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142 

The Dismantlement of the Netherlands Antilles: 
How Autonomy is More Viable than Independence  

Cameron Wathey 

 
Cameron Wathey is from the 37 square mile half-Dutch, half-French island of St. 
Maarten/St. Martin. His family roots are established on the Dutch side of the island, 
which is technically considered an autonomous country within the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. He is currently studying Cinema Studies, English, and History, with a 
specific focus on Caribbean History. He is also a student leader on campus, serving 
as the Vice-President Internal & Services for the University of Toronto Students’ 
Union. Cameron has a keen interest in the history and culture of the Caribbean, the 
diaspora, and politics of the region. 

On October 10th, 2010, the Netherlands Antilles was 
dismantled. The islands have decided to part ways with Curacao and 
St. Maarten as countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
while Bonaire, St. Eustatius, and Saba have become public 
authorities, the equivalence of municipalities in the Netherlands. The 
debates over the years pertaining to the viability of the Netherlands 
Antilles have ended with the Dutch Caribbean achieving their goal. 
Yet, these islands are not independent territories. They still remain 
apart of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This essay addresses the 
political history that has led to the recent dismantlement of the 
Netherlands Antilles in which the islands continue to be autonomous 
partners within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Due to the recent 
developments in the dismantlement, however, scholarly work has 
not been written on the status of the decolonization process as of yet. 
Therefore, this essay presents the decolonization process up to the 
final plunge in 2010. Attention will be focused on the context in 
which the Netherlands Antilles was created, and the key events that 
have occurred, with the results of 2004 referendum as the 
culminating event. The idea of autonomy explains why the Dutch 
territories fought for dissolution yet wanted to remain ‘partners’ with 
the Netherland as opposed to independent countries. 

 
For several islands in the Caribbean, the topic of 

independence does not concern them. A relatively large proportion 
of non-sovereign islands can still be found in the Caribbean with 
most being content with the present status of their country. The 
claim to the acceptance of their relationship with a ‘mother country’ 
is mainly due to the evident benefits that are attached with the status 
of non-sovereignty. Gert Oostindie claims in his article, Dependence 



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and Autonomy in Sub-National Island Jurisdictions: The Case of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, that between the collections of 
islands in the Caribbean, there is a positive correlation between non-
sovereignty and standards of living.1 According to his findings, 
Oostindie notes that sovereignty can be a drawback to the economic 
development.2 He notes that the three major countries in the region, 
Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic are all sovereign states. In 
terms of their economic development Haiti is currently the poorest 
country in the Caribbean with the Dominican Republic tailing right 
behind.3 As for the case of the ten richest islands in the Caribbean, 
nine of them are non-sovereign.4 Paul Sutton lists in his article Non-
Independent Territories and Small States: Retrospect and Prospect, 
that non-sovereign territories in the Caribbean also have the 
advantages of free trade with the metropolis, grants and social 
welfare assistance, access to foreign capital and labour markets, 
special tax concessions, aid for infrastructure and communications, a 
working health care system, high levels of school administration, and 
relatively low levels of crime compared to their independent 
counterparts.5 Other than the advantages of aid and security by the 
metropolis, the level of democracy and standards of governance is 
considerably higher in non-sovereign islands too. The non-
independent islands still attain autonomy, yet standards of 
governance are defined and enforced by the metropolis.6 For all the 
reasons listed, politicians on non-sovereign islands aspire to 
maintain their partnership with the metropolis, while at the same 
time securing maximum autonomy. Godfrey Baldacchino notes that 
non-sovereign territories, or what he refers to as a ‘sub-national 
island jurisdictions (SNIJ)’, are guaranteed a safety net by the 
metropolitan power, while are granted enough freedom to protect 
their national identity, local culture, and general exercise of local 
power.7 With the dismantlement of the Netherlands Antilles, it was 

                                                           
1 Gert Oostindie, “Dependency and autonomy in sub-national island jurisdictions: 

The Case of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.” The Round Table: The 

Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 95, no. 386 (2006): 610.  
2 Ibid., 610. 
3 Ibid., 610. 
4 Ibid., 611. 
5 Paul Sutton, “Non-independent Territories and Small States: Retrospect and 

Prospect” in Governance in the Non-Independent Caribbean: Challenges and 

Opportunities in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Peter Clegg and Emilio 

Pantojas-Garcia (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2009), xxxviii. 
6 Oostindie, Dependence and Autonomy in the Kingdom, 611.  
7 Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne, “Success Without Sovereignty: Exploring 



CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2013 

144 

not a matter of independence from the Netherlands. Rather it was 
about securing more autonomous advantages while retaining their 
relationship with the metropolis.  

