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67 

Haiti and the False Promise of State Power 
Daniel Troup 

 

Daniel Troup is a fourth year undergraduate student in the University of Toronto’s 

Peace and Conflict Studies program, operating out of the Trudeau Centre at the Munk 

School of Global Affairs. His academic interests include Latin American politics and 

society, political economy, and critical theories of international relations. Born and 

raised in the Niagara region, he currently resides in Toronto.                                       
 

Since the devastation of January 12, 2010, Haiti, more than 
any other Caribbean nation, has commanded the world’s attention. 
Despite the wave of humanitarianism following the earthquake, 
poverty and political instability have persisted in the country. For 
years critical scholars have attributed Haiti’s dismal socio-economic 
conditions to the involvement of international powers, particularly 
the United States. It is argued that the foreign policies of leading 
western countries, whether they are considered predatory or simply 
misguided, have impeded the establishment of meaningfully 
autonomous governance in the country. Such analyses establish the 
Haitian state as central to understanding the plight of the Haitian 
people. While it can certainly be argued that the Haitian state’s lack 
of autonomy from external influence is the chief source of the 
country’s condition, this essay will argue that the state is unlikely to 
be a source of solutions. This argument has implications for efforts 
to improve conditions within the country as it runs contrary to 
orthodox political strategies which emphasize the pursuit of state 
power. 

 
This paper will first examine the contradictions of Haiti’s 

independence by providing a brief historical overview of the external 
interventionism and internal authoritarianism which has 
constrained the freedom of the Haitian people. Secondly, the 
presidency of Jean-Bertrand Aristide will be presented in order to 
illustrate the continued constraints which effectively prevent the 
state from responding to the wishes and demands of the Haitian 
people. Next, the earthquake, the international response to it, and 
the country’s recent flawed elections will be discussed. This will be 
followed by an examination of the Haitian state in theoretical 
context, which will outline the impediments to future leftist 
governance in Haiti proposing the development of political strategies 
aside from the pursuit of state power. All of this will be presented in 



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68 

support of the argument that the Haitian state, though nominally 
independent, is subject to domestic and international constraints 
which prevent it from serving as an effective channel for the change 
which has been historically pursued by the Haitian populace. As a 
result, those seeking progressive change, pro-poor economic policy, 
and greater social equality, must resist the temptation to centre their 
political activity on the pursuit of state power.  

 

The Contradictions of Haitian Independence 

 
 It is difficult to ignore the sad irony that, after being the 
second colony in the Americas to attain independence, Haiti’s post-
independence history has been one of foreign intervention and 
domestic authoritarianism. While space constraints prohibit an 
exhaustive account of this history (which can be found in the work of 
numerous scholars including Laurent Dubois) this section seeks to 
provide an historical overview highlighting key instances of foreign 
intervention and authoritarianism.1 The San Domingo revolution, led 
by Toussaint L’Ouverture, spanned from 1791 to 1803 and 
culminated with the founding of the Haitian republic.2 The success of 
the revolution is particularly notable because it was undertaken by 
an enslaved populace, unlike the elite-led revolutions of Latin 
America which would follow decades later. Unfortunately, the 
struggle for substantive independence in Haiti did not end with the 
revolution, and colonial domination continued under other names. 
As Peter Hallward argues, “the deeply subversive success of Haiti’s 
revolution provoked both at home and abroad a counter-revolution 
that in many ways continues to this day.”3   
 
 Haiti’s experiences in the decades following its 
independence revolved around two simultaneous processes. First, 
the successful consolidation of economic and political power on the 
part of Haitian elites which began following the assassination of the 
revolutionary leader Jean Jacques Dessalines, whose plans for the 
country were deemed to be intolerably radical.4 Secondly, Haiti’s 

                                                           
1 Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History, (New York, New York: 

Metropolitan Books, 2012) 
2 CLR James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo 

Revolution, (Toronto, Ontario: Vintage Books, 1989) 
3 Peter Hallward, Damming the Flood: Haiti and the Politics of Containment, 

