28                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

   

  

  
 

 

Internarrativity of Authoritarian Rule: 

A Narrative Analysis of Vladimir Putin’s Speeches between 2012 and 2019 

 

Ignat Vershinin 1, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia 
 

 

 
 

Abstract 

This article examines the concept of internarrativity in Vladimir Putin’s speeches from 2012 to 

2019, focusing on how interconnected narratives legitimize authoritarian governance. Using 

discourse analysis and qualitative coding of 201 speeches, the study identifies 40 key narratives, 

emphasizing their interplay in constructing a cohesive “web of meaning.” The analysis reveals that 

the “strong hand” narrative, central to Putin’s rhetoric, is reinforced through interrelated themes 

of historical resilience, sovereignty, external threats, and moral superiority. These narratives 

collectively justify centralized leadership as essential for Russia’s domestic stability and 

international influence. By linking internarrativity to broader fields such as international relations, 

public diplomacy, and narrative theory, the study highlights the dynamic nature of political 

discourse in shaping national identity and geopolitical positioning. It also identifies gaps for future 

research, including the socio-cultural resonance of narratives and their adaptability in evolving 

political contexts. This work advances understanding of narrative strategies in authoritarian 

regimes. 

  

 
1 Ignat Vershinin is an Associate Professor at the Department of International Regional Studies of the Higher School 

of Economics in Moscow, Russia  



29                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Introduction 

Since the beginning of its conflict with Ukraine in 2014, Russia’s political elites have crafted a 

range of narratives to justify their actions and strengthen domestic and international support 

(Claessen 2021; Fridrichová 2023; Khaldarova 2019). Like many states—though to varying 

extents—Russia employs a combination of communication strategies, including public diplomacy 

(PD), propaganda, misinformation/disinformation, and “fake news” to advance its objectives. 

While the boundaries between these terms are often blurred, they collectively form a puzzle of 

how narratives are constructed, disseminated, and received. Despite extensive attention to the 

mechanisms of these strategies, less focus has been given to what makes Russia’s communication 

narratives compelling and effective both domestically and abroad. 

This article argues that much of the scholarship on Russia’s communication strategies 

conceptualizes narratives narrowly as standalone “stories” created for propaganda purposes, rather 

than as dynamic and interconnected components of broader social meaning-making processes. 

This limited view tends to prioritize “what”-type questions—such as “What narratives does Russia 

use?” or “What reactions do they elicit?” Consequently, many studies implicitly adopt a 

universalist logic that portrays Russian narratives as relatively stable constructs, such as those 

emphasizing “great power” status, sovereignty, or external threats (Dajani et al. 2021; Götz and 

Staun 2022; Maksimmon and O’Loughlin 2017). While these works offer valuable insights, they 

often overlook more nuanced, post-structuralist inquiries into the how—that is, how are these 

narratives constructed and how their meanings emerge. 

Existing literature often provides valuable insights by deconstructing narratives into elements or 

components and examining their connections (Claessen 202; Miskimmon et al. 2014; Roselle et 

al. 2014). While these approaches have significantly advanced the understanding of narrative 

structures and their functions, this article suggests that they might not fully capture the complexity 

of narrative production and influence in certain contexts. Specifically, it argues for complementing 

these methods with an approach that views narratives as mutually connected and legitimized 

through their interplay rather than as isolated units. To contribute to this ongoing discourse, the 

article introduces the concept of internarrativity—a framework for analyzing narratives as 

interconnected webs of meaning that reinforce and legitimize one another. By building on and 

extending traditional notions of intertextuality, this approach emphasizes the dynamic and 

relational nature of narratives within broader discursive systems, offering a deeper understanding 

of their construction and impact. 

The study focuses on Vladimir Putin’s public discourse from 2012 to 2019, a period encompassing 

his third presidential term and the pre-pandemic years. This timeframe allows for an analysis of 

narratives that laid the groundwork for justifying key geopolitical actions, including the annexation 

of Crimea and tensions with the West, while avoiding the narrative shifts prompted by the COVID-

19 pandemic. By qualitatively analyzing 201 of Putin’s speeches, the article highlights how 

internarrative connections—such as the “strong hand” narrative—construct and legitimize 

authoritarian power2 through appeals to historical resilience, sovereignty, and external threats. 

This article aims to contribute to the literature on narrative analysis and Russian political 

communication by addressing two primary gaps: the methodological challenge of analyzing 

narratives as dynamic and interconnected, and the empirical need to understand the specific 

mechanisms of influence within Putin’s rhetoric. The subsequent sections discuss shortcomings in 

contemporary approaches to narrative analysis, introduce the concept of internarrativity, and 

outline the research methodology, which emphasizes inductive coding and discourse analysis. 

Finally, the article demonstrates the application of internarrativity through the case study of the 

 
2 Here “authoritarian power” and “authoritarian rule” are defined by Vladimir Putin through the narrative of a 

“strong hand” rather than as a compilation of objective characteristics that define “authoritarian” countries. 



30                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

“strong hand” narrative—a key element in Russia’s portrayal of its domestic and foreign policies 

under authoritarian rule. 

 

Narratives and Propaganda 

Russian narratives, especially as part of its propaganda, have been a topic of scholarly focus for 

decades, with their roots often traced back to the Soviet era. In recent years, this focus has 

intensified due to Russia’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election, its military operations 

in Syria, and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. As a result, analyses of Russia’s communication 

strategies often concentrate on narratives tied to geopolitical conflicts. Scholars have identified 

various adversarial narratives employed by Russia, including the promotion of the “superiority of 

Russian values and institutions’” (Gerber and Zavisca 2016), conspiracy theories (Yablokov 2015), 

portrayals of an “aggressive NATO” (Pynnöniemi and Rácz 2016), anti-establishment sentiments 

(Fisher 2020), and narratives designed to foster disruption (Cull 2016). These studies have greatly 

advanced the understanding of Russia’s narrative strategies, particularly in conflict contexts. 

However, many approaches tend to conceptualize narratives in ways that may not fully capture 

their relational and dynamic nature. 

A dominant trend in the literature has been to frame Russian narratives through the lens of state-

centred propaganda, disinformation, or the distortion of reality. Scholars have developed concepts 

such as strategic narrative (Hagström and Gustafsson 2021; Miskimmon et al. 2014; Schmitt 2018) 

to emphasize the role of governments and political elites in shaping public opinion. Combined 

with a conflict-oriented focus, this has provided fertile ground for studying Russia’s strategic 

narratives (Götz and Staun 2022; Hansson et al. 2023; Popkova 2020; Roselle 2017; Szostek 2018). 

At the same time, these approaches often reduce narratives to measurable and observable binaries, 

such as reality versus the story. As Dajani (2021, 18) notes, Russia’s strategic narratives are far 

more complex and adaptive, often shaped by ongoing interactions with audiences and socio-

cultural contexts. This dynamic nature is sometimes overlooked in favour of seeing narratives as 

fixed systems with predetermined meanings. 

This issue is evident in how social contexts are often omitted from analyses of Russian state 

narratives, with an overemphasis on the state-to-media model. For example, Tyushka (2022, 4) 

claims that “media…always echoes the Kremlin-set discursive frames,” one of which is 

“Gayropa”—a homophobic slur used in narratives opposing LGBTQ+ rights. While the Kremlin 

undeniably employs this narrative, reducing it to a weaponized frame overlooks the deeper societal 

meanings attached to sexuality and gender in Russia (Morris and Garibyan 2021) and Ukraine 

(Shevtsova 2020). A broader analysis is needed to fully understand how such narratives resonate 

with or challenge existing societal norms and values. 

Similarly, while many scholars analyze Russian narratives as combinations of elements, 

components, or themes (Bacon 2012; Khaldarova 2016; Berzina 2018; Götz and Staun 2022; 

Fridrichová 2023), fewer explore the ways these narratives interact to construct broader systems 

of meaning. Tolz and Hutchings (2023, 6), for instance, examine how narratives often reference 

shared discourses, a perspective aligned with the approach of this article. However, their 

framework risks conflating narratives and discourses, as Derek Hook (2001, 16) critiques, 

potentially obscuring the specific relational dynamics of narratives within discursive systems. 

Recent scholarship underscores the importance of aligning strategic narratives with local political 

myths (Schmitt 2018) and analyzing them within broader discursive contexts (Pamment 2014). 

For example, Faizullaev and Cornut (2017, 598) highlight that narratives must be understood as 

part of the processes that enact and compete with other narratives. These perspectives reflect a 

growing interest in poststructuralist approaches, which emphasize the relational and contingent 

nature of narrative construction and meaning-making. This article contributes to this ongoing 



31                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

discussion by exploring how narratives collectively construct social reality, with a specific focus 

on their interconnectedness. 

To advance this understanding, the concept of internarrativity is introduced as a framework for 

analyzing narratives as interconnected, dynamic, and mutually reinforcing. Unlike approaches that 

isolate narratives as standalone constructs, internarrativity highlights how their meaning and 

effectiveness depend on their relationships with one another. For example, the narrative of strong 

Russian leadership is not an independent construct; it is continually reinforced by interrelated 

narratives, including those of historical resilience, Western aggression, and moral superiority. By 

analyzing these narratives as interconnected webs of meaning, this article seeks to provide deeper 

insights into how they gain legitimacy, adapt to shifting political realities, and influence domestic 

and international audiences. 

 

The Concept of Internarrativity 

Narratives are more than mere stories; they represent structures of meaning-making that are crucial 

for constructing realities, enabling individuals and societies to “know, understand, and make sense 

of the social world” (Somers 1994, 606; see also Hayden 2013). These narratives are deeply 

embedded in social, political, and historical contexts that shape both their creation and reception. 

On the one hand, narratives facilitate the formation of collective identities and shared meanings 

(Adler 2013; Groulier and Tordjman 2020; Neumann 2002). On the other hand, the power to 

construct narratives is unevenly distributed, allowing certain actors to exert disproportionate 

influence, which can result in narratives that are forceful (Mattern 2001) or even oppressive (Dutta-

Bergman 2006). Within states, governments and political elites hold significant, though not 

uncontested, power in shaping dominant narratives. 

The ability of states to project narratives internationally, however, is less absolute. Domestically 

constructed narratives often lose efficacy abroad due to the state’s limited capacity to influence 

foreign audiences or divergences in intersubjective knowledge—widely shared meanings formed 

through social interaction (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Heylighen 1997; Berger and Luckmann 

(1967, 24) aptly highlight this issue: “The others have a perspective on the common world that is 

not identical with mine.” This underscores how narratives’ acceptance and legitimacy vary across 

societies and groups, depending on their compatibility with pre-existing meanings. 

Traditional positivist approaches to narrative analysis frequently overlook the socially constructed 

and contingent nature of narratives. Such approaches often assume that external realities can be 

objectively known (Patomäki and Wight 2000; Morçöl 2001, 382), which risks imposing a “taken-

for-granted” worldview on the analysis (Durkheim 2013; Pouliot 2007, 364). This can obscure the 

role of social and cultural contexts in shaping narratives. In contrast, post-structuralist approaches, 

such as the one employed in this study, emphasize the dynamic, socially constructed nature of 

narratives, acknowledging that they evolve through the interplay of historical, cultural, and 

political factors. This research adopts a post-structuralist perspective to examine how narratives in 

Vladimir Putin’s discourse are constructed and reinforced, building on existing studies while 

addressing gaps in their methodologies. Unlike analyses that treat narratives as isolated units, this 

approach delves into the relational dynamics between narratives. Hansen (2016, 107–108) 

observes that post-structuralist approaches are particularly valuable for exploring how texts 

connect to each other, recognizing that narratives are deeply rooted in past discourses and thus 

exist within a limited range of potential interpretations. 

