







































48                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 
 

 
 

Russia’s Strategy of Outsuffering and the War in Ukraine 
 

Toms Rostoks 

Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia 

 

 
 

 

 

Abstract 

Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but it has failed to attain its 

political and military objectives. Since then, Russia has doubled down on its war effort. This 

article claims that Russia’s decision to continue the war despite initial setbacks and a high 

number of casualties is the result of using the strategy of ‘outsuffering’ its adversaries. This 

article explains the origins and instrumentalization of this strategy by Vladimir Putin, as well 

as its implications for Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russia’s foreign policy more generally, and 

Russia’s domestic politics. The article concludes that although insensitivity to costs can be an 

important advantage when states pursue confrontational foreign policy strategies, Russia’s 

attempts to outsuffer its adversaries in a war of attrition raise questions about the viability of 

this strategy. Thus, the strategy’s ominous promise for Russia is suffering without end. 

 
 

 

 

 

  



49                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Introduction 

When the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, was told two weeks before the start of the 

war by his British counterpart Ben Wallace that Russia would face steep economic costs if it 

invaded Ukraine, Shoigu responded that “We [Russians] can suffer like no one else” (Harris et 

al. 2022). Leaving aside the obvious point that Russians do not have a unique ability to suffer 

when compared with other nationalities, it is easy to dismiss Shoigu’s remark as a mere attempt 

to brush off a subject that he was uncomfortable with. After all, Russia had seemingly 

developed a world-class military, and it had a clever, albeit risky, plan to accomplish regime 

change in Kyiv in a bold military move. Once Volodimir Zelensky would have either fled or 

been captured, the remnants of Ukrainian military resistance would be dealt with.  

Russia’s plan ultimately failed because the Ukrainian leadership chose to stay and fight, and 

the Ukrainians rallied around their leaders. As a result, Russia became bogged down in a 

prolonged, costly, and bloody war against Ukraine. It has lost the Western energy markets, and 

EU and NATO member states have provided Ukraine with military assistance that may not just 

allow it to stave off Russia’s attacks but also conduct offensive operations with the aim of 

retaking territories occupied by Russia. The decisions taken by Ukraine’s Western partners to 

provide main battle tanks and F-16 fighter aircraft (yet to be delivered) offer further proof of 

that.  

How did Russia commit a blunder of such epic proportions that is likely to leave it severely 

weakened for decades? This article claims that this outcome has been the result of the implicit 

strategy that Russia has adopted in its efforts to confront the West. For a lack of a better term, 

Russia’s approach can be called ‘the strategy of outsuffering.’ The following sections 

introduce, define, and characterize the strategy of outsuffering. The aim of this article is to 

explore its origins, key elements, and limitations. The strategy of outsuffering is then used to 

explain Russia’s war against Ukraine.  

The strategy of outsuffering represents a paradox. Normally, states do not aim to ‘outsuffer’ 

their adversaries when they consider the use of military force. Instead, they aim to achieve 

quick and decisive victories, and yet they may end up in grinding fights against their 

adversaries. Literature on conventional deterrence notes that efforts to deter the adversary are 

likely to fail if the adversary can reasonably assume that its use of military force will produce 

a fait accompli that will be hard to reverse for the defender (Mearsheimer 1983). Thus, states 

use military force in the hope that it would produce quick and decisive victories. Sometimes, 

they succeed, but on other occasions, they miscalculate, and wars become protracted and costly. 

This description aptly characterizes Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russia’s initial plan was to 

win quickly (Kofman and Edmonds 2022), but it became apparent early on that Russia failed 

to achieve the results it anticipated (Zabrodskyi et al. 2022).  

Attempting to outsuffer the adversary is hardly what states aim for, but it is their ability to 

absorb high costs that makes the pursuit of this strategy possible in the first place. Since the 

use of military force in international relations can backfire, the use of this strategy can be 

considered a risky choice. States usually refrain from pursuing costly military policies unless 

there are important interests at stake and a relatively safe fallback option. The strategy of 

outsuffering represents such an option.  

The article proceeds in the following order. The following section provides an overview of 

Russia’s openly confrontational foreign policy over the past 15 years. The strategy of 

outsuffering refers to instances when powerful states pursue confrontational foreign policies 

that pit them against other powerful actors. The second section looks at the origins and key 

characteristics of the strategy of outsuffering. To that end, it also discusses the practical 



50                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

application of this strategy in Russia’s war against Ukraine. This section emphasizes the 

domestic preconditions for the adoption of this strategy. The third section discusses the 

limitations of this strategy for Russia in its current war against Ukraine. The article concludes 

that although the ability to absorb costs can be an important advantage when states pursue 

confrontational foreign policy strategies, Russia’s use of the strategy of outsuffering raises 

questions about its ability to achieve its stated foreign policy objectives through this strategy 

and perhaps even to sustain this strategy in the war against Ukraine. Unless that happens, the 

strategy’s ominous promise for Russia is suffering without end rather than victory through 

outsuffering Ukraine.  

 

1. Russia’s Confrontational Foreign Policy and its Consequences 

 

What are the roots of Russia’s confrontational policies? This is a complex question that has 

been the subject of heated scholarly debate that has intensified since Russia’s full-scale 

invasion of Ukraine in 2022. To explain the origins of Russia’s foreign policy, this article 

accepts that foreign policy is an amalgam of various actors, interests, principles, and threat 

perceptions. Foreign policy is also prone to misperception (Jervis 2017a). It is useful to 

conceptualize Russia’s foreign policy along five dimensions, as they provide a useful frame for 

assessing Russia’s foreign policy behaviour.  

The first dimension is global. Putin assumed his first presidency in 2000 in a unipolar world at 

the time when Russia seemingly did not have much influence internationally. Over time, Putin 

has worked to facilitate the transition to a multipolar system because this would help to extend 

Russia’s influence around the world and reduce other states’ dependency on the US. 

Importantly, the US’ ability to influence Russia’s foreign and domestic policies would also be 

greatly reduced under the conditions of multipolarity. Multipolarity would make the world safe 

for Russia to pursue its foreign policy as it sees fit. Bringing down the unipolar system, 

however, is hardly a simple task. Confronting the strongest state in the system and going against 

its policies is likely to be inherently costly. Therefore, some degree of suffering was probably 

expected by Russia’s policymakers, and that has probably been the case since the war against 

Georgia. 

The second dimension is regional. Russia considers itself a great power, it has historically been 

one, and it is likely to persist as a major power in Europe (Kofman and Kendall-Taylor 2021). 

However, Russia has also suffered from its economic, technological, and (sometimes) military 

weakness against Western European great powers (Omelicheva 2013). This has, at times, 

reduced Russia’s ability to project its power even onto its closest neighbourhood, while 

allowing for external influence in what Moscow sees as its backyard. This has implications for 

Russia’s security and economic interests, and it reduces Russia’s ability to shape the domestic 

and foreign policies of its neighbours. Unfortunately for Russia, its soft power attraction also 

lags behind that of the EU and NATO (Rostoks and Sprūds 2015), thus forcing Russia to rely 

on hard power.  

The third dimension is domestic. Russia has grown increasingly authoritarian since the early 

2000s, and it has witnessed a series of so-called ‘colour revolutions’ which have led to the 

ousting of long-time political leaders in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine, and a few other states. 

Russia has aimed to reduce the potential for external interference in its domestic affairs to 

ensure domestic stability. After the mass protests in 2011-2013, Russian authorities concluded 

that the protests were US-inspired, which led to further deterioration in US-Russia relations 

(Cordesman 2014). Opposition to US interference in the domestic affairs of Russia and other 

states around the world has become a key security interest of Russia.  



51                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

The fourth dimension is individual. Key decisions in Russia’s foreign policy are heavily 

influenced by Putin’s personal views and his various roles (Hill and Gaddy 2015). Russia’s 

aggression against Ukraine in 2022 cannot be viewed separately from Putin’s personal 

preferences and interpretation of history (Putin 2021). Indeed, the attempt at regime change in 

Kyiv is likely to have been motivated by concerns over Putin’s personal legacy in Russian 

politics. He did not want to go down in history as the man who took Crimea but lost Ukraine. 

To avoid this, he needed to ensure Ukraine’s return to Russia’s orbit.  

The final dimension is normative. It includes various widespread beliefs among Russian 

policymakers and the public that reflect their world outlook, views on the nature of 

international affairs, and Russia’s place in the world. In general, Russia perceives international 

affairs as highly conflictual and in zero-sum terms. Putin has repeatedly complained about the 

US hegemony and Western hypocrisy, arguably more frequently after the invasion of Ukraine 

in 2022. However, Russia’s criticism of the US and the West more broadly also reflects 

Russia’s quest for status and legitimacy. Furthermore, there is a value dimension in Russia’s 

opposition to the West that is based on the claim that values that Russia represents are 

fundamentally different from those of the West (Kari 2018; Person 2022).  

All in all, Russia’s confrontation with the West is not an accident. Instead, it is the result of 

fundamentally different interests and security perceptions between Russia and the West. In this 

regard, the US was and still is the key obstacle that prevents Russia from attaining its key 

foreign policy interests in Europe because the interests of Russia and the US have been at odds 

for the most part of the post-Cold War era (Kramer 2010).  

