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154 

From Democratic Socialism to a Neoliberal 
Agenda: A Jamaican Case Study 

Raquel Brown 

 
Raquel Brown is a graduate of the University of Toronto. She completed her Hon. 
Bachelors of Arts with majors in Political Science and Sociology and a minor in 
Caribbean Studies. She is particularly interested in the development of the global 
south; the links between globalization, migration, immigration and Canadian public 
policy. 
 
Introduction 
 

This paper looks at Jamaica's experience with neoliberal 
policies. It argues that structural adjustment policies implemented 
through the International Monetary Fund has undermined 
democracy and autonomy, as well as hindered economic 
development of the Jamaican economy. Further, the paper will also 
highlight the ways in which dependence on foreign loans reduces a 
government's ability to fully engage its citizens in the process of 
economic development. A brief but necessary historical 
contextualization of the formation of the two major political parties 
and immediate independence period of Jamaica will be outlined. A 
more detailed exploration of the period from 1972 to 1989 will be 
undertaken, as this period is characterized by the emergence of two 
very different ideologies in Jamaican politics. More significantly, 
during this period the Jamaican economy had its first introduction to 
neoliberal policies.  

 
The period of 1972- 1980 will be compared to the period 

1981 - 1989, as these periods are characterized by opposing political 
and economic ideologies, the former being democratic- socialism, 
the latter being a neoliberal democracy. It will be argued that during 
the 1970s, the government of the Peoples National Party (PNP), 
under the leadership of Michael Manley, had greater autonomy over 
the affairs of the nation than the Jamaica Labour Party of the 1980s 
under Prime Minister Edward Seaga. In essence the PNP in the 
1970s: 1) was able to independently decide what the country's foreign 
policy would look like and who its allies would be. 2) Had more 
freedom over its economic policies; they were able to decide what 
goods and services came through its wharfs for local consumption. 
Resulting from this, the government was in a better position to 
ensure the longevity of local businesses. 3) The government of the 



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70s had autonomy over the implementation of social policies; these 
policies included social welfare, education, and health.                                                              
 
Historical Context 

 
The two party system in Jamaica was born out of a divide in 

the nationalist movement in 1943. Alexander Bustamante the leader 
of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) left the Peoples 
National Party (PNP). Bustamante formed the Jamaica Labour Party 
(JLP) to run against the PNP in Jamaica's first election with 
universal suffrage in 1944. At the time the PNP was supported by the 
upper-middle class and the capitalist class and was committed to 
Fabian socialism. The JLP on the other hand had its support in the 
working class and a small conservative section of the capitalist class. 
Both parties’ ideologies became very similar over the course of time. 
In the 1950s they started to drift apart, with shifted support base; the 
JLP attracted the middle class voters, and the formation of the 
national workers movement by the PNP gained them the working 
class vote (Stephens and Stephen, 1987). 

 
During the period from 1950 to the 1960s economic growth 

in Jamaica was rapid. Foreign investment and exports led to foreign 
domination over the economy, this also increased levels of social 
inequality within society (Girvan and Bernal 1982). Jamaica 
imported half its food, all of its energy and capital goods as well as a 
significant portion of its raw material and consumer goods. This was 
paid for by the bauxite and tourist industry (Stephens and Stephens, 
1987). The economy grew at an average rate of 8 percent in the 1950s 
and 5 percent in the 1960s. However, between 1960 and 1972 
unemployment jumped by 7.5% affecting nearly a quarter of the 
population. Growing inequality resulted in social tensions and a rise 
in crime rates (Stephen and Stephen, 1987). 
 
