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China-Central Asia Regionalization and Its Impact on the Central Asian Region 

and Beyond 
 

Assylzat Karabayeva, KIMEP University, Kazakhstan1 

 

Abstract 

Since gaining independence, Central Asian countries have maintained stable and friendly relationships 

with China. Through China-led bilateral, regional, and multilateral projects, China and Central Asia 

have significantly strengthened their strategic partnership and elevated the importance of their 

relationship in the region-building process. As a result of these interactions, Central Asia is emerging 

as an active regional actor. This article characterizes China and Central Asia’s interactions as 

Warleigh-Lack’s (2006) “regionalization” and examines the impact of this process on diffusing 

China’s model of regionalism in Central Asia. Specifically, the article aims to answer the question: 

what are the implications of China and Central Asia’s regionalization processes for shaping the region 

and for the presence of a third actor, Russia? 

Employing Acharya’s (2004) “norm localization” analytical framework, the article argues that the 

current Central Asian regional cooperation model can be described as an indirect (recipient-driven) 

influence of China and Central Asia’s regionalization processes within the scope of the Shanghai 

Cooperation Agreement (SCO), bilateral strategic partnership agreements and Belt and Road Initiative 

(BRI). It posits that, of the various types of indirect diffusion of institutional and policy models of 

regionalism, the new Central Asian model of regional cooperation entails a “lesson-drawing” diffusion 

mechanism from the Chinese model of regionalism. 

Keywords: China, regionalism, regionalization, diffusion, Central Asia 

  

 

1 Assylzat Karabayeva is an Assistant Professor at KIMEP University 



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1. China-Central Asia Relations 

After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China and the Central Asian 

countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan smoothly and 

carefully constructed their relations. The Central Asian states identified their position clearly: they 

would not allow any outbreak and expansion of separatist and Islamic fundamentalist movements in 

their territory and beyond. Additionally, Central Asian countries first stated that they recognize China 

as “one” and that “Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory” (Tokayev 2001). These claims 

fit China’s “core interests” well, which were stressed in the white paper as “state sovereignty, national 

security, territorial integrity and national reunification” (China’s Peaceful Development 2011). In turn, 

China constructed its image as part of the Global South—a developing country that is not hegemonic 

but pursuing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that advocate for multipolarity, non-

interference, and different development models (Zhongping and Jing 2014).  

China initiated the Shanghai Five—confidence-building talks with the post-Soviet countries sharing a 

border with China (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) in 1996. In 2001, with the 

membership of Uzbekistan, the Shanghai Five Forum became more institutionalized, which led to the 

formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Despite not sharing any borders with 

China, other Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan became important 

members as they were the first to officially start following the Chinese model of development at the 

beginning of the 1990s (Kazantsev 2008; Syroezhkin 2010). The SCO has been a multilateral site 

where countries engaged in their deals bilaterally. In other words, the SCO is an institution for bilateral 

intergovernmental cooperation, which does not transfer any authority to an institution. Such an 

approach was important for China as it allowed for the continuation of its “hub and spoke” strategy; 

on the other hand, the Central Asian states liked a bilateral approach as it enabled them to feel like 

equal partners in the organization and not as ‘Russia’s little brothers.’ These factors enabled the Central 

Asian states to construct a more clear-cut vision of an organization that corresponds to their national 

interests. 

Moreover, China favours a come as you are approach that avoids any conditionality, entailing the 

exportation of some external norms and values (Laruelle 2018; Russo 2018). In this regard, 

Kazakhstan’s former president Nursultan Nazarbayev (1997) stated that they welcome China’s anti-

hegemonic policy of friendship with neighbouring countries. He went on to say, “China never dictates 

its own terms and does not say ‘live as we live’, as the West has always taught us” (Nazarbayev 2019). 

Meanwhile, Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov, declared that “China is the most reliable and 

trustworthy friend of Uzbekistan” (Syroezhkin 2010). While many countries criticized Karimov’s 

regime after the Andijan crisis,2 China was the first not to question the internal affairs of Uzbekistan, 

which, in turn, improved economic ties by signing the Treaty on Friendly and Cooperative Partnership 

(Karrar 2010). Such gradually contracted political mutual trust was the first and key component of the 

China-Central Asia interactions. 

The vast majority of the literature has looked at China and Central Asia relations from the perspectives 

of China’s geopolitical and geo-economic domination aspirations, as well as China’s strategies for 

dealing with its domestic economic and security needs3
 and its impact on strengthening authoritarian 

regimes in Central Asia.4 Several studies have highlighted the agency of Central Asian countries and 

 

2 The Andijan crisis of 2005 was a violent crackdown on protesters in Andijan, eastern Uzbekistan, where security forces 

opened fire on demonstrators, leading to hundreds of deaths and international condemnation. 

 
3 For more information, see Bohr 2004; Clarke 2017; Ercilasun and Ercilasun 2018; Gabuev 2016; Indeo 2018; Tekdal 

2018; Reeves 2018; Sternberg et al. 2017; Swanström* 2005; Xuanli Liao 2021; Zhang et al. 2018. 

 
4 For more information, see Allison 2008; Kembayev 2020; Peyrouse 2022; Peyrouse and Raballand 2015.  



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their hedging foreign policy approach in their relations with China (Bitabarova 2018; Dadabaev 2018; 

Sim and Aminjonov 2022; Zhang 2022); still, as Blanchard (2021) and De Lombaerde et al. (2022) 

argued, most literature related to China and Central Asia relations overlooks how such relations 

contribute to the diffusion of China’s norms and experiences in the domestic and foreign policy-

making of Central Asian countries. This article aims to bridge this gap by examining how China-

Central Asia relations are influencing the domestic and regional integration efforts of Central Asian 

states and their relations with an external actor, Russia. The study aims to demonstrate the diffusion 

of China’s regionalism ideas, rather than their implementation. Examining the implementation of these 

diffused ideas lies beyond the scope of this study. This study employs an interpretive and qualitative 

approach. Official documents retrieved from state presidents’ official websites are examined to trace 

the processes of norm diffusion through content and discourse analyses. The research also incorporates 

speeches, interviews, press conferences, publications, and articles authored by heads of state as well 

as members of epistemic communities. 