Russia’s efforts to facilitate a transition to a multipolar world have taken place in the context 

of a unipolar world. Even the Soviet Union during the Cold War was considered one of the two 

contenders in a bipolar world mainly because of its “massive military capabilities and 

geopolitical location in the center of Eurasia” (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016, 1) rather than 

because of its economic might and alliances (Walt 2011). In comparison, Russian President 

Vladimir Putin has faced a more challenging problem since his ascent to power because Russia 

has been considerably less powerful than the combined power of the transatlantic community. 

Faced with the US and NATO military power and the EU’s economic power, Russia’s approach 

has been from a position of relative weakness. Although Russia has had a military advantage 

vis-à-vis its smaller NATO and non-NATO neighbours, the overall balance of military and 

economic power in Europe has not been in Russia’s favour. This has had far-reaching 

consequences for Russia’s strategy, which has aimed to undermine the unity of the collective 

West and sow domestic discontent in the EU and NATO countries.  

Russia’s strategy vis-à-vis the West has clearly been confrontational since Putin’s defiant 

speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 (Putin 2007). Although there was an attempt 

to reset negotiations with Russia early on during US President Barack Obama’s first term, this 

effort was short-lived and largely unsuccessful (Deyermond 2013). Russia’s annexation of 

Crimea and orchestration of the war in Donbas, military intervention in Syria with an aim to 

prevent the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and, most recently, unprovoked military 

aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 have decisively demonstrated what Russia’s 

interests and foreign policy ambitions are. Its actual ability to pursue those interests and its 

timeline for achieving foreign policy objectives are debatable, but it has become apparent that 

Russia sees itself as being not just different from the West but also in a highly adversarial 

relationship with it (Giles 2023). Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the 

fundamental domestic and foreign policy differences between Russia and the West were not 

fully internalized by Western political decision makers (Giles 2019).  



52                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Until 2022, Russia’s use of military power was quite successful. Russia prevented Georgia and 

Ukraine from becoming NATO member states. Russia annexed Crimea through a successful 

military operation with hardly any shots fired. Although the subsequent efforts to create a pro-

Russian entity called Novorossiya were thwarted to some extent, the outcome of the military 

conflict was a relative victory for Russia that created a frozen conflict and a diplomatic 

mechanism—the Minsk process—that allowed Russia to exert consistent pressure on the 

government in Kyiv. In the meantime, Russia has decisively intervened in the Syrian war—a 

military success that made Russia an influential player in the Middle East and cemented its 

security cooperation with Iran. More importantly, Russia projected an image of strength in the 

minds of Western policymakers, who became convinced that Russia had become a formidable 

military power. Russia’s military modernization, which began in earnest in the aftermath of its 

2008 war with Georgia (Trenin 2016), had seemingly produced a world-class military ready to 

take on almost any other military and backed by Russia’s modernized nuclear weapons arsenal. 

More importantly, the upward trajectory of Russia’s military modernization was in stark 

contrast to the downsizing of NATO non-US militaries that was taking place at the time. 

NATO’s combined military spending was steadily decreasing until 2014 (NATO 2016). The 

trend was reversed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but the measures taken to strengthen 

NATO’s eastern flank and to provide military support to Ukraine were still timid. As US 

President Barack Obama remarked in an interview in his final year in office, Ukraine was more 

important to Russia than to the US. It was assumed, that there would always be an asymmetry 

of motivation which would favour Russia (Goldberg 2016).  

There were setbacks along the way, but these were relatively minor. The Russia-Georgia War 

led to NATO defence plans for the Baltic states being adopted for the first time since 2004. 

The annexation of Crimea led to increased US military presence in Europe and the 2016 NATO 

decision to deploy multinational battlegroups to the Baltic states as part of the Enhanced 

Forward Presence framework (Lanoszka, Leuprecht, and Moens 2020). On the economic front, 

sanctions that were imposed on Russia in the wake of the military conflict in Donbas did have 

a moderate negative effect on Russia’s economy, and the impact was compounded by the fall 

in the price of oil in 2014 (Christie 2016). Despite economic sanctions being a double-edged 

sword, negative economic effects on the EU were considerably less than on Russia (Giumelli 

2017). This could be problematic in the long run, as that would tilt the distribution of power 

between Russia and NATO in favour of the Alliance. Russia’s confrontational policies 

produced costs, but these did not lead to a softening of Russia’s policies.  

The costs arising from Russia’s war in Ukraine since 2022, however, exceed any preceding 

costs by far. Russia’s military has been fighting a war in Ukraine that it is unlikely to win 

decisively, and the long-term prospects for the Russian economy are bleak as the effects of 

economic sanctions begin to mount. Assessments of the impact of unprecedented economic 

sanctions on Russia vary, and the original expectations of Russia’s imminent economic 

collapse have turned out to be unfounded (David et al. 2023; Demertzis et al. 2022; Jentleson 

2022; Sonnenfeld and Tian 2022). Sanctions have affected Russia’s ability to produce some of 

the high-end military platforms, but Russia “still possesses a significant degree of adaptability 

to Western sanctions, taking advantage of its prewar stockpiles of older equipment, as well as 

countries willing to supply Moscow with restricted dual-use items and technology via a web 

of illicit supply chains” (Bergmann et al. 2023, 1). However, medium- to long-term prospects 

for Russia’s economy are still inauspicious (Demarais 2022).  

Over the course of the war, the focus of discussions on Russia’s strategy in Ukraine has been 

mainly on Russia’s military strategy and whether it may succeed in defeating Ukraine’s 

military or at least forcing Ukraine to accept peace on Russia’s terms. In this regard, experts 

have offered very different assessments (O’Brien 2023; Rice and Gates 2023). The same goes 



53                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

for experts’ views on whether Ukraine will be forced to make concessions or not (Foreign 

Affairs 2023), the preferable Western strategy in providing military and economic assistance 

to Ukraine (McFaul 2023), and the likely consequences for Russia’s domestic politics if it 

suffers defeat in Ukraine (Kasparov and Khodorkovsky 2023). Russia has suffered staggering 

losses since the start of the war, although precise numbers are unavailable at this point. Leaked 

US government documents from late February 2023 indicate that Russia’s casualties were in 

excess of 200,000 killed and wounded (Lamothe and Khurshudyan 2023). US General Mark 

Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, estimated in an interview, which was published 

on May 2, 2023, that Russia has suffered between 200,000 and 250,000 casualties (Kurtz-

Phelan 2023). These figures are likely to have increased considerably over the course of 

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, although reliable numbers are hard to come by. Russia 

has paid a steep price for whatever territorial, political, and military objectives that it has sought 

to attain in Ukraine. Russia also seems to have embraced Joseph Stalin’s way of war by 

throwing mobilized men against the Ukrainian defences and trying to overwhelm the adversary 

with sheer mass (Aron 2023). However, even the tenuous gains that the Russian military has 

scored since February 2022 can come to naught if Ukraine succeeds in liberating territories that 

have been occupied since 2014 (Vindman 2023; Zagorodnyuk 2023).   

Initially, the economic and military costs of Russia’s assertive foreign policy were relatively 

low. More recently, however, considerable losses have accrued in the form of economic 

sanctions, political and diplomatic isolation, and war casualties. Russia’s strategy has been 

characterized by far-reaching confrontational aims and by the outsized price that Russia has 

paid for its policies. Although there is disagreement regarding the likely outcome of the war in 

Ukraine, it is unlikely that Russia’s relations with the West will normalize anytime soon. Also, 

the war is likely to continue beyond 2023 because both Russia and Ukraine still hope that they 

can achieve a decisive military victory or that they must continue to fight because of the fear 

of adverse consequences on foreign and domestic political fronts (Sebenius and Singh 2023).  
 

In sum, the costs of war for Russia will continue to mount. This begs the question of why 

Russia is trying to outsuffer Ukraine and the West. Russia’s policies seem even more puzzling 

if one considers that Russia faced no immediate or medium-term threats to its security before 

the war, including from NATO (Dickinson 2023). Although there is no shortage of claims that 

it was the threat of NATO and EU enlargement that provoked Putin back in 2014 (Mearsheimer 

2014) and then again in 2022, there is little evidence that Ukraine either on its own or with 

NATO support was planning to threaten Russia. If Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had anything 

to do with NATO, then it was probably Ukraine’s ambition to join NATO (and the EU) rather 

than the willingness of NATO members to bring Ukraine into the Alliance.  

Russia’s accusations that it levelled against Ukraine and the West prior to the invasion were, 

for the most part, unfounded, and some of its complaints, such as that Ukraine was run by Nazis 

and that it was developing nuclear weapons, were outrageous (Putin 2022a, 2022b). Most of 

the foreign-imposed costs that Russia has accrued are self-inflicted wounds.  

