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Crisis in Russian-American Diplomacy: 

Boris Yeltsin, Bill Clinton, and the 1998 Bombing of Iraq 

 
Ebrahim Daryaee Motlagh1, Chechen State Pedagogical University, Grozny Russia 

 

Abstract  

This article is an attempt to investigate the growing challenges in Russian-American diplomacy in 

the post-Soviet environment. To this end, the study focused on the crisis of Iraq and, more 

specifically, the US-British bombing of Iraq in 1998 as a source of tension in bilateral relations. 

In doing so, declassified communications between US President Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin 

were reviewed following a discussion of American and Russian foreign policy towards the Iraq 

crisis. The review of communications demonstrated that both leaders actively attempted to avoid 

further divergence by keeping friendly and consensus-building communications while insisting on 

their differing positions. The Yeltsin-Clinton correspondence also showed that they tried to avoid 

unilateral action and develop their strategies within international frameworks such as the United 

Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), and  

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this regard, Bill Clinton ostensibly sided with 

UNSCOM, whereas Boris Yeltsin supported the UNSC framework, where Russia could exert more 

influence. The study concluded that, despite these efforts, the US-British bombing of Iraq further 

alienated the Russian government and affected the post-Soviet world order. These conclusions are 

significant in that they demonstrate challenges to American diplomatic hegemony and show the 

earliest roots of divergence in the Russian-American presidential diplomacy. 

  

 
1 Ebrahim Daryaee Motlagh is a PhD candidate in Russian History at Chechen State Pedagogical University in 

Grozny Russia 



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Introduction 

This article is an attempt to examine the impact of the 1998 Iraq crisis and the US-British bombing 

of Iraq on Russia-US relations. In doing so, the article will refer to declassified correspondence 

and telephone calls between Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin. By reviewing these documents, this 

study places the aforementioned crisis in the context of emerging disputes between the Russian 

Federation and the United States towards the end of the 20th century. It suggests that these relations 

were gravely tested in the post-Soviet era, which ultimately led to the coldness of strategic relations 

between the governments. The review of these documents can be significant in that they highlight 

the divergence between the United States and Russia with regard to the Iraq crisis and how it set 

the grounds for later developments.  

With respect to the subject of this study, the choice of the 1998 bombing can be relevant in several 

ways. Soon after the bombing campaign, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin arranged a telephone call 

during which Yeltsin reminded his American counterpart that in the aftermath of the military 

action, what was at stake “was not just the person of Saddam Hussein but also our relations with 

the US” (Helfont 2022). Before the air strikes, the media had quoted him as saying that bombing 

Iraq might even bring a “World War” (Specter 1998). Yeltsin’s remarks suggested the significance 

of the Iraq crisis as a factor in recalibrating Russian foreign policy. In fact, this event had 

significant implications and outcomes for Russia-US relations and global strategic relations. 

Firstly, it renewed the debate among different states about the legitimacy or practicality of military 

action in dealing with Iraq or other states that would violate the UN resolutions. Second, the subject 

was a significant case of military action against Iraq after the end of the Gulf War in 1991 and 

before the invasion of the country in 2003. In the United States, the military campaign and its 

preceding developments paved the way for further military action and perhaps removed some legal 

obstacles to such campaigns. Third, when considered in the context of communications between 

Clinton and the other heads of state, the case study demonstrates the importance of international 

institutions and UN frameworks. It may also serve as an example of their effectiveness or 

inefficiency in avoiding global escalations. Finally, the US-British bombing of Iraq further 

alienated the Russian government and challenged the American diplomatic hegemony in the post-

Cold War environment. Regardless of its primary goals, this military action failed to resolve the 

issue of Iraq and its alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.   

One can note that, initially, Russia-US relations embarked on a different path following the 

dissolution of the USSR. On June 18, 1992, Boris Yeltsin delivered his address to the US Congress 

with symbolic words that assured the beginning of a new era for Russians and Americans. With 

words filled with optimism, Yeltsin praised the will of the Russian people and finished his speech 

in a way that may seem naïve and simplistic today: 

Today, free and democratic Russia is extending its hand of friendship to the people of America. 

Acting on the will of the people of Russia, I am inviting you, and through you the people of the 

United States, to join us in partnership in the quest for freedom and justice in the 21st century. 

(Yeltsin 1992) 

However, Yeltsin’s promises did not remove the vague landscape that the collapse of the Soviet 

Union had created for American foreign policy officials. In a similar way, the new landscape 

brought tremendous challenges to the newly established Russian Federation and its first 

democratically elected leader. These challenges included a wide range of economic, social, and 

political problems that initially led Boris Yeltsin’s government to expand relations with the West 



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and especially the United States (Donaldson 1999; Felkay 2002). On the home front, Yeltsin’s 

government experimented with controversial economic reforms and promoted Russian 

nationalism after decades of Soviet rule over Russia’s economy, politics, and social life.2 

