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CARIBBEAN QUILT 
2023 VOL. 7 NO. 1 
 

 79 

 

                                                                                  

 
 

                                                       

Conditional Support: Chinese Development Aid in the 

Caribbean 

Omar Danaf 

Centre for Caribbean Studies 

Faculty of Arts & Science, University of Toronto 

 
Omar Danaf is a fourth-year undergraduate student at the University of Toronto majoring in Political Science and American Studies. He has interned 

at various political organizations, including the office of a U.S. Senator, a U.S. intelligence agency, and private sector think tanks. In combination with 

his coursework, these experiences have cultivated an interest in how strategic competition between the United States and China has affected the 

Caribbean.  

                                                                                  
 
KEYWORDS: 

Development Aid 

Maritime Silk Road 

Intiative 

MSRI 

Chinese-Caribbean 

Relations 

Chinese-Caribbean 

Trade 

Rare Earth Elements 

Sino-Taiwanese Com-

petition 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 

ABSTRACT 

                                                                                        
In recent decades, China has emerged as a significant economic power operating within the Caribbean, analyzing its 

foreign policy strategy in the region of paramount importance. This essay will seek to identify the ideology undergirding 

China's foreign policy within the Caribbean, using these insights to analyze the effects of Beijing's increased engagement 

within the region. This essay will argue that Beijing has sought to create close ties with several Caribbean states by 

launching numerous generous development assistance projects, attaching conditionalities to these projects to effectively 

incorporate partner states into their export and ideological network. China views the Caribbean as a valuable political 

partner, as its proximity to the United States makes its potential alliance with China a prominent counterfactual to Western 

hegemony. To achieve this argument, I will highlight how China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) has influenced China’s 

grand strategy within the Caribbean, as it seeks to incorporate the region into a broader economic network to challenge 

Western economic systems. I will then highlight how economic considerations influence China’s bilateral relations with 

some resource-rich Caribbean states, investigating China's diplomatic approach to increasing its access to natural 

resources in the region. Lastly, this essay will investigate how China's development assistance-based strategy has impacted 

the Caribbean. This will cover its negative and positive effects on domestic industries while exploring how China's ambitious 

economic expansion has stoked social discontent in the region. 

 

 

In recent decades, China has emerged as a significant eco-
nomic power operating within the Caribbean, analyzing its 

foreign policy strategy in the region of paramount im-
portance. This essay will seek to identify the ideology 

Caribbean Quilt 
Journal Homepage: https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/cquilt/index 
 
 



CARIBBEAN QUILT 
2023 VOL. 7 NO. 1 
 

 80 

undergirding China's foreign policy within the Caribbean, 
using these insights to analyze the effects of Beijing's in-
creased engagement within the region. This essay will ar-
gue that Beijing has sought to create close ties with many 
Caribbean states by launching numerous generous devel-
opment assistance projects, attaching conditionalities to 
these projects to effectively incorporate partner states into 
their export and ideological network. China views the Car-
ibbean as a valuable political partner, as its proximity to 
the United States makes its potential alliance with China a 
prominent counterfactual to Western hegemony. To 
achieve this argument, I will highlight how China’s Mari-
time Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) has influenced China’s 
grand strategy within the Caribbean, as it seeks to incorpo-
rate the region into a broader economic network to chal-
lenge Western economic systems. I will then highlight how 
economic considerations influence China’s bilateral rela-
tions with a number of resource-rich Caribbean states, in-
vestigating the diplomatic approach China has used to in-
crease its access to natural resources in the region. Lastly, 
this essay will investigate how China’s development assis-
tance-based strategy has impacted the Caribbean. This will 
cover its negative and positive effects on domestic indus-
tries while exploring how China's ambitious economic ex-
pansion has stoked social discontent in the region. 
 
