boost the representation of women in the tech entrepreneurship ecosystem, thereby fostering innovation and diversification within the industry. information concerning activities aimed at promoting investment and trade under ceta, with a specific focus on women, remains challenging to access from the european side. neither wegate nor the europe enterprise network (een) women entrepreneur groups have documented any activities specific to canada. despite the european women association's (ewa) international engagements, it does not have a presence in canada. clearly, there is ample room for the eu to facilitate networking and establish connections between european women entrepreneurs and canadian buyers and that room is, to some extent, taken by the eu member states. as regards data infrastructure, in 2018, the eu supported a specific project with unwomen on gender, trade, and ceta. the final report on gender and trade concluded that monitoring and assessment of factors driving women's and men's participation in trade and their benefits under ceta can guide robust trade policy tools.31 it also determined that improving data availability, quality, and accessibility is crucial for gender and trade analysis, especially since, despite substantial research, studies using microdata directly related to trade participants are limited. yet enhancing such research with better data can establish causal relationships, improving policy design. the report proposed three approaches for compiling trade-related statistics: a macrodata approach utilizing sectoral statistics, a microdata approach linking detailed data on individuals and firms participating in trade, and an in-depth approach involving surveys or interviews. however, acting on the recommendations was, in the end, delegated to international organizations and away from the eu-canada bilateral relations on ceta: the data improvements were to be attained 28 european commission. n.d. support tools and networks for women. accessed august 2, 2024. https://singlemarket-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes/supporting-entrepreneurship/women-entrepreneurs/support-tools-and-networkswomen_en. 29 wegate. 2024. accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.wegate.eu/. 30 european commission. n.d. women techeu. accessed august 2, 2024. https://eismea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/european-innovation-ecosystems/women-techeu_en. 31 un women. 2020. gender and trade assessing the impact of trade agreements on gender equality: canada-eu comprehensive economic and trade agreement. https://unctad.org/system/files/officialdocument/unwomen_2020d1_en.pdf. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes/supporting-entrepreneurship/women-entrepreneurs/support-tools-and-networks-women_en https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes/supporting-entrepreneurship/women-entrepreneurs/support-tools-and-networks-women_en https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes/supporting-entrepreneurship/women-entrepreneurs/support-tools-and-networks-women_en https://www.wegate.eu/ https://eismea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/european-innovation-ecosystems/women-techeu_en https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/unwomen_2020d1_en.pdf https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/unwomen_2020d1_en.pdf 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 36 through a collaboration between united nations trade and development (unctad), the weempower program, un women, the international labour organization (ilo), statisticians, and trade policymakers aiming to identify key indicators for more comparable global insights.32 4.2.2 the member states and ceta-focused women entrepreneurship in the pursuit of information about mentorship activities for women entrepreneurs focusing on ceta from various eu chambers of commerce and trade representatives, the authors came across only a handful of countries and their respective activities, namely italy, which has led a range of women-focused initiatives related to ceta in vancouver, and france, with its numerous activities through the french chamber of commerce in toronto as well as its abeona network. other member states’ representatives who shared information, specifically spain, austria, and ireland, discussed their general policies supporting women entrepreneurship, but they did not focus specifically on ceta. germany indicated an isolated transatlantic endeavour facilitated by national women associations, such as verband deutscher unternehmerinnen e.v. in collaboration with the women in business new brunswick that have introduced mentoring programs that could potentially enhance women's involvement in ceta-related trade. however, such efforts remain scarce. simultaneously, some chambers of commerce of select eu member states have displayed active support for women in business. for instance, the french chamber of commerce in ontario has established the women in leadership forum annual awards, while the irish chamber of commerce acknowledges exceptional irish canadian women in business. however, these initiatives primarily honour diaspora women in canada, who may not necessarily be engaged in trade activities under ceta. the authors are unable to authoritatively state why the eu member states put so little emphasis on inclusive trade under ceta. based on the interviews, the authors may suggest that the trade promotion instruments supporting women are overall a very new policy phenomenon in the eu. it is quite understandable that a specific focus on ceta would not be the primary concern at this early stage. canadian approaches in the canadian context, trade promotion instruments targeting women-led businesses are implemented in two ways. first, women’s business associations are the only direct contact with women-owned businesses in canada. they implement training and mentoring schemes and support trade missions for their members. the governmental bodies support these organizations and work with them to reach out to women-led businesses with additional support. on this level, the efforts to support women entrepreneurs in reaping benefits from the comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) have been limited to the activities of several actors: business development bank of canada (bdc), royal bank of canada (rbc) and the trade commissioners’ service (tcs) of global affairs canada. the information gathered highlights trade-promoting instruments such as virtual missions, training sessions, and trade missions that support women-owned businesses’ internationalization efforts. 32 un women. 2020. gender and trade assessing the impact of trade agreements on gender equality: canada-eu comprehensive economic and trade agreement. https://unctad.org/system/files/officialdocument/unwomen_2020d1_en.pdf. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/unwomen_2020d1_en.pdf https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/unwomen_2020d1_en.pdf 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 37 minister-led virtual trade mission to france, march 2021: the mission aimed to support canadian businesses’ access to export opportunities in france’s green economy and leverage ceta. the mission had both exploratory and exporter streams, with 257 participating companies. it resulted in business deals for several companies, including women-owned ones. francophone businesswomen’s trade mission to france and belgium, january 2020: organized by the tcs, this mission was the first of its kind and focused on connecting women entrepreneurs with buyers in france and belgium. eighteen women entrepreneurs participated, and the mission resulted in multiple business deals and contracts. second annual canadian women in tech virtual mission to the eu, 2021: tcs offices in warsaw, brussels, and the hague organized this virtual mission to target opportunities in fintech, healthtech, and cleantech in the eu. the mission included b2b meetings and opportunities for canadian women-owned tech companies to pitch their solutions. these trade missions aimed to promote canadian businesses’ internationalization efforts, specifically targeting european markets. the covid-19 pandemic could explain the limited number of missions, and the authors could expect a larger number going forward. however, it seems that virtual missions garnered more interest than in-person missions. the pandemic can only partially explain this. a bigger factor is the fact that european markets are not popular among canadians in general and among canadian women in particular (i.11, i.12). in fact, despite tcs’ endeavours, associations representing women entrepreneurs have not actively taken up the ceta agenda. instead, the associations’ efforts have been channeled towards strengthening business connections with mexico and the united states (i.10, i.12). for example, owit-toronto (organization of women in international trade) conducted trade missions, including three to mexico and hosted webinars on trade between canada and the eu, leveraging ceta. their activities occur annually, with 100 women participating in their webinars, 75 in a webinar with global affairs canada (gac), and 10 in the mexican trade mission. invest ottawa leads international trade missions but mostly to the us and mexico, not the eu. their training program features training on exporting to europe under ceta. réseau femmes d’affaires du québec (rfaq) has had a number of training courses on ceta, but it has focused on francophone markets, which obviously has limited the impact of its outreach. it was the main co-organizer of the francophone tcs mission in 2021. all in all, canadian government’s dedication to the trade and gender policy agenda has resulted in increased support for women-led business organizations that implement trade promotion strategies and instruments. however, that effort has not translated into a significant increase for the activities under ceta. 5. conclusion at the beginning of the article, the authors asked: what are the prospects of the trade and gender policy agenda to make a lasting impression on canada-eu trade? there are no easy answers to that question, especially in such early stages of cooperation, which is solely based on the goodwill of partners focused on their respective political agendas. the authors can say that ceta indeed delivers solid structures to design and implement concrete actions, leading to more policy 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 38 coordination between the eu and canada on trade and gender issues. the regulation allows for action plans that push partners’ bureaucracies to set measurable goals and deliverables in this area. there are still several issues the partners could address in their work in this area in order to leave a lasting impression and serve as a model for other agreements to come. the most prominent have been those related to data collection and closing the knowledge gap. at the moment, the canadian side is more advanced in this respect in general terms but still unable to gather reliable data on women in trade under ceta in particular. the lack of gender-disaggregated data was discussed earlier, in 2019, during the second and third canada-eu ceta meetings on trade and gender.33 the representatives highlighted that due to the gap in relevant data, it is challenging to assess the impact of trade agreements on women entrepreneurs and to implement an official strategy.34 as regards data infrastructure, efforts since 2018 have seen the women entrepreneurs knowledge hub in canada monitoring data adjustments. some progress has been made, including incorporating gender as a category in entrepreneurship databases. however, several recommendations from 2018 remain partially unresolved. the absence of clear data definitions impedes the measurement and evaluation of gender aspects of ceta. while data on women entrepreneurship exists broadly, it remains a challenge to precisely gauge gender-specific trade flows, investment stocks, and flows pertaining to the eu, both on the canadian side and in the opposite direction. other issues relate to encouraging more women in trade under ceta, which has been missing from bilateral work. if ceta is to serve as a model, it must cater to women in trade first and foremost. without setting an example of cooperation, canada will find it more and more difficult to leave a mark internationally in the area of trade and gender. 33 government of canada. 2019. report: 2nd canada-european union comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) meeting on trade and gender by videoconference, ottawa and brussels, june 14th, 2019. accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-06-14-trade-gender-commerce-genre.aspx?lang=eng. 34 government of canada. 2019b. report: 3rd canada-european union comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) joint committee recommendation on trade and gender by videoconference, ottawa and brussels, october 24th, 2019. accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-10-24-trade_gender-commerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-06-14-trade-gender-commerce-genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-06-14-trade-gender-commerce-genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-10-24-trade_gender-commerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-10-24-trade_gender-commerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 39 references adema, willem, ali, nabil, frey, valerie, kim, hyunsook, lunati, mariarosa, piacentini, mario, and monika queisser. 2014. “enhancing women’s economic empowerment through entrepreneurship and business leadership in oecd countries.” organisation for economic co-operation and development. accessed july 15, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/enhancing-women-empowerment-throughentrepreneurship_bb885dbf-en.html. antoniades, andreas. 2008. “social europe and/or global europe? globalization and flexicurity as debates on the future of europe.” cambridge review of international affairs 21 (3):327– 346. bach, david. and abraham l. newman. 2007. “the european regulatory state and global public policy.” journal of european public policy 14 (6): 827–846. bartels, lorand. 2007. “the trade and development policy of the european union.” european journal of international law 18 (4): 715–756. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chm042. bluedorn, john c., caselli, francesca, hansen, niels-jakob, shibata, ippe, and marina mendes. 2021. “gender and employment in the covid-19 recession: evidence on ‘she-cessions.’” international monetary fund. accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2021/03/31/gender-and-employment-inthe-covid-19-recession-evidence-on-she-cessions-50316. bretherton, charlotte. 2001. “gender mainstreaming and eu enlargement. swimming against the tide?” journal of european public policy 8: (1): 60–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760010018331. ceta joint committee. recommendation 002/2018 of 26 september 2018 of the ceta joint committee on trade and gender. 2018. accessed july 10, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/rec-002.aspx?lang=eng. coleman, susan, and alicia robb. 2012. “gender-based firm performance difference in the united states: examining the roles of financial capital and motivations.” in global women’s entrepreneurship research: diverse settings, questions, and approaches, edited by karen d. hughes and jennifer e. jennings, 75–92. cheltenham, uk: edward elgar publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849804752.00012. council of the european union. 2015. council conclusion on the gender action plan 2016-2020 (gap ii) 13201/15. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24467/st13201-en15.pdf. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chm042 https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2021/03/31/gender-and-employment-in-the-covid-19-recession-evidence-on-she-cessions-50316 https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2021/03/31/gender-and-employment-in-the-covid-19-recession-evidence-on-she-cessions-50316 https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/rec-002.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/rec-002.aspx?lang=eng https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24467/st13201-en15.pdf 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 40 debusscher, petra, and ian manners. 2020. “understanding the european union as a global gender actor: the holistic intersectional and inclusive study of gender+ in external actions.” political studies review 18 (3): 410–425. https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299198993. delegation of the european union to canada. 2021. “relations with the eu: the european union and canada.” accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/canada/european-union-andcanada_en?s=220#:~:text=ceta%20is%20not%20just%20one,development%2c%20labo ur%20and%20the%20environment. directorate-general for trade (european commission). 2020. eu-canada comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta). accessed march 14, 2024. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-andregions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en. drezner, daniel w. 2008. all politics is global. explaining international regulatory regimes. princeton: princeton university press. dür, andreas, and hubert zimmermann. 2007. “introduction: the eu in international trade negotiations.” journal of common market studies 45 (11): 771–787. european commission. n.d. eu-canada comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta). accessed august 2, 2024. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-countryand-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en. european commission. 2020a. gender action plan – putting women and girls’ rights at the heart of the global recovery for a gender-equal world. accessed march 15, 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2184. ———. 2020b. gender equality strategy. achievements and key areas for action. accessed on march 15, 2024. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-andfundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en. ———. 2023. 2023 report on gender equality in the eu. https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-04/annual_report_ge_2023_web_en.pdf. ———. n.d. support tools and networks for women. accessed august 2, 2024. https://singlemarket-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes/supporting-entrepreneurship/womenentrepreneurs/support-tools-and-networks-women_en. ———. n.d. women techeu. accessed august 2, 2024. https://eismea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/european-innovation-ecosystems/womentecheu_en. https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299198993 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu-canada-agreement_en https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2184 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-04/annual_report_ge_2023_web_en.pdf https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes/supporting-entrepreneurship/women-entrepreneurs/support-tools-and-networks-women_en https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes/supporting-entrepreneurship/women-entrepreneurs/support-tools-and-networks-women_en https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes/supporting-entrepreneurship/women-entrepreneurs/support-tools-and-networks-women_en https://eismea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/european-innovation-ecosystems/women-techeu_en https://eismea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/european-innovation-ecosystems/women-techeu_en 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 41 european union. 2022. five years of ceta: sustainable and reliable trade in uncertain times. september 21, 2022. accessed july 10, 2024. https://ceta-5-years-anniversaryevent.b2match.io/page-861. fabian, judit. 2021. “milestones in canadian gender and trade policy.” canadian global affairs institute. accessed august 7, 2024. https://www.cgai.ca/milestones_in_canadian_gender_and_trade_policy. ferraris, luchino. 2020. the pursuit of sustainable agriculture in eu free trade agreements. wageningen, nl: wageningen academic publishers. gopa com. 2022. five years of ceta: sustainable and reliable trade in uncertain times. september 19, 2022. accessed july 10, 2024. https://ceta-5-years-anniversaryevent.b2match.io/page-861. ———. 2019a. canada-united states-mexico agreement (cusma). trade and gender provisions summary. accessed march 15, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/gender_equalityegalite_sexes.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2020. ceta trade and gender recommendation: eu-canada work plan 2020-2021. accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/ceta_work_planaecg_plan_travail-2020-2021.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2024. privacy act. accessed august 23, 2023. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p21/page-1.html. ———. 2019. report: 2nd canada-european union comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) meeting on trade and gender by videoconference, ottawa and brussels, june 14th, 2019. accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-06-14-tradegender-commerce-genre.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2019b. report: 3rd canada-european union comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) joint committee recommendation on trade and gender by videoconference, ottawa and brussels, october 24th, 2019. accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-10-24-trade_gendercommerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2017. text of the comprehensive economic and trade agreement – chapter twenty-six: administrative and institutional provisions. accessed july 10, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/26.aspx?lang=eng. https://ceta-5-years-anniversary-event.b2match.io/page-861 https://ceta-5-years-anniversary-event.b2match.io/page-861 https://www.cgai.ca/milestones_in_canadian_gender_and_trade_policy https://ceta-5-years-anniversary-event.b2match.io/page-861 https://ceta-5-years-anniversary-event.b2match.io/page-861 https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/gender_equality-egalite_sexes.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/gender_equality-egalite_sexes.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/gender_equality-egalite_sexes.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/ceta_work_plan-aecg_plan_travail-2020-2021.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/ceta_work_plan-aecg_plan_travail-2020-2021.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/ceta_work_plan-aecg_plan_travail-2020-2021.aspx?lang=eng https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p-21/page-1.html https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p-21/page-1.html https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-06-14-trade-gender-commerce-genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-06-14-trade-gender-commerce-genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-06-14-trade-gender-commerce-genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-10-24-trade_gender-commerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-10-24-trade_gender-commerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/2019-10-24-trade_gender-commerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/26.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/26.aspx?lang=eng 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 42 ———. 2023. trade and gender in free trade agreements: the canadian approach. accessed march 15, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/gender_equalityegalite_genres/trade_gender_fta-ale-commerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2021. trade and gender: the canada-european union story. accessed july 10, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/gender_equality-egalite_genres/eu_storyhistoire_ue.aspx?lang=eng. ———. 2022. ceta@5 delivering trade benefits during unprecedented times. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/economisteconomiste/analysis-analyse/benefits-ceta5-avantages_eng.pdf. government of canada (office of the chief economist). 2020. women-owned smes and trade barriers. accessed march 15, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/women_owned_smes_tradepme_commerce_appartenant_femmes.aspx?lang=eng#a2viii. hannah, erin, roberts, adrienne, and silke trommer. 2022. “canada’s ‘feminist’ trade policy?” in canada and great power competition, edited by david carment, laura macdonald, and jeremy paltiel, 71–96. new york: palgrave macmillan. hoskyns, catherine. 2008. “governing the eu: gender and macroeconomics.” in global governance: feminist perspectives, edited by shirin rai and georgina waylen, 107–128. new york: palgrave macmillan. international institute for sustainable development (iisd) sdg knowledge hub. women foreign ministers’ meeting, montreal, quebec, september 21–22, 2018. accessed june 5, 2023. http://sdg.iisd.org/events/women-foreign-ministers-meeting/. lister, marjorie, and maurizio carbone. 2006. new pathways in international development: gender and civil society in eu policy. farnham, uk: ashgate. leblond, patrick, and crina viju-miljusevic. 2022. “ceta as the first eu third-generation trade agreement: does it act like one?” perspectivas. journal of political science 27 (december 2022): 41–55. https://doi.org/10.21814/perspectivas.4496. lenz, tobias. 2021. interorganizational diffusion in international relations: regional institutions and the role of the european union. oxford university press. meunier, sophie and kalypso nicolaidis. 2006. “the european union as a conflicted trade power.” journal of european public policy vol. 13(6), pp. 906-925. mattoo, aaditya., rocha, nadia and michele ruta.2020. “the evolution of deep trade agreements.” in handbook of deep trade agreements, edited by mattoo, aaditya, rocha, nadia and michele ruta.washington, dc: the world bank. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/gender_equality-egalite_genres/trade_gender_fta-ale-commerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/gender_equality-egalite_genres/trade_gender_fta-ale-commerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/benefits-ceta5-avantages_eng.pdf https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/benefits-ceta5-avantages_eng.pdf https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/women_owned_smes_trade-pme_commerce_appartenant_femmes.aspx?lang=eng#a2viii https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/women_owned_smes_trade-pme_commerce_appartenant_femmes.aspx?lang=eng#a2viii https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/women_owned_smes_trade-pme_commerce_appartenant_femmes.aspx?lang=eng#a2viii http://sdg.iisd.org/events/women-foreign-ministers-meeting/ 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 43 monteiro, josé-antonio. 2021. “the evolution of gender-related provisions in regional trade agreements.” wto staff working paper, no. ersd-2021-8, world trade organization (wto), geneva, https://www.wto-ilibrary.org/content/papers/25189808/269. newman, abraham. l. and elliot posner. 2015. “putting the eu in its place: policy strategies and the global regulatory context.” journal of european public policy vol. 22(9), pp. 13161335. neuwahl, nanette. 2021. “the 2020 eu-uk trade and cooperation agreement as a canada style agreement”. may 19, eu3d research paper no. 4, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3633959. organization of the american states (oas) foreign trade information system. 2020. “joint activity report to the ceta joint committee.” accessed may 28, 2024. http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/can_eu/committees/ceta_gender_joint_activity_report _09_2020_e.pdf. pelkmans, jacques. 2021. “linking “values” to eu trade policy—a good idea?” european law journal vol. 26(5-6), pp. 391-400. https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12409 . poletti, arlo and daniela sicurelli. 2018. the political economy of normative trade power europe. springer. pollack, mark and emilie hafner-burton. 2000. “mainstreaming gender in the eu.” journal of european public policy vol. 7 (3), pp. 432–456. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760050086116 . rioux, michèle, christian deblock, and guy-philippe wells. 2020. “ceta, an innovative agreement with many unsettled trajectories.” open journal of political science 10: 50– 60. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2020.101005. ruffat, agnès, and patrick leblond. 2022. “public procurement under ceta chapter 19.” in ceta implementation and implications: unravelling the puzzle, edited by robert g. finbow, 143–158. montreal: mcgill-queen’s university press. true, jacqui. 2009a. “trading in gender-equality: gendered meanings in eu trade policy.” in the discursive politics of gender equality: stretching, bending, and policymaking, edited by emanuela lombardo, petra meier, mieke verloo, 121–137. abingdon, uk: routledge. ———. 2009b. “trading-off gender equality for global europe? the european union and free trade agreements.” european foreign affairs review (5): 723–742. https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2009050. ulmer, karin. 2007. “equity in trade negotiations: a gender review of the epas.” trade negotiations insights 6 (2): 8–9. https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919899345. united nations women. 2020. gender and trade assessing the impact of trade agreements on gender equality: canada-eu comprehensive economic and trade agreement. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/unwomen_2020d1_en.pdf. https://www.wto-ilibrary.org/content/papers/25189808/269 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3633959 http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/can_eu/committees/ceta_gender_joint_activity_report_09_2020_e.pdf http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/can_eu/committees/ceta_gender_joint_activity_report_09_2020_e.pdf https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760050086116 https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/unwomen_2020d1_en.pdf 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 44 van der vleuten, anna, van eerdewijk, anouka, and conny roggeband. 2014. gender equality norms in regional governance: transnational dynamics in europe, south america and southern africa. new york: palgrave macmillan. velluti, samantha. 2020. the role of the eu in the promotion of human rights and international labour standards in its external trade relations. new york: springer. vogel, david. 1995. trading up. consumer and environmental regulation in a global economy. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. wegate. 2024. accessed august 2, 2024. https://www.wegate.eu/. young, alasdair r., and john peterson. 2006. “the eu and the new trade politics.” journal of european public policy 13 (6): 795–814. https://www.wegate.eu/ 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 45 annex table 1: three generations of trade agreements35 35 table from leblond and viju-miljusevic (2022), pp. 108. 1st generation 2nd generation 3rd generation background • development of regionalism • rise of trade in services • emergence of global value chains (gvcs) • digitization of the economy: increasing deterritorialization of trade • growing dematerialized world trade • interconnected world economy characteristics • focus on tariff barriers • easy to implement • focus on non-tariff barriers • internationalization of firms • a regulation and integration model based on contractual approach • attempt to liberalize other policy issues that affect trade in goods and services (e.g., investment, people, ideas, sustainability, data) • non-trade objectives (e.g., human rights, gender equality, climate change) • necessity of wider and deeper cooperation • a renewal of economic regulation examples • eec • eu-switzerland • eu-mexico • nafta • eu-switzerland • eu-colombia-peruecuador • ceta • updated eu-mexico 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 46 innovations • ftas • custom unions • inclusion of social clause • protection of intellectual property rights • dispute settlement mechanism • institutions to assist implementation • government procurement provisions • provisions on labour and the environment • mixed agreements • precautionary principle • new “regulatory cooperation forum” • deepening and widening of regulatory cooperation (issue-specific committees) • investment court system • enhanced protection of intellectual property rights • adoption of negative list approach • updated public procurement processes 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 47 list of interviews experts from embassies and chambers of commerce, responsible for trade: i.1. austria, embassy (june 20, 2022) i.2. germany, embassy (august 12, 2022) i.3. ireland, chamber of commerce (august 12, 2022) i.4. italy, chamber of commerce (june 1, 2022) i.5. poland, embassy (september 15, 2022) i.6. spain, embassy (august 20, 2022) experts from pan-european bodies supporting women in business i.7. wegate/european enterprise network (october 10, 2022) interviews with the trade commissioner service i.8. trade commissioners’ service in helsinki (july 26, 2022) i.9. trade commissioners’ service in poland (august 24, 2022) i.10. trade commissioners’ service in italy/malta (june 15, 2022, in writing) interviews with business-support organizations in canada i.11. invest ottawa (june 21, 2022) i.12. organization of women in trade toronto (august 2, 2022) i.13. réseau femmes d'affaires du québec (october 3, 2022) 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 26-48 issn 2562-8429 48 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ why reforms fail: the role of ideas, interests and institutions canadian journal of european and russian studies, 13 (1) 2019 issn 2562-8429 becoming european? strangers finding a place in the european union maricia fischer-souan1 universidad carlos iii de madrid https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2550 abstract this article addresses the idea of belonging in europe from the perspective of postcolonial migrants settling in eu societies. it draws on over one hundred in-depth interviews with algerian, ecuadorian, and indian individuals settled mainly in and around the cities of london, madrid, and paris. rather than investigating migrants’ orientations to europe through a narrow interest in selfidentification (feeling vs. not feeling european), it delves into individual migration narratives for evidence of how europe is imagined (if it is imagined at all) during the migration process and its relation to other physical and symbolic sites. as a frame for interpreting individual migration narratives, i introduce the concept of ‘migratory rupture’, a dialectical experience of both the disorienting and creative aspects of migration. in excavating some of the reflexive processes involved in constructing symbolic geographies of attachment, i find that regardless of the scales of comparison used to articulate place affiliation across different contexts, e.g. whether small-scale (neighbourhoods or city districts) or larger-scale (supranational or de-territorialized categories), symbolic geographies allow migrants to view their transnational life experience on a single, coherent plane and express a form of global consciousness. 1 maricia fischer-souan is a phd candidate in the department of social sciences at the universidad carlos iii de madrid https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v13i1.2550 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 now home to millions of people from non-european backgrounds, and with its many religious and cultural dispositions, europe is a crossing of transnational networks that incorporate almost all its citizens and residents. it is as much a space of longings rooted in myths of origin and tradition, as it is a space of cosmopolitan identities and attachments, and hybrid geographies of cultural formation. -ash amin 1. introduction there is ample public and scholarly interest in the ways native-born and ‘majority’ segments of european populations experience and position themselves in relation to interrelated globalization and europeanization process. recently, greater attention is being paid to the ways in which ‘people on the move’, including immigrant minorities, view the global processes in which they are enmeshed. migration is thus seen as the ‘human face’ of globalization and the migrant as the ‘figure of our time’ (nail 2015). contrary to what one might expect with the advent of european citizenship, european union (eu) movers are not the most emblematic of these processes. though intra-eu mobility has been on the rise since the turn of the new millennium, third-country nationals and individuals born outside of the eu make up a larger share of the european population than eu movers (eurostat 2017; recchi 2015). to be sure, much of the geographic mobility in european societies (not to mention human and cultural diversity) is associated with ‘non-european’ migrants and their descendants, a label which can obscure the many cultural and historic ties the latter have to europe since many of these migration flows are in some way related to colonial and postcolonial contexts. with respect to the different cultural and social processes that shape the experiences of noneuropean/postcolonial migrants in the european union, the specifically european dimension of experience has sparked some scholarly interest. there is growing research into how non-europeanorigin populations relate to the added european dimension of political and cultural membership. studies of european identity and support for european integration are increasingly interested in the perspective of minorities (agirdag et al. 2016; cinnirella and hamilton 2007; dowley and silver 2011; erisen 2017; roeder 2011; teney et al. 2016; vieten 2018), as well as the potential significance of ‘europe’ in processes of migrant integration (sperling 2013). survey research on these issues indicates that minorities support european integration more than non-minorities. the former are less likely to see european integration as a threat to national identity (cinirella and hamilton 2007; dowley and silver 2011; roeder 2011). minorities may also be more likely to see eu law as a potential arena for supranational human rights claims-making when faced with discrimination at the national level (dowley and silver 2011). on the other hand, the possibility that eu policy discourse may reinforce perceptions, especially among muslims, of the eu as a ‘christian club’ may lead to more ambivalent relationships with the idea of europe (ibid.). qualitative studies on non-eu migrant identification with and understandings of europe illuminate some of the ambivalence in these attitudes. experiences of discrimination or marginalization visà-vis dominant groups and the increased politicization of migration across europe may limit the sense of belonging to europe (vieten 2018). at the same time, the freedom of mobility associated with the european union can offer a potentially more ‘open’ space of belonging and foster cosmopolitan and post-national understandings of membership as well as opportunities for individual growth and freedom (sperling 2013; vieten 2018). 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 yet, relatively little is known about the ways in which understandings of and identifications with europe (understood loosely) are articulated in migrants’ narratives of mobility and settlement, that is, how europe is imagined (if it is imagined at all) during the migration process and its relation to other physical and symbolic sites that structure the migratory experience. by approaching the idea of europe from postcolonial migrants’ perspective in a roundabout away that considers europe as one of several potential spatial referent points, i try to glimpse into the dynamic process of place affiliation in european migration contexts. this study considers international migration as an intense life experience with the ability to alter one’s identity, potentially casting it against a global frame of reference (savage, bagnall, and longhurst 2005). it should be noted that the postcolonial relationships that have significantly shaped migration processes in europe (and which are investigated in this study) have global reflexivity built into them, leading to a degree of familiarity among north african, south american and south asian individuals with their european societies of destination (and vice-versa). elements of cultural and linguistic proximity are reinforced by contemporary mediascapes (appadurai 1996) and other global processes. yet, postcolonial migrants are equally cast as distant, unfamiliar, and other – as a result of international migration regimes, cultural boundaries, and racializing ideologies. through this dialectic of ‘familiarity and unfamiliarity’ and ‘nearness and farness’, non-european postcolonial migrants settling in europe can be understood in terms of simmel’s figure of the ‘stranger’ – “the one who comes today and stays tomorrow” (simmel 1950) as well as more contemporary accounts of ‘strangeness’ under conditions of globalization (amin 2012; rumford 2013). the north african, south american and south asian (mainly firstgeneration algerian, ecuadorian, and indian) participants in this study are not considered ‘strangers’ merely because they are migrants, newcomers, or minorities in european majority contexts, however. rather, their accounts of affiliation to place that frequently draw on hybrid and reflexive geographies are relevant to some of the key qualities of the simmelian notion of the stranger-as-outsider – notably, creativity, improved perspective, and the ability to be a catalyst for change (coupland 1999; rumford 2013; simmel 1950). contemporary theorizations that build on simmel’s account emphasise the blurring of lines between ‘strangers’ and ‘neighbours’ and associate the global era with a generalized condition of ‘strangeness’, as argued by rumford (2013). through this understanding, the condition of strangeness applies to migrants and non-migrants alike and involves a “sense of disorientation resulting from […] an experience of globalization in which previously reliable reference points have been eroded and we encounter strangers where previously we encountered neighbours” (rumford 2013, 7). how postcolonial migrants deal with processes of ‘disorientation’– both pertaining to the life-changing intensity of migratory experience and to becoming embedded into social worlds that are themselves “on the move” (bauman 1991, 97) is what this study is about. as a way of connecting both the classical properties of ‘strangerhood’ and the contemporary condition of strangeness in an international migration experience, i present the concept of ‘migratory rupture’. through a dialectical experience involving personal rupture engendered by migration and the need to re-establish a sense of continuity during settlement, the concept draws both on the potentially disorientating aspects of the lived experience of migration as well as the creative potential of migrants to regain control of their life-narrative. as a frame for interpreting individual migration narratives, the migratory rupture concept allows me to excavate some of the reflexive processes involved in constructing symbolic geographies of attachment. regardless of the scales used to draw spatial comparisons or bridge the distance between distinct places, e.g. 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 whether small-scale (neighbourhoods or city districts) or larger-scale (supranational or deterritorialized categories), i argue that symbolic geographies can serve at least two functions. first, they articulate a migrant’s transnational experiences on a single plane of existence and second, they express a form of global consciousness. 2. theoretical framework 2.1. spatial consciousness and identity formation in migration contexts how do individual understandings of and attachments to place change in the context of migration and settlement experiences? specifically, in international migration processes between a noneuropean country of origin and a destination society in the european union, how does the supranational european category intermingle in one’s expanding spatial consciousness and postmigration identity formation? this study considers international migrants settling in european societies as particularly interesting subjects for investigating: a) how one’s geographic imagination expands to incorporate a growing number of potential place attachments; and b) how different scales of attachment, ranging from neighbourhoods, cities, states, and supranational categories, are articulated in these changing geographic imaginations. human geographers have developed several conceptual tools for thinking about the meaning people attach both to everyday practical and more abstract spatial forms. the geographic or spatial imagination refers to the ways in which individuals understand and classify places and the connections between them (agnew and duncan 1989; gregory 1994; harvey 2005). closely linked is the concept of mental maps which can refer both to processes of storing and extracting meaning from concrete experiences in space as well as imagining unknown places (tuan 1975). these concepts view human spatial consciousness as shaped by both the material and symbolic realms of personal and collective experience and as relevant to sociological concepts, such as the social imaginary (taylor 2002). through a multidimensional understanding of place as constructed by location, social interactions and identifications, agnew and duncan (1989) argue for a more systematic focus on the simultaneous engagement between the social and geographic imaginations. linking the social and geographic imaginations is also crucial to harvey (2005), who draws attention to the specific role of space and place in shaping individuals’ understandings and experiences of their own biographies and their relationships to the world around them. he writes that the geographic imagination allows the individual to recognize the relationship which exists between him [sic.] and his neighbourhood, his territory […]. it allows him to judge the relevance of events in other places […] – to judge whether [these events] are relevant to him wherever he is now. it allows him also to fashion and use space creatively and to appreciate the meaning of the spatial forms created by others (harvey 2005, quoting harvey 1973). for harvey, investigating the relations between social processes and spatial forms is essential in order to develop a fuller understanding of complex global processes, including regional integration and migration. harvey’s emphasis on “consciousness” and “imagination” as well as his references to “geographical knowledges” and mental maps are particularly relevant to the cultural focus of this study. he understands mental maps as repertoires of spatial concepts and geographical understandings shaped by an individual’s surroundings, which vary greatly across different spatial and cultural environments. “such mental maps, once formed, tend to be stubbornly recalcitrant to 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 change and ill-adapted to the heightened fluidity demanded by contemporary processes of globalization” (harvey 2005, 236). this relatively static view of mental maps is surprising given harvey’s frequent emphasis on dynamic processes such as relational space. it is also a departure from tuan’s (1975) multidimensional definition of mental maps that includes a highly projective and aspirational element through “imaginary worlds that depict attractive goals that tempt people out of their habitual rounds” (tuan 1975, 210). harvey nevertheless challenges overly deterministic notions of the geographic imagination by highlighting the diversity of specialized geographical knowledges, even within a single locality: “the nature of experience as well as of socialization guarantees considerable variation in geographical perceptions according to class, gender, age, ethnicity, religion and lifestyle dispositions” (2005, 236). the emphasis on the complex relationship between individual-level and external factors that shape spatial consciousness is highly relevant to the research at hand, given the multiple spatial and cultural realms of socialization and individual experience that international migrants ‘cross’ along their journey. building on the sociological relevance of this geographical scholarship, recchi (2015) offers the concept of space-sets: “the complex of physical sites where individuals spend their social existence, stemming from past and present practices, unified by remembering ‘togetherness’ in a geographical location” (recchi 2015; recchi and kuhn 2013, 192). similar to harvey’s understanding of the geographic imagination, recchi and kuhn (2013) underline the variability of space-sets and liken them to ‘personal maps’, the components of which differ in terms of width, interconnectedness, and salience (ibid.). these three properties endow the space-sets concept with a more dynamic and context-specific definition than the geographic imagination. both objective and subjective processes distinguish the characteristics of space-sets, as width is concerned with the totality of places encountered at multiple scales, so that the experience of geographic mobility expands the width of one’s space-sets. recchi and kuhn’s understanding of the interconnectedness and salience of sites, on the other hand, can be likened to the symbolic aspects of the geographic imagination, based on the extent to which one perceives different places as separate or connected and the affective meaning conjured by each. they explore this in relation to the political legitimacy of the european union in the minds of eu citizens but trace the relevance of the concept to other historical moments of social transformation, such as industrialisation, “which unleashed workers from the countryside and brought them to cities, expanding their space-sets significantly” (recchi and kuhn 2013, 192). the dynamic and interrelated properties of width, interconnectedness, and salience that make up an individual’s space-sets and shape the geographic imagination are thus of specific interest to the study of migrant subjectivity and identity formation. drawing on gregory’s (1994) geographical imaginations, robins (2019) emphasises the identity processes that are at stake in the geographic imagination beyond the perceptions and behaviours that shape and are shaped by our spatial consciousness. individuals and collectives also use the geographic imagination “to imagine and negotiate their identities in relation to wider national and cultural ones” (robins 2019, 730). in his study of brazilian migrants in london, he highlights the significance of interconnected frames of reference that define a migrant’s spatial consciousness and belonging: “the way the places of origin and destination are imagined occur in reference to each other” (ibid.). 2.2. “migratory rupture” and the dialectics of belonging 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 three aspects of these different theoretical contributions are particularly significant for the study at hand. first, our geographic imaginations, mental maps, and space-sets refer both to our objective spatial knowledge and experience as well as the individual and collective meanings attached to them. second, these objective and subjective processes not only shape our orientations to spatial forms but also our identity work and other imaginaries (e.g. social, cultural, and political). third, we mobilize both objective experience and subjective meanings of space inter-temporally and at multiple scalar levels (e.g. neighbourhood, city, state) in connecting or distinguishing physical sites in our personal mental maps. moreover, though mental maps and geographic imaginations are essential to most human experience, the theories discussed thus far suggest the act of migration and the ‘migrant condition’ as particularly revealing of the complexity of these processes. the authors dealing with various aspects of spatial consciousness seem to differ when it comes to the malleability of mental maps and geographic imaginations. whereas harvey suggests that one’s mental maps, born of context-specific spatial and social experience, are not particularly well equipped to deal with changing circumstances and environments, tuan (1975) and recchi and kuhn (2013) are more inclined to view mental maps or space-sets as continuous processes. the latter approach seems the most appropriate for addressing the geographic imagination and belonging in migration contexts as it puts the migrant actor in a position to take stock of accumulated experiences and desired outcomes related to multiple spatial and social contexts. but how might some of the building blocks of mental mapping in tuan’s words, the combination of “memory-images and imaginary-images” (1975, 211), or for recchi and kuhn (2013), width, interconnectedness, and salience – be felt and experienced by migrants as changing, expanding, and potentially challenging their previous orientations to space? specifically, if our mental maps are complex by nature, as this conceptual framework suggests, how does the added complexity of socialization in multiple societies – as one becomes dis-embedded or ‘uprooted’ from one (noneuropean) society and embedded into another (european, urban one) affect our spatial consciousness? if we consider the lived experiences of international mobility as fundamental aspects of a migrant’s biography, then the dialectical relationships that inform processes of dis-embedding and embedding – involving both personal rupture and continuity – deserve special attention. whether we are more inclined to follow harvey’s understanding of recalcitrant mental maps or a more fluid approach to the geographic imagination, the spatial consciousness that informs our identity work does not simply stay put nor expand on its own. especially in a migratory experience, one is confronted with new social and geographic circumstances which will inevitably lead one to reflect on and question one’s understanding of and attachments to place. the rupture-continuity dialectic can be used as a frame for better understanding some of the particularities of migrant biographies as well as the connected concept of evolving mental maps. as a way of assembling together the different subjective and objective components that give personal meaning to the migrant biography, i offer the concept of “migratory rupture”. this concept is based on the premise that the migration experience represents a significant life-event which may cause one to re-evaluate the self-concept in ways that other ‘milestones’, more in-line with social expectations related to the life-course (e.g. education or fertility decisions), do not. thus, moving to and settling in an eu context, regardless of one’s desire to do so, can be experienced as a form of rupture, both in space and in the life-course. i use the concept of migratory rupture to highlight the feeling of fragmentation of the self in the context of migration and the 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 subsequent effort to re-establish personal continuity that is coherent and ‘makes sense’ in the individual biography. 2.3 “elective belonging” and expanding european space-sets research on how the idea of belonging in urban contexts is changing through globalization processes highlights the importance of reflexivity and symbolic geographies. the concept of “elective belonging” developed in globalization and belonging by savage, bagnall, and longhurst (2005) suggests that individual narratives of settlement may have greater significance than local historic ties in contemporary urban contexts. as a core idea in the empirical study on globalization and local belonging, elective belonging articulates senses of spatial attachment, social position, and forms of connectivity to other places. […] individuals attach their own biography to their ‘chosen’ residential location, so that they tell stories that indicate that their arrival and subsequent settlement is appropriate to their sense of themselves. people who come to live in an area with no prior ties to it, but can link their residence to their biographical life history, are able to see themselves as belonging to the area. this kind of elective belonging is critically dependent on people’s relational sense of place, their ability to relate their area of residence against other possible areas, so that the meaning of place is critically judged in terms of its relational meanings (savage, bagnall, and longhurst 2005, 29, emphasis added). the role that critical reflection plays in connecting place to biography – the conscious effort to achieve a coherent sense of self in the context of geographic mobility – is illustrative of the link between our spatial orientations and our identity work. savage and his colleagues’ emphasis on both meaningful and relational senses of place reinforces the theoretical material discussed previously. the multi-scalar interconnectedness and salience of sites (recchi and kuhn 2013) and interconnected frames of reference (robins 2019) that come to structure one’s self-understanding are intimately related to the experience of geographic mobility and to the way we imagine and relate our departure, arrival, and settlement stories. though savage, bagnall, and longhurst’s concept of elective belonging draws principally from findings on internal mobility in britain more than on international migrants, it is relevant to any analysis of the agentic capabilities of newcomers in their own social integration, embedding and emplacement in their new society (wessendorf and phillimore 2019). the latter authors have drawn attention to the role of ‘superdiverse contexts’ (such as the european capitals in this study) as highlighting the still unresolved public and scholarly debates around ‘migrant integration’ by begging the question of which spatial unit migrants are supposed to ‘integrate’ into. the study at hand suggests that postcolonial migrants settling in european cities develop symbolic geographies of their settlement contexts that are not necessarily congruent with official spatial units. as will be shown, they develop their own accounts of settlement or ‘integration’ into the spatial units that are most appropriate for their self-understandings, based on a relational and interconnected sense of space. exploring the meanings and salience of europe in connection to other spatial categories in the context of these processes of elective belonging and changing geographic imaginations allows us to consider the multi-scalar and interconnected properties of these processes to a greater extent than a focus on national or local place attachments would. to what extent do the mental maps of newcomers in european societies, reveal a ‘european imaginary’ of sorts, whether spatial, cultural, social, or political? the european union, especially through its regime of free cross-border 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 mobility, has potentially set the stage for an increased “internationalisation of europeans’ spacesets” (recchi and kuhn 2013, 202). similarly, for harvey (2005), the political transformations related to european integration have led to a progressive transformation of nationally based geographical outlooks into a more european-wide perspective. it is beyond the scope of this investigation to ask what the effects of citizenship status of non-eu migrants might have on their potential for developing european space-sets, and how these space-sets might be constituted compared to those of ‘native’ eu citizens. however, given the cross-country comparative research design, it is possible to explore the differences across groups when it comes to the cultural resonance of europe. the european union as the common denominator among all possible spatial categories of reference adds an additional layer of complexity to the question of expanding geographical imaginations in the migration context, while at the same time allowing for more robust comparisons of migration narratives. 3. research design and analytical approach the theory of elective belonging, put specifically in an international migration context, would suggest that newcomers to europe – as ‘strangers’ – understand their biography and their sense of belonging in relation to multiple spaces, both in practical and personally meaningful terms. in-line with research on migrants’ integration into social networks in the ‘new’ society, i find that the boundaries between the functions of instrumental and affective relationships (in this case, to space), are fuzzy, rather than fixed (see wessendorf and phillimore 2019). i suggest that the comparative evaluation of both the instrumental and affective meaning of different spatial categories encountered during migration and settlement (no matter how directly or indirectly) constitutes a dynamic process through the dialectics of migratory rupture discussed previously. as an interpretative approach to my interview material, i pay special attention to multiple spatial scales and environments as well as the social and cultural imaginaries connected to them, through which the sense of place attachment and belonging is articulated. these include towns, neighbourhoods and districts, landscapes, national territories and supranational categories. the focus is on the way these categories are mobilized in individual migration narratives to make sense of the individual biography in a context of migratory rupture. it should be noted that many of these spatial categories have cultural resonance in one’s spatial imagination, without necessarily constituting the most relevant sites of belonging, however. they represent the multiple places and spaces that individuals reckon with and negotiate as they engage in processes of elective belonging and become embedded in their new society. as will be seen in the findings, many questions that probe for images and understandings of spatial forms and cultural configurations associated with urban, national or supranational categories can take respondents off-guard. during the first and most lengthy part of interviews, migration narratives unfolded more on informants’ own terms and resembled biographical narratives. in the second phase of the interview, i steered narratives into more specific spatial and cultural units. moreover, many questions on distinct categories (e.g. france, madrid, europe) were formulated in intentionally vague terms. though this often disrupted the fluidity of the exchange and could even cause confusion or discomfort in some respondents (e.g. “what comes to mind if i say ‘europe’ to you?” or, “is there something about europe that distinguishes it from other parts of the world?”), it was important not to overly ‘correct’ such situations, even where they provoked 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 silences or reluctance to engage with vague concepts. such reactions in themselves can be revelatory of how spatial categories are understood and constructed. 3.1 sampling and fieldwork in cross-country context this study draws on over one hundred in-depth semi-structured interviews on different aspects of migration and settlement experiences, including identity formation and place affiliation. three main groups of research participants were selected: individuals born in algeria, ecuador, and india2 who had been living for at least five years in the regions of paris, london, and madrid (as well as a few other cities in the uk and spain). fieldwork was conducted between 2014 and 2016 and involved a range of participant recruitment methods in each context with the help of the researcher’s personal and research network, religious, cultural, and professional organizations, local journalists and ‘lucky encounters’ during civic and cultural events. some key aspects of the cultural and political backdrop at the time of the fieldwork which often shaped the narratives obtained are related to the 2008 eurozone crisis and its aftermath, the european ‘migrant crisis’, and the calls for a uk referendum on eu membership. the three principal migrant groups were selected on the basis of their historical and cultural connection with one of the three european contexts under investigation. the sampling logic in each national context was based on the relevant postcolonial migration relationship. thus, the principal sampling pairs are algerians in the french context, ecuadorians in the spanish context, and indians in the british context. however, to enhance the comparative dimension of the study, a sub-sample of each migrant group was also constructed in a second context so that roughly ten ecuadorians were interviewed in london, ten indians in paris and ten algerians in madrid as well as valencia. interviews were conducted and transcribed by the researcher in english, french, and spanish according to the national context. interview excerpts in french and spanish presented in this essay have been translated by the researcher. the names of participants have been changed in order to preserve their anonymity. 3.2 interviewing strategies: ‘spontaneous’ europe vs. probing for europe about three quarters of the interview schedule was designed to encourage biographical migration narratives (as far as 2-3-hour semi-structured interviews can allow for). where the sections on the pre-departure and settlement stages of the narrative were concerned, i avoided direct references to specific locations in my questions (e.g. using the names of cities or countries relevant to the migrant’s trajectory). i tended more to frame questions on relevant spatial categories using deixis adverbs such as ‘here’ and ‘there’ (e.g. “tell me about your life back there,” or “before you came here…”). only towards the last quarter of the interview were respondents ‘led’ into specific spatial categories relevant to the specific migration context, with questions such as, “what is the first thing that comes to mind when you think of paris/france/europe? what are the main challenges facing the uk today?” thus, as a typical interview progressed towards the end, the narrative style became less biographical in scope. my questions became narrower and focused on perceptions of national societies and politics as well as european integration. although it was not disclosed to participants, i was constantly “on the look-out” for mentions of europe, among other supranational constructions. informants only became immediately aware of 2 with the exception of a few respondents from other countries in north africa, south asia and south america, including colombia, venezuela, sri lanka, pakistan, morocco and tunisia. 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 this when i deployed the second strategy and narrowed the geographical scope of questions to fit with existing or potential institutional and territorial configurations (e.g. “can you imagine the countries of your region of origin establishing similar integration patterns as the eu? or “is it a good thing that spain/france/uk is in the eu?”). in contrast, as mentioned, the first strategy was concerned with obtaining spontaneous spatial references (potentially, more salient ones). during this phase of the interview, participants would develop different scalar or cultural meanings associated with abstract spatial adverbs (usually at local or national scales). instances in which respondents spontaneously referred to ‘europe’ (e.g. “i came to europe…”, “the european lifestyle is very different from ours…” etc.) gave me the opportunity to probe deeper on the topic of europe (e.g. “you just mentioned that you had a long interest in moving to europe. what was your image of europe at the time of your departure?”). as fieldwork progressed, it became clear that spontaneous utterances on europe, although not exactly rare (they concern just over one-third of participants), had little to do with a clearly articulated orientation to europe as a spatial category or as a source of belonging. still, the relative frequency of spontaneous references to europe is noteworthy. they were usually located in the context of comparative talk on lifestyles and values between the country of origin and country of residence, or in referring to a european space-set associated with progress, culture, and prosperity. probing directly for europe towards the close of interviews was therefore necessary in order to develop a more complete picture of the various orientations to different spatial categories and how they relate to one another. as my findings suggest, questions on european integration and images of europe could shed light on respondents’ orientations to spaces and sites of collective belonging related to both european and non-european spaces, including places related to the countries of origin and residence. the ‘direct probing’ strategy was especially relevant in the context of the comparative nature of the study. putting a common referent ‘europe’ to the test in different national contexts among different groups of migrants actually revealed little in common at all. not only does this reinforce previous research on the particular national frames of interpretation of european integration (díez medrano 2003), it also suggests that unique understandings of europe are emerging among migrant populations as a result of multiple socialization processes related to the country of origin, european societies, and personal experiences of migration. 4. findings i offer two contrasting scales through which to consider the interconnectedness of spatial reference points articulated as meaningful in individual migration narratives. first, a small-scale, which is developed through emphasis on belonging to specific local or urban settings and conceptions of community as well as distinct physical environments as opposed to more extensive ones. second, a large-scale, which shifts the focus of the study exclusively onto the algerian/north african group of research participants based on their extensive mobilization of frames related to the mediterranean sea in articulating feelings of belonging that connect contexts of origin and residence. i cannot, within the scope of this essay, explore all of the relevant spatial categories that seem to shape informants’ geographic imaginations (whether smaller or larger scale) nor examine in-depth the boundary-drawing and distinction processes that often accompany work of constructing meaningful places of belonging. 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 however, by presenting a selection of spatial motifs relevant to respondents’ discourse on belonging, i hope to achieve two things. first, to shed more light on how migrants experience their own integration, or embedding, into european societies through interpretative ‘comparative work’. comparisons between the different places that have shaped one’s biography inevitably draw sending and receiving country-contexts onto the same plane of experience and existence. thus, whether or not as migrants, we are conscious of the concrete acts or symbolic processes through which we become ‘embedded’ into the new society or psychologically attempt to resolve the experience of migratory rupture, any perception of the ‘new’ place is built in relation to perceptions of ‘other’ spaces of experience, and vice-versa. thus, and as discussed in the theoretical section, migrants construct spatial categories with cultural and personal resonance through relational processes. second, i argue that this emphasis on relational spatial constructs needs to be taken into account in investigations on non-eu migrants’ orientations to europe, no matter how diverse, vague, or ambivalent they may be. to be sure, there are few participants across the three-country study who articulate strong attachments to a supranational european category (whether spontaneously evinced or directly probed for) in the absence of other contexts (social, spatial, cultural, institutional). however, when probed for in relation to other categories (e.g. multi-scalar conceptions of sending and receiving contexts), or simply, by paying attention to how mobilizations of europe occur in participants’ narratives, the category can take on unique significance in conceptions of belonging and expanding geographic imaginations. 4.1 small-scale constructions of salience and interconnected spaces: “le bled”, “el pueblo”, “mini-india” one of the more striking aspects of the findings is the multi-scalar, comparative, and relational shape that answers to direct questions on spatial categories of belonging take. indeed, responding “yes” or “no” to a question on “feeling european” or developing more or less positive or negative orientations to europe can reveal ambivalent and even contradictory attitudes if not contextualized against specific cultural and social fields. when probing for the degree of relevance of specific spaces to daily life and belonging (whether or not i had mentioned names of cities, countries, or continents in questions) it is remarkable how talk of one’s relationship to a place conjured talk of other places and spaces. reflections of this sort drew equally on material and symbolic realms of experience. several respondents claimed a sense of belonging, familiarity or relative ease of acculturation in the host society by mobilizing comparative frames drawing their place of origin and place of residence closer together, suggestive of processes of commensuration (espeland and stevens 1998). these instances are illustrative of a degree of global reflexivity, which, in its weaker variant, is identified by savage, bagnall, and longhurst (2005) as the ability to draw comparisons between one’s city and other cities (nationally or internationally), reinforcing the notion that globalization fosters the “comparative interaction of different forms of life” (the authors citing robertson 1992, 27). the following interview excerpts focus on the relation between the european capitals under study and how they can be experienced as similar to meaningful places in the sending country (to the extent that the meaning of european places can be quite transformed in a migrant’s symbolic geography). these are not meant to be taken as the basis for a general schema of interpreting the relation between distinct spaces in migration narratives. however, the following quotes 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 demonstrate that the relational nature of place interpretation can be particularly strong in the context of postcolonial migratory processes. case study 1: spatial continuity across disparate geographies (small-scale) “when i saw paris, i saw algiers” moussa, paris what is the first thing that comes to mind when you think of paris? when i think of paris? what do i think of? i don’t know how to answer that…in terms of what? it’s up to you. the first time i came…when i arrived in paris [after having crossed from the south of france and taken a train] … when i saw paris, i saw algiers. yes? i saw algiers, directly. are you talking about buildings? architecture? it’s the same. the architecture. the same, the same. they [the french] have left their mark [in algiers]. [as algerians], we can’t get lost [in paris]. very quickly, it’s as if…we know the streets [of paris]. it was not a shock [coming here] … paris, the first time i saw it, i saw algeria. it’s algiers. the capital. the same. “the way we live in london, it’s like mini-india” abbigail, london [when you arrived,] was there anything about life here [in london] that seemed different, new, strange to you? [no.] because the way we live [in london], it’s like mini-india. i don’t know whether you noticed it […] east ham. it’s like mini-india. so, you don’t feel lost at all [as a recently arrived indian] until you go outside east ham. other than east ham, manor park…you have to go outside [of those areas] to know what london is. […] when we visited [family] in oxford, [i understood that] that was english countryside. “i think in terms of india. we can’t say that this is europe…” balavan, london when you think of your daily life, on what scale are you thinking? for example, are you thinking more in terms of london, the uk, europe…? i think [in terms of] india. (laughter). we can’t say that this is europe […] or the uk […] or, london or anything. […] if i want to feel that this is london, i have to travel from here [east ham] to… at least to tower bridge. (laughter). i think like... this is south india. and if you go to other side, in upton park, it’s north india. if you go to southall, we think like…we are in punjab! (laughter). 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 arriving in madrid was like being in quito” santiago, madrid what felt different and what felt familiar when you arrived in madrid? let’s see, what was familiar is that madrid looks a lot like the capital of ecuador. […] when i was 12 years old, i moved [from the countryside to quito]. so [arriving here in madrid] was like being in quito. even the bridges […] the streets are the same, the architecture and everything is the same as in the centre of quito. […] you said earlier [that when you travel to other parts of spain], you tend to miss madrid… [yes] and whenever i return [i notice how madrid] looks a lot like the part of quito where i used to live, so i feel very close to madrid, i identify with it and i feel very good. i walk around the streets with ease, i move around with ease, i know madrid very well. the passages in case study 1 are not merely an illustration of the comparative thought-processes through which migrants arrive at elective belonging across disparate geographic contexts. they are equally revelatory of a pattern in strategies for embedding oneself in the new society (wessendorf and phillimore 2019) and may be connected to the psychology of easing the sense of migratory rupture. indeed, mobilizing comparative frames through figures of speech that establish equivalence or similarity between disparate places seems to be a way of transforming and appropriating local spaces. this is accomplished by drawing on both tangible and symbolic experience relevant to postcolonial legacies. though many research participants would reject the notions of equivalence between places like algiers and paris, quito and madrid, or the re-drawing of the map of london based on indian geography, comparative frames, though not always as striking as those presented above, are ubiquitous in migration narratives. to the extent that the testimonials in case study 1 illustrate a degree of global reflexivity that can be likened to savage and his co-authors’ account, the ‘comparative work’ of postcolonial international migrants settling in europe seems to have a stronger impact on their identity formation than that observed by the authors of globalization and belonging who studied (mainly) british internal movers. though the latter were frequently able to extract meaning from the city of manchester against a global context of other cities, these comparisons more often reinforced their local identities and attachments to the manchester area. indeed, the authors point out that most of the respondents in their study “did not develop the kind of reflexivity which indicated that their own identity was placed in a global context” (savage, bagnall, and longhurst 2005, 191). the comparisons drawn by participants in the study at hand instead suggest that the sense of belonging integrates multiple contexts understood as central to the individual migration story. indeed, rather than fostering a stronger attachment to one place or another, the global reflexivity of the sort developed in case study 1 (and in the section below) can transform the nature of the attachment altogether along the lines of one’s symbolic geography. even participants who tend to highlight more differences than similarities across spaces of experience and belonging are engaged in processes of social commensuration, through which they are constructing unique scales of value. this is evocative of boltanski and thévenot’s notion of grandeurs (1991) – the common reference points that structure actors’ understandings of and justifications for their and others’ actions. talk on tangible experiences in different and multiscalar environments can provide insights into how one constructs personally meaningful spatial categories of attachment. the extended cases presented below highlight the discursive use of 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 comparative frames as central to accounts of belonging to particular spaces understood in connection to specific social groups. whether they span both sending and receiving country geographies or are more restricted to a single territory, what is seen as constituting the most important unit of belonging is articulated in relation to another unit – both socially and spatially constituted. 4.1.1. merging social and geographic imaginaries fadéla, a woman born in 1961 in rural western algeria who grew up in the city of oran, was one of the few algerians interviewed who struggled with the french language. coming from a traditional low-income family, she completed only three years of primary education and explains her decision to move to france around the age of thirty in terms of her inability to find work, to marry, or to become emancipated. she settled in the paris suburb of argenteuil after having married a moroccan man she had met during one of her previous family visits. fadéla, though she displays a great interest in one day acquiring french nationality for practical reasons, but also given her belief that “as algerians, we are a little bit french,” develops a decidedly local-level account of her place attachments. though our interview generated few rich accounts due to our communication difficulties, she does not limit her responses on identity questions to simplistic national territorial spheres. though she feels strongly algerian and not french, she nevertheless distinguishes between multiple scales of belonging in france that have differentiated meanings to her. crucially, through frequent references to the bled3, she mobilizes a single unifying frame that focuses on her most salient attachments in both france and algeria. what is the first thing that comes to mind when you think of france? i don’t understand [the question] … france? that’s where i got married, where i live freely. it’s calm. it’s normal…i live just like in the bled. i haven’t changed. do you feel at home here, in argenteuil, in france? yes, yes. more than in algeria? here in argenteuil, i feel like over there in the bled. paris is different. in argenteuil, the people are like [those] in the bled. it’s a lot more working-class. it’s a quartier populaire [working-class district]. in paris, i feel a little bit like it’s something else. more like france. a strikingly similar focus on working-class districts as offering the most meaningful and authentic sites for belonging across both sending and receiving societies is offered by santiago, an ecuadorian migrant in madrid who is deeply attached to his rural and indigenous roots in the region of cayambe. similar to fadéla, whose understanding of the bled and quartier populaire bridge the space between france and algeria, santiago offers the pueblo4 frame as an important 3 bled is a noun with multiple meanings used in both french slang and north african arabic. in french, it means ‘small village’ having pejorative or affective connotations (e.g. a ‘hole’ in the middle of nowhere). in north africa, it often denotes the country-side. north african migrants in france specifically use bled to refer to the country or the village of origin (cambridge online dictionary 2016; centre national de ressources textuelles et lexicales 2012). 4 there are three general meanings of the noun pueblo. it can refer to a ‘people’ or ‘nation’ in the political sense; to the ‘plebe’ or ‘common people’ in terms of social class and to a ‘small town’, ‘village’ or ‘countryside’ from a spatial and cultural perspective (collins spanish-english online dictionary 2019). 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 reference point that transcends the distance between ecuador and spain. when asked about which spatial scales between madrid, spain, and europe are the most relevant to his daily life, like many research participants, santiago chose the local (madrid) scale. he accounts for this choice drawing on both symbolic and tangible experiences. why is madrid the most important level for you? because it has been 16 years… that i have imbibed, as one says… [the surroundings of madrid] … 21 years in ecuador, in cayambe especially, you know? i’ve spent 16 years here [madrid]. i’ve spent almost equal parts of my life in the two cities, in the two pueblos. because this is also the pueblo of madrid. i really like that word, i identify more with it. when asked to explain his unusual use of the term pueblo to make sense of a capital city like madrid, he specifically emphasizes the working-class sense of the term (rather than the political or geographic sense). that is, his identification with both madrid and the ecuadorian city of cayambe springs from an attachment to places he associates with ‘common people’. in contrast, he creates a socially-differentiated map of the city of madrid when i ask him what comes to mind if i say the word ‘europe’ to him: i think of london, of switzerland, of those places. for me, that’s europe. why? i don’t know…because…you see those people standing out there? [motioning from the window of the café we are seated at toward the crowd in the puerta del sol square]. they look more like common people (más de pueblo). i’ve always thought, since they say that the [typical] european is blonder, taller… even when i find myself in the barrio of salamanca [affluent district of madrid], i tell myself, “now, this is europe.” thus, santiago develops a class-based understanding of what distinguishes the european and noneuropean sides of madrid as well as an ‘ethnic’ component of europeanness that intermingles with geographic distinctions. the unpretentious and ‘common’ spaces he associates with the workingclass barrios of madrid – decidedly ‘un-european’ ones –constitute his primary spaces for attachment in the spanish context. the previous passage, in which he explains his attachment to madrid in terms of accumulated life experience, as well as the pueblo common denominator to express his relationship to the spanish capital and cayambe, illustrate the possibility of experiencing the two spaces as continuous in spite of the distance that separates them. as a result, both fadéla and santiago effectively transform the spaces they inhabit by positioning them in relation to other (socially-differentiated) ones encountered throughout the migratory experience, both european and non-european: argenteuil as the bled vs. paris as france; the district of salamanca as ‘europe’ vs. the pueblo (spanning both madrid and cayambe). these individuals are examples of participants who, through their discourse on belonging and various aspects of the migratory story, reveal themselves as ‘small-thinkers’ when it comes to the construction of socially and spatially meaningful places. it is not that fadéla and santiago display limited consciousness of inhabiting potentially larger spaces or develop one-sided orientations to territory (e.g. sendingvs. receiving-society). indeed, they actually consider the multiple units of space relevant to the migration experience and develop unique interpretations of them through comparative frames of analysis. ‘thinking small’, for these participants, is the means through which the continuity-rupture dialectic is resolved. for fadéla and santiago, ‘small-thinking’ puts greatest value on local-level working-class spaces of experience in a way that guarantees 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 continuity of the sense of self across disparate geographies. for other participants that can be described as ‘small-thinkers’, the value of local and small-scale spaces is not necessarily understood in terms of class. one’s attachment (or lack thereof) to local spaces can also be explained in terms of topographical characteristics. nabil, for instance, an algerian participant in paris explains his lack of strong attachment to the french capital in terms of the value he places on a rural existence compared to an urban one. he coins the phrase “topographical exile” to depict his transition from his mountain-top village in kabylie, northern algeria ma montagne (“my mountain”) as he calls it, to the parisian metropolis. the two are inherently incompatible. unlike for fadéla and santiago, who can connect the bled and the pueblo to specific parts of the regions of paris and madrid, ma montagne is a contradiction in terms with the french capital. 4.2 large-scale constructions of salience and interconnected spaces: the mediterranean sea as a ‘bridge’ to europe and other spaces of belonging this section shifts focus toward the construction of meaningful and interconnected spatial categories articulated at larger scales. the accounts in this section are germane to savage and his colleagues’ (2005) observations on both the limited and more profound expressions of global reflexivity. they illustrate that large scales of comparison can be used to demonstrate an identity unfolding together with an expanding geographic imagination (akin to feeling one is a ‘citizen of the world’) while still being anchored in a physically and culturally constituted sense of place. in other words, articulating larger-scale spatial orientations that draw from experiences and perceptions of multiple contexts does not necessarily lead one into abstract notions of ‘cosmopolitanism’ or rootlessness but in fact can reinforce specific attachments. one of the most salient ‘big’ frames for understanding the sense of belonging to receiving-societyrelevant spaces (such as the country of residence or europe) is the mediterranean sea. the mediterranean as a cultural and physical space was remarkably present in the migration narratives of algerian and other north african participants. a total of twenty-seven informants spontaneously referred to the ‘mediterranean sea’ (or basin) and/or to ‘mediterranean culture’ (roughly one-quarter of respondents), most of them algerians or other north africans.5 indeed, out of the 45 interviews conducted with algerians (in france and spain), more than half (24) mobilized this category. more remarkable is the sheer emphasis that many participants put on this category to make sense of the experience of migration and settlement in europe. indeed, when compared to the roughly one-third of participants in the study who had spontaneously conjured more or less vague images of ‘europe’ in the migration story, the ‘mediterranean’ category emerges as a much more clearly articulated space of reference. apart from a minority of respondents who were self-proclaimed ‘citizens of the world’, few other large-scale spatial and cultural frames – apart from europe – could rival the significance of the mediterranean space-set. evidence of a globally reflexive cultural imagination for south american and south asian participants that could have been used as a bridge between the place of origin and destination, are la hispanidad, the commonwealth, or other referents that emphasise cultural and historical ties in postcolonial contexts. such referents were virtually non-existent in testimonials, however. instead, the spatial and cultural imaginaries of south americans and south asians that indicated a large-scale or global consciousness at work in the rupture and continuity dialectics of 5 the only other references to the ‘mediterranean’ category were by two ecuadorian participants in spain and two indian participants in france. 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 belonging tended to be assembled in a more dispersed fashion rather than through a single unifying frame. i cannot present this evidence in a detailed manner within the limits of this study but provide a brief depiction in the following paragraph. examples of large-scale articulations of belonging include, for south americans, transnational evangelical christian communities as crucial in their understanding of their own social and cultural embedding in madrid as well as developing or reinforcing their south american/latino identity as a result of migration and settlement in europe. for indians and other south asians, a large-scale articulation of belonging could emphasise their feeling at home within the indian and south asian diaspora in britain and abroad, including canada and the united states. moreover, though the commonwealth did not appear explicitly in testimonials, it seems to influence some of the boundary-work through which several indian respondents in london questioned both the moral and historic legitimacy of eu migrants that they saw as displacing the more ‘appropriate’ relationship of postcolonial migration to the uk. finally, a number of indian respondents – both in the british and french contexts – evinced a particularly interesting form of global reflexivity in endorsing the project of european integration specifically in terms of their indian spatial imaginaries. indeed, some participants explicitly framed their desire for more integration and a ‘truly’ borderless europe in terms of their commitment to indian nationalism. by comparing the territorial, cultural, and linguistic diversity of india with that of the european continent, they articulated an almost common-sense desire for european federalism based on their strong attachment to the indian state project. turning back to the significance of the mediterranean for situating north african migrant identities into a large-scale more globally reflexive context, the significance of this particular space-set may lie in its ability to conjure multidimensional imaginaries pertaining to culture, space, power, and history. figure 1. different frames of the mediterranean referent the interview data offer four broad articulations of the mediterranean as a meaningful category (see figure 1). one is constructed as an adjective for a (spatially situated) common culture – e.g. a mediterranean culture, lifestyle, climate, family structure, etc. a second meaning is constructed in reference to the mediterranean as a physical space, e.g. direct references to the sea and the geographical context that connects the different points of the basin. third, the mediterranean emerges as a historically situated concept, through references to mediterranean civilizations and different periods of conquest and colonization (and their legacies) that have shaped the region. finally, the mediterranean is frequently mobilized as an image of (unequal) spatial distributions of power. the mediterranean in this context becomes a frame to symbolize uneven power and status that distinguishes one side of the sea and the other, frequently illustrated by the figure of culture space power history mediterranean 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 harragas6 or the migrant dead at sea. each category is expressed along different degrees of ‘harmony vs. contestation’ vis-a-vis more ‘official’ and existing organizations of culture and power through space and alternative or normative ones. figure 2. the mediterranean as ‘bridge’ to other spatial categories with respect to the cultural resonance of the mediterranean for north african participants, it seems to act as a vehicle to maintain an attachment to their native culture while simultaneously facilitating the opening up of the self towards other identity spaces, such as the country of residence and europe, among others (see figure 2). regardless of the specific parameters with which respondents associate mediterranean culture (or dissociate it from) e.g. southern europe, europe, northern europe, maghreb, marseilles, valencia, france, spain, etc., claiming a mediterranean identity is equivalent to establishing oneself as a ‘big thinker’ or as having developed an extended geographic imagination. to signal the salience of the mediterranean throughout the migration narrative is to assert that one’s geography of belonging extends beyond specific nation states or sub-national regions. in addition, it also allows north african migrants to endorse alternative visions of the spatial and cultural limits of europe and/or to claim moral legitimacy of belonging to existing organizations of culture and space related to the country of residence and europe. as the case studies below illustrate, the mediterranean as a common culture is located frequently in discourse to establish cultural similarities (or few incompatibilities) between algeria and the country of residence, in this case, france or spain, e.g. “i’m very mediterranean, so i felt right at home in spain,” or, “as an algerian, i feel completely at home whenever i visit marseilles.” another frequent use of the mediterranean as a container of common culture occurs in relation to what participants consider as distinct pockets of larger spatial categories. for instance, associating southern europe and/or north africa with a common mediterranean culture at times presented in conjunction with larger spaces that extend beyond the basin “e.g. i relate to people in spain and italy because we are all mediterranean. i am algerian, i am african!” but just as it can signal the experience of commonality, it can also be mobilized as an emblem of institutionalised inequality between inhabitants of the northern and southern frontiers, resulting in differentiated and fractured cultural and geographic imaginaries. in other cases, the mediterranean as a common culture can be used to establish continuity and compatibility across different identifications through an extension of scales, including a european level, e.g. “i prefer to consider myself as euro-mediterranean rather than franco-algerian.” 6 clandestine migrants, see abderrezak (2016). france/spain/ algeria europe/eu southern europe maghreb/north africa/africa mediterranean 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 case study 2: the mediterranean vis-à-vis europe: contesting boundaries and unequal status europe as a “great wall” touraya, madrid now for an ‘out of the blue’ question: what do you think of if i say the word ‘europe’ to you? …a great wall. […] when i came of age and began to dream about travelling, and all young people [in tunisia] were dreaming of travel, [i realized that] […] one must line-up and request a visa, […] the schengen visa for europe. it felt like you were about to enter a perfect world and that you need to be screened in order to enter this perfect world. so, if you don’t have the means, the education, if you’re not the son of…or the daughter of… [someone with means], all you see is this great wall. so i saw this from the perspective of my generation, of [tunisian] youth. if i, as a student, can go on [a single] trip, europeans [on the other hand], they have seen all of europe, they have the erasmus scholarship, they have all these possibilities. and we [north africans] have all the languages of the world, but we are faced with this big wall. a tunisian like me who has always lived in an environment that’s very close to the francophonie, if not 100% francophone, must request a visa to enter france, whereas a spaniard, who may not know any languages, is a european citizen, he can enter [france]. … so there is this big wall…so the only thing that’s left for you is to look to your right and to your left onto the arab world …and now that i’ve crossed this wall, i keep telling them [tunisian youth], “don’t be fooled. don’t dream about crossing or climbing that wall, because it’s all a big lie! life [on the other side] is not as amazing as you think!” … so, as a result of this understanding of europe [as a ‘wall’] should the eu expand to include a country like tunisia? we are in africa. i am african. i have become increasingly conscious of this and i assume my african identity and origins because my country is located in africa. clearly. but there is something very important, very influential in the history of the world – the mediterranean [sea]. and i think that a french [person] is closer to a tunisian than…a person from norway. one, there is the language, the history. we overcame a history of war and colonisation and we were able to have friendships or marriages or cultural exchanges between france and tunisia. when france recognized that one of the main dishes of the french family is couscous, this means that we have overcome the negative part of our relationship. we have this exchange. even in tunisia…we make quiche…because it’s a very good dish […] we have this exchange, which begins with culture, with tastes, with smells, with colours, with artistic expression, with the [french] language that brings us closer together. and this wall called europe has been created. this geographical division that completely refused turkey […] it isn’t advantageous to create a barrier between the countries of […] the northern mediterranean and of the southern mediterranean. we cannot build europe while forgetting the mediterranean. stigma and “the other side of the mediterranean” bariza, paris [talking about perceptions of racism as an algerian physician in the french healthcare sector] there is clear racism in the french medical establishment. […] the difference of treatment toward my [foreign] colleagues [who, unlike myself are not white or have an accent] is very clear. there is a huge difference. […] though [the racism] is never directly expressed. but i think that amongst themselves [native french physicians], they speak about us [non-european physicians] in a different way. they don’t have the same rapport with a polish [physician]. […] the polish or the hungarian [physician] with her little accent [in french] …she is a part of europe. but for someone who comes from the other side of the mediterranean, they [french] talk about ‘blacks’! the medical establishment by definition is a right-wing milieu. 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 case study 3: the mediterranean vis-à-vis europe: reconfiguring identity horizons “i feel mediterranean and i feel european…i even feel international” hakima, paris [talking about the experience of becoming naturalized as a french citizen] i am algerian and i am french. i have the two cultures in me because when one lives in a country…any country […] no matter where i go, i don’t think i would ever ask myself the question of whether i belong or whether i am algerian or something else. […] [i am drawn to the idea of] the euro-mediterranean because i think it is a new identity space. because i feel mediterranean and i feel european. […] i cannot say that i am only algerian or only french. honestly, i even feel international at times. i would have no problem living elsewhere. in fact, i travel a lot. and wherever i go, i feel at home. i don’t know why. “i am african, you see. i am mediterranean” lounès, paris you have mentioned you are intending to apply for french citizenship. what might be the advantages of becoming a french citizen? […] i want to live here [france]. i do exactly the same things as anyone one who is here. i mean, can a nationality really reflect what i am from an identity perspective? there is no nationality in the world that could summarize who i am. even algerian nationality. [even] when one speaks of the three identity dimensions in algeria: arab-ness, islamic-ness, berber-ness (l’arabité, l’islamité, la berberité) … but i feel very close to…i am african, you see. i am mediterranean. you see, italians, spaniards, i really feel very close to their way of being. […] case study 4: the mediterranean vis-à-vis europe: bridging “the maghreb is mediterranean” hosni, paris [talking about regional integration processes] where do you see algeria in the midst of these processes [of integration]? closer to europe or closer to the maghrebi countries? both, in fact. algeria…the maghreb is mediterranean. we are mediterranean. […] [regional] integration in north africa would have to be based on [shared] principles. it could be [based] on the land, on language, on history. […] the maghreb shares the same land, the same history, the same language, the same religion. we are berbers. […] a strong, united maghreb […] could become integrated into other groups [in future]. in europe, in africa…in the middle. […] if [the maghreb] had been strong, it could have been a bridge between all of that [europe and africa]. unfortunately, it [maghrebi integration] is not working and we have many problems. so…and also, the maghreb is mediterranean. when you go to marseilles, or you go to algiers, it’s the same thing. it’s the same thing. “on which side of the sea…?” malika, paris if you have children one day, where would you like to raise them? not in paris. i mean, if it’s in france, it would be [somewhere else, where life is easier, less stressful, more affordable]. […] ideally, i don’t think it will be in paris. ideally, it would be by the sea. i think that [the sea] is a reference point. a visual reference point, for me. i mean, i always grew up by the sea. i would love to live by the mediterranean. now, on which side [of the sea would i be living], that i don’t know. in which country, i don’t know. but the mediterranean basin is sufficiently large to… [choose]. to be able to see the sea, i would love that. i think it’s a lovely thing for children to grow up by the sea, it’s a nice horizon. 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 thus, the mediterranean frame allows many algerian and other north african participants to establish themselves as simultaneously ‘close’ to both ‘european’ (valencia, marseilles, southern europe…) and ‘non-european’ (e.g. maghreb, berber, africa, north africa…) space-culture configurations, as well as de-territorialized global reference points. in addition, by establishing proximity to certain notions of europeanness and distance from others, north africans are contesting dominant and mainstream understandings of europe and european integration. the fact that the mediterranean and its connection to europe resonates almost exclusively among north african participants and is conspicuously absent in the narratives of ecuadorians settling in spain, for instance, reinforces the significance of the dialectical relationship of rupture and continuity in the context of migration and settlement. objectively speaking, the mediterranean coast is closer to madrid (303 km via valencia) than to paris (660 km via marseilles). yet, the mediterranean as a meaningful way to articulate spatial reflexivity scarcely surfaced in narratives of migration and settlement among ecuadorians interviewed in madrid, in contrast to algerians in paris (and valencia). therefore, my findings provide some support to harvey’s understanding on the ‘stickiness’ of mental maps and can be connected to savage, bagnall, and longhurst’s conclusions on the nature of global reflexivity – namely, that it “does not seep into people’s lives because of the pervasive power of global idioms and cues, but rather it depends on particular, indeed local and personal circumstances” (2003, 202). perhaps the desire for continuity, after all, overpowers the experience of rupture in the migration experience, as ‘strangers’ categorize their new experiences in ways that are legible from the perspective of previous spatial orientations. algerians’ frequent interpretation of france, spain, and europe through the mediterranean lens may be more illustrative of the current stakes surrounding algerian and north african identity formation7 than of french, spanish, or european identity construction. other spatial themes that emerged frequently in ecuadorian participants’ migration narratives, though not explored in this study, may also lend support to the recalcitrance of geographic imaginaries. they invite us to reconsider the theme of ‘topographical exile’ used by an algerian kabyle respondent to describe his experience in paris. indeed, the discourse on roots (raíces) and land (tierra) that surfaced frequently in the accounts of ecuadorians is evocative of certain aspects of the geographic imagination that may not ‘travel’ as well as others, especially where the journey begins in a rural and developing space and ends in a major european capital. for ecuadorians intent on returning to their place of origin, the use of such vocabulary illustrates both the distinction between one’s ‘true home’ and the place of residence as well as the salient markers of ecuadorian geography – highland and coastal regions – that shape their sense of self. 5. conclusion: toward a migrant’s cartography of europe my use of the ‘thinking small’ vs. ‘thinking big’ trope should not be seen as an assumption on the limited cognitive resources for spatial abstraction of some research participants. i am not making an argument premised on cognitive mobilization theory (inglehart 1970) that would assume lower 7algerian research participants draw attention to the multiple and often conflicting identity narratives in contemporary algerian society that have to do with french colonial legacies (e.g. the continued relevance of the french language in national administration and education as well as the cultural divisions between more arabic/islamically-oriented and french/secularly-oriented segments of society); the status of berber languages and culture marginalized by the state, as well as a general sensation of algerian culture and civil society being stifled by heavy emigration trends and a political regime dominated by an elite and military caste. 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 educated participants are less inclined than higher-educated ones to perceive the relevance of becoming embedded into larger socio-spatial categories. indeed, the cases discussed in some depth as well as the interview fragments presented in the case studies find that small-scale motifs are not synonymous with limited spatial imaginaries. instead, participants who make use of smaller spatial frames are simply emphasising the higher degree of relevance of these spaces, both in material and symbolic terms, to their daily lives and migratory experiences, compared to other, often larger spatial categories. articulating notions of belonging, membership and identification in the context of different spatial scales, whether small or large, seems to bridge distance between distinct spaces and may ease the multiple transitions inherent in migratory rupture. for example, talk on the transformation and appropriation of official units of urban space in the country of residence (using vocabulary such as mini-india, bled, or pueblo to make sense of attachment vis-à-vis london, madrid, and paris) reflects perceptions of shifting multi-scalar boundaries. whether between diaspora and ‘mainstream’ society or between working-class and affluent urban and sub-urban spaces, the process of appropriating local spaces, even from a small-scale perspective, involves the blurring of boundaries between sending-and receiving-societies. thus, migrants are able to re-draw boundaries in the receiving society (through expanding spatial consciousness) in a way that nevertheless preserves elements of the mental maps acquired prior to migration. with respect to understandings of the physical environment, such as architecture that reminds individuals of former colonial relationships (e.g. paris=algiers, quito=madrid) or topographical characteristics which act as evidence of the disjuncture between one’s life preand post-migration (e.g. ma montagne≠paris), migrants frequently judge the relationship between distinct spaces when they provide accounts of acculturation processes. this alerts us to the significance of connecting multiple urban and physical environments as savage et al.’s work on elective belonging and global reflexivity already suggests. in globalization and belonging (2005), savage, longhurst, and bagnall remarked on how the minority of research participants they interviewed in the manchester area who were not brought up in britain or whose life experiences abroad were not limited to the beaten track of the ‘white british diaspora’ seemed to possess the most developed forms of global consciousness. though the authors effectively challenge abstract notions of cosmopolitanism that have tended to confuse global cultural processes with the de-territorialization of attachments, they nevertheless view the ‘strangers’ in their study as the most authentically cosmopolitan. these are the only individuals who “place their identities in some kind of explicit global frame” (savage, longhurst, and bagnall 2005, 197), compared to the majority of respondents for whom global reflexivity is more limited to understanding their urban environment (and their attachments to it) in a broader context of national and international cities. my findings to a certain extent challenge the assumptions these authors make about global reflexivity – both in its more limited and profound versions. i do not view small-scale reflexivity (e.g. comparing neighbourhoods or cities in different places) as reinforcing a primary local attachment, as may be the case for non-migrants. rather, i show how drawing these comparisons allows migrants to: a) create symbolic geographies that bridge the distance between ‘here’ and ‘there’, and b) convert these symbolic geographies into the basis for belonging. this inevitably leads to an extended form of global awareness, even if one does not proclaim oneself to be a citizen of the world. the ability of international migrants to set their place of settlement in europe in a broader context that is significant to their sense of self, whether this occurs at a small or at a large 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 scale, need not result in strengthening one local attachment over another. instead, this reflexivity is what allows them to ease the migratory transition and draw together multiple spheres of experience into a coherent life-narrative. with respect to reflexivity through larger-scale forms of bridging, my exploration of the mediterranean frame of reference highlights how extending one’s spatial and cultural imaginary is nevertheless rooted in a particular sense of place. moreover, my findings suggest that the migratory experience, though it constitutes a form of “extreme life experience”, in the words of savage and his colleagues, is not on its own what “recruits” individuals into developing more global awareness (2005, 202). though i have argued that the act of migration certainly contributes to expanding and unsettling previous orientations to space, my findings emphasise the important role of previous imaginaries and the embodied cultural capital that migrants ‘carry’ with them along their journey. this essay stops-short in developing an account of the degree to which non-european migrants understand themselves as ‘becoming europeans’ as they settle in the different eu cities under study. though the european category is the focal point of the investigation, it is premised on the idea of connecting images and experiences of europe to other geographies and spaces of belonging. since the interviewing and data analysis approach paid attention to both ‘organic’ (spontaneous) constructions of meaningful spaces as well as reactions to spatial categories that were ‘forced’ upon participants, the question “to be or not to be european” altogether loses relevance, compared to: to what extent is there a place for europe in your geographical imagination? as i have tried to show, asking postcolonial migrants about their relationship to europe is a loaded question. international postcolonial migrants are not ‘clean slates’ or ‘complete strangers’ to europe, contrary to what one might expect. rather, they are strangers in the simmelian sense of embodying the synthesis of proximity and distance relationships. multiple processes of socialization that occur at different space-time junctures (before and after the act of border-crossing) and the will to re-establish internal consistency in what may be a radically different environment turn migrants into cartographers of sorts. more than constructing unique cartographies of europe, however, the accounts developed in this study speak to a broader research agenda that questions implicit spatial assumptions in concepts such as ‘culture’ and ‘society’. following gupta and ferguson (1992), in an effort to de-naturalize cultural and spatial divisions across peoples, this study reinforces the need for further research into the ability of people to confound the established spatial orders, either through physical movement or through their own conceptual and political acts of re-imagination, [which means] that space and place can never be a ‘given,’ and that the process of their sociopolitical construction must always be considered (1992, 17). 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 references abderrezak, hakim. 2016. ex-centric migrations: europe and the maghreb in mediterranean cinema, literature, and music. bloomington: indiana university. agirdag, ohran, karen phalet and mieke van houtte. 2016. “european identity as a unifying category: national vs. european identification among native and immigrant pupils.” european union politics, 17 (2): 285-302. agnew, john a. and james s. duncan, eds. 1989. the power of place: bringing together the geographical and sociological imaginations. boston: unwin hyman. amin, ash. 2012. land of strangers. cambridge: polity press. appadurai, arjun. 1996. modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization. minneapolis: university of minnesota. bauman, zygmunt. 1991. modernity and ambivalence. cambridge: polity press. boltanski, luc and laurent thévenot. 1991. de la justification: les économies de la grandeur. paris: gallimard. cambridge online dictionary. 2016. “translation of ‘bled’.” https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/french-english/bled centre national de ressources textuelles et lexicales. 2012. “bled.” https://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/bled cinnirella, marco and saira hamilton. 2007. “are all britons reluctant europeans? exploring european identity and attitudes to europe among british citizens of south asian ethnicity.” ethnic and racial studies, 30 (3): 481-50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870701217530. collins spanish-english online dictionary. 2019. “english translation of pueblo.” https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/spanish-english/pueblo coupland, nikolas. 1999. “other representation.” in handbook of pragmatics highlights: society and language use, edited by jürgen jaspers et al., 241-260. amsterdam: john benjamins publishing company. díez medrano, juan. 2003. framing europe: attitudes to european integration in germany, spain and the united kingdom. princeton university press. dowley, kathleen m. and brian d. silver. 2011. “support for europe among europe’s ethnic, religious, and immigrant minorities.” international journal of public opinion research, 23 (3): 315-337. erisen, elif. 2017. “seeking refuge in a superordinate group: non-eu immigration heritage and european identification.” european union politics, 18 (1): 26-50. espeland, wendy nelson and mitchell l. stevens. 1998. “commensuration as a social process.” annual review of sociology, 24: 313-343. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.313 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/french-english/bled https://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/bled http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870701217530 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/spanish-english/pueblo https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.313 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 eurostat. 2017. “people in the eu statistics on origin of residents: statistics explained.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=people_in_the_eu__statistics_on_origin_of_residents#foreignborn_residents_from_countries_outside_the_eu (accessed january 2020). gregory, derek. 1994. geographical imaginations. cambridge, ma: blackwell. gupta, akhil and james ferguson. 1992. “beyond ‘culture’: space, identity, and the politics of difference.” cultural anthropology, 7 (1): 6-23. harvey, david. 1973. social justice and the city. baltimore: johns hopkins university. harvey, david. 2005. “the sociological and geographical imaginations.” international journal of politics, culture and society, 18 (3/4): 211-255. inglehart, ronald. 1970. “cognitive mobilization and european identity.” comparative politics, october: 45-70. nail, thomas. 2015. the figure of the migrant. stanford university. recchi, ettore. 2015. mobile europe: the theory and practice of free movement in the eu. london: palgrave macmillan. recchi, ettore and teresa kuhn. 2013. “europeans’ space-sets and the political legitimacy of the eu.” in a political sociology of transnational europe, edited by niilo kauppi, 191-222. colchester: ecpr press. robertson, roland. 1992. globalisation: social theory and global culture. london: sage. roeder, antje. 2011. “does mobility matter for attitudes to europe? a multi-level analysis of immigrants’ attitudes to european unification.” political studies, 59: 458-471. robins, daniel. 2019. “imagining london: the role of the geographical imagination in migrant subjectivity and decision-making.” area, 51: 728-735. rumford, chris. 2013. the globalization of strangeness. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. savage, mike, gaynor bagnall and brian j. longhurst. 2005. globalization and belonging. london: sage. simmel, georg. 1950. “the stranger.” in the sociology of georg simmel, edited and translated by kurt h. wolff. new york: free press. sperling, jessica. 2013. “belonging, beyond the nation: the significance and meaning of european identity for latin american-origin youth in spain.” national identities, 15 (1): 67-84. taylor, charles. 2002. “modern social imaginaries.” public culture, 14: 91-124. teney, céline, laurie hanquinet and katharina bürkin. 2016. “feeling european: an exploration of ethnic disparities among immigrants.” journal of ethnic and migration studies, 42 (13): 2182-2204. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2016.1166941. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=people_in_the_eu_-_statistics_on_origin_of_residents%23foreign-born_residents_from_countries_outside_the_eu%20 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=people_in_the_eu_-_statistics_on_origin_of_residents%23foreign-born_residents_from_countries_outside_the_eu%20 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=people_in_the_eu_-_statistics_on_origin_of_residents%23foreign-born_residents_from_countries_outside_the_eu%20 https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2016.1166941 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 tuan, yi-fu. 1975. “images and mental maps.” annals of the association of american geographers, 65 (2): 205-213. vieten, ulrike m. 2018. “europe is for being recognized for more than an ethnic background” middle class british, dutch and german minority citizens’ perspectives on eu citizenship and belonging to europe.” cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 10 (1): 27-46. wessendorf, susanne and jenny phillimore. 2019. “new migrants’ social integration, embedding and emplacement in superdiverse contexts.” sociology, 53 (1): 123-138. 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, vol 13 (1) 2019 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 1-3 issn 2562-8429 introduction competing visions and new regional order in central asia and the caucasus special issue editor crina viju-miljusevic, carleton university the special issue examines cooperation within the europe-caucasus-asia (eca) region and the interdependence among its participating countries. the eca represents a distinct geopolitical grouping of states where historical institutional structures shape both the dynamics of cooperation and the challenges it faces. these factors also influence interactions with neighbouring regions, fostering collaboration or resistance. the eca serves as a compelling case study of overlapping regional influences driven by three key actors: the people’s republic of china (prc), the russian federation (rf), and the european union (eu). the ongoing russian invasion of ukraine has further heightened the strategic significance of studying eca cooperation. the war has disrupted traditional geopolitical alignments, trade routes, and energy supply chains, pushing countries in the region to reassess their economic and security dependencies. as russia's actions create new divisions and tensions, understanding the evolving roles of china and the eu in the region becomes increasingly crucial. this special issue provides valuable insights into how shifting alliances, trade realignments, and security concerns are reshaping cooperation within the eca and its broader geopolitical landscape. the contribution “external forces in central asia: shaping the regional balance” by mubinzhon abduvaliev, ricardo bustillo, and crina viju-miljusevic explores the influence of external powers on regional cooperation in central asia. it highlights key regional initiatives led by the european union, russia, and china, focusing on their objectives, involved actors, and achievements. the variety of regional organizations offers a valuable case study for comparing different models of regionalism. given that many of these organizations are established by authoritarian states, their goals, structures, and approaches to regional integration differ significantly from those triggered by democratic actors. rather than fostering deep regional cohesion, these initiatives often reflect the geopolitical ambitions of their founding states. the authors argue that external powers frequently employ divide-and-conquer strategies to maintain leverage over central asian states, therefore deterring the development of regionalization. this fragmentation not only limits cooperative mechanisms within the region but also reinforces the dependency of individual states on external actors. assylzat karabayeva’s article, “china-central asia regionalization and its impact on the central asian region and beyond,” examines the effects of china-central asia relations on region-building in central asia and their relations with an important external actor, russia. the article highlights intraregional cooperation among central asian countries, which increasingly reflects characteristics of the chinese model of regionalism. these include policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and strengthened people-to-people ties. this form of regionalism, driven by pragmatic economic collaboration and flexible institutional arrangements, contrasts sharply with russia-led initiatives, which tend to emphasize political alignment, security 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 1-3 issn 2562-8429 cooperation, and tighter institutional control, as seen in organizations like the eurasian economic union (eaeu). in contrast to the arguments presented by abduvaliev, bustillo and viju-miljusevic, karabayeva asserts that regional cooperation in central asia exists as a result of china’s indirect, recipient-driven influence. the third article in the special issue, “new regional alignment in the post-soviet space: the eu as an active player in the eastern partnership countries (case of georgia)” by beka chedia, examines the evolving role of the european union in the caucasus, with a particular focus on georgia. the author argues that the eu’s geopolitical interest in the region has grown over time, leading to a partial shift away from its traditional emphasis on soft and transformative power toward a more strategic effort to expand its sphere of influence. using a five-concept framework—indifference, neighbourhood, soft power via partnership, great europe, and four-speed europe—chedia analyzes the trajectory of eu-georgia relations. he identifies two primary factors that have slowed their development: georgia’s geographical remoteness and russia’s regional influence. however, the eu’s strategic pivot toward a “great europe” and the impact of russia’s war in ukraine have served as key catalysts for a closer alignment between georgia and the eu. the final article in this issue, the digital silk road in europe: china’s soft power maneuvers at euro 2024, examines how china utilized its soft power capacity and diplomacy, particularly sports diplomacy, in support of it digital silk road initiative in europe in connection with the 2024 uefa european football championship. the author argues that china was able to use the event as a vehicle for attracting european consumers and thus increase the level of acceptance of chinese digital influence. this occurred through sponsorships at uefa, relying on the capacity of chinese tech companies to promote their services. the author argues that these efforts challenged negative images of china and provide a potential bases for increasing the scope of chines investment in europe. 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 1-3 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 offensive weapons and the future of nuclear arms control nancy teeple1 north american and arctic defence and security network abstract with a focus on the strategic competition between the united states and russia, this paper explores the prospects for the future of arms control under an intensifying nuclear security dilemma. the end of stability-enhancing agreements such as the inf treaty and the us withdrawal from the jcpoa and open skies has accelerated the arms race. the relationship between arms control and strategic stability is part of this evaluation, particularly with respect to how states view the concept framed within their national security interests. the provocative role that offensive – deterrence by denial – capabilities play in contributing to strategic instability is central to this study. this work looks particularly at new systems designed for asymmetric advantage, including those that can defeat strategic defences, such as longer-range cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles. given conditions of modernizations and upgrades to nuclear arsenals, including the entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems that can threaten a first strike, this work considers how a dialogue on limiting dangerous systems could be initiated between the us and russia, and whether new start could be revised, or a new treaty established, to limit advances in cruise missile technology, hypersonic vehicles, missile defences, and tactical nuclear weapons. 1 nancy teeple is a postdoctoral fellow at the north american and arctic defence and security network (naadsn) and an adjunct assistant professor and research associate at the department of political science and economics at the royal military college of canada. 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 introduction in 1987, president ronald reagan and general secretary mikhail gorbachev signed the intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty. this marked a significant moment of arms control, eliminating an entire class of nuclear delivery systems, and enhanced strategic stability by reducing the mutual threat posed by intermediate range weapons in the european theatre.2 in recent times, the strategic competition between the united states (us) and russia is intensified by the deployment of nuclear and conventional means to threaten one another, including new advanced delivery systems launched by sea, air, and land, to offset capability gaps. these developments led to the demise of several arms control regimes that had defined east-west cooperation in reducing strategic weapons since the cold war. the end of key biand multilateral arms control regimes, such as the inf treaty, and the us withdrawal from the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa) and open skies, places other arms control in peril, such as new start that was set to expire in february 2021. the conditions facilitating agreement on arms control cooperation have all but disappeared, save for russia’s appeal to the us to consider renewing or extending new start before its expiration plunges the two nations into greater instability and arms races. the deployment of new offensive nuclear weapons intensifies an already problematic security dilemma that characterizes the strategic competition between the us and russia. these systems deployed for strategic advantage through deterrence-by-denial have the effect of provoking a counter-response by a nuclear peer competitor to offset that advantage through asymmetric means, creating conditions of strategic instability. strategic stability can be defined as conditions characterized by a balance of mutual vulnerability and mutual threat, ensured by credible secondstrike systems, that reduce incentives to use nuclear weapons in a first strike. simply stated, mutual deterrence is reinforced by mutually assured destruction or some other form of devastating punishment. however, this understanding is nuanced, based on what nuclear states perceive as stabilizing relative to their own security. their actions to increase security through fielding offensive weapons could have the effect of creating instability that increases incentives to use nuclear or conventional disarming weapons. the concept of strategic stability is being redefined in the current strategic context as tensions increase between nuclear competitor states with the development of new destabilizing offensive weapons with a first-strike disarming capability.3 the thesis of this work rests on the assumption that the deployment offensive weapons and postures contributes to strategic instability, provokes states into arms races, and reduces incentives for cooperation on arms control. this paper argues that in a post-inf world, the deployment of next-generation offensive weapons creates unique challenges for current and future arms control. viewing us-russian strategic relations as constituting an intensifying security dilemma, based on the increasingly offensive orientation of their nuclear forces, this work employs a typology for assessing the orientation of nuclear postures and weapons systems that lends to forecasting competitive strategic behaviour. the analysis demonstrates that the situation has reached an unprecedented level of volatility in us-russia relations with the breaking down of constraints on 2 the inf treaty prohibited the soviet and us deployment of “all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5500 kilometers” (kimball and reif 2019). 3 james acton states, “from almost as soon as the term ‘strategic stability’ first entered the nuclear lexicon, there have been calls to redefine it … critics often advocated for a redefinition on the grounds that the quest for stability led to a nuclear policy that was at variance with effective deterrence” (2013, 117). 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 dangerous weapons systems, and equally provocative counter responses. these outcomes also have implications for canada as a close us continental defence partner and nato ally. the structure of this discussion begins with outlining the security dilemma framework for understanding the strategic dynamics between the us and russia, exploring the offensive orientation of nuclear systems and its impact on strategic stability. following this is an assessment of the deterioration of us-russia strategic relations and implications for canada, the offence dominance of us and russian nuclear postures with an investigation of the destabilizing weapons systems deployed by both states. the final sections consider what this means for arms control and provides recommendations for moving forward. current conditions: intense security dilemma the security dilemma is a concept that applies to conventional and non-conventional nuclear threats, with different outcomes. herz’s original concept applies to conditions under which one state exhibits an increase in military strength, intended to increase its defences and therefore security, which creates a perception of threat in another state that views it as a competitor or rival (herz 1950; 1951; 1959). whether intended to be provocative or not, the second state’s response is to build up its military capabilities to enhance its security, which the first state then perceives as aggressive (jervis 1976; 1978). in its application to conventional forces, this security dilemma creates tensions and conditions that are likely to result in conflict. however, the nature of nuclear threats creates a different kind of outcome than conventional actions. because of their destructive capacity and the taboo (and intense fear) that surrounds their use, a nuclear security dilemma does not result in conflict, but rather a destabilizing arms races fueled by mutual fear and uncertainty about intentions. this dilemma is brought about by conditions in which the actions of one state to increase its security through deploying nuclear forces creates a response by a peer competitor, perceiving the first state’s behaviour as threatening, to deploy nuclear capabilities. this response causes the first state to perceive the second state as aggressive, motivating it to increase its nuclear capabilities, and the spiral of action-response ensues. nuclear behaviour can intensify or mitigate the security dilemma based on the orientation of nuclear postures and the deployment of weapons systems towards either the offence or defence. thus, the concept of a nuclear security dilemma offers an understanding the tension between the u.s and russia, focusing on the offensive or defensive orientation of their nuclear postures and forces. the security dilemma frames the conditions that affect the future of bilateral and multilateral arms control as they pertain to the impact of nuclear weapon state members of the treaties. the security dilemma is influenced by states’ perceptions of the offensive or defensive orientation of nuclear forces, which generate a competitive or benign response. these perceptions drive the intensity of the security dilemma that creates a sense of threat, vulnerability, fear, mistrust, and uncertainty, producing a symmetric and/or asymmetric response. this nuclear security dilemma framework builds upon established security dilemma models refined for strategic relations dominated by nuclear behaviour (van evera 1998; 1999; jervis 1978; 82 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 adams 2003/04).4 its refinement provides a typology for offensive deterrence and defence deterrence (od/dd) defined by nuclear strategies and systems oriented for denial or punishment. deterrence-by-denial (offensive deterrence) refers to capabilities designed to disarm an adversary’s nuclear launch platforms, early warning systems, or command and control (c2) through a first-strike against these counterforce targets. deterrence-by-denial is distinguished from deterrence-by-punishment (defensive deterrence). due to their first-strike disarming effects, offensive weapons are destabilizing weapons. deterrence-by-punishment is characterized by survivable systems and postures designed for second-strike / retaliation (i.e. traditional mutually assured destruction (mad) strategies) that target populations and economic centres (such as cities) and infrastructure not necessarily related to military developments.5 these high-value countervalue targets constitute unacceptable damage that dis-incentivizes a state from striking in the first place. defensive weapons are therefore second-strike, intended to deter through retaliation. current systems tend to reflect flexible nuclear strategies with capabilities spanning the three legs of the nuclear triad – sea, air, land launch platforms – providing a combination of denial and punishment approaches. for nuclear powers like the us, these arsenals are strongly oriented for first-strike advantage. in recent times, nuclear deterrence systems include the entangling of conventional capabilities – such as conventional warheads on missile platforms – that play a role in offensive deterrence-by-denial strategies targeting the rival state’s nuclear assets. conventional counterforce alternatives increase the uncertainty and complexity of perceptions of threat posed by offensive systems (acton 2020). these conditions dis-incentivize competitor states from cooperating on constraining the expansion of nuclear arsenals that would otherwise involve the reduction of deployed warheads and launch platforms. the current nuclear security dilemma creates conditions that 1) obstruct forward momentum on new nuclear arms control agreements, and 2) threaten the continuation of current arms control agreements. evidence for this argument are the outcomes resulting from the us abrogation of the anti-ballistic missile (abm) treaty in 2002, mutual accusations of violating the inf treaty leading to the withdrawal from said treaty in 2019, the us withdrawal from the open skies multilateral treaty in 2020, and anticipated expiration of new start in february 2021. with a focus on offensive capabilities deployed for deterrence-by-denial, the following section presents a typology for evaluating nuclear postures and systems oriented for offensive deterrence. this typology provides a set of indicators demonstrating the threat posed to a competitor state by denial doctrine, strategies, and systems orientation. the perceived threat causes the competitor state to respond by attempting to close the gap through deploying its own denial capabilities and/or creating an asymmetric threat to target the superior state’s vulnerability in order to re-establish a sense of parity. 4 this revised framework was first proposed in the unpublished doctoral dissertation (teeple 2017). 5 ‘survivable’ indicates systems that are hardened or difficult to locate, so that they cannot be eliminated in a firststrike. hardened intercontinental ballistic missiles and hidden nuclear missile submarines (ssbns) often comprise survivable second-strike assets. 83 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 offensive deterrence orientation offensive nuclear deterrence postures are the policies, doctrines, and strategies that guide nuclear force employment for deterrence-by-denial. denial strategies to disarm the other state’s nuclear arsenals may include targeting its command, control, and communications. first-strike capabilities create advantages, but also incentivizes the opposing state to strike pre-emptively if it believes the first state to be getting ready to disarm and decapitate it. offensive strategies are rarely clear in nuclear postures, which often use ambiguous language to justify expanding nuclear arsenals and strike options. however, a spectrum of flexible responses often applies the language of warfighting, damage limitation, and escalation control to communicate intentions to act beyond retaliation in the interest of achieving advantage over the adversary. extended deterrence – a pledge to use nuclear weapons to defend an ally from nuclear attack – can be interpreted as both a defensive and offensive approach, reinforcing ambiguity and uncertainty. whether this pledge is credible is uncertain, given that it has never been tested.6 the typology for classifying nuclear postures includes the following indicators: deterrence-bydenial; counterforce, warfighting doctrine, damage limitation, escalation control, protection of the homeland, pre-emptive doctrine, indistinguishable offensive and defensive postures, ambiguous intentions, and extended deterrence. offensive nuclear deterrence systems are weapons designed with the capability to disarm the adversary’s military and leadership. these weapons are distinguished from punishment nuclear weapons in lower yield, accuracy, precision, speed, and stealth, with the purpose of evading detection and interception by missile defences. nuclear deterrence systems include multiple independently re-targetable vehicles – multiple warheads – on a missile to overwhelm missile defences and increase the likelihood of strike at multiple targets. cruise missiles that travel at lower altitudes also provide advantages of evading early warning systems. lower yield means they can be usable in the battlefield without the large-scale destructive effect against cities, but are alarming in the potential that their use could create an escalation to the use of larger, more strategic weapons. systems on high alert can be launched almost immediately and provide a pre-emptive first strike advantage against an adversary. unlimited and capable missile defences provide an advantage over states’ first and second-strike forces, which reduces the stability of mutually assured destruction. enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities designed to gather information at all levels – signals, communications, imagery, seismic, human collection and other forms of espionage – provides an advantage to a state with superior capabilities to know where and what kinds of assets the adversary deploys. the typology for offensive nuclear deterrence systems includes the following indicators: orientation for first-strike; systems on high alert; usability of weapons based on precision, accuracy, and low yield; comprehensive missile defence systems; multiple independentlyretargetable vehicles (mirvs); long-range standoff advanced cruise missiles; hypersonic vehicles with high speed and maneuverability; enhanced stealth; and enhanced isr. in the past decade, new developments in delivery platforms have been pursued by the us and russia (and china) to enhance the denial capabilities of their nuclear systems. these attempts are 6 betts (1987) describes confrontations between the us and soviet union in the european theatre during the cold war that brought both nations to the brink of conflict and nuclear threats. 84 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 intended to advantage one side over the other, and to offset advantages of the superior state by providing an asymmetric threat. these new developments increase the dominance of the offence. they include new intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbms), such as russia’s new sarmat and the us ground-based strategic deterrent to replace the minuteman iii. new delivery platforms are also able to add hypersonic capabilities – either boost-glide systems on ballistic missiles, like russia’s avangard, or us conventional global strike capabilities. hypersonic vehicles, which are also in development for cruise missiles, threaten to evade missile defences and early detection by both speed and maneuverability. as discussed, the entanglement of conventional weapons with nuclear weapons as part of the strategic arsenal creates ambiguity because the other state is uncertain whether missiles are nuclear or conventionally armed. it creates complexity in a state’s calculation in how to respond. dual-use capabilities for space and cyber increase uncertainty, as they can be deployed as highly precise anti-satellite capabilities and offensive cyber weapons to target c2 and launch platforms in all domains. the deployment of these new capabilities risks escalation by incentivizing a nation to use its nuclear weapons before losing them. strategic (in)stability and arms races the previous discussion demonstrated how offensive deterrence contributes to conditions that incentivize arms races over cooperation on arms control. such behaviour is mutually provocative and reduces the perception of any benefit in maintaining arms control. these perceptions relate to what constitutes security. from the us perspective, invulnerability achieved through superiority or, according to some critics, primacy, provides security through impenetrable defences and unmatched forces to deny other nations’ strike capabilities (lieber and press 2006a; 2006b). this is the reasoning behind upgrading missile defences, ballistic missiles and other missile systems, information advantages through enhanced isr, and new strike systems provided by long-range standoff weapons and prompt global strike (crs). from russia’s perspective, it is important to asymmetrically offset us superiority through systems that can penetrate defences and threaten the american homeland and its allies. these are pursued through the deployment of intermediate range forces in the european theatre (particularly in kaliningrad and crimea), in addition to weapons that provide enhanced stealth, precision, speed, and maneuverability (such as developments in new cruise missile technology). the pursuit of capabilities to offset us advantages also include conventional, nuclear, and the newly-emerging domains of cyber, information and space, providing opportunities to explore cross-domain coercion (adamsky 2018). mutually-provocative developments by both the us and russia negatively impact strategic stability, a concept directly tied to deterrence. given the return to great power competition in the international system, strategic stability is being redefined based on the national security interests of states, which is becoming increasingly distanced from the traditional concept based on mutual deterrence/mutual vulnerability. this strategic concept is under debate in the strategic analysis community, particularly in how russia and china are moving to reinstate strategic balance through pursuing asymmetric means to continue to be able to threaten the us, despite the superiority of america’s diverse and quantitative nuclear arsenal and evolving missile defence architecture (colby 2013). analysts define strategic stability, either narrowly or broadly, with regard to scope and content (acton 2013). former us secretary of defense edward warner provided three ways of 85 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 understanding strategic stability. most narrowly, it is the absence of incentives to use nuclear weapons first (crisis stability) and the absence of incentives to build up a nuclear force (arms race stability). in the medium-range it is the absence of armed conflict between nuclear-armed states. and, broadly, it is a regional or global security environment in which states enjoy peaceful and harmonious relations (acton 2013). the main challenge is in achieving agreement between states on what strategic stability means. the us and russia have different understandings (or preferences) of what constitutes strategic stability, which are based on how they understand deterrence (pavlov and malygina 2018). deterrence itself is an evolving concept given the increasing emphasis on deterrence-by-denial as a strategy to enhance a state’s national security against new systems against which no defence yet exists. deterioration of us-russia strategic relations and implications for canada deteriorating conditions between the us and russia involve a number of interrelated issues in military and political realms, particularly with provocative nuclear and non-nuclear behaviour contributing to increasing tensions. provocative non-nuclear behaviour involves conventional and unconventional activities intended to threaten or otherwise undermine western military and political governance (i.e. western liberal democracy). such activities include hybrid or grey warfare which spans kinetic and non-kinetic activity across multiple domains, utilizing a combination of information operations, cyber-attacks, and other covert military and non-military methods, allowing for deniability and creating ambiguity in distinguishing actions that constitute conflict versus aggressive actions below the threshold of war.7 these actions affect western forces, economic systems, political systems, and the general public – the latter through manipulation of public opinion by sowing discontent and undermining confidence in governing institutions. nato deployments close to russia’s borders in response to ambiguous russian threats against the baltic states and ukraine – including indirect support to ukrainian forces – are perceived by russia as provocative. in order to mitigate the perceived threat to russia’s sphere of influence, russia has deployed denial of access and maneuverability systems to prevent or limit western forces from operating in a given area by sea or air.8 recent exercises that simulate confrontation with a state’s adversary – such as russia’s zapad, vostok, tsentr, or nato’s trident juncture – may be viewed as provocative, and in worst cases, mis-perceived as a prelude to actual confrontation. the russia-belarus zapad-2017 exercise simulated the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict with nato.9 in the fall of 2018, nato trident juncture exercises in and around norway simulating an article v response 7 nicole jackson (2018; 2019) explores hybrid capabilities in her evaluation of nato-russia relations. 8 these attempts to deny western activity in a given region (the arctic, eastern europe, and eastern mediterranean) by sea and air is often termed anti-access and area-denial (a2/ad) – a controversial term in strategic circles because it is not explicitly stated in russian doctrine. 9 zapad is a routine exercise held by russia and belarus every four years. giles (2018) reports that “previous russian exercises on the scale of zapad left troops in position for undertaking military operations immediately afterward— against georgia in 2008 and ukraine in 2014.” however, giles cautions against western alarmist reporting about russia’s intentions, as these former developments occurred within a context preceded by a political crisis. 86 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 encountered negative reactions from russia, who perceived the exercise as targeting them.10 however, as per the organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce) vienna document on notification of military exercises to increase transparency and predictability, russia was invited to observe trident juncture (nato 2018). russia’s zapad, however, fell short of the 9000-troop minimum requiring notification to osce states. trident juncture was followed by a us-led nato exercise in poland, lithuania, latvia, and estonia (which likely also provoked russia); while russia ran its vostok exercise just weeks before trident juncture with no advanced notification to the osce under the vienna document.11 these exercises appear to simulate conflict with nato, and signal capabilities and potential intentions. non-nuclear behaviour plays a role in the escalation of tensions between nuclear powers (including nuclear-conventional entanglement). the following table presents the actions and events since the 1990s that led to the demise of formerly positive us-russia relations since the end of the cold war. table 1: irritants in us-russia security relations time period/year actors actions 1990s nato enlargement in central and eastern europe (pifer 2014) • the west had made an implied commitment to not expand nato eastward beyond the united germany (hahn 2018). • nato’s enlargement impacted russia’s sense of security and regional stability (martin 2017). 1999 nato operation allied force in yugoslavia • this operation started the decline of us-russian relations (snyder 2017) and negatively impacted nato-russia relations (averre 2009). 2002 us withdrawal from abm treaty; modernization of the nuclear triad • the 1972 abm treaty established constraints on us and russian missile defences, which dis-incentivized destabilizing arms race behaviour (nti overview 2011). • following withdrawal from the abm treaty, the us embarked on the modernization of its nuclear arsenal, combining offensive nuclear weapons with missile defences and conventional strike capabilities that increased the threat to russia (federation of american scientists 2002; woolf 2002; kristensen, norris, and oelrich 2009). 2008 russia military activity in south ossetia and abkhazia • russia aimed to create buffer zones in the form of ‘frozen conflicts’, providing leverage to prevent western interests in these regions (i.e. russia’s “near abroad”) – particularly blocking them from joining nato and the eu (matsaberidze 2015, 81). 2011 nato nato-led coalition intervention in libya 10 exercises ran from october 25 to november 7, 2018 (masters 2018). 11 vostok ran from september 11-15, 2018, and included participation of china’s people’s liberation army (masters 2018; boulègue 2018; johnson 2018). 87 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 table 1 cont’d 2014 russia russian annexation of crimea and support to separatists in the donbas region of ukraine12 2015 russia russian support to the assad regime in the syrian conflict 2016 nato decision to deploy four battlegroups to the baltics and poland • at the 2016 warsaw summit, nato established a forward presence in poland, estonia, latvia, and lithuania, and a tailored forward presence in the black sea region, to strengthen its defence and deterrence posture in eastern europe. 2016 russia revelation that russia was in violation of the inf treaty by deploying the 9m729 (ssc-8) novatar land-based cruise missile 2018 us withdrawal from jcpoa – the ‘iran nuclear deal’ – in may 2019 us withdrawal from the inf treaty in august • like the abrogation of the abm treaty, this action signaled a lack of confidence in arms control and cooperation. it removed constraints on expanding nuclear forces into more threatening deployments (kimball and reif 2019). 2019 us the trump administration’s intention to withdraw its signature of the ctbt in may on the belief that russia is cheating (persbo 2020) 2020 us withdrawal from the open skies treaty • russia had been restricting overflights within kaliningrad region, and the corridor between russia and south ossetia and abkhazia (reif 2019). the us responded by restricting overflights over hawaii and alaska. the current period has been described as an era of great power competition, in which russia and china are increasingly posing a strategic challenge to the united states in specific geopolitical regions – such as eastern europe, the arctic, and the eastern mediterranean (russia), and the asia pacific (china) – and globally. the arctic in particular has emerged as an area of strategic importance to the us, russia, and canada. this region is seeing russia deploy new nuclear weapon systems with long-range capabilities that increase its ability to threaten targets in north america. these evolving threats affect canada through its geographical proximity at the top of the continent with a long arctic coastline, in addition to its defence partnerships with the us (particularly norad).13 the enhancement of strategic stability through nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament has been a key long-term canadian foreign policy interest since the cold war. as a close defence partner with the us, a norad partner, nato ally, and five eyes member, canada has a vested interest in the outcomes of strategic behaviour that affect stability-enhancing agreements to limit offensive weapons and constrain the arms race. geographically, canada shares 12 note the language of “annexation” and “seizure” is a contested issue in russia (o’loughlin and toal 2019; ragozin 2019). 13 canada’s 2017 defence policy describes the military-strategic importance of the arctic, modernization of norad, and enhancing arctic capabilities (dnd/caf, 2017). charron and fergusson (2017; 2018) provide a detailed discussion on the evolution of north american defence. 88 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 in the security of the north american continent, which has become more vulnerable to destabilizing offensive weapons deployed by russia, china, north korea, and potentially iran. these issues and outcomes affect canada’s relationship with the us, potential fallout in canadarussia relations, and its objectives to promote peace and security regionally and globally. through the evolution of north american defence and deterrence concepts, canada may become increasingly integrated into the us strategic defence architecture in support of denial doctrine and capabilities. the new shield concept for integrating sensors, defeat mechanisms, and joint all domain command and control (jadc2) explicitly declares a deterrence-by-denial doctrine through offensive capabilities (o’shaughnessy and fesler 2020). although focused on conventional threats to the continent, many of china’s and russia’s long-range delivery platforms are dual-use, capable of carrying nuclear or conventional payloads, suggesting entanglement with the mission of stratcom. the implications for canada involve norad renewal with a potential offensive role, including options for a canadian contribution to missile defence. this outcome would be a significant departure from its traditional policy of rejecting nuclear weapons in canada, declining participation in us missile defence, and promoting nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. as the threats to north american security evolve, canada may align its foreign and defence policies closer to those of the us to enhance its own security in an increasingly uncertain and volatile strategic environment. this alignment, in conjunction with the end of stability-enhancing arms control agreements, may also see the canadian government’s retreat from its traditional active methods of promoting arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. this may also coincide with canada’s support of innovations in deterrence-by-denial concepts as part of the modernization and evolution of north american defence. as the expiration of new start looms, it remains to be seen whether canada will remain quietly on the sidelines or resume its role as an arms control activist to encourage the us to negotiate with russia to extend, revise, or renegotiate a new treaty. beyond north america, canada’s role in nato includes contributing to the enhanced forward presence leading a battlegroup in latvia. canada’s commitment in europe and support for the aegis theatre missile defence system – by land and sea – may involve a future role for canada in missile defence. the planned new canadian surface combatant (lockheed martin bae/type 26 design) equipped with the an/spy-7(v)1 advanced radar system (designed for long-range discrimination) has been suggested as providing a back door to participation in ballistic missile defence (canadian naval review 2020). this role would further integrate canada into us/natoled deterrence doctrine in a way that is yet undetermined. it may involve contributing capabilities from sensors, to data analytics, to kinetic and/or non-kinetic denial roles. us-russia and offensive deterrence in applying the typology presented previously, the nuclear deterrence postures and systems of the us and russia can be described in terms of the level of dominance of their offensive orientations. the us nuclear posture demonstrates ambiguity. it intends to deter the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (wmd) through the threat of nuclear use, but recent 89 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 posture expands this role. even prior to the 2018 nuclear posture review (npr 2018) and under the previous administration, the us stated that it would use nuclear weapons in defence of its vital national interests and those of its allies (us white house 2013). the 2018 npr states that the us nuclear triad “contributes uniquely to the deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear aggression” (2018, 16). nuclear forces also contribute to reassuring allies, as conventional forces “do not provide comparable deterrence effects” (2018, iv). notably, the npr states that nuclear weapons will achieve us objectives if deterrence fails and hedge against an uncertain future (2018, 23, 27). analysts at the federation of american scientists (fas) argue that the posture expands scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be used – such as against actors that assist terrorists in obtaining nuclear devices (fas 2019). the us arsenal comprises a number of first-strike systems, but questions remain about whether it has a ‘no first use’ posture. analysts argue that an explicit no first use policy is rare among nuclear weapon states (although china has maintained a no first use pledge since 1964). nato rejects no first use and the us “has considered but never declared a no first use policy” (panda 2018). the 2010 npr under the obama administration reduced the role of nuclear weapons, with the intention that the sole use of nuclear weapons would be to deter and retaliate against a nuclear attack. prior to becoming president, joe biden reinforced this “sole use” with the potential to shift to a “no first use” objective (kutchesfahani 2020). this approach would eliminate the ambiguity of using nuclear weapons first in response to a conventional attack. but ambiguity remained in the npr to use nuclear weapons “only in extreme circumstances” (npr 2018, 23). the trump administration’s 2018 npr reflects continuity of the 2010 posture, but has expanded “extreme circumstances” to include non-nuclear attacks against the us and allies, in addition to supplementing the arsenal with lower-yield (i.e. usable for warfighting) nuclear weapons (pifer 2020). this broadening of the role of nuclear weapons reinforces ambiguity. although it seems logical that nuclear states would be explicit with their intentions about nuclear weapon use in various scenarios, it serves us interests to be ambiguous, as per the logic of “the threat that leaves something to chance” described by thomas schelling (1960, 188, 193). this approach allows the us to “manipulate risk” and keep its adversary uncertain enough not to test america’s willingness to cross the threshold if pushed (schelling 1966, 93). russia’s nuclear weapons policy appears in its military doctrine, which explicitly states that russia would employ nuclear weapons to respond to the use of nuclear weapons and other wmd, aggression against the russian federation, and conventional forces that threaten the existence of the russian state (embassy of the russian federation 2014). russia maintained a pledge of no first use from 1982 to 1993, then abandoned this policy in military doctrine (panda 2018). there remains some debate about the role of nuclear weapons in russia’s national security strategy today, particularly when it comes to regional security. some analysts claim that this debate results from western perspectives on how russia would deploy its nuclear forces. certain western perspectives contrast with what is explicitly stated in russian strategy. one issue of debate is whether russia has an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine in which russia would prevail in a conventional conflict against a superior military force (read: nato) by detonating a tactical (low-yield) nuclear weapon in the battlefield, in order to force the us to move down the escalation ladder. however, nonwestern analysts have argued russia’s intention to lower the nuclear threshold in a conflict is “far 90 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 from convincing” (oliker 2016, 2).14 nevertheless, russia is concerned that us strategic superiority will threaten its strategic interests in its near abroad (eastern europe, middle east, and the arctic). destabilizing weapons systems in addition to nato enlargement starting in the 1990s, it can be argued that the us abrogation of the abm treaty in 2002, and the us pursuit of the new triad with a greater emphasis on offensive/denial capabilities, constitutes a significant turning point in the deterioration of usrussia relations. key capabilities that threaten strategic instability, and thus arms control, include expanded missile defences, longer-range cruise missiles, hypersonic vehicles, enhanced isr, and tactical nuclear weapons. this section will address these key capabilities and explore them in greater depth. offensive denial systems pose significant challenges to strategic stability, resulting in innovative counter-measures against the others, namely: 1) standoff capabilities posed by long range cruise missiles (like america’s new long-range standoff weapon (lrso) or russia’s attempt to create a nuclear-powered hypersonic cruise missile) that provides a first strike advantage; 2) invulnerability by negating second-strike through expanded missile defences and enhanced isr allowing for improved early warning detection and ability to intercept incoming nuclear weapons; 3) capabilities to defeat missile defences by evading detection and interception (such as the maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles); and 4) asymmetric advantage in knowledge of the other side’s capabilities on land, sea, and in the air (or airbases). enhanced isr provides information on platform location, warhead numbers, and possible vulnerabilities of weapon systems. missile defences are tasked with the detection, classification, tracking, discrimination, fire control, diversion, interception, and kill assessment of incoming missiles (csis 2020). the us operates a series of systems in multiple geographic regions: defence of the homeland, and defence of deployed us forces and allies in the european, asia-pacific, and middle east geopolitical regions. the current system is comprised of an integrated layered architecture to counter short, medium, intermediate, and long-range ballistic missiles, bombers, air-launched cruise missiles (alcms), and sea-launched cruise missiles (slcms). these are deployed in the us and abroad through the homeland (national) missile defence system which is comprised of an advanced network of sensors, space-based, and infra-red systems – land and sea-based radars to support ground-based midcourse defence, with plans to add 20 next generation ground-based interceptors in alaska for a total of 64 and to build a new missile field at fort greely, alaska (vergun 2019). new layered concepts being considered for homeland defence include the integration of the terminal high altitude air defence (thaad), patriot advanced capability-3 (pac-3), and aegis systems (midcourse). additionally, theatre missile defences include the phased adaptive approach in europe with deployed aegis systems at sea and on land (employing standard missile-3 (sm-3) interceptors in poland and romania). plans for defending deployed forces include enhancing the aegis ballistic missile defense system by procuring sm-3 block ib and iia missiles and integrating the an/spy-6 radar (air and missile defence radar). plans also include procuring 14 oliker states that “the combination of what states write, what they say, what they exercise, and what they build should provide a good sense of their actual policy” (2016, 2). 91 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 additional terminal high-altitude area defense interceptors, patriot interceptors, and the army indirect fire protection capability c2 system. similarly, in preparation for emerging threats, plans for upgrading missile defences include additional space-based sensors (vergun 2019). new concepts beyond ballistic missile defence (bmd) are being developed and promoted by strategic command, missile defence agency, northern command, and possibly part of norad renewal, to confront new capabilities such as advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic vehicles. these new concepts involve what has been described as “a holistic continuum of offensive and defensive warfighting integration” involving kinetic and non-kinetic means of eliminating threats before they launch.15 this system involves a global network of sensors, including space-based sensor architecture that can provide persistent tracking and discrimination, all-source intelligence, and integrated fires for both left and right of launch (judson 2019). there is a new emphasis on left of launch (attack operations) (2019 mdr), which can involve non-kinetic means of interrupting or sabotaging missile development programs or individual missile before launch. options for achieving these goals through cyber or electronic attacks are being considered (judson 2019). new generation cruise missiles can maintain a cruise trajectory at low altitudes, which makes them difficult to detect by radars and early warning systems, and difficult to target. new advanced cruise missiles include standoff capabilities, namely longer ranges, that allow them to be launched from out of area. this allows the platform to be protected from air defences and bypass missile defence systems, creating an advantage for the state deploying the capability. both russia and the us are pursuing advanced cruise missile technologies with standoff capabilities, such as the us agm154 standoff weapon (mizokami 2019). hypersonic weapons fly at speeds above mach 5. there is debate among strategic and technical analysts whether hypersonic vehicles are game-changers in the strategic balance. the re-entry vehicles of icbms travel at hypersonic velocities to their targets, but hypersonic vehicles offer additional advantages. there are two types of hypersonic vehicles: hypersonic glide vehicles (hgvs), and hypersonic cruise missiles. hypersonic cruise missiles provide high-speed, airbreathing engines (or scramjets), after target acquisition, and are most likely air-launched. unlike icbms, hypersonic vehicles do not follow a ballistic trajectory, but maneuver en route to the target (sayler 2019). hypersonic vehicles’ advantage is in speed and maneuverability, which reduces a target state’s reaction time as the weapons “compress time/speed/distance relationships while also flying at high altitudes” (cummings 2019). hypersonic glide vehicles have just entered operational military forces in russia, which fielded the avangard hgv on the stiletto icbm, until the new sarmat icbm is ready to be fielded. asymmetric isr can be destabilizing and can intensify the security dilemma, inciting adversaries to seek countermeasure to disable systems intended to track their nuclear forces and target c4i (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence). information-gathering capabilities, including new technologies, could enhance a state’s ability to track an opponent’s mobile nuclear forces and the corresponding countermeasures being deployed (long and green 2015). new 15 statements made by us strategic command’s deputy commander, mgen rick evans, at the space and missile defense symposium on august 6, 2019 (judson 2019). 92 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 capabilities include satellites, radars, advanced information processing systems, in which artificial intelligence may have a role (acton 2020; hersman, stadler, and arias 2019). the development and deployment of offensive systems accelerates the arms race. russia is attempting to close the gap and restore deterrence or parity through asymmetric means. this causes the us to pursue new deterrence concepts and capabilities in attempts to close the new gaps created by russian developments. the situation is further complicated by the integration of new domains into systems, including the ‘entanglement’ of nuclear and conventional systems in the nuclear architecture, which creates uncertainty in distinguishing conventional from nuclear warheads. entanglement includes the integration of c2 systems with nuclear architecture (as observed in china), in addition to unintended challenges posed by cyber and space domains and their vulnerability to countermeasures. regarding the latter, the us is vulnerable in the space and cyber domains, on which it is reliant on space surveillance, communications, and precision navigation. space assets are vulnerable to both anti-satellite weapons (asats) and potentially to cyberhacking, which the us counters with hypersonic weapons providing a rapid strike capability to disable command uplinks to asat weapons before they achieve their effect (cummings 2019). the spiraling of arms races in multiple domains, including conventional counterforce alternatives being entangled into the architecture, risk miscalculation and nuclear escalation. a recent report by russia’s national research university indicates that russian analysts view the current situation as posing a low risk of premeditated war, especially nuclear war between the nuclear powers (karaganov and suslov 2019).16 however, it does pose a higher risk of unintended military conflict that could possibly escalate to nuclear war. given the complexities of the current context, the state of strategic stability is more complex and less manageable than during the cold war. what does this mean for arms control? the future of arms control is challenged by the current conditions of an intensifying nuclear security dilemma between the us and russia. the us-russian relationship had already begun to unravel after the 1990s nato expansion, intervention in kosovo, and particularly the withdrawal from the abm treaty in 2002. relations started to improve under the obama administration due to concessions made to russia involving non-deployment of missile defence interceptors in czech republic and romania. these positive relations involving a ‘reset’ with russia led to negotiating new start in 2010. however, russia’s activities in crimea and eastern ukraine and the us/nato’s response determined the decline of us-russia relations, affecting the future of arms control. the inf treaty ended because of mutual mistrust between us and russia both thought the other was fielding a system that violated the treaty and posed a regional threat. russia deployed the 9m729 (ssc-8) intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile and the us established aegis ashore and at sea to defend its allies and deployed forces in europe. the us ended its cooperation in the open skies multilateral treaty due to concerns that russia restricted overflights of kaliningrad and parts of georgia to conceal its military activities in those regions. the us leadership’s attitude indicates a failure of confidence in the benefits of arms control as 16 this report explicitly mentions the support of the russian foreign ministry, state duma, and council on foreign and defence policy (karaganov and suslov 2019). 93 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 demonstrated by its withdrawal from the joint comprehensive plan of action iran nuclear deal (p5+1). these behaviours set a negative precedent for the future of arms control and raise concerns about the future of new start beyond february 2021. dialogue and transparency will be essential in communication between washington and moscow to address intentions and misperceptions that feed into the security dilemma. recommendations and challenges this is the key time for taking pragmatic steps in the dialogue to re-negotiate new start and perhaps consider restoring the inf treaty. bilateral talks between us and russian officials have been underway in recent years, such as helsinki sept 2017; the cancelled march 2018 meeting in vienna, which restarted in june 2020, and more recent discussions in october 2020 to extend the treaty for one year. progress remains to be seen. there are options to be considered in maintaining current, and negotiating new, arms control to restore transparency and predictability that reinforces strategic stability. in exploring these options, the question of what a post-new start world would look like should be considered. should it be allowed to expire and a new regime negotiated? should it be renewed and with what kind of changes? should there be a temporary expansion, from one to five years, to allow time to negotiate a more comprehensive treaty? should new start be expanded to include third parties (such as china)? recently, analysts have explored ideas for incorporating emerging technologies that are perceived as problematic and destabilizing. however, strategic stability between the us and russia will have to address the following: 1) hypersonic and cruise missile technology: what measures could be explored to limit types of hypersonic and advanced cruise missiles that threaten missile defences? limitations could include banning test flights of hypersonic vehicles. 2) limitations on missile defences: to restore mutual deterrence both sides would need to allow some targets to be vulnerable. this requires considering what ranges of ballistic missiles should be included in limitations. perhaps this option requires negotiating a new kind of missile defence treaty (a new abm that extends to limit threatening passive defence concepts), or could be included in an established treaty like new start. 3) limitations on enhanced isr systems: this is a challenge because transparency relies on trust and other means of verifying capabilities, and competing states fear that one another will conceal cheating on arms control. limiting asymmetric isr capabilities that create advantages for one state but disadvantages the other state makes the case for restoring the open skies treaty and other verification regimes to build trust. 4) tactical nuclear weapons: tactical or theatre nuclear weapons are not addressed in new start, which creates a gap. the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in new start contributes to nuclear warhead reductions and may alleviate western concerns about russia’s large stockpile of tactical nuclear warheads and its ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine. 5) de-alerting nuclear systems: this recommendation comes from a number of arms control analysts from organization such as arms control association and federation of american scientists. they argue that the de-alerting of systems would reduce the risk of accident, miscalculation, and inadvertent launch otherwise posed by systems on ‘hair-trigger alert’ or ‘launch on warning’. 94 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 the above options would encounter challenges in reception by american and russian leadership. considerations involve the role of politics in strategy and how to propose, negotiate, and implement any approach that might be perceived as making a concession, thus communicating weakness. the challenge is how to propose a concession without emboldening the other to aggressive action. the role of domestic variables also plays a significant role in the receptivity of including offensive nuclear deterrence systems in arms control. these variables include particular leadership styles that contribute to the failure of arms control cooperation and resurgence (such as medvedev-obama vs putin-trump), in addition to strategic advisors and commanders that oversee the nuclear arsenal and missile defences. congressmen representing stakeholders in defence industries in their states may also have an impact on which capabilities are affected by new arms control agreements. similar considerations must be part of the evaluation of russian domestic politics. these considerations provide an avenue for further exploration of the issues, particularly in terms of the failure of leadership and forward-thinking when it comes to limiting and controlling the most dangerous weapons on the planet. conclusion this paper demonstrates how the provocative role of offensive systems, particularly the newgeneration of faster and highly maneuverable vehicles oriented for deterrence-by-denial, negatively affects cooperation on arms control and creates conditions that lead to destabilizing arms races. the discussion outlines how nuclear and non-nuclear behaviour, including a chain of events and provocative behaviours, affect strategic relations between states. particularly, this article is concerned with how russia perceives us and nato activity since the 1990s as obstructing its interests in restoring/expanding its sphere of influence in eastern europe (and more recently in the arctic and middle east). the strategic behaviour of the us contributed to deterioration of relations with russia, particularly the modernization of the us nuclear arsenal for enhanced deterrence by denial systems involving the three legs, in addition to expanding missile defence and enhanced isr. russia’s response to the vulnerabilities created by us offensive systems designed for denial has been to pursue asymmetric capabilities designed to defeat missile defences, targeting military assets, command, control, and communications (c3), critical infrastructure, and isr. these behaviours intensify the nuclear security dilemma, which accelerates the arms race, resulting in the end of stability-enhancing arms control. the future of new start is in peril, although options for renewal may address multilateral partners, as well as new offensive technologies that are particularly destabilizing, such as hypersonic and cruise missiles, missile defences, and tactical nuclear weapons. these developments have implications for canada, as an arctic nation, close north american defence partner of the united states, and nato ally. will we see a change in canada’s defence and deterrence posture more in line with the us, possibly participating in missile defence? will this result in canada’s shift away from actively promoting nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament? 95 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 references acton, james. 2020. is it a nuke? pre-launch ambiguity and inadvertent escalation. carnegie endowment for international peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/acton_nukeornot_final.pdf. _____. 2013. “reclaiming strategic stability.” in strategic stability: contending interpretations, edited by elbridge colby and michael s. gerson, 117-146. carlisle, pa: us army war college press. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/ssi_colbygerson.htm. adams, karen ruth. 2003/04. “attack and conquer: international anarchy and the offencedefence-deterrence balance.” international security 28 (3): 45-83. adamsky, dmitry. 2018. “strategic stability and cross-domain coercion: the russia approach to information (cyber) warfare.” in the end of strategic stability? nuclear weapons and the challenge of regional rivalries, edited by lawrence rubin and adam n. stulberg, 149173. baltimore: ml: project muse. averre, david. 2009. “from pristina to tskhinvali: the legacy of operation allied force in russia’s relations with the west.” international affairs 85 (3): 575-591. betts, richard k. 1987. nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance. washington, dc: brookings institution press. boese, wade. 2002. “u.s. withdraws from abm treaty; global response muted.” arms control association, july/august 2002. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-07/news/uswithdraws-abm-treaty-global-response-muted. boulègue, mathieu. 2018. “russia’s vostok exercises were both serious planning and a show.” chatham house, 17 september 2018. https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/russia-s-vostok-exercises-were-bothserious-planning-and-show. canadian department of national defence and the canadian armed forces. 2017. strong secure engaged: canada’s defence policy. ottawa: government of canada. canadian naval review. 2020. “the canadian surface combatant: a backdoor to ballistic missile defence?” canadian naval review, 17 may 2020. https://www.navalreview.ca/2020/05/the-canadian-surface-combatant-a-backdoor-toballistic-missile-defence/. charron, andrea, and james fergusson 2018. “beyond modernization.” in north american strategic defence in the 21st century: security and sovereignty in an uncertain world, edited by christian leuprecht, joel j. sokolsky, and thomas hughes, 141-148. cham, switzerland: springer https://carnegieendowment.org/files/acton_nukeornot_final.pdf https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/ssi_colby-gerson.htm https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/ssi_colby-gerson.htm https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-07/news/us-withdraws-abm-treaty-global-response-muted https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-07/news/us-withdraws-abm-treaty-global-response-muted https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/russia-s-vostok-exercises-were-both-serious-planning-and-show https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/russia-s-vostok-exercises-were-both-serious-planning-and-show https://www.navalreview.ca/2020/05/the-canadian-surface-combatant-a-backdoor-to-ballistic-missile-defence/ https://www.navalreview.ca/2020/05/the-canadian-surface-combatant-a-backdoor-to-ballistic-missile-defence/ 96 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 _____. 2017. “norad and the evolution of north american defence.” inside policy – macdonald-laurier institute, 14 may 2017. https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/norad-andthe-evolution-of-north-american-defence-andrea-charron-and-james-fergusson-for-insidepolicy/. colby, elbridge. 2013. “defining strategic stability: reconciling stability and deterrence.” in strategic stability: contending interpretations, edited by elbridge colby and michael s. gerson, 47-84. carlisle, pa: us army war college press. council on foreign relations. 2020. “conflict in ukraine.” global conflict tracker, 17 april 2020. https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine. crs for congress. 2020. “conventional prompt global strike and long range ballistic missiles: background and issues.” crs, r41464, 14 february 2020. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/r/r41464. csis. 2020. “missile defence 2020.” missile threat, center for strategic and international studies missile defence project. https://missilethreat.csis.org/evolution-homeland-missile-defense/. cummings, alan. 2019. “hypersonic weapons: tactical uses and strategic goals.” war on the rocks, november 12, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/hypersonic-weaponstactical-uses-and-strategic-goals/. department of national defence and the canadian armed forces. 2017. strong secure engaged: canada’s defence policy. dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canadadefence-policy-report.pdf. federation of american scientists. 2018. 2018 nuclear posture review resources. https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-posture-review/#major-components-of-thenpr. _____. 2002. “excerpts of classified nuclear posture review.” nuclear posture review report, 8 january 2002. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/excerpts-of-classified-nuclearposture-review.pdf. giles, keir. 2018. “russia hit multiple targets with zapad 2017.” carnegie, 25 january 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/russia-hit-multiple-targets-with-zapad-2017pub-75278. gould, joe, and aaron mehta. 2019. “us to europe: fix open skies treaty or we quit.” defense news, 21 november 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/11/21/us-toeurope-fix-open-skies-treaty-or-we-quit/. hahn, gordon m. 2018. “broken promise: nato expansion and the end of the cold war.” russian and eurasian politics, 23 april 2018. https://gordonhahn.com/2018/04/23/brokenpromise-nato-expansion-and-the-end-of-the-cold-war-an-update/. https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/norad-and-the-evolution-of-north-american-defence-andrea-charron-and-james-fergusson-for-inside-policy/ https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/norad-and-the-evolution-of-north-american-defence-andrea-charron-and-james-fergusson-for-inside-policy/ https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/norad-and-the-evolution-of-north-american-defence-andrea-charron-and-james-fergusson-for-inside-policy/ https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/r/r41464 https://missilethreat.csis.org/evolution-homeland-missile-defense/ https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/hypersonic-weapons-tactical-uses-and-strategic-goals/ https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/hypersonic-weapons-tactical-uses-and-strategic-goals/ http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-posture-review/#major-components-of-the-npr https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-posture-review/#major-components-of-the-npr https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/excerpts-of-classified-nuclear-posture-review.pdf https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/excerpts-of-classified-nuclear-posture-review.pdf https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/russia-hit-multiple-targets-with-zapad-2017-pub-75278 https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/russia-hit-multiple-targets-with-zapad-2017-pub-75278 https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/11/21/us-to-europe-fix-open-skies-treaty-or-we-quit/ https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/11/21/us-to-europe-fix-open-skies-treaty-or-we-quit/ https://gordonhahn.com/2018/04/23/broken-promise-nato-expansion-and-the-end-of-the-cold-war-an-update/ https://gordonhahn.com/2018/04/23/broken-promise-nato-expansion-and-the-end-of-the-cold-war-an-update/ 97 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 hersman, rebecca, bernadette stadler, and lizamaria arias. 2019. “when more is actually less? situational awareness, emerging technology, and strategic stability.” on the radar, 29 july 2019. https://ontheradar.csis.org/analysis/overview/. herz, john h. 1964 (1951). political realism and political idealism. chicago, il: university of chicago press. _____. 1966 (1959). international politics in the atomic age. new york: columbia university press. _____. 1950. “idealist internationalism and the security dilemma.” world politics, 2 (2): 157180. jackson, nicole. 2018. “canada, nato, and global russia.” international journal, july: 317325. _____. 2019. “deterrence, resilience, and hybrid wars.” journal of military and strategic studies 19 (4): 104-125. jervis, robert. 1976. perception and misperception in international politics. princeton, nj: princeton university press. _____. 1978. “cooperation under the security dilemma.” world politics 30 (2): 167-214. johnson, dave. 2018. “vostok 2018: ten years of russian strategic exercises and warfare preparation.” nato, 20 december 2018. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/12/20/vostok-2018-ten-years-of-russianstrategic-exercises-and-warfare-preparation/index.html. judson, jen. 2019. “should the dod shift focus toward passive missile defense?” defense news, 6 august 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/digital-showdailies/smd/2019/08/06/should-the-dod-shift-focus-toward-passive-missile-defense/. karaganov, sergei, and dmitry suslov. 2019. “the new ways of understanding and ways to strengthen multilateral strategic stability.” russia’s national research university’s higher school of economics, september 2019. svop.ru/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/report_eng_1.pdf. kimball, daryl. 2019. “the open skies treaty at a glance.” arms control today, october 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/openskies. kimball, daryl, and kingston reif. 2019. “the intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty at a glance.” arms control association, august 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/inftreaty. king, charles. 2008. “the five-day war: managing moscow after the georgia crisis.” foreign affairs, november/december 2008. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russiafsu/2008-11-01/five-day-war. https://ontheradar.csis.org/analysis/overview/ https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/12/20/vostok-2018-ten-years-of-russian-strategic-exercises-and-warfare-preparation/index.html https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/12/20/vostok-2018-ten-years-of-russian-strategic-exercises-and-warfare-preparation/index.html https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/smd/2019/08/06/should-the-dod-shift-focus-toward-passive-missile-defense/ https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/smd/2019/08/06/should-the-dod-shift-focus-toward-passive-missile-defense/ svop.ru/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/report_eng_1.pdf. svop.ru/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/report_eng_1.pdf. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/openskies https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/inftreaty https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2008-11-01/five-day-war https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2008-11-01/five-day-war 98 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 kristensen, hans m. and matt korda. 2019. “tactical nuclear weapons, 2019.” bulletin of the atomic scientists 75 (5): 252-261. kristensen, hans m., robert s. norris, and ivan oelrich. 2009. “from counterforce to minimal deterrence: a new nuclear policy on the path toward eliminating nuclear weapons.” federation of american scientists, april 2009. https://fas.org/nuke/norris/nuc_10042901a.pdf. kutchesfahani, sara z. 2020. “here’s what to expect from biden on top nuclear weapons issues.” bulletin of the atomic scientists, 9 november 2020. https://thebulletin.org/2020/11/heres-what-to-expect-from-biden-on-top-nuclear-weaponsissues/. lieber, kier a., and daryl g. press. 2006a. “the rise of u.s. nuclear primacy.” foreign affairs, mar/apr 2006. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61508/keir-a-lieber-and-daryl-gpress/the-rise-of-us-nuclear-primacy. _____. 2006b “the end of mad? the nuclear dimension of u.s. primacy.” international security 30 (4): 7-44. long, austin and brendan rittenhouse green. 2015. “stalking the secure second-strike: intelligence, counterforce, and nuclear strategy.” journal of strategic studies 8 (1-2): 3873. marcus, jonathan. 2020. “how russia’s putin became the go-to man in syria.” bbc, 5 march 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51733595. martin, kimberly. 2017. “reconsidering nato expansion: a counterfactual analysis of russia and the west in the 1990s.” european journal of international security 3 (2): 135-161. masters, jonathan. 2018. “nato’s trident juncture exercises: what to know.” council on foreign relations, 23 october 2018. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/natos-trident-junctureexercises-what-know. matsaberidze, david. 2015. “russia vs. eu/us through georgia and ukraine.” connections 14 (2): 78-86. mcdonald, david. 2017. “the syrian crisis: a geopolitical analysis of western intervention in the middle east.” foreign policy news, 3 january 2017. https://foreignpolicynews.org/2017/01/03/syrian-crisis-geopolitical-analysis-westernintervention-middle-east/. mizokami, kyle. 2017. “america is building a new, stealthy nuclear cruise missile.” popular mechanics, 24 august, 2017. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27925/america-stealthynuclear-cruise-missile/. https://fas.org/nuke/norris/nuc_10042901a.pdf https://thebulletin.org/2020/11/heres-what-to-expect-from-biden-on-top-nuclear-weapons-issues/ https://thebulletin.org/2020/11/heres-what-to-expect-from-biden-on-top-nuclear-weapons-issues/ http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61508/keir-a-lieber-and-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-us-nuclear-primacy http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61508/keir-a-lieber-and-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-us-nuclear-primacy https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51733595 https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/natos-trident-juncture-exercises-what-know https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/natos-trident-juncture-exercises-what-know https://foreignpolicynews.org/2017/01/03/syrian-crisis-geopolitical-analysis-western-intervention-middle-east/ https://foreignpolicynews.org/2017/01/03/syrian-crisis-geopolitical-analysis-western-intervention-middle-east/ https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27925/america-stealthy-nuclear-cruise-missile/ https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27925/america-stealthy-nuclear-cruise-missile/ 99 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 national security archive. 2017. “nato expansion: what gorbachev heard.” national security archive, george washington university, 12 december 2017. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansionwhat-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early. nato. 2020. “relations with the republic of north macedonia.” 30 march 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48830.htm. _____. 2019. “boosting nato’s presence in the east and southeast.” 21 january 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm. _____. 2018. “international observers visit exercise trident juncture 2018.” 1 november 2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_160033.htm. _____. 2016. “nato enlargement and open door.” fact sheet, july 2016. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607factsheet-enlargement-eng.pdf. nuclear threat initiative.1972. treaty between the united states of america and the union of soviet socialist republics on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (abm treaty). signed in moscow 26 may 1972. https://media.nti.org/documents/abm_treaty.pdf. _____. 2011. treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (abm treaty): overview. 26 october 2011. https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-limitation-antiballistic-missile-systems-abm-treaty/. oliker, olga. 2016. “russia’s nuclear doctrine: what we know, what we don’t, and what that means.” csis, may 2016. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160504_oliker_russiasnucleardoctrine_web.pdf. o’loughlin, john, and gerard toal. 2019. “the crimea conundrum: legitimacy and public opinion after annexation.” eurasian geography and economics 60 (1): 6-27. o’shaughnessy, terrence j., and peter m. fesler. 2020. “hardening the shield: a credible deterrent & capable defense for north america.” wilson center, canada institute, september 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/hardening%20 the%20shield_a%20credible%20deterrent%20%26%20capable%20defense%20for%2 0north%20america_en.pdf. panda, ankit. 2018. “’no first use and nuclear weapons.” council on foreign relations, 17 july 2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons. pavlov, andrey, and anastasia malygina. 2018. “the russian approach to strategic stability: preserving a classical formula in a turbulent world.” in the end of strategic stability? nuclear weapons and the challenge of regional rivalries, edited by lawrence rubin and adam n. stulberg, 41-65. baltimore: ml: project muse. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48830.htm https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_160033.htm https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-enlargement-eng.pdf https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-enlargement-eng.pdf https://media.nti.org/documents/abm_treaty.pdf https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-limitation-anti-ballistic-missile-systems-abm-treaty/ https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-limitation-anti-ballistic-missile-systems-abm-treaty/ https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160504_oliker_russiasnucleardoctrine_web.pdf https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160504_oliker_russiasnucleardoctrine_web.pdf https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/hardening%20the%20shield_a%20credible%20deterrent%20%26%20capable%20defense%20for%20north%20america_en.pdf https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/hardening%20the%20shield_a%20credible%20deterrent%20%26%20capable%20defense%20for%20north%20america_en.pdf https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/hardening%20the%20shield_a%20credible%20deterrent%20%26%20capable%20defense%20for%20north%20america_en.pdf https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons 100 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 persbo, andreas. 2020. “will the trump administration’s accusations doom the nuclear test ban treaty?” bulletin of the atomic scientists, 18 may 2020. https://thebulletin.org/2020/05/will-the-trump-administrations-accusations-doom-thenuclear-test-ban-treaty/. pifer, steven. 2020. “nuclear weapons: it’s time for sole purpose.” national interest, 15 september 2020. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nuclear-weapons-it%e2%80%99stime-sole-purpose-168968. _____. 2014. “did nato promise not to enlarge? gorbachev says ‘no’.” brookings, 6 november 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/11/06-nato-nopromise-enlarge-gorbachev-pifer. ragozin, leonid. 2019. “annexation of crimea: a masterclass in political manipulation.” al jazeera, 16 march 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/annexation-crimeamasterclass-political-manipulation-190315174459207.html. reif, kingston. 2019. “u.s. reverses courses on open skies treaty.” arms control association, october 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-10/news/us-reverses-course-openskies-treaty. reif, kingston, and shannon bugos. 2019. “u.s. considers open skies treaty withdrawal.” arms control today, november 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/news/usconsiders-open-skies-treaty-withdrawal. sayler, kelley m. 2019. “hypersonic weapons: background and issues for congress.” crs for congress, r45811, 17 september 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/r45811.pdf. smith, julianne. 2008. “the nato-russia relationship: defining moment or deja-vu?” politique étrangère 4, winter. https://www.cairn-int.info/article-e_pe_084_0759--thenato-russia-relationship-defining.htm. snyder, christian. 2017. “analysis: how a 1999 nato operation turned russia against the west.” the pitt news, 7 september 2017. https://pittnews.com/article/121917/opinions/analysis-1999-nato-operation-turned-russiawest/. spindel, jennifer. 2019. “what turkey’s purchase of a russian air defense means for the u.s. and nato.” washington post, 23 july 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23/what-turkeys-s-purchase-means-usnato/. teeple, nancy jane. 2017. arms control on the eve of destruction: the prospects for an arctic nuclear weapon-free zone in an age of counterforce dominance. phd dissertation. political science, simon fraser university. https://thebulletin.org/2020/05/will-the-trump-administrations-accusations-doom-the-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/ https://thebulletin.org/2020/05/will-the-trump-administrations-accusations-doom-the-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/ https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nuclear-weapons-it%e2%80%99s-time-sole-purpose-168968 https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nuclear-weapons-it%e2%80%99s-time-sole-purpose-168968 http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/11/06-nato-no-promise-enlarge-gorbachev-pifer http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/11/06-nato-no-promise-enlarge-gorbachev-pifer https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/annexation-crimea-masterclass-political-manipulation-190315174459207.html https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/annexation-crimea-masterclass-political-manipulation-190315174459207.html https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-10/news/us-reverses-course-open-skies-treaty https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-10/news/us-reverses-course-open-skies-treaty https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/news/us-considers-open-skies-treaty-withdrawal https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/news/us-considers-open-skies-treaty-withdrawal https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/r45811.pdf https://www.cairn-int.info/article-e_pe_084_0759--the-nato-russia-relationship-defining.htm https://www.cairn-int.info/article-e_pe_084_0759--the-nato-russia-relationship-defining.htm https://pittnews.com/article/121917/opinions/analysis-1999-nato-operation-turned-russia-west/ https://pittnews.com/article/121917/opinions/analysis-1999-nato-operation-turned-russia-west/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23/what-turkeys-s-purchase-means-us-nato/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23/what-turkeys-s-purchase-means-us-nato/ 101 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 united states department of defense. 2018. “nuclear posture review.” february 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2018/feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-nuclearposture-review-final-report.pdf. us department of state. 2017. 2017 report on adherence to and compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. bureau of arms control, verification, and compliance. https://www.state.gov/2017-report-on-adherenceto-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-andcommitments/#inf2. us white house. 2013. “nuclear weapons employment strategy of the united states.” fact sheet, 19 june 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states. vergun, david. 2019. “defense of u.s. is top priority for missile defense, dod leader says.” us department of state defense, 3 april 2019. https://www.defense.gov/explore/news/article/article/1805051/defense-of-us-is-toppriority-for-missile-defense-dod-leader-says/. van evera, stephen. 1999. causes of war: power and the roots of conflict. princeton, nj: princeton university press. _____. 1998. “offense, defense, and the causes of war.” international security 22 (4): 5-43. welt, cory. 2019. “ukraine: background, conflict with russia, and u.s. policy.” crs for congress, r45008, 19 september 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/r45008.pdf. woolf, amy. 2002. “the nuclear posture review: overview and emerging issues.” crs for congress, rs21133, 31 january 2002. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a477933.pdf. https://media.defense.gov/2018/feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-nuclear-posture-review-final-report.pdf https://media.defense.gov/2018/feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-nuclear-posture-review-final-report.pdf https://www.state.gov/2017-report-on-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/#inf2 https://www.state.gov/2017-report-on-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/#inf2 https://www.state.gov/2017-report-on-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/#inf2 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states https://www.defense.gov/explore/news/article/article/1805051/defense-of-us-is-top-priority-for-missile-defense-dod-leader-says/ https://www.defense.gov/explore/news/article/article/1805051/defense-of-us-is-top-priority-for-missile-defense-dod-leader-says/ https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/r45008.pdf https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a477933.pdf 102 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14 (1) 2020: 79-102 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 1 a “good” samaritan? the geopolitics of russia’s covid-19 assistance mariya omelicheva1 national war college abstract between march and december 2020, more than three dozen states received various types of covid-19 assistance from moscow. the russian government emphasized a humanitarian character of what has become the largest package of emergency aid since russia's independence. the western governments and commentators cautioned that moscow had strategic and nefarious motives in choosing the recipients of its covid-19 aid. this study theorizes humanitarian aid allocations by authoritarian states and tests theoretical expectations using novel data on russia's covid-19 aid allocations. far from being driven exclusively by humanitarian concerns, russia has used humanitarian assistance to project power on the global stage and support diverse political objectives. moscow's use of humanitarian aid for geopolitical benefits has not been a critical disruptor in the humanitarian system by itself; however, jointly with other instruments of foreign policy, russia's approaches to foreign assistance can be detrimental to the future of the international humanitarian system. 