In order to understand the relationship between China and Central Asia and their regional and global 

impact, the article will briefly describe the theoretical framework explaining norm diffusion 

mechanisms, define key concepts, and conceptualize the China-Central Asia relationship as a 

regionalization process, where Central Asian countries draw lessons from China’s model of 

regionalism. Afterwards, there will be an analysis of China’s model of regionalism and how China and 

Central Asian countries have interacted within this framework. Next, the article will examine the 

impact of China-Central Asia regionalization on recent policymaking in Central Asia. Lastly, the 

article will look at how recent changes in region-building, resulting from China-Central Asia 

regionalization, have strengthened the position of member countries vis-à-vis Russia. 

 

2. Theoretical Framework and Conceptualization of China-Central Asia Relations 

This article applies Acharya’s norm localization theory, which explains how foreign ideas are adapted 

by local actors to align with local beliefs and practices. Acharya (2004, 245) defines this process, 

known as constitutive localization, as “the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, 

and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing 

significant congruence with local beliefs and practices.” In simpler terms, localization involves 

integrating external concepts into one’s existing cognitive priors. Acharya (2009, 21) defines cognitive 

priors as “an existing set of ideas, belief systems, and norms, which determine and condition an 

individual’s or social group’s receptivity to new norms.” The beliefs of a nation’s founding leaders or 

elite groups often serve as primary sources of these cognitive priors, particularly in shaping how 

recently independent states conduct themselves internationally (Acharya 2009). 

States localize foreign norms through diffusion to create new, practical policy tools that enable them 

to achieve modern objectives without abandoning their established cognitive frameworks. When a 

foreign norm clashes with strong cognitive priors, diffusion through localization fails, however, it 

succeeds when the foreign norm replaces an existing local norm (Acharya 2004). Localization entails 

active participation rather than the passive adoption of new rules and institutional frameworks. It 

includes translating, interpreting, and integrating new norms and rules into existing institutions, while 

also resisting certain foreign norms (Acharya 2016; Risse 2016). 

For the purposes of this article, diffusion is defined as “any process where prior adoption of a trait or 

practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters” (Strang 1991, 

325). Risse (2016) gives two types of diffusion mechanisms: direct (sender-driven) and indirect 

(recipient-driven). According to her, the diffusion of regionalism, institutional structures, and regional 

governance is primarily shaped by indirect, recipient-driven processes of emulation rather than direct, 

sender-driven influence. Among the different types of indirect diffusion (competition, lesson-drawing, 



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normative emulation, and mimicry), this article uses the lesson-drawing mechanism to show norm 

diffusion. The lesson drawing mechanism is defined as a process where “actors look to others for 

policies and rules that effectively solved similar problems elsewhere and are transferable into their 

own context” (Risse 2016, 145). States are most likely to draw lessons from those facing similar 

political and economic challenges and have successfully overcome them. Through lesson drawing, 

states follow the logic of consequence, emulating foreign norms based on instrumental rationality and 

a problem-solving approach (Jetschke and Murray 2012; Risse 2016; Torney 2012).  

Moreover, this article adopts Börzel and Risse’s (2016) definitions of regional cooperation, regional 

integration, and regionalism. Regional cooperation is defined as “intergovernmental relations that do 

not entail the transfer of authority to the respective regional organizations” (Börzel and Risse 2016, 7–

8). Integration occurs when “states transfer at least some authority and sovereignty rights to the 

regional level” through pooling or delegation (Börzel and Risse 2016, 8). Regionalism is described as 

“a primarily state-led process of building and sustaining formal regional institutions [norms, rules, and 

procedures] and organizations [with a street address] among states (7).” Thus, regionalism goes 

beyond Eurocentric approaches and includes regional interactions in the non-European world 

(Acharya 2016). However, this article employs the definition of regionalization offered by Alex 

Warleigh-Lack. He defines regionalization as follows:  

An explicit, but not necessarily formally institutionalized, the process of adopting 

participant state norms, policy-making processes, policy styles, policy content, 

political opportunity structures, economies and identity (potentially at both elite and 

popular levels) to both align with and shape a new collective set of priorities, norms, 

and interests at the regional level, which may itself then evolve, dissolve or reach 

stasis. (Warleigh-Lack 2006, 758) 

Regional interaction between China and Central Asian states can fit within the scope of this definition 

of regionalization. China and Central Asia’s regionalization process has been tracked since the 

beginning of the 1990s. However, regionalization started strengthening in 2013 when China 

announced the BRI project. Particularly, the regionalization process has become increasingly evident, 

particularly following the regime change in Uzbekistan. China and Central Asian regionalization 

processes that have been occurring within the scope of the SCO, bilateral strategic partnership 

agreements (SPA) and the Belt Road Initiative BRI created a favourable environment for the Central 

Asian leaders to localize the foreign norms to solve domestic and regional issues. The new Central 

Asian regional cooperation model, which has been active since Shavkat Mirziyoyev became president 

in 2017, can be described as the indirect (recipient-driven) influence of China and Central Asian 

regionalization processes through lesson drawing mechanism. The focus on Uzbekistan is due to the 

fact that it played a triggering role in the start of the new wave of regional cooperation in Central Asia.  

 

3. China’s Model of Regionalism and Central Asia 

A number of scholars have discussed the ambiguity of China’s model of regionalism (Clarke 2018; 

Dunford and Liu 2019), with some defining it as epochal regionalism (Chen 2021), open regionalism 

(Yi 2022), or virtual regionalism (Allison 2008). However, Xi Jinping’s 2013 speech, which framed 

the BRI as a regional project aimed at “[forging] closer economic ties, deepening cooperation, and 

expanding development space in the Eurasian region,” along with the publication of the report, “Vision 

and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” 

offered a clearer conceptualization of China’s model of regionalism.5 This report outlined five key 

cooperation priorities: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial 

 

5 Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. 2017. “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road.” April 

17, 2017. Accessed March 15, 2025. http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html.  



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integration, and people-to-people bonds. These priorities are not new, as China and Central Asia have 

already been implementing them in their regionalization processes. 

Facilities Connectivity and Policy Coordination  

For the most part, facilities connectivity and policy coordination are carried out through Chinese 

partnership agreements. These agreements and BRI are called “policy-led trade facilitation” through 

investment (Arase 2015). At these stages, investment is a key concept. China’s going out policy, which 

has been implemented since the end of the 1990s, played a crucial role in prioritizing investment 

policies over trade. The focus on investment is what makes China’s approach to regionalism different 

from the Western model, which places less emphasis on economic infrastructure (Arase 2015). 