 

2. Strategy of Outsuffering: Origins and Main Characteristics 

What is the strategy of outsuffering, and what are its characteristics and origins? To begin with, 

the strategy of outsuffering can be applied to both offensive and defensive contexts. Weaker 

states or non-state actors can try to outsuffer and outlast stronger adversaries to avoid being 

defeated decisively or even to win. There are many examples where weaker actors have been 

able to persist and prevail in the face of external aggression (Arreguin-Toft 2005). These 

include the American fiasco in Vietnam, the French defeat in Indochina, the Soviet loss in 



54                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Afghanistan, and the US-forced withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. In other cases, 

the aggressor can obtain partial victory, such as the Soviet Union in the Winter War against 

Finland. Weaker actors may also fold in the face of military aggression, such as the Baltic states 

did in 1940 under Soviet pressure, but overall, it can be expected that also weaker states and 

non-state actors will try to defend themselves even when the chances of success are uncertain 

at best.  

Attempts to outsuffer the enemy are used in an offensive context as well, as the examples of 

German, Japanese, and North Korean expansionism indicate. However, large-scale wars rarely 

follow a single pattern, and the unique characteristics of each war make it difficult to 

generalize. German expansion in Europe starting in the late 1930s was initially successful, and 

only later, after failing to defeat the Soviet Union decisively, did Adolf Hitler pursue the 

strategy of outsuffering, although that did not end well for Germany. While Japan’s aggression 

against the US in 1941 was largely motivated by its susceptibility to economic coercion by the 

US, it was difficult for the US to anticipate a Japanese attack because of the conventional 

wisdom that weaker powers do not attack stronger ones (Jervis 2017b). North Korea’s 

aggression against South Korea triggered a bloody and costly proxy war between the US on 

the one hand and the Soviet Union and China on the other, while North Korea had to fight for 

survival after its attack was repelled and the US forces were pushing the North Korean troops 

towards the Yalu River. Clearly, there is variation in terms of contexts in which states may try 

to outsuffer their adversaries. The presence of nuclear weapons in the post-1945 international 

system only adds to this complexity (Monteiro 2014), as great powers in possession of nuclear 

weapons are unlikely to suffer the fate of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan at the end of the 

Second World War. Nuclear powers can outsuffer their adversaries without fearing ultimate 

defeat in a war.  

The use of this strategy in an offensive context happens when aggressors miscalculate by either 

underestimating the strength of the adversary or considerably overestimating their own 

capacity to conduct a sustained military campaign or engage in strategic competition. The most 

likely context in which powerful states may be forced to resort to the strategy of outsuffering 

is where the target of their aggressive policies manages to secure support from other powerful 

actors. The consequences of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 largely fit that 

description. What was supposed to be a quick and decisive victory turned into a long and 

bloody stalemate.  

What is the strategy of outsuffering? This strategy is a fallback option for states that pursue 

confrontational policies that other states are likely to resist. It is chosen when states cannot 

attain their objectives easily and when they are forced to mount a major effort to attain a 

favourable outcome in a political, military, and economic confrontation. It is expected that the 

mobilization of the latent power of a state and the willingness of its population to endure 

hardships to attain valued foreign policy objectives will help it surmount the countermeasures 

taken by other states. In military terms, this strategy resembles the war of attrition (Echevarria 

2017). A similar concept has been used to describe Ukraine’s approach to counter Russia’s 

military—the strategy of corrosion (Ryan 2022). However, the strategy of outsuffering applies 

not just to the military realm because it encompasses the overarching political aspects of a 

state’s foreign policy approach. Thus, it can be applied to adversarial situations where states 

aim to endure through economic, political, and military terms.  

The strategy of outsuffering does not embrace any particular foreign policy objectives, and in 

this sense, it is different from the standard range of policy choices that states face in their pursuit 

of a “grand strategy” (Brands 2014). A grand strategy lays out “a country’s most important and 

enduring interests and a theory of how it will use its resources to defend or advance those 



55                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

interests, given domestic and international constraints” (Charap et al. 2021, 5). Although there 

has been some unease about whether the term ‘strategy’ still has a clear and distinct meaning 

(Strachan 2005), debates on grand strategy are indispensable because they flesh out the key 

elements of a state’s ambition in world politics (Drezner 2011).  

The strategy of outsuffering is strategic in the sense that it offers general principles of behaviour 

and identifies a variety of factors that affect the implementation of this strategy. Strategy is 

always pursued in a particular political, economic, social, and international context. The 

problems that a strategy aims to solve are always rooted in practical realities that policymakers 

are facing (Gray 2006). The strategy of outsuffering, however, is not a grand strategy. It 

primarily focuses on the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’ question, and it is used when a state that 

is trying to upset the status quo faces the difficult choice between giving up on valued 

objectives or doubling down in the hope that a more determined effort will force the adversary 

to back down. The strategy of outsuffering is more general than a purely military strategy with 

its focus on warfighting. It helps to clarify the reasons why Russia did not call off its attack on 

Ukraine when it was warned that its aggression would face steep costs and why Russia has 

persisted in the war against Ukraine after initial setbacks. It also helps to explain Russia’s 

earlier acceptance of the costs of economic sanctions in the aftermath of the annexation of 

Crimea and the start of the war in the Donbas region in 2014. This was the price of territorial 

expansionism and the intentional weakening of Ukraine. 

The strategy of outsuffering reflects the determination of a state to pursue foreign policy 

objectives even when the costs of the chosen policy exceed initial calculations. This strategy is 

about staying the course and not backing down in the face of adversity and external pressure, 

and it is a deliberate acceptance of the costs of expansionist policies that is an important 

characteristic of this strategy. States that pursue this strategy double down on their efforts when 

they initially fail to achieve stated objectives. This strategy is likely to be pursued by powerful 

actors who assume that their ability to advance ambitious foreign policy objectives depends on 

their demonstrated motivation to do so and readiness to mobilize all sources of national power 

after initial failures. They may enjoy significant advantages in terms of military and economic 

power vis-à-vis a state that is on the receiving end, but they may be weaker than a coalition of 

states that may want to thwart its foreign policy ambitions. Importantly, suffering is not the 

aim, but it is the path that a state chooses when it faces a difficult choice between accepting a 

humiliating defeat or staying in the fight with the hope that it will be able to turn the situation 

around at a later point. Moreover, the strategy of outsuffering is wasteful in the sense that it 

requires using people and resources to solve problems on the foreign policy front without being 

fully prepared. Russia’s decision in April 2022 to refocus its military campaign against Ukraine 

from taking Kyiv to defeating Ukraine in the Donbas region without solving the military’s 

manpower problem is a case in point. Also, this strategy is characterized by the need to respond 

to immediate problems and challenges, often at the expense of a state’s long-term interests—

the strategy of outsuffering sacrifices the future in exchange for staying in the game in the short 

term.  

The strategy of outsuffering reflects a particular characteristic of international politics where 

the behaviour of other states may not conform to expectations, and the costs of action may be 

higher than anticipated. In this regard, concepts such as change, motivation, time, and risk are 

particularly significant. To start with, the strategy of outsuffering involves some degree of 

foreign policy change (Welch 2005), where non-confrontational policies give way to more 

aggressive and confrontational ones. The challenger divests from a peaceful pursuit of foreign 

policy objectives in favour of a more muscular approach and then doubles down on the chosen 

policy, making a negotiated solution to the conflict less likely.  



56                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

The strategy of outsuffering signals the aggressor’s motivation and aims to demonstrate that its 

determination to pursue specific interests and secure certain outcomes exceeds that of other 

actors. Doubling down on confrontational policies may prompt other actors to defer to the 

aggressor due to its higher motivation, and this has been recognized in the literature on coercive 

diplomacy (George 1992).  

Also, the strategy of outsuffering is time-consuming. Unless other states acquiesce quickly, it 

leads to ever-increasing costs that stem from the chosen policy. Outsuffering is the context of 

wills and resources. Finally, the strategy of outsuffering involves considerable risk because the 

possibility of adverse outcomes increases. After all, there may be good reasons why the initial 

effort has not been successful. Doubling down and trying to win after failing to win initially 

may signal threatening behaviour and result in a large countervailing coalition, as other states 

respond to the threatening behaviour (Walt 1987).  

The riskiness of the strategy needs to be explored further because it is prospect theory (Jervis 

1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levy 1992; McDermott 1998, 2004; Welch 2005) that 

sheds light on the reasons why policymakers may try to outsuffer their adversaries. Prospect 

theory stipulates that humans treat gains and losses differently, with losses looming larger than 

gains. Losses induce risky behaviour, while gains induce caution. As decision makers find 

themselves deeper in the domain of loss, they are likely to pursue riskier policies. However, 

the strategy of outsuffering cannot be reduced to peoples’ sensitivity to losses alone because 

not all risky decisions involve outsuffering, albeit some of them certainly do. Thus, the strategy 

of outsuffering is chosen by actors who find themselves in the domain of loss and who are 

ready to embrace a risky strategy to redeem losses accruing from a military operation going 

badly or costs that stem from geopolitical competition. This has implications for deterrence 

and compellence as well (Schaub 2004), as it might be more difficult to deter political leaders 

who are in the domain of loss and, consequently, are more prone to take significant risks.  