Social-Democracy and the Manley Era 1972-1980 

 
Resulting from the growing inequalities of the 1960s, in 

1972 the Peoples National Party was elected under the leadership of 
Michael Manley. Manley enjoyed wide support from various stratas 
of society.  At this time Manley was best described as a populist; he 
enjoyed mass support and was not organized along specific class 
lines (Payne, 1994). Keeping with his mandate of ‘change’ the 
Manley government initiated numerous social projects which were 
aimed at improving the social and economic well being of the 



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Jamaican masses (Henke, 1994). The social projects and reforms 
included a Land Lease project, the commitment to universal 
secondary education, skill training for young people, adult literacy 
programs, food subsidies, equal pay for women, nationalization of 
telephone, transport, electricity companies and recognized statutory 
corporations which kept him in favour with the capitalist class 
(Payne, 1994; Girvan and Bernal 1982). The reforms Manley 
undertook were aimed at creating social and political conditions that 
would foster social justice and improve the quality of lives of 
Jamaicans. For Manley, social justice is the key to national 
development (Manley, 1974).  

 
In 1974, the Manley administration made a significant break 

from the previous government's economic directions when they 
announced that they were adopting democratic socialism as the 
parties’ official ideology (Henke 1994). Democratic socialism, 
defined in Kaufman (1885) “...was a political economic theory under 
which the means of production, distribution and the exchange are 
owned and/or controlled by the people...political power is used to 
ensure that exploitation is abolished, that the opportunities of 
society are equally available to all and that wealth...is fairly 
distributed”. The democratic socialist programme rejects socialism 
as an economic policy but preserves the right of every Jamaican to 
own private property. This programme called for Jamaica to 
diversify its economy and create private and public sector linkages 
(Kaufman, 1985).  

 
The dependence of the 50s and 60s made Jamaica more 

vulnerable to the economic crisis of the 70s; the country’s economy 
simply could not absorb the sudden rise in oil prices. In 1974 
Jamaica’s oil bill rose from $64 JMD million to $177 JMD million1. 
Subsequently other prices rose, the impact was felt most when 
purchasing groceries and manufactured goods. The cost of living 
went up as a result. Foreign capital inflows were on a decline as was 
income from tourism: this created a need for alternative sources of 
revenue.  In January 1974, the government announced its plans to 
renegotiate tax agreements with US and Canadian owned Bauxite 
companies. A production levy was to be implemented that taxed all 
bauxite mined or processed in the country. The initial rate of the tax 
was set at 7.5% of the selling price of aluminum.  The revenue 

                                                           
1 In 1974 the exchange rate was $1 USD= $0.90 JMD 

http://www.boj.org.jm/foreign_exchange/fx_rates_annual.php 



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generated from this moved profit from a marginal $22 million JMD 
to $170 million JMD in two years (Payne, 1994). 

 
Increased payments from bauxite were critical to the 

expansion of government services.  The government had also 
developed a National Bauxite Commission to examine the issues of 
revenue generation. Under Manley, Jamaica also played an 
instrumental role in the development of an International Bauxite 
Association (IBA) which has major oil exporters as its partners. The 
IBA countries produced 85 percent of the capitalist world’s bauxite 
(Kaufman 1985). The formation of the IBA put Jamaica out of favour 
with the Kissinger administration as it promoted ‘wider Third World 
resistance to Western economic interests’ (Payne, 1994).  

 
The Manley administration also sought to enhance self 

reliance. They did this by expanding their international 
relationships; going beyond traditional trading and economic 
partnerships with the US and Britain. In adopting new foreign 
policies, the Manly government became friendly with Cuba, and 
created third world trade alliances. In 1973, Manley arrived with 
Fidel Castro and Forbes Burnham at the Algiers Conference of Heads 
of State of the Non-Aligned Countries. This resulted in Jamaica 
being included in high profile Third World politics boosting its 
responsibilities in the years to come. For example, Jamaica was 
placed on the Security Council of the UN and Manley had been 
influential in negotiating a settlement in Zimbabwe and in the 
agitation of the New International Economic Order. Under Manley, 
Jamaica also took steps to expand its Bauxite exports to the USSR 
and Eastern Europe, however the world economic markets were not 
favorable to the expansion of an export led economy at this time 
(Kaufmann 1994).  