Investment is essential for building infrastructure that supports seamless connectivity within and 

beyond national borders through collaborative development efforts. Investment is also the key to 

opening free trade zones to improve international trade. Many developing countries are reluctant to 

sign free trade agreements with China because of competitiveness. Therefore, before the formation of 

the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), countries’ practices involved establishing special economic zones 

(SEZ).6 In the long term, the spillover effect of free trade zones to free trade whole zones (FTA)7 is 

expected. The idea of establishing SEZ in the China-Kazakhstan border has existed since the beginning 

of the 1990s. The first cross-border SEZ was Zharkent in the Taldykorgan region. It is strategically 

positioned on the Kazakhstan-China border and serves as a major hub for trade, logistics, and industrial 

development. 

Countries seek to enhance policy coordination to facilitate investment and trade. In some cases, they 

couple their national development strategies to achieve mutual benefits. At these stages, the primary 

focus is on removing barriers to the free movement of physical capital. One of the most notable 

examples of aligning development programs is Kazakhstan's 2016 agreement to integrate its new 

economic policy, Nurly Zhol, with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Harutyunyan 2022).8 During 

the Chinese leader’s visit to the SCO Summit held in Bishkek on June 13, 2019, the president of 

Kyrgyzstan at the time, Soornbay Jeenbekov, expressed Kyrgyzstan’s willingness to establish 

institutionalized mechanisms to align its 2018–2040 National Development Strategy with China’s Belt 

and Road Initiative (BRI), emphasizing their strategic compatibility (Xuequan 2019). Moreover, in the 

strategic partnership agreements between China and Turkmenistan, the members agreed to make all 

efforts to interface the “Chinese dream” strategy about the revival of the Chinese nation and 

Turkmenistan’s “Era of Power and Happiness” strategic development plan to achieve common growth 

based on the principle of win-win cooperation.  

In 2022, during the SCO meeting in Beijing, Uzbekistan presented its Development Strategy of New 

Uzbekistan for 2022–2026 and expressed its intention to align it with China’s BRI (Eurasia Diary 

2022b). Another interesting coupling happened with the Eurasian Economic Union and the BRI 

through the signing of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Eurasian 

Economic Union (EAEU) and China. This event represented a partial realization of multiple 

unsuccessful attempts by Chinese authorities to integrate the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO) with the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)9 through the establishment of a free trade 

area and a development bank (Kembayev 2020; Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 2019). During 

 

6 A special economic zone (SEZ) is a designated area within a country that has different economic regulations, such as tax 

incentives and trade benefits, to attract investment, boost exports, and promote economic growth. 
7 Free trade whole zones FTA is a designated area where goods can be imported, stored, processed, and re-exported with 

minimal customs regulations and without paying duties or tariffs. 
8 This strategic move aimed to integrate Kazakhstan’s infrastructure development plans with China’s massive global trade 

and connectivity project. 
9 EurAsEc was the regional organization which existed between 2000 and 2014, which aspired towards economic 

integration within post-Soviet territories.  



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Uzbekistan’s chairmanship at the SCO in 2022, a range of innovative ideas and documents were 

presented, including the Transport Connectivity Strategy, the Plan for Advancing Intra-Regional Trade, 

the Infrastructure Development Program, the Economic Forum, the SCO Industrial Innovation Week, 

the Forum of Regional Leaders, and the Forum of Industrial Cooperation (Eurasia Diary 2022a).  

Unimpeded Trade 

The unimpeded trade stage aims to establish a free trade system covering the entire national territory 

by signing free trade agreements. In other words, countries agree to eliminate any tariff and non-tariff 

barriers to trade in goods and services. Within the framework of the SCO, China has repeatedly 

attempted to negotiate free trade agreements with member states. However, Russia and the Central 

Asian countries have been reluctant to proceed, fearing market dominance by Chinese counterparts 

(Kassenova 2013; Syroezhkin 2010). The most recent attempt to establish a common economic space 

between China and the EAEU member states was once again unsuccessful, particularly from China's 

perspective. The 2018 Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the EAEU 

did not include any tariff preferences. Instead, it focused solely on eliminating non-tariff barriers for 

goods in transit. 

People-to-People Bond 

The people-to-people bond pillar is oriented to bring societies closer through “extensive cultural and 

academic exchanges, personal exchanges and cooperation, media cooperation, youth and women 

exchanges, and volunteer services” (Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation 2015). 

Through this pillar, China is aiming to expand its soft power. This pillar appears to be the least 

important in comparison with the other four pillars as China has been demonstrating itself as “we-

doing” rather than “we-feeling” in the international arena (Kavalski 2013, 262). Therefore, China’s 

position is often characterized as “warm politics, cold public,” meaning that it prioritizes strong 

relations with the political elites of partner countries over public sentiment (Dave 2018; Kerr 2010). 

China is engaging with the Central Asian youth mostly through the Confucius Institutes, Belt Road 

Initiatives research centers at universities, and Model SCO Youth Conferences. China and Central 

Asia have forged connections between 58 pairs of sibling cities, established 13 Confucius Institutes, 

and set up 22 Confucius Classrooms (Ge 2023). In the last five years, Model SCO Youth Conferences 

have been held 20 times. 

The Characteristics of China’s Model of Regionalism 

China’s model of regionalism is defined by a pragmatic and state-driven approach that prioritizes 

economic integration, flexible partnerships, and non-politicized cooperation. It emphasizes bilateral 

engagements within broader multilateral frameworks, strategic economic zones as stepping stones for 

integration, and a win-win narrative that aligns with South-South cooperation. The model is relational, 

emphasizing long-term diplomatic engagement, and avoids rigid structures or politically sensitive 

issues, instead focusing on mutual economic benefits and stability.  

1. Bilateral. China prefers to build relations with other countries in a bilateral framework. Even in 

multilateral sites like the SCO, the ASEAN+3,10 and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 

(RCEP), the most important issues are targeted bilaterally. This bilateral framework enables China to establish 

a “hub-and-spoke” relationship with developing countries, positioning itself as the central hub while other 

Global South nations function as the peripheral spokes.  

2. Depoliticization. China has eliminated all politically sensitive aspects from its economic cooperation 

and integration style. Many post-colonial states are reluctant to share their authority with the supranational 

 

10 ASEAN+3 refers to the regional cooperation framework that includes the 10 member states of the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 

Thailand, and Vietnam—plus China, Japan, and South Korea. 