This study extends the concept of intertextuality, first introduced by Kristeva (1980) in linguistic 

studies, to the analysis of political narratives. Kristeva demonstrated that texts do not exist in 

isolation but are situated within webs of meaning that challenge or reinforce cultural norms and 

values. Hansen (2006) brought this concept into International Relations (IR), arguing that texts 



32                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

within political discourse rely on one another to construct authority and legitimacy. Texts, Hansen 

(2006, 49) notes, work together to create cohesive discourses by mutually reinforcing each other. 

In this study, the goal is to explore how narratives interact similarly, drawing on facts and 

knowledge from one to another to construct foreign policy discourses (Hansen 2006, 51). Moving 

beyond intertextuality, this study introduces the concept of internarrativity, which examines how 

narratives themselves interact within shared social contexts to reinforce mutual legitimacy 

(Hagström and Gustafsson 2021). While intertextuality addresses the relationships between texts, 

internarrativity focuses on the dynamic interplay between narratives as interconnected elements of 

broader discursive systems. As Kristeva (1980, 66) states, every text is an absorption and 

transformation of others; similarly, narratives are shaped by pre-existing cultural, historical, and 

intersubjective knowledge. 

Although the term “internarrativity” has been employed in feminist and critical studies (Maan 

2009; Way  2015), these applications often focus on the expression of identities. This article makes 

a step toward expanding the concept into the realm of politics and international relations. 

Responding to Hagström and Gustafsson’s (2019, 400) call to broaden its empirical and theoretical 

applications, this study explores how narratives derive their power from interconnections with 

other narratives. Internarrativity is particularly relevant in the context of political narratives, where 

its relational nature is essential for understanding legitimacy. Such interconnectedness ensures that 

narratives are not isolated but are co-constructed within webs of meaning, enabling them to adapt 

to shifting political realities. For researchers, internarrativity offers a nuanced tool to analyze how 

narratives interact and shape public opinion. In areas such as propaganda and public diplomacy, it 

reveals how governments, media, and civil society actors construct and disseminate narratives that 

resonate with audiences. By uncovering the relationships between narratives, scholars can provide 

deeper insights into political communication strategies and their impact. For policymakers, 

understanding internarrativity enables the crafting of more effective communication strategies. By 

accounting for how narratives interact with pre-existing beliefs and social contexts, policymakers 

can identify contradictions and craft counter-narratives to challenge or subvert unfavourable 

depictions. Recognizing internarrativity also allows authors to create more persuasive narratives 

by linking them to historical or cultural traditions that resonate with target audiences. 

 

Methodology 

The study develops a methodological approach to utilize the term “internarrativity” and 

demonstrate its complexity. Firstly, it focuses on public speeches made by Vladimir Putin between 

2012 and 2019, which marks Putin’s third term in power, and includes the period before the 

COVID-19 pandemic, as the latter brought about significant changes in communication that 

involved fewer public events and a shift in some of the dominant narratives. While Putin is not the 

only person who defines how Russia is presented, his speeches are crucial, as he is both the primary 

face of the nation and the authorized voice of its dominant discourse (Milliken 1999, 233). In that 

sense, both constitutionally and politically, Putin serves as the principal figurehead of the nation.. 

The decision to focus on public speeches over printed texts or documents is explained by the 

necessity to analyze discourse and narratives in a “day-to-day context” (Wiener 2009, 188) and 

“where society is being made” (Cruickshank 2012, 43). This approach is in line with the 

constructivist view that “social recognition stands to be constructed by social interaction” (Wiener 

2009, 179) and that it is important to recover meanings from agents directly (Pouliot 2007) rather 

than analyzing their reflection in the media. Furthermore, given the main goal of analyzing 

communication narratives, the data collection was limited to speeches or public interactions that 

involved journalists or were addressed to both the foreign and domestic public. The data was 

collected from the official government website Kremlin.ru for Russian-language documents and 

en.kremlin.ru for English-language documents. First, all Vladimir Putin speeches were collected 



33                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

with some documents being omitted, such as official announcements, ceremonial/protocol 

documents, expressions of sympathies (e.g., in response to earthquakes, terrorist attacks, etc) or 

congratulatory statements. Speeches were excluded if they were purely procedural and lacked 

significant narrative elements. 

In a second step, the speeches were analyzed using NVivo software, a qualitative software tool for 

capturing, collecting, coding, and analyzing large amounts of text. The analysis followed an 

inductive approach with no pre-established codes. Coding took place in three stages.  First, the 

documents were read to identify and label the main narratives—those that appeared 

consistently. Second, the documents were read again to assign these codes. Third, as narratives 

function as “collective memories” (Wendt 2004, 313) and help construct a “common lifeworld” 

(Risse 2000, 10) or notions of “self” and “other” (Campbell 1998), they were organized into “Self” 

and “Other” categories to reflect their socially constructed nature. The description of Russia, the 

Russian government, culture, and history were categorized as “self.” The description of other 

countries, political and non-political actors associated with politics, constituted the construction of 

“others.” 

The subsequent stage involved identifying narratives through an interpretative approach and 

discourse analysis, following Wiener’s (2009) framework, which involves a skeptical reading and 

interrogation, coding, and the formulation of tentative hypotheses. The approach taken here views 

discourse as the realm where shared meaning is generated, sustained, altered, and thus 

fundamentally shapes our understanding of the social world (Holzscheiter 2014, 144). To 

differentiate it from ordinary written or spoken text, discourse is seen as encompassing “ideas, 

knowledge, beliefs, and practice” (Sunderland 2004, p. 31), which are brought to life through 

narratives. Consequently, the primary focus of this research centers on identifying discourse 

through narratives, which serve as the underlying structure for making meaning and constructing 

our perception of the world around us, allowing us to comprehend, interpret, and give meaning to 

the social fabric (Somers 1994, 606). Narratives are delineated as specific stories or interpretations 

of social reality, encompassing the perspectives of entities such as the state or political elites, their 

self-concept, portrayal of others, and depiction of events. This study also underscores the concept 

of internarrativity, highlighting the interconnected nature of narratives generated by various actors 

within the context of their social reality. These connections are illuminated through the 

examination of the historically grounded backdrop against which these narratives unfold. 

The research involved gathering and scrutinizing 201 textual sources (Appendix 1), encompassing 

interviews, press conferences, meetings of the All-Russian Youth Educational Forum “Seliger” 

and expert forum “Valdai,” yearly Direct Lines with the Russian president, and similar events. 

From these materials, 40 primary narratives (Appendix 2) were distinguished, encapsulating the 

discourse on Russia from 2012 to 2019. Among these narratives, 21 depicted a self-representation. 

Conversely, 19 narratives depicted “others.” In addition, three narrative groups were also 

identified. However, due to space limitations, it is not feasible to provide detailed descriptions and 

examples for each individual narrative within the main body of this article. Therefore, all essential 

information is included in Appendix 2. 

In order to operationalize the concept of internarrativity, an additional methodological approach 

was used. After collecting data and identifying narratives, the research examined how these 

narratives relate to one another, focusing on their intersections and reinforcing mechanisms. It was 

done by identifying points of convergence, such as thematic overlap, rhetorical continuities, cross-

referential themes, and temporal sequencing.  

 

 

 



34                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Thematic overlap 

The “misrepresented” narrative and the “disrespected” narrative both emphasize the idea that 

Russia is unfairly treated by external actors, particularly Western countries. Together, these 

narratives overlap thematically in portraying an external world that undervalues or distorts 

Russia’s role and intentions. This thematic alignment reinforces a shared sentiment of grievance 

and victimization, bolstering the argument that Russia must assert itself internationally to combat 

these injustices.  

Rhetorical Continuities 

The “defensive” narrative and the “enemy need” narrative reinforce each other through consistent 

rhetorical patterns that emphasize external threats and the necessity of protective measures. The 

“defensive” narrative frames Russia’s actions as necessary responses to aggression or destabilizing 

influences, while the “enemy need” narrative suggests that Western countries manufacture 

hostility against Russia to consolidate their own power. Shared rhetorical constructs, such as the 

idea of external forces targeting Russia, create a continuity that strengthens both narratives. 

Cross-Referential Themes: 

The “natural place” narrative, which argues for Russia’s rightful position as a global power, 

intersects with the “Russian necessity” narrative, which emphasizes the indispensability of Russia 

in resolving global challenges. Both narratives share the theme of Russia’s pivotal role in 

international relations, with the “natural place” narrative providing the aspirational vision and the 

“Russian necessity” narrative offering pragmatic evidence of Russia’s contributions. By cross-

referencing Russia’s historical significance and current geopolitical actions, these narratives 

collectively assert Russia’s indispensability and legitimacy on the global stage. 

Temporal Sequencing: 

The “sovereignty” narrative and the “betrayal” narrative align through temporal sequencing. The 

“betrayal” narrative recounts instances of perceived Western duplicity, such as NATO expansion, 

as historical precedents that validate the “sovereignty” narrative’s emphasis on independence and 

self-determination. By framing sovereignty as a response to past betrayals, the narratives are 

temporally linked, with one providing the historical justification for the other’s forward-looking 

claims about the necessity of safeguarding Russia’s autonomy. 

 

Internarrativity and Webs of Meaning 

To more clearly illustrate the value of an internarrative approach, it is helpful to contrast it with 

Hutchings and Szostek (2015, 236–237), who briefly described the sources of Putin’s legitimacy. 

They identified several key elements that contribute to this legitimacy, such as the maintenance of 

internal order following Russia’s near-collapse and the protection of Russia from external threats 

and humiliation. These observations point to a master narrative of Putin’s legitimacy, built from 

several distinct narratives that each play a role in constructing this overarching image. While 

Hutchings and Szostek highlight the presence of multiple legitimating elements, their analysis, 

like much of the literature, treats these narratives as separate factors, loosely contributing to a 

common theme. What this misses is the interconnected nature of these narratives and how they 

work in concert to reinforce each other. An internarrative or intertextual approach would 

emphasize how these narratives are not just parallel but mutually legitimating. For instance, the 

narrative of internal order does not simply coexist with the narrative of protection from external 

threats; instead, the two interact and reinforce one another, weaving a more cohesive and 

persuasive portrayal of Putin as both a domestic stabilizer and a protector against foreign enemies. 

This relational perspective adds depth to our understanding of how such grand narratives are 

constructed and sustained over time. 



35                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Regarding the application of the internarrativity concept, the narratives should be viewed within 

the social context in which they are enacted and in close interrelation with each other. This allows 

not only to access the intended meaning behind narratives, which the literature predominantly 

ignores, but also to understand the process of meaning/knowledge legitimization. Among the 

prominent narratives, the “strong hand” is one of the central narratives that legitimize Vladimir 

Putin’s power and could, arguably, serve as a legitimizing element for future Russian leaders as 

well. Its significance has been evident since the start of Putin’s first term, when calls for a “strong 

hand” response (Russell 2002, 85) during the Chechen wars resonated with the Russian public and 

played a crucial role in legitimizing his presidency. 

The political system is one of the major characteristics of a state. It defines how a country engages 

in the international arena, governs itself domestically, and is perceived by the rest of the world. 

Accordingly, discourse surrounding the political system constitutes a central element of the 

country’s communicative efforts. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s political system 

was often characterized as authoritarian or as an autocracy (Gel’man 2015; Hassner 2008; Safire 

1994). Even before Putin’s Munich Speech in 2007,3 the Western media generally treated Russia 

as “the authoritarian, imperial power; the bully; the aggressor” (Macgilchrist 2007, 76). However, 

the external imposition of authoritarian meanings should be separated from the internal definition 

of being “authoritarian” presented by the Russian political elites. 