1dr. mariya y. omelicheva is a professor of strategy at the national war college in washington, dc. all opinions expressed in the article are her own and do not represent an official position of the us government or us department of defense. 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 2 introduction in late march 2020, several il-76 military planes began taking off from an airbase in the moscow region, heading to the covid-19-stricken regions of italy. the launch of a humanitarian operation dubbed “from russia with love” followed a telephone conversation between russia's president vladimir putin and italian prime minister giuseppe conte. framed by the russian media as a goodwill gesture in support of the italian people, the whole operation, which included the transfer of medical equipment, supplies, doctors, nurses, and decontamination personnel, received a large dose of criticism within the western media space. la stampa, one of the oldest italian newspapers, published a report questioning russia’s motives, impugning the utility of aid, and warning of security breaches due to the involvement of the russian military. la stampa's assessments were cited widely in online and print media worldwide (bbc news 2020). moscow’s decisions to send covid-19 assistance to italy, serbia, iran, venezuela, and select countries of the maghreb region in africa, while sidelining other countries have raised questions about the kremlin's rationale for choosing where to send its aid. the western media has accused russia of using the “politics of generosity” and “mask diplomacy” to blanket its unchecked appetite for influence in “good samaritan” terms (giusti and ambrosetti 2022). however, the extent to which moscow’s geostrategic considerations have polluted the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and need in its humanitarian aid allocations has not yet received a systematic examination. this is partly due to the lack of comprehensive data on the levels of russia's development and humanitarian aid. in 2007, russia was invited to join the organization for economic co-operation and development (oecd). as part of the accession process, russia was reporting its official development assistance to oecd’s development assistance committee (dac). the accession process was postponed in the wake of russia’s annexation of crimea in 2014 and fully terminated following moscow’s invasion of ukraine in february 2022. as a consequence, there has been limited information on russia’s humanitarian and development assistance. the covid-19 pandemic, which left no country unscathed, provided an opportunity for collecting open-source data on russia’s covid-19 assistance. the russian government's information blitz to publicize its humanitarian efforts simplified the process of tracking down its transfers of personal protective equipment (ppe) and medical supplies. the goal of this article is to theorize and statistically analyze russia’s covid-19 aid allocations in 2020. there are several reasons for studying russia’s motives for humanitarian assistance. the demand for humanitarian aid will continue to rise due to intensifying climate change-induced natural disasters as well as conflict-related complex emergencies. however, the growing demand for aid is unmatched by its supply. the scarcity of funding to respond to crises has rekindled the old debate about states’ motives for humanitarian aid. the surge of the so-called “new”2 or “emerging” donors in the humanitarian milieus has also reinvigorated a conversation about the impact of domestic factors on the foreign policies of donor countries. while some humanitarian stakeholders have 2 the term “new donor” is somewhat misleading. many so-called “new” donors, including russia and china, have acted as providers of assistance for decades. some, like russia, have re-emerged in the development and humanitarian assistance scene after a period of hiatus. what unites “new” donors is that they operate largely outside the regulatory and reporting frameworks of the oecd development assistance committee (dac). 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 3 welcomed and encouraged “new” donors’ contributions to humanitarian causes, others have warned that their interests and practices are often contrary to the humanitarian principles and, therefore, threatening to the integrity of the humanitarian system itself (fuchs and klann 2013). this apprehension of the “new” donors’ foreign aid has been reinforced by the evidence of the leading authoritarian governments, like those in russia and china, hijacking the concept of “soft power,” to boost their global image, influence global public opinion, and increase their leverage over other states (walker 2016). development and humanitarian assistance, which have been viewed as important instruments of “soft power” projection, have been added to the modern authoritarian toolkit (blair, marty, and roessler 2022). for example, russia’s foreign minister sergei lavrov has repeatedly alluded to his country’s participation in international aid programs as one of russia’s “soft power” tools (kiseleva 2015). there are indeed several reasons for why “new” donors’ decisions about aid can be different from those of “traditional” donors. first, many “new” donors are not bound by the regulatory framework of the dac, which serves as the major agency to set aid agendas and shape the direction of the global aid flow. this means that “new” donors are not fully bound by the dac humanitarian principles and aid reporting requirements. this, in turn, offers these countries a greater opportunity to use aid in their interests. second, the majority of “new” donors are below the levels of economic development of dac donors, especially in per capita terms. this also provides an incentive for “new” donors to pursue their self-interest more than dac donors. third, the official aid philosophies of many “new” donors (with the exception of russia) include a principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of the recipient states (fuchs and klann 2013). this study theorizes these differences in aid motivations by tracing them to certain characteristics of democratic versus authoritarian regimes and tests theoretical expectations using novel data on russia’s covid-19 aid allocations. it begins with an overview of the literature on humanitarian aid, followed by the presentation of a theoretical framework for authoritarian aid allocations. the last section describes the research design and methodology for the study, followed by the presentation and discussion of findings. determinants of humanitarian aid international aid broadly falls into three categories: development assistance, military aid, and humanitarian assistance (also known as emergency relief aid). development assistance consists of financial flows, technical assistance, debt relief operations, and other activities aimed at promoting economic development and the welfare of developing countries. the major objective of development assistance is to meet united nations’ (un) sustainable development goal 1 – end poverty in all its forms everywhere (united nations 2018), although its various programs and activities contribute to political, environmental, and social developments of the recipient states. military aid encompasses the transfer of military articles, services, and financial flows in support of sales of military equipment and training as well as military education. these types of military assistance are designed to foster international stability, enhance the national security of donor states, assist recipient governments, deter or combat security threats, and share the burden for mutual defence. for some governments, military aid is also a means of diplomacy to cultivate 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 4 goodwill and even persuade foreign governments to take action consistent with the donors’ interests. contrary to development and security assistance that tends to be pre-planned, long-term, and targets underlying structural issues that hinder countries’ development and limit their capacity to address economic and security challenges, humanitarian assistance is designed to offer short-term rapid relief in response to an incident or event threatening human lives. its goal is to alleviate human suffering in the wake of natural disasters, technological catastrophes, and conflicts often classified as “complex emergencies,” which often combine natural disasters and conflict thus exacerbating vulnerabilities of those affected (fink and silvia redaelli 2009). the covid-19 pandemic has not only aggravated the existing humanitarian emergencies triggered by armed conflict and natural disasters, it has also disrupted livelihoods and caused economic devastation and deaths in countries previously unaffected by humanitarian disasters. according to the un under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief mark lowcock, in 2020, the covid-19 pandemic pushed the number of people needing humanitarian assistance by 40 percent compared to 2019 (un ocha 2021). another 40 percent increase in humanitarian aid was projected for 2021 due to the combination of the virus and its secondary impacts, such as falling incomes, rising food prices, and interrupted vaccination programs (world health organization 2020). international donors have been challenged to come up with additional funding for critical response efforts to the outbreak while fighting the health crises at home. some of this additional humanitarian aid has been channelled toward providing basic subsidence needs (food, shelter, etc.) in complex emergencies exacerbated by the pandemic. other types of assistance have been used to save peoples’ lives threatened by the covid-19 virus by providing support for testing and disease-surveillance capacities of countries, the supply of medical and personal protection equipment to improve these countries’ rapid response capacity, and vaccine efforts. humanitarian assistance has been regarded as a distinct form of assistance due to its ethical foundation in humanitarian law. reflected in the un resolution a/res/46/182, “humanity, neutrality and impartiality” have been the guiding principles of humanitarian assistance (united nations 1991). these principles seek to remove political conditionality from donor governments’ considerations of humanitarian assistance. the scholarship on humanitarian aid (the majority of which has been conducted on traditional donors such as the us) has found the ongoing importance of need as a driver for humanitarian aid decisions but also pointed out other motives, including countries’ self-interest for explaining their aid allocations (boussalis and caryn peiffer 2011; kevlihan, derouen, and biglasier 2014). drawing on the studies of foreign aid, it is possible to classify states’ motivations for supplying emergency aid into the needs-based, interest-based, and merit-based logics (dollar and levin 2006). the need-based logic is consistent with the humanitarian principles of emergency relief. donors’ decisions concerning assistance are determined by the needs of recipient countries, usually measured by the total number of people affected by a natural disaster or the number of casualties and displaced persons in conflict (drury, olson, and van belle 2005; fink and redaelli 2009; raschky and schwindt 2012). the greater the human suffering, the more humanitarian aid is expected to alleviate it (fuchs and klan 2013). 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 5 under the interest-based framework, humanitarian aid is deemed to be similar to other types of assistance and therefore influenced by a range of geostrategic considerations (alesina and dollar 2000; drury, olson, and van belle 2005; van der veen 2011). some studies have found that donors are driven by political and security interests and provide assistance to their allies, former colonies, and politically-aligned governments (alesina and dollar 2000; drury and olson 1998; boussalis and peiffer 2011). still, other studies have shown the impact of commercial interests and donors’ own political processes on aid allocation, such as election cycles and the budgetary situation (eisensee and strömberg 2007; dreher, nennenkamp, and thiele 2011; fleck and kilby 2006; fuchs and vadlamannati 2013; hoeffler and outram 2011). the merit-based framework is premised on the idea that donors are concerned about the effectiveness of aid and therefore favour the most deserving recipients with the worth determined by the quality of their governance, strength of institutions, and the density and effectiveness of the network of non-governmental (ngo) and international organizations that are present in the affected countries. thus, it has been found that the presence and strength of humanitarian stakeholders and their infrastructure—ngos, specialized international humanitarian agencies, donor states’ agencies, early warning systems, and rapid response units—play a decisive role in the allocation of humanitarian aid (olsen, carstensen, and hoyen 2003). in addition to the aggregate levels of humanitarian assistance, the scholarship on humanitarian aid has looked at sector-specific types of aid and different categories of donors. the idea is that some sector-specific assistance, such as health aid to contain the spread of contagious and deadly diseases, is less afflicted by donors’ geostrategic interests (neumayer 2005). the literature has also impugned the motivations of the so-called “new” donors, accused of practicing “rogue aid” driven by the interest in national wealth extraction and the generation of political leverage over the recipient states (naím 2007). the “new” donors are a rather heterogenous group of lowand middle-income countries, autocratic regimes, and donors operating outside the dac (fuchs and klann 2013; dreher and fuchs 2015; kragelund 2008). many of these donors are not “new” to the donor community; for example, china and russia, launched their aid programs at the beginning of the cold war era (asmus, fuchs, and muller 2020). many, like brazil, south africa, and india, emphasize “south-south” cooperation and appear to be reluctant to be seen as reproducing traditional donor-recipient hierarchies (rowlands 2008). in addition, the practices of these “new” donors have been under heightened attention fuelled by a suspicion that these donors abuse humanitarian and development assistance to push their national interests (fuchs and klann 2013). theorizing humanitarian aid by authoritarian states as noted in the previous section, there is no consensus in aid scholarship on the decision-making logic that determines the choices of the recipients of humanitarian aid. in theory, humanitarian aid is supposed to be driven by the principles of neutrality and impartiality, but in practice, it has been affected by the same considerations of strategic interest as development assistance and military aid. furthermore, the emergence or comeback of the so-called "new” donors has added a new layer 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 6 to the debate over the aid motivations of autocratic and less-wealthy donors. while some studies have dubbed assistance by authoritarian donors as “rogue aid” spurred exclusively by self-interest (naím 2007), others disputed this finding, noting minimal or no differences in the aid allocation of autocratic and democratic donors (dreher and fuchs 2015; dreher, nennenkamp and thiele 2011). one of the chief conclusions that stems from the broader literature on international relations and foreign policy analysis is that internal differences between democratic and autocratic states bear important implications for their foreign policy decisions. this tradition informs the studies of democratic peace that have attributed states' decisions concerning the use of force to the makeup of democratic institutions, culture, and informational processes (doyle 1983; rosato 2003). differences in states’ domestic makeup have been used to explain a range of strategic decisions (de mesquita and smith 2012). in line with this strand of scholarship, this study begins with the premise that domestic politics strongly influence foreign policy preferences, including those concerning donors’ decisions about humanitarian aid. the second assumption is that governments and individual decision-makers are rational actors seeking to maximize their utility. their paramount interest is to stay in power. all actions of political elites, whether in the domestic or foreign policy realm, are shaped by their desire to retain political power (de mesquita et al. 2003). while the humanitarian aid literature places a higher premium on the properties of disaster events and the characteristics of recipient countries, this study contends that foreign policy choices with regard to humanitarian aid are coloured by the governments’ interest in political survival. important variations in the nature of domestic constraints placed on the democratic and autocratic leadership create different incentive structures for their leadership and lead to varying policy patterns. the key characteristic of autocratic regimes3 that distinguishes them from democratic states has to do with the size of the “winning coalition” that propel autocratic leaders to power and keep them at the helm. in autocracies, the winning coalition—a group of regime insiders, also known as the “selectorate,” whose support is necessary to sustain the leader in office—is small (peceny and butler 2004; de mesquita et al. 2003). to sustain the winning coalition’s loyalty and support, autocratic leaders rely on the distribution of private goods and other favours doled out to the members of the authoritarian leaders’ inner circles. in democracies, winning coalitions are large and more diverse as far as their private interests are concerned, making it all but impossible for the democratic government to engage in the targeted distribution of goods to the individual members of the winning coalition. subsequently, democratic policies are more attuned to the needs and interests of the larger swaths of the population that they seek to satisfy through the provision of public goods, such as social welfare, security, and education. this is not to say that democratic governments do not engage in the provision of private goods to a range of special interests, yet, greater accountability of democracies compels them to use resources efficiently and favour the provision of public goods in relative terms (bader, gravingholt, and kastner 2010). transferring these differences between autocracies and democracies to the logic of foreign policymaking, there are several plausible theoretical explanations for the decisions about humanitarian 3 it is important to note that autocracies vary on a number of dimensions that bear implications for their foreign policy decisions (see for example weeks 2014). 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 7 aid by autocratic states. since the autocratic incentive structure is based on the distribution of private benefits and the reduction of private costs to the winning coalition, autocratic donors prefer dealing with likeminded autocrats in the recipient states because both governments can benefit from the lack of accountability to their respective populations. from the autocratic donor’s perspective, it is easier to manipulate the autocratic recipient’s decisions affecting the distribution of various benefits. from the autocratic recipient’s standpoint, it is easier to get private benefits from the aid, investment, or trade policies of the autocratic donor in exchange for various policy concessions (bader, gravingholt, and kastner 2010). there is strong empirical evidence that corroborates this theoretical claim. during the cold war, for example, the soviet union's relationships with developing countries were guided by their shared commitment to the communist ideology and their discontent with western capitalism and colonialism (jaster 1969). this leads to the following expectation: h1. ceteris paribus, autocratic donors are more likely to provide humanitarian assistance to other autocratic states. to recall, political survival is the dominant motive of both democratic and autocratic political leadership. however, the costs of losing political office are particularly acute in authoritarian regimes where removal from office may result in imprisonment, exile, asset forfeiture, and even death. other than natural causes (death or impairment), the loss of office by an autocratic leader and those who rely on them typically occurs due to political destabilization – whether through people’s revolt or a coup by regime insiders. autocratic regimes are, therefore, acutely sensitive to political instability and prioritize order and security over other considerations. this preference for stability and order is not limited to the domestic context of authoritarian regimes but applies to foreign contexts as well; however, autocrats are more concerned about the destabilization of fellow autocratic governments than democratic regimes. first, lacking democratic mechanisms and processes to respond to political crises, autocratic governments are more likely to resort to repressive means to quell threats to their regime. the state-led violence, in turn, can lead to escalation. second, the toppling of an autocratic government presents an opportunity for installing a democratic regime – an undesirable prospect for other autocratic leaders. therefore, authoritarian governments will be interested in the stability of autocratic governments abroad. humanitarian disasters are the types of exogenous shocks that have been associated with the political destabilization of affected countries. humanitarian disasters reduce countries’ wealth and deplete their resources, increasing the likelihood of political conflict (nel and righarts 2008; homer-dixon 2010). while humanitarian disasters affect ordinary people the most, it is the dissatisfied members of the winning coalition, or political elites excluded from the winning coalition, that mobilize people by directing their grievances against the authorities responsible for disaster relief. for autocratic regimes with greater economic and administrative resources, this moment of domestic instability in another country not only bodes potential losses, but can also bring about permanent changes in the government structure of the affected state that will curtail the channels for private benefit extraction (bader, gravingholt, and kastner 2010). furthermore, disaster-affected states are vulnerable to foreign intervention, including the larger donor states that have sought to implement their ideological (democratization) agenda with the provision of humanitarian aid (curti 2001). the prospects of a regime change in disaster-stricken countries do not sit well with the authoritarian states. subsequently, the latter will be attuned to the magnitude 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 8 of disasters and are more likely to provide aid to the most affected countries, less for humanitarian reasons and more due to concerns regarding the destabilization of the affected states. this discussion suggests the following hypothesis: h2: ceteris paribus, autocratic states are more likely to provide humanitarian aid to other autocratic governments gravely affected by humanitarian disasters. countries affected by disasters are vulnerable to political discontent to a different extent. a high level of development in the affected country reduces its susceptibility to political and economic crises precipitated by a disaster event; it also increases the country’s ability to cope with the consequences of the disaster (anbarci, escaleras, and register 2005; fink and redaelli 2009; kahn 2005). therefore, robust socioeconomic indicators of the affected state may reduce the risk associated with instability, leading to decreased humanitarian assistance. h3. ceteris paribus, stronger socioeconomic background of the affected states will reduce the probability of humanitarian assistance by autocratic donors. to reiterate, autocratic stability is a function of the stability of the winning coalition that is sustained by the continued provision of private benefits to its members. foreign relations— including trade—is an important avenue for extracting rents for private distribution among the members of the ruling elite. the reduction in import/export flows that occurs as a consequence of political or economic crises in the trading partners is an unwelcome development for autocratic elites who get a cut from the economic interchanges. this suggests the following hypothesis: h4: ceteris paribus, trading partners of autocratic states are more likely to receive humanitarian assistance. although politics, colonial history, and a host of other reasons might prevent the autocratic states from trading with their closest neighbours, the easiest market access is in countries that geography puts nearby. proximity, therefore, plays a role in the calculus of costs and the benefits of economic and humanitarian engagements by the autocratic states. logistical costs can be minimized by helping recipients within closer proximity to autocratic states' borders (fuchs and klann 2013). when it comes to the consequences of disasters, including pandemics, autocratic donors will be interested in containing the destabilizing spread of disease from nations in their neighbourhood by offering humanitarian assistance toward the treatment and control of that disease (boussalis and peiffer 2011). h5: ceteris paribus, autocratic states are more likely to provide humanitarian aid to the affected countries in their neighbourhood. lastly, aid-related decisions are not made in isolation from considerations about the broader strategic context of the autocratic states, which include national security interests, economic interests, and broader political interests, all of which have bearing on the stability of the ruling administration. therefore, humanitarian assistance can be used to signal the autocratic donor’s broader interests; for example, it can be used to reward countries willing to align their policies with the interests of the donor states. alternatively, it can be used in support of commitments made 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 9 by the autocratic donors to members of alliances. in the case of russia, multiple observers have noted that russia used its covid-19 assistance to reward countries that were moscow’s customers in the arms trade. russia’s arms sales have been its main export commodity, apart from oil and gas exports. arms transfers have been key to moscow’s image as a world power and an essential tool for projecting its global influence. h6a: autocratic donors are likely to use humanitarian aid allocations to reward countries who support the donors’ foreign policies. h6b: autocratic donors are likely to use humanitarian aid allocations to countries who are members of alliances with the donor states. h6c: the customers of russia’s arms sales are more likely to be the recipients of its covid-19 assistance. research design academic and policy communities began taking an interest in russia's role in the donor community following moscow’s highly publicized involvement in the syrian and venezuelan humanitarian crises and its covid-19 aid to italy. russia has re-emerged as a donor following the aid hiatus of the 1990s when it was a net recipient rather than a contributor of development and humanitarian assistance. yet the history of russia’s aid programs goes back to the post-world war ii period when the soviet regime invested lavishly in various infrastructure projects in south asia and the middle east (berliner 1958; rai 2018). the levels of aid, which fluctuated during the soviet period, declined precipitously in the years preceding the soviet union’s dissolution. in the 1990s, russia curtailed its aid activities; they picked up again in the 2000s following a decadelong economic growth spurred by the high petroleum prices. it was also in the 2000s that russia began establishing a regulatory and institutional framework for development and humanitarian assistance. in 2007, moscow adopted its first concept on development assistance reflecting the millennium development goals (rakhmangulov 2010). the document was updated in 2014 with a presidential decree that approved the current concept in the area of international development assistance (president of the russian federation 2014). there is no single federal agency responsible for the implementation of assistance policies. the ministry of finance, the ministry for civil defense, emergencies, and the elimination of consequences of natural disasters, defense ministry, the federal agency for commonwealth of independent states affairs, compatriots living abroad, and international humanitarian cooperation (rossotrudnichestvo) along with a number of public foundations and state-backed ngos are engaged in the development and humanitarian aid administration (velikaya 2018). when the covid-19 pandemic spread around the world, russia began sending covid-19 test kits, masks, protective gear, and medical personnel to countries that reported spikes in the spread of infections. the russian government presented its foreign aid as an act of generosity delivered at times of hardship to countries in need (zykov 2020). for example, following moscow’s delivery of covid-19 aid to italy, russian diplomatic twitter went into overdrive publicizing the shipment as russia’s “humanitarian gesture” under the hashtag #russiahelps (gigitashvili 2020). russia's own concept of international assistance exhibits a mix of goals ranging from humanitarian 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 10 objectives, such as the elimination of natural disasters' consequences, to pragmatic political aims, which include bolstering russia’s influence on global processes (president of the russian federation 2014). to collect data on russia’s covid-19 donations (most of which were in-kind), a search algorithm was created and applied to the lexusuni and additional digital sources to identify open-source data on the transfers of covid-19 aid by moscow. each donation was coded as an event with the date, donor, recipient, type and volume of donation, and other characteristics of the event recorded. for a covid-19 donation to be recorded in the dataset, it had to be confirmed in at least two different sources. to standardize donations into their dollar equivalents, a reference list of values for purchasing various types of medical equipment and supplies was defined (see appendix i table 4 for examples of conversion and total level of donations supplied by russia). the reference list contained the lowest and highest known market values for each product that were used to convert the known quantities of such items as covid-19 tests, ppe, and ventilators into their dollar equivalents. the lowest and highest totals (based on the lowest and highest market values respectively) were calculated and aggregated over the year for each recipient of covid-19 aid (see appendix i table 3). afterwards, a mean value was identified for each state year. analyses were conducted on the mean as well as the lowest and highest values of covid-19 assistance.4 aid scholarship identifies two stages of decision-making in aid allocation (boussalis and peiffer 2011; kevlihan, derouen, and biglaiser 2014). first is the "selection" stage, where a donor decides which countries will receive aid and which ones will be bypassed. the second is the "outcome" stage, and it involves decisions about the amount of aid distributed to states identified as aid recipients in the first round. consistent with the literature, this study tests the determinants of russia’s covid-19 aid in two stages. in the first (selection) stage, the dependent variable is whether the covid-afflicted country received any aid from moscow at all. countries selected for covid-19 assistance by russia were coded as “1 and “0” otherwise. in the second (outcome) stage, the dependent variable is the total volume (in usd) of covid-19 aid allocated by russia. independent variables the scholarship on humanitarian assistance typically measures the magnitude of a disaster by the number of fatalities or the number of people being affected. it is expected that more catastrophic events attract more post-disaster aid. consistent with the aid literature, the total number of deaths due to covid-19 appears to be an appropriate measure of the severity of the pandemic. however, the different approaches to counting covid-related deaths used by 4 the prices were not adjusted for inflation for the following reasons. the span of the study is short (10 months of 2020). during this time, russia experienced a 3.38% annual inflation. however, a bulk of its covid-19 donations were allocated early in 2020, and i assume that the change in prices for russian ppe and medical supplies would be insignificant to affect the results of the study. there is, however, a related challenge of using in-kind donations for inferring a country’s motivations for aid, namely, the structure of donations. arguably, airlifting military medical personnel (which is difficult to translate into a dollar value) signifies a higher priority of a recipient state for russia than a country that receives gloves and masks. i acknowledge this as one of the data limitations and invite further research into the ways in which the structure of in-kind donations reflects a donor’s motivations for aid. 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 11 countries raise concerns about the reliability of this measure.5 therefore, this article opted for the covid-19 mortality rate to be displayed in percentage terms as a measure of the pandemic’s severity in a country. the metric is calculated as a ratio of the total deaths to the number of infected individuals. since russia allocated most of its covid-19 assistance in the early stages of the pandemic—in late spring and early summer of 2020—the half-year total deaths estimate, as of july 1, 2020, was used in the study. our world in data is the source of data that was consulted on the number of covid-19 deaths (ritchie et al. 2020). it is expected that the higher number of deaths due to covid-19 will be associated with both a decision to provide aid and the higher volume of aid disbursed to the affected country. socioeconomic background that conditions decisions about aid allocation is typically measured by a country’s gdp per capita. this study uses gross domestic product per capita in 2019, measured in millions of usd logged in the statistical analysis of russia’s covid19 assistance; this data comes from the world bank (2019). similar to other disasters, the covid-19 pandemic affected economic relations, including trade, among countries. it was hypothesized that autocratic donors were sensitive to losses due to interruptions in economic exchanges and would be motivated to assist countries with greater economic ties to the donor state. the study uses the total volume of trade with russia in 2019 measured in thousands of us dollars; this data comes from the un statistics division (2020). the proximity of recipient states to russia was measured by the distance from moscow to the country's capital in km (gleditsch and ward 2001). the expectation is that the shorter the distance of a country’s capital to moscow, the more likely it is to receive russia’s covid 19 aid. to measure the regime type, this study uses v-dem’s interval-scale index for liberal democracy for 2019 (coppedge 2020). the expectation is that states with higher values of liberal democracy are less likely to receive covid-19 aid from moscow. to create an interaction term for testing hypothesis 2, which expects russia to provide more assistance to autocratic counterparts severely affected by the covid-19 pandemic, this study created two binary variables: one measuring whether or not the country’s covid-19 mortality rate fell below or above the median and another one measuring whether the country was a full liberal democracy (scoring 0.6 or above on a scale from 0 to 10). countries with higher (above median) mortality rates due to covid-19 and full liberal democracies were coded as “1” and “0” otherwise. an interaction terms of the two binary variables was used in the equation. the political affinity of a country with russia (i.e., the extent to which the country supports russia’s foreign policy) can be proxied by their voting alignment in the un general assembly. the study used the roll-call votes for the un general assembly resolution 74/17 on the militarization of crimea, adopted on december 9, 2019 (un general assembly 2019). 5 to illustrate this problem, the central asian republics of kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan used to exclude atypically high death numbers due to pneumonia from the covid-19 death counts at the beginning of the pandemic. both governments changed their methodology in summer 2020 that resulted in a spike of deaths reported due to covid19. 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 12 the resolution condemned russia’s temporary occupation of the crimean peninsula . all votes in favour of these resolutions were coded as "1"; all other votes were coded as “2 .”6 membership in an alliance (including nonaggression pacts or a treaty containing a stipulation of nonaggression) was measured as a binary variable with "1" denoting membership in an alliance with russia and "0" otherwise (leeds, ritter, and mclaughlin 2002). to separate membership in an alliance with russia from the proximity variable, another binary variable denoting whether a country shared a land border with russia was added for the robustness checks to select models. this study also included a binary variable denoting whether a country was a recipient of arms sales from russia since 2014 ("yes" = 1 and "no" = 0). the source of the data was the stockholm international peace research institute (sipri) arms transfers database (sipri 2020). lastly, the total population at the end of 2019 (logged) is also included among the control variables (un population division 2019). the study estimated russia’s decisions about covid-19 aid allocations using heckman’s (1979) two-step estimator, which allows for the correlation of the error terms of two decisions at hand. the sample includes all states in the year 2020 (but excludes unrecognized territories— abkhazia, transdniestria, south ossetia, palestine—to which moscow also provided assistance). russia’s aid to the kremlin-controlled territories in eastern ukraine and a highlycontested transfer of medical supplies and equipment to the us were excluded from the study. the heckman model generates a wald test statistic. when significant, it indicates that the two models are not independent and must be solved together. in this study’s case, the wald test statistic was significant in all but the base model (1) with and without the binary variable denoting shared borders with russia (see table 1) suggesting that a null hypothesis of the two models’ independence could be rejected. the base model (1) was further estimated using logit and regression analysis separately for the selection and outcome stages, with result s being largely similar to that estimated by the heckman model (see appendix i table 2). table 1 contains the results of the heckman selection estimator. model 1 is a base model that uses the mean values of russia’s covid-19 aid (in usd) and excludes the interaction term. model 2 also uses mean values of russia’s covid-19 aid and includes an interaction of the severity of the covid-19 crisis and the type of regime among its predictors. models 3 and 4 use the lowest and highest estimated values of russia’s covid-19 aid, respectively. since the distribution of the covid-19 aid in dollar values was skewed, a logarithmic transformation of the variable was used in the outcome part of the equation. table 5 containing a variance inflation factor (vif) appears in the appendix. in the selection stage, the direction of the coefficients on all independent variables is consistent with the study’s expectations but only “un resolution a74/17,” “membership in alliance,” and “liberal democracy index” reached a level of statistical significance at p < 0.01 or above. 6 as a robustness check, this study substituted roll-call votes for the un general assembly resolution 54/17 with roll-call votes for the un general assembly resolution 68/262 adopted on march 27, 2014 (un general assembly 2014) in response to the russian annexation of crimea. it was a non-binding resolution that called on states not to recognize changes in the status of the crimea region, affirmed the territorial integrity of ukraine, and invalidated the 2014 crimean referendum. the findings of the models with the alternative measure of “political affinity” were similar to those reported in table 1 and, therefore, are not included here. 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 13 table 1: the heckman model of the determinants of russian covid-19 aid selection stage (1) covid-19 aid mean values (2) covid-19 aid mean values (3) covid-19 aid minimal values (4) covid-19 aid maximum values covid-19 deaths rate -0.0212 (0.043) 0.014 (0.052) 0.014 (0.052) 0.0143 (0.052) covid deaths/liberal democracy interaction 0 1 1.24* (0.68) 1 0 -0.249 (0.381) 1 1 0.087 (0.859) 0 1 1.24* (0.683) 1 0 -0.249 (0.381) 1 1 0.087 (0.920) 0 1 1.24* (0.683) 1 0 -0.249 (0.381) 1 1 0.087 (0.859) distance to capital -0.000026 (0.00048) -0.00002 (0.00005) -0.00002 (0.00005) -0.0002 (0.0005) un resolution a74/17 1.076** (0.484) 1.24** (0.506) 1.105** (0.505) 1.105** (0.505) liberal democracy index -0.945 (0.736) -2.112** (1.000) -2.12* (1.09) -2.119* (1.09) membership in alliance 1.129*** (0.387) 1.197*** (0.414) 1.197*** (0.414) 1.197*** (0.414) total trade in 2019 (logged)) -0.003 (0.022) -0.009 (0.096) -0.010 (0.0234) -0.0096 (0.023) total population (logged) -0.100 (0.092) -0.067 (0.096) -0.068 (0.096) -0.067 (0.096) arms sales 0.192 (0.315 -0.039 (1.569) 0.064 0.325 0.065 (0.325) constant 0.204 (1.523) -4.008* (2.40) -0.039 (1.569) -4.122 (2.474) outcome stage (1) (2) (3) (4) covid-19 deaths rate 0.699* (0.360) 0.708** (0.277) 0.773*** (0.268) 0.643** (0.285) distance to capital -0.0001 (0,0003) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0003) liberal democracy index 4.021 (6.057) 2.347 (4.153) 2.193 (4.034) 2.692 (4.271) membership in alliance -2.016 (3.227) -1.646 (4.15) -1.581 (2.124) -1.707 (2.248) total trade in 2019 (logged) 0.284 (0.199) 0.252* (0.142) 0.318** (0.138) 0.186 (0.146) 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 14 table 1: cont’d gdp per capita in 2019 (logged) 1.828* (0.968) 1.507** (0.678) 1.62** (0.658) 1.393** (0.697) total population (logged) -0.136 (0.636) -0.206 (0.480) -0.364 (0.467) -0.048 (0.494) arms sales 0.559 (2.09) 1.21 (1.48) 1.515 (1.150) 0.574 (1.522) constant 3.255 (11.438) 5.928 (8.275) 5.369 (8.039) 6.487 (8.512) n=153 selected=34 wald chi2(8) = 14.32 prob>chi = 0.074 n=153 selected=34 wald chi2(8) = 24.6 prob>chi2 = 0.002 n=153 selected=34 wald chi2(8) = 28.96 prob>chi2 = 0.000 n=153 selected=34 wald chi2(8) = 21.46 prob>chi2 = 0.000 to interpret the coefficients, marginal effects were calculated. the probability of being selected as recipients of russia’s covid-19 aid increases by nearly 20 percentage points across all models for those countries that abstained from voting or voted against the un general assembly resolution a74/17 (compared to those who voted in support of the resolution). in the soviet tradition of “aid for votes,” russia used aid to reward countries that expressed support to its foreign policy priorities by siding with moscow on the un’s roll call votes. moscow also rewarded the members of alliances with aid. the likelihood for a country to be chosen as a recipient of russia’s covid-19 assistance increased by 18.4 percent if it was a member of an alliance with russia. importantly, the impact of alliances held even when controlled for the shared borders with russia (see models 3 and 4, appendix i table 2). many members of alliances with russia are also moscow’s neighbours; however, there are several russian neighbours—ukraine, georgia, estonia, latvia, lithuania, finland, norway, and poland, among others—that are not members of alliances with russia. the border variable turned insignificant in the robustness checks while the alliances’ measures retained their significance, suggesting that autocratic donors are more likely to use humanitarian aid allocations to countries who are members of alliances with the donor states. lastly, democracies in the sample were less likely to be selected as recipients of russia’s covid-19 assistance. the marginal effect for a full liberal democracy of being selected as a recipient of russia’s covid-19 aid is 19.6 percent less compared to nondemocracies. the interaction term did not return the results consistent with the expectation that autocratic states experiencing a severe health crisis due to the covid-19 pandemic were more likely to be selected as recipients of russia’s covid-19 assistance. interestingly, it is the democracies with lower than median mortality rates due to covid-19 were more likely to be selected to be the recipients of russian covid-19 aid. while this finding departs from the theoretical expectations, it comports with the available empirical evidence of moscow sending large amounts of medical supplies and ppe to italy, serbia, bosnia and herzegovina, and other democratic countries with the purported 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 15 goal of breaking the european solidarity and changing the “hearts and minds” of the people in these countries to view russia in a more favourable light. in the end, the regime variable returned a statistically significant coefficient in the expected direction, independent of the interaction term; everything else being equal, moscow has consistently preferred other autocracies as the recipients of its covid-19 assistance. the second “outcome” model corresponding to the second stage of the decision-making process of aid allocation returned statistically significant coefficients on two variables – the mortality rate due to covid-19 and the gdp per capita. this implies that in russia’s case, the selection or the gate-keeping stage of decision-making involved many more considerations concerning the choice of the recipients of covid-19 assistance from russia. when it comes to making decisions about the levels of assistance, countries experiencing more severe health crises, as measured by covid19 mortality rates, received higher levels of assistance from russia. while somewhat unexpected, the relationship was born out in practice in that russia's assistance appeared to be tracing the spread of the infectious disease around the globe. in march 2020, the epicentre of the covid19 outbreak shifted to europe, with italy experiencing higher daily death tolls than china, and italy received some of the highest amounts of covid-19 aid (in usd) from the kremlin. in late spring/early summer of 2020, central asian republics experienced the peak of the first wave of the pandemic. the first wave of the covid-19 pandemic was milder in africa than in the rest of the world, but the second wave that came by the end of 2020 was more aggressive. russia’s assistance roughly followed the same pattern with the first aid packages going to europe, then to central asian and african states. countries with higher levels of gdp per capita also received higher amounts of covid-19 aid from russia. this outcome might be accounted for by the pragmatic considerations over the logistics of accepting and distributing the in-kind assistance packages (better-off countries have more robust infrastructure for accepting and distributing aid deliveries). in addition, high levels of gdp per capita are also suggestive of stronger institutional and health infrastructure, which means that even the modest in-kind contributions of ppe and equipment may have a higher rate of return, which can be claimed by russia as outcomes of its assistance. russia’s total volume of aid was not conditional on the size of the countries’ population, regime, membership in alliance with moscow, or proximity to russia. statistical findings offer several plausible explanations for russia's covid-19 assistance. first, the results attest to the importance of separating the decision-making process regarding aid into two stages: a “selection” stage of making a decision on the recipients of aid and an “outcome” stage where decisions about the amount of aid are made. different sets of determinants appear to be at play at different stages of decision-making about covid-19 assistance. in the “selection” stage when an authoritarian donor, such as russia, makes a decision about which countries deserve its assistance, several factors consistent with the theoretical expectations turned out to be significant in shaping russia’s decisions. these include political affinity (as measured by countries’ votes in the un general assembly), membership in alliances with russia, and the nature of the political regime. russia appears to reward countries supporting its foreign policies by resorting to the “checkbook" diplomacy of humanitarian assistance. similarly, members of alliances are rewarded with aid, as are the fellow co-authoritarians, while countries with higher scores on the liberal democracy index are less likely to receive russia’s aid. when it comes to the 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 16 second stage of the decision-making process regarding the amount of total assistance allocated to the countries selected as the recipients of russia’s covid-19 aid, many of the determinants of aid from the selection model appear to be less relevant. discussion and conclusions in 2003, an informal donor forum and network of 17 donors endorsed the principles of good humanitarian donorship (2003). these principles include humanity (saving lives and alleviating suffering as a goal of humanitarian assistance), impartiality, neutrality, and independence. by adhering to these principles, donors foreswear using humanitarian aid for geopolitical and other non-humanitarian means. like many other so-called “new” and “emerging” donors, russia has not acceded to these principles, and its motives for humanitarian assistance have been called into question. by focusing on russia’s decisions about covid-19 assistance allocation, this article sought to contribute to the larger literature on foreign aid that deals with donors' determinants of aid flow. more directly relevant for this study is the literature on humanitarian aid suggesting that the level of humanitarian assistance is not just an expression of humanitarian concerns, but it is also influenced by donors’ domestic strategic considerations. the study theorized aid as a function of the donor government’s interest in political survival, which is more astute in authoritarian than democratic states. the key differences between democratic and autocratic regimes relevant for understanding their aid choices have to do with the nature of constraints placed on democratic versus authoritarian leaders. by destabilizing the affected countries, humanitarian disasters threaten autocratic states’ access to and their ability to distribute private gains and/or elevate the costs of maintaining the “winning coalition.” autocratic states, therefore, are sensitive to the prospects of the disaster-induced instability and are more likely to assist countries that are vulnerable to political instability. consistent with these expectations, the study found that russia was more likely to allocate aid to countries that were non-democratic, supportive of russia’s foreign policy orientation, and belonged to alliances with moscow. russia’s international response to the covid-19 crisis is telling of its foreign policy priorities. moscow has taken advantage of the humanitarian cause to advance its military cooperation, weaken the prospects for democracy around the world, and gain geopolitical approval. moscow might have scored some points by presenting itself as a responsible global power delivering the much-needed medical supplies at a time of us retrenchment, its political gamble under the guise of humanitarian covid-19 assistance was cut short by the pandemic troubles at home and the limitations of russia’s own fiscal approach. the government of vladimir putin has been opposed to investments in public welfare in favour of a fiscal discipline to eliminate moscow’s public debt. russia’s unfinished healthcare reforms increased the public’s vulnerability to contracting covid-19, which spiked during the summer of 2020 (cook and twigg 2020). as the russian military jets delivered ppe and medical supplies around the world, russia turned out to be utterly unprepared to manage the crisis at home. the kremlin’s cavalier approach to the pandemic, which involved downplaying the threat of covid-19 infections in russia, had backfired with the population growing highly skeptical of personal health and safety measures and 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 17 becoming distrustful of vaccines (stronski 2021). russia’s strong financial reserves have been viewed as a symbol of its “sovereignty.” subsequently, russia’s domestic covid-19 relief measures were less than 3 percent of its gdp, compared to extensive pandemic relief packages in some european countries that stood in double digits (trudolyubov 2020). only a sliver of this amount was put toward foreign covid-19 assistance, which dwindled toward the end of 2020. this does not mean, however, that russia’s humanitarian contributions are irrelevant. humanitarian aid is not the only tool in the russian foreign policy toolkit. when used together with other instruments of the so-called “smart power,” combining “soft” and “hard” power techniques for generating a desired foreign policy effect, humanitarian aid can be a force multiplier helping moscow to achieve its foreign policy objectives. whether in central asia, africa, latin america, or south east asia, russia’s covid-19 aid has been used in conjunction with expanding military cooperation, including through the use of private military contractors (pmcs), deepening economic engagement (mostly through moscow’s contracts in extractive industries), and informational influence. the efforts at cultivating and sustaining bi-lateral, mainly elite-to-elite, connections have been accompanied by an anti-western narrative contrasting the principles of sovereignty and [regime] security with the value-based conditionality imposed by the west. the so-called “traditional donors” are not beyond the pale in deviating from the need-based principles of humanitarian aid allocations. still, the ideas of impartiality, neutrality, and need have long been integral to the integrity of the humanitarian system and an important draw for private and public donations. russia’s participation in humanitarian efforts for clear, pragmatic concerns and geopolitical motives reinforces the growing skepticism regarding the universality of international disaster relief aid that threatens to undermine global humanitarian efforts. the perceived politicization of aid and biases in states’ allocations of disaster relief assistance have been named among the chief reasons for the crisis in the international humanitarian system (paulmann 2016). 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 18 appendix i table 2: ols and logit models of the determinants of russian covid-19 aid (1) logistic (selection) model (2) ols (outcome) model (3) logistic (selection) model (4) ols (outcome) model covid-19 deaths rate -0.013 (0.071) -0.083 (0.126) -0.052 (0.083) 0.023 (0.131) un resolution a74/17 2.482** (1.106) 3.046** (1.333) 2.793** (1.321) 1.126* (0.661) distance to capital -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0002* (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0001) liberal democracy index -2.988** (1.477) -1.853 (2.562) -1.227 (1.676) -0.199 (2.501) membership in alliance 2.045*** (0.647) 3.644*** (1.222) 1.776*** (0.581) 3.518*** (1.185) states bordering russia 2.924 (1.780) total trade in 2019 (logged) -0.0113 (0.040) 0.019 (0.062) 0.0111 (0.041) 0.019 (0.065) gdp per capita in 2019 (logged) 1.828* (0.968) -0.907** (0.355) -0.809*** (0.231) -1.004*** (0.365) total population (logged) -0.078 (0.153) -0.296 (0.281) -0.167 (0.174) -0.452 (0.310) arms sales -0.692 (0.632) 1.559 (0.974) 0.411 (0.586) 1.728 (1.252) constant 0.40 (2.57) 15.98*** (5.718) 7.357* (3.910) 15.86*** (5.582) n (pseudo) r-squared 153 0.23 153 0.24 153 0.29 153 wald chi2(8)/ f(8, 145) prob > chi2 / prob > f 16.55 0.035 4.57 0.000 21.25 0.019 4.66 0.00 robust error terms in parentheses * p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 19 table 3: russia’s covid-19 donations (2020) country minimum estimate maximum estimate afghanistan 65,629.8 757,500 algeria 771,600 14,600,000 angola 440,000 11,400,000 armenia 1,299,600 15,000,000 azerbaijan 1,457,112 16,800,000 belarus 2,234,041 22,100,000 bosnia and herzegovina 3,086,400 58,300,000 cape verde 440,000 11,400,000 central african republic 4600 4600 china 1,840,000 34,800,000 comoros 46 4600 congo 4600 4600 costa rica 26000 300,000 democratic republic of the congo 103,920 125,440 djibouti 778,378 1,020,270 ethiopia 4600 46,000 guinea 154,200 606,400 iran 649,800 7,500,000 italy 33,500,000 380,000,000 kazakhstan 1,299,600 15,000,000 kyrgyzstan 2,737,900 3,953,000 moldova 1,494,540 17,300,000 mongolia 1,299,600 15,000,000 nicaragua 11569 528,630 north korea 84,474 975,000 serbia 8,526,570 160,000,000 sierra leone 130,000 1,500,000 somalia 46 4600 south africa 1299.6 15,000 syria 172,124.5 1,595,445 tajikistan 1,299,600 15,000,000 ukraine 80,000 1,512,000 uzbekistan 1,299,600 15,000,000 venezuela 1,189,880 19,600,000 zambia 65,000 750000 zimbabwe 4600 46,000 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 20 table 4: examples of the ppe and market prices (in us$) ppe price per item (low) price per item (high) price per box amount in the box weight per item 3ply face mask 0.2 0.6 30 50 0.011 kn95 mask 1.89 2.6 18.9 50 0.005 nitrile gloves 0.2907 3.5 29.07 100 0.012 protective coveralls 20.99 45 0.124 rapid test kit 12.996 150 324.9 25 test reagent 66 370 face shield 4.9 5.1 0.078 table 5: variance inflation factor variable vif 1/vif liberal democracy index 2.55 0.392290 unres74_19 2.48 0.402521 gdp per capita (logged) 1.85 0.539595 arms sales from russia 1.48 0.677441 distance to capital 1.35 0.738348 population (logged) 1.33 0.749909 membership in alliances 1.26 0.792916 covid deaths rate 1.2 0.831789 trade (logged) 1.18 0.845555 mean vif 1.66 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 21 references anbarci, nejat, monica escaleras, and charles a. register. 2005. “earthquake fatalities: the interaction of nature and political economy.” journal of public economics 89: 1907-1933. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.002. alesina, alberto, and david dollar. 2000. “who gives foreign aid to whom and why?” journal of economic growth 5 (1): 33-63. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1009874203400. asmus, gerda, andreas fuchs, and angelika müller. 2020. “brics and foreign aid.” in the political economy of the brics countries. volume 2: brics and the global economy, edited by soo yeon kim, 139-177. singapore: world scientific. bader, julia, jorn gravingholt, and antje kastner. 2010. “would autocracies promote autocracy? a political economy perspective on regime-type export in regional neighborhood.” comparative politics 16 (1): 81-100. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569771003593904. bbc news. 2020. “coronavirus: what does ‘from russia with love’ really mean?,” april 3, 2020. accessed november 21, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52137908. ———. 2022. “ukraine attention shows bias against black lives, who chief says,” april 13, 2022. accessed november 21, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61101732. berliner, joseph s. 1958. soviet economic aid: the new aid and trade policy in underdeveloped countries. new york: frederick a. praeger for the council on foreign relations. blair, robert a., robert marty, and philip roessler. 2022. “foreign aid and soft power: greater power competition in africa in the early twenty-first century.” british journal of political science 52 (3): 1355-1376. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123421000193. boussalis, constantine, and caryn peiffer. 2011. “health, need and politics: the determinants of bilateral hiv/aids assistance.” journal of development studies 47 (12): 1789-1825. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.579109. cook, linda j., and judy twigg. 2020. “can russia’s health and welfare systems handle the pandemic?” current history 119 (819): 251-257. https://doi.org/10.1525/ curh.2020.119.819.251 coppedge, michael, john gerring, carl henrik knutsen, staffan i. lindberg, jan teorell, david altman, michael bernhard, agnes cornell, m. steven fish, lisa gastaldi, haakon gjerløw, adam glynn, allen hicken, anna lührmann, seraphine f. maerz, kyle l. marquardt, kelly mcmann, valeriya mechkova, pamela paxton, daniel pemstein, johannes von römer, brigitte seim, rachel sigman, svend-erik skaaning, jeffrey staton, aksel sundtröm, eitan tzelgov, luca uberti, yi-ting wang, tore wig, and daniel ziblatt. 2020. “v-dem codebook v10” varieties of democracy (v-dem) project. https://www.v-dem.net https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.002 https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1009874203400 https://doi.org/10.1080/13569771003593904 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52137908 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61101732 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123421000193 https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.579109 https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2020.119.819.251 https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2020.119.819.251 https://www.v-dem.net/ 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 22 curtis, devon. 2001. “politics and humanitarian aid: debates, dilemmas and dissension.” humanitarian policy group, report 10. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/18f8247951dba45cc1256d6600483bfd-odi-politicsandhumanitarianaidapr01.pdf. de mesquita, bruce bueno, and alastair smith. 2012. the dictator’s handbook: why bad behavior is almost always good politics. new york: public affairs. de mesquita, bruce bueno, alastair smith, randolph m. siverson, and james d. morrow. 2003. the logic of political survival. cambridge, ma: mit press. dollar, david, and victoria levin. 2006. “the increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-2003.” world development 34 (12): 2034-2046. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.06.002. doyle, michael w. 1983. “kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs.” philosophy and public affairs 12 (3): 205–235. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265298. dreher, alex, and andreas fuchs. 2015. “‘rogue aid?’ an empirical analysis of china’s aid allocation.” the canadian journal of economics 48 (3): 988-1023. https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12166. dreher, alex, peter nennenkamp, and rainer thiele. 2011. “are ‘new’ donors different? comparing the allocation of bilateral aid between non-dac and dac donor countries,” world development 39: 1950-1968. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.024. drury, a. cooper, and richard stuart olson. 1998. “disasters and political unrest: an empirical investigation.” journal of contingencies and crisis management 6: 153-161. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.00084. drury, a. cooper, richard stuart olson, and douglas a. van belle. 2005. “the politics of humanitarian aid: u.s. foreign disaster assistance, 1964-1995.” journal of politics 67 (2): 454-473. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00324.x. eisensee, thomas, and david strömberg. 2007. “news droughts, news floods, and u.s. disaster relief.” the quarterly journal of economics 122 (2): 693-728. https://doi.org/ 10.1162/qjec.122.2.693. fasanos, federica saini. 2022. “russia’s wagner group in africa: influence, commercial concessions, rights violations, and counterinsurgency failure.” brookings institution. february 8, 2022. accessed november 21, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessionsrights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/. fink, guenther, and silvia redaelli. 2009. “determinants of international emergency aid: humanitarian need only?” the world bank policy research working paper 4839, https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/wps4839.pdf. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/‌resources/18f8247951dba45cc1256d6600483bfd-odi-politicsandhumanitarianaid-apr01.pdf https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/‌resources/18f8247951dba45cc1256d6600483bfd-odi-politicsandhumanitarianaid-apr01.pdf https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/‌resources/18f8247951dba45cc1256d6600483bfd-odi-politicsandhumanitarianaid-apr01.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.06.002 https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12166 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.024 https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.2.693 https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.2.693 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/ https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/ https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/ https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/wps4839.pdf 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 23 fleck, robert k., and christopher kilby. 2006. “how do political changes influence us bilateral aid allocations? evidence from panel data.” review of development economics 10 (2): 210-223. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00313.x. fuchs, andreas, and nils-hendrik klann. 2013. “emergency aid 2.0,” vfs annual conference 2013 (dusseldorf): competition policy and regulation in a global economic order 79898, verein für socialpolitik/german economic association. https://dx.doi.org/ 10.2139/ssrn.2519635. fuchs, andreas, and krishna chaitanya vadlamannati. 2013. “the needy donor: an empirical analysis of india’s aid motives.” world development 44: 110-128. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.12.012. gigitashvili, givi. 2020. “russia’s covid-19 ‘humanitarian aid’ comes at a price.” the emerging europe. may 8, 2020. accessed november 21, 2022. https://emergingeurope.com/voices/russias-covid-19-humanitarian-aid-comes-at-a-price/. giusti, serena, and eleonara tafuro ambrosetti. 2022. “making the best out of a crisis: russia’s health diplomacy during covid-19.” social sciences 11: 1-14. https://doi.org/10.3390/ socsci11020053. gleditsch, kristian s., and michael d. ward. 2001. “measuring space: a minimum-distance database and applications to international studies.” journal of peace research 38 (6): 739758. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343301038006006. good humanitarian donorship. 2003. “24 principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship.” accessed november 21, 2022. https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/ principles-good-practice-of-ghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html. heckman, james j. 1979. sample selection bias as a specification error. econometrica 47 (1): 153–161. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912352. hoeffler, anke, and verity outram. 2010. “need, merit, or self-interest – what determines the allocation of aid?” review of development economics 15 (2): 237-250. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00605.x. homer-dixon, thomas f. 2010. environment, scarcity, and violence. princeton: princeton university press. jaster, robert s. 1969. “foreign aid and economic development: the shifting soviet view,” international affairs 45 (3): 452-464. https://doi.org/10.2307/2614822. kahn, matthew e. 2005. “the death toll from natural disasters: the role of income, geography and institutions.” the review of economics and statistics 87: 271–284. https://doi.org/ 10.1162/0034653053970339. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00313.x https://doi.org/‌10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.12.012 https://doi.org/‌10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.12.012 https://emerging-europe.com/voices/russias-covid-19-humanitarian-aid-comes-at-a-price/ https://emerging-europe.com/voices/russias-covid-19-humanitarian-aid-comes-at-a-price/ https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11020053 https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11020053 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343301038006006 https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-of-ghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-of-ghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html https://doi.org/10.2307/2614822 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 24 kevlihan, rob, karl derouen jr., and glen biglaiser. 2014. “is us humanitarian aid based primarily on need or self-interest?” international studies quarterly 58: 839-854. https://doi.org/10.1162/0034653053970339. kiseleva, yulia. 2015. “russia’s soft power discourse: identity, status and the attraction of power.” politics 35 (3-4): 316-329. https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/default/ files/kiseleva-2015-politics.pdf. kragelund, peter. 2008. “the return of non-dac donors to africa: new prospects for african development.” development policy review 26 (5): 555-584. leeds, brett, jeffrey m. ritter, sara mclaughlin mitchell, and andrew g. long. 2002. “alliance treaty obligations and provisions, 1815-1944.” international interactions 28: 237-260. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620213653. naím, moisès. 2007. “rogue aid.” foreign policy 159, march/april: 95-96. accessed november 28, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/15/rogue-aid/. nel, philip, and marjolein righarts. 2008. “natural disasters and the risk of violent civil conflict.” international studies quarterly 52 (1): 159-185. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14682478.2007.00495.x. neumayer, eric. 2005. “do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?” journal of conflict resolution 49 (6): 925-953 https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0022002705281. olsen, gorm r., nils carstensen, and kristian hoyen. 2003. “humanitarian crises: what determines the level of emergency assistance? media coverage, donor interests and the aid business.” disasters 27 (2): 109-126. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00223. paulmann, jonannes. 2016. “the dilemmas of humanitarian aid: historical perspectives.” in dilemmas of humanitarian aid in the twentieth century, edited by jonannes paulmann, 131. oxford: oxford university press. peceny, mark, and christopher k. butler. 2004. “the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes.” international politics 41: 565-581. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800093. rai, kul b. 1980. “foreign aid and voting in the un general assembly, 1967-1976.” journal of peace research 17 (3): 269-277. https://www.jstor.org/stable/424322. rakhmangulov, mark. 2010. “establishing international development assistance strategy in russia.” international organizations research journal 5 (31): 5067. http://www.ecsocman.edu.ru/data/2011/05/06/1268030701/9.pdf. raschky, paul a. and manijeh schwindt. 2012. “on the channel and type of aid: the case of international disaster assistance.” european journal of political economy 28 (1): 119-131. https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/default/files/kiseleva-2015-politics.pdf https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/default/files/kiseleva-2015-politics.pdf https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/15/rogue-aid/ https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00495.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00495.x https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705281 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705281 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00223 https://www.jstor.org/stable/424322 http://www.ecsocman.edu.ru/data/2011/05/06/1268030701/9.pdf 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 25 ritchie, hannah, edouard mathieu, lucas rodés-guirao, cameron appel, charlie giattino, esteban ortiz-ospina, joe hasell, bobbie macdonald, diana beltekian, and max roser. 2020. “coronavirus pandemic (covid-19)”. our world in data. accessed june 30, 2021. https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus. rosato, sabastian. 2003. “the flawed logic of democratic peace theory.” american political science review 97 (4): 585–602. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3593025. rowlands, dane. 2008. “emerging donors in international development: a synthesis report.” international development research centre. https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/ bitstream/handle/10625/57509/idl-57509.pdf?sequence=2&isallowed=y. president of the russian federation. 2014. kontseptsiia gosudarsvennoi politiki rossiiskoi federatsii v sfere sodeistviia mezhdunarodnomy razvitiiu. [concept of the russian federation’s state policy in the area of international development assistance], approved by decree no, 259 of the president of the russian federation of april 20, 2014. accessed june 21, 2021. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents//asset_publisher/cptickb6bz29/content/id/64542. rozzelle, josie. 2022. “whose suffering counts? a discussion looking at crisis coverage beyond ukraine.” the new humanitarian, april 8, 2022. accessed november 21, 2022. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/04/08/event-crisis-coverage-beyondukraine. sipri (stockholm international peace research institute). 2022. “arms transfers database.” https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. stronski, paul. 2021. “russia’s response its spiraling covid-19 crisis is too little, too late.” carnegie endowment for international peace. october 28, 2021. accessed november 21, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/28/russia-s-response-to-its-spiraling-covid19-crisis-is-too-little-too-late-pub-85677. trudolyubov, maxim. 2020. “thrifty with covid-19 relief, putin pursues other goals.” wilson center, may 1, 2020. accessed november 21, 2022. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blogpost/thrifty-covid-19-relief-putin-pursues-other-goals. united nations. 2018. “the 2030 agenda and the sustainable development goals: an opportunity for latin america and the caribbean,” santiago. https://repositorio.cepal.org/ bitstream/handle/11362/40156/25/s1801140_en.pdf. united nations affairs. 2022. “un general assembly votes to suspend russia from human rights council.” april 7, 2022. accessed november 21, 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782. united nations general assembly. 1991. un general assembly resolution a/res/46/182, strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the united https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/57509/idl-57509.pdf?sequence=2&isallowed=y https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/57509/idl-57509.pdf?sequence=2&isallowed=y https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/cptickb6bz29/content/id/64542 https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/cptickb6bz29/content/id/64542 https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/04/08/event-crisis-coverage-beyond-ukraine https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/04/08/event-crisis-coverage-beyond-ukraine https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/28/russia-s-response-to-its-spiraling-covid-19-crisis-is-too-little-too-late-pub-85677 https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/28/russia-s-response-to-its-spiraling-covid-19-crisis-is-too-little-too-late-pub-85677 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/thrifty-covid-19-relief-putin-pursues-other-goals https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/thrifty-covid-19-relief-putin-pursues-other-goals https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/40156/25/s1801140_en.pdf https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/40156/25/s1801140_en.pdf https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 26 nations. december 19, 1991. https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/582/70/img/nr058270.pdf?openelement. ———. 2014. un general assembly resolution a/res/68/262, territorial integrity of ukraine. march 27, 2014. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n13/455/17/pdf/ n1345517.pdf?openelement. ———. 2019. un general assembly resolution a/res/74/17, problem of the militarization of the autonomous republic of crimea and the city of sevastopol, ukraine, as well as parts of the black sea and the sea of azov. accessed november 21, 2022.https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3838477?ln=en, ———. 2022. un general assembly resolution a/es-11/l.1, march 1, 2022. https://documentsdds-ny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/293/36/pdf/n2229336.pdf?openelement. united nations office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs. 2021. statement by the under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator mark lowcock to the security council on the implementation of sc resolution 2532. january 25, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/statement-under-secretary-general-humanitarianaffairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator. united nations population division. 2019. “world population prospects: 2019 revision.” https://population.un.org/wpp/. united nations statistics division. 2020. “un comtrade. international merchandise trade statistics.” accessed november 21, 2022. http://comtrade.un.org/. van der veen, a. maurits. 2011. ideas, interests and foreign aid. cambridge: cambridge university press. velikaya, anna a. 2018. “the russian approach to public diplomacy and humanitarian cooperation.” public diplomacy of rising and regional powers 3 (3): 39-61. https://risingpowersproject.com/files/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/vol3.3-velikaya.pdf. walker, christopher. 2016. “the hijacking of ‘soft power.’” journal of democracy 27 (1): 4963. weeks, jessica. 2014. dictators at war and peace. ithaca: cornell university press. white, abraham, and leo holtz. 2022. “figure of the week: african countries’ votes on the un resolution condemning russia’s invasion of ukraine.” the brookings institution, march 9, 2022. accessed november 21, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-infocus/2022/03/09/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolutioncondemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/. world bank. 2019. “world development indicators database.” https://databank.worldbank.org/ source/world-development-indicators. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/582/70/img/nr058270.pdf?openelement https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/582/70/img/nr058270.pdf?openelement https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n13/455/17/pdf/n1345517.pdf?openelement https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n13/455/17/pdf/n1345517.pdf?openelement https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3838477?ln=en https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/293/36/pdf/n2229336.pdf?openelement https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/293/36/pdf/n2229336.pdf?openelement https://population.un.org/wpp/ http://comtrade.un.org/ https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/03/09/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/03/09/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/03/09/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 27 world health organization. 2020. “un and partners release record humanitarian response plan as covid-19 wreaks havoc.” december 1, 2020. accessed november 21, 2022. https://worldhealthorganization.cmail19.com/t/viewemail/d/0ff9a0b2affb5d912540e f23f30feded/7979a0f208459ae6419c69e1cebe89f9. zykov, kirill. 2020. “russia sends coronavirus aid to 46 countries – analysis.” the moscow times, august 19, 2020. accessed november 21, 2022. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 2020/08/19/russia-sends-coronavirus-aid-to-46-countries-analysis-a71201 https://worldhealthorganization.cmail19.com/t/viewemail/d/0ff9a0b2affb5d912540ef23f30feded/7979a0f208459ae6419c69e1cebe89f9 https://worldhealthorganization.cmail19.com/t/viewemail/d/0ff9a0b2affb5d912540ef23f30feded/7979a0f208459ae6419c69e1cebe89f9 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/08/19/russia-sends-coronavirus-aid-to-46-countries-analysis-a71201 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/08/19/russia-sends-coronavirus-aid-to-46-countries-analysis-a71201 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16(1) 2023: 1-28 issn 2562-8429 28 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 nato and the csdp after the ukraine war: the end of european strategic autonomy? luca ratti, università roma tre abstract the paper debates the impact of russia’s invasion of ukraine on the relationship between the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and the european union’s common security and defence policy (csdp). it argues that the invasion has dramatically changed europe’s security landscape, carrying major implications for both organizations and their relationship. after nato’s withdrawal from afghanistan in 2021 and persisting frictions between the us and its european allies about burden-sharing, the war instilled a new sense of purpose into the alliance, placing renewed emphasis on its core functions of territorial defence and deterrence. however, the war was also a reality check for the eu, raising important questions about the future of the european security architecture, the union’s role within it, and its relationship with nato (hereafter also referred to as the alliance). the aim of this article is to try to answer some of these questions by providing an assessment of the impact of the war on the relationship between nato and csdp and to discuss potential avenues for strengthening the eu’s role in transatlantic security. more specifically, the paper will try to answer the following questions: what are the implications of the conflict on nato and csdp? how did the war impact the eu’s aspiration to strategic autonomy? will the conflict trigger more effective burdensharing within the alliance as the us prepares for deepening systemic competition with china, or will it be another missed opportunity to strengthen the eu’s role in transatlantic security? 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 introduction russia’s invasion of ukraine has shocked the foundations of europe’s post-cold war security architecture, ushering in a critical junction for european and transatlantic security. after the 2008 economic crisis, frictions about burden-sharing between the us and its european allies had cast a sense of fatigue over the transatlantic partnership, fuelling american threats of disengagement from europe as well as european fears of de-coupling and calls for strategic autonomy from the us. however, the outbreak of the largest and most brutal war on the european continent since 1945 made it evident that european countries remain heavily dependent on the us both in terms of political leadership and military capabilities. nevertheless, the war also highlighted the need for an expanded eu role in security and defence and intensified cooperation between nato and csdp. in future years, closer coordination between the alliance and the eu will be particularly needed, as the revamped american commitment to europe is unlikely to usher in a structural “pivot in reverse” of us strategic priorities (haroche and brugier 2023, 6). rather, increasing us concerns about china’s assertiveness will require europeans to carry a bigger share of the burden of transatlantic security. while in the aftermath of the invasion, both organizations updated their key guiding strategic documents, in january 2023, nato’s secretary general jens stoltenberg, the president of the european council charles michel, and the president of the european commission ursula von der leyen signed a joint declaration on nato-european union cooperation, promising to bring their partnership to the ‘next level’ (council of the eu 2023). this document was the fourth joint declaration signed by the two organizations after the 2002 eu-nato declaration (nato 2002), the 2016 joint declaration on eu-nato cooperation (council of the eu 2016), and the 2018 joint declaration on eu-nato cooperation (council of the eu 2018). while condemning russia’s invasion of ukraine and restating a common determination to act together against a wide array of security threats, the declaration confirmed nato’s premier role for euro-atlantic security, firmly enshrining the prospect of closer european security cooperation within the boundaries of the alliance. to a degree, it also cast aside calls for european strategic autonomy. nonetheless, the paper argues that, in the current systemic context, european leaders should grab onto the momentum created by the war to further institutional integration in security and defence. in the face of the ongoing conflict in europe as well as deepening systemic tensions between the us and china, the risks implied in inaction were summed up in 2021 by the eu’s high representative for foreign and security policy, josep borrell, who remarked that the eu could no longer afford to be an herbivore in a power struggle between carnivores (borrell 2021, 292). rather, the paper argues that in the current systemic context, europeans need to make a quantum leap towards achieving a degree of supranational centralization of the decision-making process in order to endow the eu to play a larger role in european and transatlantic security. it is from these assumptions that the paper proceeds as follows. the first section discusses the impact of the war on nato. the second section debates the implications of the war on the csdp. in the third section, the paper assesses the impact of the conflict on the relationship between the two organizations, arguing that the war confirmed nato’s premier role for european and transatlantic security and the csdp’s inability to act effectively without support from the alliance. lastly, it sketches out potential future scenarios for the relationship between the two organizations, concluding that eu members need to take stock of the current situation to further advance integration in security and defence. the impact of russia’s invasion of ukraine on nato a revamped transatlantic alliance the beginning of russia’s ‘special military operation’ in ukraine at the end of february 2022 ushered in a critical junction for european and transatlantic security. for the first time since the yugoslav wars of the 1990s, prolonged and high-intensity warfare returned to european soil. although ukraine was neither a nato nor an eu member when the invasion began and is unlikely to secure 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 membership in any of these institutions anytime soon, russia’s invasion shook the foundations of the euro-atlantic security architecture that was established at the cold war’s end and gradually consolidated between the end of the 1990s and early 2000s. this architecture was based on the alliance’s premier role for european and transatlantic security as a provider of both collective defence and as a crisis management tool but also on the development of european capabilities for the conduct of peacekeeping and crisis management operations (the so-called petersberg tasks). this architecture also relied on the search for a durable accommodation between the euro-atlantic institutions and moscow. while relations with russia had already begun to deteriorate during the late 1990s and early 2000s and never fully recovered after the russian-georgian war in 2008 (ratti 2013), the annexation of crimea in 2014 and full-blown invasion of ukraine in 2022 have caused significant harm to the prospect of a durable arrangement between the west and russia. with the war in its second year, the european security architecture has now been radically transformed with immediate consequences for both nato and the eu as well as their relationship with the russian federation. more specifically, the war has produced three main consequences for the alliance and the eu. first, rekindling a security discourse based on deterrence and territorial defence, rather than crisis management and cooperative security, it triggered a reinvigoration of the us role on the continent and strengthened transatlantic cohesion. the war brought about a tactical reorientation of the us priorities towards europe, leading, for the first time since the end of the cold war, to a significant enhancement of nato’s forward presence on the eastern flank. it also gave a fundamental impulse towards allied unity, acting as a catalyst for transatlantic unity and firmness. the us used intelligence, diplomatic, defence, deterrence, and economic assets to respond to the invasion, reassuring its european allies and consulting extensively with them to support ukraine and provide a coordinated response. the biden administration’s policy thus restored a strong sense of unity between the two sides of the atlantic. both the 2022 us national security strategy (nss) and national defense strategy (nds) stressed the importance of working closely with the nato allies (department of defense 2022; white house 2022). the us lead allowed the allies to signal unity and showcase their ability for joint action (simón 2022). second, the war has been a reality check for the eu and for the ambition of some european leaders to achieve strategic autonomy from the us. in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, due to deepening frictions within the alliance about burden-sharing, and even more so during the troubled years of the trump presidency, some european decision-makers began calling for the eu to acquire strategic autonomy from the us and nato. burden-sharing disputes are as old as the alliance itself and are certainly not a novelty (pothier and vershbow 2017). they reflect a long-standing view in washington that there is a dysfunctional disproportion in the contribution made by member states to the alliance’s management and operations. in the aftermath of nato’s intervention in libya in march 2011, in his last official speech as secretary of defence, former cia director robert gates brandished nato as a two-tiered alliance and warned europeans that future us leaders “may not consider the return on america’s investment in nato worth the cost” (joyner 2011). similar views were also expressed by his successor leon panetta on his first trip to nato’s headquarters as secretary of defence (michel 2013, 257). in 2016, then-us president barack obama openly criticized washington’s european allies, accusing them of acting like “free riders” (goldberg 2016). under the presidency of donald trump, these disputes intensified further and received widespread publicity. more specifically, the president openly adopted a critical position towards nato, calling the alliance obsolete and claiming that europeans owe “vast sums” of money to the united states (morin 2017). the severity of trump’s position and his administration’s concerns about the systemic threat posed by china deepened fears that the us might abandon its contractual obligations to europe’s defence. in response to trump’s vociferous and repeated criticism of the european allies, french president emmanuel macron championed the notion of european ‘strategic autonomy’ as one of the key objectives of the eu foreign and security policy. in a speech at the sorbonne in september 2017, the french president called on the eu to develop an autonomous capacity for action (macron 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 2017), while in august 2018, he publicly remarked that europe “cannot entrust its security to the united states alone,” urging the eu to develop autonomous capabilities (macron 2018). in a famous 2019 interview with the economist, macron scornfully described nato as “braindead” (the economist 2019). the french president also embarked on a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening cooperation among eu members and pursuing the eu’s strategic autonomy. in 2019, macron and germany’s then-chancellor angela merkel signed the aachen treaty, promising to deepen bilateral cooperation and extend it to their european partners. their initiative mirrored the 1963 franco-german treaty, which charles de gaulle and konrad adenauer had signed at the height of a prolonged period of transatlantic frictions with the us —which stretched from the anglo-french debacle at suez to the cuban missile crisis—to assert a degree of european autonomy in the bipolar structure of the cold war. at the same time, both borrell and his predecessor federica mogherini in the post of high representative for the eu’s foreign and security policy called for the eu to acquire the institutional capacity to independently plan and conduct military operations across the full spectrum of conflict—including high-intensity military operations, such as expeditionary warfare and territorial defence missions—and to autonomously develop and produce the related defence capabilities with minimal or no assistance from the us (howorth 2017; meijer and brooks 2021). russia’s invasion of ukraine, revamping conventional high-intensity warfare and raising the prospect of a tactical nuclear strike in europe, downplayed these ambitions. whereas during the trump administration, calls for european strategic autonomy had fuelled fears of a transatlantic drift, the debate on us detachment from europe and the tussle for relevancy between nato and the eu in defending the continent has been considerably softened (maze-sencier 2022). third, although restoring a strong sense of purpose among the allies, the war also highlighted the need for an expanded european contribution to transatlantic security. the national security strategy approved by the biden administration in october 2022 makes a specific distinction between the “immediate” but localized threat of russia and the “systemic” and “global” challenge posed by china (white house 2022). in february 2023, the us congress established a new committee on the pressing threat of the chinese communist party to us national security. although the alliance was expressly designed to address threats to the euro-atlantic area, in recent years, it expanded its focus to the indopacific region, inviting the leaders of japan, south korea, australia, and new zealand to participate in its 2022 madrid and 2023 vilnius summits. the new strategic concept (nsc) adopted in 2022, while focusing on the consequences of russia’s invasion, names china as one of nato’s priorities, stating that beijing’s ambitions challenge the west’s “interests, security and values” (nato 2022a, 5). strategic competition between china and the us is poised to deepen further in future years, requiring eu members to assume greater responsibility for the security and defence of the continent and show a willingness to act collectively to address complex and substantial challenges. deterrence and defence of the eastern flank the more direct consequence of russia’s invasion has been a robust reinforcement in the alliance’s posture on the eastern flank. whereas after the end of the cold war, nato had refrained from deploying considerable military forces on the territory of its new members since the russiangeorgian war in 2008 over the status of south ossetia and abkhazia and russia’s annexation of crimea in 2014, nato had begun to carry out small deployments of forces in frontline states – the so-called “tripwire” model to deter moscow (ratti and leonardi 2019). these token deployments occurred in the context of the european reassurance/deterrence initiative, which the alliance launched in 2014 with the aim of reassuring its east european members. however, russia’s invasion of ukraine made this approach no longer sufficient, leading nato to significantly strengthen its posture and increase the number of forces on its eastern flank (bond and scazzieri 2022). washington and its european allies committed significant resources, agreeing on unprecedented steps to reinforce deterrence, establishing four additional multinational battlegroups in bulgaria, hungary, romania, and slovakia. this measure effectively doubled the number of battlegroups deployed on the alliance’s eastern flank. 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 nato’s strengthened posture on the eastern flank was also reflected in the evolution of the alliance’s official strategy. almost half a year into the conflict, the madrid summit of the alliance in june 2022 approved a new strategic concept. while the nato-russia founding act of 1997—though effectively torn to pieces—was not formally revoked at the summit (pszczel 2022), the new strategic concept describes russia as the most significant threat to allied security. in the nsc, the allies affirmed their commitment to “defend every inch of allied territory” (nato 2022a, 6), agreeing to strengthen nato’s “deterrence and defence posture to deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression” (nato 2022a, 6). they also agreed to “deter and defend forward with robust in-place, multi-domain, combat-ready forces” and to increase their operational readiness, including by pre-positioning ammunition and equipment, reaching an agreement to expand the number of troops in nato’s rapid response force from 40,000 to 300,000 (nato 2022b). although the details of this reinforced posture still need to be fully worked out, this enlarged force is supposed to have a higher level of readiness than the current response force (bond and scazzieri 2022). some allies have already agreed to commit more troops. the us will set up a permanent army corps headquarters in poland and send more troops to romania and the baltic states. canada, the uk, and germany have committed to strengthening their existing deployments in the baltic states, while italy and france will increase their forces in the balkans. the allies also agreed to upgrade the strength of the forces deployed on the eastern flank from battalions to brigades. these joint commitments will lead to a major increase in nato’s enhanced forward presence (efp) in future years. currently, nato’s supreme allied commander in europe (saceur) has operational command authority over some 42,000 combat troops, 60 plus warships and hundreds of combat aircraft now in eastern europe as part of nato’s new posture of forward defence (fd). the new nato force model is planned to be completed by the end of 2023 and envisions a mainly european force of some 300,000 troops maintained at high alert, with roughly 100,000 troops to be deployable within ten days (nato 2022b). for the first time, all rapid reaction forces under nato command will be committed to playing both a deterrence and defence role. all such forces will be consolidated within one command framework. whilst the new force will be held at 24 hours “notice to act,” the bulk of the nato force structure will be held at 15 days “notice to move.” this would be a marked improvement over previous arrangements in which some forces were held at 180 days’ “notice to move” (lindley-french 2022). new defence investments at their madrid summit, the allies agreed to ensure a substantial and persistent presence on land, at sea and in the air, including through strengthened integrated air and missile defence, while committing to increased defence spending and investing in major equipment through the creation of a new nato innovation fund. as of 2022, there have been eight consecutive years of increased defence spending, with the european allies’ and canada’s cumulative investment of almost 350 billion us dollars (usd) since 2014 (nato 2022a). nonetheless, the availability of troops at high readiness will require concrete pledges of national contributions (pszczel 2022). the european members of the alliance now need to quickly implement their pledges and plan for the scenario of protracted high-intensity conflict in europe. thus far, russian leaders have had no incentive to test the credibility of nato’s article 5. the alliance’s response has offered a sufficient degree of dissuasion. nato has balanced incremental support to ukraine with a reluctance to risk open conflict with russia, implementing a form of deterrence by denial rather than punishment and devising a new beefed-up forward defence strategy. substantial and persistent military presence, backed by the prepositioning of equipment and strategic pre-assigning of combat forces, has now become part of the new nato force model (pszczel 2022). furthermore, nato has opened its doors to two additional members—sweden and finland—which, as a result of the war, formalized their application for membership. while in april 2023, finland became nato’s 31st member, sweden’s application awaits ratification from turkey and hungary. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russia-and-nato-how-did-we-get-here-and-how-should-we-respond 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 once finalized, their membership will bolster security on the alliance’s northern flank, allowing nato to establish a robust deterrence-by-denial posture in the scandinavian and baltic regions (alberque and schreer 2022). both countries can make a significant contribution to burden-sharing and enhance nato’s ability to modernize its defence planning and capability development. in the nsc, the allies have also made no ambiguity on the continued role played by nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of their security, stressing that “the strategic nuclear forces of the alliance, particularly those of the united states, are the supreme guarantee of the security” of its members (nato 2022a, 8). nonetheless, they will also need to invest significant sums to increase their conventional forces, particularly military deployments and pre-positioned stocks on nato’s eastern flank, and to improve their readiness and ability to operate together. these measures might be particularly needed also in the context of the crisis of the global and european arms control regimes following the collapse of the intermediate nuclear forces in europe treaty (inf) and russia’s announcements in 2023 of its withdrawal from the new strategic arms reduction treaty and the conventional forces in europe treaty (cfe). in order to put flesh on the bones of these plans, nato has recently launched two initiatives to foster defence investment and innovation: the nato innovation fund (worth 1 billion euros) to invest in start-ups and technology, and the defence innovation accelerator for the north atlantic (diana), which is designed to harness emerging and disruptive technologies by bringing together civilian and defence experts. finally, the nsc has acknowledged the need to strengthen the alliance’s 360-degree approach to security (nato 2022a, 8). this is particularly important to ensure that the strengthened posture along nato’s eastern flank will not undermine security in other parts of the euro-atlantic region. the nsc did not overlook nato’s southern neighbourhood, particularly the middle east, north africa, and the sahel, emphasizing the ongoing interconnectedness between nato’s eastern and southern flanks (nato 2022a, 3-4). the impact of russia’s invasion of ukraine on the csdp the csdp before russia’s invasion russia’s invasion of ukraine has led to a reinvigoration of nato, confirming the alliance’s role as the primary framework for collective military planning in europe. however, what are the implications of the conflict on the eu and the csdp? technically, the eu has had a common foreign and security policy since the establishment of the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) with the treaty of maastricht in 1992. during the 1990s, european military cooperation was conducted mostly through the western european union (weu). however, at the 1998 st. malo summit, the uk and france called for the development of an eu “capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces…in order to respond to international crises” (uk parliament 1998). the anglo-french initiative paved the way for the creation of the european security and defence policy (esdp) at the cologne european council meeting in 1999. in 2001, the signing of the treaty of nice transferred the weu’s competencies in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and crisis management—the revised petersberg tasks—to the european union. the eu’s acquisition of these competencies was followed by the publication of the first eu security strategy in 2003, which called for the eu to be more active in the pursuit of its strategic interests (council of the eu 2009). nonetheless, in the following years, most eu members continued to rely on the alliance for concrete military protection and to regard the esdp mostly as an enhancement of nato. as a result, its capabilities remained limited and never exceeded the range of the petersberg tasks. furthermore, in 2002, the berlin plus set of agreements between the eu and nato left the esdp heavily dependent on the alliance for key strategic assets and resources, such as intelligence, planning, and logistic facilities. this dependence proved to be a major obstacle to the development of a capacity for autonomous military action. berlin plus made use of nato’s assets subject to a right of refusal by the alliance and conditional upon the consensus of all nato members, including turkey, thus 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 constraining the eu’s ability to act as an autonomous crisis manager (howorth 2017). the signing of the treaty of lisbon in 2007 and, more specifically, the provisions enshrined in the new article 42(7) further expanded the eu’s security competencies, transferring the common defence clause of article v of the weu to the european union. the shift from article v of the weu to article 42(7) of the treaty of lisbon marked the formal establishment of the common security and defence policy (csdp), leading to the weu’s effective termination in 2011. nonetheless, in the following years, despite including the word “defence” in its title, the csdp did not live up to the promise of its name, remaining more of a foreign policy and crisis management tool than a defence policy (simón 2022). furthermore, eu member states remained reluctant to pursue institutional integration, preferring to establish bilateral and mini-lateral arrangements, such as the 2010 anglo-french lancaster house agreement, the nordic defence cooperation, and the visegrad battlegroup, rather than endeavouring to take steps towards supranational centralization. the sluggishness of the institutional process tampered with the eu’s ambitions and also impacted relations between the csdp and the alliance. the eu-nato declarations of 2016 and 2018 acknowledged that european security and defence instruments were inadequate to address the new security challenges and set out to create greater synergies, setting into motion unprecedented cooperative dynamics between the two organizations (schuette 2022). in 2016, however, the result of the brexit referendum and the election of donald trump raised the prospect of a transatlantic drift and triggered a plethora of new proposals to spur eu defence, rekindling hopes that the eu would be able to claim a larger role and take steps, such as the creation of military headquarters (biscop 2016; tocci 2017). in 2016, eu’s global strategy called for the eu to develop “strategic autonomy” (eeas 2016), while in 2017, permanent structured cooperation (pesco) was activated among 25 eu members, with only denmark, the uk, and malta declining participation at the time. while the narrative of strategic autonomy fuelled us fears of functional overlap with the alliance, it also proved a largely rhetorical and amorphous concept, exposing a dangerous gap between rhetoric and delivery. this debate failed to promote a dramatic u-turn in european defence or usher in an effective empowerment of european institutions, confirming the eu’s persisting dependence on the us and nato. furthermore, uk’s withdrawal in 2020 deprived the eu of its member with the largest military budget and one of only two members possessing “full-spectrum” military capabilities— including a nuclear deterrent—as well as removing the automatic security guarantee, which the uk government had provided since the 1948 brussels treaty. in 2018, french president emmanuel macron first proposed the creation of a european intervention initiative (eii) as a forum for preserving cooperation between the eu and the uk after brexit, while in 2022, the french president launched the project for a european political community (epc) as a platform for political coordination across the entire european continent and as a forum for engaging countries, such as the uk itself, that do not have formal frameworks for dialogue with the eu. nonetheless, both the eii and the epc have no resources, staff, or budget of their own. as such, they might function as additional forums for political dialogue but are unlikely to turn into catalysts for increased european security cooperation. the csdp’s response to russia’s invasion despite csdp’s weaknesses, like nato, the european union responded swiftly and decisively to russia’s invasion, helping coordinate the initiatives of member states. however, the csdp was never conceived to face the prospect of high-intensity warfare on european soil but rather as a crisis response or management tool. as a result, the eu’s initiatives have been mostly confined to the realm of economic and financial measures. more specifically, the eu imposed eleven sanction packages on russia and adopted a wide array of measures to support ukraine, sanctioning hundreds of individuals as well as russia’s central bank, its aviation, finance, energy, media, transport, and technology sectors. the eu also banned imports of russian coal and oil and plans to do the same with gas by 2027. more significantly, in an unprecedented step, through the newly created european peace 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 facility (epf), the eu also gave kyiv substantial military support to help finance the transfer of weapons from member states to ukraine. as a reaction to the war, member states also took measures to develop the eu's defence technological and industrial base (edtib). in july 2022, the commission presented the european defence industrial reinforcement procurement act (edirpa), aimed at supporting procurement cooperation among members. in march 2023, the european council agreed on a three-track approach calling members to jointly procure ammunition and, if requested, missiles to refill their stocks while enabling the continuation of support to ukraine. in this context, the defence joint procurement task force—made up of the european commission, the european external action service, and the european defence agency—coordinated the most urgent and critical needs of eu member states and produced a mapping of the supply capacities of the european defence industry to meet the identified demand. in may, the commission adopted the act in support of ammunition production (asap) with the aim of ramping up the eu's production capacity and addressing the current shortage of ammunition and missiles as well as their components. the eu also granted candidate status to ukraine and moldova, despite the skepticism of many of its member states (biscop 2023a). nonetheless, the eu’s reaction to the war continued to highlight the absence of centralization in eu security and defence policy. initiatives were taken by member states informally rather than through the use of existing treaties. rather, treaty mechanisms for differentiated cooperation among members, such as the execution of a task by a group of member states and enhanced cooperation, were not activated. consequently, member states were rarely subject to eu central guidance, while in the first months of the war, there was no centre at the eu level to coordinate increases in defence spending and bilateral provision of military aid to ukraine (amadio viceré 2022). this caused friction between ukraine and some member states. in february 2023, for example, italy’s prime minister georgia meloni openly criticized france’s president emmanuel macron’s invitation to ukraine’s president volodymyr zelensky to meet in paris with him and germany’s chancellor olaf scholz ahead of the eu summit in brussels. furthermore, although russian armed forces’ performance in ukraine showed that earlier assessments of russian military capabilities might have been largely exaggerated and looking ahead, the conventional threat from russia seems less daunting than previously thought (dalsjö, jonsson, and norberg 2022), the war also made it clear that without nato’s involvement, the csdp cannot counter hard security threats. rather, the lack of centralized strategic guidance and a shortage of military capabilities have made it clear that nato remains more essential than ever to preserve european security. already in 2016, the joint eu-nato declaration adopted at the end of the alliance’s warsaw summit had reaffirmed that collective defence is mainly nato’s responsibility and that there will be no european duplication of the alliance’s command structures, thus confirming a willingness on both sides not to allow heated rhetorical debates to drive a wedge between the two organizations (schuette 2022). the current conflict in ukraine has revitalized the commitment of nato’s members to invest economically and militarily within the alliance. it has also prompted two new eu member states, finland and sweden, to seek nato membership. the reality is that nato, and the protection and assets it provides through its association with the us, continues to be the most attractive option for most european states. for instance, in the event of an attack on finland or sweden before their formal admission into the alliance, under the current csdp framework, there would have been little that the eu could do without nato’s involvement and support (lowings 2022). as a result of the war, calls for a truly autonomous eu military policy have become a moot point in the present security environment, while the debate on strategic autonomy has become partly redundant (lowings 2022). rather, the war has quenched this debate, making it clear that, through its extended deterrence and unique capabilities, nato remains the indisputable bedrock of european security. nonetheless, the war also highlighted once more the risk of european overreliance on american strength. more specifically, russia’s campaign confirmed that the european union neither has the institutional capacity to independently plan and conduct military operations across the full spectrum of conflict— 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 including high-intensity military operations, such as expeditionary warfare and territorial defence missions—nor to autonomously develop and produce the related defences capabilities with minimal or no assistance from the united states. it is, therefore, likely that in future years, the prospect of closer european security cooperation will remain firmly anchored within the boundaries of transatlantic solidarity. rather, uncertainty about the duration of the war has revitalized the notion of a european pillar within the alliance to be embedded in nodal defence, in increasing european defence budgets, and in contributions to missions (ringsmose and webber 2020). at the same time, however, the military threat from russia and strategic concerns about china from the us have highlighted the urgency to deepen institutional cooperation within the eu. while most european initiatives have been confined to the non-military realm, europeans have had little choice but to take on a larger share of the burden of their own defence. since russia’s invasion in february 2022, eu countries have announced an extra 200 billion euros (eur) in defence spending. for the first time, the bloc also funded the delivery of weapons and military support to the tune of eur 2.5 billion under the newly created european peace facility. eu countries were quick to tear down old taboos: germany decided to spend more on defence, providing military assistance to a country at war; most notably, german chancellor olaf scholz pledged that germany would finally meet its nato commitment to spend 2 percent of its gdp on defence, establishing a eur 100 billion ad-hoc fund to help reach that target. as a result, in 2022, germany’s military budget became the seventh largest in the world, with further increases planned. germany also established an extra-budgetary fund to increase its armed forces’ military capabilities. defence spending in western and central europe has now surpassed that of the last year of the cold war (sipri 2023). denmark reversed its 30-year optout from the csdp, while sweden and finland applied for nato membership. finland’s accession in april 2023 brought an additional eu member into the alliance, strengthening nato’s european pillar and serving as an additional bridge-builder between nato and the eu. once sweden’s accession process is complete, 23 members of the eu will be members of the alliance, while only four eu members—malta, cyprus, ireland, and austria—will formally retain a neutral status, further easing coordination between the two organizations. the eu’s strategic compass, which was approved by the european council in march 2022, leaves no doubt about european dependence on nato and, specifically, us defence capabilities. rhetorically at least, the eu’s strategic compass sets a high level of ambition for the eu’s security and defence role. however, it also makes it clear that “nato…remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. the transatlantic relationship and eu-nato co-operation...are key to our overall security” (council of the eu 2022, 15). the eu will not take on a major role in the defence of european territory – at least not in the short term. the compass sets out plans for the eu to improve its ability to carry out medium-sized military operations by building a flexible force of 5,000 that could be deployed in a range of circumstances entitled the “rapid deployment capacity” (rdc). however, these numbers mark a significant reduction in the eu’s level of ambition. in 1999, the eu committed to deploying 60,000 troops at short notice, but in the following years, it never came close to achieving this target. the compass acknowledges that nato is the pre-eminent organization when it comes to collective defence and explains how a stronger eu is complementary to nato, thus making european strategic autonomy consistent with the strengthening of the transatlantic link. while the rdc would be a significant upgrade to the eu’s two existing battlegroups (both of which are only 1,500 strong and have never been used), being able to deploy a force of 5,000 will take years, as member states will need to acquire the military capabilities for which they currently depend on the us, including a full-scale command structure, intelligence, reconnaissance, air-to-air refuelling, and strategic airlift (bond and scazzieri 2022). these shortages were made patently clear with nato’s operation against libya in 2011, which highlighted europe’s difficulties in sustaining a relatively small military operation over an extended period of time. there are also some additional issues. on the surface, the war seems to have wiped out strategic undercurrents among eu members. however, some nuances have not been transcended. hence, some 82 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 eu members may be unwilling to assign troops to the rdc, or the hq needed to command it, given competing demands from nato structures. east european members, for example, have been traditionally lukewarm about assigning forces to the eu, fearing a weakening of the alliance. furthermore, even if the rdc became fully operational, all member states—especially those providing it with essential assets—would have to agree before it could actually be deployed (bond and scazzieri 2022). members who want to use military force might continue to find it more practical to do so through nato if there is consensus in the alliance or in ad-hoc coalitions. in order to turn the eu into a more effective agency, member states will require a willingness to pursue forms of supranational integration in security and defence but current dynamics and post-cold war history indicate that this is highly unlikely to happen. as long as unanimity formally remains the rule in eu foreign and security policy, the eu’s contribution to european security is, therefore, bound to remain ephemeral and inherently vulnerable to the contingent preferences of member states (amadio viceré 2022). the impact of russia’s invasion on nato-eu cooperation nato-eu cooperation before the war how will cooperation between nato and the eu adapt and respond to the new scenario and challenges created by the war? the formal establishment of the eu-nato partnership dates back to the late 1990s and early 2000s. after the appointment of former nato secretary general javier solana to the post of high representative for the cfsp at the 1999 cologne european council summit, it was formalized with the signing of the berlin plus arrangements in december 2002. in the same month, a nato-eu declaration welcomed the strategic partnership established between the eu and nato but also reaffirmed that the alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members (nato 2002). these arrangements allowed the eu to borrow nato’s facilities and structures to carry out crisis management operations, as was the case with the eu operation concordia in north macedonia and althea in bosnia-herzegovina. more specifically, the eu’s bosnian deployment has made extensive recourse to nato’s assets and resources and has been headquartered in the supreme headquarters allied powers europe (shape). strategic cooperation intensified in the following years, particularly after france’s reintegration into nato’s military command in 2009. the eu and nato attempted to coordinate their efforts and conducted operations in the same country or region, first in the balkans and later in afghanistan, iraq, the mediterranean, the red sea, and off the horn of africa. the two joint declarations in 2016 and 2018 set the agenda for additional cooperation, expanding it to such fields as cyber and hybrid threats, defence capabilities, countering terrorism, and military mobility. in 2016, the eu and nato set up the european centre of excellence for countering hybrid threats in helsinki, held common exercises on responding to cyber threats, worked together in fighting disinformation, and intensified dialogue and contacts between officials and leaders. additionally, each organization’s leaders began to attend the other’s ministerial-level meetings (bond and scazzieri 2022). in recent years, eu initiatives on defence have tended to complement nato and draw on the particular strengths of the eu with the aim of strengthening the alliance’s european pillar. eu-nato cooperation after the war russia’s invasion of ukraine further strengthened the need for closer coordination between the eu and nato. while in the aftermath of the invasion, both organizations updated their key guiding strategic documents; in january 2023, nato’s secretary general jens stoltenberg, the president of the european council charles michel, and the president of the european commission ursula von der leyen signed the fourth joint declaration on nato-european union cooperation. the declaration highlighted “the value of a stronger and more capable european defence that contributes positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to, and interoperable with, nato” (council of the eu 2023). 83 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 by undermining the prospect of strategic autonomy in favour of european efforts within nato itself, the war reinvigorated the notion of nato’s “european pillar” but also strengthened the need for closer cooperation between the alliance and the csdp. nonetheless, there are still many question marks and grey areas. first, the csdp continues to experience important shortcomings due to incomplete institutional reforms and severe capabilities shortfalls (bergmann and mueller 2021; meijer and brooks 2021). in total, since 2014, the united states has provided more than usd 39.7 billion in security assistance for training and equipment to help ukraine (department of state 2023). in january 2023, the biden administration agreed to supply ukraine with a limited number of us battle tanks, and in may, it endorsed plans to train ukrainian pilots on us-made f-16 fighter jets. however, while in august, the us approved sending f-16 fighter jets to ukraine from denmark and the netherlands, the prospect of sending war planes to kyiv remains a contentious issue for many eu member states, which fear that the sending of potentially offensive weapons could escalate hostilities. second, despite an apparent show of unity in the aftermath of the invasion, the csdp continues to be hampered by varying threat perceptions and strategic priorities (meijer and brooks 2021). some european nations have clearly signalled their lack of appetite for a wider confrontation with moscow or to risk an escalation. after failing to dissuade putin in the run-up to the invasion, france and germany slowly stepped up their support to ukraine. nonetheless, their attitude was long perceived as more cautious than those of other eu members, such as poland, the czech republic, slovakia, romania, and the three baltic states. although german bilateral support to ukraine since the beginning of the invasion has amounted to eur 17 billion, making it the largest donor of military aid after the us, in early 2023, germany hesitated before providing ukraine with leopard 2 tanks or even allowing other european nations in possession of german military equipment to transfer it to ukraine. furthermore, although in may 2023, the german government promised to double its commitment, the issue remains politically contentious in germany. eu member states have also shown a different determination to reduce energy dependency on russia. only after months of wrangling and protracted negotiations in december 2022, eu members agreed on a full ban on russian seaborne crude oil imports and a price cap for russian gas. however, whereas poland and the baltic states have called for lowering the price of oil, croatia and bulgaria were granted temporary derogations, and germany, the netherlands, france, and austria have argued that any overly aggressive market cap would destabilize global energy markets and called for conditions such as an automatic suspension of the cap in certain circumstances. these dynamics highlight the difficulties in coordinating policies among member states in the lack of centralized decision-making. in order to become truly effective, a european pillar within the alliance should provide both more military capabilities and a coordinated policy. third, the fragmentation of the european armaments market remains a problem. european nations are still working on developing two different next-generation fighter aircraft programs: the francogerman-spanish future combat air system (fcas) and the british-italian-swedish tempest. while there are political and technical obstacles to merging the two, doing so would allow greater economies of scale (taylor and antinozzi 2022). european industrial cooperation is barely advancing despite increased military budgets. the european defence industry remains fragmented along national lines, except for the aviation and missile sectors, while each country continues to prefer to buy from its own firms. more integration between european military forces would also lead to greater efficiencies. for example, the belgian and dutch navies have integrated training, logistic, and maintenance arrangements, allowing them to make substantial savings and, at the same time, keep military capabilities that they could not afford to maintain individually (bond and scazzieri 2022). finally, china represents another potentially divisive challenge for the future of transatlantic unity and european security cooperation. asian partners attended nato’s 2022 madrid summit and have been invited to attend the alliance’s 2023 summit in vilnius, while europeans hardened their views on china in the last few years. however, unlike in the us, china is still perceived by many eu members as a potential economic partner rather than a strategic or military threat. although there is 84 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 increasingly greater alignment between european and us positions, a further deterioration in relations between washington and beijing could raise questions as to how far the us-european allies will be willing to sign on to additional initiatives containing china (gramer and iyengar 2022). in april 2023, french president macron’s statement about europe’s need to avoid being sucked into a hypothetical us war with china caused unease within the alliance but also highlighted the need to forge a clearer and more detailed common european approach on china (biscop 2023b). although china is currently unable to invade taiwan in the short term, many observers believe that it will be capable of doing so as early as 2027 (haroche and brugier 2023). what is the way forward for nato and the csdp in the current systemic context? first, there are areas where the eu could contribute more efficiently to european security. more specifically, the eu has a crucial role to play in enabling defence investment and encouraging member states to cooperate more in defence research, development, and procurement. the eu’s eur 8 billion european defence fund (edf) finances both defence research (including disruptive technology) and the development of new capabilities. while european collaborative spending in 2021 accounted for 18 percent of total defence equipment procurement, bolstering european capabilities will also require other initiatives: additional adjustments to the eu’s fiscal rules to encourage member states to invest more in defence and incentives in the edf and in pesco to promote joint procurement and deeper cooperation between military forces. second, the eu should be more ambitious: it should coordinate increased defence spending, support efforts to strengthen european military capabilities and push countries to cooperate more in developing and procuring military capabilities as well as joint maintenance and logistics. these steps would help achieve efficiency gains and support the scientific, technical, and industrial capabilities that europe needs for its security. some pesco projects, such as the ones focusing on military mobility, help military forces better prepare for conflict by making it easier for them to move around in a crisis. this would be crucial, for example, to allow faster reinforcement to the baltic states, which are currently poorly connected to other allies by land (bond and scazzieri 2022). in november 2022, the united kingdom joined the military mobility program led by the netherlands, which the us, canada, and norway joined in 2021 and which has been a flagship of nato-eu cooperation. although the 2021 integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy identified china as the foremost threat to the uk’s long-term security interests (uk cabinet office 2021), russia’s invasion of ukraine reinforced the logic that the uk should concentrate its strength on bolstering the deterrent power of nato within the euro-atlantic area (magill and rees 2022). third, in the following years, the eu and nato should continue to coordinate and find a division of labour that avoids the risks of duplication. nato and the eu will both have roles to play. unlike the alliance, the eu is neither equipped to dissuade or deter russia nor face the prospect of an escalation or expansion of the conflict. close coordination and permanent dialogue between the eu and nato should also support efforts in defence spending. it will be particularly important to make sure that levels of troop commitment and readiness are not mutually detrimental while avoiding waste and duplication, which hamper economic growth and fuel higher inflation in europe. this coordination will be particularly important also to guarantee the security of other regions where the us might be less willing to counter threats or deploy forces, such as the balkans, the mediterranean, and north africa. endeavours to deepen military and technical cooperation represent an additional challenge for both nato and the eu. european forces have limited stocks and are lacking in important capabilities, such as air and missile defence, modern tanks, artillery, and intelligence. since russia’s invasion, the number of us troops in europe has increased by approximately 20,000, bringing the total number to over 100,000, and it is set to grow further. however, europeans cannot expect washington to continue to shoulder the lion’s share of their defence willingly. even before donald trump’s presidency, us complaints about unfair burden-sharing were growing more frequent. washington’s increased focus and posture on the asia-pacific region does not mean that it will stop underwriting european security, but resource constraints mean that the us contribution to europe’s 85 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 conventional and nuclear defence might not be taken for granted in future years (bond and scazzieri 2022). the potential redistribution of us efforts among theatres might leave europe in a vulnerable position. rather than taking us support for granted (haroche and brugier 2023), europeans should acknowledge that the us attitude might be considerably affected both by dynamics in east asia and the outcome of the 2024 presidential elections. hence, europe should not only continue to invest in capabilities but also make a quantum leap beyond the instruments in place and towards centralized forms of decision-making. conclusion this paper has discussed the impact of russia’s invasion of ukraine on nato and the csdp. it has argued that the war has reinvigorated nato and cast aside calls for european strategic autonomy, emphasizing the eu’s ongoing reliance on the us as a security supplier. the war has made it evident that when it comes to deterrence and defence, nato is clearly the indispensable organization for european security. it is through nato’s military structures that most european states organize their collective defence and allied armed forces get used to operating together effectively. while the eu is gradually stepping out of its previous role as a crisis manager, its contribution to euro-atlantic security continues to be hampered, however, by a number of shortcomings. all the evidence suggests, therefore, that future steps towards allowing the csdp to make a credible and more effective contribution to european security will be primarily channelled through nato. nonetheless, as strategic competition between the us and china deepens, eu members cannot take it for granted that washington will continue to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of transatlantic security. rather, the us will likely call upon its european allies to do more. america’s long-term strategic priorities lie in the indo-pacific, and the outcome of the us presidential election in november 2024 may well impact the us role in the alliance. it is in the very interest of the eu itself to learn the right lessons and make the necessary changes. even though both the alliance’s new strategic concept and the eu’s strategic compass emphasize the importance of strengthening the eu-nato partnership, the crisis in ukraine has not only shown the need to strengthen european capabilities but also the dangers of overreliance on the united states. rather than taking strong us support for granted, in order to be able to address current and future security challenges, eu members should strengthen their contribution to the alliance but also endeavour to rekindle and deepen integration. while the european priority should remain to keep the us engaged in european security, in future years, the eu should direct its efforts towards achieving a degree of centralization in security and defence decision-making. this is an essential precondition if the eu wants to be able to define its own collective interests and objectives and acquire sufficient instruments to make an effective contribution to european and transatlantic security. 86 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 references alberque, william, and benjamin schreer. 2022. “what kind of nato allies will finland and sweden be?” survival, 64 (6): 123-136. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150430. amadio viceré, maria giulia. 2022. “eu foreign policy integration at times of war: from shortterm responses to long-term solutions.” istituto affari internazionali. https://www.iai.it/ sites/default/files/iaicom2263.pdf. bergmann, julian, and patrick müller. 2021. “failing forward in the eu's common security and defense policy: the integration of eu crisis management.” journal of european public policy 28 (10): 1669-1687. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1954064. biscop, sven. 2016. “all or nothing? the eu global strategy and defence policy after the brexit.” contemporary security policy 37(3): 431-445. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13523260.2016.1238120. ———. 2023a. "from buffer to frontier: ukraine and the eu.” egmont policy brief. february 2023. https://www.egmontinstitute.be/app/uploads/2023/02/svenbiscop_policy_brief_298.pdf?type=pdf. ———. 2023b. “eu-china: we have to talk about (not macron but) strategy.” egmont policy brief. april 2023. accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.egmontinstitute.be/eu-china-wehave-to-talk-about-not-macron-but-strategy/. bond, ian, and luigi scazzieri. 2022. “the eu, nato and european security in a time of war.” centre for european reform. https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/ pbrief_ib_ls_nato_5aug22.pdf. borrell fontelles, josep. 2021. staying on course in troubled waters. eu foreign policy in 2021. brussels: publication office of the european union. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/ default/files/documents/of0921510enn_002%20%281%29.pdf. council of the european union, general secretariat of the council. 2009. european security strategy: a secure europe in a better world. publications office. accessed august 5, 2023. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2860/1402. _____. 2016. “joint declaration on eu-nato cooperation by the president of the european council the president of the european commission, and the secretary general of nato.” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf. ———. 2018. “joint declaration on eu-nato cooperation by the president of the european council donald tusk, president of the european commission jean-claude juncker, and secretary general of nato jens stoltenberg.” accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/press/press-releases/2018/07/10/eu-nato-jointdeclaration/. ———. 2022. a strategic compass for security and defence. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/ sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2150430 https://www.egmontinstitute.be/eu-china-we-have-to-talk-about-not-macron-but-strategy/ https://www.egmontinstitute.be/eu-china-we-have-to-talk-about-not-macron-but-strategy/ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/of0921510enn_002%20%281%29.pdf https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/of0921510enn_002%20%281%29.pdf https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf 87 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2023. "joint declaration on eu-nato cooperation.” accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-jointdeclaration-10-january-2023/. dalsjö, robert, michael jonsson, and johan norberg. 2022. “a brutal examination: russian military capability in light of the ukraine war.” survival 64 (3): 7-28. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044. european external action service (eeas). 2016. shared vision, common action: a stronger europe. a global strategy for the european union’s foreign and security policy. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf. gramer, robbie, and rishi iyengar. 2022. “europe’s great catch-up on china.” foreign policy, december 20, 2022. accessed february 23, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2022/12/20/europes-great-catch-up-on-china/. goldberg, jeffrey. 2016. “the obama doctrine.” the atlantic, april 2016. accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/. haroche, pierre, and camille brugier. 2023. “2027: the year of european strategic autonomy.”’, groupe d’etudes geopolitiques. working paper – april 2023. https://geopolitique.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2023/04/note-de-travail-10-avril-en-1.pdf. howorth, joylon, 2017. “strategic autonomy and eu-nato cooperation: squaring the circle.” egmont institute. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06626. joyner, james. 2011. “gates: nato a two-tiered alliance with a dim, dismal future.” new atlanticist, june 10, 2011. accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ blogs/new-atlanticist/gates-nato-a-twotiered-alliance-with-a-dim-dismal-future/. lindley-french, julian. 2023. “europe’s military priorities in 2023: time for hard choices?” aspenia online, january 4, 2023. accessed august 5, 2023. https://aspeniaonline.it/europesmilitary-priorities-in-2023-time-for-hard-choices/. lowings, ben. 2022. “strengthening eu defence and foreign policy: a 2022 assessment.” brussels international center. https://www.bic-rhr.com/sites/default/files/inline-files/ bic%20september%202022%20policy%20brief%20%20eu%2c%20ben%20lowings.pdf. macron, emmanuel, 2017. “initiative pour l'europe discours d'emmanuel macron pour une europe souveraine, unie, démocratique” [initiative for europe: emmanuel macron's speech for a sovereign, united and democratic europe]. élysée – présidence de la république. accessed august 3, 2023. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europediscours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique. ———. 2018. “speech by president emmanuel macron – 2018 ambassadors’ conference.” ministère de l’europe et des affaires étrangères. accessed august 3, 2023. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/news/ambassadorsweek/ambassadors-week-edition-2018/article/speech-by-president-emmanuel-macronambassadors-conference-2018. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-january-2023/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-january-2023/ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/news/ambassadors-week/ambassadors-week-edition-2018/article/speech-by-president-emmanuel-macron-ambassadors-conference-2018 https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/news/ambassadors-week/ambassadors-week-edition-2018/article/speech-by-president-emmanuel-macron-ambassadors-conference-2018 https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/news/ambassadors-week/ambassadors-week-edition-2018/article/speech-by-president-emmanuel-macron-ambassadors-conference-2018 88 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2019. “emmanuel macron warns europe: nato is becoming brain-dead.” the economist, november 7, 2019. accessed august 3, 2023. https://www.economist.com/ europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead. magill, peter, and wyn rees. 2022. “uk defence policy after ukraine: revisiting the integrated review.” survival 64 (3): 87-102. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078048. maze-sencier, philippe. 2022. “has european strategic autonomy crashed over ukraine.” institut montaigne, july 13, 2022. accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.institutmontaigne.org/ en/expressions/has-european-strategic-autonomy-crashed-over-ukraine. meijer, hugo, and stephen g. brooks. 2021. “illusions of autonomy: why europe cannot provide for its security if the united states pulls back.” international security 45 (4): 7-43. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00405. michel, leo. 2013. “nato and the united states: working with the eu to strengthen euro-atlantic security.” in the routledge handbook of european security, edited by sven biscop and richard whitman, 255-269. new york: routledge. morin, rebecca, 2017. “trump in tweet: germany owes us ‘vast sums of money’ for nato.” politico, march 18, 2017. accessed august 3, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-intweet-germany-owes-us-vast-sums-of-money-for-nato/. north atlantic treaty organization (nato). 2002. “eu-nato declaration on esdp.” accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm. ———. 2022a. nato 2022 strategic concept. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/ pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf. ______. 2022b. new nato force model. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/ 6/pdf/220629-infographic-new-nato-force-model.pdf. pothier, fabrice, and alexander vershbow. 2017. “nato and trump. the case for a new transatlantic bargain.” atlantic council, brent scowcroft center for international security. https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/nato _and_trump_web_0623.pdf. pszczel, robert. 2022. “the consequences of russia’s invasion of ukraine for international security – nato and beyond.” nato review, july 7, 2022. accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/07/07/the-consequences-of-russias-invasionof-ukraine-for-international-security-nato-and-beyond/index.html. ratti, luca. 2013. “nato-russia relations after 9/11: new challenges, old issues.” in nato beyond 9/11: the transformation of the atlantic alliance, edited by ellen hallams, luca ratti, and benjamin zyla, 258-277. new york: palgrave macmillan. ratti, luca, and alessandro leonardi. 2019. “reviving flexible response: an assessment of nato’s russian strategy on the alliance’s 70th anniversary.” the journal of slavic military studies 32 (2): 135-158. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2019.1618580. ringsmose, jens, and mark webber. 2020. “hedging their bets? the case for a european pillar in nato.” defence studies 20 (4): 295-317. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2020.1823835. https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/has-european-strategic-autonomy-crashed-over-ukraine https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/has-european-strategic-autonomy-crashed-over-ukraine https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-in-tweet-germany-owes-us-vast-sums-of-money-for-nato/ https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-in-tweet-germany-owes-us-vast-sums-of-money-for-nato/ https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2020.1823835 89 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 schuette, leonard a. 2022. “shaping institutional overlap: nato’s responses to eu security and defence initiatives since 2014.” the british journal of politics and international relations. https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481221079188. simón, luis. 2022. “european strategic autonomy and defence after ukraine.” real istituto elcano, november 28, 2022. accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/ analyses/european-strategic-autonomy-and-defence-after-ukraine/. stockholm international peace research institute (sipri). 2023. “world military expenditure reaches new record high as european spending surges.” april 24, 2023. accessed may 20, 2023. https://www.sipri.org/news/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-higheuropean-spending-surges-0. taylor, trevor, and isabella antinozzi. 2022. “the tempest programme: assessing advances and risks across multiple fronts.” royal united services institute for defence and security studies (rusi). https://static.rusi.org/op_356_tempest_programme_final_web1.pdf. tocci, nathalie. 2017. “from the european security strategy to the eu global strategy: explaining the journey.” international politics 54: 487-502. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0045-9. united kingdom cabinet office. 2021. “global britain in a competitive age, the integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy.” accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-theintegrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy. united kingdom parliament. 1998. “joint franco-british st. malo declaration.” accessed august 5, 2023. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmdfence/39/39w17.htm. united states department of defense. 2022. “national defense strategy”. accessed august 5, 2023. https://www.defense.gov/national-defense-strategy/. united states department of state. 2023. “u.s. security cooperation with ukraine.” may 9, 2023. accessed may 16, 2023. https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/. the white house. national security strategy. 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/10/biden-harris-administrations-national-security-strategy10.2022.pdf. https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/‌analyses/european-strategic-autonomy-and-defence-after-ukraine/ https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/‌analyses/european-strategic-autonomy-and-defence-after-ukraine/ https://www.sipri.org/news/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges-0 https://www.sipri.org/news/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges-0 90 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 73-89 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 139 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 139-145 issn 2562-8429 misreading russia or misreading putin? commentary on leigh sarty’s article joan debardeleben, carleton university leigh sarty’s thesis that the west and western scholars have repeatedly misread russia might seem to be supported by the fact that ‘russia experts’ did not foresee and, in fact, were most commonly surprised by russia’s attack on ukraine in february 2022. we did not correctly read the warning signals of russia’s 2008 actions in georgia and the russian annexation of crimea in 2014. the fact that we did not anticipate russia’s 2022 actions suggests, however, that we misread putin, not russia. and perhaps also that we ‘read’ ukraine better than putin did, expecting that ukrainians, based on their history, would not bow down in defeat and, therefore, russia would not launch a doomed attack. if we misread putin, it was probably because we overestimated his rationality and savvy. we did not expect him to embark on what would turn out to be a counterproductive action that would create a self-fulfilling prophecy—namely, the further expansion of nato on russia’s northern flank and a reinforced determination on the part of ukrainians to ‘join the west,’ meaning both nato and the european union (eu), all of this potentially reducing russia’s perception of its own security. if we misread putin, whether we ‘misread russia’ is another question. equating putin’s action with russia is a perilous road to follow because russia’s political and social reality, beneath the apparently controlled surface, is as multifaceted and varied as its geography. just read larry black’s (2024) piece in this issue on the variety of viewpoints and methods being used to oppose putin, even under highly repressive conditions. because social scientists generally did not predict or foresee russia’s actions in 2022 also does not mean that those actions were predetermined or that they defy a nuanced explanation that takes into account a range of factors. there is already a large literature trying to explain russia’s invasion of ukraine, and many of these explanations are quite plausible without appealing to historical determinism. many analysts consider contingent factors or point to previous critical junctures when a particular path was taken rather than other possible ones. contingent factors include those relating to putin’s state of mind at the time he made the decision, as sarty acknowledges. this was influenced by his relative isolation during the pandemic, unreliable information received from his closed circle of advisers, and his mistaken assessment of western (and ukrainian) weakness and division. in terms of putin’s faulty assessment of the west, even such contingent factors as the timing of merkel’s withdrawal from the german leadership position may have played a role, along with russia’s misunderstanding of the basis of the transatlantic relationship. other explanations draw on the particularities of the relationship that developed between ukraine and russia in recent decades (gomza 2022), marked by a cycle of events and critical junctions that led to one of several 140 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 139-145 issn 2562-8429 possible outcomes. here, the recent book by popova and shevel (2024) is particularly insightful, where the authors explicitly consider counterfactuals that could have led to different outcomes. finally, another set of explanations draws on the domestic political situation in russia itself (mcfaul 2020). in this instance, one could point to the tightening grip of putin’s control in russia, the success with which the regime used the crimean annexation to bolster regime legitimacy, and the failure of the regime to embrace a process of economic reform that could assure prosperity in peace. this combination created a domestic situation where a further appeal to russian nationalism and russia’s right to hegemonic control in its neighbourhood might have seemed like an attractive option to putin for securing the elite’s continuing dominance. this latter explanation suggests that what is at stake is not russia’s security but the security of the elite’s power. in view of the variety of possible explanations, sarty’s self-acknowledged determinism is somewhat puzzling because he at once critiques the “politics of inevitability” (sarty 2024, 129) that he sees in the deluded optimism about russia underlying the ‘post-cold war consensus’ in the west while himself endorsing a more pessimistic determinism. while i agree that the optimism in the west that prevailed in the late 1980s and early 1990s was exaggerated, it is equally misguided to conclude that the descent of russia into authoritarianism and expansionism under vladimir putin was inevitable. in arguing that western actions and assumptions “underappreciated our own role in influencing the perceptions and choice of the leadership in the kremlin” (sarty 2024, 125). sarty himself implies that the outcome was not pre-determined had we, in the west, but exerted a different type of influence. furthermore, what is the point of ‘reading russia’ more correctly if everything is already determined? as a social scientist, i balk at the idea that outcomes are predetermined as much as i resist the notion that they can be reliably predicted. social scientists try to explain outcomes without claiming to be able to predict the future. the reason for this is simple: social science explanations are probabilistic, not deterministic. we most often conclude, based on our attempt to apply a ‘scientific’ method to the study of society and politics, that some kinds of outcomes are more likely than others, but we can never find the certainty of outcomes that is expected by the natural sciences. our inability to reliably predict outcomes is, in part, because what occurs is the result of the interaction of so many diverse factors; we could never know them all, take them all into account, or devise a ‘controlled experiment’ to test them. but our inability to reliably predict is also, and probably most importantly, because human will and human choice are important determinants of outcomes, even if, for any given individual, that choice is constrained by upbringing, genetics, the environment, and chance happenings. people make choices in complex situations, and these choices influence the choices and decisions of those who come after them. during critical historical junctures, those choices can have a pivotal influence on later circumstances, but even then, further decision points arise where various paths are possible. one can point to the importance of the orange revolution and the euromaidan as key critical junctures for ukraine, where the future trajectory was shaped by the choices of both thousands of individual protesters but also by a small group of leaders that responded to them. turning to russia, the peaceful collapse of soviet power, which represented a critical juncture, was a result of gorbachev’s decisions, which could have gone otherwise or have been different had another leader risen to power. that the peaceful collapse of the ussr was something unanticipated by many experts would suggest that russia is not on an inevitable path to dictatorship and aggression. the 141 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 139-145 issn 2562-8429 subsequent authoritarian turn under putin’s leadership was also not predetermined or inevitable. factors that affected it are multiple, including the failure of an effective opposition force in the late 1990s and early 2000s (gel’man 2005) to project itself as a viable alternative, yeltsin’s own personal weaknesses, which sarty correctly identifies as contributing to his political downfall, and yeltsin’s choice of putin as interim prime minister, which was hardly inevitable. the fact that gorbachev’s reform direction was reversed under putin does not mean it was inevitable. sarty is correct, however, to point out that a belief in its inevitable success was also incorrect. the failure was instead the product of underlying dynamics, contingent factors, and the choices of individual leaders, as well as citizens. one could add to this policies adopted by western actors, although it is contested whether the west ‘provoked’ russia through policies such as nato expansion (mearsheimer 2022) or was inadequately responsive to russia’s concerns. sarty suggests that russia is so unique that general theories or concepts that western scholars use to explain political outcomes elsewhere are of little use for understanding russia, and in trying to apply them, we end up “misreading russia.” he argues that “the explicit assumption was that russia’s ‘flaws’ did not render it unique, that it was on the track to develop like any other ‘middleincome capitalist democracies’ in accordance with the postulates of social science theory” (sarty 2024, 130). no doubt russia is unique, as is every country, and sarty is correct that prescriptions for success cannot be copied from one society to another. however, this does not mean that analyzing russia in a comparative context is useless or that russia is exempt from insights generated by the study of comparative politics. a major turn in political science studies of russia following the collapse of the ussr was precisely an effort to bring the study of russia into the field of comparative politics (chandler 1994), challenging the notion that russia is so distinctive that it is exempt from factors that might be influential in other contexts. we should remind ourselves that this effort to ‘bring russia in’ to the realm of political science analysis was viewed as particularly promising because we could, through the comparison of several post-communist countries, try to develop general insights about determinants of political outcomes of reform in countries that shared many commonalities in terms at least of recent historical experience (hanley 2011). several of these states, like russia, have seen efforts at liberal reform either stillborn or reversed. in this, russia is not unique. true, no other post-communist state has executed an attack of this scope on a neighbouring country (but bringing china into the universe of cases raises the possibility that that may happen). therefore, expanding the comparative sweep, russia is also not unique among nations in this characteristic either. the effort ‘to bring russia in’ to the study of comparative politics has not been in vain and has, in fact, produced very important insights. the types of questions that these studies have sought to answer include the following: why did some post-communist or post-authoritarian countries develop consolidated democracies while others did not? what impact did various economic reform strategies (e.g., shock therapy versus gradualism) have both on economic outcomes but also on political trajectories? what types of institutional features (e.g., electoral systems, parliamentary versus presidential systems) were more conducive to successful liberalization? what role have identity factors played in influencing the likelihood of liberalizing reforms or a reversion to authoritarianism? these are just a few examples of the types of questions that social scientists have explored using the universe of post-communist systems and sometimes the broader database of post-authoritarian systems. this work has, in fact, yielded important results and helps us to better understand the trajectory of russia’s development. fruitful examples of this type of work include 142 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 139-145 issn 2562-8429 the insights of henry hale explaining why colour revolutions occurred in some post-communist countries and not others, and lucan way (2015), who explains why authoritarian governments sometimes fail. some of the very factors that sarty himself mentions are mobilized in these explanatory frameworks to elucidate outcomes that differentiate post-communist systems from one another more generally, for example, “the preponderance of the state over society” (sarty 2024, 127). others include the degree of elite unity in times of leadership transition (hale 2005), the types of linkages that exist between economic and political power, and the impact of conditionality by the european union in acceding countries (vachudova 2009). the one feature that sarty attributes the most importance to, however, in explaining russia’s attack on ukraine, is “the ceaseless quest for security in conditions of relative backwardness,” and indeed the paramount impact of the “security imperative” (sarty 2024, 127). no doubt this is an important factor that drove russia’s 2022 war on ukraine, along with russia’s “status aspirations” (götz and staun 2022). but as constructivist theorists and the ‘ontological security’ school emphasize (akchurina and della sala 2018; mitzen 2006; moulioukova and kanet 2021), a state’s definition of security is constructed, not given and is closely tied to notions of identity. if sarty is correct that russian leaders are preoccupied with security, one should examine what russia’s current leaders mean by security. few would claim, and probably putin himself does not and did not believe that nato, ukraine, or the eu was going to attack russia; thus, there was no material threat to russia’s security. however, for russia’s current leaders, security is apparently understood to equate to russia’s hegemony in its neighbourhood. tom casier calls this idea “no great russia without greater russia” (casier 2023), while götz and staun (2022, 491) point to the russian leadership view that a few great powers “are entitled to have their own spheres of influence, whereas the sovereignty of smaller states in negotiable.” on this point, western leaders and many scholars have ‘read russia’ (or at least putin) quite correctly but are unprepared to accede to the implications of russia’s position. most western leaders have chosen to challenge this position, in other words, to reject the notion that large states have a right to hegemony over weaker and smaller neighbouring states. thus, the problem may not be ‘misreading russia’ but rather contesting russia’s reading of itself. history and political culture, of course, matter, but this does not mean that other nations need to accept the narrative about history and culture put forth by authoritarian leaders. in accepting that narrative, western actors would, in fact, reinforce whatever inevitability sarty may see in russia’s actions. on the contrary, in supporting those russians who choose to endorse other more liberal and less aggressive identity narratives, western voices are affirming russia’s possibility of choice. i stand on that side of the debate. both as a social scientist and as a human being, i stand with alexander gabuev’s (2023) view that the russian state’s path is the result of choices, primarily of russia’s elites. that said, the war in ukraine is a critical juncture for russia, with path dependency in the direction of continued authoritarianism, although this also is not inevitable or predetermined. certainly, sarty is correct that we should strive to ‘read russia’ better if that means trying to understand the depth and breadth of that complex society and polity. we should also recognize that current choices are constrained and influenced by history and culture. however, they are choices, and our task as social scientists is to understand what influences them. that requires a deeper knowledge of russia, including its language, society, culture, history, and politics. nevertheless, this should not be done in isolation, with an assumption that russia is totally unique and, therefore, 143 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 139-145 issn 2562-8429 exempt from social and political dynamics that affect other societies and polities, and we should not bow to the temptation of determinism, which can lead to fatalism and complacency. 144 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 139-145 issn 2562-8429 references akchurina, viktoria, and vincent della sala. 2018. “russia, europe and the ontological security dilemma: narrating the emerging eurasian space.” europe-asia studies 70 (10): 1638–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1546829. black, joseph laurence. 2024. “falsehood in wartime: hiding truths and spreading untruths in russia during the first year of putin’s war in ukraine.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 17(1). casier, tom. 2023. “no great russia without greater russia: the kremlin’s thinking behind the invasion of ukraine.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 16 (2):14–29. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i2.4148. chandler, andrea. 1994. “the interaction of post-sovietology and comparative politics: seizing the moment.” communist and post-communist studies 27(1): 3–17. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45301883. gabuev, alexander. 2023. “the russia that might have been: how moscow squandered its power and influence.” foreign affairs, march 13, 2023. accessed july 6, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-might-have-been. gel’man, vladimir. 2005. “political opposition in russia: a dying species.” post-soviet affairs 21 (3): 226–246. https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.21.3.226. gomza, ivan. 2022. “the war in ukraine: putin's inevitable invasion.” journal of democracy 33, 3 (july): 23–30. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0036. . götz, elias, and jørgen staun. 2022. “why russia attacked ukraine: strategic culture and radicalized narratives.” contemporary security policy 43 (3): 482–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633. hale, henry e. 2005. “regime cycles: democracy, autocracy, and revolution in post-soviet eurasia.” world politics 58 (1): 133–165. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2006.0019. hanley, seán. 2011. “reconfiguring post-communist comparisons.” europe-asia studies 63 (2): 1489–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2011.601120. mankoff, jeffrey. 2022. “russia’s war in ukraine: identity, history, and conflict.” center for strategic and international studies (csis). accessed july 8, 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep40567. mcfaul michael. 2020. “putin, putinism, and the domestic determinants of russian foreign policy.” international security 45 (2): 95–139. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00390. mearsheimer, john j. 2022. “the causes and consequences of the ukraine war.” horizons (summer): 12–27. https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/causes-and-consequencesukraine-war. mitzen, jennifer. 2006. “ontological security in world politics: state identity and the security dilemma.” european journal of international relations 12 (3): 341– 370. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067346. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45301883 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-might-have-been?mc_cid=7f4b59f73b&mc_eid=14f1517ee6 https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0036 https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633 https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2006.0019 https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00390 https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/causes-and-consequences-ukraine-war https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/causes-and-consequences-ukraine-war 145 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 139-145 issn 2562-8429 moulioukova, dina, and roger e. kanet. 2021. “ontological security: a framework for the analysis of russia’s view of the world.” global affairs 7 (5): 831–853. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2021.2000173. popova, maria, and oxana shevel. 2024. russia and ukraine: entangled histories, diverging states. hoboken, nj: polity. sakwa, richard. 2023. the lost peace: how the west failed to prevent a second cold war. new haven: yale university press. sarty, leigh. 2024. “misreading russia.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 17(1):124-138. shokoohi, saeed. 2023. “putin’s misperceptions and the russian invasion of ukraine in 2022.” central eurasia studies 15 (2): 265–288. vachudova, milada. 2009. “democratization in post-communist europe: illiberal regimes and the leverage of the european union.” in democracy and authoritarianism in the postcommunist world, edited by valerie bunce, michael mcfaul, and kathryn stoner-weiss, 82–106. cambridge: cambridge university press. way, lucan. 2016. pluralism by default: weak autocrats and the rise of competitive politics. baltimore: johns hopkins university press. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2021.2000173 146 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 139-145 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 1-3 issn 2562-8429 introduction james casteel, carleton university joan debardeleben, carleton university special issue editors in honour of the fiftieth anniversary of the institute of european, russian, and eurasian studies (eurus) at carleton university in ottawa, canada, the canadian journal of european and russian studies is producing a special journal issue featuring research articles authored or coauthored by present and past faculty members and research associates of the institute. the articles in this issue, all of which are peer-reviewed1 and open access publications as per journal policy, span a range of disciplines, topics, and approaches reflecting the diversity of research interests that faculty and students cover in the institute. the first two articles address topics of contemporary interest in european studies and canada-eu relations. achim hurrelmann’s contribution “brexit: a critical juncture in canada-europe relations?” examines how brexit has affected canada’s relations with both the united kingdom (uk) and the european union (eu) in three dimensions: economics, political differentiation, and populist mobilization. drawing on the concept of critical junctures from the theoretical toolbox of historical institutionalism, hurrelmann concludes that while other outcomes were possible, brexit produced only limited and incremental change (in economics and in terms of populist mobilization) or no meaningful change (in terms of political differentiation) in canada’s relations with its european partners (the uk and the eu). his article delves into explanations for this relative continuity. turning to a different aspect of canada-eu relations, crina viju-milusevic and agnieszka weinar’s article “gender in the eu-canada comprehensive economic trade agreement: thirdgeneration trade agreements as a gateway to policy coordination?” examines the degree to which the canada-europe comprehensive trade agreement (ceta), signed in 2016, broke new ground by introducing new expectations and structures to encourage gender policy coordination between the eu and canada. building on previous research, the authors argue that as a new breed of ‘third generation’ trade agreements, ceta goes beyond traditional expectations and aspires to promote gender mainstreaming, gender equality, and the promotion of female entrepreneurs. the 1 due to the nature of the contributions, the peer review process for the articles and commentaries in the “viewpoints” section were not double-blinded. https://carleton.ca/eurus/ 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 1-3 issn 2562-8429 authors conclude that despite high ambitions, the results to date have been somewhat limited, with the most marked, but still inadequate, progress achieved in data collection and data infrastructure. the remaining three research articles in the special issue deal with developments in russia and the post-soviet space. in their contribution, jeff sahadeo and paul gosselin provide an innovative historical study of how the mtkvari (kura) river shaped urban life in tiflis (present-day tbilisi) in the late russian empire. drawing on a wide range of primary source materials, the authors highlight the symbolic, practical, and sociological significance of the river for the city. the mtkvari river emerges not only as an important symbol of an emerging georgian national identity within the russian empire but also as an actor in its own right that often thwarted efforts of the city’s inhabitants to control it. their contribution paints a vivid picture of the interaction of nature, economy, and society in this multiethnic city on the periphery of empire, capturing aspects of daily life that would later be radically transformed under soviet rule through demographic engineering and urban restructuring. turning to our contemporary moment, the next two research articles by joan debardeleben and larry black examine in different ways the reverberations of political and military tensions between ukraine and russia since 2014 that led to the current russo-ukrainian war. joan debardeleben’s essay “a respite from geopolitical tension? russian media depictions of cross-border cooperation with the eu 2014-2021” shifts the focus to russia’s northern periphery, examining how intensifying geopolitical tension between the eu and russia in the period after russia’s annexation of crimea in 2014 affected the depiction of cross-border cooperation (cbc) programs between russia and the eu. based on an analysis of russian media coverage of cbc, the author concludes that less severe geopolitical tension may stand side-by-side with continuing cooperation at the local level, allowing russian media to promote an image of ‘normality’ in eu-russian relations. however, extraordinary geopolitical ruptures, such as russia’s full-scale invasion of ukraine in 2022, led to the suspension of even these lower-level linkages. the final research article by larry black, “the kremlin’s responses to anti-war voices in russia: setting the tone in the first year of war,” examines putin regime’s narrative about russia’s war against ukraine as well as efforts by critics within russia to counter it. the article elucidates the power of disinformation, bolstered by historical references and emotional appeals, and efforts by the state to employ nationalism to mobilize youth in support of the war. however, black also points to the strength and determination of those engaged in opposition to the war who utilize a range of tools, including blogs, artworks, rallies, and instances of individual defiance in the face of an oppressive political system. the issue concludes with a “viewpoints” section, intended to spark debate and critical reflection. the article “misreading russia” by leigh sarty, a seasoned foreign policy expert, provides an interpretive analysis of the authoritarian path that russia has taken under vladimir putin that led to russia’s current war against ukraine and what he views as the failure of some western countries to anticipate it. joan debardeleben provides a commentary in response to this article. regardless of what position the reader might take in this particular debate, we hope that this discussion, taken together with the other research articles, demonstrates the necessity of regional expertise for 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 1-3 issn 2562-8429 providing a complex understanding of issues in this region and their larger impact on canada and the world more generally. 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 the linguistic factor in the deterrence conversation between russia and the west: if and how russians understand the meaning of “deterrence?” liia vihmand-veebel, university of tartu viljar veebel, university of tartu abstract given russia's aggressive actions in ukraine and its hostile remarks toward its nato neighbours, the question of why the credible deterrence posture of the alliance is not producing the desired results is becoming increasingly important. either russian political leaders do not want to comply with the western credible deterrence posture, or they do not understand what is expected from them. linguistic factors (e.g., the ‘lost in translation’ effect) affect the effectiveness of the conversation on deterrence between russia and the west, including nato. the russian language does not have one unambiguous equivalent for the western term “deterrence.” there are several possible translations for deterrence in russian, including sderzhivaniye, ustrasheniye, sderzhivaniye putem ustrasheniya, sderzhivaniye prinuzhdeniyem, as well as others. these terms are not synonymous, with each having its own different meaning and some being used in russian military-political theory, where they refer to different concepts. the current study focuses on the most visible linguistic complications in the deterrence dialogue between russia and the west. based on the current study, it would often be more reasonable to talk to the russian political and military elite about containment or coercion, which are more common and have clear, specific meanings in russian. 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 introduction language, as a communication tool and specific sign system, is an essential component of all dialogues, including political and security-related ones. it does not only transfer information but also indicates the status and attitude of the speaker. in recent decades, there has been no fruitful dialogue between russia and nato countries on strategic stability and deterrence. parallel monologues are mostly performed for internal audiences and within the context of the actors' own interests. in russia, foreign concepts are often not understood or perceived by recipients in the way that one would expect. one of the factors that has a direct role in this is the linguistic factor, which can cause a ‘lost in translation’ effect instead of transparent communication. like any scientific discipline, the international relations field has its own terminology, which is known to those who have studied it. different countries and language groups have their own specific political and military concepts and corresponding terminology, which is expected to be understood by other countries and languages. using inappropriate or imprecise terminological equivalents can lead to difficulties in understanding the actual message, especially in conflict situations, resulting in a rejection of partnership or even an escalation of the conflict. back in the 1990s, when relations between the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and the russian federation were improving, and both parties were committed to productive dialogue, cooperation, and the establishment of lasting peace in the euro-atlantic region (sarott 2021), nato and russia signed the founding act on mutual relations, cooperation, and security in may 1997. it marked the beginning of a new relationship aimed at a partnership between the western institutions and russia, which established a framework for nato-russia consultation and cooperation. to dispel myths and improve the transparency of communication and mutual understanding, the nato-russia glossary of contemporary political and military terms was developed and published. this glossary covered the full range of terminology relevant to natorussia consultation and cooperation. in the glossary’s preface, then-nato secretary general lord robertson and the former russian federation minister of defense sergey ivanov expressed their hope that such a glossary would help to better understand each other’s intentions (nato 2001). in this context, the conversation on deterrence was and hopefully still is one of the key parts of contemporary russia-nato relations. at the same time, deterrence is a core element of nato’s strategy towards russia (nato 2022) and is, therefore, increasingly important for russian and nato military thought. however, russian understanding, translations, and definitions of deterrence differ from the western conceptualization of deterrence. next to the negative political sentiment in russia toward the deterrence concept, the linguistic factor makes the deterrence conversation even more complicated. on the one hand, this is because russian theorizing of deterrence is constantly evolving and is frequently lacking official codification. on the other hand, nato’s deterrence concept lacks an established, generally accepted, and unambiguous terminological equivalent in the russian language (adamsky 2018). in this aspect, after russia’s 2022 aggression against ukraine, the russian political and military elite has shown full rejection of the idea that russia would accept nato deterrence in any format in the future (medvedev 2022; putin 2022; the washington post 2022). given russia's aggressive actions in ukraine and toward its nato neighbours, the question of why the concept of credible deterrence is not yielding the expected results with russia is becoming increasingly important. either russian political leaders do not want to comply with the western 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 concept of deterrence, or they do not understand what is expected of them. the current study focuses on the most visible linguistic complications in the deterrence dialogue between russia and the west. to do this, it focuses on russian terminological equivalents of the term “deterrence,” the reasons why there is not one unambiguous equivalent term, how different terminological equivalents are used when discussing western and russian deterrence (as well as coercion and containment) concepts, and what impact can it have on the deterrence debate. the current study also considers which terminology would be more understandable (or even acceptable) for russian political and military leaders. nato’s conception of (credible) deterrence deterrence is a western military-political concept, which has been chosen to be a core element of nato's overall strategy in relation to global competitors and adversaries, including the russian federation. according to belobrov (2020), russian political leaders believe that despite the adjustments that have been made to the formulation of nato’s strategy throughout its existence and the dynamics of the relations with the ussr/russia, deterring russia remains a key element of nato’s strategy, being the fundamental principle for other strategic concepts and basic documents of the alliance (belobrov 2020). the idea of deterrence is the practice of discouraging or restraining someone—usually a nationstate in world politics—from engaging in undesirable aggressive behaviour, such as an armed attack. it refers to an attempt to halt or prevent an action, as opposed to the closely related but distinct concept of compellence, which refers to an attempt to compel an actor to do something (mazarr 2018). lawrence freedman offers a more challenging definition of deterrence as he defines it as “deliberate attempts to manipulate the behaviour of others through conditional threats” (freedman 2004, 6). according to the nato definition, deterrence is “the convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. this requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act” (nato 2020, 42). the united states department of defense defines deterrence as “the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits” (dod 2021, 63). comparing this with the british perspective, the encyclopedia britannica (2022a) defines deterrence as a “military strategy under which one power uses the threat of reprisal effectively to preclude an attack from an adversary power.” the concept of deterrence consists of both the functional message that possible aggression is not cost-effective and the reputational message that the implementing side considers itself to be in sufficient control and has the necessary capabilities to prevent aggression or escalation. the concept and definitions of deterrence first appeared at the start of the cold war when international actors began to construct and discuss nuclear deterrence. during the 1950s and 1960s, most of the work on the formulation of the deterrence concept was undertaken. the early concept of deterrence appeared during the time of complete us nuclear superiority. it was aimed at deterring hostile powers from challenging the us in large-scale conventional conflicts in europe. the focus and center of gravity of the conceptual development of deterrence changed once again in the early 1970s when the soviet union reached nuclear parity with the us; the concept of mutually assured destruction (mad) appeared, and both sides accepted the impossibility of nuclear war. 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 it was natural to assume that two equivalent, lethal, multi-megaton arsenals would result in a “balance of terror,” resulting in an uncomfortable but potentially long-lasting peace. deterrence was assumed to work through the threat of severe punishment because of the nuclear association. that approach is known as “deterrence by punishment” (freedman 2021, 5). however, the first two waves of deterrence theory made confident pronouncements about what would and would not deter an aggressor without any clear foundation (mazarr 2018). later, as the concept evolved, deterrence was rearticulated in another approach—deterrence by denial. in its simplest form, denial is “the immediate balance of forces in the contested territory” (snyder 1959, 6). however, despite including a credible threat, denial further implies flexibility and control to “deny an opponent strategic options” (freedman 2004, 37). its strategies aim to deter an action by making it impossible or unlikely to succeed, robbing a potential aggressor of confidence in achieving its goals (mazarr 2018). according to michael j. mazarr, there are two circumstances in which deterrence can be used: direct and extended (mazarr 2018). direct deterrence consists of efforts by a state to prevent attacks on its own territory. extended deterrence involves discouraging attacks on third parties, such as allies or partners (mazarr 2018). by its nature, extended deterrence is more difficult than protecting one's own country. a task that requires the projection of military force, sometimes thousands of miles away and often much closer to the territory of the aggressor state, is more difficult to accomplish when the attack is carried out in an area that is further away from the home country (mazarr 2020). deterrence can be classified into two types based on the time periods in which it can be used: general and immediate. general deterrence is the ongoing, persistent effort to prevent unwanted actions over the long term in non-crisis situations. immediate deterrence represents more shortterm, urgent attempts to prevent specific, imminent attacks, most typically during a crisis (mazarr 2018). deterrence can also be viewed in terms of its scope. according to the most restrictive definitions, deterrence only refers to military tools of statecraft—using the threat of military response to prevent a state from taking an action (veebel 2018a). a broader concept of deterrence keeps the focus on threats but expands the scope to non-military actions: a state can deter using threats of economic sanctions, diplomatic exclusion, or information operations (mazarr 2018). lawrence freedman describes these categories as “narrow” and “broad” (freedman 2004, 32). freedman suggests that “narrow deterrence involves deterring a particular type of military operation within a war, whereas broad deterrence involves deterring all war” (freedman 2004, 32). one of the main specific domains of deterrence, both in theory and practice, was nuclear deterrence. nuclear deterrence was and still is an essential component of the national security policies of many countries in the world today, most notably the united states and russia, which have the greatest nuclear arsenals. the concept of mutually assured destruction (mad), which was at the core of the nuclear deterrent strategy employed by both the united states and the soviet union at the height of the cold war, continues to play an important role in the nuclear policy of these nations. the idea of mad and the annihilation of both countries serves as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons. mad, in essence, is the purest form of deterrence by punishment. this form of punishment is not the direct defence of the contested environment but rather a threat of extensive punishment that would make an attack too costly (veebel 2018b). 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 there are numerous variables and conditions defining and impacting deterrence: credibility, policy cohesion, capability, reputation of resolve, and communication. this study is aimed at improving the quality of communication relating to the discussion on deterrence. communication is a basic element of deterrence by denial, as the adversary must be aware of the capability for it to be effective. it is difficult for adversaries to evaluate the effectiveness of a defence's deterrent impact, and attackers can only determine whether or not a target is impenetrable by attempting to do so. if this is the case, deterrence fails. to counter this argument, carefully crafted strategic communication can help communicate perceived effectiveness and convey a clear message to the adversary. rebecca hersman points out that deterrence depends fundamentally on the ability to shape adversaries’ and allies’ perceptions and risk calculations (hersman 2017). it is a rationalityoriented conversation among allies and adversaries, designed to persuade adversaries that the risks of conflict outweigh any potential benefits and to reassure allies that this conversation is working to protect their core interests (hersman 2017). to be credible, both allies and adversaries must share a common understanding of the efficiency and rationality of this concept and clearly understand what the other side is saying and expecting, even when not sharing each other’s understanding of rationality (veebel and ploom 2023). next to the concept of deterrence, the similarly aimed concept of compellence started to evolve. compellence is an effort to force an actor to do something, while deterrence entails an effort to prevent an action (mazarr 2018). the most distinguishing characteristic between compellence and deterrence is whether an act or behaviour has already been initiated that you wish to amend or stop. this differentiation is explained by slantchev and freedman. slantchev states that “compellence aims to persuade the opponent to change his behaviour” and that “compellence is active: it seeks to change the status quo, where deterrence can be enduring” (slantchev 2005, 4). on the other hand, as lawrence freedman states, “deterrence can be a technique, a doctrine and a state of mind. in all cases, it is about setting boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with the crossing of those boundaries” (freedman 2004, 116). the deterrence debate between russia and nato before 2022 the origins of the deterrence debate between russia and the west can be traced back to the beginning of the cold war in the mid-twentieth century. the announcement of the truman doctrine, also known as “truman’s containment doctrine,” in 1947 was one of the events that marked the beginning of the cold war and led to the creation of nato. it was the start of containment policy: the united states' foreign policy, an ambiguous concept designed to limit the soviet union’s and communism’s expansion. containment was originally advocated by us diplomat george kennan, who was one of the policy’s architects. the overarching goal of such a policy was to keep the soviet union within the military boundaries established at the end of world war ii. therefore, containment could be seen as accommodationist rather than overtly aggressive, as some revisionist cold war analysts have suggested (evans and newnham 1998). the rapid development of nuclear weapons signalled the start of a new era in the conflict between the united states and the soviet union. in the late 1940s and early 1950s, nato scholars worked to understand how to best use nuclear weapons’ new power to deter the soviet union (sagan 1991). nuclear weapons had a revolutionary impact on the global security balance, and the concept of nuclear deterrence was born. until the end of the cold war, nuclear deterrence was the focal point of the nato-soviet deterrence debate, and its elements have gradually migrated into the national 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 defence strategies of other states (such as russia), albeit with specific national nuances (pechatnov 2016). strategic deterrence as an official military-political concept in russia emerged only at the beginning of the twenty-first century. due to the soviet dual attitude toward nuclear war and the peculiarities of soviet strategic culture, deterrence was not a central and elaborated concept in moscow’s strategic thinking. of course, soviet leadership did act intuitively in accordance with the logic of deterrence (adamsky 2014) and had their own view of deterrence. the soviet view of deterrence had a dual nature, emphasizing both offence and war avoidance (simes 1980). the soviet union's military policy aimed to deter the united states from launching a nuclear attack on the ussr by assuring that nuclear aggression would not go unanswered. unlike the us, however, the soviets did not develop or research deterrence doctrine (adamsky 2014). following the collapse of the ussr, the new 1990s international world order, under the hegemony of the united states, in which “there was nothing much that needed deterring” (freedman 2004, 21), did not provide fertile ground for the development of deterrence theory. after the soviet union disintegrated in 1991, relations between nato countries and russia began to improve, and russia hoped to become a part of the western security culture (romanova 2011). however, that relatively peaceful and friendly period of dialogue lasted only two decades. the second decade of the twentyfirst century marked the beginning of a new period of confrontation between nato and russia (rumer and sokolsky 2020). tensions began to escalate with the russo-georgian war in 2008 and skyrocketed after russia annexed crimea and fuelled the armed conflict in eastern ukraine in 2014. all of this signalled the start of a new era in the nato-russian deterrence dialogue, with deterrence regaining prominence in the two countries' relations. the number of times the word deterrence appeared in the respective communiqués of the nato 1999 washington summit (once) and the nato 2016 warsaw summit (28 times), where deterrence was one of the two interrelated main themes, exemplifies this point vividly (paulauskas 2016). whereas deterrence in its military-political sense was not a central and elaborate concept in the soviet union’s strategic thinking (adamsky 2014), russia now has its own state-level concept of strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye, which is a russian version of deterrence strategy. russian translations of “deterrence”: do russians understand what is expected? the concept of deterrence has a relatively standardized meaning in english-speaking nato countries. however, in the russian language, there is no unambiguously understandable equivalent for the western concept of “deterrence.” in various english-russian dictionaries and online translators, this term has a large number of possible translations; these include sderzhivaniye, ustrasheniye, sderzhivaniye putem ustrasheniya, politika sderzhivaniya, uderzhaniye, otpugivaniye, zapugivaniye, zamedleniye, prepyatstvovaniye, etc. according to dictionaries, online translators, and scholarly articles, the two most-used russianlanguage equivalents of “deterrence” are sderzhivaniye and ustrasheniye. however, according to scientific articles, the term prinuzhdeniye also appears when discussing nato’s deterrence, mostly in phrases such as sderzhivaniye prinuzhdeniyem and prinuzhdayushcheye sderzhivaniye. all of the terms mentioned are not synonyms in russian. these russian translations have meanings other than “deterrence,” and most of them are used in common parlance, where they also have different meanings and connotations. in most cases, if they were to be translated to english, 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 “deterrence” would not be the first possible option suggested by the dictionaries. for example, sderzhivaniye can be translated as containment; ustrasheniye and zapugivaniye as intimidation; politika sderzhivaniya as containment policy; uderzhaniye as retention; otpugivaniye as frightening away; zamedleniye as deceleration; prinuzhdeniye can be translated as coercion, compulsion, or compellence; prepyatstvovaniye as obstruction, etc. as a result, the linguistic factor in the deterrence conversation manifests itself in two ways. first, deterrence does not translate into russian as a single understandable word (or concept) but rather as at least three distinct words. second, these three words also carry additional meaning (in terms of content) and social status not related to the western idea of deterrence. on different levels, all russian translations include the sentiment that the one who is deterred is the one being dominated, controlled, and patronized (karaganov and suslov 2019). this is the implication that most russian political and military leaders would want to avoid at any cost. now, the authors will analyze the most common russian translations of “deterrence.” sderzhivaniye is the most frequently used term for “deterrence.” it literally means containment, restraining, or holding back. in russian, this term is conceived more broadly than the western understanding of deterrence to include all activities aimed at war prevention (ven bruusgard 2016) and often includes what in the west is expressed using at least three different terms: “containment,” “deterrence,” and “compellence” (fenenko 2020; pechatnov 2016). sderzhivaniye refers to efforts to preserve the status quo and implies, similar to western usage, a more reactive modus operandi (adamsky 2018). however, sderzhivaniye does not cover all aspects of deterrence but rather focuses on deterrence through denial in conjunction with resilience. significantly, an aspect related to deterrence through punishment is absent (veebel et al. 2020). the term sderzhivaniye is mainly used in the strategic (also nuclear) and political context. however, though the noun sderzhivaniye is mostly related to the military domain, the verb sderzhivat’ is widely used in russian common parlance and has various meanings, which could also affect the way the military term “deterrence” is interpreted in russia. to highlight the variety of potential synonyms and meanings of the term sderzhivat’, it could also mean to restrain or to hold back (uderzhivat’), restrict (ogranichivat’), humble (smiryat’), keep (in the sense of keeping a promise), or even slow down (zamedlyat’). sderzhivaniye first appeared in the soviet union at the end of the 1940s as a russian-language equivalent of the western term “containment.” nowadays, the term “containment” is rarely used by the institutions of nato or by the governments of nato member states. it is not included in the nato term base (nato term 2023) or the united states department of defense dictionary of military and associated terms (dod 2021). however, for more than four decades, the concept of containment existed as a separate western military-political concept, and it was referred to as sderzhivaniye or politika sderzhivaniya (containment policy) in the soviet union and, later, in russia. the term “containment” is also absent from the nato-russia glossary of contemporary political and military terms (nato 2007). however, one can find there the term politika sderzhivaniya; its equivalent in english is listed as “deterrence,” not “containment.” it is described as follows: “a range of political, military and other measures, aimed at convincing the other side that it cannot achieve its political ends by armed attack, because of the overt threat of retaliation” (nato 2007, 71). it is curious that in the nato-russia glossary, the term politika sderzhivaniya refers to the russian federation’s policy that was already formed in the twenty-first century, rather than the 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 western military political concept of containment. the term politika sderzhivaniya can also be found in a russian military-technical dictionary: war and peace in terms and definitions (voyenno-tekhnicheskiy slovar': voyna i mir v terminakh i opredeleniyakh) edited by former russian deputy prime minister dmitry rogozin. this dictionary is intended for top military and political leaders, as well as specialists in national security and military sciences. it includes the definition of politika sderzhivaniya, which states that it is a type of foreign policy of a peace-loving state, the main purpose of which is to reduce the level of military danger, limit the possibility of aggression and actively hold the aggressor back from any military aggression, conflicts and wars. this policy assumes the effective use of a complex of political, economic, military, and diplomatic measures (rogozin 2004). to summarize, politika sderzhivaniya refers to two distinct concepts in russia: the concept of us foreign policy during the cold war (also known as containment policy or simply “containment” in the western world) and the concept of russia’s military-political theory in the twenty-first century (usually referred to in the western world as “deterrence”). both of them are also referred to as sderzhivaniye. in russian strategic thinking, there is a broad concept of voyenno-politicheskoye sderzhivaniye that can be translated as military-political containment or military-political deterrence. this is a broad concept that refers to a set of military and political measures taken by a state to deter aggression and threats to its peaceful development and vital interests. these policies are based on both direct and indirect use of military force as a political means of forcing a potential adversary to abandon an armed attack due to the threat of retaliatory actions that will result in such consequences that the aggressor state will lose its ability or political motivation to continue the war. strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye (strategic containment or strategic deterrence) is a part of voyennopoliticheskoye sderzhivaniye. it is a narrower concept than voyenno-politicheskoye sderzhivaniye or just sderzhivaniye. strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye is a system of non-coercive and coercive measures that are implemented on a continuous basis, both during peacetime and during wartime. these precautions are taken not only to avoid coercive actions or to keep the object within a specific framework but also to de-escalate a military conflict. an essential part of strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye is voyennoye sderzhivaniye (military containment or military deterrence). it consists of silovoye sderzhivaniye (coercive containment or coercive deterrence), which implies the direct use of various weapon systems, including nuclear ones. yadernoye sderzhivaniye (nuclear containment or nuclear deterrence) is a part of silovoye sderzhivaniye, and, as the term implies, it is containment or deterrence by a threat of using nuclear weapons. although these concepts overlap in some ways with the essence of the western concept of deterrence, they overlap more with the definition of containment. if one reads the definitions of the concepts of sderzhivaniye in russian military-political theory, one can clearly see that it is described as a defensive concept drawn to prevent or de-escalate aggression and conflict, to stop the adversary’s coercive actions, and to end hostilities (entsiklopediya raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya 2022; spravochnik po terminologii v oboronnoy sfere 2022; voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar’ 2022). in these definitions, retaliatory actions and actions that hold back, rather than provoke aggression, predominate. sderzhivaniye aims to prevent or end further aggression. causing damage is mentioned only as a response to the aggressor's actions. for 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 that reason, in english, to translate the names of various parts of the russian concept of voyennopoliticheskoye sderzhivaniye, it would be more accurate to use the terms “contain” and “containment” because, in english, these words correspondingly mean to “control” or “restrain” and to “hold someone or something within.” these terms express a less aggressive mode of operation than the terms “deter” or “deterrence,” and they are better suited to interpreting the essence of russian military-political concepts (or at least how they are formulated in theory). the authors of this article believe that, despite its widespread use, sderzhivaniye is a confusing term rather than an unambiguous equivalent for “deterrence.” there are several reasons for this. first, sderzhivaniye does not encompass all aspects of deterrence, both conceptually and linguistically. second, in russian, it is used in several lexical phrases as an equivalent for three different western concepts: containment, deterrence, and compellence. third, the term sderzhivaniye has its own specific meaning in russian military-political theory, where sderzhivaniye means more than the western concept of deterrence implies. all that influences one's understanding of the western concept. ustrasheniye is the second most popular russian translation for deterrence; it translates as “intimidating” or “frightening.” this noun is mainly used in a military context, but the verb ustrashat’ and the corresponding adjectives are quite frequently used in common parlance, where they have clearly aggressive and intimidating connotations. this term’s association with aggressive intimidation to get its own way is particularly clearly reflected in the expression ustrashat’ vraga, which means not only to cause fear among the opponents (in russian, this would be pugat’), but to frighten them by one’s “mightiness” and “greatness” (veebel and vihmand 2020, 9), meaning that the other side is seen as a lower or less important actor. accordingly, this verb has a strong element of labelling the actor as superior to the object, which makes it very complicated to accept for the russian political and military community. the military-political term ustrasheniye first appeared in the soviet union after the cold war began, when international actors began to discuss (nuclear) deterrence. even though sderzhivaniye was used to refer to deterrence, ustrasheniye was also used to refer to the new western concept. ustrasheniye has negative connotations and is still primarily used to describe others' deterrent policies. this term was frequently used in the soviet union when discussing western deterrence, but in the twenty-first century, it has fallen out of favour, giving sderzhivaniye a chance to dominate the russian-language deterrence discourse. in the nato-russia glossary, ustrasheniye is marked as a synonymous term for sderzhivaniye as the russian equivalent for “deterrence” (nato 2007). however, in russian military-political theory, these two terms are not synonymous. the most visible difference between these two terms and concepts is revealed by the definitions of the two separate russian military-political strategies: strategiya sderzhivaniya and strategiya ustrasheniya. strategiya sderzhivaniya (containment strategy) is a method of strategic action based on the implementation of a set of measures aimed at pinning down the enemy from unleashing a war (rogozin 2004). there can be several containment strategies, which form a comprehensive containment strategy (strategiya sderzhivaniya kompleksnaya)—a set of strategies based on the principle of inflicting unacceptable damage on the aggressor in a war, adequate defence, strategic stability, and the development of a peace-loving state's defence capabilities. a comprehensive containment strategy entails both active attacks in the name of containment and increased selfdefence (rogozin 2004). 