In another direction, following the imperatives of a seemingly unipolar world, the United States 

also committed itself to returning a democratic Russia to the world stage. However, these efforts 

that appeared in the form of financial assistance and loans often fell short of expectations and were 

below the minimum required to cover the country’s communist-era debts and address the severe 

economic crises in its transition to capitalism. In the midst of such campaigns, the Clinton-Yeltsin 

contacts laid the foundations of a critical but unstable relationship between the two nations that, 

despite its promising beginnings, took a reverse course during the 1990s. Shortly after the fall of 

the Soviet Union, US foreign policy urgently sought a mechanism to promote political stability in 

Russia and curb the threats of nuclear proliferation in the former Soviet bloc. In what was 

controversially labelled an “American Eurasian geostrategy,” Washington also endeavoured to 

exploit opportunities that appeared in these territories. Therefore, this era also demonstrated a 

myriad of passionate writings in support of an interventionist Eurasian strategy. A prominent 

example is Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “The Grand Chessboard,” which linked the US global 

supremacy to “how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is 

sustained” (Brzezinski 1997, 17). A similar but more assertive advocacy of this primacy is found 

in Samuel P. Huntington’s writing. In what seems to be a euphoric post-Soviet atmosphere, 

Huntington (1993) argued that the US influence is crucial “to the future of freedom, democracy, 

open economies and international order in the world” (83). 

However, recent reviews of Russia-US relations in that period also emphasize common interests 

such as nuclear security, nuclear arms control, and counter-terrorism cooperation.3 Thus, in 1993, 

President George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin managed to finalize the Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START II), the aim of which was to prevent the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

In essence, it was a continuation of the work between the two Cold War superpowers. Here, the 

first sign of a clash appeared in earnest. Geopolitical tensions, global security crises and the US 

government’s approach drew criticism from Moscow officials and created a gap in Russian-

American diplomacy. In this respect, some scholars point to the failures of Boris Yeltsin’s 

domestic reforms, which were based on Western models, as a factor in alienating the Russian elites 

from the West in general and the United States in particular (Donaldson 1999; Felkay 2002). Some 

also point to insufficient investment or economic support from the US government. For instance, 

key among such scholars is Strobe Talbott, the former deputy secretary of state in Clinton’s 

administration. In his widely read memoir, The Russia Hand, Talbott (2007) praises the 

instrumental and friendly relations between Clinton and Yeltsin, arguing that these relations “either 

resolved or alleviated disputes over Russia’s role in the post–Cold War world” (9). Nevertheless, 

he also questions the wisdom of Russia’s rapid transition to a liberal capitalist economy, which 

was largely encouraged by Washington (Talbott 2007, 189–213). As the records show, the Clinton 

administration’s criticism of Yeltsin’s leadership and especially his handling of the First Chechen 

War (1994–1996) also led to some resentment. The Russians were also deeply troubled by security 

threats such as the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Eastern 

Europe, which, according to Boris Yeltsin, had no justification after the end of the Cold War. What 

complicated the dispute even further were NATO’s air strikes against Yugoslavia in the context of 

 
2 See Desai 1995, 2000 for more discussion. 
3 See, for instance, Orlova 2020 and Parker 2019. 



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the Kosovo War in 1999. These challenges eroded Russian-American foreign policy achievements. 

For instance, the Russian State Duma did not ratify the START II treaty until 2000, and Russia 

eventually withdrew from START II in 2002 due to the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic 

Missile Treaty of 1972 on June 13, 2002. In other areas, the relations suffered due to the growing 

conflict of interests around the world.  

In sum, the countervailing priorities of the United States and the Russian Federation soon 

weakened the initial optimism invested in bilateral relations, even though, as will be discussed 

below, Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton continued their maneuvers to curb these tensions. 

Nevertheless, apart from the military tensions in the Balkans, a major twist in Russia-US relations 

had its roots in the Middle East. It grew from the conflicts between the US and Saddam Hussein’s 

regime after the 1991 ceasefire agreement. In this respect, the current study is an attempt to 

examine some aspects of this difference in the historical context of the US military campaign and 

the 1998 bombing of Iraq. In what follows, the study will focus specifically on the conversations 

between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton. However, first, it is important to discuss Russia’s complex 

relations with Iraq and how they contradicted US interests in the region.  

 

Iraq: A Bone of Contention in Russia-US Relations 

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation tried, where possible, to 

maintain the previous alliances that Moscow had developed during the Cold War. This policy 

became increasingly relevant from 1996 to 1998 with Yevgeny Primakov as the new Minister of 

Foreign Affairs.4 Primakov replaced Andrei Kozyrev, who had faced criticism for failing to defend 

Russian interests, particularly with regard to the question of NATO expansion and critical 

developments in Iraq. Yeltsin’s new foreign minister enjoyed a solid reputation among Soviet and 

Russian diplomats and was also well-known in academic circles as an Arabist and Middle East 

scholar. As a pragmatist, he supported Russian strategic autonomy, regional integration, 

particularly in the former Soviet bloc, and multilateralism with an emphasis on cooperation with 

China and India. The sum of these strategies was later regarded as the “Primakov doctrine” 

(Delong 2020; Rumer 2019). As will be discussed later, another key but problematic aspect of this 

doctrine was non-intervention, which highlighted Russia’s opposition to US military campaigns 

in the Middle East.  