China’s actions within the Caribbean have been guided by 
its strategic desire to economically incorporate developing 
states into a vast Sinocentric trading network, with Beijing 
attempting to create an economic coalition amongst the 
Global South to challenge Western dominance. The Carib-
bean thus stands out as an ideologically significant region 
for China, as its proximity to the U.S. makes it a potentially 
symbolic rebuttal to Western economic hegemony. Despite 
its close proximity to the United States, the Caribbean has 

 
1 Gahman, Levi, Gabrielle Thongs, and Adaeze Greenidge. 
2021. “Disaster, Debt, and ‘Underdevelopment’: The Cun-
ning of Colonial-Capitalism in the Caribbean.” Develop-
ment (Society for International Development) 64 (1-2): 
112–18. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41301-021-00282-4. 
2 Mendez, Alvaro, and Chris Alden. “China in Panama: 
From Peripheral Diplomacy to Grand Strategy.” Geopoli-
tics 26, no. 3 (2021): 838. 

failed to create sustained economic growth and benefit 
from trade globalization, leading to its exploitation and un-
derdevelopment by the West.1 This has influenced the re-
gion's unique relationship with China in two ways. First, 
the Caribbean's classification as a region that has failed to 
economically benefit from the neocapitalist system led by 
the United States has made it a region of emphasis for the 
CCP, as ‘small states’ left behind during the neocapitalist 
revolutions of the 1980s are of distinct significance to 
China’s attempts to create a “Sinocentric [trade] network” 
spanning the Global South that can challenge the Eurocen-
tric economic and political norms governing international 
politics.2 China frames this coalition as an inclusive alter-
native to the West’s current dominance of the international 
system, as it will incorporate developing economies into 
China’s vast export market.3 Second, China’s ideological 
beliefs have made the Caribbean an area of pronounced 
importance for Beijing due to the region’s difficulty gener-
ating economic growth despite its geographic proximity to 
the United States, as this neatly demonstrates the West’s 
exploitative relationship towards the Global South. 4  If 
Beijing could develop close ties with the Caribbean and 
partially displace the West's economic and diplomatic he-
gemony, it would achieve a symbolic political victory, 
showing that China could compete with and even beat 
America in its backyard. To this end, China has drawn 
heavily from its MSRI initiative to guide its actions in the 
Caribbean. This broad ideological strategy intends to 
achieve structural changes to the global economy by creat-
ing maritime trade flows that situate China as the de facto 
leader of international maritime trade through its vast ex-
port network.5  This ideological cornerstone of Chinese 
foreign policy explains why economic considerations are 
central to Beijing's approach to the Caribbean. They seek 
to incorporate the region into a more extensive trading 

https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1657413. 
3 Ibid., pg. 838-839. 
4 MacDonald, Scott B. 2022. “Introduction.” In ‘The New 
Cold War, China, and the Caribbean : Economic Statecraft, 
China and Strategic Realignments.’ Cham: Springer Inter-
national Publishing AG. 
5 Ibid., pg. 839; 844. 



CARIBBEAN QUILT 
2023 VOL. 7 NO. 1 
 

 81 

network to significantly augment Chinese soft power in 
distant parts of the world.  
 
China's high demand for natural resources has led to its 
calculated courtship of resource-rich Caribbean states such 
as Guyana, Cuba, and Jamaica, aiming to gain access to 
new streams of natural resources. China relies on develop-
ment assistance to garner close relations with these poten-
tial client states, allowing several Caribbean nations to se-
cure significant material gains through developing close 
economic and political ties with China. Due to China's on-
going economic expansion, it had become a significant 
consumer of rare earth elements such as nickel and bauxite, 
with its 'thirst' for these natural resources being "one of the 
most compelling drivers of [its] foreign economic policy."6 
This has led to Beijing's interest in cultivating close rela-
tions with Caribbean countries with significant mineral de-
posits, such as Jamaica and Guyana, attempting to access 
these resources through its state-sponsored investment in 
Caribbean domestic resource production sectors.7 To this 
end, China has directly invested in Caribbean resource pro-
duction companies through its state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), seen through its purchase of a 70% controlling 
stake in Guyana’s Omai Bauxite Mining corporation, using 
this purchase to make its Chinese state-owned aluminum 
giant the largest bauxite producer in the global market.8 To 
secure these favourable deals, China rolled out an exten-
sive campaign to assuage the Guyanese government, com-
plete with a 15.3 million dollar public debt write-off that 
held symbolic value due to the Caribbean's high rate of ex-
ternal debt.9 This acquisition strategy is not exclusive to 