Russia’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine can be considered risky. Putin 

returned Crimea to Russia in 2014, but Russia’s subsequent policies were less successful, as 

Ukraine’s foreign policy was primarily aimed at building closer ties with the EU and NATO. 

Russia’s efforts to prevent that from happening were ineffective. Russia was in the domain of 

loss when it decided to reverse its fortunes in Ukraine with one bold stroke in February 2022. 

Even in a realistic best-case scenario, with Russian forces taking Kyiv in a few days after the 

start of the military operation, Russia would face steep costs in terms of international sanctions 

and insurgency in Ukraine. These would seem limited when compared to the military disaster 

that Russia actually endured, but the decision to invade Ukraine was risky anyway.  

The choice in favour of the strategy of outsuffering after the initial attempt to achieve valued 

foreign policy objectives stands in stark contrast to overconfidence and positive illusions that 

are prevalent at the start of military conflicts (Johnson 2004, 2020). It is unlikely that the logic 

underpinning the strategy of outsuffering would play a major role at this stage because 

policymakers are likely to expect to achieve their objectives quickly. There is some debate 

regarding the extent to which they first have to convince themselves about the correctness of 

their chosen course of action in order to be able to convince political elites and the general 

public (Jervis 2017b). Policymakers may genuinely believe that they will score a quick victory 

against their foreign adversaries, but they can also have doubts about the viability of the chosen 

course of action. In this case, they need a reliable alternative course of action that they may 

pursue if the original plan fails to deliver the desired outcomes. Although it is reasonable to 

assume that Russia expected to win quickly against Ukraine in February/March 2022, 

policymakers in Moscow were probably aware that they could try to win gradually by using its 



57                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

military, political, and economic power against a nominally weaker opponent to outsuffer 

Ukraine, if Russia’s plan for a regime change in Kyiv would fail.  

What are the characteristics of the strategy of outsuffering? Overall, this strategy implies the 

pursuit of foreign policy objectives in the face of mounting costs imposed by other states. The 

choice in favour of this strategy is likely to be taken by an actor in the domain of loss, and the 

chosen alternative will bear significant risks. Overall, this strategy has five characteristics. 

First, it is pursued in the name of vital foreign policy interests. The strategy of outsuffering 

implies a considerable degree of compulsion and a widespread belief among policymakers and 

the public that ‘there is no other choice.’ Putin has repeatedly emphasized that he did not have 

any other choice but to invade Ukraine to prevent grave threats to Russia’s national security. 

Although Russia’s justification for the war cannot be taken at face value, the use of 

overwhelming military force against Ukraine—a country of more than 40 million people—was 

hardly an easy decision.  

Second, the strategy of outsuffering is chosen with a long-term view. Difficulties faced in the 

short term are likely to pay off in the long run, and the setbacks and difficulties a state is facing 

can be surmounted. Costs accrued in the process may ultimately mean little if foreign policy 

objectives are achieved, and the adversary is either defeated or forced to settle the conflict on 

the terms of the state that pursues the strategy of outsuffering. Being weakened in the short 

term may be less important than achieving important objectives and weakening the adversary 

in the process. Russian leadership likely believes that it can outlast the joint effort of Ukraine 

and its Western supporters (Face the Nation 2023). If Russia stays in the fight long enough, it 

can win because the cost of the conflict is higher for Ukraine. While Ukraine’s economy has 

been gravely affected by the conflict, Russia’s economy has suffered to a lesser extent. With 

important interests for Russia being at stake in Ukraine, short-term costs can be tolerated. 

Keeping Ukraine in Moscow’s sphere of influence would likely benefit Russia in the long term, 

and the price for doing that—high as it is—may seem less 20 or 30 years from now.  

Third, reputational concerns are a key reason why states may decide to endure hardship rather 

than accept defeat and scale down their objectives. Thus, the strategy of outsuffering can be 

chosen by political leaders not just because they have become victims of prospect theory, but 

also because they—rightly or wrongly—believe that at stake is either their personal or national 

reputations or both. Although there is a vibrant academic debate on whether reputations should 

matter (Mercer 1996), there is a near consensus that decision makers take reputational concerns 

seriously (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015). Thus, the pursuit of the strategy of outsuffering is 

made more likely not just by important foreign policy interests being at stake but also by actors’ 

concerns about the negative consequences for their reputation if they admit defeat. In 

reputational terms, much is at stake for Russia in its war against Ukraine. Although the war has 

revealed that Russia’s military is less powerful than it was assumed before the invasion and 

most of the military units that took part in the full-scale attack have been severely depleted, its 

reputation can be at least partially redeemed if eventually, Russia manages to hold onto the 

occupied territories and repel Ukraine’s efforts to liberate them. It needs emphasizing, though, 

that the pursuit of the strategy of outsuffering represents a genuine choice between seeking a 

negotiated solution and doubling down on confrontation. Russia could have settled its conflict 

with Ukraine in the spring of 2022, at least temporarily. Also, it could extract concessions from 

Ukraine back then. However, it chose not to pursue a negotiated solution and decided to 

outsuffer Ukraine, although the Russian military was arguably in bad shape after being defeated 

near Kyiv.  

Fourth, the strategy presumes a significant loss of power relative to other actors. After all, 

outsuffering means exactly that—expending sizable resources in the pursuit of important 



58                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

foreign policy objectives. Expending military and economic power may leave the actor 

vulnerable and may even leave them in a precarious position in the long run, especially when 

valued foreign policy objectives remain unattained. Moreover, resorting to plan B means that 

the original plan has failed, and the strategy of outsuffering may be pursued under conditions 

that are far more unwelcoming than at the start of the confrontation. Thus, the strategy may fail 

if the costs become too high because the state would no longer have the means to continue its 

policies. It is a persistent challenge for actors that use this strategy to limit the costs of 

confrontation and the amount of suffering to an acceptable level.   

Also, improvisation becomes necessary, which may result in even greater losses than 

anticipated. Abandoning the Kyiv axis of advance made Russia’s subsequent military efforts 

in the Donbas region more difficult because of the heavy losses in the early stages of the war. 

Problems with logistics resulting in an inability to supply troops have haunted the Russian 

military since the early stages of the war (Berkowitz and Galocha 2022). Military mobilization 

that began in late September 2022 was problematic because Russia did not have a well-

prepared system to support such an effort. Also, the decision to mobilize a few hundred 

thousand additional military personnel was taken too late, and Russia had to send thousands of 

newly mobilized troops to the frontlines without proper military training. Russia’s most capable 

military units have been decimated, and it will take years to rebuild the expertise and skillset 

that have been lost (Horton 2023; Miller et al. 2022).  

Finally, the adoption of the strategy of outsuffering is affected by the worst-case scenario that 

a state may face if it fails to accomplish its stated objectives. The mobilization of national 

resources in support of a confrontational policy may not necessarily succeed. If the expected 

consequences in case the state fails to outsuffer its adversaries are expected to be catastrophic, 

this strategy is less likely to be chosen. If, however, the fallout from confrontational policies is 

likely to be limited, that makes the adoption of this strategy more likely. In the context of 

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the worst-case scenario is probably a combination of 

military defeat, high economic costs, and the failure to achieve its objectives in Ukraine. Since 

Russia is a nuclear power, other worst-case consequences, such as the loss of territory beyond 

Donbas and Crimea and the military devastation of Russia’s cities, are highly unlikely. In the 

nuclear age, great powers are more likely to escape suffering catastrophic consequences from 

their foreign policy blunders (Monteiro 2014). Importantly, the Second World War ended with 

the capture of Berlin and the occupation of Germany, but the war between Russia and Ukraine 

is unlikely to have such catastrophic consequences for Russia, albeit less so for Putin’s regime.  

Much attention in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been paid to Russia’s 

attempts to deter NATO from helping Ukraine, but General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the 

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Lieutenant General Mykhailo 

Zabrodskyi, First Deputy Chairman of the National Security, Defense, and Intelligence 

Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, identified impunity as the center of gravity in 

the ongoing war. Previously, Russia could target Ukrainian territory at will with long-range 

weapons, while Ukraine could not respond in kind because it did not have the means to do that 

(Zaluzhnyi and Zabrodskyi 2022). As of October 2023, Ukraine has received Storm Shadow, 

Scalp EG, and ATACMS missiles from its Western partners, but these likely come with 

limitations, meaning, these weapon systems should not be used against Russia’s territory. The 

result of Russia’s relative impunity has been its campaign to damage Ukraine’s energy 

infrastructure during the winter of 2022/23. Moreover, Russia’s nuclear weapons will likely 

shield it from the loss of territory if Ukrainian forces manage to de-occupy large swaths of 

Ukraine’s territory. Impunity makes the adoption of the strategy of outsuffering easier because 

powerful actors can expect to be shielded from the negative consequences of their actions even 

in the case that the strategy of outsuffering fails to deliver the expected results.  