(New York and London: Verso, 2010), 12 
4 Ibid, 13 



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69 

international debt, which continues to haunt the country to this day, 
began to be established.5 It was not until the twentieth century, 
however, that Haiti was faced with an occupation by the United 
States.6 Concerns about German influence in Haiti combined with 
the desire to establish regional hegemony informed the Wilson 
administration’s decision to dispatch three hundred thirty soldiers to 
the country in July of 1915.7 This began an occupation which would 
last until 1934 and cost thousands of Haitian lives.8 This intervention 
demonstrated the linkages between US business interests and the 
behaviour of the US government which has remained an integral 
component of US-Haitian relations. The occupation was preceded by 
the United States’ insistence on the establishment of a US 
administered customs receivership which would require the Haitian 
government to effectively surrender its sovereignty.9 Frustrated with 
Haitian recalcitrance toward the idea of surrendering their own 
sovereignty, Roger Farnham, a banker working for the US 
government, stated that there were two potential leaders who would 
be acceptable, but they required US intervention to attain power.10 
With the intervention of 1915 and the subsequent occupation of the 
country, the United States signaled its willingness to usurp Haitian 
sovereignty in the interests of US capital. 
 
 Upon ending the occupation in 1934, the United States left 
power to a small group of Haitian elites backed by a US trained 
military force.11 These forces governed the country until 1957 when 
François Duvalier, reinforced by his own militia, rose to power in 
fraudulent elections.12 Duvalier appointed his son as his successor, 

                                                           
5 Ibid, 12 
6 This is not to suggest that the US was removed from Haitian politics in the 

eighteenth century. Numerous Naval interventions, for example, occurred to 

“protect American lives and property” between 1857 and 1892.  Hans Schmidt, 

The United States Occupation of Haiti 1915-1934, (Rutgers University Press, 

1995), 31 
7 Ibid, 67 
8 Ibid, 102 
9 Ibid, 60 
10 Farnham was the vice president of National City bank of New York, the vice 

president of the Banque Nationale in Haiti, and President of National Railway of 

Haiti. He was brought in to consult for state department. Ibid, 48.  Regarding the 

potential leaders, see; Ibid, 61. 
11 Paul Farmer, Haiti: After the Earthquake, (New York, New York: PublicAffairs, 

2011), 130 
12 Ibid 



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70 

and Jean-Claude Duvalier ruled the country from 1971 to 1986.13 
While not beholden to traditional elite interests and less connected 
to US power than the preceding governments, the rule of the 
Duvalier’s was certainly not consistent with any reasonable 
definition of freedom for the Haitian population.14 Terror was 
systematically employed via the notorious tonton-macoute, and the 
initially populist rhetoric of François Duvalier belied the concessions 
to foreign-owned extractive industries established during the 
family’s rule.15 The systemic violence of the Duvalier governments 
combined with declining prospects in the agricultural sector further 
contributed to the exploitation of Haiti’s workforce by precipitating 
significant migration to urban areas, providing a surplus labour 
supply for internationally owned factories.16 Washington’s approach 
to the Duvalier administration further illustrated the intent of the US 
government to control Haiti and its people regardless of the human 
costs. This was explicitly stated by John F. Kennedy’s Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk. When considering the possibility of a replication of 
the Cuban Revolution in Haiti, Rusk admitted, “we ourselves cannot 
in good conscience say that this could be worse for the Haitians 
however damaging to US and cause of freedom in the 
Americas.”17(sic) Essentially, the United States committed itself to 
championing freedom in the Americas according to its own terms, 
even if it meant tolerating a dictatorship. As we shall see, defending 
freedom on American terms has been a consistent feature of US-
Haiti relations even after the Cold War.  
 