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 strategiya ustrasheniya (intimidation strategy) is a set of strategic actions involving the threat of military force. it is defined as a military strategy used to force the enemy to end hostilities. strategiya ustrasheniya assumes overwhelming superiority in forces and the use of means and methods against which no effective defence exists (rogozin 2004). strategiya ustrasheniya is considered to be more aggressive than strategiya sderzhivaniya and directly implies the conducting of hostilities, intimidation through a threat of destroying the enemy, and the use of methods from which there is no defence. accordingly, the one who implements this strategy is the one having strategic initiative and supremacy, while accepting it means accepting the domination of an imposer (karaganov and suslov 2018). besides sderzhivaniye and ustrasheniye there are other terms that are used when talking about the western concept of deterrence. on the basis of sderzhivaniye and ustrasheniye, another term was formed and used in the soviet union and later in the russian federation as a possible russianlanguage equivalent of deterrence—sderzhivaniye putem ustrasheniya, meaning “containment through intimidation.” at the turn of the twenty-first century, the paradigm of deterrence began to shift, and new deterrence strategies, methods, and instruments emerged. despite the fact that the term prinuzhdeniye is not listed in dictionaries as a possible translation of the english term “deterrence” and that it is absent from the official russian military encyclopedias and handbooks,1 due to the constant development of deterrence theory, phrases including the term prinuzhdeniye are now increasingly used in the russian scientific literature when referring to the western concept of “deterrence.” traditionally, prinuzhdeniye is the russian equivalent of “coercion,” both as a legal and a militarypolitical term (bartosh 2021). in russia, the term is more commonly used as a legal term to refer to the act of persuading someone to do something by using force and threats (coercion), but it is also increasingly used in the military context, where it refers to efforts to change the status quo and implies a more proactive connotation, similar to the western usage of the term (adamsky 2018). however, some russian political scientists use this term to denote compellence (fenenko 2021). since, in their interpretation, compellence is a type of deterrence—the more offensive type of deterrence—prinuzhdeniye is used when talking about deterrence, for example, in such phrases as prinuzhdayushcheye sderzhivaniye and sderzhivaniye prinuzhdeniyem that can be correspondingly translated as “coercive containment” and “containment by coercion” or, in other words, “coercive deterrence” and “deterrence by coercion.” however, in the western strategy, deterrence and compellence are two different concepts. whereas deterrence is aimed at preventing adversary behaviours through threatened action, compellence involves threats or actions to force the adversary to do something. coercion is also a distinct military-political concept in western countries. in fact, deterrence and compellence are two distinct concepts in western militarypolitical theory that are both forms of coercion (encyclopedia britannica 2022b). even though prinuzhdeniye does not yet have a place as an official term in russian militarypolitical theory, it is becoming increasingly common when discussing military-political relations. this term is often used in the phrase silovoye prinuzhdeniye when referring to “compulsion by force” as a means of aggressive deterrence. ekonomicheskoye prinuzhdeniye refers to “economic 1 for example, see entsiklopediya raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya 2022; spravochnik po terminologii v oboronnoy sfere 2022; voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar’ 2022. 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 compulsion,” but prinuzhdeniye k miru is translated to english as “peace enforcement.” the term prinuzhdeniye is also used when referring to sanctions, which russians refer to as “means of compulsion” (metody prinuzhdeniya). diplomatiya prinuzhdeniya is the russian equivalent for “coercive diplomacy,” but “strategic coercion” is sometimes translated as strategicheskoye vozdeistviye (strategic influence) instead of strategicheskoye prinuzhdeniye (strategic coercion). sometimes, the term prinuzhdeniye is used as a synonym for nastupateljnoye sderzhivaniye (offensive containment) (fenenko 2019, 2021). how to improve the russian-western deterrence conversation? as rebecca hersman states, “deterrence is, at its core, a dialogue—and, as such, rests on three questions: can we be heard? are we listening? and are we understood?” (hersman 2017). despite the use of similar terms and expressions in public statements and political declarations by the russian political elite and nato leaders, the two groups appear to speak a different security and defence language because the meaning of the terms and the concept of deterrence differ between the russian and western communities (veebel and ploom 2019). as a result, it is no surprise that there might be doubts if nato’s deterrence towards russia is still credible after the 2022 russian war against ukraine. precise and transparent translations are required to keep the nato-russia deterrence conversation effective. unfortunately, the english term for nato's key concept of deterrence does not have a clear terminological equivalent in russian, which might create confusion among people who have not studied it as a concept. in nato, when deterrence is being discussed, a single well-defined term is used, meanwhile, the terminological apparatus in russia remains inconsistent due to the presence of several similar phenomena and the corresponding terminology. when the term “deterrence” first appeared in the dialogue between the west and the soviet union, it did not get one specific lexical equivalent in russian. it was referred to as sderzhivaniye (the same term that was used to mark “containment”), ustrasheniye (the term that emphasized the aggressiveness of western concept) and sderzhivaniye putem ustrasheniya (the hybrid of the first two terms). the terms sderzhivanye and ustrasheniye have been used interchangeably when talking about the western concept of deterrence for many decades. sderzhivaniye putem ustrasheniya has also been used from time to time. later, as the deterrence strategy evolved and the corresponding englishlanguage terminological apparatus was supplemented by updated terminology, new terms began to appear in russian as well. for example, expressions such as prinuzhdayushcheye sderzhivaniye and sderzhivaniye prinuzhdeniyem also started to be used to refer to some form of deterrence. when discussing the same concept in two different linguistic and cultural spaces, the use of specific terminology, one or more terms, can affect how the recipient perceives this concept. in this process, some of the vital components might be lost during translation or some sentiments added. due to its etymology, the concept of deterrence in english implies instilling fear and threatening the adversary (online etymology dictionary 2023a; online etymology dictionary 2023b). the russian term sderzhivaniye does not relate to fear. sderzhivaniye is concerned with actions taken to hold the adversary back. ustrasheniye, on the other hand, is directly related to generating fear. that is, in fact, what this word literally means. the language used may influence the public's willingness to accept risks and, as a result, their willingness to escalate the crisis (berejikian and zwald 2020). the choice of terms influences how the message is perceived and interpreted, as well as how the attitude of one part of the conversation 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 toward the other is perceived. furthermore, during the meaning construction process, the information presented in the text interacts with previously stored knowledge and mental models (schäffner 2004). all of this points to the deterrence dialogue between russia and the west. in that conversation, the russian federation frequently employs the terminology examined in this study, giving the impression that russia is containing and restraining aggression while the west is intimidating and coercing. when describing its own policies, russia uses the term sderzhivaniye, but when describing nato expectations and actions, russians frequently use the terms ustrasheniye and prinuzhdeniye. for example, the term ustrasheniye is normally used to portray (implicitly illegitimate) deterrence policies of other powers and implies certain negative associations. the habitual phrase to describe us policies during the cold war was sderzhivaniye putem ustrasheniya (ven bruusgard 2016). the strategic concept of the us adopted in the early 1970s—national security strategy of realistic deterrence—is translated to russian as strategiya realisticheskogo ustrasheniya (rogozin 2004, 101). indeed, in the russian language, sderzhivaniye (containment) sounds more peaceful than ustrasheniye (intimidation) and prinuzhdeniye (coercion), which have more aggressive connotations. in fact, there is a reason for using these terms in such a way. in the mind of the russian federation, the russian analogue of the western concept of strategic deterrence—the concept of strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye evolves within a framework of the defensive concept of national security. the western concept of deterrence, on the contrary, is seen as an expansionaryoffensive concept that ensures the advancement of us international interests (pechatnov 2016). this fact explains why there is a difference in terminology when discussing russian and western actions. however, because the russian concept of strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye implies that all of russia's actions are defensive or reactive, and its intention is only to restrain the adversary rather than conduct an offensive operation, it may give russia the impression that it is always acting defensively. as kristen ven bruusgard points out, this terminology may lead the russian leadership to believe that their actions are simply a reaction to perceived aggression (ven bruusgaard 2016). although russian military-political theory admits that in some cases, the strategy of containing (sderzhivaniye) military aggression can be implemented through intimidation (ustrasheniye). conclusion allies agreed at the nato summit in warsaw in 2016 that deterrence must be supplemented by meaningful dialogue, with the goal of avoiding misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation, as well as increasing transparency and predictability (paulauskas 2016). understanding the linguistic component of the deterrence conversation between russia and nato aids in meeting these objectives. it is useful in understanding how russian leaders perceive and comprehend the nato deterrence posture, and, if they do not, how it can be changed. it also helps to understand moscow's intentions and russia's strategic thinking, especially after russia’s aggression against ukraine in 2022. it should also be kept in mind that, at different levels, all russian translations for deterrence include the idea, that the one who is deterred, is the one being dominated, controlled, and patronized. this, however, is the implication that most russian political and military leaders would want to avoid. the fact that the same terms are used as equivalents for the western concept of deterrence and as terms noting concepts of russia's own military thinking complicates the issue of terminology. 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 however, the underlying concepts of these terms differ. for example, the most commonly used russian deterrence equivalent, sderzhivaniye, plays an important role in russia’s strategic thinking, where it is a much broader term than the western concept of deterrence. sderzhivaniye denotes a concept that in western thinking is expressed by three concepts and corresponding terms: “deterrence,” “containment,” and “compellence.” etymologically and historically, sderzhivaniye is more appropriate as an equivalent term for “containment.” furthermore, on a conceptual level, it is less aggressive than the western concept of deterrence. not without reason, that term was coined as a russian equivalent for the western concept of containment, which some revisionist cold war analysts suggested was a policy of accommodation rather than overt aggression (evans and newnham 1998). based on the analysis and etymology of the terms under consideration, the term sderzhivaniye is a suitable equivalent for the western term “containment,” which is related to but not synonymous with the term “deterrence.” another term that is often used when talking about deterrence is ustrasheniye. however, while it is sometimes used interchangeably with sderzhivaniye when discussing the western concept of deterrence, in russian military-political thinking, these two terms denote distinct concepts and cannot be considered synonyms for conceptual and etymological reasons. ustrasheniye, on the other hand, is a better etymological and conceptual equivalent term for “deterrence,” directly associated with the creation of fear, which is a key component of deterrence. speaking about the terms prinuzhdayushcheye sderzhivaniye and sderzhivaniye prinuzhdeniyem, it should be noted that these terms only convey a portion of the deterrence strategy. terminological confusion is deepened by the fact that, in some cases, prinuzhdeniye is used to talk about compellence or coercion. however, in western strategy, “deterrence,” “compellence,” and “coercion” are three distinct terms with distinct underlying concepts. all of this only complicates the terminological issue of translating the western military-political term “deterrence” into russian. another factor to consider is how russian equivalents of the concept of deterrence are translated into english. russian strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye, for example, is not conceptually the same as western strategic deterrence, despite the fact that it is frequently translated as such. considering the essence of russian military-political strategy, dmitry adamsky (2018, 36) proposed to use the term “cross-domain coercion” when talking about the russian concept. this question requires further investigation based on the components of the russian strategy and the possible deterrence conceptualization variations. the translation and perception of the western concept of deterrence in russia is heavily influenced by russian terminological equivalents of “deterrence” and terminology used in modern russian military theory. however, it is also critical for the west to understand the foundations of russian strategic thinking and the linguistic factors that influence it. as a result, understanding the problems associated with translating the term “deterrence” and its most commonly used russian equivalents, as well as the relationships between these terminological units, will aid in better understanding each other in the deterrence conversation. additionally, if nato is about to make its dialogue more transparent and straightforward with russian political and military leaders, then it should consider the use of the terms “containment” and “coercion” in proper context instead of “deterrence,” which may be ambiguously interpreted by russians. this would be clearer in terms of expected content and would also be comprehensible for a wider russian political and military society. 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 references adamsky, dmitry. 2014. “if war comes tomorrow: russian thinking about ‘regional nuclear deterrence.’” the journal of slavic military studies 27 (1): 163-188. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2014.874852. ———. 2018. “from moscow with coercion: russian deterrence theory and strategic culture.” journal of strategic studies 41 (1-2): 33-60. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01402390.2017.1347872. bartosh, aleksandr. 2021. “sderzhivaniye i prinuzhdeniye v strategii gibridnoy voyny.” [deterrence and coercion in a hybrid war strategy]. voyennaya mysl’, no. 9, 18-34. belobrov, yuriy. 2020. “evolyutsiya politiki nato po sderzhivaniyu sssr i rossii” [the evolution of nato policy of deterring the ussr and russia]. mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, no. 6, 22-33. accessed june 15, 2023. https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/2353. berejikian, jeffrey, and zachary zwald. 2020. “why language matters: shaping public risk tolerance during deterrence crises.” contemporary security policy 41 (4): 507-540. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1729496 dod (united states of america department of defense). 2021. dictionary of military and associated terms. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/dictionary.pdf. encyclopedia britannica. 2022a. “deterrence”. accessed december 10, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/topic/deterrence-political-and-military-strategy. ———. 2022b. “compellence”. accessed december 10, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/ topic/compellence. entsiklopediya raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya. 2022. accessed december 12, 2022. http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/listrvsn.htm. evans, graham, and jeffrey newnham. 1998. the penguin dictionary of international relations. london: penguin books. fenenko, aleksey. 2019. “effektivno li yadernoye sderzhivaniye?” [is nuclear deterrence efficient?] russian international affairs council, april 26, 2019. accessed december 16, 2022. https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/effektivno-li-yadernoesderzhivanie/. ———. 2020. “evolyutsiya teorii yadernogo sderzhivaniya v ssha v gody kholodnoy voyny.” [evolution of the nuclear deterrence theory in the us during the years of the cold war]. vestnik sankt-peterburgskogo universiteta. mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya 13 (1): 111135. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2020.108. ———. 2021. “asimmetrichnaya model' yadernogo sderzhivaniya” [an asymmetric model of nuclear deterrence]. analiz i prognoz. zhurnal imemo ran 3: 13-29. https://doi.org/10.20542/afij-2021-3-13-29. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2014.874852 https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2014.874852 https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1347872 https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1347872 https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/2353 https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1729496 https://www.britannica.com/topic/deterrence-political-and-military-strategy https://www.britannica.com/topic/compellence https://www.britannica.com/topic/compellence http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/listrvsn.htm https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/effektivno-li-yadernoe-sderzhivanie/ https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/effektivno-li-yadernoe-sderzhivanie/ https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2020.108 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 freedman, lawrence. 2004. deterrence. cambridge: polity press. ———. 2021. “introduction—the evolution of deterrence strategy and research.” in nl arms netherlands annual review of military studies 2020: deterrence in the 21st century— insights from theory and practice, edited by frans osinga and tim sweijs, 1-10. accessed on september 5, 2023. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_1. hersman, rebecca. 2017. “the deterrence and assurance conversation.” center for strategic and international studies, january 13, 2017. accessed october 18, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/deterrence-and-assurance-conversation. karaganov, sergei, and dmitry suslov. 2019. “sderzhivaniye v novuyu epokhu” [deterrence in a new epoch]. rossiya v global'noy politike, no. 4. accessed october 27, 2023. https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/sderzhivanie-v-novuyu-epohu/. ———. 2018. “a new world order: a view from russia.” russia in global affairs. accessed on september 5, 2023. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-new-world-order-a-view-fromrussia/. mazarr, michael j. 2018. “understanding deterrence.” santa monica, ca: rand corporation. accessed september 5, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/pe295.html. ———. 2020. understanding deterrence. in nl arms netherlands annual review of military studies 2020: deterrence in the 21st century—insights from theory and practice, edited by frans osinga and tim sweijs, 13-28. accessed on september 5, 2023. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_2. medvedev, dmitry. 2022. “medvedev v otvet na ugrozy udarit' po chernomorskomu flotu napomnil pro giperzvukovyye rakety” [in response to threats to strike the black sea fleet, medvedev reminded about hypersonic missiles]. kommersant. accessed october 27, 2023. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5572179. nato (north atlantic treaty organization). 2001. “preface of the nato-russia glossary of contemporary political and military terms. accessed january 12, 2022. https://www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng/index.htm. ———. 2007. nato-russia glossary of contemporary political and military terms. accessed september 17, 2022. https://www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng/15-main.pdf. ———. 2020. aap-06 nato glossary of terms and definitions. https://www.coemed.org/files/stanags/05_aap/aap-06_2020_ef_(1).pdf. ———. 2022. “deterrence and defence.” september 12, 2022. accessed december 4, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm. nato term. 2023. “welcome.” accessed september 5, 2023. https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/content/nato/pages/home.html?lg=en. https://www.csis.org/analysis/deterrence-and-assurance-conversation https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-new-world-order-a-view-from-russia/ https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-new-world-order-a-view-from-russia/ https://www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng/index.htm https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/content/nato/pages/home.html?lg=en 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 online etymology dictionary. 2023a. “deterrence.” accessed january 9, 2023. https://www.etymonline.com/word/deterrence. ———. 2023b. “terror.” accessed january 9, 2023. https://www.etymonline.com/ search?q=terror. paulauskas, kęstutis. 2016. “on deterrence.” nato review, august 6, 2016. accessed february 2, 2022. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/08/05/on-deterrence/index.html. pechatnov, yuri. 2016. “teoriya sderzhivaniya: genezis” [deterrence theory: the genesis]. vooruzheniye i ekonomika 2: 25-32. putin, vladimir. 2022. “speech on the incorporation of donetsk, lugansk, kherson, and zaporozhye.” michael rossi poli sci. accessed september 5, 2023. youtube video, 43:44. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zp69jld8xae. rogozin, dmitriy, ed. 2004. voyna i mir v terminakh i opredeleniyakh [war and peace: terms and definitions]. moscow: porog. romanova, tatiana. 2011. “yevrosoyuz kak normativnaya sila i problemy yeye vospriyatiya v rossii kak bar'yer na puti politiko-pravovogo sblizheniya” [european union as a normative power and problems of its perception in russia as an obstacle in the way of political and legal rapprochement]. vestnik sankt-peterburgskogo universiteta 6 (1): 56-66. rumer, eugene, and richard sokolsky. 2020. “tridtsat' let khozhdeniya po krugu: politika ssha v otnoshenii rossii” [thirty years of walking in circles: the us policy toward russia]. carnegie endowment for international peace. accessed june 15, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/21/ru-pub-81258. sagan, scott d. 1991. “history, analogy, and deterrence theory.” the journal of interdisciplinary history 22 (1): 79-88. sarott, mary elis. 2021. “sderzhivaniye posle kholodnoi voiny” [deterrence after the cold war]. rossiya v global'noy politike, no. 6, 44-60. accessed june 15, 2023. https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/sderzhivanie-posle-holodnoj-vojny/. schäffner, christina. 2004. “political discourse analysis from the point of view of translation studies.” journal of language and politics 3 (1): 117-150. https://doi.org/ 10.1075/jlp.3.1.09sch. simes, dimitri k. 1980. “deterrence and coercion in soviet policy.” international security 5 (3): 80-103. slantchev, branislav l. 2005. introduction to international relations: lecture 2: state and anarchy, april 19, 2015. university of california – san diego. http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/ courses/ps12/02-state-and-anarchy.pdf. snyder, glenn h. 1959. deterrence by denial and punishment. princeton: center of international studies. https://www.etymonline.com/word/deterrence https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=terror https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=terror https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/08/05/on-deterrence/index.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zp69jld8xae https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/21/ru-pub-81258 https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/sderzhivanie-posle-holodnoj-vojny/ https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.3.1.09sch https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.3.1.09sch 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 spravochnik po terminologii v oboronnoy sfere [directory for defence terminology]. 2022. accessed december 12, 2022. http://dictionary.mil.ru/dictionary. veebel, viljar. 2018a. “nato options and dilemmas for deterring russia in the baltic states.” defence studies 18 (2): 229-251. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2018.1463518. ———. 2018b. “(un)justified expectations on nuclear deterrence of nonnuclear nato members: the case of estonia and latvia?” defense & security analysis 34 (3): 291-309. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1500758. veebel, viljar, and illimar ploom. 2019. “are the baltic states and nato on the right path in deterring russia in the baltic?” defense & security analysis 35 (4): 406-422. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1675947. veebel, viljar, and liia vihmand. 2020. “living in confronting or parallel strategic narratives? the reasons behind the missing security dialogue between russia and the baltic states.” journal on baltic security 5 (2): 17-28. https://doi.org/10.2478/jobs-2019-0007. veebel, viljar, liia vihmand, illimar ploom, and raul markus. 2020. “western misperception when deterring russia: cultural and linguistic factors.” journal of politics and law 13: 151-159. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v13n3p151. ven bruusgaard, kristin. 2016. “russian strategic deterrence.” survival 58 (4): 7-26. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945 viljar veebel, and illimar ploom. 2023. “president putin: a holy mad man or a brave but trapped chicken in ukraine?” comparative strategy 42 (1): 61-79. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2022.2158030. voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar' [military encyclopedic dictionary]. 2022. accessed december 12, 2022. https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/list.htm. the washington post. 2022.“read putin’s national address on a partial military mobilization.” accessed september 5, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/21/putinspeech-russia-ukraine-war-mobilization/. http://dictionary.mil.ru/dictionary https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2018.1463518 https://doi.org/10.2478/jobs-2019-0007 https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v13n3p151 https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945 https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/list.htm 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 30-47 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 146 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 misreading russian studies: a response to sarty paul goode, carleton university,1 leigh sarty’s introspective essay “misreading russia” makes two core claims: (a) that understanding russia’s history is crucial to understanding russia today and (b) that failing to appreciate russia’s history explains the west’s perpetually misguided policy towards russia since the 1990s, culminating in the war russia is currently waging on ukraine. the first claim could be formulated as a general stance on the importance of historical and area knowledge for policymakers—a claim that i suspect few would find objectionable despite sarty’s admitted historical determinism. however, the implications of such a stance do not necessarily lead to the second claim, which i argue is factually detached from debates within the academic study of russia as well as recent russian history and politics. the tradition of “getting russia wrong” sarty’s article fits within the literary genre of “getting russia wrong”: every few years, a debate arises in western capitals over policy towards russia in which academics and policy-makers lament their failure to appreciate the true drivers of russian policy. as a result of this failure to attend to russia’s history, culture, and regional specificities, western analyses and policy are claimed to have produced pathological outcomes that repeatedly drive russia away from democratization and into renewed conflict with the west. at times, this failure is ascribed to the west’s ideological blinders—this was especially the case during the cold war, though it also emerges in the claim that the west imposed market reforms on russia—or otherwise to the west’s inability to understand different peoples. both of these implications are present in sarty’s essay, particularly as concerns the destructive path of russia’s economic “shock therapy” and privatization and the claim of the west’s ethnocentrism (sarty 2024, 129–33). for example, the work for which this genre is named, patrick cockburn’s getting russia wrong (1989), argued at the tail end of the cold war that gorbachev’s reforms were for real—a seemingly uncontroversial point in hindsight, but one which took aim at conservative voices in the west who argued that gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika were nothing more than a strategic pause in the cold war between the ussr and the west. 1 paul goode is an associate professor and mcmillan chair of russian studies at the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies 147 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 stephen cohen’s failed crusade (2000) marked another significant contribution to the genre, arguing that the west (mainly the us) perceived only reform and success in russia but downplayed the costs inflicted on russian society—a claim that resonates with sarty’s observation that, “inattention to russia’s distinctiveness contributed to the tumult of the 1990s, and tarred wellintentioned efforts to assist russia with a brush of insensitivity” (sarty 2024, 132). cohen further argued that the west’s ideological motives were revealed in its failure to criticize russia’s leaders as long as their actions appeared to support western foreign policy interests. at best, such takes rely upon a highly selective reading of the vast research conducted during and since the 1990s. the collapse of the soviet union occasioned a wave of state creation and, along with it, a wave of regime change that was claimed in the name of national democracies by those who led the revolution (beissinger 2002; huntington 1991; mcfaul 2002). academics vigorously debated ways to understand and model politics in russia in the 1990s. in political science, the rush to incorporate russia and other post-communist states into comparative understandings of political and market transitions sparked debates about the applicability of models from previous democratizing waves in latin america or southern europe that occupied the pages of flagship journals in the field, most notably the slavic review (bunce 1995a, 1995b; schmitter and karl 1994, 1995;). as a graduate student at oxford, i was fortunate to witness a legendary debate between historian timothy garton ash and columbia university’s alfred stepan over the merits of the so-called “transitology.” ultimately, the notion that “transitology” dominated comparative politics (carothers 2002) and the field of russian studies became more of a myth that informed critiques than a substantive reality that informed policy (gans-morse 2004). the reverse influence of political openings in the post-communist world was felt within political science, as well. from the varied and somewhat chaotic range of approaches to studying russia and post-communist states in the 1990s emerged a consensus around the need for systematic approaches in comparative research but also to integrate them with historical approaches and qualitative methods. in fact, the movement that challenged the centrality of rationalist approaches and quantitative methods in american political science even took its name from gorbachev’s perestroika (monroe 2005). stephen fish’s (2001) rejoinder to cohen (entitled “russian studies without studying”), lists in exhaustive detail the varieties of research ignored by the “getting russia wrong” perspective. with particular regard to russia’s market reforms, fish and others have documented (and historians are well aware) that the soviet union’s economy was deeply corrupt at the elite level in the 1980s while the soviet masses relied on black markets and bribery to survive the systems’ problems including endemic shortages, hoarding of labour, and falsified statistics (dallin 1992), while the process of stealing the state’s assets began already under gorbachev (solnick 1998). consequently, fish argues that “blaming yeltsin and the americans exclusively for russia’s postcommunist agonies is like blaming ronald reagan for (or crediting ronald reagan with) the dissolution of the soviet union” (fish 2001, 355). along similar lines, sarty cites a controversial article by shleifer and treisman (2004) as evidence of a field consensus “that russia’s ‘flaws’ did not render it unique, that it was on track to develop like any other middle-income capitalist democracy, in accordance with the confident postulates of social science theory” (sarty 2024, 130). yet this claim misses the active debate that followed the publication of the article. indeed, one of the most telling was the intervention by leeson and trumbull (2006), who noted that a key failing in shleifer & treisman’s work was their reliance on 148 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 biased official statistics—in other words if russia appeared to be “a normal country,” it was because it aimed to present itself as such. mistaking the politics of ignorance in autocracies another crucial oversight found in the “getting russia wrong” perspective is the influence of regime context on the production of knowledge about autocracies and hybrid regimes like russia. autocracies are producers of ignorance about their own operations, concealing both the formal and informal means by which power circulates in closed regimes (ahram and goode 2016). scholars conducting research within autocracies face significant obstacles, ranging from restricted access for conducting fieldwork and interviews to risking surveillance and reprisal (glasius et al. 2017; goode 2010). often, the constraining effects of rising authoritarianism are not felt or can be dismissed until open repression becomes impossible to ignore. in 2009, i presented a paper at a conference on “the russian field” hosted by the center for independent social research in st. petersburg, where i provided evidence of the decline of fieldwork conducted in russia that tracked with autocratization in the 2000s. by contrast, field research suddenly increased after democratic openings in countries like georgia and ukraine. russian scholars in attendance told me that they did not see this as evidence of a problem for russian scholarship so much as it suggested the “degradation of western political science.” in this regard, ironically, russian academics reflected the perspective that sarty attributes to western social scientists about russia and post-communist states as semi-democratic or democratizing. by contrast, my own meta-analysis of all publications in top disciplinary and area journals found that scholars who continued to conduct fieldwork in the 2000s and 2010s (publishing their research mainly in area studies journals) produced important consensus-infirming research that signalled rising authoritarianism in russia and throughout the region (goode 2016). fast forward to the present day and we now find russian school and university curricula re-written to require patriotic education and emphasize the kremlin’s preferred version of history. russian researchers have found themselves cut off from access to foreign sources of funding, which are declared “undesirable” organizations. university administrations patrol what academics can present at international conferences or publish abroad and require russian scholars to report on contacts with foreign researchers. in the wake of russia’s full-scale invasion of ukraine, the few remaining independent research centers and private universities were either closed, absorbed into state-run universities, or their leadership replaced or co-opted. many researchers were fired for their critical stances on the war and thousands fled russia. as one russian colleague wrote to me in 2022, “we no longer know where the regime’s red lines are.” in post-soviet autocracies, regimes use a range of repressive measures to pre-empt political challenges, including “the manipulation of public consciousness and collective memory to spread stereotypes and myths about the domestic opposition, the west, former communist countries that shifted to the democratic track, and democracy in general” (silitski 2010, 276). among western observers, these regime narratives are often mistaken for real grievances, while public silences or conformity with regime narratives are treated as indications of their legitimacy. consequently, one risks becoming complicit in autocratization when repeating regime narratives that discredit opposition, facilitate domestic repression, and even justify foreign aggression. in sarty’s essay, for example, putin’s lamentations about the 1990s are implicitly treated as legitimate reflections of 149 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 public sentiment,2 while nato’s intervention to halt genocide in kosovo is presented as “actions against fellow slavs in yugoslavia.” indeed, he draws a straight line from the kremlin’s narratives about the 1990s to the current war, stating plainly that “once this background is understood, the logic of the decision to invade ukraine becomes apparent.” (sarty 2024, 131) misreading putin’s politics of history and memory in arguing that the west’s failure to appreciate the distinctiveness of russia’s geography and culture culminated in the consolidation of russia’s elite consensus around anti-westernism (for whom putin emerged as the chief advocate), sarty elides the vast mobilization of domestic repression in russia that keeps putin in power. moreover, there is little evidence that the kremlin does a better job of appreciating russia’s history than the west. defenders of russia’s war in ukraine sometimes point to putin’s now-infamous essay from the summer of 2021, “on the historical unity of russians and ukrainians,” as justification (putin 2021), yet the essay was roundly criticized by professional historians within russia for its many inaccuracies. in a study of the evolution of putin’s historical references over the years, alexei miller concludes that “attempts to analyze these texts…as, above all, statements on historical issues, and to see the roots of political decisions in the author’s views on history are fundamentally wrong” (miller 2023, 71–72). there is also ample evidence that few russians have a clear understanding of recent history or that they share putin’s predilection for re-writing russia’s history. in my own interviews conducted in 2014–2016, i found that many russians had only a loose grasp of recent history, struggling even to identify when the soviet union ceased to exist or when putin came to power. during the covid-19 pandemic, putin invoked an obscure historical reference to pechenegs and polovtsy in likening the threat of the pandemic to historical challenges overcome by russia in the previous millennium. rather than inspiring the russian people, putin’s comment was relentlessly ridiculed online and became a popular meme on russian social media (gaufman 2023, 124–25). in short, we should not take putin’s quotes about the lessons of history as accurate, nor should we assume their popular resonance stems from russians’ knowledge of history. in fact, the kremlin is most successful when it uses history as a pretext to mobilize emotional attachments rather than using it to convince and educate. for example, the committee established under former president dmitrii medvedev3 to correct “historical inaccuracies” about the great patriotic war quickly faded into obscurity. by contrast, the kremlin’s annual campaign to commemorate the great patriotic war around may 9th succeeds by cultivating the sensation of being part of a great victory (oushakine 2013). claiming agency on russia’s behalf beyond its reliance on a caricature of the field of russian studies and mistaken assumptions about the political relevance of historical memory in russia, the “getting russia wrong” perspective suffers from two additional problems. in the first place, it amounts to a subtle assertion that the west has agency in determining policy towards russia, whereas russia can only respond. indeed, 2 “putin and the elites who support him have seen themselves as correcting the errors of the 1990s and their consequences; by painting that decade in ever more dire terms, they foster their legitimacy as the stewards of a strong russian state that guarantees order at home and secures russian interests abroad” (sarty 2024, 131). 3 it scarcely bears mentioning today, but medvedev’s single term as russian president was overshadowed by the ongoing presence of putin as prime minister—a period that is sarcastically referred to as “tandemocracy” in reference to putin and medvedev as the ruling tandem. the changing of places between putin and medvedev in 2008 and 2012 is cynically referred to as a “castling” maneuver, to borrow from chess terminology. 150 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 sarty presents russia as eternally trapped by and reacting to the challenge of competing with a more powerful west from a position of relative weakness, which in turn is “the wellspring of russian authoritarianism” (sarty 2024, 127). if russia’s lack of agency resulted in autocracy in russia and even war in ukraine, then sarty suggests this represents a “failure adequately to appreciate how washington’s universalist pretensions—aided and abetted by its nato allies— have been perceived in moscow” (sarty 2024, 132). to support this interpretation, sarty presents putin’s description of the terrorist attack on a school in beslan in 2004 as an attempt by “international forces” (a dog whistle for the west) to grab a piece of russia as evidence that russia is only focused on its own survival. while one might argue that putin’s rhetorical response to beslan actually focused on domestic terror rather than foreign threats (snetkov 2007), the policy responses clearly reflected the priority of consolidating power. these measures amounted to the shutting down of democratic institutions within russia, including the elimination of gubernatorial elections, and imposing a range of restrictions on the state duma that further strengthened the ruling party: eliminating singlemember districts in parliamentary elections, which previously provided a path for independent representatives to win seats; raising the electoral barrier for parties to 7 percent, which was more than the combined vote of the two largest democratic opposition parties in the previous year; eliminating the category of “against all” from the ballot, which typically provided an outlet for protest voting; and eliminating minimum turnout requirements, which made it easier for the kremlin’s candidates to get elected without having to win voters. the mismatch between rhetorical anti-westernism and the policy steps towards consolidating domestic power is a common theme in the uses of cultural pre-emption—including rhetorical antiwesternism—in the post-soviet autocrat’s toolkit and more broadly among “informational autocracies” (guriev and treisman 2022; schatz 2009). the claim that the west is attacking and undermining russia at every turn has been a staple of putin’s domestic politics for over two decades. the political uses of anti-westernism became particularly evident following the diffusion of electoral revolutions in central and eastern europe as well as former soviet states in the early2000s (georgia, ukraine, kyrgyzstan) that became known as “color revolutions” (beissinger 2007; bunce and wolchik 2006; hale 2006). more recently, the kremlin used the charge of western meddling to demonize opposition protest movements, most notably the “for fair elections” movement in 2012 and alexei navalny’s anti-corruption protests in 2017–2018. today, russia’s war in ukraine is further cast in anti-western tropes, in which ukraine is depicted as a puppet of the us and anti-war russians are accused of doing the bidding of russia’s enemies. in short, we should be very careful about taking what putin or his agents say at face value, without considering the political context—particularly when they appear to obscure russia’s agency. realists also get russia wrong a second issue with the perspective offered in sarty’s essay is that it treats regime survival as synonymous with state survival. this is not “realism 101” but a confirmation of the kremlin’s domestic propaganda that portrays putin remaining in power (he is now in his sixth term of office) as necessary to safeguard the state from all threats, foreign and domestic. this conflation of personal political survival with state survival has been a constant problem throughout russia’s modern history, as it reinforces personalist and clientelist politics at the expense of institutional development or even liberalizing reform. 151 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 a prominent example is provided by boris yeltsin, who is often depicted as a victim of the west’s inattention. putin’s predecessor was unwilling to risk democratization and instead treated his own political survival as essential for the survival of russia at every critical juncture (ostrow, satarov, and khakamada 2007). this association contributed directly to the constitutional crisis of 1992– 1993 that was resolved by the forcible dissolution of russia’s parliament (which also sought to remove yeltsin from power) and the unilateral imposition of a constitution that created superpresidential powers. in 1995, the fear of losing power contributed to yeltsin’s forming of a faustian pact with prominent business leaders that led to the infamous “loans for shares” deal that auctioned off russia’s powerful strategic enterprises (i.e., those that could not be privatized without an act of government) at bargain-bin prices, effectively creating the oligarchs in exchange for their unyielding support for yeltsin’s re-election in 1996 (freeland 2000; treisman 2010). in 1999, yeltsin’s decision to leave office early and hand super-presidential powers to putin was motivated, in part, by his desire to protect “the family” (the inner circle of yeltsin’s regime) rather than trust in the electoral process—once again ensuring that russia would continue to drift towards autocracy. in the context of russia’s war against ukraine, the conflation of regime and state survival also informs the most recent version of “getting russia wrong” associated with realist accounts of the war in international relations. the most visible proponents of this version include famous international relations scholars like john mearsheimer and stephen walt. mearsheimer not only argued that russia’s occupation of crimea was a defensive response (mearsheimer 2014) but today confirms the kremlin’s narrative that nato somehow provoked russia into its full-scale invasion of ukraine (mearsheimer 2022). such takes display a surprising naiveté in accepting at face value putin’s claims that russia was forced into action by the west—once again obscuring russia’s agency, this time in its invasion of ukraine. it is further disheartening that these arguments would be taken up by those who argue for appreciating russian history and area knowledge, given that mearsheimer and walt are not experts on russia (or ukraine, for that matter) and lack in-depth knowledge of the region’s politics.4 conclusion: asking the right questions contrary to the “getting russia wrong” perspective, i would suggest that scholars of russia have struggled to ensure that russia’s history and contextual knowledge are taken into account and that area experts are accessible to policy-makers. along with sarty, cohen, cockburn, and others writing in this tradition, most would accept the principle that appreciation for a country’s history and knowledge of the area are prerequisites for making effective policy. however, this knowledge does not reserve agency to those making policy in the west, meaning that one needs to take seriously the likelihood that russian history and anti-westernism are subordinated to the kremlin’s domestic political and economic agendas and that these agendas concern regime survival rather than russian history and geography. looking at russia’s recent history, it is unclear what might have turned out differently or, indeed, what concretely is being proposed by such a perspective, today. given the vast amount of historical and social science research produced on the breakup of the soviet union, does it make sense to accept the kremlin’s narrative of 1991 as something that happened to russia rather than as an 4 it is worth noting that mearsheimer’s approach is criticized even among international relations scholars for its reliance on untestable theoretical propositions and lack of empirical evidence (dutkiewicz and smolenski 2023; polianskii 2024). 152 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 outcome that was accelerated, say, by competition between gorbachev and yeltsin? with regard to the 1990s, does it make sense to suggest that the west forced market reform upon russia, or perhaps the west made excuses for corrupt and increasingly autocratic behaviour precisely because it treated russia as exceptional? since 2014, does such a perspective mean indulging russian nationalists’ complaints about the west’s “lack of respect,” excusing russia’s ongoing attempts to re-imperialize, and interpreting conflicts primarily from russia’s perspective (koval et al. 2022)? and today, does it mean that the west should accept russia’s claim that it is responsible for russia’s invasion, including the crimes and destruction that it has committed? these questions serve to illustrate that the “getting russia wrong” approach is fatalistic rather than constructive. instead, there are more useful and pressing questions that require analysis by scholars and experts with career experience in studying russia: for starters, what remains of our pre-war paradigms for understanding the drivers of russian politics, and what are the realistic scenarios for a post-putin russia? how can russia de-imperialize after the war’s end? how deep and enduring is the russian public’s support for putin’s regime, if one can even peer beyond the effects of wartime censorship and repression? how can we research and support anti-war activists in russia without also exposing the networks that support them? how has the war enabled alternative national projects to rival the regime’s brand of militarized patriotism? to these questions, one might further add a range of practical questions that will shape research agendas for those who study russia for years to come: what are the best practices for collaborating with russian scholars to avoid exposing them to risk while also avoiding extractive relationships? how should we respond to calls for decolonizing research on russia, including greater attention to minority ethnicities and inequalities and promotion of subaltern voices within russia, especially under conditions where external funding and research collaborations cannot reach local scholars? and to ensure that we do not lose a generation’s worth of expertise, how should academic departments and academic publishers recalibrate their expectations, training, and standards with regard to data collection and reporting, given the lack of access to russia for graduate students and emerging scholars, especially coming on the heels of the pandemic? there is a regular cadence to the west’s hand-wringing about “getting russia wrong,” which is typically followed by finger-pointing over “who lost russia” and then, inevitably, the alarmist “where have all the russia experts gone?” in fact, the russia experts are still here, and their ranks are swelling with scholars and experts who opposed the war in ukraine and fled russia after february 2022. for anyone still worried about “getting russia wrong,” the way forward is to learn from this new generation of experts who have exacting and personal knowledge of putin’s russia. rather than seeking to claim responsibility for the kremlin’s actions, worrying about paths not taken in the 1990s, or revealing russia’s fate in its geography, they are focused on the kinds of questions raised above, and they are starting to lead the way with methodological innovations that lay bare the regime’s political, economic, cultural, and informational underpinnings. 153 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 references ahram, ariel i., and j. paul goode. 2016. “researching authoritarianism in the discipline of democracy.” social science quarterly 97 (4): 834–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12340. beissinger, mark r. 2002. nationalist mobilization and the collapse of the soviet state. cambridge: cambridge university press. ———. 2007. “structure and example in modular political phenomena: the diffusion of bulldozer/rose/orange/tulip revolutions.” perspectives on politics 5 (2): 259–76. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592707070776. bunce, valerie. 1995a. “paper curtains and paper tigers.” slavic review 54 (4): 979–87. https://doi.org/10.2307/2501403. ———. 1995b. “should transitologists be grounded?” slavic review 54 (1): 111–27. https://doi.org/10.2307/2501122. bunce, valerie j., and sharon l. wolchik. 2006. “international diffusion and postcommunist electoral revolutions.” communist and post-communist studies 39 (3): 283–304. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609565. carothers, thomas. 2002. “the end of the transition paradigm.” journal of democracy 13 (1): 5–21. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/carothers-131.pdf. cockburn, patrick. 1989. getting russia wrong: the end of kremlinology. london: verson. accessed november 19, 2024. http://archive.org/details/gettingrussiawro0000cock. cohen, stephen f. 2000. failed crusade: america and the tragedy of post-communist russia. new york: norton. dallin, alexander. 1992. “causes of the collapse of the ussr.” post-soviet affairs 8 (4): 271–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.1992.10641355. dutkiewicz, jan, and jan smolenski. 2023. “epistemic superimposition: the war in ukraine and the poverty of expertise in international relations theory.” journal of international relations and development 26 (4): 619–31. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-023-00314-1. fish, m. steven. 2001. “russian studies without studying.” post-soviet affairs 17 (4): 332–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2001.10641507. freeland, chrystia. 2000. sale of the century: the inside story of the second russian revolution. london: little brown. gans-morse, jordan. 2004. “searching for transitologists: contemporary theories of postcommunist transitions and the myth of a dominant paradigm.” post-soviet affairs 20 (4): 320–49. https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.20.4.320. gaufman, elizaveta. 2023. everyday foreign policy: performing and consuming the russian nation after crimea. manchester: manchester university press. glasius, marlies, lange, meta de, bartman, jos, dalmasso, emanuela, lv, aofei, del sordi, adele, michaelsen, marcus, and kris ruijgrok. 2017. research, ethics and risk in the authoritarian field. new york: springer. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592707070776 https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.20.4.320 154 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 goode, j. paul. 2010. “redefining russia: hybrid regimes, fieldwork, and russian politics.” perspectives on politics 8 (4): 1055–75. https://doi.org/10.1017/s153759271000318x. ———. 2016. “eyes wide shut: democratic reversals, scientific closure, and the study of politics in eurasia.” social science quarterly 97 (4): 876–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12343. guriev, sergei, and daniel treisman. 2022. spin dictators: the changing face of tyranny in the 21st century. princeton: princeton university press. hale, henry e. 2006. “democracy or autocracy on the march? the colored revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism.” communist and post-communist studies 39 (3): 305–29. huntington, samuel p. 1991. the third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century. london: university of oklahoma press. koval, nadiia, kulyk, volodymyr, riabchuk, mykol, zarembo, kateryna, and marianna fakhurdinova. 2022. “morphological analysis of narratives of the russian-ukrainian conflict in western academia and think-tank community.” problems of postcommunism 69 (2): 166–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2021.2009348. leeson, peter, and william trumbull. 2006. “comparing apples: normalcy, russia, and the remaining post-socialist world.” post-soviet affairs 22 (3): 225–48. https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.22.3.225. mcfaul, michael. 2002. “the fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship: noncooperative transitions in the postcommunist world.” world politics 54 (2): 212–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054183. mearsheimer, john j. 2014. “why the ukraine crisis is the west’s fault: the liberal delusions that provoked putin.” foreign affairs 93 (5): 77–89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306. ———. 2022. “the causes and consequences of the ukraine war.” horizons: journal of international relations and sustainable development, no. 21: 12–27. accessed november 19, 2024. https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-summer-2022-issue-no.21/thecauses-and-consequences-of-the-ukraine-war. miller, alexei i. 2023. “talking politics: vladimir putin’s narrative on contemporary history (2019-2022).” russia in global affairs 21 (2): 58–75. https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-63742023-21-2-58-75. monroe, kristen renwick, ed. 2005. perestroika!: the raucous rebellion in political science. new haven: yale university press. ostrow, joel m., satarov, georgiy a., and irina m. khakamada. 2007. the consolidation of dictatorship in russia: an inside view of the demise of democracy. westport, ct: praeger security international. oushakine, serguei alex. 2013. “remembering in public: on the affective management of history.” ab imperio, no. 1: 269–302. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/imp.2013.0000. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/imp.2013.0000 155 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 polianskii, mikhail. 2024. “russian foreign policy research and war in ukraine: old answers to new questions?” communist and post-communist studies 57 (2): 156–72. https://doi.org/10.1525/cpcs.2024.2112378. putin, vladimir. 2021. “ob istoricheskikh edinstve russkikh i ukraintsev [on the historical unity of russians and ukrainians].” july 12, 2021. accessed november 19, 2024. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181. sarty, leigh. 2024. “misreading russia.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 17 (1): 124–38. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v17i1.4409. schatz, edward. 2009. “the soft authoritarian tool kit: agenda-setting power in kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan.” comparative politics 41 (2). https://www.jstor.org/stable/40599210. shleifer, andrei, and daniel treisman. 2004. “a normal country.” foreign affairs 83 (2): 20– 38. accessed august 8, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2004-0301/normal-country. schmitter, philippe c., and terry lynn karl. 1994. “the conceptual travels of transitologists and consolidologists: how far to the east should they attempt to go?” slavic review 53 (1): 173–85. https://doi.org/10.2307/250033. ———. 1995. “from an iron curtain to a paper curtain: grounding transitologists or students of postcommunism?” slavic review 54 (4): 965–78. https://doi.org/10.2307/2501402. silitski, vitali. 2010. “contagion deterred: preemptive authoritarianism in the former soviet union (the case of belarus).” in democracy and authoritarianism in the postcommunist world, 274–99. new york: cambridge university press. snetkov, aglaya. 2007. “the image of the terrorist threat in the official russian press: the moscow theatre crisis (2002) and the beslan hostage crisis (2004).” europe-asia studies 59 (8): 1349–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130701655192. solnick, steven l. 1998. stealing the state: control and collapse in soviet institutions. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. treisman, daniel. 2010. “‘loans for shares’ revisited.” post-soviet affairs 26 (3): 207–27. https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.26.3.207. https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.26.3.207 156 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(1) 2024: 146-156 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 elections in canada and russia in 2019: a comparative analysis of cross-national media coverage anna tsurkan1 canada-russia research initiative abstract in 2019, canada and russia both went through election campaigns; russia held regional and municipal elections in september, while canadians voted at the federal level in october. this article examines cross-national media coverage during the two election campaigns in order to provide a snapshot of the positions and perceptions each country has about the other’s electoral and political processes. the purpose is to identify and explain over-arching narratives that frame each country’s media discourse about the other, as media from the two countries were actively involved in cross-commenting about the situation on the ground as the election campaigns took place and after results were reported. however, the content of canadian and russian reporting differs greatly, in part because of the different levels at which the elections occurred, but more importantly due to differences in underlying assumptions and biases on both sides. while these differing narratives remain in place, it is unlikely that media, and by extension, public opinion about the other country will shift. 1 anna tsurkan is a founder and project coordinator of the canada-russia research initiative. 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 introduction in 2019, canadians and russians went through election campaigns in their respective countries. canada held a general election in october, which resulted in a minority government led by justin trudeau. a month earlier, russia undertook elections of heads and legislative bodies in many regions and municipalities, as well as a number of by-elections at all levels of government. voters in 70 out of 85 regions of the russian federation went to the polls, which outnumbers canadian voters in absolute figures. in comparing the two election campaigns, the level of each election is an important factor, as, in russia, there were multiple separate campaigns at the local and regional levels, each with its own issues and agendas. the canadian election, on the other hand, was conducted across the nation to determine the next federal government. examining these two 2019 elections allows us to take a snapshot of canada-russia relations at a given moment in time, providing insight into mutual perceptions of the other’s electoral processes. this article analyzes pre-election discourses, media coverage, and commentary, and examines the extent to which disinformation campaigns took place on either side. canadian and russian media outlets were actively involved in cross-commenting about the situation in each other’s country in 2019. but this coverage was rather disproportional. on the eve of the canadian federal election campaign, a number of media and research-based analyses (global news 2019; jardine 2019; al-rawi and jiwani 2019; kolga 2019a) suggested the high probability of russian interference, especially in light of the american investigation into russian meddling during the 2016 united states (us) presidential election. during the pre-election period in canada, an anti-russian discourse portraying russia as a potential threat to canadian democracy became one of the dominant themes linked to discussions of election security in the canadian context. the anti-russian media narrative in canada provoked a boost in anti-canadian rhetoric in russia. this contrasted with the traditionally low level of coverage of canada as a topic for analysis in the country. russian media did not suggest that canada was a threat to russian elections, which contrasts with the dominant narrative of a russian threat by canadian media, yet nonetheless, articles about canada in general, and the canadian reaction to the russian elections in particular, were negative in tone even while being sporadic in distribution. nevertheless, the bi-lateral relations between the two nations were further strained by a short canadian twitter campaign in the midst of pre-election opposition rallies in moscow. speaking up against mass detentions, canadian authorities called on their russian counterparts to respect freedoms of assembly which enmeshed the two foreign agencies in twitter diplomacy on the issue. taking into consideration the above-mentioned context and the research task to compare media coverage, this paper is divided into three sections. the first section discusses how a russian factor in the form of non-interference was projected by canadian media outlets as one of the main pillars of free and fair election in the country. the second part looks at russian media frames about the 2019 general election in canada. and, finally, the final section analyzes how canadian journalists covered regional and municipal elections in russia. the conclusion provides the main findings on cross-national media coverage. although the question of election interference is extensively discussed in this article, it does not represent the subject of the research. media coverage could be considered one of the aspects of election meddling, however, other aspects such as spreading misinformation through social media, 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 cyberattacks on politicians and government institutions, intrusions into election systems, and financing favorable candidates are far more serious allegations indicative of actual interference. thus, both interference and non-interference are examined in this context as topics of media coverage influencing people’s perceptions, but the validity of the various claims is not assessed in this article. the research question rather relates to how media discourses and contexts differ in the two countries. methodology and theoretical foundation the notion of ‘media cross-coverage’ is utilized in this paper in addition to a number of standard terms used in the communications field, such as ‘media coverage’ and ‘media discourse’. media cross-coverage refers to media coverage and discourse of pre-election and election campaigns in the two countries in a cross-national commenting format. as opposed to self-coverage, where self is seen as the country of origin of any given media outlet, cross-national coverage is applied to coverage of the other, in this case canadian media coverage of russia and russian media coverage of canada. furthermore, the cross-commenting does, in fact, sometimes transgress the bounds of simple media coverage and includes state officials on various levels making statements on positions and/or actions of their counterparts. in this analysis, statements connected to the substance of this research are analyzed as a part of a framing concept in media, as media content is produced in a continuous interaction between journalists and elites (de vreese 2005, 52-3). in addition, nowadays, any politician in either country can actively participate in a frame-building process by means of social media. this paper specifically focuses on twitter, which has become not only a new tool of digital diplomacy, but also one of the primary sources of troll-generated content aiming to either spread disinformation and/or to create an illusion of public discourse (chamberlain 2010, 16). in terms of methodology, this research draws from both political science and communication studies. taking media content (mainstream as well as social) as the main data for study, both qualitative and quantitative approaches were implemented in content analysis and comparative analysis relative to classical political science theory (wilkerson and casas 2017, 530). in turn, a media framing assessment was conducted based on deductive and empirical communication approaches (de vreese 2005, 53-4). the data collection and text analysis were implemented manually, with the content being drawn from media broadcasts and official statements from russian and canadian sources in russian and english.2 as the main body of this article is divided by elections in canada and russia, a systematic study of major russian3 and canadian4 media outlets was conducted on a regular basis from june, 2 canadian sources in french stayed beyond the scope of this project, which creates an additional opportunity to analyse differences in english and french media coverage of russia in canada in a separate study. 3 channel one russia, dozhd, interfax, izvestia, russian news agency, tass (telegrafnoye agentstvo sovetskogo soyuza), kommersant, moskovskij komsomolets, nezavisimaya gazeta, novaya gazeta, ria (rossiskoe informatsionnoe agentstvo) novosti, russia 1, vedomosti, vesti, vzglyad. 4 the canadian broadcasting corporation (cbc), ctv, global news, globe and mail, national post. 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 2018 to november, 2019 to gauge cross-national coverage of pre-election and election campaigns, as well as election results in both countries. for the same period of time, in the interests of tracing diversity in the existing media discourse on the issue together with an evaluation of the initial stages of media framing and the identification of media content from lesser-known sources, a news search was run through google.ca in english and yandex.ru in russian, with ‘elections in russia’ and ‘election in canada’ as key phrases. in addition, publication tracking on websites and social media accounts of global affairs canada and the russian ministry of foreign affairs, as well as other governmental institutions participating in canada-russia relations, was actively used for gathering information for content analysis and framing assessment. examination of russian media coverage of canada identified the existence of two separate categories of broadcasting. these two categories are examined separately in this paper because the target audience as well as goals of reporting were found to be different. the first category addresses russian-language media directed at a russian-speaking population both in and outside of russia, while the second looks at english-language outlets, in particular, rt (a rebranded version of russia today), which is available in canada online and through all major cable providers, and sputnik, which is available online. both media outlets are widely associated with the kremlin’s propaganda (van herpen 2015; oates 2016) and information warfare (lough et al. 2014). canadian media coverage of russia, which was only in english, contrasted with the russian approach, which published both in english and in russian. speculations about potential russian meddling in the 2019 federal election in canada were widespread in canada, and theoretical and analytical works were published about the issue (alrawi and jiwani 2019; bradshaw 2018; jardine 2019; kolga 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; sukhankin 2019). this present study builds on these sources and supports some of their conclusions. however, the author’s own experience working in the field of international election observation and election management, both in russia and in canada, enriches this article with insights on the essence of the electoral process in the two countries. canadian media coverage of the 2019 general election: the threat of russian meddling despite the absence of party leaders’ debates on foreign policy during the 2019 election campaign, russia played an important role in the campaign. candidates generally criticized russian actions on the world stage, particularly in relation to events in crimea and ukraine in 2014. however, in comparison with the 2015 election campaign, there was a shift from international to national issues and, in particular, to the issues of national cyber security. in this regard, canadian journalists, analysts, politicians, and state institutions placed the potential threat of russian meddling in the election at the centre of the discourse about freedom and fairness of elections in canada. thus, protection against foreign interference was framed as one of the main pillars preserving the canadian democratic process. pre-election period: framing the narrative a focus on election interference was initiated by the media in response to the us investigation into russian meddling during the 2016 american presidential election, and in conjunction with disruptive actions conducted by st. petersburg’s internet research agency, commonly known as 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 the ‘russian troll factory’, which produces content in the name of domestic users in foreign countries. a cache of three million deleted tweets associated with russian trolls (based on their account information) was made public by the us house intelligence committee (us house of representatives 2018). two professors from south carolina’s clemson university collected all tweets (linvill and warren 2018, 3) and shared them with fivethirtyeight website (roeder 2018). having searched this database for 60 keywords connected with canadian issues, cbc journalists revealed in august, 2018 that almost 8,000 russian tweets had targeted canada between june, 2015 and december, 2017 (rocha 2018). following this media report, a national survey commissioned by ctv showed that 69 percent of canadians found it credible that the russian government was using social media to meddle in western democracies (nanos research 2018, 23). the two major canadian media outlets, cbc and ctv, not only allowed the narrative of a potential russian interference in the 2019 election in canada to emerge, but also reinforced it by evaluating people’s perceptions on this matter. the election meddling narrative became theoretically and linguistically conceptualized, with the majority of its concepts being used further in the course of the election campaign. in addition to widely used terms like ‘disinformation’, ‘meddling’ and ‘interference’, certain keywords and ideas that continued to emerge from the initial cbc article (like, ‘target canadians’, ‘sow discord’, ‘polarizing content’, ‘threat to democracy’, etc.) indicate the existence of this narrative that could be found in subsequent media discourse. from august, 2018 to august, 2019, dozens of analyses predicting foreign interference in the 2019 federal election in canada appeared (al-rawi and jiwani 2019, jardine 2019, kolga 2019b, 2019c). several more waves of tweets showcasing the interests of russian trolls in canadian domestic policy were released. a number of research papers on how to secure the election from disinformation coming from abroad were published by researchers and by state security agencies (bradshaw 2018, communications security establishment 2019, kolga 2019a). but, more importantly, the issue was raised at the highest level. in september, 2018, canada’s prime minister justin trudeau, when asked by a journalist, denied direct russian interference in the 2015 canadian election. however, he admitted that canada was aware of and had taken actions to prevent such a possibility in 2019 (council on foreign relations 2018). in april, 2019, he went further. speaking to reporters in toronto about divisive campaigns in social media conducted by “countries like russia,” he re-affirmed that the task of the government was to ensure noninterference in canadian elections (global news 2019). the ‘russian threat’ narrative continued to amplify during the campaign, with contributions from analysts, politicians, state institutions, and media. the government of canada developed and announced a plan to protect canadian democracy in january, 2019. this plan was based on four pillars: informing voters about online threats; engaging social media platforms in tracking disinformation; activating intelligence; and coordinating government institutions’ role in security provision (government of canada 2019). the ‘get cyber safe’ campaign was conducted by a newly-created canadian centre for cyber security, and seven million dollars were allocated by the government toward digital, media, and civic literacy programming (government of canada 2019). nevertheless, alerting the public to the probability of foreign meddling fell largely to news media outlets and politicians who communicated their messages through mass media and social media. previous media research has identified the significant role played by the media in alignment with the government’s objective of informing the electorate (druckman 2005, 476-7). 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 a regular news search through google.ca during this pre-election period detected only two canadian texts counter-arguing the predominant anti-russian discourse (climenhaga 2019; nelson 2019). both of these texts were published in april, 2019 after trudeau’s above-mentioned comments about foreign disinformation campaigns on social media. mocking the election meddling narrative, both authors disputed trudeau’s politics, stating their intention not to support the prime minister and the liberal party during the 2019 general election. the existence of this counter-narrative speaks in favour of public and media pluralism, nonetheless the narrative of russian interference was clearly dominant. climenhaga’s article was posted on a personal blog and nelson’s in the calgary herald. the absence of similar messages in mainstream national media outlets in canada is an indicator that their point of view was an outlier (chomsky 2002, 29). election campaign and election day: expectations vs. reality the election campaign in canada officially started on september 11, 2019. the narrative of potential russian interference was soon eclipsed by campaign scandals and debates among election contestants. russia, or relations with russia in any form, were hardly ever mentioned by candidates or their political parties. this is explained partly by the lack of a separate debate on canadian foreign policy. the only event which had been scheduled – the 2019 munk debate on foreign policy – was cancelled due to trudeau’s absence, in spite of the fact that the other three leaders of major parties, including elizabeth may (green), andrew scheer (conservative) and jagmeet singh (new democratic party) confirmed their participation. two other leaders’ debates involving all six party leaders were organized by a leaders’ debate commission as an integral part of canada’s federal election, one in english and another one in french; these debates focused on internal canadian politics, as did the entire election campaign. the only event where a russian issue came up was the national leaders’ debate held by maclean’s and citytv. the question was raised by paul wells, a moderator and maclean’s senior writer, and addressed elizabeth may’s proposal to shift canadian focus and funding away from nato in spite of “putin’s military muscle flexing” (maclean’s 2019). among the three leaders who participated in this event, russia was mentioned only by may and andrew scheer in their responses, while jagmeet singh addressed another topic. may spoke briefly about putin’s efforts to increase russian nuclear capabilities and canadian lack of surveillance on its arctic shores to intercept russian vessels, while scheer concentrated on the russian government’s actions in ukraine and crimea and promised to support ukrainians in their “fight against the russian aggression.” the conservative leader, who was the house of commons speaker at that time, had been banned from travelling to russia under retaliatory sanctions on 13 canadian officials issued by putin back in march, 2014. when the 2019 federal election took place, the question of whether there had been interference remained open for a while. it was clear right away that the critical election incident protocol, created specifically to decide if a level of disinformation was high enough to notify citizens and compromise elections, was not activated. however, despite the fact that the threshold to threaten the integrity of the election was not met, canadian officials declared that some malicious activities were detected (thompson 2019). although the details were expected to be made public in spring 2020, the elections canada report came out earlier, in mid-february. the document repeated the pre-election security concerns and measures taken by the agency to address them, including the social media monitoring unit operating in 21 languages to detect disinformation. this particular 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 unit flagged only 28 pieces of both misinformation and instances of impersonation of elections canada between august and the election day, which “could have interfered with electors’ ability to vote” (elections canada 2020, 57-9). other than that, no cybersecurity incidents were found to have influenced the electoral process. similar estimates about the scope of foreign election interference had been presented to the public earlier by media outlets with a reference to other stakeholders monitoring potential disruptive actions online. for example, the cbc reported that facebook canada’s global director and head of public policy, kevin chan, did not see signs of election meddling on their platform (thompson 2019). the cbc also published an article titled “fears of election meddling on social media were overblown” (rocha 2019), sharing research results of the digital democracy project, the ryerson social media lab, and the university of toronto's citizen lab. thus, despite high-profile international investigations into russian meddling in foreign elections in the us and france, and the constant discourse of possible russian interference in the canadian federal election, evidence brought out in the media indicated that election-meddling never moved from a potentiality to an actuality. significantly, public discourse on interference versus non-interreference in the 2019 general election in canada was focused on either direct cyberattacks or social media trolls. (dis)information and/or messages in favour or against certain election contestants spread by foreign media broadcasters were not taken into consideration, nor were they counted for the purposes of official statistics, despite the fact that tracing this type of materials is essential for a comparative analysis of media cross-national coverage. the examination of this data is described further in the section about russian english-language media. but, at this point, it seems important to note that what we count as cases of foreign meddling in the internal politics of a sovereign state, and how we count them, finally, produces our definition of interference. in 2019, canada seemed to exclude media broadcasting from their understanding of foreign interference. lessons learned examining the goal of media warnings about potential russian election interference reveals a paradox. on the one hand, the strategy of highlighting such threats was apparently based on the assumption that the more information the media provide about the potential threat, the more protected canadian voters will be. on the other hand, there is no research on the effects of this framing, including information processing effects as well as attitudinal and behavioral effects (de vreese 2005, 52). also unclear is the type of data that could be used to evaluate such effects. unlike a variety of studies looking at how russian trolls contributed to polarization of conversations on social media, studies have not detected a direct correlation between media content and voters’ behavior (gallacher and heerdink 2019; kriel and pavliuc 2019). national surveys and anthropological research conducted in a timely manner might have helped to reveal some interesting linkages. in the meantime, several extracts from the elections canada internal social media monitoring report released by the cbc indicate a relatively high-volume of discussions among canadians questioning the legitimacy of the 2019 election (burke 2020). among the major concerns, directly or indirectly connected with the meddling narrative, were: a) an alleged potential for non-citizens to vote sparked by elections canada’s report of removing more than 100,000 non-canadians from voters’ lists and by questioning the existing id requirements for voting; b) speculations about the 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 release of compromising materials about candidates, in particular justin trudeau, which could have been an indication of foreign media interference in the election campaign; c) other instances of election-related commentary from foreigners. thus, the canadian electorate, as determined by the elections canada’s social media monitoring unit, was partially concerned about the appropriateness of foreign opinions, including media broadcasting coming from outside of the country, during the election campaign period. in turn, elections canada had to remind voters that election law permits people outside of the country to give their views on topics related to canada’s election (burke 2020). russian media coverage of the 2019 general election in canada: trudeau’s hypocrisy and the decline of liberal democracy in contrast with canadian broadcasters, which do not publish in russian language, their russian counterparts have both english-language and russian-language media outlets. their target audience as well as goals of reporting were found to be different which slightly affects the existing narratives. this section explores russian media frames about the 2019 election in canada in both types of broadcasters. canada in russian-language media and political discourse for traditional media outlets and institutions in russia, canada is not a very popular topic for analytical coverage. despite a firm anti-russian stand on most of the issues in the international arena adopted by canada since 2014, the country is mostly perceived by russian foreign agencies and portrayed in the russian media as dependent on the us. the predominant discourse in russia sees canadian eagerness in foreign policy matters strongly interconnected with us foreign policy. canada is presented as being either influenced by the us or attempting to outdo the us (ministry of foreign affairs 2019), but almost never as an independent player. however, russian elites enjoy much more power in this frame-building process in media in russia than their canadian counterparts in canada (de vreese 2005, 52), which allows us to claim that the russian authorities promote narratives about canada which are transmitted by media, shaping public opinion to a certain degree. in response to anti-russian frames put forth in canadian media, a similar boost of anti-canadian discourse was apparent in russia. on january 13, 2019, canada unexpectedly became an object of a ten-minute-long tv report prepared for dmitry kiselev’s weekly news on russia 1. kiselev, the only russian journalist sanctioned by canada for propaganda, charged the canadian government with falling under the strong influence of the ukrainian lobby within its borders (lyadov 2019). the dissemination of a russian state narrative is often depicted in the west as propaganda (jowett and o'donnell 2018, 6). in this view, russian-language media mostly represent a platform for the government to maintain a desired level of support among its citizens. media discourse is also depicted as being connected to national identity in the sense that if patriotism becomes a concept monopolized by the kremlin, those who do not support the state can be labelled unpatriotic, denying them any opportunity to criticize either the government or the dominant narrative (oates 2014, 3). 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 this new form of russianness cannot help influencing russian speakers abroad. researchers suggest the particular interest of russia is to reach out to its citizens who reside outside of the country to promote the idea of a ‘russian world’ (kozdra 2018, 63). however, in some ways this re-connection with the russian state media frames happens naturally. some segments of russianspeaking people abroad watch russian-language television and read russian-language newspapers online. ongoing negative messages about russia in countries of their residence surely affects their russian national identities. as chris nelson from the calgary herald points out, “it is a tad annoying to constantly see your native land being blamed for every problem on earth” (2019). thus, in their attempts to defend these national identities, russians abroad may become prone to accepting narratives coming from russian broadcasters. according to the 2016 census, 622,445 people in canada claimed russian ethnic origins (2016). a few television providers offer russian state-channel packages. russians living in canada can also access the same channels and a wider range of resources produced in russia online. it is not possible to estimate the exact number of russians in canada regularly following the russian media, although the majority stays consciously or unconsciously exposed to the russian content if they read anything in russian on the internet. this content contains media frames, most of which would inevitably contradict those which circulate in canada. recipients of the russian state narrative in canada are accused of spreading the kremlin’s propaganda if they wish to share any contradictory messages or speak up in favour of the russian regime (kolga 2019, 29-31). the russian congress of canada (rcc) expressed its discontent with being labeled as a ‘white propaganda’ outlet or being pro-putin (rcc 2019a). this diaspora organization tried to prove its ideological and financial independence (2019a) and defend its right to represent russian-speaking community interests, including before the government of canada (rcc 2019b). although the russian community in canada is clearly under-studied by researchers, the rcc example demonstrates the adverse effect of seeing pro-russian sources or associations as deliberately propagandist unless they take an anti-putin stand. such an interpretation would make the entire russian diaspora an outcast associated either with the kremlin’s funding, or depicted as being driven by its propaganda. in these circumstances, canadians of russian ethnic origin might feel deprived of their right to participate in any activities related somehow to the russian state or to defend any pro-russian position without being labeled propagandists. such exclusion forces them to make a choice in between russian and canadian discourses, while the media environment becomes extremely polarized. meanwhile, the more stakeholders in canada got involved in an anti-russian discourse, increasing the volume of media broadcasting about potential election interference, the more the russian press broke its previous silence in analytical coverage of canada. in april and may of 2019, three articles were published by filippov, with two appearing in the newspaper vzglyad. in addition to being a regular contributor to russian news outlets, filippov works at the centre of applied research and programs in moscow which specializes in consultation and analysis, with a separate focus in managing election campaigns in russia, abkhazia, belarus and ukraine (prisp, n.d.). in an overly-free and caddish tone, filippov accused canada of meddling in elections abroad, of committing cultural genocide towards its first nations, and of playing the russian card in order to hide its own corruption scandal with snc-lavalin (2019b; 2019c). as examples of canadian election interference, filippov mentioned canada’s role in toppling the regime in ukraine in 2014, 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 its further military and economic support of the country, and canada’s efforts to support juan guaido in venezuela (filippov 2019a). his main idea was to show russian readers that although canada blamed other international actors for their attempts to influence different countries, it has never admitted to the same in its own politics. filippov’s articles illustrate the counter-narrative with which russian media responded to an increase in the intensity and volume of canada’s anti-russian stance. the canadian rhetoric about russia could not simply be ignored in a modern highly interconnected world where information flows relatively freely. paraphrasing oates’ dilemma (2014, 9), if you can’t ignore the canadian frames, how do you try to shape them to fit the strategic narrative? the algorithm included the use of the same frames against the counterpart, by adding counterarguments and further details to support them. distinctively for this type of reporting, being portrayed through the strategic lens, it often contains a significant fraction of truth (paul and matthews 2016, 5). however, a blend of facts which an average consumer would know very little about raises credibility concerns. like in canada, not all the reporting in russia follows the dominant script. for example, in january, 2019, nezavisimaya gazeta published an article by akimushkina, a russian expert in canadian studies, who wrote that canada is not “a northern extension of the usa” (2019). she not only accurately described canada’s stance on russia, but also factually contradicted the foreign ministry’s notion about canada’s dependent foreign policy. that this sort of material was published by a state-affiliated newspaper might seem confusing in the context of state-controlled russian media. nonetheless, it happens occasionally and might reflect either a lack of interest by the authorities in print media, or their own way of challenging certain narratives to test public opinion. canadian election campaign coverage in russian media started a day earlier than the official campaign in canada. on september 10, 2019, ria novosti, an original rt founder and a part of the international information agency group rossiya segodnya, published an article about rising negativity surrounding justin trudeau on the eve of the election campaign in connection with the snc-lavalin corruption scandal (kornilov 2019). the author clearly attempted to undermine the current canadian prime minister by citing spencer fernando, a frequent contributor of antigovernment pieces to the post millennial.5 the russian media outlet claimed that cbc news was taking trudeau’s side because of the broadcaster’s funding boost generated by the prime minister. all this information was given to suggest hypocrisy among liberal canadian politicians and their form of democracy. keeping in mind that ria novosti as a part of rossiya segodnya is included on a list of russian strategic enterprises and is treated as a pro-kremlin media resource, materials produced by this news outlet must be seen in a broader framework of internal and external information campaigns (sukhankin 2019, 9). russian speakers both in russia and in canada are meant to receive a portion of the russian state narrative through such exclusively online pieces of information. thus, they 5 canadian news platform founded in 2017 in montreal and portraying itself as a “reasonable alternative” (the post millennial 2020). 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 inevitably contain pro-russian messages about how, in this case, canada is far from being truly democratic. nevertheless, the russian-language media coverage of the canadian election campaign was not very dynamic. while justin trudeau appeared in newspapers’ headlines several times during this period, the russian press mostly reacted discreetly to the campaign scandals exposed by the canadian press. in particular, an increase in media activity was noted in connection with the release of pictures of trudeau wearing blackface makeup in the past. other than that, the russian media rather neutrally reported the election results, once again coming back to a general lack of interest in covering canadian stories. russian english-language media coverage of canadian election campaign in april, 2019, the predominantly anti-russian rhetoric in canada resulted in a small-scale twitter diplomacy response on alleged charges initiated by the russian embassy. the embassy denied any allegations via its twitter account. the accusation of the impending election meddling was stated as being “fake,” adding to the disinformation campaign against russia. “given #russiagate fiasco in the us, it’s ridiculous to play the same card in canada to distract public attention from real issues,” tweeted russian diplomats (2019). the russian embassy, not unexpectedly, is viewed in canada as promoting the official russian discourse. messages coming from the embassy resemble frames used in russian media outlets, both in their tone and format of delivery. it is equally true with regard to the canadian embassy in russia which represents canadian views and follows the country’s official narrative. russian news outlets broadcast in canada in english to appeal to a broader english-speaking audience, whereas canadian media do not broadcast in russian. thus, while canadian media frames are directed primarily internally, russian english-language narratives are directed at an external audience to challenge those of western media. this state of affairs leads their western counterparts to define these types of russian information sources as propagandists (paul and matthews 2016, 2). despite the fact that even the russian ministry of foreign affairs repeatedly intervenes in the public discourse defending russian english-language media outlets, such as rt and sputnik, both of which are connected under the umbrella of rossiya segodnya, vladimir putin, when talking about the creation of rt, specified that the intention was to introduce “another strong player on the international scene [to] provide unbiased coverage of the events in russia” and to “try to break the anglo-saxon monopoly on the global information streams” (putin 2013). moreover, according to the russian president, as this media outlet receives state funding, “it cannot help but reflect the russian government’s official position on the events in our country and in the rest of the world one way or another.” although both sputnik and rt published articles during the canadian election campaign, the volume of these two outlets was quite different. sputnik issued only three major articles, two of which retranslated the actual campaign scandals and debates, including trudeau’s blackface makeup and scheer’s dual canadian and us citizenship. the third piece was more specific, showcasing election candidates from various provinces. notably, the author of this text called maxim bernier, together with his newly formed people’s party of canada “a powerful new player,” contrasting with canadian mainstream media depictions of bernier, which generally described him as populist (bolotsky 2019). after election day, sputnik shared a video of an imam 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 from british columbia appealing to his congregation to boycott the vote, accusing all the candidates of being “evil” in their approval of homosexuality and supporting “the zionists against islam and the muslims” (korso 2019). rt’s canadian election coverage was much higher in volume, and more anti-trudeau in nature. on the blackface matter alone, rt produced four articles on september 19-20, 2019, which were shared on facebook more than 600 times. through all of them, the canadian prime minister was depicted as a hypocrite, a liar, and a “self-proclaimed champion of ‘liberal values’” (cunningham 2019). the same negative depictions of trudeau in particular, and liberalism in general, were repeated by rt in its op-eds on september 27, october 7, and october 16, right up to the election day, and shared on facebook more than 1,000 times. the articles on trudeau were supplemented with a history of first nations marginalization, the snc-lavalin corruption case, and broken election promises (vivanco 2019a). additionally, rt covered more topics than did sputnik, shoring up the canadian hypocrisy narrative through stories about tensions with the philippines because of the canadian plastic trash, the disrespectful behavior of antifa protesters outside mohawk college in hamilton, trudeau’s bulletproof vest worn at one of the campaign events, air canada’s decision to apply “everyone” as a gender-neutral form of greeting, and a former playboy model with polish roots contesting the election on behalf of the people’s party of canada. and, finally, all the allegations against the current prime minister were repeated in the rt news block on october 16. compared to coverage of trudeau, other election contestants were covered minimally by the outlet. when trudeau won the election, rt portrayed his victory as a lack of competition and a broken electoral system (vivanco 2019b). knowing that rt is available in canada on a variety of basic news packages, its narratives about this country definitely reach the canadian audience, although the exact number of viewers is unknown. their articles went far beyond the original rt and sputnik mandates to improve russia’s image abroad; they easily fall under the category of promoting political polarization in the recipient country. they had the potential to influence voters’ behavior and could be construed as a disinformation campaign or election interference, but it is difficult to assess their effectiveness without further research. canadian media about regional and municipal elections in russia: concerns over political and electoral freedoms the summer of 2019 was marked by regional and municipal election campaigns in the majority of russian regions, with the elections held on september 8th across the country. in contrast to canada, a threat to the integrity of election is perceived somewhat differently in the russian context. moreover, these perceptions vary, in general, among stakeholders. election integrity is measured by the russian authorities as stability for the existing regime, as opposed to pure freedom and fairness of the election. considering widespread demands for free and fair elections in 2011, and the importance of this for an evolving civil society in russia, this concept of stability can be understood as a form of the kremlin’s interference in elections in its own country. 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 in terms of the electoral process, this interference is often expressed in registration barriers and denials of oppositional candidates, misuse of administrative resources, and inequitable media coverage, as well as election day fraud reported by numerous international and independent domestic observers.6 an ‘electoral fallacy’ has been described as an integral part of putin’s first two terms, and has been traced back to the yeltsin era and the soviet union (evans 2011, 42-3). beyond the electoral process, this fallacy is rooted in the state of the political system in russia. the opposition in the country is extensively covered as driven by external forces. they are presented as the “fifth column” funded by the us state department, while people who express their opposing views through participation in activism in person or online are exposed to political persecution (katorzhnov 2014; martinov 2011; pinchuk 2019). media coverage and twitter diplomacy election campaigns in russia officially started on may 30, 2019. by then, prominent opposition figure alexei navalny had been promoting his new voting initiative ‘smart vote’ for half a year. the idea of this project was to encourage voters to support the strongest candidates despite their party’s affiliation, to win a victory over election contestants associated with united russia (navalny 2018). navalny and his team identified candidates in various electoral districts across the country, based mainly on previous election results. this data was made publicly accessible to voters online. beyond that, navalny’s anti-corruption foundation endorsed a number of election contestants in several russian regions. none of these activities were covered by canadian media outlets until a series of demonstrations occurred after the official denial of registration for opposition candidates aiming to contest the 2019 moscow city duma election. after the first rally on july 20, 2019 gathered around 22,000 people, subsequent protests were not authorized by the city administration.7 this is when the media coverage by canadian broadcasters began. on july 27-29, canadian media outlets reposted news articles originally published by reuters and associated press about massive arrests in moscow and the suspected poisoning of alexei navalny. cbc, ctv and global news all discussed the situation in moscow in their televised news reports. their stories about the kremlin’s involvement referred to a series of similar alleged operations, including poisonings of sergey and yulia skripal, alexander litvinenko, and viktor yushchenko. the first article about the events in moscow appeared in the globe and mail on july 30, written by american author amy knight (2019).8 knight, together with another leading american researcher, william pomeranz, presented their vision on ctv news earlier. more american 6 the respective conclusions on the essence of these allegations of election violations are based on findings and reports of the following election observation missions and groups: osce/odihr, osce pa, pace, golos, league of voters, citizen observer, sonar, for clean elections and national civil monitoring. this data from 2011 to 2018 election campaigns in russia can be found on the internet and is not included into bibliography of this paper. in addition, having served as a member with a decisive vote of a precinct election commission in moscow during 2013 and 2014 regional elections, the author of this article witnessed several attempts and some particular cases of election violations. 7 an authorisation is required for any type of protests except for an individual one, according to the russian legislature. 8 the use of us experts on russia in canadian media outlets is very common and they are interviewed extensively. 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 experts shared their points of views on global news, questioning putin’s role in this whole story (pazzano 2019). global also introduced to the canadian audience that more russian regions had rallies of the same sort. the russian smart vote initiative appeared in the information environment in canada only a couple of days prior to the election day, on september 6, 2019. notably, the globe and mail interviewed exiled russian oligarch mikhail khodorkovsky, who called on voters to support only “genuine” opposition candidates in contrast to navalny’s plan (mackinnon 2019a). on july 29, 2019, by means of its twitter, global affairs canada (@canadafp) expressed grave concerns over the detention of more than a thousand participants in a pre-election opposition rally held two days previously in moscow. the canadian agency referred to the russian constitution, which includes such fundamental rights as freedom of assembly and expression. canadians called on “russian authorities to respect these rights and refrain from violence” (july 29, 2019). in response, the russian ministry of foreign affairs (@mfa_russia) recalled clashes between canadian demonstrators and local police forces in quebec city in march, 2015 (july 30, 2019). this exchange of narratives upgraded simple media coverage to the level of foreign policy practitioners in both countries. despite that the canadian broadcasters did not produce content in russian, thus limiting access for the russian audience, russian media outlets took countermeasures against the canadian coverage of russian elections. a frequent rt contributor, canadian independent journalist, eva bartlett (@evakbartlett) claimed through her facebook page that she came to moscow to observe russian protests without financial assistance from any broadcasters (august 11, 2019).9 without any prior expertise on russia, she made assumptions about the apathetic spirit of opposition protestors in moscow and specifically denied cbc’s narratives about “intense police repression.” these messages ignited more than 100 comments, including a number of aggressive exchanges between the author and her followers, and marked 270 shares of the original post on facebook. they were also widely used by russian media outlets. for example, bartlett’s views were quoted by vzglyad and eurasia daily, while federal news agency and izvestia interviewed her. although in these interviews bartlett admitted her limited knowledge about the situation in russia and an absolute lack of russian language skills which prevented her from gaining insights from protesters, she re-translated several common russian anti-opposition media frames about foreign interference and us state department funding (bartlett 2019b, 2019c). election results: canadian perceptions the successful strategy developed by key oppositional players, in combination with demonstrations and media coverage of the events within the country and abroad, led to a significant shift in the election results compared to previous elections. until the 2019 election, the ruling party, united russia, was represented in the moscow city council by 38 deputies. on september 8, 2019, united russia received only 25 of 45 seats in the city. a similar situation was seen in khabarovsk region, mari el republic, irkutsk, birobidzhan, penza, and anadyr. having featured rallies and detentions earlier, canadian broadcasters waited until the elections were over in russia before making any assessments. most of the outlets, with the exception of the 9 on her blog, ‘in gaza and beyond’ bartlett (n.d.) defines herself as “an independent writer and rights activist with extensive experience in syria and in the gaza strip.” 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 cbc and the globe and mail, limited their coverage to reports from reuters and associated press. the cbc, which has its correspondent, chris brown, stationed in moscow, made an attempt, with the assistance of a few russian scholars, to evaluate the election results on september 9th. on september 12th, the cbc broadcast a 24-minute segment from brown, which began with a comparison of canadian and russian elections. brown (2019) stated that canadian elections were “a lot more competitive, freer and unpredictable in terms of who was going to win than you would see in russia.” he expressed the view that the election outcome was much worse for the kremlin than had been expected. but more than that, brown presented insights based on background information about the situation in russia that often is not typically provided to a canadian audience. in particular, he mentioned how and why a narrative of a stable government differs in the two countries. the globe and mail sent its london-based correspondent, mark mackinnon, to moscow on the eve of their elections, and subsequently published four original articles between september 8th and 12th. mackinnon (2019b) fully described election results in various russian regions, as well as the essence of navalny’s smart vote tactic, calling it controversial. in addition, the globe and mail featured lyubov sobol, the opposition candidate promoted by navalny, whose registration to contest these elections was rejected, and followed up on police raids against addresses affiliated with navalny’s supporters across the country. russian authorities, capitalizing on the western interference narrative in russian media, made accusations against the canadian media coverage of russian elections. a foreign ministry representative, ilya timohov, outlined a strong new russian narrative at a meeting of the interim federation council commission to protect state sovereignty and prevent interference in the russian federation’s domestic affairs. despite the fact that no concrete examples of the canadian broadcasters’ misconduct were given, the canadian media was referenced in regard to their alleged information campaign against russia and its existing regime, as well as attempts to influence the russian population (timohov 2019). the russian foreign ministry seemed dissatisfied with the extensive reporting about the above-mentioned pre-election rallies and arrests. the russian frame about this type of western media election interference was spread further in the country’s media, carrying cross-national coverage to the point of absurdity. conclusion concluding this snapshot of cross-national media coverage of electoral campaigns, it is apparent that both countries report on the elections of their counterparts using certain media frames. however, the canadian media directs its state narratives exclusively at an english-speaking audience, primarily local. russian broadcasters and state institutions have both russianand english-language channels to transmit information. russian-language resources target a russianspeaking audience both in russia and abroad, while english-language sources from russia are directed at all english-speakers, including canadians. the content of canadian and russian reporting differs greatly. canadian media and officials accuse russia of election meddling, basing their charges on previous examples of similar violations proven by investigations and research (communications security establishment 2017; 2019; al-rawi and jiwani 2019). russian outlets and authorities also accuse canada by calling 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 any media coverage, especially on election day, a form of interference (timohov 2019). at the same time, russian reporting both in english and in russian contains a negative vocabulary and offensive tone which is not the norm in canadian reporting (e.g., filippov 2019b; cunningham 2019). canadian broadcasters feature the russian opposition and its activity more than the kremlin (e.g., mackinnon 2019b), but generally do not produce insulting materials. in contrast, all the negativity in russian media is abusive, using terms such as a “poster-boy politician,” a “repeat offender,” a “self-proclaimed champion of liberal values,” a “pathetic fraud” having “racist blood,” “two-faced justin trudeau,” “trudeaumania,” “hypocrisy and duplicity of the smooth-talking liberals,” etc. finally, elections canada did not try to regulate media content outside of the country and reminded voters that election law permits people outside of the country to give their views on topics related to canada’s election (burke 2020). in contrast, the russian central election commission and the ministry of foreign affairs stressed that foreign media in their respective countries should obey the russian election law when covering russian elections (timohov 2019). in canada, where citizens trust the system, the perception of threat to the process is external, and this notion is reflected in media coverage. in russia, where citizens trust neither the system nor media coverage, the perception of threat is internal. the totally unexpected successes of the russian opposition in this election period forced certain changes in russian media coverage, as state-owned mainstream media outlets had to acknowledge the decrease in popularity for united russia across the country. this article has focused on cross-national media coverage during the russian regional elections of september 2019 and canadian federal elections of october 2019 in order to provide a snapshot of the positions and perceptions each country has about the other’s electoral and political processes. what is important in the wider perspective, however, is the existence of certain over-arching narratives that frame each country’s media discourse about the other. these media frames, largely negative ones in 2019, become interpretive tools for media consumers and ultimately translate not only elections but any event or phenomenon, using a familiar set of tropes, visual images, and linguistic associations. it is these narratives – invisible, assumed and often taken for granted – that this article has set out to explore, explain, and make visible. while these discourses remain in place it is unlikely that media, and by extension, public opinion about the other country, will shift. it will be important to keep these assumptions and biases on both sides in mind as the two countries endeavor to find common ground and work together on issues of international importance. 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 references akimushkina, irina. 2019. “canada is not ‘a northern extension of the usa.’” [in russian.] nezavisimaya gazeta, january 27, 2019. http://www.ng.ru/dipkurer/2019-0127/10_7492_canada.html. al-rawi, ahmed and yasmin jiwani. 2019. “russian twitter trolls stoke anti-immigrant lies ahead of canadian election.” the conversation, july 23, 2019. https://theconversation.com/russian-twitter-trolls-stoke-anti-immigrant-lies-ahead-ofcanadian-election-119144. bartlett, eva (@evakbartlett). 2019. “i’ve been to many protests, in dc (2006, against israeli bombings of lebanon and gaza), in bil’in (at least 10 times, 2007), in gaza (too many times to count), in toronto (quds day protests).” facebook, august 11, 2019. https://www.facebook.com/100000000104830/posts/2618957821447529. bartlett, eva. 2019b. “american embassy actively promoted the august 10 ‘opposition’ rally” (interview). [in russian]. fan, august 13, 2019. https://riafan.ru/1203382-eva-bartlettamerikanskoe-posolstvo-aktivno-reklamirovalo-miting-oppozicii-10-avgusta. _____. 2019c. “i saw attempts of provocations aimed at police” (interview). [in russian]. izvestia, august 17, 2019. https://iz.ru/911267/izvestiia/ia-videla-popytki-sprovotcirovat-politciiu. _____. n.d. “about me.” in gaza and beyond, blog entry. accessed on april 14, 2020. https://ingaza.wordpress.com/about-me/. bolotsky, denis. 2019. “trudeau’s liberals face uphill battle in canada’s heartlands ahead of federal elections.” sputnik, october 18, 2019. https://sputniknews.com/us/201910181077087738-trudeaus-liberals-face-uphill-battle-incanadas-heartlands-ahead-of-federal-elections/. bradshaw, samantha. 2018. “securing canadian elections: disinformation, computational propaganda, targeted advertising and what to expect in 2019.” behind the headlines: research paper series 66 (3): 1-12. brown, chris. 2019. “understanding vladimir putin’s grip on power: interview with chris brown.” cbc front burner september 12, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/understanding-vladimir-putin-s-grip-on-power1.5281725. burke, ashley. 2020. “social media users voiced fears about election manipulation during 2019 campaign, says elections canada.” cbc news, january 30, 2020. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/elections-canada-social-media-monitoring-findings1.5444268. chamberlain, p.r., 2010. “twitter as a vector for disinformation.” journal of information warfare 9 (1): 11-17. http://www.ng.ru/dipkurer/2019-01-27/10_7492_canada.html http://www.ng.ru/dipkurer/2019-01-27/10_7492_canada.html https://theconversation.com/russian-twitter-trolls-stoke-anti-immigrant-lies-ahead-of-canadian-election-119144 https://theconversation.com/russian-twitter-trolls-stoke-anti-immigrant-lies-ahead-of-canadian-election-119144 https://www.facebook.com/100000000104830/posts/2618957821447529 https://riafan.ru/1203382-eva-bartlett-amerikanskoe-posolstvo-aktivno-reklamirovalo-miting-oppozicii-10-avgusta https://riafan.ru/1203382-eva-bartlett-amerikanskoe-posolstvo-aktivno-reklamirovalo-miting-oppozicii-10-avgusta https://iz.ru/911267/izvestiia/ia-videla-popytki-sprovotcirovat-politciiu https://ingaza.wordpress.com/about-me/ https://sputniknews.com/us/201910181077087738-trudeaus-liberals-face-uphill-battle-in-canadas-heartlands-ahead-of-federal-elections/ https://sputniknews.com/us/201910181077087738-trudeaus-liberals-face-uphill-battle-in-canadas-heartlands-ahead-of-federal-elections/ https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/understanding-vladimir-putin-s-grip-on-power-1.5281725. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/understanding-vladimir-putin-s-grip-on-power-1.5281725. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/elections-canada-social-media-monitoring-findings-1.5444268 https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/elections-canada-social-media-monitoring-findings-1.5444268 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 chomsky, noam. 2002. media control: the spectacular achievements of propaganda. new york: seven stories press. climenhaga, david. 2019. “an election’s coming and the pm’s treading water – where’s a russian to blame now that we need one?” alberta politics, blog entry, april 7, 2019. https://albertapolitics.ca/2019/04/an-elections-coming-and-the-pms-treading-water-wheresa-russian-to-blame-now-that-we-need-one/. communications security establishment. 2017. cyber threats to canada’s democratic process. ottawa: government of canada. https://cyber.gc.ca/sites/default/files/publications/csecyber-threat-assessment-e.pdf. _____. 2019. 2019 update: cyber threats to canada’s democratic process. ottawa: government of canada. https://cyber.gc.ca/sites/default/files/publications/tdp-2019-report_e.pdf. council on foreign relations. 2018. “a conversation with justin trudeau, chrystia freeland, and jim carr” video, 55:26. september 25, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/event/conversationjustin-trudeau-chrystia-freeland-and-jim-carr. cunningham, finian. 2019. “canada’s furor over trudeau’s racist problems is only skin deep.” rt, op-ed, september 20, 2019. https://www.rt.com/op-ed/469259-trudeau-canadaindigenous-rights/. de vreese, claes h. 2005. “news framing: theory and typology.” information design journal & document design 13 (1): 51-62. druckman, james n. 2005. “media matter: how newspapers and television news cover campaigns and influence voters.” political communication 22 (4): 463-481. elections canada. 2020. report on the 43rd general election of october 21, 2019. ec 94372, february 2020. https://www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/sta_ge43/stat_ge43_e.pdf. evans, alfred b. 2011. “the failure of democratization in russia: a comparative perspective.” journal of eurasian studies 2 (1): 40-51. filippov, artem. 2019a. “how canada interfered in elections in other countries.” [in russian.] vzglyad, april 23, 2019. https://vz.ru/world/2019/4/23/974520.html. _____. 2019b. “canadian indians are extirpated right at school.” [in russian.] vzglyad, may 11, 2019. https://vz.ru/world/2019/5/11/977091.html. _____. 2019c. “the government of canada plays the russian card attempting to hide corruption.” [in russian.] slovo i delo, may 11, 2019. https://slovodel.com/527704-pravitelstvo-kanadyrazygryvaet-rossiiskuyu-kartu-v-popytke-skryt-korrupciyu. foreign policy can (@canadafp). 2019. “canada is gravely concerned 1000+ peaceful protesters were detained in advance of upcoming #moscow elections. freedom of assembly and expression are fundamental rights & enshrined in constitution.” twitter, july 29, 2019. https://twitter.com/canadafp/status/1155937471533727744. https://albertapolitics.ca/2019/04/an-elections-coming-and-the-pms-treading-water-wheres-a-russian-to-blame-now-that-we-need-one/ https://albertapolitics.ca/2019/04/an-elections-coming-and-the-pms-treading-water-wheres-a-russian-to-blame-now-that-we-need-one/ https://cyber.gc.ca/sites/default/files/publications/cse-cyber-threat-assessment-e.pdf https://cyber.gc.ca/sites/default/files/publications/cse-cyber-threat-assessment-e.pdf https://cyber.gc.ca/sites/default/files/publications/tdp-2019-report_e.pdf https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-justin-trudeau-chrystia-freeland-and-jim-carr https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-justin-trudeau-chrystia-freeland-and-jim-carr https://www.rt.com/op-ed/469259-trudeau-canada-indigenous-rights/ https://www.rt.com/op-ed/469259-trudeau-canada-indigenous-rights/ https://www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/sta_ge43/stat_ge43_e.pdf. https://vz.ru/world/2019/4/23/974520.html https://vz.ru/world/2019/5/11/977091.html https://slovodel.com/527704-pravitelstvo-kanady-razygryvaet-rossiiskuyu-kartu-v-popytke-skryt-korrupciyu https://slovodel.com/527704-pravitelstvo-kanady-razygryvaet-rossiiskuyu-kartu-v-popytke-skryt-korrupciyu https://twitter.com/hashtag/moscow?src=hashtag_click https://twitter.com/canadafp/status/1155937471533727744 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 gallacher, john and marc heerdink. 2019. “measuring the effect of russian internet research agency information operations in online conversations.” defence strategic communications 6 (spring): 155-198. global news. 2019. “trudeau: government taking steps to fight foreign election interference,” video, 1:06. april 5, 2019. https://globalnews.ca/video/5134751/trudeau-governmenttaking-steps-to-fight-foreign-election-interference. government of canada. 2019. “the government of canada’s plan to safeguard canada’s 2019 election.” canada.ca, democratic institutions, march 21, 2019. https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/news/2019/03/speech-thegovernment-ofcanadas-plan-to-safeguard-canadas-2019-election.html. jardine, eric. 2019. “a storm of misinformation is coming. our federal election could be at risk.” the globe and mail, april 16, 2019. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-astorm-of-misinformation-is-coming-our-federal-election-could-be-at/. jowett, garth and victoria o’donnell. 2018. propaganda & persuasion, 7th edition. thousand oaks: sage publications. katorzhnov, dmitry. 2014. “putin and the fifth column. experts comment on president’s words.” [in russian.] mk.ru, december 18, 2014. https://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/12/18/putin-ipyataya-kolonna-slova-prezidenta-kommentiruyut-eksperty.html. knight, amy. 2019. “the kremlin lashes out against the people, but russians are no longer afraid to fight back.” the globe and mail, july 30, 2019. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-kremlin-lashes-out-against-thepeople-but-russians-are-no-longer/. kolga, marcus. 2019a. stemming the virus: understanding and responding to the threat of russian disinformation. ottawa: macdonald-laurier institute publication. http://macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/20181211_mli_russian_disinformation%20paper_ fweb.pdf. _____. 2019b. “canada needs a plan to deal with hostile cyber campaigns.” national post, may 6, 2019. https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canada-needs-a-plan-to-deal-with-hostile-cybercampaigns. _____. 2019c. “russian disinformation is attacking our democracy and making us sick.” the star, february 21, 2019. https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2019/02/21/russiandisinformation-is-attacking-our-democracy-and-making-us-sick.html. kornilov, vladimir. 2019. “corruption benefits are described to canada.” [in russian.] ria novosti, september 10, 2019. https://ria.ru/20190910/1558491839.html. https://globalnews.ca/video/5134751/trudeau-government-taking-steps-to-fight-foreign-election-interference https://globalnews.ca/video/5134751/trudeau-government-taking-steps-to-fight-foreign-election-interference https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/news/2019/03/speech-thegovernment-of-canadas-plan-to-safeguard-canadas-2019-election.html https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/news/2019/03/speech-thegovernment-of-canadas-plan-to-safeguard-canadas-2019-election.html https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-a-storm-of-misinformation-is-coming-our-federal-election-could-be-at/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-a-storm-of-misinformation-is-coming-our-federal-election-could-be-at/ https://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/12/18/putin-i-pyataya-kolonna-slova-prezidenta-kommentiruyut-eksperty.html https://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/12/18/putin-i-pyataya-kolonna-slova-prezidenta-kommentiruyut-eksperty.html https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-kremlin-lashes-out-against-the-people-but-russians-are-no-longer/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-kremlin-lashes-out-against-the-people-but-russians-are-no-longer/ http://macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/20181211_mli_russian_disinformation%20paper_fweb.pdf http://macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/20181211_mli_russian_disinformation%20paper_fweb.pdf https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canada-needs-a-plan-to-deal-with-hostile-cyber-campaigns https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canada-needs-a-plan-to-deal-with-hostile-cyber-campaigns https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2019/02/21/russian-disinformation-is-attacking-our-democracy-and-making-us-sick.html https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2019/02/21/russian-disinformation-is-attacking-our-democracy-and-making-us-sick.html https://ria.ru/20190910/1558491839.html 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 korso, tim. 2019. “canadian imam urged worshipers not to vote for ‘filthy non-muslim’ candidates ahead of election,” with video of younus kathrada. sputnik, october 22, 2019. https://sputniknews.com/us/201910221077120282-canadian-imam-worshipers-vote-forfilthy-non-muslim-candidates/. kozdra, michał. 2018. “the boundaries of russian identity analysis of the concept of russkiy mir in contemporary russian online media.” lingua cultura 12 (1): 61-66. kriel, charles, and alexa pavliuc. 2019. “reverse engineering russian internet research agency tactics through network analysis.” defence strategic communication 6 (spring): 199-227. linvill, darren l. and patrick l. warren. 2018. “troll factories: the internet research agency and state-sponsored agenda building.” resource centre on media freedom in europe, june, 2018. https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/publications/academic-sources/troll-factoriesthe-internet-research-agency-and-state-sponsored-agenda-building. lough, john, orysia lutsevych, peter pomerantsev, stanislav secrieru, and anton shekhovtsov. 2014. “russian influence abroad: non-state actors and propaganda.” chatham house, russia and eurasia programme meeting summary, october 24, 2014. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20141024russianin fluenceabroad.pdf. lyadov, anton. 2019. “ukrainians manage to disagree with russians even in canada.” [in russian] january 13, 2019. russia 1 video, 9:28, https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=3104005. mackinnon, mark. 2019a. “kremlin gearing up bid to permanently quash protest movement, russian oligarch in exile warns.” the globe and mail, september 6, 2019. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-kremlin-gearing-up-bid-to-permanentlysquash-protest-movement-russian/. _____. “putin’s opponents cheer results as russia’s ruling party suffers setbacks in local elections.” the globe and mail, september 9, 2019. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-putins-opponents-cheer-results-as-russiasruling-party-suffers/. maclean’s. 2019. “national leaders debate 2019,” video, 1:59:41, september 10, 2019. https://www.macleans.ca/politics/national-leaders-debate-2019-live-video-macleans-andcitytv/. martinov, andrey. 2011. “oppositionist gave his colleagues a broadside.” [in russian.] mk.ru, july 1, https://www.mk.ru/politics/2011/07/01/602169-oppozitsioner-obrushilsya-nakolleg.html. https://sputniknews.com/us/201910221077120282-canadian-imam-worshipers-vote-for-filthy-non-muslim-candidates/ https://sputniknews.com/us/201910221077120282-canadian-imam-worshipers-vote-for-filthy-non-muslim-candidates/ https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/publications/academic-sources/troll-factories-the-internet-research-agency-and-state-sponsored-agenda-building. https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/publications/academic-sources/troll-factories-the-internet-research-agency-and-state-sponsored-agenda-building. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20141024russianinfluenceabroad.pdf https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20141024russianinfluenceabroad.pdf https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=3104005 https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-kremlin-gearing-up-bid-to-permanently-squash-protest-movement-russian/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-kremlin-gearing-up-bid-to-permanently-squash-protest-movement-russian/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-putins-opponents-cheer-results-as-russias-ruling-party-suffers/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-putins-opponents-cheer-results-as-russias-ruling-party-suffers/ https://www.macleans.ca/politics/national-leaders-debate-2019-live-video-macleans-and-citytv/ https://www.macleans.ca/politics/national-leaders-debate-2019-live-video-macleans-and-citytv/ https://www.mk.ru/politics/2011/07/01/602169-oppozitsioner-obrushilsya-na-kolleg.html https://www.mk.ru/politics/2011/07/01/602169-oppozitsioner-obrushilsya-na-kolleg.html 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 mfa russia (@mfa_russia). 2019. “march, 2015, #quebec city. #police fired tear gas and clashed with protesters outside, after demonstrators gathered in the protest against austerity policies. see for yourselves. #isthisdemocracy.” twitter, july 30, 2019. https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1156201738225029121. ministry of the foreign affairs of the russian federation. 2019. “comment by the information and press department regarding new anti-russia sanctions adopted by the united states and canada.” march 15, 2019. http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkj e02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb. nanos research. 2018. “most canadians believe that the russian government is using social media to meddle in the elections of western democracies.” ctv news and nanos national survey, august, 2018. http://www.nanos.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2018-1239-ctv-julyrussian-election-interference-populated-report-w-tabs.pdf. navalny, alexei. 2018. “how we will win a victory over the united russia during elections. smart vote.” [in russian.] navalny, blog entry. november 28, 2018. https://navalny.com/p/6017/. nelson, chris. 2019. “trudeau’s more of a threat to canada than russia.” the calgary herald, april 11, 2019. https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/nelson-trudeaus-more-of-athreat-than-russia/. oates, sarah. 2014. “russian state narrative in the digital age: rewired propaganda in russian television news framing of malaysia airlines flight 17.” american political science association annual meeting, august 1, 2014. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941192. oates, sarah. 2016. “russian media in the digital age: propaganda rewired.” russian politics 1 (4): 398-417. paul, christopher and miriam matthews. 2016. “the russian ‘firehose of falsehood’ propaganda model.” rand corporation: 2-7. pazzano, jasmine. 2019. “moscow’s local election has shaken all of russia. here’s why.” global news, august 17, 2019. https://globalnews.ca/news/5775688/moscow-local-electionshakes-russia-heres-why/. pinchuk, alina. 2019. “’a wave of repression has begun.’ who and why faces the prospect of persecution.” [in russian.] radio svoboda, february 7, 2019. https://www.svoboda.org/a/29757531.html. prisp. n.d. “election campaigns by prisp centre.” [in russian.] accessed on april 6, 2020. http://www.prisp.ru/experience/28-prisp-elections. putin, vladimir. 2013. (text version of an interview) “visit to russia today television channel.” kremlin. published on june 11, 2013. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319. https://twitter.com/hashtag/quebec?src=hashtag_click https://twitter.com/hashtag/police?src=hashtag_click https://twitter.com/hashtag/isthisdemocracy?src=hashtag_click https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1156201738225029121 http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cknonkje02bw/content/id/3573396?p_p_id=101_instance_cknonkje02bw&_101_instance_cknonkje02bw_languageid=en_gb http://www.nanos.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2018-1239-ctv-july-russian-election-interference-populated-report-w-tabs.pdf http://www.nanos.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2018-1239-ctv-july-russian-election-interference-populated-report-w-tabs.pdf https://navalny.com/p/6017/ https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/nelson-trudeaus-more-of-a-threat-than-russia/ https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/nelson-trudeaus-more-of-a-threat-than-russia/ https://globalnews.ca/news/5775688/moscow-local-election-shakes-russia-heres-why/ https://globalnews.ca/news/5775688/moscow-local-election-shakes-russia-heres-why/ https://www.svoboda.org/a/29757531.html http://www.prisp.ru/experience/28-prisp-elections http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 rocha, roberto. 2018. “data sheds light on how russian twitter trolls targeted canadians.” cbc news, august 3, 2018. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/russian-twitter-trolls-canadatargeted-1.4772397. rocha, roberto. 2019. “fears of election meddling on social media were overblown, say researchers.” cbc news, november 3, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/socialmedia-bots-trolls-canadian-election-2019-1.5343210. roeder, oliver. 2018. “why we’re sharing 3 million russian troll tweets.” fivethirtyeight, july 31, 2018. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-were-sharing-3-million-russiantroll-tweets/. russia in canada (@russianembassyc). 2019. “blaming moscow for fake #meddling is pure disinformation. given #russiagate fiasco in the us, it's ridiculous to play the same card in canada to distract public attention from real issues #cndpoli.” twitter, apr. 5, 2019. https://twitter.com/russianembassyc/status/1114246378111111168. russian congress of canada (rcc) board of directors. 2019a. “rcc statement on cbc coverage of the rossiya 1 report on the ukrainian canadian diaspora.” russian congress of canada. february 10, 2019. http://russiancongresscanada.org/news-en/rcc-statement-on-cbccoverage-of-the-rossiya-1-report-on-the-ukrainian-canadian-diaspora/. _____. 2019b. “open letter to the macdonald-laurier institute in reply to the publication of marcus kolga’s report ‘stemming the virus.’” russian congress of canada. february 23, 2019. http://russiancongresscanada.org/press-releases-en/open-letter-to-the-macdonaldlaurier-institute-in-reply-to-the-publication-of-marcus-kolgas-report-stemming-the-virus/. statistics canada. 2016. “2016 census of population.” statistics canada catalogue no. 98-400x2016187. sukhankin, sergey. 2019. “the western alliance in the face of the russian (dis) information machine: where does canada stand?” the school of public policy publications, university of calgary, research paper 12:26. the post millennial. 2020. “about us.” february 18, 2020. https://www.thepostmillennial.com/page/about-us. timohov, ilya. 2019. (remarks). “meeting of a working group of an interim federation council commission to protect state sovereignty and prevent the interference in the russian federation’s domestic affairs.” [in russian]. filmed on september 12, 2019. federation council video, 1:23:13, http://council.gov.ru/events/news/107732/?hl=рабочая%20группа%20временной%20ко миссии%20совета%20федерации%20по%20защите%20государственного%20сувере нитета%20и%20предотвращению%20вмешательства%20во%20внутренние%20дела %20россии. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/russian-twitter-trolls-canada-targeted-1.4772397 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/russian-twitter-trolls-canada-targeted-1.4772397 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/social-media-bots-trolls-canadian-election-2019-1.5343210 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/social-media-bots-trolls-canadian-election-2019-1.5343210 https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-were-sharing-3-million-russian-troll-tweets/ https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-were-sharing-3-million-russian-troll-tweets/ https://twitter.com/hashtag/meddling?src=hashtag_click https://twitter.com/hashtag/russiagate?src=hashtag_click https://twitter.com/hashtag/cndpoli?src=hashtag_click https://twitter.com/russianembassyc/status/1114246378111111168 http://russiancongresscanada.org/news-en/rcc-statement-on-cbc-coverage-of-the-rossiya-1-report-on-the-ukrainian-canadian-diaspora/ http://russiancongresscanada.org/news-en/rcc-statement-on-cbc-coverage-of-the-rossiya-1-report-on-the-ukrainian-canadian-diaspora/ http://russiancongresscanada.org/press-releases-en/open-letter-to-the-macdonald-laurier-institute-in-reply-to-the-publication-of-marcus-kolgas-report-stemming-the-virus/ http://russiancongresscanada.org/press-releases-en/open-letter-to-the-macdonald-laurier-institute-in-reply-to-the-publication-of-marcus-kolgas-report-stemming-the-virus/ https://www.thepostmillennial.com/page/about-us http://council.gov.ru/events/news/107732/?hl=рабочая%20группа%20временной%20комиссии%20совета%20федерации%20по%20защите%20государственного%20суверенитета%20и%20предотвращению%20вмешательства%20во%20внутренние%20дела%20россии http://council.gov.ru/events/news/107732/?hl=рабочая%20группа%20временной%20комиссии%20совета%20федерации%20по%20защите%20государственного%20суверенитета%20и%20предотвращению%20вмешательства%20во%20внутренние%20дела%20россии http://council.gov.ru/events/news/107732/?hl=рабочая%20группа%20временной%20комиссии%20совета%20федерации%20по%20защите%20государственного%20суверенитета%20и%20предотвращению%20вмешательства%20во%20внутренние%20дела%20россии http://council.gov.ru/events/news/107732/?hl=рабочая%20группа%20временной%20комиссии%20совета%20федерации%20по%20защите%20государственного%20суверенитета%20и%20предотвращению%20вмешательства%20во%20внутренние%20дела%20россии 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 thompson, elizabeth. 2019. “‘more needs to be done,’ gould says after some online election meddling detected.” cbc news, october 28, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/election-misinformation-disinformation-interference1.5336662. us house of representatives permanent select committee on intelligence. 2018. “schiff statement on release of twitter ads, accounts and data.” press releases, june 18, https://intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?documentid=396. van herpen, marcel h. 2015. putin’s propaganda machine: soft power and russian foreign policy. lanham, md: rowman and littlefield. vivanco, pablo. 2019a. “the end of trudeaumania: canadians are over pm's image obsession, lack of substance & broken promises.” rt, op-ed. october 16, 2019. https://www.rt.com/oped/471051-trudeau-elections-promises-broken/. _____. 2019b. “lack of alternatives, broken electoral system delivers ‘win’ for trudeau.” rt, oped. october 22, 2019. https://www.rt.com/op-ed/471581-trudeau-victory-canada-electionsystem/. wilkerson, john and andreu casas. 2017. “large-scale computerized text analysis in political science: opportunities and challenges.” annual review of political science 20: 529-544. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/election-misinformation-disinformation-interference-1.5336662 https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/election-misinformation-disinformation-interference-1.5336662 https://intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?documentid=396 https://www.rt.com/op-ed/471051-trudeau-elections-promises-broken/ https://www.rt.com/op-ed/471051-trudeau-elections-promises-broken/ https://www.rt.com/op-ed/471581-trudeau-victory-canada-election-system/ https://www.rt.com/op-ed/471581-trudeau-victory-canada-election-system/ 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 14(1) 2020: 55-78 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 90 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 implications of the russian war on ukraine for climate policy and the geopolitics of energy miranda schreurs, technical university of munich abstract the february 2022 russian invasion of ukraine has led to radical changes in european energy politics and placed new urgency on plans to expand renewable energy and enhance energy efficiency. the european union, the united states, and many other states have slapped a series of crippling sanctions on russia and reduced or completely cut their fossil fuel imports in an effort to stop the cash flow the kremlin needs to finance its war. russian fossil fuel is being replaced by imports from other regions while demand has been reduced through energy savings by households and businesses. putin's aggression against ukraine has forced europe to speed up its energy transition, meaning that russia has unintentionally spurred on european climate policy. china, on the other hand, is deepening its trade ties with russia, supporting the country by buying more oil and gas. new alliances are forming that will have long-term consequences for the geopolitics of energy and could also affect the potential for further cooperation on climate change globally. 91 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 introduction1 on february 24, 2022, russian forces launched a full-scale attack on ukraine. the war has evolved into the deadliest conflict europe has witnessed since the end of world war ii.2 after years of increasing economic trade and investment, cultural exchange, and international cooperation, russia’s renewed aggression has put previous russian territorial incursions into a new light. when russia launched a military campaign in georgia in 2008, backing separatists in the breakaway region of south ossetia and pushing georgian nationals out of the area, the global response was muted. for russia, this was interpreted as a green light to pursue further territorial goals, given that there appeared to be little western appetite to take steps that would cause themselves much pain (dickinson 2021). in 2014, the russian federation took control of and illegally annexed the crimean peninsula in southern ukraine. the us, europe, and canada introduced sanctions in response to the annexation of crimea, but these proved insufficient to prevent further aggression (ashford 2016). russian-backed separatists subsequently led an insurgency in donetsk and luhansk oblasts (provinces) in eastern ukraine. along with the 2022 invasion of ukraine, the kremlin sought to turn energy into a political weapon. gazprom, a majority state-owned russian energy giant, reduced its flow of gas to europe, presumably with the aim of convincing europe to accept russia’s expansionist territorial aims. amidst these developments, european decision makers had to scramble to assure european energy demand could be met and a deep and painful recession avoided. by restricting gas flow to the west, putin most likely presumed europe would cave in and accept its take-over of ukraine in order to maintain access to cheap sources of fossil fuel for its industries and citizens. instead, as will be demonstrated below, russia’s 2022 aggression invited a much more formidable response from the west than its earlier territorial incursions, with major geopolitical and economic security ramifications. putin clearly miscalculated when he combined his attack on ukraine with reduced flows of energy to heavily energy-import dependent europe. by seeking to use energy as a political weapon, putin strengthened nato and led to a rethinking of the meaning of energy security in europe. in response to the kremlin’s attack on ukrainian sovereignty, the european union, the united states, canada, japan, south korea, australia, new zealand, and numerous other countries have slapped a series of increasingly harsh sanctions on russian businesses and select russian nationals with the intention of weakening russia’s capacity to finance and supply its military. they have restricted exports of sensitive technologies to russia and armed ukraine to defend itself. eu member states finland and sweden both chose to give up their neutrality and applied to become members of nato (chatterjee 2023). finland was admitted to nato on april 4, 2023, while sweden’s accession is still pending. as will be discussed below, security crises can be triggers of major policy changes in a wide variety of areas. in response to the energy crisis created by the war, european policymakers have made major changes to energy policies at the eu level. there have also been significant and, at times, surprising amendments made to individual european states’ climate and energy policies and programs. more ambitious renewable energy targets, accelerated greenhouse gas reduction timetables, new clean energy innovation support mechanisms and regulations, and energy trade agreements have been established. there have also been major shifts in energy trade flows with significant geopolitical implications. the direct and indirect impacts of the war on global greenhouse gas emission trends and the international climate negotiations are also 1 i wish to thank the anonymous reviewers of this article for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article as well as the extensive and insightful comments provided by joan de bardeleben on the manuscript. 2 in the first year of the war (through june 4, 2023), the united nations office of the high commissioner for human rights (ohchr) recorded 24,425 civilian casualties in ukraine: 8,983 killed and 15,442 injured (ohchr 2023). in addition, many tens of thousands of military personnel have been killed or injured. 92 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 significant. in what follows, these points will be examined with a focus on how the ukrainerussia war has impacted the energy and climate policies of the european union and three of its largest member states: germany, france, and poland. in addition, the impacts of the war on trans-atlantic energy trade ties, russia-china relations, ukraine’s integration into europe, and regional and global climate policies will be explored. security crises as a driver of policy change theoretically, the russian invasion of ukraine shows how an international security crisis can have far-reaching and reverberating policy impacts. in response to a security crisis, not only may geopolitical relations and alliances be reevaluated, but there may also be changes in policy areas not directly tied to the crisis, such as when pandemics and wars drive energy policy change (siddi 2023; steffen and patt 2022; zacheri et al. 2022). indeed, the russian war against ukraine has led to major policy changes in european energy and climate policies. the tragedy of war has forced european decision makers to alter policies in the energy sector that go well beyond the already quite substantial changes they had made in recent years in response to the climate crisis. since the 2022 russian invasion of ukraine, there has been further acceleration and accumulation of new regulations (knill and steinebach 2021). these aim to enhance european energy security while reducing europe’s climate footprint. of course, not all crises lead to policy changes. history is filled with crises that led to little or no change in policy directions or ambitions. the 2014 russian invasion and annexation of crimea did not lead to the same intensity of reaction from europe (ikani 2021) as the 2022 invasion has, although with some differences across eu member states. what appears different now is not only a greater threat perception on the part of many eu member states after russia attempted to take ukraine’s capital, kyiv, at the start of the war but also that many actors saw in this crisis possibilities to bring about changes to policies that otherwise might have taken years or even decades to achieve, if they would be achievable at all. these include the strengthening of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) alliance, new energy trade arrangements across the atlantic (hammelehle 2023), and stronger climate policies (samandari et al. 2022). the 2022 russian invasion of ukraine also suggests that the direction and intensity of policy change will depend on the availability and fit of alternative policy ideas as well as whether there are actors (political entrepreneurs) with the power and skills needed to take these ideas and steer them through the maze of potential obstacles, which could stand in the way of their adoption. policy entrepreneurs must be there to present decision makers with potential solutions to the crisis; political entrepreneurs must take these ideas and run with them. which political parties are in power, how strong coalitions for change are, and how dominant actors backing the status quo are can matter. political entrepreneurs must see a potentially workable idea and know how to quickly build a support coalition behind it. they must also have a sufficient understanding of policy-making processes to know how to bring their ideas onto the agenda while the window of opportunity created by the crisis is still open (hogan and feeney 2012; hwang and powell 2005). building sufficient support behind an idea among key actors is critical. this process can be aided by decision makers’ need to show their publics they are taking action. efforts to bring about policy change are likely to fail, however, if infighting between groups with different political or economic interests cannot be held at bay (berman 2020). in the case of a complex, multi-level institutional structure such as the european union, major policy change may need to be pursued simultaneously by multiple policy and political entrepreneurs who, with greater or lesser degrees of coordination, work across multiple governance levels to pursue their policy interests (schreurs and tiberghien 2007). 93 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 european energy politics and policy vladimir putin’s decision to invade ukraine in 2022 became a trigger for far-reaching energy and climate policy changes in europe and beyond. as discussed in greater detail below, what is quite astounding is that despite the frailty the european union had shown in previous years, most notably with brexit, political entrepreneurs at the national and european levels succeeded in finding ways to push through a series of policy reforms that are simultaneously breaking european dependence on russian fossil fuels, reducing european greenhouse gas emissions, and giving a boost to europe’s clean energy industries. riding on the back of the covid-19 pandemic, which itself ushered in many changes in work patterns and digital communication, the 2022 war in ukraine has forced europe to once again rethink its energy strategies. for those concerned with climate change, the war led to fears about a rise in greenhouse gas emissions but also presented an opportunity to turn away from fossil fuels, push for more far-reaching climate policies, and move up emission reduction target dates. european dependence on russian fossil fuels europe produces only about 40-45 percent of its own energy, importing the remainder. the level of dependency on imports has expanded with time but varies significantly across the eu. several of the eu’s smaller member states are almost completely dependent on imports (e.g., cyprus, luxembourg and malta) to meet their energy needs. dependency levels are also high in the biggest economies in the eu. in 2019, germany imported 67 percent of its energy, with just a slight decline to 63.7 percent in 2020. in 2020, dependency levels were in the mid-40 percent range for france, denmark, and poland, 68 percent for spain, and 73.5 percent for italy. only a handful of eu member states had import dependencies below the 40 percent mark: czech republic, bulgaria, romania, sweden, and estonia (eurostat 2023a). at the start of the 2020s, russia was the world’s largest exporter of gas and the second largest exporter of oil after saudi arabia. it was also europe’s single most important energy trade partner, supplying europe with close to half of its solid fuel imports, over 40 percent of its natural gas imports, and over a quarter of its crude oil imports. in comparison, norway, the second largest supplier, accounted for a much smaller 16 percent of the natural gas and 7 percent of the crude oil imported by the eu in 2019. fourteen of the 20 largest country importers of russian fossil fuels were member states of the eu—germany, the netherlands, italy, poland, france, bulgaria, belgium, spain, greece, austria, romania, slovakia, hungary, and estonia—the other six countries being china, turkey, india, japan, egypt, and south korea (myllyvirta et al. 2022). while the eu had long indicated its intentions to expand renewables and decrease fossil fuel use over the next decades, it was broadly understood that gas path dependencies would remain for years to come. natural gas from russia was viewed as important for europe’s energy transition away from the most polluting fossil fuel—coal—with the assumption being that any phase-out of natural gas would require decades (muradkhanli 2023). gas pipelines linking russia to europe and its economic powerhouse, germany in previous decades, an extensive set of pipelines was built to enable the shipment of russian gas to eastern europe, including the druzhba (friendship), and soyuz (union) pipelines, part of the brotherhood pipeline system. already during the cold war, the first efforts to link russia to western europe via trade—exchanging gas for pipeline and drill technology and knowhow—began. in the early 1970s, the first pipeline extensions to western europe were launched (bros, mitrova, and westphal 2017). in the following years, further gas line projects were initiated, most notably extensions to the yamal pipelines, which transported gas from the yamal peninsula and western siberia to western europe via belarus, poland, and ukraine. 94 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 germany was a major supporter of a concept known as ostpolitik, literally “eastern policy”— the idea that strong economic ties with russia would strengthen mutual interdependence and enhance the prospects of peaceful coexistence. chancellor willy brandt was credited with launching ostpolitik, a policy that opened the doors for the eventual reunification of germany under the chancellorship of helmut kohl and the later enlargement of the european union to the east. ostpolitik was thus seen as a logical and legitimate strategy to follow with the soviet union and later with post-soviet russia that could contribute to a softening of russian authoritarianism (kinkartz 2022). by the time the berlin wall came down in 1989, germany was already importing about one-third of its gas demand from the soviet union (sullivan 2022). as a major manufacturing power and europe’s largest economy, germany is power hungry. the end of the cold war was seen as an opportunity for germany to gain access to even more cheap russian gas to power its steel, chemical, glass, and automobile industries as well as to supply its electricity and thermal power plants (bros, mitrova, and westphal 2017). germany was eager to have pipelines that did not traverse eastern european states—especially ukraine and poland—given the history of tensions between these states and russia. on a number of occasions, russia stopped gas flows to europe via these transit routes in response to conflicts with ukraine over gas transit fees, raising german concerns about its energy security. this led to decisions by germany (in cooperation with several other european states) to build new pipelines that would allow the direct import of natural gas from russia to germany via the baltic sea. gerhard schröder of the social democratic party, who served as chancellor from 1998 to 2005, played a particularly prominent role in supporting the nord stream pipelines. angela merkel of the christian democratic union, who succeeded him as chancellor, lent her support to the nord stream projects as well (muradkhanli 2023). fourteen years after the project was first started, the two nord stream 1 pipelines were inaugurated on november 8, 2011, by german chancellor angela merkel, russian president dmitry medvedev, french prime minister françois fillon, and dutch prime minister mark rutte. construction of the nord stream 2 pipelines (two additional pipelines) began in 2015 under chancellor merkel’s leadership with former chancellor schröder’s strong support; they were completed in 2021. the baltic states, poland, ukraine as well as the united states warned against building the nord stream pipelines, which they claimed threatened european energy security by making europe overly dependent on russian gas. in a joint statement, poland and ukraine criticized germany: “the decision to build nord stream 2 made in 2015 mere months after russia’s invasion and illegal annexation of ukrainian territory, created a security, credibility and political crisis in europe” (euronews 2021a). germany’s energy and security politics began a radical transition on february 22, 2022, hours after russia recognized the independence of donetsk and luhansk oblasts (provinces) of ukraine. germany’s new chancellor, olaf scholz, who was from the social democratic party, announced he would not provide the certification necessary for the nordstream 2 pipelines to go into operation. two days later, on february 24, putin launched his war on ukraine, further shaking germany out of its naivety and leading to a major rethinking in germany about russia and vladimir putin’s intentions. the eu moves to end dependence on russian fossil fuels europe entered the winter of 2021 with sharply rising gas, coal, and electricity prices. this was in large part due to russia’s decision to restrict shipments just as energy demand was growing again in europe once covid-19-related restrictions started being lifted. european commission president ursula von der leyen stressed the urgency of becoming independent of russian fossil fuels, stating that europe cannot rely on a supplier who is threatening the continent. she warned that europe remains “too reliant on gas,” making it vulnerable to soaring gas prices and possible supply cut-offs. playing the role of a political entrepreneur, she highlighted the importance of 95 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 the european green deal’s vision of a carbon-neutral, circular economy: “a speedy transition to clean energy would also make the bloc a more independent global player” (euronews 2021b). efforts to promote energy efficiency and energy savings, renewable energy expansion, and green hydrogen development were already underway when the war broke out. a window of opportunity to speed up and expand the scope of europe’s green energy transition was thus provided by putin’s aggressive actions. the european union began the process of weaning itself off russian fossil fuels soon after the war began, albeit more slowly than critics of russian aggression would have liked to see. the very big differences in eu member states’ dependence on russian fossil fuels complicated efforts to achieve quick action. on march 8, 2022, just weeks after the start of the war, the eu commission outlined a plan (repowereu) to cut russian gas imports by two-thirds by the end of the year and to end dependence “well before 2030” (taylor 2022). the repowereu plan was formally communicated on may 18, 2022 (european commission 2022a, 2022b). it proposed ambitious new targets for energy saving and an increase in renewable energy targets in the power, building, and transport sectors. in response to the plan, the renewable energy directive and the energy efficiency directive are being amended, setting higher targets. early signs of change are manifold. the industry group, solarpower europe, issued a report showing that eu solar power soared by almost 50 percent in 2022, with 41.4 gigawatts (gw) of solar being installed, an increase of 47 percent from the 28.1gw installed in 2021 (solarpower europe 2022). the largest capacity increases were in germany, spain, poland, the netherlands, and france. sanction packages became an important vehicle for negotiating agreements among member states related to their energy policies. in its fifth round of sanctions issued on april 8, 2022, the eu agreed to a ban on imports of all forms of russian coal effective august 1, 2022. in its sixth round of sanctions (june 3, 2022), the eu issued a complete import ban on russian seaborne crude oil (to go into effect within six months) and petroleum products (to go into effect within eight months). combined, these restrictions covered 90 percent of oil imports from russia. exceptions were made for hungary, bulgaria, and croatia, given their special energy dependencies. eu operators are now prohibited from insuring and financing the transport of russian oil to third countries (european commission 2022c). a tenth sanctions package was released on the one-year anniversary of the start of the war (european council 2023), and an eleventh package was issued in june 2023. both aim to make it harder for parties to circumvent the sanctions (european commission 2023d). neither china nor india have joined in on these sanctions, frustrating western powers. european sanctions on russian gas, oil shipments, petroleum products (such as diesel and jet fuel), and coal do not look like they will end any time soon. this means that russia has lost major revenue sources even if, in 2022, europe was still paying large sums to russia for the smaller quantities of energy it was importing. since the war began, gas flows from russia to europe have dropped precipitously. russia also retaliated against the import restrictions placed on it by reducing energy exports to europe. russia stopped westward gas flows through the yamal pipeline soon after the war began. flows through nord stream 1 ended in september 2022, after its two underwater pipelines plus one of the nord stream 2 pipelines were blown up in multiple places in still unexplained circumstances. some gas—less than contracted—does, however, flow through the ukrainian network (sudzha being the main route) and the turk stream pipeline (via turkey) (afanasiev 2023; elliott 2022). ukraine has warned eastern european countries which still rely on these gas imports that it is unlikely to renew the gas transit deal that allows gazprom to pipe gas from russia via ukraine; it is set to expire at the end of 2024 (gavin 2023). russia’s war on ukraine is proving to be a powerful accelerator of 96 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 europe’s diversification of its fossil energy suppliers and of the transition towards a clean energy future.3 germany and the end of ostpolitik russia’s march into ukraine and weaponization of energy made it painfully clear to german policy leaders how dependent the country still was on fossil fuels and especially on imported russian gas. for the “traffic light” coalition (the social democratic party—red, the free democratic party—yellow, and the green party—green) that had formed only a few months earlier, the war has proven to be both a huge challenge and an opportunity to pursue larger policy changes. the newly reorganized ministry of economic affairs and climate action, headed up by robert habeck from the green party, seized the moment, introducing dozens of new laws and programs aimed at simultaneously ending dependency on russia while reducing overall dependence on fossil fuels through the promotion of energy savings, energy efficiency, renewable energy expansion, and green hydrogen development. to understand the direction of the regulatory changes that came in response to the external shock of war, it is helpful to first examine the recent german climate and energy regulatory developments. in 2019, the german government issued its first national climate law (bundes klimaschutzgesetz), which set a 2050 climate neutrality target for the country. in april 2021, however, the constitutional court determined that the law was unconstitutional as it did not adequately protect the basic rights of younger generations because it put too much of the burden of reducing climate emissions to the period after 2030 (bundesverfassungsgericht 2021). in response to the court ruling, the government amended the climate law, shifting forward its climate neutrality target to 2045 and setting mid-term targets (a 65 percent reduction compared to 1990 ghg levels by 2030 and an 88 percent reduction by 2040). the climate action programme 2030 and the climate action plan 2050 were also adjusted to account for the new targets. these plans set out specific targets for different sectors that needed to be reached on an annual basis through 2030. up until early 2022, germany was by far europe’s biggest importer of russian gas. in response to the war, in april 2022, the coalition government introduced what came to be known as the “easter package”—a set of legislative initiatives aimed to speed up and expand the deployment of renewable energy even more than had been called for in the amended climate law. the package of legislative initiatives, which was passed into law in july 2022, increased the share that renewables are to have in the electricity sector to 80 percent by 2030. permitting processes for renewables are being simplified, and obligations were established to make the 16 german länder (states) contribute to achieving a target of setting aside 2 percent of german territory for the development of wind parks. further measures were introduced to promote the research and development of green hydrogen and electric vehicles. industries and customers were asked to voluntarily cut back on their electricity and gas use, and government offices were required to do so as well. these efforts, combined with the effects of the sharp rise in gas prices and a relatively mild winter, contributed to a 14 percent reduction in gas demand in 2022 compared with the average for the four years from 2018 to 2021 (bundesnetzagentur 2023). however, the crisis had other consequences that did not fit so well with the policy interests of the traffic light coalition. to make up for the loss in russian gas supply, imports from norway and the netherlands had to be expanded. the german government was also forced to enter into new gas and oil contracts with canada, the united states, and middle eastern countries. the 3 as a side note of interest, despite some discussions, europe has not taken steps to end the import of fuel rods from russia for its nuclear power plants. in the spring of 2023, the french firm framatome even expressed its interest in producing nuclear fuel in a joint venture with russia’s rosatom (jordans 2023). 97 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 government also passed legislation permitting the temporary placement of about eight gw of hard coal and lignite plants into a reserve capacity through the end of march 2024 to replace gas plants in electricity production should the country be hit with a gas shortage (bundesregierung 2022). this reserve capacity came from coal-fired power plants that had been or were soon to be moth-balled under plans to phase out coal-fired power plants by around 2030. a short extension of the operating time of germany’s remaining three nuclear power plants through april 2023 also was approved despite the misgivings of the green party. these emergency measures were taken to cover energy supply in a worst-case scenario. there has been a heavy price to pay for these changes on the part of consumers and government coffers. gas prices reached record highs in 2022, with the average power price for a german household using 3,500 kwh per year jumping from 32.16 euro cents/kwh in 2021 to 40.07 cents/kwh in the second half of 2022 (wehrmann 2023). the added costs for consumers and industry have been substantial, and this has led to growing concerns about public acceptance of specific policy measures. the government has been forced to intervene with price caps and rebates for private and industrial consumers. despite these many challenges, by the end of 2022, german imports of russian fossil fuels had been largely stopped. while germany was forced to temporarily rely more on heavily polluting coal, putin’s war on ukraine helped the traffic light coalition speed the shift away from fossil fuels, to enhance energy savings, and to build up renewable energy capacity. poland reacts to russia’s invasion of crimea poland and its baltic neighbours were particularly vocal in their criticism of russia’s illegal war on ukraine. poland began to reduce its dependence on russian energy in response to the russian invasion of crimea in 2014; its dependency on russian gas dropped from around 76 percent in 2014 to 55 percent in 2021. once the war broke out, poland pursued energy demand reduction policies, cutting demand by 13 percent. renewable energy capacities were also increased, bringing the country’s total to 21.2 gw (european commission 2023e). a series of liquefied natural gas (lng) terminal and gas pipeline projects, which had been initiated in the previous years to enhance the region’s energy security, came into operation in 2022, thus blunting the impact of russia’s cut off of gas supplies through the yamal pipeline in april 2022 after poland refused to pay for the gas in rubles (andzāns 2022; cohen 2022). moreover, poland’s contract with russia’s gazprom for gas imports via the pipeline was set to expire at the end of 2022, and the country’s leaders had long made it known they had no intention of renewing it (wanat 2022). poland, with large supplies of domestic coal, has been a foot-dragger in relation to european climate policies. it is the only eu member state not to have set a climate neutrality target for at least 2050. the russian invasion of crimea in 2014 did, however, initiate a rethinking of polish energy policies with a main focus on securing interconnectivity with other european states. poland was able to maintain a stable supply of energy to its economy in part because it was able to import gas and oil in 2022 through the newly built fossil fuel infrastructure connecting it to its neighbours to the north and west. while the 2022 russian war against ukraine has also led to some climate-policy-relevant changes in poland, the impacts have been less dramatic than in germany, where climate change has had a higher priority among citizens and policymakers. france and the need to cope with multiple crises for france, which also had a much lower dependency on russian fossil fuels than germany, the war nevertheless has had dramatic impacts that have accelerated its energy transition. france was struck by a series of crises in 2022. not only did it have to contend with the consequences of russia’s invasion of ukraine, a record hot summer and drought conditions 98 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 lowered the level of french rivers, creating a problem for the country’s nuclear power plants, which need water to cool their reactors. in addition, a backlog of maintenance and repair issues meant that in the fall of 2022, just as europe was entering its first winter without stable supplies of russian gas, 26 of france’s 56 reactors were offline (alderman 2022). the country thus had to scramble to repair its nuclear plants and import electricity from its neighbours, including germany. in 2022, france was in the unusual situation of importing more electricity (72.9 twh) than it exported (56.5 twh) (fraunhofer ise 2023). in reaction to the war and the repower eu directive, france passed the renewable energy acceleration bill. the measures included in the bill aim to speed up permitting processes. france now aims to produce as much electricity from renewables in 2050 as its total electricity demand stood at in 2022. this will mean a ten-fold increase in solar power (100 gw) and 40 gw of offshore wind (messad 2023). yet, unlike germany, which is pursuing a double transition—phasing out nuclear while phasing down fossil fuels—france plans to continue to invest in nuclear plants and sees nuclear energy as an integral part of its energy mix. linking ukraine to european energy infrastructure for ukraine, maintaining a stable energy supply during the war has been a major challenge. infrastructural path dependencies from soviet times have complicated ukraine’s efforts to maintain stable energy supplies while under attack from russia. in 2021, before the latest russian incursion into ukraine, 55 percent of ukraine’s electricity was generated by 15 pressurized water reactors of russian design operated at four nuclear power plants, including europe’s largest nuclear power plant, zaporizhzhia. coal was the second largest source at 23 percent, and renewables accounted for another 14 percent (statista research department 2023). ukraine has substantial fossil energy reserves and was producing about two-thirds of the energy it consumed. despite its relatively high level of energy self-sufficiency, ukrainian energy generation facilities are in precarious conditions. electricity generation facilities have been a main target of russian attacks. the chernobyl nuclear facility, which is undergoing decommissioning, was occupied and vandalized by invading russian troops in late february and early march 2022 (russian troops have since pulled out of the region). the zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, now under the control of russia but with ukrainian staff still working at the plant, is in an active war zone and has even been hit by missiles, raising global concerns about the potential for another nuclear disaster. zaporizhzhia’s six reactors have been shut down, but there is still the risk of a nuclear catastrophe should they be blown up. the international atomic energy agency has sent experts to monitor the situation, demanding access throughout the facility in light of opposing statements and allegations being made by the ukrainian and russian governments regarding the military situation and vulnerabilities at the site, including reports that the site might be mined. there have also been incidents where electric power to the plant has been cut off, forcing the cooling systems to rely on backup power generation (international atomic energy agency 2023). an additional concern relates to the availability of water to cool the six shut-down reactors and spent fuel storage after the destruction of the kakhovka reservoir. steps are being taken to assure access to alternative water supplies, but the destruction of the kakhovka dam illustrates just how vulnerable and tense the military situation around the plant is. throughout the winter of 2022-2023, blackouts and scheduled curtailments became a new norm for many regions of ukraine as russia launched attack after attack on the country’s electricity infrastructure, depriving ukrainians of electricity, heat, and water. efforts to decouple ukraine’s energy dependence on russia and provide alternative energy pathways have been critical components of eu’s support for ukraine. plans had already been laid out years earlier to connect ukraine to the european grid as a result of russia’s earlier 99 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 invasions. these plans were put in fast-forward after the february 24, 2022 invasion. in the course of just two weeks, ukraine’s electricity grid was synchronized (and thus connected) to the european grid (blaustein 2022). ukraine has also been supported in other ways. european countries have assisted with parts to repair damaged generation facilities and have shipped over a thousand portable power generators to support critical facilities (hospitals, schools, etc.). the european union also launched a program in january 2023 to supply ukrainians with lightemitting diode (led) lamps, which use about eight times less electricity than incandescent light bulbs. thus, even in war-torn ukraine, efforts are being made to link the war-related energy crisis to climate-friendly solutions (delegation of the eu to ukraine 2023). once the war ends, ukraine will need to be supported in its efforts to rebuild. with ukraine aiming to become a member of the european union, it will also need to work to meet european climate goals. renewable energy expansion is already being discussed as an important way of achieving greater energy security and a less intensive carbon footprint (cahill and dawes 2023). canada and the united states deepen their energy ties to europe the united states is one of the world’s largest producers of oil, coal, and gas; it was thus far less dependent on russia for fossil fuel imports than europe. while total petroleum imports from russia in the period from 2000 to 2021 varied, peaking first around 2011 and then again at a slightly higher level in 2021, they amounted to only about 8 percent of all us petroleum imports (including both crude oil imports and petroleum product imports, such as unfinished oils) (hack 2022). on march 8, 2022, us president joe biden announced that the united states would stop importing russian oil and refined petroleum products. canada was never a big importer of russian fossil fuels, importing less than 1 percent of its crude oil demand in 2019 and none thereafter (canada energy regulator 2022). this made canadian prime minister justin trudeau’s decision to end canadian imports of russian oil relatively straightforward. canada is becoming an increasingly important partner for europe as it seeks to decarbonize its economy while ridding itself of russian fossil fuels (nunez, quitzow, and schreiner 2022). both canada and the united states have entered into new energy trade and cooperation deals with europe. shipments of liquefied natural gas to europe from the united states picked up once the war began (zachmann, scaravatti, and mcwilliams 2023). europe became the largest market for us lng in 2022, accounting for 64 percent of exports (us energy information administration 2023). canada intends to start shipping green hydrogen produced from wind farms to germany in 2025 (platt and nienaber 2022). in its efforts to diversify suppliers, europe has also courted canada in relation to minerals, such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, and natural graphite, which it needs to produce batteries and renewable energy equipment. the release of the eu’s critical raw materials act in march 2023 was accompanied by eu president ursula von der leyen’s visit to canada and the us to tighten and expand transatlantic energy partnerships. china deepens its energy ties to russia china, in contrast with western nations, has refrained from criticizing russia for its aggression and has instead placed blame for the war on what it views as the us-led expansion of nato. despite some differences between them, china and russia have a joint interest in limiting us power in the international system. china’s tacit acceptance of russia’s “special military operation” in ukraine could be read as a willingness to accept russia’s view of history and putin’s claims that ukraine belongs to russia. soon after the invasion began, china’s president 100 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 xi jinping spoke of the historically close relations that have formed between russia and china and placed the blame for the war on the west and us–led nato expansion (blanchette 2022). china has been on a global search for additional energy sources for the past several decades to fuel its economic growth and meet the demands of its large and increasingly middle-class population (leonard 2022). china became a net importer of oil in 1993 and the world’s largest net importer of oil in 2017; it is over 70% dependent on imported oil and over 40% import dependent for its gas (international energy agency 2022). for china, russia is seen as a potential source of cheap oil and gas. gas began to flow from russia to china via their first joint pipeline, power of siberia, in december 2019. the $400 billion, 30-year agreement was initiated in 2014 between russia’s gazprom and the china national petroleum corporation; the pipeline has a capacity of 38 billion cubic meters of gas a year (moscow times 2019a). china sharply increased energy imports from russia in 2022 (tan 2022); its pipeline gas imports increased by 2.6 times and lng imports by 2.4 times. crude oil imports also grew by 8 percent (hale 2023). on the one-year anniversary of russia’s attack, 141 nations voted to support a un resolution calling on russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw from ukraine. yet, in addition to seven countries that voted against the resolution, china, india, iran, and 29 other countries abstained from the vote, weakening its impact (un 2023). much to the frustration of europe, canada, and the united states, china has deepened its ties with russia despite its claims of neutrality vis-à-vis the war. in july 2022, the same time that the west was decoupling from russian fossil fuel dependency, china and russia announced plans for a new gas pipeline, the power of siberia – 2, which will transit mongolia and deliver gas from western siberia to china. pipeline construction is to begin in 2024, and the pipeline is to go into operation by 2030. the possibility that the timeline will be accelerated in reaction to the war exists (moscow times 2022). the effectiveness of european sanctions has been dampened by chinese as well as indian and turkish purchases of russian oil and gas. russia does, however, appear to be earning less for the oil and gas it exports due to the price cap europe put on russian oil in its tenth sanction package (menon 2023). china’s unwillingness to openly come out against russia’s invasion of ukraine and its purchasing of russian fossil fuels have strained its relations with the west and led european countries to begin to rethink their heavy dependence on china for rare earth minerals and clean energy parts and products. the climate and environmental implications of the russian war on ukraine globally, greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise even while climate scientists warn that they need to be cut dramatically in this decade if the global average temperature increase is to remain within the 1.5 degrees celsius range. there is still much work to be done in relation to funding developing countries to address climate-related loss and damage, to addressing post-2030 national climate ambitions, and to preparing the global stocktake (gst) set to take place at the 2023 un climate change conference (cop28) in december 2023 in the united arab emirates (directorate-general for climate action 2022). the next rounds of international climate change negotiations are likely to be especially challenging, given rising nationalism, growing global tensions, and inflationary tendencies linked to the russian war against ukraine. the countries that will have some of the most influence on global emission levels—the united states, china, the european union, and russia—which together, account for about half of global carbon dioxide emissions, have seen their scientific cooperation negatively impacted by the war, for example, in relation to arctic and space science—two critical areas for climate change research (gaind et al. 2022). 101 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 european greenhouse gas emissions drop as renewable energy expansion accelerates while the loss of access to russian gas has pushed some countries to use more coal and oil, which have higher carbon contents, the transition away from fossil fuels in europe is picking up steam. the environment protection agency in germany estimates that germany’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2022 dropped by 1.9 percent compared to 2021 levels (umwelt bundesamt 2023). increased use of hard coal and lignite in the energy sector as a short-term response to the loss of russian supplies was offset by steep increases in renewable energy deployment, which reached 20.4 percent of gross final energy consumption, up from 19.2 percent in 2021 (umwelt bundesamt 2023). european union greenhouse gas emissions were also down in the fourth quarter of 2022 when compared to pre-pandemic levels, suggesting that despite greater use of coal and oil, reductions in energy demand and the expansion of renewable energy capacities were beginning to have an impact (eurostat 2023b). especially noteworthy is that eu emissions appear to have dropped by 2.5 percent in 2022 compared to 2021 levels, suggesting that europe’s acceleration of its energy transition has had a positive climate impact (international energy agency 2023). further drops in european greenhouse gas emissions can be expected as the policies introduced in 2022 are beginning to kick in. global clean energy competition and us climate change policies while the war has had limited direct impacts on us climate and energy policies, there have been important indirect impacts. already in 2021, as one of his first acts as president, joe biden returned the united states to the paris agreement. his administration subsequently proposed the 2021 infrastructure and investment jobs act, targeting money for public transportation, renewable energy development, digital infrastructure, grid infrastructure, electric vehicles, and hydrogen fuel technologies, which received bipartisan support in congress. this was followed by the inflation reduction act, which is said to be the largest climate bill ever passed. the act allocates usd 370 billion in support of renewables, green technologies, and climate mitigation and aims to shift investments from the private sector towards green technologies (colón, christianson, and childs 2022). the act covers climate and environmental justice block grants, enhanced monitoring of methane and air pollution, the clean-up of transit systems, and the promotion of clean energy, for example, through seeding state and local clean energy financing institutions (white house 2022). the law is already resulting in a visible global competition for clean-tech leadership. china has become dominant in recent years in the clean-tech area. the new laws aim to put the us back on track to becoming a leading manufacturer of clean energy technologies. the eu responded to this new climate legislation with an eu green deal industrial plan. canada, which aims at climate neutrality by 2050, is now talking about the need for a clean energy industrial plan (haley 2023). environmental destruction in ukraine the war’s impacts on the ukrainian environment have been enormous. ukrainian forests have been devastated, wind turbines destroyed, buildings burned, and soils contaminated. one interim assessment puts the greenhouse gas emissions for the first seven months of the war at 100 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tco2e), about the level emitted by the netherlands during the same period (de klerk et al. 2022). ukraine pointed out at the 2022 un climate change conference (cop 27) in egypt that the war was a major contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions and environmental destruction (rannard 2022). beyond environmental and climate change impacts, the effects of russia’s war have been devastating for global food availability. ukraine is one of the world’s top five producers of cereals and grains. the war has caused widespread damage to farms, transport infrastructure, grain storage facilities, and harbours. 102 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 uncertainty regarding russia’s climate policies in lieu of the war climate change has not been high on the russian political agenda, and many climate skeptics can be found among russia’s political elite. andrei semenov, a visiting fellow at the center for strategic and international studies, described the challenge of pursuing climate mitigation in russia: “president putin does not consider the climate agenda other than as a threat to russia’s national security and economy, and the subordination of other branches of power to the chief executive precludes other actors from developing their own agenda” (semenov 2021). russia is the world’s fourth largest greenhouse gas emitter, responsible for approximately 4.7 percent of global emissions and the third largest historical emitter behind the united states and china, responsible for 6.9 percent of the carbon dioxide emitted in the world since the start of the industrial revolution (evans 2021). while putin has a history of denying the seriousness of climate change and the role of anthropogenic emissions in contributing to warming temperatures, the melting of permafrost, desertification, and damage to agriculture as a result of climate change threaten the country. the russian environment ministry released a report indicating that russia was heating at twice the rate of the rest of the world between 1976 and 2018 (moscow times 2019b). russia signed the paris agreement in 2019. in the summer of 2021, in the lead up to the climate negotiations in glasgow, scotland, putin announced a climate target: to make russia climate neutral by 2060 and to reduce russian carbon emissions by 25–30 percent of 1990 levels by 2030 (oshchepkov 2021). to what extent russia is serious about its climate targets is an open question. its targets have been viewed with considerable skepticism in the west. the carbon action tracker (2022) rated moscow’s targets as critically insufficient and summed them up as equating to russia working towards a 4 degrees celsius global temperature increase. troianovski and ponomarev (2021) suggest the target may have been made out of economic necessity given that the eu was planning to put tariffs on products with a high carbon content, impacting russian exports. angelina davydova (2023), writing for the carnegie endowment for international peace, suggests the decline in russian gdp and depopulation could reduce russian greenhouse gas emissions, “but can hardly be seen as genuine decarbonization.” with russia now viewed as a pariah state in the west, and with a growing number of states scaling back and ending imports of russian fossil fuels altogether, russia is unlikely to show any real interest in cooperating with the west on meaningful climate action. in fact, in june 2023, it blocked europe’s efforts to propose an eastern european country to host the international climate change negotiations in 2024 (weise 2023). russia’s own emissions could, however, fall as its fossil fuel production volumes drop. global greenhouse gas emissions in its march 2023 global carbon dioxide emissions report, the international energy agency found that global growth in emissions was lower than had originally been feared as a result of the global energy crisis created by the war (international energy agency 2023). while global emissions did rise, growing by 0.9 percent in 2022, the rise was smaller than it had been in previous years. increased emissions from coal and oil were offset by reductions in emissions from natural gas and a strong expansion of renewable energy. at the end of 2022, british petroleum estimated that the push to enhance energy security by promoting domestic renewable energy development could lead to a 3.7 percent drop in global emissions by 2030 and 9.3 percent in 2050 (lawson 2023). 103 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 conclusion: a crisis with major implications for the geopolitics of energy and climate mitigation the russian attack on ukraine’s territorial sovereignty has had major geopolitical implications. after years of weak western responses to earlier russian territorial incursions into neighbouring states, putin clearly miscalculated when he launched a full-scale attack on ukraine. rather than fragmenting and weakening europe and nato, his actions have brought the west together. nato has been strengthened, and its membership expanded. putin’s attempts to blackmail europe by closing the valves on energy exports failed. rather than forcing europe into acquiescence and acceptance of new territorial realities, putin pushed europe to fundamentally reconsider its energy security programs and infrastructure and sever many of its most important trade ties with russia. theoretically, it is clear that the global energy crisis triggered by the war has been used by various political entrepreneurs to pursue policy solutions that might otherwise have been difficult to achieve and would certainly not have been otherwise possible in such a short time frame. the war has forced western policymakers to pay greater attention to how they can strengthen resilience against external shocks by diversifying supplies. it has also given climate legislation a boost, especially in germany and at the eu level. skillful policy entrepreneurs successfully coupled concerns about fossil fuel import dependence with the need to make progress on climate mitigation. while some new path dependencies may have been created when imports of fossil fuels from russia were replaced by fossil energy imports from norway, the netherlands, canada, the united states, and various middle eastern countries and putin’s war did cause a short-term spike in coal use in europe, it has also accelerated green energy revolutions in europe and the united states with canada and europe intensifying climate cooperation. in the months after the war broke out, europe reduced its energy demand through various energy-saving campaigns, set higher targets for renewable energy capacity development and energy efficiency improvements, and altered rules to speed up permitting processes for the introduction of clean energy technologies. significantly, a further spill-over effect of putin’s war may be that it is accelerating competition for clean energy and geopolitical leadership between china and the us, with major implications for europe and canada. learning lessons from its excessive dependence on russia for fossil fuels, europe has begun to question if it is too dependent on china as a supplier of the technologies and mineral resources necessary for its own energy transition. this has led europe to seek new partnerships with canada and the united states for the minerals needed for batteries, solar photovoltaics, and wind turbines, as well as the development and use of green hydrogen. it has also been a factor, although certainly not the only one, behind some of the new climate legislation introduced in europe and the united states and being considered in canada. a major clean energy technology race between some of the world’s largest carbon emitters has thus been given an added, if indirect and certainly unintended, boost by putin’s imperial ambitions. putin’s actions have also led to a european embrace of ukraine that would have been hardly imaginable at the beginning of the decade. ukrainian membership in nato and the european union no longer seem like a far-off dream. the process of uncoupling ukraine from russian energy infrastructure and coupling it to europe’s electricity and gas infrastructure received a major boost from the war. ukraine’s energy supply is now being secured in part via new grid interconnectors to europe and reverse gas pipeline flows from europe to ukraine. europe is also laying initial plans to aid ukraine in achieving a post-conflict renewable energy transition and taking a small early step in this direction by supplying the country with millions of led lights. thus, contrary to putin’s presumed aims, his war has distanced europe from russia, tightened ties between europe, canada, and the united states, and connected ukraine more closely to europe. 104 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 there are, however, still many uncertainties regarding the long-term geopolitical impacts of the war. the kremlin’s failure to diversify the russian economy means the country is vulnerable. the kremlin depends very heavily on energy and resource exports to fill its government coffers and on western countries for advanced technologies (borrell 2022). this means that the unprecedented scale of the sanction packages western states have placed on russia has the potential to cut deeply into the russian economy and, in this way, cut the funding putin needs to sustain his military ambitions. while china, india, turkey, and other states have bought up some of the supplies europe now rejects, it could be difficult for russia to fill the gap the sanctions have left. not only has russia lost a major export market, it has lost access to major potential sources of investment that it needs to maintain and develop its energy infrastructure and other business sectors. whether this will lead russia to capitulate or force it to make major concessions at the negotiating table remains uncertain. russia could also simply ride out these troubling times and fight a war of attrition in ukraine. currently, the west’s resolve to continue its support of ukraine appears strong, and russia appears increasingly isolated. what is clear is that russia’s actions are redrawing strategic alliances and speeding up the transition to a low-carbon energy future, especially in europe but also in other world regions. military, energy, and climate security have become increasingly intertwined, giving policy and political entrepreneurs the chance to take major steps towards reducing fossil fuel dependency and moving forward on climate change, steps that climate activists have long demanded. 105 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 references abrams, elliott. 2022. “the new cold war.” council on foreign relations, march 4, 2022. accessed august 20, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-cold-war-0. afanasiev, vladimir. 2023. “gazprom squeezes european gas supply through remaining routes.” upstream, january 9, 2023. accessed august 20, 2023. https://www.upstreamonline.com/production/gazprom-squeezes-european-gas-supplythrough-remaining-routes/2-1-1385024. alderman, liz. 2022. “as europe quits russian gas, half of france’s nuclear plants are offline.” the new york times, november 15, 2022. accessed february 20, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/15/business/nuclear-power-france.html. andzāns, māris. 2022. “the baltic road to energy independence from russia is nearing completion.” baltic bulletin, may 25, 2022. accessed february 20, 2023, 2023. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/the-baltic-road-to-energy-independence-fromrussia-is-nearing-completion/. ashford, emma. 2016. “not-so-smart sanctions: the failure of western restrictions against russia.” foreign affairs 95(1): 114-123. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43946631. berman, sheri. 2020. “crises only sometimes lead to change: here’s why.” foreign policy, july 4, 2020. accessed february 15, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/ 04/coronavirus-crisis-turning-point-change/. blanchette, jude. 2022. “the worse things go for putin in ukraine, the more china will back him.” washington post, march 24, 2022. accessed july 3, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/24/xi-jinping-putin-china-russiasanctions/. blaustein, anna. 2022. “how ukraine unplugged from russia and joined europe’s power grid with unprecedented speed.” scientific american, march 23, 2022. accessed july 4, 2023. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-ukraine-unplugged-from-russia-andjoined-europes-power-grid-with-unprecedented-speed/. borrell, josep. 2022. “the sanctions against russia are working.” european union external action, july 16, 2022. accessed august 20, 2023. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ sanctions-against-russia-are-working_en. bros, aurélie, tatiana mitrova, and kirsten westphal. 2017. “german-russian gas relations: a special relationship in troubled waters.” stiftung wissenschaft und politik. swp research paper 13, december 2017. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/ products/research_papers/2017rp13_wep_etal.pdf. bundesnetzagentur. 2023. “bundesnetzagentur veröffentlicht zahlen zur gasversorgung 2022” [federal network agency publishes data on gas supply]. accessed june 15, 2023. https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/shareddocs/pressemitteilungen/de/2023/20230106 _rueckblickgasversorgung.html. https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-cold-war-0 https://www.upstreamonline.com/production/gazprom-squeezes-european-gas-supply-through-remaining-routes/2-1-1385024 https://www.upstreamonline.com/production/gazprom-squeezes-european-gas-supply-through-remaining-routes/2-1-1385024 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/15/business/nuclear-power-france.html https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/the-baltic-road-to-energy-independence-from-russia-is-nearing-completion/ https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/the-baltic-road-to-energy-independence-from-russia-is-nearing-completion/ http://www.jstor.org/stable/43946631 https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/04/coronavirus-crisis-turning-point-change/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/04/coronavirus-crisis-turning-point-change/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/24/xi-jinping-putin-china-russia-sanctions/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/24/xi-jinping-putin-china-russia-sanctions/ https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-ukraine-unplugged-from-russia-and-joined-europes-power-grid-with-unprecedented-speed/ https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-ukraine-unplugged-from-russia-and-joined-europes-power-grid-with-unprecedented-speed/ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sanctions-against-russia-are-working_en https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sanctions-against-russia-are-working_en https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2017rp13_wep_etal.pdf https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2017rp13_wep_etal.pdf https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/shareddocs/pressemitteilungen/de/2023/20230106_rueckblickgasversorgung.html https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/shareddocs/pressemitteilungen/de/2023/20230106_rueckblickgasversorgung.html 106 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 bundesregierung. 2022. “weniger gasverbrauch im ernstfall” [less gas consumption in case of emergency]. july 12, 2022. accessed july 4, 2023. https://www.bundesregierung.de/ breg-de/themen/klimaschutz/gasersatz-reserve-2048304. bundesverfassungsgericht. 2021. “verfassungsbeschwerden gegen das klimaschutzgesetz teilweise erfolgreich” [constitutional complaint against the climate law partially successful]. pressemitteilung nr. 31, apr. 29, 2021. accessed july 3, 2023. https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/shareddocs/pressemitteilungen/de/2021/bvg 21-031.html. canada energy regulator. 2022. “market snapshot: crude oil imports declined in 2021, while refined petroleum product imports rose modestly.” march 30, 2022. accessed august 21, 2023. https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/marketsnapshots/2022/market-snapshot-crude-oil-imports-declined-in-2021-while-refinedpetroleum-product-imports-rose-modestly.html. carbon action tracker. 2022. “russian federation.” accessed august 20, 2023. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russian-federation/ cahill, ben, and allegra dawes. 2022. “developing renewable energy in ukraine.” center for strategic & international studies, december 19, 2022. accessed july 2, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/developing-renewable-energy-ukraine. chatterjee, phelan. 2023. “how sweden and finland went from neutral to nato.” bbc, july 12, 2023. accessed july 14, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478. cohen, patricia. 2022. “estonia never needed to import gas by ship. until it did.” new york times, august 12, 2022. accessed july 3, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2022/08/12/business/economy/estonia-natural-gas-lng.html. colón, frances, anne christianson, and cassidy childs. 2022. “how the inflation reduction act will drive global climate action.” american progress, august 17, 2022. accessed june 15, 2023. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-the-inflation-reductionact-will-drive-global-climate-action/. davydova, angelina. 2023. “how russia’s war is impacting the global environmental agenda.” carnegie endowment for international peace, january 11, 2023. accessed july 24, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88773. de klerk, lennard, anatolii shmurak, olga gassan-zade, mykola shlapak, kyryl tomliak, and adriaan korthuis. 2022. “climate damage caused by russia’s war in ukraine.” climate focus, november 1, 2022. accessed july 14, 2023. https://climatefocus.com/wpcontent/uploads/2022/11/climatedamageinukraine.pdf. delegation of the european union to ukraine. 2023. “ukrainian government approved an eusupported programme to exchange incandescent light bulbs for led light bulbs.” january 10, 2023. accessed july 14, 2023. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ ukraine/ukrainian-government-approved-eu-supported-programme-exchangeincandescent_en?s=232. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/klimaschutz/gasersatz-reserve-2048304 https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/klimaschutz/gasersatz-reserve-2048304 https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/shareddocs/pressemitteilungen/de/2021/bvg21-031.html https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/shareddocs/pressemitteilungen/de/2021/bvg21-031.html https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/2022/market-snapshot-crude-oil-imports-declined-in-2021-while-refined-petroleum-product-imports-rose-modestly.html https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/2022/market-snapshot-crude-oil-imports-declined-in-2021-while-refined-petroleum-product-imports-rose-modestly.html https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/2022/market-snapshot-crude-oil-imports-declined-in-2021-while-refined-petroleum-product-imports-rose-modestly.html https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russian-federation/ https://www.csis.org/analysis/developing-renewable-energy-ukraine https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/12/business/economy/estonia-natural-gas-lng.html https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/12/business/economy/estonia-natural-gas-lng.html https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-the-inflation-reduction-act-will-drive-global-climate-action/ https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-the-inflation-reduction-act-will-drive-global-climate-action/ https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88773 https://climatefocus.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/climatedamageinukraine.pdf https://climatefocus.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/climatedamageinukraine.pdf https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/ukrainian-government-approved-eu-supported-programme-exchange-incandescent_en?s=232 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/ukrainian-government-approved-eu-supported-programme-exchange-incandescent_en?s=232 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/ukrainian-government-approved-eu-supported-programme-exchange-incandescent_en?s=232 107 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 dickinson, peter. 2021. “the 2008 russo-georgian war: putin’s green light.” atlantic council, august 7, 2021. accessed july 13, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/. directorate-general for climate action, european commission. 2022. “paving the way to cop 27: the bonn climate change conference.” june 17, 2022. accessed july 14, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news-your-voice/news/paving-way-cop-27-bonn-climatechange-conference-2022-06-17_en. elliott, stuart. 2022. “russian pipeline gas flows to europe slip further in november.” s&p global commodity insights, december 6, 2022. accessed july 3, 2023. https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/naturalgas/120622-russian-pipeline-gas-flows-to-europe-slip-further-in-november. euronews. 2021a. “nord stream 3: ukraine and poland slam deal to complete controversial gas pipeline.” july 22, 2021. accessed july 4, 2023. https://www.euronews.com/ 2021/07/21/ukraine-poland-slam-insufficient-deal-struck-by-germany-and-u-s-on-nordstream-2. euronews. 2021b. “europe’s energy crisis: continent ‘too reliant on gas,’ says von der leyen.” october 10, 2021. accessed may 15, 2023. https://www.euronews.com/ 2021/10/20/europe-s-energy-crisis-continent-too-reliant-on-gas-says-von-der-leyen. european commission. 2022a. “in focus: reducing the eu’s dependence on imported fossil fuels.” april 20, 2022. accessed may 15, 2023. https://commission.europa.eu/ news/focus-reducing-eus-dependence-imported-fossil-fuels-2022-04-20_en. european commission. 2022b. “repowereu: joint european action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy.” march 8, 2022. accessed may 15, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511. european commission. 2022c. “russia’s war on ukraine: eu adopts sixth package of sanctions against russia.” june 3, 2022. accessed december 10, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2802. european commission. 2023d. “eu adopts 11th package of sanctions against russia for its continued illegal war against ukraine.” june 23, 2023. accessed july 14, 2023. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directivetargets-and-rules/renewable-energy-directive_en. european commission. 2023e. repowereu: one year later_poland. accessed june 14, 2023. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/pl_repowereu.pdf. european council. 2023. “10th package of sanctions on russia’s war of aggression against ukraine: the eu includes additional 87 individuals and 34 entities to the eu’s sanctions list.” february 25, 2023. accessed june 14, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ en/press/press-releases/2023/02/25/10th-package-of-sanctions-on-russia-s-war-ofaggression-against-ukraine-the-eu-includes-additional-87-individuals-and-34-entitiesto-the-eu-s-sanctions-list/. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/ https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news-your-voice/news/paving-way-cop-27-bonn-climate-change-conference-2022-06-17_en https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news-your-voice/news/paving-way-cop-27-bonn-climate-change-conference-2022-06-17_en https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/120622-russian-pipeline-gas-flows-to-europe-slip-further-in-november https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/120622-russian-pipeline-gas-flows-to-europe-slip-further-in-november https://www.euronews.com/2021/07/21/ukraine-poland-slam-insufficient-deal-struck-by-germany-and-u-s-on-nord-stream-2 https://www.euronews.com/2021/07/21/ukraine-poland-slam-insufficient-deal-struck-by-germany-and-u-s-on-nord-stream-2 https://www.euronews.com/2021/07/21/ukraine-poland-slam-insufficient-deal-struck-by-germany-and-u-s-on-nord-stream-2 https://www.euronews.com/2021/10/20/europe-s-energy-crisis-continent-too-reliant-on-gas-says-von-der-leyen https://www.euronews.com/2021/10/20/europe-s-energy-crisis-continent-too-reliant-on-gas-says-von-der-leyen https://commission.europa.eu/news/focus-reducing-eus-dependence-imported-fossil-fuels-2022-04-20_en https://commission.europa.eu/news/focus-reducing-eus-dependence-imported-fossil-fuels-2022-04-20_en https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2802 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive-targets-and-rules/renewable-energy-directive_en https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive-targets-and-rules/renewable-energy-directive_en https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/pl_repowereu.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/25/10th-package-of-sanctions-on-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-the-eu-includes-additional-87-individuals-and-34-entities-to-the-eu-s-sanctions-list/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/25/10th-package-of-sanctions-on-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-the-eu-includes-additional-87-individuals-and-34-entities-to-the-eu-s-sanctions-list/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/25/10th-package-of-sanctions-on-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-the-eu-includes-additional-87-individuals-and-34-entities-to-the-eu-s-sanctions-list/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/25/10th-package-of-sanctions-on-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-the-eu-includes-additional-87-individuals-and-34-entities-to-the-eu-s-sanctions-list/ 108 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 eurostat. 2023a. “energy imports dependency.” online data code: nrg_ind_id. updated january 23, 2023. accessed july 12, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/ view/nrg_ind_id__custom_938402/bookmark/table?lang=en,en&bookmarkid=f1ab 4519-82df-4a89-a329-1b8d0a5925f7. eurostat. 2023b. “quarterly greenhouse gas emissions in the eu.” accessed july 15, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ index.php?title=quarterly_greenhouse_gas_emissions_in_the_eu#:~:text=greenhouse %20gas%20emissions-,in%20the%20fourth%20quarter%20of%202022%2c%20eu%2 0economy%20greenhouse%20gas,tonnes%20of%20co2%20equivalents. evans, simon. 2021. “analysis: which countries are historically responsible for climate change?” carbon brief, october 5, 2021. accessed august 19, 2023. https:// www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-which-countries-are-historically-responsible-for-climatechange/. fraunhofer institute for solar energy systems. 2023. “grenzüberschreitender stromhandel zwischen allen ländern in 2022” [cross-border electricity trade between all countries in 2022]. accessed august 20, 2023. https://energy-charts.info/charts/ import_export/chart.htm?l=de&c=de&year=2022&flow=scheduled_commercial_exch anges_all. gaind, nisha, alison abbott, alexandra witze, elizabeth gibney, jeff tollefson, aisling irwin, and richard van noorden. 2022. “seven ways the war in ukraine is changing global science.” nature, july 20, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-022-01960-0. gavin, gabriel. 2023. “ukraine warns key russian gas supply to europe will be cut.” politico, july 12, 2023. accessed july 15, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/ukrainewarns-it-wont-negotiate-new-russian-gas-transit-deal/. hack, kevin. 2022. “the united states imports more petroleum products than crude oil from russia.” u.s. energy information administration, march 22, 2022. accessed june 15, 2023. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51738. hale, erin. 2023. “how china and india’s appetite for oil and gas kept russia afloat.” al jazeera, february 24, 2023. accessed june 14, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/ economy/2023/2/24/how-china-and-indias-appetite-for-oil-and-gas-kept-russia-afloat. haley, brendan. 2023. “will the response to the us inflation reduction act reveal canada’s lack of green industrial policy?” broadbent institute, march 19, 2023. accessed july 8, 2023. https://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/canadas-green-industrial-policy-response. hammelehle, julia. 2023. “refueled: energy security.” munich security report 2023. accessed july 13, 2023. https://securityconference.org/publikationen/munich-securityreport-2023/energy-security/. hogan, john and sharon feeney. 2012. “crisis and policy change: the role of the political entrepreneur.” risk, hazards & crisis in public policy (3) 2, no. 6: 1-24. https://doi.org/ 10.1515/1944-4079.1108. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg_ind_id__custom_938402/bookmark/table?lang=en,en&bookmarkid=f1ab4519-82df-4a89-a329-1b8d0a5925f7 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg_ind_id__custom_938402/bookmark/table?lang=en,en&bookmarkid=f1ab4519-82df-4a89-a329-1b8d0a5925f7 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg_ind_id__custom_938402/bookmark/table?lang=en,en&bookmarkid=f1ab4519-82df-4a89-a329-1b8d0a5925f7 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=quarterly_greenhouse_gas_emissions_in_the_eu#:~:text=greenhouse%20gas%20emissions-,in%20the%20fourth%20quarter%20of%202022%2c%20eu%20economy%20greenhouse%20gas,tonnes%20of%20co2%20equivalents https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=quarterly_greenhouse_gas_emissions_in_the_eu#:~:text=greenhouse%20gas%20emissions-,in%20the%20fourth%20quarter%20of%202022%2c%20eu%20economy%20greenhouse%20gas,tonnes%20of%20co2%20equivalents https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=quarterly_greenhouse_gas_emissions_in_the_eu#:~:text=greenhouse%20gas%20emissions-,in%20the%20fourth%20quarter%20of%202022%2c%20eu%20economy%20greenhouse%20gas,tonnes%20of%20co2%20equivalents https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=quarterly_greenhouse_gas_emissions_in_the_eu#:~:text=greenhouse%20gas%20emissions-,in%20the%20fourth%20quarter%20of%202022%2c%20eu%20economy%20greenhouse%20gas,tonnes%20of%20co2%20equivalents https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-which-countries-are-historically-responsible-for-climate-change/ https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-which-countries-are-historically-responsible-for-climate-change/ https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-which-countries-are-historically-responsible-for-climate-change/ https://energy-charts.info/charts/import_export/chart.htm?l=de&c=de&year=2022&flow=scheduled_commercial_exchanges_all https://energy-charts.info/charts/import_export/chart.htm?l=de&c=de&year=2022&flow=scheduled_commercial_exchanges_all https://energy-charts.info/charts/import_export/chart.htm?l=de&c=de&year=2022&flow=scheduled_commercial_exchanges_all https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51738 https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/2/24/how-china-and-indias-appetite-for-oil-and-gas-kept-russia-afloat https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/2/24/how-china-and-indias-appetite-for-oil-and-gas-kept-russia-afloat https://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/canadas-green-industrial-policy-response https://securityconference.org/publikationen/munich-security-report-2023/energy-security/ https://securityconference.org/publikationen/munich-security-report-2023/energy-security/ https://doi.org/10.1515/1944-4079.1108 https://doi.org/10.1515/1944-4079.1108 109 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 hwang, hokyu, and walter powell. 2005. “institutions and entrepreneurship.” in handbook of entrepreneurship research: disciplinary perspectives, edited by sharan a. alvarez, rajshree r. agarwal, and olav sorenson, 201-232. new york, ny: springer. ikani, nikki. 2021. crisis and change in european union foreign policy: a framework of eu foreign policy change. manchester, uk: manchester university press. international atomic energy agency. 2023. “update 171 – iaea director general statement on situation in ukraine.” july 5, 2023. accessed july 14, 2023. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-171-iaea-director-generalstatement-on-situation-in-ukraine. international energy agency. 2022. “oil, gas and coal import dependency in china, 20072019.” october 26, 2022. accessed february 20, 2023. https://www.iea.org/data-andstatistics/charts/oil-gas-and-coal-import-dependency-in-china-2007-2019. international energy agency. 2023. “co2 emissions in 2022.” accessed july 13, 2023. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/3c8fa115-35c4-4474-b237-1b00424c8844/ co2emissionsin2022.pdf. jordans, frank. 2023. “germany criticizes russian role in french nuclear fuel plant.” associated press news, march 30, 2023. accessed july 10, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/germany-france-russia-nuclear-power-rosatom-framatomece47027005349580306d55553c7f1142. kinkartz, sabine. 2022. “germany’s ruling spd faces the ruins of its russia policy.” deutsche welle, march 22, 2022. accessed june 12, 2023. https://www.dw.com/en/ germanys-ruling-spd-faces-the-ruins-of-its-russia-policy/a-61206332. knill, christoph, and yves steinebach. 2021. “crises as driver of policy accumulation: regulatory change and ratcheting in germany asylum policies between 1975 and 2019.” regulation & governance 16 (2): 603-617. https:/ /doi.org/10.111/rego.12479. lawson, alex. 2023. “global carbon emissions forecast cut due to ukraine war and biden, says bp.” the guardian, january 30, 2023. accessed july 12, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/jan/30/global-carbon-emissions-ukrainewar-biden-bp. leonard, mark. 2022. “russia’s war on ukraine viewed from china.” european council on foreign relations, july 29, 2022. accessed february 14, 2023. https://ecfr.eu/article/ russias-war-on-ukraine-viewed-from-china/. menon, shutri. 2023. “ukraine crisis: who is buying russian oil and gas?” bbc, may 23, 2023. accessed june 12, 2023.https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60783874. messad, paul. 2023. “france publishes renewables progress report for 2022.” euractiv, may 11, 2023. accessed june 13, 2023. https://www.euractiv.com/section/energyenvironment/news/france-publishes-renewables-progress-report-for-2022/. mintrom, michael, and phillipa norma. 2008. “policy entrepreneurship and policy change.” the policy studies journal, 37 (4): 649-677. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15410072.2009.00329.x. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-171-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-171-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/oil-gas-and-coal-import-dependency-in-china-2007-2019 https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/oil-gas-and-coal-import-dependency-in-china-2007-2019 https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/3c8fa115-35c4-4474-b237-1b00424c8844/co2emissionsin2022.pdf https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/3c8fa115-35c4-4474-b237-1b00424c8844/co2emissionsin2022.pdf https://apnews.com/article/germany-france-russia-nuclear-power-rosatom-framatome-ce47027005349580306d55553c7f1142 https://apnews.com/article/germany-france-russia-nuclear-power-rosatom-framatome-ce47027005349580306d55553c7f1142 https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-ruling-spd-faces-the-ruins-of-its-russia-policy/a-61206332 https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-ruling-spd-faces-the-ruins-of-its-russia-policy/a-61206332 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/jan/30/global-carbon-emissions-ukraine-war-biden-bp https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/jan/30/global-carbon-emissions-ukraine-war-biden-bp https://ecfr.eu/article/russias-war-on-ukraine-viewed-from-china/ https://ecfr.eu/article/russias-war-on-ukraine-viewed-from-china/ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60783874 https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/france-publishes-renewables-progress-report-for-2022/ https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/france-publishes-renewables-progress-report-for-2022/ https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2009.00329.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2009.00329.x 110 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 moscow times. 2019a. “russia launches gas exports to china: gazprom’s power of siberia pipeline comes online, carrying russian gas to china for the first ever time.” december 2, 2019. accessed february 12, 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 2019/12/02/russia-launches-power-siberia-gas-exports-china-a68423. moscow times. 2019b. “russia is warming disproportionately fast, environment ministry says.” september 4, 2019. accessed february 12, 2023. https:// www.themoscowtimes.com//09/04/russia-is-warming-disproportionately-fastenvironment-ministry-says-a67145. moscow times. 2022. “russia, china to break ground on gas pipeline via mongolia in 2024 – pm.” july 18, 2022. accessed february 12, 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 2022/07/18/russia-china-to-break-ground-on-gas-pipeline-via-mongolia-in-2024-pma78323. muradkhanli, nigar. 2023. “german-russian gas relations: from cooperation to conflict.” doctoral dissertation, technical university of munich, munich, germany. https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/doc/1660661/document.pdf. myllyvirta, lauri, hubert thieriot, jan lietava, erika uusivuori, ronja borgmästars, vera tattari, lyder ulvan, oleksii mykhailenko, and andrei ilas. 2022. “financing putin’s war: fossil fuel exports from russia in the first six months of the invasion of ukraine.” center for research on energy and clean air, september 6, 2022. accessed february 12, 2023. https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/financing-putins-war-fossil-fuelexports-from-russia-in-the-first-six-months-of-the-invasion-of-ukraine/. nunez, almudena, rainer quitzow, and marleina schreiner. 2022. “hydrogen in canada: war in ukraine kindles new interest, research institute for sustainability.” helmholtz centre potsdam, july 6, 2022. accessed july 12, 2023. https://www.rifspotsdam.de/en/blog/2022/07/hydrogen-canada-war-ukraine-kindles-new-interest. oshchepkov, michael. 2021. “russia has set an ambitious goal for reducing emissions by 2030,” climate scorecard, july 11, 2021. accessed february 13, 2023. https://www.climatescorecard.org/2021/07/russia-has-set-an-ambitious-goal-forreducing-emissions-by-2030/. platt, brian and michael nienaber. 2022. “germany taps ‘boundless’ fuel potential in canada hydrogen deal.” bloomberg, august 24, 2022. accessed july 12, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-23/germany-taps-boundless-fuelpotential-in-canada-hydrogen-deal?leadsource=uverify%20wall. rannard, georgina. 2022. “cop 27: war causing huge release of climate warming gas, claims ukraine.” bbc, november 14, 2022. accessed july 13, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-63625693. samandari, hamid, dickon pinner, harry bowcott, and olivia white. 2022. “the net-zero transition in the wake of the war in ukraine: a detour, a derailment, or a different path?” mckinsey quarterly, may 19, 2022. accessed june 14, 2023. https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/the-net-zerotransition-in-the-wake-of-the-war-in-ukraine-a-detour-a-derailment-or-a-different-path. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/04/russia-is-warming-disproportionately-fast-environment-ministry-says-a67145 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/04/russia-is-warming-disproportionately-fast-environment-ministry-says-a67145 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/04/russia-is-warming-disproportionately-fast-environment-ministry-says-a67145 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/07/18/russia-china-to-break-ground-on-gas-pipeline-via-mongolia-in-2024-pm-a78323 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/07/18/russia-china-to-break-ground-on-gas-pipeline-via-mongolia-in-2024-pm-a78323 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/07/18/russia-china-to-break-ground-on-gas-pipeline-via-mongolia-in-2024-pm-a78323 https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/doc/1660661/document.pdf https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/financing-putins-war-fossil-fuel-exports-from-russia-in-the-first-six-months-of-the-invasion-of-ukraine/ https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/financing-putins-war-fossil-fuel-exports-from-russia-in-the-first-six-months-of-the-invasion-of-ukraine/ https://www.rifs-potsdam.de/en/blog/2022/07/hydrogen-canada-war-ukraine-kindles-new-interest https://www.rifs-potsdam.de/en/blog/2022/07/hydrogen-canada-war-ukraine-kindles-new-interest https://www.climatescorecard.org/2021/07/russia-has-set-an-ambitious-goal-for-reducing-emissions-by-2030/ https://www.climatescorecard.org/2021/07/russia-has-set-an-ambitious-goal-for-reducing-emissions-by-2030/ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-23/germany-taps-boundless-fuel-potential-in-canada-hydrogen-deal?leadsource=uverify%20wall https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-23/germany-taps-boundless-fuel-potential-in-canada-hydrogen-deal?leadsource=uverify%20wall https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-63625693 https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/the-net-zero-transition-in-the-wake-of-the-war-in-ukraine-a-detour-a-derailment-or-a-different-path https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/the-net-zero-transition-in-the-wake-of-the-war-in-ukraine-a-detour-a-derailment-or-a-different-path 111 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 schreurs, miranda, and yves tiberghien. 2007. “multi-level reinforcement: explaining eu leadership in climate change mitigation.” global environmental politics 7 (4): 19-46. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2007.7.4.19. semenov, andrei. 2021. “russian political forces meet climate change.” center for strategic and international studies, april 6, 2021. february 13, 2023. https://www.csis.org/ /russian-political-forces-meet-climate-change. siddi, marco. 2023. “europe’s energy dilemma: war and the green transition.” current history 122 (842): 83-88. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2023.122.842.83. solarpower europe. 2022. eu market outlook for solar power: 2022-2026. accessed june 13, 2023.https://api.solarpowereurope.org/uploads/ 5222_spe_emo_2022_full_report_ver_03_1_319d70ca42.pdf?updated_at=2022-1219t08:21:34.541z. statista research department. 2023. “distribution of electricity generation in ukraine in 2021, by source.” january 25, 2023. accessed july 14, 2023. https://www.statista.com/ /1237676/ukraine-distribution-of-electricity-production-by-source/. steffen, bjarne, and anthony patt. 2022. “a historical turning point? early evidence on how the russia-ukraine war change public support for clean energy policies.” energy research & social science 91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102758. sullivan, arthur. 2022. “russian gas in germany: a 50-year relationship.” deutsche welle, september 3, 2022. accessed february 8, 2023. https://www.dw.com/en/russian-gas-ingermany-a-complicated-50-year-relationship/a-61057166. tan, amy. 2022. “china buys a record amount of russian lng as oil and coal purchases also surge.” bloomberg, december 21, 2022. accessed february 14, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-21/china-buys-a-record-amount-ofrussian-lng-as-oil-and-coal-purchases-also-surge?leadsource=uverify%20wall. taylor, kira. 2022. “eu rolls out plan to slash russian gas imports by two thirds before year end.” euractiv, march 9, 2022. accessed february 8, 2023. https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/eu-rolls-out-plan-to-slash-russian-gasimports-by-two-thirds-before-year-end/. troianovski, anton, and sergey ponomarev. 2021. “on a pacific island, russia tests its battle plan for climate change.” the new york times, october 19, 2021. accessed july 13, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/19/world/europe/russia-climate-change.html. umwelt bundesamt. 2023. “uba forecast: 2022 greenhouse gas emissions down by 1.9 percent.” no.11, march 15, 2023. accessed june 15, 2023. https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/press/pressinformation/uba-forecast-2022greenhouse-gas-emissions-down19#:~:text=increase%20in%20coal%20and%20fuel,energy%20use%20curb%20the%20 effects&text=germany%27s%20greenhouse%20gas%20emissions%20(ghg,million% 20tonnes%20less%20than%202021. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2023.122.842.83 https://api.solarpowereurope.org/uploads/5222_spe_emo_2022_full_report_ver_03_1_319d70ca42.pdf?updated_at=2022-12-19t08:21:34.541z https://api.solarpowereurope.org/uploads/5222_spe_emo_2022_full_report_ver_03_1_319d70ca42.pdf?updated_at=2022-12-19t08:21:34.541z https://api.solarpowereurope.org/uploads/5222_spe_emo_2022_full_report_ver_03_1_319d70ca42.pdf?updated_at=2022-12-19t08:21:34.541z https://www.statista.com/statistics/1237676/ukraine-distribution-of-electricity-production-by-source/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/1237676/ukraine-distribution-of-electricity-production-by-source/ https://www.dw.com/en/russian-gas-in-germany-a-complicated-50-year-relationship/a-61057166 https://www.dw.com/en/russian-gas-in-germany-a-complicated-50-year-relationship/a-61057166 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-21/china-buys-a-record-amount-of-russian-lng-as-oil-and-coal-purchases-also-surge?leadsource=uverify%20wall https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-21/china-buys-a-record-amount-of-russian-lng-as-oil-and-coal-purchases-also-surge?leadsource=uverify%20wall https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/eu-rolls-out-plan-to-slash-russian-gas-imports-by-two-thirds-before-year-end/ https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/eu-rolls-out-plan-to-slash-russian-gas-imports-by-two-thirds-before-year-end/ https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/19/world/europe/russia-climate-change.html 112 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 united nations (un). 2023. “un general assembly calls for immediate end to war in ukraine.” un news, february 23, 2023. accessed june 8, 2023. https://news.un.org/ en/story/2023/02/1133847. united nations office of the high commissioner for human rights (ohchr). 2023. “ukraine: civilian casualty update 5 june 2023.” accessed june 6, 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/06/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-5-june-2023. united states energy information administration. 2023. “europe was the main destination for u.s. lng exports in 2022.” march 22, 2023. accessed july 9, 2023. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=55920#:~:text=europe%20became%2 0the%20primary%20destination,u.s.%20lng%20exports%20to%20europe. wanat, zosia. 2022. “poland and bulgaria start life with no russian gas.” politico, april 27, 2022. accessed february 13, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-bulgaria-lifeno-russia-gas/. wehrmann, benjamin. 2023. “what german households pay for electricity.” clean energy wire, january 16, 2023. accessed february 15, 2023. https://www.cleanenergywire.org/ factsheets/what-german-households-pay-electricity. weise, zia. 2023. “eastern european cop summit in limbo over russian blockade.” politico, june 15, 2023. accessed july 13, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/eastern-europeancop-summit-in-limbo-as-russia-blocks-eu-host-candidates/. white house. 2022. “inflation reduction act advances environmental justice.” august 17, 2022. accessed october 9, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2022/08/17/fact-sheet-inflation-reduction-act-advancesenvironmental-justice/. zacheri, behnam, katsia paulavets, leonardo barreto-gomez, luis gomez echeverri, shonali pachauri, benigna boza-kiss, caroline zimm, joeri rogelj, felix creutzig, diana ürgevorsatz, david g. victor, morgan d. bazilian, steffen fritz, dolf gielen, david l. mccollum, leena srivastava, julian d. hunt, and shaheen pouya. 2022. “pandemic, war, and global energy transitions.” 2022. energies 15 (17): 1-23. https://doi.org/10.3390/en15176114. zachmann, georg, giovanni scaravatti, and ben mcwilliams. 2023. “european natural gas imports.” bruegel. accessed august 8, 2023. https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/europeannatural-gas-imports. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133847 https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133847 https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/06/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-5-june-2023 https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-bulgaria-life-no-russia-gas/ https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-bulgaria-life-no-russia-gas/ https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/what-german-households-pay-electricity https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/what-german-households-pay-electricity https://www.politico.eu/article/eastern-european-cop-summit-in-limbo-as-russia-blocks-eu-host-candidates/ https://www.politico.eu/article/eastern-european-cop-summit-in-limbo-as-russia-blocks-eu-host-candidates/ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/17/fact-sheet-inflation-reduction-act-advances-environmental-justice/ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/17/fact-sheet-inflation-reduction-act-advances-environmental-justice/ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/17/fact-sheet-inflation-reduction-act-advances-environmental-justice/ https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/european-natural-gas-imports https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/european-natural-gas-imports 113 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 16 (2)2023: 90-113 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this working paper is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. no use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes. issn: 2562-8429 © 2019 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 the digital silk road in europe: china’s soft power maneuvers at euro 2024 flávio bastos da silva 1, university of minho (braga, portugal). abstract in recent years, china has intensified efforts to expand the belt and road initiative (bri), with particular emphasis on its digital corridor, the digital silk road (dsr), in europe. despite the presence of giants such as huawei, the dsr has faced various challenges due to the security concerns of european states, further influenced by the positions of the european union (eu) and the united states of america (usa). in this article, the authors argue that one of beijing’s responses lies in the 2024 uefa european football championship (euro 2024), where chinese technology companies are among the main sponsors. viewing this action as a tactic of soft power and public diplomacy, this article examines how these sponsorships can contribute to the expansion of the dsr in europe. accordingly, the authors’ investigation revolves around the following research question: how has china employed diplomacy and soft power to promote the dsr during euro 2024? using a predominantly qualitative approach, the study concludes that china, through its companies, seeks to attract european consumers, making them more receptive to the potential expansion of its digital corridor into european territory. 1 flávio bastos da silva is a phd student in political science and international relations at the university of minho (braga, portugal). 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 introduction the belt and road initiative (bri) was launched in 2013 by chinese president xi jinping as a project capable of logistically connecting more than 60 countries and 4 billion people (ahmed and lambert 2022; benvenuti et al. 2022). in 2015, the initiative’s action plan was introduced, highlighting its objective to “uphold the global free trade regime and an open world economy in the spirit of open regional cooperation” (national development and reform commission 2015). in 2017, the bri was incorporated into the constitution of the people’s republic of china, the same year that the first belt and road forum for international cooperation was held (xinhuanet 2017d, 2017a). initially planned with two corridors—the silk road economic belt (sreb) and the 21st century maritime silk road (msr)—the bri quickly expanded into new areas of cooperation, including additional corridors such as the digital silk road (dsr). in recent years, the bri has been the subject of study by various scholars (fallon 2015; ferdinand 2016; huang 2016; wang 2016), who have primarily focused on the silk road economic belt (dave and kobayashi 2018; tracy et al. 2017) and the maritime silk road (blanchard and flint 2017; chang 2018; wang et al. 2019). research on the dsr, on the other hand, is not as developed, possibly because it is a more recent project. regarding the security and geopolitical impacts of the dsr in europe, there is also a scientific gap, with the exceptions of the works by paulo (2018), caridi (2023), and szunomár (2024). acknowledging the scarcity of literature on the expansion of the dsr in europe and recognizing that not all states in this region formally participate in the bri, this article aims to contribute to the understanding of china’s digital dynamics in europe, as well as their geopolitical and security impacts. the authors argue that china has faced significant skepticism in europe towards the bri and dsr. as a result, its soft power strategy has struggled to gain the anticipated traction for these initiatives in the region. in response, china has turned to sponsoring major sporting events, such as the 2024 uefa european football championship (known informally as “euro 2024”), in an effort to reshape perceptions and promote a more positive image of itself, its companies, products, and technological services, thereby encouraging european populations to embrace the dsr. this study will support this argument by analyzing the case of euro 2024, where china’s sponsorship activities serve as a key example of how the country has adjusted its diplomatic and marketing strategies to better engage with the european public and promote the dsr. this article, therefore, seeks to explore these aspects as part of beijing’s broader strategy to build a “community of shared future for humanity.” in this context, the article will address the following research question: how did china employ diplomacy and soft power to promote the dsr during euro 2024? this article adopts a predominantly qualitative methodology, with the use of descriptive and exploratory methods. the descriptive approach will be employed to outline the contours of dsr and its expansion across europe. the exploratory method, in turn, will primarily be used to investigate the obstacles to dsr’s expansion in europe and china’s response through sports diplomacy. this approach aims to explore a relatively underexplored area, deepening the analysis of topics that remain insufficiently developed, thereby contributing new insights and generating hypotheses. the authors’ research design centres on a case study approach, focusing specifically on china’s sponsorship activities during euro 2024 as a tangible example of its broader efforts to expand the bri and dsr. this study draws on primary sources, such as official documents and news, as well as secondary sources, including academic articles and reports from think tanks, notably the european think-tank network on china (etnc). the data collected has been 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 analyzed using techniques including a literature review, document and content analysis. from a theoretical perspective, the analysis is structured around the operationalization of the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy, which have a long-standing tradition in the discipline of international relations (nye 2008; sun 2008; tsvetkova and rushchin 2021; xifra 2009; yiwei 2008a). to this established framework, the authors add the concept of sports diplomacy, expanding the scope of analysis of the phenomenon under study. the article is structured as follows. the first section connects theory with practice by presenting a brief introduction to the dsr and the theoretical framework used in the analysis (soft power, public diplomacy, and sports diplomacy). this section also explains and justifies how these frameworks are applied to address the research question. the subsequent sections focus on the analysis of the study’s subject: the dsr in europe, with particular emphasis on the case of euro 2024. the conclusion summarizes the findings, highlighting the interplay between the bri and dsr and the diplomatic and marketing strategies employed by beijing during euro 2024. bridging theory and practice: digital silk road, soft power, and public diplomacy the bri was first announced through two separate proposals by xi jinping: in september 2013, during a visit to kazakhstan, he proposed the creation of a “new silk road” linking china and central asia (china daily 2013a), and in october of the same year, during a visit to indonesia, he introduced the idea of a “maritime silk road” connecting china and southeast asia (china daily 2013b). in the following years, the initiative began to take concrete shape, establishing itself as a project aimed at financing the construction of logistical infrastructure around the globe, fostering trade and development (ahmed and lambert 2022; ferdinand 2016). the bri is associated with the proposal to build a “community of shared future for mankind,” an idea grounded in the establishment of a “new type of international relations” (national development and reform commission 2015, 2017b, 2017c). in advocating this idea, beijing envisions a more peaceful and stable world, characterized by harmonious coexistence, respect, and the exchange of cultures and experiences (xinhuanet 2017c). in this vision, states must cooperate to tackle global challenges while upholding principles such as justice, mutual benefit, and sovereignty (xinhuanet 2017c). nevertheless, while some authors argue for the benevolent or at least beneficial nature of this community, others contend that it is linked to china’s aspiration for a more prominent role in the international system and even the proposal of a new international order and a new model of global governance (nathan and zhang 2022; silva 2024; yan 2021; zhang 2018). although originally launched with two corridors—the silk road economic belt and the 21st century maritime silk road—the bri has since expanded into new domains of cooperation, including the digital sphere. the first mention of a digital corridor came with the presentation of the action plan for the bri in 2015, which proposed the creation of an “information silk road” (national development and reform commission 2015). a few months later, during the china-eu digital cooperation forum, the first official reference to the “digital silk road” was made, a challenge that was reiterated during the 15th forum on internet media in china, where chinese companies and media operating online were urged to assist in expanding international trade and digital banking services along the belt and road (china daily 2015). in 2017, during the second belt and road forum for international cooperation, xi jinping called for the establishment of a “21st century 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 digital silk road” aimed at “intensifying cooperation in frontier areas such as the digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and quantum computing, and advancing the development of big data, cloud computing, and smart cities” (xinhuanet 2017b). given that the main objective of the bri is global connectivity, the dsr, as its digital corridor, is conceived as a project capable of creating technological and digital infrastructures worldwide, thereby linking all states along the economic corridors of the belt and road (hussain et al. 2024). the dsr involves 5g technology, quantum computing, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, big data, and cloud computing, aiming to connect peoples and assist “other countries to build digital infrastructure, construct transnational platforms for e-commerce, generate qr codes, promote exports, conduct financial transactions, and develop mechanisms for internal security surveillance” (chung 2023, 124–25). another crucial element of the dsr is digital currency. in this regard, beijing has developed the renminbi—a digital currency aimed at replacing the dominance of the dollar in e-commerce (aysan and kayani 2022). complementary to the economic corridors of the bri, the dsr operates to enhance the expansion of chinese industrial companies, providing them not only with physical infrastructures but also digital ones that support the internationalization of their businesses. through the dsr, china supports the export of technological infrastructures, reinforcing the transnational influence of its companies and promoting the establishment of new standards (chung 2023; hussain et al. 2024). consequently, the dsr is recognizable as a geo-economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic instrument related to the control of internet infrastructures, particularly the fibre optic cables that interconnect continents and through which a significant amount of digital information flows. by controlling these cables, china can manage data traffic and digital information, granting it greater international power (shen 2018). as hussain et al. (2024, 242) argue, the dsr is not just “a project of infrastructure development but also a strategy for china to promote a worldwide china-centric digital order opposite to the us-centric one.” as highlighted by ghiasy and krishnamurthy (2020), through the dsr, china aims to shape cyber governance and norms, exporting its system of values by influencing the content that reaches the public through investments, partnerships, and the acquisition of media and social networks. as an integral part of the bri, the dsr is also a key element in advancing the construction of a “community of shared future for mankind.” due to its distinct, digital-focused nature, the dsr contributes to this project, in part, by promoting a “community of shared future in cyberspace.” while the bri evokes a new model of global governance, the dsr envisions a similar framework specifically for cyberspace, advocating for shared governance of this domain to ensure that it benefits all of humanity while upholding principles such as cyber sovereignty, cooperation, peace, and security (china daily 2022). it is widely acknowledged in the literature that the bri serves as an instrument of chinese soft power (dinh et al. 2024; duarte and ferreira-pereira 2022; voon and xu 2020; zhu et al. 2024). on the other hand, the dsr appears to exhibit this element to a lesser degree, although it still seeks to contribute to promoting a more favourable narrative for china. through this article, the authors argue that beijing not only uses the bri and the dsr as instruments of its soft power but also employs both soft power and public diplomacy to facilitate the expansion of these initiatives. given that, in the chinese context, soft power and public diplomacy are closely interconnected, the authors aim to employ these theoretical frameworks, alongside the concept of sports diplomacy, to interpret and understand the strategies developed by beijing during euro 2024 to promote the dsr. 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 soft power is a concept introduced by joseph nye in his work bound to lead: the changing nature of american power. in this work, nye (1990) argued that certain states, particularly the united states of america (usa), could achieve their objectives without resorting to coercion and typical hard power tactics, instead relying on attraction and persuasion. soft power extends beyond the conventional notion of power as the imposition of will and control over another actor (bakalov 2019). according to nye (2004), soft power is characterized as the state’s ability to shape the preferences of others, achieving desired outcomes not through threats or payments, but simply because other states want to follow suit. the success of soft power lies in the appeal of a state, influenced by its values, culture, political system, and international conduct (nye 2004, 2008). therefore, the resources that generate soft power are the values and culture expressed internationally by a country. public diplomacy, on the other hand, is the tool “that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments” (nye 2008, 95). in this sense, tuch (1990, 3) describes public diplomacy as “a government’s process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to foster understanding of its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies.” although predominantly associated with public entities, the evolution of public diplomacy has introduced new actors, such as transnational corporations or non-governmental organizations, leading governments to utilize them to project their international image (ordeix-rigo and duarte 2009). associated with the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy, the notion of sports diplomacy also warrants consideration. sports diplomacy can be defined as “the conscious, strategic use of sportspeople and sporting events by state and non-state actors to engage, inform and create a favourable image among foreign publics and organisations” (murray 2018, 3). this concept may be interpreted in a traditional context, where governments employ sport as a diplomatic tool or, alternatively, in a context where nonstate actors engage in communication and negotiation through participation in international sporting competitions (abdi et al. 2018; murray and pigman 2014). it is the former sense that will be the focus of this article. in practice, as murray and pigman (2014) argue, if diplomacy serves as a means of advancing the foreign policy objectives of states, then sports diplomacy can be regarded as a form of diplomacy. it is worth highlighting that, as conceptualized by nye (2004), sport constitutes one of the cultural foundations of soft power. thus, through the use of sports diplomacy, states can enhance their attractiveness, thereby improving public perceptions of their diplomacy, strengthening their soft power, and shaping the preferences of others (abdi et al. 2018; murray and pigman 2014). in china, soft power was introduced in 1993 by wang huning, an academic close to political circles. however, it was only in 2007, during the 17th national congress of the communist party of china, that soft power was identified as a crucial part of chinese foreign policy (sayama 2016). chinese soft power is based on the conception presented by wang (1993, 91), associating it with national culture, considering that “only when a culture is widely spread can soft power produce strong power.” chinese soft power is thus distinct from american soft power, focusing not so much on the attractiveness of the political model and popular culture, as proposed by nye, but rather on the diffusion of traditional culture and the chinese development model, relying on state action rather than civil society (michalski 2012; zheng and chi 2013). by primarily relying on state action and the dissemination of values, including through propaganda, chinese soft power aligns 82 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 closely with public diplomacy. this serves as a tool to reinforce and enhance chinese soft power by making china and its values more attractive abroad, thereby conveying a narrative more conducive to chinese interests (“right chinese story”2 ) and improving china’s international image (yiwei 2008b). one of the tools serving chinese diplomacy and soft power has been sport. numerous examples and studies underscore china’s use of sport as a means of projecting its power and pursuing its objectives. for instance, jeong et al. (2024) demonstrate that beijing has sought to use sport to convey a more positive international image, citing examples such as investments in olympic disciplines and the hosting of events like the 2008 summer olympics and the 2022 winter olympics. similarly, niu (2024) showed that the beijing 2022 winter olympics functioned as a soft power strategy designed to promote china’s international image. these games also served as a form of “diplomatic activity” (niu 2024, 2) aimed at improving relations with certain states, particularly in the middle east. finally, hernández-correa and gúdel (2024) identified a similar pattern in china’s diplomatic strategy over recent decades, highlighting investments in domestic football and european football clubs. they emphasize the link between these sports diplomacy efforts and the bri, with the aim of strengthening ties between china and european peoples (hernándezcorrea and gúdel 2024). against this backdrop, and with a particular focus on the use of sport as a tool for diplomacy and soft power, this article analyzes china’s sponsorship of euro 2024. through this, the authors aim to substantiate the argument that china seeks to utilize such sponsorships as a form of sports diplomacy and soft power to promote a favourable image not only of itself but also of its technology companies, fostering greater receptiveness among europeans to chinese technology and digital services. in turn, this facilitates the expansion of the dsr into european markets. the digital silk road in europe: eu constraints and security implications europe is one of the priority regions of the bri. today, more than twenty countries have cooperation agreements signed with china under the bri, although not all have signed memoranda of understanding (mous) (wang 2021). among the countries with mous, notable examples include albania (2017), croatia (2017), portugal (2018), romania (2015), serbia (2015), slovakia (2015), the czech republic (2015), and greece (2018), among others. additionally, noteworthy is the mou signed between the ministry of finance of the people’s republic of china, the european bank for reconstruction and development, and the european investment bank (nedopil 2023;wang 2021). regarding the dsr, china has aimed to expand its digital corridor into european territory, utilizing key tools such as 5g technology, e-commerce, and digital currency. however, alongside the usa, the european union (eu) stands as a significant geopolitical opponent to both the bri and the dsr. in 2020, the european commission introduced a digital strategy focused on artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, digital education, climate change mitigation, and democracy, titled “shaping europe’s digital future,” with the goal 2 the expression “right chinese story” refers to beijing’s effort to promote a favourable image of itself abroad, countering the “china threat” narrative and discouraging the discussion and dissemination of ideas and discourses linked to sensitive topics that may harm china’s international reputation. essentially, it denotes the version of china’s story that the chinese leadership seeks to have projected globally. 83 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 of positioning the eu as the global leader in technology (european commission 2020). the eu further launched two white papers—one on data and another on artificial intelligence—and initiated a cybersecurity program linked to 5g (eu toolbox for 5g security), as well as a recent program for a digital decade. thus, the union demonstrates its desire to assert itself as an international digital powerhouse, competing with china, and moreover, providing its member states with an alternative to the dsr. prior to the launch of this strategy, the european parliament had already issued a resolution on the security risks associated with the use of technology of chinese origin in the eu (european parliament 2019). based on this, the european commission issued a recommendation, urging member states “to assess the cybersecurity risks affecting 5g networks at national level [sic] and take necessary security measures” (european commission 2019, 45). the european commission’s recommendations, along with the perception of risks associated with chinese technology, led around ten european countries to ban chinese companies from installing 5g infrastructure (kroet 2024). examples include estonia, which in 2021 banned its operators from using chinese technologies; lithuania, which decreed in 2021 that only suppliers authorized by the government could provide technology for the installation of the 5g network (reuters 2023b); portugal, where the operators themselves initiated the decision not to use chinese technology, which was later supported by the superior cyberspace security council (jornal económico 2023;rádio renascença 2020). other countries, such as germany, continue to consider the possibility of banning companies like huawei and zte, even though they have not yet implemented a ban on the use of chinese technology (nienaber 2024). given this scenario, the eu has even considered prohibiting member states from using technologies from companies that pose a risk to the union’s cybersecurity in their 5g networks, especially huawei (reuters 2023a). in fact, the eu’s strategic compass, launched in 2022, considers china as “a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival” (european union 2022, 18), demonstrating a more assertive and cautious stance toward beijing, its interests, as well as its products, services, and companies. outside the eu, other states have also expressed security concerns regarding china’s 5g technology. one example is kosovo, which has committed to excluding chinese companies from the deployment of its 5g network (vladisavljev 2021). moreover, the situation of the bri and the dsr in the balkans has benefited from the china-ceec cooperation forum. however, this forum has faced challenges, with some countries opting out (plevnik 2022). in this domain, the usa has implemented the “clean network” initiative aimed at excluding chinese firms from the 5g network deployment in this region. kosovo, north macedonia, and albania have joined this initiative, contributing to a distancing from beijing (vladisavljev 2021). despite obstacles, the digital corridor of the bri has achieved significant advancements in europe, both within and outside the eu. in 2021, huawei inaugurated a 5g and artificial intelligence laboratory (5gainer) in aveiro, portugal, in collaboration with the university of aveiro and the portuguese telecommunications institute (eco 2021). in bosnia, the ministry of communications and transport signed an agreement with huawei in 2018 aimed at developing smart city and safe city projects (xinhua silk road information service 2018). additionally, in bosnia, alongside serbia and north macedonia, huawei’s “seeds for the future” project is being implemented, focusing on training in 5g, ai, and cybersecurity (vladisavljev 2021). in 2021, serbia, a candidate country for eu accession, installed a video surveillance and facial recognition system in 84 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 belgrade developed by huawei (pascual 2021). the year before, huawei had inaugurated an innovation and development center in belgrade aimed at accelerating serbia’s digital transformation. serbia is one of the most engaged european countries in the bri and dsr, with prospects for cooperation with huawei in various fields such as artificial intelligence, 5g, and smart cities (xinhuanet 2020). serbia signed a memorandum of understanding in 2017 on strengthening the development of the information silk road for information connectivity and has been the focal point of huawei’s activity in the region, with numerous projects extending to data centers (vladisavljev 2021). beyond telecommunications, aliexpress, a branch of the e-commerce giant and competitor of amazon, alibaba, has been implementing its “local to global” strategy in europe. in this regard, in 2019, it began allowing retailers from spain and italy to use its platform to sell their products (ecommerce news 2019). on the other hand, alipay has established partnerships with digital payment services across europe, including bluecode (austria), pagaqui (portugal), epassi and pivo (finland), and momo pocket (spain), among others, resulting in agreements for the adoption of a unified qr code provided by alipay. this indicates “a systematic integration that enables china to strategically position itself for future dominance of overseas markets” (ghiasy and krishnamurthy 2020, 13), thereby also contributing to the formation of new standards. china’s soft power strategy at euro 2024: leverage sports marketing for dsr expansion despite the agreements of the bri, both this initiative and the dsr have encountered challenges in expanding into european territory. pressures from the eu and the usa, along with security concerns from various states, have not contributed to chinese interests in the region. as a result, chinese soft power appears to have faltered. in fact, as a report from the clingendael institute indicates, china’s image in europe began to deteriorate after 2006, despite diplomatic maneuvers like the 2008 beijing olympics (d’hooghe 2010). a subsequent 2021 report from the european think-tank network on china concluded similarly, noting that china’s soft power has faced difficulties in europe (dams et al. 2021). in response, beijing appears to have strengthened its strategy, resorting to public diplomacy and soft power. the authors argue that, through these tools, china seeks to promote its values and narrative, making itself more attractive to the european public and thereby facilitating its penetration into the european market. this strategy is not new, having been employed by china for many years, primarily through state-owned and private companies (yiwei 2008b; zheng and chi 2013). however, it is important to note that the actions promoted by chinese companies, whether state-owned or private, are aligned with the interests of the chinese communist party (walker 2018). chinese soft power and public diplomacy take many forms, one of which involves the use of sports. as previously analyzed, sports diplomacy is a powerful tool for states’ foreign policy, enhancing attraction and acting as a catalyst for cooperation (qingmin 2013; murray 2018). china’s investment and sponsorship in sports are not new strategies in its efforts to attract and engage european populations. they have frequently been used by beijing to promote its image as well as its companies and products (chadwick et al. 2022; hernández-correa and gúdel 2024; junior and rodrigues 2020). with these sponsorships, china ultimately seeks to improve its image, as well as the image of its companies (chadwick et al. 2022; connell 2018; xue et al. 2020). in doing so, it conveys 85 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 a narrative aligned with its interests, countering the narrative of the “chinese threat” propagated by the eu and the us. for a time, there was even a wave of acquisitions of major european sports clubs by chinese investors, including giants like atlético de madrid, associazione calcio milan, and football club internazionale milano (lim 2024; xue et al. 2020). similarly, several european football teams prominently displayed sponsorships from chinese companies on their jerseys (reale 2021). however, both of these dynamics appear to have slowed down, with chinese companies selling their clubs and terminating their sponsorships (lim 2024; reale 2021). currently, western companies such as heineken, lay’s, fedex, and mastercard dominate the sponsorship list for major european sports events, like the uefa champions league, while amazon and visa take center stage in the uefa women’s champions league (uefa 2024a). a similar trend is observed with clubs. however, chinese companies are now seeking to reverse this trend through major football platforms in europe. a notable example is the 2020 uefa european football championship (held in 2021 due to the pandemic), which was sponsored by four chinese tech companies: hisense, vivo, tiktok, and alipay (dan 2021). by capitalizing on a competition that reaches millions of viewers across europe and beyond, these chinese firms aimed to position themselves as viable alternatives to western products and services. their objective extended beyond market expansion, striving to cultivate a positive image both for themselves and for china. through this public diplomacy initiative, beijing’s soft power stands to gain greater influence and outreach, appealing to european audiences and potentially fostering greater receptivity towards initiatives like the bri and dsr. this strategy continued with the 2024 uefa european football championship, where chinese sponsors accounted for over a third of the total sponsors (5 out of 13) (uefa 2024a). one such case is the e-commerce company aliexpress, the international branch of the giant alibaba, which aims to surpass the american amazon in e-commerce. aliexpress is a digital retail marketplace that has been growing in europe, recently opening its platform to merchants from several european countries. through this partnership, uefa and aliexpress aim to enhance fans’ digital experience by connecting them with digital commerce and linking consumers to football (uefa 2024b). as part of this collaboration, aliexpress has also offered various discounts on products sold on its platform, including providing tickets to games for some of its customers (aliexpress 2024). simultaneously, aliexpress has launched several physical events in cities across germany, where the tournament is held, notably featuring david beckham as the face of the “score more with aliexpress” campaign (utley 2024). through this partnership, which includes naming rights for the tournament’s top scorer award (euro 2024 alipay+ top scorer) and involves uefa making alipay available as a payment option for purchasing tickets digitally, alipay aims to expand its presence in the european market. concurrently, alipay has expanded the number of european merchants accepting mobile payments through its technology. additionally, through a partnership with the european company bluecode, alipay now provides payment services to customers of over three hundred banks in germany and austria, with similar agreements established in france, the united kingdom, spain, and italy (the paypers 2024). the technology company vivo is another sponsor of the uefa european football championship, continuing its sponsorship from the previous edition (uefa 2020). the brand aims to promote its smartphones in a region where samsung, apple, and xiaomi 86 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 dominate. similarly, the electric vehicle manufacturer byd (build your dreams) has joined as a sponsor, with the expressed aim of competing globally with tesla and european car manufacturers. in this way, the company assists beijing not only in projecting a more positive image but also in establishing new international standards. finally, the last sponsor is the television brand hisense (uefa 2024a). chinese companies appear to hold a dominant position among the sponsors of a tournament that, in its previous edition, attracted a cumulative audience of approximately five billion viewers—over 300 million of whom watched the final alone (uefa 2021). through these sponsorships, which provide leisure opportunities and prominently feature chinese characters in on-field advertisements, chinese companies aim to allure and attract european consumers. since the beginning of the competition, not only has alipay seen a notable increase in the number of transactions in germany, but the aliexpress app has also experienced a 100 percent growth in downloads (ferreira 2024; ludlow 2024). overall, there is a noticeable trend towards using marketing as a form of public diplomacy through the sponsorship of major events in europe. in this way, beijing not only ensures the conquest of new markets for itself and its companies but also facilitates the dissemination of a more positive narrative aligned with its interests, captivating european populations, ensuring the success of its soft power, and thereby enabling the gradual expansion of the dsr. this reality is particularly observable in the realm of e-commerce, specifically within the alibaba group, which includes both aliexpress and alipay. conclusion through this article, the authors aimed to explore the use of tools such as soft power and public diplomacy by china to promote the dsr. the article began by developing the theoretical framework that underpins the analysis, which consists of the concepts of soft power, public diplomacy, and sports diplomacy, all adapted to the chinese context. in the same section, the context for the dsr was also provided. in the following section, the presence of the bri digital corridor in europe was discussed, highlighting the obstacles imposed by the eu and western skepticism. finally, the authors analyzed how china has sought to use sports diplomacy to overcome these challenges and promote the expansion of the dsr. this article contends that china has sought to bypass obstacles to the expansion of the bri and dsr across european territory by sponsoring major sports events, with particular emphasis on the most recent case: the 2024 uefa european football championship. aware of the difficulties in expanding the dsr into european territory, china, through its companies, decided to become one of the main sponsors of the largest sporting event in europe. in this way, china aimed to familiarize europeans with its brands, products, and technological services, enticing them and thus facilitating the penetration of the dsr into the region. acknowledging that the sponsorship of the event by chinese companies falls under the categories of public diplomacy, soft power, and sports diplomacy, and recognizing that this is a strategy china has been employing in the promotion of the bri, the authors conclude that beijing has sought to attract and engage european consumers with the services provided by its companies. this strategy challenges the “chinese threat” narrative, promoting a story that appeals to european populations and is beneficial to china’s interests. by convincing europeans that its companies care about their well-being and offer services that are as sophisticated as, or even more so than, those of western 87 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 companies, china is able to regain public trust and expand the geographical reach of its products and services, thus enabling the gradual penetration of the dsr in a region where the eu and the us have worked hard to counter chinese investment projects at all costs. through this study, the authors contribute to the understanding of the role sport can play in the dynamics of international relations. more than that, the article demonstrates china’s ability to utilize diverse instruments and complex, heterogeneous tactics to achieve its objectives on the international stage. the analysis, however, has some limitations, which future studies should address. these include quantifying the european public’s perception of chinese sponsorship of sports events, as well as their views on chinese technological and digital products and services. 88 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 references abdi, kambiz, mahdi talebpour, jami fullerton, mohammad javad ranjkesh, and hadi jabbari nooghabi. 2018. “converting sports diplomacy to diplomatic outcomes: introducing a sports diplomacy model.” international area studies review 21 (4): 365–81. https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865918808058. ahmed, faisal, and alexandre lambert. 2022. the belt and road initiative: geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects. routledge. aliexpress. 2024. “aliexpress to give away over 1,000 uefa euro 2024tm match tickets to shoppers.” prnewswire. may 30, 2024. accessed may 20, 2025. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aliexpress-to-give-away-over-1-000uefa-euro-2024-match-tickets-to-shoppers-302158958.html. the paypers. 2024. “alipay+ expands payment services for uefa euro 2024. ” june 12, 2024. accessed may 21, 2025. https://thepaypers.com/online-mobilebanking/alipay-expands-payment-services-for-uefa-euro-2024--1268587. aysan, ahmet faruk, and farrukh nawaz kayani. 2022. “china’s transition to a digital currency does it threaten dollarization?” asia and the global economy 2 (1): 100023. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aglobe.2021.100023. bakalov, ivan. 2019. “whither soft power? divisions, milestones, and prospects of a research programme in the making.” journal of political power 12 (1): 129–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379x.2019.1573613. benvenuti, andrea, chien-peng chung, nicholas khoo, and andrew t. h. tan. 2022. china’s foreign policy: the emergence of a great power. routledge. blanchard, jean-marc f., and colin flint. 2017. “the geopolitics of china’s maritime silk road initiative.” geopolitics 22 (2): 223–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1291503. caridi, giorgio. 2023. “bri’s digital silk road and the eu: the role of innovation and communication in the italian case study.” in china and eurasian powers in a multipolar world order 2.0, edited by mher d. sahakyan, 192–201. routledge. chadwick, simon, paul widdop, and nicholas burton. 2022. “soft power sports sponsorship – a social network analysis of a new sponsorship form.” journal of political marketing 21 (2): 196–217. https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2020.1723781. chang, yen-chiang. 2018. “the ‘21st century maritime silk road initiative’ and naval diplomacy in china.” ocean & coastal management 153 (march): 148–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2017.12.015. china daily. 2013a. “xi proposes a ‘new silk road’ with central asia.” china daily, september 8, 2013. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcenterasia/201309/08/content_16952228.htm. ———. 2013b. “xi in call for building of new ‘maritime silk road.’” china daily, october 4, 2013. accessed may 23, 2025. https://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-10/04/content_17008940.htm. 89 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2015. “digital silk road linked to ‘net plus.’” china daily, september 8, 2015. accessed may 23, 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/12/24/content_2814752599016 40.htm. china daily. 2022. “full text: jointly build a community with a shared future in cyberspace.” november 7, 2022. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202211/07/ws63687246a3105ca1f2274748.ht ml. chung, chien-peng. 2023. “china’s digital silk road.” east asian policy 15 (2): 123– 37. https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793930523000168. connell, john. 2018. “globalisation, soft power, and the rise of football in china.” geographical research 56 (1): 5–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-5871.12249. d’hooghe, ingrid. 2010. “the limits of china’s soft power in europe: beijing’s public diplomacy puzzle.” netherlands institute of international relations “clingendael.” https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20100100_cdsp_paper_dhoo ghe_china.pdf. dams, ties, xiaoxue martin, and vera kranenburg. 2021. “china’s soft power in europe: falling on hard times.” european think-tank network on china. accessed may 19, 2025. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/chinas-soft-power-europefalling-hard-times. dan, zhang. 2021. “chinese companies grab attention as sponsors at uefa event.” global times, june 14, 2021. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1226105.shtml. dave, bhavna, and yuka kobayashi. 2018. “china’s silk road economic belt initiative in central asia: economic and security implications.” asia europe journal 16 (3): 267–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-0513-x. dinh, julia luong, ha hai hoang, and cu thi thuy lan. 2024. “china’s soft power in southeast asia through the belt and road initiative and vietnam’s reception.” asian perspective 48 (2): 301–26. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2024.a928618. duarte, paulo afonso b., and laura c. ferreira-pereira. 2022. “the soft power of china and the european union in the context of the belt and road initiative and global strategy.” journal of contemporary european studies 30 (4): 593–607. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2021.1916740. ecommerce news. 2019. “aliexpress welcomes sellers from europe.” ecommerce news. may 10, 2019. accessed may 23, 2025. https://ecommercenews.eu/aliexpresswelcomes-sellers-from-europe/. european commission. 2019. “commission recommendation on cybersecurity of 5g networks.” official journal of the european union l88: 42–47. https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32019h0534. ———. 2020. “shaping europe’s digital future: commission presents strategies for data and artificial intelligence.” press release. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_273. 90 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 european parliament. 2019. “european parliament resolution of 12 march 2019 on security threats connected with the rising chinese technological presence in the eu and possible action on the eu level to reduce them.” 2019/2575(rsp). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/ta-8-2019-0156_en.pdf. european union. 2022. “a strategic compass for security and defence.” https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en. fallon, theresa. 2015. “the new silk road: xi jinping’s grand strategy for eurasia.” american foreign policy interests 37 (3): 140–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2015.1056682. ferdinand, peter. 2016. “westward ho-the china dream and ‘one belt, one road’: chinese foreign policy under xi jinping.” international affairs 92 (4): 941–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12660. ferreira, pedro. 2024. “‘the numbers are beautiful:’ alipay+ europe gm discusses euro 2024 impact.” finance magnates. june 26, 2024. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.financemagnates.com/fintech/payments/the-numbers-are-beautifulalipay-europe-gm-discusses-euro-2024-impact/. ghiasy, richard, and rajeshwari krishnamurthy. 2020. “china’s digital silk road: strategic implications for the eu and india.” special report #208. institute of peace and conflict studies, leiden asia centre. https://ipcs.org/issue_briefs/issue_brief_pdf/sr208_august2020_china’s%20digita l%20silk%20road strategic%20implications%20for%20the%20eu%20and%20india_final.pdf. hernández-correa, emilio, and ricardo gúdel. 2024. “kicking power play: china’s football diplomacy as a geopolitical force.” janus net e-journal of international relation 14 (2): 59–71. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.dt24.4 huang, yiping. 2016. “understanding china’s belt & road initiative: motivation, framework and assessment.” china economic review 40 (september): 314–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.007. hussain, fakhar, zakar hussain, muhammad ikramullah khan, and ali imran. 2024. “the digital rise and its economic implications for china through the digital silk road under the belt and road initiative.” asian journal of comparative politics 9 (2): 238–53. https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911231174731. jeong, joonoh, jonathan grix, and louis grix. 2024. “the role of sports mega-events in china’s unique soft power strategy.” humanities and social sciences communications 11 (1): 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-04116-9. jornal económico. 2023. “governo afasta empresas chinesas das redes 5g nacionais” [government excludes chinese companies from national 5g networks]. jornal económico, may 26, 2023. https://jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/noticias/governoafasta-empresas-chinesas-das-redes-5g-nacionais/. junior, emanuel leite, and carlos rodrigues. 2020. “belt, road and ball: football as a chinese soft power and public diplomacy tool. ” in the belt and road initiative: an old archetype of a new development model, edited by francisco josé b. s. leandro and paulo afonso b. duarte, 61–83. palgrave macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2564-3_4. 91 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 kroet, cynthia. 2024. “most eu members not implementing huawei, zte 5g ban, data shows.” euronews. february 12, 2024. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/02/12/most-eu-members-notimplementing-huawei-zte-5g-ban-data-shows. lim, lionel. 2024. “a chinese conglomerate loses control of its elite european soccer team, as beijing fails to dominate the world’s favorite sport.” yahoo! finance. may 27, 2024. accessed may 23, 2025. https://consent.yahoo.com/v2/collectconsent?sessionid=3_cc-session_83dd17823b90-4e32-99ff-b78abe0f53ef . ludlow, edward. 2024. “alibaba, byd use the global game to reach new customers.” bloomberg. july 1, 2024. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-07-01/alibaba-byd-use-euro2024-to-turn-football-fans-into-customers. marcela, ana. 2021. “huawei inaugura laboratório de 5g e inteligência artificial em aveiro” [huawei inaugurates 5g and artificial intelligence lab in aveiro]. eco economia online, november 16, 2021. accessed may 23, 2025. https://eco.sapo.pt/2021/11/16/huawei-inaugura-laboratorio-de-5g-e-inteligenciaartificial-em-aveiro/. michalski, anna. 2012. “china and the eu: conceptual gaps in soft power.” in conceptual gaps in china-eu relations: global governance, human rights and strategic partnerships, edited by pan zhongqi, 65–79. palgrave macmillan. murray, stuart. 2018. sports diplomacy: origins, theory and practice. routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351126960. murray, stuart, and geoffrey allen pigman. 2014. “mapping the relationship between international sport and diplomacy.” sport in society 17 (9): 1098–1118. https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2013.856616. nathan, andrew j., and boshu zhang. 2022. “‘a shared future for mankind’: rhetoric and reality in chinese foreign policy under xi jinping.” journal of contemporary china 31 (133): 57–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2021.1926091. nedopil, christoph. 2023. “countries of the belt and road initiative.” green finance & development center, fisf fudan university. https://greenfdc.org/countries-ofthe-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/. nienaber, michael. 2024. “germany closing in on huawei 5g ban as digital ministry resists.” bloomberg. may 17, 2024. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-17/germany-closing-in-onhuawei-5g-ban-as-digital-ministry-resists. niu, song. 2024. “beijing winter olympics and china’s middle east diplomacy in the xi era.” journal of balkan and near eastern studies 27 (2): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2024.2352327. nye, joseph s. 1990. bound to lead: the changing nature of american power. basic books. ———. 2004. soft power: the means to success in world politics. public affairs. 92 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2008. “public diplomacy and soft power.” the annals of the american academy of political and social science 616 (1): 94–109. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699. ordeix-rigo, enric, and joão duarte. 2009. “from public diplomacy to corporate diplomacy: increasing corporation’s legitimacy and influence.” american behavioral scientist 53 (4): 549–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764209347630. pascual, manuel g. 2021. “reconhecimento facial chinês chega às portas da união europeia” [chinese facial recognition reaches the gates of the european union]. el país brasil, june 20, 2021. accessed may 23, 2025. https://brasil.elpais.com/tecnologia/2021-06-20/reconhecimento-facial-chineschega-as-portas-da-uniao-europeia.html. paulo, mireia. 2018. “china–europe investment cooperation: a digital silk road.” in the belt & road initiative in the global arena, 177–205. palgrave macmillan. plevnik, jasna. 2022. “china-ceec cooperation cannot be undermined.” china daily, august 31, 2022. accessed may 23, 2025. https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202208/31/ws630ea9e4a310fd2b29e75175.ht ml. qingmin, zhang. 2013. “sports diplomacy: the chinese experience and perspective.” the hague journal of diplomacy 8 (3–4): 211–33. https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191x-12341257. rádio renascença. 2020. “nos, altice e vodafone não usam huawei na rede “core” 5g, apesar de governo não banir operadora chinesa” [nos, altice, and vodafone do not use huawei in their 5g core networks, despite the government not banning the chinese operator]. rádio renascença, july 30, 2020. accessed may 23, 2025. https://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/economia/2020/07/30/nos-altice-e-vodafonenao-usam-huawei-na-rede-core-5g-apesar-de-governo-nao-banir-operadorachinesa/202018/. reale, hannah. 2021. “china’s future with european soccer.” the wire china. april 25, 2021. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.thewirechina.com/2021/04/25/chinasfuture-with-european-soccer/. reuters. 2023a. “eu considers mandatory ban on using huawei to build 5g, financial times reports.” reuters, june 7, 2023. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/eu-considers-mandatory-banusing-huawei-build-5g-ft-2023-06-07/. ———. 2023b. “european countries who put curbs on huawei 5g equipment.” reuters, september 29, 2023. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/technology/european-countries-who-put-curbs-huawei5g-equipment-2023-09-28/. sayama, osamu. 2016. “china’s approach to soft power: seeking a balance between nationalism, legitimacy and international influence.” royal united services occasional paper. institute for defence and security studies. https://static.rusi.org/201603_op_chinas_soft_power.pdf. shen, hong. 2018. “building a digital silk road? situating the internet in china’s belt and road initiative.” international journal of communication 12: 2683–2701. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/8405/2386. 93 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 silva, flávio bastos da. 2024. “a tianxià e a faixa e rota na ordem internacional: a construção de uma ‘comunidade de destino comum da humanidade’” [the tianxià and the belt and road in the international order: the construction of a ‘community with a shared future for mankind’]. daxiyangguo. portuguese journal of asian studies, no. 32 (september): 65–91. https://doi.org/10.33167/1645-4677/daxiyangguo2024.32/pp.65-91. sun, henry h. 2008. “international political marketing: a case study of united states soft power and public diplomacy.” journal of public affairs 8 (3): 165–83. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.301. szunomár, ágnes. 2024. “to connect or not to connect responding to the digital silk road in central and eastern europe.” european journal of international management 23 (2–3): 344–63. https://doi.org/10.1504/ejim.2024.138658. tracy, elena f., evgeny shvarts, eugene simonov, and mikhail babenko. 2017. “china’s new eurasian ambitions: the environmental risks of the silk road economic belt.” eurasian geography and economics 58 (1): 56–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2017.1295876. tsvetkova, natalia, and dmitry rushchin. 2021. “russia’s public diplomacy: from soft power to strategic communication.” journal of political marketing 20 (1): 50–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2020.1869845. tuch, hans. 1990. communicating with the world: us public diplomacy overseas. st. martin’s. uefa. 2020. “vivo torna-se parceiro oficial do uefa euro 2020 e 2024” [vivo becomes official partner of uefa euro 2020 and 2024]. october 20, 2020. accessed may 23, 2025. https://de.uefa.com/news-media/news/026210a7eb7aad9e-e509f50e84b9-1000--vivo-torna-se-parceiro-oficial-do-uefa-euro2020-e-2024/. ———. 2021. “uefa euro 2020 com audiência global acumulada em directo de 5,2 mil milhões de espectadores” [uefa euro 2020 achieves a global cumulative live audience of 5.2 billion viewers]. september 6, 2021. accessed may 23, 2025. https://pt.uefa.com/news-media/news/026d-132d3b0a5a36a270393fe6a5-1000--uefa-euro-2020-com-audiencia-global-acumulada-emdirecto/. ———. 2024a. “uefa official sponsors and partners.” accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.uefa.com/partners/. ———. 2024b. “aliexpress signs as uefa euro 2024 partner.” march 27, 2024. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.uefa.com/news-media/news/028b1a8277e0fb2d-1bcaeba4402c-1000--aliexpress-signs-as-uefa-euro-2024-partner/. utley, elizabeth. 2024. “alibaba news roundup: aliexpress uefa euro 2024 events kick off; alibaba joins dot europe.” alizila news from alibaba. june 14, 2024. accessed may 23, 2025. https://www.alizila.com/alibaba-news-roundupaliexpress-uefa-euro-2024-events-kick-off-alibaba-joins-dot-europe/. vladisavljev, stefan. 2021. “china’s ‘digital silk road’ enters the western balkans.” policy paper. china observers in central and eastern europe. https://chinaobservers.eu/chinas-digital-silk-road-enters-the-western-balkans/. 94 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 voon, jan p., and xinpeng xu. 2020. “impact of the belt and road initiative on china’s soft power: preliminary evidence.” asia-pacific journal of accounting & economics 27 (1): 120–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2020.1686841. walker, christopher. 2018. “what is ‘sharp power?’” journal of democracy 29 (3): 9– 23. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0041. wang, heng. 2021. “the belt and road initiative agreements: characteristics, rationale, and challenges.” world trade review 20 (3): 282–305. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1474745620000452. wang, huning. 1993. “zuò wèi guójiā shílì de wénhuà ruǎn quánlì” [cultural soft power as a national strength]. fùdàn xuébào shèhuì kēxué bǎn 1993 (3): 91–96. wang, liehui, yuanbo zheng, cesar ducruet, and fan zhang. 2019. “investment strategy of chinese terminal operators along the “21st-century maritime silk road”.” sustainability 11 (7): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11072066. wang, yiwei. 2016. the belt and road: what will china offer the world in its rise. new world press. xifra, jordi. 2009. “catalan public diplomacy, soft power, and noopolitik: a public relations approach to catalonia’s governance.” catalan journal of communication & cultural studies 1 (1): 67–85. https://doi.org/10.1386/cjcs.1.1.67_1. national development and reform commission, ministry of foreign affairs, and ministry of commerce of the people's republic of china. 2015. “full text: vision and actions on jointly building belt and road.” belt and road forum for international cooperation. http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html. xinhuanet. 2017a. “china focus: xi launches belt and road forum to map out new global vision.” may 14, 2017. accessed may 23, 2025. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282137.htm. ———. 2017b. “full text of president xi’s speech at opening of belt and road forum.” may 14, 2017. accessed may 23, 2025. http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/201705/14/c_136282982.htm. ———. 2017c. “full text of xi jinping’s report at 19th cpc national congress.” october 18, 2017. accessed may 23, 2025. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm. ———. 2017d. “‘belt and road’” incorporated into cpc constitution.” october 24, 2017. accessed may 23, 2025. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201710/24/c_136702025.htm. ———. 2020. “huawei’s new innovations and development center will accelerate serbia’s digital transformation: pm.” september 15, 2020. accessed may 23, 2025. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/15/c_139368084.htm. xinhua silk road information service. 2018. “huawei aids bosnia and herzegovina in building smart city.” november 9, 2018. accessed may 23, 2025. https://en.imsilkroad.com/p/118790.html. 95 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 xue, hanhan, nicholas m. watanabe, ryan chen, joshua i. newman, and grace yan. 2020. “football (as) guanxi: a relational analysis of actor reciprocity, state capitalism, and the chinese football industry.” sport in society 23 (12): 2005–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2020.1755959. yan, karl. 2021. “the railroad economic belt: grand strategy, economic statecraft, and a new type of international relations.” the british journal of politics and international relations 23 (2): 262–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120940938. yiwei, wang. 2008a. “public diplomacy and the rise of chinese soft power.” the annals of the american academy of political and social science 616: 257–73. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207312757. ———. 2008b. “public diplomacy and the rise of chinese soft power.” the annals of the american academy of political and social science 616 (1): 257–73. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207312757. zhang, denghua. 2018. “the concept of ‘community of common destiny’ in china’s diplomacy: meaning, motives and implications.” asia & the pacific policy studies 5 (2): 196–207. https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.231. zheng, yongnian, and zhang chi. 2013. “‘soft power’ and chinese soft power.” in china’s soft power and international relations, edited by lai hongyi and lu yiyi, 21–38. routledge. zhu, runping, zhipeng ma, and richard krever. 2024. “domestic accounts of china’s belt and road initiative as an internally oriented soft power exercise.” china report 61 (1): 63–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/00094455241289183. 96 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 77-96 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of highquality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 china-central asia regionalization and its impact on the central asian region and beyond assylzat karabayeva, kimep university, kazakhstan1 abstract since gaining independence, central asian countries have maintained stable and friendly relationships with china. through china-led bilateral, regional, and multilateral projects, china and central asia have significantly strengthened their strategic partnership and elevated the importance of their relationship in the region-building process. as a result of these interactions, central asia is emerging as an active regional actor. this article characterizes china and central asia’s interactions as warleigh-lack’s (2006) “regionalization” and examines the impact of this process on diffusing china’s model of regionalism in central asia. specifically, the article aims to answer the question: what are the implications of china and central asia’s regionalization processes for shaping the region and for the presence of a third actor, russia? employing acharya’s (2004) “norm localization” analytical framework, the article argues that the current central asian regional cooperation model can be described as an indirect (recipient-driven) influence of china and central asia’s regionalization processes within the scope of the shanghai cooperation agreement (sco), bilateral strategic partnership agreements and belt and road initiative (bri). it posits that, of the various types of indirect diffusion of institutional and policy models of regionalism, the new central asian model of regional cooperation entails a “lesson-drawing” diffusion mechanism from the chinese model of regionalism. keywords: china, regionalism, regionalization, diffusion, central asia 1 assylzat karabayeva is an assistant professor at kimep university 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 1. china-central asia relations after the collapse of the union of soviet socialist republics (ussr), china and the central asian countries of kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, uzbekistan, tajikistan and turkmenistan smoothly and carefully constructed their relations. the central asian states identified their position clearly: they would not allow any outbreak and expansion of separatist and islamic fundamentalist movements in their territory and beyond. additionally, central asian countries first stated that they recognize china as “one” and that “taiwan is an inseparable part of chinese territory” (tokayev 2001). these claims fit china’s “core interests” well, which were stressed in the white paper as “state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification” (china’s peaceful development 2011). in turn, china constructed its image as part of the global south—a developing country that is not hegemonic but pursuing the five principles of peaceful coexistence that advocate for multipolarity, noninterference, and different development models (zhongping and jing 2014). china initiated the shanghai five—confidence-building talks with the post-soviet countries sharing a border with china (russia, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, and tajikistan) in 1996. in 2001, with the membership of uzbekistan, the shanghai five forum became more institutionalized, which led to the formation of the shanghai cooperation organisation (sco). despite not sharing any borders with china, other central asian countries such as uzbekistan and turkmenistan became important members as they were the first to officially start following the chinese model of development at the beginning of the 1990s (kazantsev 2008; syroezhkin 2010). the sco has been a multilateral site where countries engaged in their deals bilaterally. in other words, the sco is an institution for bilateral intergovernmental cooperation, which does not transfer any authority to an institution. such an approach was important for china as it allowed for the continuation of its “hub and spoke” strategy; on the other hand, the central asian states liked a bilateral approach as it enabled them to feel like equal partners in the organization and not as ‘russia’s little brothers.’ these factors enabled the central asian states to construct a more clear-cut vision of an organization that corresponds to their national interests. moreover, china favours a come as you are approach that avoids any conditionality, entailing the exportation of some external norms and values (laruelle 2018; russo 2018). in this regard, kazakhstan’s former president nursultan nazarbayev (1997) stated that they welcome china’s antihegemonic policy of friendship with neighbouring countries. he went on to say, “china never dictates its own terms and does not say ‘live as we live’, as the west has always taught us” (nazarbayev 2019). meanwhile, uzbekistan’s first president, islam karimov, declared that “china is the most reliable and trustworthy friend of uzbekistan” (syroezhkin 2010). while many countries criticized karimov’s regime after the andijan crisis,2 china was the first not to question the internal affairs of uzbekistan, which, in turn, improved economic ties by signing the treaty on friendly and cooperative partnership (karrar 2010). such gradually contracted political mutual trust was the first and key component of the china-central asia interactions. the vast majority of the literature has looked at china and central asia relations from the perspectives of china’s geopolitical and geo-economic domination aspirations, as well as china’s strategies for dealing with its domestic economic and security needs3 and its impact on strengthening authoritarian regimes in central asia.4 several studies have highlighted the agency of central asian countries and 2 the andijan crisis of 2005 was a violent crackdown on protesters in andijan, eastern uzbekistan, where security forces opened fire on demonstrators, leading to hundreds of deaths and international condemnation. 3 for more information, see bohr 2004; clarke 2017; ercilasun and ercilasun 2018; gabuev 2016; indeo 2018; tekdal 2018; reeves 2018; sternberg et al. 2017; swanström* 2005; xuanli liao 2021; zhang et al. 2018. 4 for more information, see allison 2008; kembayev 2020; peyrouse 2022; peyrouse and raballand 2015. 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 their hedging foreign policy approach in their relations with china (bitabarova 2018; dadabaev 2018; sim and aminjonov 2022; zhang 2022); still, as blanchard (2021) and de lombaerde et al. (2022) argued, most literature related to china and central asia relations overlooks how such relations contribute to the diffusion of china’s norms and experiences in the domestic and foreign policymaking of central asian countries. this article aims to bridge this gap by examining how chinacentral asia relations are influencing the domestic and regional integration efforts of central asian states and their relations with an external actor, russia. the study aims to demonstrate the diffusion of china’s regionalism ideas, rather than their implementation. examining the implementation of these diffused ideas lies beyond the scope of this study. this study employs an interpretive and qualitative approach. official documents retrieved from state presidents’ official websites are examined to trace the processes of norm diffusion through content and discourse analyses. the research also incorporates speeches, interviews, press conferences, publications, and articles authored by heads of state as well as members of epistemic communities. in order to understand the relationship between china and central asia and their regional and global impact, the article will briefly describe the theoretical framework explaining norm diffusion mechanisms, define key concepts, and conceptualize the china-central asia relationship as a regionalization process, where central asian countries draw lessons from china’s model of regionalism. afterwards, there will be an analysis of china’s model of regionalism and how china and central asian countries have interacted within this framework. next, the article will examine the impact of china-central asia regionalization on recent policymaking in central asia. lastly, the article will look at how recent changes in region-building, resulting from china-central asia regionalization, have strengthened the position of member countries vis-à-vis russia. 2. theoretical framework and conceptualization of china-central asia relations this article applies acharya’s norm localization theory, which explains how foreign ideas are adapted by local actors to align with local beliefs and practices. acharya (2004, 245) defines this process, known as constitutive localization, as “the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices.” in simpler terms, localization involves integrating external concepts into one’s existing cognitive priors. acharya (2009, 21) defines cognitive priors as “an existing set of ideas, belief systems, and norms, which determine and condition an individual’s or social group’s receptivity to new norms.” the beliefs of a nation’s founding leaders or elite groups often serve as primary sources of these cognitive priors, particularly in shaping how recently independent states conduct themselves internationally (acharya 2009). states localize foreign norms through diffusion to create new, practical policy tools that enable them to achieve modern objectives without abandoning their established cognitive frameworks. when a foreign norm clashes with strong cognitive priors, diffusion through localization fails, however, it succeeds when the foreign norm replaces an existing local norm (acharya 2004). localization entails active participation rather than the passive adoption of new rules and institutional frameworks. it includes translating, interpreting, and integrating new norms and rules into existing institutions, while also resisting certain foreign norms (acharya 2016; risse 2016). for the purposes of this article, diffusion is defined as “any process where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters” (strang 1991, 325). risse (2016) gives two types of diffusion mechanisms: direct (sender-driven) and indirect (recipient-driven). according to her, the diffusion of regionalism, institutional structures, and regional governance is primarily shaped by indirect, recipient-driven processes of emulation rather than direct, sender-driven influence. among the different types of indirect diffusion (competition, lesson-drawing, 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 normative emulation, and mimicry), this article uses the lesson-drawing mechanism to show norm diffusion. the lesson drawing mechanism is defined as a process where “actors look to others for policies and rules that effectively solved similar problems elsewhere and are transferable into their own context” (risse 2016, 145). states are most likely to draw lessons from those facing similar political and economic challenges and have successfully overcome them. through lesson drawing, states follow the logic of consequence, emulating foreign norms based on instrumental rationality and a problem-solving approach (jetschke and murray 2012; risse 2016; torney 2012). moreover, this article adopts börzel and risse’s (2016) definitions of regional cooperation, regional integration, and regionalism. regional cooperation is defined as “intergovernmental relations that do not entail the transfer of authority to the respective regional organizations” (börzel and risse 2016, 7– 8). integration occurs when “states transfer at least some authority and sovereignty rights to the regional level” through pooling or delegation (börzel and risse 2016, 8). regionalism is described as “a primarily state-led process of building and sustaining formal regional institutions [norms, rules, and procedures] and organizations [with a street address] among states (7).” thus, regionalism goes beyond eurocentric approaches and includes regional interactions in the non-european world (acharya 2016). however, this article employs the definition of regionalization offered by alex warleigh-lack. he defines regionalization as follows: an explicit, but not necessarily formally institutionalized, the process of adopting participant state norms, policy-making processes, policy styles, policy content, political opportunity structures, economies and identity (potentially at both elite and popular levels) to both align with and shape a new collective set of priorities, norms, and interests at the regional level, which may itself then evolve, dissolve or reach stasis. (warleigh-lack 2006, 758) regional interaction between china and central asian states can fit within the scope of this definition of regionalization. china and central asia’s regionalization process has been tracked since the beginning of the 1990s. however, regionalization started strengthening in 2013 when china announced the bri project. particularly, the regionalization process has become increasingly evident, particularly following the regime change in uzbekistan. china and central asian regionalization processes that have been occurring within the scope of the sco, bilateral strategic partnership agreements (spa) and the belt road initiative bri created a favourable environment for the central asian leaders to localize the foreign norms to solve domestic and regional issues. the new central asian regional cooperation model, which has been active since shavkat mirziyoyev became president in 2017, can be described as the indirect (recipient-driven) influence of china and central asian regionalization processes through lesson drawing mechanism. the focus on uzbekistan is due to the fact that it played a triggering role in the start of the new wave of regional cooperation in central asia. 3. china’s model of regionalism and central asia a number of scholars have discussed the ambiguity of china’s model of regionalism (clarke 2018; dunford and liu 2019), with some defining it as epochal regionalism (chen 2021), open regionalism (yi 2022), or virtual regionalism (allison 2008). however, xi jinping’s 2013 speech, which framed the bri as a regional project aimed at “[forging] closer economic ties, deepening cooperation, and expanding development space in the eurasian region,” along with the publication of the report, “vision and actions on jointly building silk road economic belt and 21st century maritime silk road,” offered a clearer conceptualization of china’s model of regionalism.5 this report outlined five key cooperation priorities: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial 5 belt and road forum for international cooperation. 2017. “vision and actions on jointly building belt and road.” april 17, 2017. accessed march 15, 2025. http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html. 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 integration, and people-to-people bonds. these priorities are not new, as china and central asia have already been implementing them in their regionalization processes. facilities connectivity and policy coordination for the most part, facilities connectivity and policy coordination are carried out through chinese partnership agreements. these agreements and bri are called “policy-led trade facilitation” through investment (arase 2015). at these stages, investment is a key concept. china’s going out policy, which has been implemented since the end of the 1990s, played a crucial role in prioritizing investment policies over trade. the focus on investment is what makes china’s approach to regionalism different from the western model, which places less emphasis on economic infrastructure (arase 2015). investment is essential for building infrastructure that supports seamless connectivity within and beyond national borders through collaborative development efforts. investment is also the key to opening free trade zones to improve international trade. many developing countries are reluctant to sign free trade agreements with china because of competitiveness. therefore, before the formation of the free trade agreement (fta), countries’ practices involved establishing special economic zones (sez).6 in the long term, the spillover effect of free trade zones to free trade whole zones (fta)7 is expected. the idea of establishing sez in the china-kazakhstan border has existed since the beginning of the 1990s. the first cross-border sez was zharkent in the taldykorgan region. it is strategically positioned on the kazakhstan-china border and serves as a major hub for trade, logistics, and industrial development. countries seek to enhance policy coordination to facilitate investment and trade. in some cases, they couple their national development strategies to achieve mutual benefits. at these stages, the primary focus is on removing barriers to the free movement of physical capital. one of the most notable examples of aligning development programs is kazakhstan's 2016 agreement to integrate its new economic policy, nurly zhol, with china's belt and road initiative (bri) (harutyunyan 2022).8 during the chinese leader’s visit to the sco summit held in bishkek on june 13, 2019, the president of kyrgyzstan at the time, soornbay jeenbekov, expressed kyrgyzstan’s willingness to establish institutionalized mechanisms to align its 2018–2040 national development strategy with china’s belt and road initiative (bri), emphasizing their strategic compatibility (xuequan 2019). moreover, in the strategic partnership agreements between china and turkmenistan, the members agreed to make all efforts to interface the “chinese dream” strategy about the revival of the chinese nation and turkmenistan’s “era of power and happiness” strategic development plan to achieve common growth based on the principle of win-win cooperation. in 2022, during the sco meeting in beijing, uzbekistan presented its development strategy of new uzbekistan for 2022–2026 and expressed its intention to align it with china’s bri (eurasia diary 2022b). another interesting coupling happened with the eurasian economic union and the bri through the signing of the agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the eurasian economic union (eaeu) and china. this event represented a partial realization of multiple unsuccessful attempts by chinese authorities to integrate the shanghai cooperation organization (sco) with the eurasian economic community (eurasec)9 through the establishment of a free trade area and a development bank (kembayev 2020; krapohl and vasileva-dienes 2019). during 6 a special economic zone (sez) is a designated area within a country that has different economic regulations, such as tax incentives and trade benefits, to attract investment, boost exports, and promote economic growth. 7 free trade whole zones fta is a designated area where goods can be imported, stored, processed, and re-exported with minimal customs regulations and without paying duties or tariffs. 8 this strategic move aimed to integrate kazakhstan’s infrastructure development plans with china’s massive global trade and connectivity project. 9 eurasec was the regional organization which existed between 2000 and 2014, which aspired towards economic integration within post-soviet territories. 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 uzbekistan’s chairmanship at the sco in 2022, a range of innovative ideas and documents were presented, including the transport connectivity strategy, the plan for advancing intra-regional trade, the infrastructure development program, the economic forum, the sco industrial innovation week, the forum of regional leaders, and the forum of industrial cooperation (eurasia diary 2022a). unimpeded trade the unimpeded trade stage aims to establish a free trade system covering the entire national territory by signing free trade agreements. in other words, countries agree to eliminate any tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services. within the framework of the sco, china has repeatedly attempted to negotiate free trade agreements with member states. however, russia and the central asian countries have been reluctant to proceed, fearing market dominance by chinese counterparts (kassenova 2013; syroezhkin 2010). the most recent attempt to establish a common economic space between china and the eaeu member states was once again unsuccessful, particularly from china's perspective. the 2018 agreement on economic and trade cooperation between china and the eaeu did not include any tariff preferences. instead, it focused solely on eliminating non-tariff barriers for goods in transit. people-to-people bond the people-to-people bond pillar is oriented to bring societies closer through “extensive cultural and academic exchanges, personal exchanges and cooperation, media cooperation, youth and women exchanges, and volunteer services” (belt and road forum for international cooperation 2015). through this pillar, china is aiming to expand its soft power. this pillar appears to be the least important in comparison with the other four pillars as china has been demonstrating itself as “wedoing” rather than “we-feeling” in the international arena (kavalski 2013, 262). therefore, china’s position is often characterized as “warm politics, cold public,” meaning that it prioritizes strong relations with the political elites of partner countries over public sentiment (dave 2018; kerr 2010). china is engaging with the central asian youth mostly through the confucius institutes, belt road initiatives research centers at universities, and model sco youth conferences. china and central asia have forged connections between 58 pairs of sibling cities, established 13 confucius institutes, and set up 22 confucius classrooms (ge 2023). in the last five years, model sco youth conferences have been held 20 times. the characteristics of china’s model of regionalism china’s model of regionalism is defined by a pragmatic and state-driven approach that prioritizes economic integration, flexible partnerships, and non-politicized cooperation. it emphasizes bilateral engagements within broader multilateral frameworks, strategic economic zones as stepping stones for integration, and a win-win narrative that aligns with south-south cooperation. the model is relational, emphasizing long-term diplomatic engagement, and avoids rigid structures or politically sensitive issues, instead focusing on mutual economic benefits and stability. 1. bilateral. china prefers to build relations with other countries in a bilateral framework. even in multilateral sites like the sco, the asean+3,10 and the regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep), the most important issues are targeted bilaterally. this bilateral framework enables china to establish a “hub-and-spoke” relationship with developing countries, positioning itself as the central hub while other global south nations function as the peripheral spokes. 2. depoliticization. china has eliminated all politically sensitive aspects from its economic cooperation and integration style. many post-colonial states are reluctant to share their authority with the supranational 10 asean+3 refers to the regional cooperation framework that includes the 10 member states of the association of southeast asian nations (asean)—brunei, cambodia, indonesia, laos, malaysia, myanmar, the philippines, singapore, thailand, and vietnam—plus china, japan, and south korea. 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 institutions. most asian countries prefer a sovereignty-bound regime. china constructed an “anticolonial” foreign policy, which favoured top-down state-led intergovernmental cooperation. moreover, developing countries consider the enormous chinese labour force as a threat to their emerging labour market. therefore, the chinese model kept the free movement of goods and capital flow but eliminated the free movement of the labour force from their agenda. in addition, the chinese model is silent about western norms, such as human rights and democracy. 3. from micro to macro. the formation of the fta (free trade area extended to the whole area) is a medium or long-term project. the step toward the fta starts with opening free trade zones (cross border, within the region, etc.). china’s external opening up in the 1970s started with the building of special economic zones (sez). china established four sezs to attract foreign direct investment in 1979. the positive results of these sez led to the launch of 15 new economic and technological developmental zones between 1984 and 1988 (zeng 2015). sez were an attractive policy for the chinese government as they permitted liberalization of only some parts of the territory. this approach enabled economic experimentation without exposing the entire national economy to uncertainty. however, there needs to be a positive spillover effect if the sez project is to succeed. this was the case for china when the successful pearl river delta sez quickly extended to the guangdong and fujian provinces of china. the southern china growth triangle even became the first and most successful project in east asia. today, there are around 5400 sez worldwide, with more than 2500 sez being located in china (552 state-level zones and 1991 provincial zones) (unctad 2019). the importance of the sez strategy in contemporary chinese policies has been evident from the thirteenth five-year plan (2016– 2020), where the concepts of free trade zones and free trade areas are repeated more than 11 times (pacory 2019). sez are attractive for those countries which are in transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, seeking external capital flow that incentivizes economic activities (thant et al. 1995). 4. flexible. the chinese model is not based on a rigid or already defined framework, in other words, “china has not taken a cookie-cutter, one size fits all” approach (webster 2007). instead, china implements the all-weather approach, which means that states, based on their mutual interests, decide how to conclude their agreements. for instance, china’s free trade agreements (ftas) are diverse in terms of form, coverage, and brevity (antkiewicz and whalley 2005). while china’s ftas with asean, australia, and new zealand are found to be more undefined, superficial, and gradual process-oriented, china’s ftas with hong kong or chile adopted a more concrete, comprehensive, and western-like formal structure (antkiewicz and whalley 2005; webster 2007). 5. south-south cooperation. china has tended to position itself as part of the global south or as a developing country that “gives economic aid to meet china’s own development needs while also serving the development needs of recipients” (arase 2015). in other words, china offers a win-win formula for codevelopment purposes. unlike traditional north-south cooperation, which often involves aid from developed to developing countries, china’s approach emphasizes equal partnerships, mutual benefits, and codevelopment rather than donor-recipient dynamics. through soft loans, infrastructure development, and technology transfers, china provides economic support that not only facilitates the growth of recipient countries but also serves its own long-term strategic interests—such as securing resources, expanding markets for chinese goods, and strengthening political alliances. 6. relational: chinese relationality logic entails the maintenance of dynamic processes through diplomacy, and relation-building is paramount to the chinese model of cooperation rather than immediate tangible results (qin 2011; sally 2013). this involves institutionalizing official visits and regular summit meetings of top government representatives as well as discourses through conferences, forums, and think-tank dialogues like global belt and road forum for international cooperation, 16+1 forum, belt and road innovation, the entrepreneurship forum, china-central asia cooperation forum, china-kazakhstan think tank dialogue, and model sco youth conference (goldstein 2005). 7. comfort zone. leaving aside conflictual issues, the “comfort zone” understanding takes its roots from deng xiaoping’s famous concept, “setting aside dispute and pursuing joint development” for a peaceful settlement of border and transboundary water issues as proclaimed in 1978. the main elements of this approach are that states put aside their conflictual issues for the time being and develop joint solutions for less politically sensitive problems to improve mutual understanding through constructive dialogue (embassy of the prc in the republic of estonia 2004). 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 china’s versus asean’s model of regionalism all these criteria mentioned above are not only exclusive for china’s model of regionalism but can be also found in other asian regionalism11 frameworks like asean. however, there are two things that make china’s regional model different from that of asean’s: first, an unclear identification as to who is the self and other and second is the fact that china’s regional model is not regional enough. china has been constructing its foreign policy-making in a very careful manner so as not create new foes. even though there were some tensions between china and the us, china restrained its use of harsh discourse, instead, requesting that “outside countries [e.g., us], on their part, should respect the diversity of [china’s]region and do their part to facilitate its development and stability” (xi 2014). when malaysian prime minister mahathir, a leader of an asean member nation, proposed the east asian economic group as an exclusive regionalist alternative to asia-pacific economic cooperation (apec), aimed at countering the us, it was china that vetoed the proposal (he 2017). another example, when president xi first announced his silk road and belt initiative in astana, he stated “[w]e [china] stand ready to enhance communication and coordination with russia and all central asian countries to strive to build a region of harmony” (xi 2013). china expressed its acknowledgment and respected russia’s role and interest presented in the central asian region and by doing so effectively avoided any misunderstandings with russia. in the case of asean, numerous instances illustrate how exclusive regionalism has been employed to balance the influence of major powers while strengthening regional identity and autonomy. asean member states have actively shaped regional cooperation through norm-driven mechanisms, effectively constraining the influence of external powers by prioritizing consensus-based decisionmaking, non-interference, and informal diplomacy—an approach commonly referred to as the asean way. the asean way, developed through decades of region-making, is characterized by sovereignty preservation, mutual respect, non-intervention, and consensus-building. this informal and nonbinding approach has allowed smaller asean states to prevent domination by major external actors, including china and the united states, while maintaining regional stability and fostering cooperation. by adhering to this model, asean has successfully managed to neutralize great-power competition within its framework, ensuring that no single external power dictates regional affairs. asean was called as the most successfully developed normative regionalism that effectively identified who is the self and who is other (acharya 2006; ganesan 2010; severino 2008; solingen 2008;). china’s regional policies are not committed to regionalism per se (he 2017). indeed, the driving force for all of china’s regional efforts is national developmental strategies and internal social stability factors. for chinese officials, an instrumental approach that prioritizes national interests more than building the region or that of a regional sense of community is more important. there is almost no discourse about the instances where regionalism is constructing the chinese nation-state, whereas in the case of asean, regionalism was more functionalist and liberalist in nature (eurasia review 2020) . 4. china-central asia regionalization: impact on central asian region-building new uzbekistan: as region builder in central asia changes in international politics of the region that have been happening since early 2017 were directly related to uzbekistan’s new president shavkat mirziyoyev and his innovative domestic and foreign policies. by analyzing speeches and the most important documents adopted by the new leader, one can 11 prominent ideas in asian regionalism include the principles of absolute sovereignty and non-interference, a preference for informal processes, relatively weak and centralized institutions, agreements with nonbinding outcomes, and consensusbased decisions (acharya 2016; kahler and macintyre 2013). 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 learn more about turning points from the previous policy direction to the current situation.12 in all the official documents and statements, the key message has been “economy first,” implying that development takes place through the economic sector. such rhetoric was also famous during the previous president karimov’s regime, but his economy first concept propagated together with other political and geopolitical concerns, such as “independence, independence and once again independence” (bbc 1993). indeed, the “cognitive priors” established by karimov in uzbekistan— non-interference, a self-reliant identity, and autonomy-seeking cooperation—rejected the diffusion of european ideas of regionalism13 in central asia (karabayeva 2021). therefore, several attempts to create a central asian union by emulating the eu model, as well as russia and kazakhstan’s efforts to expand the eaeu—an integration project modeled after the eu’s institutional design—were resisted by uzbekistan. however, mirziyoyev’s idea seems genuinely focused on economic matters through export. the current regime’s internal and external policies are aimed at decreasing imports from abroad and increasing exports to foreign partners (dadabaev 2019). such developmental strategies of the state have also influenced the structure and missions of the ministry of foreign affairs in uzbekistan. now, the first and foremost goal of uzbekistan’s embassies or representative offices abroad is to bring as much foreign direct investment as possible. this question was cemented by the “must” point. this directive has been reinforced as an absolute mandate, reflecting the country’s strategic focus on economic modernization, industrial development, and global market integration. in addition, mirziyoyev empowered the status of regional governors, particularly the hakims14 of those regions that share borders with neighbouring countries. even if one considers the names given to years since 2017, it is not difficult to notice what sectors and issues uzbekistan has been concentrating on. the year 2017 was declared as “the year of dialogue with people and human interests”; 2018: “the year of support of active entrepreneurship, innovative ideas, and technologies”; 2019: “the year of active investment and social development”; and 2020: “the year of the development of science, education and the digital economy.” with such declarations, uzbekistan has been initiating and supporting programs such as “every family is entrepreneur” and “youth is our future” as well as projects aimed at training a million software programmers (agency for strategic reforms 2022). mirziyoyev stated uzbekistan should emulate and learn from those states “[i]n their foreign policies, prioritize facilitating exports of their products in foreign markets” (dadabaev 2019). in this respect, it can be more evident now why uzbekistan’s new foreign policy has been making challenges in determining who is the self and who is the other. one cannot clearly define what the direction uzbekistan is leaning toward; who is the closest partner of uzbekistan: is it russia, china, or the west? in this respect, dadabaev (2019) claimed that uzbekistan has short-term goals that might give off the impression that uzbekistan has been taking a particular foreign policy direction. still, one should not confuse and take it as uzbekistan’s official stance. further, dadabaev (2019) stated that such shortterm goals have been taking place to accomplish the real long-term perspective becoming an export 12 for example, the early key documents, including uzbekistan’s national development strategy (2017–2021); the decree of the president “on additional measure to ensure the accelerated development of the entrepreneurial activity, comprehensive protection of private property and substantial improvement of business climate”; president mirziyoyev’s speeches, including his foreign policy speech from 2016, his speech “central asia is a region of huge unrealized potential” at the international conference held in samarkand, november 14, 2017, and the president’s addresses to the oliy majlis (uzbek parliament) in 2018, 2019 and 2020 and his address to uzbekistan’s ambassadors abroad in 2017. 13 the main principles of european regionalism include a preference for sovereignty-constraining structures through the formation of some degree of supranationalism, highly institutionalized legal frameworks, and majority decision-making structures with binding outcomes (acharya 2016). 14 in uzbekistan and some other central asian countries, a hakim is a regional or city governor appointed to oversee local governance, economic policies, and administrative matters. 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 oriented economy; this implies that every country is equally important for uzbekistan. moreover, such an equal relationship is also related to the central asian countries. the head of the ministry of foreign affairs, kamilov, noted that uzbekistan does not prioritize any country (e.g. kazakhstan) in central asia; instead, it works mutually with all of them (berdiev 2017). a good example from practice can be the case when mirziyoyev had his first official foreign trip as a president to turkmenistan, instead of the influential countries outside of the central asia (e.g. russia, china, the us, or japan) or even a larger country within the region like kazakhstan. most importantly, the elements of china’s developmental and problem-solving approach are present in uzbekistan’s current domestic and foreign policy-making. strategic partnership agreements kazakhstan signed a strategic partnership agreement (spa) with kyrgyzstan in may 2012 and with uzbekistan in june 2013. however, after the leadership change in uzbekistan from islam karimov to shavkat mirziyoyev, uzbekistan pushed strategic partnership agreements with other central asian countries. as a result, all central asian countries had signed spas with each other by 2018, with the exception of kyrgyzstan and tajikistan due to longstanding tensions between the two countries (see table 1). almost all central asian strategic partnership agreements prioritized the economic sector among others15 by focusing on trade, investment, and infrastructure aspects, except the spa between kazakhstan and tajikistan and kyrgyzstan and turkmenistan16 where the security aspect and energy sector were found to be at the core of the agreements. such flexible character of the central asian countries’ strategic partnership agreements (caspas) emulates chinese partnership models rather than rigid american or russian security-based spas or european partnership types aimed at the expansion of democratic, human rights, and governance values. like chinese spas, the caspas have not emphasized common values or identity. the caspas followed the comfort zone logic by leaving aside contentious issues. instead, the rhetoric of “we have not left any issues unresolved” became an integral part of the agreements. countries are showing their willingness to find mutual understandings on more economic issues, rather than politically sensitive disputes. thus, uzbek and tajik leaders decided not to remember about official statements made at the end of the 2000s about territorial claims for samarkand and bukhara and the construction of the rogun dam.17 the uzbekistan-tajikistan spa bypassed the rogun dam disputes and instead agreed to mutually benefit from jointly constructing two other hydro-electric power stations in zarafshan river (tolipov 2018). additionally, these two countries jointly settled the status of the farkhad hydropower station located in the spitamen district in sughd province, which is part of a disputed border territory between uzbekistan and tajikistan.18 these types of natural resource-based development initiatives were also found in the uzbekistan-turkmenistan and uzbekistan-kyrgyzstan spas. the national energy companies of uzbekistan and turkmenistan, uzbekneftegaz and turkmennebit, signed a memorandum of understanding (mou) for the joint exploration and development of turkmen energy deposits in the caspian sea (sattarov 2018). additionally, uzbekgidroenergo and the kyrgyz national energy holding company signed a memorandum on the 15 all central asian strategic partnership agreements include economic, security and cultural-humanitarian cooperation features. 16 the kyrgyzstan-turkmenistan spa specifically mentioned the importance of the realization of the gas pipeline between turkmenistan, uzbekistan, kyrgyzstan, and china. 17 relations between former uzbek president islam karimov and the president of tajikistan emomali rahmon worsened in 2009. this aggravation of relations led leaders to make official statements where rahmon stated that tajikistan will take back samarkand and bukhara; on the other side, karimov threatened war if tajikistan kept constructing the rogun dam. 18 working group delegations on delamination and demarcation from both countries agreed that the territory where farkhad hydropower station located belongs to tajikistan, whereas the hydropower station itself is under the ownership of uzbekistan. all maintenance of the hydropower station will be under the responsibility of uzbekistan, and security will be guaranteed by tajikistan. 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 joint construction of the kambaratinsky hydroelectric power station-1. uzbekistan and kyrgyzstan further agreed on the joint use of orto-tokoy reservoir in the jalal-abad region of kyrgyzstan (sputnik uzbekistan 2017). more importantly, all five central asian leaders participated in the third consultative meeting despite the fact that kyrgyzstan and tajikistan were in the midst of a border conflict. kassenova claimed that central asian states seem to have learned from chinese diplomatic conventions to treat its regional partners with respect, despite having limited experience on the international stage (sorbello 2024). table 1: central asian strategic partnership agreements kaz kgz tj tm uz kaz n/a may 2012 september 2018 april 2017 june 2013 kgz may 2012 n/a no spa august 2018 october 2017 tj september 2015 no spa n/a november 2017 august 2018 tm april 2017 august 2018 november 2017 n/a march 2017 uz june 2013 october 2017 august 2018 march 2017 n/a source: author special economic zones all seven attempts to create central asian economic integration since the post-independence period have failed. indeed, such failures were mostly reasoned due to the low level of intra-regional trade accounting for less than 10 percent of their total trade, different levels of economic and social development, as well as the incompatibility of the countries’ rules regulating trade and investment.19 however, these obstacles are not the case for sub-regional economic zones (thant et al. 1995). unlike trading blocs, special economic zones (sezs) do not discriminate against non-members by offering them mutual beneficial deals, including market access and foreign capital flow. special economic zones that guided china’s opening up to the world economy seem to play a significant role in uzbekistan’s new leader’s domestic and foreign economic policy making.20 the number of sezs doubled from 27 in 2015 to 55 in 2022, thanks to uzbekistan. by 2015, kazakhstan, turkmenistan, kyrgyzstan, tajikistan, and uzbekistan had ten, seven, five, three, and two sezs, respectively (ictsd 2015). however, by 2022, the numbers of sezs skyrocketed in uzbekistan reaching 22, and there was a gradual increase in other central asian countries, with the exception of kyrgyzstan (5): 13 in kazakhstan, 10 in turkmenistan, 5 in tajikistan (adrianople group 2023). strategic partnerships in central asia, particularly those ones where uzbekistan is a partner, made a very significant step for the regional cooperation through the signing of bilateral agreements between governments on intraregional cooperation. president mirziyoyev’s initiative, intraregional cooperation, refers to sub-regional interactions, in other words, interactions between administrativeterritorial units of corresponding states, particularly focusing on trade investment relations. for this 19 economic integration or trading blocs precondition the existence of the following criteria: 1) large volumes of international trade; 2) similar laws and regulations governing trade and investment flows; 3) per capita income.should be similar; 4) geographical proximity is significant; 5) high level of political commitment and policy coordination (thant et al. 1995). 20 scholars put forward four of the most common driving forces of building different types of sezs, including “(i) attracting foreign direct investment and promoting exports and industrialization; (ii) serving as pressure valves to alleviate largescale unemployment; (iii) supporting a wider economic reform strategy; and (iv) acting as experimental laboratories for the application of new policies and approaches” (zeng 2015). 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 aim, he proposed to set up “an association of regional governors” of central asian countries. today it is necessary to give priority to regional cooperation. in this regard, i propose founding an association of heads of, that is to say, governors of regions and business communities of central asian countries. when we conduct dialogue directly with the regions, their leadership, and business communities, the results will, as they say, be evident. there will be more results when we help them and do not prevent them [from doing so]. (bbc 2017). this initiative was the first step toward central asian bottom-up or zonal economic cooperation. kazakhstan supported the new uzbek leader’s idea and proposed to build a cross-border cooperation zone on the border of kazakhstan and uzbekistan. after a year, the two countries signed a memorandum on the creation of an international center for trade and economic cooperation—central asia and turkestan. these cross-border zones aim to become a cross-border trade, logistics, and tourist hub, opening up economic opportunities with europe and china (kazakh tv 2019). the realization of the special economic zone between central asia and turkestan is certainly important for the accomplishment and further development of the international central asian northsouth transport corridor (ministry of national economy of the republic of kazakhstan 2019). with the support and technical assistance of the asian development bank, the core project of the northsouth corridor —the turkestan-shymkent-tashkent-khujand economic corridor—has already been initiated. this initiative connects three densely populated regions (oblasts), which have popular touristic centers in central asia—turkestan (kazakhstan), tashkent (uzbekistan), and sughd (tajikistan). such a project is not new for the asian development bank, as it has already been technically supporting another central asian interregional economic project—the almaty-bishkek economic corridor under the framework of the central asia regional economic cooperation (carec) program since 2017. the almaty-bishkek economic corridor involves the almaty and zhambyl regions of kazakhstan and the chuy and issyk kul regions of kyrgyzstan. both economic corridors are meant to intensify economic activities in sub-sectors, including agriculture, health services, information and communications technology (ict), transport, and tourism (asian development bank 2018). in 2022, at the tashkent investment forum, kazakhstan proposed to build another intraregional “turan special economic zone” (astana times 2022). intraregional cooperation is also growing between uzbekistan and tajikistan, particularly between surxondaryo and khatlon regions and the samarkand, tashkent, and sogdy regions. annual consultative meeting of leaders the annual consultative meeting, originally suggested by uzbekistan in 2017, has evolved into a crucial collaboration platform exclusively designed for central asian nations. over time, this meeting has grown into a significant event, with different central asian countries taking turns to host it. kazakhstan hosted the first event in 2018, followed by uzbekistan in 2019, turkmenistan in 2021, kyrgyzstan in 2022, and tajikistan in 2023. the key topics that the heads of state have discussed and agreed upon so far include the creation of local free trade zones, fostering central asian industry, connecting to key economic routes, supporting business communication with a business council, addressing regional security, collaborating on energy and the environment, sharing news via a regional tv channel, expanding higher education through branch universities, and forming a youth policy agreement. an interesting observation was the more active participation of turkmenistan’s leader. turkmenistan has always tried to isolate itself from regional initiatives, yet, during this meeting, turkmenistan took a different path. the turkmen leader, president gurbanguly berdimuhamedov, advocated for the 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 ca5+n formula21 of cooperation. he called for cooperation among states, especially major powers. he also proposed a five-party business council as “a think tank for the formation of a joint strategy of [their]states on priority areas of economic partnership” (kadyrova 2019). such five-party initiatives, especially from the side of turkmenistan, were unexpected and introduced a new level of improved regional relationships. it is evident that when discussing regional cooperation, the leaders of the central asian countries intentionally refrain from making grandiose statements and instead provide carefully considered and politically neutral evaluations. the advisory meeting, as a collaborative format, currently aligns with the preferences of all central asian leaders. 5. china-central asian regionalization: impact on russia’s position in central asia the eurasian economic union (eaeu), formed under russian leadership alongside kazakhstan and belarus, was largely modeled after the eu’s institutional framework. the eaeu is a regional closed bloc, which is concentrated only on the post-soviet countries. like the eu, the eaeu is a top-down, institutionalized organization with supra-national bodies. the eurasian economic community (eurasec), a predecessor to the eaeu, once included all central asian countries except turkmenistan as members. in both the eurasec and eaeu, central asian countries sought similar economic benefits, including unrestricted access to the russian market, a steady influx of russian capital, and infrastructure development, in return for their political alignment with russia (president of the russian federation 2004). however, in his interview with the author of the article, olzhas khudaibergenov, a kazakh economist, stated that russia failed to fulfill the role of a “center” leading to the loss of trust from the central asian countries.22 moreover, moscow’s role as a primus inter pares within the framework of the eaeu prompted the states of central asia to seek more direct engagement with china (gabuev 2016, 63). the need for economic benefits has been effectively met by china since the establishment of partnership agreements with central asian countries. some scholars have observed that russia’s eaeu and china’s bri represent competing and rival regional frameworks (indeo 2020). it’s worth noting that not all central asian countries are members of the eaeu, every central asian country participates in the bri. it appears that central asian states are increasingly favouring chinese-led economic initiatives over russian-led ones. temur umarov, a fellow at the carnegie moscow center, pointed out that, “before the war, uzbekistan was one step closer to joining the eurasian economic union...i think that now uzbekistan will try to distance itself from moscow” (pikulicka-wilczewska 2022). on the other hand, uzbekistan in 2017 and tajikistan in 2020 formally expressed their interest in joining the quadrilateral traffic in transit agreement (qtta), a customs cooperation initiative originally signed in 1995 by china, pakistan, kyrgyzstan, and kazakhstan. this agreement aims to streamline customs procedures among the participant countries. china and the central asian nations consistently refer to the qtta as a foundational element for expanding connectivity projects within the bri, including the chinapakistan economic corridor and the upcoming china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan project (nelson and sutherland 2023). the war in ukraine, coupled with the resulting sanctions, has disrupted trade in central asia. russia, in particular, experienced a substantial trade contraction, with estimates suggesting a possible 60 percent decline in 2022 (darvas et al. 2023). in contrast, china has remarkably increased its trade with the region more than 100-fold over the past three decades (state council of the prc 2022). during a 21 ca5+n cooperation refers to the engagement between the five central asian countries (kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, uzbekistan, tajikistan, and turkmenistan) and external partners (denoted as “n”), which may include major global and regional powers like the us, eu, china, russia, japan, india, south korea, or the gulf states. 22 author’s unpublished interview with the economist olzhas khudaibergenov, august 7, 2018. 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 summit in january 2022, chinese leader xi jinping unveiled plans to open up china’s market to imports from central asia, with the goal of boosting total trade turnover between china and the region to 70 billion us dollars (usd) by 2030 (nelson and sutherland 2023). china assisted central asian states in reducing their dependence on the northern corridor23 and was able to successfully open up the kazakh-china joint terminal in lianyungang port as well as launch central asia’s connectivity to the middle corridor, which extends from china to turkey. central asian goods now can reach europe without passing through russian territory, although a dependency on the northern corridor still exists. nevertheless, astana, for instance, claimed that moscow’s leverage to exert pressure has been limited (hess 2023). the collaborative efforts of china and the central asian states have improved both the infrastructure and interconnections within the central asia region (bohr 2019). out of the six economic corridors within the bri, two traverse central asia: the new eurasian land bridge and the china-central asiawest asia economic corridor. kazakhstan is involved in five of the six routes within the new eurasian land bridge corridor, facilitating connections for central asian countries to the baltic sea, black sea, mediterranean sea, persian gulf, and the indian ocean (harutyunyan 2022). cargo arrives at the kuryk port in aktau, kazakhstan and, via the caspian sea and azerbaijan, reaches europe. the kuryk port was successfully connected to turkmenistan and iran to reach the middle east. such road and sea connectivity improvements are not only important for chinese and kazakh goods, but there is also a big potential for export capacities of uzbekistan and turkmenistan. to achieve this objective, the reconstruction of the beineu-akzhigit-border of uzbekistan and zehtibai-zhanaozen-kendirliborder of turkmenistan is underway to enhance connectivity between this automobile corridor and kuryk port. these projects, along with other ongoing upgrades to the transport and logistics network in central asia, contribute to regional infrastructure development and connectivity enhancement (kazakh tv 2018). under the bri, kyrgyzstan and uzbekistan are also working together with china to build a railway, which will connect asia to europe and the far east. china was able to successfully convince kazakhstan, turkmenistan, and uzbekistan to jointly construct a gas pipeline to export energy to china. this was another opportunity for turkmenistan to break russia’s monopoly over its energy export. furthermore, russia’s conflict with ukraine has also brought central asian states closer to china in the security sphere (nelson and sutherland 2023). scholars claim that russia’s war undermined its role to serve as a mediator in intraregional conflict (doolotkeldieva and marat 2022) or a source of stability (pikulicka-wilczewska 2022) in central asia. china has conditioned its support for the reconstruction of the dushanbe-uzbekistan border road on tajikistan and uzbekistan improving bilateral relations, particularly through the resolution of border disputes and other conflicts (indeo, 2018). furthermore, at the third china and central asia (c+c5) foreign ministers’ meeting in kazakhstan, the participating states signed four outcome documents; among these, one document conveyed central asia’s endorsement for a localized iteration of china’s data security cooperation initiative, with the aim of enhancing coordination for cross-border data exchanges (kadyrova 2022). central asian countries have already started constructing their political and economic course oriented toward china’s strategic policies. for example, the former president, nursultan nazarbayev, has not hidden the fact that it was the 2050 china strategy that influenced kazakhstan to choose the long-term “strategy kazakhstan-2050” program (nazarbayev 2012). the alignment of the timeframe for the “made in kazakhstan-2025” program—which seeks to promote technological modernization and the development of a non-resource-based economy—with china’s “made in china-2025” strategy, aimed at advancing the production of higher-value goods and services, is unlikely to be coincidental. 23 seventy percent of all routes from central asia are directed toward the northern corridors, which passes through russia. 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 6. conclusion after the collapse of the ussr, the newly independent central asian states carefully crafted their foreign policies concerning china. both china and the central asian states had a shared interest in prioritizing stability above all else. the key to this cooperation was their mutual commitment to respecting each other’s sovereignty and the absence of political pressure in their relations. this allowed china and the central asian countries to establish a trustworthy environment in the region. the shanghai forum and its successor, the sco, played significant roles in constructively resolving serious disputes, such as border issues, through bilateral dialogue and consultations. under china’s leadership, central asian countries experienced a new form of soft, peaceful, and incremental-based regionalism. this innovative central asian regional cooperation model was initiated by uzbekistan’s president mirziyoyev in 2017 and received strong support from other central asian countries. it appears that central asian nations took cues from china’s regionalism model by engaging in china and central asia regionalization processes, which involved the sco, bilateral partnership agreements, and the bri. china’s successful transition from a planned to a market economy, coupled with the role of sezs in achieving high economic growth and attracting foreign capital, motivated central asian countries to adopt a similar model of regionalism. uzbekistan’s open foreign policy stance was a driving force behind central asia’s shift toward regional cooperation characterized by inclusiveness, openness, progressiveness, and a conflict-free nature. this growing intra-regional cooperation in central asia exhibited many common characteristics with china-led regionalism rather than russia-led initiatives like the eaeu. this alignment may be attributed to the perception, as stated by nargis kassenova, director of the program on central asia at harvard university’s davis center, that central asians “see china as an agent of modernization— not russia” (davis center 2019). kassenova also remarked that “[t]he chinese leadership has been really effective in making smaller powers feel more like important actors in the global stage. there are certain aspects of diplomatic culture that kazakhstan is taking from the chinese [rulebook]. it’s a very subtle difference from the russia-dominated soviet past, but it’s a noticeable change in narrative, rhetoric, and ceremonies” (sorbello 2024). 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 references acharya, amitav. 2006. “do norms and identity matter? community and power in southeast asia’s regional order.” in order and security in southeast asia: essays in memory of michael leifer, edited by joseph chinyong liow and ralf emmers, 78–92. routledge. ———. 2004. “how ideas spread: whose norms matter? norm localization and institutional change in asian regionalism.” international organization 58 (2): 239–75. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818304582024. ———. 2016. “regionalism beyond eu-centrism.” in the oxford handbook of comparative regionalism, edited by tanja a. börzel and thomas risse, 109–30. oxford university press oxford. ———. 2009. whose ideas matter?: agency and power in asian regionalism. cornell university press. adrianople group. 2023. “open zone map: mapping the world’s special economic zones.” cyber concepts llc. accessed february 20, 2025. https://www.openzonemap.com. agency for strategic reforms under the president of the republic of uzbekistan. 2022. “the results of the project ‘one million uzbek coders.’” accessed february 15, 2025. https://asr.gov.uz/en/news/5722. allison, roy. 2008. “virtual regionalism, regional structures and regime security in central asia.” central asian survey 27 (2): 185–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930802355121. antkiewicz, agata, and john whalley. 2005. “china’s new regional trade agreements.” world economy 28 (10): 1539–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2005.00746.x. arase, david. 2015. “china’s two silk roads initiative: what it means for southeast asia.” southeast asian affairs 2015 (1): 25–45. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814843089-018. asian development bank. 2025. “regional: assessing economic corridor development potential among kazakhstan, uzbekistan, and tajikistan.” accessed march 10, 2025. https://www.adb.org/projects/52188-001/main. astana times. 2022. “regional cooperation is important for economic growth, says kazakh minister of industry and infrastructural development at tashkent investment forum.” accessed february 20, 2025. https://astanatimes.com/2022/03/regional-cooperation-isimportant-for-economic-growth-says-kazakh-minister-of-industry-and-infrastructuraldevelopment-at-tashkent-investment-forum/. bbc (british broadcasting corporation). 1993. “cis heads of state answer questions at press conference.” accessed august 20, 2020. https://advance.lexis.com/document/ ?pdmfid=1000516&crid=ed3c6e24-5ba0-4605-9bdf4995024a8bea&pddocfullpath=%2fshared%2fdocument%2fnews%2furn%3acontentitem %3a3s51-vgf0-0017-g4bm-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3acontentitem%3a3s51-vgf00017-g4bm-00000-00&pdcontentcom. ———. 2017. “uzbek leader proposes setting up new central asian body.” accessed june 25, 2022. https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=574a2137-8973-4c38bb1ee36bd0bececc&pddocfullpath=%2fshared%2fdocument%2fnews%2furn%3acontentit em%3a5pxj-3xd1-jc8s-c07c-00000 00&pdcontentcomponentid=10962&pdteaserkey=sr4&pditab=allpods&ecomp=ppnqk. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814843089-018 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 belt and road forum for international cooperation. 2017. “vision and actions on jointly building belt and road.” april 17, 2017. accessed march 15, 2025. http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html. berdiev, hamid. 2017. “glava mid uzbekistana otvergnul ideu sozdaniya ‘regional’noi osi’ astana-tashkent” [uzbek foreign minister rejects the idea of creating astana-tashkent ‘regional’ axis]. podrobno.uz, september 28, 2017. accessed february 15, 2020. https://podrobno.uz/cat/politic/glava-mid-uzbekistana-otvergnul-ideyu-sozdaniyaregionalnoy-osi-astana-tashkent/. bitabarova, assel g. 2018. “unpacking sino-central asian engagement along the new silk road: a case study of kazakhstan.” journal of contemporary east asia studies 7 (2): 149–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2018.1553226. blanchard, jean-marc f. 2021. “belt and road initiative (bri) blues: powering bri research back on track to avoid choppy seas.” journal of chinese political science 26 (1): 235–55. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-020-09717-0. bohr, annette. 2004. “regionalism in central asia: new geopolitics, old regional order.” international affairs 80 (3): 485–502. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00394.x. ———. 2019. “kazakhstan: tested by transition.” chatham house. accessed february 20, 2025. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/11/kazakhstan-tested-transition/about-authors. börzel, tanja a, and thomas risse. 2016. “introduction: framework of the handbook and conceptual clarifications.” in the oxford handbook of comparative regionalism, edited by tanja a. börzel and thomas risse, 1–15. oxford university press. chen, xiangming. 2021. “china’s belt and road initiative: an epochal initiative connecting the world.” scientia, september 1, 2021. https://doi.org/10.33548/scientia723. clarke, michael. 2017. “the belt and road initiative: china’s new grand strategy?” asia policy 24 (1): 71–79. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2017.0023. ———. 2018. “the belt and road initiative: exploring beijing’s motivations and challenges for its new silk road.” strategic analysis 42 (2): 84–102. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/09700161.2018.1439326. dadabaev, timur. 2019. “developmental state and foreign policy in post-karimov uzbekistan.” in the sage handbook of asian foreign policy, edited by takashi inoguchi, 893–917. london: sage publications. ———. 2018. “japanese and chinese infrastructure development strategies in central asia.” japanese journal of political science 19 (3): 542–61. https://doi.org/ 10.1017/s1468109918000178. darvas, zsolt, luca léry moffat, catarina martins, and conor mccaffrey. 2023. “russian foreign trade tracker.” bruegel, march 17, 2025. accessed february 20, 2025. https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/russian-foreign-trade-tracker. davé, bhavna. 2018. “silk road economic belt: effects of china’s soft power diplomacy in kazakhstan.” in china’s belt and road initiative and its impact in central asia, edited by marlene laruelle, 97–108. the george washington university, central asia program. davis center for russian and eurasian studies. 2019. “introducing our scholar-entrepreneurs.” harvard university. accessed march 15, 2025. https://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/ insights/introducing-our-scholar-entrepreneurs. 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 de lombaerde, philippe, kairat moldashev, ikboljon qoraboyev, and servaas taghon. 2022. “strategic responses of regional economic organizations to the chinese belt and road initiative: the cases of asean, eaeu, and eu.” asia pacific business review 30 (2): 399– 419. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602381.2022.2093526. doolotkeldieva, asel, and erica marat. 2022. “why russia and china aren’t intervening in central asia.” foreign policy, october 4, 2022. accessed february 20, 2025. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/04/tajikistan-kyrgyzstan-russia-china-intervention-centralasia/. dunford, michael, and weidong liu. 2019. “chinese perspectives on the belt and road initiative.” cambridge journal of regions, economy and society 12 (1): 145–67. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsy032. embassy of the people’s republic of china in the republic of estonia. 2004. “set aside dispute and pursue joint development?” accessed february 20, 2025. http://ee.chinaembassy.org/eng/zggk/xzgwjjs/t110291.htm. ercilasun, güljanat kurmangaliyeva, and konuralp ercilasun, eds. 2018. the uyghur community: diaspora, identity and geopolitics. politics and history in central asia. palgrave macmillan. eurasia diary. 2022a. “bri & sco and role of uzbekistan: an expert opinion.” accessed february 20, 2025. https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=5e251b28-1437-4880bc76c5d341303c1a&pddocfullpath=%2fshared%2fdocument%2fnews%2furn%3acontentit em%3a66d0-36x1-jch9-g31v-0000000&pdcontentcomponentid=461109&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=hmnyk&earg =sr0&prid=7af9c249-f6f3-489b-a217-4bc0ebe20329. ———. 2022b. “china’s central asia policies; priorities.” https://advance-lexiscom.proxygw.wrlc.org/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentitem:65ng-pyp1f00c-63hm-00000-00&context=1516831. eurasia review. 2020. “new bipolarity a threat to asian regionalism – oped.” accessed february 20, 2025. https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=c2ab3700-91e6-4cebac3cf511c6bf8cdb&pddocfullpath=%2fshared%2fdocument%2fnews%2furn%3acontentitem% 3a616x-d8y1-f11p-x32f-0000000&pdcontentcomponentid=417294&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=hmnyk&earg =sr0&prid=e4a0ce25-4661-4430-8faf-88c79fadde78. gabuev, alexander. 2016. “crouching bear, hidden dragon: ‘one belt one road’ and chineserussian jostling for power in central asia.” journal of contemporary east asia studies 5 (2): 61–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2016.11869097. ganesan, narayanan. 2010. “east asian regionalism: policies and priorities.” in east asia regionalism, edited by narayanan ganesan and colin dürkop. konrad-adenauer-stiftung and the hiroshima peace institute. accessed february 20, 2025. http://apisa.org/publications/regionalism.pdf#page=86. ge, anna. 2023. “china-central asia relations: in region, for region.s astana times, may 17, 2023. accessed february 20, 2025. https://astanatimes.com/2023/05/china-central-asia-relations-inregion-for-region/. goldstein, avery. 2005. rising to the challenge: china’s grand strategy and international security. stanford university press. 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 harutyunyan, aghavni a. 2022. “china-kazakhstan: cooperation within the belt and road and nurly zhol.” asian journal of middle eastern and islamic studies 16 (3): 281–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2128135. he, baogang. 2017. contested ideas of regionalism in asia. routledge. hess, maximillian. 2023. “russia is down, but not out, in central asia.” foreign policy research institute, february 17, 2023. accessed february 20, 2025. https://www.fpri.org/ article/2023/02/russia-is-down-but-not-out-in-central-asia/. ictsd (international centre for trade and sustainable development). 2015. “svobodnye ekonomicheskie zony mogut byt’ dvigatelem ekonomicheskogo progressa v stranah asii” [free economic zones can be a driver of economic progress in asian countries]. indeo, fabio. 2018. “the impact of the belt and road initiative on central asia: building new relations in a reshaped geopolitical scenario.” in china’s belt and road initiative, edited by wenxian zhang, ilan alon, and christoph lattemann, 135–53. springer. ———. 2020. “china and russia: cooperation or rivalry along the belt and road initiative?” in china’s belt and road initiative in central asia: ambitions, risks, and realities. osce academy. special issue 2. accessed february 20, 2025. https://www.osceacademy.net/upload/file/bri_08_07.pdf. information office of the state council the people’s republic of china. 2011. “china’s peaceful development.” accessed february 20, 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/ archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm. jetschke, anja, and philomena murray. 2012. “diffusing regional integration: the eu and southeast asia.” west european politics 35 (1): 174–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.631320. kadyrova, elvira. 2019. “summit of the heads of central asian states in tashkent initiates comprehensive regional integration.” news central asia. accessed may 19, 2022. https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=17c77095-b47b-4b2885f86734f3b3b1d4&pddocfullpath=%2fshared%2fdocument%2fnews%2furn%3acontentit em%3a5xmx-7801-f11p-x26n-0000000&pdcontentcomponentid=343631&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=ppnq. ———. 2022. “nursultan hosted third china+central asia (c+c5) foreign ministers’ meeting.” new central asia. accessed february 20, 2025. https://www.newscentralasia.net/2022/06/ 09/nursultan-hosted-third-chinacentral-asia-cc5-foreign-ministers-meeting/. kahler, miles, and andrew macintyre. 2013. integrating regions: asia in comparative context. stanford university press. karabayeva, assylzat. 2021. “leaders, ideas, and norm diffusion in central asia and beyond.” asian journal of comparative politics 6 (1): 25–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891119887813. karrar, hasan. 2010. the new silk road diplomacy: china’s central asian foreign policy since the cold war. ubc press. kassenova, nargis. 2013. “kazakhstan and eurasian economic integration: quick start, mixed results and uncertain future.” in eurasian economic integration, edited by rilka dragneva and kataryna wolczuk, 139–160. edward elgar publishing. kavalski, emilian. 2013. “the struggle for recognition of normative powers: normative power europe and normative power china in context.” cooperation and conflict 48 (2): 247–67. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836713485386. 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 kazakh tv. 2018. “central asian republics are increasing their export capacities.” accessed may 20, 2022. https://kazakh-tv.kz/en/view/business/page_191359_central-asian-republics-areincreasing-their-export-capacities. ———. 2019. “sotrudnichestvo kazakhstana i uzbekistana vyhodit na novyi uroven’” [kazakhstan and uzbekistan’s cooperation reaches a new level]. accessed may 20, 2022. https://kazakhtv.kz/ru/view/business/page_202532_sotrudnichestvo-kazakhstana-i-uzbekistana-vykhodit-nano. kazantsev, andrey. 2008. bol’shaya igra s neizvestnymi pravilami: mirovaya politika i tsentral’naya azia [the great game with unknown rules: world politics and central asia]. nasledie yevrazii. kembayev, zhenis. 2020. “development of china–kazakhstan cooperation: building the silk road of the twenty-first century?” problems of post-communism 67 (3): 204–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1545590. kerr, david. 2010. “central asian and russian perspectives on china’s strategic emergence.” international affairs 86 (1): 127–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00872.x. krapohl, sebastian, and alexandra vasileva-dienes. 2019. “the region that isn’t: china, russia and the failure of regional integration in central asia.” asia europe journal 18: 347–366. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-019-00548-0. laruelle, marlene. 2018. “introduction. china’s belt and road initiative. quo vadis?” in china’s belt and road initiative and its impact in central asia, edited by marlene laruelle, x–xii. the george washington university. ministry of national economy of the republic of kazakhstan. 2019. “o sozdanii mezhdunarodnogo tsentra torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva ‘tsentralnaya aziya’” [on the establishment of the international center for trade and economic cooperation ‘central asia’]. accessed march 23, 2020. https://economy.gov.kz/ru/news/o-sozdanii-mezhdunarodnogocentra-torgovo-ekonomicheskogo-sotrudnichestva-centralnaya-aziya. nazarbayev, nursultan. 2012. “address by the president of the republic of kazakhstan, leader of the nation, n.nazarbayev ‘strategy kazakhstan-2050’: new political course of the established state.” akorda, december 14, 2012. https://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/ addresses_of_president/address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-leader-of-thenation-nnazarbayev-strategy-kazakhstan-2050-new-political-course-of-the-established-state. ———. 2019. “china never dictates its own terms and does not say ‘live the way we live’ nazarbayev.” zakon.kz. accessed february 20, 2025. https://www.zakon.kz/stati/4985195-okazahstane-kitae-i-ne-tolko-e.html. ———. 1997. evraziiskii souz: idei, praktika, perspektivy 1994-1997 [eurasian union: ideas, practices, perspectives 1994-1997]. foundation for the advancement of social and political sciences. nelson, rebecca m., and michael d. sutherland. 2023. “central asia: implications of russia’s war in ukraine.” congressional research service, june 9, 2023. accessed february 20, 2025. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/r47591.pdf. pacory, fabien. 2019. “the bri and the free trade zones strategy.” the asia-pacific cirle. accessed may 19, 2019. https://asiapacificcircle.org/asia-pacific-insights-trends/fabien-pacory-bri-freetrade-zones-strategy/. peyrouse, sebastien. 2022. “china’s impact on democracy and human rights in central asia.” security and human rights 32 (1–4): 53–68. https://doi.org/10.1163/18750230-bja10012. 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 peyrouse, sebastien, and gaël raballand. 2015. “central asia: the new silk road initiative’s questionable economic rationality.” eurasian geography and economics 56 (4): 405–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2015.1114424. pikulicka-wilczewska, akniezska. 2022. “ukraine war: is central asia loosening ties with russia?” al jazeera, march 25, 2022. accessed february 20, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 2022/3/25/ukraine-war-is-central-asia-loosening-ties-with-russia. president of the russian federation. 2004. “otvety glav gosudarstv chlenov caco na voprosy jurnalistov” [responses of the heads of state members of caco to journalists’ questions]. accessed february 19, 2022. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22645. qin, yaqing. 2011. “rule, rules, and relations: towards a synthetic approach to governance.” the chinese journal of international politics 4 (2): 117–45. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/por008. reeves, jeffrey. 2018. “china’s silk road economic belt initiative: network and influence formation in central asia.” journal of contemporary china 27 (112): 502–18. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/10670564.2018.1433480. risse, thomas. 2016. “the diffusion of regionalism.” in the oxford handbook of comparative regionalism, edited by tanja a. börzel and thomas risse, 87–108. oxford university press. russo, alessandra. 2018. regions in transition in the former soviet area: ideas and institutions in the making. palgrave macmillan. sally, razeen. 2013. “chinese trade policy after ten years in the world trade organization: a postcrisis stocktake.” in china’s new role in the world economy, edited by yiping huang and miaojie yu, 183–224. routledge. sattarov, rafael. 2018. “asean, uzbek-style: tashkent’s new ambitions in central asia.” carnegie moscow center. accessed january 16, 2022. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/75308. severino, rodolfo c. 2008. “the emerging region of east asia.” asia europe journal 5 (4): 447–54. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-007-0134-2. sim, li-chen, and farkhod aminjonov. 2022. “statecraft in the steppes: central asia’s relations with china.” journal of contemporary china 33 (148): 618–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022.2136937. solingen, etel. 2008. “the genesis, design and effects of regional institutions: lessons from east asia and the middle east.” international studies quarterly 52 (2): 261–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00501.x. sorbello, paolo. 2024. “kazakhstan in the middle.” vlast.kz. accessed august 6, 2024. https://vlast.kz/english/61345-kazakhstan-in-the-middle.html. state council of the prc. 2022. “china-central asia trade grew by 100 times over 30 years.” january 18, 2022. accessed january 18, 2022. http://english.www.gov.cn/ statecouncil/ministries/202201/18/content_ws61e60de2c6d09c94e48a3cf9.html. sternberg, troy, ariell ahearn, and fiona mcconnell. 2017. “central asian ‘characteristics’ on china’s new silk road: the role of landscape and the politics of infrastructure.” land 6 (3): 55. https://doi.org/10.3390/land6030055. strang, david. 1991. “adding social structure to diffusion models: an event history framework.” sociological methods & research 19 (3): 324–53. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0049124191019003003. 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 swanström*, niklas. 2005. “china and central asia: a new great game or traditional vassal relations?” journal of contemporary china 14 (45): 569–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560500205001. syroezhkin, konstantin. 2010. kazakhstan-kitai: ot prigranichnoi torgovli k strategicheskomu partnerstvu. kniga #2. [kazakhstan-china: from border trade to strategic partnership. book #2. ] kazakhstan institute for strategic studies under the president of the republic of kazakhstan. tekdal, veysel. 2018. “china’s belt and road initiative: at the crossroads of challenges and ambitions.” the pacific review 31 (3): 373–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09512748.2017.1391864. thant, myo, min tang, and hiroshi kakazu. 1995. growth triangles in asia: a new approach to regional economic cooperation. oxford university press. tokayev, kassym-zhomart. 2001. diplomatiya respubliki kazakhstan. elorda. tolipov, farkhod. 2018. “uzbekistan-tajikistan relations: the long way to strategic partnership.” caci analyst, september 18, 2018. accessed december 19, 2021. https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13533-uzbekistan-tajikistanrelations-the-long-way-to-strategic-partnership.html. torney, diarmuid. 2012. “assessing eu leadership on climate change: the limits of diffusion in eu relations with china and india.” kfg working paper series, 46. deu. accessed february 20, 2025. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-373619. unctad (united nations trade and development). 2019. “world investment report: special economic zones.” accessed february 20, 2025. https://unctad.org/en/pages/ publicationwebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2460. sputnik uzbekistan. 2017. “uzbekgidroenergo’ primet uchastie v stroitel’stve ges v kyrgyzstane [uzbekhydroenergy to participate in the construction of a hydropower plant in kyrgyzstan.].” sputniknews. accessed may 19, 2021. https://uz.sputniknews.ru/politics/20171007/ /uzbekistan-kirgizstan-sovmestnoye-stroitelstvo.html. warleigh-lack, alex. 2006. “towards a conceptual framework for regionalisation: bridging ‘new regionalism’ and ‘integration theory.’” review of international political economy 13 (5): 750–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290600950639. webster, timothy. 2007. “bilateral regionalism: paradoxes of east asian integration.” berkeley journal of international law 25 (3): 434. https://doi.org/10.15779/z389h2n. xi, jinping. 2014. the governance of china. foreign language press. xi, jinping. 2013. “speech by h.e. xi jinping president of the people’s republic of china at nazarbayev university.” ‘the world and japan’ database. accessed february 25, 2025. https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/br/20130907.o1e.html. xuanli liao, janet. 2021. “china’s energy diplomacy towards central asia and the implications on its ‘belt and road initiative.’” the pacific review 34 (3): 490–522. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1705882. yi, wang. 2022. “maintain a global vision, forge ahead with greater resolve and write a new chapter in major-country diplomacy with chinese characteristics.” ministry of foreign affairs of china. accessed february 20, 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202212/t20221225_10994828.html. 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 zeng, douglas zhihua. 2015. “global experiences with special economic zones: focus on china and africa.” world bank policy research working paper no. 7240. accessed march 12, 2025. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2594576. zhang, chi. 2022. “china’s emergence and development challenges that china faces in central asia.” asian review of political economy 1 (1): 10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44216-022-000057. zhang, wenxian, ilan alon, and christoph lattemann. 2018. china’s belt and road initiative: changing the rules of globalization. springer. zhongping, feng, and huang jing. 2014. “china’s strategic partnership diplomacy.” espo working paper. accessed may 16, 2019. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459948. 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 30-53 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 new regional alignment in the post-soviet space: the eu as an active player in the eastern partnership countries (the case of georgia) beka chedia, east european university, tbilisi, georgia1 abstract this article debates how the interests, objectives, strategy, and policy of the european union (eu) towards the countries of the eastern partnership have changed over time through the case study of georgia. it explains the essence of europeanization and integration processes in this region, as well as the new role that the eu plays in the post-soviet region. the research examines how georgia’s status gradually changed from that of a recipient of eu humanitarian aid to that of an eu candidate country. in the analysis, various official eu documents that subsequently became guides for the formation of the eu policy about the eastern partnership countries are examined. attention is also drawn to the contradictory geographical identity of individual eastern partnership countries, most notably in the south caucasus region, with georgia as a key example. the analysis demonstrates how war became the main variable influencing the fundamental revision of the eu policy towards the eastern partnership countries, and examples include the russo-georgian war of 2008 and the russoukrainian war of 2022. finally, the article looks at how, in both cases, war became a trigger for the development of new geopolitical projects and concepts on the part of the eu. 1 beka chedia, phd is an associate professor of political science at east european university, tbilisi, georgia. 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 introduction for many years, the european union (eu) has used its soft power in the complex region of post-soviet eastern europe but defiantly refused to play the role of an active geopolitical player. however, gradually, its role in the region began to grow. russia’s war on ukraine became a factor that radically changed not only the policy of the eu but also of leading eu member countries. the eu’s approach to this region has changed over time. after a long period of neglect, followed by cooperation through the european neighbourhood policy and eastern partnership, a further unexpected rapprochement began in 2022. the eu has long-term interests in the post-soviet space, which have guided the eu decision-makers towards an accelerated integration. this study explores the key concepts and tools that the eu has developed to strengthen its transformative power and geopolitical role in the region. an examination of one of these eastern partners, georgia, moved from being an ordinary neighbour of europe to becoming a candidate for membership. following the introduction, the article details the methodology and provides a background overview of the research. the analysis is organized around five concepts that have driven eu policy toward georgia in the period from 1992 until the present: indifference, neighbourhood, soft power via partnership, “great europe from the mediterranean to the north sea, from lisbon to tbilisi” (agenda.ge 2022), and “four-speed europe” (costa et al. 2023). this is followed by the conclusion. methodology and background the research focuses on the case of georgia, but examples from other eastern partnership (eap) countries serve as a tool to demonstrate the broader picture. after identifying the key concepts underlying eu policy towards georgia and other eastern partners, the analysis divides eu policy towards georgia and the region into specific phases and examines each stage separately. the study examines what goals eu policy pursued in all specific periods and what instruments it used to realize its interests. the focus is mainly on the eu’s soft power and transformative influence. however, the growing geopolitical interest of the eu in the region is the main factor that partially displaces such traditional eu instruments. as liik (2017) argues, there has always been a belief in russia that “europe is trying to spread its norms and values in the eap region with the aim of expanding its sphere of influence at the expense of moscow’s.” qualitative content analysis has been used to explore the evolution of eu policy towards the countries of the eastern partnership, with a focus on the examination of official statements and positions of high-ranking eu officials, as well as leaders of certain influential eu countries, such as germany and france. the article analyzes official eu documents related to such eu programs and initiatives as the eu eastern neighbourhood policy, the eastern partnership program, the association agreement between the eu and georgia, and several contemporary policy papers developed in 2023 by eu experts. the research presented here examines the path of georgia in the process of rapprochement with europe and later with the eu from the 1990s to 2024. the role of the eu as an active player in the eastern partnership countries, including georgia, has been analyzed from various perspectives, with the concepts of europeanization (bauer et al. 2007; börzel 2010, börzel and pamuk 2011; börzel and risse 2016) and the eu’s transformative power (börzel 2009) being widely applied. the literature uses a variety of concepts to describe the role of the eu as a regional player in the post-soviet region (ehrke 2007). regarding georgia, the concept of indifference has been used to describe the eu’s initial policy (coppieters 1998), while official documents have referred to georgia as a neighbour of wider europe (commission of the european communities 2003) and the eu (european union 2016). a significant place in the literature is devoted to the study of the eu eastern partnership program (baltag and romanyshyn 2023; chedia 2010, 2015; habets 2014; longhurst and nies 2009; paul and ciolan 2021). the eu’s soft power has been 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 emphasized (gahler 2021), along with the phenomenon of the irreversibility of the “return to europe” by post-soviet countries and the eu’s responsibility to integrate former communist states into european structures (cirtautas and schimmelfennig 2010). debardeleben (2021) described eu policy toward the eastern partnership countries as “bold ambitions in a troubled region.”. among the reasons for the eu’s cautious policy towards the post-soviet region, including georgia, the importance of russia’s opposition to closer relations between georgia and the eu has been highlighted (haukkala and moshes 2004; longhurst and nies 2009, przetacznik and russell 2021). other sources mention doubts also about georgia’s geographical affiliation with the european continent (un 2023). however, later references describe georgia as a european country (barroso 2014; council of the european union 2014; european commission 2022a), and official eu documents highlight the importance of potential members, including georgia, adopting common european values as a prerequisite for joining the eu, emphasizing the need to strengthen democratic institutions and implement specific reforms (borrell 2023; european commission 2022b). even before russia’s fullscale invasion of ukraine, some scholars had already emphasized “increasing multipolarity and geopolitical competition,” pointing to the “strategic importance” of the eastern partnership for the eu and calling the eastern neighbours “natural allies for the eu” (gherasimov 2020, 8). following russia’s military invasion of ukraine in 2022, several new studies and policy documents emerged outlining various views, strategies, and approaches for the future possible enlargement of the eu to include some of the eap countries, including georgia (borrell 2023; drozdiak et al. 2023; scholz 2022). they argue for the necessity and irreversibility of eu enlargement as well as the importance of rethinking the role of the eu as an active geopolitical player in the post-soviet region (costa et al. 2023). some studies draw attention to the enormous financial resources that it will cost eu members to bring nine new countries from the eastern partnership and the balkans into the eu (foy 2023), with one author calling georgia a “terrible dilemma for europe” (genté 2023, 1). many agree that the new geopolitical situation is accelerating the expansion of the eu and “enlargement is a geopolitical project for europe” (várhelyi 2023a). some authors argue that after russia invaded ukraine, the european union suddenly discovered geopolitics and the eu started “redrawing its mental map” (de waal 2022). to explore the new regional alignment in the post-soviet space by analyzing the growing role of the eu as an active player in the eastern partnership countries, five main concepts are introduced: indifference, neighbourhood, soft power via partnership, “great europe from the mediterranean to the north sea, from lisbon to tbilisi”(agenda.ge 2022) and “four-speed europe” (costa et al. 2023). concepts underlying the eu’s policy toward the eastern neighbourhood five main concepts are utilized in this analysis of the eu’s policy toward the eastern neighbourhood from the 1990s to 2024: indifference, neighbourhood, soft power via partnership, “great europe from the mediterranean to the north sea, from lisbon to tbilisi” (agenda.ge 2022), and “four-speed europe” (costa et al. 2023). the analysis charts the progression through stages of development of eu policy based on these five concepts. these different key concepts that the eu has applied over the years towards its eu eastern neighbours have been based mainly on two main theories: the eu’s soft power and transformative power. the theory of soft power developed by joseph nye (1990) is based on the ability of a state (international actor) to get what it wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments (nye 1990). in discussing the capabilities of the eu, some scholars point to the presence of sources of soft power (nitoiu and sus 2018). it is worth noting the attempt of some scholars to differentiate the phenomenon of soft power and transformative power. these scholars argue that the eu usually applies soft power to third countries by promoting its norms, while transformative power is applied to countries that want to join the eu (dimitrova et al. 2016). heather grabbe (2006) also discusses transformative power in the context of a tool for future eu membership, using the example 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 of countries in central and eastern europe. instead of soft power or transformative power, manners discusses the concept of normative power in the context of the former communist bloc countries of eastern europe. manners (2002) points to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights as basic norms that the eu promoted in these countries and thus contributed to their transformation. some scholars argue that “[t]he eu as such initially mostly adopted a soft-power approach towards georgia, focussing its engagement on the promotion of good governance and democratisation, as well as the development of economic relations” (deen, zweers and linder 2023, 38). when discussing the effectiveness of the eu’s soft power in georgia, some scholars link this issue to the prospect of eu membership; for example, amanda paul (2015) argued that for many years, the lack of prospect of eu membership undermined the eu’s effectiveness in promoting democracy in the region. in the case of georgia, theories of soft power and transformative power partially merge into one. tanja börzel (2009) discusses the early stage of georgia’s (and other caucasus countries’) cooperation with the eu not in the context of soft power but in the context of transformative power and calls the eu a promoter of good governance in georgia and other eastern neighbours. as judith kelly (2006) argues, even before the launch of the eastern partnership programme, in the framework of enp to promote reform agenda, the european commission used an “adapted enlargement template” of its former accession policy with regard to the central and eastern europe countries. in discussions about the eu’s use of soft power and its transformative power, two doctrines have emerged: soft and traditional geopolitics. some authors (nitoiu and sus 2018) point to the presence of a soft version of geopolitics in the eu approaches, which, in their opinion, differs from traditional geopolitics: for example, on the one hand, the eu for many years did not recognize the presence of geopolitical interest in the countries of the eastern partnership, on the other hand, it was still involved in “geopolitical competition” with russia through the use of its soft power (deen, zweers and loon 2021). a high level of normative, cultural, and economic attractiveness served as a kind of soft geopolitical instrument to strengthen its influence in this region (nitoiu and sus 2018). the traditional geopolitical approach marks 2015 as the year when the eu openly declared its geopolitical interest in relation to its eastern neighbours (deen, zweers, and loon 2021). 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: concepts, theories and doctrines used by the eu towards georgia and other eastern partnership countries the concept of indifference (1990s-2003) during this time period, the eu demonstrated indifference to georgia’s problems; this stage has been referred to as the marginalization of georgia by the eu (coppieters 1998). the concept of indifference was most reflected in the non-intervention of the eu and european countries in the ethno-political conflict in georgia in the 1990s, which was provoked by russia. the eu largely refrained from taking a position on the bloodshed on georgian territory. the eu was more concerned about armed conflicts in the balkans, meanwhile, the turmoil in the caucasus and, in particular, georgia was a secondary issue for the eu (coppieters 1998) and was generally absent from the foreign policy agenda of the european community. among the probable reasons for the eu’s indifference towards georgia may have been a desire not to anger russia, which was echoed in the following sentiment: “brussels and some member states do not wish to upset by interfering too openly in moscow’s ‘near abroad’” (börzel 2010, 18, citing baun, 2007). the second main reason for indifference was that europe did not perceive georgia as part of the continent (coppieters 1998). in the 1990s, the eu developed the “technical assistance to the commonwealth of independent states (tacis) program, which was intended for the former soviet republics (with the exception of the three baltic countries) and mongolia. this program included countries geographically belonging to the european continent as well as countries of central asia and the caucasus (armenia, azerbaijan, belarus, georgia, kyrgyzstan, kazakhstan, moldova, mongolia, russia, tajikistan, turkmenistan, ukraine, and uzbekistan). at this time, the eu perceived the countries of the caucasus as transcontinental countries and treated georgia in the same way as the countries of central asia. the purpose of this program was to assist these countries in democratization and economic transformation by providing know-how and grant financing to support projects in a variety of fields, including energy, transport, and telecommunications infrastructures, nuclear safety, the environment, food production, processing and distribution, and social services and education (european commission 1992). the the concept of indifference the concept of neighborhood the concept of soft power via partnership the concept of ``great europe``, ``from the mediterranean to the north sea, from lisbon to tbilisi`` the concept ``four-speed europe`` soft power transformative power soft geopolitics traditional geopolitics 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 program evolved into a mechanism for the development of economic and political ties between the eu and these countries. within the framework of this program, georgia received less financial assistance than the countries of central asia (coppieters 1998), which emphasized the indifference of the european community towards georgia. europe did not provide any european projects for georgia; georgia was treated based on the general concept of a regional approach. georgia perceived itself as a european country, but the eu perceived georgia as part of a separate region. in 1999, the partnership and cooperation agreement between georgia and the eu came into force. this agreement was the main instrument of the eu for following its interests in different countries, including the countries of the south caucasus—armenia, azerbaijan, and georgia. the same partnership and cooperation agreement came into force a year earlier (1998) in the case of ukraine and moldova. as for belarus, although the eu signed the same agreement in 1995, the ratification process was frozen due to the authoritarian regime in belarus. these eu agreements with the former ussr republics were almost identical and contained general principles, political dialogue, trade, legislative, economic and cultural cooperation, cooperation on the prevention of illegal activities, and cooperation on matters relating to democracy and human rights. the content of these agreements showed that the eu acted as a kind of normative power and tried to use the agreements to europeanize these countries through the export and implementation of democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, fair elections, freedom of speech, among other principles (minister of foreign affairs of georgia 1996). however, the analysis of the agreement with georgia showed that the eu did not have a clear external political course toward georgia (minister of foreign affairs of georgia 1996). in contrast to the eu concept of indifference, georgia developed its own concept: “i am georgian and therefore i am european!” discussions about georgia’s civilizational affiliation with europe began immediately after the collapse of the ussr and its restoration of independence. in the second half of the 1990s, such discussions became more intense against the backdrop of georgia’s desire to join the council of europe. georgia’s potential membership in the council of europe was entirely separate from the prospect of joining the eu—at that time, the idea of eu membership for georgia was not even a consideration. rather, for both georgia and europe, the issue related to a possible revision of the borders of europe. in 1996, georgia was granted “special guest status” by the council of europe. that same year, georgia made an official application for membership. heated discussions about whether georgia should be admitted to the council of europe continued for another couple of years. in 1998, during his official visit to the south caucasus states, the secretary general of the council of europe, daniel tarshis, concluded: “because of its historical and cultural ties, the caucasus and its population belong to the european family” (chedia 2010, 23). in 1999, georgia was the first south caucasus country to join the council of europe; this was, in fact, the first institutional recognition of georgia and the caucasus region as part of europe’s cultural and political sphere. the phrase “i am georgian and therefore i am european!” was proclaimed by the chairman of the georgian parliament during the parliamentary assembly of the council of europe session in which georgia was admitted as a member. this phrase marked the beginning of the process of georgia returning to the european family and was the first step in strengthening its image as a european nation. the concept of neighbourhood (2004-2008) the eu’s approach of indifference was replaced by the concept of neighbourhood, embodied in the european neighbourhood policy (enp). this new concept included strengthening the eu’s soft power in neighbouring countries. the main objective of the enp was “to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged union and its neighbours” (magen 2006, 391). at that time, many already believed that the ability of the eu to expand had reached its limit, and to achieve stability, security and prosperity in neighbouring countries, it was necessary to develop an alternative project. 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 the european neighborhood policy was developed in 2003 and included countries such as algeria, egypt, jordan, israel, lebanon, libya, morocco, the palestinian authority, syria, and tunisia, as well as post-communist european countries like ukraine, moldova, and belarus (commission of the european communities 2003). in the first stage, the countries of the south caucasus were not included in the program. however, in 2003, the eu demonstrated interest in these countries by introducing a new position—an eu special representative for the south caucasus. it was only in 2004 that the eu decided to include the three south caucasus countries in this neighbourhood program. at that time, some believed that the inclusion of the south caucasus countries in this project was facilitated by the rose revolution in georgia in 2003. the rose revolution contributed to the rapprochement of georgia with the eu, as far as the pro-european aspirations of the country were broadly recognized (edwards 2008). before the rose revolution, the process of europeanization was mainly one-sided and was expressed by the export of democratic values and reforms by the eu. georgia most likely was a passive contributor to the ideas of europeanization and did not make any effort to use internal resources to accelerate europeanization, although the pull towards the eu was always present. after the revolution, europeanization in georgia increasingly became a two-way process. post-2003, the official political course was the complete europeanization of the country. a reflection of this new georgian policy was the establishment (in 2004) by the georgian government—the position of state minister for european and euro-atlantic integration (minister of foreign affairs of georgia). however, for the leadership of georgia, rapprochement with the eu without the prospect of membership was not very attractive (chedia 2015, 9). the georgian leadership at the time even named 2010 as the probable year for georgia’s accession to the eu (chedia 2010, 24). however, in 2010, börzel (1) argued that “‘neighbours of europe do not have a membership perspective, at least not in the foreseeable future.” after the rose revolution, significant progress was made to bring georgia and the eu closer. after 2003, a noticeable rebranding of georgia as a european country began. for example, the country altered its state symbols by restoring the historical flag of the georgian kingdom, commonly known as the five-cross flag, as the official state flag. the image of crosses on the flag clearly emphasized, on the one hand, the christian identity of georgia, and on the other, it was described by authorities as a promotional banner of georgia belonging to the european civilization (chedia 2009, 171). georgia paid special attention not only to the harmonization of its legislation with the eu or close integration into the economic and political structures of the eu but also to its inclusion in the cultural or educational space of the eu (chedia 2010, 24). the presence of african and asian countries as participants in the eu neighborhood policy directly indicated that this project was not conceived as an eu integration project, and it could not become a tool for possible eu membership for georgia. it meant that the eu perceived the countries of africa and asia as neighbours of the european continent and, at the same time, as neighbours of the eu but not as prospective members. although ukraine and moldova were perceived as parts of the european continent, they were considered neighbours of the eu. as for georgia and the south caucasus region, the controversial perception of their geographical position gave rise to an ambiguous and vague concept of these neighbours’ status. it is noteworthy that in 2007, germany proposed to introduce an enp eastern dimension (kurpas and riecke 2007, 45–46; rinnert 2011, 9). this was the first unsuccessful attempt at a differentiated approach to the eu’s eastern neighbours because france opposed this idea (rinnert 2011, 9). in the same year (2007), the eu launched the eu black sea synergy (european commission 2007), which was “the first attempt by the eu to design a regional policy for eastern neighbours” (rinnert 2011, 9). some scholars argued that some countries, especially georgia, considered the black sea synergy as “a potential driving force of further eu integration” (rinnert 2011, 9). georgia’s interest in advancing this geographical perspective grew even stronger following the accession of bulgaria and romania to the eu, with georgia arguing that “any identification with the south caucasus would damage the country’s chances of getting closer to the 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 eu” (chedia 2022, 65). the inclusion of georgia in the enp was viewed by both eu officials and georgian politicians as progress toward closer ties with the eu, but not as an acknowledgment of georgia’s potential eu membership. participation in the enp did not completely resolve the issue of recognition of the european identity of georgia and the caucasus region. the persistent policy of the georgian ruling elite of knocking at the door of the eu had nevertheless begun to bear fruit. in august 2008, for the first time, the eu appeared as an active geopolitical player in the caucasus region during russia’s attack on georgia. france, which held the eu presidency at the time, took the lead in the mediation process. if, for many years, the eu had refrained from active political intervention in this region, the russo-georgian war provided the impetus for the strengthening of the eu as a significant geopolitical actor in the caucasus region. french president nicolas sarkozy successfully mediated a ceasefire agreement with moscow, known as the medvedev-sarkozy agreement (the government of georgia 2008). to comply with the terms of the ceasefire, brussels sent an unarmed civilian monitoring mission to georgia in 2008, a few weeks after the war. the deployment of 300 ceasefire monitors to georgia in 2008 was assessed as a “larger and more politically challenging” eu operation (vasconcelos 2010, 22). moreover, this made it possible for the eu to believe in its strength as a geopolitical player in this region; as vasconcelos (2010, 22) argued, “the political determination of eu member states can translate into a mission that makes a difference on the ground.” to this day, eu observers remain in georgia along the line of occupation. the concept of soft power via partnership (2009-2022) one of the main results of the russo-georgian war of 2008 was the eu eastern partnership program (eap) developed on the initiative of poland and sweden. longhurst and nies (2009, 9) argued that this war “provided the eu with a strong impulse to move ahead with the eap.” in 2009, the eu signed the eastern partnership treaty with six post-soviet states (georgia, azerbaijan, armenia, ukraine, moldova, and belarus). according to josé manuel barroso, the president of the european commission in 2008, the eastern partnership program merely demonstrated the “soft power” of the european union in this complex region (chedia 2015). in georgia, great hopes were placed on this program as, in comparison with the enp, the eastern partnership (eap) program was perceived as a window of opportunity for integration with the eu. however, the eu did not perceive the eap as an instrument for future eu membership of post-soviet countries. the eap was initially a product of the eu’s concept of “ever closer partnerships” (habets 2014, 129) with the eastern partnership countries. habets (2014, 129) called this program an “alternative to membership” and pointed out that “offering the prospect of membership may not be possible due to the lack of political will on the eu side.” by launching this program, the eu then partially satisfied georgia’s ambitions, establishing it as a close partner. the eap was an eclectic formation since it included six countries of the former ussr, which differed both in their foreign policy directions and their internal state structure and political regimes. longhurst and nies (2009, 12) argued that “the eap group of states present an array of challenges for the eu and enjoy different types of relations with brussels.” georgia was the country among them that most clearly expressed euro-atlantic aspirations, persistently seeking eu membership, referred to as a “beacon of liberty” (guardian 2005). in general, the attitudes of georgia, ukraine, and moldova towards the eu and its membership were described as “fundamentally positive” (longhurst and nies 2009, 12). two eap states—armenia and belarus—might be classified as “less pro-european” and russia’s dependent countries (longhurst and nies 2009, 12). azerbaijan’s stance toward the eu was characterized as “positive neutrality” (longhurst and nies 2009, 12), while belarus remained an authoritarian country close to russia. the inclusion of georgia in the eap partially ensured the strengthening of its european identity and geographic affiliation to the european continent. in the communiqué on the eap, participating countries were designated as “eu partners in eastern europe and the southern caucasus” (commission of the european communities 2008); meaning that, at that time, the eu still did not call georgia a country of eastern europe. 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 russia, which considered itself the owner of the post-soviet space, considered the eap a potential danger to its interests in the region. in 2010, russia formed the eurasian customs union and, in 2012, the single economic space. wolczuk, dragneva, and wallace (2022) argue that this was “partly spurred by the eu eastern partnership policy (eap).” russian propaganda presented the eap as “an ‘anti-russian’ and ‘postcolonial’ tool used by the eu for alleged interference in internal affairs of the post-soviet countries” (east stratcom task force 2021). some western commentators see the eu using the eap to compete with russia in the shared neighbourhood. for example, milsovovich (2021, 10) argued that “the eap reflect[s] a european decision to compete with russia in the region and refute the notion of a russian zone of privileged interest.” however, at the same time, josé manuel barroso maintained that the eap was not intended to create new spheres of influence and draw new dividing lines in europe (chedia 2015). the eap has proven to be a useful tool, especially for ukraine, georgia, and moldova, the three participating countries that were able to sign an association agreement as well as free trade agreements with the eu, which later introduced a visa-free regime for these countries. georgia signed the association agreement and a free trade agreement in 2014, while a visa-free regime with the eu was introduced in 2017. these steps were a major achievement for georgia, as it became an associated country, and its citizens were able to freely enter the schengen area. in the association agreement, georgia is mentioned as an “eastern european country” (council of the european union 2014, 5). despite some skepticism about the effectiveness of the program, it is because of the eastern partnership that georgia has become a close partner of the eu, as stated by eu officials: “for me, georgia is not only an important partner of the eu. when i say georgia, i mean ‘freedom’, when i say georgia, i mean ‘pride’, when i say georgia, i mean ‘courage’” (tusk 2019). it is noteworthy that in 2016, the eu presented its new global strategy where georgia and other eastern partnership countries were given a small place in the corner of a large hall along with regions such as the western balkans, mena (middle east and north africa) and africa (european union 2016). the purpose of this strategy was to protect the interests of the eu as a global player and did not in any way reflect the european aspirations of georgia and other eap countries. however, before russia invaded ukraine, the eu countries ruled out any possibility of future membership of georgia, ukraine, or moldova. in 2019, france submitted a discussion paper, which stated that “the partnership is based on economic and political cooperation,” but excludes “all prospects or all mechanisms of eu integration or membership” (jozwiak 2020). in this regard, some sources even indicated that france “doesn’t want to do anything in the neighborhood that would potentially upset moscow” (jozwiak 2020). this confirms the opinion that some influential eu member states, such as france, even in 2020 supported the idea of a kind of buffer zone in the form of eastern partnership countries. this once again emphasizes that throughout the history of the eu’s relations with its eastern partners such as georgia, ukraine, and moldova, one of the main variables has been the russian factor and its interests in the region. russia has always considered the eap region “as belonging to its sphere of influence” (der spiegel 2009). western european members of the eu have tried for many years not to irritate russia and refrained from deepening relations with these countries by offering a membership perspective. the eap, most of all, demonstrated the eu’s ambivalent foreign policy towards the eastern partnership countries. while western european countries continued to defend their skeptical views about eap countries, a bloc of countries from the former communist bloc (the visegrad countries, led by poland and the baltic states) boldly advocated for georgia’s rapprochement with the eu. this bloc of euro optimists actively supported the formation of an even smaller group of countries that distinguished themselves by their desire to accelerate the pace of eu membership (makszimov 2021, 15). among the six eap countries, only georgia, ukraine, and moldova advanced in the eu rapprochement process. in 2021, these three nations formed the so-called “associated trio” (ministry of foreign affairs of ukraine 2021). this trio was created similarly to the visegrad four and the council of the 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 baltic sea countries. the european commission expected “associated countries to lead by example” (makszimov 2021, 16). in response to concerns of some western european eu members, ukraine assured the eu that “the trio cooperation should be seen as complementary to the eastern partnership and ‘will not aim at replacing the existing issues’” (przetacznik and russell 2021, 5). thanks to the eap, the eu and its institutions have become important players in georgia’s domestic politics, which was shown by the level of europeanization of the country. the involvement of european politicians in the internal political life of georgia has reached an unprecedented scale that indicates the growing influence of the eu as a regional or even global player in the post-soviet region, in particular in georgia. members of the european parliament began to comment on internal political events in georgia almost on a daily basis. for example, members of the european parliament, viola von cramon, markéta gregorová, andrius kubilius, rasa juknevičienė, and others have been very active in the political life of georgia in recent years and often commented on the country’s internal political issues on georgian television or in such social platforms as x (formerly twitter). such an intense involvement of european politicians has already included georgia in the common intraeuropean political space. at the early stage of georgia’s independence, for the eu, this small south caucasus country was just a distant periphery (coppieters 1998), in which the eu showed little interest. gradually, the eu became an active player in georgian domestic politics. for example, the eu council president charles michel got involved in finding a solution to the political crisis that arose after the october 2020 parliamentary elections in georgia. michel sent his representative several times and personally visited georgia twice to mediate between the authorities and the opposition. his mission ended on april 19, 2020, with the signing of an agreement according to which the opposition stopped boycotting the work of the parliament. such an unprecedented intervention by a high-ranking european leader delineates the outlines of the european perspective on georgia. the concept of “great europe, from the mediterranean to the north sea, from lisbon to tbilisi” (2022-present) the potential accession of ukraine, georgia, and moldova to the eu was perceived as a fantasy or a matter for many decades prior to 2022. russia’s full-scale invasion of ukraine in 2022 triggered the eu’s revolutionary turn in favour of eastward expansion. ukraine decided to position itself as a defender of the eastern flank of the eu from russian aggression and put forward demands to speed up eu membership procedures. as a result, together with ukraine, two other eap countries, moldova and georgia, applied for eu membership in 2022. in the same year, the european council decided to grant the status of candidate country to ukraine and to the republic of moldova and recognized a european perspective for georgia (delegation of the eu to georgia 2022). the eu countries that had been against enlargement for many years suddenly turned into euro optimists. for example, germany and france, which had long resisted offering a membership perspective to eap countries, emerged in 2022 as leading proponents of a new wave of eu expansion. german chancellor olaf scholz put forward a completely new concept of a new vast europe in which georgia was included for the first time: scholz stated, “we are the people of europe and our voice must be heard throughout europe, from the mediterranean to the north sea, from lisbon to tbilisi and beyond” (agenda.ge 2022). in 2023, german foreign minister annalena baerbock referred to the “understanding of eu enlargement as a necessary geopolitical consequence of russia’s war” (reuters 2023). in an op-ed for foreign affairs, olaf scholz (2022) argued that “putin wanted to divide europe into zones of influence and to divide the world into blocs of great powers and vassal states. instead, his war has served only to advance the eu.” in eu relations with post-soviet countries, war has become one of the main political variables. the russo-georgian war urged the eu to accelerate the eastern partnership program, while the ongoing war in ukraine led europe to take steps toward welcoming its eastern neighbours. 