 
6 Bernal, Richard L. “The Growing Economic Presence of 
China in the Caribbean.” World Economy 38, no. 9 (2015): 
1427. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12204. 
7 Valle, Valeria Marina. “Latin America and the Caribbean 
Satisfy China’s Hunger for Energy, Minerals, and Metals.” 
Latin American Policy 4, no. 1 (2013): 2–3. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12001. 
8  Bernal, Richard L. “The Growing Economic Presence 
of China in the Caribbean.” World Economy 38, no. 9 
(2015): 1427. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12204. 
9 Ibid., pg. 1423. 
10 Horta, Loro. “A Brave New World: China Embraces the 

Guyana, as China sent over $100 million in aid for infra-
structure projects in Jamaica to strengthen its relationship 
with the Golding government, using this relationship to 
open the door to Beijing's investment in Jamaica's alumi-
num sector.10 Caribbean leaders have been able to capital-
ize on China's desire to secure long-term investments in the 
region, as host countries often leverage investment from 
Beijing to increase domestic resource production, evi-
denced by its creation of a "state-of-the-art" sugar produc-
tion facility in Guyana, nearly doubling sugarcane produc-
tion in the country.11 This strategy has the potential to gen-
erate lasting benefits to Caribbean economies, as China's 
investment signals its willingness to strengthen the econo-
mies of partner states in ways that its Western competitors 
have historically been unwilling to do.12 Ultimately, Chi-
na's need for natural resources will be a crucial facet of its 
engagement with the Caribbean, as host countries will 
likely solicit large aid packages from Beijing in exchange 
for access to their valuable natural resources.  
 
Despite China's notable investments in several resource-
rich Caribbean countries, its development assistance pro-
jects are often undergirded with economic conditionalities 
designed to significantly increase Chinese migrant flows 
to host countries, creating tension with local businesses 
that often cannot compete with Chinese-owned businesses. 
China's development assistance projects represent multi-
million dollar investments that have a chance to route sig-
nificant sums of money to small Caribbean economies and 
rejuvenate portions of their private sectors.13 However, the 
Caribbean has failed to benefit from these projects in such 

Caribbean.” Defense & Security Analysis 25, no. 4 (2009): 
428. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790903416749. 
11Bernal, Richard L. “The Growing Economic Presence of 
China in the Caribbean.” World Economy 38, no. 9 (2015): 
1421. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12204. 
12 Gustafson, Bret. “The New Energy Imperialism in the 
Caribbean: The Caribbean Has Some of the Highest Utility 
Rates in the World. Decades of Fossil Fuel Dependence, 
Foreign Profiteering, and Domestic Debt Made It So.” 
NACLA Report on the Americas (1993) 49, no. 4 (2017): 
421–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2017.1409013. 
13  MacDonald, Scott B. 2022. “Introduction.” In ‘The 