Historically, the Arab World was an area of friction in Soviet-US and later Russia-US relations. 

More specifically, Russia’s long-standing relations with Saddam Hussein’s regime, which were a 

legacy of Soviet foreign policy, became a bone of contention in the Kremlin and Washington 

interactions. Indeed, these relations and their ramifications drew the attention of many scholars 

throughout the 1990s (Freedman 2001; Nizamedden 1999; Rumer 2000; Shaffer 2001; Vassiliev 

1993). These scholars debated the reasons why the Soviet officials had tried to form a strategic 

relationship with Iraq that was geographically (and sometimes politically) closer to the USSR 

compared to other Arab countries. Of course, these analyses were not without precedent. Writing 

in 1980, Francis Fukuyama discussed the relevance of factors such as Iraq’s growing military and 

political influence in the region, its oil revenues, the consolidation of the Ba’ath Party and the need 

for Soviet weapons. He then concluded that Iraq was indeed “an ideal location for the expansion 

of Soviet influence” (Fukuyama 1980, 5). Fukuyama’s research gave realistic prominence to the 

 
4 See, for instance, Simha 2015. 



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“considerable weakness” of Soviet influence in Iraq between 1968 and 1980, and Primakov’s 

firsthand account of such difficulties may corroborate this view (Primakov 2009, 301–324). With 

its energy and economic resources, Iraq remained an important sphere of influence in Russian 

foreign policy. Therefore, with the end of the Cold War, the Kremlin continued to support Baghdad 

while the Western governments adopted an increasingly aggressive approach to contain Saddam’s 

provocative ambitions. 

The support for Iraq was sometimes coupled with Yeltsin’s direct opposition to US policies, 

especially the unilateral sanctions, which limited Russia’s economic ties with Baghdad. 

Historically, one may argue that Yeltsin had inherited a complex legacy in foreign policy in which 

Iraq was a problematic aspect. Early in the 1990s, his government openly supported the United 

States in its efforts to pressure the Iraqi regime. Nevertheless, foreign policy priorities and internal 

pressure from the parliament ultimately forced Yeltsin to revise his policy and, where possible, act 

independently of the United States regarding the crisis in Iraq (Zlobin 2004). Simply put, during 

this transition, post-Soviet Russia became aware of its fundamental differences with the western 

camp. This change was accompanied by explicit criticisms of the US’ occasional military actions 

in Iraq, even when these actions were retaliatory or seemed justified to western observers. 

However, as some scholars have noted, Russia’s relations with Iraq were subject to a more 

complex logic. For instance, in 1996, Yevgeny Primakov addressed the question of the Iraqi debt 

to the former Soviet Union, which came to seven billion USD. With regard to this logic, some 

political analysts have argued that the Kremlin saw this debt essentially as an instrument to 

influence the Iraqi regime (Zlobin 2004, 91). The economic necessities and the urgent need to 

support Russian businesses and companies, where Western and International Monetary Fund 

(IMF) aid seemed insufficient, encouraged Primakov to recalibrate the relations with the Cold War 

allies. From this point of view, the Russians thought that the US unilateral foreign policy and 

military actions were illegal, counterproductive, and dangerous. On this subject, Western media 

frequently quoted Yeltsin’s warning that “Clinton might run into a world war” (Williams 1998). 

In fact, the Kremlin and Washington dealt with a multitude of differences in the 1990s, but what 

is relevant here is the role of Iraq in intensifying the differences and particularly the case of US-

British air strikes in 1998. 

After the ceasefire agreement, which ended the Gulf War in 1991, the Bush and Clinton 

administrations orchestrated or supported destabilizing insurgencies against Saddam Hussein’s 

regime. This was a strategy that conflicted with Russia’s interests in Iraq. In addition to sanctions 

and embargoes, which the Kremlin intended to lift, the US government used every opportunity to 

undermine Saddam Hussein. CIA assessments showed that the Ba’athist regime was still a threat 

to American interests after the 1991 ceasefire (Ignatius 2003).  Consequently, Washington resorted 

to covert actions that mainly included support for insurgents and sabotage operations in Iraq, even 

though they did not overthrow the Iraqi regime. These actions were finally made official on 

October 31, 1998. On this date, the President of the United States signed the congressional 

statement known as the “Iraq Liberation Act.” This Act, which later served as the rationale for the 

US invasion of Iraq in 2003, clearly stated that the US policy should “support efforts to remove 

the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.”5 

 
5 “Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.” Pub. L. No. 105–338, 112 Stat. 3178. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-

105publ338/pdf/PLAW-105publ338.pdf. 

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-105publ338/pdf/PLAW-105publ338.pdf
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-105publ338/pdf/PLAW-105publ338.pdf


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Thus, in 1998, regime change became Washington’s official policy towards Iraq. During such 

developments, Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, were committed to preventing 

military tensions in the region. In his memoir, Russia and the Arabs, Primakov has allocated a 

considerable part of his writing to revisit “the Phenomenon that was Saddam Hussein” (Primakov 

2009, 301–324). Drawing on his close familiarity with Saddam’s personality, he recalled Russia’s 

unsteady influence in Iraq and reached this conclusion: 

But without meaning to belittle the influence that Russia had, it has to be said that Saddam 

continued to believe in his lucky star, in his own foresight, and ultimately in Allah, who would 

save him from harm. What sustained his belief was not blind hope, but his realpolitik certainty 

that, given the prevailing sentiment in the Arab world—and indeed the Americans’ own interests—

the United States had nothing to gain from bringing about his downfall. (Primakov 2009, 318) 

Primakov has noted that Russia did everything in its power to keep Iraq from the brink. 

