

































The Grenada Revolution: Investigating the Ambitions and 
Shortcomings of a Radical Caribbean Political Experiment 

Shenhat Haile 2T1
University of Toronto
FAS History, Political Science & African Studies

In March 1979, the New Jewel Movement 
(NJM) transitioned into the People’s Revolu-
tionary Government (PRG) through a 
bloodless coup that for a time revolutionized 
the structure of governments in the Com-
mon-law Caribbean. This policy review 
seeks to consider the success of the revolu-
tion based on: its aim of developing and 
sustaining a grassroots democracy, emphasis 
on mass education and its expansion of 
agribusiness initiatives as a part of broader 
industrialization efforts. Through an investi-
gation of some of the critical events, ideolog-
ical frameworks and ambitious political 
objectives that briefly transformed Grenadi-
an society from 1979 to 1983 this review 
illustrates the complexity of the political 
experiment undertaken by the People’s 
Revolutionary Government and argues that 
despite its short time span, the Grenada 
Revolution remains one of the most critical 
examples of revolutionary potential and 
radical self-rule in the twentieth-century 
Caribbean.

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Grenada Revolu-
tion, People’s Revolutionary 

Government, New Jewel 
Movement, Maurice Bishop

B I O

Shenhat has a BA from the University of Toronto with a double major in History and 
Political Science and a minor in African Studies. Her academic interests include history 
and politics of the Horn of African, anti-/alternative development theory, and intellectual 
histories of Caribbean decolonization and transnational Black radical feminism. 
© 2021 Shenhat Haile 
Caribbean Studies Students’ Union, Canada - https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/cquilt/

                       This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution- ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
                       To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

92

(January 20, 2022 / 09:38:47)

122864-1b_CaribbeanQuilt_Vol7_rev.pdf  .92



93

     Kate Quinn, “Conventional Politics or Revolution: Black Power and the Radical Challenge to the Westminster Model in 
the Caribbean,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 53, no. 1 (February 2015): 73.
     Anne Hickling Hudson, “Education in the Grenada Revolution: 1979-83,” Compare 19, no. 2 (1989): 96.
     Quinn, 73.
     Brian Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: an Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada 
(Kingston: Univ. of the West Indies Press, 2001): 140.
     Meeks, 140.
     Quinn, 73.
     The Black Scholar, “Revolution in Grenada: An Interview with Maurice Bishop,” Journal of Black Studies and Research 
11, no. 3 (1980): 52.
     Ibid.
  

       

 

1

On the 13th of March, 1979,  a bloodless 
coup transformed the trajectory of political 
and social development on the island of 
Grenada. This policy review will investi-
gate some of the critical events, ideologi-
cal frameworks, and ambitious political 
objectives that briefly transformed Grena-
dian society from 1979 to 1983. The 
Grenada Revolution is regarded as one of 
the very few successful political experi-
ments undertaken by a leftist vanguard 
party and arguably epitomizes the revolu-
tionary potential of the organized Caribbe-
an masses. Thinking alongside this notion, 
this review seeks to critically analyze the 
policy decisions of the People’s Revolu-
tionary Government (PRG), considering 
the revolution’s aim of developing a 
grassroots democracy, emphasis on mass 
education reform, and the expansion of 
agribusiness initiatives as a part of broader 
industrialization efforts. 

To understand the peaceful ousting that 
took place on 13 March 1979, we must 
first briefly recall the administrative 
abuses, political corruption, and general 
public contempt that characterized Eric 
Gairy’s government that would give rise to 
revolutionary opposition led by Maurice 
Bishop and The New Jewel Movement 
(NJM).   While he enjoyed general popu-
larity in the early period of Grenada’s 
independence ,  evidence of Gairy’s 
political abuse was made apparent as early 
as 1962.   Gairy’s attempts to consolidate 

greater executive powers would subse-
quently lead to the detrimental findings of 
the Commission of Inquiry, the suspension 
of the constitution, and the call of new 
elections in 1962.   Gairy returned to 
popularity five years later in the 1967 
election through a “demagogic ‘Land for 
the Landless’ programme” that put him 
back in credible position against the 
opposition however Gairy never followed 
through with the land redistribution 
initiative and once again lost the faith of 
the planter class.  Gairy continued to use 
extralegal means to consolidate full 
Cabinet authority, silencing his critics, and 
developing both an overt system of 
political patronage and a violent personal 
paramilitary, the seeds of revolutionary 
opposition had been planted.   Widespread 
discontent towards Gairy’s abuse of power 
surged across Grenada. Meanwhile, a new 
radical organization was being formed that 
would confront Eric Gairy’s despotism.

