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The Maroon Communitarian Dilemma: 
Navigating the Interstices between Resistance 

and Collaboration 
 

*** 
Robert Connell earned his Bachelor of Environmental Studies degree 
with honors and a minor in Political Science from York University in 
2009. He is currently a PhD student at the University of California, 

Berkeley in African Diaspora Studies. His research focuses on conflicts 
over resource extraction and sovereignty rights between Maroons and 
the Jamaican state in the 21st century. His corollary research interests 

include indigeneity and indigenous struggle, development studies, 
ethnic multiplicity in the African Diaspora, global environmental 

politics and ecological economics. 
 

THIS PAPER IS A SYNOPSIS OF THE ORIGINAL 

From the arrival of the first African slaves in the Spanish colony 
of Hispaniola in 1502 to the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888 (the 
last slaveholding state of the Americas), a powerful act of resistance 
stalked the slaving powers. Slaves, most often as individuals or in small 
groups but sometimes in great numbers, sabotaged and rejected the 
slave system by fleeing their bondage, an action known as marronage. 
The English word Maroon, denoting an escaped slave and the French 
word marronage, the act of becoming a Maroon, descends from the 
Spanish 

*** 

cimarrón, often explained as a term for wild, escaped animals, 
suggestive of the slaves being viewed on par with livestock by their 
masters, although the word may also be a derivative of the Spanish 
marrano, meaning wild boar (Higginson, p.4). Whatever the roots of 
the term, marronage denied the colonists the use of the former slave’s 
labour, while setting an example of resistance for their enslaved 
contemporaries. The first recorded act of marronage in the New World 



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happened in Hispaniola in 1502 when an anonymous slave, part of the 
very first contingent of Africans to be transported to the New World, 
ran off into the hills with the Taîno natives shortly after arriving in the 
colony (Price, 1973, p.1). 

The odds were stacked heavily against these Maroons; in most 
cases the state employed considerable resources for preventing 
marronage and re-capturing or killing those that did escape. Horrific 
examples were often made of those who were caught. In Suriname, 
captured Maroons often had to suffer having their tongues cut out, 
castration (Price, 1983, p.10) and the amputation of their legs in an 
effort to prevent further escape (Price, 1988, p.7). It should be noted, 
however, that in the oral traditions of the Samaraka Maroons of 
Suriname there is more focus on the crushing day-to-day horror and 
humiliation of being a slave rather than the brutal responses of the 
colonists to insubordination (ibid., p.10). That is, it was the entire 
structure of the slave system that the Africans were attempting to fight 
and escape from, rather than specific injustices happening therein. 

This essay will begin with a historical analysis of the Jamaican 
Maroons, highlighting the pivotal moments in their struggle to show 
how their community emerged and threw off their enslavement, 
culminating in the treaties of 1739. The tenets of these treaties 
challenge the conventional view of the Maroons as freedom-fighters 
because they transformed the Maroons into a slave-catching rural police 
force for the British. Grounded in socio-philosophic analysis, I will 
interrogate Maroon motives for signing the treaties by applying 
descriptive ethics, the study of people’s beliefs about morality. I will 
argue that the Maroons, through their doctrines of exceptionalism and 
the autonomist goals of their leadership, exhibited an ethically 
communalistic outlook that served to drive them apart from the 
Africans that remained enslaved; a situation that was further 
exacerbated by the latter’s creolization. I will explain that although 
dissent did exist within the Maroon ranks, this opposition was 
ultimately impotent at creating a united, island-wide struggle of all 
Africans against the slave system. In the end the Maroons would do 
little more to undermine the slave state once their collective freedom 



Robert Connell – THE MAROON COMMUNITARIAN DILEMMA: NAVIGATING THE INTERSTICES 
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was secured within it, thus suggesting an essential difference in motive 
(if not ferocity) from the Haitian Revolution1

Marronage was a direct response to slavery, the most 
dehumanizing of social relations, driven by the slave’s yearning for 
freedom. Slaves ran away to be reunited with family, escape a 
punishment, out of anger after receiving a punishment, to flee habitual 
sadism and excess driving or to take temporary leave of work with the 
intention of eventually returning. Indeed the Maroons were “both the 
offspring and antithesis of plantation slavery” (Bilby, p.89). The 
physical act of flight was only the first dangerous step in a long journey 
towards freedom. After absconding a Maroon had to find sustenance, 
shelter and ways to prevent their recapture, often with little or no 
equipment in unfamiliar terrain. While some Maroons would escape to 
a region where slavery had been abolished, like Fredrick Douglass or 
Harriet Tubman who fled north from southern U.S. slavery, or built new 
lives isolated and alone, such as Esteban Montejo

. 