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 in 2022, european council president charles michel stated that the eu should begin to build “a european geopolitical community” that would cover a wide area (michel 2022). involvement in such a group would not preclude full eu membership in the future, but the eu must now go beyond providing soft power support and become a security player in the region. the idea of a european geopolitical community, on the one hand, does not mean direct support for eu accession for eastern partnership countries, but on the other hand, it demonstrates the readiness of the current eu leadership to take bolder steps, including towards the eastern partnership countries. in 2023, during a visit to georgia, the high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy, josep borrell, argued that “there is no doubt for the eu that georgia belongs to the european family” (2023). if, for many years, there was no consensus in the eu on enlargement regarding the eastern partnership countries, since 2022, disagreements focused on specific dates and procedures for eu enlargement. in 2023, two contradictory eu strategies were developed regarding the possible enlargement of the eu to include some balkan and eastern partnership countries. the author of the first approach is the european council president charles michel, who argued that “enlargement is no longer a dream” and the bloc should be ready to accept new members in 2030 (bayer 2023). in contrast to michel’s strategy, which focused on the date, the president of the european commission, ursula von der leyen, emphasized that eu enlargement is a “merit-based process,” and candidate countries should only be allowed to join once they fulfill the eu’s entry criteria (sorgi 2023). von der leyen contended that the european commission is “not focused on a date, but focused on working very closely with candidate countries to get ready for joining the european union” (sorgi 2023). these two different strategies also reflect the expectations of potential eu members, including georgian leadership, who, from 2022, had hopes that due to the war in ukraine and the changing geopolitical situation in eastern europe, the eu may turn a blind eye to the presence of weak democratic institutions in these countries (chedia 2023). in georgia, hopes have arisen that the eu can and should go against its principles by not taking into account democratic backsliding and speed up the procedures for eastward expansion, which would include georgia (chedia 2023). if previously many scholars argued that georgia’s membership in the eu was useful only for georgia, after 2022, a new narrative emerged among european experts, emphasizing that “it is in the eu’s interest to bring georgia into the western sphere. leaving georgia in geopolitical limbo would make it vulnerable to russian exploitation” (kuchenbecker 2023). moreover, georgian authorities even began to use geopolitical blackmail tools against the eu. in 2023, on the eve of the eu candidate status decision, georgia signed a strategic partnership with china (government of georgia 2023). despite the ongoing conflict with russia and the absence of diplomatic relations, georgia has intensified its trade and economic relations with russia. with these steps, the georgian authorities demonstrated that if georgia’s eu membership slows down, georgia could alternatively consider rapprochement with other geopolitical players. researchers had previously warned about russia’s “attempts to reassert itself as a global power by violating the international order on the eu’s doorstep” and argued that leaving eap countries “as a buffer zone between russia and the eu, with no clarity on their membership perspective, will alienate their citizens” (gherasimov 2020, 8). in spite of this, josep borrell (2023) argued that “there are no shortcuts to eu accession. neither for georgia, nor anyone else. the enlargement process always follows clear criteria. it requires, for sure, hard work, political will and a clear commitment to the european union’s values.” in 2023, some experts even proposed to the eu the idea of creating a european democracy fund—a support package for eastern europe and the western balkans “that would place democratic reform at the top of the enlargement agenda” (van der staak 2023). european commission officials have never officially confirmed the connection between the eu’s geopolitical position and the decision on possible membership for georgia. one member of the european parliament, nacho sánchez amor, commented on the european council’s failure to grant georgia eu candidate status in 2022, calling it a “geopolitical mistake” (agenda.ge 2023). in 2022– 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 2023, various scenarios for the future expansion of the eu were proposed, envisioning the eu as a “union of 35 nations” (börzel et al. 2023), a “union of 36 nations” (spanish presidency of the council of the eu 2023), or a “union 37 members” (drozdiak et al. 2023). in these projects, the eu began to consider both the balkan countries and the eap countries. the concept of “four-speed europe” (2023-present) as an alternative approach to eu enlargement, initiated by germany and france in 2023, a group of 12 european experts developed a plan for structural reform to prepare the eu for future expansion. the authors called themselves “the group of twelve” and issued a 60-page report entitled “sailing on high seas: reforming and enlarging the eu for the 21st century” (costa et al. 2023). this vision of a future europe is based on a new concept termed “four-speed europe.” this plan is a synthesis of two different debates dominant in the eu, where emphasis is placed both on a specific date for possible eu enlargement and on the importance of meeting the necessary criteria for membership. costa et al. (2023) pointed out that the eu must be ready for expansion by 2030 should candidates meet the necessary conditions, proposing the principle of a differentiated approach and the division of european states into four groups according to the level of integration and the desire for integration, acknowledging the possibility that in the future, some of the current member states may prefer looser forms of integration. the authors recommend envisioning the future of european integration as “four distinct tiers” (costa et al. 2023, 10), each with a different balance of rights and obligations: 1. the inner circle: internally, the members of the eurozone and schengen area already participate in forms of deeper integration, with either permanent or temporary exemptions for the non-participating countries. 2. the eu: all current and future eu member states are bound by the same political objectives. 3. associate members: a first outer tier could streamline the different forms of association with the eea countries, switzerland, or even the uk. associate members would not be bound to ‘ever closer union’ and further integration, nor would they participate in deeper political integration in other policy areas such as justice, home affairs or eu citizenship. 4. the epc: a second outer tier would not include any form of integration with binding eu law or specific rule of law requirements and would not allow access to the single market. instead, it would focus on geopolitical convergence and political cooperation in such policy areas as security, energy, the environment, climate policy, etc. the concept of “four-speed europe” seems reminiscent of the concentric circles idea. this differentiated approach makes the future contours of an enlarged europe even more unclear. this new concept still, in part, reflects old fears about the integration of some of the countries that have territorial conflicts. it was the war in ukraine that became the main catalyst for accelerating the expansion of the eu, but the document talks about the problematic nature of eu membership for countries that have territorial conflicts with countries outside the eu. the ‘conflict resolution’ principle states that “[f]or security and stability reasons, countries with lasting military conflicts cannot join the eu. the same applies to countries with a territorial conflict with another candidate country or an eu member state” (costa et al. 2023, 44). all three countries (georgia, ukraine and moldova) of the eastern partnership trio program have a territorial conflict that involves russia. russia has occupied two regions of georgia (abkhazia and the tskhinvali region), maintains military control over moldova’s transnistria region, and is engaged in a prolonged war in ukraine. this concept also involves the development of an alternative model to full eu membership. ukraine objected to these eu plans immediately after the publication of the report entitled “sailing on high seas: reforming and enlarging the eu for the 21st century” (lynch 2023). the eap countries are seeking full membership rather than a secondary status in the eu in the form of surrogate membership. 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 in 2023, eu officials announced the main principles of the enlargement strategy regarding ten potential eu candidates, including albania, bosnia and herzegovina, moldova, montenegro, north macedonia, serbia, turkey, ukraine, georgia, and kosovo. according to the european commissioner for enlargement and neighbourhood affairs oliver varhelyi (2023b), before eu accession, these countries will be allowed to gradually integrate into the single market in the direction of the four freedoms of the european union—freedom of movement of goods, capital, services, and people. it is noteworthy that these countries have already achieved these results in the process of rapprochement with the eu, and it can be inferred that such a statement by one of the eu leaders is largely declarative. the eu is also aware that its increasing role as a geopolitical player and its plans for future expansion will come with a significant economic cost. in 2023, the financial times reported that an eu document prepared by the secretariat of the eu council calculated the financial consequences of expanding the union to include countries such as ukraine, moldova, georgia and the six western balkan states. the cost of eu enlargement is estimated at 256.8 billion euros (eur) (foy 2023). according to the forecast, not only wealthy states such as germany, france, and the netherlands will be required to increase their budget contributions, but all other eu members as well (foy 2023). on november 8, 2023, the european commission adopted the 2023 enlargement package, which recommended opening accession negotiations with ukraine and moldova and granting candidate status to georgia (european commission 2023a). on december 14, 2023, the european council decided to grant candidate country status to georgia (council of the european union 2023), marking the beginning of plans to implement its new geopolitical strategy aimed at advancing a new wave of enlargement. european commission president ursula von der leyen declared that “enlargement is ‘vital’ for the european union’s future and comes with strong ‘economic and geopolitical logic’” (european commission 2023b). immediately after the announcement of the 2023 enlargement package, russian foreign minister lavrov stated that “the european union isn’t hiding its intentions to restrain [russia] in every possible way and push it out of central asia and the south caucasus” (afp 2023). lavrov argued that “russia has been ‘historically present there’ and is ‘not going to disappear’ (afp 2023). in response to the eu’s integration strategies, russia utilized its traditional strategy of disinformation, leveraging the presence of territorial conflicts in moldova and georgia to advance its objectives. prominent russian publications disseminated widespread disinformation, claiming that “the european union may consider the option of accepting moldova and georgia into its membership partially, that is, without the territories of transnistria, abkhazia and south ossetia” (izvestia 2023). conclusion the eu’s interests in the post-soviet region have changed over time, and, accordingly, its geopolitical role has undergone an evolution. for many years, the eu avoided taking on an active geopolitical role, focusing instead on humanitarian efforts and employing soft power through cultural and educational initiatives. over time, however, the eu gradually transformed into a competitive actor in the region. however, the ultimate outcome of the eu’s enhanced role in this region remains uncertain. this article analyzed the developing nature of georgia’s relations with the eu through five key concepts, each roughly corresponding to a distinct period. however, each concept is further divided into multiple stages, resulting in georgia holding various statuses within each framework. the rising step model demonstrates how georgia successfully elevated its status in its relationship with the eu, progressing from a lower level to the highest level of engagement. in this model, each level corresponds to a new status (see figure 2). the fifth concept is still under development and has not yet influenced georgia’s specific status; its outcome is unlikely to become evident until after the conclusion of the war in ukraine. 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 figure 2: the rising step model shows how georgia has been perceived by the eu for 30 years the first three concepts describe developments roughly up to 2022. the first, “indifference,” characterized the period from independence up until the rose revolution. the second period, captured by the concept of “neighbourhood,” began in 2004 when georgia became part of the european neighbourhood policy along with countries of northern africa and some former soviet republics. during this phase, georgia positioned itself as a proponent of europeanization, while the eu redefined georgia’s status, transitioning it from merely a geographic neighbour of europe to providing it with official eu neighbour status. the third concept, “soft power via partnership,” started after the russogeorgian war of 2008 and applied right up until 2022. the eu began to realize its geopolitical role in the region and launched the eastern partnership policy in 2009. during this period, georgia and the eu signed an association agreement, in which georgia is mentioned as an eastern european country (council of the european union 2014, 5). the eu utilized its soft power to steer the partnership, albeit without offering the prospect of eu membership. the final two concepts utilized in the article are the result of the 2022 full-scale russian military invasion of ukraine. they reflect the ambiguity of the current period and of the future, which remains indeterminate. according to the concept of “great europe from the mediterranean to the north sea, from lisbon to tbilisi,” georgia, along with ukraine and moldova, is recognized as part of europe and has been acknowledged first as a potential and subsequently as an actual, eu candidate state. for the first time in the history of the eu, geopolitical considerations have come to the fore, while issues of democratic reform take a back seat. while georgia experiences a regression in democratic practices, and ukraine and moldova grapple with widespread corruption, the eu continues to strive to maintain its influence amidst growing geopolitical pressure from russia. most recently, the concept of “fourspeed europe” has been put forth, as european leaders reflect on the future shape of the eu. an analysis of these last two concepts shows that, on the one hand, the eu is looking for ways to strengthen its role in the region but is not fully ready to expand to include countries in the post-soviet 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 space. however, an analysis of all previous eu concepts confirms that the success of any concept depends on whether it provides the prospect of membership in eastern european countries, including georgia. in the eyes of the eastern partnership countries, the strength of the eu lies not only in the attractiveness of its political and economic development model or its transformative strength but also in the prospect of membership. during the entire post-communist period, the eu’s policy towards georgia was influenced by two main factors: the geographical remoteness of georgia and the eu’s desire to take into account russia’s interests in the region. georgia’s location had not changed, and while the eu did not initially consider georgia as part of the european continent in the early 1990s, the growing significance of the region to the eu has since led to georgia being recognized as part of europe. as a result of the development of the last two concepts, the factor of georgia’s geographical distance from the eu has lost its relevance for the eu. if previously georgia’s geographic identity was the reason for the eu’s indifference, currently this same geographic positioning is expected to play a central role in facilitating georgia’s integration into the eu. the second main factor (russia), which prevented the rapprochement of georgia and some other post-soviet countries with the eu, has now, on the contrary, become the driving force behind the rapid expansion of the eu to the east. it may be more accurate to frame the discussion not in terms of the eu’s growing interest in georgia but rather as an increase in the eu’s assertiveness and a deliberate disregard for russia’s interests in the region. namely, moscow’s aggressive policy and intense geopolitical competition in the region between leading actors will increasingly push the eu to strengthen its ranks at the expense of countries such as georgia, ukraine, moldova, and, in the future, even belarus, armenia, and azerbaijan. the eu factor as an active geopolitical player in the eastern partnership countries will increasingly grow, which, on the one hand, will benefit this region and, on the other hand, will strengthen the eu’s capabilities in competition with other geopolitical players. 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 references afp (agence france-presse). 2023. “russia says eu won’t ‘push’ it out of central asia.” radio free europe/radio liberty. november 12, 2023. accessed november 15, 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-central-asia-influence-eu-lavrov-push-out/32681531.html. agenda.ge. 2022. “german chancellor: we are people of europe, our voice must resound throughout europe, from lisbon to tbilisi, beyond.” october 16, 2022. accessed september 10, 2023. https://agenda.ge/en/news/2022/4013. ———. 2023. “mep stresses ‘geopolitical mistake’ of not granting georgia eu candidate status in 2022.” september 13, 2023. accessed september 22, 2023. https://agenda.ge/en/news/2023/3353. baltag, dorina, and iulian romanyshyn. “special issue: the european union and its eastern partnership neighbours—a framework to evaluate performance.” international politics 61: 1059–1077. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-023-00475-3. barroso, josé manuel. 2014. “speech by president at the georgia investment conference.” tbilisi, june 13, 2014. accessed august 10, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/ detail/de/speech_14_462. bauer, michael w., christoph knill, and diana pitschel. 2007. “differential europeanization in eastern europe: the impact of diverse eu regulatory governance patterns.” journal of european integration 29 (4): 405–448. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330701502431. bayer, lili. 2023. “charles michel: get ready by 2030 to enlarge eu.” politico, august 28, 2023. accessed august 28, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/european-council-president-charlesmichel-eu-enlargement-by-2030/. borrell, josep. 2023. “the eu wants to see georgia succeeding on its european path.” the european external action service (eeas). september 11, 2023. accessed april, 11, 2024. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-wants-see-georgia-succeeding-its-europeanpath_en?fbclid=iwar0elwuoloq7dww_hr972yafu2upjrfzdl0g8zcse5gbjnnj8vzud qvsu_k. börzel, tanja a. 2010. “the transformative power of europe reloaded: the limits of external europeanization.” kolleg-forschergruppe (kfg) “the transformative power of europe” freie universität berlin, kfg working paper no. 11 (february): 1–30. https://dnb.info/1192191560/34. ———. 2009. “transformative power europe? the eu promotion of good governance in areas of limited statehood.” paper prepared for the erd workshop “transforming political structures: security, institutions, and regional integration mechanisms,” florence, april 16–17. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228454998_transformative_power_europe_the_e u_promotion_of_good_governance_in_areas_of_limited_statehood. börzel, tanja a., stahn, andreas, and yasemin pamuk. 2010. “the european union and the fight against corruption in its near abroad: can it make a difference?” global crime 11 (2): 122– 44. https://doi.org/10.1080/17440571003669142. https://d-nb.info/1192191560/34 https://d-nb.info/1192191560/34 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228454998_transformative_power_europe_the_eu_promotion_of_good_governance_in_areas_of_limited_statehood https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228454998_transformative_power_europe_the_eu_promotion_of_good_governance_in_areas_of_limited_statehood https://doi.org/10.1080/17440571003669142 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 börzel, tanja a., and yasemin pamuk. 2011. “europeanization subverted? the european union’s promotion of good governance and the fight against corruption in the southern caucasus.” kolleg-forschergruppe (kfg) “the transformative power of europe” freie universität berlin, kfg working paper no. 26 (april). https://www.polsoz.fuberlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/wp/wp26/wp_26_boerzel_pamu k.pdf. börzel, tanja a., and thomas risse. 2017. “from europeanization to diffusion.” in domestic politics and norm diffusion in international relations: ideas do not float freely, edited by federica bicchi, tanja börzel, and mark pollack, 290–307. routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315623665. börzel, tanja a., sergio fabbrini, yves mény, sonja puntscher riekmann, and frank schimmelfennig. 2023. “fit for 35? reforming the politics and institutions of the eu for an enlarged union.” edited by göran von sydow, and valentin kreilinger. the swedish institute for european policy studies (sieps) 2 (september): 1–92. https://www.sieps.se/globalassets/publikationer/2023/sieps-2023_2op-eng-webb.pdf?. chedia, beka. 2009. “the georgian orthodox church in current georgian policy.” journal of social and political studies: central asia and the caucasus 4–5 (58–59): 1691–75. ———. 2022. “can georgia get back on track?” new eastern europe magazine no.5 (septemberoctober): 63–67. accessed february 10, 2025. https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/10/03/cangeorgia-get-back-on-track/. ———. 2010. “georgia on the political map of europe: new geopolitical realities.” journal of social and political studies: central asia and the caucasus 11 (1): 19–28. ———. 2015. “the eastern partnership: an opportunity and instrument for georgia to become a part of europe.” visegrad school of political studies. poland: 1–9. https://visegradschool.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/the-eastern-partnership.pdf. ———. 2023. “georgia believes ‘modest dowries’ are enough for eu membership.” the jamestown foundation’s eurasia daily monitor 20 (28), february 15, 2023. accessed march 15, 2024. https://jamestown.org/program/georgia-believes-modest-dowries-are-enough-for-eumembership/. cirtautas, arista maria, and frank schimmelfennig. 2010. “europeanisation before and after accession: conditionality, legacies and compliance.” europe-asia studies 62 (3): 421–441. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668131003647812. commission of the european communities. 2003. “communication from the commission to the council and the european parliament. wider europe — neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbours.” brussels, march 11, 2003. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf. ———. 2008. “communication from the commission to the european parliament and the council. eastern partnership.” brussels, december 3, 2008. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/lexuriserv/ lexuriserv.do?uri=com:2008:0823:fin:en:pdf. coppieters, bruno. 1998. “georgia in europe: the idea of a periphery in international relations.” in commonwealth and independence in post-soviet eurasia, edited by bruno coppieters, alexei zverev, and dmitri trenin. london, routledge, 191–213. https://doi.org/ 10.4324/9781003340379. https://www.sieps.se/globalassets/publikationer/2023/sieps-2023_2op-eng-webb.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003340379 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003340379 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 costa, olivier, daniela schwarzer, pervenche berès, et al. 2023. sailing on high seas: reforming and enlarging the eu for the 21st century. report of the franco-german working group on eu institutional reform. paris-berlin, september 18, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2023/09/19/paper-eu-reform.pdf. council of the european union. 2014. “association agreement (aa).” official journal of the european union no. 57 (august): 1–745. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:l:2014:261:full&from=en. ———. 2023. european council conclusions on ukraine, enlargement and reforms. accessed december 29, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/ 12/14/european-council-conclusions-on-ukraine-enlargement-and-reforms/. debardeleben, joan. 2021. “the european union’s eastern partnership: bold ambitions in a troubled region.” canadian global affairs institute’s policy perspective (july). https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/4761/attachments/original/1626821283/t he_european_unions_eastern_partnership_bold_ambitions_in_a_troubled_region.pdf?162 6821283. deen, bob, wouter zweers, and iris van loon. 2021. “the eastern partnership: three dilemmas in a time of troubles.” clingendael report (january): 1–37. https://www.clingendael.org/ sites/default/files/2021-01/the-eastern-partnership.pdf. deen, bob, wouter zweers, and camille linder. 2023. “the eu in the south caucasus. navigating a geopolitical labyrinth in turmoil.” clingendael report (march): 1–72. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/the-eu-in-the-south-caucasus.pdf. delegation of the european union to georgia. 2022. the european perspective for georgia. may 20, 2022. accessed june 19, 2023. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/europeanperspective-georgia_en?s=221. de waal, thomas. 2022. “how georgia stumbled on the road to europe. the european union has a serious test ahead in keeping tbilisi on track.” foreign policy, july 7, 2022. accessed may 5, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/07/georgia-moldova-ukraine-european-unionmembership/. dimitrova, antoaneta, maxim boroda, tatsiana chulitskaya, veaceslav berbeca, and tatiana parvan. 2016. “soft, normative or transformative power: what do the eu’s communications with eastern partners reveal about its influence?” eu-strat: 1–28. accessed january 2, 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/documents/downloadpublic?documentids=080166e 5b53b9d8f&appid=ppgms. drozdiak, william, tobias gehrke, and klaus larres. 2023. “state of the union address by president ursula von der leyen: how will the eu answer the call of history? – expert quick takes.” wilson center, september 18, 2023. accessed september 18, 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/2023-state-union-address-president-ursula-von-derleyen-how-will-eu-answer-call-history. east stratcom task force. 2021. “disinfo: eastern partnership is the anti-russian and ‘postcolonial’ project of the eu.” july 2, 2021. accessed november 30, 2023. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eastern-partnership-is-the-anti-russian-and-postcolonial-projectof-the-eu. edwards, geoffrey. 2008. “the construction of ambiguity and limits of attraction: europe and its neighbourhood policy.” journal of european integration 30 (1): 45–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330801959465. https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/19/paper-eu-reform.pdf https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/19/paper-eu-reform.pdf https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:l:2014:261:full&from=en https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:l:2014:261:full&from=en https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/4761/attachments/original/1626821283/ https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/the-eu-in-the-south-caucasus.pdf https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/european-perspective-georgia_en?s=221 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/european-perspective-georgia_en?s=221 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/2023-state-union-address-president-ursula-von-der-leyen-how-will-eu-answer-call-history https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/2023-state-union-address-president-ursula-von-der-leyen-how-will-eu-answer-call-history https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eastern-partnership-is-the-anti-russian-and-postcolonial-project-of-the-eu https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eastern-partnership-is-the-anti-russian-and-postcolonial-project-of-the-eu https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330801959465 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 ehrke, michael. 2007. “the european union and the post-communist sphere integration. european neighbourhood policy and strategic partnership.” friedrich-ebert-stiftung. compass 2020 (may): 1–20. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/05160.pdf. european commission. 1992. ec technical assistance to the commonwealth of independent states and georgia: the tacis programme. september 13, 1992. accessed may 7, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_92_54. ———. 2007. black sea synergy, a new regional cooperation initiative, communication to the council and the parliament. communication from the commission to the european parliament, the european council and the council. brussels, april 11, 2007. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:52007dc0160&from=sv. ———. 2022a. commission opinion on georgia’s application for membership of the european union. communication from the commission to the european parliament, the european council and the council. brussels, june 17. https://neighbourhoodenlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/georgia%20opinion%20and%20annex.pdf. ———. 2022b. the twelve priorities. brussels, may 9, 2022. accessed may 9, 2023. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/twelve-priorities_en?s=221. ———. 2023a. commission adopts 2023 enlargement package, recommends to open negotiations with ukraine and moldova, to grant candidate status to georgia and to open accession negotiations with bih, once the necessary degree of compliance is achieved. brussels, november 8. accessed november 10, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5633. ———. 2023b. “european neighbourhood policy and enlargement negotiations (dg near).” brussels, november 8, 2023. accessed november 11, 2023. https://neighbourhoodenlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-adopts-2023-enlargement-package-recommendsopen-negotiations-ukraine-and-moldova-grant-2023-11-08_en. european union. 2016. “shared vision, common action: a stronger europe. a global strategy for the european union’s foreign and security policy.” https://www.eeas.europa.eu/ sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf. foy, henry. 2023. “eu estimates ukraine entitled to €186bn after accession.” the financial times, october 4, 2023. accessed october 5, 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/a8834254-b8f9-4385b043-04c2a7cd54c8. gahler, michael. 2021. “boosting the eu’s soft power in eastern partnership countries.” european view 20 (1): 14–22. https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685821999847. genté, régis. 2023. “georgia: terrible dilemma for europe.” european issues 674 (june): 1–7. https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/674-georgia-terrible-dilemma-for-europe. gherasimov, cristina. 2020. “an eastern policy update, but no upgrade. the eu needs a more ambitious eastern partnership strategy.” dgap policy brief no. 5 (march) 2020: 1–12. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/66932/ssoar-2020-gherasimovan_eastern_policy_update_but.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y. grabbe, heather. 2006. the eu’s transformative power. europeanization through conditionality in central and eastern europe. palgrave macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230510302. the government of georgia. 2008. “russian aggression of georgia. six point peace plan.” august 12, 2008. https://smr.gov.ge/uploads/prev/9bbbc7.pdf. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:52007dc0160&from=sv https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:52007dc0160&from=sv https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5633 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5633 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-adopts-2023-enlargement-package-recommends-open-negotiations-ukraine-and-moldova-grant-2023-11-08_en https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-adopts-2023-enlargement-package-recommends-open-negotiations-ukraine-and-moldova-grant-2023-11-08_en https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-adopts-2023-enlargement-package-recommends-open-negotiations-ukraine-and-moldova-grant-2023-11-08_en https://www.ft.com/content/a8834254-b8f9-4385-b043-04c2a7cd54c8 https://www.ft.com/content/a8834254-b8f9-4385-b043-04c2a7cd54c8 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685821999847 https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230510302 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2023. “joint statement of the people’s republic of china and georgia on the establishment of a strategic partnership.” beijing, february 3, 2025. accessed august 2, 2023. http://ge.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/ 202308/t20230807_11123383.htm#:~:text=georgia%20supports%20the%20global%20secur ity,of%20countries%20in%20the%20region. guardian. 2005. “bush hails georgia as ‘beacon of liberty.’” may 10, 2005. accessed november 23, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/may/10/georgia.usa. habets, ingrid. 2014. “alternative prospects for the eastern partnership countries.” european view 13 (1): 125–132. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-014-0299-1. haukkala, hiski, and arkady moshes. 2004. “beyond ‘bing bang’: the challenges of the eu’sneighbourhood policy in the east.” the finnish institute of international affairs report09/2004: 1–64. https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/fiia_report_092004.pdf. izvestia. 2023. “v es dopustili vozmozhnost’ priniatiia moldavii i gruzii v soiuz po chastiam” [the eu allowed the possibility of admitting moldova and georgia into the union in parts]. november 24, 2023. accessed november 29, 2023. https://iz.ru/1610260/2023-11-24/v-esdopustili-vozmozhnost-priniatiia-moldavii-i-gruzii-v-soiuz-po-chastiam. jozwiak, rikard. 2020. “france: eastern partnership doesn’t mean eu membership.” rfe/rl, january 27, 2020. accessed february 3, 2025. https://www.rferl.org/a/france-easternpartnership-doesn-t-mean-eu-membership/30400380.html. kelley, judith. 2006. “new wine in old wineskins: promoting political reforms through the new european neighbourhood policy.” journal of common market studies 44 (1): 29–55. kuchenbecker, anna. 2023. “the geopolitical tightrope: balancing georgia’s eu candidacy. european council on foreign relations. accessed january 2, 2025. https://ecfr.eu/article/thegeopolitical-tightrope-balancing-georgias-eu-candidacy/. kurpas, sebastian, and henning riecke. 2007. “the 2007 german eu presidency: a midterm report.” the swedish institute for european policy studies (sieps) (may): 1–67. https://www.sieps.se/en/publications/2007/the-2007-german-eu-presidency-a-midterm-report20071op/sieps-2007_1op.pdf. liik, kadri. 2017. “how the eu needs to manage relations with its eastern neighborhood.” carnegie endowment for international peace, august 23, 2017. accessed january 2, 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2017/08/how-the-eu-needs-to-manage-relations-with-itseastern-neighborhood?lang=en. longhurst, kerry, and susanne nies. 2009. “recasting relations with the neighbours prospects for the eastern partnership.” europe visions no. 4 (february): 1–18. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/migrated_files/documents/atoms/files/europe_visions_4 _3.pdf. lynch, suzanne. 2023. “ukraine makes clear it won’t accept second-class eu membership.” politico, september 28, 2023. accessed september 29, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/ ukraine-wont-accept-second-class-eu-membership-pm-denysshmyhal/?fbclid=iwar2wwnkapmv7dmwqmtur7edaob5swkzdjk2xzjakjnqyww0w pmzmdvpstik. magen, amichai. 2006. “the shadow of enlargement: can the european neighbourhood policyachieve compliance?” the columbia journal of european law 12 (2): 384–427. https://fsi9-prod.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/cjel-finalmagen_offprint_12.2.pdf. http://ge.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202308/t20230807_11123383.htm#:~:text=georgia%20supports%20the%20global%20security,of%20countries%20in%20the%20region http://ge.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202308/t20230807_11123383.htm#:~:text=georgia%20supports%20the%20global%20security,of%20countries%20in%20the%20region http://ge.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202308/t20230807_11123383.htm#:~:text=georgia%20supports%20the%20global%20security,of%20countries%20in%20the%20region https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-014-0299-1 https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/fiia_report_092004.pdf https://iz.ru/1610260/2023-11-24/v-es-dopustili-vozmozhnost-priniatiia-moldavii-i-gruzii-v-soiuz-po-chastiam https://iz.ru/1610260/2023-11-24/v-es-dopustili-vozmozhnost-priniatiia-moldavii-i-gruzii-v-soiuz-po-chastiam https://ecfr.eu/article/the-geopolitical-tightrope-balancing-georgias-eu-candidacy/ https://ecfr.eu/article/the-geopolitical-tightrope-balancing-georgias-eu-candidacy/ https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2017/08/how-the-eu-needs-to-manage-relations-with-its-eastern-neighborhood?lang=en https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2017/08/how-the-eu-needs-to-manage-relations-with-its-eastern-neighborhood?lang=en 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 makszimov, vlagyiszlav. 2021. “newer eu members support associated trio as ‘champions.’” in the associated trio in action, euractiv’s special report. https://en.euractiv.eu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/special-report/the-associated-trio-in-action-special-report-1.pdf. manners, ian. 2002. “normative power europe: a contradiction in terms?” jcms: journal of common market studies 40 (2): 235–258. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00353. michel, charles. 2022. “speech by president at the plenary session of the european economic and social committee.” brussels, may 18, 2022. accessed june 28, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/18/discours-du-presidentcharles-michel-lors-de-la-session-pleniere-du-comite-economique-et-social-europeen/. milosevich, mira. 2021. “russia’s westpolitik and the european union.” the center for strategic and international studies (july): 1–11. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-westpolitik-andeuropean-union. minister of foreign affairs of georgia. 1996. “the partnership and cooperation agreement.” the legislative herald of georgia, april 22, 1996. accessed february 10, 2025. https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/1212956?publication=0. ———. “chronology of major events of eu-georgia cooperation.” accessed december 28, 2023. https://mfa.gov.ge/en/european-union/903144-saqartvelo-evrokavshiris-urtiertobebismnishvnelovani-movlenebis-qronologia. ministry of foreign affairs of ukraine. 2021. “association trio: memorandum of understanding between the ministry of foreign affairs of ukraine, ministry of foreign affairs of georgia and the ministry of foreign affairs and european integration of the republic of moldova.” may 17, 2021. accessed june 22, 2023. https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/association-trio-memorandumunderstanding-between-ministry-foreign-affairs-georgia-ministry-foreign-affairs-andeuropean-integration-republic-moldova-and-ministry-foreign-affairs-ukraine. nitoiu, cristian, and monika sus. 2018. “introduction: the rise of geopolitics in the eu’s approach in its eastern neighbourhood.” geopolitics 24 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 14650045.2019.1544396. nye, joseph. 1990. “soft power.” foreign policy no. 80 (autumn): 153–171. https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580. paul, amanda. 2015. “the eu in the south caucasus and the impact of the russia-ukraine war.” the international spectator 50 (3): 30–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2015.1054223. paul, amanda, and ionela ciolan, 2021. “lessons from the eastern partnership: looking back to move forward.” european policy centre, december 14, 2021. accessed january 2, 2025. https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/lessons-from-the-eastern-partnership-looking-back-tomove-forward~44d130. przetacznik, jakub, and martin russell. 2021. “eastern partnership post-2020 agenda.” eprs | european parliamentary research service pe 698.858 (december): 1–25. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/idan/2021/698858/eprs_ida(2021)69885 8_en.pdf. reuters. 2023. “german minister says ukraine’s place is in eu, hears calls for arms during kyiv visit.” september 11, 2023. accessed september 12, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/ europe/ukraines-place-is-eu-says-german-foreign-minister-kyiv-2023-09-11/. https://mfa.gov.ge/en/european-union/903144-saqartvelo-evrokavshiris-urtiertobebis-mnishvnelovani-movlenebis-qronologia https://mfa.gov.ge/en/european-union/903144-saqartvelo-evrokavshiris-urtiertobebis-mnishvnelovani-movlenebis-qronologia https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580 https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/lessons-from-the-eastern-partnership-looking-back-to-move-forward~44d130 https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/lessons-from-the-eastern-partnership-looking-back-to-move-forward~44d130 https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-place-is-eu-says-german-foreign-minister-kyiv-2023-09-11/ https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-place-is-eu-says-german-foreign-minister-kyiv-2023-09-11/ 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 rinnert, david. 2011. “the eastern partnership in georgia. increasing efficiency of eu neighborhood policies in the south caucasus?” stiftung wissenschaft unf politik german institute for international and security affairs fg 5, 2011 no.1 (march): 1–25. https://www.swpberlin.org/publications/products/arbeitspapiere/rinnert_eueasternpartnershipgeorgia.pdf. scholz, olaf. 2022. “the global zeitenwende. how to avoid a new cold war in a multipolar era.” foreign affairs, december 5, 2022. accessed july 21, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ germany/olaf-scholz-global-zeitenwende-how-avoid-new-cold-war. sorgi, gregorio. 2023. “commission snubs charles michel’s 2030 eu enlargement target.” politico, august 29, 2023. accessed august 29, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/europeancommission-snub-charles-michel-2030-enlargement-target/. spanish presidency of the council of the european union. 2023. “informal general affairs ministerial meeting discusses the implications of a possible eu enlargement.” murcia, september 28, 2023. accessed september 29, 2023. https://spanish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/ informal-ministerial-meeting-general-affairs-september-28-murcia/ ?fbclid=iwar1ftzaijdpg3qmacnr9epn1zo0bycc710qiiylybsw8qw9tb0k2j-gaptk. der spiegel. 2009. “the eu’s eastern ‘sphere of influence.’” may 6, 2009. accessed july 28, 2023.https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-world-from-berlin-the-eu-s-easternsphere-of-influence-a-623163.html. tusk, donald. 2019. “speech by president at the batumi international conference.” batumi, july 11, 2019. accessed july 17, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2019/07/11/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-batumi-international-conference/. un (united nations). 2023. “geographic regions.” department of economic and social affairs. accessed november 24, 2023. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/. van der staak, sam. 2023. “in her state of the union, von der leyen should swap pragmatism for principles.” politico, september 12, 2023. accessed september 12, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/in-her-state-of-the-union-speech-von-der-leyen-should-swappragmatism-for-principles/ ?utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&fbclid=iwar07z3kejgkib_e94gar4swdiv rfnfkjxie1kfb2vbautqv_s3wo81tosy8. vasconcelos, álvaro de, esra bulut, nicola casarini, et al. 2010. “a strategy for eu foreign policy.” european union institute for security studies no. 7 (june): 1–81. https://eulacfoundation.org/system/files/digital_library/2023-07/ giving_substance_to_the_strategic_partnerships.pdf. várhelyi, olivér. 2023a. “remarks at the second east med and southeast europe conference.” delphi economic forum. brussels, october 12, 2023. accessed october 13, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_4948. –——. 2023b. “commissioner press statement at the informal meeting of general affairs ministers in murcia.” murcia, september 28, 2023. accessed october 3, 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_4690. wolczuk, kataryna, rilka dragneva, and jon wallace. 2022. “what is the eurasian economic union? explaining the history, purpose, and political background to the eurasian economic union.” chatham house explainer, july 15, 2022. accessed january 2, 2025. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/what-eurasian-economic-union. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/germany/olaf-scholz-global-zeitenwende-how-avoid-new-cold-war https://www.foreignaffairs.com/germany/olaf-scholz-global-zeitenwende-how-avoid-new-cold-war https://spanish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/informal-ministerial-meeting-general-affairs-september-28-murcia/‌?fbclid=iwar1ftzaijdpg3qmacnr9epn1zo0bycc710qiiylybsw8qw9tb0k2j-gaptk https://spanish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/informal-ministerial-meeting-general-affairs-september-28-murcia/‌?fbclid=iwar1ftzaijdpg3qmacnr9epn1zo0bycc710qiiylybsw8qw9tb0k2j-gaptk https://spanish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/informal-ministerial-meeting-general-affairs-september-28-murcia/‌?fbclid=iwar1ftzaijdpg3qmacnr9epn1zo0bycc710qiiylybsw8qw9tb0k2j-gaptk https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/ https://www.politico.eu/‌article/‌‌‌‌in-her-state-of-the-union-speech-von-der-leyen-should-swap-pragmatism-for-principles/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&fbclid=iwar07z3kejgkib_e94gar4swdivrfnfkjxie1kfb2vbautqv_s3wo81tosy8 https://www.politico.eu/‌article/‌‌‌‌in-her-state-of-the-union-speech-von-der-leyen-should-swap-pragmatism-for-principles/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&fbclid=iwar07z3kejgkib_e94gar4swdivrfnfkjxie1kfb2vbautqv_s3wo81tosy8 https://www.politico.eu/‌article/‌‌‌‌in-her-state-of-the-union-speech-von-der-leyen-should-swap-pragmatism-for-principles/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&fbclid=iwar07z3kejgkib_e94gar4swdivrfnfkjxie1kfb2vbautqv_s3wo81tosy8 https://www.politico.eu/‌article/‌‌‌‌in-her-state-of-the-union-speech-von-der-leyen-should-swap-pragmatism-for-principles/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&fbclid=iwar07z3kejgkib_e94gar4swdivrfnfkjxie1kfb2vbautqv_s3wo81tosy8 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 54-76 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 parliamentary influence on sanctions policy in canada, the us and the eu thomas verellen 1, utrecht university, netherlands abstract this paper explores the role of parliaments in sanctions policy in canada, the united states, and the european union. the study contrasts the varying levels of parliamentary involvement and oversight within these jurisdictions. it highlights canada’s formal but underutilized parliamentary powers, the proactive legislative role of the us congress that actively shapes and monitors sanctions policy, and the eu’s executive-dominated approach with limited parliamentary input. the findings partially refute the hypothesis that parliaments play a marginal role in sanctions policy and underscore the importance of robust legislative oversight in ensuring that sanctions policies are democratically accountable. 1 thomas verellen is an assistant professor in european union law at utrecht university in utrecht, netherlands 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 1. introduction in liberal democracies, foreign affairs frequently fall under the purview of the executive branch. in commonwealth countries such as canada or the united kingdom, this dominance can be traced back to the monarchical roots of foreign policy powers (mclachlan 2014, 116; smith 1995; ), but similar divisions of labour can be found in republican systems of government. in the united states, the 1789 constitution allocates important foreign policy powers to congress, not in the least the power to declare war. yet an expansive reading of constitutional provisions that empower the president, such as the commander-in-chief clause, have done much to centralize foreign policy powers in the office of the president (mortenson 2019). in a (quasi-) federal system such as the european union (beaud 2007; larsen 2021), the executive also plays a central role in foreign relations, with the treaty on european union assigning responsibility for the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) to the european council and the council of europe. both of these institutions consist of representatives of the executives of the m ember states, whereas the role of the european parliament within the cfsp remains limited (thym 2008). this article takes the historically central role of the executive in foreign policymaking as its starting point and explores the current balance of power between the executive and parliament in one salient area of foreign policymaking: sanctions policy in canada, the united states and the european union. canada, the us, and the eu are multilevel systems of governance that share a constitutional commitment to representative democracy. how is representative democracy realized in sanctions policy in canada, the us and the eu? what role do parliaments play in sanctions policy in these jurisdictions? what does the legal framework that governs the relations between the legislative and executive branches of government in these jurisdictions look like? how do these frameworks compare to one another, and what lessons can be drawn from such a comparison? sanctions policy and democratic control are no easy bedfellows. as a form of “economic warfare” (mulder 2022), sanctions policy is crisis-driven and subject to pressures by the executive to act fast without much democratic deliberation. coordination of sanctions policy between jurisdictions, in particular among nato allies, may further restrict the space parliaments have to influence sanctions policy (elsuwege and szép 2023). do parliaments fully defer to the executive in this area, or do they possess alternative mechanisms to influence sanctions policy and fulfil their role of holding the executive democratically accountable? the article examines canada, the us, and the eu, three jurisdictions that actively use sanctions as a foreign policy tool. there is a significant body of literature on the role of the european parliament and national parliaments in eu external relations (vara and sánchez-tabernero 2018; verellen 2023a). literature on the role of parliaments within the cfsp is less abundant, although both political scientists and legal scholars have examined and criticized the lack of european parliament involvement in this policy area (bono 2006; huff 2015; peters, wagner, and deitelhoff 2008; rosén and raube 2018; thym 2008, 2011; tonra 2011; verellen 2024; wessel 2018). scholars have not specifically studied how the european parliament or the parliaments of member states affect the goals and substance of eu sanctions; this stands in marked contrast to a burgeoning literature on the role of the court of justice of the eu in this area (chachko 2019; lonardo 2023). across the atlantic, the academic literature pays little attention to how the us congress affects us sanctions policy. in his 2011 study examining how sanctions imposition influences us presidential approval ratings, taehee whang briefly observed that congress is comparatively weaker than the president in sanctions policymaking (whang 2011, 792). more recently, in a study on congressional sanctions legislation, jordan tama arrived at the opposite conclusion to whang, 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 arguing that congress frequently “forces the president’s hand” in sanctions policy (tama 2020). tama’s is the only study that specifically focuses on parliamentary influence on us sanctions policy. in his 2024 monograph on bipartisanship in us foreign policy, tama (2024) offers further evidence of this claim by examining the congressional-presidential dynamics in the adoption of sanctions against iran and russia. although the literature specifically addressing the role of congress in sanctions policy is limited, scholarship on us sanctions policy should be understood within the context of ongoing debates regarding presidential powers in foreign affairs. this discussion dates back to the founding and earlier; however, arthur schlesinger’s “imperial presidency” thesis, developed in the aftermath of the watergate scandal (schlesinger 1973), served as an important inflection point in debates on the appropriate balance of power between congress and the presidency in us foreign policy. schlesinger identified a historical pattern in which, during critical points in history, presidents established policies and undertook actions that arguably fell within the constitutional authority of congress. in the aftermath of watergate, however, congress did reassert itself by adopting the war powers resolution, a law that limits the us president’s ability to deploy military forces without congressional approval. yet a decade later, the balance of power had again shifted to the president. shortly after the iran-contra affair, harold koh outlined how a combination of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance had enabled the us presidency to dominate foreign policymaking (koh 1988). koh’s conclusion was all the more remarkable considering that congress, not the president, holds the clearest and most far-reaching constitutional powers over foreign affairs in the us (henkin 1996). in the wake of these contributions, an orthodoxy developed in the us centred around assumptions of presidential strength and assertiveness versus congressional weakness and acquiescence in foreign relations. this has been an important narrative during the bush, obama, and trump administrations, with successive presidents expanding the scope of their powers beyond that of their predecessors (drezner 2020, 389; kruse and zelizer 2019). constitutional law played an important role in these discussions, with some lawyers articulating theories of exclusive, plenary, and even extra-constitutional powers to conduct foreign relations (calabresi and yoo 2008; posner and vermeule 2011; yoo 2010). while these theories have not gone unchallenged (goldsmith 2017; fisher 2011; mortenson 2019), they continue to inform american understandings of the balance of congressional versus presidential power in foreign policy, including sanctions policy. the role of canada’s federal parliament in ensuring democratic accountability of the executive in foreign policy is rarely addressed in the literature. not unlike the abovementioned orthodoxy in the us, there seems to be a widespread conviction in canada that, as the authors of a handbook on canadian foreign policymaking put it, “control over the formulation of policy remains firmly vested in the hands of the political executive in cabinet” (nossal et al. 2015, 291). sanctions policy being an increasingly central component of canadian foreign policy, this claim arguably extends to sanctions policy as well. however, there is no literature that looks specifically at the influence of canada’s parliament on canadian sanctions policy. notably, political scientists and legal scholars who have written extensively on the subject of canadian sanctions policy such as andrea charron, michael nesbitt, or meredith lilly, have not examined the topic from the angle of democratic accountability, even if the latter has pointed to a risk of politicization that comes with canada’s embrace of autonomous sanctions (lilly and arabi 2020). this article fills this gap in the literature by comparatively examining whether these depictions of parliamentary irrelevance in foreign policymaking in general—and in sanctions policy more 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 specifically—are accurate, or whether parliaments have been able to find other, perhaps less visible means, to hold the executive accountable. this study employs a functional comparative method to explore how different systems approach the challenge of implementing representative democracy within the unique framework of sanctions policy. the analysis draws from primary legal sources, policy documents, secondary literature, and three online interviews with canadian parliamentarians from various political parties conducted in spring 2024. interviews were necessary to gain insights into canada’s parliamentary role in sanctions policy due to the lack of existing literature on the subject. the article focuses on the legislature’s two main responsibilities: lawmaking and exercising control and oversight over the executive. it differentiates between formal powers and informal practices that exist along the margins of formal authority, and it further distinguishes between accountability mechanisms that operate at different phases of the executive decision-making process (mello and peters 2018; rosén and raube 2018; russell and cowley 2016). indeed, parliaments can influence future executive decisions by indicating their priorities through resolutions. they may also participate directly in executive decision-making processes, such as by having the authority to oppose specific sanctions proposed by the executive. additionally, they can oversee executive actions post-decision by questioning the executive or demanding information disclosure. as this article will illustrate, institutional practices are diverse and substantial, including in the realm of sanctions policy. throughout the article, the sanctions imposed during the russian war of aggression on ukraine, which began in february 2022, serve as a case study to uncover how canada, the us, and the eu have adopted sanctions and what role their respective parliaments have played both in the process of adopting sanctions and in their subsequent implementation. the findings of this case study will feed into the general assessment of whether —and, if so, how—parliaments on either side of the atlantic can influence sanctions policy, and what the balance of power between parliaments and the executive looks like in this area. the article finds that canada has formal but underused parliamentary powers, the us congress actively shapes and monitors sanctions policy, and the eu’s approach is executive-dominated with limited parliamentary input. these findings partially refute the hypothesis that parliaments play a marginal role in sanctions policy and underscore the importance of robust legislative oversight in ensuring that sanctions policies are democratically accountable. the remainder of the article consists of five sections. the next three sections examine the constitutional frameworks and institutional practices related to sanctions in canada, the us, and the eu. the fourth section offers a number of comparative reflections, and the final section summarizes the findings and presents 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 2. canada in canada, foreign policy falls within the crown’s prerogative powers.2 in the field of sanctions policy, the crown’s prerogative powers have been displaced, however, by three acts of parliament: the united nations act, the special economic measures act (sema), and the justice for victims of corrupt foreign officials act—the latter known also as the sergei magnitsky law.3 the united nations act empowers the governor general to implement sanctions decided upon by the united nations security council. in contrast, this article focuses on the latter two statutes, which enable canada to adopt autonomous sanctions. sema and the sergei magnitsky law empower the governor general to adopt autonomous sanctions by means of orders or regulations, which are legal instruments made by the governor in council. in this context, the governor in council refers to the governor general, acting on the advice of the federal minister of foreign affairs, as the representative of the sovereign in canada. sema empowers the governor general to take economic measures against persons in a number of circumstances, namely where (i) an international organization called upon its members to do so, (ii) a grave breach of international peace and security has occurred, (iii) gross and systematic human rights violations have been committed in a foreign state, or (iv) acts of significant corruption involving a national of a foreign state have been committed.4 the first two triggers were introduced when sema was first adopted in 1992, while the latter two were added in 2017 (cherpako 2022). canada’s sergei magnitsky law was introduced in the same year as sema was amended and is inspired by the us’ adoption of the global magnitsky human rights accountability act, which was enacted in 2016 following the earlier adoption of the sergei magnitsky rule of law accountability act of 2012.5 canada’s sergei magnitsky law empowers the governor general to take measures against two sets of individuals: (i) individuals who have committed or have helped others commit “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” against individuals who sought to expose illegal government activity or who sought to exercise internationally recognized human rights, and (ii) individuals who have committed, or who helped others commit, “acts of significant corruption” such as bribery, the misappropriation of private or public assets for personal gain or the transfer of the proceeds of corruption to foreign states.6 both sema and canada’s sergei magnitsky law have a similar material scope as they both allow the governor general to act in cases of significant corruption and human rights violations. 2 canada (prime minister) v. khadr [2010] 1 s.c.r. 44 at paras. 34–35, scc 3. accessed june 10, 2025. https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/7842/index.do. 3 see respectively “united nations act”, r.s.c. 1985, c. u-2. accessed june 18, 2025. https://lawslois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/u-2; “special economic measures act (sema)”, s.c. 1992, c. 17. accessed june 18. 2025. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/s-14.5; “justice for victims of corrupt foreign officials act (sergei magnitsky law)”, s.c. 2017, c. 21. accessed june 18, 2025. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/j-2.3. 4 section 3(1) of sema. 5 see respectively russia and moldova jackson-vanik repeal and sergei magnitsky rule of law accountability act of 2012, 22 u.s.c. ch. 108, §§10101–10103, and global magnitsky act, title xii, subtitle f of p.l. 114-328, as amended; 22 u.s.c. §§10101 et seq. accessed june 22, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/housebill/6156. 6 section 4(2) of the sergei magnitsky law, s.c. 2017, c. 21. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/u-2 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/u-2 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/s-14.5 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 however, while sema addresses human rights violations in a broad sense, the sergei magnitsky law specifically targets individuals who violated the human rights of whistleblowers or others who tried to claim their own human rights. also, sema requires the human rights violations to be “systemic,” which is not a condition under the sergei magnitsky law. under sema and the sergei magnitsky law, the governor general—and therefore the cabinet— has the authority to apply various measures such as travel bans, asset freezes, import bans on goods or services, bans on property sales or aircraft landing in canada, or confiscation of those assets.7 the latter measure is noteworthy since canada was the first country in the world to pass legislation that allows the forfeiture of assets (standing committee on foreign affairs and international development 2024, 11).8 sema gives canada’s federal parliament the opportunity to pass motions to demonstrate its disapproval of a specific action taken by the governor general. the governor general has a legal obligation to present every regulation made under sema to parliament within five days after its creation,9 with copies of the order or regulation being sent to the relevant parliamentary committee.10 a 2024 report of the house of commons’ standing committee on foreign affairs and international development (faae) notes that the government does not provide additional analysis when it presents orders or regulations (standing committee on foreign affairs and international development 2024, 51). each house can discuss the regulation and pass a motion. if both houses agree on a motion, the regulation will be amended or revoked to reflect the wishes of parliament. it is important to note that parliament has never passed such a motion. interviews revealed that members of parliament (mps) are not very familiar with the instrument.11 the sergei magnitsky law contains a similar obligation for the governor general to table measures as those set out in sema. however, unlike the arrangements in sema, parliament is not offered an opportunity to amend or revoke measures taken.12 this may however change. under the previous parliament, which was in session from november 22 , 2021 to march 23, 2025, a private members’ bill proposed to require the minister of foreign affairs to respond to reports submitted by a parliamentary committee that recommends that sanctions be imposed under the sergei magnitsky law against foreign nationals.13 this kind of check would be less extensive than the one in sema, as it would not need the governor general to amend or revoke existing orders. it would, however, allow parliament to have an official say in how decisions are made. the way sema is used makes one question whether, even if such a bill is enacted, parliament will ever apply it. the sergei magnitsky law required a one-time review by the relevant commons and senate committees five years after its 2017 enactment, which the senate completed in 2023 and the house 7 section 4(2) of sema and section 4(3) of the sergei magnitsky law list the types of activities sanctions can restrict. 8 see section 437 of budget implementation act, 2022, no. 1, s.c. 2022, c. 10. accessed june 23, 2025. https://lawslois.justice.gc.ca/eng/annualstatutes/2022_10/page-113.html. this introduces a new section 5 in sema. 9 section 7(1) of sema. 10 see here standing order 32(1), house of commons (canada). accessed january 2, 2025. https://www.ourcommons.ca/procedure/standing-orders/index-e.html. 11 interview with mp, member of the conservative party of canada. conducted via microsoft teams. may 9, 2024; interview with mp, member of the liberal party of canada. conducted via microsoft teams. april 24, 2024. 12 section 5 of the sergei magnitsky law. 13 bill c-281, first session, forty-fourth parliament, 70–71 elizabeth ii – 1 charles iii, 2021–2022–2023. accessed june 17, 2025. https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/44-1/c-281. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/annualstatutes/2022_10/page-113.html https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/annualstatutes/2022_10/page-113.html https://www.ourcommons.ca/procedure/standing-orders/index-e.html 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 of commons followed in 2024, along with sema (boehm and harder 2023; standing committee on foreign affairs and international developmen 2024).14 the same parliamentary committees that can enforce the sergei magnitsky law can also review the sanctioned individuals list and suggest to their respective chambers whether those foreign nationals should remain subject to the order or regulation.15 the government is not required to follow up on such recommendations. sema does not contain similar provisions. neither of the two statutes contains an obligation on the government to publish an annual report to parliament on the effectiveness of canada’s sanctions regime. besides sema and the sergei magnitsky law, the canadian parliament can use other tools that are not tied to either law to hold the executive accountable: mps can ask questions to the executive with a 45-day reply deadline, they can question the government during the weekly question period, and they can hold hearings and pass motions.16 these tools are actively used, including in matters related to canada’s sanctions policy. in early may 2024, ndp foreign affairs critic heather mcpherson proposed a motion to study a waiver canada had given to aerospace firms over possible russian titanium use. the house of commons standing committee on foreign affairs and international development then decided to hold hearings on this issue (brewster 2024). this is not the first time the canadian parliament has spoken out on this matter. in a report published in february 2023, the same standing committee adopted a report on the subject of russia’s war of aggression against ukraine examining the government’s decision to waive sanctions for turbines that were to be used in nord stream 1, the now decommissioned offshore natural gas pipelines in europe that run under the baltic sea from russia to germany (standing committee on foreign affairs and international development 2023, 28–36). the turbines were in montreal for maintenance. the committee collected expert testimony and debated whether canada should revoke the sanctions waiver to allow the turbine to be delivered back to germany. in september 2022, underwater explosions decommissioned the pipelines, rendering moot the question the committee had been debating. also, in the abovementioned senate and house of commons reports reviewing sema and the sergei magnitsky law, parliamentarians expressed criticism of canada’s sanctions policy, questioning both the effectiveness of existing sanctions themselves and the fairness of the process of listing and delisting in canada. foreign affairs minister mélanie joly responded to both reports (joly 2023, 2024). in her response, however, she pushed back against recommendations aimed at improving the flow of information from the government to parliament—such as requiring the tabling of annual reports on the use of sanctions or amending legislation to mandate reviews by the relevant parliamentary committees, like those conducted in 2023 and 2024. joly pointed to the many opportunities parliamentarians already have to hold the government accountable and reminded parliamentarians that nothing prevents them from launching reviews on their own motion. the episode shows that canadian mps can use different tools to voice their opinions and influence the executive. a recent episode not related to sanctions shows that motions, even if not legally binding, can sometimes affect canadian foreign policy. in 2024, the same ndp mp mentioned earlier proposed a motion to recognize palestine as a state (cbc news 2024). instead of asking the majority of mps to vote against it, foreign affairs minister joly supported an amended motion 14 section 16(1) of the sergei magnitsky law. 15 section 16(3) of the sergei magnitsky law. 16 see respectively standing orders of the house of commons canada 39(5)(a), 37, 108, 54. accessed january 2, 2025. https://www.ourcommons.ca/procedure/standing-orders/index-e.html. https://www.ourcommons.ca/procedure/standing-orders/index-e.html 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 that would urge canada to cooperate with international partners to “work towards the establishment of the state of palestine as part of a negotiated two-state solution,” which the house of commons adopted (tasker 2024). despite such occasional successes, mps from different parties agree that their parliament is weak compared to the executive. they complain about the executive’s lack of transparency toward parliament.17 there is also a perception that canadian mps are more strictly controlled by their parties than mps in other westminster parliamentary systems like the united kingdom.18 opposition mps also struggle to influence the parliamentary agenda. they only have a few chances each year—on “opposition days”—to introduce motions, and only four hours out of sixteen each week are allocated for private members to conduct parliamentary business.19 similarly, while mps can hypothetically table legislation to implement the recommendations they made in the earlier reports on canada’s sanctions policy, the government's control over the parliamentary agenda significantly limits their ability to do so effectively. revealing in this regard is the language used in the recommendations of canada’s senate contained in its 2023 report: while it is parliament’s constitutional responsibility to adopt legislation, the senators nonetheless recommend that the government amend sema and the sergei magnitsky law to grant parliamentarians greater oversight opportunities (boehm and harder 2023, 47). such formulations—implying that senators may overlook the constitutional division of responsibilities between the legislature and the executive—are revealing of how senators themselves perceive the balance of power between the legislature and the executive in canada. these impressions of weakness vis-à-vis the executive echo assessments made by political scientists who have described and criticized the high levels of party discipline and the centralization of power within the prime minister’s office in canada (marland 2020; savoie 2008, 48). in conclusion, while the balance of power in canada’s system of governance concerning sanctions policy does heavily favour the executive, the landscape is nonetheless more complex than the one sketched in the textbook mentioned earlier. the executive, as the governor-in-council and thus, in practical terms, the government of canada, is key to creating and enforcing individual sanctions, but canadian mps do have tools at their disposal to speak out and to check the executive’s actions. their limited use of those tools may be due in part to the structural features of canada’s westminster parliamentary system that grant the government considerable control over the parliamentary agenda, especially when the government has the confidence of a majority of mps. yet at the same time, the experience of other westminster systems, particularly the uk, demonstrates that westminster parliaments can and do exercise influence, specifically informal influence, over the executive’s actions, including in the security policy context (russell and cowley 2016). 17 interview with mp, member of the conservative party of canada. conducted via microsoft teams. may 9, 2024; interview with mp, member of the liberal party of canada. conducted via microsoft teams. april 24, 2024; interview with mp, member of the new democratic party. conducted via microsoft teams. april 22, 2024. 18 interview with mp, member of the liberal party of canada. conducted via microsoft teams. april 24, 2024. 19 see respectively standing orders 81 and 30(6), house of commons (canada). accessed january 2, 2025. https://www.ourcommons.ca/procedure/standing-orders/index-e.html. standing order 30(6) states that one hour each sitting day is set aside for private members' business, which amounts to four hours out of the sixteen hours of sitting time each week. https://www.ourcommons.ca/procedure/standing-orders/index-e.html 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 3. the united states in the united states, both congress and the executive play a role in shaping sanctions policy. congress draws on its constitutional legislative powers—particularly its authority to regulate foreign commerce—while the president exercises powers that have been delegated to the executive through prior legislation. following russia’s full-scale invasion of ukraine, the us sanctions regime against russia and belarus has been composed of a range of legal tools. these include executive orders based on general congressional powers, such as the 1977 international emergency economic powers act (ieepa)20 and the 1976 national emergencies act (nea);21 executive orders based on laws for specific situations like the 2014 ukraine freedom support act22 or the 2017 countering america’s adversaries through sanctions act (caatsa);23 and narrowly focused instruments such as the 2022 ending importation of russian oil act.24 these congressional delegations of power to the president to adopt sanctions come with conditions to ensure that congress is aware of and maintains a degree of control over how the president exercises these delegated powers (bradley 2021; kovacs 2020). these conditions apply both ex ante, before the president adopts sanctions, and ex post, after the sanctions have been adopted. taken together, they make for a marked contrast with the canadian case. while the canadian parliament has meaningful, albeit limited, tools at its disposal to influence sanctions policy, it is unable to make full use of its powers; whereas the us congress has both important constitutional powers at its disposal and is willing to use those powers to put pressure on the executive to ensure that it acts in line with congressional priorities. 3.1 ex ante mechanisms ex ante, congress has the authority to legislate to empower the president to adopt sanctions or to amend existing delegations of authority in order to guide the direction of us sanctions policy moving forward. in addition, existing acts of congress contain various mechanisms that offer congress the ability to influence presidential decision-making. these include notice requirements, report-and-wait requirements, consultation requirements, certification requirements and, since the adoption of caatsa in 2017, also mandatory sanctions. notice requirements are clauses that mandate the president to notify congress about certain actions or decisions. for instance, under ieepa, the president must use a notice requirement when announcing a national emergency. this means that, before using any of the powers granted to them under ieepa to address any unusual and extraordinary threat, the president must declare a national emergency regarding such threat. the president does this through an executive order, such as the one adopted on march 16, 2014, the day that russian forces occupied crimea.25 the notice serves 20 international emergency economic powers act, pub. l. no. 95–223, title ii, 91 stat. 1626, enacted december 28, 1977. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/statute-91/statute-91-pg1625. 21 national emergencies act, pub. l. no. 94–412, 90 stat. 1255. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/statute-90/statute-90-pg1255. 22 ukraine freedom support act of 2014, pub. l. no. 113–272, 128 stat. 2952. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/plaw-113publ272. 23 countering america’s adversaries through sanctions act (caatsa), pub. l. no. 115–44, 131 stat. 886. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/plaw-115publ44. 24 ending importation of russian oil act, pub. l. no. 117–109, 136 stat. 1154–1158. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/plaw-117publ109. 25 executive order 13660, “blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in ukraine,” federal register 79, no. 46 (march 10, 2014): 13493–13496. accessed january 3, 2025. 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 several functions: it informs both the legislative branch and the public of what the national emergency is and outlines the president’s plan to activate specific statutory powers under ieepa. in the same order, the president then adopted the first sanctions package. a report-and-wait requirement requires the executive branch to inform congress of certain actions and then wait for a certain period before proceeding. this provision is meant to give congress time to examine and react to the proposed actions based on the information in the report. this method is used to ensure legislative supervision and feedback on important administrative decisions that could have widespread consequences. a clear example of a report-and-wait requirement is found in caatsa. section 216 of caatsa includes a provision about ending or relaxing sanctions that have been applied to russia. the president must send a report to the relevant congressional committees at least 30 days before taking any action to stop or ease the enforcement of such sanctions. this report must include a detailed explanation of the proposed action, the reasons for the action, and the expected impact of the action on the interests of the united states and its allies. a consultation requirement mandates that specific government officials, usually in the executive branch, must consult with designated parties—often members of congress, relevant committees, or other stakeholders—before taking certain actions. a consultation requirement differs from a reporting requirement in that it necessitates a two-way dialogue with congress, whereas the latter involves only one-way communication and does not obligate the president to await congressional input once the designated waiting period has ended. an example of a consultation requirement can be found in the international emergency economic powers act (ieepa), which requires the president to consult with congress before exercising any of the authorities it grants and to continue consulting regularly for as long as those authorities are being exercised.26 certification requirements in congressional statutes are mechanisms through which the executive branch must formally affirm compliance with specific conditions before proceeding with an action, such as the imposition of sanctions or the provision of assistance. for example, section 231 of caatsa requires the president to certify whether persons are knowingly engaging in significant transactions with the russian defence or intelligence sectors. the certification is a prerequisite for imposing sanctions. the statute specifies the criteria for what constitutes “significant transactions” and requires the president to use the certification process to engage with congress on potential sanctions decisions. this involves providing detailed information about the entities involved, the nature of the transactions, and the justification for imposing or waiving sanctions. mandatory sanctions are those that the president is legally required to impose when specific conditions set by congress are met. this approach differs from the usual practice where congress grants the president the authority to act but does not mandate action. long-standing statutes like ieepa provide the president with certain powers, with conditions to prevent abuse by an “imperial” presidency of the type described by arthur schlesinger in his abovementioned book. in such cases, congress defines the scope and limits of these powers. during the first trump administration, congress shifted to granting the president mandatory powers, compelling certain actions. caatsa specifically required the president to sanction individuals and entities involved in hostile activities such as cyberattacks, transactions with https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/03/10/2014-05323/blocking-property-of-certain-personscontributing-to-the-situation-in-ukraine. 26 50 u.s.c. § 1703(a). accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1703. 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 russian defence or intelligence sectors, support for syria, or corruption and human rights abuses.27 additionally, the president was required to identify and sanction sectors of the russian economy, including finance, defence, and energy.28 this necessitated a thorough examination of these sectors and the subsequent enforcement of rules and penalties. caatsa also established a review process to allow for the modification or adjustment of these sanctions. the introduction of mandatory delegations was deemed necessary in the face of president trump’s reluctance to impose sanctions on russian targets following alleged russian meddling in the 2016 us presidential election (daugirdas and mortenson 2017). when president trump did not impose sanctions, congress adopted caatsa with a 98-2 majority in the senate and a 419-3 majority in the house, thereby overriding a potential presidential veto against the act and ensuring that president trump would continue to adhere to existing us policy toward russia. while the shift from enabling powers to mandatory powers is politically significant, it comes with a qualifier: only the president is empowered to determine whether the conditions triggering the imposition of sanctions have been met. this explains why, despite their mandatory character, members of congress continue to lobby the executive branch to impose sanctions. for example, in march 2023, a number of republican members of congress “urged” then secretary of state blinken to “impose mandatory sanctions in response to the government of iran’s significant defense transactions with the russian federation” (committee on foreign affairs 2023). 3.2 ex post mechanisms in addition to ex ante mechanisms, ex post mechanisms also provide congress with opportunities to exercise control over us sanctions policy. relevant in particular are reporting requirements, joint resolutions of disapproval, and sunset clauses. a reporting requirement in a law is an instruction to the executive branch to regularly provide information to congress or other oversight bodies about how it follows, enforces, and achieves the goals of the law. these obligations ensure that congress has sufficient information to assess the executive’s past performance. an example of a reporting requirement is in ieepa, which states that the president must “immediately” send a report to congress with detailed information on what they do with the powers given to them by the act.29 one notable example of a reporting requirement in caatsa relates to russia and involves the obligation of the us department of the treasury to report on the possible consequences of extending sanctions to cover sovereign debt and derivative products. specifically, section 242 of caatsa requires the secretary of the treasury, in consultation with the director of national intelligence and the secretary of state, to submit a detailed report on the possible impacts of sanctioning russian sovereign debt and associated financial instruments within one year of the act’s enactment. this report, which was submitted to congress in february 2018, was meant to examine the possible effects of such sanctions on russia’s economy and on the economies of the united states and its allies (us department of the treasury 2024). joint resolutions of disapproval are legislative tools that congress can use to reverse specific actions, such as the waiving of sanctions. these resolutions need to be approved by both the house of representatives and the senate and then sent to the president for approval. if the president 27 sections 224, 225, and 226 of caatsa. 28 section 231 of caatsa. 29 50 usc 1703, (b). 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 rejects the resolution, congress can overrule the rejection with a two-thirds majority in both chambers. what sets joint resolutions of disapproval apart from normal legislation is their ability to bypass the usual legislative process. for example, caatsa contains provisions for congress to scrutinize any decisions by the president to remove or waive sanctions on russia.30 if the president wants to waive sanctions, he must submit a report explaining the reasons and the expected outcomes of this action. congress then has a fixed period (30 days in session) during which it can pass a joint resolution of disapproval to stop the waiver. a sunset clause in a law is a part that makes the law, or a part of it, expire unless the legislature takes action to extend or renew it. this way, laws are checked and updated for how well they work and fit over time. sunset clauses are often used for emergency, surveillance, and other fastchanging issues that need regular review and renewal. sunset clauses can be found, for example, in the fiscal year 2024 emergency supplemental appropriation.31 this act authorizes and, in some instances, requires the president to impose sanctions, but any sanctions adopted expire after a set amount of time, enabling congress to choose whether to extend, modify, or revoke them altogether.32 * * * this overview demonstrates how the us congress simultaneously grants the president important powers to adopt sanctions and endows itself with advanced tools to oversee and control the president as they wield those powers. this mix of extensive executive powers and strong accountability measures reflects the us constitutional design, where government branches operate independently and are subject to checks and balances. it stands in marked contrast to the canadian model, where mps face difficulties in exercising oversight over the executive’s sanctions policy, even though in canada, the executive’s powers are delegated to it by parliament as well. 4. the european union in the european union, sanctions or “restrictive measures” are generally adopted by the council of the european union on the basis of the eu’s competence to conduct a common foreign and security policy (cfsp).33 the council of the european union is the eu institution that represents the interests of member state executives in the eu legislative process. cfsp sanctions are adopted on the basis of article 29 of the treaty on european union (teu), which states that “[t]he council shall adopt decisions which shall define the approach of the union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature.” this is an open-ended provision, which grants the council considerable discretion in choosing the type of sanctions it introduces, provided that the high 30 section 216 of caatsa. 31 u.s. congress, h.r. 815 – making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending september 30, 2024, and for other purposes, 118th congress, 2nd session, pub. l. no. 118–50, april 24, 2024. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/815. 32 section 6(e) of the fiscal year 2024 emergency supplemental appropriation, h.r. 815 – making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending september 30, 2024, and for other purposes, 118th congress, 2nd session, pub. l. no. 118–50, april 24, 2024. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118thcongress/house-bill/815. 33 art. 24 of the treaty on european union (teu). the council of the european union (composed of national ministers) adopts legislation and coordinates policies, while the european council (composed of heads of state or government) sets the eu’s overall political direction and priorities. see respectively arts. 16 and 15 teu. accessed june 18, 2025. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=celex%3a12012m%2ftxt. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/815 https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/815 https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/815 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/?uri=celex%3a12012m%2ftxt 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy (the high representative) or a member state puts forward a proposal to do so.34 the arrangement differs from those encountered in the us and canada in that no second-tier delegation of decision-making powers by the legislature to the executive takes place. rather, the council adopts sanctions on the basis of the powers directly allocated to it by the eu treaties. the council can make a framework to guide future choices by adopting listing criteria. for example, article 3(1)(g) of the council decision that imposes sanctions on russian targets after russia invaded ukraine provides that the council can sanction the following: [l]eading businesspersons operating in russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them, or businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the government of the russian federation, which is responsible for the annexation of crimea and the destabilisation of ukraine.35 based on this definition, the council applies sanctions to persons that it deems to belong to this category. through this two-stage process, also used in horizontal sanction regimes such as the eu’s own magnitsky act targeting human rights offenders,36 the council seeks to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions by signalling beforehand the types of behaviours that are being targeted. at the same time, it also reduces the likelihood of further judicial annulments of sanctions (chachko 2019, 30). that said, the council does remain free to amend the listing criteria it has established. as a general rule, the council adopts cfsp sanctions by unanimity.37 it does so on a proposal by the high representative, by any member state, or by the high representative with the support of the european commission (the commission).38 as clara portela and others have described, the commission plays a growing role in the area of sanctions, both in formulating and in implementing sanctions (håkansson 2024; portela 2024;). it plays this role without any formal powers allocated to it by the treaties. when sanctions provide for the “interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries,”39 the council decision adopted on the basis of article 29 teu has to be supplemented by a council regulation based on article 215 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu). the council adopts this regulation by qualified majority vote (qmv) on a joint proposal by the high representative and the 34 art. 30(1) teu. 35 council of the european union. 2014. “council decision 2014/145/cfsp of 17 march 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of ukraine.” official journal of the european union 57 (l78): 16–21. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:l:2014:078:full. 36 council of the european union. 2020. “council decision (cfsp) 2020/1999 of 7 december 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses.” official journal of the european union 63(l410i): 13–19. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32020d1999 37 art. 31(1) teu. 38 art. 30(1) teu. 39 council of the european union. 2022. “council decision (cfsp) 2022/2332 of 28 november 2022 amending decision (cfsp) 2020/1999 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses.” official journal of the european union 65 (l308): 18–20. accessed june 23, 2025. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/html/?uri=celex:32022d2332. 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 commission. through this regulation, the eu implements sanctions initially introduced within the cfsp into the eu legal order. the implementation of all other sanctions is the responsibility of the high representative and the member states, which are under a legal obligation to take all the necessary steps to give effect to the sanctions adopted by the council.40 this is relevant, for example, for the adoption of travel bans, which need to be implemented by all twenty-seven member states (giumelli et al. 2022, 38). the european parliament does not have a direct say in the approval of sanctions, according to the treaties. this is different from the normal legislative process, which covers most of the eu’s legislative actions outside of the cfsp, where the european parliament and the council are colegislators based on a proposal from the commission.41 with regard to the abovementioned eu magnitsky act, the european parliament has expressed dissatisfaction at being excluded from the process of imposing sanctions under the act and has called for greater democratic oversight and an enhanced role for the parliament in proposing cases involving serious human rights violations.42 political science research points in a similar direction: while the parliament has tools at its disposal to influence the eu’s long-term foreign policy strategy, its involvement in the adoption of cfsp measures, including sanctions, is marginal (rosén and raube 2018, 78). national parliaments can have an indirect say in how the eu makes decisions on cfsp sanctions. unlike in other areas of eu policymaking, where national parliaments can formally assess compliance with the subsidiarity principle, they do not directly participate in the decision-making process to adopt cfsp sanctions.43 however, they can still attempt to indirectly influence the process by holding their national executives accountable in the european council and the council of the european union. the netherlands shows how national parliaments try to control the executive’s council actions. a lower chamber (tweede kamer) committee discusses the position of the dutch foreign minister before each council meeting, based on the agenda and report sent by the minister (huff 2015, 401, 403; tweede kamer der staten-generaal 2014). the chamber can also flag files as high priority, meaning it will follow the executive’s eu actions more closely on these files. while mechanisms such as these strengthen national parliaments’ positions vis-à-vis the executive, the ways that parliaments operate and behave are very different among member states. for example, a study published in 2015 reported that the polish, french, and italian parliaments do not have any ex ante control powers similar to those held by the dutch parliament; their scrutiny is limited to ex post interventions such as parliamentary questions, reports, or inquiries (huff 2015, 401). currently, eu law does not set any minimum standards for how much and how well national parliaments should be able to oversee the national executive’s actions within the european council and council of the eu (cotter 2022; verellen 2022). the idea of introducing such standards was discussed at the start of the millennium’s constitutional convention, but it was ultimately rejected due to concerns about interfering too much in domestic constitutional matters (european 40 art. 26(3) teu. 41 art. 294 tfeu. 42 european parliament. “point 12 of the european parliament resolution of 8 july 2021 on the eu global human rights sanctions regime (eu magnitsky act) (2021/2563(rsp)).” accessed june 23, 2025. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/ta-9-2021-0349_en.html. 43 see protocol (no 1) on the role of national parliaments in the european union, official journal of the european union 47 (c310), p. 204. accessed june 23, 2025. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/?uri=celex:12004v/pro/01. 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 convention 2002). as a consequence, there is no guarantee that member state executives are held accountable at the national level for the positions they defend within the council. this holds true also for the adoption of sanctions, with there being no certainty that national parliaments have an influence on the views taken by their executives within the council when it agrees on sanctions. therefore, parliaments have little control over cfsp sanctions policy. they do not participate directly in the decision-making or termination of cfsp sanctions; they also do not have any legal rights to affect the cfsp sanctions policy process indirectly, making their influence uneven across member states. for its part, the european parliament can only adopt resolutions.44 other powers that the european parliament has, such as its power to oversee the eu budget, do not provide it with significant influence over cfsp sanctions, as sanctions do not require any major spending.45 however, the eu does not only rely on cfsp sanctions when it wants to impose sanctions on other countries or individuals. in the last few years, the eu legislature, made up of parliament and council, has passed a series of acts that grant the commission powers to limit trade flows between the eu and certain third countries (lonardo and szép 2023; schaupp 2023; verellen and hofer 2023; ville et al. 2023;). most of these instruments have been introduced based on the eu’s common commercial policy (ccp) competence, rather than its cfsp competence. due to this difference in legal basis, parliament and council played a full role in shaping the legislation. the anti-coercion instrument (aci) is worth mentioning in this regard.46 adopted in 2023, it had not yet been used by mid-2025. it lets council and commission react to “economic coercion” aimed at eu institutions or eu member states. the aci allows for various measures to counter specific coercive actions. these could include tariffs, quotas, or other trade restrictions. instruments such as the aci more closely resemble the setup encountered in canada and the us, where the legislature (european parliament and council) delegates powers to the executive (the european commission). exercise of the powers under the aci are subject to significant constraints as well. in particular, the procedure to adopt measures under the aci consists of two steps. upon a request by the commission, the council must determine by means of a qualified majority vote that the eu or a member state is indeed a victim of “economic coercion” by a third country.47 in a second step, the commission may adopt measures only if a qualified majority of member states opposes them.48 yet in one crucial respect these constraints diverge from the principal-agent model encountered in canada and the us. while in canada and the us the legislature, consisting of two houses, grants both houses instruments to control the executive, under the aci the eu’s bicameral legislature consisting of council and european parliament grants such instruments only to one chamber, the council, while the other chamber, the parliament, lacks equivalent powers. ultimately, these 44 see rule 143 of the rules of procedure of the european parliament, 9th parliamentary term december 2019. accessed january 3, 2025 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/rules-9-2019-07-02-rule143_en.html. 45 art. 314 tfeu. 46 european parliament and council of the european union. “regulation (eu) 2023/2675 of the european parliament and of the council of 22 november 2023 on the protection of the union and its member states from economic coercion by third countries.” official journal of the european union l 2023/2675: 1–23. https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:l_202302675. while the aci pursues security objectives, other instruments pursue sustainability objectives or aim to level the economic playing field by offsetting the impact of subsidies, as is the case, respectively, for the deforestation regulation and the foreign subsidies regulation. 47 art. 5 of the aci. 48 art. 8 of the aci. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/rules-9-2019-07-02-rule-143_en.html https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/rules-9-2019-07-02-rule-143_en.html 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 control mechanisms are perhaps best understood as devices to protect the autonomy of member states, rather than as instruments to enhance democratic oversight (schütze 2011, 692). it is no coincidence that the eu institution that represents member state interests is granted the power to establish the existence of economic coercion (schaupp 2023, 7–8). even when taking into account the emergence of a sanctions practice outside of the context of the cfsp, the field of sanctions policy in the european union remains subject to comparatively weak democratic oversight. parliaments play a relatively small role in the eu’s cfsp sanctions practice; while the european parliament acts as co-legislator with the council in the adoption of ccp sanctions instruments such as the anti-coercion instrument, its ability to exercise oversight over how the commission wields its new sanctions powers remains limited. 5. comparative reflections this article investigated the role that parliaments play in sanctions policy in canada, the us, and the eu, testing the hypothesis that their role in this area is often characterized by an important degree of deference to the executive. examining the legal frameworks for sanctions in canada, the us, and the eu shows different approaches and levels of democratic oversight, leading to the conclusion that this hypothesis is only partially correct. canada and the us have comparatively strong constitutional frameworks that could provide their parliaments with meaningful influence over sanctions policies, both in the shaping of sanction regimes and in the adoption of individual sanctions. in these two jurisdictions, parliaments can adopt legislation governing sanctions; they can delegate decision-making powers to the executive, while retaining mechanisms to monitor and oversee the use of those powers. in addition, parliaments in canada and the us have other accountability instruments at their disposal, including the power to request information, ask questions to the executive, or adopt motions or reports. taken together, these instruments could grant parliaments significant influence. however, the extent to which this influence can be exercised differs significantly between the two systems. in canada, parliament can formally check and cancel sanctions, but it hardly ever does. instead, its involvement remains limited to legislating and, to a limited extent, conducting ex post scrutiny through parliamentary questions, investigations, and reports. this gap between what the parliament can do and what it actually does highlights its passive role—one that could be strengthened to ensure greater involvement in foreign policy and sanctions, beyond the confidence convention that keeps the government in power as long as it maintains the support of the house of commons. as discussed, canadian mps perceive other westminster parliaments, particularly the uk parliament, as having a more robust position in relation to the executive. as mentioned earlier, this perception is supported by empirical evidence indicating that the uk parliament is significantly more influential than commonly believed (russell and cowley 2016). this indicates that there is no inherent characteristic of the westminster model of parliamentary democracy that inhibits parliamentarians from assuming a more independent and active role. in contrast, the united states exemplifies an assertive use of legislative authority, where congress not only frames the legal basis for sanctions but also actively monitors and sometimes dictates the terms of their adoption through various mechanisms, such as reporting and certification requirements, as well as opportunities to override decisions taken by the president through the adoption of joint resolutions of disapproval. this approach underscores a dynamic interplay 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 between congress and the executive that reflects the greater distance between the branches of the us government as compared to the canadian parliament and federal government. in the us presidential system, more formal constraints on the executive are needed to safeguard democratic control, as congress cannot remove a sitting president in the same way that canada’s parliament can bring down a government through a vote of no confidence. yet the analysis also demonstrated that the influence of congress should not be overestimated. while congress can mandate sanctions, as in caasta, the president alone assesses whether the conditions for doing so are met. the president’s ability to act quickly often outpaces congress, which faces collective action problems and a policy of deference from federal courts. this places the president at an advantage vis-à-vis congress, despite the latter’s formal powers (verellen 2023b). nevertheless, compared to canada and the eu, the us legislature is notably assertive, illustrating the potential active role parliaments can play in sanctions policy. the european union presents a distinct model, in which sanctions policy is almost exclusively managed by the executive branches of the member states as represented in the council, while the european commission plays an increasingly significant role in both formulating and implementing sanctions. the european parliament’s limited role both in the adoption of and oversight over the implementation of sanctions is a point of contention that reflects broader debates about democratic legitimacy and oversight within the cfsp, as well as eu policymaking more generally. unlike the legislative bodies in canada and the us, the european parliament lacks direct influence over the formulation and application of sanctions, which are crucial areas of foreign policy. even under sanction regimes introduced outside of the cfsp context, such as the anti-coercion instrument, the european parliament’s role remains limited to the adoption of framework legislation and does not extend to democratic oversight over individual sanction decisions. moreover, the ability of national parliaments to influence eu sanctions policy cannot be taken for granted. as previously discussed, many member state parliaments have limited capacity to scrutinize their national executives. additionally, the influence of each parliament that effectively reviews its executive is constrained by the weight of its respective member state in the council. the eu’s approach raises important questions about the design of international governance structures and their capacity to uphold democratic principles. enhancing the role of the european parliament by amending the eu treaties could serve to increase the democratic legitimacy of the eu’s sanctions policy. at the same time, absent treaty changes, both the european parliament and national parliaments could already do more to hold the executive accountable. national parliaments, in particular, have a key role to play given the european parliament’s minor role within the cfsp. although challenges exist, practices in the netherlands illustrate that parliaments can implement measures to improve oversight of their executive’s actions within the council. 6. conclusion this analysis of sanctions policy across canada, the united states, and the european union highlights the distinct mechanisms of democratic oversight within each system. it underscores the crucial role of legislative involvement in ensuring democratic accountability, including in matters of foreign affairs such as sanctions policy. while the interplay between legislative bodies and executive powers varies across these jurisdictions, this research reveals a common imperative: the need for robust mechanisms that enable effective oversight and active participation in foreign policy, including the development and implementation of sanctions. 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 in canada, the legislative framework allows for parliamentary scrutiny, though it is seldom exercised to its full potential. the united states shows a more dynamic interaction, where congress more frequently exercises its powers to shape, review, and sometimes constrain executive actions through detailed legislative mechanisms. meanwhile, the european union’s model, dominated by the council with limited input from the european parliament and the member state parliaments, presents challenges for democratic accountability, suggesting areas for potential reform to enhance the role of the european parliament and the national parliaments. this comparative analysis brings to light the varying degrees to which these democracies manage the tension between swift executive action needed in foreign policy and the democratic imperative of legislative oversight. each system has strengths and potential vulnerabilities that can inform future reforms aimed at balancing efficiency with accountability. by fostering greater legislative engagement and refining oversight mechanisms, these jurisdictions can enhance the democratic legitimacy of their sanctions policies and ensure they reflect not only executive priorities but also the will of their broader political communities. this balance is essential for maintaining public trust and upholding the principles of representative democracy, which all three systems are constitutionally required to support in both domestic and foreign policy. 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 references beaud, olivier. 2007. théorie de la fédération [theory of a federation]. presses universitaires de france puf. boehm, peter m., and peter harder. 2023. strengthening canada’s autonomous sanctions architecture: five-year legislative review of the sergei magnitsky law and the special economic measures act. report of the senate standing committee on foreign affairs and international trade. https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/aefa/reports/semaandmagnitsky_fina l_10report_e.pdf. bono, giovanna. 2006. “challenges of democratic oversight of eu security policies.” european security 15 (4): 431–49. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662830701306037. bradley, curtis a. 2021. “reassessing the legislative veto: the statutory president, foreign affairs, and congressional workarounds.” journal of legal analysis, 439–99. https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laab008. brewster, murray. 2024. “house foreign affairs committee to probe decision to waive sanctions on russian titanium.” cbc news. may 2, 2024. accessed june 9, 2025. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/house-foriegn-affairs-probe-titanium-sanctions-waiver1.7191300. calabresi, steven g., and christopher s. yoo. 2008. the unitary executive: presidential power from washington to bush. yale university press. cbc news. 2024. “ndp pushing liberals to recognize state of palestine as u.k., u.s. signal openness.” february 13, 2024. accessed june 9, 2025. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ndp-liberals-palestine-state-1.7114022. chachko, elena. 2019. “foreign affairs in court: lessons from cjeu targeted sanctions jurisprudence.” yale journal of international law 44 (1): 1–52. accessed june 18, 2025. https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/6730/chachko_2.pdf?sequenc e=2. cherpako, danielle. 2022. “a review of canada’s use of autonomous sanctions under the special economic measures act (sema) and the justice for victims of corrupt foreign officials act (jvcfoa) between 2017-202.” ma thesis, university of manitoba. accessed june 18, 2025. https://mspace.lib.umanitoba.ca/server/api/core/bitstreams/1558e06a-7afc-4533b121-e2ad0dbc70c4/content. cotter, john. 2022. “to everything there is a season: instrumentalising article 10 teu to exclude undemocratic member state representatives from the european council and the council.” european law review 47 (1): 69–84. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4032080. daugirdas, kristina, and julian davis mortenson. 2017. “congress enacts sanctions legislation targeting russia.” american journal of international law 111 (4): 1015–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2017.75. drezner, daniel w. 2020. “immature leadership: donald trump and the american presidency.” international affairs 96 (2): 383–400. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa009. https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laab008 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 elsuwege, peter van, and viktor szép. 2023. “the revival of transatlantic partnership? eu-us coordination in sanctions policy.” in the routledge handbook of transatlantic relations, edited by elaine fahey, 81–95. routledge. european convention. 2002. rapport final du groupe de travail iv «le rôle des parlements nationaux» [final report of working group iv 'the role of national parliaments]. conv 353/02 – wg iv 17. brussels. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2013/7/31/d5100a2f-55b3-4254-a06cd2479101c800/publishable_fr.pdf. fisher, louis. 2011. “the law: john yoo and the republic.” presidential studies quarterly 41 (1): 177–91. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23884761. giumelli, francesco, willem geelhoed, max de vries, and aurora molesini. 2022. “united in diversity? a study on the implementation of sanctions in the european union.” politics and governance 10 (1): 36–46. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i1.4702. goldsmith, jack. 2017. “our non-unitary executive.” lawfare. july 30, 2017. accessed june 9, 2025. https://www.lawfareblog.com/our-non-unitary-executive. håkansson, calle. 2024. “the ukraine war and the emergence of the european commission as a geopolitical actor.” journal of european integration 46 (1): 25–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2239998. henkin, louis. 1996. foreign affairs and the united states constitution. 2nd ed. oxford university press. huff, ariella. 2015. “executive privilege reaffirmed? parliamentary scrutiny of the cfsp and csdp.” west european politics 38 (2): 396–415. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.990697. joly, mélanie. 2023. “government response to the tenth report of the senate standing committee on foreign affairs and international trade entitled, ‘strengthening canada’s autonomous sanctions architecture: five-year legislative review of the sergei magnitsky law and the special economic measures.’” october 13 2023. accessed june 9, 2025. https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/aefa/reports/aefa_ss3_govres_10thr eport_e.pdf. ———. 2024. “government response to the to the twenty-third report of the house of commons standing committee on foreign affairs and international development, entitled ‘canada’s sanctions regime: transparency, accountability and effectiveness.’” may 30 2024. accessed june 9, 2025. https://www.ourcommons.ca/documentviewer/en/441/faae/report-23/response-8512-441-378. koh, harold hongju. 1988. “why the president (almost) always wins in foreign affairs: lessons of the iran-contra affair.” the yale law journal 97 (7): 1255–1342. https://doi.org/10.2307/796442. kovacs, kathryn e. 2020. “constraining the statutory president.” washington university law review 98 (1): 63–122. accessed june 18, 2025. https://journals.library.wustl.edu/lawreview/article/4440/galley/21273/view/. 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 kruse, kevin m., and julian e. zelizer. 2019. “opinion | have we had enough of the imperial presidency yet?” the new york times, january 9, 2019. accessed june 9, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/09/opinion/president-trump-border-wall-weak.html. larsen, signe rehling. 2021. the constitutional theory of the federation and the european union. oxford university press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859260.001.0001. lilly, meredith, and delaram arabi. 2020. “symbolic act, real consequences: passing canada’s magnitsky law to combat human rights violations and corruption.” international journal 75 (2): 163–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020934504. lonardo, luigi. 2023. “challenging eu sanctions against russia: the role of the court, judicial protection, and common foreign and security policy.” cambridge yearbook of european legal studies:1–24. https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2023.11. lonardo, luigi, and viktor szép. 2023. “the use of sanctions to achieve eu strategic autonomy: restrictive measures, the blocking statute and the anti-coercion instrument.” european constitutional law review 28 (4): 363–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1574019618000329. marland, alexander j. 2020. whipped: party discipline in canada. ubc press. mclachlan, campbell. 2014. foreign relations law. cambridge university press. mello, patrick a., and dirk peters. 2018. “parliaments in security policy: involvement, politicisation, and influence.” the british journal of politics and international relations 20 (1): 3–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117745684. mortenson, julian davis. 2019. “article ii vests the executive power, not the royal prerogative.” columbia law review 119 (5): 1169–1272. accessed june 10, 2025. https://columbialawreview.org/content/article-ii-vests-the-executive-power-not-the-royalprerogative/ mulder, nicholas. 2022. the economic weapon: the rise of sanctions as a tool of modern war. yale university press. nossal, kim richard, stéphane roussel, and stéphane paquin. 2015. the politics of canadian foreign policy. 4th edition. mcgill-queen’s university press. peters, dirk, wolfgang wagner, and nicole deitelhoff (eds.). 2008. the parliamentary control of european security policy. arena report no. 7/08, recon report no. 6. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/forskning/publikasjoner/arenapublikasjoner/rapporter/2008/arenareport0708_online.pdf. portela, clara. 2024. “sanctions and the geopolitical commission: the war over ukraine and the transformation of eu governance.” european papers a journal on law and integration 2023 8 (3): 1125–30. https://doi.org/10.15166/2499-8249/706. posner, eric a., and adrian vermeule. 2011. the executive unbound: after the madisonian republic. oxford university press. rosén, guri, and kolja raube. 2018. “influence beyond formal powers: the parliamentarisation of european union security policy.” the british journal of politics and international relations 20 (1): 69–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117747105. 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 russell, meg, and philip cowley. 2016. “the policy power of the westminster parliament: the ‘parliamentary state’ and the empirical evidence.” governance 29 (1): 121–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12149. savoie, donald j. 2008. court government and the collapse of accountability in canada and the united kingdom. university of toronto press. schaupp, lukas sebastian. 2023. “the eu’s anti coercion instrument between eu strategic autonomy and member state sovereignty.” working paper. european university institute. accessed june 10, 2025. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/76168. schlesinger, arthur meier. 1973. the imperial presidency. houghton mifflin harcourt. schütze, robert. 2011. “‘delegated’ legislation in the (new) european union: a constitutional analysis.” the modern law review 74 (5): 661–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14682230.2011.00866.x. smith, david e. 1995. the invisible crown: the first principle of canadian government. university of toronto press. standing committee on foreign affairs and international development. 2023. the russian state’s illegal war of aggression against ukraine. house of commons canada. ———. 2024. canada’s sanctions regime: transparency, accountability and effectiveness. house of commons canada. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.ourcommons.ca/content/committee/441/faae/reports/rp12803021/faaerp 23/faaerp23-e.pdf. tama, jordan. 2020. bipartisanship and us foreign policy: cooperation in a polarized age. oxford university press. ———. 2024. “forcing the president's hand: how the us congress shapes foreign policy through sanctions legislation.” foreign policy analysis 16 (3): 397–417. https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz018. tasker, john paul. 2024. “government’s endorsement of amended palestinian statehood motion wins praise, draws outrage.” cbc news, march 19 2024. accessed june 9, 2025. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberal-government-palestinian-statehood-motion1.7148387. thym, daniel. 2008. “parliamentary involvement in european international relations’. in eu foreign relations law: constitutional fundamentals, edited by marise cremona and bruno de witte, 201–32. hart publishing. ———. 2011. holding europe’s cfsp/csdp executive to account in the age of the lisbon treaty. fundación universidad san pablo ceu. tonra, ben. 2011. “democratic foundations of eu foreign policy: narratives and the myth of eu exceptionalism.” journal of european public policy 18 (8): 1190–1207. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.615209. tweede kamer der staten-generaal. 2014. “europese besluitvorming in de tweede kamer” [european decision-making in the house of representatives]. https://www.tweedekamer.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/brochure_europese_besluitvor ming.pdf. 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 united states house committee on foreign affairs. 2023. “mccaul, wilson, kean urge mandatory sanctions against russia-iran amid significant defense transactions.” march 29, 2023. accessed june 9, 2025. https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaulwilson-kean-urge-mandatory-sanctions-against-russia-iran-amid-significant-defensetransactions/. united states department of the treasury. 2024. “treasury releases caatsa reports, including on senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the russian federation.” may 10, 2024. accessed june 9, 2025. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0271. vara, juan santos, and soledad rodríguez sánchez-tabernero. 2018. the democratisation of eu international relations through eu law. routledge. verellen, thomas. 2022. “hungary’s lesson for europe.” verfassungsblog. april 8, 2022. accessed june 9, 2025. https://verfassungsblog.de/hungarys-lesson-for-europe/. ———. 2023a. foreign relations federalism. the eu in comparative perspective. oxford university press. ———. 2023b. “imperial presidency versus fragmented executive? unilateral trade measures and executive accountability in the european union and the united states.” german law journal 24 (7): 1127–45. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.80. ———. 2024. “democratische controle over het gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid van de eu: een verkenning.” [democratic control over the common foreign and security policy of the eu: an exploration] sew: tijdschrift voor europees en economisch recht 65: 206–17. accessed june 18, 2025. https://www.recht.nl/vakliteratuur/europa/aflevering/38445/sew-tijdschrift-voor-europeesen-economisch-recht/2024/5#a575032. verellen, thomas, and alexandra hofer. 2023. “the unilateral turn in eu trade and investment policy.” european foreign affairs review 28 (special issue): 1–14. https://doiorg.utrechtuniversity.idm.oclc.org/10.54648/eerr2023011 ville, ferdi de, simon happersberger, and harri kalimo. 2023. “the unilateral turn in eu trade policy? the origins and characteristics of the eu’s new trade instruments.” european foreign affairs review 28 (special issue): 15–34. https://doiorg.utrechtuniversity.idm.oclc.org/10.54648/eerr2023012 wessel, ramses a. 2018. “legal aspects of parliamentary oversight in eu foreign and security policy.” in vara, juan santos, and soledad rodríguez sánchez-tabernero (eds.). the democratisation of eu international relations through eu law, 15-34. routledge. whang, taehee. 2011. “playing to the home crowd? symbolic use of economic sanctions in the united states.” international studies quarterly 55 (3): 787–801. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00668.x. yoo, john. 2010. crisis and command: a history of executive power from george washington to george w. bush. kaplan publishing. 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 interviews interview with mp, member of the new democratic party. conducted via microsoft teams. april 22, 2024. interview with mp, member of the conservative party of canada. conducted via microsoft teams. may 9, 2024. interview with mp, member of the liberal party of canada. conducted via microsoft teams. april 24, 2024. 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 1-25 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 the mtkvari river’s many faces: symbolism, space, and agency in late imperial tiflis1 jeff sahadeo, carleton university2 paul gosselin, carleton university3 abstract the mtkvari (kura) river framed urban life in tiflis (contemporary tbilisi) under tsarist rule in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. this paper examines how the river acted as a symbol of an evolving georgian nation and played critical roles in local society and culture. flowing through the middle of tiflis, the mtkvari, its banks, and the infrastructure built to accommodate it affected all city residents, albeit unequally. they drank its water, used it for local food supplies and entertainment, and dealt with its strong currents and frequent floods. the river acted as an agent alongside human efforts to control and transform it. unlike elsewhere in the tsarist and european empires, efforts to modernize riverine life in tiflis stalled. the reclamation of the mtkvari’s legacy takes a step towards recognizing urban (in)equality and the multiethnic nature of late imperial tiflis, where the roots of soviet and independence-era projects were envisioned if not enacted. 1 the social sciences and humanities research council of canada provided funding for this project. the authors thank ketevan gurchiani, ana lolua, paul manning, tamar qeburia, mariam urdia and kuttusi zorlu for their insights. khatuna chomakhidze and tea uchaneishvili provided georgian language instruction. we also thank the anonymous peer reviewers and the staff at the canadian journal of european and russian studies. 2 jeff sahadeo is a professor at the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies and the department of political science at carleton university. 3 paul gosselin is an ma graduate from carleton university's institute of european, russian and eurasian affairs. 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 the mtkvari river defined tiflis. the city rose on both sides of its banks. crowds gathered on its shore to fish, swim, drink, fight, or pray, mingling with the porters (metulukcheebi) who hauled river water in sacks citywide. tiflis residents crossed and congregated along the multiple bridges traversing the mtkvari to shop, stop to see or be seen—careful to avoid constant cart traffic—and watch the river’s current carry massive timber rafts as well as boats, swimmers, and animals. the mtkvari’s flow, whirlpools and steep drops challenged those who set out on it, even when it was not overflowing its banks and flooding low-lying neighbourhoods. this combination of importance and peril made the river central not only to residents’ daily lives but also to the symbology of a multiethnic city and a georgian nation. it shaped the nature of local and imperial control over the seat of the caucasus viceroyalty in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. tsarist tiflis remains, in many ways, a lost city, buried by soviet-era reconstruction (manning 2019). the mtkvari (in georgian—in russian and most western languages, it was known as the kura) was entombed from the 1930s by concrete embankments. stalinist-era urban plans and population politics radically altered the city, officially renamed tbilisi, a decade-plus after bolshevik armed forces ended georgia’s independence (1918–21). soviet designs, focused away from the river, transformed not just the landscape, but also memories. lost has been a vibrant, multiethnic imperial city that showcased the relationship between human and non-human agency. centring the mtkvari allows new ways of seeing the evolution of tiflis, as well as broader interactions between humans and nature in the caucasus, the russian empire, and beyond. as dorothy zeisler-vralsted (2014, 8) wrote: “when the river becomes an organizing theme, a new history evolves.” this article argues that the mtkvari played three critical functions in urban life in the last decades of tsarist rule. first, it acted as a symbol, touching on the nature of nation and empire, and interrogating the city’s place in contemporary narratives of ‘west’ vs. ‘east.’ the mtkvari linked the region to greco-roman antiquity, when it was known as the cyrus, as well as to the ‘east,’ from where persian and mongol conquerors invaded along the river. the aesthetic as well as historic value of the conquered river basin, separating tiflis’ soaring hills, reinforced the beauty and power of the tsarist empire. the river subsequently emerged as a georgian waterway, at a time when national ideas were coalescing. the mtkvari, finally, provided a living symbol of the extent and limits of tsarist modernization in the caucasus. the mtkvari river, second, acted in space: at the geographic centre of tiflis, it anchored daily life. as a material resource, the river’s water nourished the city. water was used not only for drinking and washing but also to cultivate the island and other gardens that fed tiflis and provided it with shade and entertainment. it powered flour and sawmills and provided fish. tiflis residents feasted on riverboats and at riverside taverns or island restaurants. water sustained the animals that were the foundation of local trade and transport. relationships to the river generated and reflected urban social hierarchies. third, the mtkvari was an actor. rivers are, by nature, fugitive resources, “inevitably unpredictable and often unmanageable” (breyfogle 2023, 9). tiflis residents attributed human qualities to the mtkvari, from its mood to its sounds as it roared through the city. we can debate whether to endow the river with inorganic agency or something more akin to human agency, but its power awed residents and was a defining feature of imperial tiflis. even as efforts to bend bodies of water towards human needs proliferated in the nineteenth century, across the russian empire as well as globally, tiflis proved an oddity. residents and newspapers 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 questioned why the city and vice-royal governments refused to construct concrete embankments to prevent damaging spring floods, decades after such structures had been built in st. petersburg (iveria, may 13, 1893). even as massive canal-building projects engulfed areas of tsarist central asia, the tiflis city administration seemed incompetent in delivering piped water to a city bisected by the mtkvari, with its tributaries flowing through different tiflis neighbourhoods (peterson 2019). this article provides pathways to consider the power of place and local societies in tsarist modernization. tiflis, if a lost city, is on its way to rediscovery. paul manning (2019) has noted the natural environment’s importance in the late imperial era. manning argues that gardens—including those on madatov and ortchala islands, eliminated as part of soviet reconstruction—allowed space for a georgian national literary identity, away from imperial regime narratives. hubertus jahn (2014) has written about the 1867 erection of a riverside statue of tsarist viceroy mikhail vorontsov as a moment to underscore a new european public culture in tiflis through its connection to russia. manning and shatirishvili (2011) have highlighted the importance of urban social distinctions, ones that will be implicated here through relationships with the mtkvari. water, as a resource, demands local management (fagan 2011). in tiflis, the city administration (gorodskaia uprava) and city assembly (gorodskaia duma) continually debated how to handle the river. residents viewed their actions as far from satisfactory; even bridge projects stemmed from private initiative and funding as much as state action. even as rivers extended empires through facilitating economic exploitation—particularly before the arrival of railways—their usage can be dictated by the quotidian needs of those who interact with it as well as the river’s character (reid 2021). water and rivers have become important subjects of inquiry in tsarist history. rivers shaped cities, as well as the reverse. the neva, randall dills (2010, ii) argues, was st. petersburg’s “lifeblood” and defining cultural feature. rivers linked cultural and economic identities. zeisler-vralsted (2008) argues that the volga represented both freedom and oppression to the cossacks who depended on its water. ilia repin’s image of volga boat haulers offers an iconic portrayal of nineteenth-century russian inequality. the economic utility as well as aesthetic beauty of rivers inculcated them into the idea of the ‘russian soul.’ across the empire, water could be “endowed with sacred and transformative properties,” write jane costlow and arja rosenholm (2017, 4). peterson (2019) has argued that efforts to control water exposed the nature of imperial control— both the colonizer’s power and the agency of the colonized. this article uses the mtkvari, its banks, and infrastructure to examine urban, cultural, social, and other processes in tiflis, focusing on tsarism’s last decades. the river runs from turkey to major cities of western georgia, including gori, to tiflis, then passes to eastern georgia and through azerbaijan before emptying into the caspian sea. sources consulted include travel diaries in english, french, german, and russian; tiflis-based german, russian, and georgian language newspapers; documents from the central historical archive of georgia [sakartvelos tsent'raluri saist'orio arkivi]; and secondary material. the first sections will concentrate on efforts to develop the mtkvari as a georgian and an imperial symbol to harness the river’s power into ideas. the article then moves to daily interactions with the river, as it powered the local economy and centred its culture. major 1890s floods constitute the next section as residents seek to attenuate the river’s impact on tiflis even as its powerful current offers a new opportunity—that of hydropower, which was envisaged in late tsarist tiflis but only realized in the soviet union. 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 the mtkvari as symbol the mtkvari river connected tiflis and georgia in an emerging national imagination. nineteenthcentury georgian literary culture employed rivers as geographic referents to anchor georgians as a people within the empire. the mtkvari held a unique place within this symbolic geography. georgian aristocrats who entered tsarist service in the early nineteenth century but eschewed education in russia became known as the mtkvardaleulni4 (‘those who drank the water of the mtkvari’) (suny 1994, 125–6). they tethered themselves to the river of their homeland—flowing within georgia and through tiflis, now seen as both a georgian and imperial capital city. nineteenth-century tiflis was dominated not only by russian imperial bureaucrats but also an armenian bourgeoisie. a minority—about 30 percent of the urban population—and often seen as an underclass, georgians nonetheless considered tiflis the ‘mother of cities,’ the seat of georgian history and heritage (suny 2009, 17). now a symbol of the georgian homeland, coursing through the heart of a nation and its capital, the mtkvari threaded the national body. the mtkvari anchored a growing awareness of nationality throughout the late imperial period. manning notes how one georgian journalist, writing pseudonymously as s. bavreli, emphasized the mtkvari’s georgianness in proclaiming his love for a river “devoted to the fatherland” (quoted in manning 2012, 256). bavreli followed the mtkvari across georgia, circumscribing the localness of his experiences. even as the river entered ottoman lands, he considered it, in manning’s words, “a patriotic georgian, who refuses to go abroad…a river that flows through georgia alone” (manning 2012, 256). centuries-old ruins dotting the mtkvari basin tied adjacent regions to the ostensibly glorious twelfth-century reign of tamar mepe (king tamar), when all georgian lands were united. trekking upriver in the 1860s–70s into ottoman lands (much of which was conquered by tsarist forces in the 1877–78 russo-turkish war), georgian writers enthusiastically, if often dubiously, asserted an ancient georgian provenance of stone bridges, fortresses, and churches as proof of these lands’ historic national ties (manning 2012, 262, 265; memmedli 2018, 245, 251– 2). the mtkvari was a symbolic cradle of nationality, but also a source of destruction that frustrated efforts to unearth the extent of this riverine nation. the river’s rapid current and unpredictable nature, along with that of its tributaries and lakes, had submerged many ‘georgian’ structures over the centuries (memmedli 2018, 251-2). european travel writers viewed the older, roman-era ruins along the mtkvari as a symbol connecting the region to europe. their narratives offered a civilizational arc stretching from roman antiquity to the russian imperial present, with an understanding that these were georgian lands. the mtkvari again reared its janus-faced head as a source of livelihood and threat. the river, for centuries, acted as a trade route, with towers placed along sloped banks near large bends and gorges, where it was convenient to stop merchant ships and levy duties (markov 1887, 123). these same towers, however, attested to the river’s treacherous role as an invasion route for foreign conquerors and solidified an impression of georgians as a martial, fighting people (hahn 1892, 26–7; merzbacher 1901, 1:925). 4 a subsequent generation of georgian intellectuals who pursued an education in russia in the 1850s dubbed themselves the tergdaleulni (“those who drank the water of the tergi” [terek, another major river along georgia’s northern frontier]) (andronikashvili 2021, 138). they evolved as a self-conscious, more progressive foil to the mtkvardaleulni. 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 within tiflis, the unfolding of daily life and culture along the mtkvari further accentuated the river’s role as an anchor for a bourgeoning city and georgian identity. the river acted as tiflis’ “main architectural axis” through which the town could be read (kardava 2013, 174). its main buildings surrounded the river—especially at the turn of the nineteenth century, when the town was more diminutive in scale and ravaged by a 1795 persian invasion (kardava 2013, 174). tsarist urban development focused on tiflis’ right bank, with newer districts and broad tree-lined streets flowing outwards from existing terraced mansions perched on steep cliffs towering above the river (koch 1843, 332; merzbacher 1901, 1: 938). the left bank gained a reputation as an ‘old town’ of half-earthen ‘saklis’ [georgian for ‘house’] and persian bazaars stretching below on flat plains (hahn 1924, 13). the river also linked urban spaces considered focal points of local identity and culture. bridges connected tiflis residents to gardens, watered by the mtkvari, on either side, as well as other sites of leisure and work. bathhouses in the old persian district along the river were a popular draw for the average “tifliser.” german botanist karl koch, visiting in the late 1830s, noted workers’ enthusiasm for attending baths, their hard-earned wages spent as soon as they could afford the entrance fee (koch 1843, 322-3). across the river, a capillary ran from the mtkvari up the hills of sololaki to water the botanical gardens nestled amidst ruins of hilltop castles. with wine shops at their entrance, the gardens hosted parties of song, dance, and storytelling, one of many river-connected sites that encouraged european stereotypes of tiflis georgians as a people fond of leisure and entertainment but loathe to work (freshfield 1869, 105; hahn 1924, 15; markov 1887, 311; merzbacher 1901, 1: 956). religious life in tiflis revolved around the mtkvari. its banks acted as a ritual site for georgian and armenian celebrations of christmas and the epiphany, a symbolic re-enactment of the jordan river where john the baptist purified believers (gurchiani 2023, 26).5 koch and alexandre dumas wrote detailed accounts of epiphany celebrations, which attracted people from across the region. on the day of the celebration, clerics and officials proceeded from morning mass at riverside churches to the mtkvari’s banks. the metropolitan blessed the river’s waters, dipping the altar cross and church banners into it (dumas 2002, 328; koch 1843, 319). “despite the cold,” wrote dumas (2002, 328), who witnessed the ceremony in 1859, “all of tiflis went, descending from the heights and rolling like a colorful avalanche towards the koura.” a gun salute from tiflis’ garrison marked the moment when the metropolitan completed the blessing of the river. a loud “hurrah!” roared from the congregation. brave congregants leapt into the icy river to absolve their sins; timid ones rode in on horseback (dumas 2002, 328). still larger throngs of believers rushed to the river’s edge to ladle some of the blessed water and bring it home as a talisman against illness (koch 1843, 318). 5 the epiphany is an orthodox celebration marking both the three magi’s visit to the infant jesus and jesus’s baptism by john. 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: armenian celebration of the epiphany, 1901 original title: water blessing in tiflis in 1901 on the banks of the kur river (tiflis, 1901) source: armenian revolutionary federation archives, watertown, ma. photographs: box 31, image 32 the mtkvari’s symbolism thus circulated throughout local society, spanning and enforcing ethnic divides. georgians and armenians collected blessed water in discrete congregations, avoiding inter-mixing (koch 1843, 319). armenians celebrated epiphany mass at the vankh cathedral, the main site of armenian worship in tiflis, standing in a predominantly riverside armenian neighbourhood (markov 1887, 331). imperial transformation and the mtkvari waterscape the mtkvari assumed meanings related to tsarist rule as a space to communicate imperial power. symbols of political mythology linked to the river appeared in the decades after russia’s conquest of eastern georgia in 1801 and its establishment of the caucasus viceroyalty. in 1846, viceroy mikhail vorontsov raised a large commemorative cross at the site of a state-ordained miracle on the georgian military highway. marking where tsar nicholas i had survived an overturned carriage while travelling at high speed during a visit to tiflis in 1837, the cross stood along the vere river, a mtkvari tributary (gurchiani 2023, 26; jahn 2021, 182). visible to anyone travelling into or out of tiflis, the monument implicated the mtkvari in imperial political pageantry. in 1871, 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 tsar alexander ii received a delegation of tiflis notables at the site of the cross, after which they celebrated mass at the sioni cathedral on the mtkvari’s banks (jahn 2021, 182). as tiflis expanded, travellers and residents encountered the cross at the city’s heart (merzbacher 1901, 1: 932). in a land where the tsarist regime staked the legitimacy of its annexation on an imagined primeval and paternalistic relationship between the russian and georgian orthodox churches, the cross reminded georgia’s faithful of the divine protection bestowed upon their russian ruler. figure 2: memorial cross and bridge, vera district source: alexander engel. n.d. accessed may 16, 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:alexander_engel._cross_on_the_vera_district.jpg. mountaineer douglas freshfield, passing through tiflis in 1868, found the symbology of the cross wanting. he linked it to the lethargy of the tsarist government, which had failed to improve inefficient road and river transport in the region, even after its precariousness nearly killed nicholas i. two decades after the tsar’s accident, “steep-sided gullies” and “perilous descents” still plagued the unfinished, difficult road into tiflis, characteristic of “the usual russian habit of leaving difficulties to the last” (freshfield, 1869, 97–8). for decades after, the cross lorded over a river system it could not control, forcing the use of land transport—roads and eventually railways—still vulnerable to natural hazards. 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 vorontsov, appointed caucasus viceroy in 1844, initiated significant infrastructural development to turn tiflis into a russian imperial capital. government patronage spurred the construction of new theatres, banks, and libraries (kishmishev’ 1909, 3; markov 1887, 327). prior to his appointment, western and russian travellers recorded dismal impressions of the town, struggling to rebuild after the 1795 persian sacking. a british visitor in the 1820s complained of a “horrible dungeon-impression of asiatic dirt and barbarism” (ker porter 1821–2, 114). another british diplomat a decade later asserted tiflis as “one of the meanest and most disagreeable towns [he] ever saw,” with dirty markets, dirty baths, and a dirty river (lyall 1825, 515). under vorontsov, however, “tiflis was becoming more european every year” (markov 1887, 327). tree-lined streets and the city’s first sidewalks along the new golovinskii prospect (today’s rustaveli avenue) led to state institutions. new spaces demarcated a modern european city from its ‘oriental’ character. brightly coloured russian buildings and open-air plazas stood out from narrow dusty alleys and grey-bricked persian-styled bazaars (bodenstedt 1851, 1:160; freshfield 1869, 105). even as vorontsov’s transformations gradually pulled the city’s gravity away from the mtkvari’s riverbanks, the river remained central to tiflis’ cityscape. just as the mtkvari defied binaries of beautiful or dirty, calming or dangerous, it also evaded straightforward categorization as ‘european’ or ‘asian’ in travel writers’ imaginaries. tiflis remained a grey zone, a place where the “strangest inter-weaving of east and west, asian life and european life, takes place” (fillipova 1910, 104). the mtkvari wove through this aesthetic confusion, anchoring tiflis’ “picturesque disorder,” tying together church domes, minarets, modern bridges, castle ruins, and a new skyline of russian buildings (fillipova 1910, 111). on the left bank, houses and gardens of german colonists stood out “strangely incongruous” next to the old town of sandy bazaars and caravanserais (freshfield 1869, 105). even these colonies, however, had an ambiguous relationship with europeanness. a german newspaper in tiflis reported that colonists in alexandersdorf, on the mtkvari’s banks on tiflis’ outskirts, displayed marked ignorance of irrigation techniques. their gardens—an ostensible hallmark of europeanness—were “pathetically” dry and brown in summers (kaukasische post jun. 18, 1906). aziatskaia rossiia, a tsarist guide to its conquered territories, highlighted the grey-bricked caravanserais on the mtkvari’s banks as evidence of tiflis’ oriental qualities. camels loaded with market wares crossed bridges to bazaars echoing with the “vile cry of thousands of asiatic crowds” (fillipova 1910, 104–7). vorontsov’s development of tiflis away from the river’s banks, now increasingly steeped in orientalist tropes, accented the spatial character of the city’s “europeanization.” the budding greenery of new gardens—sometimes inaccurately characterized as a novel european transplantation without local antecedents (leist 1903, 54)—fired the european imagination over the beauty to be unearthed in tiflis. explorer gottfried merzbacher claimed german colonists’ green gardens “stood out like an oasis in the middle of a pale-yellow, sun-scorched alluvial plain,” a village of high red-brick gable houses “gaily surrounded by a belt of green fields and fruit orchards” (merzbacher 1901, 1: 931–2). christopher ely (2002, 87) argues that nineteenth-century european travel writers in the russian empire sought to reveal the picturesque, judging that while the russian landscape was inferior in external beauty to the rest of europe, it might be superior in hidden beauty. the mtkvari, at the centre of russian artistic portrayals of tiflis and its verdant landscape, could unlock the city’s picturesque potential as part of the empire. the river’s capillaries were tools in this quest. jahn (2014, 176) notes vorontsov’s urban reconstruction efforts aimed to “enhance the fertile nature of georgia through the establishment of gardens and vineyards” 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 watered by the mtkvari. one german visitor to 1840s tiflis viewed the magnificent gardens at the viceroy’s residence as a symbol of what could be achieved in tiflis when “asiatic luxuriousness” was “managed by a european hand” (bodenstedt 1851, 1:160). by the turn of the twentieth century, the city began tending to and maintaining lush patches of wild vegetation sprouting out of riverside ravines, which provided city residents with fruit and a space to picnic (gurchiani 2023, 26; merzbacher 1901, 1: 937-8). the caucasus administration and tiflis elites began fundraising for a monument to vorontsov following his passing in 1856. such a tribute, the official newspaper kavkaz reported, would be a “big step towards europe” (jahn 2014, 168). completed in 1867, a statue of vorontsov was placed at the end of the mikhailov bridge commissioned by him, overlooking the mtkvari. georgia’s first secular monument developed as a subject and symbol of local literature and the press, which evoked its riverine setting. a military officer’s poem for the official opening ceremony ran: “and in hallowed greeting to it [the monument], roars excitedly the kura” (jahn 2014, 175). writer vladimir sollogub toasted “the monumental, unwavering bronze man towering over the roaring kura” (jahn 2014, 180). even as vorontsov moved the development of tiflis away from the mtkvari, his rule and its memory marked the riverscape. the grandiose statue concealed challenges, and largely failures, in using the mtkvari as an economic transport channel. mid-century imperial bureaucrats were convinced they could unlock the region’s economic potential through rivers. the mtkvari would nourish prized export crops to be shipped to russia and beyond (bryce 1878, 160; zapisky kazkavskogo otdela imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva 1852). the river’s capricious nature soon became clear, however. changing rapids, fluctuating shallows, and periodic flooding frustrated ambitions for commercial shipping. the mtkvari’s many unnavigable points forced long overland treks. steamships, sitting higher in the water, offered new hope. in its inaugural year of 1853, kavkaz (jan. 21) hailed the arrival of steamships to the mtkvari as “a new era in trade in this far-flung region.” vessels such as the steamship orthodox russia could transport goods 260 kilometres between tiflis and mingechaur (mingecevir, in today’s azerbaijan). steam trade broadened possibilities, but the mtkvari remained a waterway unable to take goods sea-to-sea. the railroad’s arrival to the region in the 1870s pivoted tsarist investment in regional economic development, which had been waning away from rivers. even as grandiose imperial visions foundered, the mtkvari played a central role in the local economy. georgians had long used the river for trade. merchants loaded goods from watermelons to fish and caviar in sailboats from as far as the caspian sea, often offloading them just before tiflis city limits to avoid duties (anchabadze and volkova 1990, 156). within tiflis, the mtkvari’s current turned large wheels, buoyed in place by two separate boats, along an axle to rotate hefty millstones that sawed timber or ground flour (suny 2009, 30). all species of wood from caucasian forests lay along docking sites, feeding the thirty-three active sawmills, as massive log booms floated downstream from forest and mountain areas (freshfield 1869, 106; merzbacher 1901, 1: 931-2, 951). riverside mills became an urban icon, appearing on postcards to mark tiflis’ uniqueness in the empire. entrepreneurial peasants, with foodstuffs, locally produced goods, and even livestock in tow, darted downstream in one or two-person rafts to the bazaars of gori, mtskheta, and tiflis. the advent of railway travel made this enterprise even more profitable— peasants could sell the timber that composed the raft and return home on the train with a pocketful of cash (markov 1887, 124). the river generated urban and regional everyday economic activities. 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 drinking from the mtkvari tbilisi’s topography created a unique relationship between river and city in meeting residents’ daily needs. sharp banks and a strong current complicated efforts to draw water from the mtkvari. alexander pushkin’s (1974, 42) remark that the river’s “cloudy but delicious” water nourished the city in 1829 remained true decades later. british officer j. buchan telfer (1876, 1: 175) wrote: “the kura is the only source supplying the city with water, and notwithstanding its polluted state, the georgians have what may indeed be called a religious liking for it.” only a wealthy few relied on springs or wells (anchabadze and volkova 1990). for the rest, water had to be transported upwards from the mtkvari through narrow, winding streets. pathways were often dusty and dirty, and in the poorer neighbourhoods could be filled with insects surrounding manure and other waste (kardava 2013, 64). knowledge was also required to draw potable supplies. pooled river water, though easier to pour into buckets, might carry disease. iveria (mar. 24, 1877) noted that hundreds died of typhus annually in the 1870s, blaming the city for being unable to ensure safe water supplies. metulukcheebi (water-carriers) plied the riverbanks to meet these challenges. named for the sheepskin sack (tuluk) they draped over horses and mules or carried themselves from riverbanks to all points of tbilisi, metulukcheebi formed a critical part of the urban landscape. they numbered approximately 200 in 1879 (gersamia 1984, 64), and their ubiquitous presence along the river and on city streets attracted the attention of travel writers. evgeni markov (1887, 322), who visited tbilisi in the mid-1880s, noted: water carriers carry a heavy service. they have a thick leather lining on their backs, as on the sides of the horses. they draw water deep down from the kura, across the cliffs of the bank, into huge stone jugs or, rather, barrels, fasten them with wide straps, one on the back, the other on the shoulder, and then climb with a slow step up some narrow, slippery and crumbling passage...it is pitiable to watch how painfully they make their ascent along this thorny path with full jugs... on the same steep slope of the coast or at its foot, [they were] breathing heavily, barefoot, tanned, darker than any bronze, spreading directly under the sun, right on hot stones. donkeys or horses might carry a dozen barrels at once to transport to city residents in this arduous enterprise. 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 figure 3: metulukcheebi (tulukchi or water-carriers) on the mtkvari’s banks source: dmitri yermakov. n.d. accessed may 16, 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=11352176. tiflis’ municipal authorities sought to regulate this essential service, setting a price of 15 kopecks per barrel for water delivery. this rate was frequently breached. prices more than doubled when water levels made drawing water too difficult for ordinary citizens (anchabadze and volkova, 1990, 69). the mtkvari’s strong current always threatened to sweep away those who stumbled in; metulukcheebi themselves drowned. on march 30, 1887, a crowd on the avlabari bridge witnessed two metulukcheebi being carried away, along with barrels and horses (tiflisskii listok, (tl) mar. 31, 1887). prices dropped when the river froze, and residents could drag blocks of ice up the streets themselves using ropes and animals (anchabadze and volkova 1990, 69). to improve the city’s drinking water supply, tbilisi’s municipal administration designed an urban water piping system (vodoprovod) in the 1880s. an interest-free loan from st. petersburg allowed the purchase of equipment (sakartvelos tsent'raluri saist'orio arkivi [central historical archive of the republic of georgia] (stssa) pondy/fond (p) 192 anats/opis (an) 7 sakme/del (sak) 76). engineers began in the city centre with twin piping to deliver freshwater and remove wastewater. the mtkvari would be the ultimate source and destination. water was drawn upstream at avchala https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=11352176 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 and delivered through a mechanical pumping and aqueduct system to the city (tl jan. 11, 1887). as pipes appeared on streets in january 1887, residents became aware of the system’s imminent arrival. one basement flat for rent on golovinskii prospekt advertised its attachment to the water supply (tl feb. 10, 1887). installation, however, was fraught from the start. complaints abounded about animals—and inebriated or unaware residents—falling into holes where pipes were being installed. those who received the first water found its taste unpleasant, like iron. rust from the pipes coloured the teeth (iveria sep. 13, 1887). errors in designing and laying the pipes led to drinking and wastewater pipes being interlinked. one resident reported seeing worms come from his taps (tl sep. 30, 1887). metulukcheebi considered this new system a direct threat to their livelihoods, even given its rough rollout. on september 13, 1887, the municipal administration declared its central water supply functional and ordered the closing of some river access points used by metulukcheebi and residents alike. the city’s decision sparked the first of multiple labour actions by the water-carriers. closure of access points would substantially affect their work. the expenses of extra travel, they claimed, would reduce their daily take from 2–3 rubles to 50–70 kopecks (tl sep. 16, 1887). the metulukcheebi work stoppage overlapped with continued discord over the water supply rollout. by the fall of 1887, only a few neighbourhoods received piped water and those that did still preferred river water (iveria sep. 18, 1887). a crowd descended on the municipal administration building to demand better service for water delivery. tiflisskii listok (sep. 18, 1887) reported that metulukcheebi strike-breakers were charging “ridiculously” high prices to deliver water, forcing residents in tbilisi’s hill districts to beg. the city opened new water-collection points that it claimed city residents could safely use. the locations, however, were near institutions such as the city hospital, which discharged wastewater directly into the river (tl sep. 29, 1887). the mtkvari’s role as a dumping ground—dvorniks [groundskeepers] collected waste from yards and streets for a fee and tossed it into the river (kardava 2013, 66)—further complicated efforts to find potable water. the adelkhanovs, a prominent armenian business and political family, built leather and shoe factories along the river, where it would be easier to deposit waste (kardava 2013, 67). by mid-october, the city acquiesced to a higher fixed rate for water delivery, and the metulukcheebi returned to work (anchabadze and volkova 1990, 108). another strike erupted in june 1893, when the municipal administration raised the per-barrel tax on water from the mtkvari. tiflis allowed the drawing of water for personal use at no charge; metulukcheebi and others who sold water had to purchase city stamps. metulukcheebi petitioned the city, claiming the rising price of barley for their animals following massive floods had already minimized profit margins. city officials took a hard line, announcing that the strike would be considered illegal. on june 7, the tiflis police chief arrested 25 metulukcheebi. others returned to work on the promise that the next city assembly session would reconsider rates for water as well as tax rates on their animals (kavkaz june 11, 1893). the municipal administration sought to prevent future strikes by creating a watercarrier cartel, with privileged access to prime watercollection points on the mtkvari. one particular individual, m. bozhoev, received a concession to set rates and would be guaranteed a profit. arrested metulukcheebi were banished from tiflis (iveria june 17, 1893). the city again opened water-collection points, which were, ostensibly, more accessible to the “most impoverished part of the city’s population” not yet linked to the municipal water supply. kavkaz (june 16, 1893) noted that “with the proximity of the taps, it will be possible, with the help of manual labour, to completely avoid the need to turn to water-carriers.” 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 metulukcheebi nevertheless constituted an indispensable part of tiflis’ landscape through the revolutionary period. it took over a decade to connect the city centre to water pumped from the mtkvari via the avchala aqueduct (kardava 2013, 67). complaints about the slow pace and poor quality of construction proliferated in the local press. iveria reported on an extraordinary duma meeting to address resident anger regarding the water supply on may 17, 1903. the primary challenge was the lack of new water sources; the aqueduct was incapable of serving the whole city. the next decade witnessed multiple efforts to locate springs to provide water to outlying neighbourhoods (charkviani 1975, 28). communities and enterprises took the initiative to access reliable water supplies. one 1903 petition to the caucasus water inspectorate featured a request to withdraw 50,000 barrels of water daily from the mtkvari to supply gardens and dachas on the city’s outskirts. residents of the nakhalovka neighbourhood gained approval to initiate their own water supply construction (stssa p. 365, an. 1, sak. 313, purtseli/list (pur,) 6.). sakhalko gazeti (aug. 5, 1910) reported that residents in outlying areas by the early twentieth century considered piped water safer than that coming from wells, which could be contaminated by disease. upriver on the mtkvari, children were dying of water-borne diseases in the prosperous german colony of katherinenfeld (kaukasische post, jul. 23, 1906). efforts to find a major source beyond the mtkvari eluded municipal engineers in the years preceding world war i (sakhalko gazeti jun. 10, 1912; kavkaz, may 8, 1913). sporadic and limited water supply marked tiflis through the revolution. by 1921, 42 percent of villagers outside the city centre lacked piped water (kardava 2013, 64). the mtkvari, urban hierarchies, and daily life the mtkvari played a central role in the social and cultural panorama of tiflis. it alternately reflected, exacerbated, and challenged social hierarchies. rich and poor might interact differently with the river but could not avoid its singular importance and unpredictable nature. the mtkvari required constant crossing, by bridge or boat, for business and leisure. its cooling action allowed relief from spring and summer heat. wealthy residents profited from aeration by building large terraces facing the river—an architectural feature that remains characteristic of tbilisi today (goncalves, asinadze, and pinto 2016, 25). lack of building space along riverbanks and tsarist development projects shifted elite districts away from the mtkvari in the nineteenth century. imperial construction patterns of large boulevards, primarily golovinskii prospekt, altered the interaction of tbilisi’s newer wealthy classes with the river. unlike pre-tsarist elites, who largely remained in the city through the summer’s blistering heat, tsarist upper classes abandoned tiflis for cooler, but still riverine, retreats. in so doing, they imitated patterns across the colonial world. hill stations in british india, far above cities that sweltered in the summer, created a trans-imperial model to escape the heat and contact with colonized peoples and recharge “europeanness” (kennedy 1996). markov (1887, 311) wrote that “the rich retire to the cool heights of heaven, to high mountains, to shady forests, to heavenly dachas abundant with sweet fruits…” the exodus started in late may. wealthy tiflis denizens sought not only to relax and improve their health but also to find suitable mates for their children in elite playgrounds (tl jun. 2, 1887). the mtkvari lent its aesthetic value to these retreats. arthur leist (1903, 11) recalled summer getaways where “the countryside attains an even higher charm on moonlit nights, when the wavy 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 surface of the kur shimmers like silver.” the mtkvari’s “charming oasis,” von thielmann (1875, 145) wrote, centred life in an ethnic german village, chertwiss, used as a summer “escape.” picturesque riverine castle ruins and gardens permitted leisurely strolls on the hottest summer days. ostensible western mastery over water in bath and spa retreats made liveable an ‘oriental’ environment that was otherwise “unsuitable for long-term european residence” (abich 1896, 2: 268; merzbacher 1901, 1: 957). borjomi, upriver and nestled in a gorge, emerged as the favoured getaway for imperial leaders. british historian james bryce (1878, 345) called it the “most fashionable” escape, and it became known as the ‘summer capital’ of the caucasus. medicinal springs dotted hills and valleys, with an environment that purportedly prevented fevers. grand duke mikhail nikolaevich romanov constructed a summer home across the mtkvari from borjomi’s main settlement. a stone bridge reminiscent of those left by the romans traversed the river (von thielmann 1875, 38). summer residents thought “joyfully about endless galleries of pine trees, full of coolness and green twilight, [compared] to those condemned to languish on the merciless scorching pavements of tiflis…” (markov 1878, 311). summer escapes along the mtkvari and the pulling of elites away from its banks intertwined with images of the river as a place for the poor in turn-of-the-century tiflis. tiflis’ largest imperial-era riverside neighbourhood, named for differing perceptions of its riverbank—riqe (small stones) in georgian or peski (sands) in russian—hosted a diverse underclass. molokans (largely slavic religious sectarians) joined georgians, russians, turks, persians, and other caucasus peoples (stssa p. 192, an. 4, sak. 72, pur. 120). on a flat section of the mtkvari’s right bank near the city centre, riqe was populated by porters, carriage drivers, fishers, manual workers, and small traders. livestock yards dotted the neighbourhood along with small squares and oneor two-level houses. workers without accommodation established temporary “hostels” in district squares (tl jul. 15, 1887). by the 1880s, riqe’s disarray became a regular topic in russian-language newspapers. tiflisskii listok (may 19, 1887) wrote that sanitation in the courtyards of the area’s inns, where carriage drivers stayed, was “in a horrible state.” animal waste filtered to neighbouring yards through rain, threatening epidemic diseases. residents dumped refuse at the same places where metulukcheebi gathered water. in summer, dessimonov square, the district’s centre, presented a “disgusting picture.” as manure decomposed and stank, “billions” of flies and other airborne insects swarmed the main market, bothering sellers of fruits, vegetables, and fish. the city bore responsibility for failing to provide adequate sanitary services, such as sweepers or wheelbarrows, to remove waste (tl june 14, 1887). dirty streets produced dust storms or led to massive puddles, which attracted disease-bearing mosquitoes. riqe’s location placed it in the direct path of frequent floods, which will be detailed below. districts threatened by flooding, however, implicated wealthy as well as poor residents. if the mtkvari’s banks were seen as dominated by the underprivileged, its islands remained playgrounds for the wealthy. madatov and ortachala islands were important features of tiflis’ cityscape. fruit, vegetable, and spice orchards provided sustenance and flavour. donkeys and horses stationed on the islands delivered goods citywide throughout long growing seasons. madatov hosted live entertainment, including a sophisticated animal show. early in the morning, organ music greeted travellers who traversed or gathered on mikhailov bridge, directing them to a spectacle held twelve times daily. spectators witnessed a costumed elephant lunching, trained dogs and monkeys performing pirouettes and somersaults on horses, and talking (and swearing) parrots (tl jan 10, 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 1887). the show’s owner, g. fets’, sought to ingratiate himself with tiflis’ educated public by pledging half the show’s profits to an animal protection society (tl feb. 8, 1887). figure 4: madatov island and mikhailov bridge source: george kennan. 1893. accessed may 16, 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:ar(1893)_p318_tiflis.jpg. ortachala hosted orchards and vineyards, whose ownership passed between noble families and constituted a long-time local getaway from the summer heat. pushkin encountered musicians, singers, dancers, and “asian tribesmen” in a garden lit with candles on tree branches. his hosts provided games in addition to music for a fulfilling evening (kardava 2013, 195). the island— and the boats that ran from it, sailing along the mtkvari—were prime feasting sites, with the freshest orchard foods accompanied by diverse entertainment (manning 2019). among restaurants and inns, multiple brothels beckoned (kardava 2013, 196). ortachala maintained its prestige even as tsarist building projects focused inland on main boulevards. fishing was a popular pastime and a staple of riverbank eating establishments. the mtkvari held khramul, pikeperch, trout, barbels, and catfish (eriksen 1892, 21). a caucasus branch of the imperial russian society of fishing and fish-farming met regularly, but most residents simply noticed the many lines cast from riverbanks and low bridges into the water (kavkaz apr. 30, 1896). fishers, who also used nets, took their catches in buckets to sell to nearby restaurants or passersby. fish constituted a beloved part of the local armenian diet. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:ar(1893)_p318_tiflis.jpg 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 tiflis’ riverbanks, on the islands or main shore, served as leisure hubs, including multiple taverns. boxing was a central attraction. teams were divided by neighbourhoods, often pitting one side of the mtkvari against the other (kardava 2013, 188). fights started with boys, then advanced in age. inexperienced boxers would be the ‘undercard’ before each neighbourhood’s best fighters. fights could be vicious, especially ‘stone boxing,’ where opponents used wooden sticks or brick fragments. fighters with broken noses, jaws, or worse washed off blood and tended to their wounds in the river. the riverbank was a contested territory along multiple axes. on the mtkvari’s left bank, swimmers launched rafts and dove into the water, given the lack of comfortable beaches. the shore and river were not only used by swimmers, however. one newspaper article recounted soldiers bringing their animals to drink and allowing them to bathe in the water. parents were disgusted by the soldiers’ foul language and behaviour. one who protested was treated by “rude antics” but could not locate a police officer to complain (tl july 18. 1887). a bridge-building spree in late imperial tiflis typified the government’s reticence towards riverine development. private initiative underwrote the construction of cross-river linkages. garden owners on ortachal island invested in a new bridge to increase foot traffic and revenue (tl may 3, 1887). tiflis's armenian community financed a permanent bridge over the mtkvari, where its church annually celebrated the epiphany, after a temporary one collapsed during the 1892 celebration, killing fifty (kavkaz june 13, 1893). bridges played crucial roles in the city’s economic life, lined with stores that took advantage of heavy foot traffic and city residents who used them as entertainment. as kavkaz zhurnal wrote in 1888 (no 177): “often we witness how a dense mass of every possible class of the public besieges the railing of the mikhailov bridge, to see what is going on with the kura. in some cases, they see a horse or a water buffalo swimming; in others, their attention is drawn to boats, which are unusual on the fast-flowing river, but in most cases, they see bathers or swimmers” (cited in anchabadze and volkova 1990, 205). 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 figure 5: mikhailov bridge source: dmitri yermakov. n.d. accessed may 16, 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:tbilisi_xixc_03.jpg. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:tbilisi_xixc_03.jpg 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 figure 6: avlabari bridge source: dmitri yermakov. n.d. accessed may 16, 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:ermakov._tbilisi._653751.jpg. swimming in the mtkvari besides leisure and entertainment, the mtkvari presented danger. drownings proliferated in its strong currents and whirlpools, particularly in summer months when swimming was a popular pastime for those who lacked the means or desire to leave tiflis. children and teenagers were frequent victims. tiflisskii listok (jul. 10, 1887) wrote: “daily a massive amount of the city’s children, starting from the youngest age, can be seen, with no supervision or restrictions, on the banks of the kura. daredevils seek to swim across the river and many stay in the water for a long time. it’s true that these young swimmers can well enough navigate the underwater rocks, water mills and whirlpools. but this does not always end well and some easily drown. similar numbers of cases occur annually and will keep occurring without better supervision.” quality swimming pools (kupalnykh), where residents might safely avoid the summer heat, were absent in densely populated neighbourhoods. iveria (may 21, 1903) wrote: “soon it will be sunny and working people will come to mtkvari to bathe. unfortunately, there is no swimming pool in the city and because of this many swimmers die every year.” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:ermakov._tbilisi._653751.jpg 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 drownings dominated summer news reports throughout the tsarist period, from establishment newspapers in russian and georgian to more popular ones such as tiflisskaia gazeta kopeika and sakhalko gazeti. individual cases were reported in detail. in one tiflisskaia gazeta kopeika (jul. 17, 1910) story, a young swimmer near mikhailov bridge was sucked into the water mid-afternoon. he swam bravely to the mill of m. tamamshev. observers rushed to have the miller stop his wheel; tamamshev ordered his workers to save the boy, who was pulled out unconscious but recovered. the frequency of accidental drownings prompted the establishment of a branch of the imperial russian society of water safety in the 1880s, with one boat patrolling the river (iveria apr. 12, 1893). adults who drowned were frequently reported as inebriated. on aug. 29, 1910, dateb matiashvili, a cobbler, spontaneously decided to jump into the mtkvari, was swept into a deep part of the river, and seemingly perished (tiflisskaia gazeta kopeika sep. 1, 1910). as a liminal space exposing city life to the mtkvari's manifold dangers, riverbanks assumed a macabre character as a place where bodies could be discovered. tabloidesque reporting in tiflis' german newspaper speculated over whether a german resident and his georgian friend, who went out fishing late one evening and whose bodies were later discovered on a mtkvari island, had drowned or been murdered (kaukasische post oct.15, 1906). in a more clear-cut case upstream at borjomi, locals fished the body of a well-known robber out of the river with a bullet wound to the chest (kaukasische post sep. 24, 1906). others might be drawing water from the river or simply walking along its bank, lose their balance, and drown. on april 29, 1913, two coachmen, iosif zukakishvili and pavel shioshvili, brought their horse and carriage to the riverbank near vera bridge. a sudden current dragged the cart, animal, and drivers into the river. zukakashvili swam ashore, but shioshvili drowned (kavkaz may 1, 1913). drownings affected the wealthiest—though these appeared to occur away from the city center. on june 2, 1913, p.g. ivanov, the director of the caucasus silk station, took his family for a riverside picnic on tiflis’ outskirts. as the picnickers set up their fishing rods, a surge swept away ivanov’s sons, peter, aged nine, and giorgii, thirteen. along with the men who jumped in to save them was sixteen-year-old iraida, the daughter of a.v. mulin, deputy head of the caucasus migration board. iraida, a gymnast, launched herself into the river’s “dark waves” (kavkaz jun. 5, 1913). piotr and giorgii were saved; iraida, however, fared badly and, despite the party’s efforts, was carried away by the current. her body washed ashore on a small island near the saburtalo district. the parents’ mood, according to kavkaz, “defied description.” later that summer, after decades of demands for city action on river safety, which, iveria (may 21, 1903) wrote, always met with a “deaf ear,” tiflis’ acting deputy policemaster, g.v. levashov, led a commission that included the society of water safety to develop a system of flags to display safe places to swim on the mtkvari—at least those without the whirlpools and steep drops that caused many drownings (kavkaz july 18, 1913). floods on may 3, 1893, iveria reported flooding on tiflis’ islands—a virtually annual spring rite. in subsequent days, heavy rains and a strong melt produced an unusually high and strong river flow upstream. as storms hit tbilisi, police officers notified riqe residents of potential danger and advised them to consider leaving; few, however, did so (kavkaz may 21, 1893). rain in eastern georgia strengthened on may 10, raising the mtkvari’s level by one meter. overnight on may 12, this swell arrived in tiflis, accompanied by a major rainstorm. water overflowed the riqe district. 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 dessimonov square was under 1.5 meters of water by two in the morning. residents evacuated the district by boat to other parts of tiflis. the water rescue society’s vessel removed people from houses that were taking on water, which overflowed shops, stores, churches, and arbuz square (tl may 14, 1893). police and fire officials arrived to awaken residents and order them from their homes. a sapper brigade worked to fix a pontoon bridge across dessimonov square so people could safely leave lower-lying areas. this flood’s generational impact soon became apparent. kavkaz (may 14, 1893) wrote: “in the terrifying strength and disastrous aftermath of the storm even older residents could not recall the like, even if flooding that might destroy houses and carry away property is almost an annual occurrence.” water roared over islands and riverbanks, flooding ortachala’s orchards and ripping away its wooden bridge to the mainland. gardeners climbed trees and strapped themselves with rope to survive the night. the current tore valuable log booms from their moorings at vera bridge and washed them downriver (kavkaz, may 14, 1893). flooding reached gardens and orchards in vera as well as the basements and lower floors of major streets. water climbed low-lying streets and then cascaded downwards, destroying stone walls. police stopped people from crossing the avlabari and other low-lying bridges as they risked being engulfed by rising waters—gigantic whirlpools could be seen from above (tl may 14, 1893). by morning, riqe’s one-story structures were demolished, and two-story ones effectively shorn in half. as the rain subsided, retreating water destroyed more buildings, whose foundations were encased in silt and sand. streets were rendered impassable (iveria may 15, 1893). riverside flour and timber mills were ruined. warehouses on tbilisi’s islands or riverbanks, with substantial stores of flour, barley, fish, and other goods, were washed away, along with buildings of riverside caravanserais. animals perished by the thousands. traders would shelter cart animals by the riverbanks, and animals took goods from islands into the city. pigs held for slaughter were kept in riverside pens—over two thousand were lost in the floods. one observer reported hearing the “roar” of cattle in riqe as they were swept into the water (kavkaz may 21, 1893). kavkaz (may 15, 1893) noted the effect on tbilisi’s population, quoting one eyewitness: what a terrible, grandiose spectacle the kura presents. its dirty, heavy waves roll with dizzying speed, destroying and absorbing everything in its path. roofs of houses, uprooted trees, logs, boards, household items and animal corpses float on its surface, as if testifying to the victory of the enraged element over all else. like an enraged sea, the river rumbles, boils and foams about the foundations of bridges, as if trying to conquer them with its all-destroying power. tbilisi municipal officials and residents took to boats to throw bread to those trapped on the upper floors of riqe’s buildings. private fishing vessels transformed into water taxis (kavkaz may 14, 1893). ironically, damage to the avchal pumping station led officials to warn of a water shortage in the city in the coming weeks. human loss of life was unclear. kavkaz (may 14, 1893) reported that “one native” (kakoi-to tuzemtsev) drowned, ostensibly while trying to corral logs. as the current eased, boats launched downstream to capture valuable goods left floating in the water. a later article speculated on deaths at the zubalov caravanserai (kavkaz may 16, 1893). every day, buildings were collapsing and sinkholes opening (iveria may 20, 1893). one unfortunate individual was reported killed in 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 flooding at the wetzel brewery on the left bank (kavkaz may 21, 1893). worries mounted over a potential typhus outbreak from pooled water, as had happened following a lesser flood in 1881. 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 figure 7: riqe district and water mills after 1893 floods source: dmitri yermakov. 1893.accessed may 16, 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3009317. the storm’s chaos prompted calls for tiflis’ government to consider fundamental changes to mitigate flood damage. iveria (may 13, 1893) asked: “will the building of a solid embankment like that of st. petersburg cost any more than the abundant tribute that the mtkvari collects yearly from tplisi residents?” palliative measures were no longer sufficient. total losses from the 1893 flood were estimated at 400,000 rubles (stssa p. 192, an. 4, sak. 66, pur. 215). popular fascination with the river’s power grew, however. flood images captured by renowned photographer dmitrii ermakov went on display at local stores on central shopping streets. duma discussions in coming weeks were strangely sanguine, focused mostly on repairing damaged bridges (stssa p. 192, an. 4, sak. 66, pur. 212–230). flooding again plagued tbilisi in 1896. the city endured a month of floods, with four surges. total damage surpassed 1893. its first hint came on april 21, as residents witnessed huge trees, shorn from their roots upstream, floating atop a roaring mtkvari. mills secured their connections to the shore, and islands flooded as the city banned boat traffic. tiflis avoided the worst of this wave, which struck gori hardest. a provisional committee headed by princess maria aleksandrovna shervashidze gathered donations for flood victims. a charity performance of the vaudeville show https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3009317 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 “when he knew” (kogda-b on znal) was staged at the state theatre on april 27 (kavkaz apr. 24, 1896). heavy rain triggered a second surge a week later. flooding hit hay barns and livestock pens as well as basements. police led carriages, wagons, and animals to higher ground. northern madatov island was underwater, as were ortachala gardens (iveria may 5, 1896). tiflisskii listok (may 7, 1896) wrote: “it is impossible to describe how much grief and loss the flood caused to the peskovites [riqe residents], which are a poor class of the population, generally performing physical labour and producing crafts.” police chief m.i. tamashev protested to the city duma that small credits proposed for more rescue boats were insufficient. major capital investments were needed to mitigate losses after two major events in four years. duma members were unmoved, leaving tiflisskii listok (may 7, 1896) to report that the “population [is] doomed to the loss of their property, illness, and so on; the hardships to endure when found out in the open, in pouring rain, in the middle of the street.” regional flooding cut rail and road lines, isolating tiflis from mail and supply deliveries. damage to telegraph lines complicated communication (kavkaz may 5, 1896), the third bout of flooding hit tiflis on may 11, with a current so sudden and powerful that it swept away rescue boats and tore children from homes. mothers desperately sought them in the water where barrels and other detritus floated (kavkaz may 12, 1896). tiflis residents trapped near the river climbed to the tops of mills in the hope that their fastenings to the shore would hold. people watching from terrasses of wealthy riverside homes witnessed one teenager carried away by the current and drown. horses were spotted swimming in flooded squares citywide. iveria (may 12, 1893) reported: “the raging mtkvari…destroyed the planks of sawmills, many trees and forest material and small huts where workers sheltered goods.” water reached the theatre district and flooded caravanserais that had survived 1893. ortachala island flooding promoted speculation that it would never rebound as a summer playground. military fortifications and a disinfection chamber on madatov island were underwater. a subsequent surge washed away shoreline worker barracks; at least one man lost his life (tl may 18, 1896). the month of flooding was unprecedented in city history, wrote kavkaz (may 24, 1896). the loss of warehouses and island orchards significantly affected food prices. on may 24, the city duma commissioned an inquiry into the floods, led by member melikh-nubarov (stssa p. 192, an. 4, sak. 72, pur. 120). in a contentious session, one member recounted seeing a youngster cry out in vain for 20 minutes after being caught in the current and passing under avlabari bridge, which was crowded with people watching the spectacle. the only rescue boat (essentially a vessel with a long strong rope) was helping to rescue property at riqe; consequently, the man drowned. other duma members contested whether a boat rescue would have been feasible given the current’s strength before the debate moved to which concrete measures might be taken to prevent repeats of highly predictable occurrences. duma head a.a. ivanov declared that the city administration was designing a plan for embankments to protect riqe. others demanded a broader strategy beyond payments to help riqe residents once again rebuild their lives (stssa p. 192, an. 4, sak. 72, pur. 212ob). the duma unanimously voted for the commission to study permanent solutions and immediately distribute 1,000 rubles to riqe residents as well as open a charitable drive while considering appropriate total compensation. 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 three days after the duma meeting, another major flood occurred. tables and chairs set for vera park restaurants deemed sufficiently far from the banks were swept away. linen and silverware bobbed in the river. a stone embankment, built days before by a sapper battalion readying a pontoon bridge should others be washed away, was itself destroyed. a later duma debate acknowledged the month of destruction: the losses of the peski [riqe] people are already well known. the entire site has become an impromptu venice, with home-grown gondoliers taking people in boats on flooded streets for 20 kopecks. never has the water splashed onto the roadway of the avlabari bridge. cleanup will take months. on july 8 babov announced that his commission’s work was ongoing and peski residents were justifiably complaining about the time it is taking to move sand and silt from houses and streets. (stssa p. 192, an. 4., sak. 72, pur. 194ob) a july 3 duma meeting agreed to spend 33,000 rubles to strengthen riverbank protection, but the focus was on the upstream avchala district. damage there had halted the piped water supply to tiflis. expenses were approved with nary a word about riqe residents, who were expected now to rely on private charity (stssa p. 192, an. 4, sak. 72, pur. 247). an incomplete evolution as debates about the river’s danger escalated, the mtkvari remained critical to modernizing the imperial capital of the caucasus. the 1890s floods highlighted that dirt roads still proliferated in tiflis, with not much changing outside the centre of a city characterized as an “impenetrable cesspool of stinking mud” (markov 1887, 311). efforts intensified to use stone, gravel, and sand from the mtkvari’s riverbanks to pave streets. by the turn of the century, these building materials became so valuable—for new structures as well as roads—that the city had to post guards along the river to stop theft (kavkaz july 13, 1913). the prospect of hydroelectricity vaulting tiflis to modernity attracted significant attention from the 1880s. georgian public figures and intellectuals led the charge in advocating for hydroelectrification based on european models. in 1884, georgian writer niko nikoladze beseeched the city duma to study ways to harness the river to power street lighting, now common in st. petersburg and moscow (charkviani 1975, 11). tsarist-era electric power in tiflis remained the domain of small-scale steam-powered generators, however, designed for one house, block, or factory. in 1895, ilia chavchavadze, iveria’s founder and publisher, implored municipal authorities to emulate geneva, which was powered by the rhone river. upstream at borjomi, grand duke mikhail commissioned a hydropower plant as part of a pumped water storage system, based on models in the alps. the system’s completion on a mountain mtkvari tributary in 1898, meant to power his summer residence and courtyard, produced sufficient energy for lighting the entire town. in so doing, it gained repute as the first “high-pressure hydroelectric station in the empire” (izvestiia tbilisskogo gorodskogo obshchestvennogo upravleniia 1896, 177, cited in charkviani 1975, 23). in tiflis, chavchavadze’s article sparked duma debates in 1896–7, but action was limited to site studies up to the first world war. bidding processes for lighting tiflis nonetheless attracted significant attention. electricity allowed for new leisure forms, including a massive public roller-skating rink (tiflisskaia gazeta kopeika dec. 4, 1910). imperial and local visions of 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 modernity anticipated a shift in views of georgian rivers as energy sources in the soviet era when the bolsheviks would push for mass electrification. conclusion georgian journalist s. bavreli, in the 1880s, wrote: “oh how it made me happy, when i saw my old acquaintance and friend, the mtkvari! it made me happy, but what to do, because this no longer was that mtkvari, which i had seen in my boyhood—it no longer seemed to have that purity, that freshness, that peacefulness. the agitated mtkvari was running along so angrily and so wrathfully grumbled, that my heart almost broke” (manning, 2012, 255). as symbol, space, and actor, the mtkvari remained at the centre of tiflis through decades of tsarist modernization and technological change. the river’s power both challenged and anticipated national and imperial visions of progress. in imperial tiflis, the mtkvari remained a source of life and culture, a place of excitement, spectacle, and peril, one that anchored a multicultural and stratified society. weaving past homes and under crowded bridges, with its banks holding beaches, taverns, livestock pens, caravansaries, and all manner of critical infrastructure, the river represented a type of non-human will and agency its residents seemed to respect, even as its capriciousness, highlighted by the 1890s floods, provoked great frustration. over time, the river might differentiate winners and losers, but it touched all residents’ lives. even escapes from tiflis by the wealthiest led them to banks of the mtkvari outside the city. floods threatened water supplies for those privileged enough to receive piped water instead of relying on metulukcheebi. the mtkvari allowed residents and outsiders alike to map cultural perceptions and attitudes on a city seen as neither stereotypically ‘oriental’ nor modern european, but an urban space in between. training their gaze on the mtkvari, europeans and russians could see the picturesque in the caucasus in both external and hidden beauty, as a space between europe and russia as well as between europe and asia. a focus on the mtkvari takes a step to recover the ‘lost’ histories of imperial tiflis. what remains for further investigation is how various ethnic communities interacted with, shaped, and, in turn, were shaped by the river. while this article has noted the mtkvari’s role as a symbol for a georgian national imaginary, tatar merchants plied the river with goods from the caspian, german colonists irrigated the river to water their vineyards, and armenian businessmen featured prominently in duma debates over how to harness the river for modernization schemes. much as the mtkvari of imperial tiflis has been lost to soviet-era concrete embankments that walled the river from its previous interactions with city life, so did other soviet transformations dilute the multiethnic composition of the peoples that lived with the river. the descendants of german colonists in the caucasus were deported wholesale by the soviet state in 1941, while the soviet patronage of separate national republics moved the gravity of armenian intellectual and political life to yerevan and dissimulated the armenian footprint in a city redesignated as the capital of a georgian ssr and, in 1991, an independent country. tbilisi may lack the beaches—or islands—of the imperial period, but the peace bridge of 2010 and the flood of 2015 remain two symbols of the potential and peril of a young nation through its interactions with the mtkvari. now, as then, humans and nature exist in a dynamic, mutual, and unpredictable relationship (linton 2010, 229). 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 list of references archives sakartvelos tsent'raluri saist'orio arkivi (central historical archive of the republic of georgia), (stssa) tbilisi, georgia. newspapers iveria kaukasische post kavkaz sakhalko gazeti tiflisskaia gazeta kopeika tiflisskii listok (tl) 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 references abich, hermann. 1896. aus kaukasischen ländern [from caucasian countries]. vienna: alfred hölder. anchabadze, iurii dmitrievich, and nataliia georgievna volkova. 1990. staryi tbilisi: gorod i gorozhane v xix veke [old tbilisi: city and townspeople in the xix century]. moscow: nauka. andronikashvili, zaal. 2021. “georgian political romanticism in the caucasus.” in identities and representations in georgia from the 19th century to the present, edited by hubertus jahn, 137–49. boston: de gruyter oldenburg. bodenstedt, friedrich. 1851. the morning land: a thousand and one days in the east. translated by richard waddington. london: richard bentley/schulze & co. breyfogle, nicholas b., and philip c. brown, eds. 2023. hydraulic societies: water, power, and control in east and central asian history. corvallis, or: oregon state university press. bryce, james. 1878. transcaucasia and ararat: notes of a vacation tour in autumn in 1876. london: macmillan & co. charkviani, kandid. 1975. istoriia elektroenergetiki sovetskoi gruzii [history of electric power engineering in soviet georgia]. tbilisi: sabchota sakartvelo. costlow, jane, and arja rosenholm, eds. 2017. meanings and values of water in russian culture. oxfordshire: routledge. dills, randall. 2010. “the river neva and the imperial façade: culture and environment in nineteenth century st. petersburg russia.” phd diss., university of illinois at urbanachampaign. https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/items/18481. dumas, alexandre. 2002. voyage au caucase [journey to the caucasus]. paris: hermann. ely, christopher. 2002. this meager nature: landscape and national identity in imperial russia. dekalb, il: northern illinois university press. erikson, e.v. no date. po okrestnostiam tiflisa [on the outskirts of tiflis]. tilfis. fagan, brian. 2011. elixir: a history of water and humankind. new york: bloomsbury press. fillipova. 1910. “maidan v tiflise.” [the maidan in tiflis] in aziatskaia rossiia: illiustrirovannyi geograficheskii sbornik. 3rd. ed. moscow. tipo-litografiia i.i. kushnerev. 103–112. freshfield, douglas. 1869. travels in the central caucasus and bashan, including visits to ararat and tabreez, and ascents of kasbek and elbruz. london: longmans, green & co. von freygang, frederika. 1823. letters from the caucasus and georgia. london: john murray. gersamia, tamaz. 1984. staryi tbilisi/old tbilisi. tbilisi: sabchota sakartvelo. gonçalves, jorge, davit asanidze, and pedro pinto. 2016. “the riverfront as a mirror: the case of the transformations in post‐soviet cities.” new water policy & practice 2 (2): 21–35. https://doi.org/10.18278/nwpp.2.2.4. 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 gurchiani, ketevan. 2023. “rivers between nature, infrastructure, and religion.” central asian survey 42 (1): 21–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2022.2094892. hahn, carl. 1892. aus dem kaukasus. [from the caucasus] leipzig: verlag von duncker & humblot. ———. 1924. kurzes lehrbuch der geographie georgiens (sakarthwelos respublika) und im anhang des kaukasus, aderbeidjans und armeniens [short textbook of the geography of georgia (sakartvelo respublika) and of the caucasus, azerbaijan and armenia in the appendix]. stuttgart: ausland und heimat, verlags-aktiengesellschaft. jahn, hubertus. 2014. “the bronze viceroy: mikhail vorontsov’s statue and russian imperialrepresentation in the south caucasus in the mid-nineteenth century.” in russian history 41 (2): 163–180. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763316-04102004. ———. 2021. “visits of tsars to the caucasus as representations of empire.” in identities and representations in georgia from the nineteenth century to the present, edited by hubertus jahn, 169–84. boston: de gruyter oldenbourg. kardava, dato. 2013. mtkvari da misi ori napiri. [mtkvari and its two banks] tbilisi: bakur sulakauri. kennedy, dane. 1996. the magic mountains: hill stations and the british raj. berkeley: university of california press. ker porter, robert. 1821. travels in georgia, persia, armenia, ancient babylonia, 1817-1820. london: longman, hurst, rees, orme, and brown. kishmishev’, a. 1909. tiflis, lichnye vospominaniia (za vremia upravleniia kavkazom kn. vorontsova) [tiflis, personal memoirs of prince vorontsov's administration of the caucasus]. tiflis: tipografiia m. martirosiavtsa. koch, karl. 1843. reise durch russland nach dem kaukasischen isthmus in den jahren 1836, 1837 und 1838 [journey through russia to the caucasian isthmus in 1836, 1837 and 1838]. stuttgart: verlag der j. g. cotta’schen buchhandlung. “kratkoe opisanie glavnykh torgovykh putei soobshcheniia zakavkazskago kraia” [brief description of the main trade and communication routes in the transcaucasus region]. 1852. in zapisky kazkavskogo otdela imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva [notes of the caucusus division of the imperial russian geographical society] kn. 1, 143–152. leist, arthur. 1903. das georgische volk [the georgian people]. dresden: e. pierson’s verlag. linton, jamie. 2010. what is water: the history of a modern abstraction. vancouver: ubc press. lyall, robert. 1825. travels in russia, the krimea, the caucasus and georgia. london: t. cadell. manning, paul. 2009. “the city of balconies: elite politics and the changing semiotics of the post-socialist cityscape.” in city culture and city planning in tbilisi, edited by kristof van assche, joseph salukvadze, and nick shavishvili, 71–102. new york: edwin mellen press. 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2019. “the city of gardens: three garden heterotopias of old tbilisi.” tbilisi, october 26. https://tiflis-tbilisi.com/application/files/1415/7771/7497/ city_of_gardens_december_2019-2.pdf. ———. 2012. strangers in a strange land: occidentalist publics and orientalist geographies in nineteenth century georgian imaginaries. boston: academic studies press. manning, paul and zaza shatirishvili. 2011. “the exoticism and the eroticism of the city: the ‘kinto’ and his city.” in urban spaces after socialism: ethnographies of public places in eurasia, edited by tsypylma darieva, wolfgang kaschuba, and melanie krebs, 261–282. frankfurt am main: campus. markov, evgeni. 1887. ocherki kavkaza. kartiny kavkazskoi zhizni, prirody, i istorii [sketches of the caucasus. pictures of caucasian life, nature, and history]. st. petersburg: izdanie tovarishchestva m.o. vol’f. memmedli, şureddin. 2018. “1894 yılı tiflis’in gürcüce i̇veria gazetesinde ardahan sancağına yolculuk izlenimi.” [impressions of a journey to ardahan sanjak in the georgian iverianewspaper of tiflis, 1894] ardahan değerlemeleri 8: 239-254. merzbacher, gottfried. 1901. aus den hochregionen des kaukasus: wanderungen, erlebnisse, beobachtungen. [from the high regions of the caucasus: hikes, experiences,observations] leipzig: verlag von duncker & humblot. peterson, maya k. 2019. pipe dreams: water and empire in central asia’s aral sea basin. new york: cambridge university press. pushkin, aleksandr. 1974. a journey to arzrum. translated by birgitta ingemanson. ann arbor, mi: ardis. reid, patryk. 2021. “the lands beyond the rivers: directions and potentials in riparian histories of russian and soviet eurasia.” kritika 22 (1): 137–72. https://doi.org/ 10.1353/kri.2021.0005. suny, ronald grigor. 