In 1973, the Joint Endeavour for Welfare, 
Education and Liberation (JEWEL) led by 
Unison Whiteman and Maurice Bishop’s 
Movement for Assemblies of the People 
(MAP) joined together to form the Marx-
ist-Leninist oriented, New Jewel Move-
ment.  According to Bishop, this “was an 
unconventional type organization,” in the 
sense that electoral politics was not its 
primary objective.   Instead, it intended to 
weaken Eric Gairy’s support base, raise 
the political consciousness, and advocate

2
3
4

5
6
7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

6

7

8

(January 20, 2022 / 09:38:47)

122864-1b_CaribbeanQuilt_Vol7_rev.pdf  .93



94

     Ibid.
    Quinn, 76.
    Quinn, 72.
    Gail R. Pool, “Culture, Language and Revolution in Grenada,” Anthropologica 36, no. 1 (1994): 82.
    Hudson, 97.
  “Revolution in Grenada: An Interview with Maurice Bishop,” 56.
    Pool, 87.
    Hudson, 97.
    Hudson, 98.
    Quinn, 82.
     

       

 

9

for new transparent structures of govern-
ment.   The NJM grew its political base by 
organizing with agricultural workers who 
were facing economic distress, attracting 
middle-class conservatives who were 
frustrated with the corruption of the 
current government, and by promoting a 
model of democracy in which genuine 
political participation was encouraged and 
deemed necessary for development.  
According to Kate Quinn, the bloodless 
coup of 1979 was thus “so [easy] partly 
because the ideological groundwork for 
the revolution had already been laid.”   
Many of the strengths of the political 
experiment in Grenada can be identified in 
the first few years following the formation 
of the PRG government (led by NJM 
members and Bishop as Prime Minister), 
where revolutionary spirits were high and 
people’s political participation was in full 
force.   While there could certainly be a 
much more robust conversation on the 
progressive policy decisions made during 
the PRG’s leadership, I will limit my 
analysis to the following matters: the 
development of grassroots democracy, an 
emphasis on mass education reform, and 
the expansion of agribusiness initiatives 
and industrialization efforts.

As mentioned, many scholars attribute the 
early success of the revolution to the 
enthusiastic willingness of Grenadians 
across all social classes.   Maurice Bishop 
and the PRG were determined to address

the poor socio-economic conditions left 
behind by colonial structures and the 
post-independence government by 
tackling the source of these problems. The 
vision was to move past the neo-colonial 
model of Westminster exclusionary 
electoral politics into a form of “grassroots 
democracy” that operated on the voluntary 
mobilization of ordinary Grenadians.  The 
PRG was especially able to foster a real 
sense of camaraderie, dignity and self-de-
termination in the youth by giving them 
leadership positions within the party.   The 
PRG was also comprised of town and 
village residents, leading figures of the 
private business class, trade unionists, and 
anyone “who had allied themselves with 
the NJM’s nationalist profile and analysis 
of reforms necessary to bring about 
development.”   The most important 
features of this new grassroots democracy 
were the new organizations created to 
ensure wide scale political participation at 
the local level. For instance, the National 
Youth Organization, the National Wom-
en’s Organization, and the Productive 
Farmer’s Union each had thousands of 
members contributing to different 
economic and social projects.   In addition 
to this were a number of village, parish 
and workplace assemblies that would have 
direct representation in the National 
Assembly.   This was essentially a direct 
alternative to the former two-party West-
minster system that was structurally 
incapable of responding to the people’s 

10
11
12
13

14
15
16

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

15

17

18

17
18

(January 20, 2022 / 09:38:48)

122864-1b_CaribbeanQuilt_Vol7_rev.pdf  .94



95

    Ibid.
    Ibid., 75.
    Hudson, 96.
    Ibid., 101.
    Ibid., 109.
    Ibid.,104.
    Hudson, 99.
    Pool 82.
    Hudson, 99.
    Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Ibid.
    “Revolution in Grenada: An Interview with Maurice Bishop,” 58.

       

 

19

needs.   In situating power across regions 
of the country and stimulating support 
through public meetings and mass rallies, 
the PRG was able to secure what was 
believed to be long-term support for the 
revolutionary government. 

Alongside raising the political morale of 
the people, the PRG government allocated 
considerable time, effort and investment 
into transforming Grenada’s education 
system. The legacy of colonial education 
was identified early on as major obstacle 
to rolling out the government’s bold plans 
for social and economic development.   
Prior to the revolution, the school system 
was characterized by high illiteracy rates, 
underachievement, and generally poor 
academic performance.   Foremost efforts 
at addressing this dysfunction were 
directed towards adequate professional 
training for teachers and educators, 
resulting in the establishment of a commu-
nity-based program called the Centre for 
Popular Education in 1980.   Reforms 
were later made to eliminate school fees, 
expand school capacities, prioritize 
university education programmes that 
were functional to the needs of a develop-
ing society, encourage skills development, 
and produce a more socially-conscious 
student and worker.   The goal was to 
gradually develop an education system 
that would feed the needs of a rapidly 

diversifying and industrializing Grenada.