 



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institutions. Most Asian countries prefer a sovereignty-bound regime. China constructed an “anticolonial” 

foreign policy, which favoured top-down state-led intergovernmental cooperation. Moreover, developing 

countries consider the enormous Chinese labour force as a threat to their emerging labour market. Therefore, 

the Chinese model kept the free movement of goods and capital flow but eliminated the free movement of the 

labour force from their agenda. In addition, the Chinese model is silent about Western norms, such as human 

rights and democracy.  

3. From micro to macro. The formation of the FTA (free trade area extended to the whole area) is a 

medium or long-term project. The step toward the FTA starts with opening free trade zones (cross border, within 

the region, etc.). China’s external opening up in the 1970s started with the building of special economic zones 

(SEZ). China established four SEZs to attract foreign direct investment in 1979. The positive results of these 

SEZ led to the launch of 15 new Economic and Technological Developmental Zones between 1984 and 1988 

(Zeng 2015). SEZ were an attractive policy for the Chinese government as they permitted liberalization of only 

some parts of the territory. This approach enabled economic experimentation without exposing the entire 

national economy to uncertainty. However, there needs to be a positive spillover effect if the SEZ project is to 

succeed. This was the case for China when the successful Pearl River Delta SEZ quickly extended to the 

Guangdong and Fujian provinces of China. The Southern China Growth Triangle even became the first and 

most successful project in East Asia. Today, there are around 5400 SEZ worldwide, with more than 2500 SEZ 

being located in China (552 state-level zones and 1991 provincial zones) (UNCTAD 2019). The importance of 

the SEZ strategy in contemporary Chinese policies has been evident from the thirteenth five-year plan (2016–

2020), where the concepts of Free Trade Zones and Free Trade Areas are repeated more than 11 times (Pacory 

2019). SEZ are attractive for those countries which are in transition from a centrally planned economy to a 

market economy, seeking external capital flow that incentivizes economic activities (Thant et al. 1995). 

4. Flexible. The Chinese model is not based on a rigid or already defined framework, in other words, 

“China has not taken a cookie-cutter, one size fits all” approach (Webster 2007). Instead, China implements the 

all-weather approach, which means that states, based on their mutual interests, decide how to conclude their 

agreements. For instance, China’s free trade agreements (FTAs) are diverse in terms of form, coverage, and 

brevity (Antkiewicz and Whalley 2005). While China’s FTAs with ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand are 

found to be more undefined, superficial, and gradual process-oriented, China’s FTAs with Hong Kong or Chile 

adopted a more concrete, comprehensive, and Western-like formal structure (Antkiewicz and Whalley 2005; 

Webster 2007).  

5. South-South cooperation. China has tended to position itself as part of the Global South or as a 

developing country that “gives economic aid to meet China’s own development needs while also serving the 

development needs of recipients” (Arase 2015). In other words, China offers a win-win formula for co-

development purposes. Unlike traditional North-South cooperation, which often involves aid from developed 

to developing countries, China’s approach emphasizes equal partnerships, mutual benefits, and co-

development rather than donor-recipient dynamics. Through soft loans, infrastructure development, and 

technology transfers, China provides economic support that not only facilitates the growth of recipient countries 

but also serves its own long-term strategic interests—such as securing resources, expanding markets for Chinese 

goods, and strengthening political alliances. 

6. Relational: Chinese relationality logic entails the maintenance of dynamic processes through 

diplomacy, and relation-building is paramount to the Chinese model of cooperation rather than immediate 

tangible results (Qin 2011; Sally 2013). This involves institutionalizing official visits and regular summit 

meetings of top government representatives as well as discourses through conferences, forums, and think-tank 

dialogues like Global Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, 16+1 Forum, Belt and Road 

Innovation, the Entrepreneurship Forum, China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum, China-Kazakhstan Think 

Tank Dialogue, and Model SCO Youth Conference (Goldstein 2005). 

7. Comfort zone. Leaving aside conflictual issues, the “comfort zone” understanding takes its roots 

from Deng Xiaoping’s famous concept, “setting aside dispute and pursuing joint development” for a peaceful 

settlement of border and transboundary water issues as proclaimed in 1978. The main elements of this approach 

are that states put aside their conflictual issues for the time being and develop joint solutions for less politically 

sensitive problems to improve mutual understanding through constructive dialogue (Embassy of the PRC in the 

Republic of Estonia 2004). 

 



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China’s Versus Asean’s Model of Regionalism 

All these criteria mentioned above are not only exclusive for China’s model of regionalism but can be 

also found in other Asian regionalism11 frameworks like ASEAN. However, there are two things that 

make China’s regional model different from that of ASEAN’s: first, an unclear identification as to who 

is the self and other and second is the fact that China’s regional model is not regional enough.  

China has been constructing its foreign policy-making in a very careful manner so as not create new 

foes. Even though there were some tensions between China and the US, China restrained its use of 

harsh discourse, instead, requesting that “outside countries [e.g., US], on their part, should respect the 

diversity of [China’s]region and do their part to facilitate its development and stability” (Xi 2014). 

When Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, a leader of an ASEAN member nation, proposed the East 

Asian Economic Group as an exclusive regionalist alternative to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC), aimed at countering the US, it was China that vetoed the proposal (He 2017). Another 

example, when President Xi first announced his Silk Road and Belt initiative in Astana, he stated “[w]e 

[China] stand ready to enhance communication and coordination with Russia and all Central Asian 

countries to strive to build a region of harmony” (Xi 2013). China expressed its acknowledgment and 

respected Russia’s role and interest presented in the Central Asian region and by doing so effectively 

avoided any misunderstandings with Russia.  

In the case of ASEAN, numerous instances illustrate how exclusive regionalism has been employed 

to balance the influence of major powers while strengthening regional identity and autonomy. ASEAN 

member states have actively shaped regional cooperation through norm-driven mechanisms, 

effectively constraining the influence of external powers by prioritizing consensus-based decision-

making, non-interference, and informal diplomacy—an approach commonly referred to as the ASEAN 

Way. 

The ASEAN Way, developed through decades of region-making, is characterized by sovereignty 

preservation, mutual respect, non-intervention, and consensus-building. This informal and non-

binding approach has allowed smaller ASEAN states to prevent domination by major external actors, 

including China and the United States, while maintaining regional stability and fostering cooperation. 