59                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

The five characteristics explain why states may choose the strategy of outsuffering and whether 

it represents a feasible option for a state that is pursuing a confrontational foreign policy and 

whose initial plan has been thwarted. There is, however, another crucial precondition for the 

strategy, and that is the practical ability of a state to stay the course even when the ultimate 

outcome is in doubt. The state must be able to mobilize its population and national resources 

for the purpose of obtaining ambitious foreign policy objectives in a hostile international 

environment. The government must be able to use the latent power of the state despite domestic 

opposition. It does not mean that the element of coercion is not present in this strategy. On the 

contrary, the ability of a government to discipline and mobilize its citizens can be the key 

reason why this strategy may become viable at all. This involves the government’s ability to 

remain in control, suppress public dissent, and manufacture public support for risky and costly 

policies. Not all domestic groups may be willing to persevere in the face of adversity, but it is 

up to the government to rally support for political leaders and their policies. Public support can 

be obtained either through persuasion or compulsion/repression. In Russia, there were sporadic 

protests at the start of the ‘special military operation,’ but eventually, Russians seemingly 

“learned to stop worrying and love the war” (Kolesnikov 2023). Some of them left the country 

while it was still possible, and the rest had to adapt to the wartime measures that the government 

was taking. Despite initial statements to the contrary, the Russian government eventually opted 

in favour of partial mobilization of fighting-age men in September 2022. This made possible 

an almost unlimited supply of manpower to the frontlines, while the military platforms and 

ammunition that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union allowed it to sustain high-intensity 

warfare and conduct military offensives.   

All in all, the key features of the strategy of outsuffering are as follows. It is a strategy that 

policymakers may decide to pursue grudgingly because the alternative would be to admit defeat 

either unconditionally or through negotiations and to forfeit important foreign policy 

objectives. Also, this strategy implies a long-term view of the confrontation and a hope that the 

tables may turn if the state in question manages to persevere long enough. The strategy is likely 

to generate substantial economic, military, and human costs for the state that is employing it. 

These costs may worsen the state’s relative position vis-à-vis other actors. Importantly, the 

very existence of the fallback option makes foreign policy change and the pursuit of risky 

foreign policy objectives more likely.  

 

 

3. Limitations  

What are the main limitations of the strategy of outsuffering? As Russia’s relentless military 

aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated, this strategy has allowed Russia to absorb the 

costs of the war and to remain in the fight without downgrading its military and political 

objectives in a significant way, but it also has two important drawbacks. First, this strategy 

considerably weakens the state that is employing it. Outsuffering implies the need to absorb 

military and economic losses, some of which cannot be easily replaced or compensated for. 

The material foundations of state power and nonmaterial aspects such as morale are significant 

preconditions for adopting this strategy. Thus, it is likely to fail against an opponent that is 

equally motivated and has sufficient material—financial and military—resources to expend.  

The above characterization is highly problematic for Russia because Russia is facing an 

opponent—Ukraine—that is more motivated because Russia’s military aggression poses an 

existential threat. Atrocities committed by the Russian military in Bucha and Irpin strengthened 

the resolve of the Ukrainian military and population. Ukraine is fighting for survival, and in 

this regard, it has an edge over the Russian troops that at least initially did not anticipate 



60                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

unyielding resistance. The existential character of the war also allowed the Ukrainian 

government to mobilize and arm a large number of fighting-age men. Although its military was 

supposedly smaller than Russia’s, Ukraine already had, in fact, a large military at the start of 

the war, and it has grown over the course of the war because Ukraine’s government prohibited 

men aged 18-60 from leaving the country (Carpenter and Fairchild 2022). As a result, Ukraine 

initially fielded a larger force than Russia did. Ironically, because the Russian president called 

the invasion a ‘special military operation,’ the Russian military had a manpower problem, and 

its mechanized units were not sufficiently supported by infantry (Kofman and Lee 2022). The 

Russian military faced a “brutal examination” in early 2022, and it was not up to the task 

(Dalsjö, Jonsson, and Norberg 2022).  

The situation within the Russian military changed after Putin’s announcement of the partial 

mobilization in September 2022. That decision allowed Russia to increase the number of 

military personnel, but at that point, the availability of military equipment became problematic 

because Russia had already lost thousands of pieces of equipment (Mitzer and Janovsky 2022). 

As Russia, Ukraine, and the West were beginning to prepare for the long war (Daalder and 

Goldgeier 2023), Russia’s strategy of outsuffering became problematic because Ukraine’s 

military had experienced fewer losses, was becoming increasingly better equipped, and was 

trained and supplied by the West. This does not mean that Russia would necessarily lose the 

war, but there are preconditions for Ukraine to succeed against Russia because the conventional 

military capabilities of the West that can be used to assist Ukraine exceed Russia’s, despite 

concerns that Western military equipment and ammunition stocks have dwindled. 

In the economic realm, Ukraine’s Western backers ensured that its economy did not collapse 

early in the war, and economic support has been consistent throughout the military conflict. 

Ukraine’s GDP did decrease by more than 30 percent in 2022 (Kyiv Independent 2023), and 

the reconstruction of Ukraine will cost hundreds of billions of euros after the war’s end. The 

impact of the war has been less catastrophic for Russia’s economy. The initial projections of 

GDP decrease by 8-10 percent did not materialize, and eventually, Russia’s economy 

contracted only by 2.1 percent of its GDP (European Council 2023). Its long-term prospects, 

however, are bleak because of unprecedented economic sanctions, the exodus of working-age 

Russians, reduced revenues from energy exports, and structural adjustment of Russia’s 

economy in favour of the military industry above other sectors of the economy (Kotkin, Guriev, 

and Bernstam 2023). Western economic sanctions have been relatively effective, albeit 

ensuring compliance has been difficult (Tsouloufas and Rochat 2023). Due to economic 

sanctions, Russia is still selling oil on the world market, but its oil revenues have shrunk when 

compared to 2022. The short-term effects must be equally worrying for the Russian 

government. Information released by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation in early 

February 2023 revealed a bleak picture. Russian government’s budgetary revenues in January 

2023 decreased by 35 percent when compared to January 2022, oil and gas revenues dropped 

by 46 percent, there was also a 26 percent drop in non-energy government revenues, and 

government expenditures were 59 percent higher than a year ago (Ministry of Finance of the 

Russian Federation 2023). To cover the deficit, the Russian government sold 3.6 tons of gold 

and 2.3 billion yuan in January 2023 (Bloomberg News 2023). Since then, Russia’s economy 

has somewhat recovered and is even projected to grow as Russia is gearing up for the long war. 

There is, however, little optimism regarding its performance in the coming years (Prokopenko 

2023). In sum, Russia’s use of the strategy of outsuffering faces two problems: first, Ukraine 

has the manpower and the will to fight, and second, the collective West seems determined to 

provide Ukraine with economic and military assistance to sustain its war effort.  

The second major problem for Russia, as it pursues the strategy of outsuffering, is how other 

states perceive Russia’s long-term intentions vis-à-vis Ukraine and the West more broadly. In 



61                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

a nutshell, can Russia be trusted not to attack Ukraine again after the end of the ongoing war? 

Russia has had numerous opportunities to de-escalate since February 2022, but it has chosen 

not to do so. Once its initial assault on Kyiv failed, Russia doubled down in the Donbas region, 

and then later, in the context of Ukraine’s successful counterattacks in Kharkiv and Kherson, 

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the formal annexation of the four partially 

occupied Ukraine’s regions (Putin 2022c). On the one hand, these measures have demonstrated 

Russia’s resolve. On the other hand, however, there are few, if any, signs that Russia would be 

ready for peace settlement and withdrawal of its forces from Ukraine. For Ukraine, opting for 

peace may merely present Russia with an opportunity to regroup, rearm, and invade again. 

Ukraine has been Russia’s unfinished business since early 2015, and Russia tried to achieve a 

decisive victory in Ukraine seven years later. Thus, another pause in fighting would be unlikely 

to indicate that a lasting peace has been achieved.  

In other words, only a decisive victory by Ukraine and the change of political leadership in 

Russia would pave the way to stable peace. This might not necessarily be true, but Russia has 

repeatedly used force against Ukraine; therefore, Ukraine might choose to prolong the war 

instead of opting for peace that may prove to be short-lived. Although Russia may have scaled 

down its maximalist objectives in Ukraine, there is little indication that it is willing to engage 

in serious diplomacy to end the war (Freedman 2022). 

Concerns over Russia’s intentions and future actions, however, extend well beyond Ukraine. 

In December 2021, Russia presented NATO and the US with a series of demands, including 

the request to remove NATO’s troops from Eastern and Central European states that joined the 

Alliance after 1997, thus ensuring Russia’s military preponderance (and NATO’s weakness) 

in Northern Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2021). Russia’s 

relations with the West have increasingly been characterized by a lack of mutual trust, and 

Russia’s neighbours have voiced concerns about Russia’s intentions (Rostoks 2018). Examples 

of Russia’s confrontational policies towards the West are too many to enumerate, and they 

range from Russia’s attempts to interfere in the 2016 US presidential election to interference 

in Montenegro and the poisoning of Skripals in the United Kingdom in 2018. In short, Russia 

and the West are in a state of low-level conflict in which Russia weaponizes various aspects of 

its relationship with the West with the aim of weakening it (Galeotti 2022). The overall 

relationship between the West and Russia is unlikely to change anytime soon.  