2

The nuclei of the Maroon communities were formed when the 
English invaded what was then the Spanish colony of Santiago in 1655. 
In Jamaica the slaves used the confusion of invasion to abscond into the 
mountainous interior (Edwards, p.230). Even though the literature 
makes no mention of marronage in Jamaica before the English invasion 
it stands to reason that it did at least occasionally occur given that the 
Spanish had been importing Africans since the 16

, the Maroons of 
Jamaica organized themselves into communities on the peripheries of 
slaveholding society. 

th

                                                             
1 The Haitian Revolution was a struggle in which African slaves rose up, emancipated 
themselves and overthrew the entire colonist class, thus creating the first successful 
slave revolution in history. See James, p.263-65 for a synopsis of Haitian leader 
Toussaint L’Ouverture’s revolutionary constitution. 
2 Esteban Montejo was a Cuban slave who escaped his plantation and lived in the wild 
alone for several years until emancipation (Thompson, p.59). 

 Century. R.C. 
Dallas (xxix) was of the opinion that the Spanish would have soon 
fallen victims to their own slaves had the English invasion been 
forestalled much longer, although he did not elaborate on this 
allegation. Bev Carey speculated that runaway African slaves linked up 
with refugee Taînos in the Rio Grande Valley as early as the 1520’s 



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although she offered no source for this information (Carey, p.62). 
Regardless, the English had the foresight to acknowledge as early as the 
first year of their occupation that “of the Blacks there are many, who 
are likely (sic) to prove as thorns and pricks in our sides” (Campbell, 
p.19). Indeed from the beginning of the English invasion to the treaty of 
1739, Jamaica descended into a conflagration of desperate guerrilla 
warfare. 

A typical Maroon assault employed complete surprise; the 
Maroons would silently descend upon the plantations from the hills and 
jungles, kill any whites they found, plunder the estates for arms, food 
and other supplies, and carry off the slaves, thereby boosting their 
numbers and military capabilities (ibid., p.26). Slave revolts and 
breakouts also swelled the ranks of the Maroons, particularly 
incorporating those ex-slaves who had the wherewithal and 
organizational skills to destroy their enslavers from within the 
plantation (Patterson, p.256). The Maroons became adept at 
camouflage, stealth, and reconnaissance to the point where an entire 
community could flee and remain hidden even as incoming English 
forces overran their settlements (Campbell, p.38-39). Conversely, the 
English initially proved quite incompetent at guerrilla-style combat and 
foolishly tried to emulate the open warfare of Renaissance Europe with 
all its pomp and pageantry. Making themselves easy targets, they would 
march up to John Crow summit or the Blue Mountains in neat lines 
wearing their eye catching red coats while beating drums, although by 
the 1700’s, after many painful lessons, they too became accustomed to 
guerrilla tactics (ibid., p.40).  

The initial forty years of the 18th century became a crescendo of 
Maroon uprisings in Jamaica. The First Maroon War is generally 
thought to have commenced in 1722 (although it is the opinion of the 
author that this is misleading since there had been a consistent period of 
at least low level war between the English and some Maroon group or 
another since they took the island) as the planters expanded into the 
northeast coast coming into close proximity with the Windward 
Maroons, based in the parishes of St. Mary and Portland (Patterson, 
p.260). The Windwards, having been relatively quiet up until that point, 
can trace their roots to a band of Spanish affiliated Maroons under the 