 
The historical relationship between the Dutch Caribbean 

and the Kingdom of the Netherlands indicated the Dutch’s neglect 
for their ‘other’ colonies in the Atlantic. Like several other European 
empires, the presence of the Netherlands in the Caribbean dates 
back to age of colonial expansion in the seventeenth century. While 
the Dutch acquired six islands in the Atlantic, most of their colonial 
efforts were devoted towards the Pacific. The West Indies did not 
appear on the Netherlands’ agenda again until World War II. In her 
famous radio broadcast in 1942, Queen Wilhelmina of the 
Netherlands announced that after the war, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands would pursue a new course. The Queen spoke of 
‘complete partnership’ with and autonomy for the overseas 
territories. The Queen envisaged solidarity with the overseas 
territories in which the Dutch government would assist with internal 
affairs.8 This proclamation was a consequence of the growing 
nationalism in the Dutch East Indies, as well as pressure by the U.S. 
and England to impose a new approach to colonialism.9 The proposal 
was too late, however, because nationalists in Indonesia declared 
their independence after the end the war in 1945.10 The East Indies 
was considered a crucial extension to the economy of the 
Netherlands. The loss of their prized colony in the Pacific suggested 
that the Dutch were losing their foothold as an empire. Despite their 
military intervention, however, the Dutch failed to reclaim 
Indonesia. In 1949, under pressure from the Indonesian 
independence movement and United States, the Dutch were forced 
to accept the transfer of sovereignty to the independent Republic of 
Indonesia.11 Traumatized by a violent decolonization, the Dutch were 
willing to grant more autonomy for their territories in the West.  

                                                                                                                    
Sub-National Island Jurisdictions.” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal 

of International Affairs 95, no. 386 (2006): 490. 
8 Harold Mitchell, Europe in the Caribbean: The Policies of Great Britain, France, 

and the Netherlands towards their West Indian Territories in the Twentieth 

Century (Great Britain: University of Edinburgh, 1963), 39.  
9 Gert Oostindie and Inge Klinkers, Decolonising the Caribbean: Dutch Policies in 

a Comparative Perspective (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003), 66.  
10 Ibid., 66.  
11 Ibid., 67.  



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The failure of the Netherlands to reclaim Indonesia 
benefitted the decolonization of the Netherlands Antilles and 
Surinam. In an effort to improve their international image after the 
catastrophic decolonization of Indonesia, the Netherlands were 
willing to agree to negotiations with the Dutch Caribbean islands. 
The Caribbean islands had high hopes to acquire the autonomous 
privileges that were promised by the Kingdom during wartime. The 
overseas territories did not desire independence, but rather hoped to 
achieve autonomy while preserving a platonic relationship with the 
Kingdom.12 As for the Netherlands, integrating the colonies into 
overseas provinces, after the example of the overseas departments of 
France, was not an option because the Netherlands did not wish to 
involve the overseas territories in metropolitan affairs.13 The result of 
their round table conferences was the Statuut or the Charter of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1954. The Kingdom of the 
Netherlands was composed of three equal partners: the Netherlands, 
the Netherlands Antilles, and Suriname.  

 
The Netherlands Antilles and Surinam achieved their goal 

for autonomy with the Charter. The Charter was designed to grant 
Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles the rights to self-government 
while also remain part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.14 The 
Charter defined foreign affairs, defense, citizenship, and 
safeguarding proper governmental administration as matters of 
interest that would be governed by the Kingdom.15 With final 
authority over these affairs, the Netherlands believed that they were 
ensuring good governance and fundamental human rights in the 
Netherlands Antilles and Surinam.16 Paul Sutton lists that good 
governance is recognized as having a “broad range of concerns 
focused on open, transparent and accountable government; efficient, 
effective and responsive administration; and respect for human 
rights and law.”17 Good governance for the Netherlands was securing 
a local government that abided to the framework of democracy. 
Under the matters that concerned the Kingdom, however, local 
governments had little power to administer the best interests for 
their community. The equality promised in the Charter was 