Nevertheless, in spite of some success in de-escalating the tensions in 1997 and 1998, Russia 

ultimately failed to avert the US-British attack against the Iraqi targets in December 1998. As a 

consequence, the military campaign deepened the differences in Moscow-Washington relations.   

 

Diplomatic Crisis: The 1998 Bombing of Iraq  

The bombing of Iraq in December 1998 was a major source of disagreement between the presidents 

of Russia and the United States. Despite Moscow’s efforts to prevent military action in Iraq, from 

December 16 to 19, the US and Britain carried out “Operation Desert Fox” to target sites related 

to Iraq’s weapons programs. Bill Clinton justified these attacks by referring to Iraq’s lack of 

compliance with UN resolutions and refusal to allow the UN inspectors to access targeted sites. 

On December 16, Clinton explained his administration’s objectives and rationale for striking 

military targets in Iraq. The main targets of bombings were nuclear, biological, and chemical 

weapons in Iraq. In a statement that other US government officials parroted later, Clinton claimed 

that the strikes were designed primarily to “degrade Saddam’s capacity to develop and deliver 

weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors” (Clinton 1998a). 

To justify this military campaign, Clinton (1998) referred repeatedly to Iraq’s refusal to cooperate 

with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors. He asserted that 

the use of force in Iraq was the last option, which came inevitably following “Saddam’s last act of 

defiance in late October” and claimed that this option was considered after “intensive diplomatic 

pressure on Iraq” failed to bring cooperation from Baghdad (Clinton 1998a). The speech, which 

served as a justification for the military strikes, was based on UNSCOM reports and emphasized 

Iraq’s violation of its commitment. In fact, to support his claims, the president quoted the 

UNSCOM conclusions that “Iraq’s conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in the 

fields of disarmament” and “the commission is not able to conduct the work mandated to it by the 

Security Council with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons program” (Clinton 1998). Additionally, 

Clinton reiterated the US government’s official policy towards Iraq, which had been anticipated 

by the Iraq Liberation Act. In his speech, the US president indicated the administration’s regime 

change policy: 

The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government—a government 

ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people. 

Bringing change in Baghdad will take time and effort. We will strengthen our engagement with 



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the full range of Iraqi opposition forces and work with them effectively and prudently. (Clinton 

1998a) 

As noted earlier, tensions between Iraq, the United States, and the UN Special Commission had 

begun in 1997, and there were concerns about an imminent attack. In one case, the US government 

went as far as authorizing operation “Desert Thunder,” which was ultimately averted by diplomatic 

efforts. In that particular case, apart from criticisms from the Russian government, the records 

show that there was also opposition from some Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE). With concerns about the consequences of a possible military 

campaign, these states announced that their territorial facilities should not be used for such an 

operation. As for “Operation Desert Fox,” political analysts considered this four-day military 

campaign to be consistent with the US government’s efforts to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. 

Additionally, Bill Clinton had already signed the Iraq Liberation Act, which could be used to 

legitimize the strikes.  

On December 19, Bill Clinton announced the end of the operation. He pointed to its success and 

described the way forward in dealing with the Iraqi regime. While repeating the objective of this 

military action, which was “to degrade Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction program and related 

delivery systems,” he assured his US audience that the controversial operation had achieved this 

goal (Clinton 1998b). What was similar in both speeches was the determination of the United 

States to undermine and possibly overthrow the Iraqi government. In this regard, Clinton once 

again emphasized his administration’s consensus: 

As long as Saddam remains in power he will remain a threat to his people, his region and the world. 

With our allies, we must pursue a strategy to contain him and to constrain his weapons of mass 

destruction program, while working towards the day Iraq has a government willing to live at peace 

with its people and with its neighbors. (Clinton 1998b) 

The US President also elaborated on his administration’s strategy to curb Saddam Hussein’s 

weapons program. In principle, this strategy constituted the US policy towards Iraq until 2003, 

when the George W. Bush administration authorized the invasion of Iraq. In Bill Clinton’s speech, 

the elements constituting his strategy were the following: 

• Maintaining a strong US military presence in the region and readiness to use this force again 

in Iraq 

• Maintaining a no-fly zone in the northern and southern regions of Iraq near the Kuwaiti border 

• Continuing the oil-for-food program and sanctions against Saddam’s regime 

• Enforcing pressure for the return of UNSCOM and International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) to Iraq to pursue their mandates 

However, the points mentioned in Clinton’s speech were contested internationally. To be 

understood, the bombing of Iraq can be placed in its historical context and then in the specific 

context of Russia-US relations. At the international level, the Russian Federation, along with China 

and France, had called for an end to the oil embargo against Iraq (Gellman 1998). These 

governments also criticized the UNSCOM mechanism, which was a key aspect of Bill Clinton’s 

discourse about Iraq. This special commission was formed in 1991 to handle the case of Iraq at the 