The “depersonification” narrative aims to challenge the international characterization of Russia as 

an authoritarian state. Nevertheless, this effort often falls short, as Russia under Putin is widely 

viewed as de-democratizing or nation-consolidating—rather than distancing itself from—its 

authoritarian identity (Gunitsky and Tsygankov 2018). While Russia is classified as authoritarian 

by international standards, this article focuses on examining how Russia’s political elites construct 

and articulate their understanding of political power, which is encapsulated in what this study 

terms the “strong hand” narrative. 

The analysis of Putin’s speeches gives insight and information on how Russia’s political elites 

construct a “regime of truth” (Foucault 1977, 2014)—a dominant understanding of the political 

system. This perspective is disseminated through media and other communication tools to 

domestic and foreign audiences in an attempt to justify and garner support for preserving Russia’s 

political system. This narrative is central to portraying Russia, as it embodies the model of both its 

external and internal behaviour. The main purpose is to demonstrate Russia’s sovereignty, 

independence, integrity in decision-making, adherence to principles, effectiveness, and, most 

importantly, the stability that it provides. To ensure all this, a strong hand is required to guide the 

country’s development and foreign policy. Nevertheless, especially from the position of liberal 

democracies, those narratives seem ineffective in taking into account historical and sociocultural 

contexts. There are several elements of Putin’s discursive practices or webs of meanings that 

legitimize the need for a “strong hand” (Figure 1). 

  

 
3 In his speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin condemned US unilateralism and NATO 

expansion, marking a clear break with post-Cold War cooperation and a significant turning point in the reassertion 

of Russian geopolitical ambitions globally. 



36                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Figure 1: Putin’s Discursive Practices 

 

Empirical Findings 

There are several major points that need to be highlighted. Firstly, Putin employs a range of 

narratives, building a positive view not only of Russia’s “self” but of authoritarian rule as well. 

Using Russia’s experience in the 1990s (the “1990s transition” narrative), he argues for the 

necessity of implementing a firm and stable policy to combat existing instabilities. In this context, 

he uses the political systems of other countries as an example of a volatile decision-making process, 

which is associated with democratic institutions and elections that could lead to significant changes 

in policy. This narrative is further supported by references to the policies of former US President 

Donald Trump during his first term in office, illustrating how partisan struggles can damage 

policies. Putin portrays the authoritarian tone of Russia’s political system as being in line with the 

old-style democracy of majority rule. However, to mitigate the authoritarian tone of the old-style 

Soviet power, Putin presents the narrative of “depersonification,” which is counter to the political 

elite’s positioning of Russia’s “self” to the Soviet Legacy. Since Soviet history is often depicted 

through the image of authoritarian society and Joseph Stalin, depersonification was used to create 

a distance between Putin and Stalin, as well as the modern Russian state and the Soviet past. Those 

three narratives together counter-position the desired identity to an external (through the narrative 

of depersonification) and previously existing internal images (through the narratives of Soviet 

legacy and 1990s transition). 

Secondly, three types of comparative narratives (comparison/positive type 1, comparative/positive 

type 2, and comparative/negative) are used to validate a Russian approach to governing and 

authoritarian rule. The two types of positive comparison are somewhat contradictory. The first of 

these emphasizes normativity while the second highlights exceptionalism. The normativity theme 

is reinforced through the narratives of “cooperative,” “lawfulness,” and “sovereignty,” which 

position Russia in a positive light within the international community. The exceptionality theme 

highlights Russia’s uniqueness, supported by the narratives of “responsive,” “not conflicting,” 



37                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

“moral,” “inclusive,” and “defensive.” Finally, the negative comparison reinforces Russia’s 

exceptionalism by counter-positioning it to mostly, but not exclusively, Western countries, using 

the narratives of “US mild critics,” “US harsh critics,” “morally weak,” “politically weak,” 

“imposition,” “enemy need,” and “economically weak.” 

Thirdly, Putin successfully leverages the issue of ontological security, which refers to “experience 

oneself as a whole” or the continuation of identity over time (Mitzen 2006, 342). Following the 

collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s national identity faced a crisis, as its former self-image as 

a central or great power was disrupted. While modern Russia lacks the Soviet Union’s former 

economic and political influence, the pursuit of ontological security remains difficult, as 

constructing a stable identity in the post-Soviet context is a complex and ongoing process. The 

narrative of Russia’s “natural place” reflects this struggle, highlighting that ontological security 

has not yet been achieved and continues to fuel nationalist sentiment. At the core of this ontological 

framework is the “persistent” narrative, where Putin represents the “strong hand” unyielding in the 

face of adversity, offering an image of unwavering stability. This persistence is framed as essential 

for ontological security, ensuring the nation’s continuity as it moves forward. For instance, Putin’s 

firm stance on international issues like Crimea or Syria is depicted as evidence of Russia’s 

consistent identity, signalling the strength of its leadership in protecting national sovereignty. 

Closely linked is the narrative of  “Russian necessity,” where Putin asserts that Russia plays an 

indispensable role in the global order. Here, the “strong hand” is positioned as the mechanism 

through which this role is fulfilled. By presenting Russia as vital not only to its own population 

but to global balance and stability, Putin strengthens the argument that only centralized, decisive 

leadership can safeguard Russia’s unique position, especially as a counterweight to Western 

influence. The “slowly changing” narrative further reinforces this ontological vision by portraying 

Russia’s transformation as deliberate and tightly controlled. Putin emphasizes that the “strong 

hand” ensures reforms proceed cautiously, preserving core national values while adapting to 

shifting global conditions. This portrayal supports a sense of stability and strategic coherence, 

allowing Russia to pursue economic and military modernization without compromising its internal 

unity or cultural integrity. The accompanying “logical concerns” narrative acknowledges the real 

challenges facing the country, while reinforcing a steady and calculated approach to overcoming 

them under strong leadership. 

The “economic power” and “being first” narratives celebrate Russia’s economic performance and 

historical greatness, with Putin positioning the “strong hand” as the driving force behind Russia’s 

resurgence as a global leader in areas like space exploration and military technology. By 

highlighting Russia’s leadership in cutting-edge sectors, Putin reinforces a sense of national pride 

and progress, essential to the construction of a confident and continuous identity. 

Finally, the “alternative” narrative contrasts Russia’s governance model with the perceived failures 

of Western liberal democracies. Putin presents the “strong hand” as a necessary corrective to the 

“outdated” liberal order, offering a viable alternative to the West’s approach to governance and 

international relations. This narrative reinforces Russia’s sovereignty, asserting its right to define 

its own path without external interference. Together, these narratives weave a cohesive ontological 

strategy in which the “strong hand” becomes essential to preserving and evolving Russia’s national 

identity. Through the interconnected ideas of “persistent,” “Russian necessity,” “slowly changing,” 

“being first,” and “alternative,” Putin justifies centralized leadership as the cornerstone of Russia’s 

ontological security, portraying it as vital for the nation’s survival and resurgence on the global 

stage. 

Fourthly, a distinct group of narratives centers on the construction of the “other,” positioning 

external actors as morally and strategically oppositional to Russia, or as “external threats.” This 

group includes the “threat” and “double standards” narratives, which complement earlier 

narratives such as “misrepresented” and “disrespected.” The “threat” narrative focuses on external 



38                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

dangers, predominantly NATO, while the “double standards” narrative highlights the unequal 

treatment of Russia and other non-Western countries compared to Western nations. These 

narratives collectively amplify the portrayal of external forces as unjust and antagonistic, 

reinforcing the necessity of a strong, centralized leadership to protect Russia’s interests. Putin 

employs these narratives to construct a sense of external threats, instability, and injustice in 

international politics. This framing ties into the historical pattern of perceiving Russia as a nation 

under siege, requiring a resolute defence against external hostility (Tsygankov 2016). These 

discourses are echoed in previous studies, such as Kragh and Åsberg (2017), who highlight the 

persistent narrative of external manipulation and hostility toward Russia. While critics may view 

this as a “paranoid and zero-sum worldview” (Herd 2019, 21), the focus here is on how Putin uses 

these narratives to justify authoritarian measures and consolidate power. 

The sense of an embattled “self” needing protection is particularly evident in the context of 

international sanctions, especially following the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian war in February 

2022. The Levada Center (2022b) reports that 67 percent of Russians believe sanctions primarily 

target the population, and 56 percent feel that many countries condemning Russia’s actions exhibit 

elements of “misrepresented” and “disrespected” narratives. The “threat” and “double standards” 

narratives intersect with these perceptions, painting a picture of a hostile and manipulative 

international community. 

By emphasizing the dual notions of external threats and unequal treatment, these narratives bolster 

domestic support for the “strong hand” regime. They serve to legitimize the political elite’s actions, 

portraying authoritarianism as a necessary response to a world fraught with hostility and 

manipulation. These interconnected narratives reinforce the need for strong leadership as essential 

for safeguarding Russia’s sovereignty and identity. Putin’s discursive practices frame “others” 

with volatile policies as threats to both Russia and the international system, warranting a 

“responsive” narrative and “strong” approach. This creates a sense of external instability and 

justifies the need for Russia to adopt a “strong hand” regime. The “others” are also depicted as 

actors who rely on the US—depicted as pursuing imperialistic policies—and as those who 

“misrepresent” or view Russia as an “enemy” to justify their policies. This serves to delegitimize 

Western narratives and reinforces Russia’s self-legitimation. 

Within this broader narrative framework of external threats, a particularly significant discursive 

move involves the moral characterization of  “others.” Putin’s use of discursive practices that 

frame external actors in terms of morality or immorality enables him to portray their actions not 

as rational or strategic, but as stemming from intrinsic, even essential, traits. Through the narratives 

of “irrational,” “conflictual,” and “overestimated,” Putin crafts an emotional framework that not 

only legitimizes Russia’s political elite but also delegitimizes opposing or Western narratives. 

These discourses suggest that it is not the people of foreign countries who seek bad relations with 

Russia but rather their governments (“politicians” narrative), reinforcing the notion that Russia’s 

adversaries are driven by irrational or conflictual impulses. In this way, Putin portrays his 

leadership as rational and resolute in the face of a hostile external environment, framing Russia as 

a victim of unjust governmental actions rather than the target of widespread international 

antagonism.  

Moral characterization plays a crucial role in convincing the public that although official 

statements from others may appear peaceful, their “true” intentions are hidden and hostile. The 

“betrayal” narrative, rooted in the 1990s, amplifies this perception. Building on the notion of a 

broken promise about NATO expansion eastward, Putin justifies the perception of “others” as 

inherently capable of betraying Russia again. The narrative of  “betrayal” is closely tied to Russia's 

historical and cultural understanding of international relations, where the experience of perceived 

deceit feeds into a broader sense of vulnerability. This moral framing, which casts external actors 

as untrustworthy, plays a critical role in legitimizing the “strong hand” narrative—a key tool for 



39                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

justifying Putin’s political system. As Tsygankov (2016) notes, the narrative of betrayal helps 

solidify the justification for a powerful, centralized state capable of safeguarding Russian interests 

in an unforgiving global environment. 

The “strong hand” decision-making system is presented as a necessity to deal with both tangible 

and intangible threats. To effectively respond and protect itself, Russia must first ensure stability 

and unity from within. For Putin, domestic polarization and political party struggles undermine 

decision-making and signal the weakness of political systems. He argues that democracies, with 

their volatile election cycles and partisan conflicts, are ineffective in countering immediate threats. 