1994. the making of the georgian nation. 2nd ed. bloomington, in: indiana university press. ———. 2009. “the mother of cities: tbilisi/tiflis in the twilight of empire.” in city culture and city planning in tbilisi, edited by kristof van assche, joseph salukvadze, and nick shavishvili. 17–58. new york: edwin mellen press. telfer, john buchan. 1876. the crimea and transcaucasia: being the narrative of a journey in the kouban, in gouria, georgia, armenia, ossety, imeritia, swannety, and mingrelia an in the tauric range. london: henry s. king & co. von thielmann, max. 1875. journey in the caucasus, persia and turkey in asia. london: john murray. zeisler-vralsted, dorothy. 2008. “the cultural and hydrological development of the mississippi and volga rivers.” in rivers in history: perspectives on waterways in europe and north america, edited by christof mauch and thomas g. zeller. pittsburgh: university of pittsburgh press. 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 ———. 2014. rivers, memory, and nation-building: a history of the volga and mississippi rivers. new york: berghahn books. 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17 (1)2024: 49-79 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 before the sanctions: how firms in russia institutionalized corporate social responsibility1 stanislav klimovich2, university of potsdam, germany ulla pape3, technische hochschule nürnberg georg simon ohm, germany markus b. siewert4, tum think tank, munich school of politics and public policy, germany abstract this article investigates the development of corporate social responsibility (csr) in russia before the full-scale invasion of ukraine in 2022. first, the authors present an index they constructed from csr reporting data of 45 leading firms. the article demonstrates that the degree to which firms in russia have institutionalized csr practices and norms varies extensively. second, by building on neo-institutionalist theory and mechanisms of isomorphic change, it explores the global and domestic pressures that promoted csr institutionalization in russia’s authoritarian capitalism. the findings from the qualitative comparative analysis (qca) show that there is no uniform path, but rather multiple, equifinal routes to csr institutionalization. two types of mimetic isomorphism—modelling csr activities after best international practices and path-dependent soviet-type experiences—are crucial to explaining csr institutionalization in russia. after the russian invasion of ukraine, international practices could become less important, while the domestic pressures to further csr institutionalization will remain relevant. 1 this work was supported by deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft: [grant number 388732203] 2 stanislav klimovich is a research fellow and lecturer of russian and east european politics at the university of potsdam. 3 ulla pape is a post-doctoral researcher at technische hochschule nürnberg georg simon ohm and an associate lecturer at the freie universität berlin, germany. 4 markus b. siewert is the managing director of the tum think tank at the munich school of politics and public policy 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 introduction corporate social responsibility (csr) has emerged as a business concept rooted in developed western economies (crotty 2016). from a neo-institutional perspective, scholars have attempted to understand why and how csr practices have been adopted and translated across nations (bondy et al. 2012; brammer et al. 2012; crotty 2016; gjolberg 2009; hofman et al. 2017; kang and moon 2012; maier 2021). the research has also turned to the question of csr development in authoritarian contexts that lack the institutional prerequisites—such as a functioning market, effective governmental and legal institutions and an autonomous civil society—that are commonly considered necessary for business actors to engage in csr (matten and moon 2008). nevertheless, companies in autocracies do actively engage in csr, and this development requires further explanation. russia provides a salient example. despite an increasingly authoritarian political regime (gel’man 2015), the subordination of business under state interests (rochlitz et al. 2020) and a weak civil society, there has been a proliferation of csr in russia over the past two decades (blagov et al. 2015; fifka and pobizhan 2014), which is evidenced by a growing number of large companies, both russian and foreign, which have institutionalized csr in their business operations. however, in contrast to other authoritarian regimes like china, the development of csr in russia is not the result of state legislation (hofman et al. 2017). although the russian state informally requires companies to engage in social responsibility, it does not provide formal regulation that prescribes csr institutionalization within business organizations (fifka and pobizhan 2014). instead, the development of csr in russia seems to be primarily driven by informal expectations of state actors and society at large, which concern the socially responsible behaviour of businesses (zueva and fairbrass 2021). these expectations are influenced by the experiences of the soviet economy and the post-soviet market transition, which translate into different forms of csr in companies in russia (crotty 2016). to analyze the csr institutionalization in authoritarian russia, the authors identify the underlying factors that shape the behaviour of business actors in a specific institutional context. the article argues that csr development is not a uniform process but can be understood as the result of different isomorphic pressures (campbell 2007; dimaggio and powell 1983) that occur at two separate levels: the global and the national. on the one hand, companies in russia are subject to pressures that stem from their integration into international markets and global value chains (crotty 2016). on the other hand, they operate within a domestic institutional context and need to respond to the demands of internal and external stakeholders at the national level (crotty 2016; fifka and pobizhan 2014). csr institutionalization took place against the backdrop of growing autocratization in russia that culminated in the military aggression against ukraine in 2022. the war and the subsequent sanctions against russia have led to the growing economic isolation of the country, with more than 1000 international companies withdrawing from the russian market. unprecedented sanctions targeted many of the largest russian corporations, not only directly state-owned, but also belonging to the so-called oligarchs with close ties to the kremlin. alongside the wellknown restrictions on russian gas and oil, a sector largely controlled by the state, the sanctioning countries also prohibited imports of russian coal and metals (atlantic council 2024). this massively affected the metallurgical and mining sector—the main realm of the oligarchs loyal to the regime. at present, it is impossible to determine the full extent of this economic isolation, but economists expect the russian economy to stagnate for years (bofit russia team 2023; prokopenko 2023). 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 this study focuses on csr institutionalization in russia before the full-scale invasion of ukraine in 2022. it explores the specific conditions for csr institutionalization in russian firms and various economic sectors (maier 2021; muller et al. 2023). even though this study is based on data gathered before the war, it is important to obtain a clear picture of csr institutionalization in russia. prior to the sanctions, russian companies were closely embedded in international markets, and csr was institutionalized in accordance with global trends and standards. even if sanctions are eventually lifted, the war’s impact on the economy and trade relations will remain long lasting. the analysis is guided by two questions: first, to what extent companies in russia institutionalize their csr activities, and second, which factors account for the institutionalization of csr norms and practices in companies in russia? the authors focus on the institutionalization of csr, defined as the standardization and formalization of csr practices within companies, as the most distinctive and measurable expression of csr development. they, thus, analyze the institutionalization of csr as the adoption of csr practices at the organizational level (haberberg et al. 2010) and follow the tradition of studying institutionalization processes that do not occur between organizations but within them (o’connor et al. 2017; tolbert and zucker 1996). the formalization of csr practices within companies is an element of corporate communication and, thus, a way in which business actors shape their relations with relevant stakeholders. formalized csr, as reflected in csr reports and internal procedures, therefore, does not necessarily equal the implementation of programs on the ground, particularly in closed authoritarian settings such as russia, where public pressure remains limited. nevertheless, the institutionalization of csr at the organizational level constitutes an important process in its own right, as it provides evidence of how companies in russia have changed their behaviour under the influence of external pressures for greater social responsibility. the authors developed an original index that allows them to measure the degree of csr institutionalization. drawing on literature that stresses the multidimensionality of companies’ csr activities (bondy et al. 2012; campbell 2007), the index captures central elements of csr institutionalization. the data used to build the index are drawn from the 45 largest companies by revenue across three major branches of the russian economy: oil and gas, mining and metallurgy, and retail. energy and metallurgy represent “old” industries rooted in the soviet economy. the difference between the two is that while oil and gas remain state-dominated, metallurgy and mining are mostly privately owned and are controlled by the oligarchs. in contrast, the retail sector is a “new” branch that has been rapidly growing with the market transition of the economy. to answer the second question, concerning the factors that account for the institutionalization of csr norms and practices in companies in russia, the authors draw on a neo-institutionalist framework and apply a systematic cross-case analysis using qualitative comparative analysis (qca) (ragin 2008; schneider and wagemann 2012) to analyze the impact of different isomorphic pressures on the adoption of csr norms and practices among businesses in russia. this article is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the russian institutional context for the development of csr. section 3 elaborates on the measurement of csr institutionalization and reviews the variation in its degree across companies. section 4 outlines the theoretical framework for explaining csr institutionalization within firms in russia. section 5 describes the data and methods, while section 6 presents the findings of the empirical analysis. section 7 interprets these findings and situates them within the broader theoretical literature. the article concludes with a brief summary and remarks on avenues for future research. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 csr in russia’s authoritarian capitalism a central controversy in the scholarly debate on csr concerns the reasons why business actors engage in socially responsible behaviour. in the traditional western understanding, csr is viewed as a voluntary activity, often described as going “beyond compliance,” (davis 1973, 313) undertaken to mitigate risks and enhance business performance. recently, institutionalist scholars have challenged this narrow business-centred view and instead argued that csr needs to be understood from a broader perspective to capture the diversity of the institutional arrangements that shape csr practices across nations (matten and moon 2008). consequently, csr is not merely viewed as a business tool, but as “private…collective forms of selfregulation” (brammer et al. 2012, 7) that occur at the interface between business and society. the development of csr in authoritarian settings is a puzzling case, as state dominance over the economy challenges the very idea of csr as voluntary activity by business actors. csr in russia is subject to different—and at times contradictory—economic and political developments, which have shaped the nature of csr practices within its business community (blagov and petrova-savchenko 2012; crotty 2016; fifka and pobizhan 2014). as an emerging economy, russia experienced a difficult transition from planned economy to capitalism after the fall of the soviet union in 1991. since putin’s accession to presidency in 2000, the country has experienced a “centralisation of management and concentration of financial resources in the hands of the kremlin and the federal government” (yakovlev 2014, 11). russia’s current economic system has been characterized as “authoritarian capitalism” (sallai and schnyder 2021) with businesses being highly intertwined with and tightly controlled by the state. sallai and schnyder (2021, 3) argue that authoritarian capitalism is “the result of constant renegotiation and redefinition of the boundary between the public and the private domains not just in the political, but also in the economic realm.” the defining criterion is “state action that infringes on key principles of the ‘rule of law’” (sallai and schnyder 2021, 28), which sets authoritarian capitalism apart from other state-permeated business systems. state actors, thus, do not only intervene in the economy but also erode the frontier between the public and private domains by using authoritarian mechanisms with the aim of serving the particular interests of the governing elite. the degradation of the rule of law in putin’s russia has been observed by multiple scholars (markus 2015; yakovlev 2014). the arbitrariness of state action means that business actors need to act upon uncertainty and defend themselves against predatory state behaviour (yakovlev 2014), which has a major impact on the adoption of csr norms and practices by business actors. depending on their position in the business system, companies in russia are subject to diverse pressures at the international and national levels, which have given rise to the emergence of different forms of csr. the adoption of csr practices in russia can be traced to three main drivers: the need to secure access to export markets, the soviet legacy of the socially responsible enterprise, and state efforts to compensate for weakened capacities in the social sphere. (crotty 2016, 836). recent research also points to the fact that both state actors and local communities expect businesses to provide for social welfare (bluhm and kropp 2023). although state authorities at all levels in russia heavily rely on the assistance of business actors in welfare provision (klimovich et al. 2023; pape 2024), the government has made no significant attempts to provide a legal and regulatory framework for csr (fifka and pobizhan 2014).5 instead, russian decision makers have frequently used the notion of “social 5 the only exception is the 2017 legal initiative on obligatory non-financial reporting, which has still not been approved by the state duma. 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 responsibility” as a discursive device to underpin the state’s authority over large companies and to legitimize informal demands of extra-taxational payments from the business community (zueva and fairbrass 2021). in turn, companies used their financial resources, framed as social responsibility and csr, as a strategy of legitimation of their (oligarchic) capital for the wider public (klimovich et al. 2023; kropp et al. 2023). the tradition of informal relations between the authorities and business actors thus discourages the formalization of csr procedures in favour of exclusive agreements between state and business actors. in sum, the institutional context for csr development in russia’s authoritarian capitalism is characterized by a defective rule of law, limited protection of property rights, a high level of informality, and insecurity in state–business relations. this occurs within a system characterized by minimal state regulation in the field of csr. in this article, the authors argue that companies in russia do engage in csr, but that under the conditions of authoritarian capitalism it assumes different forms from those found in western countries. to demonstrate this, the authors examine the extent to which companies in russia have institutionalized csr in their operations. indeed, one can observe a growing csr institutionalization in russia. over the past two decades, russia has seen a gradual proliferation of csr, with an increasing number of firms institutionalizing csr practices in their business operations. for instance, as of 2019, 64 prominent russian companies have become members of the united nations global compact initiative (un global compact russia 2025). business actors, thus, use international standards and approaches to structure and systematize their csr activities. the most visible sign of the proliferation of csr in russia has been an increase in non-financial reporting among large corporations. according to the russian union of industrialists and entrepreneurs, the number of large corporations that provide non-financial reporting has grown continuously since 2000, reaching 176 corporations in 2018 (rspp 2019). the subsequent sections of this article elaborate on the measurement of csr institutionalization within companies in russia and explore the factors that explain this process. measuring csr institutionalization although csr has proliferated among russia’s leading businesses, there remains a lack of comprehensive measures that capture csr institutionalization at the company level. building on previous research (bondy et al. 2012; campbell 2007), this article understands csr institutionalization as a multidimensional process that can be achieved through different sets of attributes. companies institutionalize csr by establishing organizational structures, implementing social and ecological programs, and reporting to their stakeholders, i.e., by formalizing their csr activities and making them visible. to capture this multidimensionality, the authors construct an index based on seven components, each speaking to a different aspect of embedding social responsibility as a formalized practice within a company. the first component captures whether corporate governance and organizational structures concerning csr are in place—a fact which is crucial to the strategic management of a company (lock and seele 2016). in this regard, having a top manager or a specific department responsible for csr resembles a strong institutionalization measure at the level of strategic management, whereas having no department or officer in charge of csr is a clear sign of a lack of institutionalization. between these extremes, companies may embed csr within another department and treat it alongside other issues or appoint a csr manager without establishing a dedicated department. 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 beyond organizational structures, such as written documentation and activities like programs and projects can be considered an important element of corporate social behaviour (wood 1991). concerning policies, institutionalization is indicated by whether a company has an explicit written csr policy in place. on the other hand, some companies cover csr in a less systematized and integrated manner, through separate social and environmental policies, which can be viewed as weaker forms of csr institutionalization. in addition, csr activities can include a variety of schemes, which address different external and internal stakeholders, have different organizational designs, and thematic directions. among them, csr programs, grant competitions, pension funds, and corporate foundations can be considered practices that mark the institutionalization of csr (blagov and petrova-savchenko 2012). as there are no theoretical grounds for ranking these practices according to their contribution to csr institutionalization, they are assessed in an additive manner: the more systemic csr practices a company adopts, the higher the degree of institutionalization. organizational structures, policies, and activities are one side of csr institutionalization. nevertheless, previous research also stresses the importance of making companies’ csr programs and activities visible (hawn and ioannou 2015). against this backdrop, proper reporting and communication with stakeholders are additional features of csr institutionalization. csr reporting has become a widespread tool for companies to signal their social responsibility to the public (fifka 2012). this reporting may take various forms, such as the inclusion of a csr rubric in annual reports, a standalone csr report, or a csr report subject to an independent audit, with the latter representing the highest degree of institutionalization. moreover, companies may establish information systems and present themselves as socially responsible on their websites (maignan and ralston 2002). for instance, companies may raise the visibility of csr practices by operating individual websites related to their csr activities and programs, which can be viewed as a strong form of csr institutionalization. in contrast, companies with weaker forms of institutionalization may provide only infrequent or no information on their csr programs. finally, the official reference to international standards and budgeting also plays an important role in csr institutionalization, not only in terms of reporting but also in terms of shaping csr practices (fortanier et al. 2011). having a fixed budget dedicated to csr policies and activities is a clear sign of its institutionalization. in practice, companies calculate csr budgets very differently, which makes official figures hard to compare.6 in addition, despite investing a remarkable share of their revenues in csr (polishchuk 2009), companies in russia are generally reluctant to report on their csr spending, since it goes beyond their core business operations (fifka and pobizhan 2014, 199). for these reasons, the authors focus on the issue of transparent reporting, which addresses whether a company discloses its csr expenditures or chooses not to. lastly, references to the united nations (un) global compact, international labour organization (ilo) conventions, and the organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) guidelines are a sign of strong csr institutionalization insofar as they signal adherence to universal codifications of csr practices as part of the broader sustainable development agenda. in contrast, the international organization for standardization (iso standards) are focused on providing precise guidelines on socially and ecologically responsible behaviour, whereas occupational health and safety assessment series (ohsas) standards are primarily focused on maintenance of labour safety, thereby indicating a weaker form of csr. 6 for example, several retailers count customer donations collected at the checkout counter as part of their reported csr spending, whereas others exclude them. 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 table 1 provides a summary of all seven components and how they are incorporated into the index. the authors selected the seven components to ensure they capture a broad range of possible institutional csr features, while equal weighting was applied to maintain conceptual balance and avoid arbitrary prioritization. the additive index produces a graded measure of csr institutionalization, ranging from 0 (no institutionalization) to 7 (strong institutionalization). the selected calibration captures meaningful distinctions in the degree of set membership. assigning values of 0, 0.25, 0.75, and 1 to individual components of the index aligns more closely with the logic of fuzzy sets. these thresholds help distinguish cases that lean toward either side of set inclusion, improving both the interpretive clarity and robustness of the configurational analysis. table 1: index of csr institutionalization component indicators for strong / weak institutionalization scoring 1. organizational structure ▪ top csr manager or separate csr department ▪ csr function embedded in a different department ▪ csr manager without department ▪ no csr manager or department 1.0 0.75 0.25 0.0 2. policy ▪ explicit csr policy in place ▪ social and environmental policy ▪ social or environmental policy ▪ no specific policy in place 1.0 0.75 0.25 0.0 3. activities ▪ company conducts grant competitions ▪ company runs a pension fund ▪ company manages csr programs ▪ company has a corporate foundation 0.25 each (additive) 4. reporting ▪ csr report with independent audit ▪ csr report ▪ csr rubric in the annual report ▪ no mentioning of csr in a report 1.0 0.75 0.25 0.0 5. visibility ▪ website for csr programs ▪ separate rubric for csr activities ▪ reference to csr on the general website ▪ no information about csr 1.0 0.75 0.25 0.0 6. standards ▪ reference to un global compact, ilo or oecd guidelines ▪ reference to iso ▪ reference to ohsas ▪ no standards mentioned 1.0 0.75 0.25 0.0 7. budget ▪ budget for csr disclosed ▪ budget for csr not disclosed 1 0 index of csr institutionalization additive index of all seven components max. 7 min. 0 source: authors’ compilation figure 1 demonstrates that there is a considerable variation in the degree of csr institutionalization across 45 of the largest companies in russia (in terms of revenue) in the fields of oil and gas (black bars), mining and metallurgy (hatched bars), and retail (gray bars), considering the top 15 companies from each sector. the y-axis represents the level of csr 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 institutionalization, measured on a scale from 0 (weak) to 7 (strong). each bar indicates the csr institutionalization level for a company, thus enabling a cross-company and cross-sector comparison. each company’s score is based on its csr reports, annual reports, and additional information provided on its website (see the supplementary material for details). this sample has been selected for two reasons. first, one can credibly expect companies that are at the forefront of their respective branches to be particularly prone to strong degrees of institutionalization, as they are supposed to have well-structured csr practices (bondy et al. 2012; bondy and starkey 2014). second, these firms represent a diversified sample of industries that vary across several factors relevant to the subsequent analyses, including ownership structure (state versus private), operational history and embeddedness in the russian economy (old versus new), and business model (resource-based production versus customer-focused trade). figure 1: the index of csr institutionalization across the largest 45 companies from three sectors in russia source: authors’ compilation at least three aspects stand out. first, it is apparent that there is significant variation in the degree of csr institutionalization. companies cover the full range of the index, with several companies not engaging in csr at all and others showing remarkably high levels of csr institutionalization. in total, 24 companies scored above the mid-point of 3.5 and can thus be considered as high performers in csr institutionalization. by contrast, 21 companies exhibit a substantially lower degree of csr institutionalization and can therefore be classified as low performers (with the overall mean for csr institutionalization being 3.79). second, there are striking differences between the branches. among the 24 high performers, there are 12 mining and metallurgical companies, 10 from the oil and gas industry but only two retail companies (detsky mir and x5 retail group). conversely, 13 retail companies have not made strong progress in csr, whereas only five oil and gas companies and three mining and metallurgical companies show a low degree of csr institutionalization. there is also strong variation within each sector. in the retail sector, for instance, the degree of csr 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 institutionalization ranges from 0 to 5, in the metallurgy and mining sector from 2.5 to 6.75, and in the oil and gas sector from 0.25 to 6.75. at the same time, some companies from different branches, e.g., detsky mir, novatek, and mmk, show similar degrees of csr institutionalization. one can therefore observe interesting differences within, as well as commonalities across, all branches. third, state-owned companies indicate different levels of csr institutionalization, ranging from 1.75 (slavneft) to 6.75 (gazprom neft). among the top five performers, gazprom neft is state-owned, lukoil, nornickel and severstal are privately owned, and sakhalin energy is a joint venture between the state-controlled gazprom and a group of foreign investors. if the russian state were a major promoter of csr institutionalization, one would expect equally high index scores in state-owned companies. altogether, the data shows considerable variation in the degree of csr institutionalization, which seems to be partly attributable to the characteristics of the three branches. differences across branches alone fall short of fully explaining the variations in csr institutionalization among companies in russia. however, since businesses from different branches show similar levels of csr, it is necessary to look beyond sectoral differences to explain the variation in csr institutionalization. explaining csr institutionalization previous research has shown that the csr institutionalization within a company is subject to both external and internal pressures, which stem from the institutional environment as well as stakeholder demands for businesses to take greater social responsibility (yang and rivers 2009). to identify the particular conditions and underlying mechanisms that lead to the institutionalization of csr norms and practices, the authors draw on the work by dimaggio and powell (1983) and campbell (2007) and combine different types of pressures into a configurative analytical framework. dimaggio and powell’s (1983) concept of isomorphic change involves three mechanisms. first, coercive isomorphism is the result of formal and informal pressures from other organizations and the society at large, including laws and regulations, the influence of organized societal (external) stakeholders, such as citizen activists, ngos, and market standards. second, mimetic isomorphism refers to processes where an organization models itself on others to overcome environmental uncertainty, e.g., by borrowing best practices and solutions from actors in the field “that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful” (dimaggio and powell 1983, 152). third, normative isomorphism results from professionalisation within the field, which is achieved primarily through education and the establishment of professional networks. here, the exchange of professional knowledge plays an important role in advancing normative isomorphic change. in addition to the three isomorphic pressures, campbell (2007) introduces stakeholder pressures as a mechanism that encourages the development of social responsibility. according to this view, dialogue between a company and its stakeholders has a positive effect on the company’s social responsibility. among them, shareholders and employees are most important internal stakeholders for companies’ csr. while different isomorphic mechanisms overlap in practice and the types “are not always empirically distinct” (dimaggio and powell 1983, 150), one expects that no condition alone will be necessary and/or sufficient for the institutionalization of csr but instead find distinct configurations of conditions. in the following section, the authors identify a suitable proxy for 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 each of the four outlined mechanisms (see table 2). the proxies are divided at two levels according to their origin. in sum, the article concentrates on four international conditions, which stem from global pressures that companies are challenged with, and four national conditions, which refer to the russian institutional environment and stakeholder demands for csr institutionalization. table 2: explanatory conditions for csr institutionalization in russia mechanisms international conditions national conditions coercive pressures international listing national listing mimetic pressures international market soviet legacy normative pressures international expertise business association (rspp) stakeholder pressures international investors / shareholders employees in russia source: authors’ compilation at the international level, being listed on the international stock exchanges acts as an important coercive pressure for russian companies. previous studies have confirmed the relevance of international listings with obligatory provisions on non-financial reporting as an important driver of csr disclosure among companies in russia (bhatia and makkar 2019). in line with the expanding sustainability agenda, companies attract international investors not only by emphasizing their economic performance but also by allocating significant resources to social responsibility, particularly in cleaner production and the protection of human rights throughout the supply chain. furthermore, by operating in international markets, russian companies can draw on the experiences and solutions developed by other firms. this, in turn, can serve as a guideline for structuring their own csr by importing policies and reporting practices. such mimicking paves the way for stronger csr institutionalization in accordance with global standards and market benchmarks (dimaggio and powell 1983). moreover, the international promotion of a csr agenda by professional networks and communities generates normative pressure to institutionalize these practices (campbell 2007; fortanier et al. 2011; fransen 2012). international business associations, board members, and executive managers are important actors because they introduce expertise, experiences, and practices to russian businesses by drawing on international csr standards. finally, shareholders are the most powerful stakeholders in companies’ csr as they are making decisions about the strategic priorities in business operations (mitchell et al. 1997). it has been shown that there is a turn towards “responsible ownership” (o’rourke 2003) and “socially responsible investment” (sparkes and cowton 2004) in western economies, with shareholders expecting their assets to properly address social and environmental issues. thus, one can assume that international investors positively affect the institutionalization of csr insofar as they possess resources to stimulate the incorporation of international csr standards and practices into the business strategies of their russian assets and business units. being listed nationally at the moscow stock exchange (moex) is the functional counterpart of an international listing, constituting a coercive mechanism. listed companies are thought to behave in a more socially responsible way and are more likely to provide reporting on their activities due to stock market pressures (goergen et al. 2015; van cranenburgh et al. 2013). mimetic pressures may also be present, since companies adopt csr practices modelled on their own prior experiences with social responsibility. in the soviet planned economy, factories and businesses used to play an important role in the provision of social services and support for 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 social infrastructure on the territory of their operations as well as providing extensive non-wage benefits for employees (cook 1993; davis 2001). in addition, national trade and employer associations promote socially responsible behaviour among businesses (campbell 2007). in russia, rossiiskii soiuz promyshlennikov i predprinimatelei [the russian union of industrialists and entrepreneurs] (rspp) is one of the major promoters of the csr agenda and has established two committees on csr and charity, as well as a council on non-financial reporting consisting of experts responsible for public audits and the verification of csr reports (rspp 2025). finally, employee demands for socially responsible behaviour can be considered a final driver of csr institutionalization (mcwilliams and siegel 2001). as companies with a large number of employees are growing in size, they must establish an appropriate csr organizational system to meet minimum standards and ensure coherent social policy across business units in different regions of the country. figure 2 presents the analytical framework. the analysis is conducted separately at the international and national levels. in doing so, the authors follow a “competing theories approach” (blatter and haverland 2012, 144), which maintains this separation to test the interplay of conditions within each level. the article uses these proxies for coercive, mimetic, normative, and stakeholder pressures as explanatory conditions in the empirical analysis, allowing the authors to explore which configurations of mechanisms are consistently associated with the institutionalization of csr. it is worth noting that the explanatory framework is designed to primarily explain under what conditions companies institutionalize csr practices, not why they fail to do so. this focus is viable for two reasons. first, since the mechanisms listed above are responsible for greater csr institutionalization, there is no theoretical expectation that the simple absence of these conditions should be linked to the weak or noninstitutionalization of csr practices. second, the authors contend that non-institutionalization arises not only from a lack of incentives to institutionalize csr but also from other factors that hinder the adoption of csr practices. put differently, one would need an entirely different analytical framework to examine why companies fail to institutionalize csr.7 figure 2: analytical framework to explain csr institutionalization source: authors’ compilation method and data to explain the institutionalization of csr in russia, the authors make use of qualitative comparative analysis (qca) (ragin 2008). as a set-theoretic approach, qca models associations between explanatory conditions and an outcome of interest as superset and subset relations, which can be interpreted in terms of necessity and sufficiency. qca is particularly 7 in qca, such asymmetric assumptions are built-in since outcome and non-outcome needs to be analyzed separately. for methodological reasons, the authors also ran an analysis for the absence of csr institutionalization and presented the results in the supplementary material. however, they abstain from interpreting them in a substantial manner. csr institutionalization in russian companies international listing markets expertise investors/shareholders conditions at the international level national listing soviet legacy business association employees conditions at the national level 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 well-suited to the research question at hand, as it allows the examination of, first, which combinations of conditions facilitate csr institutionalization (configurationality); second, whether multiple configurations account for different cases of csr institutionalization (equifinality); and third, to concentrate on the conditions are associated with the institutionalization of csr without presuming what factors explain its absence (asymmetry). the analytic protocol of qca is as follows: first, the authors test for superset relations, which can be interpreted in terms of necessity. a condition is considered necessary if, whenever the outcome is present, the condition is also present. for example, a high degree of csr institutionalization requires the presence of a given condition (formally, if y then x). the analysis of necessity considers both individual conditions and or-combinations (also called disjunctions). the latter are interpreted as necessary when they involve theoretically meaningful, substitutable conditions (schneider 2018, 248–9). next, the authors examined sufficiency relations, i.e., whenever conditions (or combinations thereof) are present, the institutionalization of csr should also be observed (formally, if x then y). the subset analysis is based on the truth table, which displays all logically possible combinations of conditions along with additional information on the underlying cases, limited empirical diversity (that is, combinations without empirical cases), and the strength of set relations. configurations that are consistently linked to the outcome are then further minimized (the authors used the packages “qca” (dusa 2019) and “setmethods” (oana et al. 2019), whose main objective is to remove redundant factors and to isolate those that make a difference across cases. a series of parameters exists to assess the quality of the set relations (ragin 2008, 44–69; schneider 2018; schneider and wagemann 2012, 119–49). the consistency parameter indicates the strength of set association and ranges between 0 for no relationship and 1 for a perfect set relation. the authors use a consistency level of 0.9 for necessity and 0.8 for sufficiency as widely accepted benchmarks (schneider 2018, 247). the empirical importance of set relations can be grasped using the coverage and relevance parameters.8 ranging between 0 and 1, low values on both parameters point towards low empirical importance or trivial associations, whereas high values indicate empirically relevant set relations.9 before one can perform any analysis in qca, all data needs to be transformed into sets, a procedure called calibration (ragin 2008, 71). the outcome is the degree of csr institutionalization based on the index introduced in the previous section. as outlined above, the index ranges from 0 to 7, with higher scores corresponding to stronger membership in the set of csr institutionalization. companies with a score of 7 are fully included in the set of csr institutionalization, whereas companies with a score of 0 are fully excluded. the cut-off point is set at the index’s midpoint of 3.5, which can be justified by the fact that the authors focus on the largest companies in terms of revenue, meaning that by its design, the sample already includes companies that face a high degree of pressure to institutionalize csr. table 3 provides an overview of the explanatory conditions. international listing, national listing, and soviet legacy are measured using dichotomous crisp sets, where a case, for instance, either has a soviet legacy (1) or not (0). the other conditions are based on fuzzy sets, which allow for degrees of set memberships in addition to the qualitative differentiation, e.g., being partially in (0.75) or partially out (0.25) of a set. the authors qualitatively coded all conditions 8 see mahoney and vanderpoel 2015, 70–2. 9 the pri parameter in the context of sufficiency analysis indicates if there is a problem with simultaneous subset relations, which refers to the fact that a configuration can be consistently linked to the outcome and the non-outcome at the same time. for instance, configuration x might be consistently associated with high and low degrees of csr institutionalization, which accounts for a contradictory claim and should therefore be avoided. 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 based on a detailed review of respective information collected from company websites and supplementary reports. table 3: indicators, data sources and calibration of the explanatory conditions condition indicators calibration strategy international level international listing listing on, at least, one foreign stock exchange. data source: company’s website. 1 = if a company is listed 0 = if a company is not listed international market international market orientation is measured via two indicators: i) whether a company has international customers, and/or ii) there are production sites outside of russia. data source: company’s website. 1 = if a company has both international customers and factories 0.75 = if it has either international customers or factories 0 = if a company has neither international customers nor factories international expertise international expertise is measured via three indicators: i) membership in international business association, ii) presence of foreign board members, and iii) presence of foreign topmanagers. data source: company’s website and report. 1= if all three indicators are present 0.75 = if two out of three are present 0.25 if one out of three is present 0 = if none of the three indicators are present international investors / shareholders role of international investors differentiates between i) companies with major international shareholders (at least 50 % of the shares), ii) companies with minor international shareholders (at least 5%), and iii) companies without international shareholders. data source: company’s website and report. 1= if there is major international shareholder 0.75 = if there is a minor shareholder 0 = if there is no international shareholder national level national listing listing on moscow stock exchange (moex) data source: company’s website. 1 = if a company is listed 0 = if a company is not listed soviet legacy existence of the current business before the collapse of the soviet union in 1991. data source: company’s website. 1= if company existed before 1991 0 = if a company was created after 1991 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 national level business association (rspp) potential impact of rspp membership using four levels of active participation in the business association’s structures promoting csr: i) csr and charity committee membership, ii) csr or charity committee membership, iii) rspp membership, or iv) no rspp membership at all. data source: rspp website. 1 = if a company is member of the csr and the charity committee 0.75 = if a company is member of either the csr or the charity committee 0.25 = if a company is only a member in the rspp 0 = if a company is not a member in the rspp employees in russia number of russian employees in 2018 as an indicator of their influence. data source: company’s website and report. 1= if a company belongs to the first quartile in its respective sector 0.75 = if a company belongs to the second quartile in its respective sector 0.25 = a company belongs to the third quartile in its respective sector 0 = a company belongs to the fourth quartile in its respective sector source: authors’ compilation empirical analysis this section discusses the results of the qca, presenting first the findings of the analysis at the international level and then those at the national level. both sections discuss necessity and sufficiency relations, following the analytic protocol outlined above. conditions at the international level: explaining csr institutionalization the analysis shows that none of the international conditions, whether considered individually or in combination, meet the relevant benchmarks and can therefore be deemed necessary for the institutionalization of csr in russian companies. the authors, therefore, conclude that leading companies in russia have adopted csr as a part of their business strategy in various contexts without any particular condition being necessary for csr institutionalization. table 4 presents the results of the most parsimonious strategy, based on the truth table displayed in table b1 in the supplementary material to this manuscript.10 the solution consists of three configurations of international conditions, which together account for 19 of the 24 companies that display a high degree of institutionalization of csr practices. the overall model shows a very good fit, with a consistency of 0.82 (i.e., 82 percent of the data is in line with the subset relations) and a coverage of 0.73 (i.e., 73 percent of the outcome set is covered by the three 10 in order to qualify as sufficient, a truth table row needs to pass a consistency score of 0.8 and a pri value of 0.6. based on these criteria, row 3 is excluded from the minimization since it is associated with strong and weak csr institutionalization simultaneously, which is contradictory (see table b1). 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 international packages). the pri of 0.77 indicates that the solution is not simultaneously associated with the opposite outcome, that is, no or weak csr institutionalization.11 table 4: international conditions linked to csr institutionalization solution terms model consistency: .82 | pri: .77 | coverage: .73 consistency pri raw coverage unique coverage cases markets* expertise .94 .92 .58 .09 transneft, suek; sibur, sakhalin energy; evraz, nlmk, severstal, tmk, polyus; lukoil, rosneft, tatneft, novatek, rusal, nornickel, mmk markets* investors / shareholders .87 .83 .37 .04 detsky mir, slavneft, metalloinvest; sibur, sakhalin energy; gazprom, nezavisimaya neftegazovaya kompaniy; lukoil, rosneft, tatneft, novatek, rusal, nornickel, mmk markets* international listing .79 .74 .51 .03 gazprom neft, surgutneftegas, mechel; gazprom, nezavisimaya neftegazovaya kompaniya; evraz, nlmk, severstal, tmk, polyus; lukoil, rosneft, tatneft, novatek, rusal, nornickel, mmk note: we apply the most parsimonious strategy to identify core conditions. results of the complex and intermediate strategy are described in the supplementary material. the pri score highlights that there is no problem of simultaneous subset relations. the raw coverage indicates how much of the outcome set a solution term explains, while the unique coverage signals how much is solely explained by this term, not considering those cases which are covered by both terms. uniquely covered cases (bold) are only explained by the respective configuration while multiple covered cases are explained by both terms; cases in italics highlight deviant cases, i.e., which do not show the outcome. source: authors’ compilation 11 depending on how logical remainders, i.e. rows without empirical cases, are treated, qca produces three types of solution formulas. in the present analysis, all three strategies produce the same result since neither the intermediate nor the parsimonious strategy makes use of the two logical remainders of the truth table. this speaks to the robustness of the findings. 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 the first group of companies that exhibit csr institutionalization are enterprises that are export-oriented and strongly influenced by outside expertise. these companies, thus, combine mimetic and normative pressures, as can be seen in typical cases such as transneft and siberian coal energy company (suek). by operating in international markets, such as through cooperation with international customers, these firms gain access to experiences and solutions employed by other companies, which serve as guidelines for structuring their csr activities in russia. companies also adopt international best practices through the imitation of csr practices and the adoption of norms translated through international networks and experts. a combination of mimetic and stakeholder pressure characterizes the second type of companies that exhibit institutionalized csr practices. firms like detsky mir and metalloinvest are representative of this configuration. this type is similar to the first path to institutionalization since global markets again play a crucial role in the introduction of international market values and practices to russia. this time, however, it is combined with the influence of international shareholders, which accounts for the adoption of csr standards and practices. finally, the third type of companies connects csr institutionalization with mimetic and coercive pressures.12 it uniquely describes gazprom neft and surgutneftegas, which, in comparison to the big three—lukoil, gazprom, and rosneft—are smaller players in the russian oil and gas sector and rely on international market access. since these companies need access to international markets and listings, they are forced to fulfil the requirements of international stock markets when it comes to the adoption of csr practices. this confirms the position of several russian companies in international value chains. conditions at the national level: explaining csr institutionalization turning to the national level, the superset analysis again shows that no single condition comes close to the required benchmarks to be considered necessary. looking at disjuncts, national listing or soviet legacy passes the consistency threshold; however, the authors refrain from interpreting this combination as necessary since there is no overarching theoretical concept that links these two conditions (schneider 2018, 247–8). against this backdrop, one can conclude that companies institutionalize csr norms and practices irrespective of whether a particular national condition is required. table 5 presents the results of the most parsimonious strategy based on the truth table displayed in table b2 in the supplementary material. the overall solution consists of three terms and covers 17 of the 24 companies that institutionalize csr. the solution has a good fit with a consistency of 0.82 and a coverage of 0.71; the pri of 0.78 indicates that no problem of simultaneous subset relation exists.13 12 international listing *~expertise turns out to be an alternative term—a phenomenon called model ambiguity (baumgartner and thiem 2015). however, the authors treat this configuration as a data artefact for two reasons. first, it is less consistent and empirically less relevant, covering only 22.6 percent of the outcome. second, and more importantly, the low pri score of 0.48 indicates that the combination international listing*~expertise is simultaneously associated with weak csr institutionalization. 13 the authors again choose a consistency threshold of 0.8 and a pri threshold of 0.6. this time, there is no problem with rows that are simultaneously associated with the presence and absence of the outcome. the most parsimonious strategy again yields the same results as the intermediate solution, as both make use of all three logical remainders. the findings are hence robust to alternative solution strategies. 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 table 5: national conditions linked to csr institutionalization solution terms model consistency: .82 | pri: .78 | coverage: .71 consistency pri raw coverage unique coverage cases soviet_legacy* ~national listing .81 .78 .23 .05 zarubezhneft; sibur, ugmk/ummc; suek, omk; evraz, metalloinvest soviet_legacy* employees .82 .77 .50 .16 rosneft, gazprom, gazprom neft, surgutneftegas, transneft, tatneft, mechel; lukoil, nlmk, rusal, nornickel, severstal; sibur, ugmk/ummc; evraz, metalloinvest business assocations .96 .94 .46 .10 sakhalin energy; mmk, tmk; lukoil, nlmk, rusal, nornickel, severstal; suek, omk; evraz, metalloinvest note: we apply the most parsimonious strategy to identify core conditions. results of the complex and intermediate strategy are described in the supplementary material. the pri score highlights that there is no problem of simultaneous subset relations. the raw coverage indicates how much of the outcome set a solution term explains, while the unique coverage signals how much is solely explained by this term, not considering those cases which are covered by both terms. uniquely covered cases (bold) are only explained by the respective configuration while multiple covered cases are explained by both terms; cases in italics highlight deviant cases, i.e., which do not show the outcome. source: authors’ compilation the first type describes companies that institutionalize csr based on mimetic and non-coercive pressures. companies like zarubezhneft are typical of this type, as they build on a soviet legacy without being listed on the national stock exchange. the company’s high degree of csr institutionalization can be explained by the fact that the company is deeply rooted in the soviet tradition of responsibility towards employees and territories of operation. since it is statecontrolled and mainly operates outside of russia, zarubezhneft is not listed on the moscow stock exchange. mimetic and stakeholder pressures are present in the second type of companies. firms like rosneft, gazprom, gazprom neft, surgutneftegas, and transneft fit especially well within this category as they exhibit a soviet legacy together with a large number of russian employees. what these companies have in common is that they inherited production sites from soviet times and have a strong connection to the places in which their production is based. employees and 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 the local population are, therefore, key stakeholders, which means that the companies define their csr activities mainly as a responsibility towards their workforce and the territories in which they operate. the large number of employees and the broad geographic scope of operations make it necessary for these companies to develop organizational structures and coherent csr policies. the third type of companies, exemplified by sakhalin energy, mmk, and tmk, is defined by normative pressures, as highlighted by the importance of active involvement in the business association rossiiskii soiuz promyshlennikov i predprinimatelei (rspp). the rspp is a key norm entrepreneur in csr in russia, serving as a networking venue that promotes the adoption of csr practices among companies by establishing committees on csr and offering guidance on how companies can best introduce and organize csr (blagov et al. 2015; flohr et al. 2012). discussion what do the findings tell us about the overall development of csr in russia and, more specifically, about its institutionalization? in light of the above analyses, two aspects emerge as particularly significant: 1) companies in russia display significant variation in csr institutionalization, which cannot be attributed only to branch specificities; 2) csr institutionalization is primarily linked to mimetic isomorphism at both the international and the national levels, but only when combined with other institutional pressures. based on the index, one can infer that the degree of csr institutionalization varies significantly across companies in russia. out of the 45 examined companies, 24 firms exhibit a high level of csr institutionalization. of the csr leaders, oil and gas companies, along with metallurgists and mining firms, constitute the majority, whereas retailers generally rank among the low performers in the institutionalization of csr practices. although the degree of csr institutionalization seems to go hand in hand with the specific conditions of particular branches of the economy and general trends are recognizable, it cannot suffice as an explanation of this multidimensional process for two reasons. on the one hand, the index highlights significant variation within branches. for example, different oil producers display both very high and very low degrees of csr institutionalization, ranging from 0.25 to 6.75. on the other hand, there are surprising similarities among companies from different branches, with several retailers— metallurgists as well as oil and gas extractors—having comparable scores in the index. therefore, factors other than branch characteristics need to be considered to explain why companies in russia have institutionalized csr. by applying a framework of coercive, mimetic, normative, and stakeholder pressures that foster csr institutionalization in companies in russia, the article investigated the explanatory factors for csr development and found mimetic isomorphism to be a key driver. indeed, mimetic pressures appear in a majority of pathways in both the international and the national sets of conditions that influence the institutionalization. a number of companies adopt csr practices because of international market pressures, which can be defined as “market-driven csr” (crotty 2016, 836). export-oriented industries are therefore subject to greater international market pressure to adopt csr standards and practices, as they depend on the cooperation of international customers. these companies imitate best practices with the aim of gaining access to international markets, and this is a strategy that applies mostly to russian companies that are part of international value chains. having achieved market access, companies also model their csr after other csr leaders. in the context of the large-scale sanctions against the russian economy, which are unlikely to be lifted in the near future and have made cooperation with 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 major companies and oligarchic capital from russia generally toxic, it can be assumed that the international mimetic pressures from western markets for csr development in the country will diminish. it is, however, unlikely that businesses from russia’s other trading partners, most notably china and india, which are currently replacing american and european markets, will produce the same pressures for the institutionalization of csr. for instance, recent studies on chinese companies expanding internationally suggest that csr considerations have little influence on their investment decisions (li et al. 2019). at the same time, the extent of csr promotion abroad varies significantly across firms and is shaped by country-specific contextual factors (fei 2023). at the national level, the “mimetic” version of csr institutionalization relates to the recurrence of soviet traditions of social responsibility as a form of “contextualised csr” (crotty 2016, 836), which primarily consists of taking care of employees and local communities (fifka and pobizhan 2014, 200). companies that have inherited production sites established in soviet times are more tightly embedded in the local economic context. being strongly linked with their regions of production, they have a vested interest in the socioeconomic development of these communities as a means of ensuring good living conditions for their employees and the local population. their local embeddedness makes them more inclined to develop social and environmental programs and to institutionalize csr activities with the aim of meeting the expectations of regional state actors and local communities. moreover, their own history of social responsibility offers the companies an opportunity to preserve or reintroduce best practices in csr from the soviet past into current business operations. however, mimetic pressures alone are not enough to account for csr institutionalization in russian companies; instead, they must be combined with coercive, normative, or stakeholder pressures. at the international level, in order to trigger the adoption of csr practices, mimetic pressures are accompanied by experts, investors, or international listings, which can thereby be regarded as functional equivalents. during the confrontation between russia and the west, this international connection and pressure for csr institutionalization will substantially decline. at the national level, the business association rspp stands out as a main proponent of csr development in russia, providing its members with guidelines and best practices for establishing csr programs and reporting. since 2022, the economic hardships of the war with ukraine and international sanctions have put many businesses into survival mode, with ambivalent consequences for csr institutionalization. on the one hand, lower profit means fewer financial resources for corporate responsibility and a possible rollback of these activities. on the other hand, as the state and societal expectations for welfare provision remain high, companies may start actively inventing, exchanging, and institutionalizing new cost-efficient but publicly visible csr practices to address these expectations. the empirical results confirm that there is no uniform path to csr development in russia but rather that combinations of multiple isomorphic pressures must be conjointly present for companies in russia to institutionalize csr norms and practices. in other words, there is no one-size-fits-all context under which companies in russia institutionalize their csr behaviour (crotty 2016). from a theoretical perspective, the study adds to the debate on isomorphic mechanisms of institutional change insofar as it provides empirical evidence showing that different forms of pressures indeed occur in complementary combinations, as prominently highlighted by dimaggio and powell (1983). the analysis of csr institutionalization in russia’s major companies provides some important new insights into the broader context of csr development in authoritarian russia. the high level of csr institutionalization among a substantial group of large corporations in russia is 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 in itself a notable observation, as the country lacks the institutional prerequisites that are commonly considered necessary for csr development, i.e. functioning markets, effective governmental and legal institutions and, most importantly, a strong and vocal civil society able to hold business actors accountable (matten and moon 2008, 406). authoritarian capitalism thus does not stand in the way of csr but rather changes its characteristics. conclusion the article examined the degree to which companies have institutionalized their csr activities in russia and the factors that explain csr institutionalization in russia’s authoritarian capitalism prior to the war against ukraine. to answer this twofold question, the authors first developed an index allowing for the assessment of the degree of csr institutionalization in companies. then, the authors identified several combinations of conditions at the international and national level, which are consistently associated with the institutionalization of csr norms and practices. in doing so, the analyses offer a series of new insights. the data highlights that the level to which russian companies institutionalize csr practices varies greatly, with some showing a high and others a low degree of institutionalization. exploring this variation further, the findings underscore the configurational nature of csr institutionalization since there is not just one but several equifinal paths to csr institutionalization. nevertheless, mimetic isomorphism, such as modelling csr activities after best international practices and path-dependent soviet-type experiences, in combination with other institutional pressures, seems to have played an important role at both national and international levels. while recognizing the configurational nature of the analysis, the authors argue that companies with access to international markets and/or a soviet legacy—subject to the complementary factors discussed above—tend to perform better in terms of csr institutionalization. since february 2022, the growing isolation of the russian economy from western markets and the sanctions against russian businesses have pushed these international factors into the background, while the role of russia’s other global trading partners in fostering the development of csr standards and practices remains questionable. however, in russian authoritarian capitalism, the state traditionally has strong informal expectations regarding companies’ social responsibility, a tendency that intensifies during wartime. in the context of the growing isolation and the kremlin’s attempts to build up a more autarkic war economy, coupled with additional pressure on national economic actors to bear the costs of the war, companies have a strong incentive to model csr after path-dependent soviet-type experiences and further institutionalize social responsibility as a defence strategy against further encroachments of the state. this study has some limitations that point in the direction of future research. first, one would need more in-depth case studies on typical and deviant companies to reconstruct the complex organization-level interactions that have led to csr institutionalization in an increasingly authoritarian setting of russia. the analysis provides a first step in this direction by identifying a series of relevant configurations that can serve as core ingredients for this, however, they need to be further unpacked to trace the underlying mechanisms. yet during the full-scale invasion of ukraine, under the current conditions of war economy, it is hard to access the relevant information and qualitative data concerning the csr activities of large corporations in russia. second, other factors should be considered in order to understand what prevents companies from institutionalizing csr, since this model is focused on those pressures that are positively connected with csr institutionalization. here, the role of informality in state-business relations 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 and the broader context of authoritarian capitalism, with its unfavourable conditions for csr institutionalization, offers a promising venue for future research. third, the authors kept the international and national levels separate, but more cross-case and within-case studies are necessary that explore the reinforcing and complementary effects of the two analytic levels and the potential trade-offs between them. finally, this study focused on csr institutionalization within companies in russia as a policy on paper and not necessarily in practice, as strongly institutionalized csr at the company level does not equate to the implementation of programs on the ground. however, it is necessary to look at both sides of the coin—how companies display their activities and how they act. therefore, further studies of csr implementation are needed to gain a deeper understanding of csr development in authoritarian contexts. 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 references atlantic council. 2024. “russia sanctions database.” accessed april 23, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/russia-sanctions-database/. bhatia, aparna, and binny makkar, b. 2019. “extent and drives of csr disclosure: evidence from russia.” transnational corporations review 11 (3): 190-207. https://doi.org/10.1080/19186444.2019.1652067. blagov, yury, and anastasia petrova-savchenko. 2012. “corporate philanthropy in russia: evidence from national awards competition.” corporate governance. the international journal of business in society 12 (4): 534–547. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701211267856. blagov, yury, kabalina, veronika, petrova-savchenko, anastasia and igor sobolev. 2015. “sozdanie tsennosti dlia biznesa i obshchestva. analiz korporativnoi sotsialʹnoi deiatelʹnosti rossiiskikh kompanii” [creating value for business and society. analysis of corporate social responsibility activities of russian companies]. rossiiskii zhurnal menedzhementa, 13 (2): 67–98. https://rjm.spbu.ru/article/view/180/172. blatter, joachim, and markus haverland. 2012. designing case studies. explanatory approaches in small-n research. palgrave macmillan. bluhm, katharina, and sabine kropp. 2023. “introduction to the symposium ‘asymmetrical resource exchange. business, state and social welfare provision in russian regions.’” east european politics 39 (1): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 21599165.2023.2183498. bofit (bank of finland – institute for emerging economies) russia team. 2023. “bofit forecast for russia 2023–2024.” accessed april 23, 2024. https://publications.bof.fi/ bitstream/handle/10024/53102/bru0223.pdf. bondy, krista, jeremy moon, and dirk matten. 2012. “an institution of corporate social responsibility (csr) in multi-national corporations (mncs). form and implications.” journal of business ethics 111 (2): 281–299. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-12087. bondy, krista, and ken starkey. 2014. “the dilemmas of internationalization: corporate social responsibility in the multinational corporation.” british journal of management 25 (1): 4–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2012.00840.x. baumgartner, michael, and alrik thiem. 2015. “model ambiguities in configurational comparative research.” sociological methods & research 46 (4): 954–987. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124115610351. brammer, stephen, gregory jackson, and dirk matten. 2012. “corporate social responsibility and institutional theory: new perspectives on private governance.” socio-economic review 10 (1): 3–28. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwr030. campbell, john l. 2007. “why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? an institutional theory of corporate social responsibility.” academy of management review 32 (3): 946–967. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2007.25275684. cook, linda. 1993. the soviet social contract and why it failed. welfare policy and workers’ politics from brezhnev to yeltsin. harvard university press. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/russia-sanctions-database/ https://doi.org/10.1080/19186444.2019.1652067 https://publications.bof.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/53102/bru0223.pdf https://publications.bof.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/53102/bru0223.pdf https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124115610351 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 crotty, jo. 2016. “corporate social responsibility in the russian federation: a contextualized approach.” business & society 55 (6): 825–853. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0007650314561965. davis, keith. 1973. “the case for and against business assumption of social responsibility.” academy of management journal 16 (2): 312–322. davis, sue. 2001. trade unions in russia and ukraine, 1985–95. palgrave macmillan. dimaggio, paul j., and walter w. powell. 1983. “the iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields.” american sociological review 48 (6): 147–160. dusa, adrian. 2019. qca with r: a comprehensive resource. springer. fei, ding. 2023. “internationalizing china standards through corporate social responsibility: an exploratory study of chinese state-owned enterprises in africa.” journal of contemporary china 33 (147): 465–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10670564.2023.2204811. fifka, matthias. 2012. “the development and state of research on social and environmental reporting in global comparison.” journal für betriebswirtschaft 62 (1): 45–84. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11301-012-0083-8. fifka, matthias, and maryna pobizhan. 2014. “an institutional approach to corporate social responsibility in russia.” journal of cleaner production 82 (1): 192– 201. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2014.06.091. flohr, annegret, rieth, lothar, schwindenhammer, sandra, and klaus dieter wolf. 2012. “variations in corporate norm-entrepreneurship: why the home state matters 1.” in business and global governance, edited by morten ougaard and anna leander, 235– 256. routledge. fortanier, fabienne, ans kolk, and jonatan pinkse. 2011. “harmonization in csr reporting: mnes and global csr standards.” management international review 51 (5): 665–696. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11575-011-0089-9. fransen, luc. 2012. “multi-stakeholder governance and voluntary programme interactions: legitimation politics in the institutional design of corporate social responsibility.” socio-economic review 10 (1): 163–192. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwr029. gelʹman, vladimir. 2015. authoritarian russia. analyzing post-soviet regime changes. university of pittsburgh press. gjolberg, maria. 2009. “the origin of corporate social responsibility. global forces or national legacies?” socio-economic review 7 (4): 605–637. https://doi.org/10.1093/ ser/mwp017. goergen, marc, salim chahine, geoffrey wood, and chris brewster. 2015. public listing, context and csr: the effects of legal origin. john h dunning centre for international business discussion papers jhd-2015-09. university of reading, uk. haberberg, adrian, jonathan gander, alison rieple, clive helm, juan-ignacio martin-castilla, and juan-ignacio. 2010. “institutionalizing idealism: the adoption of csr practices.” journal of global responsibility 1 (2): 366–381. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 20412561011079443. 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 hawn, olga, and ioannis ioannou. 2016. “mind the gap: the interplay between external and internal actions in the case of corporate social responsibility.” strategic management journal 37 (13): 2569–2588. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2464. hofman, peter, jeremy moon, and bin wu. 2017. “corporate social responsibility under authoritarian capitalism: dynamics and prospects of state-led and society-driven csr.” business & society 56 (5): 651–671. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650315623014. kang, nahee, and jeremy moon. 2012. “institutional complementarity between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility: a comparative institutional analysis of three capitalisms.” socio-economic review 10 (1): 85–108. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwr025. klimovich, stanislav, sabine kropp, and ulla pape. 2023. “defending business interests in russia: collective action and social investments as bargaining chips.” postcommunist economies 35 (1): 17–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2022.2104505. kropp, sabine, stanislav klimovich, and ulla pape. 2023. “legitimation strategies of russian companies: a bricolage of social responsibility.” east european politics 39 (1): 15–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2134122. li, minghui, faqin lan, and fang zhang. 2019. “why chinese financial market investors do not care about corporate social responsibility: evidence from mergers and acquisitions.” sustainability 11 (11): 1–34. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11113144. lock, irina and peter seele. 2016. “csr governance and departmental organization: a typology of best practices.” corporate governance 16 (1): 211–230. https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-01-2015-0010. mahoney, james and rachel sweet vanderpoel. 2015. “set diagrams and qualitative research.” comparative political studies 48 (1): 65–100. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013519410. maier, anna-lena. 2021. “political corporate social responsibility in authoritarian contexts.” journal of international business policy 4: 476–495. https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-020-00085-3. maignan, isabell and david a. ralston. 2002. “corporate social responsibility in europe and the u.s.: insights from businesses’ self-presentations.” journal of international business studies 33: 497–514. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8491028. markus, stanislav. 2015. property, predation, and protection. piranha capitalism in russia and ukraine. cambridge university press. matten, dirk and jeremy moon. 2008. “implicit” and “explicit” csr: a conceptual framework for a comparative understanding of corporate social responsibility.” the academy of management review 33 (2): 404–424. https://doi.org/10.5465/ amr.2008.31193458. mcwilliams, abagail, and donald siegel. 2001. “corporate social responsibility: a theory of the firm perspective.” the academy of management review 26 (1): 117–127. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2001.4011987. mitchell, ronald k., bradley r. agle, and donna j. wood. 1997. “toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: defining the principle of who and what really counts.” the academy of management review 22 (4): 853–886. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1997.9711022105. 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 muller, alan, weiqiang tan, mike w. peng, and mike pfarrer. 2023. “corporate philanthropy and ceo outside directorships under authoritarian capitalism.” business & society 62 (7): 1420–1457. https://doi.org/10.1177/00076503221148439. oana, ioana-elena, and carsten q. schneider. 2018. “setmethods: an add-on package for advanced qca.” the r journal 10 (1): 507–533. https://doi.org/10.32614/rj-2018-031. o’connor, amy, joshua m. parcha, and katherine l.g. tulibaski. 2017. “the institutionalization of corporate social responsibility communication: an intraindustry comparison of mncs’ and smes’ csr reports.” management communication quarterly 3 (4): 503–532. https://doi.org/10.1177/0893318917704512. o’rourke, anastasia. 2003. “a new politics of engagement: shareholder activism for corporate social responsibility.” business strategy and the environment 12 (4): 227– 239. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.364. pape, ulla. 2025. “russian business and the authoritarian welfare state.” communist and post-communist studies 58 (3) 117–146. https://doi.org/10.1525/cpcs.2024.2302616. polishchuk, leonid. 2009. “corporate social responsibility or government regulation: an analysis of institutional choice.” problems of economic transition, 52 (8): 73–94. https://doi.org/10.2753/pet1061-1991520805. prokopenko, alexandra. 2023. the cost of war: russian economy faces a decade of regress. accessed april 23, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88664. ragin, charles c. 2008. redesigning social inquiry: fuzzy sets and beyond. university of chicago press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226702797.001.0001. rochlitz, michael, anton kazun, and andrei yakovlev. 2020. “property rights in russia after 2009: from business capture to centralized corruption?” post-soviet affairs 36 (5–6): 434–450. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2020.1786777. rspp (rossiiskii soiuz promyshlennikov i predprinimatelei). 2019. nefinansovaia otchetnostʹ v rossii i mire: tseli ustoichivogo razvitiia – v fokuse vnimaniia. analiticheskii obzor za period 2017-2018 gg. [non-financial reporting in russia and the world: sustainable development goals in focus. analytical review of 2017 and 2018] https://rspp.ru/download/a48b14d9858856285b5f7aba0c57b076/. accessed october 3, 2025. ———. 2025. “komitety i komissii” [committees and commissions]. accessed april 23, 2024. http://rspp.ru/committee/. sallai, dorottya, and gerhard schnyder. 2021. “what is ‘authoritarian’ about authoritarian capitalism? the dual erosion of the private–public divide in state-dominated business systems.” business & society 60 (6): 1312–1348. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0007650319898475. schneider, carsten q. 2018. “realists and idealists in qca.” political analysis 26 (2): 246– 254. https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2017.45. schneider, carsten q., and claudius wagemann. 2012. set-theoretic methods for the social sciences: a guide to qualitative comparative analysis. cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139004244. https://doi.org/10.1177/0893318917704512 https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.364 https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88664 https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226702797.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2020.1786777 https://rspp.ru/download/a48b14d9858856285b5f7aba0c57b076/ http://rspp.ru/committee/ https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2017.45 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139004244 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 sparkes, russell, and christopher j. cowton. 2004. “the maturing of socially responsible investment: a review of the developing link with corporate social responsibility.” journal of business ethics 52 (1): 45–57. https://doi.org/10.1023/ b:busi.0000033106.43260.99. tolbert, pamela s., and lynn g. zucker. 1996. “the institutionalization of institutional theory.” in handbook of organization studies, edited by stewart r. clegg, cynthia hardy, and walter r. nord, 175–190. sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446218556.n6. un global compact russia. 2025. accessed april 23, 2024. http://www.globalcompact.ru/en/. van cranenburgh, katinka, kellie liket, and nigel roome. 2013. “management responses to social activism in an era of corporate responsibility.” journal of business ethics 118 (3): 497–513. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1597-7. wood, donna j. 1991. “corporate social performance revisited.” the academy of management review 16 (4): 691–718. https://doi.org/10.2307/258977. yang, xiaohua, and cheryl rivers. 2009. “antecedents of csr practices in mncs’ subsidiaries: a stakeholder and institutional perspective.” journal of business ethics 86: 155–169. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0191-0. yakovlev, andrei. 2014. “russian modernization: between the need for new players and the fear of losing control of rent sources.” journal of eurasian studies 5 (1): 10–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2013.09.004. zueva, anna, and jenny fairbrass. 2021. “politicising government engagement with corporate social responsibility: ‘csr’ as an empty signifier.” journal of business ethics 170: 635–655. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04330-5. https://doi.org/10.1023/b:busi.0000033106.43260.99 https://doi.org/10.1023/b:busi.0000033106.43260.99 https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446218556.n6 http://www.globalcompact.ru/en/ https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1597-7 https://doi.org/10.2307/258977 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0191-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04330-5 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 1-27 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings; you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 67 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 the politicization of international organizations: how non-recognizing states obstruct kosovo’s membership muhamet brajshori1, center for interdisciplinary studies of the university of sarajevo abstract the politicization of international organizations undermines their integrity and effectiveness. this article focuses on the attempts to block and hinder kosovo’s membership in the world customs organization (wco) and the permanent court of arbitration (pca), illustrating how states that do not recognize kosovo use their political clout to hinder its membership. despite kosovo fulfilling all the necessary requirements, a few influential states have obstructed its accession by exploiting their roles within these organizations. the article highlights biased actions by member states, revealing a pattern of politicization and manipulation. it discusses the impact on neutrality, impartiality, and rule-based governance, calling for robust mechanisms to protect the integrity of international organizations. the article contributes to the broader debate on how member-state politicization affects the functioning of international organizations in a polarized world. 1 muhamet brajshori is a phd candidate at the university of sarajevo, center for interdisciplinary studies. 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 introduction the quest for recognition on the international stage has long been a key aspiration for states asserting their sovereignty. however, in a world of geopolitical tensions and competing interests, the path to recognition is often fraught with obstacles and political maneuvering. this is especially true for kosovo, whose bid for statehood has been met with both support and resistance. similar scenarios were rare even during the cold war, save for cases like east and west germany or north and south korea. today, kosovo exemplifies a stark divide: western powers advocate for its recognition, while russia and china resist, backing serbia’s territorial claims. at the heart of kosovo’s ongoing pursuit of recognition lies its effort to join key international organizations, a crucial step in affirming its international legitimacy. this quest for inclusion is not just symbolic; it grants kosovo access to the privileges of recognized states. the struggle for membership reflects the broader challenges of statehood and sovereignty in the modern geopolitical landscape, where legal, political, and diplomatic forces intersect. this article explores the obstruction of kosovo’s membership in international organizations, focusing on its efforts to join the world customs organization (wco) and the permanent court of arbitration (pca). by analyzing these case studies, the article examines the motivations behind opposition to kosovo’s membership and the strategies used to block its accession. the choice of the wco and pca as case studies is intentional, as both illustrate different facets of kosovo’s membership campaign. despite opposition from non-recognizing states, kosovo has secured membership in both organizations by leveraging legal frameworks that bypass traditional voting procedures. this approach, while legally valid, has drawn criticism from some members, highlighting differing views on alternative pathways to membership within the international community. through these case studies, the article sheds light on the complex dynamics of resisting recognition within international organizations and offers broader insights into the implications for statehood, sovereignty, and the functioning of international institutions in a fragmented global order. navigating the tightrope: the interplay between member states and international organizations international organizations serve as platforms reflecting the collective interests of member states, relying on legitimacy and support to be effective (binder and heuper 2021, 1). these organizations enable states to address shared problems and pursue mutual interests, coordinating policy and fostering collective responses to global challenges. their effectiveness depends on the level of engagement they receive from members, as broad support enhances legitimacy, mobilizing resources and facilitating decision making (binder and heuper 2021, 1). conversely, skepticism and lack of support can hinder their ability to manage contentious issues. in recent decades, international organizations have seen a rise in authority, reducing their reliance on individual member states for control (lenz 2017, 1). this shift is evident in two key developments: majoritarian decision making, known as pooling, and the delegation of power to independent institutions (lenz 2017, 1). pooling allows decisions to be made by majority vote, increasing efficiency and reducing the risk of deadlock. delegating authority to independent bodies enhances the impartiality of these organizations, enabling them to address complex transnational issues more effectively. however, even with greater autonomy, international organizations still depend on member states’ consent (binder and heuper 2021, 1). sovereignty remains fundamental, and organizations must balance their authority with respect for member states’ independence. 69 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 this tension between national sovereignty and supranational authority is a persistent challenge. states acknowledge the benefits of collective action but are often reluctant to cede control over critical decisions. member state consent is crucial not only as a legal requirement but also as a political necessity. without trust and support, organizations struggle to implement policies and mobilize resources. legitimacy plays a key role, as organizations perceived as legitimate can more easily attract the financial and political backing necessary to achieve their goals. international organizations also play a pivotal role in global lawmaking through treaties, conventions, and regulations. beyond their regulatory functions, they “define meanings and diffuse norms” (binder and heuper 2015, 238), that can promote a collective identity among member states. this normative influence fosters policy harmonization, encouraging cooperation. however, the balance between cooperation and sovereignty can be fragile. states may prioritize national interests over collective goals, engaging in obstructionist behaviour that undermines organizational effectiveness. selective compliance and procedural manipulation can further weaken organizations, eroding trust and credibility. politicization within international organizations, often characterized as the pursuit of narrow political objectives in traditionally non-political arenas, complicates their functioning (lyons et al. 1977, 85). the degree of politicization typically depends on the contentiousness of the issues addressed, which, in turn, influences the organization’s structure and effectiveness. while some argue that politicization reflects the organization’s engagement in a broader global bargaining process—integrating it into the complex interplay of geopolitical and normative dynamics that shape planetary governance (lyons et al. 1977, 87)—it can also highlight its potential to expose underlying power dynamics. this dual perspective offers insights into strategic decision-making and organizational adaptation. however, politicization can also be wielded as a tool to advance specific agendas, often at the expense of consensus building, thereby exacerbating tensions and undermining the organization’s ability to respond effectively to global challenges. ultimately, international organizations’ ability to navigate the complex interplay of sovereignty, legitimacy, and politicization is key to their effectiveness in addressing the global challenges of today. the journey of kosovo towards international organizations kosovo’s declaration of independence on february 17, 2008, marked a critical juncture in its history, ending years of ambiguity over its political status. despite significant support from western nations and a un-led proposal for “supervised independence” spearheaded by former finnish president martti ahtisaari, kosovo faced considerable obstacles in securing international recognition and integrating into the global community. the resistance from serbia, backed by powerful allies such as russia and china, and the divisions among european union (eu) member states, including greece, spain, romania, cyprus, and slovakia, have complicated kosovo’s pursuit of sovereignty and international legitimacy. kosovo’s reluctance to formally pursue united nations (un) membership underscores the complexities of its situation. concerns about potential vetoes from russia and china in the un security council (newman and visoka 2018, 7) have deterred kosovo from seeking full un membership, despite substantial support from various nations and international entities. 2 following kosovo’s declaration of independence, key countries such as the united states, the united kingdom, germany, france, italy, turkey, canada, japan, and most eu member states promptly recognized the new state, bolstering its international standing.3 2 ministry of foreign affairs of kosovo. 2022. “list of recognition.” accessed may 2, 2024. https://mfa-ks.net/lista-enjohjeve. 3 ministry of foreign affairs of kosovo. 2022. “list of recognition.” accessed may 2, 2024. https://mfa-ks.net/lista-enjohjeve. https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve 70 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 however, serbia’s vehement opposition, supported by its strategic allies, has fuelled a contentious international debate regarding the legality and legitimacy of kosovo’s statehood. in an effort to obstruct kosovo’s international recognition, serbia sought an advisory opinion from the international court of justice (icj) through the un general assembly. after thorough hearings and deliberations, the icj ruled in july 2010 that kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law or security council resolutions (icj 2010), thereby affirming kosovo’s status as a sui generis case.4 despite these legal affirmations, kosovo continues to face diplomatic challenges and disputes instigated by serbia. nonetheless, kosovo has made significant strides in its quest for international recognition. as of october 2024, 117 un member states have officially recognized kosovo’s independence, according to the mfa kosovo (mfa kosovo 2024). additionally, kosovo has successfully gained membership in over 70 international, european, and regional organizations and institutions, including prominent bodies such as the international monetary fund (imf) and the world bank, as well as entities like the council of europe development bank and the european bank for reconstruction and development. the case of kosovo illustrates the intricate interplay between political sovereignty, international recognition, and geopolitical dynamics. kosovo’s journey towards international recognition highlights the challenges that new states face in securing legitimacy within the global community. the support from western nations and international organizations contrasts sharply with the resistance from serbia and its allies, underscoring the geopolitical complexities involved in statehood recognition. kosovo’s experience demonstrates that international recognition is not merely a legal or procedural matter but is deeply embedded in the broader geopolitical landscape. the divisions within the eu and the strategic interests of global powers like russia and china play a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of such recognition efforts. the icj’s ruling, while affirming the legality of kosovo’s independence, did not resolve the political and diplomatic challenges that continue to impede its full integration into the international system. christina davis’s (2023) argument regarding the role of membership in defining a state’s position within international society is particularly relevant to kosovo, as it is to any country. membership in international organizations shapes a state’s identity, relationships, and interactions with other states and actors on the global stage (davis 2023, 5). through such memberships, states seek to shape their associations with other states and enhance their international standing. for kosovo, pursuing membership in international institutions is a crucial aspect of its state-building and diplomacy efforts. by seeking membership, kosovo aims to establish itself as a recognized and respected member of the international community, solidifying its sovereignty and legitimacy as an independent state. the absence of united nations membership significantly impacts kosovo’s ability to fully participate in the international community and assert its sovereignty. this absence limits kosovo’s access to certain forums, resources, and diplomatic channels that are available to recognized states. additionally, the lack of un membership hinders kosovo’s ability to negotiate treaties, engage in formal diplomatic relations, and advocate for its interests on a global scale. in this context, membership, or the lack thereof, plays a crucial role in shaping kosovo’s position within international society. 4 the sui generis characterization of kosovo's independence constitutes a legal and political framework advanced by kosovo and its international supporters to underscore the uniqueness of its statehood within international law, rather than as a precedent for secessionist movements. this distinct status is justified by a combination of factors, including the historical context of systemic oppression and conflict, the prolonged period of international administration, the absence of serbia’s sovereign control since 1999, the un-backed political process outlined in the ahtisaari plan, and the 2010 advisory opinion of the international court of justice (icj), which served as a culminating legal affirmation of this narrative. this strategic framing has been instrumental in securing broader international recognition for kosovo’s independence while simultaneously reinforcing its exceptional nature, thereby limiting its applicability to other contested regions. 71 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 despite its established independence and recognition by many countries, kosovo’s status as a nonmember of the un underscores the ongoing challenges it faces in asserting its statehood and integrating into the international community. davis’s argument highlights the broader significance of membership in defining states’ roles and relationships within international society. beyond specific policy reforms and institutional constraints, membership status influences states’ identities, perceptions, and interactions in the complex web of international relations. for kosovo, achieving full membership in key international organizations remains a critical step towards solidifying its place in the global community and shaping its international identity. membership in international institutions is instrumental for kosovo, as it is for any country, in shaping its association with other states and enhancing its international status. the pursuit of membership in international organizations is not merely a procedural goal but a strategic endeavour. membership in bodies such as the international monetary fund (imf), the world bank, and other regional and global institutions provides kosovo with platforms to engage with other states, share its perspectives, and contribute to global policy discussions. these memberships help kosovo build its international identity and allow kosovo to counteract the opposition from states like serbia and its allies by demonstrating its commitment to international norms and cooperative engagement. through these memberships, kosovo can showcase its dedication to the principles of international law, democratic governance, and regional stability, thereby strengthening its case for broader recognition and support. kosovo’s membership in wco and pca conventions are crucial for states seeking recognition and membership in international organizations. they establish diplomatic legitimacy and adherence to international norms, providing a framework of shared principles and obligations. accession to conventions demonstrates a commitment to universal standards of behaviour, governance, and human rights, enhancing a state’s credibility and trustworthiness globally. by aligning their legal frameworks with conventions, states demonstrate readiness for constructive international engagement, fostering cooperation and collaboration. conventions are essential for navigating international diplomacy, establishing diplomatic relations, and pursuing recognition and membership in international organizations. adherence to these conventions shows a commitment to the rule of law and international governance, essential for gaining acceptance and trust. constituent treaties, which form the governance framework of international organizations, are crucial in this process. they define the rights and obligations of member states and play a transformative role in creating and defining the structures and mechanisms of international organizations, including new member admissions. the transformative nature of constituent treaties highlights their importance in the international legal framework. by formalizing the establishment of international organizations, these treaties set the foundational rules and standards that govern the behaviour and interactions of member states (klabbers 2002, 103). the regulation of membership in international organizations is rooted in the foundational principles of international institutional design, as articulated in their constituent treaties. these treaties function as constitutional documents that outline the organization’s purpose, structure, and decision-making processes, while simultaneously establishing criteria for membership (klabbers 2002, 104–105). for states aspiring to membership, understanding and adhering to the provisions of constituent treaties is crucial, as it signifies their alignment with the organization’s foundational principles, commitment to its collective goals, and readiness to integrate into its governance structures. for states like kosovo, which aspire to gain recognition and integrate into the international community, accession to conventions and adherence to constituent treaties are crucial steps. by aligning with these international legal instruments, kosovo can enhance its diplomatic legitimacy and signal its readiness to participate constructively in international governance. this alignment helps kosovo build a positive international reputation, making it a credible and trustworthy partner in the eyes of other states and international organizations. 72 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 world customs organization (wco) the provision in the convention establishing a customs co-operation council reflects a broad and inclusive approach to membership, highlighting the organization’s commitment to universality and cooperation beyond the constraints of united nations membership. by explicitly stating that “the government of any state which is not a signatory to the present convention may accede thereto,”5 the convention avoids imposing restrictions based on un membership or other specific criteria. this open language allows any state, regardless of its international status, to participate, emphasizing the importance of broad engagement in global cooperation. this inclusivity is particularly significant in areas like customs and trade, where collaboration across diverse political entities is essential for effective international coordination. furthermore, as the convention serves as the legal foundation for the world customs organization (wco), accession to the convention directly translates into membership in the wco. the convention’s accession procedure is notably straightforward, offering a sharp contrast to the complex and detailed processes required by other international organizations, such as the united nations or unesco. this simplicity underscores wco’s focus on functional cooperation and practicality, ensuring that membership remains accessible and streamlined to encourage the widest possible participation. the wco convention stipulates that the deposit of an instrument of accession by an aspiring member state is sufficient to initiate membership.6 this membership is formalized through the depositing of accession instruments within the belgian ministry of foreign affairs, which serves as the depository, followed by notification to relevant parties.7 unlike other international organizations, the wco does not mandate a comprehensive screening process or require affirmative votes from its organs. instead, accession relies solely on the formal act of depositing the instrument, reflecting the organization’s commitment to simplicity and inclusivity. there are no provisions for evaluating the suitability or qualifications of aspiring members, nor is responsibility assigned to any organ of the wco for conducting such screenings. this absence of screening procedures underscores the organization’s emphasis on openness and non-discrimination in its membership criteria. by streamlining the accession process, organizations can expedite the participation of states in collaborative efforts, such as trade facilitation, security cooperation, and capacity building. this streamlined approach allows the wco to attract a larger membership base, increasing its reach and impact on global affairs. a diverse membership enhances the organization’s resources, expertise, and network, enabling it to pursue its mission more effectively. by reducing administrative burdens and simplifying decision-making processes, organizations like the wco can allocate resources more efficiently towards achieving their objectives. this approach aligns with the logic of the founders of the convention and the wco, suggesting an intention to prioritize inclusivity and broad participation. the founders of the wco appear to have prioritized the pragmatic imperative of global customs cooperation over the political sensitivities associated with statehood. by streamlining the membership process and extending eligibility to “any state,” the organization sought to foster broad international engagement in customs affairs, circumventing the diplomatic intricacies often tied to state recognition and participation in other international institutions. 5 world customs organization. 1950. convention establishing a customs co-operation council. accessed december 16, 2024. https://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/legalinstruments/~/media/7e31eb9c9dc24d7984c217508f05d9e8.ashx. 6 world customs organization. 1950. convention establishing a customs co-operation council. accessed december 16, 2024. https://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/legalinstruments/~/media/7e31eb9c9dc24d7984c217508f05d9e8.ashx. 7 world customs organization. 1950. convention establishing a customs co-operation council. accessed december 16, 2024. https://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/legalinstruments/~/media/7e31eb9c9dc24d7984c217508f05d9e8.ashx. 73 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 on march 6, 2017, the wco received notification from the belgian federal public service foreign affairs, foreign trade and development cooperation regarding the accession of the republic of kosovo to the convention establishing a customs co-operation council (wco 2017b). this communication indicated that on january 25, 2017, the belgian authorities received the instrument of accession from the republic of kosovo pertaining to the aforementioned international act. as stipulated by article xviii, paragraph c, of the said convention, both the convention itself and its annex became effective for the republic of kosovo on the date when the instrument of accession was deposited, namely january 25, 2017 (wco 2017b).the serbian government vehemently opposed kosovo’s accession to the convention, arguing that it would grant kosovo full membership status in the wco, the primary international body governing customs. serbia contended that belgium, in its role as the depositary, had breached international law by accepting kosovo’s deposition to the convention (embassy of the republic of serbia in belgium 2017). furthermore, serbia asserted that kosovo lacks the legitimacy to become a member of the wco (embassy of serbia in belgium 2017). serbia’s opposition to kosovo’s accession to the convention extends beyond mere participation in an international convention or membership in an international organization. it delves into the realm of statehood and border control, which are fundamental pillars of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. in 2012, kosovo submitted its instruments of accession to the wco, seeking membership for the first time (wco 2012). this request sparked significant debate within the wco council and policy commission. the core of the controversy revolved around the status of kosovo as a state. the chairperson ultimately concluded that, due to the lack of consensus, kosovo’s accession should not be revisited until there was tangible progress or a compelling reason to do so (wco 2012). consequently, the council did not make a decision on kosovo’s application in 2012. there is a significant gap in the express powers granted to the wco council concerning the accession of new members. specifically, the wco convention, which establishes the legal and operational framework of the organization, does not endow the council with the authority to make decisions on the accession of new member states (wco 1950). the conclusions of the 2012 wco council chairperson, which recommended delaying kosovo’s membership application until certain conditions were met, lack binding legal authority. in 2017, belgium fulfilled its duties as a depositary by accepting kosovo’s instrument of accession to the world customs organization. a depositary’s main responsibility is to manage the administrative aspects of international treaties, including receiving and recording accession instruments. although kosovo’s statehood is not universally recognized, it enjoys recognition from a majority of the international community, providing a reasonable basis for treating kosovo as a state for accession to international organizations. therefore, belgium’s acceptance of kosovo’s accession instrument aligns with the recognition by the majority of states, operating within a legitimate and justifiable framework. kosovo’s act of depositing its accession instrument could be viewed as “tangible progress,” meeting the conditions outlined in the 2012 conclusions. kosovo’s membership in the world customs organization is clear-cut, initiated upon the deposit of its instrument of accession as stipulated by article xviii of the convention establishing a customs co-operation council. this article explicitly states that any state can become a member upon depositing the instrument of accession with the belgian ministry of foreign affairs, the designated depository.8 the 2012 conclusions, referenced by certain member states, including serbia, russia, romania, and others, lack legal weight regarding kosovo’s accession process. these conclusions were not formal decisions within the wco’s constitutional framework, as the council does not have jurisdiction over accession matters. 8 world customs organization. 1950. convention establishing a customs co-operation council. accessed december 16, 2024. https://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/legalinstruments/~/media/7e31eb9c9dc24d7984c217508f05d9e8.ashx. 74 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 however, in 2017, some member states, led by serbia and russia chose to disregard the established legal framework of the wco, impeding kosovo’s membership and challenging its rightful participation in the organization’s activities. this obstruction undermines the wco’s integrity as an inclusive and rules-based institution. the situation escalated when the chairperson of the wco council from the russian federation led discussions on challenging kosovo’s membership status (wco 2017, paras 249–251). russia, as chair, outlined discussions within the policy commission, noting their thorough nature and the lack of a definitive conclusion. the chairperson highlighted the complexity of considering quasi-state entities’ legal status and the potential precedents set by the council’s decisions for future accession processes (wco 2017, paras. 249–251). serbia’s opposition to kosovo’s accession was vocal, asserting that the council, where all member states participate, serves as the supreme decision-making body of the wco. serbia cited the council’s 2012 conclusion, which recommended deferring kosovo’s accession until tangible progress was achieved (wco 2017, para. 253). serbia argued that this consensus decision reflected the collective will of all member states, and challenging this conclusion was tantamount to challenging the will of all member states (wco 2017, para. 253). other countries, such as kazakhstan, russia, china, argentina, cyprus, belarus, spain, romania, and azerbaijan, echoed similar calls, advocating that no entity should become a member without council approval, criticizing the depository for allegedly violating the founding documents of the wco by not adhering to the council’s role in the accession process. conversely, countries led by the united states, which had recognized kosovo, welcomed kosovo as a member of the wco (wco 2017, para. 290). they opposed the argument suggesting that the council had any role in the accession process, citing the 1950 convention. the secretary general of the wco clarified the procedural norms governing accession to the convention establishing a customs co-operation council. he asserted that once the depository acknowledged an instrument of accession and notified the members and secretariat, the accession process was considered finalized, a protocol consistently followed for 65 years (wco 2017, paras. 316–318). he distinguished between the accession scenarios of 2012 and 2017. in 2012, the depository sought council advice before discontinuing the process, whereas in 2017, there was no prior consultation, and kosovo’s accession notification arrived concurrently for all members (wco 2017, paras. 316–318). stressing his lack of discretionary authority, the secretary general underscored his commitment to procedural adherence and non-involvement in political issues within the organization (wco 2017, paras. 316–318). the chairperson provided a unilateral assessment of the discussions surrounding kosovo’s accession to the wco (wco 2017, para. 319). he highlighted objections to the depository’s procedure, with several states expressing dissatisfaction and questioning the validity of actions taken (wco 2017, para. 319). the chairperson aimed to guide the process towards the removal of kosovo’s representatives by citing threats of member states leaving the organization (wco 2017, para. 320). austria raised procedural objections, disputing the accuracy of the chairperson’s conclusions and citing inadequate consideration of the depository’s position (wco 2017, para. 320). moreover, austria pointed out factual inaccuracies, particularly regarding the assertion of a decision on kosovo’s accession in 2012 (wco 2017, para. 324). this controversy underscores the complex dynamics of international organizations’ membership processes and the interplay between legal frameworks and political considerations. the case of kosovo’s accession to the wco highlights the tension between procedural adherence and political maneuvering. on the one hand, wco’s legal framework stipulates a straightforward accession process that should be immune to political influence. on the other hand, member states’ political interests and interpretations of procedural norms can complicate and impede this process. 75 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 the belgian ministry of foreign affairs, serving as the depository for the convention establishing a customs co-operation council, played a crucial role in facilitating this process. by receiving kosovo’s instrument of accession and notifying all contracting parties and the wco secretary general, belgium adhered to its procedural obligations (wco 2017, para. 328). the distinction between “receiving” and “accepting” the instrument was emphasized, with belgium clarifying that notification was a neutral formality rather than a decision (wco 2017, para. 329). this approach ensured that legal consequences were determined by the application of the convention, allowing each contracting party to assess statehood and eligibility issues through their responses. the procedural simplicity of kosovo’s accession process, as opposed to the more complex procedures of other international organizations like the un, highlights the wco’s commitment to inclusivity. in 2017, kosovo’s accession was informed by the fact that 114 states had recognized kosovo as a sovereign entity, and it had already gained membership in various international organizations and multilateral conventions (wco 2017, para. 330). belgium’s handling of kosovo’s accession mirrored its previous approach to palestine’s accession, despite not recognizing palestine bilaterally (wco 2017, para. 333). this is demonstrated, as argued by the depository, as its adherence to procedural integrity and transparency (wco 2017, para. 331). however, the 2017 accession process was marred by political contention. argentina’s proposal to establish a working group for analyzing future accessions, backed by serbia and brazil, reflects the contentious nature of kosovo’s membership (wco 2017, paras. 334–338). the chairperson of the wco council insisted on upholding the conclusions reached in 2012 and refused to grant kosovo’s representative speaking rights (wco 2017, paras. 334–341). this decision, challenged by belgium, invoked procedural rules and sought a vote, which the chairperson confirmed (wco 2017, paras. 342–343). the contrasting viewpoints between the chairperson and the secretary general regarding kosovo’s membership status and voting rights highlighted divergent interpretations of organizational norms and conventions (wco 2017, paras. 358–360). the chairperson’s opposition to acknowledging kosovo’s membership and the secretary general’s defence of kosovo’s legitimate membership underscores the tension between procedural adherence and political influence (wco 2017, paras. 358–360). while the chairperson’s actions seemed to diverge from established norms, the secretary general and the belgian depositary maintained their commitment to the wco’s conventions (wco 2017, paras. 358–360). serbia’s challenge to kosovo’s inclusion in the members’ contributions list and kosovo’s subsequent invitation to pay its annual membership fee emphasized the procedural legitimacy of kosovo’s accession (wco 2017, paras. 515–516). as belgium, acting as the depositary, explained to the council, only 13 out of the then 181 wco member states had formally objected to kosovo’s accession via note verbale (wco 2017, para. 329). therefore, the overwhelming majority of member states did not lodge any objection to kosovo’s accession, in accordance with the procedures of the 1950 convention and the vienna convention on the law of treaties. despite this, the wco was effectively hijacked by a small number of countries, supported by a chairperson who failed to distinguish his national position from his role as chairperson. the 2017 episode exemplifies the susceptibility of international organizations to political maneuvering and strategic alignments, revealing the extent to which decision-making processes can be influenced by geopolitical considerations. the actions of the chairperson, backed by a coalition of aligned member states, raise fundamental concerns about the legitimacy and neutrality of institutional procedures. although some states voiced objections, the overall response from the broader membership suggested a general acceptance of kosovo’s accession, aligning with the principles embodied in the 1950 convention and the vienna convention on the law of treaties. this divergence between established legal frameworks and political interventions underscores the persistent challenge international organizations face in preserving their institutional integrity amid shifting geopolitical currents. 76 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 kosovo’s membership in the wco not only signifies a form of diplomatic recognition but also directly contests serbia’s political narrative and territorial claims. by affirming kosovo’s ability to administer its customs and regulate its borders independently, the international community implicitly weakens serbia’s assertions of sovereignty over kosovo. kosovo’s case within the wco underscores the profound influence of political interests on the operational integrity of international institutions, highlighting the necessity for resilient mechanisms that safeguard organizational processes from undue politicization. as kosovo navigates its role within the wco and asserts its rights as a member, this episode serves as a reminder to the intricate interplay between legal frameworks and geopolitical dynamics. it further illustrates the enduring challenge faced by international organizations in upholding institutional impartiality while contending with the realities of global political power structures. permanent court of arbitration (pca) the establishment of the permanent court of arbitration (pca) at the first hague conference represents a seminal moment in the evolution of international dispute resolution. as the world’s first and oldest intergovernmental organization dedicated to the peaceful resolution of disputes, the pca embodies the foundational principles of international arbitration and diplomacy (daly et al. 2014, 3). the convention formulated during the conference enshrined a commitment among participating states to the “pacific settlement of international differences,”9 emphasizing methods such as “‘good offices,’ mediation, and inquiry” (van haersolte-van hof 2007, 397). notably, arbitration was recognized as “the most effective, and simultaneously the most equitable means of resolving disputes that diplomacy has been unable to settle.”10 initially, the pca’s focus was predominantly on arbitration between states, reflecting the early twentieth-century emphasis on inter-state conflict resolution (brooks 2014, 4). however, the pca’s scope has significantly broadened over time to include a diverse range of dispute-resolution mechanisms. today, the pca provides comprehensive services, including arbitration, conciliation, fact-finding commissions, good offices, and mediation, addressing the needs of states, state-controlled entities, intergovernmental organizations, and private entities (brooks 2014, 4). this evolution highlights the pca’s adaptability to the complexities of contemporary international relations, reflecting a nuanced understanding of the varied forms of dispute resolution required in a globalized world. kosovo’s accession to the 1907 convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes, formalized on november 18, 2015 (mfa of the netherlands 2015), provides a significant case study in the application of pca’s principles. the netherlands, as the depository for the convention, played a crucial administrative role in facilitating kosovo’s accession, adhering to the procedural guidelines set out in articles 91–97 of the 1907 convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes11 and articles 76–80 of the 1969 vienna convention on the law of treaties.12 the depositary’s role is to manage the formalities of accession, ensuring neutrality and effective implementation of the treaty, 9 the principle enshrined in article 1 emphasizes the commitment of signatory states to prevent the use of force in international relations by prioritizing peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms. this obligation requires states to resolve conflicts through legal and institutional means such as arbitration or judicial proceedings rather than coercion or military action, reinforcing their duty to seek peaceful solutions under international law. 10 permanent court of arbitration. 1907. convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. accessed february 8, 2025. https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-ofinternational-disputes.pdf. 11 permanent court of arbitration. 1907. convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. accessed february 8, 2025. https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-ofinternational-disputes.pdf. 12 un secretary general. 1969. vienna convention on the law of treaties. accessed february 8, 2025. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf. https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-of-international-disputes.pdf https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-of-international-disputes.pdf https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-of-international-disputes.pdf https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-of-international-disputes.pdf https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2525201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf 77 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 without engaging in substantive assessments of the acceding state’s legitimacy.13at the time of kosovo’s accession to the permanent court of arbitration, 116 states were parties to the pca’s founding conventions.14 of these, 66 states formally recognized kosovo as an independent sovereign entity.15 thus, more than half of the member states of the pca had then already recognized kosovo as an independent state (zyberi 2016). this recognition was crucial as it underscored the fact that membership in the united nations or other international organizations is not a prerequisite for accession to the pca’s conventions. the process of accession, akin to that of the world customs organization’s 1950 convention, relies on the formal act of depositing the instrument, reflecting an approach that prioritizes inclusivity and simplicity. this procedural framework aligns with the broader objectives of international conventions, which seek to maximize participation and facilitate broad-based adherence to international norms. kosovo’s accession to the pca’s conventions, despite its non-un membership, exemplifies the principle that procedural mechanisms in international treaties can accommodate a wide range of states. this inclusivity underscores the pca’s approach to universal principles of peaceful dispute resolution, irrespective of broader political or diplomatic controversies. the case of kosovo highlights the significance of procedural neutrality and administrative efficiency in international organizations. the role of the depositary in managing the formal aspects of treaty accession, without engaging in substantive decisions about the acceding state’s status, reinforces the importance of maintaining impartiality in international legal processes. this approach ensures that the fundamental principles of international conventions are upheld, even in the face of complex geopolitical dynamics. the case of kosovo’s accession to the permanent court of arbitration presents a complex intersection of procedural norms, institutional authority, and international law. the developments surrounding kosovo’s membership status illuminate broader discussions about the governance of international organizations and the interplay between procedural rigidity and political considerations. on january 4, 2016, the pca’s administrative council made a notable decision to “keep under review” the status of kosovo and palestine, deferring any definitive resolution on their membership (zimmermann 2016). this decision, instructing the depositary to exclude kosovo from the list of member states during the evaluation period, was met with significant objection from kosovo (mfa of the netherlands 2016). kosovo contended that accession to the 1907 convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes was contingent solely upon the deposit of an accession instrument, which had been duly completed (mfa of kosovo 2016a). kosovo argued that the convention did not provide for review or objection mechanisms by the member states or the administrative council and that no agreements establishing specific conditions for accession existed (mfa of kosovo 2016a). according to kosovo, the longstanding practice of the pca was to accept new members without imposing additional conditions, emphasizing that the convention’s legal framework did not grant the administrative council or the depositary the authority to remove kosovo from the list postaccession (mfa of kosovo 2016a).the procedural conflict came to a head when, despite the pca’s initial decision, palestine was subsequently recognized as a contracting party and member of the pca on march 14, 2016 (permanent court of arbitration 2016b). the contrast in handling kosovo’s and palestine’s accession raises crucial questions about the consistency and fairness of procedural application within the pca. the recognition of palestine as a member on december 29, 2015, following a favourable vote, while kosovo continued to face procedural and political barriers, highlights 13 permanent court of arbitration. 1907. convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. accessed february 8, 2025. https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-of-international-disputes.pdf. 14 permanent court of arbitration. 2024. “members of the permanent court of arbitration.” accessed december 16, 2024. https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduction/members-of-the-court. 15 ministry of foreign affairs of kosovo. “list of recognition.” accessed may 2, 2024. https://mfa-ks.net/lista-enjohjeve https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-of-international-disputes.pdf https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-of-international-disputes.pdf https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve 78 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 how geopolitical factors can shape decision-making within international organizations. kosovo’s recognizing partners in the pca advocated for kosovo’s inclusion in the organization. they proposed an agenda item for the pca’s 195th meeting, scheduled for june 13, 2016, to address kosovo’s membership status (permanent court of arbitration 2016c). kosovo reiterated its position that it had fulfilled all requirements for membership and that both the administrative council and the depositary had overstepped their authority under the 1907 convention (mfa of kosovo 2016b). the pca administrative council’s decision on june 13, 2016, to rescind its january 4, 2016, decision and formally recognize kosovo as a member state provides a critical case study in the understanding of institutional governance (permanent court of arbitration 2016a). this decision, following a vote of 41 in favour, 24 against, and 13 abstentions, restored kosovo’s status as a member of the pca, reaffirming its accession to the convention (permanent court of arbitration 2016a). the pca’s initial decision to review kosovo’s status reflects an attempt to navigate the political sensitivities surrounding international recognition and membership. the eventual reversal highlights the tension between procedural adherence and political influence in international organizations. this situation underscores the challenge of maintaining procedural integrity while addressing geopolitical considerations. the debate over kosovo’s membership illuminates questions of authority and legitimacy within international organizations. the pca’s decision-making processes, as evidenced by the differing treatments of kosovo and palestine, raise concerns about the consistency of institutional norms and the role of political factors in shaping organizational outcomes. the handling of kosovo’s accession reflects broader implications for international law and practice. the procedural debates and political interventions highlight the complexities of treaty interpretation and the implementation of international conventions. this case serves as a reminder of the need for robust mechanisms to safeguard the impartiality and effectiveness of international dispute resolution bodies. the role of the depositary in managing accession processes and the adherence to procedural norms is crucial for the legitimacy of international treaties. the pca’s experience underscores the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between administrative functions and substantive decisions to ensure the integrity of international legal frameworks. the actions taken by the netherlands, as the state depositary for the 1907 convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes, and the subsequent decisions by the pca’s administrative council regarding kosovo and palestine provide a critical lens through which to examine procedural norms, legal authority, and political motivations within international organizations. the netherlands’ initiative to independently raise the issue of kosovo’s accession to the pca, despite the presence of a mechanism allowing any concerned state to call for a meeting of the administrative council, raises questions about the necessity and motivations behind this action (zyberi 2016). at the time of the pca’s administrative council’s meeting on january 4, 2016, only three of the 116 pca member states—russia, serbia, and mexico—had voiced objections to kosovo’s membership (zyberi 2016). notably, a significant majority of pca member states had recognized kosovo as an independent state. this majority recognition, combined with the procedural framework for accession to the 1907 convention, suggests that the netherlands’ decision to highlight kosovo’s membership may have been disproportionate. this situation mirrors broader issues related to the role of depositaries and the exercise of authority within international organizations. the netherlands’ proactive approach could be seen as exceeding the scope of its administrative responsibilities, raising concerns about whether such actions align with the principles of neutrality and impartiality expected of a depositary. the absence of widespread dissent among pca member states further questions the justification for initiating a review process, highlighting potential biases or political motivations influencing the netherlands’ decision. 79 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 the unilateral actions taken by certain states to suspend or remove kosovo from pca membership, absent clear legal authority or procedural legitimacy, underscore a departure from established norms. the pca’s 1907 convention, like many international agreements, does not explicitly provide mechanisms for suspension or expulsion of member states by the administrative council. this lack of clear procedural provisions suggests that attempts to alter kosovo’s status without a legal basis or broad consensus represent a significant deviation from established practices, reminiscent of similar issues observed in other international bodies such as the world customs organization. the historical context of objections to state accession, including the democratic republic of germany’s efforts to join the pca in the late 1950s, illustrates a pattern of resistance to new members that challenges the foundational principles of inclusivity and voluntary participation (zyberi 2016). objections based on geopolitical considerations rather than explicit treaty provisions can undermine the collaborative nature of international adjudication mechanisms and disrupt the pursuit of peaceful dispute resolution. this phenomenon highlights the tension between the sovereign equality of states and the procedural norms governing international organizations. international law, which upholds the principle of sovereign equality among states, underscores the importance of respecting states’ autonomy in determining their treaty obligations. this principle ensures that treaty relations are based on voluntary consent and mutual agreement, reinforcing the equality and autonomy of states in the international arena. the pca’s handling of kosovo and palestine underscores the need for clear guidelines and procedures to address objections while preserving the principles of fairness, transparency, and inclusivity. the reversal of the pca’s administrative council’s decision regarding palestine set a precedent for reconsidering kosovo’s status and reflecting a broader trend toward maintaining consistency in organizational practices. however, these reversals, while necessary for preserving the pca’s credibility and commitment to impartiality, also highlight the challenges of balancing legal consistency with procedural fairness. future decisions within international organizations must prioritize adherence to legal norms, procedural transparency, and respect for established practices to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution. conclusion the case of kosovo’s accession to the world customs organization and the permanent court of arbitration offers a compelling lens through which to examine the theoretical concepts of institutional integrity and procedural adherence within international organizations. this analysis highlights the intersection between international norms, political maneuvering, and organizational governance. kosovo’s adherence to the procedural frameworks set by the wco and the pca reflects a theoretical commitment to the principles of international law and organizational norms. the meticulous following of accession procedures, including the formal submission of documentation and compliance with membership protocols, demonstrates kosovo’s dedication to engaging with the global community responsibly and lawfully. this adherence aligns with the broader theoretical notion that states must respect and follow established international norms and procedures to legitimize their participation in global institutions. certain member states’ obstruction of kosovo’s accession, despite lacking legal authority, underscores the conflict between political maneuvering and legal principles. by exploiting procedural gaps and applying diplomatic pressure, they hindered kosovo’s membership, deviating from standards of transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. scholarly discussions on political interference in international organizations highlight how such actions weaken institutional credibility and compromise their impartiality in global governance. 80 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 the effects of these tactics on the wco’s institutional structures reveal a broader challenge: the erosion of trust in international organizations. political bias in decision making undermines institutional integrity, diminishing confidence among member states and stakeholders. theoretical perspectives emphasize that maintaining credibility requires fair, transparent, and rules-based processes. conversely, the pca’s response to procedural irregularities in kosovo’s accession demonstrates institutional adaptability. its swift correction upon recognizing deviations reflects a commitment to procedural integrity and established norms. this responsiveness highlights how organizational legitimacy is upheld through acknowledging and addressing procedural deficiencies, reinforcing adherence to institutional frameworks. the failure of states to engage with legal mechanisms under the vienna convention on the law of treaties (vclt) when opposing kosovo’s membership provides insight into the theoretical tension between legal norms and political strategy. as a cornerstone of international law, the vclt establishes guidelines for treaty negotiation, ratification, and interpretation, including specific procedures for objections and modifications. adhering to these frameworks is essential for maintaining the legitimacy and operational stability of international treaty systems. when states bypass these legal protocols, they not only challenge the rule of law but also diminish the authority of international institutions, weakening their role in dispute resolution and global cooperation. kosovo’s accession to international conventions exemplifies the broader theoretical challenge of politicization within international organizations. the propensity for states to engage in political maneuvering rather than adhering to established legal norms illustrates the vulnerability of these organizations to manipulation. this politicization can manifest in various ways, such as exploiting procedural loopholes, exerting diplomatic pressure, and leveraging alliances to advance political objectives. the theoretical concern here is that such manipulation undermines the principles of impartiality, transparency, and fairness that are supposed to govern international organizations. by prioritizing political expediency over procedural integrity, member states compromise the effectiveness of these institutions and erode confidence in their ability to function as unbiased arbiters of international affairs. the disregard for organizational norms and principles in favour of political objectives sets a troubling precedent for the functioning of international organizations. theoretically, this erosion of integrity not only undermines the credibility of these institutions but also impedes their ability to fulfill their mandates effectively. when states prioritize their political interests over adherence to established procedures, they contribute to a deterioration of the organizational mechanisms designed to ensure fairness and accountability. this deterioration has significant implications for the ability of international organizations to resolve disputes, foster cooperation, and maintain global stability. the accession process of kosovo reveals the intricate dynamics between political interests and institutional frameworks within international relations. this case study illuminates a theoretical concept wherein member states exploit organizational mechanisms for strategic advantages, thus politicizing processes that should be governed by neutral and established norms. the interplay between political agendas and institutional rules underscores a fundamental challenge in international governance: the susceptibility of international organizations to external pressures and manipulation. these insights contribute to a broader understanding of how international organizations must navigate the complexities of political influence while adhering to established norms. moving forward, it is imperative for these organizations to reinforce adherence to legal frameworks and procedural integrity to safeguard their credibility and effectiveness in global governance. the lessons drawn from kosovo’s accession process underscore the need for robust mechanisms to ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability, thereby preserving the organizations’ role as neutral and effective platforms for international diplomacy and dispute resolution. 81 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 references archives of the ministry of foreign affairs and diaspora of kosovo, pristina. international bureaus of the permanent court of arbitration, the hage, netherlands. secretariat of the world customs organization, brussels, belgium. binder, martin, and monika heupel. 2015. “the legitimacy of the un security council: evidence from recent general assembly debates.” international studies quarterly 59 (2): 238–250. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12134. ———. 2021. “the politics of legitimation in international organizations.” journal of global security studies 6 (3): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa033. daly, brooks w., evgeniya goriatcheva, and hugh a. meighen. 2014. a guide to the pca arbitration rules. oxford university press.davis, christina l. 2023.discriminatory clubs: the geopolitics of international organizations. princeton university press. embassy of the republic of serbia in belgium. 2017. “note verbale 10445, march 7, 2017, addressed to the federal public service foreign affairs, foreign trade, and development cooperation of belgium.” archive of the ministry of foreign affairs and diaspora of kosovo, pristina. international court of justice. 2010. accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of kosovo. advisory opinion, no. 2010/25. https://www.icjcij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/141/16012.pdf. klabbers, jan. 2002. an introduction to international institutional law. cambridge university press. lenz, tobias. 2017. “the rising authority of international organisations.” giga focus global 4 (11)1–11. giga german institute of global and area studies leibniz-institut für globale und regionale studien. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/53943/ ssoar-2017-lenz-the_rising_authority_of_international.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2017-lenz-the_rising_authority_of_international.pdf. lyons, gene m., david a. baldwin, and donald w. mcnemar. 1977. “the ‘politicization’ issue in the un specialized agencies.” proceedings of the academy of political science 32 (4): 1–14. ministry of foreign affairs of kosovo. 2016a. “note verbale addressed to the ministry of foreign affairs of the netherlands.” february 28, 2016. archive of the ministry of foreign affairs and diaspora of kosovo, pristina ———. 2016b. “note verbale to the member states of the pca, ref. 242/2016 of 8 june.” archive of the ministry of foreign affairs and diaspora of kosovo, pristina. ministry of foreign affairs of the kingdom of the netherlands. 2015. “notification on the accession of kosovo to the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes of 1907.” november 18, 2015. https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/vd/003316/1/pdf/003316_notificaties_12.pdf. ———. 2016. “note verbale addressed to the mfa kosovo.” january 22, 2016. reference no. minbuza-2016.45091. archive of the ministry of foreign affairs and diaspora of kosovo, pristina. ministry of foreign affairs of kosovo. 2022. “list of recognition.” accessed may 2, 2024. https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve. newman, edward, and gëzim visoka. 2018. “the foreign policy of state recognition: kosovo’s diplomatic strategy to join international society.” foreign policy analysis 14 (3): 367– 387. https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw042. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12134 https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa033 https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/141/16012.pdf https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/141/16012.pdf https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/53943/ssoar-2017-lenz-the_rising_authority_of_international.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2017-lenz-the_rising_authority_of_international.pdf https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/53943/ssoar-2017-lenz-the_rising_authority_of_international.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2017-lenz-the_rising_authority_of_international.pdf https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/53943/ssoar-2017-lenz-the_rising_authority_of_international.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2017-lenz-the_rising_authority_of_international.pdf https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/vd/003316/1/pdf/003316_notificaties_12.pdf https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/vd/003316/1/pdf/003316_notificaties_12.pdf https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw042 82 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 permanent court of arbitration. 1907. convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. accessed february 8, 2025. https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-of-international-disputes.pdf. ———. 2016a. “new pca member state: kosovo.” june 14, 2016. accessed march 1, 2025. https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/new-pca-member-state-kosovo. ———. 2016b. “new pca member state: palestine.” accessed march 1, 2025. https://pcacpa.org/en/news/new-pca-member-state-palestine. ———. 2016c. “provisional agenda of the 195th administrative council meeting on june 13, 2016.” document ca 166845. international bureau of the permanent court of arbitration, the hague, netherlands. ———. 2024. “members of the permanent court of arbitration.” accessed december 16, 2024. https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduction/members-of-the-court. un secretary general. 1969. vienna convention on the law of treaties. accessed february 8, 2025. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232english.pdf. van haersolte-van hof, jacomijn j. 2007. “the revitalization of the permanent court of arbitration.” netherlands international law review 54 (2): 395–413. https://doi.org/ 10.1017/s0165070x07003956. wco (world customs organization). 1950. convention establishing a customs co-operation council. accessed december 16, 2024. https://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/legalinstruments/~/media/7e31eb9c9dc24d7984c217508f05d9e8.ashx. ———. 2012. document sc0112e1a, 2012 council session, june 28. secretariat of the world customs organization, brussels, belgium. ———. 2017. “minutes of the 129th/130th sessions of the customs co-operation council (brussels, 6–8 july).” available at the secretariat of the world customs organization, brussels, belgium. ———. 2017. “notification from belgian authority on deposit of instrument-convention establishing a customs co-operation council.” march 10. accessed may 5, 2024. https://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2017/march/notification-from-belgianauthority-on-deposit-of-instrument.aspx. zimmermann, andreas. 2016. “palestine at the gates of the peace palace: the long and windy road towards palestinian membership in the permanent court of arbitration.” ejil: talk! april 5. accessed may 25, 2024. https://www.ejiltalk.org/palestine-at-the-gates-of-the-peace-palacethe-long-and-windy-road-towards-palestinian-membership-in-the-permanent-court-ofarbitration/. zyberi, gentian. 2016. “kosovo’s membership in the pca: some comments on professor zimmermann’s post.” ejil talks, april 13. accessed may 25, 2024. https://www.ejiltalk.org/ kosovos-membership-in-the-pca-some-comments-on-professor-zimmermanns-post. https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-of-international-disputes.pdf https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/bd7626f1-1907-convention-for-the-pacific-settlement-of-international-disputes.pdf https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/new-pca-member-state-palestine https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/new-pca-member-state-palestine https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduction/members-of-the-court https://doi.org/10.1017/s0165070x07003956 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0165070x07003956 https://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/legal-instruments/~/media/7e31eb9c9dc24d7984c217508f05d9e8.ashx https://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/legal-instruments/~/media/7e31eb9c9dc24d7984c217508f05d9e8.ashx https://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2017/march/notification-from-belgian-authority-on-deposit-of-instrument.aspx https://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2017/march/notification-from-belgian-authority-on-deposit-of-instrument.aspx https://www.ejiltalk.org/palestine-at-the-gates-of-the-peace-palace-the-long-and-windy-road-towards-palestinian-membership-in-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration/ https://www.ejiltalk.org/palestine-at-the-gates-of-the-peace-palace-the-long-and-windy-road-towards-palestinian-membership-in-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration/ https://www.ejiltalk.org/palestine-at-the-gates-of-the-peace-palace-the-long-and-windy-road-towards-palestinian-membership-in-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration/ https://www.ejiltalk.org/kosovos-membership-in-the-pca-some-comments-on-professor-zimmermanns-post https://www.ejiltalk.org/kosovos-membership-in-the-pca-some-comments-on-professor-zimmermanns-post 83 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(2) 2025: 67-83 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 brexit as a driver of european disintegration: institutional reform and differentiated integration vittorio orlando1, university of iceland, reykjavík maximilian conrad2, university of iceland, reykjavík abstract this study investigates the disintegrative impact of brexit on the european union’s institutional framework. disintegration may occur in the form of other member states leaving the union. still, it can also manifest in terms of institutional reform in the direction of increased intergovernmentalism and executive dominance, resulting in a renationalization of the eu’s policymaking competences. the article contributes to the literature on european disintegration and differentiated integration by addressing the causal impact of brexit as a driver of flexible institutional designs to meet the diverging demands of eu member states. the authors’ research is grounded in a constructivist approach, which draws from several theoretical accounts of european integration, proposing that brexit has and will continue to result in increasing institutional differentiation in the eu. the authors test this hypothesis through an embedded single case study that examines how member states reacted to the new european power balance. the authors focus on proposals for institutional reform, particularly in relation to the common foreign security policy and the european stability mechanism. 1 vittorio orlando is a phd candidate in political science at the university of iceland in reykjavík 2 maximilian conrad holds a phd in political science from lund university in lund, sweden and is currently professor of political science at the university of iceland in reykjavík 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 1. introduction this article studies the impact of brexit on european integration. the uk’s departure from the eu has raised several questions about the future of european integration (leruth et al. 2019b). on the one hand, brexit represented an ontological threat to the eu, as it highlighted the risk, until then theoretical, that member states could unilaterally withdraw under certain external and internal conditions. at the same time, given how the united kingdom has been a sui generis member over the years, tending to be reluctant to adopt reforms in the direction of greater european integration, brexit has been seen as an opportunity to accelerate this integration process. both possibilities, which are not mutually exclusive, could occur gradually at different rates in different member states. this work explores the effects of brexit on european disintegration, looking at how the uk referendum on eu membership has influenced the member states’ agenda in the context of eu policies. the aim of this article is to assess how brexit has affected the vision of the future of europe of the other member states by highlighting how european integration is a reversible process. the referendum reinforced the notion, hitherto only theoretical, that a state can leave the eu and has spread awareness among member states that the eu is less stable than previously thought. as a result, rather than striving for further integration, a more effective strategy for states could be to champion differentiated integration (di) in the fields of their interest. in essence, brexit might have redefined the perception of the eu, shifting from an embryonic stage of a supranational entity with state-like ambitions to a mere international organization with exceptionally broad competences. despite the coexistence of both visions within the various member states and their respective political classes, a similar shift could significantly alter eu integration trajectories. this article does not aim to prove that one vision has replaced the other. instead, it seeks to gauge the disintegrative impact of brexit by highlighting the changes that have occurred in the years following the referendum. in pursuing this goal, it looks at two different, albeit not mutually exclusive, hypotheses: first, has brexit resulted in increased differentiation? second, did its impact on differentiation, whether positive or negative, lead to more integration or more disintegration? it does so by analyzing the political discourse of the member states on the central themes for european integration, which are the same policy issues at the heart of the british referendum debate and the agreement signed in february 2016 between prime minister david cameron and the european union. these issues include sovereignty, economic governance, and restrictions on movement and access to national welfare for intra-european migrants. the article is structured as follows. the first section focuses on the effects of brexit and the models of disintegration developed by the literature review. the following section discusses the methods used in this study, also outlining the criteria behind the data selection. the third part analyzes the institutional developments of the eu in the fields of monetary and security policy. the fourth section builds on this analysis to explore the role of brexit as a catalyst of already present disintegrative forces, highlighting the causal links between the referendum and strengthening the eurosceptic discourse. the fifth section discusses these ties, addressing the article’s central hypothesis that brexit has given momentum to a new type of discourse on eu membership. finally, the conclusion offers some remarks on how the study of european integration can develop on the subject, taking into account the case of brexit and the general idea that external events can reshape the ideological fabric of a political system, influencing its future. 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 2. literature review this research looks at the ties between disintegration—a concept which played a foremost role in eu studies in the last decades—and differentiated integration (di). differentiated integration centres around the notion that european policies are applied unevenly across member states in terms of centralization, defined as vertical integration and territorial extension, or horizontal integration, which is linked to the number of member states adhering to a given policy (schimmelfennig et al. 2015). schimmelfennig (2021) distinguishes between differentiated integration and differentiated disintegration, defining the former as the delegation of national competences to the eu by the member states and the latter as the culmination of a process that originates from the politicization of european integration issues within the sphere of mass politics. the consequence of this process is the strengthening of eurosceptic parties, which, notably through referenda, seek to achieve differentiated disintegration, ultimately resulting in withdrawal from the eu. overall, the two terms can be understood as the two ends of the differentiation spectrum—a conceptual category that includes a wide range of phenomena such as opt-outs, cooperation agreements, and the renationalization of specific competences (leruth et al. 2022). given this foundation, this study examines the impact of brexit on di to assess its disintegrative effects. by analyzing how brexit has influenced differentiation, it evaluates whether the uk’s departure has strengthened eurosceptic political actors in other member states by demonstrating the feasibility of leaving or, conversely, has discouraged such movements by highlighting the complexities and costs of disentangling from the eu. 2.1 differentiation and disintegration this research draws from the recent literature on eu disintegration, combining it with an empirical assessment of eu policies. the aim is to determine the extent to which brexit can act as a catalyst for european disintegration, which aligns with intergovernmentalist theorizing. according to this approach, member states will perceive eu membership as disadvantageous to their interests, also due to the pressures exerted by eurosceptic elements within them (leruth et al. 2019a). at the same time, it is also conceivable that the actors in this process, i.e. the member states as well as the institutions and interest groups within the eu, proceed with the creation of new institutional arrangements to overcome the challenges posed by the result of the referendum, a scenario comparable to the approach implemented by the eu in the banking and energy fields (bauer and trondal 2015). in the negotiations with the eu before the 2016 vote, prime minister david cameron emphasized the importance of member states being able to determine autonomously the extension of their adhesion to the european project. this underscored the relevance of differentiated integration in the context of brexit. both in the bloomberg speech and during the “remain” campaign, cameron advocated for institutional “flexibility” to address the new challenges faced by the eu. this position aligns with the approach already preferred by the united kingdom, a member state generally hesitant to adopt some of the most significant reforms in the eu, notably opting out of the schengen agreement and the eurozone. differentiated integration (di) was also advocated by member states who sought greater eu involvement in specific policy areas. france has been a prominent advocate of this approach, especially under the leadership of french president emmanuel macron. the french president has consistently remarked on the importance of fiscal and institutional reforms within the eu, including a common defence strategy based on a franco-german partnership open to interested member states (michel 2020; schmidt 2019). this work draws from the literature that has described differentiated integration as the situation in which some member states choose to pursue further integration, while others seek to be exempted from specific aspects of european legislation, as was the case with the uk until brexit (holzinger and tosun 2019). in this regard, 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 the unique form of membership developed by the uk in the decades before its departure— characterized by the contradiction of seeking a central role within the single market while opting out of the euro—has been highlighted in the scholarly literature as one of the causal factors behind brexit (fossum and lord 2023). accordingly, the development of similar institutional arrangements in other member states could further destabilize the eu in the future, a scenario known as “eu à la carte” (hoekman 2007). this model could also provide member states with greater autonomy to define their preferences within a larger framework. as a result, increased differentiation could strengthen or hinder eu integration, leading to the four empirical scenarios outlined in table 1. table 1: impact of differentiation on integration. source: authors part of the literature focused on how brexit might lead to a less differentiated eu, as the withdrawal of the united kingdom results in a double effect: first, it strengthens political unity between member states and, simultaneously, it discourages the adoption of models similar to the british one, which was based on opt-outs and external differentiation (martill 2021). other authors have observed how brexit has instead highlighted the limits of the eu’s ability to cope with requests for flexibility from its member states, underlining how differentiated integration is an intrinsic characteristic of the eu and shared, in certain areas, by every member state (kendrick 2023). considering how differentiated integration affects specific policy areas depending on the state analyzed and the external circumstances, and thus in line with the ambition of studying the effects of brexit on this phenomenon, this work pays particular attention to the monetary and security fields. the choice of these sectors is motivated by their relevance, as they are areas generally linked to the concept of sovereignty as portrayed in eurosceptic narratives; it has been widely observed how the issues of security and the economy were at the centre of the “leave” campaign and is a recurring topic in the eurosceptic discourse across europe (orlando 2022). differentiation is a consequence of the heterogeneity of preferences and capabilities among member states, due to the significant demographic, economic, and societal differences between them. according to the supply and demand theory, differentiation arises from the contrast between states resisting deeper integration (demand side) and those promoting it (supply side) (schimmelfennig and winzen 2020). states on the demand side will pursue differentiation through opt-outs, while those on the supply side may support this process to advance further integration without being hindered by the constraints posed by the former. in turn, the dynamics leading from heterogeneity to differentiated integration (di) have been studied through the lenses of the three main european integration theories: liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and postfunctionalism. specifically, liberal intergovernmentalism (li) and, to a minor extent, neofunctionalism (nf) consider the heterogeneity of wealth among member states as one of the causal factors of differentiated integration. member states with similar economic outputs are more likely to cooperate and more integration less integration more differentiation differentiated integration differentiated disintegration less differentiation conventional integration renationalisation in areas where di is currently practiced 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 experience greater spillover effects, while those with significant economic differences may opt for more flexible arrangements, leading to varying levels of integration across the eu. this process is facilitated by the significant advantage of wealthier states in realizing their preferences, due to their greater bargaining power. on the other hand, postfunctionalism (pf) focuses more on domestic factors and national identity in researching the driving forces of differentiated integration, thus offering an alternative, albeit complementary, explanation (schimmelfennig and winzen 2019). postfunctionalism, therefore, differs from the other two grand theories in that it turns its attention to the role of identity in individual preferences in shaping the jurisdictional architecture of the eu; this mechanism becomes of primary importance where european integration is politicized, that is, it enters the arsenal of political actors, conditioning their positions and limiting their range of action due to the fear of electoral or referendum defeat (hooghe and marks 2009). these dynamics, already hypothesized in the years following the maastricht and lisbon treaties, were widely observed in the choice of government led by david cameron to renegotiate the united kingdom’s position in the eu first and in granting a referendum afterwards (schimmelfennig 2021). they were also reflected in the post-brexit negotiations, which have been described as unfolding within a reality of constraining dissensus (biermann and jagdhuber 2022). this article aims to make a unique contribution to the existing scholarship by drawing from both the postfunctionalist approach, liberal intergovernmentalism (li), and neofunctionalism (nf), as well as by analyzing the institutional developments of the eu in the years following brexit. to achieve this, it conducts an analysis of the member states’ policy decisions in the most significant and politicized areas of european integration, namely economic governance and security policies. in this context, the impact of brexit on disintegration could manifest in two ways. first, brexit might demonstrate alternative cooperation mechanisms and the viability of referendums as a tool to implement differentiated integration. alternatively, the exit of the united kingdom could accelerate the process of european integration, potentially through the implementation of a series of reforms that lead to the coexistence of a softcore europe alongside smaller and more integrated policy communities (schmidt 2019). the purpose of this article is therefore to seek evidence in support of these two possibilities and, based on the findings, draw conclusions about differentiation in post-brexit europe. these two scenarios should not be considered mutually exclusive, as their coexistence is possible and probable. given the heterogeneity of preferences mentioned before, it appears likely that some member states would seek greater flexibility, motivated both by the desire to reduce the economic costs of further integration as envisaged by li and nf and the internal political constraints at the centre of postfunctionalist theory. this process, identified by schimmelfennig and winzen as the supply and demand model of disintegration, can conceivably push those states interested in expanding the eu’s scope of competence to achieve their aims through internal agreements. at the same time, if some member states decide to carry out ambitious reforms characterized by a high level of integration, such as the previously discussed cases of common defence and fiscal policies, it is foreseeable that they would opt for some form of differentiated integration (di), rather than allowing their efforts to be blocked by the reservations of more reluctant member states. if this is the case, brexit has opened the doors to a multi-speed europe, a phenomenon that predates it and that the referendum could further legitimize. the example of the uk has provided a new weapon to the arsenal of eurosceptic actors at the domestic politics level, while in the context of eu negotiations, it showed how concessions and opt-outs can be preferable to having a member reluctant to conform to the european integration project. in line with the choice to focus this analysis on the economic and security areas, examining the two crises that 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 hit the eu after brexit—the covid-19 pandemic and the 2022 russian invasion of ukraine— is inevitable. regarding the community response to the pandemic, the eu coordinated its efforts despite some initial resistance by certain member states; this high degree of coordination applies both to the health aspect, such as the supply of vaccines, and to the response to the economic and fiscal consequences of the crisis (schilin 2023). given these findings, schilin also suggests that the relevance of differentiated integration (di) decreased after brexit, as granting the uk optouts was not sufficient to prevent its withdrawal from the eu; accordingly, he hypothesizes that the role of di as a causal factor of european disintegration is conditioned to the existence of specific circumstances capable of strengthening its ideational importance. regarding the common foreign and security policy (cfsp), the 2022 escalation of the russoukrainian war has called into question the eu’s role in security. although the central pillar of european defence remains, for most states, nato membership, the eu’s response to the war shows the goal of implementing a common response. at the same time, di is an intrinsic characteristic of the security field—an area in which historical and geopolitical reasons led to various types of cooperation: between individual member states, between member states and non-member states, and through bilateral agreements with non-european countries, both outside and within the nato framework (rieker and giske 2024). this high level of di in the defence field is not surprising, considering how the military aspect has historically been the most emblematic expression of state sovereignty, with the very survival of the state often depending on it, as reminded by the war in ukraine. 3. materials and methods the literature discussed so far presents a highly complex picture concerning di in general and specifically the impact of brexit. at the same time, on the empirical level, it can be observed how the two major crises faced by the post-brexit eu resulted in vastly different outcomes. through an extensive analysis of the literature and policy documents, selected through an indepth analysis of the relevant material, this work aims to explain and partly reconcile these evident contrasts by analyzing policy decisions and explicit statements toward a higher level of differentiated integration by member states and the eu. the material, meticulously collected via traditional mainstream media, digital media, and official policy documents between 2020 and 2024, provides a comprehensive understanding of the disintegrative effects of brexit in the context of community policies, particularly in the final stages of the negotiations and the months preceding the official exit of the united kingdom from the eu. through an assessment of government declarations and programs, this comprehensive approach provides the opportunity to focus both on the institutional developments within the eu, measurable through an analysis of the policies implemented by member states, and on the ideological dimension, indicative instead of brexit’s impact on how the notion of belonging to the eu has changed. as a result, this work aims to discuss the disintegrative effect of brexit from the vantage point of differentiated integration, providing an empirical analysis while being cognizant of the leading european integration theory approaches. the analysis presented here, however, does not take into account programs of political parties and electoral material since, while recognizing their importance for the study of euroscepticism, it has been observed that the positions of the parties are characterized by a high level of ambivalence (heinisch et al. 2021). therefore, they appear poorly suited for studying the institutional developments of relations between the eu and its member states. 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 the analysis of the material presented in the following section aims to provide empirical support for a theoretical discussion on brexit’s direct and indirect effects on differentiated integration. by examining how brexit has influenced the evolution of eu institutions and shaped member states’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of membership, this discussion contributes to a broader assessment of european disintegration trajectories. through this institutional perspective, the study seeks to better understand brexit’s disintegrative impact within the framework of differentiated integration. this last aspect is the basis of the choice to focus on monetary policy and security, already at the centre of the brexit campaign and widely considered sectors in which it is challenging to carry forward common european policies (orlando and conrad 2024). by focusing on these crucial areas, the authors aim to shed light on the most pressing issues surrounding brexit and its impact on differentiated integration. 4. institutional development although on a purely theoretical level, eu membership obliges all member states to comply with the provisions of the treaties, it is evident that, in practice, exceptions in this sense are, in fact, the norm. in the two macro-areas affected by this analysis, a widespread tendency to resort to opt-outs can be observed. examples of this phenomenon are the economic and monetary union (emu), based on three stages of progressive economic integration that have not been adopted by all member states, as well as from schengen membership, temporary in the cases of romania, bulgaria, and cyprus, and permanent in the case of ireland.34 the existence of such resistance leads to a reflection on the supranational nature of the eu, as these two areas are not only, as previously noted, cornerstones of the eurosceptic discourse, but also involve competences generally delegated to the central government in federal states (schimmelfennig et al. 2023). 4.1 economic policy the first necessary distinction in the analysis of differentiated integration is between those states partaking in the emu and those outside it; following the 2010 eurozone crisis5 and the ensuing reforms, the gap between the two groups widened significantly. some examples of this process include: the creation of the european stability mechanism (esm) to assist euro area member states in financial difficulty; the establishment of different monitoring and reporting measures for eurozone members in the context of the stability and growth pact; the treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union (tscg), which subjects eurozone countries to particularly stringent budget rules and enhanced supervisory mechanisms; the entry into force of a specific regulation aimed at monitoring macroeconomic asymmetries (reg. 1176/2011), accompanied by special sanctioning measures for euro area 3for a detailed account of the history of the economic and monetary union, and on which some member states have yet to fullfill the convergence criteria see european parliament. 2025. “history of the economic and monetary union.” accessed june 17, 2025. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/79/history-of-theeconomic-and-monetary-union. 4 although schengen technically falls under the area of freedom, security and justice (afsj), in the context of eurosceptic rhetoric and populist discourse the issue of freedom of movement is generally framed as a security one, hence the inclusion above. 5 the eurozone crisis, beginning in 2010, was a sovereign debt crisis that exposed structural weaknesses in the euro area. triggered by the 2008 global financial crisis, it primarily affected greece, ireland, portugal, and spain, leading to bailouts coordinated by the european central bank (ecb), european commission, and the international monetary fund (imf). austerity measures and economic stagnation followed, sparking political unrest and raising doubts about the eurozone’s long-term viability. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/79/history-of-the-economic-and-monetary-union https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/79/history-of-the-economic-and-monetary-union 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 countries (reg. 1174/2011). these measures have contributed to increasing the distance between the two groups of states and, at the same time, giving rise to conflicts between the eurozone states, as they are bound by new and more stringent measures which have exacerbated pre-existing differences in terms of policy preferences (pilati and de angelis 2020). the eu’s response to the eurozone recession was a labyrinthine network of measures, signifying a resolute intent to prevent crises of the scale experienced in 2010 from recurring within member states. this was accomplished by amalgamating support tools with novel methods of sanction and supervision (börzel 2016). the measures implemented after the covid-19 pandemic, however, appeared to be aimed at intervening not only in the pathological stage of the member states’ finances but also at significantly amplifying the scope of eu investments, thereby acting already in the physiological phase of the functioning of the european economy. the multiannual financial framework (mff), adopted for the years 2021–2027, witnessed the eu endorsing an ambitious financial project aimed at fortifying its economy post-pandemic; this project, dubbed “next generation eu” (ngeu), 6 was distinguished not only by its substantial magnitude but also by the decision to finance it through the issuance of eu debt instruments, henceforth defined as eurobonds, to be repaid until 2058 (european commission 2021a). the funds raised from the issuance of these eurobonds were then allocated to member states through the recovery and resilience facility (rrf), an instrument explicitly created to provide such performance-based financing to member states under conditions that they present a national resilience and recovery plan (nrrp) in which they outline the reforms and investments to be implemented by 2026 (european commission 2021b). the negotiations that led to the approval of these measures were significantly influenced by the resistance of a bloc of states labelled as the frugal fours (austria, denmark, the netherlands, and sweden) and finland (bisciari et al. 2021). although eventually overcome, these resistances allow us to spell out some considerations regarding the institutional dynamics of post-brexit europe. in contrast to the reaction to the 2010 crisis, in which the economic support of the eu was conditioned and secondary compared to the austerity measures introduced, the strategy to respond to the pandemic shows an approach aimed at promoting the development of member states, almost in a keynesian fashion. the main objection raised by the frugal four was that the issuance of eurobonds could damage the functioning of the eurozone, specifically in the absence of a system of conditionality and accountability linked to the disbursement of european funds. after intense negotiations, these concerns were addressed by establishing the rrf and other smaller programs aimed at increasing accountability for member states benefitting from these measures (vanhercke et al. 2021). the decision to respond to the crisis through direct eu intervention of unprecedented scope has been interpreted as a post-brexit development of european economic policy, as it represents an overcoming of the neoliberal logic prevalent in the united kingdom (joseph and juncos 2024). another possibility is that the need to address the covid-19 crisis forced europe to face a dilemma rooted in two arguments at the core of eurosceptic criticisms. on the one hand, the claim—central in the brexit campaign and quite common in wealthier member states—that the eu tends to redistribute resources to benefit its poorest members, effectively subsidizing their failing economic policies. on the other hand, there is the opposing view that eu monetary policy and its austerity measures represent a threat to the economy of those states with below 6 next generation eu (ngeu), launched in 2020 in response to the covid-19 pandemic, is a €750 billion recovery instrument aimed at supporting economic resilience and green and digital transitions across the eu. marking a significant step toward fiscal integration, it allowed the european commission to issue common debt on behalf of member states—an unprecedented move that redefined the scope of eu-level solidarity. 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 average economic performance (orlando and conrad 2024). the achievement of these agreements demonstrates that, despite internal divisions arising from conflicting economic preferences and ideological differences within domestic politics, the eu has successfully pursued common financial objectives, fostering optimism about its future. this outcome aligns with the conventional understanding of eu integration, corresponding to the “more integration/less differentiation” scenario outlined in table 1, where deeper cooperation prevails over fragmentation. 4.2 foreign and defence policy as regards the second area covered by this article, namely the common foreign and security policy (cfsp), it would appear that the direct impact of brexit is lower than what the international relevance of the united kingdom would suggest. this discrepancy is because the uk took advantage of the high level of flexibility available in these areas in the years preceding brexit, so its contribution to the administrative field was reduced (schade 2020). nonetheless, losing a member state with a military and diplomatic apparatus on the scale of the uk’s had significant consequences for the cfsp. the attempts to reach an agreement through some form of external differentiation by the theresa may-led government proved fruitless, both due to the lukewarm reception by the eu and the rise of boris johnson’s government, characterized by more drastic positions on the topic (martill and sus 2023). in parallel with the need to readjust its strategy following brexit, the eu found itself facing the russian invasion of ukraine in 2022. in march 2022, the european council endorsed the strategic compass, a document previously approved by the foreign affairs council, which contained an analysis of the eu’s priorities and objectives in the field of security (council of the european union 2022). the strategic compass, hastily revised in the weeks between its promulgation and the onset of hostilities, begins by acknowledging the resurgence of war in europe and the european union’s commitment to upholding the european security order. while the document alludes to the concept of the eu’s strategic autonomy as a security actor, it remains somewhat unclear about the implementation of this autonomy, particularly in relation to the eu’s mutual assistance clause and eu-nato cooperation (koenig 2022). in essence, the strategic compass serves more as a roadmap for the future development of european security than a concrete institutional development. despite the document’s resolute language and ambitious objectives, undoubtedly influenced by the events in ukraine, it is yet to be seen how willing member states are to put it into practice, especially regarding the potential for coordinated operations under eu supervision, as outlined in article 44 of the treaty on european union (teu) (blockmans et al. 2022). the extent to which the eu can act autonomously at a regional and global level, implementing its preferences independently from the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and individual member states, remains uncertain. for instance, the fact that sweden and finland have joined nato, along with the skepticism of central and eastern european countries about the cfsp’s concrete capability to protect their interests, suggests that the eu has a long way to go before it becomes the primary security provider for its member states. this is despite the significant support in the form of financial and strategic aid provided to ukraine (helwig 2023). returning to the focus of this article, the institutional developments in the field of cfsp offer some relevant insights. enhanced cooperation in this sector is explicitly referred to in eu legislation, such as the institution of the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) based on the treaty on european union (teu). moreover, it is also logically desirable given the differing security needs of member states, such as the above case of the central and eastern european bloc, as well as shared interests, for example, among mediterranean countries concerning the management of migration flows. on these grounds, and given the need to 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 accommodate divergent interests, differentiated integration (di) has represented a recurring feature of the cfsp. however, it was present more in its passive meaning, especially in terms of opt-outs, than in the active sense, conceptualized as a higher degree of integration. this significant fragmentation is visible in the case of pesco, where it was recommended to implement straightforward guidelines and a more stringent monitoring system for member states (houdé and wessel 2023). based on the four-fold typology outlined in the second section, this policy area exemplifies differentiated integration (characterized by both more differentiation and integration), as certain states seeking deeper cooperation are advancing beyond the common eu framework. this trend suggests the emergence of strategic security partnerships among like-minded countries rather than the development of a unified european defence strategy. this analysis described how post-brexit europe has evolved, focusing on institutional developments in the economic and security fields. although a deep analysis of both events is beyond the scope of this work, it is necessary to address how the pandemic and the russoukrainian war affected these policies. therefore, the two crises are considered external causal factors capable of accelerating endogenous dynamics independent from them. the authors have highlighted how the eu has implemented robust economic measures to support its member states, overcoming internal opposition through minor concessions. although the strategic compass represents a step forward in the direction of more incisive eu-level action, within the cfsp, it appears that the national and nato dimensions continue to be dominant in the areas of diplomacy and security. the following section explores the role of brexit in the institutional developments discussed so far, aiming to determine whether, and to what extent, the notion that a state could leave the eu has had an integrative, disintegrative, or mixed effect. 5. the role of brexit 5.1 main disintegrative factors to discuss the impact of brexit on european integration, it may be helpful to summarize the main profiles under which it can be analyzed. possibly the most profound consequence of brexit is a disintegrative impact that could lead other member states to leave the eu. however, this domino effect has yet to be observed, and it does not appear likely to happen in the immediate future. another possibility is for the post-brexit eu to experience disintegrative spillovers, differentiated disintegration through the renationalization of specific competences, or a weakening of eu structures at the advantage of member state governments in line with intergovernmental theories (niemann 2021). at the same time, both during and after the brexit negotiations, the 27 eu member-state governments and public opinion privileged cohesiveness. it has been observed how even eurosceptic parties raised the issue of reforming the eu rather than promoting the example set by the uk (chopin and lequesne 2022). such instances of reform might indicate an evolution of the eu in the sense of a more flexible institutional design. institutional safeguards have been a quintessential feature of the eu constitutional design, aimed at guaranteeing member states the possibility of opting out of specific policy initiatives, a mechanism often used by the united kingdom (glencross 2021). alongside the possibility that brexit has incentivized member states to seek more flexible designs, it is also necessary to consider the dilemma of future trajectories for european integration: whether to favour deepening (institutional) or widening (geographical) integration. as noted by hobolt (2016), a process of greater differentiated integration is underway, destined to accentuate the divisions within the eu in the sense of a deeper integration of core eurozone members. in this context, the di process would represent an intrinsic characteristic of a more 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 flexible design, and it would go hand in hand with the deeper integration required by some states. 5.2 imitative effects concerning the contagion effect, on a political level, the most significant threat consists of the potential emulation effect mediated by local eurosceptic forces and the perception by member state citizens that the uk improved its position by leaving the eu. to offset this risk, the eu maintained a hard stance in the negotiations, emphasizing that the benefits associated with membership must be tied to the related costs—a position that aligns with voter preferences, as demonstrated in a large-scale quantitative study (walter 2021). this process can be witnessed in the eu-uk negotiations on the cfsp. despite brexit offering brussels an opportunity to expand its competences in the security and foreign policy domains, the eu also had to confront the claims advanced by eurosceptic actors that such developments would result in a loss of national sovereignty and the establishment of a superstate. furthermore, both parties faced significant constraints in their efforts to outline the future profiles of their cooperation in the area. the eu had to avoid an agreement that was too favourable towards the uk, as it would have reinforced the perception of an à la carte integration, with all the benefits of membership and none of the associated costs. simultaneously, boris johnson’s cabinet could not settle for a compromise that curtailed the uk’s sovereignty, which would have contradicted the hard brexit stance of his government. ultimately, this conflict led to the exclusion of the issue from the 2020 eu-uk treaty (harrois 2023), and such an agreement is still pending at the time of this writing (posaner et al. 2023). 5.3 executive dominance and the eu democratic deficit a further aspect of primary importance in assessing the disintegrative impact of brexit concerns executive dominance, specifically the tendency of member state governments to bypass the multilevel structure envisioned in the eu design, which includes both national parliaments and eu institutions. the relevance of this phenomenon harks back to the debate on the democratic deficit in the eu, one of the main points of contention in the eurosceptic discourse. in the context of the brexit referendum, the term highlighted the distance between the eu and the citizens of member states. in this analysis, a surge in executive dominance is relevant as it indicates a shift towards an understanding of the eu as an institution ultimately managed by member states, rather than a democratic supranational entity. a recent quantitative study aimed at assessing the impact of eu executive action versus member states’ governments in the 2015 refugee crisis and during the pandemic suggests how, in both cases, the executive action of national governments was decisive in shaping the relevant policymaking decision (bojar and kriesi 2023). however, in the case of covid-19 and the fiscal reforms connected to it, the friction represented by minority coalitions of member states had a minor effect, attributable to the symmetric distribution of the crisis and the limited role played by national identities. these findings align with a further quantitative study highlighting the reduced role of national parliaments in influencing government preferences (tarlea et al. 2024). the reduced role of national parliaments is partly due to the constitutional architecture of member states; however, brexit might have influenced governments to compromise more. this phenomenon is due to the absence of the uk, which has historically been a reluctant partner and to avoid facing the consequences of hindering the eu decision-making process. not only was executive dominance present independently of brexit, but the uk’s withdrawal has partly facilitated negotiations between member states, easing the implementation of shared policies. 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 thus, brexit did not increase the democratic deficit of the eu, as neither the other national actors have seen their role diminished due to the referendum, nor can one observe a surge of supranational centralization to the detriment of the member states. the central role of national governments is, instead, the leading cause of european democracy’s imperfect nature. although governments are directly or indirectly accountable to their voters, they decide on eu affairs with significant autonomy; moreover, the collegial nature of the eu decision-making practices allows them to offload their political responsibility significantly. 5.4 heterogeneity a further factor to consider is the high degree of heterogeneity between member states, which results in various institutional convergence clubs, i.e. groups of countries with comparable performances in several macroeconomic and institutional indicators (glawe and wagner 2021). this heterogeneity could be fertile ground for differentiated integration, as a flexible institutional design would help overcome conflicts between member states with different preferences; it would also allow for joint projects to be carried out with countries at a comparable level without waiting for the other member states to complete the necessary structural reforms. given such conditions, a disintegrative event like brexit could lead to a more flexible institutional design to avoid conflicts between member states. in the context of the cfsp, a sector already characterized by a high level of flexibility and autonomy on the part of the member states, it is not possible to observe any development in this sense (klose et al. 2023). on the contrary, after the referendum, and in the context of the war in ukraine, which led denmark to join the common security and defence policy, the effect of brexit appears to be negligible. in the context of security policies, di can manifest both in the sense of opt-outs and as enhanced cooperation between member states within the structures provided by european legislation. in the economic and single market fields, the type of di most relevant for the study of european disintegration is the former; the british government’s requests to the eu to avoid the referendum represent a clear example of this disintegrative drive. in the 2015 letter addressed to the president of the european council, donald tusk, pm david cameron called for exemptions for non-eurozone states from financing operations supporting the euro, limits to the free circulation of people, and an increase in the power of national parliaments (cameron 2015). despite the eventual failure of cameron’s plea, a post-brexit eu might accommodate similar instances of reform from member states to avoid their withdrawal. if this were the case, one might expect to observe an easing of european constraints, particularly budgetary ones, accompanied by a trend towards renationalizing national competences in critical sectors. this tendency would represent a radical change in the core features of the eu, as highlighted by tusk’s negative response to the british government’s requests, a position shared by the member states during the brexit negotiations (matthijs et al. 2019). 5.5 the institutional and the ideational profile a shift of this magnitude, facilitated and accelerated by the referendum’s outcome but not attributable only to it, can be studied from two perspectives. the first, empirical and particularly relevant in the short and medium term, is the assessment of instances of competences renationalization. these processes would occur gradually and concern only specific sectors at any given time. a comprehensive empirical study focused on the dynamics of single market integration across multiple policy areas contradicts this hypothesis, showing instead a situation characterized by the relaunch of initiatives aimed at promoting greater integration and a high degree of resilience towards instances of renationalization (raudla and spendzharova 2022). 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 the second vantage point, theoretical and therefore better suited to address the long-term dynamics of european integration, shifts the focus from what has been done to what has yet to be done. in other words, it evaluates whether brexit forced institutional actors to delay reforms to avoid being targeted by eurosceptic forces or exacerbating the conflict between member states (zeitlin et al. 2019). in such a scenario, differentiated integration could serve a dual purpose. it would offer member states constrained by the dynamics described above greater leeway and allow those actors interested in european integration to pursue a deeper form of it independently. the following section discusses the extent to which this has happened and the role of brexit in these developments. 6. discussion 6.1 brexit as a structural driver of disintegratios the authors’ examination of the current state of the eu has primarily delved into its institutional reforms and the concept of differentiated integration while assessing the profound disintegrative impact of brexit. in the context of emu policies, the measures outlined in the multiannual financial framework (mff), alongside the issuance of eurobonds, represent a visible sign of development in the sense of greater integration. in the security field, although the strategic compass contains several blueprints for development, the situation appears substantially unchanged. this gap between external security and other policy areas, with the latter confined to the decision-making autonomy of member states, is a feature of eu policymaking already observed by börzel (2005) in a macro analysis of the institutional evolution of the european project. the distinction between level, referring to the issues falling under eu competences, and scope, measured in terms of supranational centralization versus the involvement of national governments in the decision-making process, provides a useful framework for further analysis (börzel 2005). the extensive distributive policies implemented post-pandemic, along with the establishment of a monitoring system by the commission, demonstrate a broadening of competences. however, it is important to note that the approval of these measures was a result of consensus among the member states. in the case of the cfsp, the national dimension still holds sway in both aspects; even the calls to enhance defence cooperation by european heads of state primarily pertain to the national dimension, with the eu’s role limited to providing an institutional framework for such initiatives (le monde 2024). however, the presence of these structural limits alone cannot be considered a sign of disintegration, much less can it be attributed to brexit. on the contrary, considering that one of the central factors of divergence between the uk and brussels was the implementation of redistributive policies, brexit facilitated the implementation of next generation eu. nonetheless, establishing a permanent macroeconomic stabilization mechanism in the future is desirable and such a mechanism would be even more effective if paired with broader eu competences in the fiscal field (codogno and van den noord 2022). brexit has facilitated the negotiations, as, based on the positions of the british government during its membership and specifically the eurozone crisis, it was unlikely that the uk would have accepted a project of economic recovery of this magnitude. furthermore, the exit of the most prominent noneurozone member changed the balance of power within the eu further in favour of the euro area countries. in this sense, brexit can be considered a driver of european integration in line with the tenets of intergovernmentalism, which focuses on the power relationship between member states. 6.2 brexit as an ideological driver of disintegration 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 some further considerations can be drawn by analyzing these dynamics from a postfunctionalist perspective. brexit and the experience of the 2010 eurozone crisis had a positive impact because european leaders approached the pandemic aware that an austeritydriven reaction would have a potentially disintegrative effect, as it would favour a narrative centred on an eu distant from its citizens. the ideological effect of the referendum, combined with the emergence of more interventionist governments in various european states, also contributed to a paradigm shift in eu trade policies in the sense of greater protectionism alongside the redistributive measures already mentioned (bauerle and meunier 2024). one cannot underestimate the causal impact of the covid-19 pandemic and the war in ukraine in this paradigm shift; however, already at the time of her inauguration, the president of the european commission, ursula von der leyen (2019), had underlined the intent to increase the use of economic tools by the eu for geopolitical purposes. these difficulties in isolating the impact of brexit derive from the fact that institutional developments can be understood as the result of the interplay between external events and how they are interpreted and metabolized within the political arena. in the negotiations following the referendum, although the possibility of forming a “european army” was one of the arguments employed by the “leave” campaign, the issue of the cfsp was relatively overshadowed compared to other aspects (howorth 2017). the first developments in this area were the signing of pesco in 2017 and the reiteration by the commission of the need to create a single market for defence, optimize economies of scale, and ultimately “move towards a security and defence union” (european commission 2017). these developments suggest that eu defence integration gained momentum after brexit, with member states putting into practice the visionary discourse already present in the treaty of lisbon but essentially left unrealized in the following decade (svendsen 2019). five years later, the strategic compass reiterated this intention. however, rather than providing a framework for a common defence market, it reaffirmed the need for member states to increase military expenditures. overall, compared with the economic dimension, developments in the security sector have been more moderate. the reason for this different pace might be that, despite the russian invasion of ukraine, member states are not under the same pressure when it comes to security. if one assumes that the main drivers of institutional development are the need to adapt to crises and the emergence of ideological forces, the main difference between the two fields was nato’s presence. in the economic field, the pandemic was the structural factor leading to the need for institutional reform. on an ideological level, the experience of the 2010 crisis and the uk’s absence shaped the response of the eu; this resulted in unprecedented measures to support member states, shaping a narrative of the eu as an actor capable of responding effectively to an economic and social crisis. suppose one transposes this paradigm into the security sphere; in that case, the external event driving institutional adaptations would be the russo-ukrainian war, as highlighted by the tones of the strategic compass and the declarations of european leaders. however, the nato-national state dualism is still prevalent on the ideological level. despite the impact of brexit, also postulated by the literature, the eu is still a secondary actor. as a result, institutional developments in the sector consisted of “best endeavour” norms that have not been accompanied, until now, by concrete and effective actions. thus, the current situation is marked by uncertainty. on the one hand, the eu has managed to avert the disintegrative domino effect predicted by brexit, despite facing a global pandemic and a military conflict on its borders. on the other hand, the uk’s departure did not accelerate european integration, which continues to follow an intergovernmentalist logic. in this context, brexit remains a reminder of the potential extreme consequences of community policy failures, 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 accentuating the domestic constraints faced by member states’ governments. this stagnant situation can be attributed to the underdeveloped european identity among the population, despite the prominence of eu issues in national debates. in times of crisis, the eu becomes an easy target for criticism from interested domestic actors, as evidenced by the “leave” campaign. 