By adhering to this model, ASEAN has successfully managed to neutralize great-power competition 

within its framework, ensuring that no single external power dictates regional affairs. ASEAN was 

called as the most successfully developed normative regionalism that effectively identified who is the 

self and who is other (Acharya 2006; Ganesan 2010; Severino 2008; Solingen 2008;). 

China’s regional policies are not committed to regionalism per se (He 2017). Indeed, the driving force 

for all of China’s regional efforts is national developmental strategies and internal social stability 

factors. For Chinese officials, an instrumental approach that prioritizes national interests more than 

building the region or that of a regional sense of community is more important. There is almost no 

discourse about the instances where regionalism is constructing the Chinese nation-state, whereas in 

the case of ASEAN, regionalism was more functionalist and liberalist in nature (Eurasia Review 2020) 

.  

4. China-Central Asia Regionalization: Impact on Central Asian Region-Building 

New Uzbekistan: As Region Builder in Central Asia 

Changes in international politics of the region that have been happening since early 2017 were directly 

related to Uzbekistan’s new president Shavkat Mirziyoyev and his innovative domestic and foreign 

policies. By analyzing speeches and the most important documents adopted by the new leader, one can 

 

11 Prominent ideas in Asian regionalism include the principles of absolute sovereignty and non-interference, a preference 

for informal processes, relatively weak and centralized institutions, agreements with nonbinding outcomes, and consensus-

based decisions (Acharya 2016; Kahler and MacIntyre 2013). 



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learn more about turning points from the previous policy direction to the current situation.12 In all the 

official documents and statements, the key message has been “economy first,” implying that 

development takes place through the economic sector. Such rhetoric was also famous during the 

previous president Karimov’s regime, but his economy first concept propagated together with other 

political and geopolitical concerns, such as “independence, independence and once again 

independence” (BBC 1993). Indeed, the “cognitive priors” established by Karimov in Uzbekistan—

non-interference, a self-reliant identity, and autonomy-seeking cooperation—rejected the diffusion of 

European ideas of regionalism13 in Central Asia (Karabayeva 2021). Therefore, several attempts to 

create a Central Asian Union by emulating the EU model, as well as Russia and Kazakhstan’s efforts 

to expand the EAEU—an integration project modeled after the EU’s institutional design—were 

resisted by Uzbekistan. 

However, Mirziyoyev’s idea seems genuinely focused on economic matters through export. The 

current regime’s internal and external policies are aimed at decreasing imports from abroad and 

increasing exports to foreign partners (Dadabaev 2019). Such developmental strategies of the state 

have also influenced the structure and missions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Uzbekistan. Now, 

the first and foremost goal of Uzbekistan’s embassies or representative offices abroad is to bring as 

much foreign direct investment as possible. This question was cemented by the “must” point. This 

directive has been reinforced as an absolute mandate, reflecting the country’s strategic focus 

on economic modernization, industrial development, and global market integration. In addition, 

Mirziyoyev empowered the status of regional governors, particularly the hakims14 of those regions that 

share borders with neighbouring countries.  

Even if one considers the names given to years since 2017, it is not difficult to notice what sectors and 

issues Uzbekistan has been concentrating on. The year 2017 was declared as “the Year of Dialogue 

with People and Human Interests”; 2018: “the Year of Support of Active Entrepreneurship, Innovative 

Ideas, and Technologies”; 2019: “the Year of Active Investment and Social Development”; and 2020: 

“the Year of the Development of Science, Education and the Digital Economy.” With such 

declarations, Uzbekistan has been initiating and supporting programs such as “Every Family is 

Entrepreneur” and “Youth is Our Future” as well as projects aimed at training a million software 

programmers (Agency for Strategic Reforms 2022).  

Mirziyoyev stated Uzbekistan should emulate and learn from those states “[i]n their foreign policies, 

prioritize facilitating exports of their products in foreign markets” (Dadabaev 2019). In this respect, it 

can be more evident now why Uzbekistan’s new foreign policy has been making challenges in 

determining who is the self and who is the other. One cannot clearly define what the direction 

Uzbekistan is leaning toward; who is the closest partner of Uzbekistan: is it Russia, China, or the West? 

In this respect, Dadabaev (2019) claimed that Uzbekistan has short-term goals that might give off the 

impression that Uzbekistan has been taking a particular foreign policy direction. Still, one should not 

confuse and take it as Uzbekistan’s official stance. Further, Dadabaev (2019) stated that such short-

term goals have been taking place to accomplish the real long-term perspective becoming an export-

 

12 For example, the early key documents, including Uzbekistan’s National Development strategy (2017–2021); the Decree 

of the President “On additional measure to ensure the accelerated development of the entrepreneurial activity, 

comprehensive protection of private property and substantial improvement of business climate”; President Mirziyoyev’s 

speeches, including his foreign policy speech from 2016, his speech “Central Asia is a region of huge unrealized potential” 

at the international conference held in Samarkand, November 14, 2017, and the President’s addresses to the Oliy Majlis 

(Uzbek Parliament) in 2018, 2019 and 2020 and his address to Uzbekistan’s ambassadors abroad in 2017. 
13 The main principles of European regionalism include a preference for sovereignty-constraining structures through the 

formation of some degree of supranationalism, highly institutionalized legal frameworks, and majority decision-making 

structures with binding outcomes (Acharya 2016). 
14 In Uzbekistan and some other Central Asian countries, a hakim is a regional or city governor appointed to oversee local 

governance, economic policies, and administrative matters. 

 



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oriented economy; this implies that every country is equally important for Uzbekistan. Moreover, such 

an equal relationship is also related to the Central Asian countries. The head of the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, Kamilov, noted that Uzbekistan does not prioritize any country (e.g. Kazakhstan) in Central 

Asia; instead, it works mutually with all of them (Berdiev 2017). A good example from practice can 

be the case when Mirziyoyev had his first official foreign trip as a president to Turkmenistan, instead 

of the influential countries outside of the Central Asia (e.g. Russia, China, the US, or Japan) or even a 

larger country within the region like Kazakhstan. Most importantly, the elements of China’s 

developmental and problem-solving approach are present in Uzbekistan’s current domestic and foreign 

policy-making.  