                                                           
12 Ibid., 74.  
13 Mitchell, Europe in the Caribbean, 123.  
14 Ibid., 123.  
15 Oostindie , Decolonising the Caribbean, 217  
16 Ibid., 217.   
17 Sutton, Non-Independent Territories, xxxii 



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unbalanced from the very beginning. The lack of equality created 
tensions between local governments and the Kingdom’s obligation to 
guarantee good governance.18  

 
The Charter functioned as a form of regulation for several 

years of its instalment until the end of the 1960s. The turning point 
for the Charter came when violent riots broke out in Curaçao on May 
30 1969. It originally began as a labour conflict for higher wages then 
escalated into racial and political injustice that ended with mass 
rebellion. Rioters took to the streets and attempted to burn down the 
capital, Willemstad.19 The Netherlands sent Dutch marines to 
Curaçao to restore order in the capital of the Netherlands Antilles. 
While the revolt was quickly terminated, this intervention sparked 
criticism from the two parties involved. The people of Curaçao 
considered the military intervention as a form of neo-colonialism 
while the Netherlands found their political responsibility with the 
Netherlands Antilles as increasingly problematic.20 According to Gert 
Oostindie in Decolonising the Caribbean, from a Dutch perspective, 
the Netherlands was caught in a paradoxical situation. The Dutch 
were obligated to guarantee good governance while at the same time 
granted the local government the responsibility of overseeing local 
affairs.21 The Netherlands, therefore, believed that they needed to 
remove themselves from future obligations by dismantling the 
Netherlands Antilles.22  

 
For the Netherlands Antilles political independence was 

synonymous with economic decline. The economic benefits as part of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands made the option of independence 
unattractive. Aside from the safeguard of good governance, the 
Netherlands Antilles was provided with development aid from the 
Netherlands. This aid was used to reduce public debt and finance 
projects for the development of the infrastructure, with the 
participation of Dutch companies.23 The Netherlands complained 
that the Netherlands Antilles was too dependent on Dutch economic 

                                                           
18 Oostindie, Decolonsing the Caribbean, 218.  
19 Rita Giacalone, “The Political Status of Curacao at the End of the Twentieth 

Century,” in Islands at the Crossroads: Politics in the Non-Independent 

Caribbean, edited by Aaron Gamaliel Ramos and Angel Israel Rivera (Jamaica: 

Ian Randle Publishers, 2001), 96.  
20 Ibid. 96.  
21 Oostindie, Decolonising the Caribbean, 99.  
22 Ibid., 99.  
23 Giacalone, The Political Status, 99.  



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147 

support and did not produce any revenues in return.24 Therefore, the 
Dutch urged the Netherlands Antilles to pursue political 
independence however, the other Caribbean territories refused to 
distance themselves with the Kingdom based on the terms 
established in the Charter.  

 
After the end of the Curaçao revolt in 1969, the Netherlands 

attempted to disengage itself from its overseas dependencies. When 
Surinam proposed their independence to the Dutch, they were met 
with little resistance. The Dutch recognized Surinam’s inevitable 
independence as an opportunity to distance themselves from their 
Atlantic territories.25 The amount of time between Surinam’s 
proposal for independence to the actual transfer of their 
independence took only twenty months to come to fruition.26 This 
revealed the Dutch were not willing to gradually assist the 
Surinamese government, but would rather let them fend for 
themselves. By 1980, the government of Surinam fell under military 
dictatorship.27 The country was also on the brink of economic ruin. 
The Netherlands had imposed a ‘model decolonization’ that would 
continue to provide development aid, but it was too late.28 Even 
though the military regime has been replaced with a democratic 
country, Surinam has never recovered from the economic downfall.  