                                                           
13 Ibid 
14 Many elites actually fled the country; Ibid. President John F. Kennedy 

appeared sympathetic to a 1963 effort by the Dominican Republic to depose 

Duvalier; Stephen J. Randall and Graeme S. Mount, The Caribbean Basin: An 

International History, (New York, New York: Routledge, 1998), 98. There was 

contestation within Kennedy administration regarding whether to accept the 

Duvalier regime. Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John 

F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America, (University of 

North Carolina Press, 1999), 50 
15 It has been said that the tonton-makout “became the living symbols of 

Duvalierist coercion.” Eric Caple James, Democratic Insecurities: Violence, 

Trauma, and Intervention in Haiti, (Berkeley and Los Angeles California: 

University of California Press, 2010), 58. Regarding concessions, see; Randall 

and Mount, The Caribbean Basin, 98 
16 Eric Caple James, Democratic Insecurity, 64-65 
17 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 50. Presumably “freedom” in 

the context of the Cold War was understood to mean anything but communism. 



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Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Lavalas Movement 

 
 Following the expulsion of Jean-Claude Duvalier from Haiti 
in 1986 the military re-established direct control over the country.18 
The military government aligned itself with the United States and 
accelerated the neoliberal privatization programs prescribed by 
Washington and the leading international financial institutions, but 
struggled to establish stability despite a willingness to use 
authoritarian measures to repress social mobilizations.19 The heavy 
handed tactics of the military ran contrary to the United States’ 
ostensible commitment to democracy and by 1990, “the time had 
come to replace a pro-democratic military with a pro-military 
democrat.”20 These plans would be foiled, however, by the victory of 
a popular priest named Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his supporters in 
the Lavalas movement which had been mobilizing for years prior to 
the 1990 election.21 Aristide’s populist rhetoric and impoverished 
support-base raised fears amongst Haitian elites and US government 
agencies which quickly expressed concerns regarding plans to 
increase the minimum wage and amend the country’s foreign 
exchange policies.22 This US reaction to Aristide’s election 
demonstrated that its stated commitment to democracy was 
qualified by a stronger commitment to open markets and the 
political status-quo.23 
 
 Needless to say, the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
marked a moment of hope for a Haitian public which had endured 
decades - in fact centuries - of poverty and repression, but a 
successful coup perpetrated against the Aristide government in 1991 
crushed this optimism and marked an era of renewed social 
conflict.24 Following the coup, Aristide began appealing to the United 
States government in order to facilitate his return to office. His 
endeavour was ultimately successful, but came at a great cost. The 
US government was reluctant to allow a leftist and supposedly 
erratic leader to return and potentially challenge the socio-economic 

                                                           
18 Hallward, Damming the Flood, 16 
19 Ibid, 29 
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid, 19 
22 Ibid, 37 
23 William Robinson argues that this has been a central component of US foreign 

policy in general in Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and 

Hegemony, (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
24 Hallward, Damming the Flood, 39-40 



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72 

status-quo. Nevertheless, as Haiti became an increasingly severe 
political headache for the Clinton government, the United States 
facilitated Aristide’s return in September 1994 on the condition that 
he agree to amnesty for the coup perpetrators, the development of a 
US trained Haitian police force, and the establishment of a neoliberal 
structural adjustment program.25 Essentially, in order to return to 
power, Aristide was forced to compromise many of the core 
principles of the Lavalas movement. As a result, the matter of how to 
judge Aristide’s post-coup governance has been a topic of debate 
within the Haitian left and among critical scholars.26 Regardless of 
how one interprets Aristide’s governance, however, it is important to 
recognize that these constraints were externally imposed and 
precipitated by the reactionary capacities of Haiti’s elites. Therefore, 
Aristide’s return to office provides a stark illustration of the limits 
put on the Haitian state even when a leftist occupies the presidency. 
 