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command of the rebel-slave Juan de Serras and famous leaders like 
Nanny and Quao. The Leeward Maroons had coalesced in the parishes 
of St. James and St. Elizabeth and elected Cudjoe as their leader (ibid.). 
Numerous sorties were sent out against both Maroon tribes, of which 
the Windwards were far more aggressive. The vast majority of them 
failed however and only served to enrage and encourage the Maroons, 
emboldening them enough to actually seize and hold plantations 
(Campbell, p.79). The greatest British failure was the defeat of a large 
force of professional soldiers sent to attack the Windwards. They were 
forced to retreat in a disorganized panic and virtual state of mutiny. The 
soldiers were so fearful of the Maroons that they refused to advance and 
may have even destroyed their own supplies so as not to be forced to do 
so (Patterson, p.267). The psychological impact of fighting a shadowy 
enemy with a fierce reputation was taking its toll; the colony at this 
point was teetering on collapse, not to mention bankruptcy, and the fear 
of an island-wide Maroon-slave insurrection was now frighteningly real 
in the minds of the colonists (Campbell, p.77). 

The tide was soon to turn for the Maroons, however. A tragedy 
ensued in 1734 when British Captain Stoddard skilfully snuck up on 
Nanny Town, headquarters of the Windward Maroons, and destroyed it 
killing many inhabitants (Edwards, p.232). The British also began 
setting up garrisons in the interior of the country to harass the Maroons 
(Campbell, p.58). A major Maroon offensive focused directly on 
military forces guarding the capital, Spanish Town, was repulsed and 
the Maroons attack force had to scatter back to the hinterland (Edwards, 
p.233). After these events, a period of relative calm returned to the 
island during the mid to late 1730s. The Maroons, having experienced 
rout and repulse, returned to the less extravagant guerrilla tactics of hit-
and-run and fleeing in the face of colonial sorties (ibid.). In 1737, the 
British government enlisted Miskito natives of Honduras, themselves 
masters of guerrilla warfare, to help suppress the rebels, thus putting the 
Maroons on a permanent defensive stance (ibid., p.235). With the loss 
of Nanny Town the less aggressive Leewards, under the leadership of 
Cudjoe, became the greater Maroon force. 

Sensing an opportunity to end the destabilizing war, British 
Colonel Guthrie was given permission to form a treaty with the 



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Maroons in 1739 (Patterson, p.271). Greeting Guthrie with submission 
and fawning, Cudjoe agreed to a treaty that granted the Leeward 
Maroons freedom and a sizeable portion of the interior of Jamaica, 
known as the Cockpits. In exchange, Guthrie stipulated that escaped 
slaves fleeing to the Leewards must be returned to the whites and that 
the Maroons must help suppress internal and external threats to the 
colony, while abrogating a significant portion of Maroon juridical 
power to the colonial government (ibid., p.272). From all accounts the 
Windward Maroons (and even high ranking members of the Leeward 
Maroons) were disgusted by this treaty, but with Cudjoe tolerating no 
dissent in his own camp and threatening to ally with the British against 
the Windwards, Windward leader Quao had little choice but to sign a 
similar treaty (ibid., 274). Thus concluded 84 years of almost 
continuous warfare between the planters and the Maroons3

I will now re-examine the above historical narrative using 
descriptive ethics to determine the values that guided the Maroons in 
their struggle and their agreement to sign the treaties. I will argue that 
although the unforgiving circumstances of the war played a part in the 
Maroon acceptance of the treaty terms, the Maroons agreed to 
collaborate with the slave power because the key Maroon leader and 
decision maker at that time, Cudjoe, was guided by a generally 
communitarian ethos. This overrode any of Cudjoe’s solidarisitic 
feelings toward the still-enslaved Africans and led him to find peace 
with the slave system, provided the community’s needs were met with a 
guarantee of their own security and freedom. I will utilize philosopher 
Nigel Dower’s definition of communitarianism as an ethos in which 
one’s ethical duty is limited to those with whom one shares a 
meaningful relation, such as sentiment, shared tradition or convention 

. Despite an 
arguably ignoble ending to the war, which ultimately did little to change 
the slave system and in the short term actually strengthened it with the 
inclusion of a new capable ally, the Jamaican Maroons proved 
themselves to be masters of sustained guerrilla warfare. 

                                                             
3 The eight month Trelawny Town War of 1795-1796 was a conflict that paled in 
comparison to the previous war in terms of scale and was a catastrophic defeat for the 
Trelawny Maroons in particular (they were deported from Jamaica) and the prospects 
of a renewed Maroon resistance struggle in general (see Campbell, p.209-249)   



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(Dower, p.25). As applied to a social philosophy, communitarians deny 
the existence of obligations outside the defined group and would 
therefore tend to reject the principle of solidarity and universalist 
consciousness; in other words, communitarianism engenders an “us 
first” mentality. 