To summarize, Ukraine has major concerns about its post-war relationship with Russia, and so 

does the West. Whatever modicum of trust and mutual goodwill existed before Russia’s 

invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has been destroyed. Russia’s partners no longer have confidence 

that Russia will fulfil its obligations even if a peace agreement is negotiated and signed. 

Russia’s doubling down on territorial claims in Ukraine and its war effort has made an already 

bad situation considerably worse. If Ukraine believes that Russia will launch another attack 

sooner or later, then it would rather continue to fight instead of opting for peace. If the strategy 

of outsuffering forces adversaries to conclude that peaceful coexistence is not possible, then 

the only alternative to that is the continuation of hostilities with the aim of degrading Russia’s 

military capabilities to such an extent that it will no longer pose a threat to its neighbours. Thus, 

the strategy of outsuffering becomes self-defeating because it further entrenches existing 

hostilities and forces adversaries to make worst-case assumptions not just about the other side’s 

policies but also about its character. This, however, does not preclude the possibility that the 

strategy of outsuffering may succeed in military and economic terms. 

 

 

 



62                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Conclusion  

Russia’s war against Ukraine is nearing the end of its second year, and it is evident that Russia 

has been preparing for a prolonged war. Essentially, Russia is trying to outsuffer Ukraine and 

its Western partners. It remains to be seen, though, if Russia succeeds in that or if it will endure 

suffering without end. The aim of this article has been to outline the basic characteristics of the 

strategy of outsuffering and to demonstrate how Russia has tried to use that strategy in Ukraine 

since 2022. Although insensitivity to costs and the ability to absorb losses can be an important 

advantage when states pursue confrontational foreign policy strategies, this approach has its 

limitations that may render this strategy ineffective and even self-defeating.  

The availability of sufficient economic, military, and human resources makes the pursuit of 

confrontational and risky foreign policy more likely. When policymakers face the choice 

between winning quickly and winning slowly rather than between winning quickly and losing, 

they may pursue risky policies because they can be under the impression that the worst-case 

scenario for their efforts is the attainment of foreign policy objectives through slow and 

grinding confrontation. Victory may ultimately be more costly than anticipated, but it will still 

be victory, and the interests at stake may warrant the high costs associated with a protracted 

conflict. Negotiated outcomes can be shunned as ineffective because goals and objectives 

would have to be scaled down during the diplomatic process. Such assumptions, however, can 

be wrong because the economic and military costs may be too high, and the adversaries’ 

estimations about the intentions of the state that is using the strategy of outsuffering may 

become too pessimistic to warrant serious dialogue and diplomacy. The pursuit of the strategy 

of outsuffering may make diplomatic solutions less feasible in later stages of the conflict 

because deeply entrenched enmity may preclude serious negotiations.  

Returning to Shoigu’s remark that Russians can suffer like no one else, he might be right, but 

it might ultimately be irrelevant. Russia may be shielded from some of the worst possible 

outcomes that may result from the use of this strategy, such as the loss of territory and gradual 

extension of the war on Russia’s territory. However, Russia’s efforts might also fall short in its 

quest to bring Ukraine under its control. The limitations that are part of the strategy of 

outsuffering may eventually force Russia to seek termination of the war, where it would have 

to give up on some or even most of its foreign policy objectives. It may still succeed in attaining 

some of its military objectives in the short or medium term, however, then it will face the long-

term costs of the confrontation with the West and a much greater dependency on China. This 

may ultimately erode public support for Russia’s war effort and undermine Putin’s regime. In 

that regard, Russia’s experience may offer a cautionary tale of the benefits and costs of the 

strategy of outsuffering, as Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s June 2023 mutiny 

demonstrated. The high costs and inefficiencies that the strategy generates may cause domestic 

dissatisfaction and pushback. In the long run, most states aim to thrive, not suffer without end.  

The strategy of outsuffering warrants further research, not just because the war in Ukraine is 

still ongoing but also because this strategy can be used by other actors. If the strategy of 

outsuffering is particularly suited for economically and militarily powerful states with a large 

population and a high degree of social acquiescence either through persuasion or repression, 

then there are at least two states that fit this description: China and Iran. China’s global 

aspirations have already generated pushback from the US and its allies, while Iran’s regional 

ambitions may cause further instability in the Middle East. If Russia succeeds in outsuffering 

Ukraine and the West, China and Iran may also be tempted to do so despite the high costs 

involved. Both states harbour revisionist intentions, and they expect considerable pushback 

from the West in that regard. It may turn out that the return of the era of great power competition 

will also be the golden age of the strategy of outsuffering if revisionist states conclude that 



63                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

there is no other way to achieve valued foreign policy objectives and end the era of Western 

domination in world politics.  

  



64                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

REFERENCES 

 

Aron, Leon. 2023. “Putin Is Embracing Stalin’s Way.” The Washington Post, January 26, 2023. 

Accessed February 7, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/

01/26/putin-stalin-war-ukraine-soldiers/.  

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan M. 2005. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. 

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  

Bergmann, Max, Maria Snegovaya, Tina Dolbaia, and Nick Fention. 2023. “Out of Stock? 

Assessing the Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Defense Industry.” Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. Accessed April 14, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-

stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russias-defense-industry.  

Berkowitz, Bonnie, and Artur Galocha. 2022. “Why the Russian Military Is Bogged Down by 

Logistics in Ukraine.” The Washington Post, March 30, 2022. Accessed April 14, 2023. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-military-logistics-supply-

chain/.  

Bloomberg News. 2023. “Russia’s Deficit Hits $25 Billion as Energy Income Slumps.” 

February 6, 2023. Accessed February 7, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/

news/articles/2023-02-06/russia-racks-up-25-billion-budget-gap-as-energy-income-

halves.  

Brands, Hal. 2014. What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft 

from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  

Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2016. America Abroad: The United States’ 

Global Role in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press.  

Carpenter, Charli, and Hunter Fairchild. 2022. Zelensky’s Travel Ban on Ukrainian Men Could 

Damage War Morale. Foreign Policy, November 14, 2022. Accessed January 28, 2023. 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/14/ukraine-russia-war-zelensky-travel-ban-civilian-

men/.  

Charap, Samuel, Dara Massicot, Miranda Priebe, Alyssa Demus, Clint Reach, Mark 

Stalczynski, Eugeniu Han, and Lynn E. Davis. 2021. Russian Grand Strategy: Rhetoric 

and Reality. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021. Accessed January 10, 2023. 

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4238.html.  

Christie, Edward H. 2016. “The Design and Impact of Western Economic Sanctions against 

Russia.” The RUSI Journal 161 (3): 52-64. https://doi.org/10.1080/.2016.1193359.  

Cordesman, Anthony S. 2014. “Russia and the “Color Revolution”: A Russian Military View 

of a World Destabilized by the US and the West.” Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, May 28, 2014. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/

legacy_files/files/publication/140529_Russia_Color_Revolution_Full.pdf.  

 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/26/putin-stalin-war-ukraine-soldiers/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/26/putin-stalin-war-ukraine-soldiers/
https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russias-defense-industry
https://www.csis.org/analysis/out-stock-assessing-impact-sanctions-russias-defense-industry
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-military-logistics-supply-chain/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-military-logistics-supply-chain/
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-06/russia-racks-up-25-billion-budget-gap-as-energy-income-halves
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-06/russia-racks-up-25-billion-budget-gap-as-energy-income-halves
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-06/russia-racks-up-25-billion-budget-gap-as-energy-income-halves
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/14/ukraine-russia-war-zelensky-travel-ban-civilian-men/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/14/ukraine-russia-war-zelensky-travel-ban-civilian-men/
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4238.html
https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1193359
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140529_Russia_Color_Revolution_Full.pdf
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140529_Russia_Color_Revolution_Full.pdf


65                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Daalder, Ivo H., and James Goldgeier. 2023. The Long War in Ukraine. Foreign Affairs, 

January 9, 2023. Accessed February 2, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/

long-war-ukraine-russia-protracted-conflict.  

Dalsjö, Robert, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg. 2022. “A Brutal Examination: Russian 

Military Capability in the Light of the Ukraine War.” Survival 64 (3): 7-28. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044.  

David, Andrew, Sarah Stewart, Meagan Reid, and Dmitri Alperovitch. 2023. “Russia’s 

Shifting Import Sources Amid U.S. and Allied Export Restrictions.” Silverado Policy 

Accelerator. https://cdn.sanity.io/files/0wfzc71x/production/

6745ea42c21d65d6709231e0e7767bd5de57469b.pdf.  

Demarais, Agathe. 2022. “Sanctions on Russia Are Working. Here’s Why.” Foreign Policy, 

December 1, 2022. Accessed January 28, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/01/

ukraine-russia-sanctions-economy-war-putin-embargo-technology-financial-energy/.  

Demertzis, Maria, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Ben McWilliams, Elina Ribakova, and Simone 

Tagliapietra. 2022. “How Have Sanctions Impacted Russia?” Bruegel. Accessed April 

15, 2023. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/how-have-sanctions-impacted-russia.  