 
Because of the unpredictability of international markets, the 

rise in oil prices, as well as an unfavorable economic climate, Manley 
opted to place restrictions on imports (Kaufman 1994). The main 
motivation behind the restrictions, Manley explained, is that 
reduction in imports will aid in self reliance: Jamaicans will learn to 
make things themselves and create local industries. This will result 
in the creation of more jobs for the Jamaican people. More 
importantly, the restrictions were an immediate response to 



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economic pressures; reducing luxury imports would save much need 
foreign exchange for the essentials2.  

 
Manley’s new friends and trade partners continued to 

weaken Jamaica’s relationship with the United States. The friendship 
reached its most tumultuous stage when Manley in 1976 supported 
Cuban presence in Angola. In a meeting with US Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger (late 1975) Manley was asked to remain neutral on 
the Cuban-Angolan situation, it was implied that the much needed 
$100 million USD trade credit depended on it. Days after this 
meeting Manley announced his support for the Cuban presence in 
Angola, this resulted in US economic aid being embargoed for the 
rest of the Ford administration’s term (Payne, 1994). In 1976, attacks 
from the US press practically destroyed the tourist industry. 
Disturbances in tourism occurred alongside declining remittances 
and the development of a black market in Jamaica. The local 
Jamaican local newspaper: The Daily Gleaner, made unfounded 
allegations daily. The international commercial bank ceased making 
new loans to the country. At the same time crime was rampant; this 
led to claims that the CIA was trying to destabilize the Jamaican 
government (Girvan and Bernal 1982).  The evidence supporting 
destabilization, albeit seemingly isolated incidents, was too much to 
ignore. Payne (1994) suggests that after investigating several 
incidents that transpired in 1976 compiled with testimony by Philip 
Agee, former CIA operative, there might have been destabilization 
underway. The USA however has denied any involvement. Blum 
(2004) seems to support CIA presence in Jamaica at the time.  
Destabilization or not, the combined result of the 1976 disturbances 
was a loss in the exchange reserve of a detrimental $254 million USD 
(Girvan and Bernal, 1982).   

 
Despite all the social disturbances and economic shortfalls, 

the PNP was re-elected for a second term in December 197. This was 
a testament to the appeal and effectiveness of their political and 
social programs (Girvan and Bernal, 1982). It should be noted 
however, at this time Manley could not be seen as populist. Though 
he had won the second term, he had lost a significant portion of his 
upper and middle-class following and had gained an even larger 
working class following (Stone, 1981). His vision of change came 
with sacrifice: Manley alienated himself from many of the upper and 

                                                           
2 Interview with Micheal Manley by Journalist Gil Noble  on “Like It Is” October 

28, 1977 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tKvvKaQhFY 



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middle classes when his plan of reform began to infringe on the 
importation and use of luxury items. In 1975, Manley 
unapologetically told the people that ‘Jamaica has five flights a day 
to Miami’ for those who were not willing to make the necessary 
sacrifices to build a new Jamaica (Weis, 2005). This statement was 
directed toward the middle and upper class. 

 
The entire second term of the Manley regime was plagued 

by economic crisis (Stephens and Stephens, 1987). PNPs victory 
came at the same time as the exhaustion of the central banks liquid 
reserves. Within the PNP camp there were serious discussions about 
the economic crisis, and the IMF must have been considered as an 
option for alleviating the immediate economic problems. The left-
leaning within the party were doubtful of the efficiency of the IMFs 
approach to Third World economies and argued Jamaica could 
survive the economic crisis by careful spending and supplementary 
loans of other kinds. In January 1977, Manley explained the position 
to Jamaican people, stating the IMF imposes difficult conditions on 
countries who are trying to secure loans. He went on to say ‘we are 
the masters in our own house and in our house there shall be no 
masters but ourselves, Above all we are not for sale.’(Thomas, 2001). 
The PNPs team of economist drafted an elaborate emergency 
production plan that would increase self-reliance in the production 
of food and raw materials diversify economic relations and promote 
state sector investment, inter alia. The plan was rejected by the 
cabinet because of the anticipated repercussions (Stephens and 
Stephens, 1987).  The IMF loans appeared to be the only options for 
foreign exchange at the time. Further, in a national poll conducted by 
Carl Stone in 1977, 76 percent of the populations were in favour of 
US aid. This was hardly the climate to challenge the dominance of 
international Capitalism. (Stone, 1980) 