I will briefly investigate some mitigating factors that may have 
informed the Maroon acceptance of the treaty terms noting that without 
the direct testimony of Maroons alive during those days this path of 
investigation will be limited. A few scholars have offered their theories: 
Mavis C. Campbell (p.31) suggests that perhaps Cudjoe and many of 
his Maroons were simply war-weary and longed for an end to the 
fighting, even at a steep cost, while Alvin O. Thompson (p.295, 316) 
argues that guerrilla warfare in such conditions was an ultimately 
unsustainable activity, especially given the military resources of the 
slave states, which could count on other colonies or the mother country 
for reinforcements. While the Maroons almost certainly did consider 
their difficult military situation when choosing to make peace with the 
British, I propose that a communitarian ethical outlook was of 
paramount importance to Maroon decision-making in those critical 
moments. 

At face value it seems puzzling that after fighting so adamantly 
for their own freedom the Maroons would aid in the denial of it to 
people who were in the exact same position they themselves were once 
in. Historical analysis illustrates that in the early days of the Jamaican 
Maroon War, long before the treaties, the group that would become the 
Windward Maroons seemed quite content to keep to themselves in the 
as-of-yet unsettled areas of Jamaica, only lashing out in their militant 
manner after expanding settlements encroached on their territory 
(Campbell, p.33). In fact the early Windwards were so notorious for 
their bad treatment of the runaways that tried to seek refuge in their 
community that some slaves were reported to have gone back to the 
plantations, preferring to live with their masters over the Maroons 
(Patterson, p.258). It was only after the Maroons were trespassed by the 
colonists and were experiencing shortages of arms and basic necessities 
that they took a kinder disposition toward the slaves (ibid.). 



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Similarly, the attacks against the plantations were not 
necessarily for the purpose of ending slavery, although the liberation of 
slaves was a result of these assaults. In order to sustain their guerrilla 
war the Maroons needed to raid plantations for arms, sustenance, and to 
maintain or increase their numbers, particularly through the taking of 
enslaved women for procreation. Unfortunately none of the literature 
examined in this study appears to deal with the issue of consent in these 
situations. Further research is needed. 

Beyond returning runaway slaves as per the treaty terms, the 
Maroons were known to keep them as well (Campbell, p.198-99). 
Furthermore, any children sired with their slave women took the status 
of the mother (Dallas, p.126-27). Even when the Maroons could have 
joined one of the many slave revolts that happened in the years between 
the treaties and emancipation, they still chose to remain loyal to their 
agreement with the colonists. Note the Maroon assault on the rebels of 
the St. Mary slave revolt of 1760 in Jamaica, in which the Maroons 
took their agreement with the colonists seriously enough to hunt down 
and kill Tackey, the revolt leader (Edwards, p.242-44). In order to 
understand how a communitarian ethic could have come about amongst 
the Maroons I will now examine their lore and mythology. 

The oral history of Jamaica’s Maroons gives us some striking 
clues. Kenneth Bilby (p.247-8) reports that the Maroons see themselves 
as a “chosen people”, with God granting them the super-human ability 
to put up the tenacious fight they did against their enslavement. 
Furthermore, the Jamaican Maroons describe themselves as separate 
and even somewhat spiritually opposed to the descendents of the slaves, 
whom they call “the Other Side of People” or Obroni (ibid., 291). 
Campbell also speaks of the Maroon disdain for the slaves (Campbell, 
p.204). In the Maroon creation story there is a myth that Nanny, the 
celebrated chief sorceress of the Windward Maroons and “mother” of 
all Maroons, had a sister (the “mother” of the rest of Afro-Jamaica) who 
accepted her lot in life as a slave thus making her an object of contempt 
in the minds of the Maroons (Bilby, p.110-111). The mentality that non-
Maroon Africans “chose” to stay in slavery is evident in their oral 
traditions (Campbell, p.204). Since Maroon spirituality preached 
Maroon exceptionalism, and spirituality gave the Maroon leadership its 



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ideology and courage in the face of the colonists, it is of little surprise 
that a “chosen people” mentality would inhibit any sense of solidarity 
with the Obroni (Campbell, p.3-4). This schism still exists today. 