6.3 future trajectories of european integrations a further halting factor is linked to the democratic deficit of european institutions, in particular in the context of eu constitutional politics. as observed by patberg (2017), the eu currently lacks an institution that allows citizens to exercise constituent power independently of the governments of member states. this limit, accompanied by a european identity weaker than the national one, can only discourage any attempt at significant reform, making it politically hazardous. in this context, the eu’s democratic deficit can be traced back to two significant causal factors. the first, and perhaps the most crucial, is the member states’ need to preserve their autonomy. this need is met by maintaining a consensus-based decision-making system, aligning with the principles of liberal intergovernmentalism. however, this process, while protecting national sovereignty, also hampers integration. as actors bound by domestic electoral constraints, national governments are often reluctant to decrease their sovereignty, thereby impeding the eu’s democratic functioning. the second factor contributing to the eu’s democratic deficit is the lack of citizens’ involvement at the institutional level. this issue is evident in the relatively minor role of the european parliament and the absence of a strong european identity. against this background, differentiated integration, understood as opt-outs or controlled disintegration, can potentially prevent or mitigate the dysfunctionalities of european integration, ultimately empowering citizens to shape their policy preferences (patberg 2020). this interpretation can also be applied, a posteriori, to the negotiations conducted by the british government prior to the referendum. while some of the requests made by the british prime minister in 2015 show a clear intention to stop or even reverse european integration, they can also be seen as a plea for differentiated integration. given that the united kingdom was already an eu member with unique characteristics, it appears that the british government viewed differentiated integration as a potential solution to the issues it faced at the time. these issues are the same ones that ultimately led to the outcome of the referendum—namely, a domestic context characterized by a plurality of potential disintegrative factors, including weak support for the eu amongst the public, a high level of polarization on european topics, and the existence of solid opposition to the eu both within the conservative party and in the electorate (niemann et al. 2020). it would be bold to claim that an increase in the institutional flexibility granted to member states is in itself a remedy for european disintegration. however, within the framework of the complex dynamics of european integration and the inevitable conflicts that arise from it, one of the lessons of brexit is that the eu’s adoption of overly strict positions can exacerbate the polarization of the debate and reinforce eurosceptic narratives. this further underscores the need for a flexible approach to european integration, one that accounts for the diverse needs and perspectives of member states and their citizens. brexit, therefore, represented a significant turning point, demonstrating the potential consequences of an excessively rigid approach, namely, demonization by national actors of the eu. this process, in turn, has created a space for eurosceptic forces to shape the domestic debate on european integration. consequently, mainstream parties found themselves fighting an unequal battle on the national front without being able to rely on policy solutions at a european level (schmitter and lefkofridi 2016). as of today, the lessons of brexit have been at least partially received by the eu. the issuance of eurobonds and the intention, although 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 not yet fully realized, to implement a common defence strategy represent significant developments in this sense. the relevance of these institutional developments lies not only in the scope of such measures but in the potential ideological impact on the debate on european integration. however, although brexit has yet to represent a driver of differentiated integration, it cannot be considered an isolated event. euroscepticism, understood as a radical opposition to further integration, still has a central role in the eu debate. the critical warning of brexit is, perhaps, that eu membership is reversible given the right conditions. in terms of institutional development, these conditions can stem from a systemic crisis and the conflicts that could arise following the eu’s attempt to deal with such an event. under the prevailing circumstances, brexit has had a notably contained influence on european disintegration. particularly in the institutional sphere, the progress in economic and security policies observed thus far allows us to dismiss the notion that the referendum halted institutional development or led to increased differentiated integration. however, the referendum’s outcome has bolstered the factors that precipitated it, notably the presence of a fertile eurosceptic narrative that political actors can exploit to impede the eu’s institutional progress. this situation has, to some extent, given rise to a scenario described by rosamond (2016, 868) as an “institutional equilibrium of diminishing returns”—the belief that the costs and risks of integration are too steep to implement the ambitious reforms that have characterized the european project over time. conquering this interplay of institutional and ideological constraints, which brexit has facilitated, poses a significant hurdle to eu development. there are, however, potential strategies that could alter this trajectory. firstly, the eu’s democratic deficit could be reduced by enhancing the role of parliament. secondly, deeper integration in key policy sectors could yield positive results, even if it is limited to a core group of states. this process would align with the constructivist understanding that policy boundaries can shift over time (hoeffler 2019). if this holds true, establishing a more integrated institutional model in the fiscal and security sectors, in addition to the structural benefits envisaged by liberal intergovernmentalism (li) and, to a minor extent, neofunctionalism (nf), could, on the ideological level, counter the negative politicization of eu issues that led to brexit. in other words, it could introduce and reinforce among the population the narrative of a europe close to its citizens and capable of meeting their needs. 7. conclusion this article discussed the effect of brexit on institutional developments in the eu. it delved into the disintegrative impact of the referendum at a systemic level, examining whether and to what extent brexit contributed to differentiated integration, with a specific focus on economic and security policies. by concentrating on these two areas, which played a pivotal role in shaping the eurosceptic narrative that led to the referendum, the authors tested the central hypothesis of this work, which was to assess the disintegrative impact of brexit on the institutional framework of the eu. this was done by looking at the effects of brexit on differentiation, exploring the two sides of it: differentiated integration and differentiated disintegration. this research was based on an analysis of official policy documents in these sectors, supplemented by a comprehensive review of qualitative and quantitative studies on euroscepticism and european integration. additionally, the authors considered the two crises that the eu has faced in the post-brexit period, the covid-19 pandemic and the war in ukraine, aligning with the theoretical assumption that external events significantly impact the institutional developments of the eu. 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 the analysis reveals that developments in the two sectors were not adversely affected by the referendum. in the economic sphere, the measures adopted after the pandemic, focused on support for member states by the eu, demonstrate significant progress compared to the european response to the 2010 eurozone crisis. in this context, the effect of brexit was likely positive for two reasons: the absence of the opposition represented by the uk and the recognition that a response focused on austerity would have been unpopular and would have strengthened eurosceptic forces. in the sphere of the cfsp, the most relevant causal factor was the russian invasion of ukraine, a few weeks after the promulgation of the strategic compass. this document, significantly modified after the outbreak of hostilities, reflects member states’ ambivalence towards a common security policy. although the document highlights the intention to implement a common defence framework, these developments are still largely unrealized. concerning differentiated integration, the strong stand adopted in the brexit negotiations, especially in the context of the cfsp, shows how this option was not contemplated in the case of the united kingdom. as for other member states, a certain level of differentiated integration remains the norm in the security sector, a sector characterized by broad decision-making autonomy by national governments. in the economic sphere, however, despite the frugal four’s concerns regarding the accountability of member states concerning the funding received in the context of the national resilience and recovery plan, the community response was substantially unitary. this research indicates that brexit has not triggered a surge in differentiated disintegration within the eu, nor has it initiated a trend towards institutional reforms that would lead to greater disintegration. however, brexit has had a dual impact on european disintegration. in line with postfunctionalist theorizing, it has provided interested actors with a roadmap for effectively promoting a eurosceptic narrative within their member states. furthermore, it has imposed additional constraints on the governmental policy level by highlighting the risks of politicizing policy issues. this trend could potentially lead to a deceleration of european integration in the long run, by escalating the costs of potentially unpopular reforms. in addition to providing an overview of the current state of european institutional development, this article has examined how brexit has fundamentally altered the concept of eu membership. the long-term implications of this transformation are uncertain. while further crises could lead to a negative politicization of the eu in the aftermath of brexit, there is also potential for positive change. strategies such as addressing the democratic deficit within the european union, promoting differentiated integration in specific sectors to overcome any situations of paralysis, and striving to counter the ideological forces that precipitated the referendum could all be effective. future research will need to explore the feasibility and consequences of such an approach in more detail. 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 references bauer, michael, and jarle trondal, eds. 2015. the palgrave handbook of the european administrative system. palgrave macmillan london. biermann, felix, and stefan jagdhuber. 2022. “take it and leave it! a postfunctionalist bargaining approach to the brexit negotiations.” west european politics 45 (4): 793–815. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1901039. bisciari, patrick, paxil butzen, wouter gelade, wim melyn, and s. van parys. 2021. “the eu budget and the next generation eu recovery plan: a game changer.” nbb economic review (september): 29–67. https://www.nbb.be/doc/ts/publications/economicreview/2021/ecorevii2021_h2.pdf. blockmans, steven, dylan macchiarini crosson, and zachary paikin. 2022. “the eu's strategic compass: a guide to reverse strategic shrinkage?” ceps policy insight no. 2022–14 (march): 1–9. https://cdn.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/cepspi2022-14_eu-strategic-compass.pdf. bojar, abel, and hanspeter kriesi. 2023. “policymaking in the eu under crisis conditions: covid and refugee crises compared.” comparative european politics 21 (4): 427–47. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-023-00349-1. börzel, tanja a. 2005. “mind the gap! european integration between level and scope.” journal of european public policy 12 (2): 217–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760500043860. ———. 2016. “from eu governance of crisis to crisis of eu governance: regulatory failure, redistributive conflict and eurosceptic publics.” journal of common market studies 54 (s1): 8–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12431. cameron, david. 2013. “eu speech at bloomberg.” london, january 23, 2013. accessed november 11, 2022. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-atbloomberg. ———. 2015. “pm letter to president of the european council donald tusk.” november 10, 2015. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a80ce4440f0b62305b8d3f4/donald_t usk_letter.pdf. chopin, thierry, and christian lequesne. 2021. “disintegration reversed: brexit and the cohesiveness of the eu27.” journal of contemporary european studies 29 (3): 119– 131. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2020.1714560. codogno, lorenzo, and paul van den noord. 2022. “assessing next generation eu.” in economic challenges for europe after the pandemic, edited by luigi paganetto, 59– 82. springer international publishing. council of the european union. 2022. a strategic compass for security and defence. 7371/22. brussels, march 21, 2022. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/st-7371-2022-init/en/pdf. danzman, sarah, and sophie meunier. 2024. “the eu’s geoeconomic turn: from policy laggard to institutional innovator.” journal of common market studies 62 (4): 1097– 1115. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13599. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 eppler, annegret, lisa h. anders, and thomas tuntschew. 2016. “europe’s political, social, and economic (dis-)integration: revisiting the elephant in times of crises.” political science series working paper no. 143. institute for advanced studies. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/52102/ssoar-2016eppler_et_aleuropes_political_social_and_economic.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y&lnkname=ss oar-2016-eppler_et_al-europes_political_social_and_economic.pdf. european commission. 2017. reflection paper on the future of european defence. accessed april 1, 2024. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/172d0a7c-161c450b-b7f6-2d36acd7861f_en?filename=reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf. ———. 2021a. the eu’s 2021–2027 long-term budget and nextgenerationeu. accessed march 13, 2024. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d3e77637a963-11eb-9585-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. ———. 2021b. “the recovery and resilience facility.” accessed march 14, 2024. https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recoveryand-resilience-facility_en. fossum, john erik, and christopher lord. 2023. “introduction to the european union and brexit.” in handbook on the european union and brexit, edited by john erik fossum and christopher lord, 1–24. edward elgar publishing. glawe, linda, and helmut wagner. 2021. “convergence, divergence, or multiple steady states? new evidence on the institutional development within the european union.” journal of comparative economics 49 (3): 860–84. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.01.006. glencross, andrew. 2021. “managing differentiated disintegration: insights from comparative federalism on post-brexit eu–uk relations.” british journal of politics and international relations 23 (4): 593–608. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120968516. harrois, thibaud. 2023. “the politicisation of the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) in the british domestic debate on brexit: a challenge to eu-uk foreign and security cooperation.” contemporary british history 37 (4): 656–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2023.2237316. heinisch, reinhard, duncan mcdonnell, and annika werner. 2021. “equivocal euroscepticism: how populist radical right parties can have their eu cake and eat it.” journal of common market studies 59 (2): 189–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13055. helwig, niklas. 2023. “eu strategic autonomy after the russian invasion of ukraine: europe’s capacity to act in times of war.” journal of common market studies 61 (s1): 57–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13527. hobolt, sara b. 2016. “ever closer or ever wider? public attitudes towards further enlargement and integration in the european union.” in the european union: integration and enlargement, edited by r. daniel kelemen, anand menon and jonathan slapin, 22–38. routledge. hoeffler, catherine. 2019. “differentiated integration in csdp through defence market integration.” european review of international studies 6 (2): 43–70. https://doi.org/10.3224/eris.v6i2.03. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d3e77637-a963-11eb-9585-01aa75ed71a1/language-en https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d3e77637-a963-11eb-9585-01aa75ed71a1/language-en https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 hoekman, bernard. 2007. “regionalism and development: the european neighborhood policy and integration à la carte.” the journal of international trade and diplomacy 1 (1): 1-55. holzinger, katharina, and jale tosun. 2019. “why differentiated integration is such a common practice in europe: a rational explanation.” journal of theoretical politics 31 (4): 642-659. hooghe, liesbet, and gary marks. 2009. “a postfunctionalist theory of european integration: from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus.” british journal of political science 39 (1): 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123408000409. houdé, anneke, and ramses a wessel. 2022. “a common security and defence policy: limits to differentiated integration in pesco?” european papers 7 (3): 1325–56. https://doi.org/10.15166/2499-8249/614. howorth, jolyon. 2017. “eu defence cooperation after brexit: what role for the uk in the future eu defence arrangements?” european view 16 (2): 191–200. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-017-0455-5. joseph, jonathan, and ana e juncos. 2024. “conceptual politics and resilience-at-work in the european union.” review of international studies 50 (2): 373–92. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210523000463. kendrick, maria. 2023. “brexit the ultimate opt-out: learning the lessons on differentiated integration.” european papers 7 (3): 1211–27. https://doi.org/10.15166/24998249/608. klose, stephan, elie perot, and sevgi temizisler. 2023. “spot the difference: differentiated co‐operation and differentiated integration in the european union.” journal of common market studies 61 (1): 259–76. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13370. koenig, nicole. 2022. “putin’s war and the strategic compass: a quantum leap for the eu’s security and defence policy?” hertie school, jacques delors centre. https://www.delorscentre.eu/fileadmin/2_research/1_about_our_research/2_researc h_centres/6_jacques_delors_centre/publications/20220428_koenig_strategiccompa ss.pdf. le monde. 2024. “ukraine allies france, poland and germany to tighten ties.” february 12, 2024. accessed march 30, 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/02/12/ukraine-allies-francepoland-and-germany-to-tighten-ties_6518926_4.html. leruth, benjamin, stefan gänzle, and jarle trondal. 2019a. “exploring differentiated disintegration in a post‐brexit european union.” journal of common market studies 57 (5): 1013–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12869. ———. 2019b. “differentiated integration and disintegration in the eu after brexit: risks versus opportunities.” journal of common market studies 57 (6): 1383-1394. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12957. leruth, benjamin, stefan gänzle, and jarle trondal. 2022. “introduction: differentiation in the european union as a field of study.” in the routledge handbook of differentiation in the european union, edited by benjamin leruth, stefan gänzle and jarle trondal, 1–16. routledge. https://www.delorscentre.eu/fileadmin/2_research/1_about_our_research/2_research_centres/6_jacques_delors_centre/publications/20220428_koenig_strategiccompass.pdf https://www.delorscentre.eu/fileadmin/2_research/1_about_our_research/2_research_centres/6_jacques_delors_centre/publications/20220428_koenig_strategiccompass.pdf https://www.delorscentre.eu/fileadmin/2_research/1_about_our_research/2_research_centres/6_jacques_delors_centre/publications/20220428_koenig_strategiccompass.pdf 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 martill, benjamin. 2021. “unity over diversity? the politics of differentiated integration after brexit.” journal of european integration 43 (8): 973–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.1877285. martill, benjamin, and monika sus. 2022. “with or without eu: differentiated integration and the politics of post-brexit eu-uk security collaboration.” european papers 7 (3): 1287–1302. https://doi.org/10.15166/2499-8249/611. matthijs, matthias, craig parsons, and christina toenshoff. 2019. “ever tighter union? brexit, grexit, and frustrated differentiation in the single market and eurozone.” comparative european politics 17 (2): 209–30. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-01900165-6. michel, ellie. 2020. “the politics of differentiated integration: what do governments want? country report–france.” robert schuman centre for advanced studies research paper no. rscas 2020/94. accessed june 14, 2025. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3783241#. niemann, arne. 2021. “neofunctionalism.” in the palgrave handbook of eu crises, edited by marianne riddervold, jarle trondal, and akasemi newsome, 115–33. springer international publishing. niemann, arne, geoffrey edwards, and pia jakobi. 2020. “still not yet obsolete? a neofunctionalist account of brexit.” mainz papers on international and european politics (mpiep) no. 25, 1–19. chair of international relations, johannes gutenberg university. https://internationale.politik.uni-mainz.de/files/2023/06/g1_niemann-a.edwards-e.-and-jakobi-p.-2021-still-not-yet-obsolete-a-neofunctionalist-accountof-brexit.pdf. orlando, vittorio. 2022. “post-truth politics, brexit, and european disintegration.” in europe in the age of post-truth politics: populism, disinformation and the public sphere, edited by maximilian conrad, guðmundur hálfdanarson, asimina michailidou, charlotte galpin, and niko pyrhönen, 103–27. springer international publishing. orlando, vittorio, and maximilian conrad. 2024. “reinforcing or moderating? the impact of brexit on italian and german euroscepticism.” frontiers in political science no. 6, 1– 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2024.1063039. patberg, markus. 2017. “a systematic justification for the eu’s pouvoir constituant mixte: principles of constitutional politics in supranational polities.” european law journal: review of european law in context 23 (6): 441–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12262. ———. 2020. “can disintegration be democratic? the european union between legitimate change and regression.” political studies 68 (3): 582–99. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719870431. pilati, marta, and francesco de angelis. 2020. “differentiated integration in the emu: impact on policy effectiveness and political unity.” eu integration and differentiation for effectiveness and accountability policy papers no. 2, 1–40. https://epc-webs3.s3.amazonaws.com/content/pdf/2020/eu_idea-_differentiated_integration.pdf. posaner, joshua., laura kayali and jon stone. 2023. “uk’s labour would target defense ‘pact’ with eu.” politico, december 7, 2023. accessed march 24, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/labour-targets-defense-security-pact-eu-if-winsgeneral-election-uk-2024-sunak/. https://internationale.politik.uni-mainz.de/files/2023/06/g1_niemann-a.-edwards-e.-and-jakobi-p.-2021-still-not-yet-obsolete-a-neofunctionalist-account-of-brexit.pdf https://internationale.politik.uni-mainz.de/files/2023/06/g1_niemann-a.-edwards-e.-and-jakobi-p.-2021-still-not-yet-obsolete-a-neofunctionalist-account-of-brexit.pdf https://internationale.politik.uni-mainz.de/files/2023/06/g1_niemann-a.-edwards-e.-and-jakobi-p.-2021-still-not-yet-obsolete-a-neofunctionalist-account-of-brexit.pdf 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 raudla, ringa, and aneta spendzharova. 2022. “challenges to the european single market at thirty: renationalisation, resilience, or renewed integration?” journal of european integration 44 (1): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.2011263. rieker, pernille, and mathilde t. e giske. 2024. european actorness in a shifting geopolitical order: european strategic autonomy through differentiated integration. springer nature. rosamond, ben. 2016. “brexit and the problem of european disintegration brexit and the problem of european disintegration.” journal of contemporary european research 12 (4): 865–871. https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v12i4.807. schade, daniel. 2021. “untying the knot: brexit and administrative disintegration in cfsp and csdp structures.” politique européenne 70 (4): 18–39. https://doi.org/10.3917/poeu.070.0018. schilin, alexander. 2023. “eu or euro area crisis? studying differentiated integration as an idea structuring elite perceptions of the sovereign debt and the covid-19 crisis.” journal of european integration 46 (1): 47–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2220894. schmidt, vivien a. 2019. “the future of differentiated integration: a ‘soft-core,’ multiclustered europe of overlapping policy communities.” comparative european politics 17 (2): 294–315. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00164-7. schmitter, philippe c, and zoe lefkofridi. 2016. “neo-functionalism as a theory of disintegration.” chinese political science review no. 1, 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-016-0012-4. schimmelfennig, frank. 2021. “brexit: differentiated disintegration in the european union.” in the politics and economics of brexit, edited by simon bulmer and lucia quaglia, 66–85. routledge. schimmelfennig, frank, dirk leuffen, and catherine e de vries. 2023. “differentiated integration in the european union: institutional effects, public opinion, and alternative flexibility arrangements.” european union politics 24 (1): 3–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221119083. schimmelfennig, frank, dirk leuffen, and berthold rittberger. 2015. “the european union as a system of differentiated integration: interdependence, politicization and differentiation.” journal of european public policy 22 (6): 764–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1020835. schimmelfennig, frank, and thomas winzen. “grand theories, differentiated integration.” 2019. journal of european public policy 26 (8): 1172–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1576761. svendsen, øyvind. 2019. “brexit and the future of eu defence: a practice approach to differentiated defence integration.” journal of european integration 41 (8): 993– 1007. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2019.1622540. tarlea, silvana, stefanie bailer, zdenek kudrna, and fabio wasserfallen. 2024. “executive power in european union politics.” governance 37 (1): 161–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12761. https://doi.org/10.3917/poeu.070.0018 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 vanhercke, bart, amy verdun, angelina atanasova, slavina spasova, and malcolm thomson. 2021. “from the european semester to the recovery and resilience facility. some social actors are (not) resurfacing.” european semester to the recovery and resilience facility working paper no. 13. european trade union institute. https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/202111/from%20the%20european%20semester%20to%20the%20recovery%20and%20 resilience%20facility_some%20social%20actors%20are%20not%20resurfacing_20 21.pdf. walter, stefanie. 2021. “eu‐27 public opinion on brexit.” journal of common market studies 59 (3): 569–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13107. von der leyen, ursula. 2019. “speech by president-elect von der leyen in the european parliament plenary on the occasion of the presentation of her college of commissioners and their programme.” strasbourg, november 26, 2019. accessed june 14, 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6408. zeitlin, jonathan, francesco nicoli, and brigid laffan. 2019. “introduction: the european union beyond the polycrisis? integration and politicization in an age of shifting cleavages.” journal of european public policy 26 (7): 963–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1619803. 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 26-49 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of highquality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 external forces in central asia: shaping the regional balance mubinzhon abduvaliev, central asian regional economic cooperation institute of the asian development bank (adb) 1 ricardo bustillo, university of the basque country upv/ehu2 crina viju-miljusevic, institute of european, russian and eurasian studies, carleton university 3 abstract competing regional cooperation mechanisms in central asia provide a unique opportunity for a case study of overlapping regionalisms pursued by three core external actors: the people’s republic of china (prc), the russian federation (rf), and the european union (eu). the authors’ analysis is focused on the increasingly competing trade routes or corridors in central asia as well as the rivalry and interdependency between the participating countries. the research question addressed is what are the distinctive roles of the core powers—eu, rf and prc—in reshaping the region? the mapping of the most important external-driven regional initiatives in central asia, their goals and achievements presented in this article, provides supporting evidence to a potential divide-and-conquer strategy pursued by the three external powers in central asia. the use of bilateral agreements and privileged relations with certain countries (kazakhstan) hinder the development of regional cooperation. 1 mubinzhon abduvaliev is a researcher and national consultant of the central asian regional economic cooperation institute of the asian development bank (adb). 2ricardo bustillo is an associate professor at the university of the basque country upv/ehu in leioa, spain.2 3 crina viju-miljusevic is an associate professor at the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 introduction studies on regional integration have yielded a set of heterogeneous generalizations and theoretical frameworks based on various case studies of well-known international regions in europe, north america, southeast asia, and, to a lesser extent, south america and africa. scholars use different terminology in referring to these various integrative arrangements in different regions of the world, but “regionalism” has emerged as the general term to refer to international cooperation based on geographic area (börzel and risse 2016; hettne 2005; katzenstein 2005; söderbaum and shaw 2003; van langehove 2011). this article focuses on the models of regionalism exhibited within central asia. the countries in the region follow multi-vector foreign policies by seeking to balance relations with the eu, russia, china, the us, but also turkey and iran. thus, central asia provides a unique case study of overlapping regionalisms pursued by different core actors, among which we consider china, russia, and the eu. this article will seek to answer the following research question: what are the distinctive roles of the core powers—eu, russia, and china—in reshaping the region? the article is structured as follows: the first section starts with a discussion of the history of regionalism in central asia. the following section provides an empirical analysis to assess trade integration in central asia, followed by a discussion of the roles played by the eu, russia, and china in regional integration. the article ends with conclusions and future policy recommendations. history of regionalism in central asia regionalism was a form of territorial government during the soviet era since administrative divisions played an important role in soviet territorial organization. the union of soviet socialist republics (ussr) consisted of 15 separate union republics4 (simon 1987). through the further division of the republics into oblasts, krais,5 and districts, a complex administrative system that often crossed ethnic and linguistic boundaries was created. moreover, this structure reinforced the idea of a multinational state by promoting regionalism as a method for organizing a country with a diverse population. the collapse of the ussr in 1991 shifted the focus of regional attention to nation-states due to the rise of new sovereign nations after the soviet era. as a significant part of the ussr, the central asian republics (cars) of kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, uzbekistan, tajikistan, and turkmenistan experienced some degree of autonomy and collaborated with each other (patel 2020). during the period of the soviet union, central asia was a significant region that underwent extensive administrative and political restructuring. the soviet government aimed to integrate cars into the broader framework of the ussr, promoting industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and the establishment of a centralized economy. this integration often involved suppressing local cultures and identities in favour of a unified soviet identity. each republic had its own unique ethnic composition and historical background but was governed under the overarching policies dictated by moscow (cummings 2004). the collaboration within central asia as part of the ussr was marked by both cooperation and tension among the various ethnic groups and local leaders. while there were efforts to promote economic 4 the list of republics was as follows: armenian soviet socialist republic (ssr), azerbaijan ssr, byelorussian ssr, estonian ssr, georgian ssr, kazakh ssr, kirghiz ssr, latvian ssr, lithuanian ssr, moldavian ssr, russian ssr, tajik ssr, turkmen ssr, ukrainian ssr, and uzbek ssr. 5 the term “oblast” (russian: область) translates to “province” or “region.” during the soviet era, oblasts became the primary top-level administrative division of the soviet socialist republics (ssrs). the term “krai” (russian: край) can be translated as “territory” or “frontier.” historically, krais were larger administrative divisions than oblasts and were often associated with border regions or areas of significant geographical importance. 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 development through shared resources and infrastructure projects, there were also significant challenges related to ethnic nationalism and resistance to central authority. the legacy of this collaboration continues to influence post-soviet relations among these countries today (olcott 2005). following the collapse of the ussr, the absence of a central government to manage the economy left them without key state institutions, sovereign legal frameworks, and military forces. the newly independent cars exhibited an outstanding degree of heterogeneity following the breakup of the ussr—a heterogeneity that was hidden under the centralized soviet hierarchy (laitin 1991). in the early years of independence, cars focused primarily on nation-building and consolidating their sovereignty. a number of internal issues occupied their attention, including the establishment of political institutions, constitutional development, and the transition from centrally planned to marketdriven economies (rakhimov 2018). therefore, regional cooperation and integration were not a priority at the time. however, cars recognized the benefits of regional cooperation as they progressed through the initial phase of nation-building. regional cooperation contributes to economic development, security, and environmental issues. it was at this point that central asian regionalism began to take shape. as the region shared a similar historical and cultural heritage (bohr 2004) due to several empires and civilizations leaving their mark on central asia over time, cars were starting to develop a sense of common identity. cars realized that by working together, they could better overcome their individual economic challenges triggered by the transition from centrally planned to market-oriented economies (libman and obydenkova 2017). as a result, they explored opportunities for trade, investment, infrastructure development, and security within the region. consequently, the lack of regional cooperation among cars is surprising and the failure of regionalism in central asia is puzzling. cars have not been able to establish durable regional cooperation since the end of the cold war despite efforts to do so (krapohl and vasileva-dienes 2020). the failure of central asian regionalism can be explained by domestic political factors as well as their dependency on extra-regional economies and external powers. although some cars are members of wider regional organizations, such as the commonwealth of independent states (cis), the eurasian economic union (eaeu), and the shanghai cooperation organisation (sco), the integration of these organizations is often questioned.6 for instance, political challenges, economic struggles, and security concerns have all contributed to the perception of cis’ weakness. organizational weakness can be attributed to a lack of strong central authority, political disagreements, economic disparities, corruption, and security threats (sattar and shiells 2004). thus, soviet policies, both intentional and unintentional, contributed to the strengthening of regional identities and regionalism in various parts of the ussr. regional cooperation may exist in developing regions, but this does not imply that it is supplied automatically (krapohl et al. 2014). however, while organizational weaknesses may pose challenges to regional cooperation in developing areas like central asia, forums such as the consultative meeting of central asian heads of state exemplify how countries can come together independently to address mutual concerns effectively. from 2018 to 2023, the consultative meeting of central asian heads of state became pivotal in reshaping regionalism in central asia by fostering dialogue on economic integration, security cooperation, cultural exchange, and collaboration with international organizations (umirzakova and 6 pomfret (2009, 54) argues that regionalization is not worth going through with in this region due to the similarity of the economies, as all cars are specialized in a similar group of primary goods. additionally, wang (2014) argues that cars’ exports are similar, with a low degree of complementariness. looking at different regions for comparison, in 2023, approximately 60 percent of the total trade value of the eu takes place within the eu (eurostat 2025), 25 percent of exports take place within the association of southeast asian nations (asean) region, while only 9 percent of exports take place within central asia (asian development bank 2023). 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 marat 2024). this evolving discourse reflects a growing recognition among central asian states that their futures are interconnected and that cooperative strategies are essential for addressing common challenges (rakhimov 2023). as part of the fifth consultative meeting of the heads of state, a joint statement was adopted, outlining the main priorities of regional cooperation, as well as highlighting challenges and suggesting solutions. additionally, the heads of state adopted agreements concerning land transport and youth policy in central asia (unrcca 2023). on august 9, 2024, the sixth consultative meeting of central asian heads of state was held in astana, kazakhstan, with the goal of enhancing regional cooperation. there have been reports that economic ties and political dialogue are becoming increasingly intensive (astana times 2024). in this light, central asian cooperation can be viewed as a crucial tool for the region’s countries as they navigate and deal with globalization’s challenges. the configuration of the consultative meeting of central asian heads of state serves as a vital forum that unites the countries of the region independently of external influences. it addresses the pressing requirement for mutual comprehension, unity, and regional development. current status of central asian regionalism regional integration and economic development: an empirical analysis of trade the new trade theory (ntt) (krugman 1979, 1980) outlined the role of regional integration (especially among medium or small-sized countries) as an important factor for economic growth. ntt identified the relevance of economies of scale and network effects as key elements to explain specialization patterns among countries. therefore, localization of economic activities would require free access to enlarged integrated markets, hence suggesting improved cooperation among (too small) neighbouring countries. the traditional reference for cars was the european union (eu), but later, the relative success of mercosur7 or other integration schemes for developing nations demonstrated to cars the convenience of closer cooperation between themselves. however, the path towards regional integration has not been easy for the central asian states; they are still unable to agree on the basis for an eventual free trade agreement. moreover, their access to global markets has not been too successful either, as figures of trade openness over the last two decades reveal (figure 1, appendix i): total trade over gdp decreased from around 80 percent in the early 2000s to levels between 50–60 percent in the 2020s. the percentage seems to have increased only for kazakhstan, whereas the share for uzbekistan has stayed at the same level. most studies explain the poor trade performance of cars as a multi-factorial phenomenon. firstly, most cars are landlocked countries, whose road and railway infrastructures should be improved to boost intraregional trade. although central asia is strategically located on the route between europe and east asia, which formed the ancient “silk road” (frankopan 2017), nowadays it could be considered a peripheral region according to its economic appeal (allison 2004). secondly, even though three of the cars belong to the wto, trade policies remain rather protectionist. moreover, all cars tend to establish cumbersome customs controls, which hinder import-export operations. the wto, as well as other institutions, have warned about the need to apply trade facilitation measures over the entire region (asian development bank 2021). finally, yet importantly, transport and logistic problems become even more significant for countries specializing in commodities such as energy, agricultural, or mineral products (ogunleye et al. 2018). the average share of intraregional trade between cars from the total trade of each car was 15 percent in 2022, rather low in comparison with countries belonging to trade integration schemes; for instance, intraregional exports of each mercosur country are 40–50 percent of total exports (cepal 7 mercosur is a south american trade bloc established in 1994, whose members are argentina, bolivia, brazil, paraguay and uruguay. 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 2022). cars’ intraregional trade average share has stayed unchanged from 2000 (14 percent) to 2022 (15 percent). there are, however, differences among cars (figures 2–6): whereas tajikistan registers a high share of intraregional share over the total (30 percent), kazakhstan and turkmenistan’s percentage is much lower (approximately 5 percent). the other two reveal a share around the average (figures 2–6). the external partner whose share in cars trade has grown the most is china. this is mainly due to its recent economic upsurge using an export-led growth strategy, which is even more relevant for cars as china’s neighbouring countries (aizenman et al. 2018). china is the most important trade partner for uzbekistan, kyrgyzstan, and turkmenistan (figures 1, 4, and 6, appendix i); for kazakhstan, the most relevant one is the eu (figure 5, appendix i); for tajikistan, it is the russian federation (figure 3, appendix i). despite the eu’s low percentage of trade with most cars, it is nevertheless the main trade partner of the region due to the increased trade flows with kazakhstan (european commission 2023). the application of a “multivector policy” (paramonov and akramova 2024) has permitted the establishment of strong economic ties between the eu and kazakhstan. there has been a slight reduction in russia’s average trade participation from 19 percent in 2000 to 17 percent in 2022 despite the formation of the eurasian economic union. russia still holds relevant participation in the total trade figures for tajikistan (24 percent), kyrgyzstan (29 percent), and kazakhstan (20 percent), whereas uzbekistan (10 percent) and turkmenistan (5 percent) register lower shares (figures 2–6). therefore, it seems that both china and the eu exhibit the largest trade potential. china has managed to increase its trade participation while the eu has just maintained its role in the region. nevertheless, the decreasing trade role of russia does not mean a decreased russian influence in central asia. apart from the trade link, russia benefits from other types of connections, such as migration flows (especially from tajikistan and kyrgyzstan) together with security agreements in the region. the nomadic lifestyle prevalent among many ethnic groups in this region contributed to a fluidity in population movements. the soviet era further complicated these dynamics as borders were drawn that did not necessarily reflect ethnic or cultural lines. forced migrations during this period led to significant demographic changes that still affect mobility patterns today. in contemporary times, labour mobility is a critical aspect of people’s movement in central asia. economic disparities between countries have prompted many individuals to seek employment opportunities abroad. for instance, kyrgyzstan, uzbekistan and tajikistan have seen substantial numbers of their citizens migrate to russia for work due to higher wages compared to what is available domestically. remittances are an important source of external financing exceeding the inflow of foreign direct investment and official development assistance in these countries, making up as much as 16 percent to 48 percent of their gdp, respectively (world bank 2023a). it is estimated that 5.6 million international migrants have been living in the five central asian countries since 2020. almost nine percent of the international migrants hosted in central asia originate from the region itself. however, while there is potential for improved human mobility in central asia due to its strategic location and resources, various barriers— including geopolitical constraints, economic challenges, infrastructure deficiencies, cultural attitudes, and inadequate legal frameworks—have hindered this progress. these factors collectively create an environment where many individuals feel compelled to migrate out of the region in search of better opportunities for themselves and their families. in 2020, the total number of international migrants from central asian countries reached 7.8 million. of this total, 63 percent (4.9 million) resided in the russian federation, 17 percent (1.3 million) in germany, and 7 percent (529 thousand) in the united states, ukraine, and gulf countries combined (un desa 2020). the central asia-russia migration corridor is characterized by significant labour movements driven by economic necessity, established social networks, political relationships, and demographic trends (iom 2021). delovarova et al. (2013) argue that considering the fact that russia is a key player in the region, strengthening cooperation both among central asian countries and between russia and central asia is essential for addressing key regional issues, as this remains a defining characteristic of the area. in addition, they argue that 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 kazakhstan possesses significant potential to become a strong migration hub due to its economic stability, dynamic development trajectory, and proactive role in promoting regional cooperation in migration matters. in 2022, amid the russian invasion of ukraine, central asian countries experienced a significant increase in the number of russian citizens arriving, which represented the largest influx since the cars gained independence from the soviet union (wahlang 2022). despite the significant decrease in migration flows in 2023, the economies of all five central asian countries continue to benefit from russian migrant workers and relocated companies, as well as the increasing demand for workers in russia. there was general stability in central asian countries during 2023, as conflicts were avoided and economies grew, aided by high remittances from russia. however, as a consequence of the gradual reversal of russian migration flows in favour of other destinations, the eu has been attracting more migrants from central asia and eastern europe, owing to the unfavourable security and socioeconomic conditions in russia as well as strategic measures taken by origin countries to diversify labour migration destinations and strengthen national economies. in 2022, there were 1.1 million valid work permits in the eu held by nationals of central asia and eastern europe (icmpd 2024). the report provides a partial overview of advancements in the twelve countries of eastern europe and central asia (eeca), as categorized by the icmpd armenia, azerbaijan, belarus, georgia, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, moldova, russia, tajikistan, turkmenistan, ukraine, and uzbekistan. to sum up, the trade figures underline the limited contribution of intraregional trade among cars over the past 20 years. additionally, the role of external actors has fluctuated over time, with an almost even distribution of trade among the eu, russia, and china, with the eu and china increasing their trade shares with cars during the past few years. as it pertains to people mobility, due to economic limitations, internal migration in central asian countries remains underdeveloped; however, external migration is flourishing primarily towards russia in search of better opportunities, facilitated by economic incentives, fewer language barriers, social networks, and significant remittance inflows. the following sections will evaluate the main regional initiatives pursued by external actors in central asia. russia’s impact on eurasian regionalism: challenges and perspectives in the period following the break-up of the soviet union, russia initiated a spaghetti bowl of regional agreements with overlapping memberships, including the cars. russia has favoured the creation of several institutions aimed at strengthening its relations with the cars, however, not many were successful. thus, the authors will focus on three of the most prominent examples: the eurasian economic union (eaeu) led by russia, the collective security treaty organization (csto) led by russia, and the shanghai cooperation organisation (sco) led by russia and china. the origins of eaeu were established in 1995 with the formation of a customs union by belarus, kazakhstan, russia, kyrgyzstan, and tajikistan. in 2000, the five countries furthered their economic integration by forming the eurasian economic community (eurasec). belarus, kazakhstan, and russia decided to take the economic relations further and thus, first, in january 2010, they formed the eurasian customs union, followed by the signing in may 2014 of the treaty on the eurasian economic union (eaeu), which became effective on january 1, 2015. a key aim of the eaeu is to create a single market and economic space among its member states. however, the eaeu’s economic viability and significance are highly debated. the eaeu is structured along a strict four-tiered institutional framework in which a higher-level institution may override a lower-level institution’s decision (yeliseyeu 2019). according to mostafa and mahmood (2018), upon initial observation of its external appearance and organizational framework, it may seem that the eurasian economic union (eaeu) has achieved considerable advancement and operates effectively as a successful entity. however, a deeper examination reveals 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 that the organization encounters a multitude of challenges and obstacles, stemming both from its member states and the broader regional context. russia plays an active role and contributes to the integration process, however, the lack of complementarity of the economies involved raises questions about the real objectives and motivations of russia for pursuing such a project. according to some authors, russia sometimes paternalizes cars, as if russia continues to understand cars still as a part of the great game dynamics (dadabaev 2021). the member states of the eaeu are different in terms of economic size, interests, and structures as well as their main trading partners. a common tariff policy within the eaeu benefits russia more than smaller and poorer countries due to its large natural resource reserves, competitive economy, and relatively better-developed industry. linn (2012) claims that the eaeu has the limitation of not including key cars (tajikistan, turkmenistan, and uzbekistan) as well as not fully conforming to open regional principles. additionally, the presence of non-tariff barriers has impeded the development of trade relations between its member states (kaczmarski 2017). one of the main issues related to eaeu has been the large power asymmetry, with russia being the dominant economic and military player (libman et al. 2022). thus, according to a number of analysts, the main goals of the eaeu are to revive and strengthen the former soviet empire and establish russian imperialism by building on the best values of the ussr (mankoff 2022; stronski and sokolski 2020). however, the russian annexation of crimea and the war in ukraine brought to the surface two important aspects of the eaeu. first, western sanctions have raised major controversy in the eaeu. on the one hand, the sanctions imposed on russia resulted in negative impacts for all members of the eaeu, which are dealt with by imposing domestic measures on currencies, remittances, and trade in commodities (wolczuk and dragneva 2022). on the other hand, countries of the eaeu can benefit from financial opportunities given the open borders with russia. additionally, a consensus within the eaeu on how to react to the western sanctions could not be reached. thus, not all members of the eaeu followed the russian lead in imposing countersanctions on western food products despite the customs union rules (stronski and sokolski 2020). as far as cars are concerned, only kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan are members of the eaeu. one of the main goals of joining the eaeu is to establish bilateral relations with russia, rather than multilateral integration. kyrgyzstan joined the eaeu primarily for military, security, and strategic reasons (trilling 2010). as remittances from kyrgyz seasonal migrants represented about 30 percent of the country’s annual gross domestic product in 2022 and given that most kyrgyz workers migrate to russia, kyrgyzstan’s membership in the eaeu was seen as a significant factor (world bank 2023a). joining the eaeu was also expected to ease trade barriers in agricultural exports to russia and kazakhstan (satke 2015). using a computational general equilibrium model to estimate the net impact of multiple channels (changing tariffs, re-exporting, and migration) between kyrgyzstan and eaeu members, mogilevskii et al. (2018) concluded that accession to the eaeu would result in a reduction in welfare as the falling profit from re-exporting outweighs an increase in migrant remittances and tariffs. their conclusion, however, is that accession would be beneficial only to poor households. given the lack of economic benefits for kyrgyzstan, its membership in the eaeu is seen by many as merely a continuation of a long-standing russian stranglehold (peyrouse 2015). the expansion of the eaeu to states with weak economic and institutional foundations might delay the decision-making process within the organization. in exchange for its support of russian initiatives in the eaeu, kyrgyzstan likely sought certain economic benefits from russia, such as benefits for migrants, foreign direct investment, and financial support in various areas (tarr 2014). compared to kyrgyzstan, kazakhstan’s government has been a staunch supporter of the eaeu despite the doubts related to its economic goals raised by scholars. thus, the country has actively participated in the decision-making processes of the eaeu, contributing to the development of the organization’s policies and initiatives. without kazakhstan’s participation, eurasian integration would not have been possible in central asia (yuneman 2020). at first, kazakhstan’s economic conditions improved, trade and investment increased, and economic growth was stimulated, however, this was followed by a 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 gradual decline in trade and foreign direct investment (fdi), especially since 2014 when the western sanctions against russia started and oil prices declined (mostafa and mahmood 2018). according to konopelko (2018), the eaeu will result in an increased dependence on russia for its member states. regarding the effects on trade, most studies have found that trade turnovers experienced only negligible increases (isakova et al., 2015), whereas the overall well-being of the countries involved tended to decline. however, investments and migration were positively impacted, which led to questions about the necessity of a customs union (obydenkova and libman 2019). aside from economic challenges, cars face security challenges that require greater attention from researchers and policymakers. due to the deterioration of afghanistan’s security situation and the russo-ukrainian war, the perception that central asian countries have more limited room to maneuver than other post-soviet states has been heightened. due to these processes, the collective security treaty organisation (csto)8 has been strengthened, serving both to support russian sovereignty abroad as well as a method to enhance russian supremacy at home. csto has developed a common military command and rapid reaction forces. russian military forces are dominant in the csto and russia has military bases located in some cars (kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, and tajikistan) (hussain et al. 2022). thus, the central asian states are quite limited in terms of freedom of initiative within the csto. an exception is uzbekistan, which is not dependent on russia from a political, economic, or security perspective (de haas 2017). to summarize, russia has tried to continue its role as a hegemon in the region with the help of institutions that primarily defend its economic (eaeu) or military interests (csto), but without a genuine objective of favouring the development of trade and economic activity in the region. the reasoning behind supporting such integration initiatives is diverse, including support for like-minded regimes and their legitimacy and status at the international level. russia, for example, describes the eaeu as the ultimate confirmation of the country’s status as a global power (libman 2017). of the three leading powers, russia’s regionalization projects are the most comprehensive, addressing both economic and military aspects. in addition to regional frameworks and organizations, russia has also signed several bilateral agreements with the cars, particularly in the field of energy. russian oil companies have also engaged heavily in every car with the backing of the russian state, spreading the country’s energy dominance in the region (kazantsev et al. 2021). china’s impact on eurasian regionalism: challenges and perspectives china has been active in central asia since the early 1990s, with the signing of multiple bilateral investment agreements (bit).9 in addition to bilateral treaties, china has also engaged in multilateral cooperation through the shanghai cooperation organization (sco) and the belt and road initiative (bri) in line with its supporting institutions such as the asian infrastructure investment bank (aiib). regionalism efforts in the twenty-first century have been driven by more multilateral cooperation through sco as well as bri, although bri investment agreements are generally conducted on a bilateral basis. the shanghai cooperation organisation (sco), composed of china, russia, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, tajikistan, and uzbekistan, was established in 2001 with the goal of promoting regional cooperation in areas such as security, economy, and culture. india and pakistan joined the organization in 2017, followed by iran in 2023. the sco developed an institutional framework that allows regular meetings 8 the collective security treaty organization (csto) is an intergovernmental military alliance in eurasia consisting of six post-soviet states: armenia, belarus, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, russia, and tajikistan, formed in 2002, which originates from the collective security treaty signed in 1992 by armenia, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, russia, tajikistan, and uzbekistan. the treaty was joined in 1993 by azerbaijan, belarus and georgia (csto 2025). 9 china signed bilateral agreements with kazakhstan, uzbekistan (updated 2011), kyrgyzstan and turkmenistan in 1992, and with tajikistan in 1993 (updated 2024). 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 at different levels (heads of state, business councils and other working groups) (de haas 2017). the sco is viewed by some as an instrument to improve relations between russia and china and to promote their interests in the region (aris 2008). others consider that the sco is mainly a chinese initiative through which china attempts to implement its development model in central asia (yuan 2010). the relationship between china and cars has steadily deepened in new multilateral settings since the founding of the sco. however, several authors have argued that china’s foreign policy in central asia is characterized by a form of “new regionalism,” establishing vassal relations with central asia or executing geopolitical maneuvers (ba 2009; chung 2004). kolpakova and kuchinskaya (2015) and yun and park (2012) assert that the sco provides a basis for the deepening of chinese-russian relations, whereas kembayev (2017) argues that the sco contributes to economic prosperity among its members and complements the one belt one road initiative. in addition to strengthening the influence of russia and china in central asia, the sco also demonstrates a new model for regional cooperation,10 which is crucial to establishing a mechanism of trust in security and economic cooperation. furthermore, china is actively promoting economic and financial cooperation within the sco, prioritizing investment projects in addition to being the largest economic partner of central asia. due to china’s heavy reliance on loans to implement investment projects in central asia, cars have become china’s debtors over the years (stonis 2022). sco members and observers, however, do not share a common set of objectives. the organization’s diverse membership and wide-ranging agenda inevitably undermine the organization’s effectiveness (de haas 2017). as an example, china is looking for (central asian) markets to expand its economy and energy sources to sustain its economic growth (pradhan and mohanty 2021), as well as resolve border issues with central asian countries and maintain stability in the xinjiang region (chao 2022). russia aspires to regain its regional leadership within the cis as well as the status of a global power. the protection of russia and china, as well as the sco, is viewed by some central asian regimes as a guarantee of their survival. additionally, there are a number of conflicting interests among the sco member states concerning military transit, regional rivalry, and confrontation (between china and russia, kazakhstan and uzbekistan, and india and pakistan) (de haas 2017). it is clear from this mixture of divergent objectives that there is not much common ground between the member states of the sco. however, focusing on the economic aspects, there are many benefits to central asia’s economic development through sco, as it provides a platform to do business with other sco members and ensures that neither moscow nor beijing will take the first step towards dominating central asia. sco is a valuable organization for the regional development of central asia by providing a platform to launch multilateral or bilateral negotiations. it achieved most successes in solving border disputes, in promoting a security agenda and in fighting international terrorism. from a trade perspective, the sco shows quite limited results. however, scholars pointed out that most efficient decisions are taken at the bilateral level, thus bringing into question its multilateral goals (obydenkova and libman 2019). moving on to china’s economic-focused initiatives, during the ancient silk road (207 bce-220 ce), central asia was an important hub for long-distance overland trade between china, europe, and the middle east (yazdan 2020). a new historical period in the relationship between china and central asia began with the disintegration of the soviet union in the early 1990s. whereas china offers central asia a way to travel between china and europe overland, central asia can access the pacific ocean safely and securely through china (zhuangzhi 2007). the silk road economic belt crosses 10 there have been significant efforts to create a productive security agenda in central asia and to increase solidarity among the members of the sco. in the meantime, international relations scholars are concerned about the excessive presence of two influential members of the sco, namely russia and china. it is likely that these two enormous powers may be compelled to go beyond these objectives in an attempt to mimic western-style organizations as a result of increased cooperation opportunities in the asian region (ünaldilar kocamaz 2019). 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 through central asia, which is an important strategic region for china’s belt and road initiative (bri). additionally, the region is replete with natural resources that are vital to the growth of the chinese economy. a key component of the belt and road initiative is the silk road economic belt, introduced by president xi jinping in 2013 as the central asian component of the bri (astana times 2013). this initiative is intended to promote trade and develop infrastructure to deliver stability to all (davé and kobayashi 2018). furthermore, it launches new initiatives aimed at improving connections between central asia, south asia, and china as well as expanding the security arc westward to serve as a corridor between china and europe, in addition to consolidating beijing’s existing economic investments and security measures. the number of countries that signed a memorandum of understanding with china has reached 138 (yue and nedopil 2022). bri is divided into six corridors, each with its own set of trade and investment opportunities, with the china–central asia–west asia corridor belonging to cars. this corridor will connect western china to turkey and improve connectivity between china, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, uzbekistan, tajikistan, turkmenistan, iran, and turkey by connecting railway networks from china to the mediterranean sea (ministry of foreign affairs of the people’s republic of china 2019). furthermore, to invest in rail, china is building roads and other infrastructure projects that have the potential to transform the economies of central asia. according to the china global investment tracker of the american enterprise institute (november 2020), the total volume of chinese investments within the bri in 2013–2020 was 755.17 billion us dollars (usd). moreover, the total volume of chinese investment in central asian countries from 2005 to 2020 amounted to 50 billion usd, of which 35.58 billion usd went to kazakhstan, 5.79 billion to uzbekistan, 4.73 billion to kyrgyzstan, and 2.15 billion to tajikistan. additionally, the chinese government has invested in the construction of an oil pipeline between kazakhstan and china, a gas pipeline between kyrgyzstan and china, and a power transmission line between tajikistan, afghanistan, and pakistan. bishkek-tashkent and lanzhou-xinjiang are examples of railways and highways that china has built in the region. it is highly likely that china’s bri initiative will become one of the most important contributions to the economic development of central asia. cars will benefit from increased investments under bri, increased trade, and job creation. however, there are also concerns about the potential risks and challenges associated with china’s growing influence in the region, such as debt sustainability and environmental impacts. china is the largest lender in the region, and all cars, except for kazakhstan, are heavily indebted to china (matveeva 2023). additionally, all projects are negotiated and implemented at the bilateral rather than multilateral level, with no centralized coordination mechanism (dunford and liu 2019; huang 2016; tekdal 2018). there has been no doubt that china’s economic transformation over the past few decades has been nothing short of extraordinary. as a result of this rapid growth, the chinese leadership has developed a sense of “moral superiority,” believing that their success entitles them to export their “benevolence” around the globe. in addition to its aspirations for global influence, this belief is rooted in china’s historical and cultural identity. therefore, the bri appears to be based on a combination of western and confucian values, suggesting a post-western/chinese form of regionalism (bunskoek and shih 2021). however, international observers have expressed concern and debate over this self-perceived “benevolence.” some view china’s actions as driven by strategic interests rather than genuine altruism, raising questions about the implications of china’s expanding influence on global governance and norms. cheng (2010) argues that while the “great game” provides historical context, it falls short of explaining contemporary complexities in central asia’s geopolitical landscape. a complex power 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 structure model better encapsulates the interplay between traditional powers like russia, rising influences such as china and the us and the assertive roles played by regional states. however, a nuanced understanding requires consideration of a complex power structure model that incorporates both traditional influences and emerging dynamics. understanding central asia requires moving beyond the simplistic binary framework of the “great game” to embrace a more nuanced perspective that accounts for multiple layers of influence from powers like russia, china, and the united states alongside regional actors. to summarize, china’s substantial involvement in central asia has been dubbed “the new great game” (cooley 2012; fingar 2016). economic interests have taken precedence over security concerns. china’s relative influence in central asia compared to russia and western countries (eu and us) has grown with its increasing economic engagement in the region. in fact, there is no doubt that china’s economic expansion and dynamism can have a win-win effect that benefits both, china as well as the cars. while chinese investment in central asia offers opportunities for economic growth and development, it also presents several challenges that need to be carefully managed to ensure sustainable and mutually beneficial outcomes for all parties involved. one of the primary challenges associated with chinese investment in central asia is the risk of debt dependency. as china provides loans and investments for infrastructure projects in the region, there is a concern that central asian countries may accumulate unsustainable levels of debt. furthermore, chinese investments in central asia may also bring about social challenges. large-scale infrastructure projects often require significant labour forces, and there have been reports of chinese companies bringing in their workers rather than employing locals (hillman and tippet 2021). in addition, the growing influence of china in central asia through its investments poses geopolitical risks for the region. as china expands its economic footprint, there are concerns about potential political interference or pressure exerted by beijing on central asian governments. this could lead to shifts in regional power dynamics and create instability if countries in the region feel compelled to align themselves more closely with china at the expense of other international relationships. overall, china’s regionalism projects in the region, except for the sco, are largely carried out through initiatives with global scope. china has an undeniable interest in central asia, where significant investments have been made in oil and gas infrastructure and transport corridors. this has led to a gradual supplantation of russia as the leading power in the region. chinese regionalism has largely focused on stability and infrastructure investments for economic connectivity. while china attempted to promote free trade in the early 2000s through the sco, this appears to have largely failed (song 2013). the eu’s impact on eurasian regionalism: challenges and perspectives at first, the eu did not show much interest in strengthening its relations with the newly independent cars (matveeva 2023). although the eu established diplomatic links with the five cars in 1992, the connections were scarce until 2001; after the september 11 terrorist attacks, international attention shifted towards afghanistan. from that moment onwards, the reborn european interest resulted in initiatives aimed at strengthening the link with the cars. the first eu initiative in the region was the transport corridor europe caucasus asia (traceca) launched in 1993 as an integration scheme bringing together the european union (eu) and 13 member states11 from the wider area stretching from the black sea across to central asia. the main goals of the initiative are to increase trade, investment, and transport infrastructure in the region. traceca is acknowledged by some as the eu trial of re-establishing the silk route long before china disclosed its belt and road initiative in 2013 (blandy 1999; gorshkov and baraturia 2001). 11 the 13 member states part of traceca are armenia, azerbaijan, bulgaria, georgia, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, iran, moldova, romania, turkey, ukraine, uzbekistan, and tajikistan. 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 over the years, the eu has favoured a regional approach to central asia, with the expectation of regional economic integration. this was expressed through the first eu strategy towards central asia in 2007 (council of the european union 2007). however, the cars were not successful in reaching a high level of regional integration in comparison with other consolidated schemes such as the southern common market (mercosur), association of southeast asian nations (asean) or even the southern african development community (sadc) (krapohl 2017). additionally, only three out of the five cars acceded to the wto (kyrgyzstan in 1998, tajikistan in 2013, and kazakhstan in 2015). uzbekistan and turkmenistan are still going through their accession process. thus, the lack of a shared multilateral trade framework has hindered not only intraregional commerce but also bilateral ties with main trade blocs, such as the eu or nafta. in these circumstances, the eu has had to make an almost titanic effort aimed at strengthening relations with each car. the new approach combines unilateral trade policy measures with bilateral and regional ones. regarding the eu’s unilateral trade policy approach12 in central asia, only three out of the five cars (kyrgyzstan, tajikistan, and uzbekistan) are provided with preferential access to the eu markets. the eu grants preferential access to its markets through the enhanced generalized scheme of preferences (gsp+)13 solely to kyrgyzstan and uzbekistan, whereas tajikistan receives the standard gsp scheme (european commission 2023).14 kazakhstan and turkmenistan cannot benefit from any gsp scheme since they have acquired the status of upper-middle-income level countries. moreover, in recent years, the eu has attempted to design a general strategy for central asia, thus trying to overcome the fragmentation problems explained above. the new eu strategy, entitled “new opportunities for a stronger partnership,” outlines three priority strands: resilience, prosperity, and regional cooperation (council of the european union 2019). first, resilience refers to cooperation in strengthening reforms, respect of human rights and the rule of law as well as facing environmental challenges. secondly, prosperity promotes accession of all cars to the wto and favours private entrepreneurship, research, and innovation, together with improving connectivity and economic modernization. finally, regional cooperation supports sustainable regional trade integration as well as working together for peace in afghanistan and the fight against terrorism. concisely, the eu plan is aimed at boosting social, economic, and political reforms in the cars, paying special attention to economic reforms and trade integration together with security and environmental issues. the eu will continue to provide funding under the eu development cooperation instrument, which reached a level of 1.1 billion euros (eur) between 2014 and 2020 (european commission 2023). however, the plan does not appear to be excessively innovative, as it proposes financial support schemes, which supply funds based on approval of economic or political reforms. the contestation of past imf conditionality of financial support, as well as china’s willingness to provide funds without 12 according to the european commission, “unilateral trade arrangements are one-sided, non-reciprocal trade preferences granted by developed countries to developing ones, with the goal of helping them to increase exports and spur economic development” (european commission. “unilateral trade arrangements.” accessed march 6, 2025. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/unilateral-trade-arrangements). 13 “the gsp+ is the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance that supports vulnerable developing countries that ratified 27 international conventions on human rights, labour rights, environmental protection and climate change, and good governance” (european commission. “generalised scheme of preferences.” accessed march 6, 2025. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/generalised-schemepreferences_en). 14 “standard gsp for low and lower-middle income countries. this means a partial or full removal of customs duties on two-thirds of tariff lines.” (european commission. “generalised scheme of preferences.” accessed march 6, 2025. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/generalised-scheme-preferences_en). https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/generalised-scheme-preferences_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/generalised-scheme-preferences_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/generalised-scheme-preferences_en 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 conditions attached, might suggest that conditional funding, as well as criticism, might not be the best way forward. despite that, when compared with previous initiatives, the eu policy in central asia is more pragmatically based, and it puts more weight on resilience rather than democratization. this is a direct consequence of geopolitics and competition with russia and china in the region (winn and gänzle 2022). the cooperation instrument introduced by the new eu strategy is the enhanced partnership and cooperation agreement (epca), signed individually with each country. the first epca was signed with kazakhstan and entered into force on march 1, 2020. it reinforces bilateral political dialogue, especially in sensitive fields such as human rights and democratization, promotes sectoral cooperation and boosts bilateral trade and investment. both parties signed a memorandum of understanding in november 2022 on sustainable raw materials, batteries, and hydrogen value chains (european commission 2023). moreover, the epca seeks to create a better regulatory framework for businesses involved in trading in services and energy, so that kazakhstan could eventually sign the plurilateral public procurement wto agreement. to allow the implementation of the epca, the eu provides a bilateral cooperation facility of 9 million euros. kyrgyzstan and uzbekistan have also signed epcas with the eu, but the eu has raised concerns regarding human rights and democracy in both countries, as well as the bilateral border dispute between kyrgyzstan and tajikistan. as the most isolated country in the region, turkmenistan’s relations with the eu are still conducted according to the interim trade agreement of 2010. however, the eu and turkmenistan maintain annual bilateral dialogues on human rights and security issues. finally, negotiations for an epca with tajikistan started in 2023. additionally, the eu has encouraged tajikistan to improve its respect for human rights. to summarize, advances in the negotiation of a future closer relationship between the eu and cars are still weak. moreover, it seems that oil and gas exporting countries are becoming the centre of attention for eu policy cooperation in the region. nevertheless, eu officials have clearly stated that without a deep institutional change in the region, the prospects for economic expansion are bleak. this view explains european insistence on issues such as democracy improvement or respect for human rights. despite outlining the importance of institution-building and respect for human rights, the eu has embraced a more pragmatic approach in its latest strategy, which was dictated by the role of russia and china in the region. central asia holds significant strategic importance as a trade facilitator between europe and asia. unlike the us, the eu adopts a soft approach, prioritizing connectivity and security over sanctions in the current geopolitical context. recent initiatives include the global gateway investors forum, expert conferences, and the high-level political and security dialogue. the eu focuses on the “middle corridor,” a route bypassing russia, connecting southeast asia, china, kazakhstan, the caspian sea, azerbaijan, georgia, and europe. kazakhstan is an important player for the eu within central asia. as a result of the latest strategies, the eu is favouring bilateral relations rather than regional ones, which undermines the original promoted regional perspective (winn and gänzle 2022). moreover, the recent success of the consultative meetings of central asian leaders in 2018 sheds doubts about the convenience of prioritizing a bilateral approach in the region. conclusion: comparing the role of external actors (china, russia, and the european union) in shaping regionalism in central asia since academic literature understands “regionalism” as a response to multilateral globalization (dür 2006; schirm 2002), cars could have prioritized regional integration. regionalism is also interpreted as an alternative against a globalization paradigm dominated by a unique hegemon, the us (pelagidis and papasotiriou 2002). according to acharya (2007), weaker states can also form regional coalitions to restrict the powers of regional hegemons, in this case, russia. however, the attempt to create a regional organization failed when the central asian cooperation organization (caco) was dissolved in 2005. in consequence, and despite sharing common cultural and historical features, the five central 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 asian countries were not successful in creating a common regional trade organization, a phenomenon generally viewed as a puzzle. in general, continuous border and resource disputes have impeded the creation of a trade institutional framework for the region (matveeva 2023). modern regionalism in central asia has been driven by the extensive involvement of key global powers (russia, the us, china, and the eu). as a result of this involvement, different geopolitically motivated projects of regionalism are undertaken and, in some way, shape or reshape the borders of regional areas (kazantsev 2014). a network of roads, railways, and sea routes connecting china and europe is part of the belt and road initiative and the shanghai cooperation organisation, which china has heavily invested in. russia remains committed to expanding its traditional sphere of influence politically through csto and economically through eaeu, while the eu interests in the region are focused on counterterrorism, economic and political modernization as well as the large natural reserves. the large number of regional organizations developed in central asia, each with a different membership, provide a good case for comparing regionalism. the types of regionalism pursued by the three actors in the region differ in terms of their goals, achievements and the actors involved. many of the regional organizations created in central asia, such as sco, csto, and eaeu, are founded and dominated by authoritarian regimes. this phenomenon is described by odydenkova and libman (2019) as “authoritarian regionalism.” such regional organizations have, in general, different goals as compared to their democratic counterparts as the analysis above has shown. in addition to the official goals of economic and security integration, which in most cases are not successful, authoritarian regionalism provides support and legitimacy for like-minded regimes and increases the global status of the founder (obydenkova and libman 2019). the question that needs to be raised is whether all these regional organizations pursued by external actors had impacted central asian regionalization. the literature has identified two possible scenarios related to the role of external powers in the process of regional cooperation. in the first scenario, the external actors reward regional cooperation with financial benefits or, in general, stronger economic and security relations. one important assumption of this scenario is that all countries in the region benefit equally from cooperation with each other and the external partner (krapohl 2017). in the second scenario, the external actors do not reward regional cooperation, and thus, they privilege relations with certain countries within the region by pursuing, for example, bilateral trade and investment agreements, selective opening of labour markets or privileged access to infrastructure (krapohl et al. 2014). the mapping of the most important external-driven regional initiatives in central asia, their goals and achievements presented in this article, provides supporting evidence to a potential divide-and-conquer strategy pursued by the three external powers in central asia. the use of bilateral agreements and privileged relations with certain countries (kazakhstan) hinder the development of regional cooperation. this conclusion is supported by other scholars (krapohl and vasileva-dienes 2020), however, it will be further tested empirically in future research. 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 references acharya, amitav. 2007. “the emerging regional architecture of world politics.” world politics 59 (4): 629–652. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2008.0000. aei (american enterprise institute). “china global investment tracker.” accessed january 18, 2024. https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/. aizenman, joshua, yothin jinjarak, and huanhuan zheng. 2018. “chinese outwards mercantilism– the art and practice of bundling.” journal of international money and finance 86: 31–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2018.03.016. allison, roy. 2004. “regionalism, regional structures and security management in central asia.” international affairs 80 (3): 463-483. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00393.x. aris, stephen. 2008. “russian-chinese relations through the lens of the sco.” ifri russia/nis center (september): 1–20. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/migrated_files/documents/ atoms/files/ifri_rnv_aris_sco_eng_3.pdf. asian development bank. 2006. “central asia: increasing gains from trade through regional cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs transit.” https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29927/central-asia-trade-policy.pdf. ———. 2021. “asia-pacific trade facilitation report 2021: supply chains of critical goods amid the covid-19 pandemic disruptions, recovery, and resilience.” october 21, 2021. accessed september 19, 2023. https://dx.doi.org/10.22617/spr210365-2. ———. 2023. “asian economic integration report 2023. trade, investment, and climate change in asia and the pacific.” accessed september 19, 2024. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/859946/asian-economic-integration-report2023.pdf. astana times. 2013. “xi jinping calls for regional cooperation via new silk road.” september 11, 2013. accessed september 19, 2024. https://astanatimes.com/2013/09/xi-jinping-calls-forregional-cooperation-via-new-silk-road/. ———. 2024. “central asia consultative meeting advances cooperation in key sectors, expert says.” august 12, 2024. accessed march 6, 2025. https://astanatimes.com/2024/08/centralasia-consultative-meeting-advances-cooperation-in-key-sectors-expert-says/. ba, alice d. 2009. (re) negotiating east and southeast asia: region, regionalism, and the association of southeast asian nations. stanford university press. blandy, charles w. 1999. “rebirth of the great silk road: myth or substance?” conflict studies research centre. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/43788/03_aug_10.pdf. bohr, annette. 2004. “regionalism in central asia: new geopolitics, old regional order.” international affairs 80 (3): 485–502. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14682346.2004.00394.x. börzel, tanja a., and thomas risse. 2016. “introduction.” in the oxford handbook of comparative regionalism, edited by tanja a. börzel and thomas risse, 3–16. oxford university press. brown, rachel. 2016. “where will the new silk road lead? the effects of chinese investment and migration in xinjiang and central asia.” academic commons, columbia university. https://doi.org/10.7916/d8kh0n9c. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2008.0000 https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2018.03.016 https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29927/central-asia-trade-policy.pdf https://dx.doi.org/10.22617/spr210365-2 https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/859946/asian-economic-integration-report-2023.pdf https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/859946/asian-economic-integration-report-2023.pdf https://astanatimes.com/2013/09/xi-jinping-calls-for-regional-cooperation-via-new-silk-road/ https://astanatimes.com/2013/09/xi-jinping-calls-for-regional-cooperation-via-new-silk-road/ https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00394.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00394.x 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 bunskoek, raoul, and chih-yu shih. 2021. “community of common destiny post-western regionalism: rethinking china’s belt and road initiative from a confucian perspective.” uluslararası i̇lişkiler dergisi 18 70: 85–101. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.33458/uidergisi.954744. cepal (la comisión económica para américa latina). 2022. “superación de la pandemia de enfermedad por coronavirus (covid-19) y desafíos de la guerra en ucrania” [overcoming the coronavirus disease pandemic (covid-19) and the challenges of war in ukraine]. boletín de comercio exterior del mercosur no. 5. https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/ core/bitstreams/217d5838-c5cd-4d23-ac58-1755d5996f75/content. chao, wen-chih. 2022. “the political economy of china’s rising role in the shanghai cooperation organization (sco): leading with balance.” the chinese economy 55 (4): 293–302. https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2021.1972548. cheng, yang. 2010. “the emerging regional configuration in central asia: the remaining traces of unipolarity, unstable multipolarity and other alternatives.” in edb eurasian integration yearbook 2010, edited by evgeny vonokurov: 175–205. https://eabr.org/bitrix/redirect.php?event1=archives+of+edb+periodical+publications+%e2 %80%93+eurasian+development+bank&event2=7.+emerging+regional+configuration+in+ central+asia%3a+remaining+traces+of+unipolarity%2c+unstable+multipolarity+and+ot her+alternatives%2c+yang+cheng&event3=download&goto=%2fupload%2fiblock%2f29 c%2fa_n3_2010_13.pdf. chung, chien-peng. 2004. “the shanghai co-operation organization: china’s changing influence in central asia.” the china quarterly 180: 989–1009. https://doi.org/10.1017/ s0305741004000712. cooley, alexander. 2012. great games, local rules: the new great power contest in central asia. oxford university press. council of the european union. 2007. “the eu and central asia: strategy for a new partnership.” brussels, may 31. accessed january 20, 2024. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/st-10113-2007-init/en/pdf. ———. 2019. “council conclusions on the new strategy on central asia. proceedings from: general secretariat of the council.” brussels, june 17. accessed january 20, 2024. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39778/st10221-en19.pdf csto (collective security treaty organization). 2025. “collective security treaty organization.” accessed march 6, 2025. https://en.odkb-csto.org. cummings, sally (ed.). 2004. power and change in central asia. routledge. dadabaev, timur 2021. decolonizing central asian international relations: beyond empires.routledge. davé, bhavna, and yuka kobayashi. 2018. “china’s silk road economic belt initiative in central asia: economic and security implications.” asia europe journal 16: 267–281. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-0513-x. de haas, marcel. 2017. “relations of central asia with the shanghai cooperation organization and the collective security treaty organization.” journal of slavic military studies 30 (1): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2017.1271642. https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/217d5838-c5cd-4d23-ac58-1755d5996f75/content https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/217d5838-c5cd-4d23-ac58-1755d5996f75/content https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2021.1972548 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/st-10113-2007-init/en/pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39778/st10221-en19.pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-0513-x https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2017.1271642 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 delovarova, al-farabi, delovarova, leila, shkapyak oxana, and fatima kukeyeva. 2013. “migration processes in central asia: main directions and key issues of regional system.” middle-east journal of scientific research 15 (11): 1505–10. https://doi.org/ 10.5829/idosi.mejsr.2013.15.11.11580. dunford, michael and weidong liu. 2019. “chinese perspectives on the belt and road initiative.” cambridge journal of regions, economy and society 12 (1): 145-167. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsy032. dür, andreas. 2006. “regionalism in the world economy: building block or stumbling stone for globalization.” in globalization state of the art and perspectives, edited by stefan a. schirm: 199–215. routledge. european commission. 2023. “eu trade relations with central asia. facts, figures and latest developments.” accessed january 20, 2024. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-traderelationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/central-asia_en. european commission. n.d. “generalised scheme of preferences.” accessed march 6, 2025. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/generalised-schemepreferences_en ———. n.d. “unilateral trade arrangements.” accessed march 6, 2025. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/unilateral-trade-arrangements. eurostat. 2025. “international trade in goods for the eu an overview.” accessed february 20, 2025.https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ index.php?title=international_trade_in_goods_for_the_eu_-_an_overview. fawn, rick. 2022. “not here for geopolitical interests or games’: the eu’s 2019 strategy and the regional and inter-regional competition for central asia.” central asian survey 41 (4): 675– 698. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1951662. fingar, thomas, ed. 2016. the new great game: china and south and central asia in the era of reform. stanford university press. frankopan, peter. 2017. the silk roads: a new history of the world. vintage books. gorshkov, teimuraz, and george bagaturia, 2001. “traceca–restoration of silk route.” japan railway & transport review 28: 50–55. https://www.ejrcf.or.jp/jrtr/jrtr28/pdf/f50_gor.pdf. hettne, björn. 2005. “beyond the ‘new’ regionalism.” new political economy 10 (4): 543–571. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460500344484. hillman, jennifer, and alex tippett. 2021. “who built that? labor and the belt and road initiative.” council on foreign relations, july 6, 2021. accessed march 6, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/blog/who-built-labor-and-belt-and-road-initiative. huang, yiping. 2016. “understanding china’s belt & road initiative: motivation, framework and assessment.” china economic review 40: 314–321. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.007. hussain, mumtaz, mahrukh, hamna, and saleem maimona. 2022. “study of russian security activities in central asia under collective security treaty organization.” journal of development and social sciences 3 (3): 186–193. https://doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2022(3-iii)19. icmpd (international centre for migration policy development). 2024. “migration outlook.” https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/60848/file/icmpd%2520migration%2520outlook%25 20eeca%25202024.pdf https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsy032 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/central-asia_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/central-asia_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/generalised-scheme-preferences_en https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/generalised-scheme-preferences_en https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/unilateral-trade-arrangements https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=international_trade_in_goods_for_the_eu_-_an_overview https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=international_trade_in_goods_for_the_eu_-_an_overview https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1951662 https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460500344484 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.007 https://doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2022(3-iii)19 https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/60848/file/icmpd%2520migration%2520outlook%2520eeca%25202024.pdf https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/60848/file/icmpd%2520migration%2520outlook%2520eeca%25202024.pdf 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 indeo, fabio. 2018. “the role of russia in the central asian security architecture.” osce academy in bishkek policy brief 48 (june): 1–12. https://osce-academy.net/upload/file/ pb48the_role_of_russia_in_the_central_asian_security_architecture.pdf. iom (international organization for migration). 2021. “world migration report 2022.” accessed march 6, 2025. https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2022. isakova, asel, zsoka, koczan, and alexander plekhanov. 2015. “how much do tariffs matter? evidence from the customs union of belarus, kazakhstan and russia.” journal of economic policy reform 19 (2): 166–184. https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2014.988212. kaczmarski, marcin. 2017. “two ways of influence-building: the eurasian economic union and the one belt, one road initiative.” europe-asia studies 69 (7): 1027–1046. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2017.1373270. katzenstein, peter. 2005. a world of regions: asia and europe in the american imperium. cornell university press. kazantsev, a. andrey. 2014. “eurasian perspectives on regionalism: central asia and beyond.” in eurasian integration-the view from within, edited by piotr dutkiewicz and richard sakwa, 231–249. routledge. kazantsev, a. andrey, medvedeva, svetlana, and ivan safranchuk. 2021. “between russia and china: central asia in greater eurasia.” journal of eurasian studies 12 (1): 57– 71. https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366521998242. kembayev, zhenis. 2017. “implementing the silk road economic belt: from the shanghai cooperation organisation to the silk road union?” asia europe journal 16 (1): 37–50. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-017-0483-4. korneev, oleg. 2013. “eu migration governance in central asia: everybody’s business–nobody’s business?” european journal of migration and law 15 (3): 301–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718166-00002038. kolpakova, tatyana v., and tatiana n. kuchinskaya. 2015. “china’s “new regionalism” as a mechanism to strengthen the influence of china in the global integration processes: an example of eurasian economic union.” international journal of economics and financial issues 5 (2): 109–115. https://www.econjournals.com/index.php/ijefi/article/view/1590/pdf. konopelko, agnieszka. 2018. “eurasian economic union: a challenge for eu policy towards kazakhstan.” asia europe journal 16 (1): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-017-0480-7. krapohl, sebastian. 2015. “financial crises as catalysts for regional cooperation? chances and obstacles for financial integration in asean+3, mercosur and the eurozone.” contemporary politics 21 (2): 161–178. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2015.1030171. ———. 2017. “two logics of regional integration and the games regional actors play.” in regional integration in the global south: the external influence on economic cooperation in asean, mercosur and sadc, edited by sebastian krapohl, 33–62. palgrave. krapohl, sebastian, meissner, katharina l., and johannes muntschick. 2014. “regional powers as leaders or rambos of regional integration? unilateral actions of brazil and south africa and their negative effects on mercosur and sadc.” journal of common market studies 52 (4): 879–895.https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12116. krapohl, sebastian, and alexandra vasileva-dienes. 2020. “the region that isn’t: china, russia and the failure of regional integration in central asia.” asia europe journal 18 (3): 347–366. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-019-00548-0. https://osce-academy.net/upload/file/pb48the_role_of_russia_in_the_central_asian_security_architecture.pdf https://osce-academy.net/upload/file/pb48the_role_of_russia_in_the_central_asian_security_architecture.pdf https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2022 https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2014.988212 https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2017.1373270 https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366521998242 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-017-0483-4 http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718166-00002038 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-017-0480-7 https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12116 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-019-00548-0 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 krugman, paul r. 1979. “increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade.” journal of international economics 9 (4): 469–479. https://doi.org/10.1016/00221996(79)90017-5. ———. 1980. “scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade.” the american economic review 70 (5): 950–959. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1805774. laitin, david d. 1991. “the national uprisings in the soviet union.” world politics 44 (1): 139–177. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010426. libman, alexander, 2017. “russian power politics and the eurasian economic union: the real and the imagined.” rising powers quarterly 2 (1): 81–103. https://rpquarterly.kureselcalismalar.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/vol2.1-alexanderlibman.pdf. libman, alexander, obydenkova, anastassia, and erik davtyan. 2022. “eurasian regionalism and russia’s war against ukraine: consequences for the eaeu and kazakhstan.” russian analytical digest 287: 2–6. https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000577719. libman, alexander, and anastassia obydenkova. 2017. “why is the ‘post-soviet’ regionalism postsoviet?” historical legacies and regional integration in eurasia.” munich personal repec paper 83506. accessed march 6, 2025. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83506/. linn, jonansen j. 2012. “central asian regional integration and cooperation: reality or mirage?” edb eurasian integration yearbook. https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/10-regional-integration-and-cooperation-linn.pdf. mankoff, jeffrey. 2022. “the war in ukraine and eurasia’s new imperial moment.” the washington quarterly 45 (2): 127–147. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2022.2090761. matveeva, anna. 2023. “a new opening for eu–central asia relations?” carnegie europe, april 13, 2023. accessed march 6, 2025. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/04/13/new-opening-for-eucentral-asia-relations-pub-89454. ministry of foreign affairs of the people’s republic of china. 2019. “joint communique of the leaders’ roundtable of the 2nd belt and road forum for international cooperation.” beijing, april 27, 2019. accessed january 20, 2024. http://english.scio.gov.cn/brf2019/201904/28/content_74730528.htm. mogilevskii, roman, thurlow, james, and adeline yeh. 2018. “kyrgyzstan’s accession to the eurasian economic union: measuring economy-wide impacts and uncertainties.” university of central asia – institute of public policy and administration (ippa) working paper no. 44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3807831. mostafa, golam and monowar mahmood. 2018. “eurasian economic union: evolution, challenges and possible future directions.” journal of eurasian studies 9 (2): 163–172. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2018.05.001. nikiforova, elena, and olga brednikova. 2018. “on labor migration to russia: central asian migrants and migrant families in the matrix of russia’s bordering policies.” political geography 66: 142–150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.04.006. obydenkova, anastassia, and alexander libman. 2019. authoritarian regionalism in the world of international organizations. global perspectives & the eurasian enigma. oxford university press. olcott, martha brill. 2005. central asia’s second chance. carnegie endowment for international peace. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(79)90017-5 https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(79)90017-5 https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000577719 https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83506/ https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10-regional-integration-and-cooperation-linn.pdf https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10-regional-integration-and-cooperation-linn.pdf https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2022.2090761 https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/04/13/new-opening-for-eu-central-asia-relations-pub-89454 https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/04/13/new-opening-for-eu-central-asia-relations-pub-89454 http://english.scio.gov.cn/brf2019/2019-04/28/content_74730528.htm http://english.scio.gov.cn/brf2019/2019-04/28/content_74730528.htm http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3807831 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 ogunleye, olusogo, akinyemi, ajibola, oluwafemi, enilolobo, and olufolakemi, shogunle. 2018. “influence of road transport infrastructure on agricultural sector development in nigeria.” logistics & sustainable transport 9 (1): 39–50. https://doi.org/10.2478/jlst-2018-0004. paramonov, vladimir, and lola akramova. 2024. “economic relations of central asia and the european union”. himalayan and central asian studies 28: 71–94. accessed march 6, 2024. https://www.himalayanresearch.org/journal-2024.php. patel, k. kiran. 2020. project europe: a history. cambridge university press. pelagidis, theodore, and harry papasotiriou. 2002. “globalisation or regionalism? states, markets and the structure of international trade.” review of international studies 28 (3): 519–535. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210502005193. peyrouse, sebastian. 2015. “kyrgyzstan’s membership in the eurasian economic union: a marriage of convenience.” russian analytical digest 165 (10): 10–12. pomfret, richard. 2009. “regional integration in central asia.” economic change and restructuring 42 (1): 47–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10644-008-9060-6. pradhan, ramakrushna, and sankar s. mohanty. 2021. “chinese grand strategies in central asia: the role of shanghai cooperation organization and belt and road initiative.” fudan journal of the humanities and social sciences 14 (2): 197–223. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-02100318-6. rakhimov, mirzhokhid. 2018. “complex regionalism in central asia: local, regional, and global factors.” cambridge journal of eurasian studies 2: 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.22261/cjes.j6y3o7. ———. 2023. “multilateral relations in central asia: a perspective on the central asian consultative forum.” in the completion of eurasia? continental convergence or regional dissent in the context of ‘historic turns’, edited by kuralay baizakova, yann alix, and pierre chabal, 83–93. peter lang. satke, ryskeldi. 2015. “kyrgyzstan and the eurasian economic union: the view from bishkek.” european council on foreign relations, may 9, 2015. accessed january 20, 2024. accessed march 6, 2025. https://ecfr.eu/article/ commentary_kyrgyzstan_and_the_eurasian_economic_union_the_view_from_bis3022/. schirm, stefan. 2002. globalization and the new regionalism: global markets, domestic politics and regional cooperation. wiley. shiells, clinton r., and sarosh sattar, eds. 2004. the low-income countries of the commonwealth of independent states: progress and challenges in transition. international monetary fund. simon, gerhard. 1987. “regionalism in the soviet union: challenging or stabilizing the soviet system?” journal of baltic studies 18 (3): 257–268. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/01629778700000111. söderbaum, frederik, and timothy m. shaw, eds. 2003. theories of new regionalism: a palgrave reader. palgrave macmillan. song, weiqing. 2013. “interests, power and china’s difficult game in the shanghai cooperation organization (sco).” journal of contemporary china 23 (85): 85–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.80998. stonis, danylo. 2022. “comparative analysis of the shanghai cooperation organisation and european union strategy on central asia: confrontation or cooperation?” polish political science yearbook 51: 1–22. https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202230. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10644-008-9060-6 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-021-00318-6 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-021-00318-6 http://dx.doi.org/10.22261/cjes.j6y3o7 https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kyrgyzstan_and_the_eurasian_economic_union_the_view_from_bis3022/ https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kyrgyzstan_and_the_eurasian_economic_union_the_view_from_bis3022/ 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 stronski, paul, and richard sokolsky. 2020. “the eurasian economic union. multipolarity in practice: understanding russia’s engagement with regional institutions.” carnegie endowment for international peace. accessed january 20, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/multipolarity-in-practice-understanding-russia-sengagement-with-regional-institutions-pub-80717. tarr, david. 2014. “the eurasian customs union among russia, belarus and kazakhstan: can it succeed where its predecessor failed?” applied trade policy modeling in 16 countries. (may): 509–516. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814551434_0020. tekdal, veysel. 2018. “china’s belt and road initiative: at the crossroads of challenges and ambitions.” the pacific review 31 (3): 373–390. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1391864. trilling, david. 2010. “moscow using new customs union to extend influence in central asia.” eurasianet. july 7, 2010. accessed march 6, 2025. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61484. umirzakova n., and t. marat. 2024. “consultative meetings of the heads of states of central asia: analyzing the prospects of regionalism and cooperation in central asia.” international school of economics maqsut narikbayev university. http://repository.kazguu.kz/bitstream/handle/ 123456789/2095/gr%2010%20umirzakova%20n.%2c%20marat%20t..pdf?sequence=1&is allowed=y. ünaldılar kocamaz, sinem. 2019. “the rise of new powers in world politics: russia, china and the shanghai cooperation organization.” uluslararası i̇lişkiler dergisi 16 (61): 127–141. https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.541542. unctad (united nations conference on trade and development). “china: bilateral investment treaties (bits).” accessed september 12, 2024. https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/ international-investment-agreements/countries/42/china. united nations comtrade database. 2023. “the united nations commodity trade statistics database.” accessed september 19, 2023. http://comtrade.un.org/. un desa (united nations department of economic and social affairs). 2020. international migrant stock 2020. accessed march 6, 2025. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/ www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesa_pd_2020_ims_stock_by_sex_and_destination. xlsx. unrcca (united nations regional centre for preventive diplomacy for central asia). 2023. “srsg kaha imnadze participates at the fifth consultative meeting of heads of state of central asia.” accessed march 6, 2025. https://unrcca.unmissions.org/srsg-kaha-imnadzeparticipates-fifth-consultative-meeting-heads-state-central-asia. van langehove, luk. 2011. building regions: the regionalization of the world order. ashgate publishing. wahlang, jason. 2022. “russia’s ‘partial mobilization’ and central asia – analysis.” eurasia review, november 28, 2022. accessed march 6, 2025. https://www.eurasiareview.com/28112022russias-partial-mobilization-and-central-asia-analysis/. wang, weiran. 2014. “the effects of regional integration in central asia.” emerging markets finance and trade 50 (sup2): 219–232. https://doi.org/10.2753/ree1540-496x5002s215. wilson, jeanne l. 2021. “russia and china in central asia: deepening tensions in the relationship.” acta via serica 6 (1): 55–90. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/multipolarity-in-practice-understanding-russia-s-engagement-with-regional-institutions-pub-80717 https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/multipolarity-in-practice-understanding-russia-s-engagement-with-regional-institutions-pub-80717 https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1391864 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61484 https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.541542 https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/42/china https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/42/china http://comtrade.un.org/ 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 winn, neil, and stefan gänzle. 2022. “recalibrating eu foreign policy vis-à-vis central asia: towards principled pragmatism and resilience.” geopolitics 28 (3): 1342–1361. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2022.2042260. wolczuk, kataryna, and rilka dragneva. 2022. “putin’s eurasian dream may soon become a nightmare.” chatham house expert comment, may 3, 2022. accessed march 6, 2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/05/putins-eurasian-dream-may-soon-become-nightmare. world bank. 2023a. “remittances remain resilient but are slowing.” accessed on september 19, 2023. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd. ———. 2023b. “world development indicators.” accessed january 20, 2024. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. ———. 2024. “world development indicators.” accessed september 12, 2024. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators yazdani, enayatollah. 2020. “china-central asia relations and role of the belt and road initiative.” chinese business review 19 (5): 178–195. https://doi.org/10.17265/1537-1506/2020.05.004. yeliseyeu, andrey. 2019. “the eurasian economic union: expectations, challenges, and achievements.” german marshall fund of the united states, may 15, 2019. accessed march 6, 2025. https://www.gmfus.org/news/eurasian-economic-union-expectations-challenges-andachievements. yuan, jing-dong. 2010. “china’s role in establishing and building the shanghai cooperation organization (sco).” journal of contemporary china 19 (67): 855–869. yue, mengdi, and christoph nedopil. 2022. “chinese role on public external debt in dss countries and the belt and road initiative.” green finance and development center, march 21, 2022. accessed january 20, 2024. https://greenfdc.org/2022/03/21/. yun, yeonhee, and kinam park. 2012. “an analysis of the multilateral cooperation and competition between russia and china in the shanghai cooperation organization: issues and prospects.” pacific focus 27 (1): 62–85. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2012.01076.x. yuneman, a. roman. 2020. “kazakhstan and the eurasian economic union.” russia in global affairs 18 (4): 37–55. https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2020-18-4-37-55. zhuangzhi, sun. 2007. “the relationship between china and central asia.” in eager eyes fixed on eurasia, edited by iwashita akihiro, 41–63. slavic research center, hokkaido university. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2022.2042260 https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/05/putins-eurasian-dream-may-soon-become-nightmare https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators https://www.gmfus.org/news/eurasian-economic-union-expectations-challenges-and-achievements https://www.gmfus.org/news/eurasian-economic-union-expectations-challenges-and-achievements https://greenfdc.org/2022/03/21/ 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 appendix i figure 1: merchandise trade over gdp in percentage source: world bank wdi, 2023 figure 2: evolution of uzbekistan’s trade with its partners, 2000-22 source: comtrade un, 2023, wdi 2023 and adb 2006. 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 merchandise total trade over gdp (in %) kaz tjk tkm kgz uzb average cac 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 uzbekistan trade with various partners (in %) china eu russia cacs 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 figure 3: evolution of tajikistan’s trade with its partners, 2000-22 source: comtrade un, 2023, wdi 2023 and adb 2006. figure 4: evolution of kyrgyzstan’s trade with its partners, 2000-22 source: comtrade un, 2023, wdi 2023 and adb 2006. 0 10 20 30 40 50 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 tajikistan trade with various partners (in %) china eu russia cacs 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 kyrgyzstan trade with various partners (in %) china eu russia cacs 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 figure 5: evolution of kazakhstan’s trade with its partners, 2000-22 source: comtrade un, 2023, wdi 2023 and adb 2006. figure 6: evolution of turkmenistan trade with various partners, 2000-22 source: comtrade un, 2023, wdi 2023 and adb 2006. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 kazakhstan trade with various partners (in %) china eu russia cacs 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 turkmenistan trade with various partners (in %) china eu russia cacs 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 4-29 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 crisis in russian-american diplomacy: boris yeltsin, bill clinton, and the 1998 bombing of iraq ebrahim daryaee motlagh1, chechen state pedagogical university, grozny russia abstract this article is an attempt to investigate the growing challenges in russian-american diplomacy in the post-soviet environment. to this end, the study focused on the crisis of iraq and, more specifically, the us-british bombing of iraq in 1998 as a source of tension in bilateral relations. in doing so, declassified communications between us president bill clinton and boris yeltsin were reviewed following a discussion of american and russian foreign policy towards the iraq crisis. the review of communications demonstrated that both leaders actively attempted to avoid further divergence by keeping friendly and consensus-building communications while insisting on their differing positions. the yeltsin-clinton correspondence also showed that they tried to avoid unilateral action and develop their strategies within international frameworks such as the united nations security council (unsc), the united nations special commission (unscom), and international atomic energy agency (iaea). in this regard, bill clinton ostensibly sided with unscom, whereas boris yeltsin supported the unsc framework, where russia could exert more influence. the study concluded that, despite these efforts, the us-british bombing of iraq further alienated the russian government and affected the post-soviet world order. these conclusions are significant in that they demonstrate challenges to american diplomatic hegemony and show the earliest roots of divergence in the russian-american presidential diplomacy. 1 ebrahim daryaee motlagh is a phd candidate in russian history at chechen state pedagogical university in grozny russia 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 introduction this article is an attempt to examine the impact of the 1998 iraq crisis and the us-british bombing of iraq on russia-us relations. in doing so, the article will refer to declassified correspondence and telephone calls between bill clinton and boris yeltsin. by reviewing these documents, this study places the aforementioned crisis in the context of emerging disputes between the russian federation and the united states towards the end of the 20th century. it suggests that these relations were gravely tested in the post-soviet era, which ultimately led to the coldness of strategic relations between the governments. the review of these documents can be significant in that they highlight the divergence between the united states and russia with regard to the iraq crisis and how it set the grounds for later developments. with respect to the subject of this study, the choice of the 1998 bombing can be relevant in several ways. soon after the bombing campaign, bill clinton and boris yeltsin arranged a telephone call during which yeltsin reminded his american counterpart that in the aftermath of the military action, what was at stake “was not just the person of saddam hussein but also our relations with the us” (helfont 2022). before the air strikes, the media had quoted him as saying that bombing iraq might even bring a “world war” (specter 1998). yeltsin’s remarks suggested the significance of the iraq crisis as a factor in recalibrating russian foreign policy. in fact, this event had significant implications and outcomes for russia-us relations and global strategic relations. firstly, it renewed the debate among different states about the legitimacy or practicality of military action in dealing with iraq or other states that would violate the un resolutions. second, the subject was a significant case of military action against iraq after the end of the gulf war in 1991 and before the invasion of the country in 2003. in the united states, the military campaign and its preceding developments paved the way for further military action and perhaps removed some legal obstacles to such campaigns. third, when considered in the context of communications between clinton and the other heads of state, the case study demonstrates the importance of international institutions and un frameworks. it may also serve as an example of their effectiveness or inefficiency in avoiding global escalations. finally, the us-british bombing of iraq further alienated the russian government and challenged the american diplomatic hegemony in the postcold war environment. regardless of its primary goals, this military action failed to resolve the issue of iraq and its alleged weapons of mass destruction (wmd) program. one can note that, initially, russia-us relations embarked on a different path following the dissolution of the ussr. on june 18, 1992, boris yeltsin delivered his address to the us congress with symbolic words that assured the beginning of a new era for russians and americans. with words filled with optimism, yeltsin praised the will of the russian people and finished his speech in a way that may seem naïve and simplistic today: today, free and democratic russia is extending its hand of friendship to the people of america. acting on the will of the people of russia, i am inviting you, and through you the people of the united states, to join us in partnership in the quest for freedom and justice in the 21st century. (yeltsin 1992) however, yeltsin’s promises did not remove the vague landscape that the collapse of the soviet union had created for american foreign policy officials. in a similar way, the new landscape brought tremendous challenges to the newly established russian federation and its first democratically elected leader. these challenges included a wide range of economic, social, and political problems that initially led boris yeltsin’s government to expand relations with the west 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 and especially the united states (donaldson 1999; felkay 2002). on the home front, yeltsin’s government experimented with controversial economic reforms and promoted russian nationalism after decades of soviet rule over russia’s economy, politics, and social life.2 in another direction, following the imperatives of a seemingly unipolar world, the united states also committed itself to returning a democratic russia to the world stage. however, these efforts that appeared in the form of financial assistance and loans often fell short of expectations and were below the minimum required to cover the country’s communist-era debts and address the severe economic crises in its transition to capitalism. in the midst of such campaigns, the clinton-yeltsin contacts laid the foundations of a critical but unstable relationship between the two nations that, despite its promising beginnings, took a reverse course during the 1990s. shortly after the fall of the soviet union, us foreign policy urgently sought a mechanism to promote political stability in russia and curb the threats of nuclear proliferation in the former soviet bloc. in what was controversially labelled an “american eurasian geostrategy,” washington also endeavoured to exploit opportunities that appeared in these territories. therefore, this era also demonstrated a myriad of passionate writings in support of an interventionist eurasian strategy. a prominent example is zbigniew brzezinski’s “the grand chessboard,” which linked the us global supremacy to “how long and how effectively its preponderance on the eurasian continent is sustained” (brzezinski 1997, 17). a similar but more assertive advocacy of this primacy is found in samuel p. huntington’s writing. in what seems to be a euphoric post-soviet atmosphere, huntington (1993) argued that the us influence is crucial “to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies and international order in the world” (83). however, recent reviews of russia-us relations in that period also emphasize common interests such as nuclear security, nuclear arms control, and counter-terrorism cooperation.3 thus, in 1993, president george h. w. bush and boris yeltsin managed to finalize the strategic arms reduction treaty (start ii), the aim of which was to prevent the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles. in essence, it was a continuation of the work between the two cold war superpowers. here, the first sign of a clash appeared in earnest. geopolitical tensions, global security crises and the us government’s approach drew criticism from moscow officials and created a gap in russianamerican diplomacy. in this respect, some scholars point to the failures of boris yeltsin’s domestic reforms, which were based on western models, as a factor in alienating the russian elites from the west in general and the united states in particular (donaldson 1999; felkay 2002). some also point to insufficient investment or economic support from the us government. for instance, key among such scholars is strobe talbott, the former deputy secretary of state in clinton’s administration. in his widely read memoir, the russia hand, talbott (2007) praises the instrumental and friendly relations between clinton and yeltsin, arguing that these relations “either resolved or alleviated disputes over russia’s role in the post–cold war world” (9). nevertheless, he also questions the wisdom of russia’s rapid transition to a liberal capitalist economy, which was largely encouraged by washington (talbott 2007, 189–213). as the records show, the clinton administration’s criticism of yeltsin’s leadership and especially his handling of the first chechen war (1994–1996) also led to some resentment. the russians were also deeply troubled by security threats such as the enlargement of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) in eastern europe, which, according to boris yeltsin, had no justification after the end of the cold war. what complicated the dispute even further were nato’s air strikes against yugoslavia in the context of 2 see desai 1995, 2000 for more discussion. 3 see, for instance, orlova 2020 and parker 2019. 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 the kosovo war in 1999. these challenges eroded russian-american foreign policy achievements. for instance, the russian state duma did not ratify the start ii treaty until 2000, and russia eventually withdrew from start ii in 2002 due to the us withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty of 1972 on june 13, 2002. in other areas, the relations suffered due to the growing conflict of interests around the world. in sum, the countervailing priorities of the united states and the russian federation soon weakened the initial optimism invested in bilateral relations, even though, as will be discussed below, boris yeltsin and bill clinton continued their maneuvers to curb these tensions. nevertheless, apart from the military tensions in the balkans, a major twist in russia-us relations had its roots in the middle east. it grew from the conflicts between the us and saddam hussein’s regime after the 1991 ceasefire agreement. in this respect, the current study is an attempt to examine some aspects of this difference in the historical context of the us military campaign and the 1998 bombing of iraq. in what follows, the study will focus specifically on the conversations between boris yeltsin and bill clinton. however, first, it is important to discuss russia’s complex relations with iraq and how they contradicted us interests in the region. iraq: a bone of contention in russia-us relations following the dissolution of the soviet union, the russian federation tried, where possible, to maintain the previous alliances that moscow had developed during the cold war. this policy became increasingly relevant from 1996 to 1998 with yevgeny primakov as the new minister of foreign affairs.4 primakov replaced andrei kozyrev, who had faced criticism for failing to defend russian interests, particularly with regard to the question of nato expansion and critical developments in iraq. yeltsin’s new foreign minister enjoyed a solid reputation among soviet and russian diplomats and was also well-known in academic circles as an arabist and middle east scholar. as a pragmatist, he supported russian strategic autonomy, regional integration, particularly in the former soviet bloc, and multilateralism with an emphasis on cooperation with china and india. the sum of these strategies was later regarded as the “primakov doctrine” (delong 2020; rumer 2019). as will be discussed later, another key but problematic aspect of this doctrine was non-intervention, which highlighted russia’s opposition to us military campaigns in the middle east. historically, the arab world was an area of friction in soviet-us and later russia-us relations. more specifically, russia’s long-standing relations with saddam hussein’s regime, which were a legacy of soviet foreign policy, became a bone of contention in the kremlin and washington interactions. indeed, these relations and their ramifications drew the attention of many scholars throughout the 1990s (freedman 2001; nizamedden 1999; rumer 2000; shaffer 2001; vassiliev 1993). these scholars debated the reasons why the soviet officials had tried to form a strategic relationship with iraq that was geographically (and sometimes politically) closer to the ussr compared to other arab countries. of course, these analyses were not without precedent. writing in 1980, francis fukuyama discussed the relevance of factors such as iraq’s growing military and political influence in the region, its oil revenues, the consolidation of the ba’ath party and the need for soviet weapons. he then concluded that iraq was indeed “an ideal location for the expansion of soviet influence” (fukuyama 1980, 5). fukuyama’s research gave realistic prominence to the 4 see, for instance, simha 2015. 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 “considerable weakness” of soviet influence in iraq between 1968 and 1980, and primakov’s firsthand account of such difficulties may corroborate this view (primakov 2009, 301–324). with its energy and economic resources, iraq remained an important sphere of influence in russian foreign policy. therefore, with the end of the cold war, the kremlin continued to support baghdad while the western governments adopted an increasingly aggressive approach to contain saddam’s provocative ambitions. the support for iraq was sometimes coupled with yeltsin’s direct opposition to us policies, especially the unilateral sanctions, which limited russia’s economic ties with baghdad. historically, one may argue that yeltsin had inherited a complex legacy in foreign policy in which iraq was a problematic aspect. early in the 1990s, his government openly supported the united states in its efforts to pressure the iraqi regime. nevertheless, foreign policy priorities and internal pressure from the parliament ultimately forced yeltsin to revise his policy and, where possible, act independently of the united states regarding the crisis in iraq (zlobin 2004). simply put, during this transition, post-soviet russia became aware of its fundamental differences with the western camp. this change was accompanied by explicit criticisms of the us’ occasional military actions in iraq, even when these actions were retaliatory or seemed justified to western observers. however, as some scholars have noted, russia’s relations with iraq were subject to a more complex logic. for instance, in 1996, yevgeny primakov addressed the question of the iraqi debt to the former soviet union, which came to seven billion usd. with regard to this logic, some political analysts have argued that the kremlin saw this debt essentially as an instrument to influence the iraqi regime (zlobin 2004, 91). the economic necessities and the urgent need to support russian businesses and companies, where western and international monetary fund (imf) aid seemed insufficient, encouraged primakov to recalibrate the relations with the cold war allies. from this point of view, the russians thought that the us unilateral foreign policy and military actions were illegal, counterproductive, and dangerous. on this subject, western media frequently quoted yeltsin’s warning that “clinton might run into a world war” (williams 1998). in fact, the kremlin and washington dealt with a multitude of differences in the 1990s, but what is relevant here is the role of iraq in intensifying the differences and particularly the case of usbritish air strikes in 1998. after the ceasefire agreement, which ended the gulf war in 1991, the bush and clinton administrations orchestrated or supported destabilizing insurgencies against saddam hussein’s regime. this was a strategy that conflicted with russia’s interests in iraq. in addition to sanctions and embargoes, which the kremlin intended to lift, the us government used every opportunity to undermine saddam hussein. cia assessments showed that the ba’athist regime was still a threat to american interests after the 1991 ceasefire (ignatius 2003). consequently, washington resorted to covert actions that mainly included support for insurgents and sabotage operations in iraq, even though they did not overthrow the iraqi regime. these actions were finally made official on october 31, 1998. on this date, the president of the united states signed the congressional statement known as the “iraq liberation act.” this act, which later served as the rationale for the us invasion of iraq in 2003, clearly stated that the us policy should “support efforts to remove the regime headed by saddam hussein from power in iraq.”5 5 “iraq liberation act of 1998.” pub. l. no. 105–338, 112 stat. 3178. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/plaw105publ338/pdf/plaw-105publ338.pdf. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/plaw-105publ338/pdf/plaw-105publ338.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/plaw-105publ338/pdf/plaw-105publ338.pdf 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 thus, in 1998, regime change became washington’s official policy towards iraq. during such developments, yeltsin and his foreign minister, yevgeny primakov, were committed to preventing military tensions in the region. in his memoir, russia and the arabs, primakov has allocated a considerable part of his writing to revisit “the phenomenon that was saddam hussein” (primakov 2009, 301–324). drawing on his close familiarity with saddam’s personality, he recalled russia’s unsteady influence in iraq and reached this conclusion: but without meaning to belittle the influence that russia had, it has to be said that saddam continued to believe in his lucky star, in his own foresight, and ultimately in allah, who would save him from harm. what sustained his belief was not blind hope, but his realpolitik certainty that, given the prevailing sentiment in the arab world—and indeed the americans’ own interests— the united states had nothing to gain from bringing about his downfall. (primakov 2009, 318) primakov has noted that russia did everything in its power to keep iraq from the brink. nevertheless, in spite of some success in de-escalating the tensions in 1997 and 1998, russia ultimately failed to avert the us-british attack against the iraqi targets in december 1998. as a consequence, the military campaign deepened the differences in moscow-washington relations. diplomatic crisis: the 1998 bombing of iraq the bombing of iraq in december 1998 was a major source of disagreement between the presidents of russia and the united states. despite moscow’s efforts to prevent military action in iraq, from december 16 to 19, the us and britain carried out “operation desert fox” to target sites related to iraq’s weapons programs. bill clinton justified these attacks by referring to iraq’s lack of compliance with un resolutions and refusal to allow the un inspectors to access targeted sites. on december 16, clinton explained his administration’s objectives and rationale for striking military targets in iraq. the main targets of bombings were nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in iraq. in a statement that other us government officials parroted later, clinton claimed that the strikes were designed primarily to “degrade saddam’s capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors” (clinton 1998a). to justify this military campaign, clinton (1998) referred repeatedly to iraq’s refusal to cooperate with the united nations special commission (unscom) weapons inspectors. he asserted that the use of force in iraq was the last option, which came inevitably following “saddam’s last act of defiance in late october” and claimed that this option was considered after “intensive diplomatic pressure on iraq” failed to bring cooperation from baghdad (clinton 1998a). the speech, which served as a justification for the military strikes, was based on unscom reports and emphasized iraq’s violation of its commitment. in fact, to support his claims, the president quoted the unscom conclusions that “iraq’s conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in the fields of disarmament” and “the commission is not able to conduct the work mandated to it by the security council with respect to iraq's prohibited weapons program” (clinton 1998). additionally, clinton reiterated the us government’s official policy towards iraq, which had been anticipated by the iraq liberation act. in his speech, the us president indicated the administration’s regime change policy: the best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new iraqi government—a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people. bringing change in baghdad will take time and effort. we will strengthen our engagement with 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 the full range of iraqi opposition forces and work with them effectively and prudently. (clinton 1998a) as noted earlier, tensions between iraq, the united states, and the un special commission had begun in 1997, and there were concerns about an imminent attack. in one case, the us government went as far as authorizing operation “desert thunder,” which was ultimately averted by diplomatic efforts. in that particular case, apart from criticisms from the russian government, the records show that there was also opposition from some arab states such as saudi arabia, bahrain, and the united arab emirates (uae). with concerns about the consequences of a possible military campaign, these states announced that their territorial facilities should not be used for such an operation. as for “operation desert fox,” political analysts considered this four-day military campaign to be consistent with the us government’s efforts to topple saddam hussein’s regime. additionally, bill clinton had already signed the iraq liberation act, which could be used to legitimize the strikes. on december 19, bill clinton announced the end of the operation. he pointed to its success and described the way forward in dealing with the iraqi regime. while repeating the objective of this military action, which was “to degrade saddam’s weapons of mass destruction program and related delivery systems,” he assured his us audience that the controversial operation had achieved this goal (clinton 1998b). what was similar in both speeches was the determination of the united states to undermine and possibly overthrow the iraqi government. in this regard, clinton once again emphasized his administration’s consensus: as long as saddam remains in power he will remain a threat to his people, his region and the world. with our allies, we must pursue a strategy to contain him and to constrain his weapons of mass destruction program, while working towards the day iraq has a government willing to live at peace with its people and with its neighbors. (clinton 1998b) the us president also elaborated on his administration’s strategy to curb saddam hussein’s weapons program. in principle, this strategy constituted the us policy towards iraq until 2003, when the george w. bush administration authorized the invasion of iraq. in bill clinton’s speech, the elements constituting his strategy were the following: • maintaining a strong us military presence in the region and readiness to use this force again in iraq • maintaining a no-fly zone in the northern and southern regions of iraq near the kuwaiti border • continuing the oil-for-food program and sanctions against saddam’s regime • enforcing pressure for the return of unscom and international atomic energy agency (iaea) to iraq to pursue their mandates however, the points mentioned in clinton’s speech were contested internationally. to be understood, the bombing of iraq can be placed in its historical context and then in the specific context of russia-us relations. at the international level, the russian federation, along with china and france, had called for an end to the oil embargo against iraq (gellman 1998). these governments also criticized the unscom mechanism, which was a key aspect of bill clinton’s discourse about iraq. this special commission was formed in 1991 to handle the case of iraq at the united nations. however, the performance of this commission and particularly its australian chairman, richard butler, became the target of criticism from russia and china. in retrospect, primakov noted the difficulties of working with the un commission from iraq’s standpoint: 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 in all fairness, it should be pointed out that while richard butler was head of unscom—a time when the iraqis were demanding that it should not be allowed to inspect saddam’s palaces or replace members of its team, and so on—the commission was not impartial and was acting outside its remit. (primakov 2009, 318) in this respect, the us government’s military campaign did not enjoy the support which president clinton had stressed in his remarks. on december 17, president jiang zemin of china sent a message to president bill clinton urging him to consider a “halt to military action against iraq,” noting that this attack would destabilize the persian gulf (miis 1998). zemin’s response was consistent with that of the chinese foreign ministry, which had condemned the bombings “as a violation of the un charter and the principles of international law” (miis 1998). in a more subtle manner, the french also criticized the us-british military campaign. on december 17, hubert vedrine, the french foreign minister, said that his government was “not convinced” that the military campaign would bring about tangible positive effects but concluded that the iraqi president was to blame for the escalations (miis 1998). similarly, some non-aligned governments such as india, pakistan, south africa, malaysia, vietnam, and indonesia criticized the use of force and demanded a halt in military strikes to allow for diplomatic solutions (miis 1998). at the same time, the kremlin’s official reaction is of particular interest. in this connection, boris yeltsin asked the us and uk to “put an immediate end to the military actions, show restraint and prudence, and not allow a further escalation of the conflict” (miis 1998). earlier, yeltsin had asserted that the bombings violated the un charter, and his position was in line with that of the new foreign minister, igor ivanov, who similarly insisted that the us air strikes must stop. one should note that russia’s disagreement with military action had started well before the us-british campaign. in the security council meeting of december 16, which was held specifically to deal with this issue, the representative of the russian federation expressed russia’s position clearly. the security council press release (sc/6611) summarizes this position: the representative of the russian federation asked what right had the united states and the united kingdom to justify the use of force to enforce council resolutions or mandates; no one could act independently on behalf of the united nations or assume the functions of a world policeman. while there were problems between iraq and unscom, the current crisis was artificially created. the executive chairman of unscom, richard butler, had presented a distorted picture of what was taking place in the country. (un 1998) at that time, russia’s chief representative at the un was sergei lavrov, who had worked since 1994 to present a more assertive russian foreign policy. however, his anti-unscom position was rooted in the consensus among the russian diplomats, some of whom had been working closely with the iraqis since the soviet times. on the other hand, richard butler had been appointed chairman of the special commission a year earlier in 1997 and had already received poor assessments from the un secretary-general kofi annan. while butler was convinced and often stated publicly that the iraqi regime was in possession of undisclosed weapons of mass destruction (wmd), saddam’s top diplomat, tarik aziz, who had close relations with the russians, accused the organization of spying for the united states. on the diplomatic front, however, russia’s choice was clear. in this sense, russia was critical of the us-british military action from the outset and, along with china, regarded it as a violation of the un charter. accordingly, the kremlin recalled its ambassador from washington after the us president announced the decision to use force in iraq. even after the end of this campaign, boris yeltsin asserted that the air raids “crudely violated the un charter” and would only worsen the weapons crisis in iraq (cns 1998). in this case, only 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 traditional allies supported the us-british bombing of iraq in december 1998, which was perhaps an early sign of a challenge to the us hegemony in the late 1990s. as stated previously, the crisis was also a twist in russia-us relations, which was set to persist in the next century. presidential diplomacy: clinton-yeltsin contacts declassified documents containing bill clinton’s telephone conversations and correspondence about the bombing of iraq show that he made several attempts to gain international support and, if possible, align world leaders with his military campaign. according to these documents, clinton contacted prince abdullah of saudi arabia, french president jacques chirac, israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu, british prime minister tony blair, president hosni mubarak of egypt, king hussein of jordan, and prime minister nawaz sharif of pakistan. in all these contacts, he reflected his administration’s view of the unfolding crisis of iraq within the context of regional issues, which concerned each of these governments. of these cases, the contact between bill clinton and boris yeltsin was exceedingly important. this can be inferred from the transcripts of letters and telephone conversations that indicate serious differences between the two presidents. the transcripts also demonstrate that, despite their differences, clinton and yeltsin tried to express their positions in a conducive manner, often emphasizing the value of bilateral relations. unlike western and middle eastern governments, the russian government traditionally had the benefit of closer relations with baghdad and moscow was potentially in a position to influence baghdad’s agenda. as stated earlier, though with some fluctuation, iraq was considered an ally of the soviet union in the middle east and, after the founding of the russian federation, moscow continued to work with saddam hussein on matters of mutual interest. in what follows, considering the above discussions, the study will approach the text and transcript of yeltsin-clinton communications about the case study. on november 23, 1998, bill clinton sent a message (through the us embassy in moscow) to boris yeltsin about the situation in iraq. in this letter, he emphasized the importance of international cooperation in forcing iraq to comply with its obligations and cooperate with un weapons inspectors. in doing so, he also claimed that saddam hussein was unreliable due to his previous actions and, using consensus-building language, insisted that “we must now concert our efforts to ensure iraq fulfills its obligations” because, according to clinton, “the coming weeks will provide a real test of saddam’s intentions” (nsc 1998, 29).6 it seems that clinton’s message served to clarify the us position on gaining the support or acknowledgement of the russian government and open the way for the use of military force in the event of saddam’s violation of un obligations. to do so, as discussed previously, clinton needed some support from russia, as conducting operations unilaterally without international consensus was not a favourable option for washington. a review of the records concerning iraq shows the emphasis of the us government on unscom and the iaea as instruments to pressure the ba’athist regime. on the other hand, the discourse of some other governments, including russia and china, indicates skepticism about the role of these organizations. in this context, the us president acknowledged boris yeltsin’s key role in exerting pressure on baghdad: 6 this author has taken the quotations used in this part of the article from the clinton presidential records used as an administrative marker by the william j. clinton presidential library staff. national security council and records management office. 1998. “declassified documents concerning iraq.” clinton digital library. accessed august 4, 2023. https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16192. 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 you have played a very important role in your communications with saddam. i hope you will send him a clear message about the importance of full disclosure and full compliance and the consequences if he does not. while i am ready to see if saddam lives up to his word this time, the united states remains prepared to act if saddam once again interferes with unscom’s ability to operate or refuse to disclose all information needed by unscom and the iaea. (nsc 1998, 29) boris yeltsin’s reply summarizes the russian government’s position regarding the iraq crisis. in his reply, while referring to russia’s diplomatic efforts to soften iraq’s positions, yeltsin sought a common framework to act: i would like to reaffirm that we continue exerting heavy pressure on baghdad to compel it to fulfill its obligations to fully restore cooperation with the un. with respect to your letter, we have once again addressed the iraqi leadership with an urgent request not to allow any backslides in the interaction with unscom. (nsc 1998, 79) however, being aware of the us intentions to intervene militarily, yeltsin also emphasized that none of the parties should “overdramatize” the situation and that a structure should be made in the security council to monitor iraq’s weapons programs (nsc 1998, 79). considering the records, russia preferred non-intervention in handling these developments. in this sense, diplomatic records may suggest that russia considered the security council holistically as a lever to prevent escalations and coordinate efforts in response to other international conflicts. what was similar in the yeltsin-clinton correspondence was the emphasis on maintaining russia-us relations and a joint and collective effort to control saddam’s weapons program. however, despite yeltsin’s diplomatic efforts and his warnings against the use of force in iraq, operation desert fox ultimately brought the crisis to a climax. this divergence called for renewed efforts to maintain bilateral relations. therefore, on december 30, 1998, clinton and yeltsin arranged a telephone conversation that focused predominantly on the us airstrikes and their impact on their two countries’ relations. according to the documents, the purpose of this contact was to “set a framework for bilateral contacts that will get the relationship on track after the iraq crisis” (nsc 1998, 36). prior to the telephone conversation, clinton’s advisers had briefed him on the important points to be made in that dialogue. accordingly, these points were sustaining the relationship, agenda for 1999, the economy (which was then supervised in russia by primakov as prime minister), and, most importantly, the issue of iraq, which involved more details (nsc 1998, 38). specifically, clinton was advised to clarify these points because they were important to both governments. among other things, the president was asked to acknowledge that recent events had seriously tested and strained russia-us relations. he was also to confirm that he had received yeltsin’s letter through russian foreign minister ivanov (who had held the role since september 11). according to the documents, the team of advisers had recommended that clinton emphasize maintaining relations to “ensure that u.s. and russia enter next century as partners” (nsc 1998, 38). the second point that clinton needed to make was the agenda for 1999. in the conversation, the us president was to emphasize three key issues for 1999. these issues were “getting russian economy back on track, stemming proliferation and strengthening arms control via start ii and start iii” (nsc 1998, 38). one should note that all of these actions had been delayed due to international disagreements, including the iraq crisis. in this regard, the president was supposed to indicate the timing of the meetings between russian and american officials. the third point was related to the russian economy. to address this subject, which was particularly important to 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 yeltsin, clinton was advised to emphasize the us government’s support for the “russian economic reform program” in his telephone conversation. finally, and more importantly, the fourth point was about the bombing of iraq. here, the president was to reassert that the air strikes were only conducted as a last resort after giving “saddam every opportunity to keep his word on cooperation” (nsc 1998, 39). in order to justify this attack, clinton had been advised to assign the blame to saddam and his lack of commitment to the obligations of the un security council. accordingly, it was recommended that clinton insist that only saddam was responsible for the military response of the us. this was partly to support unscom and its chairman, richard butler, who had been criticized by the russians. in the same document, in case yeltsin said that “butler has abused his authority and must be replaced,” clinton was advised to defend butler and unscom by adding that the accusations against saddam were based on “unambiguous facts” (nsc 1998, 39–40). these behind-the-scenes recommendations, along with the points discussed openly in the media at that time, demonstrate that the administration regarded unscom, headed by butler, as a key player in the implementation of their strategy. regarding the iraqi crisis, clinton was to acknowledge the deep differences between russia and the united states and remind his russian counterpart that the relations between the two nations were too important strategically to be overshadowed by saddam hussein’s adventurism. in anticipation of yeltsin’s complaints that the us government had not tried hard enough to find a political solution or had not consulted with the kremlin in advance, clinton was advised to say two things. first, he needed to stress that the us had waited weeks before the decision to launch the airstrikes and, second, insist that secrecy was necessary to protect the us forces in the region and avoid giving saddam the opportunity to “disperse his forces and equipment.” therefore, the us team had made a list of the points to be made in the telephone conversation. additionally, they had anticipated yeltsin’s complaints and recommended the appropriate response to them (nsc 1998, 38–40). in the telephone conversation recorded on december 30, yeltsin indicated the implications of the us-british attack for the future of relations between russia and the united states. in this regard, he asserted that what was at stake were indeed the relations with the us, as the impact of the bombings could go beyond iraq and saddam hussein (nsc 1998, 72). yeltsin’s words suggest that, historically, the bombing of iraq had presented yet another challenging turn in russia-us diplomacy to such an extent that it could change the extent of bilateral relations. in the phone conversation, yeltsin insisted on the same point that he had made in his message to clinton. once again, he put emphasis on finding a multilateral solution within the security council framework. in his talk, the russian president stressed “unity of action” and “joint and agreed action” in the future. since the iraq crisis had pushed the us administration toward arbitrary measures, emphasizing joint action through the un mechanisms was, in yeltsin’s view, the best way to avoid further unilateralism. the russian president indicated that he attached particular importance to the quality of russia-us cooperation, not least because he himself had tried hard to form constructive relations with bill clinton. although by that time, russia had begun to adopt a more assertive foreign policy, yeltsin still saw cooperation with the united states as something necessary in the revival of the russian economy and the return of russia to the world stage. consequently, yeltsin indicated that russia was willing to disregard this controversial act of the united states. referring to his consultations with primakov regarding the crisis in iraq, he concluded that “we have to turn what has not been the best page in russian-u.s. relationships” (nsc 1998, 73). 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 however, yeltsin’s talk went beyond the question of iraq. it was important for the kremlin to restore relations to a level where russia-us economic and security cooperation could continue smoothly based on previous agreements. yeltsin briefly mentioned the negotiations with the international monetary fund and the long-expected support from the us government. one should note that, at the same time, the close negotiations (from 1997 to 1999) between primakov and secretary of state madeleine albright served as a background to yeltsin-clinton communications. while the focus of these negotiations was often russia’s economic hardships, on many occasions, security issues and particularly the nato issue overshadowed the negotiations. in this context, yeltsin raised the question of “rapid transition from start ii to start iii.” at that point, russia-us strategic goals had been interrupted due to nato enlargement, the balkan crisis and the us military action in iraq. hence, yeltsin and primakov were not able to advance these security agreements as an anti-american atmosphere had formed in the russian parliament. in sum, yeltsin’s words were indicative of a crisis in bilateral relations that overshadowed his foreign policy achievements. nevertheless, regarding start iii, yeltsin reassured clinton that he had at least made the effort: “i, myself, and primakov, did everything we could to assure prompt and early ratification of the agreement. you are fully aware of that. regrettably, at this point in time, prospects for passing this agreement have deteriorated” (nsc 1998, 73). this telephone conversation was recorded in late december as both men looked ahead to 1999. they wanted to leave a positive foreign policy legacy in the final year of the century. for this reason, yeltsin ended his speech in the following way: “1999 will be a very important year in terms of the development of the russian-u.s. relationship. in the foundation underneath that relationship, we must leave behind a very good inheritance.” historically, yeltsin’s optimism may seem ironic and naïve. precisely a year later, in december 1999, he announced his resignation six months early to improve the election chances of his chosen successor. yeltsin left a mixed legacy in foreign policy, and his successor, vladimir putin, steered the russian federation towards a different direction both domestically and externally. however, on another level, clinton’s utterances were also worthy of attention. his points were based on the recommendations of the white house advisory team. like yeltsin, clinton was aware of the significance of relations, and he therefore endorsed bilateral achievements. as mentioned above, clinton addressed the question of iraq, the agenda for 1999, and the russian economy. regarding the iraq crisis, he reasserted that his administration took military action out of necessity and that he did not want this crisis to hamper bilateral relations. he reminded yeltsin that in march, october, and november 1998, he had called off the attacks in the hope that the crisis could be resolved through diplomacy. clinton also stated that the possibility of further military conflicts still existed due to the retaliatory acts that iraq was showing against coalition aircraft in the no-fly zone (nsc 1998, 80). turning to the agenda for 1999, he indicated that the us support for russia’s negotiations with the imf depended on progress in the ratification of start ii and the results of economic reforms that the primakov government had promised. this subject was important because the russian government felt an urgent need to attract foreign investment. in short, strengthening ties with the united states was of great value to boris yeltsin, even though he encountered pressure on the home front for being too close to the west. that being said, both men emphasized their resolve and initiative to overcome obstacles. in other words, the significance of russia-us relations was the underlying theme of the yeltsin-clinton conversation. however, despite their efforts to advance friendly and conciliatory actions, the iraq crisis dealt yet another 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 blow to these relations, with intermittent courses of cooperation and conflict that continued into the twenty-first century. conclusion the demise of the soviet union created many uncertainties and ushered in a new level of diplomacy and engagement. this unusual situation led to extensive diplomatic efforts to maintain old allies and strengthen relations with newly established governments in the 1990s. in such a framework, the current study approached the above-mentioned aspects of russian-american presidential diplomacy in the post-soviet world order. in june 1992, at the beginning of this trajectory, the president of a free and democratic russia stood before the american lawmakers in congress and invited all americans to partnership and friendship that was meant to continue into the twenty-first century. towards the end of this chastening trajectory, in december 1998, both yeltsin and clinton sought to maintain what had remained of their achievements. in this case, the review of yeltsin-clinton contacts demonstrates that, while the iraq crisis was yet another major setback in russia-us relations, both presidents attempted to continue their cooperation with a sense of respect and transparency that reflected each side’s national priorities. in other words, they both tried to arrange productive talks to maintain the relations which they had formed despite pressure and criticism from within. this was more relevant in the case of yeltsin, who had grappled with a multitude of domestic challenges. the question of iraq may also highlight yeltsin’s strategy to control the perceived unilateralism of the clinton administration in favour of a multilateral structure. the emphasis that the russians put on the un security council was perhaps linked to their evolving foreign policy strategy at that time, one which gave prominence to multilateralism and non-intervention. internationally, the clinton administration employed the same mechanisms to legitimize the military campaign against iraq. in this case, the yeltsin-clinton correspondence shows the importance of foreign investment, financial aid, and imf support for russia, which clinton’s advisers saw as an instrument to influence the kremlin’s policies. while the russians could communicate their demands to the iraqi regime directly, and often did at the request of americans, washington’s main instrument was unscom, which had attracted a great deal of criticism. on the other hand, yeltsin’s communications with saddam had not brought the intended results, and this was indicative of the disappointment that both presidents felt with diplomacy. on a larger scale, the international reactions to the us-british air raids also demonstrated that the us hegemony was seriously challenged, but not in a way that russia could exploit to resolve the problem of iraq. in this way, the iraq crisis of 1998 can be considered as one of the early signs of the next order to come. the records show that the united states only received support from its traditional allies, while a considerable number of governments came out against the use of military force. this being said, the above discussions reveal only one point of friction in russia-us relations. this is particularly true when these relations are considered in the broad context of challenges which preceded or coincided with this case, including the question of nato enlargement, the balkan crisis, and the growing conflict of interest in eastern europe, the caucasus, and central asia. in a narrower sense, what makes the december 1998 bombing of iraq important is the fact that it was one of the last causes for direct presidential diplomacy, less than a year before yeltsin’s presidency came to an abrupt end. 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 references brzezinski, zbigniew. 1997. the grand chessboard: american primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. basic books. clinton, bill. 1998a. “transcript of president clinton’s speech announcing the attack.” cnn, december 16, 1998. accessed july 8, 2025. http://edition.cnn.com/allpolitics/stories/1998/12/16/transcripts/clinton.html clinton, bill. 1998b. “transcript of president clinton’s speech announcing the end of operation desert fox. the white house, december 19, 1998. accessed july 8, 2025. https://clintonwhitehouse5.archives.gov/wh/new/html/19981219-2655.html cns (james martin center for nonproliferation studies). 1998. “international reactions to us strikes on iraq.” december 17, 1998. accessed july 8, 2025. https://nonproliferation.org/international-reactions-to-us-strikes-on-iraq/. desai, padma. 1995. “russian privatization: a comparative perspective.” harriman review 8 (3): 1-34. https://www.columbia.edu/~pd5/privatization.pdf. ————. 2000. “why did the ruble collapse in august 1998?” american economic review 90 (2): 48–52. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.48. delong, marek. 2020. “the concept of russian federation foreign and security policy by eugene primakov.” internal security 12 (1): 307–318. accessed july 8, 2025. https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1375016. donaldson, robert h. 1999. “boris yeltsin’s foreign policy legacy.” tulsa journal of comparative and international law, 7 (2): 285–326. https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=tjcil. felkay, andrew. 2002. yeltsin’s russia and the west. praeger. freedman, robert o. 2001. “russian policy toward the middle east: the yeltsin legacy and the putin challenge.” middle east journal 55 (1): 58–90. accessed july 8, 2025. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329582. fukuyama, francis. 1980. the soviet union and iraq since 1968. rand corporation. gellman, barton. 1998. “iraq inspections, embargo in danger at u.n. council.” the washington post, december 22, 1998. accessed june 25, 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/12/22/iraq-inspections-embargoin-danger-at-un-council/beb5edb0-5e68-4b15-b6b8-1bd9f28003de/?ismobile=. helfont, samuel. 2022. “from iraq to ukraine: a new perspective on the russian-western confrontation.” war on the rocks, may 16, 2022. accessed july 8, 2025. https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/from-iraq-to-ukraine-a-new-perspective-on-therussian-western-confrontation/. huntington, samuel p. 1993. “why international primacy matters.” international security 17 (4): 68-83. http://edition.cnn.com/allpolitics/stories/1998/12/16/transcripts/clinton.html https://clintonwhitehouse5.archives.gov/wh/new/html/19981219-2655.html https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329582 64 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 ignatius, david. 2003. “the cia and the coup that wasn't.” washington post, may 16, 2003. accessed june 25, 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/05/16/the-cia-and-the-coup-thatwasnt/0abfb8fa-61e9-4159-a885-89b8c476b188/ miis (middlebury institute of international studies at monterey). 1998. “international reactions to us strikes on iraq.” december 17, 1998. accessed july 8, 2025. https://nonproliferation.org/international-reactions-to-us-strikes-on-iraq/. national security council and records management office. 1998. “declassified documents concerning iraq.” clinton digital library. accessed august 4, 2023. https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16192. nizamedden, talal. 1999. russia and the middle east. st. martin's. orlova, victoria v. 2020. “us–russia relations in the last 30 years: from a rapprochement to a meltdown.” in 30 years since the fall of the berlin wall, edited by alexander akimov and gennadi kazakevitch, 117–138. palgrave macmillan. parker, david. 2019. us foreign policy towards russia in the post-cold war era: ideational legacies and institutionalized conflict and co-operation. routledge. primakov, yevgeny. 2009. russia and the arabs: behind the scenes in the middle east from the cold war to the present. basic books. rumer, eugene. 2000. dangerous drift: russia’s middle east policy. washington institute for near east policy. ———. 2019. the primakov (not gerasimov) doctrine in action. carnegie endowment for international peace. united nations. 1998. “security council meets to discuss military strikes against iraq; some members challenge use of force without council consent.” security council press release, sc/6611. new york, december 16, 1998. accessed june 25, 2025. https://press.un.org/en/1998/19981216.sc6611.html. shaffer, brenda. 2001. partners in need: the strategic relationship of russia and iran. washington institute for near east policy. simha, rakesh krishnan. 2015. “primakov: the man who created multipolarity.” russia beyond, june 27, 2015. accessed june 25, 2025. https://www.rbth.com/blogs/2015/06/27/primakov_the_man_who_created_multipolarity_ 43919. specter, michael. 1998. “yeltsin says clinton could blunder into a world war.” the new york times, february 5, 1998. accessed june 25, 2025. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/020598iraq-russia.html. talbott, strobe. 2007. the russia hand: a memoir of presidential diplomacy. random house. vassiliev, alexei. 1993. russian policy in the middle east: from messianism to pragmatism. ithaca press. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/05/16/the-cia-and-the-coup-that-wasnt/0abfb8fa-61e9-4159-a885-89b8c476b188/ https://nonproliferation.org/international-reactions-to-us-strikes-on-iraq/ https://press.un.org/en/1998/19981216.sc6611.html 65 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 williams, daniel. 1998. “yeltsin says bombing iraq might bring ‘world war’.” the washington post, february 5, 1998. accessed june 25, 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/02/05/yeltsin-says-bombing-iraqmight-bring-world-war/0807cf31-417e-44e8-882e-bbc7c7f65192/. yeltsin, boris. 1992. “address to u.s. congress.” june 18, 1992. accessed june 25, 2025. http://www.speeches-usa.com/transcripts/047_yeltsin.html. zlobin, nikolai. 2004. “iraq in the context of post-soviet foreign policy.” mediterranean quarterly 15 (2): 83-102. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/168487. http://www.speeches-usa.com/transcripts/047_yeltsin.html 66 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(1) 2025: 50-66 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 explaining change in citizens’ preferences about intergovernmental responsibilities during the covid-19 crisis: the case of spain césar colino, spanish national distance-learning university (uned) madrid, orcid: 0000-0002-9352-705x1 gibrán cruz-martínez, complutense university of madrid, madrid, orcid: 0000-0002-4583-29142 eloísa del pino, institute of public goods and policies, csic, madrid, orcid: 0000-0001-5497-13023 jorge hernández-moreno, institute of public goods and policies, csic, madrid, orcid: 0000-0002-2085-12034 abstract the covid-19 pandemic brought about some extraordinary shifts in citizens’ preferences about intergovernmental responsibilities in several federal states and has therefore provided an especially interesting context to contribute to the ongoing debate about the scope, direction, and determinants of attitudinal change in citizens’ preferences in situations of protracted crisis. although there is evidence of the role of partisanship and some other factors during normal times, the importance that partisanship may have with respect to other factors in accounting for changes in citizens’ preferences during these crises still needs to be established. does partisanship account for attitudinal changes during a crisis, or do citizens have other predispositions, such as individual core beliefs about federalism, perceptions of government performance, or trust in government, which could account for the scope and direction of these changes? the article relies on an original national survey of 7,175 respondents collected during the transition from the first to the second wave of the pandemic in spain and examines the shift in citizens’ preferences in three policy domains: healthcare, nursing homes, lockdown declaration and management. it finds that partisanship and attribution of responsibility are relevant to explaining shifts in preferences for intergovernmental responsibilities, whereas, contrary to expectations, individual beliefs about autonomism are not significant. the authors’ findings contribute to the broader literature on the configuration of public preferences for multilevel governments and to understanding blame management and accountability during crisis situations in federal democracies. 1 césar colino is an associate professor at the department of political science and public administration at the spanish national distance-learning university (uned) in madrid 2 gibrán cruz-martínez is an assistant professor at the department of political science and public administration at complutense university of madrid, spain (corresponding author) 3 eloísa del pino is a senior research fellow at the institute of public goods and policies (csic) in madrid, spain 4 jorge hernández-moreno is a researcher at the institute of public goods and policies (csic) in madrid, spain. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9352-705x https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4583-2914 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5497-1302 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2085-1203 2 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 1. introduction the flourishing observational and experimental survey research undertaken during the pandemic indicates some extraordinary shifts in preferences among citizens concerning intergovernmental responsibilities in federal states at different phases of the pandemic. for example, a large amount of criticism of the federal system in germany at the start of the pandemic led to an increase in citizens’ support for strengthened powers for the federal government, which dropped sharply after a few weeks, to rise again during the second wave of the pandemic (eckhard and lenz 2020; juhl et al. 2022). in the us, an apparent shift in preferences for federal responsibility due to the pandemic reveals a complete reversal in the traditional preferences for federal responsibility among republicans and democrats (dinan and heckelman 2020; jacobs 2021; schildkraut, berry, and glaser 2020). in spain, the beginning of the pandemic apparently produced increased support for the central government (cg), which was preferred to the regional government by 73 percent of citizens, but this figure declined to 56 percent by may 2020 (barbet porta 2022; cis 2020a, 2020b, 2020c; white et al. 2021). in september 2020, the same national survey—with a slightly altered wording for the relevant question—found that collaboration between central and regional governments was preferred by 72 percent of respondents, leaving the central government acting alone with only 16 percent of support and the regional governments acting alone with only 5 percent. changes in preferences for policy functions in a multilevel context during a prolonged crisis have been insufficiently studied. this is a very relevant issue for the better understanding of accountability in democratic and federal systems and the extent to which crises complicate this further. crises tend to reinforce multilevel system features, such as collaboration or conflict between federal and subnational governments, intergovernmental blame games or buck-passing, competition, outright bickering or open confrontation, and even defiance. in this context, citizens can take refuge in heuristics or partisan cues to interpret what is happening and structure their beliefs on who should do what in the territorial system. however, other studies lead us to believe that during a crisis, other factors might gain greater weight in opinion formation due to the exceptional nature of the situation, manifested in the issue’s high salience, high individual anxiety, and highly available policy information, which allows partisan cues to be ignored. with increased media attention, debates in the public sphere focus on what should be done and on who should lead responses to the crisis but also on more specific key issues, such as who should be managing different crisis-related policies (e.g. lockdowns, curfews, and re-openings), who should protect older adults in nursing homes, and who should be guaranteeing healthcare for all citizens (blackburn et al. 2023; congleton 2021; del pino et al. 2021; vicentini and galanti 2021). finally, other individual factors, such as deeprooted beliefs in government, trust in a specific level of government, or contextual factors, such as polarization, the timing of the measures, or trust in national leaders, have been found to explain the attitudes of the general public towards policy responsibilities and government performance (altiparmakis et al. 2021). this pandemic has thus provided an especially interesting context to contribute to the ongoing debate about the scope, direction, and determinants of attitudinal change in citizens towards government responsibilities in decentralized systems. this research seeks to establish the importance of partisanship with respect to other factors in accounting for this change of preference during the crisis. does partisanship explain the changes in citizens’ preferences, or do citizens have other predispositions, such as individual core beliefs about federalism or trust in government, which might have been activated during the pandemic in response to elite discourses or expert or media 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 information? does the evaluation of government policies and growing satisfaction or dissatisfaction affect citizens’ preferences, or is this evaluation wholly determined by partisan cues and motivated reasoning? spain is a decentralized country which offers us a persuasive case for investigating which level of government citizens believe should manage the crisis and to what extent these preferences have changed during the pandemic. the spanish model of federalism, known as estado autonómico, has several unique features (colino 2020; del pino and colino 2024). the constitution outlines only broad principles such as autonomy and unity, leaving the specific power distribution vague but safeguarded by the constitutional court. it has evolved into a highly decentralized system concerning public spending and policies, although the central government maintains significant control through shared powers and revenues. the system exhibits both centrifugal forces, encouraging regional differentiation and centripetal forces, thus promoting uniformity. its political dynamics are influenced by strong nationalist movements in specific regions, which have led to recognized asymmetries and impacted the system’s evolution. however, the system has transitioned from an asymmetrical to a symmetrical cooperative model without formal constitutional amendments through political agreements, judicial interpretations, and updates to regional statutes. concurrently, spain has constructed a modern welfare state, with regional and local governments now managing over half of the public expenditures and employing 75 percent of public employees. since 2002, healthcare governance in spain has been decentralized, giving power to the 17 regional governments, which now handle 92.5 percent of the country’s healthcare expenditure. the central government maintains regulatory oversight, setting the fundamental entitlements, organization, and financing of the national health system (nhs), while the autonomous communities manage the system’s operation. coordination between these levels is facilitated by an intergovernmental body, the inter-territorial council of the nhs, comprising central and regional health ministers (mattei and del pino 2021). spain was one of the countries most severely affected by the covid-19 health crisis, which claimed many victims. it witnessed different political constellations and degrees of intergovernmental agreements and conflict in response to the crisis during the pandemic’s various phases (hernándezmoreno and harguindeguy, 2024; hernández-moreno, pereira-puga, and cruz-martínez 2023; navarro and velasco 2022; pereira-puga, hernández-moreno, and cruz-martínez 2023). as a relevant contextual element, spaniards have experienced increasing polarization of political attitudes in general, which also influenced their attitude towards crisis management in several phases of the health crisis. several hypotheses are tested, which aim to establish the scope and determinants of the changes in citizen’s preferences. an original national representative web-based survey of 7,175 respondents was used. the dependent variable is the change in preferences for the level of government which should be responsible for managing the covid-19 pandemic in three policy domains: healthcare, nursing homes, lockdown declaration and management. it is found that during the transition from the first to the second wave of the pandemic, only a small share of the population changed their minds about government responsibilities (i.e., most people did not change their opinion on preferred governmental responsibility during the initial period of very serious public health emergency). partisanship and trust in institutions matter, but other individual factors also become more critical, displacing the importance of partisanship, depending on the policy initiative. 4 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 this study contributes to the broader literature on how the public assigns preference for policy responsibility to various government levels (del pino and van ryzin 2013; schneider, jacoby, and lewis 2011). it is also valuable for studying democratic accountability and understanding how citizens in federal democracies can hold their governments accountable. it helps us understand under what conditions citizens will simply seek refuge in heuristics or partisan cues to make sense of what is happening in the multilevel political context, during a crisis where politicians and governments will typically frame issues of policy as questions of federal governance and will play blame games to avoid accountability for bad policy results. the article is organized as follows: in the next section, the existing literature on changing preferences about government responsibility in normal and crisis times and the explanatory factors which have been identified are reviewed. then, some theoretical expectations for the spanish case are presented, followed by a description of the data collected and the empirical strategy applied. after introducing the statistical analysis, the results and the implications of this research are discussed, suggesting some future research avenues. 2. explaining public preferences regarding intergovernmental responsibility in normal times and crises the literature provides three contrasting, inconclusive sets of expectations about the factors behind citizens’ preferences about government responsibility and how they change in normal times and during crises (schneider and jacoby 2011, 2013; león, jurado, and garmendia-madariaga 2018). the first view contends that preferences are often driven by partisanship and motivated reasoning (kunda 1990). party positions move opinions, leading citizens to become more supportive of their own party’s policy position (slothuus and bisgaard 2020; viskupic and wiltse 2023). partisanship could act as a “judgmental shortcut, efficient ways to organize and simplify political choices” (sniderman, brody, and tetlock 1991, 19). regarding government-level preferences in the us, for example, democrats become more supportive of decentralization when the republicans control the federal government (wolak 2016), which means that support for decentralization tends to decrease when an individual’s party is in office at the central level and increases when the other party governs. when attributing blame and responsibility across territorial levels of government, citizens will assign more blame to the state or regional government when it is controlled by the opposing party and will unevenly punish regional officeholders for unpopular federal or central presidents and hold their own party and opposing parties to different standards of performance (brown 2010). individuals will ignore damaging information when it challenges an individual’s partisan priors (druckman, peterson, and slothuus 2013). motivated reasoning based on partisan identities and government preferences influences individuals’ assessment of information about governmental performance and evidence of strength (james and van ryzin 2017; torcal and mota 2013). according to these studies, few people can be motivated to incorporate knowledge of policies or federal division of power into their judgements. instead, they rely on easy and ready heuristics to inform their evaluations. partisan identification also becomes stronger and less ambivalent under polarized conditions, leading to stronger party cue effects and increased motivated reasoning. polarized environments fundamentally change how citizens make decisions by intensifying the impact of party endorsements on opinions and 5 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 decreasing the impact of substantive information on opinions (druckman and lupia 2016; druckman, peterson, and slothuus 2013). much of the research that appeared during the pandemic supports the idea that the effect of partisanship can be even more pronounced in times of crisis in federal countries (glaser, berry, and schildkraut 2023; goidel et al. 2024; jacobs 2021; lobera, santana, and gross 2024; snow and evans 2024; vandusky-allen et al. 2022). rodriguez et al. (2020) found consistent evidence of partisan divergence in pandemic response policy preferences across the first six months of the crisis: republicans supported national control measures, whereas democrats supported welfare policies, and these interparty differences grew over time. milosh, van dijcke, and wright (2020) found only limited evidence that exposure or experience moderates these partisan differences. león and garmendia-madariaga (2020) observe a centralizing trend in opinion in spain, with partisanship exerting an apparent moderating effect. a second view has been developing in recent years, with many studies increasingly showing citizens as capable of reasoning without bias (arceneaux and vander wielen 2017) and presenting a more complex picture of the public and its ability to process information both heuristically and systematically (ciuk and yost 2016). given certain conditions, motivated partisan reasoning can be limited (groenendyk 2013). elite partisan influence and, therefore, support for governments or leaders and levels of government might be limited by individual factors and the perception of efficacy (arceneaux and vander wielen 2017; mullinix 2016), by emotions, such as anxiety and risk perception (albertson and kushner gadarian 2015), competition for policy information and arguments (bullock 2011), polarization (druckman, peterson, and slothuus 2013), as well as issue salience (ciuk and yost 2016). party cues do not inhibit thinking about policy, and people’s attitudes seem to be affected at least as much by information, reference groups, and cues from other party elites (bullock 2011; grofman and norrander 1990). in this line, some research has also studied how people evaluate government and allocate blame in normal times or crisis and whether a preference shift towards more centralization or decentralization occurs (arceneaux 2008; arceneaux and stein 2006). due to the high degree of risk perception, this research finds less partisan bias and more accuracy-based reasoning during a crisis than in normal times. many citizens, emotionally moved by the health crisis, engage in accuracy-based reasoning to inform and update their opinions, suppressing some of their predispositions and attributing blame that may contradict their usual partisan biases (atkeson and maestas 2012). finally, a third view has consistently argued that citizens have beliefs or values about the territorial system, the right amount of decentralization, and how the territorial division of powers should work. this expression of a federalist culture or set of beliefs has been called citizens’ “intuitive federalism” (schneider and jacoby 2013). wolak (2016) finds that these deeply rooted values or core beliefs can anchor individuals’ federalism and policy devolution preferences. these beliefs in federalism can inform reactions to policy debates, and thus make people less likely to rely on policy concerns and more likely to form preferences based on their beliefs about federalism (jacobs 2017; kam and mikos 2007; rendleman and rogowski 2024). this attitudinal configuration is not always manifested but can be activated in cases of crisis and amplified by elite and media discussions of system failures (kam and mikos 2007; pears and sydnor 2022). in sum, the second and third views generally contend that in extraordinary times, such as natural disasters or pandemics, the role of partisanship in preference formation and blame attribution diminishes, meaning that a non-partisan shift of preferences can be expected, 6 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 giving priority to other individual short-term predispositions or perceptions, deep-rooted beliefs, and contextual factors. information, especially from expert and non-partisan sources, can prompt citizens to overlook their party affiliation and change preferences or to assign blame in a more performance-based manner by freeing individuals from partisan biases on how they find information or by reinforcing their individual beliefs or predispositions. 3. toward a theory of citizen preference changes in the covid-19 pandemic this section proposes a set of testable propositions about the conditions under which citizens change their preferences about intergovernmental policy responsibilities during a pandemic like covid-19. it is reasonable to expect that some citizens would change their preferences over the course of the crisis. it is well known that in the early stages of a crisis, there is a rally-around-the-flag effect. public opinion and leaders momentarily set aside their ideological differences and political interests and support the government, although in the long run, the rally-around-the-flag effect diminishes (johansson and shehata 2021; kritzinger et al. 2021). the same literature suggests that after an initial alignment with the (central) government, citizens’ attitudes can change. as the crisis evolves, citizens will begin to evaluate the results of the various authorities’ responses to different policies and hold them accountable. from the literature on blame management, it is known that governments themselves change strategies during crises and use discursive or presentational strategies, such as scapegoating, spinning, or framing (blackburn et al. 2023; porumbescu et al. 2022), to claim credit from or shift blame to other levels of government. citizens’ attitudes react to these strategies, and therefore, their preferences may change over the course of the crisis. one can also expect a certain negativity bias. regardless of the government’s policy responses, any action by the authorities can be viewed critically, since a pandemic will bring with it a high degree of chaos typical of such crises, combined with death and personal suffering (flinders 2020). 3.1 the influence of partisanship on preferences in troubled waters, confusion will grow over the responsibilities and the adequacy of solutions. as the media will offer multiple perspectives on a health crisis, one can expect individuals to gravitate toward narratives expressing attitudes congruent with their existing personal predispositions. with increasing awareness of coordination failures, blame games, and the resulting lack of clarity about governmental performance, individuals’ sources for opinion formation about responsibility will tend to be based increasingly on partisan cues rather than on performance evaluations, federalist or autonomist beliefs, or feelings of trust in the different levels of government (biddle, gray, and mcallister 2024). the likely change in individuals’ preferences will then be shaped by the party control of different governments and by their preferred parties’ cues through media discourse. the party which controls the government of the region in which an individual lives will determine whether their preferences shift towards greater centralization. it is argued that partisanship could act as a heuristic that simplifies complex decisions during a crisis, leading to a preference for a certain government level. the capabilities of party leaders are essential to shifting public citizens’ preferences on questions of central versus regional authority. jacobs (2021) has shown how shifting rhetoric and strategic framing led citizens to favour different levels of government during 7 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 the pandemic. moreover, in polarized systems, citizens are more sensitive to public officials or partisan cues across party lines (kincaid and leckrone 2020). h1: partisanship and party positions will determine the shift in citizens’ preferences towards centralized or decentralized pandemic management. h1a: right-wing voters (pp and vox5) will support further decentralization of responsibility, regardless of their individual preference for autonomism or satisfaction with their government’s performance. h1b: left-wing voters (psoe and up6) will support the further centralization of responsibility towards the central government regardless of their regional incumbent or satisfaction with their government. h1c: when a voter’s party is in office at the regional level, there will be an intergovernmental shift in preferences towards decentralization. 3.2 satisfaction with performance and citizens’ government responsibility preferences citizens are sometimes partially able to set aside their partisan biases. due to the high issue salience of the covid-19 pandemic, it is expected that most people will be sophisticated enough to process increasing information (arceneaux and vander wielen 2017). citizens in spain were continuously exposed to comparative information on covid-19 cases by country and region. this informed their views on government effectiveness, making it easier for them to evaluate the performance of different levels of government and ultimately conditioned their preferences. following ciuk and yost (2016), it is expected that during the health crisis, the increased issue salience that the pandemic generated motivated people to go beyond heuristics and engage in the systematic processing of policy-relevant information. that means that we can expect citizens to evaluate and credibly process information in the media, combined with a need to assess threatening events fully and accurately (albertson and kushner gadarian 2015; white et al. 2021). it is expected that only the people who are satisfied with the government’s management performance and consider it effective will maintain their preferences. in contrast, the authors expect that dissatisfaction with the management of the pandemic could lead citizens to change their preferences or produce a certain desire for change (arceneaux and vander wielen 2017; mullinix 2016). h2. the more satisfied citizens are with the management of a policy initiative, the less likely they are to want another level of government to perform this task. 3.3 autonomist beliefs, the crisis and preferences about government responsibilities as recent studies by wolak (2016) and rendleman and rogowski (2024) show, individuals with stronger federalist or autonomist values, as measured by their preference for subnational power over national power, are more likely to support policy devolution across various policy areas. federalist or autonomist values, such as beliefs about the appropriate balance of power between national and regional governments, play a crucial 5 pp stands for partido popular (popular party). it is the main center-right party in spain and the leader of the opposition to the current government. vox is a populist radical right party and the third-largest political force, ranking just below pp. 6 psoe stands for partido socialista obrero español (spanish socialist workers' party). it is the main center-left party in spain and the leader of the coalition government with unidas podemos (up)—a coalition of left-wing parties in its own right. 8 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 role in shaping individuals’ preferences towards policy devolution. such beliefs can shape attitudes toward various policy areas, including fiscal management, education, healthcare, and cultural policies. this support for shifting authority from the national level to subnational levels is influenced by an individual’s core beliefs about the role of government at different levels. for example, according to the characteristics of different federations, these core beliefs or values could derive from an individual’s support for historical states’ rights, limited government, subsidiarity, or the identification with a minority nation within a federal multinational state. these deeply rooted orientations are anchored in a substantive desire for smaller, closer government or ethnonational selfgovernment at the subnational level and are not merely a reflection of short-term partisan interests or considerations. they form a principled basis for reasoning about federalism. people’s preferences for devolution are thus responsive to the existing balance of power, demonstrating a nuanced understanding of federalism that goes beyond partisan heuristics. individuals with federalist and autonomist beliefs are more likely to advocate for policy devolution, seeking to shift authority from the national level to subnational levels and guiding people to consider the alignment between the structure of government and their broader values. as wolak and kelleher palus (2010) have also pointed out, these autonomist beliefs can intensify during periods of crisis, such as the covid-19 pandemic, when the effectiveness of local responses becomes more visible and relevant to citizens and not just in partisan matters. the covid-19 crisis and the high media attention may have also triggered federalist and autonomist beliefs, which have been described as citizens’ intuitive federalism. strong autonomist beliefs would push citizens towards greater support for decentralization or the sharing of responsibilities between different levels of government in the management of the pandemic. however, it is also known that citizens’ preferences for one or another government level may not necessarily be uniform across different policies aimed at combating the pandemic (connolly et al. 2020). citizens’ views about the assignment of policy responsibilities may vary by policy sector and even within a sector (thompson and elling 1999). additionally, citizens frequently exhibit contradictory attitudes, generally favouring federalism and decentralization yet advocating for centralization in numerous policy areas (jedwab and kincaid 2018). citizens also show an inability to assign responsibility correctly (kennedy, sayers, and 2022). some differences in preferences are then expected among areas, mostly consistent with the constitutional distribution of power. these deep-rooted preferences are expected to be pretty consistent with each other and, therefore, to vary both according to the pandemic policy area and to its different phases, adapting to the circumstances as people perceive them to change. given the extent of media discussion during a crisis, people are expected to become more sophisticated at pinpointing the responsible levels of government and at assigning to each what they do and what they should do. h3. the stronger an individual’s autonomist beliefs, the greater the shifts in support towards subnational or shared responsibilities, with variations according to the type of pandemic policies 3.4 attribution of responsibility and changes of preferences even if in some disasters or crises there is no culprit, citizens end up blaming the government, which they hold responsible for managing the crisis (skarżyńska, urbańska, and radkiewicz 2021). this is especially true when crises become protracted 9 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 (arceneaux and stein 2006). a protracted crisis is characterized by a prolonged period of instability involving complex and multifaceted challenges which are difficult to solve, e.g., the covid-19 crisis (boin 2024; boin and ‘t hart 2022; boin, mcconnell, and ‘t hart2021; boin and rhinard 2023). in fast-burning crises or in their early moments, there is less opportunity to find someone to blame. citizens and even the opposition need time to understand the magnitude of the crisis and for reasons of loyalty, solidarity, or in order not to hinder efforts to end the crisis, they avoid looking for culprits at first. however, in a protracted crisis, the severity of the situation as well as the political and media dynamics may “significantly alter levels of political support for public officeholders and public policies” (boin, ‘t hart, and mcconnell 2009, 83) even if experienced only vicariously through media coverage (atkeson and maestas 2012). a decentralized political system provides the opportunity for a change of preferences from one level to another (heinkelmann-wild et al. 2020), so the following is expected: h4. in a protracted crisis, there is a higher probability that an intergovernmental shift of preferences in the opposite direction of the level of government to which responsibility is attributed for the policy area will be observed. those attributing responsibility to the central government will shift their preferences towards decentralization and vice versa. from a longitudinal perspective, this hypothesis allows us to understand the evolution of citizens’ attitudes during the crisis. 3.5 control variables the authors considered both theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence in the selection of control variables for the multivariate analysis to ensure a comprehensive analysis. education, social class, and political variables are incorporated as control variables based on both their empirical relevance to the selected dependent variable and foundational theories in political science and sociology. theoretically, education is often linked to increased political awareness and cognitive skills, which enable individuals to understand and engage with complex governmental structures. this is aligned with theories suggesting that higher education levels equip individuals with the cognitive tools necessary to evaluate the benefits of centralization in policy implementation, particularly in nuanced or complex policy areas (dalton 2018). this theoretical perspective supports konisky’s (2011) empirical finding that individuals with higher levels of education tend to prefer centralization for certain policies. theoretical perspectives on fiscal federalism suggest that economic resources influence political preferences, including governance structures. higher-income groups with more at stake in terms of property and taxes can prefer decentralized government systems, which often allow more localized and potentially favourable fiscal policies (banzhaf and walsh 2008). this theoretical framework supports the inclusion of social class as a control variable in examining preferences for governmental decentralization. this aligns with thompson and elling’s (1999) findings that individuals from higher income brackets are more likely to support state and local governance. similarly, schneider, jacoby, and lewis (2011) contribute to this discussion by indicating that the unemployed and those facing economic vulnerability, prefer the national government’s capacity for mobilizing extensive resources during crises. beyond socioeconomic factors, political theories emphasizing trust and legitimacy argue that trust in governmental institutions fundamentally shapes citizens’ governance 10 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 preferences (wolak and kelleher palus 2010). this theoretical basis supports the inclusion of trust as a control variable, reinforced by blackburn et al.’s (2023) empirical finding that trust in government is a significant predictor of approval of pandemic governance. these theoretical frameworks provided a robust foundation for the selection of the control variables utilized, ensuring that our empirical investigation is grounded in a nuanced understanding of the political and social dynamics influencing preferences for governmental decentralization and centralization. 4. research design and measurement 4.1 data collection to examine these hypotheses, a representative sample of the spanish population was selected, and an original survey instrument was designed to assess the intergovernmental shift of preferences to manage the pandemic in three policy areas. the sample consisted of 7,175 respondents aged over 18, with a 99 percent confidence level and a 2 percent margin of error.7 the data was gathered by netquest (www.netquest.com) using a web-based survey with a nonprobability sampling approach and op-in panels between august 30 and september 23, 2020 (i.e., coinciding with the protracted period of the second wave of covid-19 in spain).8 the questionnaire took an average of 11 minutes to complete, which is similar to the median period for netquest questionnaires in spain (revilla 2017). netquest sent 39 rounds of invitations to their respondents’ panel, making sure to have national-level representative quotas for gender, education, and age. the response rate was 52.6 percent. the resulting sample has a similar demographic composition to the prestigious and extensive representative surveys conducted by the spanish centre for sociological research (cis) regarding gender, age, and education quotas. sample statistics and a translated version of the questionnaire for dependent and explanatory variables appear in tables a.7 and a.8 of appendix i. 4.2 dependent variable the dependent variables are binary variables measuring whether there was a centralizing or decentralizing intergovernmental shift in preference for the management of the lockdown, nursing homes, and healthcare. they were constructed from the following two survey questions: 1) imagine that today is march 1 – that is, at the beginning of the coronavirus crisis – and you are given the choice of which level of government should be primarily responsible for managing the following issues. which level of government would you have chosen on march 1? 