 
The Carter administration appeared to want a more friendly 

relationship with the Caribbean. US policy at that time appeared to 
be persuading Jamaica back to the ‘Western camp’. The US also 
made known that US aid would be forthcoming if Jamaica repaired 
its relationship with the IMF. Jamaica resumed negotiations with the 
IMF. Initially the government appeared to have some bargaining 
power. However, in December 1977, the Bank of Jamaica exceeded 
its prescribed ceiling by 2.6 percent. The IMF deemed this economic 
mismanagement and suspended the next insulation of the loan 
(Payne, 1994). As Bartilow (1997) puts it, this was a ‘carefully 
constructed trap’. The IMFs set unrealistic targets to encourage 



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Jamaica’s noncompliance. When these targets were not met Jamaica 
was introduced to ‘a very stringent adjustment programme’ 
(Bartilow, 1997). A new agreement was finally concluded in 1978, 
which in Manley’s words, ‘was one of the most savage packages ever 
imposed on any client government of the IMF’ (Payne, 1994). The 
fund demanded price liberalizations, interest rate adjustments, 
currency devaluation and cuts to social spending. Unfortunately 
none of this alleviated economic decline, it had however, successfully 
undermined the parties goals of social reform. Over the next year, 
the dismal outlook of the plan led the party to seek ‘non-IMF’ 
alternatives to Jamaica's economic problems. Prime Minister Manley 
announced a general election one year before it was due, giving 
Jamaicans the opportunity to decide what economic path the 
country would take and whether the IMF was going to be a part of 
that path (Girvan and Bernal, 1982). 
 
Seaga and Jamaica’s Neoliberal Agenda 
 

In October 1980, the Jamaican working class decided they 
could not sacrifice any longer. The Jamaica Labour Party, under 
Edward Seaga, won the elections with an overwhelming majority. 
His campaign emphasized ‘deliverance’ from the tragedies of 
socialism and promised ‘to make money jingle in your pockets’ 
(Henke, 1999; Weis, 2005). Seaga was very vocal about embracing 
pro-US foreign policy and free market domestic policies. This 
rhetoric was aimed at US conservatives and successfully mended 
Jamaican-US relations as it was well received by the Reagan 
administration. Following the change in rhetoric in Jamaica, the US 
government extended extraordinary resources to the island (Biddle 
and Stephens, 1989).  

 
In addition to Jamaica’s renewed relationship with Western 

democracy, the countries internal dynamics also changed. The style 
and transparency of public disclosure on topics of the economy and 
politics was eroded in the 1980s. The rhetoric of the 70s was based 
on themes such as self reliance, liberation and non alignment. In the 
80s the rhetoric was centered on the functioning of markets, macro 
and micro economic management with a general anti-communist 
sentiment (Henke 1994). The ideology of the country shifted from 
democratic socialism to neoliberalism. There was no room in 
political dialogue for critical questioning of the status quo. Questions 
of democracy, human rights and social development in Jamaica were 
completely bypassed in public debate. The focus was placed on short 



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term questioning and reasoning about immediate, small scale 
problems of economic management. The larger issue of national 
development was overlooked for the most part (Haneke 1999). 

 
In keeping with the countries new neoliberal ideologies and 

embracing a pro-US ideology, the government adjusted its 
diplomatic ties. As soon as Seaga was inaugurated, the JLP 
government extradited the Cuban ambassador. Shortly after, the 
government also withdrew its plans for regional expansionism. The 
local and foreign press  were pleased with Sega’s diplomatic decision 
and praised him in the media. By the end of 1981 Jamaica completely 
severed its relations with Cuba. This break was good for a ‘US 
Caribbean policy scheme’ which was aimed at isolating Cuba. The US 
commended Jamaica for their ‘sovereign’ decision that was ‘essential 
to their own interest’ (Henke, 1994). 