As for other possible schisms, Eugene D. Genovese (p.36) 
argues that the Maroons were primarily concerned with restoring an 
African past whereas the increasingly revolutionary creolized Africans 
wanted full emancipation. The “Africanness” of the Maroons and the 
increasing creolization of the slaves was thus another source of tension 
between the two groups (ibid., p.54). Genovese (ibid., p.55) also argues 
that Maroons in general cared primarily for their own autonomy and 
illustrates his point by citing the case of the Haitian Maroons during the 
revolutionary period who allied with the whites and Afro-Europeans to 
wage war against the recently freed blacks who were trying to solidify 
their authority. The Maroons did this out of a wish to protect their 
autonomy from any centralizing power, even a black revolutionary one. 

It is important at this point to note the dissent against the treaties 
within the Maroon ranks and evidence that the leadership was out of 
step with at least some of their populace. Cudjoe had two of his officers 
executed and another two banished for rebelling against the treaty and 
attempting to spark a slave uprising (Patterson, p.273). I will further 
examine that case shortly. It is also known that Windward chief Quao 
only begrudgingly signed the treaty from a position of strategic 
weakness and after having been threatened by Cudjoe. It is rumoured 
that Nanny also disapproved of the 1739 treaties, although like Quao, 
she was forced to concede (Thompson, p.305). Yet, even though 
dissension to the treaties did exist to one degree or another amongst the 
Maroons, it remains unclear as to the rationale behind that dissent. Was 
it a solidarisitc dissent born out of a yearning for all Africans to be free 
of bondage? Was it distrust of the colonists? The war involved trickery 
and deceit and some Maroons may have feared that peace negotiations 
were simply some kind of ruse. Indeed the treaties involved the 
stationing of European officers in the Maroon settlements, a situation 
that must have seriously unnerved individuals who had fought merciless 
battles against the colonists for much of their lives. Was dissent against 
the treaties a matter of honour? Nanny had reportedly vowed to fight 
the colonial enemy to the death and was enraged at the prospect of 



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having to break that vow (Bilby, p.262). There is a Jamaican Maroon 
tale of the warrior Ojedu (alias Opong, Kwaku or Welcome) who was 
so embittered by the peace treaties that he left his people forever (which 
may be an allusion to suicide). In fact the legend of Ojedu may refer to 
whole groups of Maroons rather than a single person (ibid.). Given the 
horrors of the slave system, and the fact that many Maroons and their 
loved ones were themselves tortured and brutalized by the enslavers, 
cooperation with the Europeans must have been an agonizing choice for 
many of the warriors. 

The likeliest case of solidaristic opposition to the treaties, 
suggesting the existence of a desire for a unified struggle of all Africans 
against slavery was the case of Cudjoe’s rebel commanders who 
rejected the treaty by attempting to ferment an island-wide revolt in 
response to it (Patterson, p.273). It stands to reason then that a mix of 
distrust, honour and solidaristic opposition to slavery added fuel to the 
discord surrounding one of the most momentous choices in Maroon 
history. The above examples suggest that while a communitarian ethic 
did exist, it was not all-encompassing and stood in conflict with a more 
solidaristic ethic, which may have indeed prevailed if not for 
communitarianism being a particularly prevalent characteristic of 
Cudjoe’s leadership. In spite of this, it is worth noting Genovese’s 
(p.57) paradox that even though the Maroons essentially accepted the 
slave system, thereby inhibiting revolutionary action among the slaves, 
they simultaneously sent “revolutionary shock waves though the slave 
quarters” by exposing the lie of European racial superiority through the 
example of their very existence. 

I will conclude by quoting the astute observations of the 
Brazilian historians João José Reis and Flávio dos Santos Gomes 
(Andrews, p.225) on the subject of Maroon resistance: 

 
Let them be celebrated as heroes of freedom[;] but what we celebrate in 

this volume is the struggle of men and women who, in order to live in freedom, 
weren’t always able to act with the certainty and coherence normally attributed to 
heroes. 
 
 
 



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