Strategic Partnership Agreements 

Kazakhstan signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with Kyrgyzstan in May 2012 and with 

Uzbekistan in June 2013. However, after the leadership change in Uzbekistan from Islam Karimov to 

Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan pushed strategic partnership agreements with other Central Asian 

countries. As a result, all Central Asian countries had signed SPAs with each other by 2018, with the 

exception of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan due to longstanding tensions between the two countries (see 

Table 1). Almost all Central Asian Strategic Partnership Agreements prioritized the economic sector 

among others15 by focusing on trade, investment, and infrastructure aspects, except the SPA between 

Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan16 where the security aspect and energy 

sector were found to be at the core of the agreements. Such flexible character of the Central Asian 

countries’ Strategic Partnership Agreements (CASPAs) emulates Chinese partnership models rather 

than rigid American or Russian security-based SPAs or European partnership types aimed at the 

expansion of democratic, human rights, and governance values. Like Chinese SPAs, the CASPAs have 

not emphasized common values or identity.  

The CASPAs followed the comfort zone logic by leaving aside contentious issues. Instead, the rhetoric 

of “we have not left any issues unresolved” became an integral part of the agreements. Countries are 

showing their willingness to find mutual understandings on more economic issues, rather than 

politically sensitive disputes. Thus, Uzbek and Tajik leaders decided not to remember about official 

statements made at the end of the 2000s about territorial claims for Samarkand and Bukhara and the 

construction of the Rogun Dam.17 The Uzbekistan-Tajikistan SPA bypassed the Rogun Dam disputes 

and instead agreed to mutually benefit from jointly constructing two other hydro-electric power 

stations in Zarafshan River (Tolipov 2018). Additionally, these two countries jointly settled the status 

of the Farkhad hydropower station located in the Spitamen district in Sughd Province, which is part of 

a disputed border territory between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.18 These types of natural resource-based 

development initiatives were also found in the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan 

SPAs. The national energy companies of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekneftegaz and 

Turkmennebit, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the joint exploration and 

development of Turkmen energy deposits in the Caspian Sea (Sattarov 2018). Additionally, 

Uzbekgidroenergo and the Kyrgyz National Energy Holding Company signed a memorandum on the 

 

15 All Central Asian Strategic Partnership Agreements include economic, security and cultural-humanitarian cooperation 

features.   
16 The Kyrgyzstan-Turkmenistan SPA specifically mentioned the importance of the realization of the gas pipeline between 

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and China.   
17 Relations between former Uzbek president Islam Karimov and the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon worsened 

in 2009. This aggravation of relations led leaders to make official statements where Rahmon stated that Tajikistan will take 

back Samarkand and Bukhara; on the other side, Karimov threatened war if Tajikistan kept constructing the Rogun Dam.  
18 Working group delegations on delamination and demarcation from both countries agreed that the territory where Farkhad 

hydropower station located belongs to Tajikistan, whereas the hydropower station itself is under the ownership of 

Uzbekistan. All maintenance of the hydropower station will be under the responsibility of Uzbekistan, and security will be 

guaranteed by Tajikistan. 



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joint construction of the Kambaratinsky hydroelectric power station-1. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 

further agreed on the joint use of Orto-Tokoy reservoir in the Jalal-Abad region of Kyrgyzstan (Sputnik 

Uzbekistan 2017). More importantly, all five Central Asian leaders participated in the third 

consultative meeting despite the fact that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were in the midst of a border 

conflict. Kassenova claimed that Central Asian states seem to have learned from Chinese diplomatic 

conventions to treat its regional partners with respect, despite having limited experience on the 

international stage (Sorbello 2024).   

Table 1: Central Asian Strategic Partnership Agreements  

 KAZ KGZ TJ TM UZ 

KAZ N/A May 2012 September 

2018 
April 

2017 
June 2013 

KGZ May 2012 N/A No SPA August  
2018 

October 2017 

TJ September 

2015 
No SPA N/A November 

2017 
August 2018 

TM April 2017 August  
2018 

November 

2017 
N/A March 2017 

UZ June 2013 October 2017 August 2018 March 2017 N/A 

Source: Author 

Special Economic Zones  

All seven attempts to create Central Asian economic integration since the post-independence period 

have failed. Indeed, such failures were mostly reasoned due to the low level of intra-regional trade 

accounting for less than 10 percent of their total trade, different levels of economic and social 

development, as well as the incompatibility of the countries’ rules regulating trade and investment.19 

However, these obstacles are not the case for sub-regional economic zones (Thant et al. 1995). Unlike 

trading blocs, special economic zones (SEZs) do not discriminate against non-members by offering 

them mutual beneficial deals, including market access and foreign capital flow. Special economic 

zones that guided China’s opening up to the world economy seem to play a significant role in 

Uzbekistan’s new leader’s domestic and foreign economic policy making.20 The number of SEZs 

doubled from 27 in 2015 to 55 in 2022, thanks to Uzbekistan. By 2015, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan had ten, seven, five, three, and two SEZs, respectively (ICTSD 

2015). However, by 2022, the numbers of SEZs skyrocketed in Uzbekistan reaching 22, and there was 

a gradual increase in other Central Asian countries, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan (5): 13 in 

Kazakhstan, 10 in Turkmenistan, 5 in Tajikistan (Adrianople Group 2023).  

Strategic partnerships in Central Asia, particularly those ones where Uzbekistan is a partner, made a 

very significant step for the regional cooperation through the signing of bilateral agreements between 

governments on intraregional cooperation. President Mirziyoyev’s initiative, intraregional 

cooperation, refers to sub-regional interactions, in other words, interactions between administrative-

territorial units of corresponding states, particularly focusing on trade investment relations. For this 

 

19 Economic integration or trading blocs precondition the existence of the following criteria: 1) large volumes of 

international trade; 2) similar laws and regulations governing trade and investment flows; 3) per capita income.should be 

similar; 4) geographical proximity is significant; 5) high level of political commitment and policy coordination (Thant et 

al. 1995). 
20 Scholars put forward four of the most common driving forces of building different types of SEZs, including “(i) attracting 

foreign direct investment and promoting exports and industrialization; (ii) serving as pressure valves to alleviate large-

scale unemployment; (iii) supporting a wider economic reform strategy; and (iv) acting as experimental laboratories for 

the application of new policies and approaches” (Zeng 2015).   



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aim, he proposed to set up “an association of regional governors” of Central Asian countries.  