 
In aligning himself with US foreign policy, Seaga throughout 

his time in office removed diplomatic ties with Grenada. The 
government supported the exclusion of Grenada from the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative, stating that Cuba and other socialist countries would 
take care of Grenada’s needs. Seaga also supported the Barbadian 
Prime Minister’s proposal to exclude countries from CARICOM that 
deviated from the norms of parliamentary democracy in the 
Caribbean. This was clearly designed to isolate Grenada (Libby 
1990).  Seaga also played an instrumental role in supporting the US 
invasion of Grenada, the JLP government even involved Jamaican 
forces (in minor roles) in the operation in 1983 (Payne 1994). 
       

Seaga’s first priority in office was to secure financial funding 
and prevent Jamaica from going bankrupt. In his first address to the 
nation, he declared there was only foreign exchange for four more 
days. He signed a short term loan agreement with Venezuela and 
committed himself to restoring Jamaica’s relationship with the IMF. 
In April 1981 the Seaga government received its first loan of $698 
million USD. It is important to note that the IMF did not impose the 
harsh conditions that they imposed on the Manley government. 
Seaga’s government was not required to devalue the Jamaican 
currency and there was no imposition of wage and price control 
(Payne 1994). 

 
In the year following the election Jamaica emerged as one of 

the most committed client states to the US government in the 
Caribbean area (Payne 1994). Weis (2005) posits that Jamaica was 



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the US’s special project and it was believed that the failure of the 
program in Jamaica would confirm the views of the rest of the Third 
World. That cooperation with the IMF was a pointless undertaking. 
As a result by 1985 Jamaica had received twenty-seven times more 
per-capita USAID that did sub-Saharan Africa (Weis, 2005).  

 
Despite the high levels of IMF/ World Bank support, the 

economic performance in Jamaica was dismal. By 1983 the economic 
situation in Jamaica was so bad that the government had to 
implement a two-tier exchange rate. This assisted in further 
devaluations of the dollar. By March of the same year Jamaica had 
failed its first IMF performance test under the Seaga government, by 
September they had failed the second (Payne 1994). The average 
growth rate was barely 1.2 % by 1985 the country had gone to a 
recession. In 1988 the real GDP still had not reached the growth rate 
it was in the second year of Democratic Socialism. The social 
conditions deteriorated rapidly as a response to IMF austerity 
programs. Class antagonism heightened during the 80s, and the gap 
between the rich and the poor widened. Financial constraints 
reduced the government's ability to regulate (re)distribution of goods 
and services (Henke, 1994). 

 
The Jamaican people were losing faith and patience with the 

Seaga government. Seaga was elected with a sweeping majority. In 
May 1981, public opinion polls showed that JLP had a 28% lead over 
the Manley government. By the end of that year only 7% of people in 
the opinion polls favour Seaga over Manley; in October 1982 the PNP 
pulled ahead with 43 percent favoring them and 38 percent favoring 
the JLP. On November 23, Seaga announced an economic plan that 
included further devaluations of the dollar (Payne 1994). Dr. Paul 
Robertson, the general secretariat of the PNP, condemned ‘in the 
strongest terms the deception enacted on the Jamaican people by the 
Prime Minister regarding the September 30 IMF test’. The statement 
went on to accuse the JLP government of misrepresenting the truth 
about the IMF performance test. The statement also accused the 
government of a lack of transparency and said the country should 
have been immediately informed about the failure of the tests. 
Robertson declared that ‘the only honorable thing would be for the 
Minister of Finance [Seaga] to resign. The People’s National Party 



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hereby calls for his resignation.’(Daily Gleaner, November 23, 
1983)3. 

 
On November 26, Prime Minister Edward Seaga announced 

that he would hold elections on December 15th. Sega asserted that 
the call for his resignation was a "challenge to my sincerity, my 
honesty and my integrity based upon a public statement which I 
made, the accuracy of which was the subject of technical 
interpretations between Jamaica and the IMF, the resolution of 
which was not concluded having been superseded by another [IMF] 
agreement"4. The PNP boycotted the election on grounds of 
illegitimacy. They stated that the elections were being held using the 
1980 voters list; this would disenfranchise 150,000 young people.5 
The JLP subsequently had the largest victory in the history of 
Jamaican elections, claiming all seats uncontested.  