CARIBBEAN QUILT 
2023 VOL. 7 NO. 1 
 

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a manner. China views these projects "as lucrative [con-
struction] activities whose profit has to go to Chinese 
firms," systematically excluding local labourers and con-
struction companies from participating in these ventures.14 
As a result of its preferential selection of Chinese contrac-
tors, China 'exports thousands of migrants to the Caribbean 
countries it sends assistance to, with a significant number 
of Chinese migrants sent to work on development projects 
staying in the country and creating distinct communities 
known for their ownership of successful small busi-
nesses.15 Beijing strategically includes terms in develop-
ment projects that prevent partner states from limiting Chi-
nese migrant inflows and preventing recipient states from 
establishing economic barriers regulating migrants' in-
volvement and ownership activities in domestic indus-
tries.16 As a result, Beijing’s assistance projects drastically 
increase Chinese migrant inflows to the Caribbean, allow-
ing China to use these groups to enhance Beijing’s soft 
power in the region.17 This complicates the relationship 
that China’s seemingly benign development agenda has 
with the Caribbean, as aid projects are meant to usher in 
deep economic connectivity with China and their host 
countries, often having a detrimental impact on local busi-
nesses that have to contend with highly competitive Chi-
nese supply chains. This practice has led to the “soaking 
up [of] small businesses” in countries where large infra-
structure projects are built, creating a dynamic in which 
Chinese expatriates drive local competitors out of business 
and create foreign-owned monopolies that closely mirror 
Western multinational corporations, exporting profits gen-
erated abroad. 18  In this sense, development assistance 
poses similar challenges to Caribbean governments as the 
restrictive loan packages offered to the region by the West, 

 
New Cold War, China, and the Caribbean : Economic 
Statecraft, China and Strategic Realignments,’ 93-94. 
Cham: Springer International Publishing AG. 
14 Tudoroiu, Theodor, and Amanda Ramlogan-Gangabis-
soon. “The Myth of China’s No Strings Attached Develop-
ment Assistance : a Caribbean Case Study,” 6. Lanham, 
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2020. 
15 Ibid., pg. 156. 
16 Ibid., pg. 151. 
17 Ibid., pg. 151. 

obfuscating China's seemingly benevolent intentions. De-
spite this, however, development projects will continue to 
be a salient characteristic of Sino-Caribbean relations, 
bringing with it a set of economic conditionalities that have 
the potential to damage the local Caribbean industry.  
 
Political competition with Taiwan has been a defining fea-
ture of Sino-Caribbean relations, as several Caribbean 
states’ recognition of Taiwan has led to intense competition 
between the two nations in the region. This has benefitted 
several CARICOM members, as China has sought to use 
development assistance flows to reward its regional allies, 
a dynamic which has been used to gain funding to modern-
ize domestic industries by several governments. 
CARICOM has a unique relationship with China, as six of 
its fifteen member states recognize Taiwan, making it one 
of the few remaining battlegrounds in Taiwan and China’s 
diplomatic war.19  This rivalry has profoundly impacted 
China's interactions with the region, as Richard Bernal 
finds that the $25 billion China spends yearly on develop-
ment assistance in the Caribbean is generally only offered 
to countries in the region that no longer recognize Tai-
wan.20 Countries such as Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis 
have used the competition to their advantage, soliciting 
generous aid projects from China in exchange for their sole 
recognition of the PRC, a tactic used by Dominica to get 
approximately $140 million in aid from Beijing.21 In addi-
tion to increased development inflows, preferred nations 
receive access to an expanded Chinese export market, 
gaining access to higher-value exports such as maritime 
vessels, support equipment, and tankers, of which some 
CARICOM members re-export for profit.22 China's strat-
egy of providing aid to its diplomatic partners thus can be 

18 Ibid., pg. 165. 
19  Horta, Loro. “A Brave New World: China Embraces 
the Caribbean.” Defense & Security Analysis 25, no. 4 
(2009): 426. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790903416749. 
20 Bernal, Richard L. “The Growing Economic Presence 
of China in the Caribbean.” World Economy 38, no. 9 
(2015): 1411; 1422. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12204. 
21 Ibid., pg. 1423. 
22  Idib., pg. 1412. 



CARIBBEAN QUILT 
2023 VOL. 7 NO. 1 
 

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reliably used by Caribbean nations to gain a substantial 
source of development inflows, as Beijing's investments in 
the region indicate that it is willing to divert economic re-
sources to gain diplomatic partners in the Caribbean. How-
ever, as the power in this trade relationship is dispropor-
tionately balanced in China's favour, significant risks re-
main associated with the Caribbean's acceptance of China's 
development assistance.  
 