United Nations. However, the performance of this commission and particularly its Australian 

chairman, Richard Butler, became the target of criticism from Russia and China. In retrospect, 

Primakov noted the difficulties of working with the UN commission from Iraq’s standpoint: 



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In all fairness, it should be pointed out that while Richard Butler was head of UNSCOM—a time 

when the Iraqis were demanding that it should not be allowed to inspect Saddam’s palaces or 

replace members of its team, and so on—the commission was not impartial and was acting outside 

its remit. (Primakov 2009, 318) 

In this respect, the US government’s military campaign did not enjoy the support which President 

Clinton had stressed in his remarks. On December 17, President Jiang Zemin of China sent a 

message to President Bill Clinton urging him to consider a “halt to military action against Iraq,” 

noting that this attack would destabilize the Persian Gulf (MIIS 1998). Zemin’s response was 

consistent with that of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which had condemned the bombings “as a 

violation of the UN charter and the principles of international law” (MIIS 1998). In a more subtle 

manner, the French also criticized the US-British military campaign. On December 17, Hubert 

Vedrine, the French Foreign Minister, said that his government was “not convinced” that the 

military campaign would bring about tangible positive effects but concluded that the Iraqi 

president was to blame for the escalations (MIIS 1998). Similarly, some non-aligned governments 

such as India, Pakistan, South Africa, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia criticized the use of force 

and demanded a halt in military strikes to allow for diplomatic solutions (MIIS 1998). At the same 

time, the Kremlin’s official reaction is of particular interest. In this connection, Boris Yeltsin asked 

the US and UK to “put an immediate end to the military actions, show restraint and prudence, and 

not allow a further escalation of the conflict” (MIIS 1998). Earlier, Yeltsin had asserted that the 

bombings violated the UN charter, and his position was in line with that of the new Foreign 

Minister, Igor Ivanov, who similarly insisted that the US air strikes must stop. One should note 

that Russia’s disagreement with military action had started well before the US-British campaign. 

In the Security Council meeting of December 16, which was held specifically to deal with this 

issue, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed Russia’s position clearly. The 

Security Council press release (SC/6611) summarizes this position:  

The representative of the Russian Federation asked what right had the United States and the United 

Kingdom to justify the use of force to enforce Council resolutions or mandates; no one could act 

independently on behalf of the United Nations or assume the functions of a world policeman. 

While there were problems between Iraq and UNSCOM, the current crisis was artificially created. 

The Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, had presented a distorted picture of what 

was taking place in the country. (UN 1998) 

At that time, Russia’s chief representative at the UN was Sergei Lavrov, who had worked since 

1994 to present a more assertive Russian foreign policy. However, his anti-UNSCOM position 

was rooted in the consensus among the Russian diplomats, some of whom had been working 

closely with the Iraqis since the Soviet times. On the other hand, Richard Butler had been appointed 

chairman of the special commission a year earlier in 1997 and had already received poor 

assessments from the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. While Butler was convinced and often 

stated publicly that the Iraqi regime was in possession of undisclosed weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), Saddam’s top diplomat, Tarik Aziz, who had close relations with the Russians, accused 

the organization of spying for the United States. On the diplomatic front, however, Russia’s choice 

was clear. In this sense, Russia was critical of the US-British military action from the outset and, 

along with China, regarded it as a violation of the UN charter. Accordingly, the Kremlin recalled 

its ambassador from Washington after the US president announced the decision to use force in 

Iraq. Even after the end of this campaign, Boris Yeltsin asserted that the air raids “crudely violated 

the UN charter” and would only worsen the weapons crisis in Iraq (CNS 1998). In this case, only 



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traditional allies supported the US-British bombing of Iraq in December 1998, which was perhaps 

an early sign of a challenge to the US hegemony in the late 1990s. As stated previously, the crisis 

was also a twist in Russia-US relations, which was set to persist in the next century.  

 

Presidential Diplomacy: Clinton-Yeltsin Contacts  

Declassified documents containing Bill Clinton’s telephone conversations and correspondence 

about the bombing of Iraq show that he made several attempts to gain international support and, if 

possible, align world leaders with his military campaign. According to these documents, Clinton 

contacted Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, French President Jacques Chirac, Israeli Prime 

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, President Hosni Mubarak of 

Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan. In all these contacts, 

he reflected his administration’s view of the unfolding crisis of Iraq within the context of regional 

issues, which concerned each of these governments. Of these cases, the contact between Bill 

Clinton and Boris Yeltsin was exceedingly important. This can be inferred from the transcripts of 

letters and telephone conversations that indicate serious differences between the two presidents. 