 
Payne (1994) suggests that the snap elections were strategic. 

Seaga was falling out of public favour and there was real prospect 
that his government would be the first Jamaican government, since 
independence, to be removed from office after serving only one term. 
There were two things working in his favour: an election in 1983 
would mean that the voters list would not be updated to include 
those who had come of age after 1980, these young people 
predominantly favored Manley. In public opinion polls, 40 percent 
of the electorate were opposed to calling elections on the old voters 
list (Bryan 2009). Second, Seaga was riding high on Jamaica’s role in 
the invasion of Grenada was successful at painting the Grenadian 
government as illiberal without frequently held elections. He was 
also able to show that the PNP had taken part in the allegedly 
subversive meetings in Nicaragua with other Socialist International 
Parties in the region. Seaga in essence was effectively able to deploy 
the classic ‘red scare.’ Roberson’s comments were the perfect excuse 
to call elections before the Grenadian effect had worn off (Payne 
1994). 

After his victory, Seaga remained committed to the course 
he had set. However during later years he was more openly critical of 
IMF policies. The ultimate justification for continuing a one-party 
system would be improved economic situation and quality of life for 

                                                           
3 Daily gleaner “Elections over the years” Lloyd Williams October 14, 2002 

http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20021014/news/news6.html 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid 



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Jamaicans. However in the years to come the JLP government was 
faced with further economic deterioration and a widening gap 
between the rich and the poor. In the midst of economic hardship 
there was some progress. Despite complaints from the private sector, 
companies like Island Life, Highgate Chocolate and Seprod showed 
definite signs of growth. Kingston Free-Zone had found employment 
for six thousand women. Exports had increased generating much 
needed foreign exchange. The tourism industry was also booming 
showing 62 percent more growth. Despite all this growth economic 
recovery was elusive. In a public opinion poll taken in 1986, 
Jamaicans believed that their situation had worsened. After 1984, 
the economy had turned to negative growth. In 1985 the 
government’s debt payments neared half the countries export 
earnings (Bryan 2009). 

 
In 1985 the government signed a new IMF agreement for a 

loan of $120 million JMD on the conditions that there would be 
further budget cuts, tighter control on credit and more cuts in the 
public sector. This came after 65 thousand jobs were cut in the 
previous two years. At this point Seaga became vocally critical of the 
IMF and openly stated that their policies were counter productive 
(Bryan 2009). The Jamaican people were disgruntled and could not 
take any further devaluation of the dollar. In 1986 the government 
took a new approach to IMF and really started to attempt 
bargaining:  in September of that year Seaga went to Washington to 
discuss why he was deliberately not making payments to the IMF. 
This meeting was blunt, the Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs informed Seaga to create a proper privatization process and 
devalue the Jamaican dollar further to its real market level. Seaga 
continued negotiations, he conducted some privatization measure 
but he knew as it related to currency devaluation he had no 
alternative but to hold ground. The fund relented and in January 
1987 the JLP signed its fourth major agreement with the IMF 
(Payne, 1994). 

 
The success of this negotiation was pivotal. For Seaga, they 

marked the beginning of a much more positive relationship with the 
IMF. The IMF relented, but there was no doubt that the devaluations 
would take place at the end of the loan period if the inflation target 
was not met. Nevertheless Seaga’s negotiations bought him more 
time. Seaga was able to announce real GDP growth for the fiscal year 
1986-1987 of 3-4%. The main factors that accounted for this growth 
however were falling oil prices and growth of exports to the US under 