Therefore, only a centralized political system under strict control can restore Russia to its rightful 

place and defend it from both internal and external challenges. This belief in the necessity of a 

“strong hand” reinforces the legitimacy of Putin’s centralized rule, casting it as the only viable 

response to the complexities of both domestic politics and international geopolitics. 

Fifth, the predominantly negative framing of “others” in Putin’s rhetoric, some narratives, such as 

“cooperative,” “allies,” “partners,” and “people,” introduce a more positive dimension, focusing 

on collaboration and shared values. These narratives, however, do not perfectly fit into the 

overarching justification for a “strong hand” regime. Instead, they present a nuanced layer to the 

discourse, portraying Russia as a constructive and cooperative actor but only when “conditions” 

align. The “cooperation” narrative suggests that foreign citizens, as opposed to their governments, 

seek partnerships with Russia, reflecting a natural alignment of interests. Similarly, the “allies” 

narrative emphasizes shared goals with like-minded states, casting Russia as part of an alternative, 

balanced global order. The “partners” narrative extends this view to the West, recognizing mutual 

achievements and celebrating successful collaborations grounded in respect for sovereignty.  

While these narratives project a softer, more diplomatic image, they stand somewhat apart from 

the usual portrayal of a hostile international environment necessitating centralized control. Instead 

of directly reinforcing the “strong hand,” they reflect an aspirational vision of global cooperation. 

However, their coexistence with narratives of threat and opposition highlights the duality in Putin’s 

messaging, where moments of constructive engagement are framed as contingent on a secure, 

stable, and strong Russia. The legitimacy of Putin’s regime is increasingly intertwined with these 

internarrative connections, wherein sanctions and foreign criticisms are reframed as proof of the 

narrative construction of the “other.” As international sanctions are seen as a form of external 

aggression, they serve to reinforce Russia’s self-construction as an embattled nation resisting 

foreign interference. The “strong hand” becomes the necessary response—a symbol of resistance 

against an unjust world order. This not only legitimizes the current regime but also strengthens the 

political elite’s ability to maintain power through the manipulation of these interwoven narratives. 

However, this dynamic also raises questions about the role of the public in sustaining these 

narratives. The construction of narratives by political elites, especially Putin, is not merely an act 

of imposing propaganda on the masses but rather a socially constructed discourse that evolves over 

time. The debate surrounding whether Russians, in the absence of a powerful authoritarian regime, 

would still pursue ontological security and a stronger sense of “self” underscores the complex 

relationship between elites and the public. Would the internarrative connections that sustain the 

construction of Putin’s discourse weaken if the political elites’ power were diminished, or would 

the underlying narratives retain their force? Analyzing internarrativity allows us to explore not 

only how elites and the public legitimize certain narratives but also how these interconnected 

narratives form a web-like structure that sustains legitimacy even in the absence of direct 

intervention by political elites. 

Internarrativity reveals that sets of narratives do not exist in isolation but rather reinforce each 

other to create a comprehensive and coherent picture of reality. The effectiveness and appeal of 

propaganda narratives, especially in convincing foreign publics, depend on how well these 

narratives resonate with the existing webs of meaning held by target audiences. Countries or 



40                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

groups that share similar conceptual frameworks—such as viewing the US as an aggressive power 

or Western countries as “pawns”—are more likely to accept Russia’s “regime of truth” and its 

justification for the “strong hand” narrative. Keating and Kaczmarska (2017, 19) argue that the 

“centralization of decision-making processes…appeal[s] to several political actors in the 

democratic world.” This concept can be applied to the global arena where Russian narratives might 

resonate particularly in regions or with groups that perceive the international system as unjust. 

Authoritarian governments, emerging powers, or dissatisfied populations within democracies that 

question the legitimacy of Western decision-making may find these Russian narratives more 

convincing. 

In analyzing the corpus of Putin’s speeches, it becomes evident that the narrative of the “strong 

hand” is not created in isolation. Rather, it is reinforced through the invocation of interconnected 

narratives that appeal to Russia’s historical, cultural, and geopolitical identity. For instance, 

references to Russia’s role in defeating Nazism during the Second World War or its survival 

through the turbulent post-Soviet years are frequently used to justify the need for strong, 

centralized leadership. These historical narratives contribute to the legitimacy of the “strong hand” 

by positioning it as a necessary force for maintaining stability and protecting the nation. As such, 

the internarrative approach allows us to understand how these historical and cultural narratives 

interlock to create a robust justification for the centralization of power in Russia. 

While intertextuality refers to the ways in which texts reference one another, the concept of 

internarrativity captures the active and evolving nature of narratives within Putin’s discourse. In 

this context, the “strong hand” narrative is not merely a reflection of past political traditions or a 

static construct; it is continuously reshaped through references to Russia’s geopolitical struggles, 

cultural values, and national identity. These speeches construct a network of meaning that draws 

on both historical triumphs and contemporary challenges to justify the concentration of power in 

the executive. For example, appeals to external threats—whether from NATO, Western countries, 

or internal dissidents—are woven into a broader narrative framework that positions 

authoritarianism as a necessary response to ensure Russia’s security and integrity. Thus, 

internarrativity highlights how Putin’s narratives are embedded in ongoing social and political 

realities, reinforcing the “strong hand” by linking it to deeply rooted intersubjective knowledge. 

 

Conclusion 

This study has explored the concept of internarrativity and its application to the analysis of 

Vladimir Putin’s political discourse, particularly in relation to the “strong hand” narrative. By 

examining how narratives function as interconnected webs of meaning, this research reveals the 

dynamic and relational nature of the narratives that legitimize Putin’s regime. While previous 

scholarship has focused on the components or elements of these narratives, this article underscores 

the importance of understanding how these elements interact and mutually reinforce each other. 

The findings offer key contributions to the fields of International Relations (IR), public diplomacy, 

Russian foreign policy, and narrative theory. First, the study demonstrates that the conceptual lens 

of internarrativity is useful for unpacking the layered complexities of political discourse. By 

illustrating how interconnected narratives collectively construct legitimacy, this work extends the 

scope of narrative analysis in IR, enriching the understanding of how states craft and sustain 

influence domestically and abroad. Second, it highlights the strategic use of narrative 

interconnectedness in Russian public diplomacy, offering insights into the mechanisms through 

which authoritarian regimes legitimize governance models and assert geopolitical identity. 

Additionally, the study identifies several gaps and unresolved questions, providing a foundation 

for future research. While this analysis emphasized the interrelations of narratives within Putin’s 

discourse, further exploration is needed to understand the socio-cultural underpinnings that enable 

these narratives to resonate both within Russia and abroad. Specifically, research could focus on 



41                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

how different audiences, including dissenting domestic groups or international actors, interpret 

these narratives, potentially challenging their coherence or legitimacy. 

Future studies might also examine the adaptability of these narratives over time, particularly in 

response to changing geopolitical dynamics or shifts in leadership. How might these narratives 

evolve post-Putin, and to what extent will their interconnectedness remain a source of legitimacy 

for future Russian elites? Furthermore, the potential application of internarrativity to other 

authoritarian or hybrid regimes could shed light on comparative strategies for narrative 

construction and maintenance in global politics. In conclusion, this study highlights the importance 

of internarrativity in understanding the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, particularly in the case 

of Russia. By examining how these narratives interact and sustain each other, it offers deeper 

insight into how authoritarian leaders construct legitimacy both at home and abroad. This research 

underscores the value of studying the relational dynamics of narratives to comprehend the broader 

implications for IR, public diplomacy, and authoritarian communication strategies. 

 

  



42                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

REFERENCES 

Adler, Emanuel. 2013. “Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and 

Debates.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 

Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 112–144. London: SAGE Publications. 

Bacon, Edwin. 2012. “Public Political Narratives: Developing a Neglected Source through the 

Exploratory Case of Russia in the Putin-Medvedev Era.” Political Studies 60 (4): 768–86. 

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00939.x. 

Berger, Peter L, and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. “The Social Construction of Reality.” Penguin 

Books. Anchor Books. 

Berzina, Ieva. 2018. “The Narrative of  ‘Information Warfare against Russia’ in Russian 

Academic Discourse.” Journal of Political Marketing 17 (2): 161–175. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2018.1447762. 

Carter, Erin Baggott, and Brett L. Carter. 2021. “Questioning More: RT, Outward-Facing 

Propaganda, and the Post-West World Order.” Security Studies 30 (1): 49–78. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.1885730. 

Claessen, Eva. 2021. “The Making of a Narrative: The Use of Geopolitical Othering in Russian  

Strategic Narratives during the Ukraine Crisis”. Media, War & Conflict 16 (1): 82–99. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352211029529. 

Crilley, Rhys, and Precious N. Chatterje-Doody. 2020. “Emotions and War on YouTube: 

Affective Investments in RT’s Visual Narratives of the Conflict in Syria.” Cambridge 

Review of International Affairs 33 (5): 713–733. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1719038. 

Cruickshank, Jørn. 2012. “The Role of Qualitative Interviews in Discourse Theory.” Critical 

Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines 6 (1): 38–52. 

https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/journals/cadaad/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Volume-

6_Cruickshank.pdf. 

Cull, Nicholas J. 2016. “Engaging Foreign Publics in the Age of Trump and Putin: Three 

Implications of 2016 for Public Diplomacy.” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 12 

(4): 243–246. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-016-0052-4. 

Dajani, Deena, Marie Gillespie, and Rhys Crilley. 2021. “Differentiated Visibilities: RT Arabic’s 

Narration of Russia’s Role in the Syrian War.” Media, War & Conflict 14 (4): 437–58. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635219889075. 

Durkheim, Emile. 2013. The Rules of Sociological Method. Edited by ed Steven Lukes. 2nd ed. 

Palgrave MacMillan. 

Dutta-Bergman, Mohan J. 2006. “U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East: A Critical Cultural 

Approach.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 30 (2): 102–124. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/0196859905285286. 

Dyson, Stephen Benedict, and Matthew J. Parent. 2018. “The Operational Code Approach to 

Profiling Political Leaders: Understanding Vladimir Putin.” Intelligence and National 

Security 33 (1): 84–100. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1313523. 

Erlich, Aaron, Calvin Garner, Gordon Pennycook, and David G. Rand. 2023. “Does Analytic 

Thinking Insulate Against Pro-Kremlin Disinformation? Evidence From Ukraine.” 

Political Psychology 44 (1): 79–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12819. 



43                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Faizullaev, Alisher, and Jérémie Cornut. 2017. “Narrative Practice in International Politics and 

Diplomacy: The Case of the Crimean Crisis.” Journal of International Relations and 

Development 20 (3): 578–604. https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2016.6. 

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 

Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political 

Science 4 (1): 391–416. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.391. 

Fisher, Aleksandr. 2020. “Demonizing the Enemy: The Influence of Russian State-Sponsored 

Media on American Audiences.” Post-Soviet Affairs 36 (4): 281–296. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2020.1730121. 

Foucault, Michel. 1977. “The Political Function of the Intellectual.” Radical Philosophy, no. 016 

(Summer): 12–14. https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/the-political-function-of-

the-intellectual. 

———. 2014. On The Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980. 

Michel Foucault: Lectures at the Collège de France. Palgrave Macmillan. 

Fridrichová, Kateřina. 2023. “Mugged by Reality: Russia’s Strategic Narratives and the War in 

Ukraine.” Defense & Security Analysis 39 (3): 281–295. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2201018. 

Gel’man, Vladimir. 2015. Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes. 

University of Pittsburgh Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt155jmv1. 

Gerber, Theodore P., and Jane Zavisca. 2016. “Does Russian Propaganda Work?” The 

Washington Quarterly 39 (2): 79–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204398. 