 Following a period of political competition, Aristide agreed 
to step aside in order to allow René Préval to run in the presidential 
election of 1996.27 Préval assumed office with an overwhelming 
electoral victory, albeit with a low voter turnout, and occupied the 
presidency until the 2000 elections which saw the return of 
Aristide.28 After results showed an overwhelming victory for Aristide 
and the Lavalas party, Aristide’s political opponents and the US 
government began disputing the results of the election. As Peter 
Hallward puts it, “the Haitian people had again misunderstood the 
true meaning of democracy. They had failed to choose the leader that 
the great powers had chosen for them.”29 But the United States did 
not take military action, nor was there an immediate coup. Instead, 
the US began employing familiar economic tactics in order to 
undermine the Aristide government, including the suspension of aid 
to the country.30 The human costs of such a decision should be self-
evident, but the action also reveals the extent to which indebtedness 
and aid dependence has effectively served as yet another constraint 
on the Haitian state. This time Aristide was constrained not just by 

                                                           
25 Ibid, 50-51 
26 For a perspective critical of the Duvalier government, see; Alex Dupuy, The 

Prophet and the Power: Jean Bertrand Aristide, the International Community, 

and Haiti, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007). For a 

perspective more sympathetic to Aristide, see; Hallward, Damming the Flood 
27 Hallward, Damming the Flood, 62 
28 Ibid, 63 
29 Ibid, 78 
30 Ibid, 82 



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the conditions placed on his 1994 return, but the external crippling 
of the government’s ability to fund anything that could come close to 
satisfying the wishes and demands of the Lavalas constituency. This 
effectively manufactured an escalation of internal opposition and 
discontent toward the Aristide government.  
 
 The difficulties faced by Aristide culminated in yet another 
coup on February 29, 2008. The particularities of the event vary 
greatly depending on which account one is presented with, and these 
debates are beyond the scope of this paper. What is not disputed is 
the fact that the events of February 29 included an international 
component, with the United States facilitating the exit of Aristide out 
of the country.31 Immediately following Aristide’s departure, 
Canadian, American, and French military forces began arriving to 
reinforce the American forces already present at the Port-au-Prince 
airport, again illustrating a willingness to exert direct military 
influence over the country if necessary.32 Following Aristide’s ouster, 
the country was governed by Gérard Latortue and following the 2006 
elections, René Préval. These governments engaged in their own 
struggles in a political climate largely defined by the lingering 
consequences of Aristide’s removal from power.33 Needless to say, 
with Aristide unable to return to the country, any Haitian 
government would have struggled to establish legitimacy in the eyes 
of a significant portion of the Haitian population. It was not until 
January 2010, however, that Haiti would again attract the attention 
of the world’s dominant media outlets and most influential polities. 
 

The Earthquake 

 
 On the twelfth of January, 2010, Haiti was struck with a 
massive earthquake and series of aftershocks which devastated the 
capital Port-au-Prince and the less populated surrounding areas. An 
earthquake of such magnitude would likely cause death and injury in 
any populous area unfortunate enough to be impacted, but the scale 
of the death and destruction witnessed in Port-au-Prince revealed 
the extent to which the event was a human-made as well as natural 
disaster. First, it is necessary to address the matter of urbanization in 
Port-au-Prince, a city which has been entirely unable to 
accommodate the number of citizens within it. This urbanization was 

                                                           
31 Ibid, 234 
32 Ibid, 235 
33 Ibid, 250-316 



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precipitated in large part due to the decimation of Haitian 
agriculture as a result of trade liberalization, particularly the 
reduction of agricultural import tariffs following the ouster of Jean-
Claude Duvalier.34 Haiti was self-sufficient in rice, poultry, sugar, 
and pork production in the 1970s, only to become the largest 
importer of US foodstuffs in the Caribbean and the fourth largest 
importer of subsidized US rice in the world.35 In a striking moment 
of candor following the earthquake, Bill Clinton admitted that while 
the trade policies advocated by successive US administrations 
including his own, “may have been good for some farmers in 
Arkansas,” they have entailed horrible consequences for the Haitian 
people.36 This realization has apparently not prevented Clinton from 
continuing to champion the same failed neoliberal development 
model which brought about the circumstances he now laments. 
 