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the 807 programmes; but most significantly, the growth of the 
tourist industry. It can be argued that this growth was 
unambiguously an achievement of the JLP government, their 
alignment with US foreign policy restored Jamaica’s favorable world 
image as a holiday destination. In 1988 and the previous year, 
Seaga’s government had significantly increased public expenditure 
on road building. When introducing the April 1988 budget, he 
announced his ‘social well-being programme’ which was designed to 
rebuild the country's social services. The political message was clear: 
because finances were under control, the social costs of the 
adjustment programme could now be tackled. In late 1988, Seaga 
secured another loan from the IMF without much problem. However 
there were accusations that aid was being distributed along party 
lines. This damaged JLP in the public opinion polls and the PNP 
reasserted itself. This was right about the time of elections; Seaga 
had run out of time politically. In the elections of February 1989, the 
PNP took 45 of 50 seats with 57% popularity.  
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 
 The political ideology of the 1970s was democratic 
socialism. This was a political economic theory under which the 
means of production, distribution and the exchange are owned 
and/or controlled by the people. Manley, the leader of the PNP, had 
a long term vision for the country. He wanted to create an equitable 
society because, for him, equity was the foundation on which 
development is built.  As Stone (1989) puts it, Manley was seen as 
the ‘trade unionist’: someone concerned with fairness, social justice 
and equity for the poor. He was voted in as a populist leader in 1972; 
however, by the time of his re-election he had lost the vote of the 
upper and middle-class. Towards the end of his second term, the 
working class had also lost faith in Manley’s ability to lift them out of 
poverty.  

 
Seaga’s political ideology in the 1980s was neoliberalism. 

The JLP’s 1980 manifesto declared the parties intention to "create a 
market system of economics... to shift unnecessary public enterprises 
to the private sector... [and the] progressive liberalization of import 
restrictions leading eventually to the elimination of all licensing 
requirements" (Wilson 1996). Seaga was seen as the manager and 
the fixer: he creates benefits by increasing production, income and 
cash flow (Stone, 1989). The Economist in 1983 noted that the 
manifest of 1980 was a regurgitation of the structural adjustment 



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programme outlined by the IMF and World Bank (Wilson 1996). It 
should come as no surprise that after aligning himself with a US 
developmental plan, one of his first political moves was to negotiate 
with the IMF and begin implementing his neo liberal economic 
policies. 

The Manley government in its quest of social democracy, 
subscribed to a foreign policy of non alignment, this gave the country 
freedom to expand its foreign affairs and trading partners beyond 
the traditional scope of the West, namely, the United States and 
Britain.  In doing this the Manley government became friendly with 
Cuba. In his speech before the Non Alignment Movement (NAM) in 
Havana, Manley embraced the fraternal party relations between the 
Cuban Communist Party, the PNP, and the NJM of Grenada (Libby, 
1990). Manley also supported the Cuban presence in Angola after 
being asked by Kissinger to stay neutral. This compiled with the 
growing number of open Marxists in Manley’s cabinet was becoming 
increasingly threatening to the US who feared Cuba having alliances 
in the region.   

 
Manley’s lack of compliance with US advice and his open 

support for Cuba in particular raised alarms in Washington. Even if 
the claims of destabilization are dismissed as conspiracy the US did 
take harsh measures, in the direction of crippling the Manley 
government. The aid from the US was significantly lower after the 
Angolan incident. The US governments also tied aid to IMF loans, 
strongly implying that if the government wanted assistance they had 
to befriend the IMF. The US took the opportunity of the Jamaican 
IMF loans to implement very harsh conditions. Bartilow (1997) 
asserts that the IMF was not pleased with the way Manley had 
politicized the negotiation process (example the ‘we are not for sale’ 
speech) and undermined its autonomy.  

 
By signing with the IMF, neoliberal policies were 

implemented under structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and this 
effectively undermined the social democratic programme. The SAPs 
reduced the amount of money in the budget for social spending and 
also attempted to regulate the economy by opening up Jamaica to 
cheaper imports, at the same time devaluing the dollar. A great deal 
of suffering came along with the IMFs SAPs, most of which had to be 
bore by the Jamaican people. In the election that followed, the SAPs 
proved to be too much of a burden for the Jamaican people and 
Manley was voted out of office.  