Caribbean leaders view China as a potential source of sig-
nificant tourism inflows and structure their relationships 
with Beijing to attempt to promote Chinese tourism in the 
Caribbean. However, these efforts are unlikely to yield 
substantial returns as they ignore Chinese tourist prefer-
ences and domestic opposition to Beijing's increased re-
gional presence. Due to China's potential to be a significant 
source of tourism inflows, Caribbean policymakers "have 
an obsession" with capturing a significant portion of Chi-
na's tourism market, leading to close cooperation with 
China to build Chinese-owned tourism projects in coun-
tries such as St Maarten, St. Lucia, and Guyana.23 Despite 
policymakers' hopes that China will become a significant 
player in the tourism industry, it is unlikely to happen, as 
few Chinese tourists prefer the Caribbean over similar sea 
and sand destinations in Asia. The region's geographical 
isolation from China ultimately limits its appeal.24 Even if 
these obstacles could be surmounted, significant chal-
lenges domestically exist to allow for the reforms and so-
cietal changes that would need to be made to facilitate a 
significant scale shift in Chinese tourism preferences. Pri-
marily would be the need for a cultural change within the 

 
23  Tudoroiu, Theodor, and Amanda Ramlogan-Gangabis-
soon. “The Myth of China’s No Strings Attached Develop-
ment Assistance : a Caribbean Case Study,” 114. Lanham, 
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2020. 
24 Ibid., pg. 114. 
25 Liao, Xinge, and Dolores Sánchez Aguilera. “Chinese 
Tourism in the Caribbean—Destination Image and Future 
Expectations.” In Tourism Product Development in China, 
Asian and European Countries, 128; 132. Singapore: 
Springer Singapore, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-
981-15-4447-7_7. 
26  Hearn, Adrian H. “Harnessing the Dragon: Overseas 

Caribbean, as studies indicate Chinese tourists expect local 
tour guides and officials to be proficient in Chinese while 
requiring cultural traditions to be accommodated by their 
host countries.25  There remains significant hostility to-
wards China in the region,26 as high levels of cultural ten-
sion in recent years led thousands of protestors in Santo 
Domingo to protest against Chinese business interests in 
2013. 27  Events such as this have alarmed Beijing and 
soured potential tourists, as Chinese nationals in the Car-
ibbean “feel threatened” by such occurrences, leading top 
CCP officials such as Vice-Premier Li Keqiang to “explic-
itly [ask] for the protection of Chinese shopkeepers” and 
nationals in negotiations with Caribbean officials. 28 
Therefore, China is unlikely to posit a notable impact on 
the Caribbean tourism industry, as there is relatively little 
interest in the region from Chinese tourists, and cultural 
hostility to Chinese nationals has soured prospective tour-
ists. 
 
Despite China's enthusiastic engagement with the Carib-
bean, it will not displace America's hegemonic influence 
over the region. This is for two reasons: America is the Car-
ibbean's most prominent export and import market by a 
significant margin—making its displacement as the re-
gion's primary economic partner a daunting investment 
that China is unwilling to take—and because any such dis-
placement would likely trigger a security confrontation 
with the U.S. that China seeks to avoid. While China's re-
cent economic advancements in the Caribbean are signifi-
cant, they are dwarfed in comparison to the West's eco-
nomic presence in the region, as China accounted for less 

Chinese Entrepreneurs in Mexico and Cuba.” The China 
Quarterly (London) 209, no. 209 (2012): 111–113. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741011001500. 
27  Li, Yuan. “Dominican Republic and P.R. China: Ex-
change, Trade and Investment,” 13. GFDD/Funglode Fel-
lows Program. Global Foundation for Democracy and De-
velopment, December 2013. https://www.globalfounda-
tiondd.org/documentos/dr-china-exchange-eng.pdf.  
28  Tudoroiu, Theodor, and Amanda Ramlogan-Gangabis-
soon. “The Myth of China’s No Strings Attached Develop-
ment Assistance : a Caribbean Case Study,” 153; 161. Lan-
ham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2020. 