The transcripts also demonstrate that, despite their differences, Clinton and Yeltsin tried to express 

their positions in a conducive manner, often emphasizing the value of bilateral relations. Unlike 

Western and Middle Eastern governments, the Russian government traditionally had the benefit 

of closer relations with Baghdad and Moscow was potentially in a position to influence Baghdad’s 

agenda. As stated earlier, though with some fluctuation, Iraq was considered an ally of the Soviet 

Union in the Middle East and, after the founding of the Russian Federation, Moscow continued to 

work with Saddam Hussein on matters of mutual interest. In what follows, considering the above 

discussions, the study will approach the text and transcript of Yeltsin-Clinton communications 

about the case study. 

On November 23, 1998, Bill Clinton sent a message (through the US embassy in Moscow) to Boris 

Yeltsin about the situation in Iraq. In this letter, he emphasized the importance of international 

cooperation in forcing Iraq to comply with its obligations and cooperate with UN weapons 

inspectors. In doing so, he also claimed that Saddam Hussein was unreliable due to his previous 

actions and, using consensus-building language, insisted that “we must now concert our efforts to 

ensure Iraq fulfills its obligations” because, according to Clinton, “the coming weeks will provide 

a real test of Saddam’s intentions” (NSC 1998, 29).6 It seems that Clinton’s message served to 

clarify the US position on gaining the support or acknowledgement of the Russian government 

and open the way for the use of military force in the event of Saddam’s violation of UN obligations. 

To do so, as discussed previously, Clinton needed some support from Russia, as conducting 

operations unilaterally without international consensus was not a favourable option for 

Washington. A review of the records concerning Iraq shows the emphasis of the US government 

on UNSCOM and the IAEA as instruments to pressure the Ba’athist regime. On the other hand, 

the discourse of some other governments, including Russia and China, indicates skepticism about 

the role of these organizations. In this context, the US President acknowledged Boris Yeltsin’s key 

role in exerting pressure on Baghdad: 

 
6 This author has taken the quotations used in this part of the article from the Clinton Presidential Records used as an 

administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff. National Security Council and Records 

Management Office. 1998. “Declassified Documents Concerning Iraq.” Clinton Digital Library. Accessed August 4, 

2023. https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16192. 



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You have played a very important role in your communications with Saddam. I hope you will send 

him a clear message about the importance of full disclosure and full compliance and the 

consequences if he does not. While I am ready to see if Saddam lives up to his word this time, the 

United States remains prepared to act if Saddam once again interferes with UNSCOM’s ability to 

operate or refuse to disclose all information needed by UNSCOM and the IAEA. (NSC 1998, 29) 

Boris Yeltsin’s reply summarizes the Russian government’s position regarding the Iraq crisis. In 

his reply, while referring to Russia’s diplomatic efforts to soften Iraq’s positions, Yeltsin sought a 

common framework to act: 

I would like to reaffirm that we continue exerting heavy pressure on Baghdad  to  compel  it  to  fulfill  

its obligations to fully restore cooperation with the UN. With respect to your letter, we have once  

again  addressed  the  Iraqi leadership  with  an  urgent  request  not  to  allow  any  backslides  in the 

interaction with UNSCOM. (NSC 1998, 79) 

However, being aware of the US intentions to intervene militarily, Yeltsin also emphasized that 

none of the parties should “overdramatize” the situation and that a structure should be made in the 

Security Council to monitor Iraq’s weapons programs (NSC 1998, 79). Considering the records, 

Russia preferred non-intervention in handling these developments. In this sense, diplomatic 

records may suggest that Russia considered the Security Council holistically as a lever to prevent 

escalations and coordinate efforts in response to other international conflicts. What was similar in 

the Yeltsin-Clinton correspondence was the emphasis on maintaining Russia-US relations and a 

joint and collective effort to control Saddam’s weapons program. However, despite Yeltsin’s 

diplomatic efforts and his warnings against the use of force in Iraq, Operation Desert Fox 

ultimately brought the crisis to a climax. This divergence called for renewed efforts to maintain 

bilateral relations. Therefore, on December 30, 1998, Clinton and Yeltsin arranged a telephone 

conversation that focused predominantly on the US airstrikes and their impact on their two 

countries’ relations. According to the documents, the purpose of this contact was to “set a 

framework for bilateral contacts that will get the relationship on track after the Iraq crisis” (NSC 

1998, 36). 

Prior to the telephone conversation, Clinton’s advisers had briefed him on the important points to 

be made in that dialogue. Accordingly, these points were sustaining the relationship, agenda for 

1999, the economy (which was then supervised in Russia by Primakov as prime minister), and, 

most importantly, the issue of Iraq, which involved more details (NSC 1998, 38). Specifically, 

Clinton was advised to clarify these points because they were important to both governments. 

Among other things, the president was asked to acknowledge that recent events had seriously 

tested and strained Russia-US relations. He was also to confirm that he had received Yeltsin’s 

letter through Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov (who had held the role since September 11). 