Lastly, development and GDP growth in 
Grenada was to be pursued through a 
mixed economy.   In the colonial period, 
Grenada was primarily a sugar economy 
that gradually came to include nutmeg, 
cocoa and bananas.   One of the main 
objectives of the PRG was to increase the 
processing capacity of these essential 
industries, while also expanding 
public-sector enterprises.   Anne Hick-
ling-Hudson describes the PRG approach 
to economic development as “flexible, 
gradualist and pragmatic.”   Its policies 
sought to deal with the issue of import 
substitution by commercializing surplus 
fruits into canned products, expanding 
farmer cooperatives, and investing in the 
local fishing industry.   The biggest impact 
to Grenada’s economy was arguably the 
trade agreements and foreign assistance 
supplied by other socialist states which 
allowed the PRG to further invest in the 
public sector and create thousands of new 
jobs.   Public-sector ownership grew to 
become 30 per cent of the economy and by 
1983 the unemployment rate dropped by 
well over fifty per cent of the Gairy 
administration’s 1978 levels.  According to 
Maurice Bishop, the economic objective 
was for Grenada to “not live in anyone’s 
backyard.”   Despite allowing the still 
dominant private sector to preserve its ties 

20
21
22
23

24
25 
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

19

20

21

22

23

24

25 

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

(January 20, 2022 / 09:38:48)

122864-1b_CaribbeanQuilt_Vol7_rev.pdf  .95



96

    Hudson, 102.
    Ibid., 103.
    Ibid., 105.
    Ibid., 99.
    Rupert Roopnaraine, “Resonances of Revolution: Grenada, Suriname, Guyana,” Interventions 12, no. 1 (2010): pp. 11-34.
    Quinn, 82.
    Meeks, 160.

       

 

33

with Western investors, it is clear that the 
PRG’s long-term goals for Grenada were 
centred around the principles of self-sus-
tainability and the rejection of foreign 
ownership.

It is in these progressive policies undertak-
en during the brief leadership of the 
People’s Revolutionary Government that 
we can see the opportunities and possibili-
ties that were left unfulfilled. For instance, 
the ambitious education reform plan was 
designed to ensure that certain vocational 
programs were prioritized in a sequential 
manner.   Upon the discussion and deliber-
ation of community members and teach-
ers, the shifting needs of education would 
be reconsidered and the Ministry of 
Education would progress into the next 
stage of development.   There were also 
plans put in place in 1983 to seek collabo-
ration with Cuban officials on how to 
develop and expand a sophisticated 
work-study program for students going 
into the agricultural industry.  According 
to Hudson, the PRG emphasized the need 
for long-term education reform because:
“By 1982, it was clear that without such 
education, progress would be severely  
constrained in the many new projects in 
construction, in the hotel industry, in  
craft design, in food technology, in scien-
tific agriculture, forestry and fishing, in  
economic and environment planning, and 
in financial and administrative   
management.” 

Despite the tremendously progressive and 
impactful achievements of the PRG, many 
opportunities for further growth were cut 
short due to the downfall of the revolution 
in 1983. Before addressing the major 
weaknesses of the PRG’s policy decisions, 
it is important to consider the domestic 
and international forces that threatened the 
survival of the revolutionary government. 
While it was Bishop’s desire to pursue a 
general policy of non-alignment, the 
nature of the political objectives and the 
government’s revolutionary ideology of 
anti-imperialism and self-determination 
naturally led the PRG to align itself with 
Cuba and other members of the socialist 
bloc. The March 1979 coup, growing 
affiliations with Cuba, and the state’s new 
stance against foreign ownership and 
Western intervention made Grenada a 
target of US suspicion. Anxiety towards a 
socialist spread or European alliance in the 
Caribbean had been of much concern to 
the United States even before the enact-
ment of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. As 
Brian Meeks puts it:
“Grenada’s significance went far beyond 
its importance as a micro-state, because  
it was  the first revolution carried out by 
Black English-speakers, with direct lines  
of communication to the major black and 
West Indian population centers in North  
America and Great Britain and because it 
presented the US for the first time since  
the Vietnamese War with an opportunity to 
reassert its hegemonic tendencies” 

34
35
36
37

38
39 

33

34

35

36 37

(January 20, 2022 / 09:38:48)

122864-1b_CaribbeanQuilt_Vol7_rev.pdf  .96



97

    Meeks, 161.
    Ibid., 131.
    Ibid., 132.
    Ibid.
    Ibid., 160.
    Ibid.
    Meeks, 164
    Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Ibid., iii.