CARIBBEAN QUILT 
2023 VOL. 7 NO. 1 
 

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than one percent of foreign direct investment in the region 
in 2013.29 Furthermore, China’s demand for Caribbean ex-
ports is significantly lower than its Western counterparts, 
as its “importance as an export market for the Caribbean 
has not significantly increased” in recent years.30 As a re-
sult, the Caribbean will be forced to continue to foster close 
relations with major Western countries such as the United 
States. Additionally, China's early-21st century expansion 
in the Caribbean occurred when American foreign policy 
was primarily preoccupied with the Middle East and Asia, 
with China's growing engagement in the region being nar-
rowly enabled by a temporary period of American malfea-
sance.31 This would likely change if China were to estab-
lish itself as a viable competitor to American hegemony in 
the Caribbean. America has a demonstrated history of us-
ing military force in the region when it perceives foreign 
superpowers as taking actions that are "clearly detrimental 
to American interests." 32  The U.S. has repeatedly pro-
jected military power in the region to deter encroaching su-
perpowers, with America's current military operation in 
Haiti serving as an indirect warning to China not to chal-
lenge the U.S. in its backyard overtly. As a result, commen-
tators argue that "the PRC will avoid any overt attempt at 
undermining US [dominance] in the region,” as this will 
force the two powers into a security showdown that will 
undermine the economic advances China has sought to 
foreground in the Caribbean.33 Thus, America's presence 
in the region limits the extent of Sino-Caribbean coopera-
tion, as China sticks to less controversial economic deals 
crafted to avoid direct competition with Western interests. 
Ultimately, China will continue to use the Caribbean as an 
economic hub to distribute Chinese goods and increase its 
soft power but will make sure not to challenge western he-
gemony for fear of security consequences.  
 
China views the Caribbean as a region of strategic signifi-
cance due to its potential to challenge Western hegemony 
in Beijing's great power competition with the United States. 

 
29  Bernal, Richard L. “The Growing Economic Presence 
of China in the Caribbean.” World Economy 38, no. 9 
(2015): 1414. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12204. 
30 Ibid., pg. 1414. 
31 Horta, Loro. “A Brave New World: China Embraces the 

Despite the Caribbean's political importance to this initia-
tive, China has prioritized its economic welfare when in-
teracting with regional states, using large development as-
sistance projects as a bargaining chip to dictate its eco-
nomic relationship with partner states. As a result of the 
lucrative investments promised by these projects, Beijing 
has been able to pressure many Caribbean governments 
into adopting domestic laws that have significantly in-
creased Chinese migrant inflows while also decreasing do-
mestic barriers to their extensive involvement in Caribbean 
economies. This has dramatically increased Beijing's soft 
power within the region, creating animosity towards Chi-
nese expansion in many Caribbean states, as these prac-
tices have eroded export competitiveness and disadvan-
taged many domestic businesses. As a result of this per-
ceived cultural hostility towards Beijing, Chinese busi-
nesses are likely to continue to prioritize their current form 
of engagement in the region—focusing investment on nat-
ural resources industries while incorporating the Caribbean 
into Beijing's vast export market. There are severe con-
straints to the CCP's engagement in the region; however, 
chief amongst these is the close geographic proximity of 
the United States to the Caribbean. Due to the profound 
economic and secure connectivity that has emerged from 
this proximity, Beijing is unlikely to be able to replace 
America as the most significant trade and political partner 
in the region, declining to challenge American hegemony 
for fear of a militarized showdown with Washington. 
 
 

Caribbean.” Defense & Security Analysis 25, no. 4 (2009): 
429. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790903416749. 
32 Ibid., pg. 425. 
33 Ibid., pg. 425. 



CARIBBEAN QUILT 
2023 VOL. 7 NO. 1 
 

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