Götz, Elias, and Jørgen Staun. 2022. “Why Russia Attacked Ukraine: Strategic Culture and 

Radicalized Narratives.” Contemporary Security Policy 43 (3): 482–497. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633. 

Groulier, Cédric, and Simon Tordjman. 2020. “Intergovernmental Organizations.” In Global 

Diplomacy: An Introduction to Theory and Practice, edited by Thierry Balzacq, Frédéric 

Charillon, and Frédéric Ramel, 139–53. The Sciences Po Series in International Relations 

and Political Economy. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-

030-28786-3_10. 

Gunitsky, Seva, and Andrei P. Tsygankov. 2018. “The Wilsonian Bias in the Study of Russian 

Foreign Policy.” Problems of Post-Communism 65 (6): 385–393. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1468270. 

Hagström, Linus, and Karl Gustafsson. 2019. “Narrative Power: How Storytelling Shapes East 

Asian International Politics.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 32 (4): 387–406. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1623498. 

———. 2021. “The Limitations of Strategic Narratives: The Sino-American Struggle over the 

Meaning of COVID-19.” Contemporary Security Policy 42 (4): 415–449. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1984725. 

Hansen, Lene. 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (The New 

International Relations). Routledge. 

Hansson, Sten, Mari-Liis Madisson, and Andreas Ventsel. 2023. “Discourses of Blame in 

Strategic Narratives: The Case of Russia’s 5G Stories.” European Security 32 (1): 62–84. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2057188. 

Hassner, Pierre. 2008. “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy.” Journal of Democracy 19 (2): 5–15. 

https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2008.0022. 



44                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Hayden, Craig. 2013. “Logics of Narrative and Networks in US Public Diplomacy: 

Communication Power and US Strategic Engagement.” The Journal of International 

Communication 19 (2): 196–218. https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2013.775070. 

Herd, Graeme P. 2019. “Putin’s Operational Code and Strategic Decision-Making in Russia.” In 

Routledge Handbook of Russian Security, edited by Roger E. Kenet, 17-29Routledge. 

Heylighen, Francis. 1997. “Objective, Subjective and Intersubjective Selectors of Knowledge.” 

Evolution and Cognition 3 (1): 63–67. 

Holzscheiter, Anna. 2014. “Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: 

Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations.” International Studies 

Perspectives 15(2): 142–162. https://doi.org/10.1111/insp.12005. 

Hook, Derek. 2001. “Discourse, Knowledge, Materiality, History.” Theory & Psychology 11 (4): 

521–547. Sage CA: Thousand Oaks, CA. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354301114006. 

Keating, Vincent Charles, and Katarzyna Kaczmarska. 2017. “Conservative Soft Power: Liberal 

Soft Power Bias and the ‘Hidden’ Attraction of Russia.” Journal of International Relations 

and Development 22: 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0100-6. 

Khaldarova, Irina. 2019. “Brother or ‘Other'? Transformation of Strategic Narratives in Russian 

Television News during the Ukrainian Crisis”. Media, War & Conflict 14 (1): 3-20. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635219846016. 

Kragh, Martin, and Sebastian Åsberg. 2017. “Russia’s Strategy for Influence through Public 

Diplomacy and Active Measures: The Swedish Case.” Journal of Strategic Studies 40 (6): 

773–816. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830. 

Kristeva, Julia. 1980. Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. Edited by 

Leon Roudiez. Translated by Thomas Gora and Alice Jardine. Columbia University Press. 

Levada Center. 2022a. “The Conflict with Ukraine.” April 11, 2022. Accessed August 11, 2025. 

https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/04/11/the-conflict-with-ukraine/. 

———. 2022b. “Sanctions.” April 12, 2022. Accessed August 11, 2025. 

https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/04/12/sanctions-5/. 

Maan, Ajit K. 2009. Internarrative Identity: Placing the Self. 2nd edition. Bloomsbury Publishing. 

Macgilchrist, Felicitas. 2011. “Positive Discourse Analysis: Contesting Dominant Discourses by 

Reframing the Issues.” Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines 1 

(1): 74–94. https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/journals/cadaad/wp-

content/uploads/2015/01/Volume-1_Macgilchrist.pdf. 

Mattern, Janice Bially. 2001. “The Power Politics of Identity.” European Journal of International 

Relations 7 (3): 349–97. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066101007003003. 

Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. “The Study of Discourse in International Relations:: A Critique of 

Research and Methods.” European Journal of International Relations 5 (2): 225–54. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005002003. 

Miskimmon, Alister, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle. 2014. Strategic Narratives: 

Communication Power and the New World Order. Routledge. 

Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006. “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security 

Dilemma.” European Journal of International Relations 12 (3): 341–370. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067346. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067346


45                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Morçöl, Göktuğ. 2001. “Positivist Beliefs among Policy Professionals: An Empirical 

Investigation.” Policy Sciences 34 (3/4): 381–401. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012749120909. 

Morris, Jeremy, and Masha Garibyan. 2021. “Russian Cultural Conservatism Critiqued: 

Translating the Tropes of ‘Gayropa’ and ‘Juvenile Justice’ in Everyday Life.” Europe-Asia 

Studies 73 (8): 1487–507. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2021.1887088. 

Neumann, Iver B. 2002. “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy.” 

Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31 (3): 627–651. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298020310031201. 

Orttung, Robert W., and Elizabeth Nelson. 2019. “Russia Today’s Strategy and Effectiveness on 

YouTube.” Post-Soviet Affairs 35 (2): 77–92. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1531650. 

Pamment, James. 2014. “Strategic Narratives in US Public Diplomacy: A Critical Geopolitics.” 

Popular Communication 12 (1): 48–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/15405702.2013.868899. 

Patomäki, Heikki, and Colin Wight. 2000. “After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical 

Realism.” International Studies Quarterly 44 (2): 213–237. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-

8833.00156 

Popkova, Anna. 2020. “Transnational Non-State Actors as ‘Alt Agents’ of Public Diplomacy: 

Putin’s Russia versus Open Russia.” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 16 (1): 70–79. 

https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-019-00126-6. 

Pouliot, Vincent. 2007. “‘Sobjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology.” International 

Studies Quarterly 51 (2): 359–84. 

Pynnöniemi, Katri, and András Rácz, eds. 2016. “Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of 

Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine.” Finnish Institute of International Affairs 45. 

https://fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/fiiareport45_fogoffalsehood.pdf.  

Roselle, Laura. 2017. “Strategic Narratives and Alliances: The Cases of Intervention in Libya 

(2011) and Economic Sanctions against Russia (2014).” Politics and Governance 5 (3): 

99–110. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1023 

Roselle, Laura, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin. 2014. “Strategic Narrative: A New 

Means to Understand Soft Power.” Media, War & Conflict 7 (1): 70–84. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516696. 

Russell, John. 2002. “Mujahedeen, Mafia, Madmen: Russian Perceptions of Chechens During the 

Wars in Chechnya, 1994-96 and 1999-2001.” Journal of Communist Studies and 

Transition Politics 18 (1): 73–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523270209696369. 

Safire, William. 1994. “Opinion | Essay; Strategic Dilemma.” The New York Times, December 1, 

1994. Accessed August 11, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/01/opinion/essay-

strategic-dilemma.html. 

Schmitt, Olivier. 2018. “When Are Strategic Narratives Effective? The Shaping of Political 

Discourse through the Interaction between Political Myths and Strategic Narratives.” 

Contemporary Security Policy 39 (4): 487–511. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2018.1448925. 

Shekhovtsov, Anton. 2017. Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir. Routledge. 

https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315560991. 



46                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Shevtsova, Maryna. 2020. “’Fighting “Gayropa’: Europeanization and Instrumentalization of 

LGBTI Rights in Ukrainian Public Debate”. Problems of Post-Communism 67 (6): 500–

510. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2020.1716807. 

Snegovaya, Maria. 2015. “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine.” Institute for the Study of War. 

Russian Report 1 (September): 1–26. 

Somers, Margaret R. 1994. “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network 

Approach.” Theory and Society 23 (5): 605–49. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00992905. 

Sunderland, Jane. 2004. Gendered Discourses. Palgrave Macmillan UK. 

https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230505582. 

Szostek, Joanna. 2017. “News Consumption and Anti-Western Narratives in Russia: A Case 

Study of University Students.” Europe-Asia Studies 69 (2): 284–302. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1274019. 

———. 2018. “Nothing Is True? The Credibility of News and Conflicting Narratives during 

‘Information War’ in Ukraine.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 23 (1): 116–

135. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161217743258. 

Tolz, Vera, and Stephen Hutchings. 2023. “Truth with a Z: Disinformation, War in Ukraine, and 

Russia’s Contradictory Discourse of Imperial Identity.” Post-Soviet Affairs 39 (5): 1–19. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2023.2202581. 

Tsygankov, Andrei. 2016. “Crafting the State-Civilization Vladimir Putin’s Turn to Distinct 

Values.” Problems of Post-Communism 63 (3): 146–58. 

https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1113884. 

Tyushka, Andriy. 2022. “Weaponizing Narrative: Russia Contesting EUrope’s Liberal Identity, 

Power and Hegemony”. Journal of Contemporary European Studies 30 (1): 115–135. 

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14782804.2021.1883561. 

Velikaya, Anna A., and Greg Simons, eds. 2020. Russia’s Public Diplomacy: Evolution and 

Practice. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12874-6. 

Way, Lori (ed.). 2015. Representations of Internarrative Identity. Palgrave Macmillan UK. 

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press. 

Wiener, Antje. 2009. “Enacting Meaning-in-Use: Qualitative Research on Norms and 

International Relations.” Review of International Studies 35 (1): 175–93. 

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210509008377. 

Yablokov, Ilya. 2015. “Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool: The Case of 

Russia Today (RT).” Politics 35 (3–4): 301–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12097. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



47                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Appendix 1. List of Events 
 

Name Date Link 

2012 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-

итальянских переговоров 

23.07.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16047 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-сербских 

переговоров 

11.09.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16465  

Интервью телеканалу Russia Today 06.09.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16393 

Пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 20.12.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173 

Саммит «большой двадцатки» 20.06.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15698 

Совместная пресс-конференция по итогам 

российско-германских межгосударственных 

консультаций 

16.11.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16852 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Премьер-

министром Люксембурга Жан-Клодом Юнкером 

25.09.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16533 

Пресс-конференция по итогам форума АТЭС 09.09.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16432 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам встречи с Президентом 

Финляндии Саули Ниинистё 

22.06.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15722 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Председателем 

Европейской комиссии Жозе Мануэлом Баррозу и 

Председателем Европейского совета Херманом Ван 

Ромпёем 

04.06.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15541 

Совместная пресс-конференция по итогам встречи 

на высшем уровне Россия – Европейский союз 

21.12.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17178 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам встречи с Премьер-

министром Турции Реджепом Тайипом Эрдоганом 

18.07.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16014 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам встречи с Президентом 

Армении Сержем Саргсяном 

08.08.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16180 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по завершении заседания Российско-

Украинской межгосударственной комиссии 

12.07.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15945 

Петербургский международный экономический 

форум 

21.06.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15709 

Заседание Совета по межнациональным 

отношениям 

24.08.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16292 

Встреча с участниками международного 

дискуссионного клуба «Валдай» 

25.10.2012 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16717 

2013 

Интервью южнокорейской телерадиокомпании 

KBS 

12.11.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19603 

Интервью Первому каналу и агентству 

Ассошиэйтед Пресс 

04.09.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143 

Интервью немецкой телерадиокомпании ARD 05.04.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17808 