       

 

40

In a similar way, Kate Quinn describes the 
PRG’s political experiments as “the most 
radical deviation from the Westminster 
model ever attempted in the Common-
wealth Caribbean.”   In a region so heavily 
dominated by capitalist modes of develop-
ment and neo-colonial exploitation, 
Grenada was providing the ideological 
foundation and revolutionary praxis to 
refashion the relationship between Carib-
bean states and hegemonic powers. This 
anxiety towards Grenada’s pursuit of 
alternative development was heightened 
by the PRG’s plans to build an airport on 
the island.   Additionally, though the 
revolution sparked an unprecedented level 
of political mobilization, the small minori-
ty of remaining Gairy loyalists who did 
not see themselves represented by the new 
government may have proved to be a 
major threat to the survival of the revolu-
tion in the near future.  However, the 
internal conflict that would contribute to 
the downfall of the government did not 
occur between the PRG and this minority, 
but amongst the leading members of the 
revolution itself. It is widely understood 
that the crisis of 1983 that put an end to 
the revolution was the result of a quiet 
opposition faction within the party led by 
Minister of Finance Bernard Coard.   On 
the other hand, scholars argue that this 
narrative of conspiracy often shifts atten-
tion away from other factors that played a 
role in the ultimate collapse of the PRG.   
It is therefore very critical to consider 
some of these threats when discussing the

major flaws and weaknesses of the revolu-
tionary experiment in Grenada. 

According to Brian Meeks, author of 
Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary 
Theory (1993), “The failure of most 
studies to explore the relationship between 
actors and structures is a fatal error.”   He 
argues that many of the political objectives 
laid out by Bishop and the PRG were 
appropriate for Grenada’s development, 
but experienced difficulty in execution. 
This is in large part due to the “clandestine 
vanguard structure” of the party and the 
way in which power was seized and 
socialist policy was pursued from a 
“paternalistic” approach.   For instance, 
Meeks argues that in gaining the support 
of the masses, populist leaders like Mau-
rice Bishop are able to present the idea of 
national elections as an unnecessary and 
counter-productive activity that could 
ultimately undermine the revolutionary 
party. He also cites that the PRG’s refusal 
to hold elections contradicted the party’s 
aims to genuinely involve the population 
in a grassroots democracy movement  and 
signalled more distress towards an already 
alert United States. Additionally, the 
seemingly impressive developmental 
growth during 1979 and 1983 is often 
attributed to the large sums of loans and 
foreign aid provided to Grenada from it 
socialist links, not from a sudden influx of 
economic activity on the island.   The 
funnelling of this aid into public industries 
meant that private sector performance 

41
42
43
44

45
46 
47
48
49

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46 

(January 20, 2022 / 09:38:48)

122864-1b_CaribbeanQuilt_Vol7_rev.pdf  .97



98

 suffered during these few years.   Efforts 
to diversify the economy from agribusi-
ness to tourism did not make significant 
changes and the majority of the country’s 
export was still dependent on the staple 
crops – nutmeg, cocoa and banana.   
Meeks therefore concludes that the 
revolutionary party was in economic crisis 
long before it “finally succumbed to 
internal dissension” in 1983.   The PRG’s 
fall would leave the country vulnerable to 
US invasion shortly thereafter.

In this policy review, I have attempt to 
illustrate the complexity of the political 
experiment undertaken by the People’s 
Revolutionary Government from 1979 to 
1983. Despite its short time span, the 
Grenada Revolution arguably remains one 
of the most critical examples of revolu-
tionary potential and radical self-rule in 
the twentieth-century Caribbean. The 
strengths and weaknesses of this political 
experiment indicate the difficulty revolu-
tionary socialist governments face when 
attempting to distance themselves outside 
the reach of Western imperialist forces. 

47

48

49

(January 20, 2022 / 09:38:49)

122864-1b_CaribbeanQuilt_Vol7_rev.pdf  .98



99

Hudson, Anne Hickling. “Education in the Grenada Revolution: 1979-83.” Compare 19, 
         no. 2 (1989): 95–114. 
Meeks, Brian. Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: an Assessment of Cuba, 
         Nicaragua and Grenada. Kingston: Univ. of the West Indies Press, 2001. 
Pool, Gail R. “Culture, Language and Revolution in Grenada.” Anthropologica 36, no. 1 
         (1994): 73–107. 
Quinn, Kate. “Conventional Politics or Revolution: Black Power and the Radical 
         Challenge to the Westminster Model in the Caribbean.” Commonwealth & 
         Comparative Politics 53, no. 1 (2015): 71–94.
Roopnaraine, Rupert. “Resonances of Revolution: Grenada, Suriname, Guyana.” 
         interventions 12, no. 1 (2010): 11–34. 
The Black Scholar. “Revolution in Grenada: An Interview with Maurice Bishop.” 
         Journal of Black Studies and Research 11, no. 3 (1980): 50–58. 

Works Cited

(January 20, 2022 / 09:38:49)

122864-1b_CaribbeanQuilt_Vol7_rev.pdf  .99