 
Unlike Surinam, the option for political independence for 

Netherlands Antilles has never been popular. The Dutch attempted 
to continue to dissociate themselves from the Atlantic after Surinam, 
but it was not that simple. To dismantle the Kingdom a change to the 
Charter of 1954 would be needed. To make any changes to the 
Charter, all partners involved would have to agree.29 The Prime 
Minister of the Netherlands Antilles from 1973 to 1977, Juancho 
Evertsz, stated in 1975 that independence would be completed under 
three conditions: first, all six island would have to realize self-
government; second, there would need to be a new cooperation 
between the islands; and finally, the islands will have attained a 

                                                           
24 Oostindie, Dependence and Autonomy, 616.  
25 Ibid, 617.  
26 Ibid., 617. 
27 Alma Young, “Decolonization in the Dutch Caribbean: Lessons from the 

Commonwealth Caribbean” in The Dutch Caribbean: Prospects for Democracy, 

edited by Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg (New York: Gordon and Breach Science, 1990), 

254.  
28 Ibid,. 255. 
29 Oostindie, Dependence and Autonomy, 616.  



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reasonable level of economic development before sovereignty 
began.30 Evertsz’ requirements for independence emphasized that 
only when the Netherlands Antilles agreed to these preconditioned 
terms would the Dutch realize their proposal for the independence of 
the Netherlands Antilles. With much annoyance to the Dutch, the 
Netherlands Antilles proved that independence would not be an 
option.  

 
The Netherlands’ hope for the decolonization of the 

Netherlands Antilles was fading after the disastrous results with 
Surinam’s independence in 1975. The first several years following 
Surinam’s independence the country underwent civil war, economic 
downturn, a significant lowering of standards of living, and 
corruption flourished.31 Nevertheless, Aruba realized that 
independence from the Netherlands Antilles might be the only way 
to achieve complete autonomy. The government of the Netherlands 
Antilles was composed of a two-tier institutional system: a 
parliament (Staten) for all the islands and a local government called 
the island council (eilandsraad).32 When the Charter was 
constructed Curaçao, the largest and most populated island, was 
granted majority control over the parliament of the Netherlands 
Antilles. Out of 22 seats for parliament, Curaçao occupied eleven, 
eight for Aruba, one for Bonaire, and one for the Windward Group 
(St. Maarten, St. Eustatius, and Saba).33 Therefore, Curaçao 
governed the federation’s affairs.  

 
In 1977, Aruba had grown tired of living in the shadow of 

Curaçao’s authority. Aruba’s decision to secede from the Netherlands 
Antilles was stemmed from Curaçao’s domination as the capital of 
the federation and along with the discrimination incited by 
Curaçao.34 Aruba’s struggle for independence could not be achieved 
without Curaçao’s approval. Furthermore, Aruba would also have to 
acquire approval from the other islands in the Netherlands Antilles, 

                                                           
30 Oostindie, Decolonising the Caribbean, 117. 
31 Armando Lampe, “The Recolonisation of Aruba,” in Islands at the Crossroads: 

Politics in the Non-Independent Caribbean, edited by Aaron Gamaliel Ramos and 

Angel Israel Rivera (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001), 107.  
32 Lammert de Jong, “The Implosion of the Netherlands Antilles,” in Governance 

in the Non-Independent Caribbean: Challenges and Opportunities in the Twenty-

First Century, edited by Peter Clegg and Emilio Pantojas-Garcia (Kingston: Ian 

Randle Publishers, 2009), 28.   
33 Young, Lessons, 257.  
34 Ibid., 257.  



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and most importantly, from the Netherlands. After many years of 
struggle, Betico Croes of the majority party in Aruba finally received 
cooperation in 1983 from all parties involved.35 Croes, however, did 
not bargain for independence. Croes argued for status aparte 
(separate status), in which Aruba would secede from the Netherlands 
Antilles in order to manage most of their domestic affairs.36 
Moreover, Aruba would continue as a partner of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands would only agree to Aruba’s status 
aparte on the condition that Aruba would be compelled to accept 
independence after ten years. These ten years would serve as a 
transition period for Aruba to gradually build a stable government 
and economy before they were deemed independent.37 Thus, on 
January 1, 1986, Aruba attained status aparte and was converted 
into an autonomous partner within the Dutch Kingdom, yet 
separated from the federation of the Netherlands Antilles. When the 
time came for their independence in 1996, Aruba succeeded with 
attaining permanent status aparte within the Kingdom.38 Aruba 
realized that independence would be a risky decision that may or 
may not end with freedom or the right to self-determination of their 
government. With the status aparte, Aruba was guaranteed greater 
autonomy, good governance, economic security from the metropolis, 
as well as a higher standard of living for its people. 