Today it is necessary to give priority to regional cooperation. In this regard, I propose 

founding an association of heads of, that is to say, governors of regions and business 

communities of Central Asian countries. When we conduct dialogue directly with the 

regions, their leadership, and business communities, the results will, as they say, be 

evident. There will be more results when we help them and do not prevent them [from 

doing so]. (BBC 2017).  

This initiative was the first step toward Central Asian bottom-up or zonal economic cooperation. 

Kazakhstan supported the new Uzbek leader’s idea and proposed to build a cross-border cooperation 

zone on the border of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. After a year, the two countries signed a 

memorandum on the creation of an international center for trade and economic cooperation—Central 

Asia and Turkestan. These cross-border zones aim to become a cross-border trade, logistics, and tourist 

hub, opening up economic opportunities with Europe and China (Kazakh TV 2019).  

The realization of the special economic zone between Central Asia and Turkestan is certainly 

important for the accomplishment and further development of the International Central Asian North-

South Transport Corridor (Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2019). With 

the support and technical assistance of the Asian Development Bank, the core project of the North-

South Corridor —the Turkestan-Shymkent-Tashkent-Khujand Economic Corridor—has already been 

initiated. This initiative connects three densely populated regions (oblasts), which have popular 

touristic centers in Central Asia—Turkestan (Kazakhstan), Tashkent (Uzbekistan), and Sughd 

(Tajikistan). Such a project is not new for the Asian Development Bank, as it has already been 

technically supporting another Central Asian interregional economic project—the Almaty-Bishkek 

Economic Corridor under the framework of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 

(CAREC) program since 2017. The Almaty-Bishkek Economic Corridor involves the Almaty and 

Zhambyl regions of Kazakhstan and the Chuy and Issyk Kul regions of Kyrgyzstan. Both economic 

corridors are meant to intensify economic activities in sub-sectors, including agriculture, health 

services, information and communications technology (ICT), transport, and tourism (Asian 

Development Bank 2018). In 2022, at the Tashkent Investment Forum, Kazakhstan proposed to build 

another intraregional “Turan special economic zone” (Astana Times 2022). Intraregional cooperation 

is also growing between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, particularly between Surxondaryo and Khatlon 

regions and the Samarkand, Tashkent, and Sogdy regions.  

Annual Consultative Meeting of Leaders  

The annual Consultative Meeting, originally suggested by Uzbekistan in 2017, has evolved into a 

crucial collaboration platform exclusively designed for Central Asian nations. Over time, this meeting 

has grown into a significant event, with different Central Asian countries taking turns to host it. 

Kazakhstan hosted the first event in 2018, followed by Uzbekistan in 2019, Turkmenistan in 2021, 

Kyrgyzstan in 2022, and Tajikistan in 2023. The key topics that the heads of state have discussed and 

agreed upon so far include the creation of local free trade zones, fostering Central Asian industry, 

connecting to key economic routes, supporting business communication with a Business Council, 

addressing regional security, collaborating on energy and the environment, sharing news via a regional 

TV channel, expanding higher education through branch universities, and forming a youth policy 

agreement. 

An interesting observation was the more active participation of Turkmenistan’s leader. Turkmenistan 

has always tried to isolate itself from regional initiatives, yet, during this meeting, Turkmenistan took 

a different path. The Turkmen leader, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, advocated for the 



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CA5+n formula21 of cooperation. He called for cooperation among states, especially major powers. 

He also proposed a five-party business council as “a think tank for the formation of a joint strategy of 

[their]states on priority areas of economic partnership” (Kadyrova 2019). Such five-party initiatives, 

especially from the side of Turkmenistan, were unexpected and introduced a new level of improved 

regional relationships. It is evident that when discussing regional cooperation, the leaders of the 

Central Asian countries intentionally refrain from making grandiose statements and instead provide 

carefully considered and politically neutral evaluations. The advisory meeting, as a collaborative 

format, currently aligns with the preferences of all Central Asian leaders. 

 

5. China-Central Asian Regionalization: Impact on Russia’s Position in Central Asia 

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), formed under Russian leadership alongside Kazakhstan and 

Belarus, was largely modeled after the EU’s institutional framework. The EAEU is a regional closed 

bloc, which is concentrated only on the post-Soviet countries. Like the EU, the EAEU is a top-down, 

institutionalized organization with supra-national bodies. The Eurasian Economic Community 

(EurAsEC), a predecessor to the EAEU, once included all Central Asian countries except 

Turkmenistan as members. In both the EurAsEC and EAEU, Central Asian countries sought similar 

economic benefits, including unrestricted access to the Russian market, a steady influx of Russian 

capital, and infrastructure development, in return for their political alignment with Russia (President 

of the Russian Federation 2004). However, in his interview with the author of the article, Olzhas 

Khudaibergenov, a Kazakh economist, stated that Russia failed to fulfill the role of a “center” leading 

to the loss of trust from the Central Asian countries.22 Moreover, Moscow’s role as a primus inter 

pares within the framework of the EAEU prompted the states of Central Asia to seek more direct 

engagement with China (Gabuev 2016, 63). The need for economic benefits has been effectively met 

by China since the establishment of partnership agreements with Central Asian countries. Some 

scholars have observed that Russia’s EAEU and China’s BRI represent competing and rival regional 

frameworks (Indeo 2020). It’s worth noting that not all Central Asian countries are members of the 

EAEU, every Central Asian country participates in the BRI.  

It appears that Central Asian states are increasingly favouring Chinese-led economic initiatives over 

Russian-led ones. Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, pointed out that, “before 

the war, Uzbekistan was one step closer to joining the Eurasian Economic Union...I think that now 

Uzbekistan will try to distance itself from Moscow” (Pikulicka-Wilczewska 2022). On the other hand, 

Uzbekistan in 2017 and Tajikistan in 2020 formally expressed their interest in joining the Quadrilateral 

Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA), a customs cooperation initiative originally signed in 1995 by 

China, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. This agreement aims to streamline customs procedures 

among the participant countries. China and the Central Asian nations consistently refer to the QTTA 

as a foundational element for expanding connectivity projects within the BRI, including the China-

Pakistan Economic Corridor and the upcoming China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan project (Nelson and 

Sutherland 2023). 

The war in Ukraine, coupled with the resulting sanctions, has disrupted trade in Central Asia. Russia, 

in particular, experienced a substantial trade contraction, with estimates suggesting a possible 60 

percent decline in 2022 (Darvas et al. 2023). In contrast, China has remarkably increased its trade with 

the region more than 100-fold over the past three decades (State Council of the PRC 2022). During a 

 

21
 CA5+N cooperation refers to the engagement between the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) and external partners (denoted as “N”), which may include major global and 

regional powers like the US, EU, China, Russia, Japan, India, South Korea, or the Gulf states.  