According to the documents, the team of advisers had recommended that Clinton emphasize 

maintaining relations to “ensure that U.S. and Russia enter next century as partners” (NSC 1998, 

38). The second point that Clinton needed to make was the agenda for 1999. In the conversation, 

the US president was to emphasize three key issues for 1999. These issues were “getting Russian 

economy back on track, stemming proliferation and strengthening arms control via START II and 

START III” (NSC 1998, 38). One should note that all of these actions had been delayed due to 

international disagreements, including the Iraq crisis. In this regard, the president was supposed to 

indicate the timing of the meetings between Russian and American officials. The third point was 

related to the Russian economy. To address this subject, which was particularly important to 



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Yeltsin, Clinton was advised to emphasize the US government’s support for the “Russian 

economic reform program” in his telephone conversation. Finally, and more importantly, the 

fourth point was about the bombing of Iraq. Here, the president was to reassert that the air strikes 

were only conducted as a last resort after giving “Saddam every opportunity to keep his word on 

cooperation” (NSC 1998, 39). 

In order to justify this attack, Clinton had been advised to assign the blame to Saddam and his lack 

of commitment to the obligations of the UN Security Council. Accordingly, it was recommended 

that Clinton insist that only Saddam was responsible for the military response of the US. This was 

partly to support UNSCOM and its chairman, Richard Butler, who had been criticized by the 

Russians. In the same document, in case Yeltsin said that “Butler has abused his authority and 

must be replaced,” Clinton was advised to defend Butler and UNSCOM by adding that the 

accusations against Saddam were based on “unambiguous facts” (NSC 1998, 39–40). These 

behind-the-scenes recommendations, along with the points discussed openly in the media at that 

time, demonstrate that the administration regarded UNSCOM, headed by Butler, as a key player 

in the implementation of their strategy. Regarding the Iraqi crisis, Clinton was to acknowledge the 

deep differences between Russia and the United States and remind his Russian counterpart that the 

relations between the two nations were too important strategically to be overshadowed by Saddam 

Hussein’s adventurism. In anticipation of Yeltsin’s complaints that the US government had not 

tried hard enough to find a political solution or had not consulted with the Kremlin in advance, 

Clinton was advised to say two things. First, he needed to stress that the US had waited weeks 

before the decision to launch the airstrikes and, second, insist that secrecy was necessary to protect 

the US forces in the region and avoid giving Saddam the opportunity to “disperse his forces and 

equipment.” Therefore, the US team had made a list of the points to be made in the telephone 

conversation. Additionally, they had anticipated Yeltsin’s complaints and recommended the 

appropriate response to them (NSC 1998, 38–40). 

In the telephone conversation recorded on December 30, Yeltsin indicated the implications of the 

US-British attack for the future of relations between Russia and the United States. In this regard, 

he asserted that what was at stake were indeed the relations with the US, as the impact of the 

bombings could go beyond Iraq and Saddam Hussein (NSC 1998, 72). Yeltsin’s words suggest 

that, historically, the bombing of Iraq had presented yet another challenging turn in Russia-US 

diplomacy to such an extent that it could change the extent of bilateral relations. In the phone 

conversation, Yeltsin insisted on the same point that he had made in his message to Clinton. Once 

again, he put emphasis on finding a multilateral solution within the Security Council framework. 

In his talk, the Russian president stressed “unity of action” and “joint and agreed action” in the 

future. Since the Iraq crisis had pushed the US administration toward arbitrary measures, 

emphasizing joint action through the UN mechanisms was, in Yeltsin’s view, the best way to avoid 

further unilateralism. The Russian president indicated that he attached particular importance to the 

quality of Russia-US cooperation, not least because he himself had tried hard to form constructive 

relations with Bill Clinton. Although by that time, Russia had begun to adopt a more assertive 

foreign policy, Yeltsin still saw cooperation with the United States as something necessary in the 

revival of the Russian economy and the return of Russia to the world stage. Consequently, Yeltsin 

indicated that Russia was willing to disregard this controversial act of the United States. Referring 

to his consultations with Primakov regarding the crisis in Iraq, he concluded that “we have to turn 

what has not been the best page in Russian-U.S. relationships” (NSC 1998, 73). 



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However, Yeltsin’s talk went beyond the question of Iraq. It was important for the Kremlin to 

restore relations to a level where Russia-US economic and security cooperation could continue 

smoothly based on previous agreements. Yeltsin briefly mentioned the negotiations with the 

International Monetary Fund and the long-expected support from the US government. One should 

note that, at the same time, the close negotiations (from 1997 to 1999) between Primakov and 

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright served as a background to Yeltsin-Clinton communications. 

While the focus of these negotiations was often Russia’s economic hardships, on many occasions, 

security issues and particularly the NATO issue overshadowed the negotiations. In this context, 

Yeltsin raised the question of “rapid transition from START II to START III.” At that point, 

Russia-US strategic goals had been interrupted due to NATO enlargement, the Balkan crisis and 

the US military action in Iraq. Hence, Yeltsin and Primakov were not able to advance these security 

agreements as an anti-American atmosphere had formed in the Russian Parliament. In sum, 

Yeltsin’s words were indicative of a crisis in bilateral relations that overshadowed his foreign 

policy achievements. Nevertheless, regarding START III, Yeltsin reassured Clinton that he had at 

least made the effort: “I, myself, and Primakov, did everything we could to assure prompt and 

early ratification of the agreement. You are fully aware of that. Regrettably, at this point in time, 

prospects for passing this agreement have deteriorated” (NSC 1998, 73). 

This telephone conversation was recorded in late December as both men looked ahead to 1999. 