 With the Haitian government’s capacity to fulfill its 
administrative duties further reduced by the earthquake’s 
destruction, the international community staged a military 
intervention which was uncritically portrayed as a purely 
humanitarian endeavour by most media outlets. What was less 
reported in the mainstream press was the shift of governmental 
power to the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, a coalition 
composed of seventeen voting members including the United States, 
Brazil, Canada, France, the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.37 Essentially, the 
institution responsible for administering Haiti’s recovery was 
composed of a greater number of international voting members than 
Haitian voting members.38 The United States and its allies used this 
opportunity to directly “manage” Haitian politics until it was deemed 
appropriate for the country to be ruled by its own citizens and 
according to the democratic mandate of the Haitian people. 
 
 This direct control was quickly coupled with the 
establishment of what observers have called “a democratic façade” 

                                                           
34 Alex Dupuy, “Disaster Capitalism to the Recue: The International Community 

and Haiti after the Earthquake” NACLA Report on the Americas Vol. 43 No. 4 

(2010): 16 
35 Ibid, 17 
36 Ibid, 14 
37 Ibid, 15 
38 Ibid 



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with the general election on November 28, 2010.39 This election was 
marred by woefully inadequate infrastructure, accusations of 
widespread fraud, and a turnout of one quarter of the country’s 
eligible voters.40 The low turnout is largely attributable to the 
banning of Fanmi Lavalas, which continues to be associated with 
Aristide and remains the country’s largest political party.41 
Consequently, the election was actually a demonstration of the lack 
of democracy in what remains an internationally dominated Haiti. 
However, this did not prevent the United States, CARICOM, and the 
OAS from celebrating and validating the results which were followed 
by a runoff election.42 Michel Martelly eventually emerged victorious 
in the March 20, 2011 elections which saw an even lower voter 
turnout than was observed in November.43 The undemocratic nature 
of this electoral process has been recognized by Haitian activists who 
have described the process as a “selection” rather than an election.44 
Regardless of the terms one prefers to use, the Haitian state has yet 
to remove itself from the elite domination and foreign control which 
has been a defining feature of its history since the original Haitian 
revolution two centuries ago. 
 
Understanding the Haitian State 

 
 The preceding historical overview of Haitian political history 
has sought to establish an historical basis for the application of state 
theory to the case of Haiti. It will also allow for an examination of the 
strategies of the Haitian left in the context of an immensely 
constrained state. Above all, it has endeavoured to support the 
notion that the horrendous socio-economic conditions existing 
within Haiti are primarily attributable to the social counter-
revolution dating back to the era of Toussaint L’Ouverture which has 
prevented the Haitian state from effectively serving the interests of 
the majority of the Haitian people. The forthcoming sections, 
however, will critique the orthodox leftist response to this condition. 

                                                           
39 Roger Annis and Kim Ives, “Haiti’s Election Debacle: A Coup Legacy” NACLA 

Report on the Americas Vol. 44 No. 1 (2011): 23 
40 Ibid, 22-23 
41 Ibid, 23 
42 Ibid, 24 
43 Kim Ives, “Michel Martelly: Aristide’s Weak Imitator,” The Guardian, March 22, 

2011, accessed February 23, 2012, 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/mar/22/haiti-

jean-bertrand-aristide 
44 Annis and Ives, “Haiti’s Election Debacle”, 23  



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Given that a weak and dependent Haitian state is the source of much 
of Haiti’s troubles, it is understandable that the Haitian left and its 
international allies would campaign for a substantively independent 
Haitian state. But this prescribes precisely what history suggests 
Haiti cannot have.  
 