Deyermond, Ruth. 2013. “Assessing the Reset: Successes and Failures in the Obama 

Administration’s Russia Policy, 2009-2012.” European Security 22 (4), 500-523. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.777704.  

Dickinson, Peter. 2023. “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Was Never about NATO.” Atlantic 

Council, July 18, 2023. Accessed July 20, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/

blogs/ukrainealert/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-was-never-about-nato/. 

Drezner, Daniel W. 2011. “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need Doctrines in 

Uncertain Times.” Foreign Affairs, June 17, 2011. Accessed April 14, 2023. 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/does-obama-have-grand-strategy.  

Echevarria, Antulio J. 2017. Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford 

University Press.  

European Council. 2023. “Infographic – Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy.” 

Accessed September 10, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/

impact-sanctions-russian-economy/.  

Face the Nation. 2023. “CIA Director William Burns on "Face the Nation with Margaret 

Brennan.” Accessed April 17, 2023. YouTube, 24:18. https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=HN4bgqKq2MU.  

Foreign Affairs. 2023. Will Ukraine Wind Up Making Territorial Concessions to Russia? 

January 24, 2023. Accessed January 27, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-

experts/will-ukraine-wind-making-territorial-concessions-russia  

Freedman, Lawrence. 2022. “Getting to Negotiations.” Substack, October 19, 2022. Accessed 

January 28, 2023. https://samf.substack.com/p/getting-to-negotiations.  

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/long-war-ukraine-russia-protracted-conflict
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/long-war-ukraine-russia-protracted-conflict
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044
https://cdn.sanity.io/files/0wfzc71x/production/6745ea42c21d65d6709231e0e7767bd5de57469b.pdf
https://cdn.sanity.io/files/0wfzc71x/production/6745ea42c21d65d6709231e0e7767bd5de57469b.pdf
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/01/ukraine-russia-sanctions-economy-war-putin-embargo-technology-financial-energy/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/01/ukraine-russia-sanctions-economy-war-putin-embargo-technology-financial-energy/
https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/how-have-sanctions-impacted-russia
https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.777704
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/does-obama-have-grand-strategy
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HN4bgqKq2MU
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HN4bgqKq2MU
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/will-ukraine-wind-making-territorial-concessions-russia
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/will-ukraine-wind-making-territorial-concessions-russia
https://samf.substack.com/p/getting-to-negotiations


66                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Galeotti, Mark. 2022. The Weaponization of Everything: The Field Guide to the New Way of 

War. New Haven: Yale University Press.  

George, Alexander L. 1992. Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to 

War. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.  

Giles, Keir. 2019. Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West. Washington, DC: 

Brookings Institutions Press.  

———. 2023. Russia’s War on Everybody and What It Means for You. London: Bloomsbury 

Academic.  

Giumelli, Francesco. 2017. “The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive Measures on EU 

Members: Winners and Losers from Imposing Economic Sanctions on Russia.” Journal 

of Common Market Studies 55 (5): 1062-1080. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12548.  

Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2016. “The Obama Doctrine.” The Atlantic. Accessed July 15, 2023. 

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/#3. 

Gray, Colin S. 2006. Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice. London: Routledge.  

Harris, Shane, Karen DeYoung, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Ashley Parker, and Liz Sly. 2022. 

“Road to War: U.S. Struggled to Convince Allies, and Zelensky, of Risk of Invasion.” 

The Washington Post, August 16, 2022. Accessed January 15, 2023. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-to-

war/.  

Hill, Fiona, and Clifford G. Gaddy. 2015. Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. Washington 

DC: Brookings Institution Press.  

Horton, Alex. 2023. “Russia’s Commando Units Gutted by Ukraine War, U.S. Leaks Show.” 

The Washington Post, April 14, 2023. Accessed April 17, 2023. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/14/leaked-documents-

russian-spetsnaz/.  

Jentleson, Bruce W. 2022. “Who’s Winning the Sanctions War?” Foreign Policy, August 18, 

2022. Accessed January 29, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/18/russia-ukraine-

war-economy-sanctions-putin/.  

Jervis, Robert. 1992. “Political Implications of Loss Aversion.” Political Psychology 13 (2): 

187-204. https://doi.org/10.2307/3791678.  

———. 2017a. Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition. 

Princeton: Princeton University Press.  

———. 2017b. How Statesmen Think. The Psychology of International Politics. Princeton: 

Princeton University Press.  

Johnson, Dominic D.P. 2004. Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive 

Illusions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  

———. 2020. Strategic Instincts: The Adaptive Advantages of Cognitive Biases in 

International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 

https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12548
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-to-war/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-to-war/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/14/leaked-documents-russian-spetsnaz/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/14/leaked-documents-russian-spetsnaz/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/18/russia-ukraine-war-economy-sanctions-putin/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/18/russia-ukraine-war-economy-sanctions-putin/
https://doi.org/10.2307/3791678


67                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision at 

Risk.” Econometrica 47 (2): 263-291. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185.  

Kari, Martti J. 2018. “Russia Analysis by Finnish Intelligence Colonel [English subtitles]” MIG 

MAG, December 3, 2018. Accessed January 25, 2023. YouTube, 1:00. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvonRMSuFpw.  

Kasparov, Gary, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. 2023. “Don’t Fear Putin’s Demise.” Foreign 

Affairs, January 20, 2023. Accessed February 2, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/

/dont-fear-putins-demise.  

Kofman, Michael, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. 2021. “The Myth of Russian Decline: Why 

Moscow Will Be a Persistent Power.” Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2021, 142-

152.  

Kofman, Michael, and Jeffrey Edmonds. 2022. “Russia’s Shock and Awe: Moscow’s Use of 

Overwhelming Force against Ukraine.” Foreign Affairs, February 22, 2022. Accessed 

March 23, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-21/russias-

shock-and-awe.  

Kofman, Michael, and Rob Lee. 2022. “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated 

Force Design.” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022. Accessed on January 23, 2023. 

https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-

fated-force-design/.  

Kolesnikov, Andrei. 2023. “How Russians Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the War.” 

Foreign Affairs, February 1, 2023. Accessed April 15, 2023. 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russians-learned-stop-worrying-and-love-

war.  

Kotkin, Stephen, Sergei Guriev, and Michael S. Bernstam. 2023. “Sanctions and Russia: 

Effects, Lessons, and the Future: A History Lab Discussion.” Hoover Institution, August 

25, 2023. Accessed on September 9, 2023. https://www.hoover.org/research/sanctions-

and-russia-effects-lessons-and-future-history-lab-discussion-w-stephen-kotkin. 

Kramer, David J. 2010. “Resetting U.S.-Russian Relations – It Takes Two.” The Washington 

Quarterly 33 (1): 61-79. https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600903418694.  

Kurtz-Phelan, Dan. 2023. “How to Avoid a Great-Power War: A Conversation with General 

Mark Milley.” Foreign Affairs, May 2, 2023. Accessed July 15, 2023. 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/how-to-avoid-great-power-war-mark-milley. 

Kyiv Independent. 2023. “Ministry: Ukraine’s GDP Fell by 30,4% in 2022.” January 5, 2023. 

Accessed January 15, 2023. https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ministry-ukraines-

gdp-fell-by-30-4-in-2022.  

Lamothe, Dan, and Isabelle Khurshudyan. 2023. “Spike in Russian Combat Deaths Fuels Fears 

of Worse Carnage to Come.”. Washington Post, May 2, 2023. Accessed July 17, 2023. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/05/02/russia-ukraine-combat-

deaths/. 

https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvonRMSuFpw
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/dont-fear-putins-demise
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/dont-fear-putins-demise
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-21/russias-shock-and-awe
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-21/russias-shock-and-awe
https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/
https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russians-learned-stop-worrying-and-love-war
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russians-learned-stop-worrying-and-love-war
https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600903418694
https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ministry-ukraines-gdp-fell-by-30-4-in-2022
https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ministry-ukraines-gdp-fell-by-30-4-in-2022


68                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Lanoszka, Alexander, Christian Leuprecht, and Alexander Moens, eds. 2020. Lessons from the 

Enhanced Forward Presence, 2017-2020. NATO Defense College. Accessed October 

20, 2023. https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1504. 

Levy, Jack S. 1992. “An Introduction to Prospect Theory.” Political Psychology 13 (2):171-

186.  

McDermott, Rose. 1998. Risk Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American 

Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  

———. 2004. “Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses from the First Decade.” 

Political Psychology 25 (2): 289-312. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-

9221.2004.00372.x.  

McFaul, Michael. 2023. How to Get a Breakthrough in Ukraine. Foreign Affairs, January 30, 

2023. Accessed on February 2, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-get-

breakthrough-ukraine.  

Mearsheimer, John J. 1983. Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  

———. 2014. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2014. 

Accessed July 14, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-

18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault. 

Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University 

Press.  

Miller, Greg, Mary Ilyushina, Catherine Belton, Isabelle Khurshudyan, and Paul Sonne. 2023. 

“‘Wiped Out’: War in Ukraine Has Decimated a Once Feared Russian Brigade.” The 

Washington Post, December 16, 2022. Accessed April 17, 2023. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimated-

ukraine/.  

Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. 2023. Predvaritel’naya otsenka ispolneniya 

federal’nogo byudzheta za yanvar’ 2023 goda [Preliminary assessment of the 

implementation of the federal budget for January 2023]. February 6, 2023. Accessed 

February 8, 2023. https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=38368-

predvaritelnaya_otsenka_ispolneniya_federalnogo_byudzheta_za_yanvar_2023_goda.  

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2021. Treaty between the United States 

of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees. December 17, 2021. 

Accessed February 2, 2023. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/

?lang=en.  

Mitzer, Stijn, and Jakub Janovsky. 2022. “Attack on Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment 

Losses During the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine.” Oryx, February 24, 2022. 

Accessed January 27, 2023. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-

documenting-equipment.html. 

Monteiro, Nuno P. 2014. Theory of Unipolar Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press.  

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00372.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00372.x
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-get-breakthrough-ukraine
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-get-breakthrough-ukraine
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimated-ukraine/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimated-ukraine/
https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=38368-predvaritelnaya_otsenka_ispolneniya_federalnogo_byudzheta_za_yanvar_2023_goda
https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=38368-predvaritelnaya_otsenka_ispolneniya_federalnogo_byudzheta_za_yanvar_2023_goda
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html


69                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

NATO. 2016. “Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2008-2015).” January 28, 2016. 

Accessed July 15, 2023.  

O’Brien, Phillips P. 2023. “Time Is on Ukraine’s Side, not Russia’s.” The Atlantic, January 14, 

2023. Accessed October 21, 2023. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/

russia-ukraine-weapon-production-nato-supply/672719/.  

Omelicheva, Mariya. 2013. Russian Foreign Policy: A Quest for Great Power Status in a 

Multipolar World. In Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and 

International Influences on States Behavior, edited by Ryan Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, 

Jeffrey Lantis, and Michael Snarr, 94-117. 2nd ed. Washington DC: CQ Press.  

Person, Rob. 2022. Rob Person and Mark Hertling on Social Science of War Podcast. Accessed 

February 2, 2023. Podcast, MP3 audio, 55:00. https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/

welcome-to-the-social-science-of-war-lessons/id1659725018?i=1000590080118.  

Prokopenko, Alexandra. 2023. Russia Is Preparing for a Long War. The Bell, July 28, 2023. 

Accessed September 10, 2023. https://en.thebell.io/russia-is-preparing-for-a-long-war/. 

Putin, Vladimir. 2007. Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Security 

Conference on Security Policy. February 10, 2007. Accessed January 13, 2023. 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.  

———. 2021. “Article by Vladimir Putin ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and 

Ukrainians.’” June 12, 2021. Accessed July 19, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/

events/president/news/66181.  

———. 2022a. “Address by the President of the Russian Federation.” February 21, 2022. 

Accessed January 15, 2023.  http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828.  

———. 2022b. “Address by the President of the Russian Federation.” February 24, 2022. 

Accessed January 15, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843.  

———. 2022c. “Signing of Treaties on Accession of Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics 

and Zaporozhye and Kherson Regions to Russia.” Accessed January 15, 2023. 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465.  

Rice, Condoleezza, and Robert M. Gates 2023. “Time Is Not on Ukraine’s Side.” The 

Washington Post, January 07, 2023. Accessed January 14, 2023. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/07/condoleezza-rice-robert-gates-

ukraine-repel-russia/.  

Rostoks, Toms, and Andris Spūds (eds.). 2015. The Different Faces of “Soft Power”: the Baltic 

States and Eastern Neighborhood between Russia and the EU. Riga: Latvian Institute of 

International Affairs.  

Rostoks, Toms. 2018. Identifying Intentions: Latvian Policy-Makers’ Perceptions of Russia’s 

Intentions. Journal of Baltic Studies 49 (1): 21-45. https://doi.org/

10.1080/01629778.2017.1416417.  

Ryan, Mick. 2022. The Ingenious Strategy that Could Win the War for Ukraine. Sydney 

Morning Herald, May 17, 2022. Accessed March 25, 2023. 

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/russia-ukraine-weapon-production-nato-supply/672719/
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/russia-ukraine-weapon-production-nato-supply/672719/
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/welcome-to-the-social-science-of-war-lessons/id1659725018?i=1000590080118
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/welcome-to-the-social-science-of-war-lessons/id1659725018?i=1000590080118
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/07/condoleezza-rice-robert-gates-ukraine-repel-russia/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/07/condoleezza-rice-robert-gates-ukraine-repel-russia/
https://doi.org/10.1080/01629778.2017.1416417
https://doi.org/10.1080/01629778.2017.1416417


70                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/the-ingenious-strategy-that-could-win-the-war-

for-ukraine-20220517-p5alz4.html.  

Schaub, Gary Jr. 2004. “Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory.” Political Psychology 

25 (3): 389-411. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00377.x.  

Sebenius, James K., and Michael Singh. 2023. “Russia and Ukraine Are Not Ready for Talks.” 

Foreign Affairs, January 11, 2023. Accessed January 29, 2023. 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-and-ukraine-are-not-ready-talks.  

Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey, and Steven Tian. 2022. “Actually, the Russian Economy Is Imploding.” 

Foreign Policy, July 22, 2022. Accessed January 13, 2023. 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/russia-economy-sanctions-myths-ruble-business/.  

Strachan, Hew. 2005. “The Lost Meaning of Strategy.” Survival 47 (3): 33-54. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248102.  

Trenin, Dmitri. 2016. “The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded.” Foreign 

Affairs, April 18, 2016. Accessed April 16, 2023. https://www-foreignaffairs-

com.gcmc.idm.oclc.org/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/revival-russian-military.  

Tsouloufas, George, and Matthew Rochat. 2023. “Revisiting the Effectiveness of Economic 

Sanctions in the Context of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” Canadian Foreign Policy 

Journal. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2023.2198247. 

Vindman, Alexander. 2023. “What Ukraine Needs to Liberate Crimea.” Foreign Affairs, 

February 2, 2023. Accessed February 5, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/

ukraine/what-ukraine-needs-to-liberate-crimea-alexander-vindman.  

Walt, Stephen, M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  

———. 2011. “The End of the American Era.” The National Interest 116: 6-16. Accessed 

April 16, 2023. https://nationalinterest.org/files/digital-edition/1319494178/

116DigitalEdition.pdf.  

Welch, David. 2005. Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change. Princeton: 

Princeton University Press.  

Weisiger, Alex, and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2015. “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions 

Matter in International Politics.” International Organization 69 (2): 473-495. 

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000393s  

Zabrodskyi, Mykhailo, Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds. 2022. 

Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: 

February-July 2022. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. 

https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-

final.pdf.  

Zagorodnyuk, Andriy. 2023. The Case for Taking Crimea. Foreign Affairs, January 2, 2023. 

Accessed January 20, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/case-taking-crimea.  

https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/the-ingenious-strategy-that-could-win-the-war-for-ukraine-20220517-p5alz4.html
https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/the-ingenious-strategy-that-could-win-the-war-for-ukraine-20220517-p5alz4.html
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00377.x
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-and-ukraine-are-not-ready-talks
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/russia-economy-sanctions-myths-ruble-business/
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248102
https://www-foreignaffairs-com.gcmc.idm.oclc.org/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/revival-russian-military
https://www-foreignaffairs-com.gcmc.idm.oclc.org/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/revival-russian-military
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/what-ukraine-needs-to-liberate-crimea-alexander-vindman
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/what-ukraine-needs-to-liberate-crimea-alexander-vindman
https://nationalinterest.org/files/digital-edition/1319494178/116DigitalEdition.pdf
https://nationalinterest.org/files/digital-edition/1319494178/116DigitalEdition.pdf
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000393
https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf
https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/case-taking-crimea


71                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Zaluzhnyi, Valerii, and Mykhailo Zabrodskyi. 2022. “Prospects for Running a Military 

Campaign in 2023: Ukraine’s Perspective.” Kyiv Post, September 8, 2022. Accessed 

March 24, 2023. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/1369.  

  

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/1369


72                 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 16 (2)2023:48-72   

ISSN 2562-8429 

 

Published by the Centre for European Studies at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada 

Available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index 

The Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies (CJERS – formerly Review of 

European and Russian Affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: 

articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. Topics relate to the European Union, its 

Member States, the former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe. The journal is 

published by the Centre for European Studies, an associated unit of the Institute of European, 

Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University. 

CJERS aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high 

quality research and scholarship.  

Contact: 

Carleton University 

The Centre for European Studies 

1103 Dunton Tower 

1125 Colonel By Drive 

Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 

Canada 

Tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; E-mail: CJERS@carleton.ca 

Creative Commons License 

 

 

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 

 

This Working Paper is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No 

Derivs 4.0 Unported License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).  

Articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the 

source is acknowledged. No use of this publication may be made for resale or other 

commercial purposes. 

ISSN: 2562-8429 

© 2019 The Author(s) 

 

 

https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index
mailto:CJERS@carleton.ca
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