Интервью информационному агентству «РИА 

Новости» 

12.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18338 

Интервью информационному агентству ИТАР-

ТАСС 

22.03.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17723 

Пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 19.12.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19859 

Молодёжный форум «Селигер-2013» 02.08.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18993 

Посещение телеканала Russia Today 11.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319 

Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным 25.04.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17976 

Заседание Совета по межнациональным 

отношениям 

19.02.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17536 

 

http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16465


48                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Name Date Link 

2013 

Пресс-конференция по итогам рабочего визита 

в Германию 

08.04.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17846 

Пресс-конференция по итогам заседания Совета 

сотрудничества высшего уровня между Россией и 

Турцией 

22.11.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19677 

Пресс-конференция по итогам заседания Высшего 

Евразийского экономического совета 

24.10.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19485 

Пресс-конференция Владимира Путина по итогам 

саммита «Группы двадцати» 

06.09.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19168 

Пресс-конференция по итогам встречи глав 

государств и правительств «Группы восьми» 

16.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18361 

Пресс-конференция по итогам встречи на высшем 

уровне Россия – Европейский союз 

04.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18253 

Пресс-конференция с Федеральным канцлером 

Германии Ангелой Меркель 

21.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18386 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-нидерландских 

переговоров 

08.04.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17850 

Пресс-конференция Президента России по итогам 

рабочего заседания глав государств и правительств 

стран – участниц Форума стран – экспортёров газа 

01.07.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18441 

Пресс-конференция с Президентом Финляндии 

Саули Ниинистё 

25.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18407 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-японских 

переговоров 

29.04.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18000 

Пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров с 

Президентом Франции Франсуа Олландом 

28.02.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17597 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-

армянских переговоров 

02.12.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19741 

Заявление для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по окончании саммита АТЭС 

08.10.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19382 

Российско-итальянские межгосударственные 

консультации 

26.11.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19701 

Встреча с Премьер-министром Великобритании 

Дэвидом Кэмероном 

16.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18350 

Заседание международного дискуссионного клуба 

«Валдай» 

19.09.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243 

Ответы на вопросы журналистов 31.08.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19113 

Ответы на вопросы участников Петербургского 

экономического форума 

21.06.2013 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18387 

2014 

Интервью информационному агентству ТАСС 24.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47054 

Интервью Владимира Путина радио «Европа-1» и 

телеканалу TF1 

04.06.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45832 

Интервью немецкому телеканалу ARD 17.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47029 

Интервью турецкому информационному агентству 

«Анадолу» 

28.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47104 

Интервью информационному агентству ТАСС 14.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47009 

Интервью российским и иностранным СМИ 19.01.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20080 

Интервью индийскому информационному 

агентству PTI 

09.12.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47209 

Интервью ведущим китайским СМИ 06.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46972 

Интервью газете «Политика» 15.10.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46806 

Интервью ведущим СМИ Китая 19.05.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/21031 

Интервью в преддверии Паралимпийских игр 

в Сочи 

05.03.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20374 

Интервью представителям телеканалов «Первый», 

ВГТРК, НТВ, РБК  

25.02.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20336 

 

  

http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20336


49                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Name Date Link 

Интервью российскому информационному 

агентству ИТАР-ТАСС 

15.07.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46218 

Интервью латиноамериканскому агентству 

«Пренса Латина» и российскому агентству ИТАР-

ТАСС 

11.07.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46190 

Интервью российским и иностранным СМИ 

в преддверии Паралимпиады 

06.03.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20384 

Заявление для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам саммита «Группы 

двадцати» 

16.11.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47027 

Владимир Путин ответил на вопросы журналистов 

о ситуации на Украине 

04.03.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366 

Большая пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 18.12.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47250 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Турции Реджепом Тайипом Эрдоганом 

01.12.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47126 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-сербских 

переговоров 

16.10.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46813 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-австрийских 

переговоров 

24.06.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46060 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам встречи с Президентом 

Швейцарии, действующим председателем ОБСЕ 

Дидье Буркхальтером 

07.05.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20973 

Саммит Россия – Европейский союз 28.01.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20113 

Ответы на вопросы журналистов 17.07.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46236 

Петербургский международный экономический 

форум 

23.05.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/21080 

Заседание Международного дискуссионного клуба 

«Валдай» 

24.10.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860 

Ответы на вопросы журналистов по итогам визита 

в Китай 

21.05.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/21064 

Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным 17.04.2014 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796 

2015 

Интервью Владимиру Соловьёву 12.10.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482 

Интервью американскому журналисту Чарли Роузу 

для телеканалов CBS и PBS 

29.09.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50380 

Интервью швейцарским СМИ 27.07.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50066 

Интервью итальянской газете Il Corriere della Sera 06.06.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49629 

Интервью ВГТРК 23.02.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47730 

Интервью информационным агентствам 

«Интерфакс» и «Анадолу» 

13.11.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50682 

Интервью информационным агентствам ТАСС 

и «Синьхуа» 

01.09.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50207 

Интервью телеканалу «Россия» 09.05.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49454 

Интервью ежедневной египетской газете «Аль-

Ахрам» 

09.02.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47643 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам встречи с Президентом 

Франции Франсуа Олландом 

26.11.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/50792 

Заседание Международного дискуссионного клуба 

«Валдай» 

22.10.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548 

Ответы на вопросы журналистов 29.09.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50394 

Большая пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 17.12.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971 

Заявление для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов  

30.11.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50850 

 

 

 

  

http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50850


50                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Name Date Link 

Пресс-конференция Владимира Путина по итогам 

саммитов БРИКС и ШОС 

10.07.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49909 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Председателем 

Совета министров Италии Маттео Ренци 

10.06.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49677 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Финляндии Саули Ниинистё 

16.06.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49714 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам встречи с Федеральным 

канцлером Германии Ангелой Меркель 

10.05.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49455 

Пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров 

с Премьер-министром Греции Алексисом 

Ципрасом 

08.04.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49220 

Заявления для прессы по итогам заседания 

Высшего Государственного Совета Союзного 

государства 

03.03.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47775 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-кипрских 

переговоров 

25.02.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47739 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-венгерских 

переговоров 

17.02.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47706 

Встреча с главами ведущих мировых 

информагентств 

19.06.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49740 

10-летие вещания Russia Today 10.12.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50911 

Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным 16.04.2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49261 

2016 

Интервью международному информационному 

холдингу Bloomberg 

05.09.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52830 

Интервью Владимира Путина телекомпании 

«Ниппон» и газете «Иомиури» 

13.12.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53455 

Интервью китайскому информационному агентству 

«Синьхуа» 

23.06.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52204 

Интервью немецкому изданию Bild. Часть 1 11.01.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51154 

Интервью немецкому изданию Bild. Часть 2 12.01.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51155 

Интервью Владимира Путина МИА «Россия 

сегодня» и информагентству IANS 

13.10.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53082 

Интервью Азербайджанскому государственному 

информационному агентству «АзерТАдж» 

05.08.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52650 

Большая пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 23.12.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53573 

Заседание Международного дискуссионного клуба 

«Валдай» 

27.10.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151 

Восточный экономический форум 03.09.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52808 

Владимир Путин ответил на вопросы журналистов 16.10.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53103 

Ответы на вопросы французских журналистов 

телеканала TF1 

12.10.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53081 

Встреча с руководителями международных 

информагентств 

17.06.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52183 

Пленарное заседание Петербургского 

международного экономического форума 

17.06.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178 

Пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров 

с Президентом Турции Реджепом Тайипом 

Эрдоганом 

09.01.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52673 

Пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров 

с Президентом Армении Сержем Саргсяном 

10.08.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52684 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Премьер-

министром Греции Алексисом Ципрасом 

27.05.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52024 

Пресс-конференция по итогам саммита Россия – 

АСЕАН 

20.05.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51954 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по завершении российско-

израильских переговоров 

  

07.06.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52125 



51                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Name Date Link 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-финляндских 

переговоров 

22.03.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51551 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-финляндских 

переговоров 

01.07.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52312 

Пресс-конференция по завершении российско-

венгерских переговоров 

17.02.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/51352 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Председателем 

Совета министров Италии Маттео Ренци 

17.06.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52181 

Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным 14.04.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51716 

Ответы на вопросы журналистов 23.11.2016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53317 

2017 

Интервью Владимира Путина французской газете 

Le Figaro 

31.05.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54638 

Интервью американскому телеканалу NBC 05.06.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54688 

Интервью телерадиокомпании «Мир» 12.04.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54271  

Большая пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 14.12.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56378 

Заседание Международного дискуссионного клуба 

«Валдай» 

19.01.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Финляндии Саули Ниинистё 

27.07.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55175 

Пленарное заседание Петербургского 

международного экономического форума 

02.06.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54667 

Пресс-конференция Владимира Путина по итогам 

саммита БРИКС 

05.09.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55535 

Пресс-конференция по итогам саммита «Группы 

двадцати» 

08.07.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55017 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Франции Эммануэлем Макроном 

29.05.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54618 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам встречи с Федеральным 

канцлером Германии Ангелой Меркель 

02.05.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/page/96 

Заявления для прессы по итогам встречи 

с Президентом Италии Серджо Маттареллой 

11.04.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54267 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-турецких 

переговоров 

03.05.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54444 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Турции Реджепом Тайипом Эрдоганом 

10.03.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54023 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Киргизии Алмазбеком Атамбаевым 

28.02.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53964 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Премьер-

министром Венгрии Виктором Орбаном 

02.02.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53806 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Молдовы Игорем Додоном 

17.01.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-итальянских 

переговоров 

17.05.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54511 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам российско-словенских 

переговоров на высшем уровне 

10.02.2017 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/53861 

2018 

Интервью американскому телеканалу Fox News 17.07.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58019 

Интервью Медиакорпорации Китая  06.06.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57684 

Интервью австрийскому телеканалу ORF  04.06.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57675 

Интервью американскому телеканалу NBC 10.03.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027  

Интервью телеканалу Russia Today 11.11.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59091 

Пленарное заседание Восточного экономического 

форума 

12.09.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58537 

 

  

http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54271
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58019
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57684
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57675
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58537


52                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Name Date Link 

Международный форум «Российская 

энергетическая неделя» 

03.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58701 

Совместная пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 

и Реджепа Тайипа Эрдогана 

03.04.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57192 

Большая пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 20.12.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59455 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Премьер-

министром Греции Алексисом Ципрасом 

07.12.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59349 

Пресс-конференция по итогам встречи лидеров 

России, Турции, Германии и Франции 

27.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58935 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-

итальянских переговоров 

24.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58889 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-

венгерских переговоров 

18.09.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58586 

Пресс-конференция по итогам встречи 

с Президентом Ирана Хасаном Рухани 

и Президентом Турции Реджепом Тайипом 

Эрдоганом 

07.09.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/58483 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Финляндии Саули Ниинистё 

22.08.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58347 

Пресс-конференция по итогам саммита БРИКС 27.07.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58119 

Пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров 

президентов России и США 

16.07.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58017 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Франции Эммануэлем Макроном 

24.05.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57545 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Канцлером ФРГ 

Ангелой Меркель 

18.05.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/57497 

Совместная пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 

и Реджепа Тайипа Эрдогана 

03.04.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57192 

Пресс-конференция по итогам встречи президентов 

России, Турции и Ирана 

04.04.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57201 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Федеральным 

канцлером Австрии Себастианом Курцем 

28.02.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56952 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-

болгарских переговоров 

30.05.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57608 

Пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров 

с Федеральным канцлером Австрии Себастианом 

Курцем 

03.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58715 

Переговоры с Президентом Австрии Александром 

Ван дер Белленом 

05.07.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57678 

Ответы на вопросы российских журналистов 15.11.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59131 