State theorists have endeavoured to establish an abstract 
and critical understanding of the modern state, and the findings of 
this field of scholarship can assist in understanding Haiti’s 
experiences and possible future trajectories. Within the Marxist 
tradition, there has been a division between instrumentalist and 
structuralist theories of the capitalist state, both of which posit that 
the capitalist state can only be understood in relation to the 
dynamics and distribution of social forces, particularly class forces, 
within society.45 Recent developments in state theory have drawn on 
the contributions of these two perspectives while attempting to 
transcend some of the reductionist tendencies inherent in both 
frameworks. Bob Jessop has developed a particularly nuanced theory 
of state power which he calls a strategic-relational approach. This 
approach argues that the capacity of a state to effectively pursue a 
particular course of action is determined by the balance of relational 
political forces operating under a given state-form which privileges 
certain political strategies over others.46 While delving into the 
details of this theoretical proposition is beyond the scope of this 
paper, such a perspective underscores the need to dispel any notion 
that, once captured, state office in and of itself can effectively 
precipitate radical social change. Put differently, the state is not 
separate from the social dynamics it supposedly presides over. As 
Poulantzas argued, “the state is a social relation.”47  

 
In the case of Haiti, this implies that so long as Haitian 

elites retain such disproportionate control over the country’s 
economic resources, and so long as their influence is backed up by 
powerful international allies such as the United States, the Haitian 

                                                           
45 Clyde W. Barrow, “The Miliband-Poulantzas Debate: An Intellectual History” in, 

Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered. eds. Stanley Aronowitz and Peter 

Bratsis, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 
46 Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place, (University 

Park Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 149. The 

concept has been more recently developed in Jessop’s State Power: A Strategic-

Relational Approach, (Malden Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2008) 
47 Jessop, State Power, 118-119 



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state will be unable to effectively pursue the interests of the country’s 
impoverished population. The structural constraints on the Haitian 
state can manifest themselves in various ways that have been 
witnessed throughout the history of Haiti and other countries of the 
global south. First, there is the possibility that the state will be 
directly controlled by elite actors themselves. Second, the state can 
be under a military force closely associated with upper class groups. 
What is more important to recognize, however, is that the state does 
not need to be under the direct control of economic elites in order to 
serve their interests. A genuinely leftist government may feel 
compelled toward moderation so as to prevent a reactionary 
response by domestic or international forces. Finally, if the state 
does take actions which challenge the essential interests of those 
with sufficient economic power, the effectiveness of this action risks 
being undermined by a reactionary response which can take the form 
of a capital strike, international economic sanctions, or a violent 
coup. Ultimately, given the immense inequality in social power 
within Haiti, compounded by the demonstrated willingness of the 
United States and its allies to intervene in the interests of 
international and Haitian capital, the state is not likely to be an 
effective channel for significant social change. 

 
Implications for the Haitian Left 

 
 Recognition of the structural constraints on the Haitian 
state can lead to an understandable degree of pessimism. 
Recognizing the constraints placed on the Haitian state, and writing 
before the devastating earthquake of 2010, Alex Dupuy concedes 
that “the best that the popular democratic movement can hope for 
during the next five years would be to create the conditions for a 
stable and functioning minimalist democracy. Such an 
accomplishment could in turn allow for the continued struggle to 
enlarge the democratic space so that the people can become self-
actualizing agents and democracy will cease to be the privileged 
domain of the wealthy and powerful few.”48 While Dupuy’s 
skepticism regarding the prospects for progressive change is 
warranted, such an approach entails two problems. First, if the social 
constraints influencing the state are considered, even if Haiti were to 
become a more stable procedural democracy, this would not ensure 
that the state could act in accordance with democratic demands. 
Secondly, there is nothing to suggest that the Haitian population will 

                                                           
48 Dupuy, The Prophet and the Power, 22 



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limit its demands to minimalist democratic procedures, as they are 
understandably more concerned with remedying the horrendous 
material conditions that so many citizens are forced to endure.  
 
 Instead, what is needed is the pursuit of social change 
outside of the state. This entails an erosion of elite dominance in 
Haiti through social action which directly confronts economic 
arrangements which perpetuate inequality. The actions of land 
reform groups in Brazil and South Africa provide an example of such 
political activity.49 Of course, such strategies entail their own 
challenges and also risk precipitating a reactionary response. They 
are distinct from state-centric political strategies, however, insofar as 
they seek to directly influence the social conditions of society, as 
opposed to attempting to influence the state which is a reflection of 
these conditions. Given the role played by international actors it also 
seems necessary for the Haitian left to continue efforts to 
internationalize their approach by appealing to others in the global 
south as well as those within the core industrialized states. 
Ultimately, the biggest obstacle to the implementation of pro-poor 
governance in Haiti is the state’s ineffectiveness as a force for change 
combined with its demonstrated effectiveness in reinforcing status-
quo power structures. This can serve to explain why the Haitian state 
has been such an important contributor to the subjugation of the 
Haitian people, but has repeatedly failed to aid their political 
emancipation. 
 