 
Aruba’s secession called for the reconfiguration of the 

Netherlands Antilles’ federal legislature. Until all parties settled 
upon the restructure of the Netherlands Antilles, the vacant seats in 
parliament were divided among the remaining five islands. Curaçao 
solidified their dominance over the central government with fourteen 
out of twenty fours seats.39 Despite being the second largest island in 
the federation after Aruba’s secession as well as the former 
representative for the Windward Islands in parliament, Sint. 
Maarten’s one seat only increased to three.40 Nonetheless, Sint 
Maarten was no longer dependent on Curaçao or the central 

                                                           
35 Robertico Croes and Lucita Moenir Alam, “Decolonization of Aruba within the 

Netherlands Antilles,” in The Dutch Caribbean: Prospects for Democracy, edited 

by Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg (New York: Gordon and Breach Science, 1990), 85.  
36 Oostindie, Decolonsing the Caribbean, 129.  
37 Croes, Decolonization of Aruba, 86.  
38 Oostindie, Dependence and Autonomy, 618.  
39 Fabian Badejo, “Sint Maarten: the Dutch half in future perspective” in The 

Dutch Caribbean: Prospects for Democracy, edited by Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg 

(New York: Gordon and Breach Science, 1990), 128.  
40 Ibid., 129.  



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government at the time of the restructure.41 A once a sleepy, 
uninhabited island with hardly any economic activity has since 
transformed into an economic superpower within the Caribbean due 
to extensive investments in the tourist industry.42 From the 
perspective of the politicians on the island, Sint Maarten was already 
autonomous and self-sufficient. As for the discussion of the 
Netherlands Antilles, the Netherlands concluded that cutting all ties 
with their Caribbean islands was no longer a possibility. Instead, the 
Dutch proposed in 1990 a draft constitution to split the Netherlands 
Antilles into Curaçao and Bonaire as one country followed by St. 
Maarten, Saba, and St. Eustatius as the other.43 The draft 
constitution was immediately rejected, however. The Dutch went 
back to the drawing board only to come back three years later to 
propose status aparte for each island.44 Political parties in Curaçao 
strongly pushed for this offer, but as the results of the referendums 
showed, the people spoke and they preferred to maintain ties with 
the Netherlands Antilles.45 The idea of dissolution was dismissed 
once more, for the time being at least.   

 
After a stalemate for the remainder of the twentieth century, 

Sint Maarten revived debates that have sparked the first step to the 
dismantlement.46 The contrasting results of the referendums held in 
2004 and 2005 marked the end of the Netherlands Antilles.47 With 
69 percent, Sint Maarten opted for separate status as an autonomy 
country within the Kingdom. Curaçao too preferred separate status 
with 68 percent. Saba and Bonaire’s voters preferred for unilateral 
link with the Netherlands while Stats preferred to maintain the 
status quo.48 The outcome of these results clearly indicated that the 
Netherlands Antilles was not functioning according to the five 
islands. Like Aruba, Sint Maarten no longer wanted to take orders 
from the dominant Curaçao. Ironically, Curaçao wanted to free itself 
from the burden of its responsibility of overlooking the affairs of 
Bonaire, Saba, and St. Eustatius. Curaçao wanted to focus on its own 

                                                           
41 Ibid., 131.  
42 Ibid., 124.  
43 Jong, Implosion, 29.  
44 Ibid., 29.  
45 Ibid., 29.  
46 Ibid., 30.  
47 Ibid., 31.  
48 Oostindie, Dependence and Autonomy, 620. 



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development.49 On 10-10-10, the five islands were promised what 
they voted for. 