Заседание дискуссионного клуба «Валдай» 18.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848 

Интервью телеканалам Al Arabiya, Sky News Arabia 

и RT Arabic 

13.10.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61792 

Интервью газете The Financial Times 27.06.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60836 

Интервью Владимира Путина Межгосударственной 

телерадиокомпании «Мир» 

13.06.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60741 

Интервью Оливеру Стоуну 19.07.2018 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61057 

2019 

Интервью информационному агентству ТАСС 21.10.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61858 

Интервью монгольской газете «Одрийн сонин» 02.09.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61414 

Интервью газете «Коррьере делла Сера» 04.07.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60912 

Интервью китайскому изданию «Жэньминь 

Жибао» 

25.04.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60344 

Интервью сербским изданиям «Политика» 

и «Вечерние новости» 

16.01.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59680 

Пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 29.06.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60857 

Большая пресс-конференция Владимира Путина 19.12.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366 

Встреча с главами мировых информагентств 06.06.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60675 

 

  

http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60675


53                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Name Date Link 

Пленарное заседание Восточного экономического 

форума 

05.09.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61451 

Совместная пресс-конференция по итогам встречи 

в «нормандском формате» 

10.12.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62277 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-сербских 

переговоров 

04.12.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/62240 

Заявления для прессы и ответы на вопросы 

журналистов по итогам трёхсторонней встречи глав 

государств – гарантов Астанинского процесса 

содействия сирийскому урегулированию 

16.09.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/61542 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-турецких 

переговоров 

27.01.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61388 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Финляндии Саули Ниинистё 

21.01.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61349 

Президенты России и Франции сделали заявления 

для прессы и ответили на вопросы журналистов 

19.08.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61336 

Пресс-конференция по итогам переговоров 

с Федеральным президентом Австрии Александром 

ван дер Белленом 

15.05.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60527 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-турецких 

переговоров 

08.04.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60247 

Пресс-конференция по итогам встречи президентов 

России, Ирана и Турции 

14.02.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59830 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-турецких 

переговоров 

23.01.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59718 

Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом 

Сербии Александром Вучичем 

17.01.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59693 

Совместная пресс-конференция с премьер-

министром Италии Джузеппе Конте 

4.07.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60920 

Пресс-конференция по итогам рабочего визита 

в Китай 

24.04.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60396 

Пресс-конференция по итогам российско-

северокорейских переговоров 

25.04.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60370 

Российско-венгерские переговоры 30.10.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61936 

Ответы на вопросы журналистов 28.02.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59914 

Заседание дискуссионного клуба «Валдай» 03.10.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719 

Пленарное заседание Международного 

арктического форума 

09.04.2019 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60250 

 

  



54                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Appendix 2. Narrative Table  

Narrative Group  

Name  Description  Examples  

Comparison/  

Positive  

Type 1  

Narrative  

Group  

Is intended to show 

the presence of 

similar elements, 

laws, orders, and 

other features 

between Russia and 

other countries.  

“Such laws have long been adopted in all developed 

countries” [1]; “The Russian judicial system is an integral 

part of the international, global judicial system” [2].  

Comparison/  

Positive  

Type 2  

Narrative  

Group  

Is intended either to 

demonstrate the 

superiority of Russia 

in comparison with 

other countries or to 

whitewash its 

negative 

characteristics 

through comparison  

“First, we do not do this, unlike you. Do not judge others 

by yourself.”[3]; “But as usual – this is something that is 

true both for Russia and any other country in the world – 

there is not enough money to deal with what seems to be 

of the first importance” [4].  

Comparison/  

Negative  

Narrative  

Group  

Reflect on ways to 

paint Russia in 

brighter light or 

deny wrongdoings 

by direct blame, 

emotional answer, or 

negative 

characterization  

“Your presidents were not killed, or what? Have you 

forgotten about it? Where was Kennedy killed, in the USA 

or Russia? What happened to King...? You have many 

problems of your own.”[3]; “they themselves are doing 

exactly what they are accusing us of doing. This is 

unbelievable cynicism.”[5]  

The Descriptions of "Self" Narratives  

Narrative  Description  Examples  

1990s 

Transition  

Negative description of 

Russia in 1990-s  

“Of course, some younger people do not remember or 

do not even know what was happening here in the 

1990s and the early 2000s. So they cannot really 

compare it to the present situation.” [6]; “…But the 

government should not act like a bearded peasant idly 

picking at cabbage pieces in his beard and watching the 

state turn into a muddy puddle where oligarchs fish out 

goldfish for themselves, like it was in the 1990s or in 

Ukraine today.” [6]  

Alternative  

  

It embodies those ideals 

or models of 

international relations 

that Russia can offer. 

Presented as an 

alternative to Western  

hegemony  

“There is also the so-called liberal idea, which has 

outlived its purpose.” [7]; “But we have gained unique 

experience, and I believe there is demand for it around 

the world.” [8]  

  



55                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Narrative  Description  Examples  

Being First  It highlights Russia's 

superiority  

“Clearly, we have overtaken all our, so to speak, 

partners and competitors in this sphere, and this fact is 

acknowledged by the experts.” [9]  

Cooperative  It reflects Russia's 

willingness to cooperate 

even under harsh 

criticism  

“If our partners wish, we are ready to develop active 

relations on a bilateral basis with any of the countries in 

the G7.” [10]; “We have common threats, as we 

wanted, and today we want, we strive to unite the 

efforts of all states of the world” [11].  

Defensive  It emphasizes Russia's 

desire to protein itself 

and its population from 

external and internal 

threats  

“What’s important for me is not to criticise Western 

values but to protect Russians from certain quasi-values 

that are very hard for our people to accept.” [12]; 

“Personally, I think that children should be left alone, 

they should be given an opportunity to grow up, to 

become aware of themselves and decide themselves 

who they are: men or women.” [13]  

Depersonific 

ation  

It attempts to reduce the 

emphasis on Vladimir 

Putin as a cornerstone or 

a symbol of Russia’s 

political system  

“But this doesn’t mean that all is related to me. That’s 

an unsound opinion, a misconception. It’s not like that. 

On the contrary, absolutely not like that!” [14]  

Disrespected  Russia is 

undermined/disrespected 

by other international 

actors  

“I think that speculations about other countries, an 

attempt to speak disrespectfully about other countries is 

an attempt to prove one’s exceptionalism by contrast. In 

my view, that is a misguided position.” [15]; “They are 

walking all over us, chewing gum. They are just having 

fun.” [16]  

Economic 

Power  

It emphasizes Russia’s 

economic power and  

potential  

“…But our economy – I can say this with full 

responsibility – has been able to adapt to external 

shock…” [5]; “But we are moving forward and will 

continue to do so. I am confident that we will build a 

strong, open and prosperous Russia.” [17]  

Inclusive  It presents Russia as 

equal to other players 

that should be involved 

in IR  

“Moreover, Russia does not aspire to be called a 

superpower,  

understanding that as a claim to world or regional 

hegemony.” [18]; “I Neither Russia nor its partners in 

the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space 

have any intention of imposing anything on anyone.” 

[19]  

Lawfulness  It refers to Russia 

following the rule of law 

or  

established international 

norms  

“..our position is that we will act within the framework 

of international law…” [20]; “I would like to say that 

the outcome of World War II is unchangeable and it has 

been fixed by a number of international legal 

documents.” [21]  

 

 



56                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Narrative  Description  Examples  

Logical 

Concerns  

It responds to criticism 

by accepting it as such 

with elements of 

mitigation, or a 

pragmatic/rational 

approach  

“We have no shortage of problems of our own in this 

area and we ourselves are far from always finding 

effective solutions, even though we all live within one 

unified country”; [22] “As usual, a question arises: 

where is the money? Probably stolen. Or they 

miscalculated something when planning its 

construction.” [23]  

Misrepresen 

ted  

  

Russia is misrepresented 

by the West and the 

media  

“Despite the attempts - your attempts, the attempts of 

your colleagues - to spoil our relations with the help of 

the media and anti-Russian propaganda, it seems to me 

that it still failed to be done the way you would like.” 

[11]; “Never mind, these are double standards and we 

have got accustomed and pay little attention to it.” [24]  

Moral  It describes Russia’s 

“moral” characteristics:  

compassion, tolerance, 

and pursuit of justice.  

“Russia is a multinational and multi-confessional 

country, and we feel a friendly atmosphere 

everywhere.” [25]; “After all, you cannot simply, say, 

listen to a telephone conversation, for example, in 

Russia  

- I can certainly tell you - without appropriate court 

sanctions” [24]  

  

Natural 

Place  

It highlights that Russia 

has or has to hold its 

natural place in IR  

“We have failed to assert our national interests, while 

we should have done that from the outset. Then the 

whole world could have been more balanced.” [11]; 

“…to ensure unfettered movement forward and to 

strengthen our country from the inside, above all, so 

that it can take its rightful place in the international 

arena as an equal among equals.” [26]  

Not  

Conflicting  

It describes Russia as a 
country that will try to  

avoid confrontation by 

all means  

“e are ready to do this in a non-confrontational manner, 

to look for compromise but, of course, based on 

international law, which must be understood uniformly 

by all.” [11]; “ussia has a peaceful foreign policy, and 

this is no exaggeration.” [27]  

Persistent  Russia is not backing 

down on its promises  

“What have they accomplished? Did they think we 

would just pack up and go? They could not have 

thought that of course, Russia is not that kind of 

country.” [28]  

Responsive  It reflects passive, 

nonconflicting 

characteristics of how 

and why Russia acts in 

the world.  

“We remember how it all started. Russia did not initiate 

the current breakdown, disruption, problems and 

sanctions. All our actions have been exclusively 

reciprocal.” [29]  

Russian 

Necessity  

It argues that the world 

and the actors need 

Russia  

“I can say with no exaggeration that Russia makes a 

significant contribution to the settlement of the 

situation around the Iranian nuclear programme..” [30]  

 



57                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Narrative  Description  Examples  

Slowly 

Changing  

It reflects the desire of 

the state to solve 

problems gradually  

“It is clear that we must really strive for de-

offshorisation, and the measures to bring it about 

should be careful, civilised.” [31]; “But if we admit that 

there were mistakes in the past, why should the 

prospects [of an intervention] be considered infallible 

now? All this should make us think about why we must 

not rush into such decisions.” [32]  

Sovereignty  Russia emphasizes 

sovereign rights' 

importance  

“Such an independent policy pursued by Ankara to 

meet its national foreign policy interests deserves great 

respect.” [33]; “Second, coming back to Iran. It is not 

up to Russia to persuade Iran to leave Syria. After all, 

both Syria and Iran are sovereign countries, and they 

should build their own relationship.” [9]  

Soviet 

Legacy  

Negative description of 

the Soviet Past  

“We have learned very well the lesson of one-party rule 

– that of the  

Communist Party (CPSU).” [15]; “The Moral Code of 

the Builder of Communism, if you read it, is just a 

pathetic copy of the Bible: Thou shalt not kill, thou 

shalt not steal, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s 

wife.” [12]  

Strong Hand  It refers to certain 

characteristics of Russia, 

which could be 

described as ideas of  

authoritarian/centralized 

government  

“Russia, as well as any other country, does not need 

dictators, but it needs equitable principles of organizing 

the state and society” [13] “Just like in the human 

body: if your immune resistance is down you 

immediately catch the flu. These bacilli and bacteria 

are seeded in the organism and reside there all the time 

but if the organism is strong you suppress the flu with 

your immunodefence.” [14]  

The Descriptions of “Other” Narratives 

Narrative  Description  Examples  

Allies  It concerns building 

"self" through the 

demonstration of 

common interests, 

values, and goals with 

countries that can be 

considered like-minded 

or allied states  

“Amid the continued increase in the production and 

export of Afghan drugs, it would make sense to 

increase the interaction of the SCO with specialised 

UN agencies and relevant international 

organisations. We are all interested in forming a 

broad anti-drug security belt in the region.” [34]  

Betrayal  It focuses on events or 

actions that were made 

openly in violation of 

rules or agreements  

“Sanctions are about something else entirely: the 

desire to halt Russia’s progress, to contain Russia. 