Conclusion 

 
 Since the declaration of the Haitian Republic following the 
country’s revolution, the Haitian people have struggled to establish a 
substantively independent state which serves the interests of the 
majority of its citizenry. Throughout the twentieth century the 
United States continually exerted its influence over the country to 
the detriment of most Haitian citizens. This process has continued 

                                                           
49 There are numerous books addressing these cases, two recent titles are; 

Gabriel Ondetti, Land, Protest, and Politics: The Landless Movement and the 

Struggle for Agrarian Reform in Brazil, (University Park, Pennsylvania: 

Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). Elke Zuern, The Politics of Necessity: 

Community Organizing and Democracy in South Africa, (Madison, Wisconsin: 

University of Wisconsin Press, 2011). Such strategies are undoubtedly being 

pursued in Haiti on a smaller scale, and this paper argues that they are likely to 

be more efficacious than those grounded in the pursuit of state office. 



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following the major earthquake of January 2010. That the United 
States has knowingly pursued policies to the detriment of the Haitian 
people should not be controversial, as prominent US government 
figures occasionally admit it themselves.50 While it is true that the 
Haitian state’s lack of autonomous capacity and continual subjection 
to elite control has been a significant contributor to the country’s ills, 
this does not validate a political strategy grounded in the pursuit of 
state office on the part of those seeking progressive change. It is up 
to the Haitian left to develop a strategy which avoids and transcends 
the pursuit of state power. Such a task faces its own significant 
obstacles but is as necessary as it is unenviable if the ambitions of the 
Haitian revolution and the generations which followed are to be 
realized. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                           
50 Recall the aforementioned quotes from Dean Rusk and Bill Clinton. 



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80 

Works Cited 

Annis, Roger, and Kim Ives. “Haiti’s Election Debacle: A Coup Legacy” 

NACLA Report on the Americas Vol. 44 No. 1 (2011): 22-24. 

Barrow, Clyde W. “The Miliband-Poulantzas Debate: An Intellectual 

History” in, Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered. eds. Stanley 

Aronowitz and Peter Bratsis. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of 

Minnesota Press, 2002. 

Dubois, Laurent. Haiti: The Aftershocks of History. New York, New York: 

Metropolitan Books, 2012. 

Dupuy, Alex. The Prophet and the Power: Jean Bertrand Aristide, the 

International Community, and Haiti. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and 

Littlefield Publishers, 2007. 

Dupuy, Alex. “Disaster Capitalism to the Recue: The International 

Community and Haiti after the Earthquake”  NACLA Report on the 

Americas Vol. 43 No. 4 (2010): 14-19. 

Farmer, Paul. Haiti: After the Earthquake. New York, New York: 

PublicAffairs, 2011 

Hallward, Peter. Damming the Flood: Haiti and the Politics of 

Containment. New York and London: Verso, 2010.  

Ives, Kim. “Michel Martelly: Aristide’s Weak Imitator.” The Guardian. 

March 22, 2011. Accessed February 23, 2012. 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/mar/22/

haiti-jean-bertrand-aristide 

 

James, CLR. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San 

Domingo Revolution. Toronto, Ontario: Vintage Books, 1989. 

James, Eric Caple. Democratic Insecurities: Violence, Trauma, and 

Intervention in Haiti. Berkeley and Los Angeles California: University of 

California Press, 2010. 

Jessop, Bob. State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place. 

University Park Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 

1990. 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/mar/22/haiti-jean-bertrand-aristide
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/mar/22/haiti-jean-bertrand-aristide


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