 



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The JLP was voted in with the promise of better days. In 
aligning himself with a US developmental plan, Seaga and the JLP 
government limited its autonomy in deciding the country's foreign 
policy, economic policy and social policy.  Libby (1990) argues that 
‘by aligning Jamaica's foreign policy with US foreign policy, Seaga’s 
principal motivation was to assert his own foreign policy by rejecting 
Manley’s policies.’  In essence what Libby is implying is that Seaga 
was not coerced into the neoliberal agenda. He opposed Manley’s 
democratic socialism and sought to introduce his own agenda. Libby 
does however acknowledge that aligning his policy with the US was 
very important in securing aid. Regardless of why his policy was 
aligned to US policy the fact that it was aligned limited his capacity 
to create economic policies that adequately address the social 
situation of Jamaicans. 

 
Witnessing the relationship between Manley and the US, it 

became evident that the relationship was strained because of the 
PNPs fraternity with the Cuban government. Seaga as a result 
removed the Cuban ambassador to Jamaica and severed all 
diplomatic ties. Though the US had not directly told him to do so, it 
is well recognized that such an action supported the US. Further it 
aided in their 20 year long scheme to isolate Cuba from the rest of 
the region. The same is true of the Grenada invasion: supporting the 
isolation of Grenada and subsequent invasion justified US ideology. 
Further, it helped ensure that Cuba remained completely isolated. In 
essence Seaga, in aligning his policies with the US, intentional or not, 
was the only reason he was able to secure the substantial amount of 
aid that he did. His government's autonomy, as it relates to foreign 
policy, was curtailed in the sense that he knew he could not have 
chosen any other foreign policy agenda and gotten the same level of 
assistance that he did.  

 
As it related to economic development the general idea in 

the JLP camp and among public sector supporters was that there was 
little conception of survival outside the IMF. As Henke (1999) puts 
its, it was believed that ‘non IMF or an IMF default would make the 
current hardships look like Eden.’ The JLP could not offer Jamaican 
businessmen the level of support or protection that the Manley 
government had offered them, because SAPs required competitive 
open markets. This resulted in many small businesses hesitant to 
take part in open capitalism. Import substitution manufactures 
believed that they had been bypassed by the government who had 
worked out a new timetable with the IMF. Further, with new IMF 



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loans the value on import substitution had decreased resulting in 
manufactures losing political influence. Most of these complaints 
came from the private sector (Henke, 1999). Money talked, and to 
the extent that more money was coming in from the USAID and IMF 
loans, the private sector lost its ability to influence government. 

 
Because of the guidelines of SAPs it was difficult for the 

government to spend on social welfare. As a result, health care 
continued to decline as did the quality of education in the country. 
The gap between the rich and the poor was widening. The opening of 
the economy put food back on shelves in supermarkets, but the 
dollar was so devalued that the poor no longer had the purchasing 
power to buy it. Seaga, towards the end of his term, was able to 
undertake meaningful negotiations with the IMF. Unfortunately this 
came at the end of his term, so it is difficult to assess the longevity of 
this new relationship. 

 
In closing there are a few important things to note. Because 

of Seagas alignment with the US, they were far more comfortable 
with him than they were with Manley. This allowed him a certain 
degree of leniency. First, he was not subject to the ‘savage’ SAPs that 
the Manley government had to endure. When he decided not to pay 
loans in protest, the US was not as hard on him as they were on the 
PNP. Additionally, because the JLP government was very responsive 
and cooperative with the US, they were better able to bargain (this 
only happened in the last year of the Seaga administration) so it is 
difficult to assess. 

 
As a general principle, democratic governments must be 

able to serve the needs of the people. The economy was, in fact, 
experiencing growth under the JLP in the latter part of their second 
term. However, in public opinion polls the people thought that 
conditions in the country had deteriorated. According to Stone 
(1989) this means Jamaicans vote according to public spending, not 
economic growth. The people are concerned with social spending 
and improvements in the services that directly impact their lives, 
such as infrastructure, health care and education. Because of SAPs 
constraints, the Seaga government, like the Manley government, was 
not able to deliver adequate social benefits in a reasonable amount to 
time.  As a result, they were voted out. 

 
 



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