 
After fifty years since the configuration of the Kingdom of 

the Netherlands, the Dutch Caribbean islands were still obsessed 
with autonomy and refused to completely severe their ties with the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. Why would a non-sovereign territory 
argue for independence when the benefits to autonomy include 
powers over finance, powers over environmental policy, powers over 
access, powers over free movements of persons, and powers over 
tourism policy?50 Curaçao and Sint Maarten are now on the same 
page as Aruba with high degrees of autonomy. Similarly, the 
Netherlands has also been relieved of the burden of their larger 
Caribbean territories. Even though there is no longer a federation 
that connects the Dutch Caribbean islands, these territories will 
never completely lose their relationship with the Netherlands. Their 
relationship within the Kingdom involves a direct connection with 
the Netherlands, including a Dutch passport, migration to the 
Netherlands, Dutch protection, and a functioning democracy.51 
Furthermore, Aruba’s status aparte has been a prime example of 
Curaçao and Sint Maarten should expect. Since their separation, 
Aruba has performed good governance, and boosted local culture as 
well as what it means to be an Aruban. As for Sint Maarten, they can 
continue to improve tourist economy without Curaçao looking over 
their shoulder. Curaçao too can work on improving and developing 
their economy as well. The dismantlement of the Netherlands 
Antilles could very well be the best-case scenario for the smaller 
islands to improve local conditions with the financial security. The 
larger, more self-sufficient islands now have the ability to improve 
their local culture since each island is unique when it comes to the 
language, race, and environment. The dismantlement of the 
Netherlands Antilles has granted more autonomy for those who 
asked for it and a closer relationship to the Netherlands for those 
who still are dependent on the ‘mother country’. These non-
sovereign territories seem to have the best of both worlds, but as 
seen through the history of the Netherlands Antilles, only time can 
tell if it will remain this way.  
 

  

                                                           
49 Ibid., 620.  
50 Sutton, Non-independent Territories, xxxvii.  
51 Oostindie, Decolonising the Caribbean, 221.  



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Citations 

Badejo, Fabian. “Sint Maarten: the Dutch half in future perspective” in 

The Dutch Caribbean: Prospects for Democracy, edited by Betty Sedoc 

Dahlberg, 119-149. New York: Gordon and Breach Science, 1990. 

 

Baldacchino, Godfrey and David Milne, “Success Without Sovereignty: 

Exploring Sub-National Island Jurisdictions.” The Round Table: The 

Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 95, no. 386 (2006):490. 

Croes, Robertico and Lucita Moenir Alam. “Decolonization of Aruba 

within the Netherlands Antilles,” in The Dutch Caribbean: Prospects for 

Democracy, edited by Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg, 81-102. New York: Gordon 

and Breach Science, 1990.  

 

de Jong, Lammert. “The Implosion of the Netherlands Antilles,” in 

Governance in the Non-Independent Caribbean: Challenges and 

Opportunities in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Peter Clegg and 

Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, 24-44. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2009.   

 

Giacalone, Rita. “The Political Status of Curaçao at the End of the 

Twentieth Century,” in Islands at the Crossroads: Politics in the Non 

Independent Caribbean, edited by Aaron Gamaliel Ramos and Angel 

Israel Rivera, 95-105. Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001, 96. 

 

Lampe, Armando. “The Recolonisation of Aruba,” in Islands at the 

Crossroads: Politics in the Non-Independent Caribbean, edited by Aaron 

Gamaliel Ramos and Angel Israel Rivera, 106-113. Jamaica: Ian Randle 

Publishers, 2001.  

 

Mitchell, Harold. Europe in the Caribbean: The Policies of Great Britain, 

France, and the Netherlands towards their West Indian Territories in the 

Twentieth Century. Great Britain: University of Edinburgh, 1963. 

 

Oostindie, Gert and Inge Klinkers. Decolonising the Caribbean: Dutch 

Policies in a Comparative Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 

University Press, 2003. 

Oostindie, Gert. “Dependency and autonomy in sub-national island 

jurisdictions: The case of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.” The Round 

Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 95, no. 386 

(2006) 609-626.  

 



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Paul Sutton, “Introduction: Non-independent Territories and Small 

States: Retrospect and Prospect” in Governance in the Non 

Independent Caribbean: Challenges and Opportunities in the Twenty 

First Century, edited by Peter Clegg and Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, xxiii-xliii. 

Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2009.  

 

Young, Alma. “Decolonization in the Dutch Caribbean: Lessons from the 

Commonwealth Caribbean” in The Dutch Caribbean: Prospects for 

Democracy, edited by Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg, 255-267 New York: 

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