They wanted to leave a positive foreign policy legacy in the final year of the century. For this 

reason, Yeltsin ended his speech in the following way: “1999 will be a very important year in 

terms of the development of the Russian-U.S. relationship. In the foundation underneath that 

relationship, we must leave behind a very good inheritance.” 

Historically, Yeltsin’s optimism may seem ironic and naïve. Precisely a year later, in December 

1999, he announced his resignation six months early to improve the election chances of his chosen 

successor. Yeltsin left a mixed legacy in foreign policy, and his successor, Vladimir Putin, steered 

the Russian Federation towards a different direction both domestically and externally. However, 

on another level, Clinton’s utterances were also worthy of attention. His points were based on the 

recommendations of the White House advisory team. Like Yeltsin, Clinton was aware of the 

significance of relations, and he therefore endorsed bilateral achievements. As mentioned above, 

Clinton addressed the question of Iraq, the agenda for 1999, and the Russian economy. Regarding 

the Iraq crisis, he reasserted that his administration took military action out of necessity and that 

he did not want this crisis to hamper bilateral relations. He reminded Yeltsin that in March, 

October, and November 1998, he had called off the attacks in the hope that the crisis could be 

resolved through diplomacy. Clinton also stated that the possibility of further military conflicts 

still existed due to the retaliatory acts that Iraq was showing against coalition aircraft in the no-fly 

zone (NSC 1998, 80). Turning to the agenda for 1999, he indicated that the US support for Russia’s 

negotiations with the IMF depended on progress in the ratification of START II and the results of 

economic reforms that the Primakov government had promised. This subject was important 

because the Russian government felt an urgent need to attract foreign investment. In short, 

strengthening ties with the United States was of great value to Boris Yeltsin, even though he 

encountered pressure on the home front for being too close to the West. That being said, both men 

emphasized their resolve and initiative to overcome obstacles. In other words, the significance of 

Russia-US relations was the underlying theme of the Yeltsin-Clinton conversation. However, 

despite their efforts to advance friendly and conciliatory actions, the Iraq crisis dealt yet another 



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blow to these relations, with intermittent courses of cooperation and conflict that continued into 

the twenty-first century. 

 

Conclusion 

The demise of the Soviet Union created many uncertainties and ushered in a new level of 

diplomacy and engagement. This unusual situation led to extensive diplomatic efforts to maintain 

old allies and strengthen relations with newly established governments in the 1990s. In such a 

framework, the current study approached the above-mentioned aspects of Russian-American 

presidential diplomacy in the post-Soviet world order. In June 1992, at the beginning of this 

trajectory, the president of a free and democratic Russia stood before the American lawmakers in 

Congress and invited all Americans to partnership and friendship that was meant to continue into 

the twenty-first century. Towards the end of this chastening trajectory, in December 1998, both 

Yeltsin and Clinton sought to maintain what had remained of their achievements.  

In this case, the review of Yeltsin-Clinton contacts demonstrates that, while the Iraq crisis was yet 

another major setback in Russia-US relations, both presidents attempted to continue their 

cooperation with a sense of respect and transparency that reflected each side’s national priorities. 

In other words, they both tried to arrange productive talks to maintain the relations which they had 

formed despite pressure and criticism from within. This was more relevant in the case of Yeltsin, 

who had grappled with a multitude of domestic challenges. The question of Iraq may also highlight 

Yeltsin’s strategy to control the perceived unilateralism of the Clinton administration in favour of 

a multilateral structure. The emphasis that the Russians put on the UN Security Council was 

perhaps linked to their evolving foreign policy strategy at that time, one which gave prominence 

to multilateralism and non-intervention. Internationally, the Clinton administration employed the 

same mechanisms to legitimize the military campaign against Iraq. In this case, the Yeltsin-Clinton 

correspondence shows the importance of foreign investment, financial aid, and IMF support for 

Russia, which Clinton’s advisers saw as an instrument to influence the Kremlin’s policies. While 

the Russians could communicate their demands to the Iraqi regime directly, and often did at the 

request of Americans, Washington’s main instrument was UNSCOM, which had attracted a great 

deal of criticism. On the other hand, Yeltsin’s communications with Saddam had not brought the 

intended results, and this was indicative of the disappointment that both presidents felt with 

diplomacy. On a larger scale, the international reactions to the US-British air raids also 

demonstrated that the US hegemony was seriously challenged, but not in a way that Russia could 

exploit to resolve the problem of Iraq. In this way, the Iraq crisis of 1998 can be considered as one 

of the early signs of the next order to come. The records show that the United States only received 

support from its traditional allies, while a considerable number of governments came out against 

the use of military force. This being said, the above discussions reveal only one point of friction 

in Russia-US relations. This is particularly true when these relations are considered in the broad 

context of challenges which preceded or coincided with this case, including the question of NATO 

enlargement, the Balkan crisis, and the growing conflict of interest in Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. In a narrower sense, what makes the December 1998 bombing of Iraq 

important is the fact that it was one of the last causes for direct presidential diplomacy, less than a 

year before Yeltsin’s presidency came to an abrupt end. 

  



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