2) if now – 5 months after the crisis began, and knowing what you know – you could choose again, which level of government should be primarily responsible for managing the coronavirus crisis? 7 each of the 17 autonomous communities (acs) has a representative sample for its population with a 95 percent confidence level and a 5 percent margin of error, except for the deliberate oversample of catalonia and the basque country (each case with 700 respondents). 8 a pre-test was launched on august 14–16, 2020, with a sample of 363 individuals. 11 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 the two questions were displayed in two checkbox grids, and respondents could choose from the central government, the autonomous community (acs) regional government, or shared responsibility between both levels. the binary variable is constructed first using a 5-point scale (2 to –2) with the following formula: 𝐷 = 𝑋𝑡1 − 𝑋𝑡2; d is the dependent variable, 𝑋𝑡1 refers to the preferred government level in march 2020 and 𝑋𝑡2 is the preferred government level at the time of completing the survey (september 2020). the central government is operationalized with a 1, both government levels with a 2, and regional government with a 3. once it was determined whether there was a shift of preferences towards centralized (2 or 1), no change (0), or decentralized (–1 or -2), the two binary variables were operationalized. table 1 shows the operationalization. table 1: operationalization of the dependent variable the change in preferences was thus measured with retrospective survey questions concerning the preferred government level to manage the crisis in early march, before the covid-19 outbreak. the cross-sectional survey data was transformed into longitudinal data to measure the change in preferences. although retrospectively measuring changes in preferences or attitudes is contentious due to memory bias and because prior preferences can be confounded with current ones, research validates the use of retrospective questions because of recall accuracy and its limited impact on the validity of research findings (hipp et al. 2020). when measuring attitude or preference changes, recall data yields similar results to longitudinal data (jaspers, lubbers, and de graaf 2009). moreover, the use of retrospective questions six months into the pandemic allowed respondents to be informed about their preferences, as the population tends to be more informed during prolonged crises. using recall data is also a normal practice in areas such as electoral studies. the pandemic generated a natural experiment of unparalleled proportions (bjørnskov and voigt 2022; rosen 2021). it would, therefore, be relevant to consider its potential impact on the shift in preferences for intergovernmental responsibilities and its determinants. logit models were conducted with and without controls to test the hypotheses. the first six models examine the reasons behind the shift in preferences towards centralization. if respondents shifted their preference towards centralization (e.g., from regional government in march to central government in september), their shift was coded as 1, while respondents with no change in preference or with a shift towards decentralization were coded 0. the last six models assess the same for respondents which displayed a shift in preferences towards decentralization. therefore, if respondents shifted their preference towards decentralization (e.g., from central government to shared responsibility), their table 1: operationalization of the dependent variable preferred level of government march september additive formula operationalisation interpretation regional (3) central (1) 3-1 2 centralized shift two levels up regional (3) shared (2) shared (2) central (1) 3-2 2-1 1 centralized shift one level up central (1) shared (2) regional (3) central (1) shared (2) regional (3) 1-1 2-2 3-3 0 no intergovernmental change of preference shared (2) central (1) regional (3) shared (2) 2-3 1-2 -1 decentralized shift one level down central (1) regional (3) 1-3 -2 decentralized shift two levels down 12 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 shifts were coded as 1, while respondents who did not change or who shifted preferences towards centralization were coded as 0. this construct allows the factors behind the shift in preferences towards centralized and decentralized government to be measured and tested separately for each policy area. 4.3 explanatory variables the first variable (to test h1) is partisanship, and it is operationalized using three dummy variables. the first indicator shows whether the respondent voted for any of the political parties in the central government. the second tests for the same but at the regional level. the third indicator assesses whether the respondent voted for either of the two main opposition parties in the central government (i.e., the right-wing parties of pp and vox). the second variable (to test h2) is satisfaction with the performance of the government managing the pandemic for each of the three policy areas. respondents were asked for their assessment using a 5-point likert scale: how do you assess the work the government has done concerning each of these three tasks? a 5-point likert scale from very good (5) to very bad (1) was used. the third variable (to test h3) is operationalized using a composite indicator between three kinds of structural attitudes towards the state’s territorial organization (autonomist beliefs). the questionnaire included three questions for this purpose. 1) a 10-point scale question on the degree of preferred centralization or decentralization for spain, where 0 represents “maximum centralization” and 10 represents “maximum decentralization.” 2) a 5-point likert scale on satisfaction with the creation and development of the current model of territorial organization in spain (distribution of competencies between 17 acs), where 1 is very low and 5 is very high. 3) a 5-point likert scale linz-moreno question, asking respondents to self-identify with an exclusive or dual territorial identity (1=only self-identified as spanish, 2– 4=different degrees of dual identity, 5=only self-identified as being from the ac). all three indicators were normalized and then assigned the same weight using an arithmetic mean to construct the composite indicator. the fourth variable (to test h4) assesses the impact of the attribution of responsibility for each of the three tasks on the shift in intergovernmental preferences. respondents were asked which level of government—central, regional, or both—they thought was mainly responsible for managing each of the three tasks. the responses were then transformed to a likert scale (–1 to 1) to distinguish in the model respondents who favoured national, shared, or subnational authority. respondents choosing central government were coded as 1, shared responsibility as 0, and regional responsibility as –1. 4.4 control variables data on various indicators were collected to control for individual political and socioeconomic factors. the political factors are the individuals’ ideological identifications (0–10 scale), interest in politics (1–5 likert scale), and trust in government (1–5 scale).9 the socioeconomic factors are net household income (1–5 scale), health 9 confidence in regional and central government was highly correlated in the pre-test, the same with regional and central parliaments. the authors, therefore, kept the questions at the regional level. 13 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 related risks (a dummy variable to measure whether the respondent contacted the health authority with the suspicion of having covid-19), vulnerable employment status (a dummy variable to measure whether the respondent was unemployed or covered by a temporary lay-off scheme), subjective social class (1–7 scale) and education (1–5 scale). a context-level variable was also included in the model: seven-days accumulated incidence of covid-19 in the region the day the survey was taken. incidence data was built using data from the spanish national epidemiological surveillance network (renave) managed by the national epidemiology center. see table a.7 in the appendix i for details on the operationalization of the control variables. 5. results: shift in intergovernmental preference during the pandemic and its determinants citizens preferred the lockdown to be managed by the central government in march and september (52.5 and 47.7 percent of respondents). this choice is consistent with the central government’s power to manage the pandemic during the state of emergency, meaning that it is possible that citizens considered that the central government should manage the pandemic response given the scope of the measures needed. however, preferences were more dispersed as regards nursing homes and healthcare. less than a third of citizens in both cases preferred the central government to be primarily responsible for these tasks. in these cases, citizens’ preferences are consistent with the existing distribution of powers in spain, where the regional governments manage these two policy areas (table 2). table 2: citizens preferred level of government to manage the pandemic overall, 37 percent of citizens changed their preferences during the crisis for at least one of the three tasks examined here. figure 1 shows the share of the population with a decentralizing, centralizing, and no shift in intergovernmental preferences. figure 2 shows the share of the population with a centralizing and decentralizing shift and excluding those with no change. clearly, the vast majority of the population (almost four out of every five respondents) did not change their preferred level of government between the first and second wave of the pandemic. this near-zero variance might make finding the determinants for the shift in preferences more difficult. fifty-eight percent of those who changed went towards decentralization, especially in the management of the lockdown. table 2: citizen’s preferred level of government to manage the pandemic prefered level lockdown nursing homes healthcare march september march september march september central government 52.50% 47.72% 31.38% 30.69% 31.03% 29.84% shared responsibility 31.95% 32.69% 38.16% 38.57% 41.95% 42.20% regional government 15.55% 19.59% 30.46% 30.73% 27.03% 27.96% 14 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: intergovernmental shift of preferences across the three policy areas note: the sample size is 7,022 for the lockdown, 6,957 for nursing homes, and 6,962 for healthcare. figure 2: intergovernmental shift of preferences across the three policy areas (excluding no changes of preferences) note: after excluding participants without changes of preferences, the sample size is 1,460 for the lockdown, 1,620 for nursing homes, and 1,463 for healthcare. before proceeding to the logit models to test the hypotheses, the most relevant trends will be summarized in the descriptive analysis (see tables a1 to a5 in appendix i for details on the descriptive statistics). the relationships between explanatory variables and intergovernmental shifts in preferences seem to vary according to the policy area. partisanship appears to be relevant for h1a and h1b. of those with a shift in preferences, right-leaning (pp and vox) voters shifted towards decentralization and left-leaning (psoe and up) voters shifted towards more centralization. this is clear for the management of healthcare and nursing homes but not for the lockdown. moreover, if the respondents’ preferred party was in office at the ac where the respondent lived, the chances for preferring more decentralization increased for all three policy areas. an unprecedented concentration of executive power was immediately reflected in the neardaily media appearances of several government figures, such as the prime minister (pedro 13.88 12.25 11.38 79.21 76.86 78.99 6.91 10.90 9.64 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 lockdown nursing homes healthcare % p o p u la ti o n decentralization shift no change of preferences centralization shift 66.78 52.92 54.14 33.22 47.08 45.86 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 lockdown nursing homes healthcare % p o p u la ti o n decentralization shift centralization shift 15 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 sánchez), the minister of health (salvador illa), and the director of the centre for the coordination of health alerts and emergencies (fernando simón). following the usual pattern for political crises, this initial reconsolidation encountered little resistance despite not being explicitly provided by the constitution (boin and t’hart 2003). similar to the great recession of 2008, competencies were recentralized. however, parliamentary support for the state of emergency eroded with each of the six votes in the lower chamber. particularly, the demands to restore regional autonomy grew increasingly strong among certain ethnonationalist parties. on one side, the basque nationalist party (pnv), canary coalition, bildu, new canaries, galician nationalist bloc (bng), regionalist party of cantabria (prc), and teruel existe supported the central government or abstained throughout the six votes, while continuously criticizing the concentrated centralism implied by the state of emergency. on the other side, the republican left of catalonia (erc) toughened its stance, as did together for catalonia (jxcat), popular unity candidacy (cup), compromís for the valencian country, navarrese people's union (upn), and asturias forum. thus, the sixth vote was held on june 3, 2020, with 177 votes in favour, 155 against, and 18 abstentions: a very close result for the government during the de-escalation phase. satisfaction with the government’s performance in managing the crisis (h2) seems to be associated with respondents changing their preferences towards decentralization of the management of nursing homes. interestingly, the share of the population favouring decentralization exceeds those favouring centralization for all degrees of satisfaction. this is particularly marked for lockdown management. the degree of autonomism (h3) does not seem to be a relevant factor in explaining the general population preference changes. there is no clear trend or difference in the autonomism scores between those shifting towards centralization or decentralization. the attribution of responsibility (h4) seems to be a relevant determinant of intergovernmental shift. those shifting in all three areas who attributed responsibility to the central government mainly shifted towards decentralization, while those attributing responsibility to the regional government shifted towards centralization. therefore, the shift in intergovernmental preferences seems to also be motivated by blame or retribution. 5.1 explaining the changes in preference: logit models in this section, the logit models are presented (tables 3 and 4). first, the authors’ analysis appears to confirm h1a and h1b regarding partisanship and the incumbency of national governments. having voted for psoe-up—which leads the left-wing governing coalition— for the central government is associated with a centralizing shift in the management of nursing homes and healthcare but not in the management of the lockdown. this holds true after controlling for political, socioeconomic, and contextual factors. the odds of having a centralizing preference shift for the management of nursing homes is 43 percent higher (odds ratio=1.43, 95% ci=1.13 – 1.82, p=0.003) and 62 percent higher (odds ratio=1.62, 95% ci=1.26–2.10, p<0.001) for the management of healthcare if the subjects had voted for any of the two parties in the central government coalition (psoe or up). after including controls in models 5 and 6 (table 3), the likelihood of a centralizing shift in the management of nursing homes and healthcare increased for psoe-up voters. the likelihood of having a centralizing preference shift for the management of nursing homes is 59 percent higher (odds ratio=1.59, 95% ci=1.21–2.11, p<0.001) and 64 percent higher for the management of healthcare (odds ratio=1.64, 95% ci=1.22 – 2.21, p<0.001) if the subjects had voted for the left-wing central government coalition. 16 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 table 3: logit models explaining the change in preferences for centralized decisionmaking in the management of the lockdown, nursing homes and healthcare table 3. logit models explaining the change of preferences for centralized decisionmaking in the management of the lockdown, nursing homes and healthcare (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) satisfaction with govt. performance .044 (.061) .067 (.051) -.028 (.048) .078 (.069) .072 (.058) .002 (.054) partisanship central government -.066 (.149) .358** (.122) .485*** (.131) .114 (.175) .466** (.142) .495** (.153) regional government -.129 (.127) -.043 (.099) .003 (.105) -.065 (.148) -.069 (.115) -.039 (.123) vote to right-wing opposition parties in the cg (pp+vox) -.172 (.190) -.074 (.166) .113 (.171) -.137 (.232) -.074 (.197) .044 (.207) degree of autonomism -.033 (.037) -.034 (.030) -.042 (.031) .028 (.044) -.023 (.035) -.032 (.037) attribution of responsibility -.561*** (.085) -.330*** (.070) -.411*** (.072) -.523*** (.094) -.295*** (.077) -.402*** (.080) incidence of covid-19 (7 days) -.001 (.001) .0003 (.001) .0007 (.0007) subjective social class .020 (.062) -.018 (.050) -.003 (.053) education .032 (.068) .057 (.056) -.011 (.058) ideology .048 (.034) .024 (.028) .016 (.030) interest in politics -.076 (.067) .097 o (.055) .117* (.059) trust in regional government -.125o (.069) -.089 (.054) -.036 (.058) contact health authority suspicion covid-19 -.043 (.197) -.044 (.153) .039 (.159) vulnerable employment status .131 (.175) -.087 (.149) -.108 (.156) income level -.136o (.076) .010 (.057) -.129* (.062) constant -2.147*** (.314) -2.227*** (.232) -2.244*** (.250) -2.154*** (.540) -2.71*** (.415) -2.437*** (.441) n 4290 4197 4227 3562 3481 3507 mcfadden pseudor2 .021 .019 .021 .027 .022 .022 nagelkerke pseudor2 .026 .027 .029 .034 .031 .031 likelihood ratio test 44.39*** 58.95*** 59.99*** 47.39*** 56.62*** 58.51*** notes: model 1 and 4 refers to the management of the lockdown, while model 2 and 5 refers to the nursing homes and model 3 and 6 to healthcare. standard errors are in parenthesis. ( o )p<0.1 *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001 17 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 table 4: logit models explaining the change of preferences for centralized decision making in the management of the lockdown, nursing homes and healthcare on the other hand, having voted for pp or vox (right-wing opposition parties) is associated with a decentralizing preference shift in all three areas, although these factors seem to lose significance after controls are incorporated into the models. the odds of having a decentralizing preference shift are 45 percent higher for the management of the lockdown (odds ratio=1.45, 95% ci=1.12–1.88, p=0.005), 49 percent higher for the table 4. logit models explaining the change of preferences for decentralized decisionmaking in the management of the lockdown, nursing homes and healthcare (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) satisfaction with govt. performance -.049 (.043) .092 o (.049) .011 (.044) -.081 o (.049) .075 (.056) -.024 (.051) central government .016 (.113) -.070 (.122) -.118 (.044) -.0002 (.130) .055 (.142) -.015 (.142) regional government .036 (.091) .139 (.098) .236* (.100) -.087 (.107) .026 (.115) .045 (.117) vote to right-wing opposition parties in the cg (pp+vox) .371** (.134) .400** (.139) .392** (.143) .142 (.163) .192 (.171) .149 (.175) degree of autonomism .067* (.027) .035 (.029) .042 (.030) .052 (.032) .030 (.035) .028 (.036) attribution of responsibility .027 (.075) .305*** (.062) .182** (.063) .024 (.082) .253*** (.070) .216** (.071) incidence of covid-19 (7 days) -.0001 (.001) -.00008 (.0006) -.001 (.001) subjective social class -.139** (.046) -.100* (.049) -.073 (.051) education -.066 (.049) .003 (.053) .057 (.055) ideology .025 (.025) .056* (.027) .055* (.028) interest in politics -.029 (.050) -.023 (.054) -.091 o (.055) trust in regional government .128* (.050) .073 (.054) .164** (.056) contact health authority suspicion covid-19 .079 (.140) .192 (.147) .169 (.151) vulnerable employment status .260* (.129) .257 o (.138) .216 (.142) income level .107* (.054) .012 (.059) -.003 (.059) constant -2.206*** (.234) -2.450*** (.225) -2.464*** (.236) -1.785*** (.392) -2.463*** (.407) -2.51*** (.423) n 4290 4197 4227 3562 3481 3507 mcfadden pseudor2 .005 .019 .011 .013 .022 .019 nagelkerke pseudor2 .007 .026 .015 .019 .030 .027 likelihood ratio test 16.03* 58.63*** 32.29*** 37.5** 54.71*** 47.68*** notes: model 1 and 4 refers to the management of the lockdown, while model 2 and 5 refers to the nursing homes and model 3 and 6 to healthcare. standard errors are in parenthesis. ( o )p<0.1 *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001 18 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 management of nursing homes (odds ratio=1.49, 95% ci=1.14–1.96, p=0.004) and 48 percent higher in the management of healthcare (odds ratio=1.48, 95% ci=1.12–1.96, p=0.006) if the subjects had voted for any of the main right-wing parties in the opposition (pp or vox). having voted for one of the governing parties at the regional government level increases the probability of having a decentralizing preference shift only for the management of healthcare (27 percent higher; odds ratio=1.27, 95% ci=1.04–1.54, p=0.018). therefore, h1c seems to be only partially confirmed. h2 is rejected. satisfaction with government performance to manage the policy areas does not have significant explanatory power for intergovernmental preference change. this variable is only significant at the 0.1 level to explain a decentralization shift for nursing homes and lockdown. for every one-unit increase in government performance satisfaction in the management of nursing homes, the odds of having a decentralizing preference shift was 10 percent higher (odds ratio=1.1, 95% ci=1.0–1.21, p=0.058), while it was 8 percent lower (odds ratio=0.92, 95% ci=0.84–1.01, p=0.094) for the management of the lockdown.10 individual core beliefs, which are here termed autonomism, do not appear to play a clear role in most scenarios. high autonomism increases the likelihood of a decentralizing preference shift only for the management of the lockdown (model 1, table 4). however, the inclusion of controls erases its explanatory power. for every one-unit increase in autonomism, the odds of having a decentralizing preference shift for the management of the lockdown was 7 percent higher (odds ratio=1.07, 95% ci=1.01–1.13, p=0.013). attribution of responsibility is very useful in determining the likelihood of an intergovernmental preference shift in either direction. this variable is statistically significant in 10 out of 12 models. the odds of a centralizing preference shift for the management of the lockdown fall 43 percent (odds ratio=0.57, 95% ci=0.48–0.67, p=0.001) as the attribution of responsibility moves up one level towards central government (i.e., it drops 43 percent as the attribution of responsibility moves from regional government to shared responsibility or from shared responsibility to central government). the likelihood of a centralized preference shift is 28 percent lower for the management of nursing homes (odds ratio=0.72, 95% ci=0.63 – 0.82, p=0.001) and 33 percent lower in the management of healthcare (odds ratio=0.66, 95% ci=0.58–0.76, p<0.001). after including controls, the attribution of responsibility continued to be relevant in explaining the increase in the centralizing shift of preferences.11 the attribution of responsibility is also relevant in explaining the likelihood of having a decentralizing preference shift for the management of nursing homes and healthcare but not the lockdown. as the attribution of responsibility moves up one level in the direction of the central government, the likelihood of a decentralizing preference shift for the management of nursing homes is 36 percent higher (odds ratio=1.36, 95% ci=1.2–1.53, 10 what if h2 and h4 were merged? the expectation would be to find a higher likelihood of no change of preference in individuals satisfied with government performance who attributed responsibility for each of the three tasks and vice versa with dissatisfied individuals. however, in table a6 in appendix i, no clear relationship can be observed between satisfaction with the performance of the government to which responsibility is attributed and a preference shift for the management of any of the three areas. the authors confirmed this with ols models. satisfaction with government performance to which responsibility is attributed for the management of the pandemic was only relevant in two out of the 18 models, one of which offered an incoherent result and the second lost significance after incorporating controls. 11 here are the odds ratios for models 4-6 in table 3: model 4 (odds ratio=0.59, 95% ci=0.49–0.71, p<0.001); model 5 (odds ratio=0.74, 95% ci=0.64–0.87, p<0.001); model 6 (odds ratio=0.67, 95% ci=0.57–0.78, p<0.001). 19 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 p<0.001) and 20 percent higher for the management of healthcare (odds ratio=1.2, 95% ci=1.06–1.36, p=0.004).12 interest in politics and income level appear to be relevant in predicting the probability of having a centralizing preferences shift but only for the management of nursing homes. for every one-unit increase in interest in politics, the odds of having a centralized preference shift for the management of nursing homes was 12 percent higher (odds ratio=1.12, 95% ci=1.00–1.26, p=0.045). the odds of having a centralized preference shift for the management of the lockdown is 12 percent lower (odds ratio=0.88, 95% ci=0.78–0.99, p=0.038) for every unit increase in income. in contrast, there are control variables which help explain the likelihood of a decentralizing preference shift in all three policy areas. the odds of having a decentralizing preference shift for the management of the lockdown is 14 percent higher (odds ratio=1.14, 95% ci=1.03–1.25, p=0.011) for every one unit increase in trust in regional government, 13 percent lower (odds ratio=0.87, 95% ci=0.8–0.95, p=0.002) for every level increase in social class, 30 percent higher (odds ratio=1.3, 95% ci=1.01–1.67, p=0.047) if the subject is in a situation of employment vulnerability (unemployed or covered by a temporary layoff scheme in spain), and 11 percent higher (odds ratio=1.11, 95% ci=1.0–1.24, p=0.048) for every unit increase in income. for every one unit to the right in the ideology spectrum, the odds of having a decentralizing preference shift for the management of nursing homes are 6 percent higher (odds ratio=1.06, 95% ci=1.0–1.12, p=0.039), and for every level increase in social class, the odds of a decentralized shift are 10 percent lower (odds ratio=0.9, 95% ci=0.82–1.0, p=0.042). the odds of a decentralized preference shift for the management of healthcare is 18 percent higher (odds ratio=1.18, 95% ci=1.06–1.31, p=0.003) for every unit increase in trust in the regional government, and 6 percent higher (odds ratio=1.06, 95% ci=1.0–1.12) for every unit to the right in the ideology spectrum. these models were replicated for a robustness check but with an ordinary least square regression analysis (see table a.10 in appendix i). the dependent variable was operationalized with a 5-point scale (–2 to +2). although the dependent variable in the robustness check is not continuous, previous literature recognizes that if it is 5 points or more (like the ones constructed), statistical treatments such as ols can be applied. this is a common and accepted practice in the field (gomila 2021; kromrey and rendinagobioff 2003). the results were confirmed: attribution of responsibility is the only explanatory variable with a statistically significant relationship with the preference shift for all models. as the attribution of responsibility moves towards central government, the population preferences move towards decentralization and vice versa. the relevance of partisanship was also confirmed for some models, with psoe-up voters having a higher probability of a centralizing shift and vox-pp voters a decentralizing shift. the mcfadden and nagelkerke pseudor-squared showed low values for all models, which many might point out as an indicator of having models with low predictive values, low quality, or poor goodness-of-fit. first, low pseudor-squared in logit models or rsquared in linear models are expected in behavioural political science, and it was particularly expected with the dependent variable due to the near-zero variance. a large part of the population (63 percent) did not change in its preference regarding the level of government to manage the pandemic in any of the areas examined. however, statistically 12 here are odds ratios for models with controls: model 5 (odds ratio=1.29, 95% ci=1.12–1.48, p<0.001) and model 6 (odds ratio=1.24, 95% ci=1.08–1.43, p=0.002). 20 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 significant predictors for a near-zero variance-dependent variable were nonetheless found. even with a small effect size, important conclusions can still be drawn with statistically significant predictors. as peng, lee, and ingersoll (2002, 6) point out: “a researcher can treat these two r2 indices as supplementary to other, more useful evaluative indices, such as the overall evaluation of the model, [and] tests of individual regression coefficients.” king (1986) also confirmed that r-squared indices can be highly misleading and that there are better ways to test the predictive power or goodness-of-fit in a model. the significance of the overall model was confirmed using the chi-square test in anova and the likelihood ratio test. in the results section, the individual regression coefficients that were statistically significant are highlighted. the statistical significance of these terms is further confirmed through additional analyses (not shown here), using odds ratios to assess the relevance and power of the predictors. moreover, greenhill, ward and sacks (2011, 993) proposed the separation plot as a “more nuances and nonscalar, visual yardstick” for assessing binary model fit. as table a.11 in appendix i shows, none of the 12 models are perfect, but they do a reasonably good job of describing the data, given that large parts of the events (i.e., centralizing or decentralizing intergovernmental preference shifts) are on the right-hand side of the graphs. 6. discussion and conclusion based on a large and original national survey of the spanish population conducted during the second wave of the covid-19 crisis, this article has studied the determinants of the shifts in the intergovernmental preferences of spanish citizens for managing three public policy areas related to the pandemic. the article makes three contributions: it adds to the literature on how and why the general population change their preferences for government-level responsibility, it presents some immediate policy and democracyrelated implications for accountability and blame management in the crisis for advanced multilevel democracies, and it contributes to our understanding of the spanish population’s opinion on federal governance. according to the hypotheses, a part of the spanish public shifted its preferences about which level of government should be in charge of crisis management as the crisis progressed and in particular— in line with the literature about rally-around-the-flag— support for central government suffered more than support for sub-national government after the initial phase of the crisis. the article shows that 37 percent of the general population surveyed shifted their government responsibility preferences during the health crisis in at least one policy area. more than half of those who changed their preferences did so towards decentralization for the three selected policy areas. therefore, it could be argued that the crisis affected citizens’ perceptions of power distribution across three policy areas, although the perceptions of the majority did not change within the short period analyzed. the authors’ hypotheses suggested three main factors for explaining the changes in attitudes during crises. even during a crisis, when citizens have more information from the media, are much more sensitive to it, and are probably very interested in the effectiveness of policies, they employ partisan cues to help make sense of policies. however, spanish citizens do not appear to be sensitive to the perceived effectiveness of these policies during the pandemic. they tend to shift their preferences regarding responsibility towards the government they voted for, even in some cases when they think 21 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 the government level responsible for the policy is doing well (e.g., those who attributed nursing home management to the region and considered it was well managed). of those who did not vote for the psoe-up coalition in central government, 9.8 percent shifted their preferences towards centralization; however, 14.2 percent of psoe-up voters reported a centralizing shift. it is possible that this effect may be different depending on the different phases of the crisis. certainly, the partisan effect will be less acute during the initial phase, in which the public ‘rallies around the flag’ and the opposition refrains from attacking the government outright (flinders 2020). however, this effect can be observed in the second phase, where blame-shifting and blame avoidance reached their peak in spain. interestingly, in spain, unlike in the us or other federations, right-wing parties at the national level are traditionally associated with centralization, while the opposite is true for parties on the left. the data in this article demonstrates that the right-wing, especially extreme-right voters, shifted their preferences towards decentralization in this crisis, while voters from the left supported the central government when their party controlled this level. surprisingly for the spanish context, the vote for vox (far-right party) was associated with a preference for decentralization. the authors’ analysis supports the conclusion that even in crises like the one analyzed in this article, a global pandemic not initially attributable to the government of spain, the government initially responsible for policy management is ultimately penalized by its citizens. citizens tend to prefer another level of government after months of failing to find a solution to the crisis. multilevel governments offer this escape route. the results in table a.5 in the appendix clearly support this conclusion. constituents cannot easily change their government outside of electoral periods, but at least they can change their preferences about who should be responsible for certain tasks. however, the authors’ results did not find that satisfaction with task management, nor with the level of government to which responsibility for the task is attributed, is relevant in explaining the intergovernmental preference shifts. among the citizens surveyed, satisfaction with government action weakly explains a decentralization preference shift for the management of nursing homes and lockdowns. one possible solution for this might be that citizens do not properly differentiate between authorities at the different levels of government when it comes to the responsibility for handling the crisis, as blackburn et al. (2023) found for russia. additionally, preferences about federal governance or beliefs about how the state territorial arrangements should be structured have shown no significant power in predicting the preference shifts in citizens. this is, to a certain extent, surprising for spain, where the territorial organization has been one of the big issues in the public debate since the restoration of democracy in the 1970s and one that citizens seem to have elaborate views on, particularly after the secessionist tensions in catalonia since 2017. furthermore, this somehow challenges previous literature on general preferences towards decentralization which had found some links between these preferences and identity. it will be necessary to explore the extent to which this may relate to the special context in which this study was conducted or, on the contrary, it may mark a period of transformation in the sophisticated conception that citizens have on the issue of their preferred system of territorial organization in spain. this research is relevant for studying other cases. for example, it proposes a way to examine if similar shifts in public preferences regarding government responsibilities occur in other federal countries with increasing polarization between left and right, 22 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 increasing geographical concentration of partisan interests, and in different federations with similar degrees of devolution of health responsibilities. it would also be relevant to assess broader applications across different types of crises (e.g., previous health crises such as the ebola or zika virus outbreaks, economic downturns, natural disasters, and even future crises). future research should replicate this analysis using a longitudinal or panel design to track changes in public opinion about government responsibilities across various stages of a crisis and beyond. among the restrictions of this study, one could highlight the usual limitations in natural experiments regarding external validity. future research should be done to confirm the validity of these results in other waves of the pandemic, other external shocks, or at postpandemic times. a second limitation concerns the non-probability sample design inherent in opt-in panel surveys. quotas were used to smooth this limitation, although it should be recalled that the lack of representativeness is not a problem because it is not the intention to explain the distribution of preferences. thirdly, although the methodology used retrospective survey questions to assess changes in preferences, we acknowledge the inherent limitations associated with recall bias and the potential conflation of past and present attitudes. nonetheless, supported by the literature mentioned in the methodology section, it has been argued that the use of recall data provides valuable insights, particularly in dynamically evolving situations like the covid-19 pandemic. 23 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 references albertson, bethany, and shana kushner gadarian. 2015. anxious politics. democratic citizenship in a threatening world. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. altiparmakis, argyrios, bojar, abel, brouard, sylvain, foucault, martial, kriesi, hanspeter, and richard nadeau. 2021. “pandemic politics: policy evaluations of government responses to covid-19.” west european politics 44 (5–6): 1159– 1179. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1930754. arceneaux, kevin, and robert m. stein. 2006. “who is held responsible when disaster strikes: the attribution of responsibility for a natural disaster in an urban election.” journal of urban affairs 28 (1): 42–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.07352166.2006.00258.x. arceneaux, kevin, and ryan j. vander wielen. 2017. taming intuition: how reflection minimizes partisan reasoning and promotes democratic accountability. new york: cambridge university press. atkeson, lonna rae, and cherie d. maestas. 2012. catastrophic politics: how extraordinary events redefine perceptions of government. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. banzhaf, h. spencer, and randall p. walsh. 2008. “do people vote with their feet? an empirical test of tiebout.” american economic review, 98 (3): 843–63. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.843. barbet porta, berta. 2022. gestió de la covid-19 i preferències de (des)centralització a catalunya [covid-19 management and (de)centralisation preferences in catalonia]. barcelona: generalitat de catalunya, institut d'estudis de l'autogovern. biddle, nicholas, gray, matthew, and ian mcallister. 2024. “federalism and confidence in australian governments during the covid-19 pandemic.” publius: the journal of federalism 54 (2): 257–282. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad032. bjørnskov, christian, and voigt, stefan. 2022. “emergencies: on the misuse of government powers.” public choice 190: 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127021-00918-6. blackburn, matthew, hutcheson, derek, tsumarova, elena, and bo petersson. 2023. “covid-19 and the russian regional response: blame diffusion and attitudes to pandemic governance.” canadian journal of european and russian studies 16 (1): 29–54. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i1.3955. boin, arjen. 2024. “pandemic challenges for public managers: juggling parallel crisis playbooks.” in research handbook on public management and covid-19, edited by helen dickinson, sophie yates, janine o’flynn, and catherine smith, 19–30. cheltenham, uk: edward elgar publishing. boin, arjen, and paul ‘t hart. 2022. “from crisis to reform? exploring three post-covid pathways.” policy and society 41 (1): 13–24. https://doi.org/10.1093/ polsoc/puab007. boin, arjen, ‘t hart, paul, and allan mcconnell. 2009. “crisis exploitation: political and policy impacts of framing contests.” journal of european public policy 16 (1): 81–106. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760802453221. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad032 https://doi.org/10.1093/polsoc/puab007 https://doi.org/10.1093/polsoc/puab007 24 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 boin, arjen, mcconnell, allan, and paul ‘t hart. 2021. governing the pandemic: a crisis management perspective. london: palgrave macmillan. boin, arjen, and mark rhinard. 2023. “crisis management performance and the european union: the case of covid-19.” journal of european public policy 30 (4): 655–675. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2141304. brown, adam r. 2010. “are governors responsible for the state economy? partisanship, blame, and divided federalism.” the journal of politics, 72 (3): 605–615. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381610000046. bullock, john g. 2011. “elite influence on public opinion in an informed electorate.” american political science review 105 (3): 496–515. https://doi.org/ 10.1017/s0003055411000165. centro de investigaciones sociológicas (cis) 2020a. “estudio 3279. barómetro de abril” [study 3279. april barometer]. accessed october 1, 2020. https://www.cis.es//avance-de-resultados-del-estudio-3279-barometro-de-abril-2020-. ———. 2020b. “estudio 3281. barómetro de mayo” [study 3281. may barometer]. accessed october 27, 2020. https://www.cis.es/-/avance-de-resultados-delestudio-3279-barometro-de-abril-2020 ———. “estudio 3292. barómetro de septiembre” [study 3292. september barometer]. accessed october 19, 2020. https://www.cis.es/-/avance-de-resultados-delestudio-3279-barometro-de-abril-2020 ciuk, david j., and berwood a. yost. 2016. “the effects of issue salience, elite influence, and policy content on public opinion.” political communication 33 (2): 328–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2015.1017629. colino, césar. 2020. “decentralisation in spain: federal evolution and performance of the estado autonómico.” in oxford handbook of spanish politics, edited by diego muro and ignacio lago, 62–81. oxford: oxford university press. congleton, roger d. 2021. “federalism and pandemic policies: variety as the spice of life.” public choice 195: 73–100. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00915-9. connolly, jennifer, klofstad, casey, uscinski, joseph, and jonathan west. 2020. “public preferences for zika policy and responsibility in the absence of partisan cues.” journal of public policy 40 (3): 402–427. https://doi.org/10.1017/ s0143814x19000011. dalton, russell j. 2018. “realignment and beyond.” in political realignment: economics, culture, and electoral change,” 215–236. oxford: oxford university press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830986.003.0010 del pino, eloísa, moreno fuentes, francisco javier, cruz-martínez, gibrán, hernándezmoreno, jorge, moreno, luis, pereira-puga, manuel, and roberta perna. 2021. “governmental response to the covid-19 pandemic in long-term care residences for older people: preparedness, responses and challenges for the future.” mc covid-19 working paper no. 13. madrid: institute of public goods and policies (ipp-csic). http://dx.doi.org/10.20350/digitalcsic/13688. del pino, eloísa, and gregg van ryzin. 2013. “intergovernmental responsibility for social policy: an analysis of public preferences in spain.” publius: the journal of federalism 43 (4), 676–700. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjs051. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00915-9 https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjs051 25 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 del pino, eloísa, and césar colino. 2024. “subnational governance in spain.” in handbook on subnational governments and governance, edited by claudia avellaneda and ricardo a. bello-gómez, 375–392. cheltenham, uk: edward elgar publishing. dinan, john, and jac c. heckelman. 2020. “stability and contingency in federalism preferences.” public administration review 80 (2): 234–243. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/puar.13157. druckman, james n., erik peterson, and rune slothuus. 2013. “how elite partisan polarization affects public opinion formation.” american political science review 107 (1): 57–79. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000500. druckman, james n., and arthur lupia. 2016. “preference change in competitive political environments.” annual review of political science 19: 13–31. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-020614-095051. eckhard, steffen, and alexa lenz. 2020. die öffentliche wahrnehmung des krisenmanagements in der covid-19 pandemie [public perception of crisis management in the covid-19 pandemic]. working paper 05, konstanzer onlinepublikations-system (kops). https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/api/core/ bitstreams/dbcf1459-5c94-4e21-9acc-28c943f6aeb6/content. flinders, matthew. 2020. “democracy and the politics of coronavirus: trust, blame and understanding.” parliamentary affairs 74 (2): 483-502. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/pa/gsaa013. glaser, james m., berry, jeffrey m., and deborah j. schildkraut. 2023. “ideology and support for federalism in theory—and in practice.” publius: the journal of federalism 53 (4): 511–535. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad003. goidel, kirby, callaghan, timothy, nuzhath, tasmiah, scobee, julia, washburn, david, and matthew motta. 2024. “professional partisans? primary care physicians, state governments, and covid-19 responsibility and response.” state politics & policy quarterly 24 (2): 145–66. https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2023.27. gomila, robin. 2021. “logistic or linear? estimating causal effects of experimental treatments on binary outcomes using regression analysis.” journal of experimental psychology: general 150 (4): 700–709. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000920. greenhill, brian, michael d. ward, and audrey sacks. 2011. “the separation plot: a new visual method for evaluating the fit of binary models.” american journal of political science 55 (4): 991–1002. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15405907.2011.00525.x. groenendyk, eric w. 2013. competing motives in the partisan mind: how loyalty and responsiveness shape party identification and democracy. oxford university press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199969807.001.0001. grofman, bernard, and barbara norrander. 1990. “efficient use of reference group cues in a single dimension.” public choice 64: 213–227. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00124367. heinkelmann-wild, tim, kriegmair, lisa, and berthold rittberger. 2020. “the eu multi-level system and the europeanization of domestic blame games.” politics and governance 8 (1): 85–94. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2522. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000500 https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsaa013 https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsaa013 https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad003 https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2023.27 https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/xge0000920 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00525.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00525.x https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199969807.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2522 26 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 hernández-moreno, jorge, pereira-puga, manuel, and gibrán cruz-martínez. 2023. “covid-19 and nursing homes in decentralised spain: how governance and public policies influence working conditions and organisational responses to the crisis.” administration & society 55 (9): 1651–1679. https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997231187075. hernández-moreno, jorge, and jean-baptiste harguindéguy. 2024. “covid-19 and territorial politics: towards a redefinition of spanish intergovernmental relations?” regional studies, regional science 11 (1), 387–405. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/21681376.2024.2370420. hipp, lena, bünning, mareik, munnes, stefan, and armin sauermann. 2020. “problems and pitfalls of retrospective survey questions in covid-19 studies.” survey research methods, 14 (2): 109–114. doi:10.18148/srm/2020.v14i2.7741. jacobs, nicholas. 2017. “an experimental test of how americans think about federalism.” publius: the journal of federalism 47 (4): 572–598. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjx018. ———. 2021. “federalism, polarization, and policy responsibility during covid-19: experimental and observational evidence from the united states.” publius: the journal of federalism 51 (4): 693–719. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab014. james, oliver, and gregg. g. van ryzin. 2017. “motivated reasoning about public performance: an experimental study of how citizens judge the affordable care act.” journal of public administration research and theory 27 (1):197–209. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muw049. jaspers, eva, lubbers, marcel, and nan d. de graaf. 2009. “measuring once twice: an evaluation of recalling attitudes in survey research.” european sociological review 25 (3): 287–301. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcn048. jedwab, jack, and john kincaid. 2018. identities, trust, and cohesion in federal systems: public perspectives. kingston, on: mcgill-queen’s university press. johansson, bengt, hopmann, david nicolas, and adam shehata. 2021. “when the rallyaround-the-flag effect disappears, or: when the covid-19 pandemic becomes ‘normalized.’” journal of elections, public opinion and parties 31 (1): 321–334. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2021.1924742. juhl, sebastian, lehrer, roni, blom, annelies g., wenz, alexander, rettig, tobias, krieger, ulrich, fikel, marina, cornesse, carina, naumann, elias, möhring, katja, and maximiliane reifenscheid. 2022. “preferences for centralized decisionmaking in times of crisis: the covid-19 pandemic in germany.” in jahrbuch für handlungsund entscheidungstheorie, edited by jan sauermann, markus tepe, and marc debus, 1–27. wiesbaden: springer fachmedien wiesbaden. kam, cindy, and robert a. mikos. 2007. “do citizens care about federalism? an experimental test.” journal of empirical legal studies 4 (3): 589–624. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2007.00100.x. kennedy, john, sayers, anthony, and christopher alcantara. 2022. “does federalism prevent democratic accountability? assigning responsibility for rates of covid-19 testing.” political studies review 20 (1): 158–165. https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299211001690. https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997231187075 https://doi.org/10.18148/srm/2020.v14i2.7741 https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjx018 https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab014 https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muw049 https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcn048 27 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 kincaid, john, and j. wesley leckrone. 2021. “partisan fractures in u.s. federalism’s covid-19 policy responses.” state and local government review 52 (4): 28– 308. https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323x20986842. king, gary. 1986. “how not to lie with statistics: avoiding common mistakes in quantitative political science.” american journal of political science 30 (3): 666– 687. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111095. kritzinger, sylvia, foucault, martial, lachat, romain, partheymüller, julia, plescia, carolina, and sylvain brouard. 2021. “‘rally round the flag’: the covid-19 crisis and trust in the national government.” west european politics 44 (5–6): 1205-1231. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1925017. kromrey, jeffrey d., and gianna rendina-gobioff. 2003. “an empirical comparison of regression analysis strategies with discrete ordinal variables.” multiple linear regression viewpoints 28 (2): 30–43. accessed september 30, 2024. https://www.glmj.org/archives/mlrv_2003_29_1.pdf#page=32. konisky, david. 2011. “public preferences for environmental policy responsibility.” publius: the journal of federalism 41 (1): 76–100. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/publius/pjp044. kunda, ziva. 1990. “the case for motivated reasoning.” psychological bulletin 108 (3): 480–498. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480. león, sandra, and amuitz garmendia-madariaga. 2020. “popular reactions to external threats in federations.” working paper (version 4). universidad carlos iii de madrid. accessed september 30, 2024. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/qyjtm. león, sandra, jurado, ignacio, and amuitz garmendia-madariaga. 2018. “passing the buck? responsibility attribution and cognitive bias in multilevel democracies.” west european politics 41(3): 660–682. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01402382.2017.1405325. lobera, josep, santana, andrés, and catherine gross. 2024. “are we looking at crises through polarized lenses? predicting public assessments of the official early responses to the covid-19 pandemic in eight countries.” european sociological review 40 (1): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcad016. mattei, paola, and eloísa del pino. 2021. “coordination and health policy responses to the first wave of covid-19 in italy and spain.” journal of comparative policy analysis: research and practice 23 (2): 274–281. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13876988.2021.1878886. milosh, maria, painter, marcus, van dijcke, david, and austin l. wright. 2020. “unmasking partisanship: how polarization influences public responses to collective risk.” university of chicago, becker friedman institute for economics working paper no. 2020-102. https://repec.bfi.uchicago.edu/repec/ pdfs/bfi_wp_2020102.pdf. mullinix, kevin j. 2016. “partisanship and preference formation: competing motivations, elite polarization, and issue importance.” political behavior 38 (2): 383–411. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-015-9318-4. https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323x20986842 https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1925017 https://www.glmj.org/archives/mlrv_2003_29_1.pdf#page=32 https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/qyjtm https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcad016 https://repec.bfi.uchicago.edu/repec/pdfs/bfi_wp_2020102.pdf https://repec.bfi.uchicago.edu/repec/pdfs/bfi_wp_2020102.pdf 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 navarro, carmen, and francisco velasco. 2022. “from centralisation to new ways of multi-level coordination: spain’s intergovernmental response to the covid-19 pandemic.” local government studies 48 (2): 191–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2022.2042683. pears, emily, and emily sydnor. 2022. “covid-19 and the culture of american federalism.” rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences 8 (8): 181–220. https://doi.org/10.7758/rsf.2022.8.8.09. peng, chao-ying joanne, lee, kuk lida, and gary m. ingersoll. 2002. “an introduction to logistic regression analysis and reporting.” the journal of educational research 96 (1): 3–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220670209598786. pereira-puga, manuel, hernández-moreno, jorge, and gibrán cruz-martínez. 2023. “la coordinación institucional durante la pandemia de covid-19: el caso de las residencias de mayores en españa. [institutional coordination during the covid19 pandemic: the case of nursing homes in spain].” política y sociedad 60 (2): 1– 20. https://doi.org/10.5209/poso.84774. porumbescu, gregory, donald moynihan, jason anastasopoulos, and asmus leth olsen. 2022. “when blame avoidance backfires: responses to performance framing and outgroup scapegoating during the covid-19 pandemic.” governance 36(3): 779-803. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12701. rendleman, hunter, and jon c. rogowski. 2024. “americans’ attitudes toward federalism.” political behavior 46: 111–134. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-02209820-3. revilla, melanie. 2017. “analyzing survey characteristics, participation, and evaluation across 186 surveys in an online opt-in panel in spain.” methods, data, analyses 11 (2): 135–162. https://doi.org/10.12758/mda.2017.02. rosen, julia. 2021. “pandemic upheaval offers a huge natural experiment.” nature 596: 149–151. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-02092-7. rodriguez, cristian, gadarian, shana kushner, goodman, sara wallace, and thomas b. pepinsky. 2020. “morbid polarization: exposure to covid-19 and partisan disagreement about pandemic response.” psyarxiv. accessed october 1, 2020. https://psyarxiv.com/wvyr7/. schildkraut, deborah j., berry, jeffrey m., and james m. glaser. 2020. “public opinion about federalism during the coronavirus pandemic.” data for progress, may 4, 2020. accessed october 1, 2020. https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/5/4/ public-opinion-federalism. schneider, saundra k., and jacoby, william g. 2013. “intuitive federalism' and public opinion toward government.” apsa 2013 annual meeting paper, american political science association 2013 annual meeting. https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2300590. schneider, saundra k., jacoby, william g., and daniel c. lewis. 2011. “public opinion toward intergovernmental policy responsibilities.” publius: the journal of federalism 41(1): 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjq036. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12701 https://doi.org/10.12758/mda.2017.02 https://psyarxiv.com/wvyr7/ https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/5/4/public-opinion-federalism https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/5/4/public-opinion-federalism https://ssrn.com/abstract=2300590 https://ssrn.com/abstract=2300590 https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjq036 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 skarżyńska, krystyna, urbańska, beata, and piotr radkiewicz. 2021. “under or out of government control? the effects of individual mental health and political views on the attribution of responsibility for covid-19 incidence rates.” social psychological bulletin 16 (1): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.32872/spb.4395. slothuus, rune, and martin bisgaard. 2020. “how political parties shape public opinion in the real world.” american journal of political science 65 (4): 896–911. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12550. sniderman, paul m., brody, richard a., and philip e. tetlock. 1991. reasoning and choice: explorations in political psychology. new york: cambridge university press. snow, dan, and geoffrey evans. 2024. “partisanship in a pandemic: biased voter assessments of past and present government performance.” political behavior. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-024-09929-7. thompson, lyke, and richard elling. 1999. “let them eat marblecake: the preferences of michigan citizens for devolution and intergovernmental service-provision.” publius: the journal of federalism 29 (1): 139–154. https://doi.org/10.1093/ oxfordjournals.pubjof.a030005. torcal, mariano, and fabiola mota. 2013. “the role of political parties in shaping citizens' political preferences for the territorial organization of the state: the spanish case.” european political science review 6 (3): 477–502. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755773913000210. vandusky-allen, julie a., utych, stephen m., and michael catalano. 2022. “partisanship, policy, and americans’ evaluations of state-level covid-19 policies prior to the 2020 election.” political research quarterly 75 (2): 479–496. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211056374. vicentini, giulia, and maria tullia galanti. 2021. “italy, the sick man of europe: policy response, experts and public opinion in the first phase of covid-19.” south european society and politics: 459–485. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13608746.2021.1940582. viskupic, filip, and david l. wiltse. 2023. “political partisanship and trust in government predict popular support for covid-19 vaccine mandates for various professions and demographic groups: a research note.” american politics research 51 (2): 139–146. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x221118888. white, trenton m., cash-gibson, lucinda, martin-moreno, jose m, matesanz, rafael, crespo, javier, alfonso-sanchez, jose l., villapol, sonia, el-mohandes, ayman, and jeffrey v. lazarus. 2021. “covid-score spain: public perceptions of key government covid-19 control measures.” european journal of public health 31: 1095–1102. https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckab066. wolak, jennifer. 2016. “core values and partisan thinking about devolution.” publius: the journal of federalism 46 (4): 463–85. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/publius/pjw021. wolak, jennifer, and christine kelleher palus. 2010. “the dynamics of public confidence in u.s. state and local government.” state politics & policy quarterly 10 (4): 421–445. https://doi.org/10.1177/153244001001000407. https://doi.org/10.32872/spb.4395 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a030005 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a030005 https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755773913000210 https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2021.1940582 https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2021.1940582 https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x221118888 https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckab066 https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjw021 https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjw021 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 acknowledgments the authors would like to thank the participants of the 79th annual midwest political science conference and the 2021 winter seminar at the complutense university of madrid, especially inés calzada, who provided much-appreciated comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. the authors received financial support for the research of this article from the spanish ministry of economy, industry and competitiveness (gowper-cso2017-85598) and the spanish national research council (mccovid19 coordination mechanisms in coronavirus management between different levels of government and public policy sectors in 15 european countries). shortcomings, of course, remain our responsibility. declarations this work was supported by the spanish ministry of economy, industry and competitiveness (gowper-cso2017-85598) and the spanish national research council (mc-covid19 coordination mechanisms in coronavirus management between different levels of government and public policy sectors in 15 european countries). the authors have no competing interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this article. authors are ordered alphabetically (surnames). 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 appendix i supplementary material table a.1: partisanship at the central government and the intergovernmental shift of preferences lockdown management decentralization shift no change centralization shift pp (right-wing, national party) 16.47% 78.10% 5.43% psoe (left-wing, national party) 13.27% 79.57% 7.15% unidas podemos (left-wing, national party) 12.32% 80.47% 7.21% vox (right-wing, national party) 16.77% 76.89% 6.34% ciudadanos (right-wing, national party) 13.71% 79.91% 6.38% esquerra republicana de catalunya (left-wing, regional party) 15.20% 80.12% 4.68% junts (right-wing, regional party) 17.86% 78.57% 3.57% eh bildu (left-wing, regional party) 13.04% 80.87% 6.09% pacma (animalist party, national party) 8.20% 77.05% 14.75% más país (left-wing, national party) 4.88% 85.37% 9.76% eaj-pnv (right-wing, regional party) 15.89% 76.64% 7.48% cup (left-wing, regional party) 2.94% 97.06% 0.00% méscompromís (left-wing, regional party) 9.68% 80.65% 9.68% cca-nc (right-wing regional party) 0.00% 83.33% 16.67% na+ (upn) (right-wing, regional party) 36.36% 59.09% 4.55% bng (left-wing, regional party) 15.22% 71.74% 13.04% prc (left-wing, regional party) 7.50% 90.00% 2.50% teruel existe (regionalist party) 28.57% 64.29% 7.14% nursing homes management decentralization shift no change centralization shift pp (right-wing, national party) 17.31% 74.13% 8.57% psoe (left-wing, national party) 10.95% 74.52% 14.53% unidas podemos (left-wing, national party) 9.02% 76.39% 14.59% vox (right-wing, national party) 16.18% 75.93% 7.88% ciudadanos (right-wing, national party) 10.64% 78.25% 11.11% esquerra republicana de catalunya (left-wing, regional party) 12.21% 80.81% 6.98% junts (right-wing, regional party) 16.36% 80.00% 3.64% eh bildu (left-wing, regional party) 5.22% 85.22% 9.57% pacma (animalist party, national party) 13.45% 73.11% 13.45% más país (left-wing, national party) 10.00% 80.00% 10.00% eaj-pnv (right-wing, regional party) 12.96% 78.70% 8.33% cup (left-wing, regional party) 11.76% 85.29% 2.94% méscompromís (left-wing, regional party) 9.68% 74.19% 16.13% cca-nc (right-wing regional party) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% na+ (upn) (right-wing, regional party) 17.39% 65.22% 17.39% bng (left-wing, regional party) 13.33% 82.22% 4.44% prc (left-wing, regional party) 9.76% 80.49% 9.76% teruel existe (regionalist party) 35.71% 50.00% 14.29% healthcate management 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 decentralization shift no change centralization shift pp (right-wing, national party) 14.98% 76.13% 8.89% psoe (left-wing, national party) 11.22% 76.82% 11.96% unidas podemos (left-wing, national party) 7.68% 79.51% 12.81% vox (right-wing, national party) 14.46% 77.69% 7.85% ciudadanos (right-wing, national party) 11.16% 79.81% 9.03% esquerra republicana de catalunya (left-wing, regional party) 12.28% 83.04% 4.68% junts (right-wing, regional party) 14.55% 83.64% 1.82% eh bildu (left-wing, regional party) 3.54% 90.27% 6.19% pacma (animalist party, national party) 9.02% 79.51% 11.48% más país (left-wing, national party) 10.00% 75.00% 15.00% eaj-pnv (right-wing, regional party) 12.84% 78.90% 8.26% cup (left-wing, regional party) 5.88% 88.24% 5.88% méscompromís (left-wing, regional party) 3.23% 87.10% 9.68% cca-nc (right-wing regional party) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% na+ (upn) (right-wing, regional party) 26.09% 65.22% 8.70% bng (left-wing, regional party) 15.22% 73.91% 10.87% prc (left-wing, regional party) 9.76% 85.37% 4.88% teruel existe (regionalist party) 28.57% 57.14% 14.29% table a.2: partisanship at the regional government and the intergovernmental shift of preferences lockdown management decentralization shift no change centralization shift did not voted for the political party ruling their regional government 13.67% 79.13% 7.20% voted for the political party ruling their regional government 14.39% 79.39% 6.22% nursing homes management decentralization shift no change centralization shift did not voted for the political party ruling their regional government 11.97% 77.52% 10.51% voted for the political party ruling their regional government 12.90% 75.31% 11.79% healthcate management decentralization shift no change centralization shift did not voted for the political party ruling their regional government 11.09% 79.65% 9.26% voted for the political party ruling their regional government 12.05% 77.44% 10.52% table a.3: satisfaction with government performance and the intergovernmental shift of preferences lockdown management decentralization shift no change centralization shift very bad 13.71% 81.09% 5.20% rather bad 14.73% 78.48% 6.79% regular 15.58% 76.73% 7.69% rather good 12.97% 80.14% 6.89% very good 11.70% 81.30% 7.00% 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 nursing homes management decentralization shift no change centralization shift very bad 12.07% 77.38% 10.56% rather bad 12.24% 77.08% 10.68% regular 12.10% 76.54% 11.36% rather good 13.35% 73.59% 13.06% very good 15.74% 71.30% 12.96% healthcate management decentralization shift no change centralization shift very bad 11.85% 79.55% 8.59% rather bad 11.13% 79.46% 9.42% regular 11.47% 78.00% 10.53% rather good 10.98% 79.99% 9.04% very good 11.90% 77.97% 10.13% table a.4: autonomic culture and the intergovernmental shift of preferences lockdown management decentralization shift no change centralization shift 1.0-1.9 8.85% 86.73% 4.42% 2.0-2.9 9.89% 86.08% 4.03% 3.0-3.9 12.96% 81.86% 5.18% 4.0-4.9 13.94% 78.75% 7.32% 5.0-5.9 14.85% 78.26% 6.89% 6.0-6.9 13.10% 78.89% 8.01% 7.0-7.9 15.12% 76.40% 8.48% 8.0-8.9 13.71% 80.26% 6.03% 9.0-9.9 10.53% 87.37% 2.11% 10 13.46% 82.69% 3.85% nursing homes management decentralization shift no change centralization shift 1.0-1.9 8.04% 87.50% 4.46% 2.0-2.9 11.85% 80.74% 7.41% 3.0-3.9 11.65% 78.02% 10.33% 4.0-4.9 13.38% 74.88% 11.74% 5.0-5.9 12.84% 77.04% 10.12% 6.0-6.9 13.04% 73.71% 13.25% 7.0-7.9 12.38% 75.13% 12.49% 8.0-8.9 10.87% 79.74% 9.39% 9.0-9.9 8.38% 86.39% 5.24% 10 4.81% 91.35% 3.85% healthcate management decentralization shift no change centralization shift 1.0-1.9 8.93% 86.61% 4.46% 2.0-2.9 11.03% 79.04% 9.93% 3.0-3.9 11.01% 77.97% 11.01% 4.0-4.9 11.48% 77.99% 10.54% 5.0-5.9 10.88% 80.41% 8.72% 6.0-6.9 12.69% 77.01% 10.30% 7.0-7.9 12.53% 75.67% 11.81% 8.0-8.9 10.81% 80.95% 8.24% 9.0-9.9 6.84% 88.42% 4.74% 10 4.81% 90.38% 4.81% 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 table a.5: attribution of responsibility and the intergovernmental shift of preferences lockdown management decentralization shift no change centralization shift regional government (-1) 14.20% 69.43% 16.37% shared responsibility (0) 12.97% 78.05% 8.99% central government (1) 14.14% 80.58% 5.28% nursing homes management decentralization shift no change centralization shift regional government (-1) 10.04% 75.86% 14.10% shared responsibility (0) 12.40% 78.32% 9.28% central government (1) 16.17% 76.70% 7.13% healthcate management decentralization shift no change centralization shift regional government (-1) 9.83% 77.35% 12.82% shared responsibility (0) 11.60% 80.26% 8.13% central government (1) 13.67% 79.70% 6.63% table a.6: satisfaction with government performance considered as the responsible for managing the lockdown, nursing homes and healthcare during the pandemic lockdown management attributed responsability satisfaction with government performance decentralization shift no change centralization shift central government total 17.54 82.46 0 very bad 16.52 83.48 0 rather bad 20.10 79.90 0 regular 24.57 75.43 0 rather good 16.00 84.00 0 very good 13.32 86.68 0 shared responsibility total 13.05 75.81 11.15 very bad 16.93 72.83 10.24 rather bad 15.28 75.75 8.97 regular 13.36 78.60 8.04 rather good 12.62 75.45 11.93 very good 11.11 70.90 17.99 regional government total 0 75.02 24.98 very bad 0 88.00 12.00 rather bad 0 80.00 20.00 regular 0 75.95 24.05 rather good 0 73.33 26.67 very good 0 67.19 32.81 total general 13.62 79.32 7.06 nursing homes management attributed responsability satisfaction with government performance decentralization shift no change centralization shift central government total 22.60 77.40 0 very bad 19.15 80.85 0 rather bad 23.01 76.99 0 regular 29.81 70.19 0 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 rather good 39.39 60.61 0 very good 25.64 74.36 0 shared responsibility total 13.49 77.75 8.76 very bad 13.49 74.85 11.66 rather bad 14.06 78.86 7.08 regular 12.18 80.91 6.91 rather good 14.07 79.26 6.67 very good 15.91 75.00 9.09 regional government total 0 75.12 24.88 very bad 0 75.62 24.38 rather bad 0 74.82 25.18 regular 0 75.79 24.21 rather good 0 74.26 25.74 very good 0 60.00 40.00 total general 12.25 76.84 10.91 healthcare management attributed responsability satisfaction with government performance decentralization shift no change centralization shift central government total 22.07 77.93 0 very bad 18.33 81.67 0 rather bad 19.19 80.81 0 regular 24.43 75.57 0 rather good 26.55 73.45 0 very good 23.44 76.56 0 shared responsibility total 10.82 81.32 7.86 very bad 10.67 78.22 11.11 rather bad 11.45 80.00 8.55 regular 11.01 81.44 7.55 rather good 10.22 85.30 4.48 very good 9.71 80.57 9.71 regional government total 0 76.49 23.51 very bad 0 77.34 22.66 rather bad 0 76.70 23.30 regular 0 75.23 24.77 rather good 0 78.28 21.72 very good 0 75.00 25.00 total general 11.40 78.96 9.64 table a.7: statements from the questionnaire used to operationalize the dependent and explanatory variables13& the operationalization of control variables dependent variable: change of preferences in the level of governments in three policy areas. we used the following two statements from our questionnaire 1) imagine that it is march 1, that is, at the beginning of this crisis, and that you are given a choice about which level of government should be primarily responsible for managing the following issues. which level of government would you have chosen on march 1 to manage (1) the lockdown during the state of alarm; (2) the contagion of covid-19 in nursing homes; and (3) the provision of healthcare to anyone in need? 2) if, after five months, since the crisis began and knowing what you know now, you could choose, tell me which level of government you would prefer to be primarily responsible for managing each of these three issues? [respondents could choose among the cg, the regional government, or shared responsibility between both government levels.] 13 the original questionnaire was distributed in spanish. statements are translated for logical reasons. 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 explanatory variables: a. satisfaction with the management of the pandemic in each of the three policy areas. 1) how do you assess the work carried out concerning each of these three tasks (managing the locjdown, nursing homes and healthcare). we use a 5-point likert scale in the questionnaire (from very good to very bad). b. partisanship 1) which party or coalition did you vote for in the last general election in october 2019? 2) and in the last autonomic elections, which party or coalition did you vote for? c. degree of autonomism 1) a country can be organized territorially in several ways. using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents “maximum centralization” and 10 represents “maximum decentralization”, in which position would you like spain to be? 2) do you think that, in general, the creation and development of the autonomous communities has been positive or negative for spain? 3) which of the following phrases do you most identify with? 01. i feel exclusively spanish 02. i feel more spanish than [name of the autonomous community in question]. 03. i feel as spanish as [name of the autonomous community in question] 04. i feel more [ name of the autonomous community in question ] than spanish. 05. i feel exclusively [name of the autonomous community in question]. d. attribution of responsibility. 1) who do you think has been primarily responsible for managing (1) the lockdown (2) the contagion of covid-19 in nursing homes; and (3) the provision of healthcare [respondents could choose among the cg, the regional government, or shared responsibility between both levels of government]. we then transform the responses to a likert scale (-1 to 1) to distinguish who favours national, shared or subnational authority in the model. if respondents chose the central government, we coded it as “1”, shared responsibility was coded as “0”, and regional responsibility was coded as “-1”. control variables 1. political ideology is on an 11-point scale, with zero being most left-wing and ten being most right-wing.14 2. interest in politics and trust in regional governments are coded using a 5-point likert scale (5 =very high interest/trust. 1 =very low interest/trust). 3. household income is in a 5-point scale according to the following range of values: less than 1000 €; from 1.000 to 1800 €; from 1,801 to 2,700 €; from 2.701 to 3.900 €; more than 3.900 €. 4. contact with the health system on suspicion of having coronavirus is coded as a binary variable (1= yes. 0=no) 5. vulnerable employment status is a binary variable coded as 1 for those unemployed or benefiting from the cash transfer due to temporary suspension of work (erte)15, and 0 for those with regular employment, students, domestic worker, and other situation. 6. the subjective social class is coded using a 7-point scale (7 =high-class. 1 =low-class). 7. education is coded on a 5-point scale, with each category referring to the attainment of different levels of education (i.e., less than five years of school enrollment. primary education, secondary education, and tertiary education). 8. incidence of covid-19 is the cumulative rate of covid-19 cases in 7 days (the day of the survey and the six previous days). this data was multiplied by 100 and divided by the population on january 1, 2020 in each autonomous community (ine data). 14 we choose an 11-point scale rather than the typical 10-point scale, so that five truly represent the middle value. 15 during the pandemic, the cg created a temporary employment scheme called erte. the government assumes part of the workers' salary whose companies temporarily suspend activity due to the coronavirus. 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 other treatments 1. do not know and no answer where coded as blank spaces to avoid altering the results. 2. we tailored question-wording related to the respondent’s region (acs) of residence to avoid generic statements about the region and rather mention the specific name. 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: 1-44 issn 2562-8429 table a.8: unweighted summary statistics n median median error variance minimum maximum q1 q3 centralization shift lockdown 7022 0 4.526e-5 0.064 0 1 0 0 centralization shift – nursing homes 6957 0 5.614e-5 0.097 0 1 0 0 centralization shift healthcare 6962 0 5.313e-5 0.087 0 1 0 0 decentralization shift lockdown 7022 0 6.172e-5 0.120 0 1 0 0 decentralization shift – nursing homes 6957 0 5.906e-5 0.107 0 1 0 0 decentralization shift healthcare 6962 0 5.716e-5 0.101 0 1 0 0 satisfaction with govt. performance managing lockdown 7121 3 2.060e-4 1.370 1 5 3 4 satisfaction with govt. performance managing nursing homes 7111 2 1.712e-4 0.944 1 5 1 3 satisfaction with govt. performance managing healthcare 7109 3 1.998e-4 1.284 1 5 2 3 central government (vote to psoe or up; coalition in the central government) 4615 0 1.358e-4 0.250 0 1 0 1 regional government (vote to the political party in the regional government) 7175 0 7.978e-5 0.209 0 1 0 1 vote to right-wing opposition parties in the cg (pp+vox) 4615 0 1.151e-4 0.180 0 1 0 0 degree of autonomism 6531 6 3.412e-4 3.162 1.33 10 4.667 7 attribution of responsibility for managing lockdown 7080 1 1.091e-4 0.380 -1 1 0 1 attribution of responsibility for managing nursing homes 6947 0 1.478e-4 0.671 -1 1 -1 1 attribution of responsibility for managing healthcare 6994 0 1.402e-4 0.612 -1 1 -1 1 incidence of covid-19 (7 days) 7175 101.234 0.014 6094.319 14.113 440.465 78.081 179.554 subjective social class 7175 4 2.243e-4 1.649 1 7 3 5 education 7175 4 1.992e-4 1.300 1 5 3 5 ideology 7041 5 4.582e-4 6.626 0 10 2 5 interest in politics 7148 3 1.999e-4 1.299 1 5 2 4 trust in regional government 7130 3 1.961e-4 1.245 1 5 2 4 contact health authority suspicion covid-19 7131 0 5.831e-5 0.110 0 1 0 0 vulnerable employment status 6959 0 6.933e-5 0.148 0 1 0 0 income level 5611 2 2.365e-4 1.121 1 5 2 3 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: ##-## issn 2562-8429 39 table a.9: characteristics of the netquest panel, survey sample design, sample structure and validation methods netquest panel at the time of survey • 157,535 panelists in spain • average response rate: 50-55% • profile of spain’s internet usage rate: 82% • age range: 16-24 = 11%; 25-34 = 25%; 35-44 = 28%; 45-54 = 22%; +55 = 14% • gender: female 64%; male 36% • socioeconomic status: high 33%; middle-high 18%; middle-middle 26%; middle-low 9%; low 14% survey sample design • scope: national (spain) • universe: people over 18 years of age • size: 7175 interviews • average survey duration: 11 minutes • fieldwork: conducted through online surveys using netquest's online panel. • field work period: august 30 to september 23, 2020 • initial sample design by quotas o gender : male 49%; female 51% o age: 18-24 12%; 25-34 15%; 35-44 22%; 45-54 20%; 55-65 18%; 65+ 13% o education ▪ no education (unfinished primary studies) 5% ▪ first grade (school certificate, 1st stage egb, more or less 10 years) 8% ▪ second grade. 1st cycle (school graduate, or egb 2nd stage, 1st and 2nd eso-1st cycleup to 14 years) 16% ▪ 2nd cycle (fp iº and iiº, bachiller superior, bup, 3º and 4º of eso (2nd cycle) cou, preu, 1º and 2º bachillerato, up to 18 years old) 33%. ▪ 1st cycle (equivalent to technical engineer, 3 years, university schools, technical engineers, technical architects, experts, teachers, ats, university graduates, 3 years of career, social graduates, social assistants, etc.) bachelor's degree, degree. 2nd cycle (university students, higher graduates, faculties, higher technical schools, etc.) master's degree. doctorate 38% sample structure, participation rate and method of calculation the participation rate is the calculation between the total number of participants and the total number of invitationi. date invitations participations response rate invitation #1 14/08/2020 17:27 799 535 67 invitation #2 25/08/2020 11:24 331 203 61 invitation #3 25/08/2020 12:42 176 83 47 invitation #4 31/08/2020 13:59 245 87 36 invitation #5 31/08/2020 16:48 371 303 82 invitation #6 01/09/2020 14:05 393 172 44 invitation #7 02/09/2020 11:34 356 150 42 invitation #8 02/09/2020 11:53 752 453 60 invitation #9 03/09/2020 13:39 325 141 43 invitation #10 03/09/2020 19:03 594 289 49 invitation #11 04/09/2020 11:30 760 500 66 invitation #12 04/09/2020 18:12 727 495 68 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: ##-## issn 2562-8429 40 invitation #13 04/09/2020 18:18 489 218 45 invitation #14 05/09/2020 11:36 410 203 50 invitation #15 07/09/2020 13:01 1024 694 68 invitation #16 08/09/2020 14:27 690 431 62 invitation #17 08/09/2020 18:24 145 62 43 invitation #18 09/09/2020 9:24 1521 866 57 invitation #19 09/09/2020 17:09 345 145 42 invitation #20 09/09/2020 18:30 781 455 58 invitation #21 10/09/2020 13:07 1311 913 70 invitation #22 17/09/2020 11:40 675 182 27 invitation #23 17/09/2020 17:55 265 103 39 invitation #24 18/09/2020 10:15 250 123 49 invitation #25 18/09/2020 10:25 110 29 26 invitation #26 18/09/2020 15:20 254 186 73 invitation #27 18/09/2020 15:30 178 108 61 invitation #28 19/09/2020 17:27 75 36 48 invitation #29 19/09/2020 17:39 86 56 65 invitation #30 21/09/2020 14:05 238 167 70 invitation #31 21/09/2020 14:05 287 182 63 invitation #32 21/09/2020 16:46 551 189 34 invitation #33 21/09/2020 17:53 96 44 46 invitation #34 22/09/2020 10:15 171 51 30 invitation #35 22/09/2020 10:20 116 59 51 invitation #36 22/09/2020 10:35 171 72 42 invitation #37 22/09/2020 16:55 53 24 45 invitation #38 23/09/2020 9:30 2 0 0 invitation #39 23/09/2020 12:45 481 273 57 validation methods 1. netquest includes trick questions such as "how much is one plus two" or "what year are we in?" so that if respondents fail, they are screen out of the survey. 2. netques have a control of speeders according to the average duration of the survey, if the person takes less than 20% of the duration to answer, they are also screen out. 3. at the beginning of the survey netquest ask for gender and age, and we apply a control that if this does not match our database it is filtered out. 4. netquest apply recaptcha. 5. netquest has a control called relevant id, which identifies each panelist as to avoid the same person can not do the same survey twice. 6. the authors requested an additional validation method as to filter out straigthliners. table a.10: ols models for robustness checks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) satisfaction with govt. performance 0.012 (0.009) 0.017 (0.010) -0.005 (0.010) 0.002 (0.012) -0.004 (0.009) 0.003 (0.010) canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: ##-## issn 2562-8429 41 central government -0.010 (0.022) 0.003 (0.026) 0.054* (0.024) 0.047 (0.029) 0.078*** (0.023) 0.067* (0.026) regional government -0.023 (0.018) 0.002 (0.022) -0.022 (0.020) -0.007 (0.024) -0.027 (0.019) -0.009 (0.022) vote to right-wing opposition parties in the cg (pp+vox) -0.066* (0.027) -0.026 (0.033) -0.077* (0.031) -0.035 (0.037) -0.041 (0.029) -0.020 (0.035) degree of autonomism -0.010 (0.005) -0.004 (0.006) -0.011 (0.006) -0.009 (0.007) -0.013* (0.006) -0.010 (0.007) attribution of responsibility -0.063*** (0.015) -0.055*** (0.016) -0.090*** (0.013) -0.080*** (0.015) -0.082*** (0.012) -0.085*** (0.014) incidence of covid19 (7 days) -0.00002 (0.0001) 0.00004 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) subjective social class 0.027** (0.009) 0.010 (0.010) 0.006 (0.010) education 0.015 (0.010) 0.008 (0.011) -0.006 (0.011) ideology -0.003 (0.005) -0.007 (0.006) -0.004 (0.005) interest in politics -0.002 (0.010) 0.019 (0.011) 0.025* (0.010) trust in regional government -0.030** (0.010) -0.025* (0.011) -0.026* (0.011) contact health authority suspicion covid-19 -0.020 (0.029) -0.031 (0.032) -0.004 (0.030) vulnerable employment status -0.034 (0.027) -0.041 (0.030) -0.052 (0.028) income level -0.025* (0.011) -0.003 (0.012) -0.012 (0.011) constant 0.0008 (0.046) -0.068 (0.080) 0.056 (0.046) -0.003 (0.084) 0.047 (0.044) 0.023 (0.080) n 4290 3562 4197 3481 4227 3507 r2 0.008 0.013 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.025 f test 5.469*** 3.093*** 17.042*** 5.766*** 14.309*** 5.907*** notes: model 1 and 4 refers to the management of the lockdown, while model 2 and 5 refers to the nursing homes and model 3 and 6 to healthcare. standard errors are in parenthesis. (o)p<0.1 *p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: ##-## issn 2562-8429 42 table a.11: separation plots of logit models to assess goodness of fit model 1 centralization model 2 centralization model 3 centralization model 4 centralization model 5 centralization model 6 centralization canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: ##-## issn 2562-8429 43 model 1 decentralization model 2 decentralization model 4 decentralizationmodel 3 decentralization model 5 decentralization model 6 decentralization canadian journal of european and russian studies, 17(2) 2024: ##-## issn 2562-8429 44 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2024 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 28 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 internarrativity of authoritarian rule: a narrative analysis of vladimir putin’s speeches between 2012 and 2019 ignat vershinin 1, higher school of economics, moscow, russia abstract this article examines the concept of internarrativity in vladimir putin’s speeches from 2012 to 2019, focusing on how interconnected narratives legitimize authoritarian governance. using discourse analysis and qualitative coding of 201 speeches, the study identifies 40 key narratives, emphasizing their interplay in constructing a cohesive “web of meaning.” the analysis reveals that the “strong hand” narrative, central to putin’s rhetoric, is reinforced through interrelated themes of historical resilience, sovereignty, external threats, and moral superiority. these narratives collectively justify centralized leadership as essential for russia’s domestic stability and international influence. by linking internarrativity to broader fields such as international relations, public diplomacy, and narrative theory, the study highlights the dynamic nature of political discourse in shaping national identity and geopolitical positioning. it also identifies gaps for future research, including the socio-cultural resonance of narratives and their adaptability in evolving political contexts. this work advances understanding of narrative strategies in authoritarian regimes. 1 ignat vershinin is an associate professor at the department of international regional studies of the higher school of economics in moscow, russia 29 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 introduction since the beginning of its conflict with ukraine in 2014, russia’s political elites have crafted a range of narratives to justify their actions and strengthen domestic and international support (claessen 2021; fridrichová 2023; khaldarova 2019). like many states—though to varying extents—russia employs a combination of communication strategies, including public diplomacy (pd), propaganda, misinformation/disinformation, and “fake news” to advance its objectives. while the boundaries between these terms are often blurred, they collectively form a puzzle of how narratives are constructed, disseminated, and received. despite extensive attention to the mechanisms of these strategies, less focus has been given to what makes russia’s communication narratives compelling and effective both domestically and abroad. this article argues that much of the scholarship on russia’s communication strategies conceptualizes narratives narrowly as standalone “stories” created for propaganda purposes, rather than as dynamic and interconnected components of broader social meaning-making processes. this limited view tends to prioritize “what”-type questions—such as “what narratives does russia use?” or “what reactions do they elicit?” consequently, many studies implicitly adopt a universalist logic that portrays russian narratives as relatively stable constructs, such as those emphasizing “great power” status, sovereignty, or external threats (dajani et al. 2021; götz and staun 2022; maksimmon and o’loughlin 2017). while these works offer valuable insights, they often overlook more nuanced, post-structuralist inquiries into the how—that is, how are these narratives constructed and how their meanings emerge. existing literature often provides valuable insights by deconstructing narratives into elements or components and examining their connections (claessen 202; miskimmon et al. 2014; roselle et al. 2014). while these approaches have significantly advanced the understanding of narrative structures and their functions, this article suggests that they might not fully capture the complexity of narrative production and influence in certain contexts. specifically, it argues for complementing these methods with an approach that views narratives as mutually connected and legitimized through their interplay rather than as isolated units. to contribute to this ongoing discourse, the article introduces the concept of internarrativity—a framework for analyzing narratives as interconnected webs of meaning that reinforce and legitimize one another. by building on and extending traditional notions of intertextuality, this approach emphasizes the dynamic and relational nature of narratives within broader discursive systems, offering a deeper understanding of their construction and impact. the study focuses on vladimir putin’s public discourse from 2012 to 2019, a period encompassing his third presidential term and the pre-pandemic years. this timeframe allows for an analysis of narratives that laid the groundwork for justifying key geopolitical actions, including the annexation of crimea and tensions with the west, while avoiding the narrative shifts prompted by the covid19 pandemic. by qualitatively analyzing 201 of putin’s speeches, the article highlights how internarrative connections—such as the “strong hand” narrative—construct and legitimize authoritarian power2 through appeals to historical resilience, sovereignty, and external threats. this article aims to contribute to the literature on narrative analysis and russian political communication by addressing two primary gaps: the methodological challenge of analyzing narratives as dynamic and interconnected, and the empirical need to understand the specific mechanisms of influence within putin’s rhetoric. the subsequent sections discuss shortcomings in contemporary approaches to narrative analysis, introduce the concept of internarrativity, and outline the research methodology, which emphasizes inductive coding and discourse analysis. finally, the article demonstrates the application of internarrativity through the case study of the 2 here “authoritarian power” and “authoritarian rule” are defined by vladimir putin through the narrative of a “strong hand” rather than as a compilation of objective characteristics that define “authoritarian” countries. 30 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 “strong hand” narrative—a key element in russia’s portrayal of its domestic and foreign policies under authoritarian rule. narratives and propaganda russian narratives, especially as part of its propaganda, have been a topic of scholarly focus for decades, with their roots often traced back to the soviet era. in recent years, this focus has intensified due to russia’s interference in the 2016 us presidential election, its military operations in syria, and the ongoing russia-ukraine conflict. as a result, analyses of russia’s communication strategies often concentrate on narratives tied to geopolitical conflicts. scholars have identified various adversarial narratives employed by russia, including the promotion of the “superiority of russian values and institutions’” (gerber and zavisca 2016), conspiracy theories (yablokov 2015), portrayals of an “aggressive nato” (pynnöniemi and rácz 2016), anti-establishment sentiments (fisher 2020), and narratives designed to foster disruption (cull 2016). these studies have greatly advanced the understanding of russia’s narrative strategies, particularly in conflict contexts. however, many approaches tend to conceptualize narratives in ways that may not fully capture their relational and dynamic nature. a dominant trend in the literature has been to frame russian narratives through the lens of statecentred propaganda, disinformation, or the distortion of reality. scholars have developed concepts such as strategic narrative (hagström and gustafsson 2021; miskimmon et al. 2014; schmitt 2018) to emphasize the role of governments and political elites in shaping public opinion. combined with a conflict-oriented focus, this has provided fertile ground for studying russia’s strategic narratives (götz and staun 2022; hansson et al. 2023; popkova 2020; roselle 2017; szostek 2018). at the same time, these approaches often reduce narratives to measurable and observable binaries, such as reality versus the story. as dajani (2021, 18) notes, russia’s strategic narratives are far more complex and adaptive, often shaped by ongoing interactions with audiences and sociocultural contexts. this dynamic nature is sometimes overlooked in favour of seeing narratives as fixed systems with predetermined meanings. this issue is evident in how social contexts are often omitted from analyses of russian state narratives, with an overemphasis on the state-to-media model. for example, tyushka (2022, 4) claims that “media…always echoes the kremlin-set discursive frames,” one of which is “gayropa”—a homophobic slur used in narratives opposing lgbtq+ rights. while the kremlin undeniably employs this narrative, reducing it to a weaponized frame overlooks the deeper societal meanings attached to sexuality and gender in russia (morris and garibyan 2021) and ukraine (shevtsova 2020). a broader analysis is needed to fully understand how such narratives resonate with or challenge existing societal norms and values. similarly, while many scholars analyze russian narratives as combinations of elements, components, or themes (bacon 2012; khaldarova 2016; berzina 2018; götz and staun 2022; fridrichová 2023), fewer explore the ways these narratives interact to construct broader systems of meaning. tolz and hutchings (2023, 6), for instance, examine how narratives often reference shared discourses, a perspective aligned with the approach of this article. however, their framework risks conflating narratives and discourses, as derek hook (2001, 16) critiques, potentially obscuring the specific relational dynamics of narratives within discursive systems. recent scholarship underscores the importance of aligning strategic narratives with local political myths (schmitt 2018) and analyzing them within broader discursive contexts (pamment 2014). for example, faizullaev and cornut (2017, 598) highlight that narratives must be understood as part of the processes that enact and compete with other narratives. these perspectives reflect a growing interest in poststructuralist approaches, which emphasize the relational and contingent nature of narrative construction and meaning-making. this article contributes to this ongoing 31 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 discussion by exploring how narratives collectively construct social reality, with a specific focus on their interconnectedness. to advance this understanding, the concept of internarrativity is introduced as a framework for analyzing narratives as interconnected, dynamic, and mutually reinforcing. unlike approaches that isolate narratives as standalone constructs, internarrativity highlights how their meaning and effectiveness depend on their relationships with one another. for example, the narrative of strong russian leadership is not an independent construct; it is continually reinforced by interrelated narratives, including those of historical resilience, western aggression, and moral superiority. by analyzing these narratives as interconnected webs of meaning, this article seeks to provide deeper insights into how they gain legitimacy, adapt to shifting political realities, and influence domestic and international audiences. the concept of internarrativity narratives are more than mere stories; they represent structures of meaning-making that are crucial for constructing realities, enabling individuals and societies to “know, understand, and make sense of the social world” (somers 1994, 606; see also hayden 2013). these narratives are deeply embedded in social, political, and historical contexts that shape both their creation and reception. on the one hand, narratives facilitate the formation of collective identities and shared meanings (adler 2013; groulier and tordjman 2020; neumann 2002). on the other hand, the power to construct narratives is unevenly distributed, allowing certain actors to exert disproportionate influence, which can result in narratives that are forceful (mattern 2001) or even oppressive (duttabergman 2006). within states, governments and political elites hold significant, though not uncontested, power in shaping dominant narratives. the ability of states to project narratives internationally, however, is less absolute. domestically constructed narratives often lose efficacy abroad due to the state’s limited capacity to influence foreign audiences or divergences in intersubjective knowledge—widely shared meanings formed through social interaction (finnemore and sikkink 2001; heylighen 1997; berger and luckmann (1967, 24) aptly highlight this issue: “the others have a perspective on the common world that is not identical with mine.” this underscores how narratives’ acceptance and legitimacy vary across societies and groups, depending on their compatibility with pre-existing meanings. traditional positivist approaches to narrative analysis frequently overlook the socially constructed and contingent nature of narratives. such approaches often assume that external realities can be objectively known (patomäki and wight 2000; morçöl 2001, 382), which risks imposing a “takenfor-granted” worldview on the analysis (durkheim 2013; pouliot 2007, 364). this can obscure the role of social and cultural contexts in shaping narratives. in contrast, post-structuralist approaches, such as the one employed in this study, emphasize the dynamic, socially constructed nature of narratives, acknowledging that they evolve through the interplay of historical, cultural, and political factors. this research adopts a post-structuralist perspective to examine how narratives in vladimir putin’s discourse are constructed and reinforced, building on existing studies while addressing gaps in their methodologies. unlike analyses that treat narratives as isolated units, this approach delves into the relational dynamics between narratives. hansen (2016, 107–108) observes that post-structuralist approaches are particularly valuable for exploring how texts connect to each other, recognizing that narratives are deeply rooted in past discourses and thus exist within a limited range of potential interpretations. this study extends the concept of intertextuality, first introduced by kristeva (1980) in linguistic studies, to the analysis of political narratives. kristeva demonstrated that texts do not exist in isolation but are situated within webs of meaning that challenge or reinforce cultural norms and values. hansen (2006) brought this concept into international relations (ir), arguing that texts 32 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 within political discourse rely on one another to construct authority and legitimacy. texts, hansen (2006, 49) notes, work together to create cohesive discourses by mutually reinforcing each other. in this study, the goal is to explore how narratives interact similarly, drawing on facts and knowledge from one to another to construct foreign policy discourses (hansen 2006, 51). moving beyond intertextuality, this study introduces the concept of internarrativity, which examines how narratives themselves interact within shared social contexts to reinforce mutual legitimacy (hagström and gustafsson 2021). while intertextuality addresses the relationships between texts, internarrativity focuses on the dynamic interplay between narratives as interconnected elements of broader discursive systems. as kristeva (1980, 66) states, every text is an absorption and transformation of others; similarly, narratives are shaped by pre-existing cultural, historical, and intersubjective knowledge. although the term “internarrativity” has been employed in feminist and critical studies (maan 2009; way 2015), these applications often focus on the expression of identities. this article makes a step toward expanding the concept into the realm of politics and international relations. responding to hagström and gustafsson’s (2019, 400) call to broaden its empirical and theoretical applications, this study explores how narratives derive their power from interconnections with other narratives. internarrativity is particularly relevant in the context of political narratives, where its relational nature is essential for understanding legitimacy. such interconnectedness ensures that narratives are not isolated but are co-constructed within webs of meaning, enabling them to adapt to shifting political realities. for researchers, internarrativity offers a nuanced tool to analyze how narratives interact and shape public opinion. in areas such as propaganda and public diplomacy, it reveals how governments, media, and civil society actors construct and disseminate narratives that resonate with audiences. by uncovering the relationships between narratives, scholars can provide deeper insights into political communication strategies and their impact. for policymakers, understanding internarrativity enables the crafting of more effective communication strategies. by accounting for how narratives interact with pre-existing beliefs and social contexts, policymakers can identify contradictions and craft counter-narratives to challenge or subvert unfavourable depictions. recognizing internarrativity also allows authors to create more persuasive narratives by linking them to historical or cultural traditions that resonate with target audiences. methodology the study develops a methodological approach to utilize the term “internarrativity” and demonstrate its complexity. firstly, it focuses on public speeches made by vladimir putin between 2012 and 2019, which marks putin’s third term in power, and includes the period before the covid-19 pandemic, as the latter brought about significant changes in communication that involved fewer public events and a shift in some of the dominant narratives. while putin is not the only person who defines how russia is presented, his speeches are crucial, as he is both the primary face of the nation and the authorized voice of its dominant discourse (milliken 1999, 233). in that sense, both constitutionally and politically, putin serves as the principal figurehead of the nation.. the decision to focus on public speeches over printed texts or documents is explained by the necessity to analyze discourse and narratives in a “day-to-day context” (wiener 2009, 188) and “where society is being made” (cruickshank 2012, 43). this approach is in line with the constructivist view that “social recognition stands to be constructed by social interaction” (wiener 2009, 179) and that it is important to recover meanings from agents directly (pouliot 2007) rather than analyzing their reflection in the media. furthermore, given the main goal of analyzing communication narratives, the data collection was limited to speeches or public interactions that involved journalists or were addressed to both the foreign and domestic public. the data was collected from the official government website kremlin.ru for russian-language documents and en.kremlin.ru for english-language documents. first, all vladimir putin speeches were collected 33 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 with some documents being omitted, such as official announcements, ceremonial/protocol documents, expressions of sympathies (e.g., in response to earthquakes, terrorist attacks, etc) or congratulatory statements. speeches were excluded if they were purely procedural and lacked significant narrative elements. in a second step, the speeches were analyzed using nvivo software, a qualitative software tool for capturing, collecting, coding, and analyzing large amounts of text. the analysis followed an inductive approach with no pre-established codes. coding took place in three stages. first, the documents were read to identify and label the main narratives—those that appeared consistently. second, the documents were read again to assign these codes. third, as narratives function as “collective memories” (wendt 2004, 313) and help construct a “common lifeworld” (risse 2000, 10) or notions of “self” and “other” (campbell 1998), they were organized into “self” and “other” categories to reflect their socially constructed nature. the description of russia, the russian government, culture, and history were categorized as “self.” the description of other countries, political and non-political actors associated with politics, constituted the construction of “others.” the subsequent stage involved identifying narratives through an interpretative approach and discourse analysis, following wiener’s (2009) framework, which involves a skeptical reading and interrogation, coding, and the formulation of tentative hypotheses. the approach taken here views discourse as the realm where shared meaning is generated, sustained, altered, and thus fundamentally shapes our understanding of the social world (holzscheiter 2014, 144). to differentiate it from ordinary written or spoken text, discourse is seen as encompassing “ideas, knowledge, beliefs, and practice” (sunderland 2004, p. 31), which are brought to life through narratives. consequently, the primary focus of this research centers on identifying discourse through narratives, which serve as the underlying structure for making meaning and constructing our perception of the world around us, allowing us to comprehend, interpret, and give meaning to the social fabric (somers 1994, 606). narratives are delineated as specific stories or interpretations of social reality, encompassing the perspectives of entities such as the state or political elites, their self-concept, portrayal of others, and depiction of events. this study also underscores the concept of internarrativity, highlighting the interconnected nature of narratives generated by various actors within the context of their social reality. these connections are illuminated through the examination of the historically grounded backdrop against which these narratives unfold. the research involved gathering and scrutinizing 201 textual sources (appendix 1), encompassing interviews, press conferences, meetings of the all-russian youth educational forum “seliger” and expert forum “valdai,” yearly direct lines with the russian president, and similar events. from these materials, 40 primary narratives (appendix 2) were distinguished, encapsulating the discourse on russia from 2012 to 2019. among these narratives, 21 depicted a self-representation. conversely, 19 narratives depicted “others.” in addition, three narrative groups were also identified. however, due to space limitations, it is not feasible to provide detailed descriptions and examples for each individual narrative within the main body of this article. therefore, all essential information is included in appendix 2. in order to operationalize the concept of internarrativity, an additional methodological approach was used. after collecting data and identifying narratives, the research examined how these narratives relate to one another, focusing on their intersections and reinforcing mechanisms. it was done by identifying points of convergence, such as thematic overlap, rhetorical continuities, crossreferential themes, and temporal sequencing. 34 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 thematic overlap the “misrepresented” narrative and the “disrespected” narrative both emphasize the idea that russia is unfairly treated by external actors, particularly western countries. together, these narratives overlap thematically in portraying an external world that undervalues or distorts russia’s role and intentions. this thematic alignment reinforces a shared sentiment of grievance and victimization, bolstering the argument that russia must assert itself internationally to combat these injustices. rhetorical continuities the “defensive” narrative and the “enemy need” narrative reinforce each other through consistent rhetorical patterns that emphasize external threats and the necessity of protective measures. the “defensive” narrative frames russia’s actions as necessary responses to aggression or destabilizing influences, while the “enemy need” narrative suggests that western countries manufacture hostility against russia to consolidate their own power. shared rhetorical constructs, such as the idea of external forces targeting russia, create a continuity that strengthens both narratives. cross-referential themes: the “natural place” narrative, which argues for russia’s rightful position as a global power, intersects with the “russian necessity” narrative, which emphasizes the indispensability of russia in resolving global challenges. both narratives share the theme of russia’s pivotal role in international relations, with the “natural place” narrative providing the aspirational vision and the “russian necessity” narrative offering pragmatic evidence of russia’s contributions. by crossreferencing russia’s historical significance and current geopolitical actions, these narratives collectively assert russia’s indispensability and legitimacy on the global stage. temporal sequencing: the “sovereignty” narrative and the “betrayal” narrative align through temporal sequencing. the “betrayal” narrative recounts instances of perceived western duplicity, such as nato expansion, as historical precedents that validate the “sovereignty” narrative’s emphasis on independence and self-determination. by framing sovereignty as a response to past betrayals, the narratives are temporally linked, with one providing the historical justification for the other’s forward-looking claims about the necessity of safeguarding russia’s autonomy. internarrativity and webs of meaning to more clearly illustrate the value of an internarrative approach, it is helpful to contrast it with hutchings and szostek (2015, 236–237), who briefly described the sources of putin’s legitimacy. they identified several key elements that contribute to this legitimacy, such as the maintenance of internal order following russia’s near-collapse and the protection of russia from external threats and humiliation. these observations point to a master narrative of putin’s legitimacy, built from several distinct narratives that each play a role in constructing this overarching image. while hutchings and szostek highlight the presence of multiple legitimating elements, their analysis, like much of the literature, treats these narratives as separate factors, loosely contributing to a common theme. what this misses is the interconnected nature of these narratives and how they work in concert to reinforce each other. an internarrative or intertextual approach would emphasize how these narratives are not just parallel but mutually legitimating. for instance, the narrative of internal order does not simply coexist with the narrative of protection from external threats; instead, the two interact and reinforce one another, weaving a more cohesive and persuasive portrayal of putin as both a domestic stabilizer and a protector against foreign enemies. this relational perspective adds depth to our understanding of how such grand narratives are constructed and sustained over time. 35 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 regarding the application of the internarrativity concept, the narratives should be viewed within the social context in which they are enacted and in close interrelation with each other. this allows not only to access the intended meaning behind narratives, which the literature predominantly ignores, but also to understand the process of meaning/knowledge legitimization. among the prominent narratives, the “strong hand” is one of the central narratives that legitimize vladimir putin’s power and could, arguably, serve as a legitimizing element for future russian leaders as well. its significance has been evident since the start of putin’s first term, when calls for a “strong hand” response (russell 2002, 85) during the chechen wars resonated with the russian public and played a crucial role in legitimizing his presidency. the political system is one of the major characteristics of a state. it defines how a country engages in the international arena, governs itself domestically, and is perceived by the rest of the world. accordingly, discourse surrounding the political system constitutes a central element of the country’s communicative efforts. after the collapse of the soviet union, russia’s political system was often characterized as authoritarian or as an autocracy (gel’man 2015; hassner 2008; safire 1994). even before putin’s munich speech in 2007,3 the western media generally treated russia as “the authoritarian, imperial power; the bully; the aggressor” (macgilchrist 2007, 76). however, the external imposition of authoritarian meanings should be separated from the internal definition of being “authoritarian” presented by the russian political elites. the “depersonification” narrative aims to challenge the international characterization of russia as an authoritarian state. nevertheless, this effort often falls short, as russia under putin is widely viewed as de-democratizing or nation-consolidating—rather than distancing itself from—its authoritarian identity (gunitsky and tsygankov 2018). while russia is classified as authoritarian by international standards, this article focuses on examining how russia’s political elites construct and articulate their understanding of political power, which is encapsulated in what this study terms the “strong hand” narrative. the analysis of putin’s speeches gives insight and information on how russia’s political elites construct a “regime of truth” (foucault 1977, 2014)—a dominant understanding of the political system. this perspective is disseminated through media and other communication tools to domestic and foreign audiences in an attempt to justify and garner support for preserving russia’s political system. this narrative is central to portraying russia, as it embodies the model of both its external and internal behaviour. the main purpose is to demonstrate russia’s sovereignty, independence, integrity in decision-making, adherence to principles, effectiveness, and, most importantly, the stability that it provides. to ensure all this, a strong hand is required to guide the country’s development and foreign policy. nevertheless, especially from the position of liberal democracies, those narratives seem ineffective in taking into account historical and sociocultural contexts. there are several elements of putin’s discursive practices or webs of meanings that legitimize the need for a “strong hand” (figure 1). 3 in his speech at the 43rd munich security conference in 2007, putin condemned us unilateralism and nato expansion, marking a clear break with post-cold war cooperation and a significant turning point in the reassertion of russian geopolitical ambitions globally. 36 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 figure 1: putin’s discursive practices empirical findings there are several major points that need to be highlighted. firstly, putin employs a range of narratives, building a positive view not only of russia’s “self” but of authoritarian rule as well. using russia’s experience in the 1990s (the “1990s transition” narrative), he argues for the necessity of implementing a firm and stable policy to combat existing instabilities. in this context, he uses the political systems of other countries as an example of a volatile decision-making process, which is associated with democratic institutions and elections that could lead to significant changes in policy. this narrative is further supported by references to the policies of former us president donald trump during his first term in office, illustrating how partisan struggles can damage policies. putin portrays the authoritarian tone of russia’s political system as being in line with the old-style democracy of majority rule. however, to mitigate the authoritarian tone of the old-style soviet power, putin presents the narrative of “depersonification,” which is counter to the political elite’s positioning of russia’s “self” to the soviet legacy. since soviet history is often depicted through the image of authoritarian society and joseph stalin, depersonification was used to create a distance between putin and stalin, as well as the modern russian state and the soviet past. those three narratives together counter-position the desired identity to an external (through the narrative of depersonification) and previously existing internal images (through the narratives of soviet legacy and 1990s transition). secondly, three types of comparative narratives (comparison/positive type 1, comparative/positive type 2, and comparative/negative) are used to validate a russian approach to governing and authoritarian rule. the two types of positive comparison are somewhat contradictory. the first of these emphasizes normativity while the second highlights exceptionalism. the normativity theme is reinforced through the narratives of “cooperative,” “lawfulness,” and “sovereignty,” which position russia in a positive light within the international community. the exceptionality theme highlights russia’s uniqueness, supported by the narratives of “responsive,” “not conflicting,” 37 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 “moral,” “inclusive,” and “defensive.” finally, the negative comparison reinforces russia’s exceptionalism by counter-positioning it to mostly, but not exclusively, western countries, using the narratives of “us mild critics,” “us harsh critics,” “morally weak,” “politically weak,” “imposition,” “enemy need,” and “economically weak.” thirdly, putin successfully leverages the issue of ontological security, which refers to “experience oneself as a whole” or the continuation of identity over time (mitzen 2006, 342). following the collapse of the soviet union, russia’s national identity faced a crisis, as its former self-image as a central or great power was disrupted. while modern russia lacks the soviet union’s former economic and political influence, the pursuit of ontological security remains difficult, as constructing a stable identity in the post-soviet context is a complex and ongoing process. the narrative of russia’s “natural place” reflects this struggle, highlighting that ontological security has not yet been achieved and continues to fuel nationalist sentiment. at the core of this ontological framework is the “persistent” narrative, where putin represents the “strong hand” unyielding in the face of adversity, offering an image of unwavering stability. this persistence is framed as essential for ontological security, ensuring the nation’s continuity as it moves forward. for instance, putin’s firm stance on international issues like crimea or syria is depicted as evidence of russia’s consistent identity, signalling the strength of its leadership in protecting national sovereignty. closely linked is the narrative of “russian necessity,” where putin asserts that russia plays an indispensable role in the global order. here, the “strong hand” is positioned as the mechanism through which this role is fulfilled. by presenting russia as vital not only to its own population but to global balance and stability, putin strengthens the argument that only centralized, decisive leadership can safeguard russia’s unique position, especially as a counterweight to western influence. the “slowly changing” narrative further reinforces this ontological vision by portraying russia’s transformation as deliberate and tightly controlled. putin emphasizes that the “strong hand” ensures reforms proceed cautiously, preserving core national values while adapting to shifting global conditions. this portrayal supports a sense of stability and strategic coherence, allowing russia to pursue economic and military modernization without compromising its internal unity or cultural integrity. the accompanying “logical concerns” narrative acknowledges the real challenges facing the country, while reinforcing a steady and calculated approach to overcoming them under strong leadership. the “economic power” and “being first” narratives celebrate russia’s economic performance and historical greatness, with putin positioning the “strong hand” as the driving force behind russia’s resurgence as a global leader in areas like space exploration and military technology. by highlighting russia’s leadership in cutting-edge sectors, putin reinforces a sense of national pride and progress, essential to the construction of a confident and continuous identity. finally, the “alternative” narrative contrasts russia’s governance model with the perceived failures of western liberal democracies. putin presents the “strong hand” as a necessary corrective to the “outdated” liberal order, offering a viable alternative to the west’s approach to governance and international relations. this narrative reinforces russia’s sovereignty, asserting its right to define its own path without external interference. together, these narratives weave a cohesive ontological strategy in which the “strong hand” becomes essential to preserving and evolving russia’s national identity. through the interconnected ideas of “persistent,” “russian necessity,” “slowly changing,” “being first,” and “alternative,” putin justifies centralized leadership as the cornerstone of russia’s ontological security, portraying it as vital for the nation’s survival and resurgence on the global stage. fourthly, a distinct group of narratives centers on the construction of the “other,” positioning external actors as morally and strategically oppositional to russia, or as “external threats.” this group includes the “threat” and “double standards” narratives, which complement earlier narratives such as “misrepresented” and “disrespected.” the “threat” narrative focuses on external 38 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 dangers, predominantly nato, while the “double standards” narrative highlights the unequal treatment of russia and other non-western countries compared to western nations. these narratives collectively amplify the portrayal of external forces as unjust and antagonistic, reinforcing the necessity of a strong, centralized leadership to protect russia’s interests. putin employs these narratives to construct a sense of external threats, instability, and injustice in international politics. this framing ties into the historical pattern of perceiving russia as a nation under siege, requiring a resolute defence against external hostility (tsygankov 2016). these discourses are echoed in previous studies, such as kragh and åsberg (2017), who highlight the persistent narrative of external manipulation and hostility toward russia. while critics may view this as a “paranoid and zero-sum worldview” (herd 2019, 21), the focus here is on how putin uses these narratives to justify authoritarian measures and consolidate power. the sense of an embattled “self” needing protection is particularly evident in the context of international sanctions, especially following the escalation of the russo-ukrainian war in february 2022. the levada center (2022b) reports that 67 percent of russians believe sanctions primarily target the population, and 56 percent feel that many countries condemning russia’s actions exhibit elements of “misrepresented” and “disrespected” narratives. the “threat” and “double standards” narratives intersect with these perceptions, painting a picture of a hostile and manipulative international community. by emphasizing the dual notions of external threats and unequal treatment, these narratives bolster domestic support for the “strong hand” regime. they serve to legitimize the political elite’s actions, portraying authoritarianism as a necessary response to a world fraught with hostility and manipulation. these interconnected narratives reinforce the need for strong leadership as essential for safeguarding russia’s sovereignty and identity. putin’s discursive practices frame “others” with volatile policies as threats to both russia and the international system, warranting a “responsive” narrative and “strong” approach. this creates a sense of external instability and justifies the need for russia to adopt a “strong hand” regime. the “others” are also depicted as actors who rely on the us—depicted as pursuing imperialistic policies—and as those who “misrepresent” or view russia as an “enemy” to justify their policies. this serves to delegitimize western narratives and reinforces russia’s self-legitimation. within this broader narrative framework of external threats, a particularly significant discursive move involves the moral characterization of “others.” putin’s use of discursive practices that frame external actors in terms of morality or immorality enables him to portray their actions not as rational or strategic, but as stemming from intrinsic, even essential, traits. through the narratives of “irrational,” “conflictual,” and “overestimated,” putin crafts an emotional framework that not only legitimizes russia’s political elite but also delegitimizes opposing or western narratives. these discourses suggest that it is not the people of foreign countries who seek bad relations with russia but rather their governments (“politicians” narrative), reinforcing the notion that russia’s adversaries are driven by irrational or conflictual impulses. in this way, putin portrays his leadership as rational and resolute in the face of a hostile external environment, framing russia as a victim of unjust governmental actions rather than the target of widespread international antagonism. moral characterization plays a crucial role in convincing the public that although official statements from others may appear peaceful, their “true” intentions are hidden and hostile. the “betrayal” narrative, rooted in the 1990s, amplifies this perception. building on the notion of a broken promise about nato expansion eastward, putin justifies the perception of “others” as inherently capable of betraying russia again. the narrative of “betrayal” is closely tied to russia's historical and cultural understanding of international relations, where the experience of perceived deceit feeds into a broader sense of vulnerability. this moral framing, which casts external actors as untrustworthy, plays a critical role in legitimizing the “strong hand” narrative—a key tool for 39 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 justifying putin’s political system. as tsygankov (2016) notes, the narrative of betrayal helps solidify the justification for a powerful, centralized state capable of safeguarding russian interests in an unforgiving global environment. the “strong hand” decision-making system is presented as a necessity to deal with both tangible and intangible threats. to effectively respond and protect itself, russia must first ensure stability and unity from within. for putin, domestic polarization and political party struggles undermine decision-making and signal the weakness of political systems. he argues that democracies, with their volatile election cycles and partisan conflicts, are ineffective in countering immediate threats. therefore, only a centralized political system under strict control can restore russia to its rightful place and defend it from both internal and external challenges. this belief in the necessity of a “strong hand” reinforces the legitimacy of putin’s centralized rule, casting it as the only viable response to the complexities of both domestic politics and international geopolitics. fifth, the predominantly negative framing of “others” in putin’s rhetoric, some narratives, such as “cooperative,” “allies,” “partners,” and “people,” introduce a more positive dimension, focusing on collaboration and shared values. these narratives, however, do not perfectly fit into the overarching justification for a “strong hand” regime. instead, they present a nuanced layer to the discourse, portraying russia as a constructive and cooperative actor but only when “conditions” align. the “cooperation” narrative suggests that foreign citizens, as opposed to their governments, seek partnerships with russia, reflecting a natural alignment of interests. similarly, the “allies” narrative emphasizes shared goals with like-minded states, casting russia as part of an alternative, balanced global order. the “partners” narrative extends this view to the west, recognizing mutual achievements and celebrating successful collaborations grounded in respect for sovereignty. while these narratives project a softer, more diplomatic image, they stand somewhat apart from the usual portrayal of a hostile international environment necessitating centralized control. instead of directly reinforcing the “strong hand,” they reflect an aspirational vision of global cooperation. however, their coexistence with narratives of threat and opposition highlights the duality in putin’s messaging, where moments of constructive engagement are framed as contingent on a secure, stable, and strong russia. the legitimacy of putin’s regime is increasingly intertwined with these internarrative connections, wherein sanctions and foreign criticisms are reframed as proof of the narrative construction of the “other.” as international sanctions are seen as a form of external aggression, they serve to reinforce russia’s self-construction as an embattled nation resisting foreign interference. the “strong hand” becomes the necessary response—a symbol of resistance against an unjust world order. this not only legitimizes the current regime but also strengthens the political elite’s ability to maintain power through the manipulation of these interwoven narratives. however, this dynamic also raises questions about the role of the public in sustaining these narratives. the construction of narratives by political elites, especially putin, is not merely an act of imposing propaganda on the masses but rather a socially constructed discourse that evolves over time. the debate surrounding whether russians, in the absence of a powerful authoritarian regime, would still pursue ontological security and a stronger sense of “self” underscores the complex relationship between elites and the public. would the internarrative connections that sustain the construction of putin’s discourse weaken if the political elites’ power were diminished, or would the underlying narratives retain their force? analyzing internarrativity allows us to explore not only how elites and the public legitimize certain narratives but also how these interconnected narratives form a web-like structure that sustains legitimacy even in the absence of direct intervention by political elites. internarrativity reveals that sets of narratives do not exist in isolation but rather reinforce each other to create a comprehensive and coherent picture of reality. the effectiveness and appeal of propaganda narratives, especially in convincing foreign publics, depend on how well these narratives resonate with the existing webs of meaning held by target audiences. countries or 40 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 groups that share similar conceptual frameworks—such as viewing the us as an aggressive power or western countries as “pawns”—are more likely to accept russia’s “regime of truth” and its justification for the “strong hand” narrative. keating and kaczmarska (2017, 19) argue that the “centralization of decision-making processes…appeal[s] to several political actors in the democratic world.” this concept can be applied to the global arena where russian narratives might resonate particularly in regions or with groups that perceive the international system as unjust. authoritarian governments, emerging powers, or dissatisfied populations within democracies that question the legitimacy of western decision-making may find these russian narratives more convincing. in analyzing the corpus of putin’s speeches, it becomes evident that the narrative of the “strong hand” is not created in isolation. rather, it is reinforced through the invocation of interconnected narratives that appeal to russia’s historical, cultural, and geopolitical identity. for instance, references to russia’s role in defeating nazism during the second world war or its survival through the turbulent post-soviet years are frequently used to justify the need for strong, centralized leadership. these historical narratives contribute to the legitimacy of the “strong hand” by positioning it as a necessary force for maintaining stability and protecting the nation. as such, the internarrative approach allows us to understand how these historical and cultural narratives interlock to create a robust justification for the centralization of power in russia. while intertextuality refers to the ways in which texts reference one another, the concept of internarrativity captures the active and evolving nature of narratives within putin’s discourse. in this context, the “strong hand” narrative is not merely a reflection of past political traditions or a static construct; it is continuously reshaped through references to russia’s geopolitical struggles, cultural values, and national identity. these speeches construct a network of meaning that draws on both historical triumphs and contemporary challenges to justify the concentration of power in the executive. for example, appeals to external threats—whether from nato, western countries, or internal dissidents—are woven into a broader narrative framework that positions authoritarianism as a necessary response to ensure russia’s security and integrity. thus, internarrativity highlights how putin’s narratives are embedded in ongoing social and political realities, reinforcing the “strong hand” by linking it to deeply rooted intersubjective knowledge. conclusion this study has explored the concept of internarrativity and its application to the analysis of vladimir putin’s political discourse, particularly in relation to the “strong hand” narrative. by examining how narratives function as interconnected webs of meaning, this research reveals the dynamic and relational nature of the narratives that legitimize putin’s regime. while previous scholarship has focused on the components or elements of these narratives, this article underscores the importance of understanding how these elements interact and mutually reinforce each other. the findings offer key contributions to the fields of international relations (ir), public diplomacy, russian foreign policy, and narrative theory. first, the study demonstrates that the conceptual lens of internarrativity is useful for unpacking the layered complexities of political discourse. by illustrating how interconnected narratives collectively construct legitimacy, this work extends the scope of narrative analysis in ir, enriching the understanding of how states craft and sustain influence domestically and abroad. second, it highlights the strategic use of narrative interconnectedness in russian public diplomacy, offering insights into the mechanisms through which authoritarian regimes legitimize governance models and assert geopolitical identity. additionally, the study identifies several gaps and unresolved questions, providing a foundation for future research. while this analysis emphasized the interrelations of narratives within putin’s discourse, further exploration is needed to understand the socio-cultural underpinnings that enable these narratives to resonate both within russia and abroad. specifically, research could focus on 41 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 how different audiences, including dissenting domestic groups or international actors, interpret these narratives, potentially challenging their coherence or legitimacy. future studies might also examine the adaptability of these narratives over time, particularly in response to changing geopolitical dynamics or shifts in leadership. how might these narratives evolve post-putin, and to what extent will their interconnectedness remain a source of legitimacy for future russian elites? furthermore, the potential application of internarrativity to other authoritarian or hybrid regimes could shed light on comparative strategies for narrative construction and maintenance in global politics. in conclusion, this study highlights the importance of internarrativity in understanding the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, particularly in the case of russia. by examining how these narratives interact and sustain each other, it offers deeper insight into how authoritarian leaders construct legitimacy both at home and abroad. this research underscores the value of studying the relational dynamics of narratives to comprehend the broader implications for ir, public diplomacy, and authoritarian communication strategies. 42 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 references adler, emanuel. 2013. “constructivism in international relations: sources, contributions, and debates.” in handbook of international relations, edited by walter carlsnaes, thomas risse, and beth a. simmons, 112–144. london: sage publications. bacon, edwin. 2012. “public political narratives: developing a neglected source through the exploratory case of russia in the putin-medvedev era.” political studies 60 (4): 768–86. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00939.x. berger, peter l, and thomas luckmann. 1967. “the social construction of reality.” penguin books. anchor books. berzina, ieva. 2018. “the narrative of ‘information warfare against russia’ in russian academic discourse.” journal of political marketing 17 (2): 161–175. https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2018.1447762. carter, erin baggott, and brett l. carter. 2021. “questioning more: rt, outward-facing propaganda, and the post-west world order.” security studies 30 (1): 49–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.1885730. claessen, eva. 2021. “the making of a narrative: the use of geopolitical othering in russian strategic narratives during the ukraine crisis”. media, war & conflict 16 (1): 82–99. https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352211029529. crilley, rhys, and precious n. chatterje-doody. 2020. “emotions and war on youtube: affective investments in rt’s visual narratives of the conflict in syria.” cambridge review of international affairs 33 (5): 713–733. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1719038. cruickshank, jørn. 2012. “the role of qualitative interviews in discourse theory.” critical approaches to discourse analysis across disciplines 6 (1): 38–52. https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/journals/cadaad/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/volume6_cruickshank.pdf. cull, nicholas j. 2016. “engaging foreign publics in the age of trump and putin: three implications of 2016 for public diplomacy.” place branding and public diplomacy 12 (4): 243–246. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-016-0052-4. dajani, deena, marie gillespie, and rhys crilley. 2021. “differentiated visibilities: rt arabic’s narration of russia’s role in the syrian war.” media, war & conflict 14 (4): 437–58. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635219889075. durkheim, emile. 2013. the rules of sociological method. edited by ed steven lukes. 2nd ed. palgrave macmillan. dutta-bergman, mohan j. 2006. “u.s. public diplomacy in the middle east: a critical cultural approach.” journal of communication inquiry 30 (2): 102–124. https://doi.org/10.1177/0196859905285286. dyson, stephen benedict, and matthew j. parent. 2018. “the operational code approach to profiling political leaders: understanding vladimir putin.” intelligence and national security 33 (1): 84–100. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1313523. erlich, aaron, calvin garner, gordon pennycook, and david g. rand. 2023. “does analytic thinking insulate against pro-kremlin disinformation? evidence from ukraine.” political psychology 44 (1): 79–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12819. 43 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 faizullaev, alisher, and jérémie cornut. 2017. “narrative practice in international politics and diplomacy: the case of the crimean crisis.” journal of international relations and development 20 (3): 578–604. https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2016.6. finnemore, martha, and kathryn sikkink. 2001. “taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics.” annual review of political science 4 (1): 391–416. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.391. fisher, aleksandr. 2020. “demonizing the enemy: the influence of russian state-sponsored media on american audiences.” post-soviet affairs 36 (4): 281–296. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2020.1730121. foucault, michel. 1977. “the political function of the intellectual.” radical philosophy, no. 016 (summer): 12–14. https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/the-political-function-ofthe-intellectual. ———. 2014. on the government of the living: lectures at the collège de france, 1979-1980. michel foucault: lectures at the collège de france. palgrave macmillan. fridrichová, kateřina. 2023. “mugged by reality: russia’s strategic narratives and the war in ukraine.” defense & security analysis 39 (3): 281–295. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2201018. gel’man, vladimir. 2015. authoritarian russia: analyzing post-soviet regime changes. university of pittsburgh press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt155jmv1. gerber, theodore p., and jane zavisca. 2016. “does russian propaganda work?” the washington quarterly 39 (2): 79–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2016.1204398. götz, elias, and jørgen staun. 2022. “why russia attacked ukraine: strategic culture and radicalized narratives.” contemporary security policy 43 (3): 482–497. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633. groulier, cédric, and simon tordjman. 2020. “intergovernmental organizations.” in global diplomacy: an introduction to theory and practice, edited by thierry balzacq, frédéric charillon, and frédéric ramel, 139–53. the sciences po series in international relations and political economy. springer international publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3030-28786-3_10. gunitsky, seva, and andrei p. tsygankov. 2018. “the wilsonian bias in the study of russian foreign policy.” problems of post-communism 65 (6): 385–393. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1468270. hagström, linus, and karl gustafsson. 2019. “narrative power: how storytelling shapes east asian international politics.” cambridge review of international affairs 32 (4): 387–406. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1623498. ———. 2021. “the limitations of strategic narratives: the sino-american struggle over the meaning of covid-19.” contemporary security policy 42 (4): 415–449. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1984725. hansen, lene. 2006. security as practice: discourse analysis and the bosnian war (the new international relations). routledge. hansson, sten, mari-liis madisson, and andreas ventsel. 2023. “discourses of blame in strategic narratives: the case of russia’s 5g stories.” european security 32 (1): 62–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2057188. hassner, pierre. 2008. “russia’s transition to autocracy.” journal of democracy 19 (2): 5–15. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2008.0022. 44 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 hayden, craig. 2013. “logics of narrative and networks in us public diplomacy: communication power and us strategic engagement.” the journal of international communication 19 (2): 196–218. https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2013.775070. herd, graeme p. 2019. “putin’s operational code and strategic decision-making in russia.” in routledge handbook of russian security, edited by roger e. kenet, 17-29routledge. heylighen, francis. 1997. “objective, subjective and intersubjective selectors of knowledge.” evolution and cognition 3 (1): 63–67. holzscheiter, anna. 2014. “between communicative interaction and structures of signification: discourse theory and analysis in international relations.” international studies perspectives 15(2): 142–162. https://doi.org/10.1111/insp.12005. hook, derek. 2001. “discourse, knowledge, materiality, history.” theory & psychology 11 (4): 521–547. sage ca: thousand oaks, ca. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354301114006. keating, vincent charles, and katarzyna kaczmarska. 2017. “conservative soft power: liberal soft power bias and the ‘hidden’ attraction of russia.” journal of international relations and development 22: 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0100-6. khaldarova, irina. 2019. “brother or ‘other'? transformation of strategic narratives in russian television news during the ukrainian crisis”. media, war & conflict 14 (1): 3-20. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635219846016. kragh, martin, and sebastian åsberg. 2017. “russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the swedish case.” journal of strategic studies 40 (6): 773–816. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830. kristeva, julia. 1980. desire in language: a semiotic approach to literature and art. edited by leon roudiez. translated by thomas gora and alice jardine. columbia university press. levada center. 2022a. “the conflict with ukraine.” april 11, 2022. accessed august 11, 2025. https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/04/11/the-conflict-with-ukraine/. ———. 2022b. “sanctions.” april 12, 2022. accessed august 11, 2025. https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/04/12/sanctions-5/. maan, ajit k. 2009. internarrative identity: placing the self. 2nd edition. bloomsbury publishing. macgilchrist, felicitas. 2011. “positive discourse analysis: contesting dominant discourses by reframing the issues.” critical approaches to discourse analysis across disciplines 1 (1): 74–94. https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/journals/cadaad/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/volume-1_macgilchrist.pdf. mattern, janice bially. 2001. “the power politics of identity.” european journal of international relations 7 (3): 349–97. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066101007003003. milliken, jennifer. 1999. “the study of discourse in international relations:: a critique of research and methods.” european journal of international relations 5 (2): 225–54. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005002003. miskimmon, alister, ben o’loughlin, and laura roselle. 2014. strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order. routledge. mitzen, jennifer. 2006. “ontological security in world politics: state identity and the security dilemma.” european journal of international relations 12 (3): 341–370. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067346. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067346 45 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 morçöl, göktuğ. 2001. “positivist beliefs among policy professionals: an empirical investigation.” policy sciences 34 (3/4): 381–401. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1012749120909. morris, jeremy, and masha garibyan. 2021. “russian cultural conservatism critiqued: translating the tropes of ‘gayropa’ and ‘juvenile justice’ in everyday life.” europe-asia studies 73 (8): 1487–507. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2021.1887088. neumann, iver b. 2002. “returning practice to the linguistic turn: the case of diplomacy.” millennium: journal of international studies 31 (3): 627–651. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298020310031201. orttung, robert w., and elizabeth nelson. 2019. “russia today’s strategy and effectiveness on youtube.” post-soviet affairs 35 (2): 77–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2018.1531650. pamment, james. 2014. “strategic narratives in us public diplomacy: a critical geopolitics.” popular communication 12 (1): 48–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/15405702.2013.868899. patomäki, heikki, and colin wight. 2000. “after postpositivism? the promises of critical realism.” international studies quarterly 44 (2): 213–237. https://doi.org/10.1111/00208833.00156 popkova, anna. 2020. “transnational non-state actors as ‘alt agents’ of public diplomacy: putin’s russia versus open russia.” place branding and public diplomacy 16 (1): 70–79. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-019-00126-6. pouliot, vincent. 2007. “‘sobjectivism’: toward a constructivist methodology.” international studies quarterly 51 (2): 359–84. pynnöniemi, katri, and andrás rácz, eds. 2016. “fog of falsehood: russian strategy of deception and the conflict in ukraine.” finnish institute of international affairs 45. https://fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/fiiareport45_fogoffalsehood.pdf. roselle, laura. 2017. “strategic narratives and alliances: the cases of intervention in libya (2011) and economic sanctions against russia (2014).” politics and governance 5 (3): 99–110. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1023 roselle, laura, alister miskimmon, and ben o’loughlin. 2014. “strategic narrative: a new means to understand soft power.” media, war & conflict 7 (1): 70–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516696. russell, john. 2002. “mujahedeen, mafia, madmen: russian perceptions of chechens during the wars in chechnya, 1994-96 and 1999-2001.” journal of communist studies and transition politics 18 (1): 73–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523270209696369. safire, william. 1994. “opinion | essay; strategic dilemma.” the new york times, december 1, 1994. accessed august 11, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/01/opinion/essaystrategic-dilemma.html. schmitt, olivier. 2018. “when are strategic narratives effective? the shaping of political discourse through the interaction between political myths and strategic narratives.” contemporary security policy 39 (4): 487–511. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2018.1448925. shekhovtsov, anton. 2017. russia and the western far right: tango noir. routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315560991. 46 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 shevtsova, maryna. 2020. “’fighting “gayropa’: europeanization and instrumentalization of lgbti rights in ukrainian public debate”. problems of post-communism 67 (6): 500– 510. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2020.1716807. snegovaya, maria. 2015. “putin’s information warfare in ukraine.” institute for the study of war. russian report 1 (september): 1–26. somers, margaret r. 1994. “the narrative constitution of identity: a relational and network approach.” theory and society 23 (5): 605–49. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00992905. sunderland, jane. 2004. gendered discourses. palgrave macmillan uk. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230505582. szostek, joanna. 2017. “news consumption and anti-western narratives in russia: a case study of university students.” europe-asia studies 69 (2): 284–302. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1274019. ———. 2018. “nothing is true? the credibility of news and conflicting narratives during ‘information war’ in ukraine.” the international journal of press/politics 23 (1): 116– 135. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161217743258. tolz, vera, and stephen hutchings. 2023. “truth with a z: disinformation, war in ukraine, and russia’s contradictory discourse of imperial identity.” post-soviet affairs 39 (5): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2023.2202581. tsygankov, andrei. 2016. “crafting the state-civilization vladimir putin’s turn to distinct values.” problems of post-communism 63 (3): 146–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1113884. tyushka, andriy. 2022. “weaponizing narrative: russia contesting europe’s liberal identity, power and hegemony”. journal of contemporary european studies 30 (1): 115–135. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14782804.2021.1883561. velikaya, anna a., and greg simons, eds. 2020. russia’s public diplomacy: evolution and practice. springer international publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12874-6. way, lori (ed.). 2015. representations of internarrative identity. palgrave macmillan uk. wendt, alexander. 1999. social theory of international politics. cambridge university press. wiener, antje. 2009. “enacting meaning-in-use: qualitative research on norms and international relations.” review of international studies 35 (1): 175–93. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210509008377. yablokov, ilya. 2015. “conspiracy theories as a russian public diplomacy tool: the case of russia today (rt).” politics 35 (3–4): 301–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12097. 47 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 appendix 1. list of events name date link 2012 пресс-конференция по итогам российскоитальянских переговоров 23.07.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16047 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-сербских переговоров 11.09.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16465 интервью телеканалу russia today 06.09.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16393 пресс-конференция владимира путина 20.12.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173 саммит «большой двадцатки» 20.06.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15698 совместная пресс-конференция по итогам российско-германских межгосударственных консультаций 16.11.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16852 совместная пресс-конференция с премьерминистром люксембурга жан-клодом юнкером 25.09.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16533 пресс-конференция по итогам форума атэс 09.09.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16432 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам встречи с президентом финляндии саули ниинистё 22.06.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15722 совместная пресс-конференция с председателем европейской комиссии жозе мануэлом баррозу и председателем европейского совета херманом ван ромпёем 04.06.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15541 совместная пресс-конференция по итогам встречи на высшем уровне россия – европейский союз 21.12.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17178 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам встречи с премьерминистром турции реджепом тайипом эрдоганом 18.07.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16014 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам встречи с президентом армении сержем саргсяном 08.08.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16180 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по завершении заседания российскоукраинской межгосударственной комиссии 12.07.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15945 петербургский международный экономический форум 21.06.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15709 заседание совета по межнациональным отношениям 24.08.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16292 встреча с участниками международного дискуссионного клуба «валдай» 25.10.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16717 2013 интервью южнокорейской телерадиокомпании kbs 12.11.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19603 интервью первому каналу и агентству ассошиэйтед пресс 04.09.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143 интервью немецкой телерадиокомпании ard 05.04.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17808 интервью информационному агентству «риа новости» 12.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18338 интервью информационному агентству итартасс 22.03.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17723 пресс-конференция владимира путина 19.12.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19859 молодёжный форум «селигер-2013» 02.08.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18993 посещение телеканала russia today 11.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319 прямая линия с владимиром путиным 25.04.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17976 заседание совета по межнациональным отношениям 19.02.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17536 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16465 48 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 name date link 2013 пресс-конференция по итогам рабочего визита в германию 08.04.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17846 пресс-конференция по итогам заседания совета сотрудничества высшего уровня между россией и турцией 22.11.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19677 пресс-конференция по итогам заседания высшего евразийского экономического совета 24.10.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19485 пресс-конференция владимира путина по итогам саммита «группы двадцати» 06.09.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19168 пресс-конференция по итогам встречи глав государств и правительств «группы восьми» 16.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18361 пресс-конференция по итогам встречи на высшем уровне россия – европейский союз 04.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18253 пресс-конференция с федеральным канцлером германии ангелой меркель 21.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18386 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-нидерландских переговоров 08.04.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17850 пресс-конференция президента россии по итогам рабочего заседания глав государств и правительств стран – участниц форума стран – экспортёров газа 01.07.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18441 пресс-конференция с президентом финляндии саули ниинистё 25.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18407 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-японских переговоров 29.04.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18000 пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров с президентом франции франсуа олландом 28.02.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17597 пресс-конференция по итогам российскоармянских переговоров 02.12.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19741 заявление для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по окончании саммита атэс 08.10.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19382 российско-итальянские межгосударственные консультации 26.11.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19701 встреча с премьер-министром великобритании дэвидом кэмероном 16.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18350 заседание международного дискуссионного клуба «валдай» 19.09.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243 ответы на вопросы журналистов 31.08.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19113 ответы на вопросы участников петербургского экономического форума 21.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18387 2014 интервью информационному агентству тасс 24.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47054 интервью владимира путина радио «европа-1» и телеканалу tf1 04.06.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45832 интервью немецкому телеканалу ard 17.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47029 интервью турецкому информационному агентству «анадолу» 28.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47104 интервью информационному агентству тасс 14.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47009 интервью российским и иностранным сми 19.01.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20080 интервью индийскому информационному агентству pti 09.12.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47209 интервью ведущим китайским сми 06.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46972 интервью газете «политика» 15.10.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46806 интервью ведущим сми китая 19.05.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/21031 интервью в преддверии паралимпийских игр в сочи 05.03.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20374 интервью представителям телеканалов «первый», вгтрк, нтв, рбк 25.02.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20336 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20336 49 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 name date link интервью российскому информационному агентству итар-тасс 15.07.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46218 интервью латиноамериканскому агентству «пренса латина» и российскому агентству итартасс 11.07.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46190 интервью российским и иностранным сми в преддверии паралимпиады 06.03.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20384 заявление для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам саммита «группы двадцати» 16.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47027 владимир путин ответил на вопросы журналистов о ситуации на украине 04.03.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366 большая пресс-конференция владимира путина 18.12.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47250 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом турции реджепом тайипом эрдоганом 01.12.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47126 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-сербских переговоров 16.10.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46813 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-австрийских переговоров 24.06.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46060 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам встречи с президентом швейцарии, действующим председателем обсе дидье буркхальтером 07.05.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20973 саммит россия – европейский союз 28.01.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20113 ответы на вопросы журналистов 17.07.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46236 петербургский международный экономический форум 23.05.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/21080 заседание международного дискуссионного клуба «валдай» 24.10.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860 ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам визита в китай 21.05.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/21064 прямая линия с владимиром путиным 17.04.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796 2015 интервью владимиру соловьёву 12.10.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482 интервью американскому журналисту чарли роузу для телеканалов cbs и pbs 29.09.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50380 интервью швейцарским сми 27.07.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50066 интервью итальянской газете il corriere della sera 06.06.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49629 интервью вгтрк 23.02.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47730 интервью информационным агентствам «интерфакс» и «анадолу» 13.11.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50682 интервью информационным агентствам тасс и «синьхуа» 01.09.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50207 интервью телеканалу «россия» 09.05.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49454 интервью ежедневной египетской газете «альахрам» 09.02.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47643 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам встречи с президентом франции франсуа олландом 26.11.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/50792 заседание международного дискуссионного клуба «валдай» 22.10.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548 ответы на вопросы журналистов 29.09.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50394 большая пресс-конференция владимира путина 17.12.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971 заявление для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов 30.11.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50850 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50850 50 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 name date link пресс-конференция владимира путина по итогам саммитов брикс и шос 10.07.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49909 совместная пресс-конференция с председателем совета министров италии маттео ренци 10.06.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49677 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом финляндии саули ниинистё 16.06.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49714 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам встречи с федеральным канцлером германии ангелой меркель 10.05.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49455 пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров с премьер-министром греции алексисом ципрасом 08.04.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49220 заявления для прессы по итогам заседания высшего государственного совета союзного государства 03.03.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47775 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-кипрских переговоров 25.02.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47739 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-венгерских переговоров 17.02.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47706 встреча с главами ведущих мировых информагентств 19.06.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49740 10-летие вещания russia today 10.12.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50911 прямая линия с владимиром путиным 16.04.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49261 2016 интервью международному информационному холдингу bloomberg 05.09.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52830 интервью владимира путина телекомпании «ниппон» и газете «иомиури» 13.12.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53455 интервью китайскому информационному агентству «синьхуа» 23.06.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52204 интервью немецкому изданию bild. часть 1 11.01.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51154 интервью немецкому изданию bild. часть 2 12.01.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51155 интервью владимира путина миа «россия сегодня» и информагентству ians 13.10.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53082 интервью азербайджанскому государственному информационному агентству «азертадж» 05.08.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52650 большая пресс-конференция владимира путина 23.12.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53573 заседание международного дискуссионного клуба «валдай» 27.10.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151 восточный экономический форум 03.09.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52808 владимир путин ответил на вопросы журналистов 16.10.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53103 ответы на вопросы французских журналистов телеканала tf1 12.10.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53081 встреча с руководителями международных информагентств 17.06.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52183 пленарное заседание петербургского международного экономического форума 17.06.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178 пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров с президентом турции реджепом тайипом эрдоганом 09.01.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52673 пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров с президентом армении сержем саргсяном 10.08.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52684 совместная пресс-конференция с премьерминистром греции алексисом ципрасом 27.05.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52024 пресс-конференция по итогам саммита россия – асеан 20.05.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51954 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по завершении российскоизраильских переговоров 07.06.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52125 51 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 name date link заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-финляндских переговоров 22.03.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51551 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-финляндских переговоров 01.07.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52312 пресс-конференция по завершении российсковенгерских переговоров 17.02.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/51352 совместная пресс-конференция с председателем совета министров италии маттео ренци 17.06.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52181 прямая линия с владимиром путиным 14.04.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51716 ответы на вопросы журналистов 23.11.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53317 2017 интервью владимира путина французской газете le figaro 31.05.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54638 интервью американскому телеканалу nbc 05.06.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54688 интервью телерадиокомпании «мир» 12.04.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54271 большая пресс-конференция владимира путина 14.12.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56378 заседание международного дискуссионного клуба «валдай» 19.01.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом финляндии саули ниинистё 27.07.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55175 пленарное заседание петербургского международного экономического форума 02.06.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54667 пресс-конференция владимира путина по итогам саммита брикс 05.09.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55535 пресс-конференция по итогам саммита «группы двадцати» 08.07.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55017 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом франции эммануэлем макроном 29.05.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54618 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам встречи с федеральным канцлером германии ангелой меркель 02.05.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/page/96 заявления для прессы по итогам встречи с президентом италии серджо маттареллой 11.04.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54267 пресс-конференция по итогам российско-турецких переговоров 03.05.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54444 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом турции реджепом тайипом эрдоганом 10.03.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54023 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом киргизии алмазбеком атамбаевым 28.02.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53964 совместная пресс-конференция с премьерминистром венгрии виктором орбаном 02.02.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53806 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом молдовы игорем додоном 17.01.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-итальянских переговоров 17.05.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54511 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам российско-словенских переговоров на высшем уровне 10.02.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/53861 2018 интервью американскому телеканалу fox news 17.07.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58019 интервью медиакорпорации китая 06.06.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57684 интервью австрийскому телеканалу orf 04.06.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57675 интервью американскому телеканалу nbc 10.03.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027 интервью телеканалу russia today 11.11.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59091 пленарное заседание восточного экономического форума 12.09.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58537 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54271 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57684 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57675 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58537 52 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 name date link международный форум «российская энергетическая неделя» 03.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58701 совместная пресс-конференция владимира путина и реджепа тайипа эрдогана 03.04.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57192 большая пресс-конференция владимира путина 20.12.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59455 совместная пресс-конференция с премьерминистром греции алексисом ципрасом 07.12.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59349 пресс-конференция по итогам встречи лидеров россии, турции, германии и франции 27.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58935 пресс-конференция по итогам российскоитальянских переговоров 24.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58889 пресс-конференция по итогам российсковенгерских переговоров 18.09.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58586 пресс-конференция по итогам встречи с президентом ирана хасаном рухани и президентом турции реджепом тайипом эрдоганом 07.09.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/58483 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом финляндии саули ниинистё 22.08.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58347 пресс-конференция по итогам саммита брикс 27.07.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58119 пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров президентов россии и сша 16.07.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58017 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом франции эммануэлем макроном 24.05.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57545 совместная пресс-конференция с канцлером фрг ангелой меркель 18.05.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/57497 совместная пресс-конференция владимира путина и реджепа тайипа эрдогана 03.04.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57192 пресс-конференция по итогам встречи президентов россии, турции и ирана 04.04.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57201 совместная пресс-конференция с федеральным канцлером австрии себастианом курцем 28.02.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56952 пресс-конференция по итогам российскоболгарских переговоров 30.05.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57608 пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров с федеральным канцлером австрии себастианом курцем 03.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58715 переговоры с президентом австрии александром ван дер белленом 05.07.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57678 ответы на вопросы российских журналистов 15.11.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59131 заседание дискуссионного клуба «валдай» 18.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848 интервью телеканалам al arabiya, sky news arabia и rt arabic 13.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61792 интервью газете the financial times 27.06.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60836 интервью владимира путина межгосударственной телерадиокомпании «мир» 13.06.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60741 интервью оливеру стоуну 19.07.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61057 2019 интервью информационному агентству тасс 21.10.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61858 интервью монгольской газете «одрийн сонин» 02.09.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61414 интервью газете «коррьере делла сера» 04.07.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60912 интервью китайскому изданию «жэньминь жибао» 25.04.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60344 интервью сербским изданиям «политика» и «вечерние новости» 16.01.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59680 пресс-конференция владимира путина 29.06.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60857 большая пресс-конференция владимира путина 19.12.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366 встреча с главами мировых информагентств 06.06.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60675 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60675 53 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 name date link пленарное заседание восточного экономического форума 05.09.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61451 совместная пресс-конференция по итогам встречи в «нормандском формате» 10.12.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62277 пресс-конференция по итогам российско-сербских переговоров 04.12.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/62240 заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам трёхсторонней встречи глав государств – гарантов астанинского процесса содействия сирийскому урегулированию 16.09.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/61542 пресс-конференция по итогам российско-турецких переговоров 27.01.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61388 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом финляндии саули ниинистё 21.01.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61349 президенты россии и франции сделали заявления для прессы и ответили на вопросы журналистов 19.08.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61336 пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров с федеральным президентом австрии александром ван дер белленом 15.05.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60527 пресс-конференция по итогам российско-турецких переговоров 08.04.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60247 пресс-конференция по итогам встречи президентов россии, ирана и турции 14.02.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59830 пресс-конференция по итогам российско-турецких переговоров 23.01.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59718 совместная пресс-конференция с президентом сербии александром вучичем 17.01.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59693 совместная пресс-конференция с премьерминистром италии джузеппе конте 4.07.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60920 пресс-конференция по итогам рабочего визита в китай 24.04.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60396 пресс-конференция по итогам российскосеверокорейских переговоров 25.04.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60370 российско-венгерские переговоры 30.10.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61936 ответы на вопросы журналистов 28.02.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59914 заседание дискуссионного клуба «валдай» 03.10.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719 пленарное заседание международного арктического форума 09.04.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60250 54 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 appendix 2. narrative table narrative group name description examples comparison/ positive type 1 narrative group is intended to show the presence of similar elements, laws, orders, and other features between russia and other countries. “such laws have long been adopted in all developed countries” [1]; “the russian judicial system is an integral part of the international, global judicial system” [2]. comparison/ positive type 2 narrative group is intended either to demonstrate the superiority of russia in comparison with other countries or to whitewash its negative characteristics through comparison “first, we do not do this, unlike you. do not judge others by yourself.”[3]; “but as usual – this is something that is true both for russia and any other country in the world – there is not enough money to deal with what seems to be of the first importance” [4]. comparison/ negative narrative group reflect on ways to paint russia in brighter light or deny wrongdoings by direct blame, emotional answer, or negative characterization “your presidents were not killed, or what? have you forgotten about it? where was kennedy killed, in the usa or russia? what happened to king...? you have many problems of your own.”[3]; “they themselves are doing exactly what they are accusing us of doing. this is unbelievable cynicism.”[5] the descriptions of "self" narratives narrative description examples 1990s transition negative description of russia in 1990-s “of course, some younger people do not remember or do not even know what was happening here in the 1990s and the early 2000s. so they cannot really compare it to the present situation.” [6]; “…but the government should not act like a bearded peasant idly picking at cabbage pieces in his beard and watching the state turn into a muddy puddle where oligarchs fish out goldfish for themselves, like it was in the 1990s or in ukraine today.” [6] alternative it embodies those ideals or models of international relations that russia can offer. presented as an alternative to western hegemony “there is also the so-called liberal idea, which has outlived its purpose.” [7]; “but we have gained unique experience, and i believe there is demand for it around the world.” [8] 55 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 narrative description examples being first it highlights russia's superiority “clearly, we have overtaken all our, so to speak, partners and competitors in this sphere, and this fact is acknowledged by the experts.” [9] cooperative it reflects russia's willingness to cooperate even under harsh criticism “if our partners wish, we are ready to develop active relations on a bilateral basis with any of the countries in the g7.” [10]; “we have common threats, as we wanted, and today we want, we strive to unite the efforts of all states of the world” [11]. defensive it emphasizes russia's desire to protein itself and its population from external and internal threats “what’s important for me is not to criticise western values but to protect russians from certain quasi-values that are very hard for our people to accept.” [12]; “personally, i think that children should be left alone, they should be given an opportunity to grow up, to become aware of themselves and decide themselves who they are: men or women.” [13] depersonific ation it attempts to reduce the emphasis on vladimir putin as a cornerstone or a symbol of russia’s political system “but this doesn’t mean that all is related to me. that’s an unsound opinion, a misconception. it’s not like that. on the contrary, absolutely not like that!” [14] disrespected russia is undermined/disrespected by other international actors “i think that speculations about other countries, an attempt to speak disrespectfully about other countries is an attempt to prove one’s exceptionalism by contrast. in my view, that is a misguided position.” [15]; “they are walking all over us, chewing gum. they are just having fun.” [16] economic power it emphasizes russia’s economic power and potential “…but our economy – i can say this with full responsibility – has been able to adapt to external shock…” [5]; “but we are moving forward and will continue to do so. i am confident that we will build a strong, open and prosperous russia.” [17] inclusive it presents russia as equal to other players that should be involved in ir “moreover, russia does not aspire to be called a superpower, understanding that as a claim to world or regional hegemony.” [18]; “i neither russia nor its partners in the customs union and the common economic space have any intention of imposing anything on anyone.” [19] lawfulness it refers to russia following the rule of law or established international norms “..our position is that we will act within the framework of international law…” [20]; “i would like to say that the outcome of world war ii is unchangeable and it has been fixed by a number of international legal documents.” [21] 56 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 narrative description examples logical concerns it responds to criticism by accepting it as such with elements of mitigation, or a pragmatic/rational approach “we have no shortage of problems of our own in this area and we ourselves are far from always finding effective solutions, even though we all live within one unified country”; [22] “as usual, a question arises: where is the money? probably stolen. or they miscalculated something when planning its construction.” [23] misrepresen ted russia is misrepresented by the west and the media “despite the attempts your attempts, the attempts of your colleagues to spoil our relations with the help of the media and anti-russian propaganda, it seems to me that it still failed to be done the way you would like.” [11]; “never mind, these are double standards and we have got accustomed and pay little attention to it.” [24] moral it describes russia’s “moral” characteristics: compassion, tolerance, and pursuit of justice. “russia is a multinational and multi-confessional country, and we feel a friendly atmosphere everywhere.” [25]; “after all, you cannot simply, say, listen to a telephone conversation, for example, in russia i can certainly tell you without appropriate court sanctions” [24] natural place it highlights that russia has or has to hold its natural place in ir “we have failed to assert our national interests, while we should have done that from the outset. then the whole world could have been more balanced.” [11]; “…to ensure unfettered movement forward and to strengthen our country from the inside, above all, so that it can take its rightful place in the international arena as an equal among equals.” [26] not conflicting it describes russia as a country that will try to avoid confrontation by all means “e are ready to do this in a non-confrontational manner, to look for compromise but, of course, based on international law, which must be understood uniformly by all.” [11]; “ussia has a peaceful foreign policy, and this is no exaggeration.” [27] persistent russia is not backing down on its promises “what have they accomplished? did they think we would just pack up and go? they could not have thought that of course, russia is not that kind of country.” [28] responsive it reflects passive, nonconflicting characteristics of how and why russia acts in the world. “we remember how it all started. russia did not initiate the current breakdown, disruption, problems and sanctions. all our actions have been exclusively reciprocal.” [29] russian necessity it argues that the world and the actors need russia “i can say with no exaggeration that russia makes a significant contribution to the settlement of the situation around the iranian nuclear programme..” [30] 57 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 narrative description examples slowly changing it reflects the desire of the state to solve problems gradually “it is clear that we must really strive for deoffshorisation, and the measures to bring it about should be careful, civilised.” [31]; “but if we admit that there were mistakes in the past, why should the prospects [of an intervention] be considered infallible now? all this should make us think about why we must not rush into such decisions.” [32] sovereignty russia emphasizes sovereign rights' importance “such an independent policy pursued by ankara to meet its national foreign policy interests deserves great respect.” [33]; “second, coming back to iran. it is not up to russia to persuade iran to leave syria. after all, both syria and iran are sovereign countries, and they should build their own relationship.” [9] soviet legacy negative description of the soviet past “we have learned very well the lesson of one-party rule – that of the communist party (cpsu).” [15]; “the moral code of the builder of communism, if you read it, is just a pathetic copy of the bible: thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife.” [12] strong hand it refers to certain characteristics of russia, which could be described as ideas of authoritarian/centralized government “russia, as well as any other country, does not need dictators, but it needs equitable principles of organizing the state and society” [13] “just like in the human body: if your immune resistance is down you immediately catch the flu. these bacilli and bacteria are seeded in the organism and reside there all the time but if the organism is strong you suppress the flu with your immunodefence.” [14] the descriptions of “other” narratives narrative description examples allies it concerns building "self" through the demonstration of common interests, values, and goals with countries that can be considered like-minded or allied states “amid the continued increase in the production and export of afghan drugs, it would make sense to increase the interaction of the sco with specialised un agencies and relevant international organisations. we are all interested in forming a broad anti-drug security belt in the region.” [34] betrayal it focuses on events or actions that were made openly in violation of rules or agreements “sanctions are about something else entirely: the desire to halt russia’s progress, to contain russia. this policy of containing russia has been pursued for decades, on and off. now it is back.” [35]; “regarding whom you can believe and whom you can’t, you shouldn’t believe anyone.” [36] 58 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 narrative description examples conflictual it describes others as initiating conflict for the same conflicts “firstly, we asked them not to withdraw from the treaty, not to destroy it. but the us pulled out. it was not us who did this but the us.” [35]; “at the same time, some of our partners demonstrate no desire to resolve the real international problems in the world today.” [37] cooperation the second part of the “politicians”, reinforces the idea that people inside foreign countries want to cooperate with russia “i think that ordinary americans have absolutely nothing to do with it, they do not understand what is happening.” [1]; “we need to be heard by all of ukraine’s people. we have no enemies in ukraine. let me say again that ukraine is a friendly country.” [38] double standards it emphasizes different treatment of russia or nonwestern countries and others, predominantly western “now i want to ask you this: if the kosovans in kosovo have the right to self-determination, why don’t the crimeans have the same right?” [11]; “well, they lecture everyone on how to live and on democracy. now, do you really think presidential elections there are democratic?” [29] economically weak it describes others as economically insufficient “the problem has a different nature, which was clearly shown by the crisis in certain european countries. the key word here is inefficiency.” [39]; “on the contrary i am even glad, to some extent, because the events have shown how risky and insecure investments in western financial institutions can be.” [40] enemy need it implies that others require russia as an enemy “it is easier to say, “we are not to blame, the russians are to blame, they interfered in our election, but we are good.” it reminds me of anti-semitism…” [16] imposition it characterizes the policies being influenced/imposed by the dominant power “we also understand that identity and a national idea cannot be imposed from above, cannot be established on an ideological monopoly.” [41] irrational it imposes irra0tional characterizations “so, is there any logic here? no, there is none. this is just a pretext for taking additional action to contain russia.” [26]; “this indicates the significant level of degradation among political elites in the west, including the united states. but i very much hope that common sense will prevail.” [42] morally weak rather a moral description of the behind-the-scenes decision-making of others; questioning of morality “as far as democracy is concerned, the ruling classes usually talk about freedom to pull the wool over the eyes of those whom they govern.” [15]; 59 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 narrative description examples overestimated it characterizes the u.s. and the west as overconfident “that is his own opinion, as i also know his opinion that the american nation, the united states is unique. i cannot agree with either of those opinions.” [15]; “respecting others’ interests means, as i said in my opening remarks, that you cannot just put the squeeze on others by using your exceptional economic or military clout.” [43] partners it consists of a positive description of the west, appreciation of cooperation, and highlighting their achievements “i think they were working away. their intelligence is one of the best in the world. let’s not start throwing criticism their way.” [44]; “i hope not, because american leaders, although we disagree on many positions, are nevertheless sensible people.” [45] pawns it deprives other countries of the right to make independent decisions if they are consistent with us decisions “how did the american nato allies react? they all nodded away in docile agreement, without even bothering to analyse what was actually happening...” [46]; “such a unipolar, standardised world does not require sovereign states; it requires vassals.” [41] people it describes russia’s view on democracy in its traditional forms as a rule of a majority “i should say that this is absolutely none of our business. this is the choice of the british people.” [22]; “it is important that the cypriots themselves work out mutually acceptable solutions, without interference from outside.” [47] politically weak it describes others as politically weaker in comparison with russia. “the negotiators, our partners, are saying: well, we would be happy to do that, we did sign it, but the congress does not let it through. so much for the decisions.” [48] politicians it argues that it is not the people who want bad relations with russia, but their governments “america's creative approach to solving the problems the country is faced with, its openness and open-mindedness which make it possible to unleash the potential of the people” [13]; “in this case as an indication that a substantial part of the american people share similar views…it is good that there are people who sympathise with our views on traditional values.” [20] threat it centered on the discussion of threats outside russia. “we are worried not about democracy on our borders, but about military infrastructure coming ever closer to our borders.” [45] us harsh critics it focuses on extensive criticism of the u.s. “they just did not want to. they wanted to reign. so they sat on the throne. and then?.” [11] 60 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 narrative description examples us mild critics it focuses on mild criticism of the u.s. “nobody listened to us! on the contrary, they thought we took an anti-western position, a hostile stance towards the west. and now, when you have hundreds of thousands, already one million of refugees, do you think our position was anti-western or pro-western?.” [11]; “now, recently, the us also withdrew from the intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty. it think it was a mistake, too, and that they could have gone a different path. i do understand the us concerns.” [49] sources 1. direct line with vladimir putin (2013, april 25). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17976 2. interview to channel one and associated press news agency (2013, september 4). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143 3. interview to fox news channel (2018, july 17). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58019 4. interview to russian and foreign media (2014, january 19). http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20080/print 5. vladimir putin’s annual news conference (2019, december 19). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366 6. vladimir putin’s annual news conference (2017, december 14). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/56378 7. interview with the financial times (2019, june 27). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60836 8. valdai discussion club session (2019, october 3). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719 9. meeting of the valdai international discussion club (2018, october 18). http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848 10. press statement and answers to journalists’ questions following talks with italian prime minister matteo renzi (2015, june 10). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49677 11. interview to german newspaper bild. part 1 (2016, january 11). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51154 12. news conference of vladimir putin (2013, december 19). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19859 13. interview to american tv channel cbs and pbs (2015, september 29). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50380 14. interview to tass news agency (2014, november 24). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47054 15. interview to german newspaper bild. part 2 (2016, january 12). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51155 16. st petersburg international economic forum plenary meeting (2017, june 2). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54667 17. st petersburg international economic forum (2012, june 21). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15709 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17976 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17976 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58019 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58019 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20080/print http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20080/print http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/56378 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/56378 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60836 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60836 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49677 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49677 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51154 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51154 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19859 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19859 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/470 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47054 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47054 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54667 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54667 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15709 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15709 61 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 18. presidential address to the federal assembly (2013, december 12). http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/19825 19. press statements and answers to journalists’ questions following meeting of the russianukrainian interstate commission (2012, july 12). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15945 20. vladimir putin’s annual news conference (2016, december 23). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53573 21. interview to russian and foreign media (2014, january 19). http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/20080 22. meeting with heads of international news agencies (2016, june 17). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52183 23. meeting of the valdai international discussion club (2017, october 19). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/558821 24. visit to russia today television channel (2013, june 11). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319 25. meeting with chief rabbi of russia berel lazar and president of federation of jewish communities alexander boroda (2018, september 9). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58500 26. vladimir putin’s annual news conference (2018, december 20). http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/59455 27. interview to vladimir solovyov (2015, october 12). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482 28. vladimir putin’s annual news conference (2015, december 17). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971 29. plenary session of st petersburg international economic forum (2016, june 17). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178 30. interview to al-ahram daily (2015, february 9). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47643 31. news conference of vladimir putin (2012, december 20). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173 32. answers to journalists’ questions (2013, august 31). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19113 33. interview to interfax and anadolu news agencies (2015, november 13). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50682 34. speech at the sco meeting in expanded format (2017, june 9). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/54739 35. interview to american tv channel nbc (2018, march 10). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027 36. news conference following talks between the presidents of russia and the united states (2018, july 16). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58017 37. meeting of the valdai international discussion club (2016, october 27). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151 38. vladimir putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in ukraine (2014, march 4). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366 39. interview to ria novosti news agency (2013, june 14). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18338 40. 40. interview to the german ard (2013, april 5). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17808 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/19825 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/19825 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15945 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15945 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53573 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53573 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/20080 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/20080 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52183 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52183 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/558821 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/558821 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58500 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58500 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/59455 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/59455 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47643 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47643 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19113 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50682 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50682 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/54739 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/54739 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58017 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58017 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18338 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18338 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17808 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17808 62 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 41. 41. meeting of the valdai international discussion club (2013, september 19). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243 42. joint news conference with president of moldova igor dodon (2017, january 17). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744 43. meeting of the valdai international discussion club (2014, october 24). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860 44. interview to vladimir solovyov (2015, october 12). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482 45. meeting of the valdai international discussion club (2015, october 22). http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548 46. interview to mir broadcasting company (2017, april 12). http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/54271 47. press statement and replies to journalists’ questions following russian-cypriot talks (2015, february 15). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47739 48. interview to tass news agency (2014. november 14). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47009 49. 49. interview with al arabiya, sky news arabia and rt arabic (2019, october 13). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61792 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/54271 http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/54271 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47739 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47739 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47009 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47009 63 canadian journal of european and russian studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64 issn 2562-8429 published by the centre for european studies at carleton university, ottawa, canada available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index the canadian journal of european and russian studies (cjers – formerly review of european and russian affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. topics relate to the european union, its member states, the former soviet union, and central and eastern europe. the journal is published by the centre for european studies, an associated unit of the institute of european, russian and eurasian studies at carleton university. cjers aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality research and scholarship. contact: carleton university the centre for european studies 1103 dunton tower 1125 colonel by drive ottawa, on k1s 5b6 canada e-mail: cjers@carleton.ca creative commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution-non-commercial-no derivs 4.0 unported license (cc by-nc-nd 4.0). articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. we request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the doi link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. issn: 2562-8429 © 2025 the author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/cjers/index mailto:cjers@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 