This policy of containing Russia has been pursued 

for decades, on and off. Now it is back.” [35]; 

“Regarding whom you can believe and whom you 

can’t, you shouldn’t believe anyone.” [36]  

 



58                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Narrative  Description  Examples  

Conflictual  It describes others as 

initiating conflict for 

the same conflicts  

“Firstly, we asked them not to withdraw from the 

treaty, not to destroy it. But the US pulled out. It was 

not us who did this but the US.” [35]; “At the same 

time, some of our partners demonstrate no desire to 

resolve the real international problems in the world 

today.” [37]  

Cooperation  The second part of the  

“Politicians”, reinforces 

the idea that people 

inside foreign countries 

want to cooperate with 

Russia  

“I think that ordinary Americans have absolutely 

nothing to do with it, they do not understand what is 

happening.” [1]; “We need to be heard by all of 

Ukraine’s people. We have no enemies in Ukraine. 

Let me say again that Ukraine is a friendly country.” 

[38]  

Double 

Standards  

It emphasizes different 

treatment of Russia or 

nonWestern countries 

and others, 

predominantly  

Western  

“Now I want to ask you this: if the Kosovans in 

Kosovo have the right to self-determination, why 

don’t the Crimeans have the same right?” [11]; 

“Well, they lecture everyone on how to live and on 

democracy. Now, do you really think presidential 

elections there are democratic?” [29]  

Economically 

Weak  

It describes others as 

economically 

insufficient  

“The problem has a different nature, which was 

clearly shown by the crisis in certain European 

countries. The key word here is inefficiency.” [39]; 

“On the contrary I am even glad, to some extent, 

because the events have shown how risky and 

insecure investments in Western financial institutions 

can be.” [40]  

Enemy Need  It implies that others 

require Russia as an 

enemy  

“It is easier to say, “We are not to blame, the 

Russians are to blame, they interfered in our election, 

but we are good.” It reminds me of anti-Semitism…” 

[16]  

Imposition  

  

It characterizes the 

policies being 

influenced/imposed by 

the dominant power  

“We also understand that identity and a national idea 

cannot be imposed from above, cannot be established 

on an ideological monopoly.” [41]  

Irrational  It imposes irra0tional 

characterizations  

“So, is there any logic here? No, there is none. This 

is just a pretext for taking additional action to 

contain Russia.” [26]; “This indicates the significant 

level of degradation among political elites in the 

West, including the United States. But I very much 

hope that common sense will prevail.” [42]  

Morally weak  Rather a moral 

description of the 

behind-the-scenes 

decision-making of 

others; questioning of 

morality  

“As far as democracy is concerned, the ruling classes 

usually talk about freedom to pull the wool over the 

eyes of those whom they govern.” [15];  

 

 

 

 



59                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Narrative  Description  Examples  

Overestimated  It characterizes the U.S. 

and the West as 

overconfident  

“That is his own opinion, as I also know his opinion 

that the American nation, the United States is unique. 

I cannot agree with either of those opinions.” [15]; 

“Respecting others’ interests means, as I said in my 

opening remarks, that you cannot just put the 

squeeze on others by using your exceptional 

economic or military clout.” [43]  

Partners  It consists of a positive 

description of the West, 

appreciation of 

cooperation, and 

highlighting their 

achievements  

“I think they were working away. Their intelligence 

is one of the best in the world. Let’s not start 

throwing criticism their way.” [44]; “I hope not, 

because American leaders, although we disagree on 

many positions, are nevertheless sensible people.” 

[45]  

Pawns  It deprives other 

countries of the right to 

make independent 

decisions if they are 

consistent with US 

decisions  

“How did the American NATO allies react? They all 

nodded away in docile agreement, without even 

bothering to analyse what was actually happening...” 

[46]; “Such a unipolar, standardised world does not 

require sovereign states; it requires vassals.” [41]  

People  It describes Russia’s 

view on democracy in 

its traditional forms as 

a rule of a majority  

“I should say that this is absolutely none of our 

business. This is the choice of the British people.” 

[22]; “It is important that the Cypriots themselves 

work out mutually acceptable solutions, without 

interference from outside.” [47]  

Politically 

Weak  

It describes others as 

politically weaker in 

comparison with 

Russia.  

“The negotiators, our partners, are saying: well, we 

would be happy to do that, we did sign it, but the 

Congress does not let it through. So much for the 

decisions.” [48]  

Politicians  It argues that it is not 

the people who want 

bad relations with 

Russia, but their 

governments  

“America's creative approach to solving the 

problems the country is faced with, its openness and 

open-mindedness which make it possible to unleash 

the potential of the people” [13]; “in this case as an 

indication that a substantial part of the American 

people share similar views…It is good that there are 

people who sympathise with our views on traditional 

values.” [20]  

Threat  It centered on the 

discussion of threats 

outside Russia.   

“We are worried not about democracy on our 

borders, but about military infrastructure coming 

ever closer to our borders.” [45]  

US Harsh  

Critics  

It focuses on extensive 

criticism of the U.S.  

“They just did not want to. They wanted to reign. So 

they sat on the throne. And then?.” [11]  

 

 

 

 

 



60                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Narrative  Description  Examples  

US Mild 

Critics  

It focuses on mild 

criticism of the U.S.  

“Nobody listened to us! On the contrary, they 

thought we took an anti-Western position, a hostile 

stance towards the West. And now, when you have 

hundreds of thousands, already one million of 

refugees, do you think our position was anti-Western 

or pro-Western?.” [11]; “Now, recently, the US also 

withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty. It think it was a mistake, too, 

and that they could have gone a different path. I do 

understand the US concerns.” [49]  

      

Sources  

1.  Direct Line with Vladimir Putin (2013, April 25). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17976  

2.  Interview to Channel One and Associated Press news agency (2013, September 4). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143  

3.  Interview to Fox News Channel (2018, July 17). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58019  

4.  Interview to Russian and foreign media (2014, January 19). 

http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20080/print  

5. Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference (2019, December 19). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366  

6. Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference (2017, December 14).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/56378  

7. Interview with The Financial Times (2019, June 27). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60836  

8. Valdai Discussion Club session (2019, October 3). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719 

9. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club (2018, October 18).  

http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848  

10. Press statement and answers to journalists’ questions following talks with Italian Prime Minister 

Matteo Renzi (2015, June 10). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49677  

11. Interview to German newspaper Bild. Part 1 (2016, January 11).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51154  

12. News conference of Vladimir Putin (2013, December 19). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19859 13. Interview to American TV channel CBS 

and PBS (2015, September 29). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50380   

14. Interview to TASS News Agency (2014, November 24).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47054  

15. Interview to German newspaper Bild. Part 2 (2016, January 12).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51155  

16. St Petersburg International Economic Forum plenary meeting (2017, June 2).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54667  

17. St Petersburg International Economic Forum (2012, June 21). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15709  

 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17976
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17976
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58019
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58019
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20080/print
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20080/print
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/56378
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/56378
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60836
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60836
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49677
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49677
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51154
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51154
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19859
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19859
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/470
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47054
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47054
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54667
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54667
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15709
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15709


61                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

18. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly (2013, December 12).  

http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/19825  

19. Press statements and answers to journalists’ questions following meeting of the Russian-

Ukrainian Interstate Commission (2012, July 12). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15945  

20. Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference (2016, December 23). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53573  

21. Interview to Russian and foreign media (2014, January 19).  

http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/20080  

22. Meeting with heads of international news agencies (2016, June 17). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52183  

23. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club (2017, October 19).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/558821  

24. Visit to Russia Today television channel (2013, June 11). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319  

25. Meeting with Chief Rabbi of Russia Berel Lazar and President of Federation of Jewish 

Communities Alexander Boroda (2018, September 9). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58500  

26. Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference (2018, December 20).  

http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/59455  

27. Interview to Vladimir Solovyov (2015, October 12). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482  

28. Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference (2015, December 17).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971  

29. Plenary session of St Petersburg International Economic Forum (2016, June 17).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178  

30. Interview to Al-Ahram daily (2015, February 9). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47643  

31. News conference of Vladimir Putin (2012, December 20). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173  

32. Answers to journalists’ questions (2013, August 31). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19113 

33. Interview to Interfax and Anadolu news agencies (2015, November 13).

 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50682  

34. Speech at the SCO meeting in expanded format (2017, June 9). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/54739  

35. Interview to American TV channel NBC (2018, March 10).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027  

36. News conference following talks between the presidents of Russia and the United States 

(2018, July 16). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58017  

37. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club (2016, October 27).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151  

38. Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine (2014, March 4).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366  

39. Interview to RIA Novosti News Agency (2013, June 14). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18338 

40.  40. Interview to the German ARD (2013, April 5). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17808  

http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/19825
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/19825
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15945
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15945
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53573
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53573
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/20080
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/20080
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52183
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52183
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/558821
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/558821
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18319
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58500
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58500
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/59455
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/59455
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47643
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47643
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19113
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50682
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50682
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/54739
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/54739
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58017
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58017
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18338
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18338
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17808
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17808


62                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

41. 41. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club (2013, September 19). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243  

42. Joint news conference with President of Moldova Igor Dodon (2017, January 17).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744  

43. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club (2014, October 24).  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860  

44. Interview to Vladimir Solovyov (2015, October 12). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482 45. Meeting of the Valdai International 

Discussion Club (2015, October 22).  

http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548  

46. Interview to Mir broadcasting company (2017, April 12).  

http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/54271  

47. Press statement and replies to journalists’ questions following Russian-Cypriot talks (2015, 

February 15). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47739  

48. Interview to TASS News Agency (2014. November 14). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47009  

49. 49. Interview with Al Arabiya, Sky News Arabia and RT Arabic (2019, October 13). 

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61792  

 

  

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/54271
http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/interviews/54271
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47739
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47739
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47009
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47009


63                                                                           Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 18(3) 2025: 28-64                                                         

   ISSN 2562-8429   
 

 

Published by the Centre for European Studies at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada 

Available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index 

 

The Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies (CJERS – formerly Review of European 

and Russian Affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are 

subject to double-blind peer-review. Topics relate to the European Union, its Member States, the 

former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe. The journal is published by the Centre for 

European Studies, an associated unit of the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies 

at Carleton University. 

CJERS aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high-quality 

research and scholarship.  

 

Contact: 

Carleton University 

The Centre for European Studies 

1103 Dunton Tower 

1125 Colonel By Drive 

Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 

Canada 

E-mail: CJERS@carleton.ca 

 

Creative Commons License 

 

 

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 

 

This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No Derivs 4.0 

Unported License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).  Articles appearing in this publication may be freely 

quoted and reproduced, in unadapted form only, provided the source is acknowledged. We 

request that for any online postings, you do so by providing the title and/or abstract with the DOI 

link back to the original version of the article on the journal's website. 

ISSN: 2562-8429 

 

© 2025 The Author(s) 

 

https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index
mailto:CJERS@carleton.ca
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/