 
22 Author’s unpublished interview with the economist Olzhas Khudaibergenov, August 7, 2018.  



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summit in January 2022, Chinese leader Xi Jinping unveiled plans to open up China’s market to 

imports from Central Asia, with the goal of boosting total trade turnover between China and the region 

to 70 billion US dollars (USD) by 2030 (Nelson and Sutherland 2023). 

China assisted Central Asian states in reducing their dependence on the Northern corridor23 and was 

able to successfully open up the Kazakh-China joint terminal in Lianyungang port as well as launch 

Central Asia’s connectivity to the Middle Corridor, which extends from China to Turkey. Central 

Asian goods now can reach Europe without passing through Russian territory, although a dependency 

on the Northern corridor still exists. Nevertheless, Astana, for instance, claimed that Moscow’s 

leverage to exert pressure has been limited (Hess 2023).  

The collaborative efforts of China and the Central Asian states have improved both the infrastructure 

and interconnections within the Central Asia region (Bohr 2019). Out of the six economic corridors 

within the BRI, two traverse Central Asia: the New Eurasian Land Bridge and the China-Central Asia-

West Asia Economic Corridor. Kazakhstan is involved in five of the six routes within the New 

Eurasian Land Bridge Corridor, facilitating connections for Central Asian countries to the Baltic Sea, 

Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean (Harutyunyan 2022). Cargo arrives 

at the Kuryk Port in Aktau, Kazakhstan and, via the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, reaches Europe. The 

Kuryk Port was successfully connected to Turkmenistan and Iran to reach the Middle East. Such road 

and sea connectivity improvements are not only important for Chinese and Kazakh goods, but there is 

also a big potential for export capacities of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. To achieve this objective, 

the reconstruction of the Beineu-Akzhigit-Border of Uzbekistan and Zehtibai-Zhanaozen-Kendirli-

Border of Turkmenistan is underway to enhance connectivity between this automobile corridor and 

Kuryk Port. These projects, along with other ongoing upgrades to the transport and logistics network 

in Central Asia, contribute to regional infrastructure development and connectivity enhancement 

(Kazakh TV 2018). Under the BRI, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are also working together with China 

to build a railway, which will connect Asia to Europe and the Far East. China was able to successfully 

convince Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to jointly construct a gas pipeline to export 

energy to China. This was another opportunity for Turkmenistan to break Russia’s monopoly over its 

energy export. 

Furthermore, Russia’s conflict with Ukraine has also brought Central Asian states closer to China in 

the security sphere (Nelson and Sutherland 2023). Scholars claim that Russia’s war undermined its 

role to serve as a mediator in intraregional conflict (Doolotkeldieva and Marat 2022) or a source of 

stability (Pikulicka-Wilczewska 2022) in Central Asia. China has conditioned its support for the 

reconstruction of the Dushanbe-Uzbekistan border road on Tajikistan and Uzbekistan improving 

bilateral relations, particularly through the resolution of border disputes and other conflicts (Indeo, 

2018). Furthermore, at the Third China and Central Asia (C+C5) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 

Kazakhstan, the participating states signed four outcome documents; among these, one document 

conveyed Central Asia’s endorsement for a localized iteration of China’s Data Security Cooperation 

Initiative, with the aim of enhancing coordination for cross-border data exchanges (Kadyrova 2022). 

Central Asian countries have already started constructing their political and economic course oriented 

toward China’s strategic policies. For example, the former president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has not 

hidden the fact that it was the 2050 China strategy that influenced Kazakhstan to choose the long-term 

“Strategy Kazakhstan-2050” program (Nazarbayev 2012). The alignment of the timeframe for 

the “Made in Kazakhstan-2025” program—which seeks to promote technological modernization and 

the development of a non-resource-based economy—with China’s “Made in China-2025” strategy, 

aimed at advancing the production of higher-value goods and services, is unlikely to be coincidental. 

 

23 Seventy percent of all routes from Central Asia are directed toward the Northern corridors, which passes through Russia. 



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6. Conclusion  

After the collapse of the USSR, the newly independent Central Asian states carefully crafted their 

foreign policies concerning China. Both China and the Central Asian states had a shared interest in 

prioritizing stability above all else. The key to this cooperation was their mutual commitment to 

respecting each other’s sovereignty and the absence of political pressure in their relations. This allowed 

China and the Central Asian countries to establish a trustworthy environment in the region. 

The Shanghai Forum and its successor, the SCO, played significant roles in constructively resolving 

serious disputes, such as border issues, through bilateral dialogue and consultations. Under China’s 

leadership, Central Asian countries experienced a new form of soft, peaceful, and incremental-based 

regionalism. This innovative Central Asian regional cooperation model was initiated by Uzbekistan’s 

President Mirziyoyev in 2017 and received strong support from other Central Asian countries. It 

appears that Central Asian nations took cues from China’s regionalism model by engaging in China 

and Central Asia regionalization processes, which involved the SCO, bilateral partnership agreements, 

and the BRI. 

China’s successful transition from a planned to a market economy, coupled with the role of SEZs in 

achieving high economic growth and attracting foreign capital, motivated Central Asian countries to 

adopt a similar model of regionalism. Uzbekistan’s open foreign policy stance was a driving force 

behind Central Asia’s shift toward regional cooperation characterized by inclusiveness, openness, 

progressiveness, and a conflict-free nature. 

This growing intra-regional cooperation in Central Asia exhibited many common characteristics with 

China-led regionalism rather than Russia-led initiatives like the EAEU. This alignment may be 

attributed to the perception, as stated by Nargis Kassenova, Director of the Program on Central Asia 

at Harvard University’s Davis Center, that Central Asians “see China as an agent of modernization—

not Russia” (Davis Center 2019). Kassenova also remarked that “[t]he Chinese leadership has been 

really effective in making smaller powers feel more like important actors in the global stage. There are 

certain aspects of diplomatic culture that Kazakhstan is taking from the Chinese [rulebook]. It’s a very 

subtle difference from the Russia-dominated Soviet past, but it’s a noticeable change in narrative, 

rhetoric, and ceremonies” (Sorbello 2024). 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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